

**SUCCESSFUL ILLICIT OPIUM
PRODUCTION SUPPRESSION
INTERVENTIONS: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF CHINA, IRAN, TURKEY,
THAILAND, PAKISTAN, VIET NAM AND
LAOS.**

by

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Abstract

This study departs from existing scholarship by analysing and documenting nine cases of national ‘success’ to inform three primary objectives: (1) To catalogue cases of success for future reference; (2) To producing ‘lessons’ that may improve the effectiveness of interventions whilst reducing inadvertent negative outcomes; (3) To reconcile the discrepancy between national and international effects of interventions at the source.

A comparison of the nine cases of national success found: (1) All governments perceived suppression as in its best interest; (2) All possessed authority throughout opium producing areas; (3) In all but two cases the state offered incentives from which farmers perceived some benefit to the cessation of opium production; (4) All governments possessed the capability to monitor opium farmers; (5) All interventions administered law enforcement. As these five factors presented across all or most cases they can be considered necessary for a successful outcome.

Additional factors, which crossed more than one case, were deemed facilitative of the five necessary factors, and included: development-orientated approaches; community punishments; negotiated eradication; and conflict resolution/limitation. The findings suggest that the primary objective when planning a national intervention must be the establishment or maintenance of the five necessary factors. As such, premature eradication - which often deviates from the establishment/maintenance of the five necessary factors - represents an erroneous path, which can be costly in terms of time and resources. The case of Afghanistan is used to further clarify and explore the cross-case findings in a practical context.

Key words: Alternative development; Case study; Displacement; Drug law enforcement; Heroin; Opium; Supply side drug policy.

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Acronyms / Abbreviations

AD	Alternative Development
ADB	Asian Development Bank
AI	Amnesty International
AL	Alternative Livelihood
BMZ	<i>Bundesministerium für Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung</i> (German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development)
BPP	Border Patrol Police (Thailand)
CCP	Chinese Communist Party (China)
CENTO	Central Treaty Organisation
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency (USA)
CINC	Committee on International Narcotics Control (USA)
CND	Commission on Narcotic Drugs (UN)
CO	Commonwealth Office (UK)
COSC	Chinese Opium Suppression Committee (China)
DEA	Drug Enforcement Agency (USA)
DOA	Development-Orientated Approaches
DODCP	Development-Orientated Drug Control Projects
EC	European Commission
ECOSOC	UN Economic and Social Council
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Pakistan)
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK)
FPA	Foreign Policy Association
FIDH	International Federation for Human Rights
FO	Foreign Office (UK)
GOA	Government Accounting Office (USA)
GoA	Government of Afghanistan
GoL	Government of Laos
GoP	Government of Pakistan
GoT	Government of Turkey
GoV	Government of Viet Nam
GTZ	<i>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit</i> (German Government Technical Cooperation)
Ha	Hectare
HRW	Human Rights Watch

HTSL	Hunting Technical Services Limited
IAOA	International Anti-Opium Association
ICG	International Crises Group
INCB	International Narcotics Control Board
INCSR	International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (USA State Department)
(PR) China	People's Republic of China
(IR) Iran	Islamic Republic of Iran
IRNA	Islamic Republic News Agency
ISI	Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate (Pakistan)
ISISC	<i>Istituto Superiore Internazionale di Scienze Criminali</i> (International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences) (Italy)
Kg	Kilogram
Km	Kilometre
KMT	Kuomintang (China/Burma)
M	Meter
Mt	Metric tonne
MCN	Ministry of Counternarcotics (Afghanistan)
NAOA	National Anti-Opium Association (China)
NCA	Norwegian Church Aid (Norway)
NDCS	National Drug Control Strategy (Afghanistan)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NNICC	National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee (USA)
NWFP	North West Frontier Province (Pakistan)
ONCB	Office of the Narcotics Control Board (Thailand)
ONDCP	Office of National Drug Control Policy (USA)
PCOB	Permanent Central Opium Board (League of Nations)
PNCB	Pakistan Narcotics Control Board
PM	Prime Minister
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
RFE	Radio Free Europe
RTG	Royal Thai Government
UN	United Nations
UNCCA	UN Common Country Assessment
UNDP	UN Development Programme
UNDCP	UN International Drug Control Programme

UNGA	UN General Assemble
UNFDAC	UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control
UNDTCD	UN Department for Technical Cooperation and Development
UNODCCP	UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention
UNODC	UN Office of Drugs and Crime
USAID	US Agency for International Development (USA)
SCSF	Special Commissioners and Supervisors of Finance (China)
SDEP	Special Development and Enforcement Plan for Opium Producing Areas of Pakistan
TMO	<i>Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi</i> (Soil Products Office) (Turkey)
TNI	Transnational Institute
VDC	Village Development Committees
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation

Glossary of key legal terms

Term	Definition
Opium	The coagulated juice of the opium poppy (UN, 1961).
Prepared opium	Product of raw opium obtained by a series of special operations, especially by dissolving, roasting and fermentation, designed to transform it into an extract suitable for consumption (League of Nations, 1912).
Medicinal opium	Opium which has undergone the processes necessary to adapt it for medicinal use (UN, 1961).
Drug	Any substance in schedule I and II (UN, 1961).
Monopoly	A government agency with exclusive trading rights, who designates production areas and licenses cultivators, who must deliver all produce to agency (League of Nations, 1953 in Bayer and Ghodse, 1999).
Illicit traffic	Cultivation or trafficking in drugs contrary to the provisions of this Convention (UN, 1961).
Manufacture	All processes, other than production, by which drugs may be obtained and includes refining (UN, 1961).
Production	The separation of opium from the opium poppy (UN, 1961).

Sources: Bayer, I., and Ghodse, H. (1999). 'Evolution of International Drug Control, 1945-1995'. *Bulletin of Narcotics*. Vol. 51(1/2) pp. 1-19; League of Nations. (1912). *International Opium Convention*. (Consulted 8 May 2006).

http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/library/studies/canadasenate/vol3/chapter19_hague.htm; UN (United Nations). (1961). *Single Convention on Narcotic Drug, 1961. As Amended by the 1972 Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961*. New York: UN; UN (United Nations). (1988). *United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988*. New York: UN.

Glossary of key terms

Term	Definition
Alternative development	An extension of Integrated Rural Development in which projects include target communities in planning and implementation whilst extending treatment and demand reduction services. In practice, a catchall term encompassing all DOA's in which drug control is the primary objective.
Anticipatory effect	A law enforcement mechanism designed to increase the perception of risk, to motivate the cessation of opium production, even if the actual risk has yet to change. The term has been altered from anticipatory benefit to avoid describing human rights abuses as beneficial.
Alternative Livelihoods	An extension and criticism of AD. Centred upon identifying and remedying why farmers produce opium. Rural development is the primary objective. Drug control is but one element of a wider approach to rural development.
Conditionality clause	Development contracts oblige 'voluntary' eradication, if broken support for development will be withdrawn. Often included in US development projects.
Containment	As global increases have been driven by factors largely outside of state control, illicit opiate market would be significantly larger if not for attempts to enforce international drug control laws.
Crop substitution	Narrow form of DOA that supports the substitution of licit crop for opium.
Deflection	Illicit activity (i.e. production) can be deflected to where it causes the least harm.
Development-Orientated Approach	Centred upon the perception that opium production is linked to poverty and thus incentives to ceasing production must be administered. Ranges compensation to AL. May or may not be conditional on reducing opium production.
Development-	Any project which administers some form of developmental

Orientated Drug Control Projects	assistance with a objective of suppressing opium production. Ranges compensation to AL. May or may not be conditional on reducing opium production.
Diffusion	Opposite effect of displacement in which shifts are often accompanied by positive benefits (i.e. increased or anticipated risk prevents some farmers from cultivating opium).
Displacement	Interventions moves production or illicit activity around, often with little positive impact.
Diversion	The theft of opium at any point along regulated production and distribution lines
Farmgate price	The price that farmers receive from merchants visiting their farm. Prices are often lower than those received at market.
Intervention	The involvement of state or non-state actors to prevent the production of opium.
Integrated Rural Development	Projects go beyond crop substitution to assist farmers in marketing crops whilst extending social welfare services.
Interdiction	Seizure or destruction of opiates or manufacturing equipment during transit or manufacturing.
Law enforcement	Provide disincentives by increasing risks associated with opium farming. Encompasses forced eradication, arrest and potential punishment, and interdiction. May or may not be coordinated with developmental assistance. May or may not be bound by due process.
Mainstream	Term used by AL theorists to denote drug control being included into and coordinated with national and local development strategies and objectives. These could include: poverty reduction; state extension; or conflict resolution.
Negotiated eradication	Farmers agree to cease opium farming in return for assistance from state or non-state actor.
Sequencing	The choice of when to instigate law enforcement, often part of development project negotiations.

Note on references

To represent the independence of each case study whilst providing greater clarity of evidence, the reference list is broken into individual chapters. To devolve some indication of authorship/document type the reference lists have been divided into subheadings representing authorship, these are: academic; Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO); mass media; national government; intergovernmental organisation. To limit replication a number of texts which feature prominently across several chapters are deposited below.

CND. (Various years). *Summary of Annual Reports of Governments*. New York: CND.

HRW (Human Rights Watch). (1989-2005). *World Report*. (Consulted 18 March 2009).

<http://www.hrw.org/en/node/79288> (references for HWR 2000b; 2004; and 2005 are deposited in Chapters Six and Nine).

INCB. (1968-1998). *Report of the INCB*____. UN: New York. E/INCB/____

INCSR. (1995-2010). *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*. Washington: US State Department.

PCOB. (Various years). *Report to the Economic and Social Council on the Work of the Board*. Geneva: United Nations. E/OB____.

RCMP. (1981-1992). *National Drug Intelligence Estimate*____. Canada: Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

NNICC. (1978-1993). *The Supply of Drugs to the US Illicit Market*____. Washington: US Government Printing Office.

Section I

1. Introduction

There is a general acceptance amongst many academics that interventions to control the production of opium at the source are of limited utility (see Chouvy, 2009; Nadlemann, 1988; Boyum and Reuter, 2008; Room and Paige, 1999; Stevenson, 1997; essays in Keefer and Loayza, 2010). The International Drug Policy Consortium's 'Drug Policy Guide'¹ notes:

... it has become clear that traditional policies and strategies have been unable to achieve a significant and sustained reduction in the overall scale of drug markets. On a global scale, successive UN campaigns and commitments to eliminate or significantly reduce drug markets have failed to achieve their objectives (Armenta *et al.*, 2010:30).

This study does not challenge this conventional position: the data presented in Annex three demonstrates that global production has increased since the 1970s.² Instead, it attempts to reconcile the discrepancy between national and international effects of interventions at the source, by demonstrating how a number of states have successfully achieved *national* policy objectives of suppressing illicit production or diversion from regulated production. Using the outcome measurement of success (henceforth *success*) of *an excess of 90 percent reduction which brings potential production national below 20 metric tonnes*, nine cases of national *success* were identified: China (under the Imperial/Republican regimes); the People's Democratic Republic of China; Iran (under the Pahlavi Dynasty); Turkey; the Islamic Republic of Iran; Thailand; Pakistan; the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam; and the Lao People's Democratic Republic.

Whether production subsequently increases in a foreign nation should not detract from national *success*. This is, however, often the case:

¹ The guide was compiled by 28 leading academics and lobbyists.

² This said, as is discussed in Chapter 2:4:3, an often neglected aspect of increased production and trafficking is the impact of technological innovations and trade liberalisation (i.e. globalisation).

Operational successes in particular countries, or against particular trafficking groups, have quickly been offset by the ‘balloon effect’. The illegal activities that have been eradicated by law enforcement efforts are quickly replaced in different areas, by different groups or with different substances, often creating greater problems than those that existed before (Armenta *et al.*, 2010: 30).

In many respects, this study supports the position of Paoli, Greenfield and Reuter (2009:8) who remain ‘pessimistic about the long-term prospects for shrinking the global production of illegal opiates’ whilst acknowledging that ‘lasting national or regional reductions in opiate production are possible’ (also, Reuter and Trautmann, 2009). Such national interventions may, however, have contributed to the global containment of non-medical/scientific opiate consumption by engineering unnaturally high prices and scarcity.

This study departs from existing scholarship by documenting cases of national *success* rather than global failure. This study may help inform a ‘positive spiral’ (Farrell and Windle, forthcoming) by illustrating that *success* is achievable and elucidating what works, rather than providing pessimistic accounts of what does not work. Policy-makers may be informed by the ‘lessons learned’ and motivated by the realisation that national success is an achievable policy objective.

This is the first study to document, synthesize and compare the population of national cases of successful production/diversion suppression in the Middle Eastern/Asian ‘opium zone’. In general, the research-base on supply side drug policy is lacking (Paoli *et al.*, 2009). That in-depth cases of *success* have not previously been compared is (in some respects) unsurprising: the production of high-quality comparative case studies are time consuming and require extensive resources (Yin, 2007). As such, this study will provide a contribution by:

- (1) Cataloguing cases of *success* for future reference;
- (2) Producing ‘lessons’ that may improve the effectiveness of interventions whilst reducing inadvertent negative outcomes;
- (3) In some respects, reconciling the discrepancy between national and international effects of interventions at the source.

The remainder of this introductory chapter shall introduce the production, manufacture and consumption of opium and its derivatives before summarising some of the major findings of this study.


1.1. Opiates

Opium poppies (*papaver somniferum*) can be grown in temperate and sub-tropical climates. It requires long hours of sunlight and cool nights, and cannot endure extreme cold or strong winds. Insufficient irrigation, cloudy or rainy weather can reduce the quantity and quality of opium harvested (Booth, 1997; Choudhary, *et al.*, 1977; Der Meer, 1989).

Opium is a labour intensive crop, whether produced under state regulation for medicinal/scientific consumption or clandestinely for black markets. The earth must be ploughed four to five times before it is ready for sowing. Once the plant begins maturing, farmers must regularly remove weeds and unhealthy poppies; which can restrict growth and yield. Production is a skilled and time-consuming job which may necessitate an entire family (or village), plus labourers, working uninterrupted for several weeks. Farmers incise the poppy capsules to free the latex which gradually solidifies on contact with the air to produce the raw opium. This is later scraped off the capsule; the process is repeated several times (see Allen, 2002; Booth, 1997; Mansfield, 2001; Westermeyer, 2004).

Farmers or merchants then boil and filter the raw opium several times to remove impurities such as adulterants or plant matter. The pure opium is then dried into solid blocks (referred to as prepared opium) which can be consumed (smoked or eaten) or manufactured into other opiates; predominantly heroin and morphine for the illicit market (see Booth, 1997; Zerel *et al.*, 2005). Diagram 1:1 illustrates the different chemicals which are added to extract the morphine base and eventually heroin; each stage requires further boiling and filtering. On average, the process reduces 10kg of opium down to 1kg of heroin (Zerel *et al.*, 2005).

Diagram 1:1



Adapted from Zerel *et al.* (2005)

Opiates¹ are the main ‘drugs of abuse’ in Asia, Europe and much of Oceania. Globally, in the late-2000s, an estimated 15.6 million people consumed an opiate for non-medical/scientific purposes (i.e. illicitly); of which 11 million consumed heroin. Indicators suggest that illicit consumption is increasing (WHO, 2009:6).

Prepared opium has been consumed in many regions of the world for religious, cultural, medicinal and/or recreational purposes for centuries.² It has been (and still is in some parts of the world) used to treat: conjunctivitis; colic; diarrhoea; coughs; insomnia and to relieve pain (see Berridge and Edwards, 1981; Booth, 1997; Bulletin of Narcotics, 1953; Musto, 1987; Trocki, 1999). Prepared opium consumption remains prevalent in some areas of Asia and the Middle East, for example, it is the principal illicit drug consumed in Iran (Windle, 2011a) and Laos (Windle, 2011b). While prepared opium consumption is uncommon in western nations, seizures have indicated an increased supply to Western Europe (Tendler, 2006).³ Consumption of prepared opium produces effects which are similar to its derivatives yet milder in intensity (Ray *et al.*, n.d.).

A Professor of Pharmacology at Stanford University has described opiate consumption as providing:

... not only direct relief of pain, but also suppression of the anxiety and distress associated with pain. Moreover, opiates relieve emotional pain, even in the absence of physical pain..... [They offer] immediate satisfaction, immediate pleasure, immediate escape from misery (Goldstein, 2001:81).⁴

Unwanted side-effects can include constipation, and the suppression of appetite for sexual intercourse and food. Regular consumption may lead to increased tolerance (i.e.

¹ Opiate refers to all ‘alkaloids derived from the opium poppy’ (i.e., heroin, codeine, morphine). This excludes synthetic opioids (i.e. fentanyl) (WHO, n.d.).

² There is evidence of opium consumption in Egypt (Hubbies, 1998) and Greece (Pietschmann *et al.*, 2009) around 1500BC.

³ There is some evidence of opium consumption by refugee communities in the UK (Mills, 2010).

⁴ Thomas De Quincey (1856/1998) famously became addicted to opium after self-medicating to relieve the symptoms of toothache and what is now termed ‘Ekbom Syndrome’ (for which codeine is currently prescribed).

greater amounts are required to achieve the initial sensation) (McBride, 2009) and dependency⁵ which can be ‘exceedingly difficult to treat... [and] success is unpredictable and often only partial’ (Goldstein, 2001:176).

Both the type of opiate consumed and the method of administration factor in the development of dependence, for example, an intravenous heroin consumer will likely develop dependence quicker than an individual who eats prepared opium. Dependent consumers may experience withdrawal symptoms (Musto, 1987) which (for heroin and morphine) usually present within eight to twelve hours of the last dose and can last for seven to ten days. Symptoms may include: ‘craving, anxiety, dysphoria, yawning, sweating, piloerection... lacrimation, rhinorrhoea, insomnia, nausea or vomiting, diarrhoea, cramps, muscle aches, and fever’ (WHO, n.d.:n.p.); in other words, ‘a very severe case of the flu’ (Goldstein, 2001:161).

Opiate dependence represents a ‘global health problem which presents enormous economic, personal and public health consequences’ (WHO, 2009:6). Heroin is generally considered one of the most harmful drugs to the individual and their community (see Degenhardt *et al.*, 2006; McCoun and Reuter, 2001; Nutt, 2009; Kleinman, 1992; Reuter *et al.*, 1997). Prepared opium, however, is often argued to be no more harmful than some drugs unconstrained by international law to medical/scientific purposes (i.e. alcohol) (see Charles and Britto, 2001; Edwards, 1924; Dikötter *et al.*, 2002; Ganguly *et al.*, 1995; Newman, 1995; Saxena, 1995). This said, prepared opium is not harm-free. Research in Laos has associated heavy consumption with: reduced productivity; increased impoverishment (Cohen, 2004; Cohen and Lyttleton, 2002; Epprecht, 2000; see Smart, 1995 for India); and domestic abuse (UNODC, 2005a).

This study will not engage with the debate on the reclassification of opiates or other drugs at the national or international level. The objective of the study is essentially to solve a problem defined by international and national laws (how to prevent farmers from producing opium) rather than a critical appraisal of the legal (or moral)

⁵ Dependence is defined as the presence of three or more of the following features:

A strong desire or sense of compulsion to take opioids; difficulties in controlling opioid use; a physiological withdrawal state; tolerance; progressive neglect of alternative pleasures or interests because of opioid use; persisting with opioid use despite clear evidence of overtly harmful consequences (WHO, 2009:5).

construction of prohibition, especially as extensive research and commentary exist on the subject of reclassification.⁶

1.2. Structure and major findings

Section I: Context, theory, concepts and methodology

The broader context within which this study develops is provided for in Chapter 2, which outlines: the international legal drug control framework; key concepts and terms; and key areas of theory. The chapter presents a foundation which allows the case study chapters to focus upon the empirical evidence and particular nuances of theory related to individual countries. In turn, this facilitates the identification of common themes and issues across countries that form the concluding section of the thesis.

Chapter 3 introduces the research design and methods of data collection and analysis employed in this study. Case selection centred upon five criteria, all: had been major opium producing nations; were situated in the Asian/Middle Eastern ‘opium zone’; administered interventions to suppress opium production during the twentieth-century; opium was produced for sale to illicit markets; conformed to the outcome measurement of *success*. Process-tracing, the method of within-case analysis utilised in this research, is then described: in-depth narratives, guided by the employment of theoretical variables (identified in Chapter 2:3) are presented to illustrate the process of causal factors through which national *success* was reached. The chapter concludes with a discussion on the distortions and difficulties of both qualitative (documentary) and quantitative data. Triangulation and contextualisation emerge as central themes in overcoming evidentiary limitations.

Section II: Case studies

Section II presents the nine case studies. The nine cases are split into six country chapters: China (including the Imperial/Republican and People’s Republican interventions); Iran (including the Pahlavi and Islamic Republic interventions); Turkey; Thailand; Pakistan; Viet Nam and Laos. As the Vietnamese and Laotian histories are so intertwined, the provision of individual chapters would have resulted in significant

⁶ Consultation of the following accounts should produce a balance between legalisation, prohibition and depenalisation: Goldstein (2001); Hughes and Stevens (2010); Krauss and Lazear (1991); Kleinman and Saiger (1990); Murji (1998); Nadelamn (1988, 1997); Reuter and McCoun (2001); Stevenson (1997); Trebach and Zeese (1992); Wilson (1990).

replication. The narratives structures situate suppression interventions within a historical context which illustrates the extent of illicit production/diversion. Further contextual depth is provided with the accompanying in-depth chronologies (Annex 1:1-7).

Imperial/Republican China: Interventions tended to be centred upon a highly repressive incarnation of law enforcement. Farmers were subjected to widespread and systematic: forced displacement; destruction of property; public torture; public humiliation and public execution. Crops were forcefully eradicated and resistance was often brutally suppressed by the military. While prohibition was intended to be gradual, the linkage of prohibition to career advancement quickened the pace of bans; this may have inflated the repressive nature of local officials. Few projects to develop alternative incomes were made available and as farmers received little reward for compliance, many prepared for a relaxation of the ban. Between 1906 and 1911, production had decreased by 89 percent and continued to decline until 1917. While the level of clandestine production from 1915 is unknown, accounts suggest that China achieved *success* around 1917. The interventions' negative consequences, however, were significant: the systematic abuse of farmers' rights would today constitute a crime against humanity. Preventive measures ceased with the dissolution of the state in 1917.

People's Republic of China: The intervention differed depending on state authority. In areas where authority was strong, bans on production were enforced quickly and centred upon: public humiliation and executions; near constant surveillance and administrative punishments. Whereas, in more remote areas, the state sequenced bans only after state extension and agricultural reform. Opposition to suppression may have been lessened by feelings of indebtedness and loyalty expressed by many of the rural poor to the Chinese Communist Party. This said, by the early-1960s agricultural mismanagement - at considerable cost to human life - may have diluted revolutionary zeal. Nevertheless, by this point China had developed a highly repressive, intrusive and hegemonic state. China realised *success* during the late-1950s/early-1960s. The intervention was, however, highly repressive, violated individual rights and, there is minimal evidence of drug control improving opium farmers' welfare.

Pahlavi and Islamic Republic of Iran: Both interventions were centred upon: forced eradication; punitive law enforcement (including community punishments); and extensive and intrusive surveillance of opium farmers. The public execution of 'drug offenders' may have produced an anticipatory effect. The Islamic Republican intervention differed only by the provision of incentives in the form of redistribution of

land, the removal of a loathed regime, and religious affiliation. Opposition to suppression may have been lessened by feelings of indebtedness and loyalty expressed by many of the rural poor to the Revolution. Intense loyalty to the Revolution and fear of persecution established a system of extensive and intrusive surveillance which was intensified by state-sanctioned vigilante groups. While details of production are mired by potential bias and national self-interest, there is a general agreement that production ceased by 1996 at the latest. The lack of economic assistance and widespread human rights violation suggest a negative impact on opium farming communities.

Turkey: The Turkish intervention began in 1940 with the restriction of areas authorised to produce opium to those in which the state possessed greatest authority. While there is little information on the specifics of the bans, it appears that there was some crop substitution; the coercive use of the military can be neither verified nor ruled out. Control, however, remained inadequate and ineffective. *Successful* suppression of diversion centred upon the administration of a highly effective control system which placed farmers under prolonged and extensive surveillance whilst providing ‘sufficiently harsh’ individual and community disincentives. Since 1974, diversion or illicit production has been minimal and the intervention appears to have positively impacted opium farming communities.

Thailand: During the 1960s, the military employed repressive law enforcement techniques against producers in areas with high Communist insurgent activity. Nevertheless, in the early-1970s highland opium production suppression began to follow a path in which state extension into a formally isolated area was sequenced before drug control and centred primarily upon development-orientated approaches. A moratorium on eradication permitted the state to capitalise on highland farmers’ awareness of the unsustainability of opium production until the state possessed sufficient authority to enforce negotiated eradication. From 1985, the risk of eradication has averaged 60 percent, indicating a high-risk environment and capability to enforce negotiated eradication schedules. In 1994, production fell below 20mt to 9.33mt; representing a 95 percent reduction from the 1970 peak of 200mt. The intervention has improved the livelihoods of many ex-opium farming communities whilst adding to the stabilisation of Northern Thailand.

Pakistan: In 1979, a campaign centred upon law enforcement suppressed production throughout areas in which the state exercised sufficient authority. Because of insufficient access to alternative incomes, the campaign pushed many communities deeper into poverty. The intervention after 1979 is essentially one of state extension

through development-orientated projects; mainstreamed after 1984 into provincial rural development. Centrally, all eradication and law enforcement was negotiated with tribal or district leaders. Between 1996 and 2001, the risk of eradication averaged 70 percent, indicating a high-risk environment and capability to enforce negotiated eradication schedules. In 2000, production fell below 20mt to 9.5mt; representing a 99 percent reduction from the 1979 peak of 753.75mt. The decline from the 1979 peak to 44mt in 2009 (the most recent harvest) represents a 94 percent reduction. Hence, while Pakistan resumed production above 20mt shortly after achieving *success*, it continued to conform to the 90 percent reduction criteria. The intervention has improved the livelihoods of many former opium farming communities.

Viet Nam: The intervention was centred upon extensive surveillance, military coercion ('persuasion'), and potentially repressive law enforcement. The public execution of traffickers may have added leverage to negotiations. Development projects in opium producing areas appear to have had little success in alleviating poverty during the intervention period: tourism emerged as one of the only viable alternative income generators. That the administration of development appears to have been insufficient suggests that disincentives provided the primary motivation for the cessation of opium production. In 1992, production fell below 20mt to 2mt; representing a 99 percent reduction from the 1990 peak of 90mt. The intervention appears to have negatively impacted many opium farming communities.

Laos: The original intervention (1994+) adopted a 'gradual approach' to suppression which emphasised 'community-based' development, tolerated small-scale opium production and sequenced eradication after the establishment of alternative livelihoods. While initially similar to best-practice developed in Thailand, significant and often negative departures included the use of resettlement, the Green Anti-Drug Project, and insufficient emphasis on marketing substitute crops. In 2000, Laotian policy shifted to the 'accelerated rural development programme', which emphasised the sequencing of eradication and law enforcement before alternative livelihoods were established. Since 2001, military coercion ('persuasion') appears the primary motivator for the cessation of opium farming. In 2006, production fell below 20mt to 14mt; representing a 95 percent reduction from the 1989 peak of 328mt. The intervention appears, however, to have negatively impacted many opium farming communities.

Section III: Synthesis, comparison and policy-implications

The documentation of cases of national *success* is by itself an important contribution to the knowledgebase on source country drug policy and may provide a useful reference for scholars and practitioners. Nonetheless, in order to extract ‘lessons’ which may improve the effectiveness of interventions, Chapter 10 presents the findings of a synthesis and cross-case comparison.

The cross-case comparison in Chapter 10:3 found five factors presented in all (or most) cases and were thus deemed necessary for *success*. These were:

- (1) All governments perceived suppression as being in its best interest;
- (2) All states possessed a strong presence throughout opium producing areas;
- (3) All but two states presented an incentive with which opium farmers could perceive some benefit;
- (4) All states possessed the capabilities to monitor opium farmers;
- (5) All interventions administered law enforcement.

Additional factors that crossed more than one case were deemed supportive or facilitative of the necessary factors. A model illustrating the optimal relationship between the necessary and supportive factors was developed. The findings suggest that the primary objective when planning a national intervention must be to facilitate or support the establishment or maintenance of the five necessary factors. These findings were supported by the semi-deviant case of Imperial/Republican China, in which failure to sustain production below 20mt was attributable to the loss of state authority and lack of incentives for farmers to cease production.

Chapter 11 explored and further clarified the findings presented in Chapter 10:3 by placing them in the practical context of contemporary Afghanistan. The chapter concluded by illustrating how premature law enforcement could create an erroneous path in which farmers are further impoverished and alienated. This in turn facilitates conflict and consecutively decreases state authority. As the loss of authority and political capital require greater law enforcement to achieve the same outcome, a negative spiral is established whereby the provision of incentives are used to gain entry into the (even further) isolated and hostile areas. Consequently, time and resources would have been better spent on establishing the five necessary conditions rather than undertaking policies counter-productive to their establishment.

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2. Context, theory and concepts

This chapter outlines the international legal context for drug control, key concepts and terms, and key areas of theory. This chapter shall provide a foundation for the remainder of the thesis. This means that concepts and terms defined here can be repeated throughout the thesis without definitional ambiguity. Most of the theory outlined in this chapter is common to all of the country-level case studies that follow. This allows the individual case study chapters to maintain their focus on the empirical evidence and particular nuances of theory as it relates to individual countries. It turns this will facilitate the identification of common themes and issues across countries that will form the concluding section of the thesis.

It is worth noting at the outset that interventions against coca production in South America have received greater academic attention than those against Asian/Middle Eastern opium production. Furthermore, some issues pertinent to opium suppression, such as aerial fumigation, have been discussed primarily in reference to coca. Since suppression strategies relating to opium and coca leaf production are closely related (see Morrison, 1997), it is appropriate that this chapter draws on both these areas of research.

Before progressing, the difference between illicit production and diversion must be made apparent. Diversion (the theft of opium at any point along regulated production and distribution lines) and illicit production (the clandestine extraction of the juice of the opium poppy) produce the same outcome yet operate in distinct environments and require different approaches. Licensed farmers are strongly linked to the state machine and divert opium from under its scrutiny, while illicit production tends to occur in remote areas distant from state authority.

2.1. Overview: objectives of source country interventions

The preambles of the contemporary international drug control conventions express three objectives: the adequate provision of medicinal drugs; the prevention of addiction and the limitation of the use of drugs for medicinal and scientific purpose. The objectives are framed as concern for the negative effects of consumption of, and trade in, illicit drugs on both individuals and societies (UN, 1961, 1971, 1988).

Although the specifics of the theory of specific strategies are reviewed further below, the broad theoretical argument in support of source control is fairly simple: reduced illicit drug supply will reduce consumption, and this is the main goal implied by the international conventions. Much of the theory of supply reduction focuses on trafficking

risks and illicit drug prices - in theory, reducing the supply of illicit drugs leads to price increases for consumers. These consist of actual price increases plus effective price increases due to reduced availability and ease of transaction. The anticipated end result is the prevention of consumption, particularly initiation, and the instigation of desistance as consumers are expelled from the market (see Falco, 1996; Moore, 1990; Murji, 1993, 1998; Kleinman, 1992; Kleinman and Reuter, 1986). Supply reduction is theorised to be possible through law enforcement and border controls targeted at any point of the distribution chain as a set of strategies that complement supply reduction at the source (Moore, 1990).

The focus of this thesis is the first stage of the supply chain, that is, opium poppy cultivation and opium production. This area of strategy is often termed 'source control' as it is based in 'source countries'. It is a major area of policy and practice and the focus of many national and international efforts of various kinds as detailed herein. Strategies relating to the adjacent stages of the supply chain (i.e. interdiction of laboratories and the arrest of traffickers) are also discussed herein when such strategies are relevant to reducing opium production.

Proponents of source control suggest that locating and destroying opiates at source removes the greatest quantity of drugs (ONCDP, 2009), whilst being easier and more cost-effective than interventions in consumer markets. A key aspect of interest is the suggestion that poppy fields are easier to detect than concealed packages of heroin. Additionally, a cornerstone of source control theory is that as the farmgate represents the cheapest link in the distribution chain, traffickers invest fewer resources in its protection (Perl, 2007; Wroblewski, 1989; Wyler, 2009; INCRS, 2008).

The fact that opium is cheapest at the farmgate is the origin of what is probably the single most critical theoretical argument against source control policy (Tullis, 1994, also Mejia and Posada, 2010). This criticism is that interventions at source are the least cost-effective means of controlling consumption (Moore, 1990). The essence of the argument is that, because opium is produced in areas with low risk and profuse cheap labour, traffickers can absorb farmgate price increases with minimal effect on profits or retail price (Holahan and Henningsen, 1972; Kleinman and Reuter, 1986; also, Caulkins *et al.*, 2010; Falco, 1996; Keefer *et al.*, 2010; Reuter, 2009, 2010; Reuter and Trautmann, 2009; Riley, 1993). For example, a contemporary estimate of the price mark-up between farmgate in Afghanistan and the street retail price in the UK is 15,800 percent (Wilson and Stevens, 2008).

Depending on the analysts perspective, a second key area of theoretical criticism of source control strategies is that western markets are ‘buffered’ by markets closer to the source (Caulkins and Hao, 2008; Caulkins *et al.*, 2010). For example, Pietschmann (2005; also Paoli *et al.*, 2009) found that a reduction in Afghan opium production in 2000 was felt most intensely in the neighbouring countries of Iran and Pakistan rather than Western Europe. As profits to be made from the industrialised West are typically greater, traffickers ensure that any short-term reduction in supply is absorbed by reduced sales in more local markets with little impact on the more lucrative markets elsewhere.

Moore (1990:109) has argued that a ‘portfolio of programs is stronger than any single program alone’. This can be interpreted as suggesting that source country approaches could, in theory, reduce consumption. The corollary, however, seems to be that a country must invest in a broad portfolio of supply reduction efforts. This is costly and encounters many practical difficulties, many of which are discussed further herein.

A further criticism of supply reduction is that it can induce some negative consequences. In particular, it has been suggested that reduced supply implies a greater need for treatment and harm-reduction efforts, and that where these are unavailable the effects can be negative. For example, in 2001 reduced Afghan production caused an acute heroin shortage in Iran. During the shortage the number of heroin related deaths increased by 60 percent (UNDCP, 2001). Australia also witnessed an acute heroin shortage in 2001 which has been attributed to either reduced Afghan production (Prunckun, 2006; Jiggins, 2008) or improved border controls, supported by reduced Burmese production (Degenhardt *et al.*, 2005a).¹ Nonetheless, the Australian experience produced several positive outcomes, including reductions in overdose, intravenous drug use (Degenhardt *et al.*, 2005b) and heroin related fatalities (Longo *et al.*, 2004). Further, between 2,745 and 10,560 individuals may have been prevented from initial contact with heroin (Day *et al.*, 2006:308). To paraphrase Moore’s (1990:136) analysis of the early-1970s New York heroin shortage, this represented a barrier to a ‘cohort’ of Australian youths who passed through a ‘period of vulnerability’. The difference in impact between Iran and Australia may be that Australia had developed sophisticated harm reduction and treatment services, (UNODC, 2008) while Iranian services were insufficient (see Aliverdinia and Pridemore 2008; Nissaramanesh *et al.*, 2005).

¹ For Wood *et al.* (2006) Burmese reduction represented the primary contributing factor.

While opium producing areas tend to possess higher than average levels of opiate consumption² (Westermeyer, 1981, 2004; also, Epprecht, 2000; Gebert and Kesmanee, 1999), reducing consumption is but one motivator for a government to suppress opium production. Alternative or parallel objectives may include: decreasing the negative effects of large-scale production and trafficking;³ state extension into remote areas; counter-insurgency; attracting foreign aid; or improving foreign and international relations. Conversely, international legal objectives are often subverted by political or economic objectives⁴ (see Berridge and Edwards, 1981; Lewis, 2001; Levin, 2003; Pan and Bruun, 1979; Price, 2006; Trocki, 1999; Walker, 1991, 1994, 2007). Such issues mean that supply reduction policy and practice is far from simple. It is often mired in a political context of competing and sometimes contradictory national and local policies and programmes. In terms of theory this means that implementation of strategies is a key area of difficulty, as will become apparent in relation to many of the country-level studies.

2.2. International legal context

While section 2:1 discussed the primary objectives of contemporary international drug control laws, several of the cases analysed in this thesis occurred before the 1961 Single Convention and were thus bounded by different international obligations. Tables 2:1 and 2:2, illustrate how each treaty draws on the previous to become stricter (Bassiouni, 1997) whilst shifting the emphasis from obligations to enact regulatory controls on licit trade to the criminalisation of all non-authorised production and distribution.

² For example, in 2007, the prevalence rate of opiate consumption in the US was 0.58 of the population. In Pakistan and Iran, it was 0.7 and 2.8 percent respectively (Windle, 2011a, 2011b).

³ Large-scale illicit opium production can sustain or escalate: high levels of corruption; political instability (see Dupont, 1999; Chandran, 1998; Guizado, 1994; Thoumi, 1987, 2010; Thoumi and Navarrete-Frias, 2005; Kursawe, 2007; Paoli *et al.*, 2009); and violent conflict (see Björnehed, 2004; Chalk, 2000; Cornell, 2007; Felbab-Brown, 2010; Garces, 2005; Labrousse, 2005; Kleinman, 2004). While it is generally considered to be obstructive to long-term national economic growth (Atkins, 1996; Dupont, 1999; Thoumi, 1987, 2005; Wert, 1994) in some cases suppression may have a negative effect on national economies (Paoli *et al.*, 2009; Tullis, 1994).

⁴ For example, institutions may emphasise source country interventions utility to justify their existence (see, Dorn *et al.*, 1994; Malamud-Goti, 1992). Private military (Ortiz, 2010; Singer, 2001) and development companies (Hafvenstein, 2007) subcontracted to drug control may lobby institutions to protect industrial interests.

Conceptions of legitimate use, production and distribution are gradually narrowed to within the parameters of medical or scientific purpose.⁵ To guide the reader in navigating this thesis a glossary of key legal terms is provided on page iv.

Table 2: 1. The criminalisation of acts under international law

Treaty	Acts criminalised
League of Nations (1925)	<i>Agree</i> to punish violations of domestic law and ‘examine’ possibility of criminalising unauthorised acts.
League of Nations (1936)	Unauthorised: Cultivation; Extraction; Production; Conversion; Preparation; Manufacture; Possession; Offering/sale; Distribution; Purchase; Brokerage; Dispatch; Transport; Importation; Exportation.
UN (1961)	As of 1936
UN (1988)	Unauthorised: Organisation, management or financing of offences; Acquiring or possessing property which was derived from an offence; Inciting others to commit an offence.

⁵ For in-depth discussions on historical and contemporary international drug control conventions see Chatterjee (1988); Krajewski (1999); Renborg (1963); Pietschmann *et al.* (2009).

Table 2: 2. Development of international drug control law

Obligation	Treaty						
	League of Nations (1912) ²	League of Nations (1925) ³	League of Nations (1931)	League of Nations (1953)	UN (1961) ⁵	UN (1972)	UN (1988)
Raw/prepared opium	Enact 'effective' laws or regulations for the control of production 'Take measures' for the gradual suppression of prepared opium	'Ensure' effective control of production through domestic laws	Prohibit distribution/ manufacture of any product obtained from opium 'not in use....for medical or scientific purposes'	Production must be regulated by a monopoly (Renborg, 1963)	Limited 'exclusively to medical and scientific purposes'	Seized plants to be destroyed	Prevent and eradicate, rather than seize and destroy unauthorised poppies. Supports DOA ⁶
Export/import	Prevent or restrict export to states that prohibit or restrict importation	Import-export authorisation system established ⁴		Permits seven states to export opiates (Steinig, 1968)	Import/export system continued		

	Prohibit 'if ready' prepared opium imports/ exports 'Endeavour' to control persons importing/exporting manufactured opiates						
Manufacture of derivatives	'Take measures' to confine morphine to medical or legitimate purpose 'Endeavour' to control persons manufacturing morphine and heroin	Enact laws to limit morphine and heroin to 'medical and scientific' purpose Recommends licensing, all persons engaged in trade	To manufacture no more than is required for licit use				
← Pre-1912, no obligations ¹							
	→ Prepared opium prohibited.						
	→ Import-export regulated. Manufactured opiates limited to medical/scientific purpose.						
	→ Raw opium production and distribution limited to medical/scientific purpose.						

Notes for Table 2:1

1. In 1909, an ‘international’ conference produced *non-binding* recommendations centred upon respecting Chinese sovereignty (Bull, 2008). Nations were *requested* to ban the exportation of opium to nations prohibiting importation whilst creating legislation restricting non-medical opium consumption and the manufacture and distribution of synthetic opiates (Steinig, 1968).
 2. The preamble to the 1912 Convention provides the objective of gradually suppressing the ‘abuse’ of opium and its derivatives. Articles concerned with raw and prepared opium or protecting Chinese sovereignty contained stronger language than those regarding manufactured opiates (i.e., ‘shall’ as opposed to ‘use their best endeavours’) indicating the Conventions priorities.
 3. The 1925 Convention’s primary objective was the control and supervision of pharmaceutical trade (Steinig, 1968).
 4. The system obliged merchants to carry government issued authorisation certificates, which had to include details of: the quantity being imported/exported; the name and address of the importer/exporter; and the period for which authorisation was valid. Exporters had to possess a certificate issued by the government of the importing nation declaring their support.
 5. The 1961 Convention was established to update, simplify and unify existing treaties. It succeeded all previous treaties (May, 1955).
 6. Article 14(3)(a-c) allows Parties to ‘increase the effectiveness of eradication efforts’ which may include support for ‘integrated rural development leading to economical viable alternatives to illicit cultivation’. It also calls for cooperation and exchange of ‘scientific and technical information’ on eradication.
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2.3. Theories of source control

This section addresses theory and practice in two main areas of source control: development-oriented and law enforcement approaches. In each instance, a roughly chronological overview of developments in theory and practice is followed by a section outlining key problems. In practice, the two areas overlap because, in a cost-benefit formulation of these strategies, development assistance equates roughly to benefits and punishment equates roughly to costs. Hence, the strategic manipulation of these costs and benefits (which include psychological and other elements in addition to monetary

costs and benefits) is the overarching theoretical framework within which this discussion takes place.

2.3.1. Development-Orientated Approaches (DOA)

DOA¹ to drug control are centred upon a perception that illicit production is ‘closely linked to development problems’ (Berg, 2003:4). While the beginnings of DOA are often traced to projects administered in early-1970s Turkey (Chouvy, 2009) or Thailand (Pleumpamya, 2009) there is documented evidence relating to India and Iran that DOA has been around for a minimum of well over a century. Fairly sophisticated DOA were undertaken in India in the late-nineteenth-century after Chinese competition pushed legally produced, but illicitly exported, Indian opium from the market. While there was no opium ban improved transport infrastructures allowed farmers to grow bulkier and more perishable crops and the Government of India began to diversify its exports thus creating markets for alternative crops (Windle, 2011).

During the mid-1920s, a League of Nations Commission was sent to Iran to investigate opium production. The Commission suggested a 15 percent increase in the yield of certain crops would make them as profitable as opium and they recommended: teaching modern agricultural techniques; re-establishing the silk industry; increasing trade with neighbours; and a gradual reduction in opium production *after* development projects had begun (Delano, 1926; League of Nations, 1926). This said, a lack of foreign support or funding prevented inauguration (League of Nations, 1927).

In the early-1970s, the UN supported its first DODCP with the administration of ‘crop substitution’ projects in Thailand and Pakistan. The projects were centred upon finding crops that could compete with opium in terms of agricultural and economic viability. The underlying theory is relatively straightforward: farmers will have sufficient incentive to reduce the cultivation of illicit crops when provided with agriculturally viable alternatives. UN experience and resources were, however, limited (UNDCP, 1993) and project workers were often ignorant of local cultures and traditions (Bruun *et al.*, 1975): they seldom included the target populations in design and administration (Renard, 2001). Several potential substitute crops were identified but by the mid-1970s, it had become apparent that projects would require significant supporting infrastructure. In particular, adequate processing, transportation and

¹ The GTZ define their organisational approach as ‘development-orientated drug control’ (Berg, 2003). The term is used here to catch the diversity across approaches centred upon incentives rather than disincentives. The term could, however, be perceived as contrary to AL theories which argue that development should not be orientated by reducing drug production.

marketing of new or improved crops proved to be fundamentally necessary conditions if substitute crops were to produce any income (UNDCP, 1993; also Berg, 2003b; Mansfield, 1999; Renard, 2001).

In the late-1970s in Thailand and the early-1980s in Pakistan, crop substitution gradually gave way to ‘integrated rural development’. These projects placed greater emphasis on: facilitating marketing by constructing transport infrastructures, processing and storage facilities; generating off-farm employment and extending social welfare (i.e. healthcare and education) (UNDCP, 1993). The underlying theory had developed to become thus: farmers will have sufficient incentive to reduce illicit crop cultivation if provided with alternatives that were agriculturally and economically viable. Theory aside, projects were often poorly designed, and a key source of problems was held to be the exclusion of local populations (the farmers and their local community) from project planning and implementation (UNODCCP, 2000).

In the 1990s, the theory of crop substitution was superseded by that of ‘Alternative Development’ (AD)² (Renard, 2001). UNGA (1998:preamble) define AD as ‘specifically designed rural development’ with the primary objective of suppressing and preventing illicit crop production. Poverty reduction was a secondary objective. AD projects should be culturally, legally, socially, economically and ecologically specific to the project area and contribute to the promotion of democratic values. Thus, target populations are included in project design and administration.³ Additionally, projects should extend demand reduction and addiction treatment services (UNGA, 1998:para 18; see UNODC, 2009). Here, articulation of the underlying theory is a more complex task: farmers will have sufficient incentive to reduce illicit crop cultivation if they have ownerships of (i.e. involved in the design and implementation) economic alternatives, which can include but are not limited to agricultural activities that significantly enhance the welfare of both the individual and the community as a whole. Nevertheless, it is also clear that in some instances drug control was a secondary objective to more general economic development. In that context, the underlying theory is that illicit cultivation would be reduced as a side-effect of general economic development.

These apparent developments in theory and practice have taken place mainly in the last four decades. Mansfield (2007; Mansfield and Pain, 2005) has criticised AD

² The term is criticised by Mansfield and Sage (1997) as misleadingly implying that drug crops support development.

³ The utility of target population participation had been illustrated by scholars of development studies in the early-1980s (Renard, 2001).

projects for: often consisting of little more than crop substitution; being unconnected to national development objectives and administered by drug control agencies that possess no comparative advantage for the delivery of effective development. These weaknesses and the growing knowledge base of what motivates opium farmers as individuals or communities rather than a homogeneous transnational group (see Atkins, 1996; Chouvy, 2009; Mansfield, 1999, 2007b; Mansfield *et al.*, 2006; Potulski, 1991, 1992; Smith, 1992; Ward *et al.*, 2008; chapters in Bennett *et al.*, 1992) resulted in the formation of the 'Alternative Livelihoods' (AL) model.

In AL, 'the structural and institutional factors that shape... [farmers'] decisions to grow' (Youngers and Walsh, 2010:11) are purportedly addressed. Thus, increasing state legitimacy in production areas (Armenta *et al.*, 2010) and building a foundation for sustainable reductions (Brown *et al.*, 2005; Mansfield and Pain, 2008) are key elements of the AL approach. It is also intended that AL projects are administered by development practitioners and supported by advice from drug control experts on what drives opium farmers (Mansfield, 2007). As development is the primary objective, rather than a means to reduce opium production (Mansfield and Pain, 2005; see Youngers and Walsh, 2010; Vargas, 2005), projects are 'mainstreamed' into national or local development strategy (Byrd, 2010; EC *et al.*, 2008; Mansfield, 2007; Mansfield *et al.*, 2006; Ward and Byrd, 2004; Ward *et al.*, 2008; Youngers and Walsh, 2010). For example, drug control might dovetail with the strengthening of state institution (Mansfield and Pain, 2005; Youngers, 2010; World Bank, 2005) or conflict resolution (Byrd, 2010; Mansfield *et al.*, 2006). In this framework, illicit crop output should be one of several measures of success (Mansfield and Pain, 2008) and conditionality should be based on multiple development targets rather than drug control (Mansfield *et al.*, 2006). As such, AL resembles more traditional rural development projects, with the addition of 'sequenced law enforcement' when appropriate (World Bank, 2005:122).

Apparently 'new' AL concepts such as mainstreaming have been around for some time. 'Mainstreaming' was proposed by academics (Bruun *et al.*, 1975; Der Meer, 1987) and practised by the Thai Royal Family in the 1970s (Renard, 2009; Pan and Bruun, 1979). Institutional change was part of BMZ (2004; also Berg, 2002) AD projects during the 1990s and had been advocated by academics (Lee, 1991; Riley, 1996). The significance of AL may be as a progression of nuance; each theory has fine-tuned the previous.

Implementation, negative outcomes and utility

DOA require significant political and resource commitments from, and cooperation between, multiple domestic and foreign state institutions, international organisations and NGOs (Brown *et al.*, 2005; UNODC, 2000). It is often administered in areas where state authority is minimal. Previous or ongoing violent conflicts may have devastated rural institutions, markets and rural-infrastructures (see Brown *et al.*, 2005; EC *et al.*, 2008; Farrell, 1996, 1998). Belligerent groups may perceive DOA as being in opposition to their interests (Hafvenstein, 2007). These difficulties can be exacerbated by corrupt state institutions, such as unofficial tolls on roads established to facilitate market access (Croker and Martin, 1992; Ghufuran, 2007).

Practical barriers to success of projects may be erected by donor nations. For example, donors may block substitute produce perceived as competing with their own industries (see Gua, 1975; Hafvenstein, 2007; Lamour and Lamberti, 1974; McCoy and Block 1992; Wert, 1994) or reduce profitability by flooding markets with cheap exports (Atkins, 1996; Rubin and Sherman, 2009). Inadequate market research has also been a barrier as farmers have produced goods for which there is no available national or international market (Carpenter, 2003; Morales, 1994; Potulski, 1991; Thoumi 2005).

There is a supposition that no licit crop can economically compete with opium (Andreas *et al.*, 1994; Carpenter, 2003). This is rejected by several practitioners (Mansfield *et al.*, 2006) as opium's relative profitability depends on several factors (i.e. farmers' ability to negotiate prices or amount of land available) (Berg, 2002). Furthermore, as opium is labour intensive, after rent and labour costs are deducted, per hectare net returns are often lower than licit crops (Der Meer, 1987; Khan, 1987). Any reduction in profit may be offset by improvements in living standards established by projects, such as: improved access to social welfare; increased food availability; access to cheaper goods through market access (Potulski, 1991); reduced opium consumption (Epprecht, 2000) or safe access to credit (Ward *et al.*, 2008). For example, Kunstadter (2000) found that the provision of village health stations in Thailand was a statistically significant factor for the cessation of opium production.

Opium does, however, have some benefits. It can be stored for long periods and thus used as savings while merchants will often buy at the farmgate and provide credit, often unavailable in developing and remote areas (Chouvy and Laniel, 2007). Risk-adverse farmers may be slow to replace a familiar crop and market (Der Meer, 1987; Lee, 1991; Potulski, 1991; Reuter, 2010; Tinker, 1992). Even if they are persuaded, the slow process can frustrate farmers who may lose interest (Atkins, 1996; Stares, 1996). The

same applies to donors who are often unwilling to commit resources to long-term projects (Brown *et al.*, 2005). Discouraged by the slowness of projects in achieving drug control objectives (GOA, 1979) some donors have withdrawn aid after project initiation. This led Brown and colleagues (2005:iii) to describe AD/AL as a ‘marginally supported and little honoured social safety net’. The lack of support may have limited AD/AL full potential from being realised: just five percent of Asian opium farmers have received AD/AL support (EU *et al.*, 2008; UNODC, 2005).

Brown and colleagues (2005:6-8) note how in practice the conception of AD ranges: narrow crop substitution; non-mainstreamed ‘discrete projects’; the UNGA (1998; CND, 2009) definition of AD and what is termed here AL. The confusion limits coordination between practitioners and donors. For example, while the Afghan Government and foreign donors officially follow an AL model (Mansfield, 2007; Wyler, 2009) many ‘AL’ projects closely resemble an AD model: promises of aid are used as leverage to establish ‘voluntary’ eradication, success is measured in drug control terms and projects are seldom linked to wider development strategies (Chouvy, 2009; Mansfield, 2007; Mansfield and Pain, 2005).

Moreover, DOA can support illicit activities (Farrell, 1998). For examples: new roads can assist trafficking (Carpenter, 2003; Stares, 1996); enhanced irrigation (Ward *et al.*, 2008) and agricultural techniques can improve opium yields; multi-cropping can provide insurance against eradication (Clawson and Lee, 1996); while farmers may start growing illicit crops to attract aid, a development known as ‘reverse conditionality’ (Farrell, 1998; see Brown *et al.*, 2005; World Bank, 2005).

Reverse conditionality is a perverse or inadvertent outcome of development projects. Communities that did not receive development assistance would threaten to begin or increase their illicit crop cultivation if they did not receive economic assistance. This unexpected turn highlighted what might be termed a dilemma in this area of theory. It is paradoxical that development assistance is, in effect, a reward to those who undertake the most illicit cultivation while communities that do not undertake illicit cultivation received less economic aid. It seems likely that this development, in theory and practice, is one of the reasons that law enforcement has retained credibility as a necessary and complementary aspect of drug control development strategies. While law enforcement is sometimes represented as (and can be) unnecessarily punitive, in this broader theoretical context it can also be viewed as a policy tool that promotes a more equitable distribution of economic assistance.

2.3.2. Law enforcement approaches

While DOA provide incentives to ceasing production, punitive strategies provide disincentives to continuing production. Forced eradication, often administered or supported by the police or military is conducted either manually (i.e., ploughing, burning, beating or slashing poppy fields) or by herbicides sprayed from the ground or air. The US Government considers forced eradication to be the:

most cost-effective means of cutting supply. Drugs cannot enter the system from crops that were never planted, or have been destroyed or left unharvested; without the crops there would be no need for costly enforcement and interdiction operations (INCRS, 2007:15).

While there seems to be an emerging consensus that development alone cannot reduce output (Feldafing Declaration, 2002:4) the UN has expressly mandated eradication as an intervention *supportive* of DOA, which may not be appropriate for poorer farmers (CND, 2009; UNGA, 1998) until viable alternative incomes are available (Chawla and Pietschmann, 2005). Thus, there is some support for discriminating against farmers who can access the resources to attain alternative incomes (Byrd and Buddenberg, 2006; UNODC, 2005; Mansfield and Pain, 2006; Pothier, 2009; Ward *et al.*, 2008). The convergence of incentives and disincentives can make licit livelihoods more attractive in an environment of increased risk (Farrell, 1998; Potulski, 1991; UNGA, 1998; UNODC, 2005).

Riley (1993) posits two types of eradication strategies. Shock policies are focused on one production period. For example, the 2001 Taliban ban represented a one-year discrete but extensive national campaign. Whereas periodic policies are applied year round, for example, since 1974 any unregulated opium poppies found in Turkey have been immediately eradicated, representing continuity rather than shock.

During the mid-1980s, UN sponsored projects began to perceive development alone as insufficient to reduce opium production. Thus, negotiated or ‘voluntary’ eradication became central to AD. Projects negotiated contracts with target populations or local elites specifying that the project will provide development assistance in exchange for farmers’ observing scheduled decreases in opium poppy cultivation. Here, the key theoretical development is the addition of an explicit disincentive to the policy formula, introduced via the contract and the threat of law enforcement. The key theoretical element of the contract was termed ‘conditionality’; wherein farmers only receive

development assistance as a condition of meeting specified drug control goals. Such contracts often contain caveats providing for forced eradication if the schedule is not adhered to (see Farrell, 1996; UNDCP, 1993). This law enforcement disincentive was a politically contentious development for some parties in a context where farmers of illicit crops were, rightly or wrongly, perceived as the victims of impoverishment. The corollary to this argument was that, while most farmers clearly lived in impoverished areas, not all people in these areas resorted to illicit crop cultivation, and people in other parts of the world in similar conditions also did not resort to illicit crop cultivation. While eradication was and remains contentious, in some USAID projects non-adherence can result in the removal of aid (Mansfield, 2007). There was also some diversification in strategy as more international agencies undertook efforts. In some instances, farmers could ‘voluntarily’ cease production if paid compensation, though this was an approach seldom used by UN projects (BMZ, 2004).

‘Sequencing’ is a closely related concept representing the choice of when to enforce the law. US sponsored projects have often eradicated crops and then presented populations with aid (Blanchard, 2009; Wert, 1994) or demanded cessation of production as a precondition for aid (Veillette and Navarrete-Frias, 2007). Many other donors – following UNGA (1998; CND, 2009) guidelines - have postponed punitive measures until alternative incomes have been established (Mansfield and Pain, 2005, 2006; World Bank, 2005). A conference convened by BMZ and UNODCCP, and attended by NGO and government practitioners concluded that AD:

... should neither be made conditional on a prior elimination of drug crop cultivation nor should a reduction be enforced until licit components of livelihood strategies have been sufficiently strengthened. (Feldafing Declaration, 2002:art. 4).

What constitutes an appropriate sequence has been narrowed further to exclude law enforcement during violent conflicts (Chouvy, 2009; Felbab-Brown, 2010; Hagan, 2001; Rubin and Guáqueta, 2007; Ruben and Sherman, 2009) in order to avoid conflicting with counter-insurgency or state building objectives (Felbab-Brown, 2010; Caulkins *et al.*, 2010).

Law enforcement operates in various ways. It can remove actors and illicit drugs from the market through: interdicting goods at any point along the distribution chain; destroying laboratories and resources used to manufacture drugs, possibly through aerial

or artillery bombardment (in Bolivia see Healy, 1988) and arresting and punishing actors, including farmers growing illicit crops or diverting from licit farms.

Several interventions analysed in this thesis employed methods designed to create a perception of increased risk (to motivate the cessation of opium production), even if the actual risk had yet to change. While referred to as ‘anticipatory benefit’ in the crime prevention literature (Smith *et al.*, 2002; see Hamilton-Smith, 2002; Johnson and Bowers, 2003), as many of the interventions employed methods which contravene international laws (predominantly public executions and torture) the term ‘anticipatory effect’ is favoured.

What could be termed covert disincentives can be achieved through the arrest of middle/high-level traffickers. This may deflate the farmgate price of opium through increasing the risk of transactions without directly confronting or alienating farmers (see Byrd and Jonglez, 2006; Pothier, 2009; Ruben and Sherman, 2009; Sajjan, 2009; World Bank, 2005) thus making DOA appear more attractive (Wert, 1994; Feldafing Declaration, 2002).⁴

The essence of the theory underpinning law enforcement can be stated in a rather straightforward fashion: costs of various sorts are imposed on farmers which serve as disincentives and thereby reduce illicit cultivation. As the different types of enforcement arguably trigger different types of disincentive mechanism, this broad statement of theory varies in its specifics for each type of punitive tactic as well as when different tactics are combined.

Implementation, negative outcomes and utility


Traffickers seek out states with weak criminal justice institutions (Caulkins *et al.*, 2010; Paoli *et al.*, 2009; Thoumi, 2005). Many significant producing nations lack the means to deter or punish illicit activity (for Afghanistan see Windle and Farrell, 2010; Felbab-Brown, 2009; Rubin and Sherman, 2009) as their institutions may be inefficient (Hagan, 2001; Navarrete-Frias and Thoumi, 2005) and corrupted (see Andreas *et al.*, 1994; Lee, 1991). Furthermore, state actors may tolerate or facilitate the illicit trade for military or political interests (Andreas *et al.*, 1994; Lifschultz, 1992; McCoy and Block, 1992; McCoy, 2003). Additionally, the danger and expense of manual eradication or law enforcement can be magnified as much opium is produced in inhospitable terrain where

⁴ For example, a 1989 campaign against Bolivian laboratories and Columbian traffickers depressed the Bolivian farmgate price of coca and forced farmers to seek out DOA (Clawson and Lee, 1996; Crane *et al.*, 1997).

state authority is minimal and the populations are heavily armed (ICG, 2008; Riley, 1996; Wert, 1994).


Convergence of these factors can reduce the risk of participating in the illicit trade. Between 1990 and 1994, the global risk of eradication averaged below 10 percent (Farrell, 1998). Driven by South American eradication, global risk increased somewhat between 1995 and 2007 (Figure 2:1), although, risk in Asia has often remained below five percent (Figure 2:2).

Figure 2: 1. Global harvest/eradication ratio (1995-2007)



Source: UNODC (various years). Note: includes, Afghanistan; Burma; Columbia; Mexico; Pakistan; Laos; Thailand; Viet Nam.

Figure 2: 2. Asian harvest/eradication ratio (1995-2007)




Source: UNODC (various years). Note: includes, Afghanistan; Burma; Pakistan; Laos; Thailand; Viet Nam.

Proponents of the aerial spraying of herbicides maintain it is the safest and most efficient means of eradication without employing highly-repressive measures (INCRS, 2008; US Senate, 2009), whilst being safer for eradication teams (UNGA, 2007). Vargas (2005), however, found that, in Columbia, for every 13.3ha sprayed in 2002 just one hectare was eradicated whereas, 63.20 percent of successfully eradicated crops were destroyed manually.⁵ As the analysis is a one-year snapshot of decades of aerial eradication the evidence is insufficient to support the conclusion that the ‘effectiveness of aerial fumigation is incomprehensible’ (Vargas, 2005:139).

This said, the supposition is supported by some Columbian officials who claim manual eradication as cheaper and more effective. This is partly due to an estimated 70 percent of aerially eradicated crops being re-planted, whereas 15-20 percent of manually eradicated crops were replanted (ICG, 2008). While others stress that the area under cultivation in Columbia has stayed constant since 1988 regardless of aerial eradication (TNI, 2007; Van Ham and Kamminga, 2007), the risk of eradication is higher in Columbia than in any other major opium producer nation.

Figure 2: 3. Columbian harvest/eradication ratio (1995-2007)



Source: UNODC (various years).

⁵ Of 130,364ha sprayed, 9,797ha were destroyed. There are inconsistencies in Vargas data that are likely a result of using data from three organisations with different objectives and methodologies.

While law enforcement may increase operational risks, it can also generate negative outcomes. Mena and Hobbs (2010:66-67; Barrett *et al.*, 2008) posit that prohibition ‘exacerbates conditions’ which limit the full realisation of the rights established by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, including the right to: life; liberty; to be free of torture, cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment; and freedom of movement (violated through forced displacement). As shall be illustrated in the case studies, punishments for opium farming have often been draconian. Abuses may be exacerbated by the inclusion of military units trained to fight rather than respect human rights (see ICG, 2008; Wert, 1994), especially if farmers oppose eradication (Armenta *et al.*, 2010).

As many opium farmers survive on or below the poverty line, eradication (Armenta *et al.*, 2010; Chouvy, 2009; Mansfield, 2009; Ruben and Sherman, 2009; Ward *et al.*, 2008) and the incapacity of farmers through imprisonment or death can intensify impoverishment. Furthermore, corruption often ensures that poorer farmers take the brunt of punitive measures (Byrd, 2010; Byrd and Jonglez, 2006; Mansfield and Pain, 2006; Landay, 2007; Sajjan, 2009; World Bank, 2005).

As herbicides indiscriminately destroy all foliage, aerial eradication represents a communal punishment (Khan, 1991) which can increase poverty and malnutrition by reducing cash and food crop harvests (Branford, 2002, 2005; Earth Justice, 2002; Forero, 2001; ICG, 2008; Jelsma, 2001). Additionally, livestock and/or human illness⁶ have been reported (see Atkins, 1996; Branford, 2005; Earth Justice, 2002; Forero, 2001; Rohter, 2000; WOLA, 2008; Sherret 2005). A UN Special Rapporteur expressed the ‘preliminary view’ that:

... there was credible and reliable evidence that the aerial spraying of glyphosate along the border damages the physical and mental health of people living in Ecuador (UNGA, 2007:para.17).

Conversely, Columbian authorities, the US Environmental Protection Agency and US State Department⁷ (2004, 2006), and independent researchers (Soloman *et al.*, 2005, 2007, 2009) assert that the application used in Columbia produced minimal health or

⁶ Ecuadorian biologists found that the formulation used in Columbia damages human DNA (Paz-y-Miño *et al.*, 2007).

⁷ US Ambassador Wood of Afghanistan offered to spray himself with Round-up to illustrate its safety (O’Shea, 2007).

environmental effects (see review in Lubick, 2007). Nonetheless, as allegations of vested interest, bias and poor scholarship have marred some research into the harms of aerial spraying, the extent of the inadvertent consequences remains open to debate (see Lubick, 2007; Sherret 2005).⁸ For example, in Afghanistan in 2004, after spraying inactive pellets American officials were confronted by farmers blaming crop failure and deteriorating human health on the (placebo) herbicide (Landay, 2007).

Regardless of utility or physical harms, aerial spraying can have political consequences. Afghan peoples, for example, have negative associations with objects dropped from planes (Blanchard, 2009). Thus, aerial eradication could be utilised as propaganda by anti-government forces (Byrd, 2010).

Generally, any measure damaging the interests of opium farmers can be detrimental to rural-state relationships (Caulkins *et al.*, 2010; Chouvy and Laniel, 2007; Paoli, *et al.*, 2009; Van Ham and Kamminga, 2007; Ward *et al.*, 2008). Interventions have resulted in political (Healy, 1988; Jelsma, 2001; Lee, 1991; Riley, 1996; Tullis, 1994) and violent opposition (Carpenter, 2003; Hafvenstein, 2007; Kleinman, 2004; Lee, 1991; Youngers and Walsh, 2010), including inflating support or incomes for insurgent groups (Carpenter, 2004; Felbab-Brown, 2009, 2010; Paoli *et al.*, 2009; Ruben and Sherman, 2009; Van Ham and Kamminga, 2007). While interdicting middle/high-level traffickers is perceived as less politically sensitive, this wrongly presumes farmers are ignorant of the state manipulating their market (Felbab-Brown, 2009).

Law enforcement may further alienate rural peoples from the state, which can augment regime destabilisation and erect barriers to democratic governance (Felbab-Brown, 2010; Rubin and Guáqueta, 2007; Ruben and Sherman, 2009) whilst inflating military budgets and authority in rural areas. This can strengthen the military against civilian rule (see Chouvy, 2009; Healey, 1994, Riley 1996).

The alienation of farmers by law enforcement may be counterproductive. Greater state authority in an area facilitates more effective, easier and sustainable drug control interventions (Thoumi, 2005; Thoumi and Navarrete-Frias, 2005), including DOA (Armenta *et al.*, 2010; Chawla and Pietschmann, 2005; UNODC, 2005, 2009). Additionally, as opium is often produced in developing or low-income nations law enforcement can displace resources from where they are most needed (i.e. social welfare or rural development) (Armenta *et al.*, 2010; Keefer *et al.*, 2010; Mena and Hobbs, 2010; Reuter and Trautmann, 2009).

⁸ For criticism of Solomon *et al.*'s work see TNI (2005) and Vargas (2005). See Soloman *et al.* (2005a) for a defence of criticism of their study.

Law enforcement may reinforce the drivers of production (Byrd, 2010; Chouvy, 2009) whilst inflating the farmgate price of opium⁹ and thus encouraging greater production (Atkins, 1996; Byrd, 2010; Clawson and Lee, 1996; Mansfield and Pain, 2008). Farmers may not cease but develop ‘adaptive responses’ (a form of displacement) (Farrell, 1998) such as: camouflaging fields; moving location; developing herbicide resistant plants; improving yields (see Clawson and Lee, 1996; Farrell, 1996; GOA, 1979; ICG, 2008; Thoumi, 2005); and increasing the area under cultivation (Atkins, 1996; Farrell, 1998; Jelsma, 2005; Youngers and Walsh, 2010; Riley, 1993; Stares, 1996).

For example, in 2010, 32 of 36 Afghan villages which had experienced forced eradication re-planted and ‘eradication did not seem to have a significant influence on [the] decision to continue or stop opium cultivation’ (UNODC, 2010b:12). This may be because, without access to alternative incomes, farmers may have little choice but to re-plant (Atkins, 1996; Hagan, 2001; Youngers and Walsh, 2010) in order to repay debts or re-establish assets (Byrd, 2010; Jelsma and Kramer, 2005; Mansfield and Pain, 2006, 2008; McCoy and Block, 1992). If ‘offenders [opium farmers] displace their criminal behaviour only when the risks and effort of committing new crimes are worth the reward’¹⁰ (Guerette, 2008:10) and the risk of *not* producing opium outweighs the risk of law enforcement then the likelihood of displacement would appear high (Mansfield and Pain, 2006).

Riley (1993) posits that as farmers will likely plant new crops in anticipation of future eradication, if opium poppies are eradicated each year (‘periodic eradication’) farmers will continue to increase the area under cultivation above that which was originally sown; especially if the efficiency of eradication decreases over time (i.e. through corruption or adaptive responses). Hence, discrete ‘shock eradication’ has a more effective impact as it creates short-term market disruption without increasing production beyond the original level. Conversely, periodic eradication may present a greater utility when associated with DODCPs. As access to licit incomes increases farmers may be provided with something to lose, which in turn increases the perceived

⁹ Scarcity brought about through interdiction can also increase farmgate prices and attract increased production (Farrell, 1995).

¹⁰ Guerette (2008) suggests that displacement is most likely if the offenders are highly-motivated and/or driven by money or drug addiction. Opium addiction and poverty represent significant motivators.

risk of periodic eradication; whereas, shock eradication may present insufficient risk to prevent production in a sustainable way (unless law enforcement was rotated around an area, maximising criminal justice resources whilst sustaining a perception of high-risk: see Sherman, 1990).

The harms and utility of negotiated eradication depend largely on the outcome of negotiations, the commitment of actors and agreed sequencing (UNODC, 2005). If negotiations contain elements of coercion (Youngers and Walsh, 2010) and alternative incomes are not established before opium is removed, then harms associated with law enforcement approaches may develop. Such developments may damage the working relations required for project success (Berg, 2002; Jelsma, 2001; Ruben and Sherman, 2009; World Bank, 2005).

Negotiated eradication linked to compensation has seldom been found to be effective. Money may be invested in improving opium yields (Carpenter, 2004; Clawson and Lee, 1996; Tullis, 1994) or as a ‘minimum wage’ (Farrell, 1996; Reuter, 2010; Riley, 1993) but with little impact on illicit cultivation. In addition, as alternative incomes are not established some farmers re-plant once compensation is received (UNDCP, 1993; Felbab-Brown, 2010; Mansfield, 1999; Rubin and Guáqueta, 2007). In 2003, in Afghanistan, as payments were lower than illicit prices (Paoli *et al.*, 2009) and often failed to reach farmers (Felbab-Brown, 2010; World Bank, 2005), many farmers were pushed deeper into poverty and alienation increased.

2.3.3. Contextual factors

While Reuter (2010) and Thoumi (2010) remind us that each producing country presents unique characteristics, several commentators have posited that certain contextual factors reduce the risk premiums of engaging in illicit narcotic activities (Thoumi 1992, 2005). Hence, the suppression of production may require altering these socio-economic/political conditions.¹¹ A key factor for Morrison (1997, also Thoumi, 2010b) is a weak state which, while undefined by Morrison, can be characterized as being governed by unstable¹² (Eizenstat *et. al.*, 2005) and inefficient institutions (Krasner and Pascual, 2005). Connected to institutional effectiveness is the existence of medium-to-high levels of official corruption (Morrison, 1997; also Lee, 1991; Kramer *et al.*, 2009).

¹¹ Thoumi (1993, 2010) emphasises a culture conducive to violence and criminality. The analysis of this factor is beyond the scope of this thesis.

¹² For Chouvy and Laniel (2007) a key factor is that the country is politically unstable.

The concept of a weak state can be narrowed further to include a lack of authority over rural areas (Byrd and Ward, 2004; Gibson and Haseman, 2001; Lee, 1991; Renard, 2001; Paoli *et al.*, 2009; Rubin and Guáqueta, 2009; Thoumi, 2005), including geographical isolation (Morrison, 1997). This is often through a lack of transport infrastructure and the existence of dense forest or mountains and populations which afford greater loyalty to family, ethnic or tribal groups rather than the state (Paoli *et al.*, 2009; Thoumi, 2005).

In addition, there may be medium-to-high levels of armed conflict (Morrison, 1997; Chouvy and Laniel, 2007; Cornell, 2007; Kramer *et al.*, 2009; Rubin and Guáqueta, 2009) and the population will likely be highly impoverished (Berg, 2003; Byrd and Ward, 2004; also Kramer *et al.*, 2009; Potulski, 1991, 1992; Thoumi, 1992). In short, opium production tends 'to concentrate in the areas where enforcement of prohibition is less intense' (Paoli *et al.*, 2009:237). Thus, illicit production is theorised to be attracted to areas:

- (1) Where state authority is low;
- (2) Which are geographically isolated;
- (3) With high levels of rural impoverishment;
- (4) With medium/high levels of corruption;
- (5) Which are politically unstable;
- (6) With medium/high levels of violent conflict;
- (7) Which possess inefficient state institutions.

The theory that such factors must change before sustainable reductions can be accomplished parallels theories of institution change posited by alternative livelihood theorists (see Byrd, 2010; Mansfield *et al.*, 2006; Mansfield and Pain, 2005; Youngers, 2010; World Bank, 2005).

2.4. Other key theoretical issues

2.4.1. Displacement, diffusion and deflection

Displacement, the reaction of crime to a preventive intervention, often implies an 'extreme-case-pessimist' position (Barr and Pease, 1990). In the drug control literature displacement is often represented as the outcome of costly interventions (Andreas *et al.*, 1994; Carpenter, 2004; Chouvy, 2009; Chouvy and Laniel, 2007; Sercombe, 1995) which simply moves production around with minimal net impact (see Armenta *et al.*,

2010; Byrd and Jonglez, 2006; Chouvy and Laniel, 2007; Clawson and Lee, 1996; Eisenlohr, 1934; Falco, 1996; Farrell, 1996; Hagan, 2001; Nadlemann, 1989; Keefer *et al.*, 2010; Sercombe, 1996).

More negatively is the position that interventions expel weaker traffickers whilst forcing stronger traffickers to become more sophisticated and hence harder to suppress (Atkins, 1996; McCoy, 1992; McCoy and Block, 1992; Sercombe, 1995). Further, Reuter and Trautmann (2009:46; also Paoli, *et al.*, 2009) maintain production (or trafficking) is often displaced to areas in which the activity is more harmful and:

... the positive effects of reducing production in the initial country are in general more than outweighed by the damage done in the new producer country.¹³

It should however be kept in mind that displacement is often driven by more than law enforcement. Political, economic or weather conditions may force traffickers to seek new suppliers, which requires the existence of suitable alternatives (Friesendorf, 2005). Traffickers may choose to change the source of their raw opium without imposed disincentives. The (hypothetical) decision for Tesco's to procure tomatoes from Kenyan rather than British farmers was driven by market forces, rather than law enforcement. This said, law enforcement limits choices and forces traffickers to operate in less favourable conditions (Farrell and Windle, forthcoming); if opium were legal it is unlikely that it would be grown in remote mountain areas with relatively poor soil and insufficient irrigation (Der Meer, 1989). Further, displacement and reorganisation induce significant additional costs on farmers and traffickers (Farrell and Windle, forthcoming).

Building upon developments in the crime prevention literature (see Clark and Weisburd, 1994; Eck, 1993; Guerette, 2009; Guerette and Bowers, 2009) Farrell and Windle (forthcoming) indicate how displacement is but one side-effect of an intervention. The opposite, termed the 'diffusion of drug control benefits', is positive and can take many forms. For example, DOA and eradication increase both the profit of corn and the risk of opium farming in a village. As this inflates the regional farmgate price farmers from a neighbouring village produce opium for the first time (displacement effect). Conversely, perceptions of increased risk may discourage farmers


¹³ Referred to as 'malign displacement' in crime prevention literature (Clark and Weisburd, 1994).

in other villages. As the initial success of the village indicates what is achievable, the Government and development NGOs increase their efforts, escalating national risk and bringing aid to otherwise neglected communities (two diffusion effects). The example also illustrates how ‘drug markets and law enforcement continuously interact and shape one another’ (Dorn *et al.*, 1992:75).

The term ‘deflection’ (Barr and Peace, 1990) may be more appropriate than displacement as production is deflected to where it is least harmful (Farrell and Windle, forthcoming) for the original nation. While suppression in Thailand *may* have increased Burmese output (displacement effect), Thailand achieved a policy objective by deflecting production from where the government perceived it as most harmful to national self-interest (deflection). Experiences gained in Thailand were then extended to Burma (diffusion effect). As Zimmer (1990:64-65) (in his analysis of a police campaign against an open-air drug market in New York) has suggested:

... displacement is of value to residents.... who, for a long time, were bearing a disproportionate share of the burden of a drug problem that extends beyond the boundaries of their neighbourhood; they had reason to favour a more equitable distribution of that problem, even if it meant pushing it to other communities.

Figure 2: 4. European and US retail heroin prices (1990-2006)



Source: UNODC (various years).

2.4.2. Containment and globalisation

Displacement represents one possible factor relating to increased global output (Annex 3) and decreasing heroin retail prices in western nations since the 1970s (Farrell, 1995;

Figure 2:4). This has led some commentators to proclaim prohibition (Carpenter, 2004) or traditional strategies (i.e. DOA or law enforcement) as a failure (Chouvy, 2009; Van Ham and Kamminga, 2007). Such arguments fail to account for globalisation or the containment hypothesis.

The globalisation¹⁴ thesis argues that increased global demand has motivated production whilst globalisation has decreased the cost and risk of transactions; decreasing the net impact of national and regional interventions. The liberalisation of national economies and advancement of technology has facilitated the ease and speed of transnational flows of both licit and illicit commodities including people and money (Keh and Farrell, 1997; Price, 2006; Raustiala, 1999; Stares, 1996; Storti and Grauwe, 2009; Williams and Baudin-O'Hayon, 2003).¹⁵ An example is that of easing the distribution of improved agricultural techniques and technology to opium farmers, which in turn, improves yields (Storti and Grauwe, 2009). Additionally, global demand has been expanded by the opening of new markets since the end of the Cold War, especially in highly populated countries such as China and Russia (see Lee, 1995; Lee and McDonald, 1993; Swanström, 2006; Swanström and He, 2006; Yang, 1993; Yongming, 2000).

Nonetheless, opium remains more expensive and scarce than if it were a legal commodity. High prices and low availability are a consequence of illegality and suppression interventions (Moore, 1990, 1993; Wilson and Stevens, 2008). Accordingly, increases in the size and capacity of the illicit drug industry would have been far greater in the absence of national and transnational drug policy interventions. This is the essence of the 'containment hypothesis' (Farrell and Windle, forthcoming; see Chawla and Pietschmann, 2007; UNODC, 2007).

2.5. Summary

The objectives of contemporary international drug control laws are to provide adequate access to medicinal drugs, prevent addiction and to limit consumption and production to medicinal and scientific purposes. These objectives are often dovetailed by, or are prioritised beneath, alternative national policy objectives, such as: state extension into

¹⁴ For more in-depth and critical discussions on 'globalisation', refer to essays in Held and McGrew (2003).

¹⁵ The forces of globalisation are also identified as a cause of increased human trafficking (Nicola, 2005).

formerly isolated areas; rural development; counter-insurgency; international diplomacy or to reduce the negative side-effects of illicit production and trade.

The essence of the set of theories of supply side interventions is that they limit consumption by reducing availability of illicit drugs and increasing the prices paid by consumers. The theory suggests that source country control is easier, more efficient and less costly than law enforcement at the border or on the street. The opposing theory of risks and prices, however, suggests that reducing consumption in western nations through source control is unrealistic as increases in farmgate prices are absorbed throughout the distribution chain. Such theories debate whether source control interventions have a greater effect on consumers closer to the source. Whether that is interpreted as an indicator of proximal success or of distal failure seems to be a matter of personal preference among scholars, and there is some evidence for both. In addition, it is argued that effective source control can have negative secondary effects, particularly upon the health of illicit drug users, unless sufficient services to counter harms associated with price increases and scarcity are provided.

Source country interventions can have significant negative consequences for the individual farmer, the local community and/or nation state. As law enforcement can reinforce the drivers of opium, whilst inflating the farmgate price, interventions that fail to provide alternative sources of income can increase output. For some, not producing opium may represent a more significant risk than eradication or law enforcement.

It has frequently been argued that interventions simply move production around, often with negative consequences. Displacement, however, is driven by more than drug control interventions and incurs significant costs on the displaced. Further, displacement is often paralleled by positive gains, referred to as diffusion of benefits. The term deflection may be more appropriate than displacement as a government has effectively achieved a major success if it deflects production outside of its national territory.

While rising global output since the 1970s is often framed as a failure of prohibition or traditional approaches, much analysis fails to account for globalisation. Improved technology and trade liberalisation have made trafficking easier and quicker whilst opening new markets. Despite that, a consequence of the enforcement of drug control laws is that illicit opiates are, relative to the absence of enforcement, expensive and scarce.

My thesis, to be developed in what follows, is that national successes have been achieved in several instances and that such successes provide lessons that may improve the effectiveness of interventions whilst reducing inadvertent negative outcomes. This

chapter has shown that drug policy is often a contentious mix of primary and secondary outcome measures that can be contradictory, alongside extremely difficult implementation environments and significant difficulties in measuring outcomes and impact. Many such issues raise their head in the country-level specifics of chapters that follow. The aim of this chapter has been to provide the broader context by outlining key areas of theory and concepts.

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3. Methodology

In the following chapters nine national-level cases (henceforth cases) of successful opium suppression shall be presented, synthesised and compared in order to engage three objectives: (1) To catalogue cases of success for future reference; (2) To produce ‘lessons’ that may improve the effectiveness of interventions whilst reducing inadvertent negative outcomes; (3) In some respects, to reconcile the discrepancy between national and international effects of interventions at the source. In other words, this thesis offers narratives of individual cases and cross-case comparison to draw out trends and infer generalisations. This chapter shall introduce the case study and process-tracing methods used to meet these objectives. It shall clarify for the reader the research design, data collection and analysis.

3.1. The use of case studies

A case is defined as:

... an instance of a class of events. The term “class of events” refers here to a phenomenon of scientific interest that the investigator chooses to study with the aim of developing theory A case study is thus a well defined aspect of a historical episode that the investigator selects for analysis, rather than the historical event itself (George and Bennett, 2005:17-18).

While George and Bennett’s definition expresses historical analysis’s centrality to case studies, Yin (2009) confines the subject to contemporary phenomenon. If Yin’s restrictive definition was accepted this thesis would be better defined as ‘comparative historical analysis’: a method which compares ‘similar and contrasting *cases*’ of historical sequences to explain and identify ‘causal configurations’ (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2008a:11-13, my italics; see Goldstone, 2008). This definition downplays the utility of, and thus excludes primarily, descriptive case studies.

Such restrictive definitions are rejected by Stake (2005:443) who maintains that a ‘case study is defined by interest in an individual case, not by the method of enquiry used’. The case represents ‘whatever “bounded system”.... is of interest’ (Stake, 1978:23).

Debate exists over whether studies should be limited to one case. Proponents of comparative analysis argue that in-depth and contextual comparisons of a small number

of cases can strengthen generalisations whilst presenting more powerful arguments against rival theories (George and Bennett, 2005; contributors to Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2008a; Yin, 2009). Conversely, Flyvbjerg (2006) argues that as good single case studies will be comparable to other single cases the investigator should concentrate on examining the minute details of one case (also, Stake, 2005). Comparison, however, requires not only the existence of up-to-date and in-depth cases but similar parameters and units of analysis.¹ There is no continuity between the few existing studies of successful opium production suppression.

There is scholarly agreement that case studies must be *contextual* and *in-depth* descriptions (see Eckstein, 1983; Flyvbjerg, 2006; Hammersley and Gomm, 2008; essays in Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2008; Mitchell, 1983; Ragin, 1989; Ragin and Rubinson, 2009; Stake, 1978, 2005; Yin, 2009) that represent social phenomena rather than abstraction (Yin, 2009). For example, an act of torture may be studied as a case, torture may not.

Thus, cases are any well-defined instance of a class of events. A case becomes a case study when it is in-depth and contextualised; when the complexities of the event are provided. Cases are used in this thesis to execute two objectives. Firstly, to ‘capture’ and interpret ‘the particular and unique’ (Eckstein, 1983:121) characteristics of successful national opium production suppression interventions; national cases of a ‘class of events’. Secondly, to compare cases to draw out similarities and differences. The two objectives combined will provide ‘the optimum conditions for the acquisition of those illuminating insights which make formerly opaque connections suddenly pellucid’ (Mitchell, 1983:183).

This thesis follows a tradition of key drug control studies. Murphy and Steele (1971) produced descriptive case studies of major opium producing nations. Historical and contemporary cross-case comparisons have been utilised by Tullis (1995) to illustrate the ‘unintended consequences’ of drug policy and McCoy and Reed (1972), who demonstrated how the opiate trade flourishes under political protection. More recent case study works have illustrated the linkages between insurgent groups and drug trafficking (Felbab-Brown, 2010) and the limitations of supply-side interventions (Paoli *et al.*, 2009). Historical analysis has been used to analyse American prohibition and its global effect through a single case (Musto, 1987) and two case comparisons (Friman, 1996).

¹ Thoumi (2002) is critical of a UN funded research project on drug control for lacking these qualities

There are a limited number of individual case studies of national success. Works on Pakistan (Murphy, 1983) and China (Yongming, 1999) relied largely on published and archival documents. Analysis of Thai (Renard, 2001) and Iranian interventions (McLaughlin and Quinn, 1974) supplemented direct observation with consultation of documents. Additionally, ethnographic accounts (Dirksen, 1999; Gillett, 2002; Epprecht, 2000) or direct observations (Cohen and Lyttleton, 2003) have been produced on individual AD projects. This study is however the first to document the population of national cases of successful opium suppression and does so with the consistency necessary to compare and contrast such cases to produce –for the first time – cross-case comparison of successful opium suppression interventions.

3.2. Research design

Much of the research design is an amalgamation of advice drawn from George and Bennett (2005:75-88) and Yin (2009). The research design began with the specification of objectives. The initial theory motivating the study was that there had been instances of successful cases of opium production suppression. This represented a challenge to the reigning theoretical orthodoxy that ‘nothing works’. The objective presented the class of events (successful opium suppression interventions) and outcome (success). A natural extension of this objective was to question how interventions arrived at the outcome. From this three narrower objectives were formulated: 1) Catalogue cases of success for future reference; 2) Produce ‘lessons’ for future interventions; 3) Reconcile the discrepancy between national and international effects of interventions at the source.

The remainder of section 3:3 shall describe the development of the strategy for achieving these objectives. Section 3:3:1 shall illustrate the rationale behind the specification of the outcome (or dependent variable). Potential causal factors (independent variables) were identified through the compilation of the literature review (see Chapter 2:3). Section 3:3:2 below shall describe how the specification of variables facilitated the case selection process.

3.2.1. Specification of outcome measurement of *success*

The research objective is centred upon cases of successful opium suppression. This section shall specify the outcome measurement of success through critically reflecting upon alternative measures of success employed in the literature. While UNODC (2007, 2008) have designated Laos, Pakistan and Thailand ‘opium-free’, no authoritative definition of the term is communicated in any open-published UNODC document. In Afghanistan and Burma the term refers to provinces cultivating less than 100ha of

opium poppies (UNODC, 2009b). At the national level there is no such consistency and, indicative of the lack of boundaries, in one document three variations of the term are interchangeably employed (UNODC, 2007).² Table 2:1 illustrates how UNODC’s parameters of national success for three opium producing countries range 213 to 2,500ha and five to 20mt. In contrast, INCSR illuminate failure rather than success by classifying ‘Major’ drug producing nations as those cultivating excess of 1,000ha. As such, in 2006 Laos was classified as both ‘opium-free’ by UNODC and a ‘major’ producer by the US State Department.

Table 3: 1. Cultivation/production when declared ‘opium-free’ by UNODC


	Area under cultivation (ha)	Potential production (mt)
Thailand (2002)	750	9
Pakistan (2001)	213	5
Laos (2006)	2,500	20

Source: UNODC (2010).

The utility of cultivation indicators is limited by lack of reference to yield differences between or within nations. Because of growing conditions and poppy varieties, Afghanistan averages significantly higher yields than Laos (UNODC, 2009a, 2009b) and thus requires less land to producer greater amounts of opium. To demonstrate this point, Figure 2:1 compares the reported potential production of Laos, Pakistan and Thailand in the years they were declared ‘opium-free’ with that which would have been produced if the 2009 Laos and Afghan yields applied. This illustrates that if growing conditions were better in Laos or Thailand both would have surpassed the ‘opium-free’ parameter.

² ‘Opium free’, ‘poppy free’ and ‘opium poppy free’. Opium-free may indicate that poppies are cultivated for reasons other than opium extraction. Poppy-free would indicate the removal of all opium and non-opium yielding varieties of poppy. Opium poppy-free would indicate the removal of opium yielding poppies.

Figure 3: 1. Yield differences



Source: Reported: Table 2:1. Laos and Afghan yields: UNODC (2009c).

Failure to place cultivation indicators in a context of percentage of arable land skews perceptions. In 2008, for example opium poppies were cultivated over similar units of land in Pakistan and Laos; however, as Laos possessed less arable land than Pakistan opium production could be viewed as nationally more significant. Conversely, while Viet Nam cultivated opium on a significantly smaller area of land than Pakistan a similar percentage of arable land was utilised. Thus, percentage of arable land may be an informative indicator of the national prevalence of opium cultivation as it places production in a national rather than international context.

Table 3: 2. Area under cultivation as percentage of arable land

	Arable land (ha)	Opium cultivation (ha)	% of arable land under opium cultivation
Afghanistan (2007)	7,911,500	193,000	2.439
Burma (2007)	10,101,300	27,700	0.274
Pakistan (2007)	19,456,600	1,701	0.008
Laos (2007)	949,600	1,500	0.157
Thailand (2002)	14,131,300	9	0.00006
Viet Nam (1999)	6,670,600	442	0.006

Source: CIA Fact book (2010); UNODC (2010).

Cultivation is an unsophisticated measure when used without reference to yield. Extrapolation of metric tonnes produced from cultivation and yield estimates represents a more useful measure of success. Percentage change, an often-used expression of trends in national crime surveys, is underutilised in analysis of drug control. Consequently, the higher UNODC parameter of ‘opium-free’ (20mt) shall be used in conjunction with a percentage change of 90 percent. Thus, *success* is defined as *an excess of 90 percent reduction that brings potential production below 20mt*. Percentage of arable land and area under cultivation will be used in the case studies or comparative analysis as secondary measures.

3.2.2. Case selection

Relevance to the research objective should be the primary decision making factor in case selection. Once the objective is established defined parameters must be set (see George and Bennett, 2005; Stake, 1978, 2005; Yin, 2009). The definition of the outcome measurement of *success* and of the class of events as *opium production* suppression set the initial two parameters. The class of events permitted the exclusion of interventions centred primarily upon: export or manufacturing interdiction; demand and/or harm reduction; precursor chemical controls; or interventions against the production/manufacture of non-opiate illicit narcotics.

Four additional parameters were established to further bound cases: (1) *Spatial*, Murphy and Steel (1971:5) described an opium ‘zone extending from the Plains of Anatolia in Turkey to Yunnan Province in China’. The zone encompasses the major historical and modern sites of licit and illicit Asian/Middle Eastern production; (2) *Major producer*, this parameter was set at 50mt to exclude smaller producers. The figure of 50mt was calculated from the INCRS classification of a major producer (1,000ha) and the 2009 Afghan yield of 48.8 kg/ha (and rounded-up to 50mt) (UNODC, 2010). Hence, national production must have exceeded 50mt for at least five years; (3) *Illicit trade*, produce must have been consumed in, or exported to, markets that prohibit unregulated consumption/import. This includes domestic consumption; (4) *Temporal*, the intervention must have been administered during the twentieth-century.

During the initial investigation a number of cases were identified in the literature as ‘successes’: China (Kleinman and Reuter, 1986; Reuter, 1985; UNODCCP, 2000); India and Iran (Farrell and Thorne, 2005); Lebanon (UNODCCP, 2000); Pakistan (Farrell, 1998; UNODCCP, 2000); Thailand (Chalk, 2000; Falco, 1996; Farrell, 1998; Riley, 1996); Turkey (Boyum and Reuter, 2005; Falco, 1996; Farrell, 1998; Fazey,

2005; Kleinman, 1992; Moore, 1990) and Viet Nam (UNODCCP, 2000). India and Lebanon, and two other potential cases, failed the parameter test:

Egypt: Production by Egyptian Bedouin in Sinai began in the early 1990s. During the mid-1990s, the DEA estimated production at 50-60mt (Hubbies, 1998), however, fieldwork by Hubbies (1998) suggested that production was closer to 288-540kg due to poor yields. Since 1996, the INCRS (1996-2007) has reported that efficient surveillance and forced eradication have limited production. Egypt falls outside of the major producer parameter.

Lebanon: While opium was produced in the Northern Bekaa Valley in the 1980s (UNODC, n.d.) it may be inferred by exclusion from early NNICC (1978, 1983, 1986) reports that this was minimal until around 1987 when production of 6mt was reported (RCMP, 1987). Production increased to 30-40mt by 1991 (RCMP, 1988, 1991). Between 1992 and 1994, forced eradication by the military reduced production to 4mt (NNICC, 1993). UNODCCP (2000) followed with AD projects. Production, which had virtually ceased by 1996 (INCRS, 1996), has been kept low by large-scale forced eradication (INCRS, 1996-2006). Lebanon falls outside of the major producer parameter.³

India: Following affirmations of Indian *success* at suppressing the diversion of opium from licit sources (Banerjee, n.d.; Bhattacharji, 2007; Deshpande, n.d.; Farrell and Thorne, 2005) India was investigated. From 1799, production and distribution were regulated by a state monopoly that facilitated export to markets that prohibited opium imports. Much was diverted from the monopoly. Throughout the early/mid-twentieth-century India gradually conformed to increasingly stringent international regulations. Nonetheless, whilst investigating the case it was found that throughout the 1990s and 2000s, between 10 and 50 percent of all opium produced under state regulation was diverted to the black market. This would indicate India as the world's third or fourth largest source of illicit opium (Windle, 2011, forthcoming; also, Paoli *et al.*, 2009) and outside the parameter of *success*.

Mexico: A major source of opium to the American market in the 1970s. Production was largely suppressed in the 1980s, although resumed by the end of the decade (see Bucardo *et al.*, 2005; Reuter and Ronfeldt, 1992; Torro, 1995). While forced eradication has continued to be extensively applied, large-scale production has been sustained

³ In-depth case studies of Egyptian and Lebanese illicit production could offer significant insights into the utility of conducting interventions before production and distribution have matured.

throughout the 1990s and 2000s (INCRS, 1996, 2000, 2009). Mexico is thus outside of the parameters of geography and *success*.

The only nations which have conformed to these parameters are: China; Iran; Turkey; Thailand; Pakistan; Laos and Viet Nam. Whilst investigating China and Iran it was found that both nations administered two separate *successful* opium suppression interventions: China in 1909-17 and 1949-50s and Iran in 1955-75 and 1979-88/94. Hence, nine case of national *success* shall be investigated.

3.3. Within-case analysis

Within-case analysis will use the technique of process-tracing: ‘the story of how something inevitably got to be where it is’ (Becker, 1992:228).⁴ The foundation of process-tracing is the identification of causal factors and their interaction in a specific context (George and Bennett, 2005) to show how:

... social phenomena.... can result from dynamic and sometimes enigmatic causal chains, interaction effects, catalysts, contingent conditions, different causal paths that lead to the same outcome (equifinality), or a simultaneous presence of different causal forces (Friesendorf, 2005:42).

Prior theories are used to establish potential causal factors (independent variables) (see Chapter 2:3) to be accounted for in the narrative.⁵ A strength of process-tracing is that factors unidentified by previous theorists may be found through the compilation of narratives (George and Bennett, 2005:147; see Goldstone, 2008). Thus, process-tracing shall permit the investigator to test and create theory through examining the interplay of multiple causal factors in the process by which a major opium producing nation reduces production by 90 percent to below 20mt.

Process-tracing shares similarities with fault-finding methods used by electricians. Few electrical wiring circuits consist of one cable linking an electrical distribution-board (fuse-board) to a light. Multiple cables pass through connections (i.e. lights, switches, joints) to reach the last light in a circuit; cables and connections represent the factors allowing electricity to reach the light. The electrician must take into account

⁴ Becker (1992:228) refers to ‘process or narrative analysis’.

⁵ Hall (2008) argues that it is the grounding of the process in theory that differentiates process-tracing from historical explanation.

factors not immediately connected to the circuit (the context). For example, nails may have broken a cables insulation; connections may be under floorboards or cables may be protected by pipes. Additionally, an electrician is trained (has the theoretical knowledge) to see a circuit where others see a tangle of cables.

Thus, the method of process-tracing used in this thesis is a detailed narrative guided by the employment of theoretical factors (variables) drawn from previous research findings. Each individual case shall engage with established theories. To place the interventions in context whilst elucidating the steps taken, in-depth chronologies are included in Annex 1:1-6. Only once national-level processes have been established can the cross-case analysis (Chapter 10) be undertaken (Goldstone, 2008).

3.4. Search methods

Yin (2009:47/123) advises that ‘construct validity’ be established by consulting multiple sources of information and by communicating the ‘chain of evidence’. Following Yin’s advice the ‘chain’ began with the formulation of research objectives (see section 3:3) on which individual Case Study Protocols were based. All information was entered into databases so that citations could be cleanly traced back to their source. Databases included in-depth notes entered into a literature review template and abstracted into an annotated bibliography. Quantitative data was entered into Excel databases. The search can be split into four stages:

Stage One: The objective of Stage One was the formulation of a literature review that defined and evaluated important theories and interventions whilst placing source country drug control in wider legal and social contexts. The review permitted the refinement of research objectives, the establishment of case study parameters, and a strengthening of theoretical understating. This established a foundation for more effective individual case document searches (Trachtenberg, 2007). Case Study Protocols were developed for each case as a means of increasing reliability whilst directing and focusing searches (Yin, 2009; see George and Bennett, 2005). An extensive ‘to find’ list was composed from cross-citation.

To formulate the review the net was initially cast wide. Metalib 4.00 was employed to search nine separate databases.⁶ As advised by Trachtenberg (2007), Google Scholar

⁶ ArticleFirst; Applied Social Sciences Index and Abstracts; British Humanities Index; International Bibliography of the Social Sciences; Sociological Abstracts; Web of Science; World Almanac; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; Zetoc.

was then searched. All searches were limited to English language sources⁷ and used the terms: cocaine; heroin; opiate; opium and narcotic.⁸ RAND, TNI and UNODC websites were then consulted. Manual searches were conducted at the Loughborough University and London School of Economics libraries.

Stage Two: Ideally documents identified during Stage One would have been collected in Stage Two, however, as the investigator interned at UNODC (in Austria) during the period specified for Stage Two a search of the UN Library was conducted. This had initially been scheduled for a later date. The library staff and UNODC researchers were most helpful and identified a number of restricted and open-archived documents not catalogued on the electronic system. Informal discussions with UNODC staff, academics and policy-makers significantly widened the investigator's practical and theoretical knowledge.

Stage Three: By Stage Three documents (or notes taken on them) collected in previous stages had been stored in individual electronic or hard-copy case study folders. A considerable 'to find' list had formed. Each case study was allocated two months to find and analyse all identified documents. To be near the Bodleian Library the investigator moved to Oxford. The Oxford University Online Catalogue was initially searched. Physical searches of relevant libraries⁹ uncovered many previously unidentified books, out-of-service journals and archived documents. Media documents were then searched for in: Chadwyck Periodicals; Economist Archives; Nexus-Lexis and Times Archives.

The Bodleian Official Documents Library was searched for UN/League documents. Once documents had been stored and in-depth notes taken the investigator visited the British National Archives. Across all cases approximately two months was spent searching the archives. All relevant documents were recorded using a digital camera

⁷ While it is acknowledged that non-English texts - especially those produced within the countries under study - could be of significant importance, time and resource considerations prevented this. The inclusion of foreign language documents would have required the investigator to search, locate and then translate documents from several Asian, Middle Eastern and European languages.

⁸ As 'drug' produced hits related to pharmaceutical drugs it was excluded.

⁹ Bodleian Law Library; Centre for Criminological Research Library; Chinese Studies Library; Indian Institute Reading Room; Middle East Centre Library; Radcliffe Science Library and Social Science Library.

(producing in excess of 8,000 images). Throughout this stage authors were contacted for hard-to-find or restricted/closed documents.

Stage Four: After all cases had been drafted the investigator returned to Oxford to locate additional documents. Those not located in Oxford were found through inter-library loans and contact with authors. Draft case chapters were then sent to key informants to validate the information presented. Responses often represented new information and/or were accompanied by unpublished work. The investigator also visited Thailand to observe DOA in action.

3.5. Source problems/limitations

This section shall describe the methods used to analyse documentary evidence. Scott (1990:20) developed a typology of documents based upon access and authorship. If document access is *Closed* or *restricted* ‘outsiders’ (i.e. non-UNODC personnel) are barred from accessing the document or must obtain the authors permission; whereas *Open-published* or *open-archival* documents can be accessed by the public. The four types are further divided between state and *private* (i.e. academic, media or NGO) authorship. As the terms ‘state’ fails to account for intergovernmental organisations, such as the UN, *public* is deemed here more appropriate.

To ensure the validity and reliability of documentary evidence, investigators must reflect on the documents’ storage and production. To achieve this Scott (1990:96/Chapter 1) posits four ‘quality control criteria’ to be asked of documents.

Initially the investigator must establish whether the document is of unquestionable *authenticity* and has not been corrupted. If the document appears to be a copy of the original its soundness must be extrapolated by identifying - malicious or accidental - omissions or errors. Authenticity can be established through physical examinations of documents (i.e., whether the language is consistent throughout) (Scott, 1990), triangulation, and knowledge of context (Trachtenberg, 2007).

To extract *meaning* (what is being communicated) the investigator must initially establish whether the content is clear and intelligible. Foreign language, technical terminology or unfamiliar terms may prevent an understanding of what the author was attempting to communicate (Scott, 1990). Furthermore, the investigator must reflect on how their interpretations of accounts are social constructions. The interpretation may differ from the author’s meaning (Erikson, 1973). For example, in several of the FO documents reporting the Imperial/Republican Chinese intervention (Chapter, 4:2) punishments were described only as ‘brutal’ - a vague term bounded by the author’s

perception of brutality. This was overcome by reading multiple accounts that described in detail the punishments administered in the course of opium suppression and by the regime more generally.

Investigators must validate the *credibility* of an author's account (Scott, 1990). This requires an initial reflection on *who* is communicating to *whom*, for what *purpose* and in what *context* (George and Bennett, 2005). Greater depth can be achieved by following Langlois' and Seignobos' (1904:167-177) criteria for identifying distortions. Investigators reflect on whether authors:¹⁰

- Sought advantage by distorting the facts of an event;
- Were in a situation which forced them to distort events;
- Prejudices produced erroneous reporting;
- Egotism facilitated a distorted perception of themselves or a group;
- Sought to please or not shock the public;
- Sought to instil dramatic effect;
- Were poorly situated for valuable observation;
- Failed to record observations immediately or systematically;
- Reiterated official versions of events;
- Claimed to have observed events which they could not access.

Narroll (1962, in Platt, 1985:175) suggests additional criteria if the author reports events in a foreign nation:

- How were case reports collected?
- What were the authors' roles in society; were they direct observers or participants?
- How long did the authors stay in the country and were they familiar with the language?

¹⁰ An example of multiple distortions: Between 1949 and 1967 the US Bureau of Narcotics declared that the Chinese Communist Party was officially facilitating the production and export of opium to foreign black markets (Chapter 4:7). The later discredited reports were distorted by a prejudiced author's perception of the accusation being advantageous to US interests in the context of the Cold War. Somewhat vague reports were produced for dramatic effect and reiterated information gathered from the Chinese Government in exile (see, Kinder and Walker, 1986).

- How ambiguous was the report?

Trachtenberg (2007:147) argues that closed/restricted documents - which later become open-archival - are 'far and away the best source there is'. As privacy allows authors to express themselves more freely than they would in public they tend to be more reliable and less distorted than open-published documents and can:

... normally be taken as genuine..... Documents, after all, are generated for a government's own internal purposes, and what would be the point of keeping records if those records were not meant to be accurate? It's just hard to believe that a major goal..... would be to deceive historians thirty years later.....you can be reasonably sure that it's not a pure fabrication (Trachtenberg, 2007:147).

For example, Pakistani opium farmers reported to Assad and Harris (2003) that much foreign funding designated to AD projects was appropriated by local officials. While knowledge of the extent of corruption in Pakistan would suggest the feasibility of the accusation, this is unacknowledged by public-access documents produced by implementing agencies. While the authors likely possessed valid reasons for not disclosing such practices, the example illustrates how entering the public domain can lead authors to distort their observation of an event for institution interests.

When considering archived evidence the investigator must reflect on *why* the document has been preserved (Erikson, 1973) or survived (Platt, 1985) and whether the document appears *representative* of the totality of relevant documents. The document used may be indicative of that which was permitted to survive rather than representative of all documents produced on the subject at the time of authorship. Unrepresentative documents can be identified through knowledge of the population of documents (Scott, 1990) and by placing the document in context and triangulating it with other sources (Trachtenberg, 2007).

Use of a quality control template supported continuity in the critical analysis of all documents (see Table 2:3 for an example). While reference to the template highlighted distortions, many could be accounted for by triangulation and contextualisation. A central tenant in document research is: the greater the number and diversity of sources, and depth of knowledge, the better the chance of identifying something close to the

truth (see Ritchie, 2006; Stake, 2005; Trachtenberg, 2007; Yin, 2009). Thus, as knowledge of a case grew, key earlier documents were revisited (Scott, 1990).

To compensate for the shortfall in access to English language documents secondary sources were occasionally relied upon. The lack of control over interpretation of sources is most evident in the case of (PR) China (Chapter 4:7). Using recently released Chinese archival documents and interviews with scholars, Yongming (1999) provides the most extensive analysis of the intervention conducted to date. The Chinese Communist Party are believed to have rewritten histories and archival documents to conform to their political objectives (Shuyun, 2006) and had banned any written reference to drugs in 1952 (Yongming, 1999). Yet, Yongming fails to reflect critically on potential distortions or why certain documents were preserved. It is possible that the documents accessed by Yongming *may* have been those the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) permitted to be written or deemed sufficiently acquiescent to be kept alive by archivists. It is also possible that documents were written at a later stage or with the foreign reader in mind. Thus, Yongming's work is triangulated with information on the specific intervention and the context with which it was conducted.

Table 3: 3. Quality control framework

	Hosie (1911) {China}	Radji (1959) {Iran}	UNODC (2005) {Laos}
Document type	Public open-archived (formerly restricted)	Public open-published	Public open-published
Meaning	Language clear	Language clear	Language clear. Some technical lingo
Authenticity	In National Archives. No physical distortion. Cited by others	In official UN publication. No physical distortion	Official UN publication. No physical distortion
Representativeness	All documents in series consulted. No evidence of destruction	Only document published	All open-published documents in series consulted
By whom	British consulate to China	Iranian Minister of Health	UNODC, GoL, BMZ, US and NCA
For whom	British consulate. Indirectly to Chinese Government & lobbyists	UN & academic audience	GoL, UN & foreign donors
Purpose	To monitor Anglo-Chinese agreement	Defence of decision to resume licit production	Analyse AD projects' impact on opium production
Context	Politically unstable. Repressive suppression	Politically repressive. Modernisation drive	Politically stable. Extensive external criticism of GoL intervention
Seeking advantage	Potential diplomatic advantage	Advantage in highlighting success	Advantage in highlighting project success
Forced to distort events	No indication	Criticism may have impacted career	No indication
Egotism	No indication	Possible national/professional pride	Possible national/professional pride
Dramatic effect	Unlikely, internal	No indication	No indication
Sought to please public	Not intended for public	Possibility of media use	Possibility of media use
Poorly situated	No, extensive monitoring	Prime location as central to reform	No, extensive monitoring
Failed to record observations	Little time lapse between event and report.	Little time lapse between event and	Little time lapse between event and report.

immediately / systematically	Systematic	report. Systematic	Systematic
Reiterated official version of events	No, critical of provincial reports	Developer of official version of events	Critical of GoL. Supportive of UNODC policy
Claimed to have observed events which they could not access	No	No	No
Intensity of the authors' involvement in the event	Meant as objective observer. Bounded by FO interest	Personally involved	Personally involved. Different perspectives and interests may have counterbalanced this
Method of observation	Extensive tour of province	Direct involvement	Aerial and village surveys
Direct observation / participation	Observer	Participant	Participants and observers
Length of the stay in country	Unknown (likely extensive)	Iranian citizen	Unknown (likely extensive)
Familiarity with language	Unknown	Iranian citizen	Unknown
Ambiguity	Comprehensive	Fairly comprehensive	Comprehensive

Note: Scott (1990) advises that templates should not be used for every document but rather kept in view to direct analysis. Thus, the template is produced here to portray the authors thought process. Sources: see individual chapters.

3.6. Measurement issues

INCRS and UNODC are the primary contemporary sources of quantitative data on illicit opium trends. UNODC's source country data is collected by national governments and annually reported to the Secretariat; UNODC assists major producing nations. As UNODC's methodology is accessible and detailed, the following discussion will focus on UNODC supported monitoring. This said, national governments (for Thailand see ONCB, 2003, Pennington, 2001) and the INCRS employ similar methods (see Mejia and Posada, 2010).


Satellite images or aerial photographs are taken of samples of high-density production areas. Ground surveys verify these findings whilst establishing how much opium can be produced per hectare. Yield estimates are calculated by counting the number of poppies per hectare and measuring the size of poppy capsules. National cultivation and production estimates are extrapolated from these samples¹ (UNODC, 2007, 2009a/b/c).

Aerial or satellite surveillance are triangulated with ground surveys to avoid the limitations of individual methods. White (2003:1554) argues that ground surveys tend to be the most reliable as 'factors such as plant density, soil fertility, harvesting efficiency, and potential crop yield' can be included. This said, until a level of trust has been established, dubious responses can be common (Roth, 1974; also, Chawla, 2004; Mejia and Posada, 2010). Furthermore, geographical isolation, violent conflicts or hostile populations can limit access (INCRS, 2008; UNODC, 2009a; White, 2003). While geography can be overcome with aerial photography, heavily-armed hostile populations can pose a significant threat (GOA, 1988). While such barriers can often be circumvented by satellite imagery (Mansfield, 2009) accuracy can be limited by intercropping opium with licit crops (Renard, 2010), high-altitudes or extensive cloud cover (Veillette and Navarrete-Frias, 2007). Thus, while satellite technology has improved during the early twenty-first-century (UNODC, 2009) data can be skewed unless verified by ground surveys (Mejia and Posada, 2010; White, 2003).

¹ Advised by experts on the ground UNODC researchers create models of high-density production areas. These are based upon potential cropping patterns and geographical locations. For example, in Laos previous experience indicated how the majority of opium was produced within 4,000m of agricultural areas, at heights of 700m in altitude and on slopes with inclines over 10 percent (UNODC, 2009b).


Whilst criticising the unreliability of amphetamine-type stimulant estimates, a UNODC employee (who wished to remain anonymous) informed the author that opium production estimates are as accurate as technology allows and present relatively reliable indicators. This is partly attributed to the retention of researchers who have refined their skills and knowledge of major producing countries and methodologies over a number of years (personal communication, 2008). The INCRS (2008:30) similarly report how 20 years of experience of crop monitoring has resulted in reasonable accurate estimates.

Figure 3: 2. Average INCRS and UNODC production estimates (1987-2007)



Source: UNODC (various years), INCRS (various years).

Figure 3: 3. Thailand: Production estimate comparison (1980-2002)



Source: NNICC (various years); INCRS (various years); UNODC (various years); RCMP (various years). Thai Government reported in De Meer (1989); Renard (2001).

This said, the often significant differences between surveying agencies may present the greatest indictment against the precision of measurements. Figure 2:2 illustrates variations between UNODC and INCRS production estimates. This variance can be

illustrated by the example of Thailand: between 1980 and 2008 five different agencies posited often widely different production estimates (Figure 3:3). Significantly, in 1987, two US monitoring agencies (NNICC and INCRS) reported a difference of 8mt. Differences aside, the downward trend in Figure 3:3 illustrates that while estimates should not be viewed as precise figures they are useful for determining trends over time (INCRS, 2009) and:

... methodological deviations between different agencies may be a beneficial way of validating.... trends. The confidence with which overall patterns of drug supply are regarded should increase when separate agencies report similar changes or trends (Morrison, 2003:5).

Older data must be treated with even greater caution. Reuter and Ronfeldt (1992:135) suggested that American data on Mexico during the late 1970s/80s ‘relied on often inconsistent and inadequately described methodologies, leading some analysts’ including one US State Department employee ‘to conclude that actual drug production is “unknowable” and that the agency’s estimates are, at best, rather unscientific guesswork’. Alarming, Mexico represented a best-case-scenario. As the US committed fewer resources to monitoring Asian/Middle Eastern production data, the Americas tended to be of better quality. This was magnified by the isolation of many major opium producers throughout the 1970s/80s (see Walker, 1992): Afghanistan was a warzone while Burma, Iran, Laos and Viet Nam were largely isolated from US and, to a lesser extent UN, interference.

Data has ‘been notoriously manipulated to serve policy preferences and to demonstrate programmatic success’ (Stares, 1996:10; also Jelsma and Kramer, 2008; Tullis, 1995). For example, to achieve diplomatic objectives US production estimates may have been understated in pre-Communist Laos (Feingold, 1970) and exaggerated in Islamic Iran (Haq, 2000). While Geddes (1970:7) reported that Royal Thai Government (RTG) estimates throughout the 1960s were underestimated partly for ‘concern for the good reputation of the country’. Data illustrating decreasing opium production throughout the 1970s may have been manipulated to attract foreign aid (Lee, 1994). The US has accused the Burmese, Pakistani and Thai Governments of politicising their estimates (GAO, 1988).

Scepticism increases as time recedes. The FPA (1924) criticised the League of Nation’s Chinese production estimates as little more than guesswork. China in the

early/mid-1920s was characterised by multiple belligerent warlord factions and an unstable central government. Even with the technological and methodological advances of recent years, monitoring would have been difficult. It may be significant that amongst 600 FO reports on Chinese opium production consulted by the author,² just one attempted a national production estimate. Additionally, MacCormack and colleagues (1925:9) reported of Persia ‘it is absolutely impossible to furnish accurate statistics... owing to the large area [cultivated].... and the secrecy observed’ by merchants.

Thus, the more historical the data the less precise the estimate. This said, both historical and contemporary data are of use when viewed as long-term trends and triangulated with other quantitative and qualitative observations.

To draw out trends and permit comparison, all legitimate data was recorded into Excel databases. For continuity all data was transformed, where appropriate, into hectares, metric tonnes or kilograms. When conflicting data presented, the mean figure was extracted to illustrate trends.

Table 3: 4. Data transformation calculations

Original measure	1 imperial tonne	1 pound	1 chest	1 picul	1 acre	1rai	1 mu
Equivalent to:	1.016 mt	0.4536 kg	63.5 kg	60.453 kg	0.4047 ha	0.16 ha	0.067 ha

Sources: chest/picul (Pietschmann *et al.*, 2009); mu (Yongming, 2000); rai/pound/acre/imperial tonne (Rowlet, 2000).

3.7. Summary

This chapter has defined case studies as in-depth and contextualised narratives of non-abstract and well-defined instance (cases) of a class of events. The cases to be analysed in the following chapters are national level opium production suppression interventions. The research design communicated in this chapter was based upon the specification of three narrow sub-objectives: 1) Cataloguing cases of *success* for future reference; 2) Producing ‘lessons’ for future interventions; 3) Reconciling the discrepancy between national and international effects of interventions at the source.

A key element of the design was the specification of the outcome (dependent variable). *Success* was defined as *an excess of 90 percent reduction that brings potential production below 20mt*. Percentage of arable land will be used as a secondary outcome measurement of *success*. Area under cultivation was rejected as a flawed indicator when

² Although not necessarily cited.

not validated by reference to yield or percentage of arable land. The discussion highlighted the imprecise nature of UNODC and INCRS proclamations of success/failure.

To guide case selection six parameters were designated. All cases had to have: been major opium producing nations; been situated in the Asian/Middle Eastern opium zone; administered interventions to suppress opium production during the twentieth-century; conformed to the outcome measurement of *success*.

Within-case analysis will be conducted through the construction of detailed narratives. Guided by the employment of theoretical variables drawn from previous hypothesis, each case shall illustrate the process of causal factors through which the outcome measurement of *success* was reached. Process-tracing will identify the combination of factors present within each case.

To validate the construction of the individual cases, the document search process and analysis were described. Analysis requires reflecting upon a number of quality control criteria to establish both document and authors authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning. The theoretical guidelines were supported by examples of reflections on documents found and used in the thesis.

The distortions and difficulties of using quantitative measurements of production were identified. It was established that while the reliability and sophistication of cultivation and production data have increased in recent years they must be viewed as long-term trends rather than precise figures. Furthermore, all data must be placed in context and triangulated with alternative quantitative and qualitative observations. Triangulation and contextualisation are central themes in overcoming the limitations of both qualitative (documentary) and quantitative evidence.

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Section II

4. China

4.1. Background and context

In 1860 China repealed prohibitions (established in 1780 and 1796) on the import and consumption of opium; increasing foreign imports and stimulating domestic production (see, Dixon, 1922; Newman, 1995; Reins, 1991; Spence, 1990; Wakeman, 1977; Windle, 2011) which, before 1860, had never exceeded 300 tons (Pietschmann *et al.*, 2009). During the 1870s Yunnan Province was permitted to tax opium production to fund a counter-insurgency (Yongming, 1999); other provinces followed the Yunnanese example and *de facto* legalisation preceded the official repeal of the prohibition on production in 1880 (Brown, 1973; Yongming, 1999; Walker, 1991).

Thus, by the 1870s domestic opium was competing with foreign imports in terms of both quality and price (Agassiz, 1884; Reins, 1991; Windle, 2011). Between 1905-1907 China produced between six (Taylor, 1913) and eight times more than it imported (Newman, 1995); Sichuan alone produced four times that of India, China's major foreign source (Hosie, 1911a). Almost all opium was consumed within China with a small amount exported to Indochina (FO, 1913k; Trocki, 1999).

Low prices and profuse availability increased consumption to exceptionally high levels. In 1890, an estimated 10 percent of the Chinese population smoked opium; this may have been as high as 60 to 80 percent in some areas (Spence, 1975) while as low as five percent in others (Newman, 1995). The Chinese delegate to the 1909 International Opium Commission declared that 6.3 percent of the population consumed opium. Conversely, the 1906 Regulations Giving Effect to the Imperial Decree reported consumption rates of 30-40 percent (reproduced in FO, 1907).¹

Between 1887 and 1906, customs and internal transit taxes on opium contributed between five and seven percent of the national budget (Reins, 1991) and significantly

¹ Trocki (1999) estimates that in the late-nineteenth-century China annually consumed 50,000mt of opium; 45,000mt more than the combined licit and illicit global consumption of the late-1990s.

This said, the majority of consumers took small quantities (Dikötter *et al.*, 2004), with an estimated 2.5 percent of the population being considered as heavy or regular consumer (Newman, 1995).

more to many provincial governments (Jordan, 1908). Nonetheless, opium was increasingly perceived as a barrier to economic and military advancement. After China was defeated by Japan (where opium was prohibited) in 1894/95, a propaganda campaign was initiated to ‘deglamorise’ opium and shift the popular perception from an expression of wealth to one of poverty and destitution (Paulès, 2008:259, also Madancy, 2001, Walker, 1991; Yongming, 1999). Additionally, external barriers to prohibition were weakened when the British administered India - China’s primary source of foreign opium – began to soften its opposition to prohibition (Windle, 2011) and the US began lobbying for global controls (Brook and Wakabayashi, 2000).

4.2. Intervention (Imperial/Republican: 1906-1917)

In 1906, an Imperial Decree ordered the gradual suppression of production, distribution and consumption (FO, 1907; Scheltema, 1910). This was followed by the Regulations Giving Effect to the Imperial Decree which obliged provincial governors to: produce estimates of the area under cultivation; license and meticulously monitor farmers; annually reduce the area, and number of farmers, by one-ninth; confiscate land used by unlicensed farmers. The Regulations provided rewards for governors which ended production prematurely (reproduced in FO, 1907). Two months later governors were ordered to halve the area under cultivation within two years (IAOA, 1924b). To reduce the economic shock land and transport taxes were increased (FO, 1911b; IAOA, 1922).

Once the ban was enforced, China negotiated (FO, 1908) the 1908 Anglo-Chinese Ten-Year Suppression Agreement, which obliged British administered India to reduce annually exports to China by ten percent and China to concurrent reductions in production. China agreed to allow British consulates to monitor progress (Dixon, 1922; Scheltema, 1910). The subsequent Prohibition on Opium (1908, reproduced in Leech, 1908) ordered provincial governors to suppress production by 1915/16. The Anglo-Chinese Opium Agreement (1911) later stipulated that any province proving to a Joint British-Chinese Commission of Investigation (henceforth Joint Investigation) that they were ‘opium-free’² could prohibit the importation of Indian opium (see FO, 1915f).

In 1911, the Imperial regime was, however, removed and a Republic declared. While there was an initial resurgence during the revolutionary period (Central China Post, 1912), production remained below 1906 levels (Jordan, 1913b). Nonetheless, in 1912 the new President ordered all officials to renew suppression efforts, the prohibition was

² An abridged term used by FO reports to denote ‘effectively suppressed the cultivation... of native opium’ (FO, 1915f:1).

reiterated by the second president of the Republic (Yuan Shikai) and supported by the majority of revolutionaries (Walker, 1991). The regime declared that stocks of opium accumulated during the Revolutionary period could be sold to state registered addicts; the tax revenue from which funded eradication teams and the administration of treatment programmes (FO, 1912a). Joint Investigations continued (Cheng, 1913; FO, 1913d, 1913l; Grey, 1913) and FO accounts report that the regime initially surpassed 'the rigors of the Manchu rulers' (Dixon, 1922:2) and a:

... general survey of the whole evidence leads to the conclusion that with the exceptions of Kweichow.... the authorities throughout the Republic are making strenuous efforts (Jordan, 1913a:14).³

4.2.1. Development-Orientated Approaches

To motivate crop substitution, in 1911, the national Financial Commissioner relieved all farmers growing cereals of land tax for a year and a half; this stimulated some provinces to experiment with foreign cereals (Changsha Jih Pao, 1911). As no 'serious attempt' was, however, made to provide alternative incomes, many farmers were pushed deeper into poverty and provincial government budgets were depressed (IAOA, 1922:21). The lack of state support is exemplified by crop substitution being mentioned just 11 times in the 472 FO reports (written between 1907 and 1917) consulted (but not necessarily cited) by this author. One reports how a Sichuan district provided no support (FO, 1910c) whilst another recounts how, due to inactivity by the provincial government of Yunnan, a British diplomat introduced improved cotton from India (Rose, 1910). Substitute crops were provided in four provinces (FO, 1908b, 1912c, 1913j, 1914e, 1914g; Rose, 1913; Turner, 1914; Wilkinson, 1910; see Wyman, 2000) and some farmers were compensated in Yunnan (FO, 1909).

Rose (1910:34) reported how the lack of alternatives and increasing impoverishment made prohibition unpopular with farmers, whilst the outflow of silver for illicitly imported opium made it unpopular with officials - especially in Yunnan Province which possessed few exportable commodities. Insightfully concluding that:

... the first sign of relaxation in attitude towards the opium question would assuredly be the signal for the poppy to spring up

³ Kweichow was the last provinces to come under Shikai's rule (Central China Post, 1913).

throughout the miles of territory now lying fallow for want of capital and knowledge and suitable crops.

Many farmers planned for this time by storing opium seeds (Turner, 1914; Wandering Naturalist, 1922; Wyman, 2000).

4.2.2. Law enforcement approaches

Before and after the Revolution, forced eradication was administered by eradication teams or farmers were compelled to eradicate their own crops by the military (Hosie, 1912; FO, 1911a, 1913c, 1913e). For example, in Swatow, during village meetings (FO, 1915g) farmers' were ordered to eradicate their own crops within five days or face military punishment (FO, 1913a; also FO, 1912a). One witness reported that:

... crops were uprooted and trampled on; men were beaten senseless by the roadside in the midst of their ruined fields; the job was done with a savage thoroughness which defies parallel (Wandering Naturalist, 1922:466).

From 1911, the official punishment for opium farming or if a government official refused to enforce the ban - mandated by the Financial Commissioner - was one to three years imprisonment and the confiscation of land (Changsha Jih Pao, 1911). In practice pre-and post-Revolution punishments, often enforced by the provincial military, for cultivation and/or resistance included: torture (FO, 1910b, 1913a); execution (Central China Post, 1912; FO, 1913h, 1914b, 1914d, 1914m; Giles, 1913; Hosie, 1910; Taylor, 1913, 1914); branding (FO, 1914n); caning (FO, 1909); public shaming (FO, 1910b; 1914n, 1915h); fines (SCSF, 1910); and the destruction of property (FO, 1913a, 1913e, 1917a; Turner, 1914) or entire villages (FO, 1910b).

In Fukien Province the Joint Investigation described a magistrate who: arrested and fined farmers; confiscated their land; burnt their houses; and executed any which 'received these corrections with ill grace' (Turner, 1914:n.p.; also FO, 1914d); another noted how 'the sacrifice of lives and property' was 'no obstacle' (FO, 1913g:2). At the extreme an entire village was massacred as a warning in Yunnan (FO, 1913f) whilst a 'few hundred' farmers were executed in Shensi (FO, 1917d:3).

Pre- and post-Revolution local gentry (FO, 1910b) or village leaders (FO, 1910c) were often punished – with imprisonment or execution (FO, 1913c, 1914f; Turner, 1914) - for not preventing cultivation within their sphere of influence while civil service

career advancement was depended on opium suppression (FO, 1910c; Leech, 1908; Spence, 1990). After the Revolution lower officials were ‘severely’ punished (FO, 1915d:26) or ‘removed’ (FO, 1915h:164) for non-compliance, unsatisfactory results (FO, 1913b; 1917f), or corruption (Turner, 1914). Hence, fear of failure instilled a motivation to thoroughly enforce prohibition (SCSF, 1910). This may have extended to the wider population as there is evidence of farmers being executed for not informing authorities of production (FO, 1917d).

4.3. Success?

As can be expected from a state twice the size of Europe the campaign progressed unevenly across and within provinces (FO, 1910a, 1910b; Hosie, 1909; Wyman, 2000). While conformity was slower in major producing provinces, they all eventually conceded to prohibition (FO, 1908). For example, the Chihli Governor-General provided a ten-year grace period in which a gradual reduction was advised (FO, 1908). Nonetheless, by mid-1910 provincial leaders had succumbed to pressure and the ban was stringently enforced (SCSF, 1910).

While Chinese proclamations of national cessation of production in 1911 (Wandering Naturalist, 1922) were premature many province had already been declared ‘opium-free’. In 1911, national production was estimated at 4,000mt which represents a 89 percent reduction from the 1906 peak of 35,353mt.

After a brief resurgence during the Revolutionary period, by 1913 half of all provinces had been declared ‘opium-free’ by Joint Investigation; the export of Indian opium unofficially ceased in 1913⁴ (FO, 1913g; Eisenlohr, 1934). While no quantitative data exists, by the end of 1917, all provinces had been declared ‘opium-free’ after a comprehensive investigation by a Joint British-Chinese Commission. Indian exports were officially discontinued (FPA, 1924; IAOA, 1924b). Illicit production recommenced in outlying provinces the following year (FPA, 1924).


Several British officials reported their suspicion that from 1915 prohibition was enforced in some areas purely for the benefit of the Joint Investigation (FO, 1915b, 1917b, 1915d, 1915h, 1917c, 1917e) or that suppression was limited by corruption (FO, 1914a, 1914e; 1915a, 1915b, 1915g).⁵ Furthermore, the British Joint Investigation for

⁴ To be partly replaced by illicitly imported Turkish and Persian opium (FO, 1914i).

⁵ In 1915 the central Government procured all existing stocks of imported opium to sell to aged smokers under a monopoly system (Walker, 2007). Under international and national pressure the stock was destroyed and the monopoly abandoned (Yongming, 1999), however, there are

Shensi Province reported that President Shikai had initially clandestinely facilitated and profited from production in the province to support his eventual ascension to the throne, before ruthlessly enforcing the ban (FO, 1917d; see also Yongming, 1999).

Figure 4: 1. China: Opium production (1836-1911)



Source: adapted from, AOAI (1922); Pietschmann *et al* (2009); Newman (1995); Wyman (2000). Note: grey line represents 20mt outcome measurement of *success*. Missing values indicates missing data. Jordan (1908) estimates national production at 20,268mt for 1906.

4.4. Rival explanations of success

An important aspect of process-tracing is the interaction with established theories, as such this section shall critically appraise rival explanations of how success was realised. Yongming (1999:25) maintains that the central factor for *success* was mass support for prohibition: the ‘majority of Chinese society was on common ground, thereby provoking minimal resistance’ (also Alexander, 1925; Britannicus, 1922; FO, 1908). For example, the IAOA (1922:22) supported their claim that ‘the farmer was a keen sufferer’ by the lack of violent resistance (also Alexander, 1925; Britannicus, 1922; FO, 1908). While increased food available was welcomed by many (FO, 1910c), the repressive nature of the state may have prevented criticism of prohibition (Madancy, 2001).

accounts that officials diverted some of the supposedly destroyed opium to the black market (Buckley, 1931).

Furthermore, FO records illuminated significant violent and non-violent resistance to eradication, before and after the Revolution⁶ (see FO, 1911a, 1912b, 1913a, 1913k; Hosie, 1910; Rose, 1913; SCSF, 1910; also Bianco, 2000; Madancy, 2001; Spence, 1990). For example, in Sichuan (FO, 1910c, 1913e) and Hunan (FO 1913l, 1913m) secret societies were formed to protect farmers (FO, 1915g, 1915a). Furthermore, Adshead (1966) has suggested that discontent at prohibition may have motivated many former Sichuan farmers to support the 1911 Republican Revolution (Adshead, 1966).

Analyses in Sichuan (Wyman, 2000), Yunnan (Hosie, 1911b), and nationwide (Taylor, 1913) partly attribute *success* to the commitment, belligerence and authority of provincial governments. The linkage of prohibition to career advancement accelerated suppression and likely inflated the repressive nature of local officials. The evidence suggests that the key factor for *success* between 1906 and 1917 was a commitment by local officials to what would today constitute a crime against humanity rather than rural support for prohibition (for a definition of crimes against humanity see Cassese, 2003). An additional factor may be that repressive law enforcement against consumers depressed the market which decreased the rewards for producing opium.

4.5. Background and context (1917-1949)

From 1911, numerous warlords had been consolidating their authority. Then after President Shikai abdicated in 1916 – in response to multiple uprisings - many other southern warlords declared independence, fragmenting the Chinese state (Wakeman, 1977). While suppression officially continued in areas under Beijing control⁷ the central Government was unstable and composed of belligerent northern warlords (see Barnett, 1963; Meyer and Parssinen, 1998; Slack, 2000). The British consulate, aware of resurgences, noted the futility of approaching the impotent central government (Dixon, 1922).

⁶ Instances of violent resistance may have increased during Republican rule (see, FO, 1913i, 1913h) in remote tribal areas where provincial governments lacked authority (FO, 1913e, 1914c, 1915e, 1917d).

⁷ The central Government continued to strengthen the legal basis of prohibition. The Criminal Code (1919) punished production with a minimum prison term of three years. Heroin was prohibited by the Amended Laws Concerning Morphia (1920) and The Opium Suppression Act (1920) obliged all officials to eradicate opium poppies and ordered the execution of officials who coerced farmers to produce opium.

Many warlords facilitated opium production to finance conflicts⁸ over territories, the central Government (IAOA, 1924b; Paulès, 2008) and eventually areas important to the opium trade (IAOA, 1924a, 1924b; see Bianco, 2000). The warlord era brought:

... economic and social distress to China: opium poppies were planted in times of extreme famine, government administration became meaningless in many provinces, and the dislocation of legitimate trade impeded industrial growth and the modernisation of agriculture. Furthermore banditry flourished and Chinese politics became even more militarised (Walker, 1991:35).

FO records suggest that dual authority often existed (Cole, 1920; FO, 1920n, 1922; Hind, 1922). Several provincial civil governments opposed opium production (Aspland, 1925; FO, 1920b, 1920g, 1920i; IAOA, 1922b) whilst warlords simultaneously facilitated the trade,⁹ in some cases violently resisting eradication (FO, 1920n; IAOA, 1922b, 1924c).

Other civil authorities were apathetic or administered their own monopolies (Bridgeman, 1919; Executive Yuan, 1935; FO, 1919b, 1920g; IAOA, 1924b; Ottewill, 1919), often whilst publicly prohibiting production (FO, 1920d, 1920e, 1920k) to avoid condemnation by anti-opium lobbyists and public sentiment (Yongming, 1999, see IAOA, 1922b; League of Nations, 1930; Meyer and Parssinen, 1998; Slack, 2000). By 1923, many civil provincial governments were recording opium taxes in their official treasury records (reproduced in IAOA, 1924a) and punishing unlicensed producers and merchants. The national military were also implicated in the distribution of opiates throughout China (Buckley, 1931; Bulletin of Narcotics, 1953; IAOA, 1923; Mulls, 1923) and into Burma and Indochina (IAOA, 1924a) in cooperation with organised crime groups (see Martin, 1996).

To ensure that opium was the only cost-effective crop many warlord imposed extortionately high land taxes (Buckley, 1931; IAOA, 1924b; Madancy, 2001; Talman, 1919; Von-ko, 1935). More overt coercion included the fining or execution of farmers or village leaders refusing to produce opium (FO, 1919c; IAOA, 1920c, 1922b, 1922n, 1924a). In some provinces food crops were eradicated to make way for opium (FO,

⁸ One Fukien warlord financed an expansion of 10,000 soldiers through taxing opium production (FO, 1920m; IAOA, 1922).

⁹ Some extended advice on soil management and irrigation to improve yields (FO, 1920a).

1920n), facilitating famines in Kweichow and Shensi provinces between 1921 and 1923 (IAOA, 1922b, 1924b) and food deficits in other provinces (Kiang, 1937; Rogers, 1919; Von-ko, 1935). This said, in some districts, opium was profitable and farmers chose to side with warlords and openly resist civil bans (Bianco, 2000).

Not all provinces grew opium. Civil authorities continued to brutally suppress production in the provinces of Chefoo (FO, 1920f), Chungking (FO, 1920l) and Shansi (FO, 1920h). Around 1924/25, in response to overproduction - and subsequently reduced opium prices and increased food prices - some warlords ceased coercing farmers and facilitated crop substitution (Aspland, 1925).

During the early/mid-1920s production averaged between 2,000 and 15,000tons (see FPA, 1924; Merrill, 1942; IAOA, 1924b) and accounted for anywhere between nine-tenths (Bulletin of Narcotics, 1953) and 50 percent of global production. Illicitly exported opium was seized in: Southeast (Gray, 1925) and East Asia; Australia; the Philippines and North America (Bulletin of Narcotics, 1953). Due to high demand, as much was imported as exported (Aspland, 1925), including smuggled Indian (Wandering Naturalist, 1922), Persian (Meyer and Parssinen, 1998) and Turkish opium (Martin, 1996).

By 1928, the Kuomintang,¹⁰ who had partly unified China under their authority (Walker, 1991), were administering an opium monopoly (Baumler, 2000) which sold gradually decreasing quantities of opium to registered consumers (Dai, 1918). In response, the NAOA launched a forceful publicity campaign which denounced the monopoly as purely revenue enhancing. The campaign resulted (Slack, 2000) in the passing of the Opium Suppression Act (1928) which reiterated the punishments contained in the 1919 Criminal Code, whilst obliging all 'Opium Suppression Bureaus'¹¹ to liquidate their affairs and surrender their stock to the state. Provincial and district officials were ordered to eradicate crops and punish re-cultivation, village chiefs were ordered to prevent production and report unregulated production. The Act was followed by a series of regulations which together allowed for the punishment of ineffective state officials and obliged magistrates to comply with the 1928 Act (COSC, 1929).

The 1928 and 1929 regulations were reportedly passed to prevent competition rather than promote prohibition (Meyer and Parssinen, 1998); unofficial monopolies continued (Phillips, 1932; Woodhouse, 1930; Slack, 2000) and the civil military were implicated

¹⁰ Kuomintang (KMT or Guomindang) translates as National Peoples Party (Spence, 1990).

¹¹ Bureaus tended to be code for unofficial opium monopolies (IAOA, 1922d).

in morphine manufacturing (FO, 1930) and opiate trafficking (Buckley, 1932; Harding, 1932; Martin, 1932; Mills, 1924). Strict prohibition was, however, enforced in areas where the Kuomintang were conducting anti-communist campaigns: ineffective magistrates were punished and farmers executed (Yongming, 1999).

Throughout the 1920s, opium continued to be produced in warlord controlled areas (CGOSC, 1929) perpetuating conflicts between warlord factions (Woodhouse, 1930) and the central Government (Dai, 1928). The Kuomintang delegate to the Hague Opium Conference described suppression as a 'farce' and declared that 12,090 tons (200,000 piculs) were produced annually (Teh, 1931). Woodhouse (1930), who considered Teh's figure too conservative, dispatched a questionnaire to knowledgeable individuals on the opium situation, the findings suggested the continual compulsion of farmers by military and civil authorities to produce opium, that prohibition was enforced in just three provinces and that production had increased under Kuomintang protection.

In short, by the end of the 1920s production continued unabated, interdiction was unenforced and the Kuomintang were either helpless (Buckley, 1931) or facilitating production and distribution. In 1930 the League of Nations (1930) singled China out as the primary source of illicit opium in East and Southeast Asia. Whilst Eisenlohr (1934:207) described China as 'the most serious menace to any scheme of universal control, either of drug manufacture or of opium cultivation'. Yongming (2000b) reports that 1930 represents the peak of Chinese production. The data for 1930-39, presented in Figure 4:2, illustrates data surrendered to the League of Nations for state regulated opium production and thus fails to represent the true scale of production once areas outside of state control and diversion from the state monopoly are accounted for. Conversely, the data for 1930 presented by Yongming (2000b) may require a cautious approach as, being drawn from a Chinese language historical account of drug control published in Beijing in 1997, it *may* represent a distorted official version of events. This said, the data illustrated in Figure 4:2 does appear representative of the general trends established by qualitative evidence.

In 1935 as much of China was unified under Kuomintang authority and most western warlords were integrated into the state opium monopoly the Six-Year Plan was initiated (Baumler, 2000; Slack, 2000) under the Enforcement Measures for the Suppression of Dangerous Drugs (1935, reproduced in Cadogan, 1935). The Measures provided for the gradual suppression of distribution and consumption by 1940 and production was

prohibition in all but eight provinces (discussed in, Bulletin of Narcotics, 1949b; Butler, 1938; League of Nations, 1938).

Under the Plan, farmers were licensed to produce gradually diminishing quantities for sale through the state monopoly to registered consumers. Opium merchants were taxed by the state whilst transiting the Yangtze River to the markets of Shanghai and Hubei (Baumler, 2000). Punishments for unauthorised production were reported as 'barbarous' (Times, 1935b:17) and included the execution of at least 263 individuals in the first year (Times, 1935; also Moss, 1936). Unregulated crops were forcefully eradicated (Bulletin of Narcotics, 1949b). Crop substitution was administered (see Bulletin of Narcotics, 1949b; League of Nations, 1939b) and by 1939 wheat was reported to be more profitable than opium in Hupeh and Kansu provinces (League of Nations, 1939b).

Several foreign observers were initially dubious of the national and provincial commitment (Brenan, 1934, 1936; Mills, 1935). Some stronger warlords overtly resisted Kuomintang authority or clandestinely administered their own monopolies (Cadogan, 1935; Harding, 1935; Merrill, 1942) and large-scale diversion from the official monopoly was reported (Austin, 1936). During the first year of the Plan, the League of Nations (1936) declared China the principle global source of both raw opium and manufactured opiates (Bureau of Narcotics, 1936). Nonetheless, in 1937 President Kai-shek (1937:31) reported that the 'cultivation of the opium poppy in the various provinces in the interior has long since been completely suppressed' and was limited to a small number of districts in the 'frontier provinces'. The statement was collaborated at the League of Nations by America and French Indochina (who reported significant reductions in smuggling from Yunnan Province). The FPA reported that decreasing production had inflated non-monopoly opium prices and forced consumers to seek treatment (Merrill, 1942). *Success* was, nevertheless, limited by conflict (Bulletin of Narcotics, 1949; Walker, 1991; Yongming, 1999).

In 1937, Japan invaded and occupied the majority of central Chinese provinces. The Japanese military continued the Kuomintang 'suppression through taxation' policy (Reuter, 1940; Tuson, 1940) and facilitated production, which had practically ceased under the Plan (Merrill, 1942).¹²

¹² For more in-depth discussions on the opiate trade within Japanese controlled areas of China refer to: Brook (2000); Brook and Wakabayashi (2000); Friman (1996); Kobayashi (2000); Merrill (1942); Meyer and Parssinen (1998); Walker (1991). For complaints by China and foreign nations against Japan see: Dennis (1937); FO (1915c); League of Nations (1936, 1939).


In 1939, the Kuomintang reported to the League of Nations (1939) that after one last purge - in which 159,449ha of poppies were eradicated, four farmers were executed and 25 imprisoned - almost all production, and illicit exports, had ceased in areas under their authority. The UK and Siam, however, complained that Yunnanese opium continued to be smuggled into Siam (League of Nations, 1939). The Kuomintang Interior Minister stated that production was limited to Yunnanese border areas (Kuo Min News Agency, 1939), the statement was confirmed by the British FO (1939, 1939b). In 1940, the British Consulate to Yunnan declared the province 'opium-free' (Prideaux-Brune, 1940). Conversely, the Consulate to Sichuan reported that the provinces illicit imports originated from the provinces of Sikang, Kweichow and *Yunnan* (Franklin, 1941). Nonetheless, both Consulates reported that scarcity had inflated retail-prices (Franklin, 1941; Prideaux-Brune, 1940).

When complete prohibition was enacted in 1941, 32,932 individuals were sentenced to life imprisonment or death. Production was limited to Japanese occupied territories and remote 'frontier' areas (Merrill, 1939) of Yunnan, Kweichow and Sikang provinces where violent opposition to eradication was common. By 1937, production had declined from the 1924 peak of 15,240mt to 890mt; a 94 percent reduction. The Kuomintang thus achieved the percentage change criteria of *success* but failed to reduce production below 20mt. While production likely fell further by 1939 accounts of the period are inconsistent, contradictory and lacking sufficient evidence to proclaim *success*.

While the UK and US maintained that Chinese production remained low throughout the early-1940s (see Morlock 1944; FO, 1945). However, diminishing Kuomintang authority during the Sino-Japanese (1937-45) and Civil Wars (1945-49) resulted in a resurgence in production as semi-independent military officials compelled farmers to produce opium (Zhongli, 2001; also Barnett, 1963) to pay soldiers (Walker, 1991). In 1944, the League of Nations reported that China produced 65.4 percent of the world's illicit opium (Atzenwiler, 1944) and in 1947 the PCOB stated, 'China may still be well at the head of the list of opium-producing countries'. The Kuomintang reported in 1947 that it had eradicated 719,319ha in Sichuan alone, however, the League of Nations noted the likelihood of exaggeration (Bulletin of Narcotics, 1949b:28). By 1949 production had resumed at significant levels (Yongming, 2000b).

Ryan (2001) posits that US and Chinese allegations of Japanese involvement were based more on diplomatic self-interest than intelligence (also, Kinder and Walker, 1986).

Figure 4: 2. China: Opium production (1921-1949)



Source: adapted from, AOAI (1924); Atzenwiler (1944); Bulletin of Narcotics (1949); League of Nations (1939); Lu and Liang (2008); Slack (2000); Teh (1931); Su (1997, in Yongming, 2000b). Missing values indicates missing data. Data for 1930 represents accounts for both licit (solid black) and illicit (lined) production estimates.

4.6. Intervention ([PR] China: 1949+)

Opium consumption had been prohibited in areas under Chinese Communist Party (CCP) authority from the early-1930s (Lowinger, 1977; Yongming, 2000b) and although opium production and export out of CCP controlled territory had sporadically been facilitated to raise revenue (Shuyun, 2006; Meyer and Parssinen, 1998; Yung-fa, 1995) it was immediately banned when the CCP ejected the Kuomintang in 1949. By 1952, the CCP had largely unified the country under their authority as the Peoples Republic of China (henceforth (PR) China).

In 1950, the CCP promulgated the Decree Regarding Suppression of Opium and Narcotics (1950:n.p., reproduced in FO, 1950) which obliged: forced eradication in areas which had come under state authority; gradual reductions in areas inhabited by minority groups ‘in the light of the actual local circumstances’; complete prohibition on the distribution of opium and narcotics and that all offenders be ‘severely punished’.

4.6.1. Development-Orientated Approaches

Although not a DOA, the redistribution of land from landlords to peasants benefitted small farmers and motivated many to acquiesce to the cessation of production (see

Yongming, 2000a). This was especially true in ‘minority areas’¹³ where crop substitution and land reform were administered prior to law enforcement as a means of state extension (Yongming, 1999, 2001). CCP members were sent to minority areas to administer local projects (i.e. irrigation construction or malaria control) and would steadily spread propaganda to establish local support (Spence, 1990).

A Chinese participant at a UNDP (1987) conference recounted how opium farmers were encouraged in the early-1950s to grow grains and cash crops by the CCP, who distributed improved seeds and modern technology. Foreign observers reported that food crops had replaced opium (Lowinger, 1977; Winnington, 1959, cited in Bruun *et al.*, 1975).

Precise information on crop substitution is, however, limited whilst that which is available appears somewhat inconsistent with Chinese agricultural planning. Between 1952 and 1957, the collectivisation (see Annex 1:1) of farmland did improve agricultural productivity (Lin, 1990) which grew on average 4.6 percent per year (Yao, 1999) and by 1956/57 food access had improved and rural consumption of grain was higher than in urban areas (Spence, 1990); although remaining below international definitions of subsistence (Fairbank, 1994). Much of the *success* was, however, attributable to private production which was banned in 1958. Between 1959 and 1961, Government ignorance of agriculture and mismanagement factored¹⁴ (Spence, 1990; Yao, 1999) in a famine which killed an estimated 18.48 (Yao, 1999) to 30 million people in rural areas (Lin and Yang, 2000).

Prior to 1959 all farmers were obliged to meet government grain quota’s and all produce was sold to the state at a set price. The quota was calculated on the needs of the urban population and foreign exports. As many villages barely covered their quotas food shortages were common; shortages increased as the urban population grew (Lin and Yang, 2000).

Additionally, in 1958 the state implemented the Great Leap Forward to modernise the state. As the development of heavy industry was an integral component of the plan the majority of farmers were ordered away from agriculture to support iron production (Smil, 1999). The remaining farmers were ordered to offset the diversion of resources by increasing the planting density of crops which was erroneously believed to increase

¹³ Defined as ‘all ethnic groups that are not Han Chinese’. The majority of ‘minority nationalities’ lived in isolated mountainous areas which ‘were safe havens for ... opium production’ (Yongming, 2001:19).

¹⁴ Lin (1990) rejected this as a cause but concedes that it did add to the severity of the famine.

yields (Yao, 1999) and there was insufficient labour to collect the negligible harvests (Fairbank, 1994). The policy failed to produce large-amounts of iron whilst creating a food shortage (Spence, 1990; Smil, 1999).

Agricultural planning and management was ineffective during the period when the development of opium farming areas would have been administered. Thus, if developmental assistance was administered as an incentive for the cessation of opium production the experience of the Great Leap Forward suggests that the policy failed to have a positive impact on former opium farmers.

4.6.2. Law enforcement approaches

In 1951, 6,333 'drug offenders' were arrested, however, insufficient central coordination and resources limited the campaigns efficiency and impact. Then in late-1951/early-1952, the Three and Five Antis Campaigns (Annex 1:1) identified - through investigates into official corruption - a number of large-scale traffickers. Building on the information the Central Ministry of Public Security coordinated bureaucratic and criminal justice institutions in a nationwide intelligence gathering campaign (Yongming, 1999, 2000a, 2001).

In August 1952, there was a nationwide wave of arrests, followed by extensive propaganda campaigns¹⁵ and three more waves of arrests. The arrests ceased in October 1952 to allow the judiciary to catch-up; 369,705 individuals had been targeted of which 82,056 (22 percent) were arrested (34,775 were imprisoned or executed; 2,138 were imprisoned in labour camps; 6,843 were placed under surveillance; and 4,337 were 'uncategorized') (Yongming, 1999, 2000a; also Chang, 2004). All opium poppies were forcefully eradicated (Meyer and Parssinen, 1998; Spence, 1990).

Offenders were tried and punished during mass rallies (Meyer and Parssinen, 1998). In total 800 (Chang, 2004) to 880 individuals were publically executed. Before the campaign the CCP had specified what percentage of those prosecuted where to be executed; enough to remove high-level traffickers, especially those deemed counter-revolutionaries, and prevent lower-level offenders from future transgression (Lowinger, 1977; Meyer and Parssinen, 1998). Rubinstein (1973:61) witnessed:

¹⁵ It followed a recognizable path (see, Paulès, 2008) by proclaiming that foreign and (under Communism) class enemies exploited China and that opium limited national advancement whilst impoverishing and corrupting consumers (Lowinger, 1977; Rubinstein, 1973; Zhongli, 2001).

a policy of highly selective, strictly enforced, drastic punitive measures for major offenders on the one hand, and on the other hand amnesty and government support for victims and cooperative petty offender.

Jones (2006:180, also Lu and Miethe, 2007) reports that during the 'Maoist era' (1949-76) crime in general was 'virtually non-existent' with the mid-1950s/mid-1960s perceived as a 'golden age' of safety and order. During this period punishments included: execution; forced labour; and administrative sanctions (i.e. forced resettlement or bans on accessing social goods) (Wu, 1988). While execution was imposed by courts, some forced labour and administrative sanctions could be imposed by civil associations and the police (Jones, 2006), who possessed 'virtually unlimited power in investigation, detaining, prosecuting and convicting criminal suspects' and commonly punished extra-judicially (Lu and Miethe, 2007:47).

However, the severity of law enforcement dovetailed the level of authority possessed by the CCP in an area, and law enforcement was sequenced after state extension in minority areas. This is illustrated with an example of the Liangshan Yi Autonomous Prefecture (Sichuan Province) where 50-80 percent of households farmed opium. In the Han Chinese areas, suppression was conducted in synergy with the national campaign: opium was forcefully eradicated, 26 individuals were executed and over 300 were imprisoned. As ethnic Yi areas were unaffected by suppression some opium was smuggled into Han areas. CCP officials initially projected propaganda and appealed to local leaders for the cessation of illicit exports. Then, in mid-1954, the CCP began interdicting Yi opium in Han areas and extending substitute crops, and by 1955, 1,072ha had been 'voluntarily' uprooted. However, subsequent forced eradication was discontinued after five months of violent resistance. In 1956, the CCP administered 'democratic reforms' in the Prefecture, which included land distribution and the freeing of slaves. The reforms were popular, and anti-reformists were suppressed by the Chinese military and ethnic Yi supportive of reform, and by late-1957 all ethnic Yi areas were under CCP authority; prohibition was immediately enforced. As landlords, the major facilitators of production, had been removed during the reforms and farmers did not want to jeopardise their newly acquired land or freedom by growing an illegal crop, production slumped. Then in 1958/59, counter-narcotic and counter-revolutionary interventions were conducted in parallel: 3,000 were arrested and forced eradication conducted (Yongming, 1999, 2001).

Zhongli (2001:183-184) recounts first-hand experience of suppression in Yanhe county (Guizhou Province). In 1950, prohibition was declared one of the Provinces primary goals. All local government and military employees were ordered to forcefully eradicate crops and ‘punish opium sellers’. Propaganda on the dangers of opium was communicated whilst CCP members, soldiers and leaders of civil organisation surveyed farmland. Farmers were encouraged to uproot their own crops and producers/manufacturers ordered to hand in equipment. After a year sub-county’s and villages signed bonds agreeing to the voluntarily cessation of production; the agreements were monitored by civil associations.

Social control

Communism made people dependent on the state. In urban areas, necessities were rationed and housing, health care and education was distributed through places of work. In rural areas land redistribution and collectivisation tied farmers to communal land (Fairbank, 1994; Lu and Miethe, 2007). There was minimal freedom of travel or choice of employment (Wu, 1988). In short, China was a ‘police state’ with ‘unquestioned control over the populace in villages’ (Fairbank, 1994:353/368).

Civil institutions – such as a residents’ group - were established in cities and rural villages (Wu, 1988) and, alongside official coercive state institutions, ‘contributed to the formation of a social control network that could encompass every aspect of an individual’s life’ and was strong enough to ‘break connections even between family members’ (Yongming, 1999:110; see Dikötter, 2003; Spence, 1990). Fear of being a target for CCP criticism ‘meant that everyone needed to be seen to participate’ and the state possessed ‘a gaze far more “panoptical” than anything designed by Bentham’. (Jones, 2006:182/183).¹⁶

For example, during the 1950s there were protests in the countryside against unreasonable state procurement. While some protestors were imprisoned or executed the CCP’s primary means of control was the inducement of communal leaders, often through promises of political advancement, (Lin and Yang, 2000) who pressurised farmers’ acquiescence. CCP members emerged as the new elite, reminiscent of the magistrates and governors of the Imperial Republican regimes. They coerced the population to meet state set targets and competed to report to the centre their personal success (Fairbank, 1994).

¹⁶ For a personal account of the pervasiveness of the state see Ye (1997).

4.7. Success?

It is widely acknowledged that production had ceased by 1953 (Lee, 1995) in areas under state authority; minority areas lagged until the late-1950s (Yongming, 2000a) after which production was minimal, sporadic (Lee, 1995) and limited to remote areas of Yunnan (FCO, 1972; US Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1973; Yang, 1993). Production decreased from 25,250mt in 1949 to close to zero by the late-1950s/early-1960s; conforming to the outcome measure of *success*.

Throughout the 1950s, the US charged the CCP with facilitating opium production for foreign black markets. The claims - which were based upon information obtained from the Kuomintang Government in exile (Government of Taiwan) (for Taiwanese and US criticism see Times, 1952) - were retracted in 1967 (see Ryan, 2001; Walker and Kinder, 1986). In 1971, the US reported that production was limited to legitimate needs (Lowinger, 1977).

4.8. Rival explanations of success

An important aspect of process-tracing is the interaction with established theories, as such this section shall critically appraise rival explanations of how *success* was realised. Yongming (2000b) maintains that central to *success* was the CCP's: authority over a unified China; effective utilisation of propaganda to mobilise the majority of citizens against opium (also Rubenstein, 1973; Lee, 1995); and extensive and intrusive social control (Yongming, 2000b).

For Lowinger (1977) the primary factor was that propaganda and social control had reduced the domestic demand for opium; depressing farmgate prices. This is supported by Dikötter and colleagues (2002) suggestion that opium had fallen out of fashion after the introduction of penicillin and decades of propaganda. For example, in 1940/41, two British diplomats had reported that opium smoking had become unfashionable and 'shameful' (Prideaux-Brune, 1940:1; Franklin, 1941; see Paulès, 2008). Additionally, the sealing of the borders had removed access to foreign markets (Meyer and Parssinen, 1998).

Rubenstein (1973:61) maintains that *success* was dependent on the punitive measures enacted against traffickers and the 'amnesty and government support for victims and cooperative petty offenders'; including farmers. However, the CCP's poor record of agri-management suggests that 'government support' for opium farmers was minimal and any crop substitution was likely interrupted by the Great Leap Forward.

It is possible that the state was more repressive than reported by Lowinger, Rubenstein and accounts based upon official Chinese documents. While the state may have executed ‘just’ 800-880 individuals, extra-judicial deaths or other physical punishments may have been higher. Punishments for production may have also been categorised as crimes against the communal production of food crops, counterrevolutionary crimes or linked to the more repressive aspects of minority ‘liberation’. The extent of use of administrative punishments for opium production has yet to be explored and may have included reduced food rations or resettlement.

The available evidence would suggest that after the revolution a number of factors converged to create an environment conducive to prohibition. Social controls were established during a period of revolutionary zeal. Furthermore, many rural poor expressed a sense of indebtedness and loyalty to the CCP for: redistributing land; reducing violent conflict and warlord exploitation; freeing slaves; and general promises of improved livelihoods under socialism (see Annex 1:1). Once revolutionary zeal had faded, intrusive social control and the threat of violence had been established.

Hence, risks were increased and rewards decreased through a combination of: initial support for CCP reforms; extensive social control; repressive punishments; and a depressed market, but only once the state possessed authority.

4.9. Case summaries

Imperial/Republican

By the early-twentieth-century, China was the world’s largest source of opium. That opium was consumed by between 6.3 to 40 percent of the Chinese population was perceived as a threat to economic and military advancement; resulting in the re-enactment of a ban on opium production and consumption in 1906. The target of being ‘opium-free’ by 1916 was achieved in many provinces by 1911, however, regime change permitted a brief resurgence in production. Once the new Republican regime was established, the opium ban was resumed. In 1917, China was declared ‘clear of opium’ by a Joint British-Chinese Commission of Investigation, although, some British members attached reservations that officially supported clandestine production had increased from 1915.

Interventions tended to be centred upon a highly repressive incarnation of law enforcement. Farmers were subjected to widespread and systematic: forced displacement; destruction of property; public torture; public humiliation; and public execution. Crops were forcefully eradicated and resistance was often brutally

suppressed by the military. While prohibition was intended to be gradual, the linkage of prohibition to career advancement quickened the pace of bans; this may have inflated the repressive nature of local officials. Few projects to develop alternative incomes were made available and as farmers received little reward for compliance, many prepared for a relaxation of the ban.

Between 1906 and 1911, production had decreased by 89 percent and continued to decline until 1917. While the level of clandestine production from 1915 is unknown, accounts suggest that China achieved *success* around 1917. However, the interventions negative consequences were significant; the systematic abuse of farmers' rights would today constitute a crime against humanity.

Between 1916 and 1928, the state authority dissolved into warlord factions, many of whom facilitated opium production. While some farmers welcomed warlord support for opium farming, others were coerced into production through sanctions as repressive as those previously used to enforce prohibition. Throughout the 1920s/early-1930s, China regained its status as the world's primary source of opium.

In 1935 the Kuomintang, who had unified much of China, initiated the Six-Year Plan. Farmers were licensed in six provinces to produce gradually diminishing quantities of opium for sale to registered consumers. Repressive punishments for unauthorised production were administered alongside some crop substitution and by 1937 production had been reduced by *an excess of 90 percent*, however, production remained 870mt above the 20mt limit. While this likely decreased further by 1939, accounts of the period are inconsistent and contradictory, consequently, there is insufficient evidence to declare *success*.

(PR) China

While production had been reduced by the Six-Year Plan, after 1937 the weakening of Kuomintang authority and the requirements of war resulted in warlord and Kuomintang commanders facilitating opium production to finance their militaries. Consequently, in 1947 the UN declared China the world's largest source of illicit opium.

By 1949, the Kuomintang had been replaced by the CPC who largely unified the country under their authority. The subsequent intervention differed depending on CPC authority. In areas under CCP authority, bans on production were enforced quickly and centred upon: public humiliation and executions; near constant surveillance; and 'administrative punishments'. Whereas, in minority areas the state sequenced bans after state extension and agricultural reform.

Furthermore, many rural poor expressed a sense of indebtedness and loyalty to the CCP for: redistributing land; reducing violent conflict and warlord exploitation; freeing slaves; and general promises of improved livelihoods under socialism. Additionally, decades of anti-opium propaganda had produced a perception of opium as backward and detrimental to individual and national health.

This said, by the early-1960s, agricultural mismanagement - at considerable cost to human life - might have diluted revolutionary zeal. However, by this point China had developed a highly repressive, intrusive and hegemonic state. A combination of initial support for CCP reforms, extensive social control, repressive punishments, and a depressed market (repression, revolutionary zeal and propaganda had equally suppressed consumption) likely increased the risk and decreased the rewards for producing opium.

China achieved *success* during the late-1950s/early-1960s. However, the intervention was highly repressive, violated individual rights and, there is minimal evidence of drug control improving the welfare of opium farmers.

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5. Iran

5.1. Background and context

While opium was produced in Iran between the Tenth- (Neligan, 1927) and Twelfth-Centuries, production was minimal (Seyf, 1984) and seldom exported. Then during the mid/late-nineteenth-century (Calabrese, 2007; McLaughlin, 1976; Raisdana and Nakhjavani, 2002; Matthee, 2005; Neligan, 1927), opium was promoted by the Government as a balance to European imports and to replace the diminishing cotton (Matthee, 2005; McLaughlin and Quinn, 1974) and silk trades (Kerimi, 2000; McLaughlin, 1976; Seyf, 1984). Furthermore, the large markets of China (McLaughlin and Quinn, 1974), Europe and India were opened to Iranian merchants (Raisdana and Nakhjavani, 2002) from 1850 onwards.

During the early-1870s, to encourage the production of export crops (including opium) the state privatised significant tracks of farmland (Malek, 1991; Society of Arts, 1875) and removed taxes (Matthee, 2005). Additionally, to encourage competitiveness in China the state assisted farmers in improving opium quality (Society of the Arts, 1880). This said, state control of production and export was minimal (Rabino, 1903); there were no legal controls on production or distribution until the 1910 Law on Limiting Opium (Jazairi, 1335; Hansen, 2001; Raisdana and Nakhjavani, 2002) which was largely ignored (CNIC, 1972).

By the 1870s, opium was grown in almost all provinces (Thomson, 1869). In the largest producing provinces (i.e. Yazd and Isfahan) opium was cultivated on all arable land (Society of the Arts, 1875) at the expense of food crops, which facilitated a famine between 1869 and 1872 (Neligan, 1927; Society of the Arts, 1875) in which one-tenth of the Iranian population died (Matthee, 2005).

Consequently, production trebled between 1859 and 1861 (Matthee, 2005), doubled during the 1860s (Thomson, 1869) and - while production dipped in the mid-1970s due to famine (Seyth, 1984) - by the 1880s, opium was Iran's leading source of export revenue (Hansen, 2001) and represented:

one of the few lucrative export products for a country that had little to offer by way of commodities desired by the outside world (Matthee, 2005:216).

While some opium was exported to British pharmaceuticals (Berridge and Edwards, 1981) in the 1860s (Thompson, 1869) and 1870s an estimated five-sixths went to China (Society of Arts, 1880). To circumvent condemnation, by 1900, opium was transhipped to China through third-parties, such as Hong Kong (Seyf, 1984) and Baghdad (Rabino, 1904), which allowed Iran to argue at the 1909 Shanghai Conference that it sold no opium to China (McLaughlin and Quinn, 1974) even though the significant majority continued to find its way to Chinese consumers (Matthee, 2005). There was also a significant clandestine export trade to Turkmenistan, Russia (Kerimi, 2000), Europe and India (Society of the Arts, 1880). In addition to foreign markets, domestic consumption increased alongside production (Calabrese, 2007; McLaughlin and Quinn, 1974) and by 1884, 40 percent of all produce was consumed domestically (Malek, 1991) by Iran's significant opium consuming population (see FO, 1894).¹

By 1912, Iran had replaced India as China's primary source of imported opium (Eisenlohr, 1934). However, in the same year, Iran (reluctantly) signed the Hague Convention which obliged the cessation of exportation to any state prohibiting opium imports; which included China (McLaughlin and Quinn, 1974). In response, Iran ventured into new markets such as Singapore (Hanson, 2001). Nonetheless, World War One weakened Iran's already meagre bureaucratic controls and prevented the implantation of export regulations (McLaughlin and Quinn, 1974; also MacCormack *et al.*, 1924).

However, in 1918, the Government supported an increase in opium production to reinvigorate the declining agricultural sector (UNODC, n.d.). By 1920, Iran had captured 30 percent of the global pharmaceutical market (League of Nations, 1926) and opium was the third most important source of export revenue (Neligan, 1927). Opium was produced in 18 of 26 provinces; in some, a quarter of households were directly or indirectly reliant on the trade (MacCormack *et al.*, 1924).

In the 1920s the Government, assisted by a US financial mission (reported in, MacCormack *et al.*, 1924; Millspaugh, 1926), formulated a national modernisation plan; opium revenue constituted an integral element. As the US mission estimated that prior to 1922, 80 percent of all opium produced had evaded taxation a tax collection system was thus established whereby farmers were obliged to deliver all opium to government warehouses for processing and sale to merchants, who paid taxes on storage, processing

¹ A western physician who resided in Iran between 1866-1881 observed that 'nine out of ten aged Iranians' consumed opium daily (Matthee, 2005:209).

and export. No limitations were placed on opium's final destination (League of Nations, 1926) or quantities produced (McLaughlin and Quinn, 1974). MacCormack and colleagues (1924) found that after initial opposition (martial law imposed in Isfahan and several protesting farmers killed) by 1923, two-thirds of all opium was being taxed. A League of Nations (1926) Commission of Inquiry corroborated these observations, with the caveat that tax collection remained minimal in many areas. Neligan (1927) suggested that the Iranian bureaucracy was too disorganised, inefficient and corrupt to control a monopoly. Additionally, the controls failed to prevent significant amounts of opium being illicitly exported to the Far East (League of Nations, 1925).

Both the US financial mission and Commission of Inquiry expressed reservations over the prospect of reducing opium production through crop substitution due to: the geographical isolation of many opium-producing areas; the absence of a transport infrastructure and modern agricultural methods; and poor irrigation (Delano, 1927; MacCormack *et al.*, 1924; Millspaugh, 1926; League of Nations, 1926). The Commission of Inquiry added that opium, which was produced in the poorest areas of Iran, was less profitable than many other crops while consumption and the lack of food production often intensified rural impoverishment (League of Nations, 1926).

The Commission of Inquiry recommended the introduction of protectionist policies to invigorate traditional trades and exports (League of Nations, 1926) and that Iran be given three years to 'put its house in order' before suppressing production (Delano, 1927:4). Iran retorted that the more developed opium producing nations should reduce their production first and while it had yet to establish the necessary body of law to control a legal trade (League of Nations, 1927) it began planning an 'ambitious' monopoly system (Eisenlohr, 1934:257).

In 1928, under the Law of Government Monopoly of Opium,² a state monopoly was mandated to: license farmers; monitored harvests (Hansen, 2001); and control all exports and domestic sales (to registered consumers) (UNODC, n.d.). While unlicensed possession, distribution, and import of opium were criminalised under the 1928 Penal Law Concerning Opium Smuggling, as the monopoly was prohibited from refusing licenses (CO, 1928) farmers convicted of illicit trading could continue to produce and sell opium. To prevent diversion the monopoly increased the set-price paid to farmers ten times; although farmers often received food vouchers or credit instead of payment (Hansen, 2001). While tax holidays and loans were presented to attract farmers away

² Also translated as: Law Pertaining to the Illegal Production and Distribution of Opium and Narcotics (Aliverdinia and Pridemore, 2008).

from opium, monopolisation significantly increased production and exports (Raisdana and Nakhjavani, 2002).

While 10,000 people were arrested under the Penal Code during the late-1920s/early-1930s the monopoly failed 'to prevent competition from the illicit trade'; more Iranians consumed illicit than monopoly opium (Hansen, 2001:102) and Iran was reproached several times by the League of Nations (1925, 1930, 1939) for insufficient export controls and, consequently, supplying clandestine markets, especially in the Far Eastern. Iran was the world's largest source of recreational and quasi-medicinal opium (Prideaux, 1927).

To distance itself from being perceived as a source of illicit opium Iran banned the direct shipping to the Far East whilst permitting merchants to tranship through third parties.³ During the 1920s and 1930s, opium was sold to Macao, Russia or Japan, from where it was smuggled into China⁴ (see Brook and Wakabayashi, 2000; Booth, 1997; Eisenlohr, 1934; MacCormack *et al.*, 1924; IAOA, 1922; League of Nations, 1925; Times, 1938); in 1925-26, an estimated 398mt was smuggled into China using this method (Neligan, 1927). Iranian monopoly opium was interdicted at the US border (US Bureau of Narcotics, 1936) while heroin and morphine, using Iranian opium and manufactured in the Japanese controlled territory of Manchuria, was seized in Canada, China and the US (League of Nations, 1936).

To limit diversion, in 1936, the monopoly began procuring opium direct from the farmgate with money, rather than credit or food vouchers. While the reforms increased the amount of opium surrendered to the monopoly (suggesting a reduction in diversion) (Hansen, 2001) by the early-1940s, as World War Two (1939-1945) commenced, access to foreign markets was blocked (McDonald and Jahansoozi, 1992). The improved procurement practices and later the War created an opium surplus which produced two outcomes. Firstly, due to protectionist policies, which limited imports of crops such as cotton and silk, agricultural crops used for manufacturing were in high-demand (Hansen, 2001). Thus, in 1936/37 ten provinces were prohibited from producing opium and encouraged to diversify (Cumberbatch, 1937; Hansen, 2001); a further 25 districts were prohibited in 1938 (Saleh, 1956). The second, more inauspicious outcome, was that the surplus opium flooded the domestic market; increasing both consumption (McDonald and Jahansoozi, 1992) and concerns over the negative impact of consumption (McLaughlin and Quinn, 1974).

³ A practice which had been prohibited in India (Eisenlohr, 1934)


⁴ Some opium was subsequently transhipped to Indochina (Booth, 1997).

Due to concern for rising consumption and foreign condemnation, production and consumption were prohibited in 1946 (Moorehead, 1947). However, as foreign markets had been reopened with the ending of the War, a British diplomat observed that ‘immense quantities’ of opium continued to be illicitly smuggled into the Far East (FO, 1946:1) while an observer at a CND session reported that Iran was ‘continuing her age-old policy of selling opium to all and sundry, no questions asked’ (Moorehead, 1947:57). Furthermore, a UN report found that the monopoly exerted control over just 23.7 percent of opium produced in Iran (Atzenwiler, 1944), while a joint UK-US report to the CND stated that Iran illicitly produced 1,500 tons ‘or more’ annually; the report stressed that illicit production did not include that which was diverted from monopoly regulated production (Bulletin of Narcotics, 1949:9). In short, the declining production of the 1940s illustrated in Figure 5:2 are more likely due to receding government controls than decreasing yields (Hansen, 2001).

Then in 1949, Iran was permitted under the Limitations Convention to produce 15 percent of global supply (Raisdana and Nakhjavani, 2002). The reinstated monopoly continued the prohibition on domestic distributed of opium and the Council of Ministers prepared for complete prohibition (McLaughlin and Quinn, 1974).


Licit and illicit exports soared after 1949 (see INCB, 1969) due to the removal of Iran’s primary competitor in Asia: China. For example, in 1953, 47 percent of all seizures in Singapore were of Iranian origin. Iran opium was also illicitly exported to Middle Eastern and European states, while domestic consumption remained significant with as much as 80 percent of some provinces consuming opium (McCoy, 2003). National prevalence rates of 7.89 percent (1,500,00) (Saleh, 1956) and 10.52 percent (2,000,000) were estimated (Wright, 1958).

Figure 5: 1. Iran: Licit opium exports (1859-1954)



Source: adapted from, MacCormack *et al.* (1924); Matthee (2005); Neligan (1927); PCOB (various years); Raisdana and Nakhjavani (2002); Seyf (1984). Note: missing values indicates missing data.

Figure 5: 2. Iran: Licit opium production (1837-1979)



Source: adapted from, Bulletin of Narcotics (1949); INCB (various years); MacCormack *et al.* (1924); Matthee (2005); Neligan (1927); Pietschmann *et al.*, (2009); PCOB (various years); Raisdana and Nakhjavani (2002). Note: missing values indicates missing data.


5.1.1. Illicit production/diversion summary

Prior to establishment in 1923 of a state monopoly, an estimated 80 percent of Iranian opium bypassed taxation and was thus illicitly traded; after 1923 two-thirds of production was brought under state control. Furthermore, the sale of state controlled opium to foreign black markets persisted. By the 1940s, the state had lost control of

production of which an estimate 76.4 percent bypassed taxation (i.e. was sold illicitly). While the methodological reasoning of these estimations are not evident in the absence of a definitive study the amount of opium diverted from Iran's 'licit' production is here estimated using different diversion rate parameters: a 'low' of two-thirds and a 'high' of 80 percent.

Clearly, the diversion rate would have varied - the parameters are merely a simplifying assumption made here for illustrative purposes. For example, diversion after 1936 may have been lower than two-thirds due to the restriction in regulated area. Conversely, in 1949, when Iran replaced China as Southeast Asia's primary source of illicit opium, diversion may have climbed close to, or above, 80 percent.

Figure 5: 3. Iran: Diverted and illicitly produced opium (1837-1993)



Source: diverted, Figure 5:2. Illicitly produced, NNICC (various years); RCMP (various years). Note: Missing values indicates missing data. For 1993 production value was calculated by multiplying the recorded area under cultivation from 1979 with a yield of 17kg/ha (established from the 1979 recorded area and production estimates).

5.2. Intervention (Pahlavi: 1955-1979)

In 1955, the Law Banning the Cultivation of Opium Poppy and Use of Opium (partially reprinted in Saleh, 1956) prohibited and criminalised the production of opium. Trafficking and processing raw opium could be punished with custodial sentences of between two years and life, while landowners facilitating production could receive between six months to one-year imprisonment (McLaughlin and Quinn, 1974). Under an Imperial Order, bureaucrats could be dismissed for failing to prevent opium cultivation in their sphere of influence (Radji, 1959). In 1959, sanctions were increased

to between 15 years and (for repeat offenders) life imprisonment for opium cultivation, and a maximum of three years imprisonment for failure of a state official to report cultivation (Radji, 1960; McLaughlin and Quinn, 1974). Then, in response to an eightfold increase in heroin manufacturing between 1964 and 1966 (CENTO, 1966), the Law was amended to provide the death penalty for: opiate manufacturing or distribution, and possession of over 500grams of opium (UNODC, n.d.).

5.2.1. Development-Orientated Approaches

The Iranian delegate to CENTO (1966) in 1966 declared that food crops had replaced opium on over 30,000ha. To support crop substitution the Agricultural Bank of Iran had offered former opium farmers 5-10 years credit and technical support - especially for irrigation (McLaughlin and Quinn, 1974; Saleh, 1956). However, as state support largely failed to develop alternative livelihoods (UNODC, 2000; n.d.) the ban 'created economic hardship' for former opium producing areas (Turnbull, 1972:7). In response, many farmers migrated to secluded areas to continue clandestine production (UNODC, n.d.).

5.2.2. Law enforcement approaches

The military (McCoy, 2003) forcefully eradicated opium poppies (FO, 1961) with mechanical ploughs; in the 1955/56 growing season over 12,000ha were eradicated (Saleh, 1956). The UK and US funded and trained (Radji, 1959) police and gendarmerie 'severely' enforced the law; many were motivated by a commission of 15 percent on the value of all seized goods (UNODC, n.d.:8). As communal punishments were administered after 1968 it is likely, they played some part in law enforcement campaigns (CNIC, 1972).

5.2.3. Repeal

While the ban had *successfully* suppressed illicit opium production/diversion, scarcity had created a black market for foreign opiates from Afghanistan and Turkey (Turnbull, 1972; see Lamour and Lamberti, 1974; Wright, 1960) and violent conflicts between Iranian gendarmes and Afghan or Turkish traffickers was common (McDonald and Jahansoozi, 1992). The large-number of farmers, consumers and traffickers imprisoned placed great economic strain on the penal system and convicted families (McLaughlin and Quinn, 1974); many landlords and farmers who had lost incomes (and received no support for alternatives) lobbied the state for repeal (UNODC, 2000). The Shah was receptive. He was embarrassed by traffickers encroaching upon Iranian sovereignty (McLaughlin and Quinn, 1974) and concerned over the drain prohibition was having on scarce resources (UNODC, n.d.) and, the balance of payments (significant amounts of

gold migrated to pay for illicitly imported opiates) (Lamour and Lamberti, 1974; Murphy and Steele, 1971; Turnbull, 1972). In 1967, the UN was informed that prohibition would be reinstated when Afghanistan and Turkey took appropriate measures (INCB, 1971; Turnbull, 1972).

Consequently, in 1968 the Law on Limited Poppy Cultivation and Opium Export reinstated the opium monopoly (UNODC, n.d.). All opium produced in Iran was procured by the state for consumption by individuals registered as infirmed or elderly addicts;⁵ exportation remained banned (McLaughlin, 1976)⁶ and the number of farmers licensed was dependent on the amount of stocks necessary for internal consumption (INCB, 1972, 1976).

The Ministry of Land Reform licensed farmers.⁷ Licenses designated a location and area of land and harvest was monitored, and collected, by the Ministry or Gendarmerie (McLaughlin and Quinn, 1974). McLaughlin (1976:743/745) observed that the 'program of opium cultivation and production seems to be efficient and tightly controlled' and there 'seems to be little opium leakage from point of harvesting through point of manufacture'. This was partly due to a high set-price (Holahan and Hennessey, 1972): farmers were paid US\$90-120/kilo, compared to US\$10-15 paid by the Turkish Government and US\$120-180/kilo on the Tehran black market.

Any license violation could result in the withdrawal of the license and prosecution (McLaughlin and Quinn, 1974; Murphy and Steele, 1971; also CINC, 1972). Penalties for license violations included being chained to the walls of 'unspeakable cells' (Lamour and Lamberti, 1974:226) while possession of 2kg of opium or 10grams of heroin was punishable with death; by 1976, at least 200 individuals had been sentenced to death by biased military courts (McLaughlin, 1976). Furthermore, as licenses were assigned to cooperatives, excess cultivation resulted in the entire cooperatives opium being eradicated (CINC, 1972).

⁵ The registration system was corrupt. As ineligible individuals were registered by to corrupt officials (INCB, 1976, 1977; McDonald and Jahansoozi, 1992) between 1972-1975 the number of registered addicts grew by 57,000 (INCB, 1972, 1975). Others procured black market opium coupons (INCB, 1975; Moharreri, 1978)

⁶ Except for a small amount to Yugoslavia in 1974 (McLaughlin, 1976).

⁷ To prevent production in Baluchistan (where the Shah's authority was less pronounced) infrastructural development projects contained conditionality clauses that no opium would be produced (Calabrese, 2007).

The unpredictability of monopoly licenses and the intrusion of gendarmes who billeted in villages during harvest reduced the attractiveness of opium as a cash crop and forced many opium farmers to seek alternative crops (Lamour and Lamberti, 1974; McLaughlin and Quinn, 1974)

5.2.4. Success?

A foreign advisor to the Iranian Ministry of Health Iran reported in 1958 that the area under cultivation had been reduced from an estimated 20,000ha ‘to practically nil’ (Wright, 1958:10; also INCB, 1969). A position supported by the British Consulate (McLaughlin and Quinn, 1974) and observers from the US Fordham Law School who found:

the ban did work, and worked well..[it]...demonstrates that the control of opium cultivation at the field site is a manageable objective of a law enforcement system (McLaughlin and Quinn, 1974:520).

The Iranian Minister of Health, declared that higher opium prices and lower availability had, by 1958, reduced the number of consumers by two-thirds⁸ and that Iran had become a net opium importer (Radji, 1959). Hence, the evidence suggests that by 1958 Iran had reduced illicit opium production and diversion from licit sources by over 90 percent to below 20mt.

Resurgence of illicit production/diversion did not immediately follow the repeal of the ban did. While the INCB (1969:13) initially declared repeal a ‘sharp disappointment’, within two years their apprehension had lessened (INCB, 1971, 1972, 1976) and they reported that ‘the Board has so far received no indication of diversion to illegitimate purpose’ (INCB, 1973:24); a position echoed by the US ambassador (McCoy, 2003).

However, in the early-1970s, Lamour and Lamberti (1974:233) interviewed farmers and found that low-quantities of opium were diverted from stores and fields (also CINC, 1972); McLaughlin and Quinn (1974) estimated that five percent was diverted. Nonetheless, illicit production had begun to increase by the late-1970s (INCB, 1979;

⁸ The number of consumers had decreased from an estimated 1.5 million in 1955 (INCB, 1969) to between 400,000 (McLaughlin and Quinn, 1974) and 350,000 (McCoy, 2003) by the end of prohibition.

UNODC, n.d.) to supply the growing number of illicit heroin manufacturers operating in Tehran and the north-west (INCB, 1975).

5.3. Intervention ([IR] Iran: 1979+)

In 1979, the Pahlavi dynasty was overthrown and Iran became the Islamic Republic of Iran (henceforth (IR) Iran). To the dismay of many of the theological elite (Trebach, 2002; McLaughlin, 2007) the instability of the revolutionary period and the dismantling of the Shah's repressive drug control apparatus initially increased production and consumption⁹ (Dalvinda, *et al.*, 1984; Falco, 1980; NNICC, 1980; McDonald and Jahansoozi, 1992; McCoy, 2003).

In 1980, a propaganda campaign - blaming consumption on counterrevolutionaries and the west - was launched (McDonald and Jahansoozi, 1992; Murphy, 1993b; Raisdana and Nakhjavani, 2002) to coincide with the enactment of the Bill on Severe Punishment of Perpetrators of Drug Offences and Protective Measures for Treatment and Employment of Addicts. The Bill prohibited all intoxicants¹⁰ and mandated that: all opium poppies be eradicated; opium farmers receive between three and 15 years imprisonment (rising to the death penalty for second offences); neighbouring farmers and village leaders failing to report production receive sentences commensurate with the tried farmer.

After an initial seven month purge, in which between 176 (Ross, 1980; Trebach, 2002) and 240 (NNICC, 1980) individuals were executed for disobeying the Bill, it was announced that 85-90 percent of the illicit narcotics trade had been suppressed and the Iranian 'Mafia' had been eliminated. While these claims may have been somewhat exaggerated, the price of opium in Tehran did increase fivefold (Ross, 1980); indicating significant scarcity of opiates.

At this point there is a divergence of opinion. The Iranian Government (in Razzaghi, *et al.*, 2000; RCMP, 1988/9; UNODC, n.d.) and UNODC (2000; in Gouverneur, 2002) claimed that production ceased in 1980 and did not resume, while, in 1981, the INCB (1981) ceased reporting illicit Iranian production. Conversely, American (NNICC, 1981, 1983, 1985-6; INCSR, 1995) and Canadian intelligence accounts (RCMP, 1983, 1986/7-1988/9) reported that illicit production increased.

⁹ Official sources suggested that close to five percent of the population were addicted to opium in 1979 (Spencer and Agahi, 1990).

¹⁰ After a six months grace period consumers were placed in 'rehabilitation' centres to detox before serving prison sentences (UNODC, n.d.).

The increase in production was reportedly a consequence of: political instability; the redeployment of resources to the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) (Aliverdina and Pridemore, 2008; McDonald and Jahansoozi, 1992; NNICC, 1983; Samii, 2003; Spencer and Agahi, 1990); the persecution of trained criminal justice personnel employed under the Pahlavi dynasty (Babcock and Kotkin, 1980; NNICC, 1985/6); and the inability of the centre to control peripheral areas, especially the Kurdish and Baluch regions (Babcock and Kotkin, 1980; NNICC 1981, 1983, 1985/86; RCMP, 1983).

The NNICC (1985:75) reported that as there 'was no narcotics control program in Iran; despite Iranian Government statements to the contrary' in many cities a period of unofficial toleration of opium transpired (McCoy, 2003; Trebach, 2002). Conversely, Spencer and Agahi (1990:176) - whilst indicating that opium was produced in eastern Iran - claim that between 1979 and 1988 the criminal justice system's treatment of consumers continued to be 'strong to draconian'; including mass public executions for drug offences (AI, 1986).

It is argued that by the early-1990s such repressive law enforcement had contained the level of supply at a high-level (McDonald and Jahansoozi, 1992; RCMP, 1983, 1986/7, 1988/9). While, McCoy (2003) maintained that little opium was exported, a former DEA agent (cited in Babcock and Kotkin, 1980) and the RCMP (1986/7-1988/9) suggested that strict currency regulations and high European and US prices resulted in some Iranian produced opium being exported (while Iranian consumers imported the cheaper Afghan opium).

In 1988, the Tehran Home Service (1988:n.p.) acknowledged the enforcement had been lax, and that resources had been diverted from drug control:

As Iran enters a new stage in the aftermath of the war, it is essential that drug officials embark on a purge of society to coincide with the reconstruction process. Most of the problems in the anti-drug campaign stemmed indirectly from issues related to the imposed war. Hence, most of the forces who should have been mobilised to combat the merchants of death had to be dispatched to the fronts out of sheer necessity.

Additionally, an unpublished report commissioned for UNODC (n.d.:15) (by an unidentified author) maintained that opium production was eradicated by 'the punitive

measures applied by the virtues of 1988 and 1997 Anti-Narcotic laws’; suggesting that opium was produced until at least 1988.

In 1988, the Anti-Drug Law (1988) was passed to re-assert enforcement of prohibition. It obliged all Village Islamic Council members to report all production to the Islamic Revolutionary Committee Corps or Gendarmerie. The punishments for illicit cultivation were shown in Table 5:1. The Law represented a return to repressive measures (Golestan, 1989) and was followed in 1989 by the *Val Adiyat* Campaign¹¹ (Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1989; also IRNA, 1989b) which commenced with: the public execution of 70 traffickers; the seizure and burning of opiates; and a conflict at the Iran-Afghan border in which 70 traffickers were killed (Koring, 1989).

Table 5: 1. Iran: Punishments for cultivation under 1988 Anti-Drug Laws

	Fine	Lashes	Custodial/execution
First offence	1-10 million rials	-	-
Second offence	5-50 million rials	3-70	-
Third offence	10-100 million rials	1-70	2-5 years
Fourth offence	-	-	Execution

5.3.1. Development-Orientated Approaches

After 1979, crop substitution programs were administered after the imposition of bans. Farmers were given ‘incentive gifts’ for cultivating substitute grains, which the state procured at a fixed-price. Loans were made available for: agri-industrial development; irrigation construction; and procurement of agri-technology. While rural development funding reportedly increased throughout the mid-1980s (UNODC, n.d.:31) that national agricultural self-sufficiency and economic conditions worsened between 1981 and 1988 (Keddie, 2006; see Annex 1:2) may suggest that support for former opium farmers could have been insufficient.

5.3.2. Law enforcement approaches

In 1980, Sadeq Khalkhali was mandated to enforce prohibition as head of the Anti-Narcotics Campaign Office and chief-judge of the Anti-Narcotics Revolutionary Courts.¹² During Khalkhali’s seven month tenure over 20,000 individuals were

¹¹ Almost 1,000 ‘drug offenders’ were arrested in pre-emptive campaigns (IRNA, 1988).

¹² Revolutionary Courts tried crimes against Islam and political crimes (Murphy, 1993). The Courts were presided over by clerics and administered by *pasdars* (guards) appointed by the Khomeini (Abrahamian, 1999).

imprisoned – including forced labour (Tehran Home Service, 1989) - under the 1980 Bill (NNICC, 1980, 1981) of which between 176 (Ross, 1980; Trebach, 2002) and 240 (Auerbach, 1980; NNICC, 1980) were sentenced to death; they were often publically hanged as a warning (Abrahamian, 1999; Blanche, 1989). While the majority of those executed were traffickers the ‘frequency of his death sentences and the zealously of his minions...probable had a chilling effect on many opium farmers’ (NNICC, 1981:23).

While the 1980 Bill declared that opium farmers be imprisoned for 3-15 years, in 1981, the Islamic Revolutionary Prosecutor in Firozabad declared they be punished as counter-revolutionaries (BBC 1981): a crime often punished with death (Abrahamian, 1999). The Prosecutor also mandated that village councils and gendarmerie be prosecuted for failure to suppress production (BBC, 1981). In Shiraz, all military and security forces were ordered to monitor compliance and report contraventions to the Islamic Revolutionary Courts, which punished opium production in accordance with an interpretation of Islamic law (BBC, 1982): Islamic law has been interpreted as allowing flogging for *Sharb al-Khamr* (intoxication) in several jurisdictions (Baderin, 2003), including for opium farmers in Pakistan (see Chapter 8). Furthermore, in 1981 flogging was designated an appropriate interrogation technique; torture in custody was common (Abrahamian, 1999). While opium poppies were forcefully eradicated (INCB, 1981) repressive law enforcement appears to have been the primary deterrence mechanism.

After the initial seven-month purge, the interdiction of laboratories (INCB, 1982) and traffickers increased (INCB, 1985). Large-numbers continued to be sentenced to death¹³ at trials conducted without representation or appeal (AI, 1986; Murphy, 1993); concepts deemed as a ‘Western absurdity’ (Abrahamian, 1999:125).

During the late-1980s/1990s the Drug Control Headquarters publically executed as many as 500 traffickers a year; many bodies were left hanging as a warning (Raisdana and Nakhjavani, 2002). According to the Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs between 1997 and 2007, over 10,000 traffickers were executed (cited in Aliverdinia and Pridemore, 2008). Additionally, forced resettlement and destruction of property was

¹³ During a three-month period in 1983, 200 were executed. A further, 197 were executed in March/April of 1985 (AI, 1986).

undertaken in localities with large consuming populations or trafficking activity¹⁴ (Raisdana and Nakhjavani, 2002).

Social control

Revolutionary zeal for some and fear (of Revolutionary zealots, vigilantes and the police) for others established an extensive and intrusive system of social control through civil society (see Annex 1:2). For example, in 1993, the majority of individuals in forced detoxification centres were informed on by families or neighbours, often through a public ‘hotline’ (Murphy, 1993). It is not an unreasonable to imagine that similarly intrusive surveillance would be placed upon opium farmers and distributors; especially as neighbouring farmers, community leaders and local bureaucrats could be punished for not preventing or reporting production (see UNODC, n.d.).

5.4. Success?

In 1995, the INCRS (1995) had reported how the Dublin Group had found that Iran had cultivated 3,500ha of opium in 1993; a figure denied by Iranian officials (Nissaramanesh *et al.*, 2005). Then in 1996 the INCRS (1996:n.p.) reported that there:

are no recent reports indicating that opium poppies are cultivated in Iran to a significant extent.... recent reports by the Dublin Group nations present in Iran lend credence to Iranian claims that poppy cultivation has been largely stamped out.

The Dublin Group estimate was verified by two US satellite imagery surveys (Marcus, 1999) which suggested that Iran produced ‘negligible’ opium (INCRS, 1998, 1999). Hence, in 1998 Iran was removed from the US list of ‘major’ illicit drug producing countries (INCRS, 1998).

Conversely, UNODC (2000:142; see Razzaghi *et al.*, 2000) has stated:

No country has a more exemplary record.... The authorities in Tehran stamped out the domestic production of illicit opium after

¹⁴ This was often as part of the extensive border defence infrastructure constructed between 1980-2005, which included, in 2001, training and arming paramilitaries in border villages (see, Calabrese, 2007; Murphy, 1993b; INCRS, 2009; Samii, 2003; Samii and Recknagel, 1999).

1979...//..For more than 20 years, this has been maintained and today there is no opium poppy cultivation in Iran.

Antonio Mazzitelli, a former Teheran representative of UNDCP, has stated that Iran suppressed illicit production within a year and a half of 1979 (Gouverneur, 2002); the INCB (1981) last reported illicit production in 1981.

Nonetheless, potential bias was present in all accounts. While pre-1994 US reports have been criticised as overestimates designed to discredit Iran (Haq, 2000) the removal of Iran from the INCRS ‘majors’ list was equally criticised – by members of the US Senate - as a diplomatic gesture without ‘substantive grounds’ (Lippman, 1998). Conversely, (IR) Iran as endeavoured to portray the country as a strong Islamic state devoid of ‘western’ influences, such as drug use, (Aliverdinia and Pridemore, 2007) it may have avoided admissions of production. The UN, however, may have sought to avoid alienating Iran from their drug control regime. Furthermore, contrary to UNODC proclamations of success, a UNODC (n.d.) commissioned draft paper suggested that production continued until the 1990s.

From the evidence presented above, the most likely scenario is that after the initial seven-month purge had cooled, resource reallocation and the existence of areas outside of state authority facilitated large-scale illicit production; Iran’s 1988 admission of the inadequacy of controls may equally have been an admission of large-scale illicit production. This said post-1988 Canadian/US production estimates appear excessive when accounting for the repressive nature of *Val Adiyat* and it appears feasible that production ceased between 1988 and 1993. The absence of Iran from UN and US reports since 1996 suggests that production declined from an estimated 300mt in 1980 to below 20mt by 1996 (at the latest); a reduction of over 90 percent to below 20mt.

5.5. Rival explanations of success

An important aspect of process-tracing is the interaction with established theories, as such this section shall critically appraise rival explanations of how *success* was realised. McLaughlin and Quinn (1974:519) posited that, from 1955, *success* was dependent on repressive law enforcement. Evidence suggests that there were few incentives to cease opium production until the state monopoly system was established in 1969; a system which continued to rely on repressive communal punishments. In many respects, the (IR) Iranian intervention was a continuation of Pahlavi policy, both were based upon: forced eradication; punitive law enforcement; community punishments; and extensive

and intrusive surveillance of opium farming communities. Additionally, the anticipatory effect of public executions of 'drug offenders' may have increased the perceived risk of production.

The (IR) Iranian intervention is differentiated only by the incentives many rural Iranians perceived the Revolution as providing, such as: the redistribution of land; the removal of a reviled regime; and religious affiliation. However, once revolutionary zeal had faded, intrusive social control and the threat of brutal punishments appear to have presented an effective deterrence. While a report for UNODC (n.d.) declared that (IR)Iranian *success* was facilitated by crop substitution and infrastructural development *after* bans had been imposed, evidence suggests that support for the development of alternative livelihoods was minimal, especially as the intervention period was characterized by increasing rural impoverishment.

5.6. Case summaries

Large-scale opium production for export began during the mid-nineteenth-century and while the state promoted the trade, it provided few controls over production or export. Consequently, prior to 1923, an estimated 80 percent of all produce was untaxed whilst some of the remaining 20 percent was exported to countries which prohibited its import. In short, the state failed to prevent and may have facilitated the circulation of Iranian opium in domestic and foreign black markets.

In 1923, an opium monopoly was created which, until the late-1930s, exerted control over an estimated two-thirds of production (i.e. it failed to prevent one-third from being diverted from state control). However, the events of World War Two weakened state control and consequently, diversion recommence at 80 percent; Iran remained a major source of opium to black markets'.

Due to foreign pressure, and domestic concern over rising consumption, production was prohibited in 1955. The ban was brutally enforced and as there was insufficient economic support it further impoverished many former opium-farming communities. While opium production was *successfully* suppressed, domestic pressures facilitated the repeal of prohibition and the reinstatement of the monopoly system. The monopoly procured opium from licensed farmers for sale to registered consumers, however, while infringements were brutally punished, limited illicit production and diversion eventually resurfaced.

In 1979, the Pahlavi dynasty was overthrown and the drug control apparatus was dismantled. The subsequent increase in production and consumption dismayed the

theological elite and a highly repressive purge of ‘drug offenders’ resulted in many being imprisoned in forced labour camps, publicly executed or (likely) flogged. Loyalty to the Revolution and fear of persecution established a system of extensive and intrusive surveillance which was intensified by state-sanctioned vigilante groups. Opium poppies were forcefully eradicated and support for the development of alternative livelihoods remained minimal.

While the Iranian Government and UNODC claim that production ended with the purge, it appears likely - considering the acknowledgement by the state owned Tehran Home Service - that production and consumption resumed in some areas due to redeployment of resources to the Iran-Iraq War and lack of authority over minority areas. In 1988 the War ended and the intervention recommenced extensive intrusive surveillance and brutality; the use torture may have been more widespread. While details of production are mired by potential bias and national self-interest, there is a general agreement that production ceased by 1996 at the latest.

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6. Turkey

6.1. Background and context

The opium poppy has been cultivated in the Anatolian region of Turkey since 1900BC (Murphy and Steele, 1971) for food, medicine and animal feed (Brundage and Mitchell, 1977); recreational consumption has remained rare (Akçasu, 1976). Opium may have been first exported to Asia in the eighth-century, however, production and export remained limited until the early-nineteenth-century (Chablis, 1977). In 1805, American merchants - barred from trading Indian opium - began illicitly exporting Turkish opium to China (Spain, 1975; Trocki, 1999) and by 1828 Turkish exports accounted for 10-11 percent of the clandestine Chinese market. In 1828, the state monopolised production and distribution; the monopoly was mandated to procure all opium produced in Turkey for sale to private merchants, for export (Poroy, 1981). However, as the monopoly possessed insufficient resources:

The sale of opium to unauthorised merchants by local officials was prevalent..... Contraband was everywhere and smuggling proved to be insurmountable in spite of numerous edicts and repeated orders. The size of the contraband is estimated to be about *one-third* of legal purchases (Poroy 1981:198, my italics).¹

In 1839, the British negotiated the end of the monopoly with the intention that British pharmaceutical companies procure opium directly from Turkish farmers. Consequently, the market for Turkish opium shifted from opium for smoking to opium for pharmaceutical preparation (Poroy, 1981) and between 1827 and 1900, Turkey supplied 59 to 99 percent of all British opium imports (Berridge and Edwards, 1981) whilst continuing to export to prohibited markets (Spain, 1975). After 1858 Turkey gradually increased its share of the newly licit Chinese market (Newman, 1989) and by 1905, alongside Iran, had become the primary source of smokable opium (Musto, 1987) and - through loosely regulated European pharmaceutical controls (see Block, 1989) - morphine (Murn, 1914) in the Far East.

¹ A nuance Poroy neglects is that as the majority of 'legal' exports went to countries which prohibited imports (i.e. China and Siam) they were essentially contraband.

By the 1930s, Turkey had become the world's primary source of opium to both the licit and quasi-licit pharmaceutical industry and accounted for 226mt of the 390mt global total (Eisenlohr, 1934; see Block, 1989). While opium was Turkey's fifth most important agricultural export, state control was limited and diversion remained high (Eisenlohr, 1934).

Throughout the 1920s as European nations strengthened controls over their pharmaceutical industries, several companies relocated to Turkey to circumvent regulations and manufacture opiates for non-medical/scientific consumption² (Block, 1989; Eisenlohr, 1934; Times, 1931). The League of Nations (cited in Times, 1931:13; see League of Nations, 1936) reported that 'no part of the [Turkish opiate] output...is applied for bona-fide medical and scientific purposes'. For example, in 1927 a Japanese company established a manufacturing laboratory in Istanbul to supply heroin to the Chinese black market. Turkish opium additionally supplied French pharmaceutical companies, which also illicitly exported opiates; in 1928, France imported three times the global medicinal requirement of opium from Turkey (Block, 1989; see Booth, 1996; Friman, 1996; Meyer and Parssinen, 2002). The increased demand from opiate manufacturers inflated Turkish opium production (Eisenlohr, 1934).

After ratifying the International Opium Convention in 1933, Turkey enacted its first domestic drug control legislation (GoT, 1986; West, 1992): the Limitations Law (No.2253) (Bulletin of Narcotics, 1950). The Law mandated that the Council of Ministers' annually determine the number of provinces permissible to produce opium or grow poppies for seeds (for which opium extraction was prohibited) (Bulletin of Narcotics, 1950). Substitute crops - including the construction of sugar factories in poppy growing areas (League of Nations, 1938) - were encouraged in areas banned from production (League of Nations, 1936).

While the majority of opiate manufacturers were closed under the Limitations Law (Block, 1989; Times, 1933) raw opium continued to be exported to markets which prohibited its import, including: Egypt; European; North American; the Far East (Bulletin of Narcotics, 1953); and Indochina (Cambodia, Laos and Viet Nam) (League of Nations, 1930). Contrary to the UNODCCP (2000:142) statement that 'illicit cultivation emerged as a major problem only in the 1960s' between 1931 and 1941, the League of Nations (1931) and UN Bulletin of Narcotics (1953) had declared Turkey one of the world's three major sources of illicit opium.

² The 1925 and 1931 international treaties obliged states to prevent the sale of opiates for recreational use by regulating their pharmaceutical companies (Bayer and Ghodse, 1999).

In 1936, Turkey reported to the League of Nations (1938) that while significant tracts of land were cultivated with opium poppies the monopoly price had been deflated by decreased foreign demand and, consequentially, as farmers could not afford to hire labourers 75-80 percent of the crop remained un-harvested. As controls over production and trade remained nominal, it is not unconceivable that 75-80 percent was diverted to black markets, rather than wasted.

While some domestic opiate manufacturing was reported in 1945 (CND, 1945) the majority of diverted opium was refined to morphine base in Lebanon and then converted to heroin in Italy (Kayaalp, n.d.; Murphy and Steele, 1970; Rottenberg, 1968). By 1952, the tightening of Italian pharmaceutical controls displaced manufacturing to France, which continued to procure Turkish opium (see McCoy, 2003; Newsday, 1974; Ryan, 2001; Vaille and Bailleul, 1953). Then in 1955, after Iran banned opium production, black market demand for Turkish opium may have increased; inflating the level of diversion (Wishart, 1974).

This said, nominal controls had been established to control diversion. In 1938, Law No.3491 established the TMO as a monopoly to buy, store and export agricultural produce - including opium (TMO-Alkasan 1989; see CND, 1945). Control was based upon the 'opium declaration system' whereby the Ministry of Agriculture calculated how much land would be required to yield a predetermined quantity and granted provinces permission to produce opium. Farmers in designated provinces informed their *Muhtar* (village leader) what they expected to yield in the following season. The expectations were relayed to the Ministry of Agriculture and farmers were expected to adhere to their own estimates (Akçasu, 1952; Murphy and Steele, 1971; also League of Nations, 1938). Monitoring was conducted by the *Muhtar*, who informed the TMO of any contravention (CINC, 1972).

However, as farmers were insufficiently regulated whilst remuneration was low and unreliable state the majority of farmers continued to sell to the black market (Akçasu, 1952; Lamour and Lamberti, 1974). Any farmer residing in a designated province was permitted to produce opium without a license, they estimated their own yields and were legally free to possess and store opium (see Akçasu, 1952; Bulletin of Narcotics, 1949; CND, 1944, 1945, 1946, 1951, 1955, 1957). Additionally, while TMO prices 'neither repaid [farmers] for their troubles and outlay nor gave them the profit they were

entitled to expect' (League of Nations, 1938:45) procurement practices were inefficient, further reducing prices³ (Murphy and Steele, 1971).

Additionally, in many border provinces where opium production was prohibited, opium poppy cultivation was permitted for the harvesting of seeds (Bulletin of Narcotics, 1950). Turkey conceded in 1968 that it was unable administer effective controls over farmers in border areas; suggesting that the state was unable to prevent farmers from extracting opium.

Thus until the 1960s, control was limited to gradually (see Table 6:1) restricting permissible production areas to where the state possessed greatest authority (Akçasu, 1952; Greenfield and Nanby, 1974; INCB, 1968, 1969, 1971) and away from areas with easy export access (i.e. border areas). According to the TMO the provincial restriction policy was 'gradual and calculated', and not unfavourable to opium farmers as bans were enacted in areas which produced the least opium or where conditions could support substitute crops (GoT, 1986:7) which were encouraged by agricultural extension workers (Murphy and Steele, 1971). While there is insufficient information on how bans were enforced, the repressive use of the military to dissolve Kurdish minorities (in border provinces) (Annex 1:3) may suggest the possibility of coercive suppression.

Table 6: 1. Turkey: Provinces permitted to produce opium

Date	No. of provinces permitted to produce opium
Pre-1933	62 (no limitation)
1940	42
By late-1940s	42 (banned in areas situated within 100km of national border)
1961	35
1962	25
1964	16
1968	11 (banned in all border provinces)
1969	9
1970	7

Source: GoT (1986); also Bulletin of Narcotics (1950); League of Nations (1938); INCB (1968). Note: there are some discrepancies between the GoT data and that reported in the Bulletin of Narcotics (1950) and INCB (1971).

³ As the TMO often stored opium for up to six weeks the moisture content was reduced, which reduced the weight and hence price (Murphy and Steele, 1971).

During the 1960s, to prevent diversion, the TMO: increased its prices by 66 percent; made it easier for farmers to deliver opium to monopoly agents; ensured all were paid with cash (many farmers had previously been paid with food coupons); radio and print media campaigns publicised penalties for non-compliance (CINC, 1972); and surveillance of opium farmers from planting to harvest was increased (Murphy and Steele, 1972) and by the late-1960s seizures of illicit opium had increased significantly (Robins, 2007). Additionally, in the late-1960s/early-1970s French and American interdiction of French heroin manufacturers and traffickers (see GOA, 1972, 1975; Times, 1970, 1971, 1972; Wigg, 1974) may have reduced demand for Turkish opium.

These measures, and the contraction of provinces did improve the amount surrendered to the monopoly (Kayaalp, n.d.; Turnbull, 1972) and led the PCOB (1965:xxix) to note with ‘approval’ and ‘satisfaction’ that restrictions were a ‘step in the right direction’ (PCOB, 1966:xx). However, the ‘declaration system’ remained insufficient:

Since yields varied from year to year, the farmer tended to understate expected yields for he was liable for prosecution if he did not deliver to the ...[TMO]... the total amount of gum he had reported in his declaration. In general, little effort was made to question farmer declarations or to verify actual yield at harvest time. Thus, this system allowed for considerable opportunity for underreporting yields (CINC 1972:A3)

Furthermore, as possession remained legal farmers could store overproduced opium which could be sold as and when; diluting the states control over distribution (Murphy and Steele, 1971). To add to bureaucratic weaknesses, the coercive arms of the state tended to be inefficient, under resourced and lacked training in narcotics control (Murphy and Steele, 1971; Newsday, 1971). Additionally, provincial bans were limited to insignificant producers; a review of Turkish agriculture in the late-1940s failed to report opium production as important for any province outside of Amasya Province or Afyonkarahisar Sub-region (Erinc and Tucdilek, 1952) while during the 1960s, Afyon accounted for 80 percent of all opium produced in Turkey (GoT, 1986).

The innovations of the 1960s may have reduced the level of diversion, however, it remained high and in 1966, Iran complained to CENTO that opium diverted from the Turkish monopoly supplied 25 percent of its black market (FO, 1966). The US, in 1961,

had also complained to CENTO that 70 percent of all heroin consumed in America was sourced from ‘Middle Eastern’, primarily Turkish, opium fields and French heroin laboratories. While the Turkish delegate replied that controls were stringent, the accusation was not refuted (FO, 1961) and by the mid-1960s, the US estimate had increased to 80 percent (Economist, 1974; Musto, 1987; Lamour and Lamberti, 1974). Both the Government of Turkey (GoT, 1986) and French authorities expressed their dissatisfaction at the 80 percent estimate. While 80 percent was seen as an overestimate by several knowledgeable individuals, it is acknowledged that Turkey was the predominant source of opium for heroin destined for the US (McCoy, 2003; Murphy and Steele, 1971; Rottenberg, 1968).⁴

During the mid/late-1960s, there was no agreement between US sources of the level of diversion. The DEA (1995) estimated that one-third was diverted; the US Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) (cited in Holahan and Henningen, 1972) estimated two-thirds; the CINC (1972, see Table 6:2) estimated that diversion decreased from 69.5 to 26 percent; while a US ambassador to Turkey reported 25 percent (Epstein, 1977). While Newsday (1974) concluded - from interviews and fieldwork in Turkey - that two-thirds was likely, other journalists reported five (Munir, 1970, cited in Robins, 2007) and ten percent by the late-1960s/early-1970s (Howe, 1980). While the two-third estimate is the one most often cited (Kayaalp, n.d.; West, 1992) Robin (2007:fn14) suggests that it was ‘bandied around’ so much that it became ‘conventional wisdom through repetition, without being established on any firm foundation’

Table 6: 2. Turkey: CINC diversion estimates

	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971
Percentage diverted	69.5	52.3	46.5	58	26
Estimated diverted (mt)	205	137	110	80	49

Source: adapted from CINC (1972). Note: CINC acknowledges often-large error margins.

BNDD estimates were established through comparing the expected and actual yields (Epstein, 1977; Holahan and Henningen, 1972). Between 1961 and 1972 on average the world’s largest source of licit opium (India) produced 12kg more per hectare than Turkey. This can be partly explained by topography, soil, the poppy variety cultivated (Bulletin of Narcotics, 1950) or extraction methods (Holahan and Henningen, 1972),

⁴ Epstein (1977:89) proclaimed the 80 percent estimate as a ‘journalistic “fact”’ to legitimise the targeting of Turkey, rather than producers that were more significant’. The argument however neglects US pressure on Thailand (see, Chapter 7:1).

however, significant diversion was likely another significant factor (Brundage and Mitchell, 1977; Wishart, 1974).

The INCB (1971:13) summarised the 1960s by stating:

Frequent appearance in the illicit traffic of opium, or opium derivatives, known or presumed to have originated from Turkey has made this country a focus of international concern for a number of years. Counter-measures have not been lacking, yet the stream of such substances has persisted and has caused much disquiet....


Turkey itself proclaimed to the INCB (1974:13) that regardless of increasingly stringent restrictions placed on the trade 'substantial quantities' of opium were entering the global illicit market in the late-1960s.

6.1.1. Illicit production/diversion summary

Reports to the League of Nations indicate that between 75 and 80 percent of all produce was diverted in 1936. This conjecture may not be unreasonable if compared to similar diversion rates recorded at the time in Iran, which possessed a more sophisticated control mechanism (see Chapter, 5:2:3). The 1936 estimate can be placed with the estimates presented in the mid/late-1960s to produce three different diversion rate parameters: a high (80 percent); middle (66 percent); and a low (25 percent) as expressed in Figure 6:1.

Diversion appears high (80 percent) from at least 1936 (peaking after the 1955 Iranian prohibition) to the 1960s when the imposition of more stringent controls make two-thirds (66 percent) appear more appropriate. By the early-1970s the low-parameter (25 percent) appears feasible, while this may have been as low as five percent by the early-1970s, the findings of Newsday suggest that two-thirds were diverted until prohibition was enacted.

Figure 6: 1. Turkey: Diverted opium (1907-1972)



Sources: adapted from, Bulletin of Narcotics (1949, 1950); CINC (1972); Grey (1925); INCB (various years); League of Nations (1941, cited in Block, 1989); PCOB (various years). Note: missing values indicates missing data.

6.2. The ban

Throughout the late-1960s, the US aggressively lobbied Turkey to prohibit opium production. Turkey refused on the basis that, as the seven remaining areas were economically dependent on opium, it would create a humanitarian crisis (Spain, 1975). While Turkey responded by improving some mechanisms of controls (see above), US threats to withhold aid (Kamminga, 2007) resulted in the passing of the 1971 Opium Licensing and Control Law. The Law: demanded that all opium farmers be licensed; barred farmers with a criminal record from obtaining a license (CINC, 1972); and criminalised the possession of unlicensed opium (GOA, 1972).

In late-1971, the civilian government was overthrown in a military coup. The new regime, under Decree No.7/2654, banned all production from June 1972 (Kamminga, 2007; Robins, 2007).⁵ The ban was funded by US\$35 million in US aid, broken-down into: US\$15 million to compensate the state for loss of export revenue; US\$15 million to compensate farmers; and US\$5 million for crop substitution (Spain, 1975). A further US\$300,000 was agreed to procure the final opium crop and US\$400,000 to pay the wages of American advisors to crop substitution projects (GOA, 1975).

Additionally, the US began to research substitute crops in the seven most important opium-producing regions (US Information Service, 1971) and a five-year plan was

⁵ While US pressure is often cited as the primary reason for prohibition, as insurgent forces had become involved in trafficking during the late-1960s (Anatolia News Agency, 1999; West, 1992) suppression may have been perceived by the military as possessing counterinsurgency elements.

formulated. The Plan centred primarily upon improving wheat yields to release land for other crops (Brundage and Mitchell, 1977), secondary objectives included: improving the agricultural and transport infrastructure; extending modern agricultural practices; improving livestock husbandry (INCB, 1973); and the establishment of a dairy processing plant in one major producing province (Kayaalp, n.d.).

While there was no violent opposition to the ban many villagers hid poppy seeds in anticipation of repeal (Newsday, 1974). This said, a US Senator reported that ‘the Turkish Army played a key role in its enforcement’ (Hatch, 1984:2) which may indicate that some coercive means were needed to enforce the ban.

6.2.1. Repeal

While opium exports were relatively unimportant to the national economy (opium accounted for just 0.5 percent of national revenue) (Brundage and Mitchell, 1977) the ban was estimated to have cost Turkey US\$400 million (West, 1992). Furthermore, for many farmers, who lived close to the poverty line, opium represented a significant percentage of their annual income. Additionally, the ban removed traditionally consumed opium poppy by-products (oil, animal-feed, fuel) and while farmers were compensated many by-product industries were not (Brundage and Mitchell, 1977; see Greenfield and Nanby, 1974; Spain, 1975).

Furthermore, crop substitution failed to deliver alternative incomes. The unstable military regime was unable to effectively administer crop substitution projects (Brundage and Mitchell, 1977; GOA, 1975) which, as they were lacking baseline agricultural research, introduced crops unsuited to the soil and weather conditions (GoT, 1986; also Time, 1974; West, 1992) while marketing of new crops were often limited by insufficient transport (Newsday, 1974). Consequently, many farmers migrated to urban areas (Klose, 1981), which created ‘a potentially dangerous social resentment.... among the people affected by the ban’ (GoT, 1986:9).

In addition to impoverishing farmers, a perception of national subservience to US interests (Robins, 2007; Zürcher, 1998) made the repeal of prohibition an issue of national pride (Fyjis-Walker, 1974; Warren-Ghosh, 1974; see Sarell, 1970). A situation further aggravated by the US and INCB who, driven by American pharmaceuticals’ anxiety over reduced opium supplies, approached India to increase production (GOA, 1975; Spain, 1975) and briefly planned to produce opium in the US (Economist, 1974).

Thus, while the ban was hailed as a success by the UN (INCB, 1972, 1973, 1974) and US (GOA, 1975), extensive opposition was expressed throughout the national media (Warren-Ghosh, 1974; Spain, 1975) and political parties (Brundage and Mitchell,

1977; Fyjis-Walker, 1974). Consequently, in 1974, the new government - partially elected on a pro-opium platform (Robins, 2007) - informed the US that they would repeal the ban (Brundage and Mitchell, 1977) and began cultivating poppy seeds in state farms to prevent them from going stale (FCO, 1974; Warren-Ghosh, 1974).

6.3. Post-ban

In July 1974, the ban on *cultivation* was lifted in seven provinces by Decree No.7522. As the Decree prohibited the extraction of opium, the ban on *production* remained. A monopoly system was established whereby farmers were licensed to produce poppy straw which was manufactured into morphine (see GoT, 1986; Warren-Gash, 1975b; UNFDAC, 1975; also Decree No.7/8522; Decree No.7/9204).⁶ Initially, 100,000 farmers were licensed (GOA, 1975) to cultivate poppies over 20,000ha (UNFDAC, 1975).

While a INCB study tour concluded that the ‘Mission was well impressed with the scope and variety of the several control measures which have been propounded’, doubts were expressed over the ability of the TMO to prevent diversion, due to insufficient resources (Greenfield, 1974:n.p.; Greenfield and Nanby, 1974). Accordingly, to assist Turkey the UN: part funded the construction of a poppy straw processing plant (Bayer, 1983; Kamminga, 2007); lobbied pharmaceutical companies to ensure the procurement of Turkish morphine (FCO, 1974b); and trained and equipped the TMO and gendarmerie. Additionally, the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development provided financial advice and, to lessen dependence on opium, funded crop substitution projects in two opium-producing provinces (Kayaalp, n.d.; UNFDAC, 1975).


The US, arguing that repeal contravened the 1971 agreement (GOA, 1975; Spain, 1975), ceased narcotics associated aid (Robins, 2007) and lobbied states to coerce Turkey to reinstate the ban (FCO, 1974). However, reports by the UN, and US media,

⁶ The INCB (1974) had initially lobbied for poppy straw production. Turkey declared their interest if economically viable (Kirca, 1974; see, FCO, 1974c) and, financially and technically supported by the UN (Kamminga, 2007).

The production of opium from poppy straw is significantly different from that of incising poppy pods. In the system introduced in Turkey in the 1970s, the poppy plant is cultivated in the same manner as elsewhere - whether India or Afghanistan - however, at harvest the farmer is prohibited from incising the poppy pods to collect the opium gum within, instead, farmers cut and crush the poppies. The crushed poppies represent the poppy straw which is then sold to the state. Using expensive technology that is not generally available, the morphine is extracted (Mansfield, 2001; see, Bayer 1983).

on the effectiveness of control gradually softened objections (Robbins, 2007) and by late-1975 the hawkish DEA (FCO, 1974d) acknowledged that controls were ‘remarkable effective’ (Warren-Gash, 1975c:n.p.; also Howe, 1980), while the US President formally expressed his satisfaction to the Turkish PM expressing (Warren-Gash, 1975). Then in 1981, the US passed the 18/20 Rule which obliges that 80 percent of all imports to the US must have originated in either Turkey or India (West, 1992). Between 1980 and 2009, Turkey remained a major source of opium for the pharmaceutical industry (Figure 6:2).

Figure 6: 2. Turkey: Share of global licit opium production in morphine equivalent (1980-2009)



Source: adapted from INCB (various years).

6.3.1. Licit controls

After 1974, the opium monopoly continued to be administered by the TMO. Prior to harvest the Council of Ministers annually instructed: the amount of land to be cultivated; in which provinces and districts; and the number of licenses to be administered (Mansfield, 2001). Farmers were then permitted to apply to the TMO for a license (GoT, 1988; Kayaalp, n.d.) detailing: the size and location of farmland; the type of seed to be used; and the irrigation source. Licences could only be held by farmers, over 18 years of age, and without a criminal record. Successful applicants were guaranteed by the *Muhtar* (Mansfield, 2001) who were made accountable for diversion; this created a considerable social restraint on farmers.

During cultivation, teams of agricultural experts (*Ajans*) inspected licensed farmers (a minimum of six times), formulated an expected yield, and administered agricultural advices. To prevent corruption all inspections results were signed-off by the *Ajans*, the licensee and *Muhtar* and any, excess cultivation was verified by a second team of *Ajans*

(Mansfield, 2001; TMO-Alkasan, 1989). The ground inspections were supported by aerial surveys of all licensed areas (Greenfield and Nanby, 1975; GoT, 1988, 1986b; Turkish Embassy, London, 1975; Turkish National News, 1981; Kayaalp, n.d.).

When the opium gum could be extracted, the TMO and Gendarmerie increased their surveillance (UNFDAC, 1986) and placed undercover agents in areas where diversion was suspected (Greenfield and Nanby, 1975; GoT, 1986b). The licensee was permitted to harvest the crop (i.e. crush the poppies) once the *Ajans* confirmed that no pods had been lanced. Once harvested, farmers delivered the straw to the *Ajans* for weighing. If the surrendered straw was significantly above or below the *Ajans* initial yield estimation the farmer was referred to court (see GoT, 1988; Mansfield, 2001; UNFDAC, 1986).

All crops cultivated in excess of the license agreement were eradicated and the farmer banned from obtaining a license in the future (Decree No.7/9204; GoT, 1986) and hence the loss of an important income. Excess cultivation or other license contraventions could be punished with between one and five years imprisonment (Law No.3298); with the potential torture and inhumane conditions associated with the Turkish penal system (see Annex 1). Furthermore, communal punishments placed a social restraint on farmers; entire community's crops could be eradicated for the excess production of one farmer (ECOSOC, 1996, in Farrell, 1998; Riley, 1993) while the *Muhtar* could be heavily fined for failing to prevent or report diversion (Law No.3298). During the first year, 205 farmers who cultivated more than their license permitted (GoT, 1986b) had their crops forcefully eradicated, were punished with a maximum of six years imprisonment and were barred from obtaining future licenses (UNFDAC, 1975).

6.4. Success?

Since 1974, the US (DEA, 1995; NNICC, 1981, 1988; INCRS, 1996-2007), UN (UNODCCP, 2000; INCB, 1975, 1977, 1979, 1980, 1982), and Interpol (1988) have reported how effective controls have limited diversion to practically nil, while a British FCO commissioned report found:

... incidences of excess cultivation are certainly low..... For instance, at the Bolvadin *Ajans* it was reported that there had been no cases of excess cultivation for at least nine years (Mansfield, 2001:20).

While small amounts of opium were reportedly illicitly produced in the early-1980s (NNICC, 1980, 1981) the practice remained minimal. *Success* may be best indicated by the Iranian (McCoy, 2003) and US heroin shortages which followed the opium ban (see Agar and Reisinger, 2002; GOA, 1975, 1979; Reuter, 1985; Spain, 1975; Wilson, 1990). In summary, depending on the diversion parameter, production declined from a peak of 123mt (25 percent) and 392mt (80 percent) in 1931 to practically nil by 1974; a reduction of over 90 percent to below 20mt.

6.5. Rival explanations of success

An important aspect of process-tracing is the interaction with established theories, as such this section shall critically appraise rival explanations of how *success* was realised. There is limited prior analysis of how the pre-1972 provincial reductions were achieved. It appears that there was some crop substitution and while repressive law enforcement approaches cannot be ruled out neither can they be verified. However, as opium poppy was not a major crop in many of the provinces, opposition may have been minimal.

While several analysts have partly attributed post-1972 *success* to the production of poppy straw (as opposed to raw opium) (Bayer, 1983; Kayaalp, n.d.; Mansfield, 2001; West, 1992), the prevention of diversion for both methods of opium extraction require extensive controls. For example, opium straw farmers must be prevented from incising the opium pods to extract opium. Therefore, Reuter (1985:92) posited that Turkish *success* was dependent on the presence of a strong central government which ‘could enforce laws without risk of revolt’, whereas deeper investigation by Mansfield (2001:19) suggested that prevention centred upon extensive surveillance, social controls and ‘sufficiently harsh’ deterrence.

The analysis above suggests that *success* centred upon the ability of the state to administer stringent regulations, which placed farmers under prolonged and extensive surveillance. Furthermore, farmers were deterred from diversion through the administration of individual and community disincentives of eradication, de-licensing (and associated loss of income), and imprisonment (and the associated torture and inhumane conditions).⁷ The punishment of village heads or entire villages for not

⁷ As there is some evidence that the military was used to enforce the 1972 ban, it is possible that law enforcement was more coercive than is often reported. There are reports of the Turkish gendarmerie and military violently repressing political opposition and abusing those convicted or accused of crimes. This said, that opium farmers constituted a significant voting block may have diluted potential repression, and few foreign accounts of the intervention (which received

preventing or reporting transgressions may have represented an important additional source of surveillance and social control.

6.6. Case summary

Industrial production commenced in the early-nineteenth-century to supply the Chinese black market. Throughout the mid/late-nineteenth-century, Turkey was a major producer of raw opium for the European pharmaceutical industry and, prepared opium to the Far East and foreign black markets. By 1905 Turkey, was the major source of opium to Asia (including China) and Europe's quasi-licit heroin manufacturers. During the 1940s, European pharmaceuticals were regulated to prevent quasi-licit heroin manufacturing; Turkey adapted and became the largest producer of raw opium to illicit heroin manufacturers.

Between 1931 and 1941, Turkey was one of the world's three largest sources of illicit opium (alongside China and Iran), primarily because - as suggested by the League of Nations in 1938 - 75-80 percent of all opium produced in Turkey was diverted from state control. From the 1940s, the primary preventive measure was the limitation of production to where the state possessed optimum authority and away from areas with easy access to foreign borders. However, as bans were administered in the lowest yielding provinces, and many permitted the cultivation of opium poppies for seeds (whilst banning the extraction of opium), the impact on national production was minimal. There is scant information on how bans were administered, while there is some evidence of crop substitution the coercive use of the military can be neither verified or ruled out. This period is a blind-spot in the history of Turkish and international drug control.

This said, as production remained within areas which produced the majority of Turkish opium, the high-levels of diversion are attributable to the laissez-faire controls exerted by an inefficient state monopoly. While some innovations during the 1960s are likely to have reduced the level of diversions, control remained inadequate. Illustrative of the problems of estimating diversion rates, during the 1960s four US institutions produced two different diversion rate estimates. American estimates were used alongside estimates from the League of Nations in 1938 to establish three diversion

substantial foreign political and media attention) detail abuse. Thus, while repressive law enforcement cannot be ruled out, the systematic violation of opium farmers' rights appears unlikely.

parameters: a high of 80 percent; a middle of 66 percent; and a low of 25 percent. Fluctuation within these three parameters appears to follow the subsequent trend: diversion appears high (80 percent) from at least 1936 (peaking after the 1955 Iranian prohibition) to the 1960s when the imposition of more stringent controls make two-thirds (66 percent) appear more appropriate. By the early-1970s the low-parameter (25 percent) appears feasible.

In 1972, the newly established military regime banned opium production. After the ban, an inefficiently administered crop substitution programme was established in some farming communities. The impoverishment of Turkish farmers, coupled with public perceptions of subservience to US interests, led a democratically elected government to repeal the ban in 1974.

With the support of the UN, a poppy straw production and manufacturing system was established under a state monopoly; minimal opium was diverted after 1972. While poppy straw is more difficult to divert, *success* centred upon the administration of a highly effective control system which placed farmers under prolonged and extensive surveillance whilst providing ‘sufficiently harsh’ individual and community disincentives. That the village head or entire village could be punished for not preventing or reporting transgressions may have represented an important additional source of surveillance and social control.

Since 1974, minimal amounts of opium have been either diverted or illicitly cultivated, hence, Turkey conforms to the outcome measurement of success: *an excess of 90 percent reduction which brings the potential production below 20mt*. Furthermore, the Turkish intervention appears to have positively impacted opium-farming communities.

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7. Thailand

7.1. Background and context

Opium was likely introduced to Siam (Thailand after 1939) in the thirteenth-century and first prohibited in the fourteenth-century. Prohibition was partly repealed in 1851 to allow Chinese immigrants to consume state distributed opium (Jinawat, 2001; see Renard, 1999). While the monopoly was supplied primarily from India (League of Nations, 1930) and Iran (Bangkok Times, 1935), there was limited procurement from Thai highlanders¹ (Renard, 2001; see Culas, 2000). Due to high monopoly prices many consumers procured black market opium (League of Nations, 1930) supplied from Burma (Renard, 2001) and, lesser amounts, from China (Malcolm, 1929) and the Thai highlands (Culas, 2003; Culas and Michaud, 1997). This said, highland production remained a garden enterprise (Renard (2010).

Prohibition on consumption was reinstated in 1921 under Opium Act B.E.2472 (1929-30) which provided a fine and/or six months imprisonment for unauthorised production (League of Nations, 1930). Under the Act opium dens were closed (Times, 1959) and crops forcefully eradicated, forcing many farmers to migrate to Laos (Culas, 2000) or violently resist suppression (League of Nations, 1930).

Prohibition was short-lived and in 1932 – after a military coup - taxed opium dens were reopened (League of Nations, 1937). However, failure to concurrently regulate production stimulated trafficking from Yunnan and Burma and 23 percent of all opium sales, between 1935 and 1940, were from ‘seized’ opium (McCoy, 2003); state officials would unofficially order opium from Burma, which was interdicted at the border. The interdicted opium was sold to the state monopoly and the Burmese official was paid a ‘reward’ for their ‘information’ (FO, 1936).²

Then in 1938, the Thai Opium Department licensed 600 farmers in Chiang Rai Province (Crosby, 1938; League of Nations, 1937).³ As documents were lost in World War Two the amount produced is unknown (Renard, 1999), yet British FO records

¹ ‘Highlander’ or *chao khao* (hill people) make up around one percent of the Thai population and resided in Northern provinces (Kesmanee, 1994; see essays in McCaskill and Kampe, 1999).

² In 1939, Siam complained to the League of Nations (1939) of the futility of prohibition when opium was trafficked from Burma and Yunnan.

³ This was partly to integrate and ‘civilise’ highlanders (Renard 1999).

indicate production was limited and could ‘support a fraction’ of Siam’s consumers (Crosby, 1938b:n.p.).

Then in 1949, in response to criticism of the monopoly at the UN, the Royal Thai Government (RTG) officially banned production (CND, 1953, 1956; Kesmanee, 1994), although unofficial toleration persisted until 1959 (and beyond in many areas) (Kesmanee, 1994). In 1949, the RTG reported to the UN that whilst reliable production estimates were difficult to ascertain, large-scale illicit export to the lowlands persisted and, while some crops were being eradicated the inaccessibility of the highlands made suppression ineffective (CND, 1949).

While globally Thailand was not a major source in the 1940s (Morlock, 1944) external events in the 1950s transformed production levels. Between 1949 and 1955 Southeast Asian production had increased in response to the removal three major sources of illicit or quasi-illicit opium – China, Iran and India - (Crooker, 1986; Jinawat, 2001; McCoy, 2003; Renard, 2001; Stevenson, 1953; Wishart, 1974) and supplied approximately 50 percent of total illicit global production by the late-1950s (McCoy 2003).

The RTG may have authorised highland production to replace foreign suppliers (Chandola, 1976) as, while production was prohibited, between 1947 and 1957 narcotics related corruption was high, ‘even for Thai standards’ (McCoy, 2003:187). It is well established that high-level state and military officials unofficially protected and taxed opium farmers, whilst protecting, and distributing opium for, the anti-communist Kuomintang⁴ and other anti-Communist insurgent/trafficking groups (Holiday, 1957; Gibson, 1966; McCoy, 2003).

However, in 1959 - due to fear of increasing domestic consumption (Jinawat, 2001) and obligations under international law – the monopoly ceased trading; the Harmful Habit-Forming Drugs Act (1959) prohibited all non-medical/scientific production, consumption and distribution⁵ (see Saihoo, 1963; Times, 1959). While prohibition was comprehensively enforced throughout Thailand (McCoy 2003) to ensure stability in the highlands and border areas, where the state possessed insufficient authority (Hinter,

⁴ The exiled army of the former Chinese Government had sought refuge in Burma after 1949 where they utilised the opium trade to raise revenue for unsuccessful counterrevolutionary operations (McCoy, 2003).

⁵ Opium smoking was prohibited by Proclamation No.37 (1960). The Harmful Habit-Forming Drugs Act (1961) extended the 1959 Act by prescribing life imprisonment or the death penalty for distribution or manufacture heroin.

1983; Thongtham, 1992), opium production was unofficially tolerated (Gibson, 1966; Hinter, 1983; McCoy, 2003; also, Geddes, 1970). Furthermore, the Thai military continued to support anti-Communist groups such as the Kuomintang who financed their activities through drug trafficking (Gibson, 1966; McCoy, 2003). Toleration significantly increased illicit opium production (see Figure 7:1).⁶

State contact with the highlands had been low. The first highland development (non-opium related) plan was launched in 1959 and unsuccessfully attempted to re-settle communities into new lowland villages (Chareonpanich, 1987; Gua, 1975). Prior to this, the Border Patrol Police (BPP) - formed in 1955 to enforce national law in the highlands – had sporadically constructed schools and distributed medicines or agricultural equipment (Renard, 2001) to build relationships between highlanders and the state (UN, 1969).

In 1960, the RTG acknowledged their lack of understating of highland peoples and requested UN assistance. A socio-economic survey of highland peoples was conducted in 1965/66, followed by a CND supported survey of the socio-economic needs of opium farmers (Bulletin of Narcotics, 1974; Chareonpanich, 1987; Jinawat, 2001). The survey found that opium was produced primarily as altitude and soil prevented the cultivation of many conventional crops, and, many highland farmers possessed expertise in its cultivation and had migrated to Thailand in search of land suitable for its production.⁷ Nonetheless, the majority of farmers expressed a willingness to abandon production if a profitable crop were available (UN 1968, 1967). Mobile development (Nuechterlein, 1967) and social welfare services were provided as a short-term solution (Chareonpanich, 1987; Jinawat, 2001).

A five-year plan (1964-1969) to: reduce opium production; slow forest and watershed degradation; and integrate highland peoples through crop substitution largely failed due to insufficient resources, knowledge of highland peoples or experience in highland development (Renard, 2001). Additionally, during this period a small-scale insurgency was being fought in the highlands. To prevent opium revenue from reaching insurgent coffers, brutal forced eradication was conducted (Economist, 1969; Kanjan and Kaewchote, 2004).⁸ For example, in 1968 Miles (2007) witnessed the Thai military

⁶ Geddes (1970) posits how RTG estimates for the 1960s tended to be conservative.

⁷ Culas (2000) describes how many tribes migrated around Southeast Asia in search of opium producing land (also, Kanjan and Kaewohotte, 2004; Culas and Michaud, 1997).

⁸ The 'Red Meo Revolt' (1967-1970) is illustrative of opium-insurgent links. RTG officials visited a Hmong village in Chiang Rai three times to collect bribes from opium farmers. On the

bombing a village and then planting mines in potential poppy fields before looting resources.

Aware that eradication alienated highland peoples and inflated insurgents' support-bases (Chapman, 1974; McBeth 1984b) by 1968 some northern official (Economist, 1969) and the BPP had began arguing that eradication was counterproductive (Marks, 1973), and in the late-1960s/early-1970s a policy to integrate highland peoples into the state began. Opium suppression, perceived as counterproductive, became secondary to rural development - especially road construction (Lee, 1994) – and while highland development remained a minor issue (Renard 2001) until the mid-1970s (Dirksen, and Kampe, n.d.; Francis, 2004) by 1971, the Thai Royal Family, UN, and US had begun to fund crop substitution projects (Renard, 2010).⁹

7.1.1. 1970s

In 1973, coinciding with the US 'War on Drugs', the RTG announced narcotic and corruption suppression as a national priority,¹⁰ while the US began unilaterally interdicting traffickers (Train, 1973). Funding and training from the US (Kuzmarov, 2008) strengthened Thai drug control capabilities (Hazlehurst, 1977; INCB, 1973) and, supported in operations by several European nations (Martin, 1977), opiate seizures increased from minimal levels in 1971 to 36mt in 1972 (GOA 1975); several traffickers and manufacturers were executed (Darling, 1978; Hazlehurst, 1977; Times, 1978). The US and Thai-European interventions facilitated a heroin shortage in Hong Kong (China Mail, 1973; South China Morning Post, 1973),¹¹ significantly reduced US supplies and deflected Southeast Asian heroin from the US to European and Australian markets (McCoy, 2000). Production decreases in the mid-1970s (see Figure 7:1), however, were

third visit, villagers attacked the provincial police, who responded by torching the village. Fearing the beginning of a major conflict, the military napalmed surrounding villages to force migration to accessible areas. In response, Hmong insurgents conducted terrorist attacks in the lowlands. The Thai military, aware of their limited skills in mountain combat, responded to the attacks by sub-contracting the Kuomintang, who killed 150 Hmong villagers (Chandola, 1976; Gua, 1975; McCoy, 2003).

⁹ Including a one-year compensated eradication campaign which destroyed 26mt (Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1973).

¹⁰ Until 1976, Thailand was almost completely reliant on US economic aid (FCO, 1976; Turnbull, 1973) and thus open to pressure.

¹¹ The Government of Hong Kong complained that corruption had limited further reductions (Hong Kong Standard, 1973).

due to a prolonged drought preceded by heavy rains, rather than intentional interventions (Hughes, 1979; Kelly, 1981; NNICC, 1980; see Roth, 1974). It was during this period that the first RTG/UN development project began.

In 1975, a British diplomat reported that while opium yields had been improved by greater access to modern agri-methods three barriers to eradication persisted. Firstly, the RTG refused to use law enforcement before substitute crops were identified. Secondly, individual police officers protected and profited from distribution.¹² Thirdly, 'circumstantial evidence' linked the military elite to insurgent groups (McBain, 1975, also, FCO, 1972; Hazlehurst, 1977; Hinter, 1983).

During the early/mid-1970s dual drug policies had been operational: a prohibitionist civil government and facilitating military elite, however, in 1976, the civil government was removed in a coup which some suggest was engineered by the military, which feared the civil government's anti-drug policies were a threat to alliances with insurgent/trafficking groups (McCoy, 2003).¹³ Nonetheless, the new military regime did pass legislation prohibiting possession of heroin precursor chemicals in border areas (Branigin, 1982) and imposed mandatory life sentences, or the death penalty, for serious drug offences. Aerial surveys were also first undertaken in northern Thailand (INCB, 1979). However, by 1980 the poor weather conditions of the early-1970s had ceased: heroin laboratories were re-established (Kelly, 1981) and production resumed at a high-level.

7.1.2. 1980-1999

By the late-1970s, the majority of insurgent bases had been destroyed and estimated Communist Party numbers had fallen from 12,000 to 2,000. Hence, the threat of eradication stimulating insurgent rural support had lessened (Lee, 1994) and all highland areas were opened to development and law enforcement (Renard, 2001). Additionally, high-level narcotics related corruption began to wane in 1980 when a new regime (McCoy, 2003) who perceived insurgent/trafficking groups as a security threat (Butler, 1982; Cima, 1985) came to power. The publication of stories of military complicity with traffickers/insurgents in the Thai media and the growing financial and political influence of banks and multinationals (the replacement of illegitimate with legitimate finance) essentially ended high-level facilitation of the trade (McCoy 2003),

¹² Gua (1975) reported that during the early-1970s the threat of prison was used to extract bribes from opium farmers.


¹³ Renard (2010) suggests that anti-drug policies were one of a convergence of multiple motivators, including opposition to the prime ministers conservative policies.

even if traffickers continued to be a corrupting factor in Thai politics throughout the 1980s (Cima, 1985; RCMP, 1988). Consequently, by 1985, all insurgent/trafficking groups and heroin laboratories had been expelled from Thailand (Cima, 1985) and the BPP had increased their interdiction capacity along the Thai-Burmese border (Malarek, 1989).

In 1982, *A Brief Account on Government Resolution Towards Problems of Hilltribe People and Opium Production*, expressed DOA as the most appropriate method of opium suppression. This was followed by two opium suppression and highland development Masterplan's (1983 and 1988). The objective of the first was to extend developmental support to 15 percent of the highland population (RCMP, 1988) and establish eight development projects in high-density opium farming areas. The objective of the second Masterplan was to improve coordination between the multiple Thai and foreign development agencies (Renard, 2001).


While small amounts were eradicated in 1980 (NNICC, 1981) the official approach was to avoid confrontation (Branigin, 1982) and extend alternative livelihoods (Renard, 2010). By 1983, alternatives to opium had secured many farmers adequate living standards. However, as many intercropped new crops with opium, production increased by 40 percent between 1981 and 1985 (Lee, 1994; also McBeth, 1984b). Consequently in 1983 eradication increased (Gammelgaard, 1987) in areas where: opium was cultivated on a large-scale; the village had received international or national support (Crooker, 1988); some alternative incomes had been established; the area was accessible (Renard, 2010). While many farmers responded by migrating opium crops away from the village and/or reducing plot size (to avoid detection and limit losses) (De Meer, 1987), eradication did increase interest in, and cooperation with, development projects (Dirksen and Kampe, n.d.) and within a couple of years Thailand had become a net importer of opium (RCMP, 1986).

Figure 7: 1. Thailand: Illicit opium production (1923-2008)



Source: adapted from, Figure 7:1; Bulletin of Narcotics (1974); Der Meer (1989); Dirksen (1999); FCO (1972); Holahan and Henning (1972); INCRS (various years); Magnussen *et al.* (1980); McCoy, 2003; NNICC (various years); ONCB (various years, cited in Der Meer, 1989; Renard, 2001); RCMP (various years); Train (1973); Renard (2001); UN/RTG (1985, cited in Der Meer, 1989); UNODCCP (1999, 2000, 2002); UNODC (2005, 2007, 2008b, 2009, 2010). Note: missing values indicates missing data. grey line represents 20mt outcome measurement of success.

Figure 7: 2. Thailand: Area under opium poppy cultivation (1934-2008)



Source: adapted from, INCRS (various years); NNICC (various years); ONCB (various years, cited in Der Meer, 1989; Renard, 2001); RCMP (various years); Saengprasert (1987); UN (1962, cited in Renard, 2001); UN/RTG (1985, cited in Der Meer, 1989); UNODCCP (1999, 2000, 2002); UNODC (2006, 2007, 2008b, 2009, 2010). Note: missing values indicates missing data. Diagonal line indicates 26-year gap in data.

7.2. The intervention

By the 1970s, a body of law had been established which prohibited and criminalised production, distribution and manufacture and provided the police sufficient power to eradicate crops and interdict trafficking (CNIC, 1972; see Harmful Habit-Forming Drugs Act, 1959, 1961). Then in 1959, the Narcotics Control Act (1979) provided sanctions for distribution, possession or production, ranging from one year to life imprisonment for 20grams of opium, to the death penalty for excess of 20grams.

7.2.1. Development-Orientated Approaches

This section shall present an overview of the five primary development projects conducted from 1969.¹⁴ The particulars of the projects, summarised in Table 7:1, are: (1) Royal Northern Project (RNP) (1969-present) in all northern provinces; (2) Crop Replacement and Community Development Project (CRCDP) (1972-1979) in Chiang Rai and Chiang Mai Provinces; (3) Highland Agricultural Marketing and Production Project (HAMP) (1979-1984) in Chiang Rai and Chiang Mai;¹⁵ Lamang; Mae Hong Son; and Tak Provinces; (4) Thai-German Highland Development Programme (TG-HDP) (1981-1998) in Chiang Rai and Mae Hong Son Provinces; (5) Doi Tung Development Project (DTDP) (1987-present) in Doi Tung (Chiang Rai Province).

Renard (2001) divides Thai DOA into the three phases. During the first phase (early/mid-1970s), projects (i.e. CRCDP and RNP) focused primarily on researching and extending substitute crops. It was a period of ‘trial and error’ (Dirksen and Kampe, n.d.:5) whereby project workers identified: that several suitable crops possessed low market prices; unanticipated pests and diseases; the unavailability of credit for highland peoples; the poor transport infrastructure (Renard, 2001); and inadequate marketing opportunities. There were also internal conflicts within Thai (Dirksen, 1999) and UN funded projects, long-term planning was ineffective (GOA, 1975) and projects were extremely top-down (Dirksen and Kampe, n.d.; Renard, 2001). However, the early-projects built relationships and established a knowledgebase:

officials learned about the hills and crops that could grow there.

Opium growers, who mostly only knew lowland officials as soldiers

¹⁴ A number of smaller projects are described in minimal details by: Renard (2001); Saengprasert (1987); Speranza (1987); Suriy (2002).

¹⁵ The Thai-Norwegian Church Aid Highland Development Project took over some HAMP villages when the project terminated (Renard, 1994).

or police who came to fight or arrest them, learned there were Thai officials with whom they could cooperate (Renard, 2001:80).

Hence, by the second phase (late-1970s/1980s) project workers possessed a growing familiarity with the cultures of, and issues facing, highlanders and while projects remained top-down (Renard, 2001),¹⁶ the focus of projects was widened from crop substitution to more comprehensive approach's targeted at local issues (Renard, 2001) which placed greater emphasis on social services (Lee, 1994; Renard, 2002). The culturally integration of succeeding generations into mainstream Thailand resulted in the extension of the education system into the highlands (Renard, 2001). During the late-1980s, the highland transport infrastructure was also greatly expanded by military, police, developmental projects and private individuals (Crooker and Martin, 1992). Research continued, for example, in 1980, Chiang Mai University began to collect, identify and document highland plant diseases in order to train farmers in their prevention (Black and Jonglaekha, 1989). Law enforcement began in the middle of this phase (Dirksen and Kampe, n.d.).

During phase three (1990s), influenced by shifts in development theory which emphasised the benefits of self-determination, projects increased the involvement of highland peoples in project implementation and planning (Renard, 2001). The 1992-1996 and 1993-2001 Masterplan's for Community Development, Environment and Narcotic Crops Control (Jinawat, 2001), supported by the Seventh Development Plan (1992-1996), coordinated all highland development into one national programme; further mainstreaming opium suppression into national highland development objectives (Dirksen and Kampe, n.d.). Additionally, throughout the 1990s, rapid national economic growth accelerated the demand for highland produce and facilitated transport infrastructural development (Hau, 2002; Renard, 2001). Consequently, the highlands attracted much private development, including non-farm employment and tourism (Fox, 2009; Mansfield *et al.*, 2006).

The RNP was the first development-orientated project administered in Thailand. The project, initiated by King Bhumibol Adulyadej and managed by Prince Bhisatej Rajani

¹⁶ An extensive critique of the lack of participation is offered by Kampe (1992) who reports that while all documents throughout the 1980s professed community participation in design and implementation, in practice this was seldom the case. Conversely, Renard (2010) recounted to the author that even during the early-1970s, projects *were* bottom-up when compared with Thai development practice of the time.

(Rojanasoonthon, 2001),¹⁷ set the primary objective of improving highland living standards; gradual opium suppression was a secondary objective. Initially the King was the primary donor, whilst university and government employees volunteered their time (Chareonpanich, 1987); however, shortly after inauguration several foreign states donated experts, agri-machinery and seeds (Royal Project Foundation, 1996; Thongtham, 2005). As knowledge of highland development was limited, research remained the priority during the first decade (Rojanasoonthon, 2001) and undertaken by Kasetsart University, Taiwan and America (Williamson, 2005; Pleumpamya, 2009) often in conjunction with CRCDP and later HAMP. The project, originally administered straight crop substitution, expanded significantly and adopted an alternative livelihoods approach which informed many later projects (Renard, 2010).

In 2007, the RNP supported 142,667 people throughout 38 development centres (Jinawat, 2009). The standard of living is reported to have increased in all project areas: the average annual income in many villages increased from a pre-project average of 4,000 baht (US\$95) to 59,000 baht (US\$1,500) in 2004 (Williamson, 2005). Furthermore, access to modern medicine and education increased significantly (Pleumpamya, 2009). Thongtham (1992) uses the village of Bah Khun Klang (Chiang Mai) as an example of success. By the late-1980s, extension workers had introduced a variety of crops, some of which earned the farmer 50 percent more than opium, whilst the villagers had gradually developed better houses, and built a temple and school.

As the UN/ONCB administered CRCDP was managed by Prince Rajani the projects worked closely with RNP. The project operated in 30 villages with two primary objectives of suppressing opium and enhancing food production (Renard, 2001). To overcome the lack of Thai expertise in highland development, agricultural advisors were sent from Israel, the US and Taiwan (Smith, 1973) and there was a significant emphasis on research (Lee, 1994). The mid-term evaluation found that farmers could earn greater profits from substitute crops, and opium production had been reduced (Saengprasert 1987); however, there was evidence of intercropping of licit crops with opium and using new techniques to improve opium yields (Hazlehurst, 1979).

¹⁷ The Thai Royal Family was a key benefactor of DOA. Their involvement in several projects lessened bureaucratic barriers (Renard, 2001) and ‘opened doors’. For example, DTDP textiles received prime placements at fashion and trade shows, and the support of the press (Bendiksen, 2002), while local administrations built roads to precede Royal visits (Renard, 2001).

The CRCDP followed by HAMP, which extended the project area to 51 (RTG, 1980) and later 64 villages (Saengprasert, 1987) and continued CRCDP's research (Lee, 1994). However, as the CRCDP staff had recognised that without a marketing division they would not be able to sell what farmers grew (Renard, 2010) there was a greater emphasis on marketing. While research and crop substitution achievements of CRCDP continued, opium cultivation increased in the project areas by 36 percent (it had only increased by one percent during CRCDP) (Lee, 1994) and between 1981 and 1985 the project area demonstrated one of the largest expansions of illicit production nationally (McBeth, 1984b). Nonetheless, while failing to reduce production, it illustrated that substitute crops could be profitable (Gammelgaard, 1987) and helped compile research on highland crops, culture and best practice (Suriya, 2002).

In 1987, DTDP was initiated by The Princess Mother (Viravaidya, 2001) with the objectives of reducing: opium production; prostitution; environmental degradation; and illegal logging (Nardone, 2008). While a pre-project socio-economic survey found that opium was the only available cash crop (Viravaidya, 2001) opium production had ceased by 2001 (Viravaidya 2001, UNODC 2005) while between 1988 and 2003 the average household annual income increased from 5,000 Baht (US\$163) to 35,000 Baht (US\$1,144).¹⁸ Additionally access to healthcare improved (Mangat, 2003) and the number of project participants without an education shrank (UNODC, 2005). However, as the project was administered in a small target area and was more cash intensive than other projects it has proved difficult to replicate (Renard, 2010).

TG-HDP has been described as a 'broad and holistic' rural development project which (Bendiksen, 2002:101) matured from narrow crop substitution to inform many later UN and RTG projects (Barrett and Palo, 1999). Throughout the life of the project, villagers diet improved (Dirksen, 1999), school enrolment increased from 25 to over 65 percent (Dirksen, 2006) while infant mortality rates, infectious diseases (i.e., malaria and smallpox) and bacterial water-borne infections were reduced (Dirksen, 2001). Many farmers tripled their income;¹⁹ between 1990 and 1998, in some areas, family income was raised from US\$120 to US\$1,000 and opium production was reduced significantly (Dirksen, 2006).

¹⁸ The Baht to Dollar conversion uses the February 2011 exchange rate of 0.03271 US Dollar per Thai Baht (MSN, 2011).

¹⁹ One of the project areas (Wawee) is now Thailand's principal source of coffee (Renard, 2010).

7.2.2. Law enforcement approaches

During the 1960s, opium suppression interventions were limited to repressive forced eradication and law enforcement in insurgent areas and included forced displacement and military assault (see Economist, 1969; Kanjan and Kaewchote, 2004; Miles, 2007). However, repressive interventions began to be perceived as counter-productive to counter-insurgency objectives (Campbell, 1983; Chapman, 1974; Economist, 1969; McBeth, 1984b) and from the inception of RNP (Renard, 2001; Pleumpamya, 2009; UNODC, 2007) and CRCDP (Lanir, 1973; Smith, 1973; UNFDAC, 1972) it was agreed that no crops would be eradicated, or farmers punished, until viable alternative incomes were available. CRCDP project staff decided that as a primary objective was getting a foothold into villages (Renard, 2010) coercion would damage project/community relationships (Renard, 2001). During the early stages of RNP, project staff communicated the illegality of opium to farmers, and whilst stressing to farmers that while they could be arrested, project staff were not involved in law enforcement; local police were requested to support this approach (Thongtham, 1992). Only once new crops began to show signs of profitability, did the RNP project negotiate agreements to cease production (Pleumpamya, 2009). Due to the realisation that coercion could be counter-productive and that opium farming was a product of poverty no opium was eradicated in Thailand until 1983.

Nonetheless, in 1980, the Shan United Army, a trafficking/insurgent group operating out of Thailand, was closed down during a military operation. The Royal Thai Air Force, Rangers and BPP (Butler, 1982) arrested 180 (Kelly, 1982), killed 100, destroyed several heroin laboratories and pushed the group into Burma (Economist, 1982). Henceforth, Thai interdiction capacity along the Thai-Burmese border was increased (Malarek, 1989) and the military and police began to interdict major traffickers and laboratories (Cima, 1985); often through aerial bombing and military assault (Economist, 1992).

While the official approach to producers remained the avoidance of confrontation²⁰ (Campbell, 1983; Branigin, 1982) in 1980, small amounts of opium were voluntarily eradicated (NNICC, 1981) through negotiations in 10 villages (Branigin, 1982). Tapp (1982) - who conducted field research within the RNP area – reported that eradication

²⁰ The Governor of Chiang Mai declared: ‘[I]t’s easy to stop people from growing opium....But what are you going to do with half a million mountain tribesmen?’ without an income (Campbell, 1983:n.p.).

was arbitrarily enforced, with many police officers seizing opium for personal consumption. However, the lack of supportive evidence may indicate that this represented low-level, rather than systematic, corruption.

Then in 1983, the Royal Thai Army, BPP and ONCB (Yodmani, 1992) conducted their first forced eradication campaign in a Third Army development programme area (McBeth, 1984b).²¹ While the initial eradication was largely symbolic (Cima, 1986) and sought to raise awareness of opium's illegality (Lee, 1994; RCMP, 1987), the following year the target group was expanded to areas which illicitly cultivated more than 160ha of opium (reduced to 48ha the following year) (De Meer, 1987) or had breached agreements to limit production to local consumption (RCMP, 1986). The third year represented the commencement of large-scale eradication.

In general, eradication campaigns began with aerial, satellite and/or ground surveys to establish the extent of cultivation (Aramrattana and Jinawat, 2006; Chotpimai, 1987; Lee, 1994; RCMP, 1986; ONCB, 2003; Pennington, 2001; Silp, 2007). The Third Army then collated information on: individual farmers; the geography of the area; and the activities of village leaders. The majority of eradication tended to be negotiated (Chotpimai, 1987; see RCMP, 1985), for example favourably treatment when applying for Thai citizenship as leverage (Renard 2001). If undertaken within DODCP areas, communities tended to be warned, sometimes years in advance²² of forced eradication as schedules of development/eradication were often negotiated with communities at the beginning of development projects (Lee, 1994).

All eradication was conducted manually, using cutting tools or sticks - herbicides were not used – and tended to be humane (Lee, 1994). To avoid impoverishing farmers the Third Army supplied basic emergency relief (Chotpimai, 1987) after the first eradication (Crooker, 1988). Few farmers were arrested or punished for production (DEA, 1992) for as General Yodmani (the head of the ONCB during the late-1980s) declared law enforcement was an expensive 'sign of failure' (Economist 1992:61).


²¹ In 1983, the Third Army promoted substitute crops in 49 villages (rising to 137 by 1987) with high-insurgent activity (Renard, 2001). The projects included: livestock promotion; the extension of modern agricultural techniques and new technology; the construction of irrigation and transport infrastructures; the establishment of pharmacies, medical centres and schools (Chotimai, 1987).

²² Farmers in the TG-HDP project area were given a four or five year grace period. In two villages where production was naturally declining eradication was not administered for eight years (Dirksen, 1999).

Conversely, observers reported eradication units as ‘heavy handed’ (Leithead, 2009; also Kesmanee, 1994). However, much like individual officers enforcing bans for personal gain when official policy banned eradication, ‘heavy handedness’ did not represent a systematic national or project-wide policy of abuse.

INCRS has tended to report higher eradication figures than UNODC who, prior to 1992, reported that the amount eradicated exceeded the amount harvested in one year only. However, estimations converge from 1992 into a trend in which more opium is eradicated than harvested (see Figure 3:3). The average of UNODC/INCRS estimates (Figure 7:3) suggests that more opium was eradicated than harvested in all but four years and that on average 60 percent of all opium cultivated has been eradicated. Furthermore, in 1989, 1993 and 1996 the area under cultivation increased slightly (Figure 7:2), however, that the amount eradicated concurrently increased indicates Thailand’s capacity to respond to illicit production.

Figure 7: 3. Thailand: Opium eradication/harvest ratio (1985-2007)



Source: adapted from, INCRS (various years); UNODCCP (1999, 2000, 2002); UNODC (2006, 2007, 2008b, 2009, 2010). Note: data unavailable for 2004.

Table 7: 1. Thailand: Summary of DODCP

	Basic data	Community involvement	Roads (km)	Irrigation / land levelling (ha)	Electrification	Agri-Training	Modern Agri-equipment	New/ improved crops	Handicraft/ alternative income
RNP	1) RPF, RTG; 2) RPF (since 1992)	Top-down before 1990s	Yes	Yes	Yes	Modern agri-methods	Yes	Extensive ¹	N.E.
CRCDP	1) UN; 2) UNFDAC/ONCB	Minimal	None ²	N.E.	N.E.	Modern agri-methods ³	N.E.	Seeds loaned	Yes
HAMP	1) UN; 2) UN	Minimal	Minimal ⁴	N.E.	N.E.	Yes	N.E.	8 crops distributed	Yes
DTDP	1) Mah Fah Luang ; 2) Mah Fah Luang	N.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	N.E.	N.E.	Food & cash crops	Extensive ⁵

¹ As roads and marketing infrastructure (i.e. cool storage vans) were improved the project promoted temperate flowers and vegetables (Bendiksen, 2002).

² Imported ponies were bred as pack animals (Bulletin of Narcotics, 1974).

³ Approximately 35 villagers a year were instructed in agricultural and non-agricultural skills (i.e. Thai language, basic math, health promotion); the best students received extra (yet limited) training and employed as extension workers (see, Bulletin of Narcotics, 1974; Lanir, 1973; Williams, 1979).

⁴ As poorly built roads had to be closed during the rainy season transportation costs remained high (RTG, 1980).

⁵ Employment was established through: reforestation (Nardone, 2008; Viravaidya, 2001); handicraft factories (Bendiksen, 2002); and tourism (Viravaidya, 2001).

TG-HDP	1) GTZ/RTG; 2) GTZ/ONCB		Yes ⁶	Yes	N.E.	N.E.	Yes	N.E.	Cash & food crops	Yes
	New/ improved livestock	Marketing	Safe drinking water	Health care	Education	Livestock health/ efficiency		Research	Sequencing	
RNP	Yes	Extensive ⁷	Yes	Yes	Free primary education and scholarships	Husbandry, healthcare and nutrition training		By mid-2000s >500 research projects conducted	Law enforcement followed DOA	
CRCDP	Imported livestock, fish	Procured and sold produce. Inefficient ⁸	No evidence	Yes	Some schools built	Vaccinations, livestock management, animal health training		Yes	No eradication	

⁶ Self-determination was established (Chatham-Good, 2003) through Community Development Coordinators which were established to: liaise between the RTG, project staff and communities; communicate community needs and; initiate and plan local activities (Dirksen, 1999).

⁷ Limited marketing began in 1976 (Bendiksen, 2002) with the establishment of canning factories and, wine and preserve manufacturing (for ease of transportation) (Bendiksen, 2002; Thongtham, 1992). In 1981, RNP began to sell farmers produce for them and later established the Doi Kham brand to assist marketing (Fox, 2009; Pleumpamya, 2009; Williamson, 2005). Produce was sold to supermarkets, retailers, hotels and through RNP owned shops (Bendiksen, 2002; Boonyakiat, 2002). The project additionally provided market information to farmers wishing to sell their own crops and manipulated demand for new crops (Bendiksen, 2002). Coffee represents an example of the linkages between research, extension and marketing. In 1969, coffee was first introduced some farmers as an alternative cash crop, however, the contraction of a virus that year discouraged farmers. Research identified a more robust coffee which was introduced to farmers through demonstration plots. Then, to aid marketing the RTG banned the import of processed coffee (Thongtham, 1992).

HAMP	N.E.	Procured and sold produce. ⁹	N.E.	Yes	37 village schools built	N.E.	Yes	No eradication
DTDP	N.E.	Extensive ¹⁰	Yes	Yes	Schools built, scholarships	N.E.	Pre-project survey	Law enforcement followed DOA
TG-HDP	N.E.	Some, mostly by private companies	Yes	Yes	Free primary education	Livestock efficiency training	N.E.	Law enforcement followed DOA

Notes: basic data codes: 1) primary financiers; 2) primary executing agency; 3) cost in millions. 'Yes' denotes an action unspecified in the literature. 'N.E.' denotes no evidence. Sources: RTP: Boonyakiat (2002); Chareonpanich (1987); Hau (2002); Fox (2009); Jinawat (2009); Jones (1982a); Krailerg (2004); Pleumpamya (2009); Renard (2001); Rojanasoonthon (2001); RPF (1996); RPF (n.d.); Thongtham (2005); Vogt (2004); Williamson, (2005). CRCDP: Bendiksen (2002); Bulletin of Narcotics (1974); Hazlehurst (1979); Lanir (1973); Lee (1994); McBeth (1984); Nepote (1976); Saengprasert (1987); Smith (1973); Williams (1979). HAMP: Bendiksen (2002); Lee (1994); McBeth (1984a); Renard (1994); RTG (1980); Suriya (2002). DTDP: Bendiksen (2002); Doi Tung (2010); Mangat (2003); Nardone (2008); UNODC (2005b, 2008b); Viravaidya (2001). TG-HDP: Bendiksen (2002); Chanthanom-Good (2003); Dirksen (1999, 2001, 2002, 2006, 2010); Piyarom (1987); Suvarnasara (1987).

⁸ While clients included Thai International Airways (Williams, 1979) and Nestlé (Bendiksen, 2002) the lack of efficient transport infrastructure limited marketing; some crops had to be helicopter to market at great expense (Lee, 1994).

⁹ Canning factories were established and wines and preserves manufactured to ease transportation. Produce was sold through a Thai marketing and distribution company which secured contracts in Thai and foreign markets (Suriya, 2002). Major clients (i.e. Nestlé) eventually bypassed the project to procure directly from the farmers (Bendiksen, 2002) which represented the achievement of a project objective (i.e. the establishment of a sustainable market) (Renard, 2010).

¹⁰ All produce was marketed through outlets or direct to clients (Viravaidya, 2001). In 2010, several foundation outlets and 22 coffee shops sold handicrafts, drinks and food produced by the project (Doi Tung, 2010).

7.3. Success?

In 1984, one year after the beginning of the eradication campaign and three years after the military interdiction of major traffickers/manufacturers, the area under cultivation sharply decreased. However, that the trend was less dramatic for production - there were small spikes in 1989, 1993 and 1996 (Figures 7:1, 7:2) - would support reports of adaptive responses, including improvements in yield from increased access to agri-technology and more efficient agricultural methods (INCRS, 1998; ONCB, 1990).

The US INCRS (1999) removed Thailand from its major drug producers list in 1999, while UNODC (2009) declared Thailand 'poppy-free' in 2002. As production fell below 20mt to 9.33mt- representing a 95 percent reduction from the 1970 peak of 200mt - in 1994 Thailand met the outcome measurement of *success* employed in this study in that year. Production continued to decline and in 2010 (the last recorded data available) produced 5mt; representing a 98 percent reduction from 1970. The intervention has additionally improved the livelihoods of many highland opium farmers whilst adding to the stabilisation of Northern Thailand. A further illustration of *success* is that the RTG, Royal Foundation and Mae Fa Lung Foundation, are major donors and advisors to Burma and Afghanistan (see Doi Tung, 2010; INCRS, 2002, 2006, 2007; Leithhead, 2009).

7.4. Rival explanations of success

An important aspect of process-tracing is the interaction with established theories, as such this section shall critically appraise rival explanations of how *success* was realised. Renard (2001:119) indicated the centrality of the 'moral leadership' of the Royal Family to *success*; they stimulated rural development whilst instilling a sense of state affiliation in formerly alienated highlanders. Several commentators (Falco, 1996; Lee, 1994; Renard, 2001), note how the intervention was built upon a foundation of sustained national and Northern Provincial economic growth from the early-1950s. As the majority of DODCP funding came from within Thailand (Dirksen and Kampe, n.d.) the growing economy represented not just an inflated consumer market for highland goods but also provided the Thai government and NGO's with sufficient resources for long-term projects.


Renard (2001) continues that a key factor for individual DODCP success was that AD projects - rather than narrow crop substitution - provided farmers with sufficient alternative incomes. Renard's proposition is supported by Kunstadter (2000) who, in a survey of 144 villages, found that 67.6 percent of villages which had ceased production

between 1979 and 1988 had accessed a DODCP. Furthermore, improved road access and the extension of village health stations were found to be statistically significant factors for the cessation of production.

Kesmanee (1994:674), however, posited that the incentives provided by AD projects, especially the linking of highland farmers to lowland markets, was coupled with the 'harsh treatment of the highland people by the Third Army'. While 'harsh treatment' is undefined by Kesmanee, Renard (2001) has suggested that effective law enforcement did compliment the establishment of alternative incomes. This is supported by the findings that 96.6 percent of 144 villages perceived the imposition of the ban was the primary motivator for the cessation of opium production (Kunstadter, 2000). This said, law enforcement does not necessarily signify 'harsh treatment'. Rather the available evidence suggests that law enforcement tended to be humane, the abuse of farmers' human rights the exception rather than the rule, and that the intervention was economically beneficial to many farmers.

Lee (1994) posited that the attractiveness of alternative incomes was driven by concurrent improvements in the profitability of legitimate incomes and deflated Thai farmgate price (brought about through increased Burmese production). Average Thai farmgate prices decreased from approximately US\$2,200 (55,000 baht) to US\$160 (4,000 baht) per 1.6 kilogram (or 1.0 joi) between the late-1970s and 1989 (Dirksen, 1999). However, between 1989 and 2005 the farmgate price increased by US\$1,060 (see Figure 7:4) whilst production declined. The price of opium was just one of several factors motivating farmers to accept/oppose suppression. Highland farmers were aware that increasing population density and traditional forms of farming had reduced the sustainability of highland agriculture and thus actively sought alternative incomes (Crooker, 1988; Dirksen, 1999). Additionally, many desired the benefits of Thai citizenship and social welfare provisions (i.e. education and healthcare) provided by development projects and improved links to the lowlands (Dirksen, 1999). Hence, acquiescing to opium suppression was perceived by many farmers as within their best-interest, especially as the risk of eradication became more viable. It appears that the moratoriums on eradication until alternative livelihoods were established permitted the state to capitalise on highland peoples' awareness of the un-sustainability of opium production.

Figure 7: 4. Thailand: farmgate price in US\$/Kg compared with production (1986-2008)



Source: UNODCCP (1999); UNODC (2006, 2007, 008b, 2009, 2010).

Essentially the Thai intervention is one of state extension through a development-orientated projects, national rural development and during the 1990s private investment facilitated by sustained economic growth and political stability. Nationally law enforcement (primarily negotiated eradication) was sequenced after state extension and the resolution of violent conflict. While the impact of crop substitution projects on farmers livelihoods may have been somewhat shallow, they were as significant to state extension as later AD projects as they helped to build positive relationships. This said, that the risk of eradication has averaged 60 percent since 1985 suggests that a high-risk environment was established. Hence, the evidence suggests that the key factors of Thai *success* were the establishment of state authority in formerly isolated areas and the extension of incentives to farmers, followed thereafter by the creation of a high-risk environment.

7.5. Case summary

Opium production in Thailand remained a cottage industry until the 1950s when, in response to the removal of Chinese, Indian and Iranian opium from the global market, production increased throughout Southeast Asia to supply roughly half of global supply by the late-1950s. While production was officially prohibited in 1959, during this period the Thai military forged links with anti-Communist insurgent groups engaged in opiate distribution, whilst state employees protected and taxed opium farmers. Hence, a combination of weak authority and counter-insurgency policy objectives facilitated an increase in production; peaking in 1970 at 200mt.

In 1965-66, the Thai intervention began with a socio-economic survey of highland opium farmers, which found that farmers were willing to cease opium production in exchange for alternative incomes. During the 1960s, the military employed repressive law enforcement techniques against producers in areas with high Communist insurgent activity. However, by 1968 a perception that coercion was counterproductive to counterinsurgency objectives emerged and the state administered limited development aid and began constructing roads to expose the highlands. Additionally, in 1969, the King initiated a highland development and research project with the primary objective of improving the welfare of highland opium farmers; a joint RTG-UN administered project followed in 1971. The two early projects established a foundation of: knowledge of highland issues and agriculture; best practice in administrating highland development; and relationships of mutual trust between the state and isolated highland peoples.

In 1973, dual drug policies were operating: the civilian government prohibited opium and, with America and Europe, administered an extensive and effective interdiction campaign whilst the Thai military continued to clandestinely facilitate the production and distribution. Nonetheless, by the late-1970s the insurgent threat had receded, rendering client insurgent/trafficking groups not only obsolete but a threat to security. Hence, the new civilian government pushed the groups from Thai territory whilst severing links between high-level state employees and the illicit opiate trade.

A number of development projects were administered throughout the 1970s/1980s that brought modern agriculture, market access and social services to highlands communities. The projects grew in sophistication from narrow crop substitution to what is now termed alternative livelihood.

Law enforcement strategies were not used until 1983. Law enforcement centred upon sequencing eradication once farmers had access to alternative livelihoods; arrest and punishment of farmers remained minimal throughout the intervention. In several DODCP's, a contract was negotiated between highland communities and the project scheduling when eradication would be undertaken. Prior to eradication, incentives for the voluntary cessation of production were offered, however, if the contract was broken (i.e. farmers continued to produce opium), then crops were forcefully eradicated through manual means and between 1986 and 2008, 60 percent of all opium cultivated had been eradicated. Farmers received basic relief from the state after their crops had been eradicated for the first time. While eradication tended to be humane, some individual

brutality from eradication teams may have presented. This said, campaigns against traffickers and manufacturers were aggressive; including aerial and artillery assaults.

The evidence suggests that the key factors of Thai *success* were the establishment of state authority in formerly isolated areas, the extension of incentives to farmers, followed by the creation of a high-risk environment.

In 1994, production fell below 20mt to 9.33mt; representing a 95 percent reduction from the 1970 peak of 200mt and hence achieved *success* in 1994. Production continued to decline and in 2003 (the last recorded data available) produced 2mt; representing a 99 percent reduction from 1970. The intervention has additionally improved the livelihoods of many ex-opium farmers whilst adding to the stabilisation of Northern Thailand.

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8. Pakistan

8.1. Background and context

Before partition in 1947, opium production was prohibited in the territories constituting present day Pakistan. While there was some production in the Tribal¹ and Merged² Areas of NWFP³ to meet the demand of domestic consumers (Qayyum, 1993; Qureshi, 1982) the scarcity of reports of resistance to prohibition may signify the unimportance of opium as a cash crop (see Haq, 1996; McCoy, 2003).

After partition, India inherited all major opium producing regions and agreed to export opium to Pakistan (Magnussen *et al.*, 1980).⁴ However, in 1955 India prohibited exports intended for non-medical/scientific consumption; including Pakistan (Hardesty, 1992) whose state monopoly sold opium for quasi-medical and recreational purposes (Wright, 1954).

However, Pakistan inherited India's administrative and judicial opium control system (Windle, 2011) and immediately licensed farmers to cultivate 0.25ha of opium poppy (CND, 1947) for the production of seeds. Then between 1949 and 1951 small experimental farms were unsuccessfully (Wright, 1954) established under Government license and supervision (CND, 1950, 1951, 1953).

In 1950, After 1955, the Lahore Opium Factory was constructed and, under the Opium Act of 1857, farmers were licensed in the Punjab Province to produce opium.

¹ At partition, the legally autonomous Tribal Agencies became administered as FATA (Qayyum, 1993). Under the Constitution (Murphy, 1983) while FATA is legally part of Pakistan, federal laws are only applicable if ordered by the President and must be administered by tribal *Jirga*'s; a Pashtun customary dispute resolution mechanisms (Wardak, 2006). In 'Protected Areas' of FATA, Political Agents have authority to administer or reject *Jirga* decisions whilst in 'Non-Protected Areas' the state has no authority over *Jirga* decisions (GoP, 2009). Political Agents are essentially diplomats (Embree, 1977) between the GoP and individual tribes who: coordinate development projects; have authority over state administered areas (i.e. roads and state buildings); and can administer force if national interests are threatened (Crises Group, 2006).

² Merged Areas possess some tribal autonomy whilst being subject to a greater width of federal legislation than FATA Agencies (Murphy, 1983; Qayyum, 1993).

³ As of 2010 renamed Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa.

⁴ Opium was also illicitly imported from Afghanistan (CND, 1947, 1950, 1951).

This turned out to be ineffective and the license was transferred to three Settled Areas⁵ of NWFP: Peshawar, Mardan and Islamabad (Khan, 1982). Individual farmers were licensed to cultivate a specified plot of land (CND, 1956, 1964) under the administration and monitoring of a village *Lambadar* (representative) (Asad and Harris, 2003). The Excise Department of the Frontier Province collected, processed and eventually redistributed the opium to licensed vends (Hasnain 1982; Khan and Wadal, 1977).

That yields were initially very low (Haq, 2000) suggests a likely combination of inefficient, under-resourced and inexperienced farmers, and high-levels of diversion (Asad and Harris, 2003). Diverted and illicitly produced opium was sold to licensed vends to supplement their licit stocks (Haq, 2000; INCB, 1977; Khan, 1982; Murphy, 1983; UNODCCP, 2000) or neighbouring states, predominantly Iran (Murphy, 1983; UN, 1966). As demand increased during the 1960s diverted and illicit production in unlicensed areas increased (INCB, 1971; Khan, 1991).

To conform to international law the 1967 Dangerous Drugs Rules updated colonial legislation to provide for a gradual restriction of consumption to those with medical prescriptions, and for a short time the licit trade was 'reasonably well controlled' (INCB, 1976:13). However, controls on licensed vends and production (Qayyum, 1993) were relaxed in 1971⁶ to a point whereby a British diplomat exclaimed there is 'no organisation and no control' (Train, 1974:n.p.); the German GTZ (Magnussen *et al.*, 1980), USAID (Khan, 1991) and, in weaker language, the INCB (1976) expressed similar concerns. Increased availability inflated demand for monopoly opium, which consecutively increased illicit production and diversion (Haq, 2000; Khan, 1991; UNODC, n.d.). One positive enterprise during this period was the inauguration, in 1976, of the first UN-Government of Pakistan (GoP) crop substitution project in Buner District (NWFP), nonetheless, the project remained somewhat disconnected from national policies (Magnussen *et al.*, 1980).


In the early-1970s Europe and North America's primary source of illicit heroin had been removed through the suppression of French and Iranian heroin manufacturing. European traffickers looked to Pakistan as an alternative source (see Ansari *et al.*, 1982; Burkhari and Haq, 2008; Haq, 1996; 2000; Haretly, 1992; Khan, 1991; Murphy, 1983) and in 1974/75 the first morphine and heroin laboratories appeared in NWFP and

⁵ Settled Areas were Districts of NWFP obliged to conform to the full scope of Pakistan law (Qayyum, 1993).

⁶ This may have been motivated by revenue collection for the India-Pakistan War (Haq, 2000).

Baluchistan Provinces (Ansari *et al.*, 1982; Choudhry and Bierke, 1977; Hardestly, 1992; INCB, 1975; 1980; Lodhi, 1994 PNCB, 1975).⁷ Illicit production and diversion consequently increased.

Figure 8: 1. Pakistan: Licit opium production (1947-1979)



Source: adapted from INCB (various years); PCOB (various years).

8.1.1. 1979

Events in 1979 reduced Pakistan's illicit production whilst increasing its importance as an exporter and manufacturer of illicit opiates. The Enforcement of Hadd Order (1979)⁸ (henceforth the Order) prohibited non-medical/scientific opium consumption and possession - ending the state monopoly. The ban on possession was interpreted as applying to production; which was unmentioned by the Order (INCB, 1979). In 1980, the NWFP provincial government banned production (Murphy, 1983; Khan, 1991) in Settled and Merged Districts (Qureshi, 1982; see INCB, 1979) and in 1979/80, amid a period of martial law, the Order was enforced through a surge in: 'demonstrative' arrests; eradication of crops; the imposition of fines; and 'constant surveillance' of opium producing areas (Magnussen *et al.*, 1980:29; Khan, 1991). Opium production

⁷ Pakistani heroin was first seized in Western Europe in 1976 (INCB, 1977).

⁸ Haq (2000) maintains that the Order was a response to rising opiate consumption and an attempt to encourage Islamic conservative support. While the Order was one of a number of series of laws passed to formally criminalise Hudud crimes (Talbot, 2009) - crimes that threaten the existence of Islam (Baderin, 2003) - it coincided with the expiration of the 'grace period' allowed under the Single Convention for quasi-medicinal consumption and thus Pakistan was conforming to its international obligations.

ceased in Settled Areas of NWFP (Khan, 1991) – where state authority was extensive - indicated by an opium ‘drought’ rural Punjab (Kurin, 1985). Illicit production continued in one-third of Merged Districts (Magnussen *et al.*, 1980; see Ansari *et al.*, 1982; Gillett, 2002) and, in Bajaur, Mohmand and Khyber Agencies (UNODC, n.d.) where the Order was not applied until 1983 (Haq, 2000; USAID, 1984). Merged Districts and Tribal Areas were geographically isolated areas and state authority was weak.

A one-year, a spike in production in 1979 created a surplus (INCB, 1980; USAID, 1984) which deflated the farmgate price of opium (Magnussen *et al.*, 1980; Murphy, 1983; Qureshi, 1982); the risk to farmers had increased whilst rewards concomitantly decreased. The surplus also increased the number of heroin manufacturers (Bukhari and Haq, 2008; Qureshi, 1993).

Also in 1979, opium production and heroin manufacturing increased in neighbouring Afghanistan as a consequence of the Soviet invasion. Eventually, US and Pakistan security forces would provide political protection to Pak-Afghan insurgents connected to production, manufacturing or distribution⁹ (see Haq, 1996, 2000; Lifschultz, 1992; McCoy, 2003; Rupert and Coll 1990; Sen, 1992).

The massive refugee migration from Afghanistan and Iran (Asad and Harris, 2003; Haq, 2000; Sadeque, 1992; Qayyum, 1993) supplemented growing domestic opiate consumption (Khan, 1991) whilst European and North American demand was growing (USAID, 1984; Zahid, 1987).

These converging factors inflated heroin manufacture across Pakistan (Haq, 2000; Lodhi, 1994; Qureshi, 1993) and by the late-1970s/early-1980s Pak-Afghan heroin had captured substantial shares of the Indian, European, US and Iranian markets (McCoy, 2003; Murphy, 1983; also Kline, 1982; Parry, 1985) leading the RCMP (1984:19) to report:

Pakistan is considered to be the key country in the narcotics trade in Southwest Asia; as a producer of opium, a refiner of heroin and a transshipment area for narcotics produced in the other SWA countries.

⁹ Pakistan’s importance as a exporter of Pak-Afghan opiates increased as Iranian Revolution and Iran-Iraq War closed a major smuggling route to Europe (Britto, 1987; Kline, 1982; Murphy, 1983).

8.1.2. 1985-2000

Opium production declined from 1979 until 1985, when farmgate prices improved (GoP, 1983a; UNODC, n.d.). The US GOA (1988) accounted the increase to the autonomous legal status of Tribal Agencies¹⁰ where much production had been displaced by the enforcement of the Order and development projects in Buner and Malakand during the late-1970s (see Farrell, 1998; Hardtly, 1992; RCMP, 1989; Sercombe, 1995). Tribal Agencies possessed inhospitable terrain and violent resistance common (Chandran, 1998; Haq, 1996; Haqqani, 1986; UNODC, n.d.).¹¹ PNCB authority in the Agencies was minimal (Chandran, 1998; Murphy, 1983; Ansari *et al.*, 1982), for example, they could not execute arrest warrants against traffickers (Anderson, 1993) and negotiations with tribal leaders were often required before interdiction, arrests or forced eradication could be undertaken (Haq, 2000; Kamm, 1988b). An observer reported ‘there is no police force. There are no courts. There is no taxation. No weapon is illegal’ (Galster, 1995, cited in McCoy, 2003:473). Others emphasised the removal of martial law in 1985 as a contributing factor (Searsight, 1986; Weisman, 1986).

The initial response to enlarged production was increased eradication in areas where crop substitution had been administered (Radio Pakistan, 1998; RCMP, 1988). However, after violent confrontations in Gadoon-Amazai, in 1987, the GoP decided upon a ‘more cautious’ approach (Mansfield and Pain, 2006:4) and eradication was subsequently limited to areas which had received sufficient development assistance (GOA, 1988).

Furthermore, as the GoP was aware that the 1979 intervention had impoverished many farmers and was understandable unpopular, in 1983 (Qureshi, 1987) with the UN (UNDCP, 1993) the Special Development and Enforcement Plan for Opium Producing Areas of Pakistan (SDEP) was inaugurated (GoP, 1983) as the first national intervention centred upon a DOA (Qureshi, 1987). While SDEP was primarily a drug control Plan (Mahmood, 2010) it was mainstreamed into national socio-economic development policy (GoP, 1983).

¹⁰ The 1930 Dangerous Drugs Act and Hadd Order were not extended to Tribal Agencies until 1983 (USAID, 1984).

¹¹ Violent opposition was not confined to rural areas. In 1985, 160 people were killed during a riot in Karachi which was reportedly engineered by traffickers to prevent the police from raiding their premises (Economist, 1986; Goldenberg, 1986).

Additionally, throughout the 1980s/early-1990s major impediments suppression included large-scale corruption (Anderson and Khan, 1994; Anderson and Moore, 1993; Auerbach, 1995; Burns, 1995; Chandran, 1998; Haq, 1996; Sen, 1992), the political protection of client insurgents operating in Afghanistan (Lifschultz, 1992; McCoy, 2003) and ‘official indifference and incompetence’ (Cima, 1986:7) at all levels of provincial and federal government. For example, it was not until 1988 that the first heroin laboratory owner was prosecuted (Randall, 1988). Qayyum (1993:12) summarises:

The personnel of the [PNCB] became increasingly corrupt and inefficient and in quite a few instances they became helpers of traffickers..... Before 1990 the action against such corrupt and inefficient personal was inadequate and sporadic.

Law enforcement, often involving elements of military assault¹² (Bearak, 2000; Qureshi, 1993) against manufacturers had begun in 1984 (Cima, 1986) with the interdiction of 43 laboratories¹³ and 248 arrests in Peshawar (Claiborne, 1984). The NWFP campaign against manufacturing continued until 1987 when, after 105 laboratories had been destroyed, manufacturers were displaced to refugee camps in NWFP. The refugee camps were raided in 1988 (Qureshi, 1993) which displaced manufacturing to FATA (INCB, 1994) and Baluchistan (RCMP, 1988, 1989). However, due to the limitations described above, in 1985 Pakistan accounted for 80 percent of all heroin seized in the UK (Parry, 1985) and by the early-1990s, Pak-Afghan heroin accounted for 75 percent of European, Arabian and African markets and 25 percent of the US market¹⁴ (INCB, 1994).

Then in 1988, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan ended and the US, without the need to accommodate client insurgents, declared a ‘war on drugs’ in Afghanistan (Behera, 2001; McCoy, 2003). The US, alongside Britain, France, Iran, and Saudi Arabia pressured Pakistan’s compliance (see Laurent *et al.*, 1996; UNODC, n.d.); which

¹² In 1985, between 500-3,500 Khyber Rifles, supported by artillery closed Khyber Agency for a month in an assaulted against a ‘heroin kingpin’ (see, Cima, 1986; RCMP, 1986).

¹³ The definition of a laboratory was vaguely applied; of the 43 interdictions no precursor chemicals, heroin or opium were destroyed (Willis 1983).


¹⁴ The Pak-Afghan share of the US market had declined from 64 percent in 1980 (Murphy, 1983) to 30 percent in 1983 (Economist, 1986).

reflected a growing concern amongst the political and religious elites over high-levels of narcotics-related corruption and domestic heroin consumption (McCoy, 2003).

Consequently, Pakistan attempted to disengage from the trade. From 1990 anti-corruption measures were undertaken in the drug-control apparatus (Qayyum 1993), greater restrictions were placed on the autonomy of NWFP and FATA, and measures were taken to limit the power of the ISI; the Pakistan secret service which had been especially compliant in the trade (Behera, 2001; McCoy, 2003). Additionally, in 1994, the PNCB was disbanded for inefficiency (DEA, 1995). The UK and US funded and trained PNCB (Murphy, 1983; Parry, 1985) were inadequately resourced with inefficient personnel (Choudhry and Bierke, 1977; Magnussen, 1980; NCB, 1975; Qayyum, 1993). For example, in 1994: they possessed World War Two rifles but lacked ammunition; just seven of 29 vehicles were operational; and petrol money was often unavailable (Anderson and Moore, 1993). While its predecessor, the US funded Anti-Narcotics Task Force, was better trained and resourced (Mahmood, 2010) it continued to be hampered by inadequate resources throughout the 1990s (INCRS, 1997, 2000).


By 1993, opiate manufacturing had been limited to Tirah and Khyber Agencies (INCB, 1993). Then in 1995, a series of 'unprecedented antidrug' operations were conducted: the leaders of three major trafficking organisations were extradited to the US (Rohde, 1995:13) and seven major trafficking organisations had their assets frozen (Burns, 1995). By 1997, the public burnings of opiates had become common (McCoy, 2003) and, due to increased law enforcement, manufacturing had ceased (INCB, 1998; INCSR, 1997). Forced and negotiated eradication increased significantly after heroin manufacturing had been suppressed and a policy objective of being declared 'poppy-free' was established (Mahmood, 2009).

Figure 8: 2. Pakistan: Illicit opium production (1947-2009)



Source: adapted from, Magnussen *et al.* (1980); NNICC (various years); INCSR (various years); PNCB (various years, cited in Der Meer, 1989); RCMP (various years); UNFDAC (1990, cited in Khan, 1991); UNODCCP (1999, 2000, 2002); UNODC. (2005, 2010). Note: grey line represents 20mt outcome measurement of *success*. Missing values indicates missing data.

Figure 8: 3. Pakistan: Area under cultivation (1976-2009)



Sources: adapted from: Der Meer (1987); INCSR (various years); Khan (1991); NNICC (various years); UNODCCP (1999, 2000, 2002); UNODC. (2005, 2010); Qayyum (1993). Note: missing values indicates missing data. Pre-1976 data unavailable.

8.2. The Intervention

Before 1979 Pakistan's inadequate and often contradictory drug control laws (Malik, 1982; Qayyum, 1993) were based upon nineteenth-century British colonial legislation and designed to regulate licensed production, rather than prevent illicit production (see Hasnain, 1982; Malik, 1982). The more stringent 1979 Enforcement of Hadd Order (1979), defined, and provided sanctions for opiate manufacturing and distribution of a maximum of five years imprisonment and 30 'stripes' (lashes). While production or cultivation were not prohibited under the Order possession of 1kg of opium was punishable with between two years and life imprisonment, and 30 'stripes' which could be interpreted as prohibiting production (INCB, 1979). Furthermore, unlicensed cultivation continued to be prohibited under the 1930 Dangerous Drugs Act which provided the death penalty (Qayyum, 1993). In 1983 the Hadd Order (Amended) increased punishments for opiate manufacturing and distribution to between two years and life imprisonment, a maximum 30 'stripes' and a fine (Haq, 2000; USAID, 1984).

Opium poppy cultivation was officially criminalised by Ordinance No.XLVII (1995). The Ordinance which provided a fine and a maximum of seven years imprisonment for illicit cultivation and the death penalty for possession of 100g of heroin. The Ordinance became law in 1997 (Mahmood, 2010) and was extended to FATA and Merged Areas in 1998 (Mahmood, 2009).

8.2.1. Development-Orientated Approaches

This section shall present an overview of the five primary development projects conducted from 1976. The particulars of the projects, summarised in Table 8:1, are: (1) Buner Development Project (BDP) (1976-1987) in NWFP; (2) Malakand Development Project (MDP) (1982-1990) in NWFP; (3) Gadoon-Amazai Area Development project (GAAD) (1983-1992) in NWFP;¹⁵ (4) Dir District Development Project (DDDP) (1985-2002) a Merged Area of NWFP; (5) Kaka Dhal Development Project (KDDP) (1988-1993) a Merged Area FATA.

In 1976, the first DODCP was inaugurated by the GoP and UNFDAC in Buner. The source of 30 percent of Pakistan production (Qureshi, 1982) a UN aerial survey (Boylan, 1978) estimated that Buner produced an average of 150mt, over 4,047-6,070ha, during the early 1970s (Khan, 1991). Prior to commencement, the PNCB (1975:88) conducted a topographic and socio-economic survey which found that opium

¹⁵ Later renamed the Northwest Frontier Area Development Project (USAID, 1994).

production 'barely meets the minimum requirements of the community' and, while an average 35.89 percent of family income was derived from opium, farmers would accept alternatives incomes.¹⁶ The survey concluded that, regardless of opium suppression, economic development was a necessity as it was one of the poorest and underdeveloped areas of Pakistan (Queshi, 1982) with a significant annual food deficit (Boner, 1991). By 1985, wheat was six times more profitable than opium and yields had increased by 100 percent (Queshi, 1982, 1987). By 1987, significant tracts of tobacco, sugarcane and fruit trees were showing profitability (Potulski, 1991) and between 1972 and 1990, per-capita income had increased from US\$60 to US\$160 (Boner 1991); farmers were generally better-off (Der Meer, 1989; Nathan-Berger, 1992; Queshi, 1987) and certainly no worse off (Mahmood, 2009). While Buner was declared opium free in 1982 (USAID, 1998) Farrell (1998) found that the reduction no more pronounced, and more expensive, than other bans administered after 1979.

As BDP was a discrete crop substitution project (i.e. not mainstreamed into national or regional development plans) its national reach was limited (Der Meer, 1987; Magnussen *et al.*, 1980). Furthermore, the GoP was aware that the 1979 intervention had impoverished many farmers and was understandable unpopular. In response to criticism of Buner and the 1979 intervention, the GoP began to develop a national intervention centred upon a DOA (Qureshi, 1987) and in 1983, the UN supported (UNDCP, 1993), Special Development and Enforcement Plan for Opium Producing Areas of Pakistan (SDEP) (GoP, 1983) was launched. While the primary objective of SDEP remained opium suppression (Mahmood, 2010) by creating a Special Development Unit to coordinate and monitor all DODCP's (GoP, 1983; USAID, 1994), drug control was mainstreamed into provincial rural development projects; particularly the Special Development Plan for Tribal Areas - a general development plan to improve the physical infrastructure of remote areas (Khan, 1991).

During the 1970s Malakand had produced an average of 30-35mt over 3,000-4,789ha (see UNODC, n.d.; Qureshi, 1987), this had been reduced by the 1979 intervention to 8,150kg over 445ha (GOA, 1988). On hearing, that Buner had received assistance farmers in Malakand District lobbied for compensation for loss of earnings (Qureshi, 1982). In response, USAID negotiated development assistance in exchange for the complete cessation of production (Qureshi, 1982; UNODC, n.d.). The MDP declared

¹⁶ Forty-seven percent reported that they would resist eradication and would prefer suicide to the loss of opium profits (PNCB, 1975).

the District was declared poppy free in 1985 (Khan, 1991; Mahmood, 2009) and reported an 'enhanced quality of life' (GOA, 1988:20).

In 1983, Gadoon-Amazai was highly impoverished, imported 80 percent of its food (USAID, 1994) and produced 50 percent of Pakistan's opium (Mahmood, 2009). GAAD, which began in 1984, reduced food imports to 15 percent (USAID, 1994), brought 'the local economy.... significantly closer to the mainstream of the Pakistan economy' than it had been in 1983 (Odell, 1991:2) and established crops which netted double the profit than could be secured from opium (Khan, 1987). Gadoon-Amazai was declared opium free in 1988 (Mahmood, 2009; UNODC, n.d.).

Suppression in Buner displaced production to Dir District (Mahmood, 2010) which had begun commercial opium production in 1980 (Qureshi, 1987). The DDDP was the first project undertaken under the SDEP with a stated objective to:

provide sufficient development benefits to persuade the majority of farmers to end their cultivation...and to allow the enforcement of the poppy ban on those who persist, with minimal use of coercion (GoP, 1983b).

Pre-project research found that farming in Dir was relatively efficient; private development projects operated by the Pakistan Tobacco Company had already provided farmers with sufficient irrigation and fairly sophisticated crop varieties (HTSL, 1984:21). Nonetheless, during the life of DDDP Dir became the third wealthiest district in NFWP; prior to initiation, 50 percent of the population had lived below the poverty line (UNODCCP, 2000; also Gillett, 2001). Furthermore, licit crops were more profitable than opium (Segare, 1998) and social welfare provisions had improved (Mansfield *et al.*, 2006). While illicit production initially increased between 1985 and 1991 from 41.6mt to 70.4mt - increased at five times the national average during phase one (Farrell, 1998) - Dir was declared poppy-free in 1997 (UNODC, n.d.).

Suppression in Gadoon-Amazai (USAID, 1994) and Buner (Mahmood, 2009) displaced production to Kaka Dhal (USAID, 1994); a decidedly underdeveloped Tribal Agency (GoP, 1983b). While the USAID (1994) end of project evaluation offered no indication of success in terms of either suppression or development, Mahmood (2009) reported the area as poppy free by 1995. However, in 2006, Kaka Dhal was Pakistan's second largest source of opium (INCSR, 2006). This resurgence was partly attributable

to the inability of the state to enforce prohibition due to increased insurgent activity, this said, production remained significantly lower than pre-1995 (Mahmood, 2010).

Under SDEP, projects were undertaken in Chitral (GoP, 1983a), FATA (Bajaur and Mohmand) (GoP, 1983c) and Mansehra (GoP, 1983d). The FATA Project began in 1989 – at which point the two Agencies produced approximately 80 percent of Pakistan’s opium - and focussed primarily on building infrastructure to facilitate crop eradication. Some irrigation, crop distribution and drinking water projects were undertaken. The majority of funding came from the US and by 2001, it was reported that both Agencies were ‘effectively’ poppy-free (UNODC, n.d.). However, in 2003, several communities continued to oppose eradication (McDonald, 2003).

8.2.2. Law enforcement approaches

In 1979/80, licit and illicit opium production was suppressed in Settle and some Merged Districts of NWFP. The intervention centred upon a law enforcement approach (Khan, 1991) which included: forced eradication; the financial punishment of farmers; and extensive surveillance of opium farming communities (Magnussen *et al.*, 1980).¹⁷ The sudden removal of an important cash crop without recourse to support for alternative incomes economically harmed many farmers (Murphy, 1983) forcing negative coping strategies such as, the sale of livestock and migration for labour (Sajidin and Qureshi, 1982; Qureshi, 1982).

Depending on the terrain and the possibility of violent confrontation (Keyser *et al.*, 1993), eradication was mostly undertaken by mechanical ploughing (Qureshi, 1987; see Zahid, 1987) or beating with sticks (Mahmood, 2010),¹⁸ this said, more often than not, crops were voluntarily eradicated after negotiations with tribal leaders (Kamm, 1988b). As of 1987, herbicides were sprayed (Asad and Harris, 2003; Economist, 1986; Kamm, 1988; Khan, 1991; NNICC, 1988; Qureshi, 1993) from US-supplied aircraft, flown by

¹⁷ Depending on the subdivision, between 86-100 percent of opium farmers who responded to a survey in Gilgit (Northern Area) proclaimed they had ceased production in 1979 in response to the Order. Furthermore, many respondents expressed anxiety that the questionnaire could be used against them by the state; indicating not only a limitation of the findings, but potentially the repressive nature of enforcement in the Northern Areas (Sajidin and Qureshi, 1982). This said, as authoritarian military administration had been the norm since partition (ICG, 2007) Gilgit may have represented an extreme example of suppression.

¹⁸ One journalist reported the ‘bombardment’ of villages with heavy artillery (Girardet, 1989). As even the more critical accounts of the intervention fail to mention military artillery attacks on opium farmers, this may represent an isolated event or a misconception of aerial fumigation.

the Pakistani airforce (Sadeque, 1992) and supported by ground troops. While the US were critical of Pakistan for insufficient use of aerial eradication (GOA, 1988) the mid-term evaluation of DDDP criticized the strategy as counterproductive (Mahmood, 2009) especially for the approaches impact on Gadoon-Amazai (Mahmood, 2010). Several incidents of violent protests against aerial eradication were recorded in the late-1980s/late-1990s (Assad and Harris, 2003; Chouvy, 2009), most notable, farmers in Gadoon-Amazai attacked planes and escorting helicopters with mounted anti-aircraft guns (Haq, 2000).

While the Hadd Order was enacted three years into the life of BDP, ‘no rigorous enforcement of the poppy ban had to be carried out during the life of the project’. Throughout the life of the project, the consent of local elites was negotiated so that, in exchange for development, farmers would gradually cease production. During the project local criminal justice resources were improved in anticipation of eventual eradication (UNODC, n.d.:12) and in the latter stages, after advanced warnings (Khan, 1982), forceful eradication of opium which had been intercropped with project supported crops was administered (Nathan-Berger, 1992; UNODC, n.d.). Farmers found cultivating opium after BDP had ended were prosecuted (Mahmood, 2009).

In the USAID administered projects (i.e. MDP and GAAD) communities, signed conditionality clauses specify the prompt cessation of opium production in exchange for developmental assistance (GOA, 1988; Williams and Rudel, 1988; Qureshi, 1982).¹⁹ Forced eradication - some of which was aerielly administered (Keyser *et al.*, 1993) - was conducted in both projects (Williams and Rudel, 1988). In Gadoon-Amazai in 1986 (three years after project inception): 8-26 people were killed; 100-120 were arrests; 150 were injured; and a military helicopter was destroyed during a clash between 4,500 and 10,000 Pakistani soldiers/paramilitaries and 20,000 to 0,000 tribal militia²⁰ (while

¹⁹ All USAID administered development projects, whether concerned with opium suppression or not, contained clauses that finances would be withdrawn if any opium were found growing in the project area (GOA, 1988; USAID, 1994). For example, a project in Bajaur Agency was suspended when villagers refused to cease opium production (William and Rudel, 1988).

²⁰ The PNCB maintained that resistance was facilitated by landowners and corrupt politicians connected to the trade (Goldenberg, 1986; also Haqqani, 1986). Assad and Harris (2003), conversely, claimed that the impetus to the conflict was a perception by farmers that funding was being stolen by project officials and politicians, and that eradication was being used against political opponents (also Searsight, 1986).

specifics differ see Assad and Harris, 2003; Brodie, 1986; Cima, 1986; Haq, 2000; Goldenberg, 1987; New York Times, 1986; Keyser *et al.*, 1993; RCMP, 1987; USAID, 1994). How the conflict ended and project summed is contested. The end-of-project USAID report indicated that the project had to 'buy its way back in' (Keyser *et al.*, 1993:x), possible by compensation (Der Meer, 1989); the Karachi Home Service (1986) similarly noted how opium was voluntarily eradicated after negotiation. Conversely, Khan (1991:126) reported a more effectively planned and 'much more massive drive' was undertaken whereby all opium was eradicated 'to the last leaf' which increased production risks. However, after the conflict the GoP decided that a 'more cautious' approach was required (Mansfield and Pain, 2006:4) and eradication was subsequently limited to areas which had received development assistance (GOA, 1988).

In all SDEP projects (i.e. Chitral, FATA and DDDP, and BDP from 1983) law enforcement/eradication followed developmental progress (Boner, 1991). For example, farmers in FATA were given a six year grace period (Pakistan Television, 1995). Throughout SDEP projects the GoP decided each September where to prohibit cultivation. Political Agents met tribal leaders and farmers to inform them: of the enforcement schedule; that their crops would be eradicated; of the alternative income opportunities available; and that they could be prosecuted, whilst highlighting the economic risks eradication and prosecution posed. These were reiterated in meetings in November and January (see Boner, 1991; Qureshi, 1987; Zahid, 1987; Williams and Rudel, 1988).

Prior to the village meetings, military troops were deployed to advertise the commitment and willingness to use force. The PNCB and local officials then surveyed project areas and identified crops were eradicated; an aerial surveillance identified unseen fields (Qureshi, 1987). Any re-cultivation or resistance to eradication was 'severely dealt with by the law enforcement agencies' (Zahid, 1987:105); which may indicate the high-levels of torture in police custody (see Annex 1:5) and Hadd

Mansfield (2004:171) notes how, due to an over-reliance on the Pakistan media, Assad and Harris's research often took a 'conspiratorial tone'. However, as Assad (a Pashtun) met and interviewed several NWFP opium farmers he may have developed an insight into the corruption of development work which non-Pashtun's could not. Conversely, as farmers may have expected more than they received they may have exaggerated perception of corruption. This said, the theft of resources claim is supported by an investigation into 'ghost' schools and health centres in the late-1990s (see, Talbot, 2009). That money was displaced is feasible, to what extent would depend largely on the monitoring mechanisms of foreign partners.

punishments (i.e. flogging and execution). Conversely, Mahmood (2010) and Rodley (1996) have reported that Hadd punishments were seldom, if ever, used and leniency was more common. For example, in Bajaur farmers imprisoned for re-cultivation were released after promising to cease opium farming (INCSR, 1996). Having to negotiate with tribal leaders before arresting a farmer may itself have blocked arrests (Kamm, 1988b), although if tribes punished farmers themselves to conform to agreements or secure economic assistance the punishment could range from a fine to the death sentence (although more positively customary despite resolution tends to re-integrate the offender back into society) (for the Pashtun *Jirga* see Wardak, 2006).


During the first phase of DDDP farmers signed contracts agreeing to a scheduled reduction whereby if opium was identified after agreed objectives had been met the GoP could eradicate (Mansfield and Pain, 2006; UNODC, n.d.). However, development assistance was opposed in several areas controlled by heavily armed tribes who maintained that federal laws did not apply (Gillett, 2001; Mahmood, 2009). As the reluctant tribes were major opium farmers (USAID, 1994) production increased at five times the national average during phase one (Farrell, 1998). However, developmental achievements softened opposition and after negotiations with community elites, the project extended throughout Dir (Gillett, 2001; Mahmood, 2010). Once development had been initiated in the second phase, officials emphasised that aid would be withdrawn if opium continued to be produced (UNODC, n.d.).

However, in 1998 it was found that community leaders were encouraging cultivation to attract aid (Mansfield and Pain, 2006). Farmers were ordered to stay inside their homes whilst crops were eradicated. As a threat (Mahmood, 2010) 3,000 Frontier Corps were stationed in the vicinity. While aggressive opposition to eradication was reported, with some shots being fired (learning from the Gadoon-Amazai experience) troops did not return fire: a peaceful 'show of force' had been ordered (Gillett, 2001:278). As the two resisting tribes were held in great regard by neighboring tribes, once they succumbed many other tribes conceded (UNODC, n.d.).

UNODC has tended to report significantly higher eradication figures than INCSR, however, both illustrate a general trend of minimal eradication until around 1995/96 followed by an increased, peaking in 2000/2001 at between 70 and 90 percent (Figure 8:5). Eradication decreased after 2004 due to re-deployment of resources to counter-insurgency operations (Windle, 2009). The average of UNODC/INCSR estimates (Figure 8:4) suggests that more opium was harvested than eradicated in 13 out of seven years, and that on average Pakistan has eradicated 20.25 percent of all opium harvested


between 1987-2009; the risk increased between 1996 and 2001 to a 70 percent average. Nonetheless, the poor eradication record has primarily been isolated to areas where the GoP possesses insufficient authority (i.e. Khyber Agency) and almost 100 percent of opium cultivated in Dir District, Bajaur and Mohmand Agencies (INCSR, 2003) and Baluchistan have been eradicated (INCSR, 2004).

Figure 8: 4. Pakistan: Opium eradication/harvest ratio (1987-2007)



Sources: average adapted from: INCSR (various years); UNODCCP (1999, 2000, 2002); UNODC. (2005, 2010). Note: no data for 2002, 2008.

Figure 8: 5. Pakistan: INCRS/UNODC eradication/harvest data (1987-2008)



Source: INCSR (various years); UNODCCP (1999, 2000, 2002); UNODC. (2005, 2010).

Table 8: 1. Pakistan: Summary of DODCP

	Basic data	Community involvement	Roads (km)	Irrigation / land levelling (ha)	Electrification	Agri-Training	Modern agri-equipment	New/ improved crops	Handicraft/ alternative income
Buner	1) UNFDAC, GoP; 2) UN	Top-down	93	464 / 578	N.E.	Yes	To rent	Cash crops introduced	N.E.
MDP	1) USAID; 2) USAID	N.E.	24.14	Yes / N.E.	19 villages	Yes	Yes	Cash crops introduced	N.E.
DDDP	1) International coalition; 2) UN, GoP	VDC manage project ¹	439 (& 25 bridges)	10,100 / 6,700	49 villages	Yes	Yes	Cash / food crops introduced	N.E.
GAAD	1) USAID, GoP;	VDC manage	116	36% increase	52 villages	Yes ²	N.E.	Cash	Industrial

¹ Composed of tribal elites in the first phase. There was greater popular participation in the second phase (UNODC, 2001).

² There was a significant investment in off-farm training, especially construction (Williams and Rudel, 1988).

	2) USAID, GoP		projects (in final two years)		in arable land / N.E.				crops & high-yielding seeds introduced	estate ³ Supported migration
KDDP	1) USAID; 2) USAID		VDC manage projects	14	10 irrigation channels	N.E.	Yes	N.E.	Improved cash crops introduced	N.E.
	New/ improved livestock	Marketing	Safe drinking water	Health care	Education	Livestock health/ efficiency		Research	Sequence	
Buner	Imported poultry / livestock sold	N.E.	To 37,500 households	N.E.	N.E.	Vaccination programme		Extensive	Law enforcement followed DOA	
MDP	N.E.	N.E.	38 projects	N.E.	20 schools	Animal husbandry		Feasibility	Negotiated law	

³ An industrial estate and surrounding infrastructure was built (Mahmood, 2009). The government offered incentives to tenants, including: low-cost loans; a ten-year tax holiday; and a 50 percent power-subsidy. However, these were stopped following lobbying from rival business interests (USAID, 1994). As the estate attracted few investors, the majority of the machinery was transferred to Punjab and Sind (Assad and Harris, 2003), leaving many newly trained local people unemployed (Odell, 1991).

			conducted		built	improved	study	enforcement preceded DOA
DDDP	Yes	Minimal ⁴	14,600 households	Basic healthcare	N.E.	N.E.	Extensive	Law enforcement followed DOA
GAAD	N.E.	N.E.	To 72,000 people	Basic healthcare	142 schools built	Veterinary dispensary	Feasibility study	Negotiated law enforcement preceded DOA. Forced eradication after 3 years
KDDP	Poultry sold (all died from disease)	N.E.	N.E.	Basic health promotion	Existing schools resourced	Improved veterinary services	N.E.	Law enforcement followed DOA

Notes: basic data codes: 1) primary financers; 2) primary executing agency. ‘Yes’ denotes an action unspecified in the literature, i.e. modern agricultural equipment was made available in MDP, what was available or how it was distributed was not made apparent. ‘N.E.’ denotes no evidence. Sources: BDP: Asad and Harris (2003); Boner (1991); Boylan (1978); HTSL (1984); Der Meer (1987); Khan (1991); Mahmood (2009); Murphy (1983); PNCB (1975); Potulski (1991); UNODC (n.d.); USAID (1994); Queshi (1982). MDP: GOA (1988); Khan (1991); UNODC (n.d.); Queshi (1982). DDDP: GoP (1983b); HTSL (1984); Gillett (2001); Guardian (1989); UNODC (n.d./b); UNODC (2000); UNODC (n.d.); USAID (1994); Queshi (1982). GAAD: Nathan-Berger (1992); Odell (1991); Khan, 1987; Keyser *et al.* (1993); USAID (1994); Williams and Rudel (1988). KDDP: Khan (1991); Keyser *et al.* (1993); Nathan-Berger (1992); USAID (1994).

⁴ While the GoP (1983b) planned to support farmers with market research and feasibility studies on the establishing food manufacturing facilities, HTSL (1984) found that marketing was remained limited to farmers selling crops at the farmgate.

8.3. Success?

In 2001, Pakistan was declared 'poppy-free' by UNODC (2008) while INCSR (2001:VII-23) acknowledged that 'Pakistan has essentially achieved its ambitious goal...of eliminating opium production by the year 2000'. Between 1999 and 2003 Pakistan produced below 20mt of opium. The decline from the 1979 peak of 753.75mt to 9.5mt in 2000 represents a 99 percent reduction. The decline from the 1979 peak to 44mt in 2009 (the most recent harvest) represents a 94 percent reduction. Hence, while Pakistan resumed production above 20mt shortly after achieving *success*, it continued to conform to the 90 percent reduction criteria. The intervention has additionally improved the livelihoods of many former opium farmers.

In 2003, a resurgence in illicit production was witnessed in Pakistan. While the state has been able to limit the damage of this resurgence by eradicating as much as 77 percent of all opium poppies cultivated (UNODC, 2008) in 2008 virtually none of the 1,729 hectares cultivated in FATA were eradicated due to the redeployment of troops and tribal militia to anti-militant operations (US State Department, 2010). Furthermore, traditional resistance by tribal leaders to law enforcement has increased in parallel to military operations in Pakistan, and Afghanistan, and:

... it has become almost impossible for the administration of tribal areas to engage in punitive action against illegal growers. There seems an anarchical situation in our tribal territories. The local tribal population has cleverly exploited this situation and thus an increase in poppy growing (Fasihuddin, 2010: 119).

That Pakistan has been able to contain a low level of production to one area – Khyber Agency (INCRS, 2006, 2008) - and prevent new production areas arising may represent a significant indicator of Pakistan's efficiency and commitment. However, The current conflict for authority in NWFP and FATA between Islamist militants and the Pakistan state, coupled with high-levels of corruption and, low-levels of development and state authority in NWFP/FATA may result in a return to large-scale opium production and heroin manufacture (Windle, 2009).

8.4. Rival explanations of success

An important aspect of process-tracing is the interaction with established theories, as such this section shall critically appraise rival explanations of how *success* was realised. The extension of the state into formerly isolated areas was central to the intervention (Mahmood, 2009; UNODC, n.d., 2008). Several development practitioners (Gillett, 2001; Mahmood, 2009; UNODC, n.d.) have posited that all aspects of state extension, law enforcement and development centred upon negotiations with tribal and district elites for access to formerly isolated, autonomous, areas; including the non-confrontational use of the military (in later DODCP's) to enforce agreed eradication schedules. For Mahmood (2009) the most successful projects were those which allowed an initial period of toleration in which development was administered without being linked to immediate law enforcement. Taking a wider perspective, UNODC (n.d.) posited that reductions were limited until official support for production had ceased.

Essentially the Pakistan intervention is one of state extension through the administration of DODCP's, mainstreamed with provincial development projects after 1984. However, a mix of sequences and strategies were used in Pakistan, ranging from the enforcement of conditionality clauses specifying eradication within the first year of a development project, to eradication in areas which had achieved agreed development objectives. Centrally, all eradication, interdiction and law enforcement was negotiated with tribal or district leaders, which may be reflected in the low risk of eradication between 1987 and 2009 - farmers either ceased production voluntarily or local elites eradicated crops in agreement with the state. There is a possibility that police brutality and torture may have added another element of risk, however, it appears that few opium farmers were prosecuted.

Thus, while law enforcement played a significant role, eradication would have been much more costly, in terms of resources and violent opposition, without the extension of alternative incomes or social welfare as leverage in negotiations and as a means of state extension. Furthermore, non-negotiated forced eradication resulted in violent opposition in 1987, if it had continued it could have destabilised an already weak regime. Thus, the evidence suggests that the key components of *success* in Pakistan were the negotiation of all aspects of drug control with local elites and the extension of incentives followed or preceded by the creation of a high-risk environment.

More critically, Farrell (1998) suggests that much of the reduction may have been attributable to increased Afghan production deflating Pakistan farmgate prices. Windle (2009) found a statistically significant negative correlation between Pakistan and

Afghan opium production between 1979 and 2007; suggesting that as opium production decreased in Pakistan it increased in Afghanistan. However, Windle illustrates how the national intervention reduced Pakistani opium farmers' competitiveness in relation to their Afghan neighbours. Thus, as demand for Pakistani opium decreased local elites may have perceived rural development as in their best interest and acquiesced to negotiated bans.

8.5. Case summary

Between 1955 and 1979 Pakistan licensed farmers in Settled Districts of NWFP to produce opium for the state monopoly; the monopoly was poorly controlled and many vendors illicitly sold opium diverted from licit farms or clandestinely produced in NWFP. During the 1960s, state regulation broke-down further; increasing both consumption and illicit and licit production.

In 1976, the first – isolated and localised – crop substitution project was administered in Buner. In 1979/80, the first national intervention was undertaken in areas where the state exercised sufficient authority. The intervention was founded upon law enforcement and as there was insufficient crop substitution, the campaign further impoverished many former-opium farmers. Production was displaced to Merged Districts and Tribal Agencies where state authority was minimal.

From the early-1980s a number of DODCP's were administered. While the projects differed in substance, crop substitution and, the construction of transport and agricultural infrastructure remained significant objectives in all projects. However, no project marketed produce for farmers. Parts of FATA and NWFP were (and still are) legally autonomous and shielded by inhospitable mountainous terrain (from a counter-militancy perspective see Tellis, 2008). Hence, a major positive outcome was that infrastructural development opened many formally isolated tribes to the state. The most successful projects allowed: farmers to transport goods to national markets; individuals to search for employment outside of their locality; the state to enforce prohibition.

A mixture of strategies in terms of sequencing is apparent. American administered projects (MDP, GAAD) made negotiated eradication a condition for development aid; whereas BDP and SDEP projects allowed farmers to develop alternative incomes before enacting coercive mechanisms. Communities were often warned in advance when eradication would occur. Forced eradication was undertaken by paramilitaries and in remote areas was conducted through the aerial application of herbicides. All eradication and development was based upon negotiation with tribal leaders; including the threat of

military force. Additionally, law enforcement was also undertaken against opium farmers who re-cultivated after eradication or in Buner once the project had ended. This said, farmers appear to have been leniently dealt with by the Pakistani criminal justice system.

Using the definition of *success* as *an excess of 90 percent reduction which brings the potential production below 20mt*, Pakistan can be considered to have achieved *success* from 1999 to 2003, after which production increased to just above the minimal level. Pakistan continues to conform to the percentage change criterion.

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9. Viet Nam and Laos

9.1. Context and background

While opium was present in Laos and Viet Nam during the seventeenth-century (Nguyen, 2008) production and consumption increased during the nineteenth-century alongside migrations of ethnic groups from China (see Culas, 2000; Culas and Michaud, 1997; Geddes, 1970; Michaud, 1997; Rapin *et al.*, 2003). By 1880, French explorers in Laos and Viet Nam reported opium as being produced in significant quantities (Culas, 2000).

The French, after colonising Indochina (Cambodia, Laos and Viet Nam), established a state monopoly selling imported opium (McCoy, 2003). While the production or consumption of non-monopoly opium was prohibited, to avoid conflict, the highland peoples of Laos and North Viet Nam were permitted to produce opium for their own consumption. Nevertheless, as controls on highland farmers were inadequate, surplus opium was smuggled to the lowlands where it competed with the colonial monopoly. In 1905, to prevent competition from highland opium, the colonial Government attempted to procure all North Vietnamese opium. However, the low price proffered by the monopoly failed to garner cooperation forcing, in 1918, the monopoly to increase the set-price sufficiently to attract Laotian and Vietnamese highland farmers' compliance. While the increased monopoly price initially decreased smuggling to the lowland markets, it quickly became common practice to adulterate highland opium with imported (inferior) Burmese opium to free better quality Vietnamese and Laotian opium for the lowland black market; in 1925 domestic procurement ceased (Rapin *et al.*, 2003). While sufficient to provoke the monopoly, in global terms illicit Indochinese production remained small throughout the 1930s (League of Nations, 1938).

In response to the severing of supply lines from India, Iran and Turkey during World War Two (Bulletin of Narcotics, 1949; UNODC, 2005), the colonial monopoly began promoting highland production by concurrently increasing highland land-taxes and monopoly prices (Stuart-Fox, 1997). However, insufficient controls over highland farmers (Dommen, 1971) meant that farmers who had previously grown only for local consumption enlarged their production in response to growing demand from both the regulated and black markets (Bulletin of Narcotics, 1949; UNODC, 2005). While Indochinese production grew (Commission on Narcotic Drugs, 1952) on a global scale it remained relatively small (Morlock, 1944).

In 1946, the French officially prohibited opium consumption and production (McCoy, 2003). Nevertheless, due to fear of violent opposition and a lack of state authority, highland Hmong and Dao peoples remained exempt from prohibition (CND, 1952). While the monopoly officially closed in 1950 (CND, 1950) the French intelligence agencies operated an unofficial monopoly to finance covert operations. To maintain Hmong loyalty during the first Indochina War, opium was procured from the highlands and sold throughout Indochina; the surplus was exported by organised crime groups to foreign black markets (McCoy, 2003).

In North Viet Nam, the Vietminh - who were ideologically opposed to opium¹ (Westermeyer, 1982) - prohibited consumption and ordered the gradual suppression of highland production. While little information is available on the extent of Vietminh involvement it appears that as hostilities intensified Vietminh opposition decreased (Rapin *et al.*, 2003). There was some production in highland areas (CND, 1953, 1954) outside of Vietminh authority (CND, 1950), however Laos continued to produce the more significant quantities (CND, 1952) and in 1953 the Vietminh invaded the four Laotian provinces which together accounted for 70 percent of Indochinese production (Joy, 1953). That the occupation persisted just long enough to harvest opium (Wekkin, 1982)² may suggest that North Viet Nam possessed insufficient opium for either profit or medicine.

Increasing Laotian production during the 1950s was encouraged by external events (Wishart, 1974) including the cessation of Indian exports for non-medical/scientific consumption in 1955 (Hardesty, 1992) and successful opium bans in China and Iran. By the end of the 1950s, Southeast Asia supplied approximately 50 percent of total illicit global production (McCoy 2003).

9.1.1. Laos: 1959-1975

The direct or indirect, intentionally or unintentional, facilitation of the opiate trade by actors of the Second Indochina War significantly inflated Laotian production (see Feingold, 1970; Hazlehurst, 1977; Holiday, 1957; Lamour and Lamberti, 1974; McCoy, 1992, 2000, 2003; Westermeyer, 1982, 2004) until at least 1968 when many highlanders were displaced from their farmland by intensifying hostilities. While such disruptions reduced production in some areas (McCoy, 2003; Westermeyer, 1978) Laotian opium

¹ The Vietminh Declaration of Independence (1945:n.p.) stated that the French had ‘forced us to use opium’.

² A practice adopted by the Pathet Lao and Royal Lao Government during the Second Indochina War (see, Feingold, 1970).

continued to supply (Feingold, 1970; Murphy and Steele, 1971) licit (Lamour and Lamberti, 1974) and illicit domestic opium consumers (FCO, 1972) and Southeast Asian manufacturers of heroin destined (INCB, 1969; McCoy, 1992) for the swelling demands of US soldiers stationed in Viet Nam (US State Department, 1973; McCoy, 1992).

Then in 1971, under pressure from the US (Kuzmarov, 2008), opium smoking was prohibited (Westermeyer, 1982). Repressive measures were taken against consumers and some distributors in urban areas (CCINC, 1972; McCoy, 2003). However, whilst production was officially restricted to older highlanders for their own consumption (US Information Service, 1971b; also INCB, 1971; 1996; Shipler, 1974) the police tended to be ambivalent in areas where they possessed authority while much of the country remained a 'no-mans-land' under neither The Royal Lao Government nor Pathet Lao authority (Westermeyer, 1982). The US improved Laotian interdiction capabilities (Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1973) and part funded crop substitution (INCB, 1973) and resettlement projects. Modelled on the CRCDP in Thailand, substitute crops were extended and farmers taught modern agricultural methods (GOA, 1975; see INCB, 1976). The projects were hampered by resistance to resettlement and, as crops were eradicated through aerial herbicides and bombs 'served as another source of both anxiety and peril' (Kuzmarov, 2008:362). Consequently, there was some large-scale violent resistance (New York Times, 1972; Stuart-Fox, 1997).

Then in 1973, the US military exited Viet Nam, the subsequent accumulation of stocks dovetailed the establishment of a gap in the market due to the removal of Turkish/French opiates. The farmgate price increased and Southeast Asian opium production and heroin manufacture increased for export to the US and, after DEA and Thai interdiction in the early-1970s, to the European and Australian markets (McCoy, 1992). Westermeyer (1982:274) posits that during this period production shifted from 'essentially a cottage industry ...//... to a large industrial complex'.

9.1.2. Viet Nam: 1954+

In the late-1960s/early-1970s US troops stationed in Viet Nam represented a major market; it is estimated that as much as 10 (Murphy and Steele, 1971) to 35 percent of all US troops had consumed heroin (Robins *et al.*, 1998). The Vietnamese market was supplied from opium produced in Burma, Laos and Thailand; minimal amounts were produced in North or South Viet Nam (INCB, 1974; Murphy and Steele, 1971). The Government of South Viet Nam claimed that illicit production had ceased in 1955 (UN, 1966) after an extensive forced eradication campaign (Nguyen, 2008) and (presumably


to conform to the US ‘war on drugs’) arrested 1,500 ‘traffickers’ (US Information Service, 1971; see INCB, 1971, 1972).

In 1971, a US Provost Marshal reported that the Vietminh had regulated some farmers to produce opium for medicinal purpose, of which little was diverted (McCoy, 2003). Nonetheless, the Vietminh did not possess the resources to support the establishment of alternative incomes for highland opium farmers. Hence, to avoid alienating highland peoples and destabilising border regions a certain amount of production was unofficially tolerated in some areas whilst effectively enforced in others (Rapin *et al.*, 2003).

In 1975, Viet Nam was unified as the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam (Finklestein, 1987; McWilliams, 1987). The US Congress (Cima, 1986) and the Chinese state controlled media (BBC, 1982; Thomson, 1988; Yu, 1983) charged the Government with supporting the production and export of opium for non-medical/scientific purposes to cover extensive national debts (the conflict and poor economic management had devastated the economy, see Annex 1:8). While the evidence to support these claims remains limited to one (alleged) 1982 official Government of Viet Nam (GoV) document, alternative evidence suggests that between 1975 (Boonwaat, 2001) and the early-1980s the state procured highland opium for domestic and foreign pharmaceutical (i.e. licit) consumption. However, the practice appears to have ceased in 1985 (Rapin *et al.*, 2003) after which farmers sold their opium on black market (Boonwaat, 2001).


The extent of production remains unclear. The US Congress declared Viet Nam a ‘secondary’ source of illicit opium alongside Afghanistan and Laos (Cima, 1986); to qualify ‘secondary’ Afghanistan produced 160 metric tonnes in 1984 and 450 metric tonnes in 1985: Laos produced 97 metric tonnes in 1985 and 32 metric tonnes in 1984. UNODC (2005:8) have stated that ‘production was systemized, and cultivation continued to be widespread.... until the early-1990s’ and included Vietnamese data in the World Drug Report from 1986 (see Figure 9:1). Conversely, between 1977 and 1993 neither Canadian (RCMP, 1981-1992) nor US (DEA, 1992; NNICC, 1977-1993) annual global production reports mentioned Viet Nam as a source. While Viet Nam was a closed society and thus data may have been unavailable to Canadian or US agencies, both reports included the equally introverted Laos in their analyses. In short, there is insufficient and contradictory evidence to the extent of illicit opium production. However, we know that by the 1990s production was sufficiently high to concern the Vietnamese Government.

Figure 9: 1. Viet Nam: Illicit opium production (1986-2008)



Source, adapted INCRS (various years); Rapin *et al.* (2003); UNODCCP (1999, 2000, 2002); UNODC (various years). Note: grey line represents 20mt outcome measurement of *success*. Missing values indicates missing data.

Figure 9: 2. Viet Nam: Area Illicitly cultivated (1951-2008)



Sources: adapted from, CND (various years); INCRS (various years); UNODCCP (1999); UNODC (2010b). Note: diagonal line indicates missing data. Missing values indicates missing data.

9.1.3. Laos: 1975+

In 1976 Resolution No.3 encouraged all farmers to grow industrial crops; including opium. Highland farmers ‘resumed opium production, with full official sanction’ and the state attempted to procure all opium (Lee, 1982:209; also Wekkin, 1982) under a state monopoly (Boonwaat, 2006; Stuart-Fox, 1986) for domestic and foreign pharmaceutical (i.e. licit) consumption (RCMP, 1987; US State Department, 1988).

Official encouragement was reiterated in 1986 under Resolution No.7, which declared opium one of the countries most important exports (Cima, 1986).

While information on Laotian illicit production/diversion during the late-1970s is unreliable (INCB, 1977; NNICC, 1980) the US State Department (1988:325) reported that after 1975 illicit production ‘declined steeply’ and then increased after Resolution No.7 (Cima, 1986); possible resulting from decreasing Thai production (see RCMP, 1988; US State Department, 1988). The post-1975 ‘steep decline’ may have been less pronounced than acknowledged as the low monopoly price paid³ likely resulted in large-scale diversion and/or illicit production (Lee, 1982). This appears particularly feasible if accounts are followed of Laotian military and civil authorities facilitating diversion, illicit production and trafficking during the 1970s (Hazlehurst, 1977), 1980s (US State Department, 1988; Wayne, 1988; McCoy, 2003) and early-1990s (DEA, 1992).

In 1987, a visit by the INCB signalled a return to cooperation with the international drug control regime. The following year the first Lao-UN development project commenced, then in 1992/93 a joint Laos-UNDP socio-economic survey found that opium was grown by 32 percent of villages in 58 of 69 provinces. The findings formed the basis of the first national Masterplan (Seeger, 1996) - the Comprehensive Drug Control Program (1994-2000) (Cohen, 2004; Thomas, 2004) was founded upon a ‘gradual approach’ which emphasised ‘community-based’ development (Boonwaat, 2004; Chansina and Raza, 2001) with an objective of reducing production to below 70mt by 2000 (INCRS, 1996). Opium farming continued to be unofficially tolerated (Epprecht, 2000) with farmers permitted to grow small plots for local consumption (Kramer *et al.*, 2009). In 1998, nominal interdiction of manufacturers and traffickers was undertaken (INCSR, 1999).

In 2000, Laotian policy shifted with Decree No.14 which ordered the complete cessation of production by 2006 (Cohen, 2004), subsequently reduced to 2005 by the Communist Party Congress (INCRS, 2002; UNODC, 2005). Opium farmers were informed that 2001 would be the last year that production would be tolerated (Lyttleton, 2004) whilst provincial governors were threatened with dismissal if reductions were insufficient (INCRS, 2003).


The post-2000 approach became known as the ‘accelerated rural development programme’ (GoL, 2006; see Phetsavan, 2002; UNODC, 2006) and theoretically

³ An average yield of 8k per family earned a minimum profit of 3,200kip; a 100kg bag of rice cost 3,000kip (Lee, 1982).

identified production as a poverty issue by acknowledging that over two-thirds of the poorest villages and seven of the ten poorest districts produced opium (Boonwaat, 2004). However, operational policies prioritised opium suppression over poverty reduction (Thomas, 2004).


The shift in policy is attributed by some commentators to pressure exerted by America, China, the UN and Viet Nam (Andersson *et al.*, 2006; Cohen, 2008; Kramer *et al.*, 2009). However, equally significant were domestic concerns over increasing opium consumption (Lyttleton *et al.*, 2004) and a perception of production and swidden agriculture as a barrier to achieving (Boonwaat, 2004; Lyttleton, 2004) the objective of rising above the classification of Least Developed Nation status by 2020 (UNCCA, 2006).

Figure 9: 3. Laos: Illicit opium production (1978-2009)



Source: adapted from DEA (1991); FCO (1972); Feingold (1970); Holahan and Henningen (1972); INCRS (various years); Joy (1953); Magnussen *et al.* (1980); McCoy (2003); NNICC (various years); RCMP (various years); Segar (1996); Train (1973); UNDCP (1993); UNODCCP (1999, 2000, 2000b, 2002); UNODC (2005, 2006b, 2010, 2010b); Wekkin (1982). Note: grey line represents 20mt outcome measurement of *success*. Missing values indicates missing data. 1975-1978 data unavailable.

Figure 9: 4. Laos: Illicit area under cultivation (1986-2010)



Sources: adapted from, Chansina and Raza (2001); CND (1953); INCRS (various years); Soulinethone (2002); US State Department (1988); UNODC (various years). Note: diagonal line indicates missing data. Missing values indicates missing data.

9.2. Intervention (Viet Nam)

During the early-1990s, the GoV became concerned over increasing opiate consumption⁴ (Rapin *et al.*, 2003) and prohibited opium production and consumption under Article 61 of the 1992 Constitution. This was followed in 1993 with Decree 06/CP which set the provisions for eradication and DAO (Boonwaat, 2001; Vogel and Boonwaat, 2001). Production and possession were first criminalised in a 1997 amendment to the 1985 Criminal Code (Nguyen, 2008) which established the death penalty for possession of more than 100g heroin or 5kg of opium (Associate Press, 2001; FIDH, 2010). While punishments for production were purposefully left vague to allow local authorities (Torode, 1997) leniency towards impoverished farmers (Agence France Presse, 1997) however as possession of opium was a capital offence the 1985 Criminal Code could be interpreted as permitting the execution of opium farmers who produced - and hence possess - excess of 5kg. This said, convention required that criminal liability only be imposed if the farmer re-cultivated after administrative sanctions (i.e. warnings, alternative income support or a fine) had been imposed. As

⁴ In 1989 a Foreign Trade Office was created to attract investment in infrastructure and oil and petrol exploration contracts signed with European companies (Cima, 1989). Thus, a dovetailing motivator may have been the improvement of foreign relations.

administrative sanction records are removed after one year, farmers are free to re-cultivate the following year without the threat of incarceration (Nguyen, 2008).

In 2000, the Law on Preventing and Combating Narcotic Drugs (2000) was passed. The Law placed a duty on all individuals, civil and public organisations to notify the state of production. The Law obliged the state to ‘help local people effectively reorient their production systems’ (Article 8) after eradication, and mandates the military with organising ‘activities aimed at preventing and combating narcotic drugs’ (Article 11).

9.2.1. Development-Orientated Approaches

During the early-1990s Programme 06 was developed to extend crop substitution to communes which agreed to cease opium production. In 1996, the Ky Son Project (Nghe An Province) was administered. The Project followed best practice developed in Thailand and Pakistan (Boonwaat, 2001:130; UNODC, 2009, see UNDCP, 2001). In 1994 Ky Son was one of Viet Nam’s poorest districts and the largest source of opium (Yamada and Dung, 2005). Prior to project initiation crop substitution and negotiated eradication had been administered, however, lack of operational experience had limited the previous projects effectiveness, and reduced farmers trust in ability of the state to administer alternative livelihoods. While many farmers initially re-cultivated or were displaced to Laos (Vogel and Boonwaat, 2001) and China (Zhongguo Xinwen She, 1995) the project eventually reduced the harvested area from 2,800ha in 1993 to 98.5ha in 1997. Production ceased completely by 1999 (Rerkasem, 2002). While the project improved the quality of life and food security of many families (Vogel and Boonwaat, 2001) by the end of the first phase, the district continued to be one of Viet Nam’s poorest areas (UNODC, 2009).

Nationally, before 1998, communes that pledged to cease production received developmental aid and/or gradually decreasing compensation (Boonwaat, 2001). All development projects contained conditionality clauses (Rapin *et al.*, 2003), for example, in Khao Khoang: farmers were taught new skills; fruit trees were imported; a fishpond was built; and irrigation infrastructures was improved. Nonetheless, as profits from new crops were significantly less than received from opium many households were unable to feed themselves for parts of the year (Poffenberger *et al.*, 1998).

Furthermore, non-opium farmers began cultivating opium to attract aid (Brown *et al.*, 2005; Rapin *et al.*, 2003). In response, in 1998, support targeted solely on opium farmers was abandoned and aid was administered on a ‘case-by-case’ basis dependent on the national poverty reduction campaign, rather than on a communes opium production (Rapin *et al.*, 2003).

Thus, opium suppression was mainstreamed into national highland development in the 1998 Programme for Socio-Economic Development of Communes in Especially Difficult Circumstances in Mountainous and Remote Areas. The Programme's objective was to develop the 1,000 most underdeveloped communes, which included major production areas. Each commune was provided with an annual budget of roughly US\$28,500 to manage one or two urgent projects (i.e. electrical supplies, transport or agricultural infrastructures) (Boonwaat, 2001; see Rapin *et al.*, 2003). The projects remained very top-down (Freedom House, 2006) and some involved resettling villages into the lowlands (Viet Nam News Agency, 2007). The state additionally improved credit access (Chinnanon, 2002), trained farmers in new agricultural techniques and promoted: new or more efficient cash crops and animal breeds; handicraft industries; and tourism (Tuan, 2001, 2002). Thus, the Government indirectly contributed to alternative development (UNODC, 2003).

Nonetheless, the expenditure per capita on development was lower in opium producing areas than the national average (Baulch *et al.*, 2002; Rapin *et al.*, 2003, UNODC, 2005) and the lack of alternatives and strict bans reduced many households' annual income (Baulch *et al.*, 2002; Michaud and Turner, 2000); in general highlanders remained the most impoverished of Vietnamese people (see Annex 1:8). The boom in highland tourism 'provided an unexpected opportunity for extra income'; as the GoV expanded the transport infrastructure to accommodate the new influx of tourists the highland peoples began to sell traditional handicrafts and local produce. Tourism, in some areas, became the primary substitute for opium (Michaud and Turner, 2000:91).

Table 9: 1. Viet Nam: Summary of Ky Son Project

Basic data	1) UN; 2) UNOPS, GoV; 3) US\$5 million
Community involvement	Theoretically high (planning & implementing). Mid-term review critical of lack of participation
Roads (km)	43
Irrigation/land levelling (ha)	Extensive
Electrification	Yes
Agri-training	Yes
Modern agri-equipment	N.E.
New/improved crops	Yes

Handicraft/alternative income	Yes ⁵
New/improved livestock	Yes
Marketing	Yes, insufficient impact ⁶
Safe drinking water	N.E.
Health care	Yes
Education	Yes
Livestock health/efficiency	Vaccinations & improved animal feed
Research	Pre-project survey
Sequence	Negotiated eradication before alternatives established

Notes: basic data codes: 1) primary financiers; 2) primary executing agency; 3) cost in millions. 'Yes' denotes an action unspecified in the literature. 'N.E.' = no evidence. Source: Bendiksen (2002); Boonwaat (2001); Chanthanom-Good (2005); Rerkasem (2002); Thai Press Reports (2006); Yamada and Dung (2005); UNDCP (2001); UNODC (2003, 2007, 2009); Vogel and Boonwaat (2001).

9.2.2. Law enforcement approaches

Since, 1992 the 'government policy is to eradicate opium poppy cultivation as soon as possible' (Boonwaat, 2001:129) and has centred upon 'eradication programs, not AD interventions' (Brown *et al.*, 2005:9). Large-scale negotiated eradication began in 1992 (INCB, 1993). As a large state presence existed in the most isolated areas (UNODC, 2005) before the cultivated period surveillance was increased (Rapin *et al.*, 2003) from already high levels (Avery, 1993; HRW, 1992) and 'prevention' campaigns were initiated (Rapin *et al.*, 2003). Prevention included: 'stern threats' (Brown *et al.*, 2005:12); propaganda campaigns (see INCRS, 2001; Voice of Viet Nam, 1994); and state guarantees to administer crop substitution projects or compensation once opium production ceased (Boonwaat, 2001).

⁵ The NGO Craft Link provided material and sold produce from their outlets in Hanoi (Bendiksen, 2002).

⁶ Commune Marketing Groups and Task Forces were established to assist with marketing. The Task Force - composed of representatives of civil and government organisations - directed marketing activities within the district. The Marketing Groups educated farmers on marketing, distributed market information and liaised between merchants and farmers. However, high-transport costs and low market-access limited the impact of marketing support (Bendiksen, 2002).

Arrest and prosecution was reserved for systematic re-cultivation (Chapon, 1992; Rapin *et al.*, 2003). However, farmers were ‘administratively’ punished (Kim, 1994; Viet Nam News Agency, 2002); ‘administrative detention’ is a punishment used for a variety of crimes. It consists of increased surveillance and orders to reside (possible under house arrest) and work in a specified area (HRW, 1992; US State Department, 1999). Under the 2005 Penal Code opium production can be punished with 3-6 years administrative detention.


Public execution of traffickers was used extensively (AI, 2003); between 1994 and 1999, 95 people were executed and 66 received life sentences (Viet Nam Economic Times, 1999; see Soloman, 1996; Viet Nam News Agency, 1995).⁷ This may have had an anticipatory effect on farmers.

In opposition to the Governments claim that few farmers were punished, between 1992 and 2000 there were several reports indicating how widespread abuse (Human Rights Watch, 2003) of highland peoples by the Vietnamese criminal justice system, including: police brutality; torture and forced confessions; prison conditions which threaten the health of prisoners; the use of shackles (see Human Rights Watch, 1993, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2005; US State Department, 1999).

Conversely, there are accounts of the military forcing eradication (Associate Press, 2001; Independent, 2001) as early as 1992 (Chapon, 1992; Kiem, 1994). During the Ky Son project eradication was undertaken so quickly and efficiently by the Border Army Force that it was ‘difficult for the project to.... fill the needs and demands created among the former opium growers’ (Vogel and Boonwaat, 2001:132). Additionally, in several areas crops were eradicated before establishing alternative incomes (UNODC, 2005c). Instances of violent resistance have been reported (UNHCR, 2004); these may have been in response to more repressive forms of law enforcement. Since 1992, in only two years have less than 20 percent of poppies cultivated been eradicated (Figure 9:5).

⁷ Between 1997-2001, 335 were executed for ‘drug offences’ while 285 received life sentences (INCRS, 2003)

Figure 9: 5. Viet Nam: Opium eradication/harvest ratio (1992-2008)



Sources: adapted from UNODCCP (1999; 2000); UNODC (2010b). Note: missing values indicates missing data.

9.3. Success?

Since 2000, Viet Nam has been classified as ‘other Asian countries’ in UNODCCP (1999-2002) and UNODC (2003-2010) statistical tables. Until 2005, the INCRS (2000-2005) designated Viet Nam a ‘major drug-producing nation’, however, this was based upon data collected in 2000 and disputed by UNODC (2005). The decline from the 1990 peak of 90mt to 2mt in 1992 represents a 99 percent reduction. The intervention appears to have negatively impacted many former opium farmers.

9.4. Rival explanations of success

An important aspect of process-tracing is the interaction with established theories, as such this section shall critically appraise rival explanations of how *success* was realised. *Success* in Viet Nam has been attributed to the ‘active government enforcement’ of an opium ban (Yamada and Dung, 2005:14; also UNODC, 2005). Rapin *et al.* (2003) posited *success* to the centrality of negotiated eradication, extensive surveillance and the inclusion of conditionality clauses in non-opium rural development projects; in other words, the mainstreaming of drug control with rural development.

However, national *success* was achieved before the Ky Son project was initiated or DOA’s were mainstreamed into national rural development policies. Furthermore, development projects appear to have had little success in alleviating poverty during the intervention period and may have worsened former opium farmers living conditions; as

Michaud and Turner (2000) suggested tourism for many farmers was the only viable substitute.

It would appear that Vietnamese *success* was dependent upon a strong state presence in opium producing areas. While the extent of forced eradication remains unclear, unequal and coercive negotiations involving the promise of aid and ‘stern threats’ appear central. The anticipatory effects of the execution of traffickers may have added leverage to negotiations.

9.5. Intervention (Laos)

In 1990, the first formal, published, drug control law was enacted (Lee, 1982; Stuart-Fox, 1986).⁸ Article 135 of the Penal Code prohibited the possession or distribution of narcotic drugs (Chansina and Raza, 2001). The INCB (1994) found the Article deficient for failure to prohibit production this was rectified by a 1996 amendment (INCRS, 1996; Lyttleton *et al.*, 2004) and in 2001 opium was first criminalised by an amendment of Article 135 which provided a maximum life sentence for possession or production of over 5kg of heroin (Chansina and Raza, 2001:21; INCRS, 2005).⁹

9.5.1. Development-Orientated Approaches

This section shall present an overview of the six primary development projects conducted from 1989. The particulars of the projects, summarised in Table 9:1, are: (1) Palavek Alternative Development Project (PADP) (1989-1996) in Xaisomboun, Hom District, Vientiane; (2) Houaphan Crop Substitution Project (HCSP) (1989-1999) in Houaphan Province; (3) Xieng Khouang Highland Development Programme (XKHDP) (1992-1999) in Xieng Khouang Province; (4) Nonghet Alternative Development Project Programme (NADPP) (1992-2002) in Nonghet District, Xieng Khouang Province; (5) Long Alternative Development Project (LADP) (1993-2004) in Long District, Luang Namtha Province; (6) Shifting Cultivation Stabilization Pilot Project (SCSPP) (1997-2000) in Houaphan Province.¹⁰

While the UN had intermittently administered small-scale crop substitution projects during the 1970s (Seger, 1996; UNDCP, 1993) and early-1980s (INCB, 1981) prior to

⁸ As the Communist criminal justice system had been arbitrary and impromptu, documented laws had been minimal (Stuart-Fox, 1986).

⁹ The death penalty for trafficking or manufacturing was introduced in 2005 (INCRS, 2002) and in 2006-07, 28 were sentenced to death (IA, 2006, 2007).

¹⁰ For discussion on smaller projects see Bouphakham (2001); Cohen and Littlejohn (2002); Domeij-Gaul and Richter (2006); Foppes and Phommasane (2006); Kuhlmann (2001).

1988 highland development had been limited (Fox, 1997); partly due to the insurgency (Fox, 2008). While the first Laos-UN development project, initiated in 1989, may represent a shift in Laotian development policy ‘the actual contribution of drug control to development ..[remained]... limited’ throughout the early-1990s (Seger, 1996:46).

Before 2000, development projects were based on the alternative development model established in Thailand (Anderson *et al.*, 2006). Following the experience of Thailand the 1994 and 2001 Masterplan’s emphasised treatment of addiction and improved medical services to remove the rural opium consumption (Boonwaat, 2004; Soulinethone, 2002) facilitating production (INCRS, 2006). However, Laos diverged from the model by allowing private companies to establish plantations, by resettling large-numbers of opium farmers and placing less emphasis on marketing of licit crops (Bendiksen, 2002).

The objectives of PADP, the first project run in Laos (UNODC, 1997), were state extension and opium suppression. In 1989, there were no usable roads or medicine dispensaries, whilst markets, schools and clean drinking water were scarce (UNDTCD, 1991). At project termination the area had become food secure and was a net rice exporter (UNODCCP, 2002) and indicators of health had improved (UNODCCP, 2000), for example, incidence of malaria had decreased by 40 percent (UNGASS, 1998). Infrastructural developments had reduced the journey time to market from three days to three hours whilst a number of new crops proved to be 300 times more profitable than opium (UNODCCP, 2000). Opium production declined from 3.5mt in 1989 to under 100kg by 1996 (UNODCCP, 2000).

The primary emphasis of HCSP was on basic infrastructural development (Kurukulasuriya, 2001) including the building of two hydroelectric/irrigation dams (INCSR, 1998) and lowland irrigation to promote resettlement to the lowlands (Laing, 1992). However, roads had to be rebuilt in 2003; the poor construction was attributed to corruption and mismanagement within the project (Lang, 2004). Additionally, production increased during the project’s life (Wai, 2009) and in 2003, Houaphan remained one of the poorest and largest opium producing provinces (Boonwaat, 2004).

The objective of NADPP was state extension and opium suppression (Sirivong, 2001). Part of the project was funded by a private Laotian company that provided technical support, seeds and tractors, and procured all crops at a fixed price (Soulinethone, 2002). The overall area under cultivation reduced from 332ha to 149.5ha throughout the life of the project (Sirivong, 2001). Whilst several crops were worth

double that of opium (Bendiksen, 2002), limited the impact of new/improved crops/livestock (Thion, 2002).

While LADP made little impact on opium production (Lyttleton *et al.*, 2004) significant improvements in health, education and market access were reported (Cohen, 2009). Market access and resettlement were facilitated by the building of a major road linking Long District to China, Muang Sing and Xiengkok Provinces (Lyttleton *et al.*, 2004).

The primary objective of SCSPP was to improve income and reduce watershed degradation; opium suppression was a secondary objective. Nonetheless, by 2005 no opium was harvested in the project area. Additionally, the average per capita household income increased by 909,000kip and living conditions improved through the extension of social welfare and transport infrastructures. However, insufficient market access or support for marketing limited the impact of new/improved crops/livestock (ADB, 2005).

Chinese Green Anti-Drug Project

In 1995, China established the Green Anti-Drug Project whereby 300 million Yuan (US\$43.95 million) and 3,000 agricultural experts were initially assigned to assist Laotian (and Burmese) opium farmers. China guaranteed to procure all former opium farmers produce (Xinhua News Agency, 2002) and, in 2002, to attract private agri-companies to establish plantations import duties and related value-added taxes were dropped on economic crops produced by private Chinese companies operating in opium producing areas (Xinhua News Agency, 2007; see Hu, 2006).¹¹

In 2008, 40 privately own Chinese companies operated in northern Laos with the stated objective of opium reduction (Cohen, 2009). The companies procured large tracks of land and established plantations (notably rubber, watermelon and sugar) which either employed (Bendiksen, 2002; Mann, 2009) or sub-contracted local farmers (Kramer *et al.*, 2009).

¹¹ An estimated 15 percent of Laotian arable land is rented to agri-companies from multiple countries; many are exploitative (MacKinnon, 2008). However, China is the only state to have supported foreign investment as drug control.

The project was temporarily suspended in 2010 for a Chinese Government impact assessment (TNI, 2010).

By 2007, a reported 66,667ha of substitute crops had been supported in Laos, Burma/Myanmar and Viet Nam (Xinhua News Agency, 2007).¹² A Chinese newspaper has reported that rice yields increased four times, and cropping systems, agricultural technology and living standards all improved (Xinhua News Agency, 2002). While:

... enterprises have built simple roads at a length of over 3000 km, 18 bridges, 500 kg water canals, 30 pools, 13 sanitary offices, 22 schools, 6 substations and 12 processing plants (Jie, 2009:33).

While the Chinese Government requires that all subsidised companies work towards developing opium-producing areas, in practice many companies negatively impact opium-producing areas (TNI, 2010). Several accounts maintain that Chinese economic interests have hi-jacked drug control and establish unsustainable agri-industries which exploit farmers (Cohen, 2009; Tanguay, 2010; TNI, 2010) whilst ignoring best practice developed by (over) 30 years of research and experience (Kramer *et al.*, 2009). Some of the primary concerns are that weak Laotian legislation and large-scale corruption allow plantations to avoid taxes (Cohen, 2009) and regulations protecting environmental and workers rights (Kramer *et al.*, 2009; Mann, 2009). For example, uneducated farmers are often insufficiently remunerated (Jelsma and Kramer, 2008) while others have been coerced to sell their land rights (TNI, 2010).

Further, the private companies profits migrate from the project area (Cohen, 2009; Lyttleton *et al.*, 2004) whilst many are short-term projects designed to make a quick profit (He, 2006). Furthermore, private companies have aggressively competed with the marketing of NGO or state promoted alternative crops (Kramer *et al.*, 2009). Tellingly, some provincial officials partnered with such companies have blocked NGO's lobbying for more stringent regulations or campaigns to raise awareness of workers rights (Cohen, 2009). The effect on opium production appears to be limited as the majority of plantations are established at lower elevations, close to roads, rather than in high-production areas (Tanguay, 2010).

Resettlement

In 1994 a policy to resettle 60 percent of highlanders by 2000 (Anderson *et al.*, 2006) into new or existing lowland villages commenced. The objectives were to reduce opium

¹² The number is likely an underestimate due to inadequate monitoring (Cohen, 2009).

production, swidden agriculture and poverty, whilst extending the state (Baird and Shoemaker, 2007). While resettlement is officially voluntary:

The terms ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ fail to adequately describe the decision-making process or local context ... almost all of what is classified as voluntary resettlement in Laos is, in reality, not villager-initiated. Despite claims that there is no involuntary resettlement in Laos, it often takes place after a number of escalating steps that are designed to fundamentally influence or coerce villagers to agree to the resettlement option (Baird and Shoemaker, 2005:15; see Dze, 2005).

Some resettled to find work in lowland plantations (Fox, 2009) and by 2005, an estimated 65,000 resettled after (AI, 2005) the imposition of opium bans (Lyttleton *et al.*, 2004; Pathan, 2003). More overtly, there have been reports of refusals to recognise village leaders (Bird, 2009), government services being discontinued (Baird and Shoemaker, 2005; Bird, 2009; Daviau, 2007) and ‘extreme violence’ in the form of military intimidation, physical force, and theft (Daviau, 2007:24; see AI, 2007, Lang, 2004).

A considerable number of negative outcomes have been attributed to resettlement. There have been conflicts (Daviau, 2007) over inadequate and overstretched social welfare, land and resources in new villages (US State Department, 2003) (i.e. safe drinking water, Bird, 2009; Khamin, 2000). Unsatisfactory agricultural conditions – including higher livestock mortality (Cohen, 2000; Evrard and Goudineau, 2004) - reduced food production (Cohen, 2008; Economist, 2005; Evrard and Goudineau, 2004) while there were reports of deteriorating human health conditions; most notably regarding increased malaria fatalities (Chouvy, 2005; Cohen, 2000, 2008; Economist, 2004; Evrard and Goudineau, 2004; Fawthrop, 2005; Khamin, 2000).¹³

Some of the negative outcomes are attributable to the inability of the state to effectively administer resettlement due to insufficient resources (US State Department, 2004, 2006), personnel and knowledge of highland peoples (Baird and Shoemaker, 2007). For example, while migrant’s health deteriorated in Muang Long there was a gradual improvement in Muang Sing; primarily due to GTZ funded health promotion

¹³ Highlanders forced to migrate to the lowlands in the late-1970s complained of difficulty breathing and high-instances of malaria and other diseases for which they had built no tolerance (Wekkin, 1982).

(Lyttleton *et al.*, 2004). Nonetheless, reductions in production were recorded in resettled communities (Cohen, 2000) prior to the post-2000 eradication campaigns due to improvements in state surveillance.

DOA summary

‘AD programmes and projects have made a visible impact [on farmers]... infrastructure, accessibility and.... economic opportunities’ (Chansina and Raza, 2001:23) whilst linked many formerly isolated villages to national markets and social welfare (and state criminal justice institution) (UNODC, 2008). In a UNODC (2005, 2006, 2006b) survey of 181 households, 36 percent of respondents reported positive economic outcomes. Female participants were the more positive as they had more time for other activities, could work closer to home, and reduced consumption raised male productivity and lessened domestic abuse.¹⁴

Conversely, the northern highlands remained the most impoverished area of one of the worlds poorest nations (ADB, 2005; Boonwaat, 2006:54) and while several projects increased farmers’ incomes, economic development has tended to lag the national average (Chansina, 2009; UNODC, 2008). In several areas eradication inflated impoverishment (Andersson *et al.*, 2006; Baird, 2005; Chouvy, 2005; Economist, 2009; Kramer *et al.*, 2009) and ‘left many people without access to a major source of income and livelihood’ (WFP, 2007:21). Representative of the failure of development is the mass migrations of former opium farmers to the lowlands¹⁵ (Baird and Shoemaker, 2005; Dze, 2005; Evrard and Goudineau, 2004; UNODC, 2006) and that a quarter of households in former opium producing areas were forced to sell livestock (UNODC, 2006). This underdevelopment, and lack of alternative incomes, led UNODC (2007, 2008) to identify 1,100 villages - representing 416,000 people - as at risk of resuming production.

9.5.2. Law enforcement approaches

Before 2002, opium production was unofficially tolerated (Epprecht, 2000; Lyttleton, 2003; Lyttleton and Cohen, 2003). This was due to the threat of violent opposition (DEA, 1992) and a policy that emphasised the sequencing of development before law enforcement (Sirivong, 2001). Generally, farmers were warned (Pathan, 2003) two to

¹⁴ Similarly positive outcomes were reported in Cohen (2004), Cohen and Lyttleton (2002) and Epprecht (2000).

¹⁵ In Muang Sing Province, an eradication initiated migratory flow was blocked by officials apprehensive of depopulating an insecure border-area (Cohen, 2008).

three years in advance of eradication (Dze, 2005). For example, in NADPP, Village Development Committees signed contracts agreeing to a 50 percent reduction in production by project termination (i.e. within ten years) (Sirivong, 2001). While, in LADP, a schedule specifying a gradual reduction was agreed, and included a caveat that aid would be withdrawn if not adhered to (Cohen, 2004; Winter, 2001). However, in 2000 Decree No.14 reversed the sequence by emphasising eradication before administering DODCP's (Andersson *et al.*, 2006; Baird and Shoemaker, 2007; Jelsma and Kramer, 2008).

The Government denied using force (Baird and Shoemaker, 2007; Jelsma and Kramer, 2008) and claimed that eradication was voluntary (Boonwaat, 2006) until 2006. After which forced eradication commenced in areas without access to alternative development or where production reductions were perceived as too slow (INCRS, 2010).

Between 2001 and 2006 farmers signed contracts agreeing to cease production in exchange for developmental assistance (Boonwaat, 2006; Cohen, 2008; INCRS, 2006). Contract negotiations took place after local law enforcement, public health and other state officials 'educated' communities on: narcotics law; the effects of opium consumption; and development opportunities available (INCRS, 2006). Once contracts were agreed all poppy seeds were seized by the police (Cohen, 2008, 2009; Jelsma and Kramer, 2008; Lyttleton *et al.*, 2004) and farmers or village officials 'voluntarily' eradicated their crops (INCRS, 2009).

Conversely, 'strong-arm eradication' (Lyttleton *et al.*, 2004:95) and 'draconian' measures were reported (Lang, 2004:n.p.). Negotiations were often one-side whilst 'education' was synonymous with intimidation (Lyttleton, 2004; Pathan, 2003) and included military exercises being conducted close to villages during negotiations (Lyttleton and Cohen, 2003; Lyttleton *et al.*, 2004). Additionally, 'voluntarily' eradication was often 'encouraged' by armed soldiers (Dze, 2005; Jelsma and Kramer, 2008).


Furthermore, some farmers were threatened with imprisonment (Pathan 2003), placed in 're-education camps' (Fox, 2009) – which may have incorporated subjection to cruel and inhumane conditions (Annex 1:9) – or fined for re-growing ('voluntarily') eradicated crops (Cohen, 2008; 2009; Fox, 2009; Lyttleton *et al.*, 2004). Further, as aid was conditional on cessation of production village leaders 'served as police surrogate' and fined or ejected opium farmers from villages (Cohen in Thomas 2006:96). Disincentives may have been supported by extensive networks of secret police and civil

organisations with intrusive surveillance powers (Annex, 1:9). However, such mechanisms may have been lesser in small highland villages.

A survey of SCSPP, by ADB (2005:165) suggested law enforcement and ‘persuasion’ were the primary motivation for ending production. However, it may be of significance that SCSPP ended before Decree No.14. PADP similarly reduced production before the onset of the eradication campaign (Ackerman and Boonwaat, 2005; Andersson *et al.*, 2006; Boonwaat, 2004; UNODC, 2005b) - possibly indicating unreported coercion.

While forced eradication¹⁶ was conducted by civil organisations and the military before and after 2006 (Baird the Shoemaker, 2005, 2007; Cohen, 2006, 2008; Lang, 2004) the eradication/harvest ratio remained low (an average of 6 percent was eradicated between 2003 and 2010). However, as the data reported to the INCRS and UNODC may have neglected coerced ‘voluntary’ eradication.

Figure 9: 6. Laos: Opium eradication/harvest ratio (1995-2010)



Source: adapted from, INCRS (various years); UNODC (2005, 2008, 2009, 2010). Note: pre-2003 data unavailable.

¹⁶ Aerial fumigation was not used (INCSR, 2009).

Table 9: 2. Laos: Summary of DODCP

	Basic data	Community involvement	Roads (km)	Irrigation/land levelling (ha)	Electrification	Agri-Training	Modern Agri-equipment	New/improved crops	Handicraft/alternative income
PADP	1) UNDCP, GoL; 2) N.E.	VDC manage project	160 (3 bridge) ¹	N.E.	N.E.	Yes	Yes	Cash crops introduced	Yes
HCSP	1) US; 2) N.E.; 3) N.E.	VDC manage project	N.E.	185 (irrigation)	To 487 families	N.E.	N.E.	Yes	Yes
XKHDP/ NADPP ²	1) UNDCP, Sweden, US; 2) UNDCP, provincial Government	VDC manage project	58 (NADPP). Inadequate (XKHDP)	N.E.	N.E.	Yes	Supplied by private companies	Cash & food crops introduced	Yes
LADP	1) UNDCP, NCA; 2) NCA	VDC manage project	20	N.E.	N.E.	Yes	N.E.	Food crops introduced	Yes
SCSPP	1) US, UNDCP, GoL; 2) Provincial Government	VDC manage project	117	85 (irrigation)	N.E.	Yes	N.E.	Yes	Off-farm employment

¹ Maintenance was insufficient (UNODC, 2005b).

² XKHDP and NADP were administered in close cooperation (Bendiksen, 2002; Sirivong, 2001).

	New/ improved livestock	Marketing	Safe drinking water	Health care	Education	Livestock health/ efficiency	Research	Sequencing
PADP	N.E.	Limited	Yes	Basic healthcare	Yes	Yes	Market research	Law enforcement followed DOA
HCSP	Yes	N.E.	Yes	Basic healthcare	N.E.	Yes	N.E.	Law enforcement followed DOA
XKHDP/ NADPP	Yes	Limited to linking farmers to merchants	N.E.	N.E.	Vocational & primary education	Health, nutrition & veterinary care	Year one devoted to research	Law enforcement followed DOA
LADP	Yes	Limited to linking farmers to merchants	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	Law enforcement followed DOA
SCSPP	Imported livestock	Limited	Yes	Basic healthcare	N.E.	Yes	Market research	Law enforcement followed DOA

Notes: basic data codes: 1) primary financiers; 2) primary executing agency; 3) cost in millions. 'Yes' = action unspecified in the literature. 'N.E.' = no evidence.

Sources: PADP: Ackerman and Boonwaat (2005); Bendiksen, (2002); UNDTCD (1991); UNODCCP (2000), UNODC (2005b; 2006b). HCSP: INCRS (1998); KPL (2000); Kurukulasuriya (2001); Segar (1996). XKHDP / NADPP: Bendiksen (2002); Data *et al.* (2002); Segar (1996); Sirivong (2001); Thion (2002). LADP: Bendiksen (2002); Cohen (2004); Littlejohn *et al.* (2004); Winter (2001). SCSPP: ADB (2005); Kurukulasuriya (2001); Mahinda and Ladouangphanh (2002).

9.6. Success?

In 2006 UNODC (2009) declared Laos ‘poppy-free’, while there was a brief increase in 2010, production has remained limited to remote areas (INCRS, 2010) and local consumption (INCRS, 2008). The decline from the 1989 peak of 328mt to 14mt in 2006 represents a 96 percent reduction. The decline from the 1989 peak to 18mt in 2010 (the most recent recorded harvest) represents a 95 percent reduction. The intervention appears to have negatively impacted many former opium farmers.

9.7. Rival explanations of success

An important aspect of process-tracing is the interaction with established theories, as such this section shall critically appraise rival explanations of how *success* was realised. The Government (GoL, 2006b:4) credit *success* with ‘widespread public advocacy and civic awareness campaigns’ supported by negotiated eradication. For UNODC (2006) a major factor was that during the ‘decades’ preceding the intervention the state extended its writ into the highlands and established conduits between highland farmers and, lowland and foreign markets.

However, surveys by ADB (2005) and UNODC (2005) suggested that law enforcement was the primary motivation for ending production. While 50 percent of respondents to UNODC reported that they ceased production due to opium’s illegality, just three and two percent reported that they had ‘enough food’ or ‘enough cash’.¹ Fifty percent of respondents in the ADB (2005:165) study reported that they would have continued producing opium ‘if they had not been told to stop... by law enforcers and government agents’; confirming ‘persuasion’ and law enforcement as the ‘key factors’ in their decision making process.


Conversely, Boonwaat (2004; also Ackerman and Boonwaat, 2005; Andersson *et al.*, 2006; UNODC, 2005b) suggested that as PADP ended before 2001, development (rather than law enforcement) may have been the primary motivation for ending production in that project area. Brown and colleagues (2005:9) alternatively posited that as production also ‘dropped rapidly in areas without AD projects... There is little evidence that AD projects have influenced Lao farmers’; they did however concede that AD projects offered protection ‘against economic hardship’.

¹ The other most common answers were ‘never grown opium before’ (12 percent); ‘no addicts’ (11 percent); ‘other’ (7 percent); ‘no one else grows’ (6 percent); ‘no land/ space’ (4 percent); ‘labour issues’ (3 percent); ‘afraid of relapse’ (2 percent).

Evidence does however suggest that development had less impact than law enforcement. The intervention after 2001 appeared to be dependent on unequal negotiations centred upon promises of aid and threats of military attack or arrest - tactics similarly utilised to great effect in resettling highland farmers. Coerced negotiations may have been supported by the existence of extensive surveillance.

Kramer and Jelsma (2008) suggested that much of the reduction may have been attributable to increased Afghan and South American production pushing Southeast Asian opiates from their respective European and North American markets. Farmgate price increases (Figure 9:7) may have reduced Laotian competitiveness, which in turn may have decreased foreign demand. However, the price increase was a consequence of the national intervention rather than increased Afghan production. Furthermore, the significant price increases from 2004 may be illustrative of the capabilities of the GoL to respond to threats of increased production. This said, decreased demand for Laotian opium may have reduced farmers' confidence in opium as a cash crop and thus made alternatives (including resettlement or plantation wage-labour) more attractive: increased Afghan competition may have made acquiescence to suppression more attractive to farmers.

Figure 9: 7. Afghanistan and Laos: Farmgate price of raw opium in US\$ (1986-2009)



Source: UNODCCP (1999, 2003); UNODC (2005, 2010b).

9.8. Case summaries

Viet Nam

In 1975, the state began procuring highland opium for domestic and foreign medicinal purposes. While the level of diversion is unknown, it is believed that when state support

ceased around 1985, illicit production significantly increased. Concerned over rising domestic opium consumption, the government prohibited production in 1992. Top-down crop substitution projects were established in the early-1990s. In 1996, a joint UN/GoV alternative development project was administered; the project appears to have had positive outcomes in terms of socio-economic development and opium control.

State administered projects were centred upon compensation or development assistance containing conditionality clauses; farmers received assistance/compensation upon ceasing production. To prevent reverse conditionality drug control was later mainstreamed into national highland development programmes, aimed at assisting the poorest communes in Viet Nam. This said, in several areas the tourist industry represented the solitary alternative income for former opium farmers and, more generally, the highlands have lagged the lowlands in terms of developmental assistance.

Since 1992, Vietnamese policy was to immediately eradicate crops. Negotiated eradication began in 1992 with extensive propaganda and development/compensation. Negotiations and propaganda were conducted by the military; this additionally increased surveillance within opium producing areas. While the existence of the military may have contained an element of implied coercion, there are reports of soldiers threatening farmers and forcing eradication before the establishment of alternative livelihoods. Furthermore, many reports of widespread human rights abuses at the hands of the police/military may indicate a more repressive intervention than is publically acknowledged.

The evidence suggests that the key components of *success* in Viet Nam were the existence of a strong state presence, extensive surveillance, and the leverage possessed by the state in negotiating eradication. That the actual administration of development appears to have been insufficient may suggest that disincentives were the primary motivation for the cessation of opium production. The decline from the 1990 peak of 90mt to 2mt in 1992 represents a 99 percent reduction. The intervention appears to have negatively impacted many former opium farmers.

Laos

While the Second Indochina War and US military consumption initially increased Laotian production, production decreased as the conflict intensified around 1968. This said, the country continued to be a relatively major source of illicit opium. In 1976, the state began procuring highland opium for domestic and foreign medicinal purposes. As

monopoly prices were low, there was potential for high-levels of diversion facilitated by Laotian military and civil authorities.

In 1987, Laos resumed cooperation with the international drug control regime. A 1994 Masterplan adopted a 'gradual approach' to opium production suppression that emphasised 'community-based' development, tolerated small-scale opium production, and sequenced eradication after the establishment of alternative livelihoods. While initially similar to best-practice developed in Thailand, significant departures included: the use of resettlement; the Green Anti-Drug Project; and insufficient emphasis on marketing substitute crops. Resettlement has been criticised for its negative impact on highlanders' health and income. The Chinese Green Project has been equally condemned for facilitating the exploitation of farmers and ignoring best-practice. The lack of marketing and market access limited the success of some development projects. Others appear to have been limited by corruption and mismanagement. As such, PADP and LGDCP appear to be the only projects which presented positive outcomes in terms of alternative livelihoods and improved social welfare.

In 2000, Laotian policy shifted to the 'accelerated rural development programme', which emphasised the sequencing of eradication and law enforcement before alternative livelihoods were established. While the GoL claimed that after 2001 farmers 'voluntarily' eradicated their own crops in exchange for development assistance, there is ample evidence of coercion by the military; to paraphrase Baird and Shoemaker (2005:15) the 'terms "voluntary" and "involuntary" fail to adequately describe the decision-making process'. Furthermore, the abusive nature of resettlement negotiations may suggest similar tactics were used against opium farmers. This is coupled with what the administration of fines and custodial sentences in prisons deemed cruel and inhumane. As such, military coercion ('persuasion') appears the primary motivator for the cessation of opium farming.

In 2006 production fell below 20mt to 14mt; representing a 95 percent reduction from the 1989 peak of 328mt and hence *success* was achieved in 2006. The intervention appears to have negatively impacted many former opium farmers.

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Section III

10. Synthesis and comparison

The previous six chapters have produced in-depth and contextual narratives that trace the processes by which major opium-producing nations reduced illicit production or diversion by *over 90 percent to below 20mt*. This chapter is split into four sections. To build a foundation for cross-case comparison Section 10:1 synthesizes information presented in the six case chapters, specifically, the interventions' positive and negative impacts, and contextual and operational factors that converged in each case. In Section 10:2, production data from 1947 to 2008 is cautiously analysed to illustrate how developments in one state can influence outcomes in another. The findings suggest that since at least 1984, transnational production shifts can be best viewed as the consolidation of an Afghan monopoly, rather than the outcome of law enforcement led displacement.

The synthesis builds the foundation for the cross-case comparison presented in Section 10:3. The comparison demonstrates how five factors were necessary for the outcome in all (or most) cases. A model representing the optimal relationships between the various factors is then proffered. These findings are supported in Section 10:4 by the semi-deviant case of Imperial/Republican China.

10.1. Synthesis


10.1.1. Outcome measures indicating success

All nine cases achieved the primary outcome measurement of success (hereafter *success* or outcome) by reducing production or diversion by *90 percent to below 20mt*. While Pakistan and Imperial/Republican China both resumed production above 20mt shortly after achieving *success*, Pakistan continued to conform to the 90 percent reduction criterion.

This said, perceptions of *success* can be dependent on the choice of outcome measurement utilised. For example, if we look at Laos in terms of arable land under opium poppy cultivation it may appear less successful than in terms of metric tonnes; it certainly illustrates more clearly the magnitude of the task that confronted the GoL. The magnitude of the task can be illustrated by comparing the peak production years of Afghanistan (2007) and Laos (1989). As illustrated in Figures 10:1 and 10:2 opium was cultivated on 2.44 percent of Afghanistan's arable land and 4.36 percent of Laos's arable land.


This perspective may, however, also dilute Laotian claims of *success*. In 2007, 0.157 percent of Laos's arable land was cultivated with opium; this represents a percentage of arable land greater than was ever recorded in Thailand or Viet Nam, and similar to the 1979 Pakistan peak of production. Thus, while Laos has realised the primary outcome, viewed from the perspective of percentage of arable land, opium may indicate the continued national importance of opium. This said, the decline between 1989 and 2007 still represents a 93 percent reduction.

Figure 10: 1. Major opium producers as percentage of arable land (5%)



Source: data presented in chapters 4-9.

Figure 10: 2. Major opium producers as a percentage of arable land (0.5%)



Source: data presented in chapters 4-9.

All cases achieved national *success* in terms of percentage change. The picture is less clear for: Pakistan, which produced excess of 20mt in 2007; and Laos, which cultivated

opium poppies over a significant percentage of its arable land in 2007. The inability of Imperial/Republican China to maintain an opium ban places a question mark over whether the case can be considered a *success*. As discussed in Section 10:4, the case is insightful for how it was achieved and why it was unable to maintain the outcome.

10.1.2. Negative outcome measures

This section shall synthesise some of the negative and positive outcomes reported in the individual case studies. These findings are summarised in Table 10:1 under the headings: Economic Harms, Political Harms and Human Rights Violations.

Table 10: 1. Summary table: negative and positive outcome measures

	Harms		Human Rights Violations		
	Economic	Political	Extrajudicial Punishments	Torture	Freedom of Residence
China (Imperial)	NI	Extensive NI	MJP	Extensive	FR
(PR) China	Possibly NI	PI	MJP	Extensive	FR
Iran (Pahlavi)	NI	Extensive NI	MJP	Extensive	NR
(IR) Iran	Possibly NI	NR	MJP	Extensive	FR
Turkey	PI	PI (after 1973)	CP	Possible. PPC	NR
Thailand	PI	PI (after 1971)	NR	PPC	NR
Pakistan	PI	PI (after 1985)	NR	PPC	NR
Laos	NI	Limited NI	CP	Possible. PPC	FR
Viet Nam	NI	NR	NR	Possible. PPC	NR

Note: torture includes cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment. CP (Community Punishment); FR (Forced Relocation); NI (Negative Impact); PI (Positive Impact); Poor Prison Conditions (PPC); NR (None Reported); MJP (Minimal Judicial Process).

Interventions in Laos, Imperial/Republican China,¹ Pahlavi Iran and Viet Nam further impoverished opium farmers. Positive economic effects were, however, reported in Pakistan, Thailand and Turkey.² While the removal of an important cash crop may have added to rural poverty in (PR) China and (IR) Iran there are no reports of increased impoverishment in opium producing areas directly related to the intervention.

It can be inferred from the experience of South American coca producers (see Chapter 3:3) that communities in Pakistan targeted for aerial eradication would have lost licit crops and livestock whilst suffering negative health effects. That such consequences were not reported may indicate either a gap in the available evidence from Pakistan or that South American complaints are an isolated phenomenon.

Violent opposition to eradication was reported in Imperial/Republican China, (PR) China, Thailand and Pakistan. While Imperial/Republican China brutally suppressed resistance, (PR) China, Thailand and Pakistan diluted opposition through negotiating with local power-holders and the extension of developmental incentives. In Turkey, large-scale political, media and popular opposition to suppression resulted in the extension of poppy straw in 1974. Discontent with opium suppression was factored in the overthrow of the Imperial and possibly Republican Chinese regimes. Resentment may have similarly added to the unpopularity of the Pahlavi regime throughout rural Iran.

Several of the interventions systematically violated the basic rights of opium farming communities. The public punishments administered in both Chinese and Iranian interventions amounted to inhumane and degrading treatment (see Nowak, 2010:para.218). Torture was systematically applied during the Imperial/Republican Chinese and both Iranian interventions. While there are no reports of opium farmers being tortured in Turkey, Laos or Viet Nam, widespread use of torture within the criminal justice system means that such violations cannot be ruled out nor verified. Corporal punishment – a form of torture (see CCPR, 1992; Nowak, 2010) -for drug offences was applied in both Iranian interventions. While corporal punishment was prescribed by law in Pakistan it was seldom, if ever, applied (Mahmood, 2010; Rodley,

¹ Greater poverty appears to have been established through warlords' demands for opium above food production after 1917.

² Pre-1972 Turkish restrictions appear to have scarcely affected rural communities, as alternative livelihoods were already established and opium was not a major part of the rural economy.

1996). Prisons in all cases were of a standard that would subject farmers to cruel, inhumane and degrading conditions.³

Judicial and extra-judicial punishments were indistinguishable in the criminal justice systems of all Chinese and Iranian cases. Community punishments in Turkey and Laos may be considered extra-judicial as populations were punished for the transgression of individual offenders.

Forced relocation is a somewhat grey area. While all forms of forced displacement are prohibited by the ICCPR they may be administered to promote 'general welfare' (CESCR, 1997:Art.5/12). Thus, there may be a case for resettlement, which facilitates reductions in opium production, environmental degradation or improves the livelihoods of isolated peoples. Nevertheless, resettlement must not be used as punishment (CESCR, 1997:Art.5/12) and the resettled must benefit from, or at least not become disadvantaged by, the move (OCHCR, 2010). Resettlement pushed many Laotian farmers deeper into poverty and was used as an administrative punishment in (PR) China. The resettlement of villages along the (IR) Iranian border may be perceived as for the 'general welfare' - especially as villages were looted by returning traffickers - and would thus depend on the welfare programmes administered in Iran.

Unsurprisingly, it is apparent that those interventions centred upon DOA (Thailand, Turkey and Pakistan) present the least negative impact and have positively impacted the target population and state interests.

10.1.3. Contextual factors

Chapter 3:3:3, introduced seven 'contextual factors' which, theorists have argued, when present provide the optimal environment for illicit opium production. The factors are: (1) low state authority; (2) geographical isolation; (3) rural impoverishment; (4) high levels of corruption; (5) political instability; (6) medium/high levels of violent conflict; (7) inefficient state institutions.

This section shall synthesise the contextual factors that converged during the period in which *success* was realised. Information is synthesized from the case chapters and the in-depth chronologies (Annex 1:1-7) into a manageable form to facilitate in-depth cross-

³ Prison conditions violate human right norms if they deprive access:

... to food, water, clothing, health care and a minimum of space, hygiene, privacy and security necessary for a humane and dignified existence (Nowak 2010:para.30).

case comparison. Table 10:2 presents a basic summary of the findings for illustrative purposes; it does not attempt to capture the complexity of the individual cases but rather to summarize specifics and illustrate trends to allow cross-case comparison.

The evidence presented and clarified below suggests that all: (1) states possessed authority over opium producing areas; (2) states remained characterised by high levels of rural impoverishment; (3) states were characterised by high levels of corruption: however, the state/high level employees disengaged from the illicit trade; (4) former production areas remained geographically isolated. Of the nine states: five were politically stable; three possessed medium levels of violent conflict; and just one possessed effective state institutions.

Table 10: 2. Summary table: Contextual factors present when *success* realised

	Rural authority	Isolated areas	Rural poverty	Corruption	State stability	Violent conflict	Effective Institution
China	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	-
(PR) China	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	-
Iran	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	-
(IR) Iran	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	1980s/yes 1990s/no	Yes	No
Turkey	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Fairly	No	No
Thailand	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Pakistan	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No
Laos	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Viet Nam	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No

All states possessed authority over opium producing areas. While the legally autonomous nature of NWFP and FATA makes Pakistan the exception in many respects, the mainstreaming of suppression with state extension objectives created *temporary* state authority in opium producing areas and represented increasing interconnectedness between the state and tribal areas.

While all states possessed authority over opium producing areas, all former production areas remained geographically isolated. While there were often improvements to transport infrastructures, the Tribal Areas of Pakistan (see Asad and Harris, 2003; Hardestly, 1992) and highlands of Southeast Asia continued to be isolated through the existence of mountainous and/or dense forest terrain (see Bendiksen, 2002; Epprecht, 2000).

Additionally, high levels of rural impoverishment remained a characteristic of all states. While improvements in living factors were reported in Pakistan and Thailand, former opium producing areas remained below the national average for many poverty indicators. Laos, Pakistan and Viet Nam remained amongst the world's least developed states.

While high levels of official corruption remained a characteristic of all states,⁴ linkages between the illicit trade and high level state employees or the state itself were largely disengaged. This may suggest high level political commitment to suppression more than corruption control. All states were committed to suppression for reasons of national self-interest, including: state extension in (PR) China, Pakistan, Thailand, (IR) Iran and Laos; ideology/theology in (PR) China and (IR) Iran; counter-insurgency in Thailand; rural development in Pakistan, Thailand, Viet Nam, and Laos; the establishment of export commodities such as poppy straw in Turkey, coffee in Thailand (Rosequist, 1994) and rubber in Laos; environmental protection in Thailand, Laos, and Viet Nam. All states (except Turkey) professed concern over domestic opium consumption.

Five of the nine states were politically stable. The World Bank (Annex 2) ranked Laos as within the bottom half of states in terms of violence and political stability. Two leading experts on Laotian politics and society, however, maintained that the state was stable and that there was minimal threat of regime change (Forbes and Cutler, 2006; see Annex, 1:6). The stability of (IR) Iran appears to have been fairly strong throughout the 1980s although receding somewhat during the mid-1990s. Large-scale political repression may have, however, diluted threats to the regime. This said, the World Bank (Annex 2) ranked (IR) Iran as within the bottom half of states in terms of violence and political stability, however, as was the case with Laos, this may be more indicative of violent conflict than political stability.

Turkey had experienced a period of political instability in the late 1960s/early 1970s that resulted in the elected government being ejected in a peaceful military coup. While the subsequent military regime received significant public support because of the cessation of large-scale terrorism, martial law had to be imposed in many cities; indicative of continued instability. Pakistan in 1999 was ranked by the World Bank (Annex 2) as one of the worlds least stable states: its politics were characterised by military coup and political violence. Imperial China was highly unstable during the

⁴ A caveat for Turkey may be that corruption was minimal within the organisation enforcing the intervention; the military.

beginning of the Imperial/Republican intervention: a Revolution eventually overthrew the monarchy and triggered the eventual dissolution of the Chinese state in 1917.

There were medium/high levels of violent conflict in Pakistan, Laos, (IR) Iran, and Turkey. This said, violent conflict in Turkey was limited to urban areas and may not have impacted opium producing areas to a great extent. The conflict in Laos was not high enough to destabilise the state but was centred on opium producing areas.

Thailand is the only government that can be considered to have possessed effective institutions.⁵ Pakistan in 1999 and Iran in 1996 are ranked just above the lowest quartile in terms of government efficiency by the World Bank. Laos in 2004 dipped in the World Bank government efficiency ratings into the lowest quartile; while the Turkish bureaucracy was reported as ‘inefficient’ (FCO, 1972:2).

10.1.4. Interventions operational factors

This section synthesizes ten ‘operational factors’ into a manageable form to facilitate cross-case comparison. The ten factors represent all approaches to DOA⁶ or law enforcement employed in individual interventions or identified in Chapter 3:3:2 and include: the provision of *incentives* to cease production centred upon DOA or other enticements; *surveillance*; the provision of *disincentives* through the administration of repressive law enforcement, law enforcement, forced eradication, anticipatory effects and/or community punishments; *negotiations* using DOA and/or coercion as leverage. Table 10:3 presents a basic summary of the findings for illustrative purposes. It does not attempt to capture the complexity of the individual cases but rather to recap specifics and illustrate trends.

The evidence presented and clarified below suggest that all: (1) but two governments presented incentives with which opium farmers could perceive as being of some benefit; (2) governments possessed the capabilities to monitor opium farmers; (3) interventions administered law enforcement; (4) administered some forced eradication often as a secondary instrument to support efforts to persuade farmers or enforce negotiated contracts.

⁵ This analysis excludes Imperial/Republican China, (PR) China and Pahlavi Iran as there is insufficient information to make a valid judgement.

⁶ Community punishment, coercive negotiation and non-DOA incentive represent previously unidentified factors extracted from the findings of the nine individual case studies.

Table 10: 3. Summary table: Principal operational factors

	Incentives		Surveillance	Disincentives					Negotiated eradication	
	DOA	Non-DOA incentives		Law enforcement (systematic HR abuse)	Law enforcement (no systematic HR abuse)	Forced eradication	Anticipatory effects	Community punishments	Coercive	DOA
Imp./Rep. China	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Some	Possible	Yes	No	No
(PR) China	Some	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Some	Yes	No	No	Yes
Pahlavi Iran	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Some	No	Yes	No	No
(IR) Iran	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Some	Yes	Yes	No	No
Turkey	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Some	No	Yes	No	Yes
Thailand	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Some	No	No	No	Yes
Pakistan	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Some	No	Some	No	Yes
Laos	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Some	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Viet Nam	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Some	Yes	No	Yes	Yes

Incentives: Seven of nine interventions offered farmers some form of incentive for the cessation of opium production, thus establishing a perception that suppression is within the farmers' own self-interest. Thus decreasing the relative rewards of opium production. Incentives are most obviously present in interventions that administered DODCPs (Thailand; Pakistan; Laos; and Viet Nam) which agreed to extend social welfare provisions or improve agri-productivity and market access.¹ Development also formed the basis of the post-1974 Turkish intervention whereby the Government assured farmers that if they ceased producing opium they would receive economic support and a stable licit industry.

Non-DOA based incentives were administered in (PR) China and (IR) Iran. In both cases, interventions were conducted immediately after the removal of an unpopular regime. The revolutionary regimes received extensive rural support after redistributing land to the rural poor, prohibiting slavery, ending violent conflicts and/or punishing oppressive landlords. Additionally, many of the rural poor identified with the ideological or theological beliefs of the new regimes.

Surveillance: All interventions established extensive surveillance. This increased the risk of sanction whilst permitting governments to plan interventions through the provision of information on the location of production and cropping patterns. Surveillance may have taken the form of aerial photography, satellite surveillance, ground surveys or the more intrusive social controls produced by hegemonic regimes of (PR) China and (IR) Iran, and to lesser extents Laos and Viet Nam. DODCPs often facilitated surveillance by connecting the state to formerly isolated areas.

Disincentives: All interventions administered one or more of the five approaches to law enforcement identified in this thesis. Law enforcement centred upon systematic and widespread violations of international human rights norms were administered in the four Chinese and Iranian interventions. While law enforcement in Thailand, Pakistan and Turkey tended to conform to international human rights norms there appears to have been widespread police/military brutality in Laos and possibly Viet Nam. Nonetheless, these two interventions were significantly less repressive than the Chinese and Iranian interventions.

Community punishments were administered in five of the nine cases as a means of establishing social control. In Turkey and post-1968 Pahlavi Iran, transgressions by one

¹ For example, in Thailand, many opium farmers illustrated an awareness that increasing population levels had reduced the agricultural productivity of the highland eco-system and thus sought support for the establishment of alternatives.

farmer could result in the eradication of an entire village's licit opium crop. Additionally, in Turkey, village representatives could be punished with economic sanctions. Similarly, local leaders in both Chinese cases could be rewarded or punished for success or failure in their sphere of influence. While DODCPs containing conditionality clauses represent a somewhat softer form of community punishment, in Laos this practice resulted in village leaders punishing farmers in order to retain funding.

Attempts to create anticipatory effects were administered in three of the nine interventions through the public shaming, torture or execution of offenders. The three interventions intended to motivate the cessation of production through inflating the perception of risk without arresting large numbers of opium farmers.

All law enforcement that arrested and/or punished farmers intended to force the 'voluntary' eradication of crops. Forced eradication was used in all interventions, often as a secondary instrument to support efforts to persuade farmers or enforce negotiated contracts.

Negotiation: Seven of nine interventions negotiated eradication.² Six used DOA as leverage. For example, in Turkey farmers signed contracts agreeing that they would not produce opium - and that if they did, they could be punished by the state - in exchange for state support in the marketing of a profitable agricultural crop (poppy straw). The Pakistani, Thai and minority areas of (PR) Chinese interventions can, in many respects, be considered as drug control mainstreamed into national state extension. Whilst law enforcement played a significant role in the three interventions, developmental assistance was the primary leverage in negotiations to gain entry into formerly isolated areas; suppression would not have been possible without the leverage provided by DODCPs.

While negotiations were the central feature of the Laotian and Vietnamese interventions, the term 'negotiated' insufficiently captures a process which is better defined as 'coercive negotiation' as they were unequal and overtly coercive. The primary leverages in negotiations were threats of administrative punishments, imprisonment, or military assault. The anticipatory effect of public punishment may

² This broad category encompasses a variety of sequences. In Pakistan's MDP and GAAD projects the administration of aid was dependent upon the cessation of production. While in the majority of Thai, the remainder of Pakistani projects, and minority (PR)China interventions farmers agreed to cease production or allow eradication by the state only after alternative incomes had been established.

have been used in Viet Nam to strengthen the perception of risk and the state's negotiating power.

10.3. Cross-case comparisons

Ragin (1989; Ragin and Rubenstein, 2009) shows how cross-case comparison can illustrate the necessary and sufficient factors which converge to produce *success*.³ A factor is necessary if it must be present for an outcome to occur. A factor is sufficient if it can by itself cause the outcome. Water is sufficient for a cup of water (discounting the cup and heat to boil the water). Water and tealeaves are necessary factors for a cup of tea. A comparison of the information presented in Sections 10:3-5 shall draw out any necessary/sufficient factors that present across individual case.

No factor by itself is sufficient to cause the outcome (*success*). There are five necessary factors which converged in all (or most) cases: (1) Possession of a government which perceived suppression as in its best interest; (2) Possession of authority over potential opium producing areas; (3) Opium farmers must perceive some benefit from accepting state demands (i.e. the state must offer appropriate incentives); (4) Surveillance capabilities; (4) The administration of law enforcement against violations.

Neither the Imperial/Republican Chinese or Pahlavi Iranian interventions provided farmers with incentives which would have helped the farmer perceive suppression as in their best interest. While this may present a strong argument against the inclusion of factors three as necessary, as is discussed in Section 10:7, the failure of the Imperial/Republican Chinese Governments to proffer incentives appears to have been a factor in both the inability to secure sustainable suppression and eventual state collapse. Thus, the case of Imperial/Republican China may support, rather than refute, the necessity of administering incentives; without which *success* may be somewhat shallow and unsustainable.⁴

It could be argued that as all interventions conducted a limited amount of forced eradication the factor is necessary. Nevertheless, the inclusion of forced eradication is qualified with the caveat that it tended to be a secondary instrument within wider negotiation or law enforcement strategies intended to compel farmers to 'voluntarily'

³ While Ragin (1987) uses the term 'condition', for consistency within the research design proffered by George and Bennett (2005) 'factor' shall be used throughout.

⁴ The Pahlavi Iranian intervention may be somewhat of a deviant case in this regard and may thus require greater investigation into farmers' attitudes towards opium at the time.

eradicate their own crops. Importantly, both Pakistan and Thailand discontinued forced eradication as it was considered counterproductive to state extension and/or counterinsurgency objectives. Thus, forced eradication is included as one of a combination of law enforcement approaches to be drawn upon, depending on the context of intervention and once the necessary factors are present.

All other factors are neither sufficient nor necessary. While they may have been characteristic of the intervention (such as coercive negotiation in Laos) their function was to facilitate or support the five necessary conditions that presented in all cases. This relationship is illustrated in Diagram 10:1. The remainder of this chapter further elucidates this relationship whilst returning to some important theoretical points established in Chapter 2:3.

Political stability cannot be considered necessary as the national governments of six of the nine cases were unstable during the period when each individual case realised *success*. It does however appear supportive of political commitment: if a government committed to suppression is overthrown by an unsupportive regime then a necessary factor (political commitment) is removed, which was the case when the Chinese Republican regime fell. If the new regime shares the previous regime's prohibitive sentiments, however, and maintains the intervention, it may continue; as was the case after *coups d'état's* in Pakistan, Thailand and Turkey. Hence, instability may be perceived as problematic only if new regimes reject suppression as nationally advantageous or in instances of state collapse whereby state authority is completely dissolved.

DOA may be necessary to prevent harmful consequences, however, as it was almost wholly absent from four (including non-minority [PR] Chinese) interventions it cannot be deemed necessary for *success*. Nonetheless, it can play several important supportive roles. Firstly, economic and social welfare incentives can provide leverage in state negotiations for access into areas alienated from, or hostile to, the state. Secondly, after initial entry projects can assist political capital building whilst physically connecting geographically isolated areas to the state machine through transport infrastructures, economic markets and social welfare institutions; establishing a level of dependency on the state that had previously been absent. Thirdly, DOA-based incentives may provide farmers with the perception that suppression is in their best interest. Lastly, as DOA-incentives can be used as leverage in negotiating the cessation of opium production they can be supportive of law enforcement initiatives; especially if new crops reduce the

relative rewards of opium production and, consequently, increase the perceived risk of law enforcement. In short, DOA can provide farmers with something to lose.

As DOA is a facilitator of necessary factors, project strategies should be dependent on an initial investigation into the potential effect the project will have upon the necessary factor(s) prioritised by national objectives. For example, crop substitution may be appropriate if sufficient state presence exists or as a means of initial contact with an isolated/hostile community. Alternatively, where state authority is weak, the construction of schools and healthcare centres may be more important to state extension than the diversification of crops.

Thus, DOA need not always be based upon deep conceptions of development as indicated by AL theorists, in fact many (but by no means all) of the DODCPs administered in Pakistan, and to an even greater extent Laos and Viet Nam were little more than crop substitution (i.e. absence of marketing, social welfare provision and eradication before alternative income generation). This said, the arguments for mainstreaming and identifying drivers of production presented by AL theorists (see Chapter 2:3:2) are important. Drug control must be mainstreamed into national or local policies in order to establish the five necessary conditions. The identification of drivers of production may illustrate what farmers in a specific area - such as the village - would be willing to sacrifice in exchange. Thus, the state can plan what incentives will yield the greatest reward in a specific area.

As the medium-term goal of opium suppression should be the establishment of the necessary factors, the use of improved infrastructures or agricultural knowledge by opium farmers/traffickers should be viewed as almost inconsequential, as long as the state is extending its authority or farmers are beginning to view some benefit to suppression. This argument may also be applied to 'reverse conditionality'. That non-opium farmers begin producing opium to attract state aid suggests that the state presence was initially insufficient and that the state or NGO is offering farmers something of value. Reverse conditionality may represent an important indicator that the policy is on track.

Alternatively, if the necessary factors are already present then DOA may not be required. For example, in (PR) China DOA was essential in gaining access to minority areas. It represented a tool for building political capital and extending state authority and, once achieved, the state was free to repressively enforce the law. Nonetheless, in areas where the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) already possessed authority law enforcement could be administered without recourse to DOA.


Likewise, while conflict resolution is not a necessary factor it may facilitate state authority and represent a strong incentive.⁵ For example, in (PR) China farmers expressed gratitude to the CCP for establishing (relative) peace; the cessation of production may have been perceived as favourable to experiences of conflict and exploitation by warlords and government soldiers. Thailand represents an example of where conflict resolution was required before the state could extend authority. Nevertheless, as both Laos and Turkey possessed authority over their opium producing areas they were able to conduct their interventions amongst periods of violent conflict.

Another aspect connected to farmers' perceptions of self-interest is that if a foreign or domestic market is deflated the rewards for opium production may be reduced. This may occur through domestic demand reduction - as it did in [PR] China - or the existence of a stronger competitor - as may have been the case in Laos, Pakistan and Thailand. While this may direct farmers' acceptance of suppression, as it is the existence of the five necessary conditions which largely dictates the cost-effectiveness of production this is not in itself necessary, but may be facilitative.

DOA-based or coerced negotiations for 'voluntary' eradication and the five law enforcement disincentives are not necessary factors; however, as they have all proved to have some utility each may be drawn upon depending upon the context of the intervention. This said, with the exception of using DOA as leverage in negotiating entry none should be used until the necessary conditions are sufficiently established. Contrary to the Feldafing Declaration (2002:art 4) these findings suggest that it is acceptable to include conditionality clauses in DOA negotiations as long as the five necessary factors are present; depending on the context in which they are applied. The model of relationships described above is illustrated in Diagram 10:1 and shall be placed in a practical context in Chapter 11:3.

⁵ An assessment of Plan Columbia found that Columbian coca and opium farmers were willing to lose income in exchange for increased security (Younger and Walsh, 2009).

Diagram 10:1. The optimal relationship between principal factors



Note: Solid lines represent the relationship between necessary factors. Dashed lines represent the relationship between facilitative and necessary factors.

10.4. A semi-deviant case: Imperial/Republican China

The case of Imperial/Republican China is illustrative for its inability to sustain production below 20mt. The intervention conformed to four of the five necessary factors yet failed to provide farmers with sufficient incentive. There is some evidence to suggest that the intervention weakened the Imperial regimes' authority in opium producing areas. A similar resentment may have been felt for the Republican regime (see Chapter 4:4). This example illustrates how failure to offer incentive to ceasing production can weaken political capital⁶ (see Felbab-Brown, 2010) which can in turn negatively impact the foundation of a *successful* intervention – state authority.

The breaking-up of the state into multiple warlord factions was the primary driver of un-sustainability. The government lost authority over the majority of its national

⁶ Thoumi, 2005 discusses how insufficient political capital between the state and farmers was one factor influencing Columbia's 'competitive advantage' in coca/opium production and trafficking.

territory and consequently the capacity to monitor opium farmers or enforce the law. As warlords became the principle centres of power in provinces and districts they essentially became the state by exerting authority over the majority of their territory - but they chose to facilitate and profit from production. Thus, the dissolution of the state strengthens the finding that interventions must be built upon a foundation of state authority and political commitment. Political commitment is ineffective without state authority; as is state authority without political commitment.

A less dramatic increase in production was witnessed in Pakistan after 2003. This increase was primarily driven by the lack of state authority in areas where there was significant insurgent activity (Windle, 2009). This supports the findings that interventions must be built upon a foundation of state authority.

10.5. Summary

In this chapter, the individual case study findings were synthesised in order to conduct cross-case comparisons. The chapter began by recapitulating how all cases reduced opium production or diversion by *an excess of 90 percent to below 20mt*. It has shown how Pakistan and Imperial/Republican China both resumed production above 20mt shortly after realising *success* while, if percentage of arable land under opium cultivation is used as a measure, Laotian cultivation remains high; however, both Pakistan and Laos continued to conform to the 90 percent reduction criterion. The discussion on negative and positive effects unsurprisingly illustrated how interventions centred upon DOA presented the least negative impact.

Previously identified ‘contextual’ and ‘operational’ factors were synthesised and collated with the discussion on displacement/competition to inform cross-case comparison. Five factors that presented in all (or most) cases were deemed necessary for the outcome measurement of *success*. These were: (1) All governments perceived suppression as in its best interest; (2) All possessed a strong state presence throughout opium producing areas; (3) All but two presented an incentive with which opium farmers could perceive some benefit; (4) All governments possessed the capabilities to monitor opium farmers; (5) All interventions administered law enforcement. All other factors that crossed more than one case are supportive or facilitative of the necessary factor. A model illustrating the optimal relationship between the factors suggests that as long as the five necessary factors are present the choice of approach will be context dependent. The primary objective when planning an approach must be to facilitate or support the establishment or maintenance of the five necessary factors. The failure of

Imperial/Republican China to sustain production below 20mt support's these findings. The model shall be explored and further clarified by placing it in the practical context of contemporary Afghanistan in Chapter 11.

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
11. Policy Implications for Afghanistan

In Chapter 10, five factors were identified as necessary for *success*, as they presented in all (or most) cases. All other trans-case factors are supportive or facilitative of the necessary factors. These findings were presented as a model illustrating the optimal relationship which suggested that as long as the five necessary factors are present, the choice of approach would be context dependent. Hence, the primary objective when planning an approach must be to facilitate or support the establishment or maintenance of the five necessary factors. This chapter shall further clarify these findings by placing them in the practical context of Afghanistan. The chapter shall conclude by prescribing pragmatic policy recommendations.

11.1. Background and context

Afghanistan was a minor producer of opium until the mid-1950s (Paoli *et al.*, 2009) when production levels are believed to have increased in response to the 1959 Iranian prohibition and prolonged drought in Southeast Asia (Felbab-Brown, 2010). There may have been a further increase in response to the Turkish prohibition in the early 1970s (INCB, 1973). Then from 1984, production increased and by 1994 Afghanistan was the world's largest source of illicit opium.

Figure 11: 1. Afghanistan: Opium production (1970-2007)



Source: adapted from: Holahan and Henningen (1972); Magnussen *et al.* (1980); NNICC (various years); NNICC (various years); INCSR (various years); RCMP (various years); UNODCCP (various years); UNODC (various years).

The primary factor for increased production appears to have been the decades of violent conflict following the 1978 *coup d'état*. The combined conflicts devastated the country's agricultural resources and rural infrastructure (Allen, 2002; MCN, 2006; Potulski, 1991; Rubin and Guáqueta, 2009), and removed a third of all arable land; leaving opium as one of the few available cash crops (World Bank, 2005). This situation was magnified by many Mujahedeen warlords, and after 1996, the Taliban who facilitated and profited from opiate production, manufacturing and distribution (see Felbab-Brown, 2010; Goodhand, 2008; Goodson, 2002; McCoy, 2003; Paoli *et al.*, 2009; Ruben and Sherman, 2009).

In 2001, the Taliban banned opium production and administered an intervention centred upon a highly repressive incarnation of law enforcement (Farrell and Thorne, 2005; see Moore, 2002). The ban decreased the area under cultivation by 91 percent (UNDCP, 2001)¹ and drove many landowners and farmers into debt (Jelsma, 2005; Jelsma and Kramer, 2005). This facilitated widespread popular resistance and weakened the Taliban's authority (Felbab-Brown, 2010) and as rural infrastructures were further damaged during the 2001 conflict (MCN, 2006) production increased on a steep incline from then onwards.

Driven by depressed opium prices, high wheat prices and improved security situations in some key production provinces (INCRS, 2010; UNODC, 2009; see Boone, 2009; Felbab-Brown, 2010; Nordland and Shah, 2010) production declined between 2008 and 2010 for the first time since 2000 (Figure 11:1); however, a number of factors may make the reduction somewhat superficial. Firstly, the destruction of almost a quarter of the 2010 crop by blight has inflated the farmgate price of opium by almost 50 percent (Sengupta, 2010) whilst wheat prices declined by 43 percent (UNODC, 2010). Secondly, as shall be discussed in greater length in Section 11:3:1, there are many reservations concerning the sustainability of Governor-led eradication (Mansfield, 2010).

11.2. Intervention

Between 2001 and 2003 a policy of informal tolerance was adopted to prevent opium suppression from conflicting with counter-insurgency and state reconstruction. The strategy centred upon interdicting manufacturers and traffickers whilst administering

¹ The majority of the remainder was produced within territories outside of Taliban authority (Farrell and Thorne, 2005).

AD. Negotiated eradication was to be sequenced after the establishment of alternative incomes (Paoli *et al.*, 2009; Jelsma and Kramer, 2005). In a policy shift in late 2004 Afghan eradication teams begun forcefully eradicating opium poppies.² Then after several Afghan eradication teams were violently resisted, America began encouraging and advising provincial and district governors to eradicate crops themselves (Blanchard, 2009) or more often than not, to negotiate with local power-holders (i.e., warlords, strongmen or tribal leaders) to eradicate crops in their sphere of influence (Byrd, 2010; Mansfield, 2010). The ‘Good Performance Indicators’ scheme was established as an incentive to Governors to ban and eradicate crops. Under the scheme, Governors were rewarded with funding for development projects if their provinces were declared poppy-free by UNODC, or presented significant reductions (Blanchard, 2009; INCRS, 2010).³ In 2009 provincial counternarcotics infantry were made available to protect eradication teams (Blanchard, 2009).

Governors and local power-holders have often suppressed production through law enforcement, forced eradication and threats of military attack. Many farmers received little or no developmental aid and were pushed deeper into poverty and debt. This consequently inflated perceptions of alienation from the national and provincial government whilst increasing the support-base of anti-governments groups (see Callimachi, 2009; Felbab-Brown, 2009, 2010; Mansfield and Pain, 2008; Mansfield, 2009, 2010; Jelsma and Kramer, 2005; Pain and Kantor, 2010; Sajjan, 2009; Stockman, 2005).

In 2005, a British diplomat reported how the effectiveness of governor-led eradication was limited by the relationships many governors had with the illicit trade (Baldouf and Bowers, 2005). While some exploited bans to inflate the price of opium for which they collected revenue (Felbab-Brown, 2010) others extorted farmers or eradicated the crops of farmers connected to opponents (Byrd, 2010; Felbab-Brown, 2010; Mansfield and Pain, 2006; Landay, 2007; Sajjan, 2009; World Bank, 2005).

Such campaigns conflict with the policy communicated in the 2006 National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS). The NDCS concedes that as opium farming is often a survival mechanism the intervention should not be ‘eradication-led’. Nevertheless, a ‘credible threat of eradication’ is required *once* alternative livelihoods have been

² The GoA consistently blocked US requests for aerial eradication (Blanchard, 2009; Felbab-Brown, 2010; Kazem, 2005; O’Shea, 2007).

³ In 2010, the scheme was administered through the Afghan MCN and possessed a budget of US\$2.2 million (Mansfield, 2010).

established in order to avoid impoverishing and alienating rural populations. It further specifies that drug control should be mainstreamed as an element in wider national and provincial state building strategies (MCN, 2006:19/20).

As the Afghan intervention is reliant on foreign assistance, and the US is the primary source of income, much policy has been driven and motivated by US Congress (Rubin and Guáqueta, 2007) even when it conflicts with the NDCS. Between 2002 and 2008 American resource allocation was heavily weighed towards law enforcement over AL (US Senate, 2009) and when DOA was administered it was often used as leverage in negotiations for quick eradication rather than as the long-term commitment addressing the drivers (i.e. lack of market, credit and land access) and facilitators (i.e. insecurity and corruption) of production (Mansfield and Pain, 2005; Mansfield, 2007) identified in the NDCS. For example, USAID ‘cash-for-work’ programmes, which employed potential opium farmers to undertake infrastructure construction (Felbab-Brown, 2010; Hafvenstein, 2007), contained conditionality clauses mandating farmers to cease opium production within a year (Blanchard, 2009; Wyler, 2009).

Additionally, research by UNODC (2009) suggests that DOA in Afghanistan has been largely centred upon crop substitution. While 33 percent of 1,064 villages surveyed had received agricultural assistance, just one percent had received agricultural tools or support for improved irrigation; 47 percent had received improved seeds/samplings.

Furthermore, the conditions present in Afghanistan make the NDCS more a ‘wish list’ than a policy. There are multiple centres of authority; including governors and power-holders actively opposed to suppression. Coordination between NGOs’ and Afghan institutions has been insufficient (Jelsma and Kramer, 2009; Rubin and Guáqueta, 2007; Ward *et al.*, 2008; see Hafvenstein, 2007). Furthermore, many ‘Afghan officials and local and international contractors’ are corrupt, incompetent (Felbab-Brown, 2010:147) and under-resourced (INCRS, 2010). These limitations are inflated by the difficulties of administrating development amidst violent conflict (Felbab-Brown, 2010).

In 2009 the new US ambassador to Afghanistan (RFE, 2009) and UNODC (Costa, 2009) criticised the previous US-led intervention as a costly failure which alienated farmers. America declared that a new policy would prioritize large-scale and sustainable DODCPs, and the interdiction of high-level actors, above eradication (Blanchard, 2009; Wyler, 2009). While the US immediately sent dozens of extra agricultural experts to administered DODCPs (Gearan, 2009), the 2010 US State Departments INCRS (2010)

illustrate a greater level of continuity with the previous strategy than is officially expressed.

The INCRS (2010:103/106) states that AD (not AL) must be supported by ‘measures to increase risk’. It then professes the success of governor-led eradication and the Good Performance Initiative for demonstrating to opium producers that suppression represents an ‘immediate and tangible positive benefit’ whilst compelling ‘farmers to self-eradicate or choose alternate crops’; sentiments echoed by UNODC (2010). The INCRS (2010:106) supports these conclusions with the example of the Governor of Helmand who reduced production through ‘public information, agricultural assistance and robust law enforcement’; he was rewarded with US\$10million (INCRS, 2010:106).

Additionally the US Senate (2009:12) - whilst defending the utility of aerial eradication - claimed that the US military would be:

... in effect, sitting amidst the most fertile poppy fields and hoping to hold their ground and force the growers into marginal areas where it is harder to cultivate poppies and riskier to get the opium to market...//... and staying long enough to restore government services and promote alternatives to poppy production.

The US Senate’s statement parallels, in many respects, the coerced negotiations administered in Laos and Viet Nam. The Governor-led eradication has more than a passing resemblance to the Imperial/Republican Chinese intervention where local governors – with dubious human rights credentials – were rewarded for suppression.

11.3. Policy implications

Chapter 10:6 identified five factors which presented across all or most cases and were thus found to be necessary for *success*. While there are inherent difficulties in transferring experiences across time and space, these findings can inform Afghan drug control policy. This section shall illustrate how – as of December 2010 - these five factors are absent from Afghanistan. It will then adapt the model expressed in Chapter 10:6 to the Afghan context and prescribe options for a more effective and sustainable intervention.

11.3.1. Context

For many of the Afghan political elite the opium trade is rewarding. Many warlords appointed to legitimate political/bureaucratic positions after 2001 had previously

exerted authority over aspects of the opiate trade (Baldouf and Bowers, 2005; Paoli *et al.*, 2009). While formal ties with overt, criminal activity were rejected in order to enter legitimate state institutions, several former warlords exploited their position by protecting ‘former’ contacts (Shaw, 2007; see Byrd, 2010; Felbab-Brown, 2010; Goodhand, 2008; Jones and Fair, 2009; Kreutzmann, 2007; Murray, 2007; Peters, 2009; US Senate, 2009; Sedra, 2006).

A less iniquitous obstruction to the state (or political elite) from perceiving suppression as in their best interest may be the observation that a sharp decline in production would be economically and politically damaging (see Jelsma and Kramer, 2005). Afghanistan is one of the least developed countries in the world. The Government of Afghanistan (GoA) have reported that 12 million individuals survive below the poverty line; UNDP have ranked it the fourth poorest country in the world in terms of food security (Danspeckgruber, 2009). In 2009, opium was produced by 12.9 percent of the rural population (UNODC, 2009). It was estimated that a third of the national population relied upon opiate generated revenue (Ruben and Sherman, 2009) while a quarter of all economic activity was centred upon opium (Byrd, 2010). Opium has additionally stabilised the national economy by positively affecting Afghanistan’s balance of payments (Byrd and Jonglez, 2006). Others - echoing scholarly opinion (Felbab-Brown, 2010) – have expressed concern that suppression would strengthen the insurgency and alienate rural populations (Jones and Fair, 2009). While the trade represents a barrier to long-term economic growth and foreign investment (World Bank, 2005; see Atkins, 1996; Thoumi, 1987) support for a policy which could remove the income of a third of the population, destabilise the economy and ignite anti-government feelings is understandably low.

Afghanistan has ‘historically been characterized by a weak state in dynamic relations with a strong society’, resulting a series of complex relationships between the state and multiple ‘micro-societies’ based upon cultural, tribal or linguistic lines (Saikal, 2009:65). While Kabul presently exerts fragile control over some of the national territory, parallel centres of authority exist throughout much of Afghanistan. Some southern and eastern areas are governed entirely by the Taliban (Paoli *et al.*, 2009) or governance is limited by an insurgency which has increased in intensity every year since 2002 (Jones and Fair, 2009; Masadykov *et al.*, 2010).


Even in areas with a significant state presence, the GoA ‘has neither the capacity nor the legitimacy to mobilize capital or coercion’ (Goodhand, 2008:415). Most state institutions are corrupt, lacking in adequate resources and trained personnel, and

generally ineffective (Goodson, 2002; ISISC, 2007; Saikal, 2009). Since 2005, the weakness of the government, and high civilian casualties from the insurgency, have diminished popular support for Kabul and increased support for insurgent groups (Masadykov *et al.*, 2010).

The weakness in governance and lack of state authority is most conspicuous in the criminal justice system; 80/90 percent of Afghans (ISISC, 2007) choose to use informal dispute resolution mechanisms, or even the Taliban, rather than the formal criminal justice system (Wardak, 2007, 2009) which is under-resourced, undertrained and inefficient. Evocative of the entire system, the police are corrupt, abusive and criminalised (Windle and Farrell, 2010; see Ghufuran, 2007; Mukhopadhyay, 2009). This makes forced eradication ineffective and disproportionately administered on the poorest farmers (Mansfield, 2006; Rubin, 2007; see Kreutzmann, 2007).

11.3.2. Model adaption

Diagram 11: 1. Afghanistan: The optimal relationship between factors



Note: Solid lines represent the relationship between necessary factors. Dashed lines represent the relationship between facilitative and necessary factors.

Section 11:3:1 illustrated the absence of the five necessary factors from Afghanistan. As previous experience suggests that these factors must be present for *success*, all interventions must be directed at meeting four medium/long-term objectives: (1) Extend the state into isolated and hostile areas; (2) Facilitate a sense of self-interest in the Afghan Government and political elite towards opium suppression; (3) Facilitate a perception that suppression benefits opium farmers; (4) Strengthen the Afghan Government's capacity to monitor opium farmers and enforce the law. The remainder of this chapter shall proffer suggestions towards meeting these four primary objectives as illustrated in the adapted model expressed in Diagram 11:2.

All strategies must facilitate the primary objectives; any that negate them must be discontinued. Analogously to (PR) China, Pakistan and Thailand, the Afghan intervention must be designed as opium suppression mainstreamed into state extension. From previous experiences, DOA and conflict resolution/limitation can be effective means of supporting state extension whilst providing incentives for farmers to accept opium bans.

Cash/food-for-work programmes - often criticised by AL theorists (Byrd, 2010) - may benefit suppression if they can build political capital for the GoA and establish state presence in formerly isolated or hostile areas.⁴ This said, deeper DODCPs (i.e. AD or AL) might provide incentives unavailable in cash/food-for-work, such as healthcare, education and improved agricultural productivity. While the extension of state run social welfare and education can build political capital by establishing positive relationships between farmers and the state, cash/food-for-work or similar crop substitution projects may: inject capital into local economies; improve agricultural infrastructures (Blanchard, 2009; Hafvenstein, 2007); provide a steady income to farmers waiting for new crops with long maturation periods to yield results and provide entry to formerly isolate areas. DODCPs may be supported by marketing campaign's informing farmers that the central objective of suppression is to improve their livelihoods (Ruben and Sherman, 2009) and that opium is against Islam: a technique used to great effect in several local interventions (Byrd, 2010).

Improving security may be a pre-requisite for DODCPs. Poor security limits farmers ability to tend and market crops (Mansfield, 2010), while insurgents and power-holders have demanded bribes from development projects operating within their sphere of

⁴ A major criticism is that the projects are unable to deliver long-term sustainable changes that many farmers expect (Byrd, 2010): however, this may represent a failure of communication rather than policy.

authority (Shelley and Husain, 2009) or attacked project workers perceived as threatening their authority (Hafvenstein, 2007).

The establishment of a more secure Afghanistan may represent the definitive incentive for the cessation of opium production. One fieldworker reported the peoples 'of Helmand would trade almost anything for [security and peace and]... would follow anyone who could offer it' (Hafvenstein, 2007:315): farmers in Columbia have reported similar sentiments (Younger and Walsh, 2009). Peace and security may represent conflict resolution/limitation or - as was the case in (PR) China and (IR) Iran - the cessation of exploitation and abuse at the hands of formal and informal power-holders (see Mukhopadhyay, 2009).


Thus, reformation of the Afghan criminal justice system will not only establish capabilities to monitor farmers and enforce bans, but also provide farmers with a strong incentive. In this respect, human rights and corruption training will be central to reform whilst ensuring that subsequent negotiations and law enforcement do not reverse earlier state extension initiatives.

The GoA must disengage from facilitating and profiting from opium production. How this is to be achieved is beyond the remit of this thesis; however, the perception that increasing opium consumption is damaging to national health and economy has been a major motivation in all nine cases analysed. The religious enmity towards opium (Byrd, 2010) and growing domestic consumption (UNODC, 2010) may naturally shift political elites' attitudes towards opium production, especially as the Afghan economy begins to modernise.

Unless the country is unified under a revolutionary government (such as the Taliban) this process will most likely take years and require 'modest expectations... a strong and sustained commitment, and adequate resources' (Byrd, 2010:302). More hawkish foreign donors – such as Russia (Agence France Presse, 2010/b) - may find this politically unattainable and lobby for increased law enforcement before the five necessary conditions have been established. Diagram 11:1 illustrates the erroneous path where law enforcement further alienates and impoverishes farming communities whilst facilitating conflict; consecutively decreasing state authority. As the loss of authority and political capital requires greater law enforcement to achieve the same outcome, a negative spiral is established which may be broken when DOA and conflict resolution are used to gain entry into the isolated and hostile areas. Consequently, time and resources would have been better spent on establishing the five necessary conditions. As

an analogy; while a roof may keep the rain out, it is not much use without walls to hold it up.

Diagram 11: 2. Possible effect of premature law enforcement



Note: Solid lines represent the relationship between necessary factors. Dashed lines represent the relationship between facilitative and necessary factors, and the potential impact of premature eradication or law enforcement.

Centrally important is how to measure progress. The findings of this thesis support suggestions that traditional drug control measures (hectares, metric tonne or even price) may be inadequate measures (Mansfield and Pain, 2008; Kramer and Jelsma, 2009). Indicators need to be developed which measure change in terms of state extension, criminal justice efficiency and political elite, and farmers' attitudes to opium production.

Lastly, as Pain and Kantor (2010) have illustrated, Afghanistan is a complex country and interventions must be tailored to the unique provincial, district or village characteristics. Hence, interventions must investigate what incentives are best placed to motivate farmers in specific locations. In this way policies can be tailored to local contexts and requirements.

11.3.3. Power-holders

All reductions in production in Afghanistan since 2001 have been as a result of bans enforced by district, provincial (Ruben and Sherman, 2009) and local power-holders (Mansfield, 2010). For, as Mukhopadhyay (2009:549) argues, all aspects of state building and opium suppression require negotiations with multiple formal and informal power-holders. This section shall discuss the problems such a situation presents.

A case study of Balkh Province found that the realisation of ‘poppy-free’ status was centred upon the Governor’s perception of suppression as ‘in his best interests as a politician’. Furthermore, the Governor possessed not only the means to enforce the law and monitor opium production but also authority over the majority of ‘his’ territory (Mukhopadhyay, 2009:557). Additionally, many power-holders - through ethnic or religious affiliation – enjoy wide political support and have proved adept at administrating local economies (including the drugs trade) (MacGinty, 2010). Hence, they may be the most appropriate vehicle for administrating a form of Governor-led suppression. This is especially as, many in ‘private..... agree that drugs are harmful and that profiting from the trafficking is not praiseworthy’ (Ruben and Sherman, 2009:42).

An alternative consideration is the threat of further decreasing the authority of Kabul and inflating power-holders’ authority (Shelley and Husain, 2009), as Governor-led suppression reinforces local perceptions of Kabul’s inability to govern. Furthermore, the relationship between Kabul and Governors, and between Governors and local power-holders is often unstable and reliant on negotiations (Mansfield, 2010). Many have sought the maintenance of insecurity for personal gain (MacGinty, 2010) and there are reports that opium bans have been administered to control prices (Felbab-Brown, 2010). Others have siphoned compensation intended for the farmer or funding for village development into their own pockets (Constable, 2002; Felbab-Brown, 2010; Shelly and Husain, 2009) or inequitable distributed resources from those which need them the most (Pain and Kantor, 2010). This said, Mukhopadhyay (2009) argues that the bargaining process may be part of a longer and more sustainable state building process.

It is suggested here that the US reformulate its policy so that Governors (and consequently local power-holders) are rewarded for: the effective implementation of policy established in Kabul; allowing NGOs or state institutions administered projects into their territory; and/or eventually negotiating the cessation of production. Since development will include national social welfare provisions, this will extend the writ of

the state. Consequently, the extension of state authority will continue to be a central long-term objective.

11.4. Recommendations

This review of Afghanistan is not meant to be exhaustive but rather to illustrate a practical application of the thesis findings. It has argued that as the five necessary factors are absent from Afghanistan, interventions must initially be centred upon four objectives: (1) Extend the state into isolated and hostile areas; (2) Facilitate a sense of self-interest in the Afghan Government and political elite towards opium suppression; (3) Facilitate a perception that suppression benefits opium farmers; (4) Strengthen the Afghan Government's capacity to monitor opium farmers and enforce the law.

While it is beyond the remit of this thesis to undertake an extensive investigation into how these would best be achieved it can be posited that in the context of Afghanistan: (1) DOA and conflict resolution/improved security can be used to secure state authority and provide incentives; (2) As the choice of DOA must be dependent on the local context and potential to facilitate the necessary conditions, narrow crop substitution must not be ruled out; (3) As the necessary conditions are long-term objectives, and will require provincial and national cooperation, opium suppression must be mainstreamed into provincial and national strategies. Isolated projects may be fine if they facilitate provincial/national objectives; (4) 'Good Performance Initiatives' must be reformulated and mainstreamed into a long-term policy designed to facilitate the five necessary conditions; (5) The strengthening of the Afghan criminal justice system must be a priority. The ANP must be made suitable for work, including human rights training, negotiating skills and corruption monitoring; (6) High-level state employees must disengage from the trade.

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12. Conclusion

To the best of the author's knowledge, this is the first study to document, synthesize and compare the population of national cases of successful production/diversion suppression in the Middle Eastern/Asian 'opium zone'. In doing so, the study has:

- (1) Catalogued cases of success for future reference;
- (2) Produced 'lessons' which may improve the effectiveness of interventions whilst reducing inadvertent negative outcomes;
- (3) Gone some way to reconcile the discrepancy between national and international effects of interventions at the source.

The suggestions made in this thesis are not easily implemented. Planning and administration will require extensive time and resource commitments, including the employment of professional and knowledgeable individuals. The narratives, synthesis and cross-case comparison will, it is hoped, inform those formulating policy to establish the most cost-effective and appropriate strategies and objectives. The study should also contribute to the somewhat scarce source country drug policy knowledge base. This concluding chapter shall present the major cross-case findings whilst providing some thoughts on how researchers could support, extend and challenge these findings.

12.1. Major findings

The documentation of cases of successful opium suppression represents a useful reference for practitioners and researchers. This is in itself an important contribution to the knowledge base of source country drug control. Aside from the descriptive outcomes, the synthesis and cross-case comparison suggest a number of findings. Outlined below, several of the key findings are consistent with scholarly convention, such as the centrality of state authority to preventive interventions. Other findings are more provocative.

Most notably, the findings reject the pessimistic position that nothing works, by demonstrating how national level interventions can significantly reduce national production. While this study does not argue that national interventions have decreased international supplies, it may provide some indication as to how global production has been contained (as discussed in Chapter 2:4:3). The nine national interventions each prevented a significant quantity (i.e. several metric tonnes) of opium from circulating in the global market. Hence, as part of the portfolio of drug control, the nine interventions

helped maintain the unnaturally high prices and scarcity which contain global consumption.

The cross-case comparison, presented in Chapter 10:3, suggests that five factors presented in all (or most) cases and could thus be deemed necessary for success. These were:

- (1) All governments perceived suppression as in its best interest;
- (2) All states possessed a strong presence throughout opium producing areas;
- (3) All but two states presented an incentive with which opium farmers could perceive some benefit;
- (4) All states possessed the capabilities to monitor opium farmers;
- (5) All interventions administered law enforcement.

Additional factors that crossed more than one case were deemed supportive or facilitative of the necessary factors. A model illustrating the optimal relationship between the necessary and supportive factors was developed (see Chapter 10:3). The findings suggest that the primary objective when planning a national intervention must be to facilitate or support the establishment or maintenance of the five necessary factors. These findings were supported by the semi-deviant case of Imperial/Republican China, in which failure to sustain production below 20mt was attributable to the loss of state authority and lack of incentives for farmers to cease production.

The exclusion of corruption controls and DOA from the five conditions may be somewhat provocative. It is, however, suggested that if the five necessary conditions are present in a country then DOA and corruption controls may not be required. This said, while the control of corruption may not be necessary, it may represent a shift from a facilitative political elite who perceive production/trafficking as personally/nationally advantageous to an elite which perceive suppression as in their best interest. Similarly, DOA may: facilitate the extension of the state into formerly isolated areas; provide incentives to the cessation of production; or support negotiated law enforcement.

Policy implications for Afghanistan

In Chapter 11, the case of contemporary Afghanistan was used to clarify further and explore the cross-case findings in a practical context. It was argued that as the five necessary factors are absent from Afghanistan, any intervention must initially centre upon four medium-term objectives:

- (1) To extend the state into isolated and hostile areas;
- (2) To facilitate a sense of self-interest in the Afghan government and political elite towards opium suppression;
- (3) To facilitate a perception that suppression benefits opium farmers;
- (4) To strengthen the Afghan government's capacity to monitor opium farmers and enforce the law.

Analogously to (PR) China, Pakistan and Thailand, the Afghan intervention should be designed as state extension which contains an element of opium suppression. From previous experiences, DOA (including narrow crop substitution) and conflict resolution/limitation can be an effective means of supporting state extension whilst providing incentives for farmers to acquiesce to opium bans.

Furthermore, premature law enforcement could create an erroneous path in which farmers are further impoverished and alienated. In turn, this may facilitate conflict and consecutively decrease state authority. As the loss of authority and political capital require greater law enforcement to achieve the same outcome, a negative spiral is established whereby the provision of incentives are required to gain entry into the (even further) isolated and hostile areas. Consequently, time and resources would have been better spent on establishing the five necessary conditions rather than undertaking policies counter-productive to their establishment.

12.2. Future research

The five necessary factors identified in Chapter 10:3 could form the foundation of assessment criteria to guide national or local interventions. In Afghanistan, the British developed a scheme which employed 23 variables to determine whether areas were appropriate for forced eradication (Rubin and Guáqueta, 2009). An extension of this study would be to develop surveys that could be administered by local bureaucrats in any area with a significant opium or coca producing population. The surveys would initially identify what could motivate farmers and farming communities to cease production; rather than surveying what motivates farmers to produce opium, such as those developed by David Mansfield (2007). During the course of an intervention, the surveys could chart farmers' feelings towards the state, the intervention and opium as an agricultural crop. At a national level, indicators could be compiled to measure the state's progress towards the remaining necessary factors. Such analysis could inform

practitioners as to what approach would be most appropriate and cost-effective at a given time, whilst avoiding many inadvertent consequences.

Goldstone (2008:51) notes how additional information on an existing or new case may 'challenge the validity' of findings 'leading to their revision, modification or abandonment'. While this is true of any research, for comparative case studies additional information which alters the process of one case may necessitate revising the five factors identified as necessary for a successful national intervention. Similarly, the emergence of new cases of success could challenge, and possibly lead to a modification of these findings. It is hoped that this research shall be taken seriously enough that scholars and practitioners will engage in an iterative process which challenges (or better still confirms) the findings of this study.

There are several avenues of research which could be undertaken to support or challenge the findings of the study. There was insufficient English language information available on the pre-1974 Turkish intervention (i.e. the restriction of small-producer provinces) and, to a lesser extent, on the Vietnamese intervention. Investigation into either of these cases would not only improve (support or challenge) the findings of this study but would by itself present a significant contribution to our understating of opium production, and source country drug control.

An investigation of South American opium and coca production may represent a significant test of the validity of these findings. Could, for example, the lack of one or more of the five necessary factors account for Mexico's inability to suppress opium production? Alternatively, does Mexico present a deviant case whereby production continues to thrive regardless of the existence of the five necessary factors? Similar questions could be asked of Columbia where, between 1998 and 2009, illicit production declined from 100mt to 9mt (UNODC, 2010). The Columbian intervention has centred primarily upon forced eradication (ICG, 2008; Mejia, 2010) whilst many drug producing areas remain outside of state authority because of the on-going violent conflict (Younger and Walsh, 2009). Thus, the Columbian case may challenge the findings of this study.

Egypt and Lebanon were excluded as cases of success for failing to meet the definition of a major producing nation employed in this study (i.e. producing over 50mt annually for five years). In-depth investigation into how these two nations prevented production from taking hold – rather than suppressing an established and entrenched agricultural practice – could greatly add to the knowledge base of source country drug control.

12.3 Displacement and sustainability

A likely criticism of this study will be that national success in one nation, say Afghanistan, will displace production elsewhere and impose substantial costs on the new host nation (Paoli *et al.*, 2009; Reuter, 2010). Discounting the possibility that a country, such as Iraq, could develop a more competitive environment than Afghanistan and assuming a pure displacement effect (i.e. law enforcement pushes production from Afghanistan to Iraq) Afghanistan would still have achieved a national policy objective. While opium production may harm the new host(s), Afghanistan would have deflected production from where the government perceived it as most harmful to *national* self-interest. To paraphrase Zimmer (1990:64): ‘displacement is of value to residents [of Afghanistan].... who, for a long time, were bearing a disproportionate share of the burden’. Furthermore, if the intervention has positively impacted Afghanistan and opium farming communities through state extension, reduced violent conflict, improved social welfare or increased taxable agricultural exports, then a significant diffusion of benefits would have occurred. Another diffusion effect is that experiences gained in Afghanistan could be used to suppress production in the new host nation. Furthermore, the perception of self-interest may be quickened by the positive spiral established during the Afghan interventions, which demonstrated that not only is success possible but that significant economic aid and increased international recognition can also be achieved.

This said, it is presently difficult to identify a more cost-effective country than Afghanistan. While Central Asian states or sub-Saharan Africa present conditions suitable for opium production (Paoli *et al.*, 2009; Reuter, 2009) there is a risk of a depressed Afghan market motivating a return to production in any of the countries analysed in this study. As it would be imprudent to volunteer predictions, a number of pessimistic worst-case scenarios will be discussed. All illustrate the threat of complicity.

The political elite’s perception of suppression as in their best interest is transient.¹ For example, the Governments of Pakistan or Iran could decide that permitting production would capture political capital from anti-government militant groups; the gains of national security could outweigh the gains of drug control as was the case in Laos during the Second Indochina War (McCoy, 2003).

¹ America’s attitude to source country drug control, as catalogued by McCoy (2003), represents one of the most manifest examples of the transient nature of national self-interest.

High farmgate prices and global recession since 2008 have increased production throughout Southeast Asia (UNODC, 2010b). (Ex-)opium producing areas of Laos (WFP, 2007), Pakistan (DFID, 2009; Nawaz *et al.*, 2009) and Viet Nam (FCO, 2010) are amongst the poorest areas of three of the world's poorest countries. Therefore, increased rewards *may* reduce the relative risks imposed by the state and the relative profitability of alternative incomes. For example, Laotian farmers who had been further impoverished by opium bans may decide to resume opium production. A forceful government response could provide an impetus to a reappearance of Hmong insurgency. This in turn could reduce state authority in opium producing areas. This would decrease the very foundation which permitted opium suppression and facilitate an environment whereby large-scale opium production is once again viable. The Laotian example represents a pessimistic worst-case scenario; however, it also illustrates the dangers of complicity. Once success has been realised, the state must ensure the maintenance of the five necessary conditions.

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Annex 1. In-depth chronologies

Annex 1:1. China

	17 th Cent.	European merchants begin exporting Indian and Turkish opium to China (Asthana, 1954; Watt, 1908)
	1729	Distribution of opium prohibited (Brook and Wakabayashi, 2000)
	1780	Importation of foreign opium prohibited
	1796	Opium smoking prohibited (Wakeman, 1977)
	1799	Domestic production prohibited (Yongming, 1999) ¹
	1801	Opium production reported in Yunnan (Bello, 2003)
	1813	Prohibited on consumption reiterated (Bello,

¹ To free itself from blame whilst continuing to secure a profit (Newman, 1989) in 1799 the East India Trading Company prohibited their employees from exporting opium to China. However, the Company began selling to private merchants who illicitly exported to China (Dixon, 1922; Wakeman, 1977; Walker, 1991). Foreign and domestic traffickers circumvented the ban through bribery or coercion (see Madancy, 2001; Macauley, 2009; Walker, 2007).

		2003)
	1823	First recorded law enforcement intervention against opium farmers in Yunnan, Sichuan and Guizhou Provinces (Bello, 2003)
	1834	Indian opium production and illicit exports to China increase (Windle, 2011)
'Opium War' begins after China seizes opium stored off Chinese coast and expels all British merchants (Farley, 1977)	1839	Opium shortage created (Spence, 1990) by brutal intervention against domestic consumers, producers and distributors (Bello, 2003; Wakeman, 1977)
'Opium War' ends. Treaty of Nanking obliges China to: pay indemnity; cede Hong Kong to Britain; and open five ports to foreign merchants. No mention of opium (reprinted in Spence, 1990)	1842	
Taiping Rebellion begins ² (Wakeman, 1977)	1851	
'Second Opium War'. China seizes a British registered, Chinese owned, ship accused	1856	

² Initially a Chinese Christian sect who sought to replace the Emperor and spread Christianity throughout China, the rebels captured Nanking in 1853. Several smaller rebellions followed the Taiping: the Small Swords Society took Shanghai; Triads seized Amoy; Hmong groups revolted in Kweichow; and Panthay Muslims controlled a separatist state in Tali for 15 years. The combined conflicts reduced central government control and facilitated several large-scale famines (see Fairbank, 1994; Wakeman, 1977)

of piracy. British and French forces occupy Canton and Tientsin (McCoy, 2003)		
Yunnan: Muslim Uprising (Grey, 2002)	1857	
‘Second Opium War’ ends after British/French occupy Tientsin and Peking. While peace treaty does not mention opium (Wakeman, 1977) China includes opium in a list of items to be subject to import tariff (Dixon, 1922; Yongming, 1999)	1860	Import legalisation increases imports; reducing prices and increasing availability (Windle, 2011)
Renewed Muslim Uprising in Yunnan (Grey, 2002)	1863	
Taiping Rebellion ends (Wakeman, 1977) Xingjian Muslim Uprising begins (Grey, 2002)	1864	Production legalised in Yunnan to fund counter-insurgency
Hmong and Muslim insurgent groups defeated (Grey, 2002)	1871	
	1880	Prohibition on production repealed nationally
Sino-Japanese War; China cedes Taiwan (Wakeman, 1977)	1894- 1895	
‘100 Days of Reform’. Modernisation programme is unpopular with conservatives in civil, military and political elite. Emperor removed by his aunt in bloodless coup. Many supporters of reform executed (Wakeman, 1977)	1898	
Boxer Rebellion. Boxers (martial arts societies) invade Peking and attack foreigners. Defeated by coalition of foreign troops. China forced to apologise and pay reparation to coalition (Wakeman, 1977)	1900- 1901	

Revolutionary Alliance becomes fragmented after several failed coup attempts (Wakeman, 1977)	1905	
	1906	Imperial Decree orders gradual reduction in opium production
	1908	Anglo-Chinese Ten-Year Suppression Agreement
Revolution. Violence in Wuhan military camp ignites uprisings by gentry and warlords throughout China. Empress abdicates and Republic of China founded (Wakeman, 1977).	1911-1912	Anglo-Chinese Opium Agreement establishes Joint Investigations Production resumes during Revolution
	1912	Sun Yat-sen reiterates prohibition and orders suppression
After KMT party sweep first national election, President Shikai has head of KMT assassinated. Southern warlords, angered at being left out of provincial governments, join KMT in failed coup; KMT banned (Spence, 1990; Walker, 1991)	1913	Half of all provinces declared opium-free by Joint Investigations
President Shikai coerces Parliament to formally elect him President (Wakeman, 1977)	1914	
Yunnan warlords declares independence after Shikai proclaims himself Emperor of China; other provinces follow (Spence, 1990)	1915	Some British Joint Investigation members report suspicion that official compliance is facilitating increased production

'Warlords era' begins after Shikai abdicates in response to uprisings (Wakeman, 1977) ³	1916	
	1917	All provinces declared 'free of opium' by Joint Investigations Many warlords and state officials begin facilitating or ordering farmers to produce opium
KMT military occupy Guangzhou Provinces (Fairbank, 1994)	1925	
Northern Expedition. KMT and CCP armies defeat several warlords to bring majority of Southern China under KMT authority (Spence, 1990)	1926	
China partially unified under KMT, who are internationally recognised as government. To extend authority into rural areas the KMT begin programme of telephone, telegraph	1928	

³ As warlords fought over Beijing 'the presidency and the Parliament became the playthings of the militarists'. The warlords who 'now controlled much of China, had a wide variety of backgrounds and maintained their power in different ways' many had been part of the national military, others were provincial or district governors whilst some were:

simply thugs..... Some dominated whole provinces and financed their armies with local taxes collected by their own bureaucracies; others controlled only a handful of towns and got their money from "transit taxes" collected at gunpoint or through confiscation. Some warlords were deeply loyal to the idea of a legitimate republic....., others believed Sun Yat-sen and the Guomindang represented China's legitimate government.../. Many... were capable of ferocities and erratic cruelty... but many others were educated men who tried to instil in their troops their own vision of morality (Spence, 1990:288-9).

and road construction. To subvert local authorities central administrations were established with authority over all military, police, customs and transport. However, little was done to rejuvenate rural economies or improve poor agricultural practices (Fairbank, 1994)		
	1928/ 1929	KMT begin taxing opium transportation through the Yangtze River KMT prohibit production and distribution; many autonomous warlords ignore ban
	1930	League of Nations declare China the primary source of illicit opium in East and Southeast Asia.
Long March. KMT extend their authority as they pursue the CCP over 6,000 miles (Fairbank, 1994)	1934	China 'the most serious menace to any scheme of universal control' (Eisenlohr, 1934:207) Majority of warlords integrated into KMT opium monopoly
KMT form civilian government in Sichuan Province. Taxes centralised, roads built and two-fifths of provincial military demobbed and retrained for civilian occupations. Some warlord resistance (Spence, 1990)	1935	Six-Year Plan commences
Second Sino-Japanese War: Nanjing and Shanghai fall. CCP gradually extend authority	1937	KMT declare opium production has ceased in

in rural areas (Fairbank, 1994)		all but frontier provinces Japanese facilitate opium production in areas under their authority
KMT retreat to Chongqing where they form alliances with Sichuan, Yunnan and Guangxi warlords (Fairbank, 1994)	1938	
	1939/ 1940	KMT report that almost all production has ceased in areas under their authority. While reports from British diplomats and KMT differ all point to significant reductions
	1941	Complete prohibition established. Production limited to frontier and areas under Japanese authority
	1944	League of Nations report that China produce 65.4 percent of global illicit supply
Second Sino-Japanese War ends. 'Civil War' between KMT and CCP commences; KMT military are incompetent and unpopular. KMT popularity diminishes after imposition of unequal taxation on agricultural crops and massive inflation push many rural peoples further into poverty. Additionally, many resent the KMT for using surrendered Japanese soldiers to fight the CCP and are tired of decades of near constant conflict (Fairbank, 1994)	1945	Semi-independent warlords and military commanders facilitate resumption in opium production

CCP unify China under Communist rule; People's Republic of China established (Gittings, 2006). The CCP receives much rural support (Fairbank, 1994) ⁴	1949	
Commencement of land redistribution to peasants and punishment of landlords (Gittings, 2006)	1950	Decree Regarding Suppression of Opium and Narcotics obliges forced eradication
Three-Antis Campaign targets corruption, waste and bureaucracy in government. Five-Antis Campaign targets capitalist class's. Almost every employer is brought to trial and all private companies nationalised (Fairbank, 1994; Gittings, 2006)	1951	Initial campaign against 'drug offenders'
	1952	82,056 'drug offenders' arrested. Forced

⁴ In central-south China an estimated 60 percent of the population benefitted from land reforms (Spence, 1990). As Fairbank (1994:348) notes:

Here was a conquering army of country boys who were strictly self-disciplined, polite, and helpful, at the opposite pole from the looting and raping warlord and troops and even departing Nationalists. Here was a dedicated government that really cleaned things up – not only the drains and streets but also the beggars, prostitutes and petty criminals, all of whom were rounded up for reconditioning. Here was a new China one could be proud of, one that controlled inflation, abolished foreign privileges, stamped out opium smoking and corruption generally, and brought the citizenry into a multitude of sociable activities to repair public works, spread literacy, control disease,//... Only later did they see that the Promised Land was based on systematic control and manipulation. Gradually the CCP organisation would penetrate the society, set model roles of conduct, prescribe thought, and suppress individual deviations.

In rural areas, once the military had taken control, the CCP recruited local activists who became the new elite. They held authority over populations through 'public trials, mass accusations, and executions' (Fairbank, 1994:350/353).

		eradication conducted
First experiments with 'mutual-aid teams' (partial communalised rural farms) (Spence, 1990). Five-Year Plan stresses heavy industry above agriculture, however, it was 'felt to be on the whole a great success' as national income grew by 8.9% and agricultural output increased by 3.8% (Fairbank, 1994:358)	1953	Han Chinese areas Opium-Free
Agricultural cooperatives established (Gittings, 2006) ⁵	1955	
Anti-rightist campaign stifles bureaucratic efficiency as 300,000-700,000 skilled workers are exiled to the countryside; intelligence and innovation is punished (Fairbank, 1994)	1957	
Great Leap Forward. Agricultural communes replace cooperatives (Gittings, 2006). ⁶ Rural Chinese were mobilised into 'round the clock labour' to construct new: roads; irrigation; factories; cities; and steel. While the immediate results were 'chaotic and uneconomic' in the midterm it extended small-scale industry to the countryside (Fairbank, 1994:371), improved rural infrastructures and increased the productivity of formerly infertile areas. More negatively it inflated official corruption (Spence, 1990). Red Guards	1958-1961	

⁵ By 1955 almost all farms were part of communes (averaging 10,000 farmers) which pooled all resources. Individuals were remunerated on their 'subsistence needs and only partly on the work performed' (Lin, 1990:1234)

⁶ During communalism grain was rationed on subsistence needs, however, the CCP definition of subsistence was significantly lower than was set by international relief organisations (Fairbank, 1994)

(students aged between 9-18) terrorise all considered as bourgeois or in opposition to Mao. Mostly uneducated youths replace trained bureaucrats (Fairbank, 1994)		
End of Great Leap Forward. Communes scaled down (Gittings, 2006)	1961	
Four Cleanups Campaign against CCP members who exploit workers (i.e. nepotism or corruption). Work teams force confessions from CCP members (Fairbank, 1994)	1964	
Many Red Guards resettled in countryside as punishment (Fairbank, 1994)	1968	
1960s-1970s		
Many had become dissatisfied over the violence of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1968) and reduced agricultural productivity. While road construction, communications, education and agricultural modernisation had improved agricultural productivity development had ‘lacked behind hopes and expectations’ (Fairbank, 1994:405).		

All un-cited information from Chapter 4.

Annex 1:2. Iran

	5 Cent. BC	Evidence of opium consumption (Raisdana and Nakhjavani, 2002)
	10 / 11 Cent.	Opium first produced (Neligan, 1927)
	1729	Opium consumption and production prohibited (Matthee, 2005)

	1796	Prohibition on opium renewed (Matthee, 2005)
	1853	Opium first exported on significant scale
	1858	China legalizes opium imports
Silk-worm destroys silk industry. Textile manufacturing reduced by lower-cost British and Russian imports	1860	
Large-scale conversion of land from food crops to opium contributes to famine	1869-1872	
	1870s	Iranian Government privatise farmland for opium production
State administration is inefficient and few taxes are collected	Mid-1800s	
New Constitution limits absolutist powers of rulers and creates Majles (Parliament), which must approve all important decisions. Equality before law and freedom of press and assembly established Foreign powers divide Iran into three spheres of authority: Russian (northern/Central, including Tehran), British (southeast) and neutral (remainder). Iran is not consulted or informed of agreement	1907	China begins gradual prohibition
Oil discovered in southwest	1908	

<p>Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (now BP) formed</p> <p>Increased tribal disorders in many provinces, revolutionary forces capture Isfahan and descend on Tehran forcing the abdication of Shah who is replaced by son</p> <p>Taxes collection remains minimal</p>	1909	
	1910	Law on Limiting Opium regulates and taxes opium consumption. Professes prohibition of non-medical use within seven years
<p>Quasi-military gendarmerie established</p> <p>Majles refuses Russian demands that Iran not engage foreign advice without Russian or British consent. Majles dissolved after Russia threatens military attack (Keddie, 2006). Iran is a 'empire struggling to survive' (Ansari, 2006:8)</p>	1911	
<p>World War One: regardless of neutrality Iran becomes a battlefield. Food shortages created after farmland and irrigation are devastated whilst farmers are forced to produce food and build infrastructures for belligerent forces (Britain and Russia). Central authority lost in many areas</p>	1914	
<p>One-quarter of northern population killed by famine related to: devastated rural infrastructure; reduced crop area; reduced harvests; and food needs of British/Russian troops during War</p>	1918-1919	
<p>Negotiations for Anglo-Iranian Treaty which would make Iran a British protectorate. UK supplies advisors to Government, arms military, and develops transportation and</p>	1919	

communications infrastructures. Opponents of draft treaty jailed or exiled by Government		
New government suspends Treaty and British troops leave Iran	1920	
Military coup: Backed by the British, Reza Khan seizes power and attempts to centralize tax collection and modernize army	1921	
Millspaugh (US delegate) signs contract with government ceding full control of Iranian budget and financial administration. New agricultural monopolies and taxes created; military collect taxes	1922	Millspaugh reforms opium control/ tax system
Reza Khan becomes PM and exiles weakened Shah. This ignites several southern rebellions	1923	Reforms have reduced diversion from 80 percent to one-third
Southern rebellions violently suppressed	1924	To limit illicit transshipment, opium imports prohibited
Majles vote Reza Khan ruler. Modernization of bureaucrat, military and communications begins.	1925	Public opium consumption criminalised League of Nations expresses displeasure at poor export controls and existence of Iranian opium in illicit market
Reza Khan crowned Reza Shah Pahlavi and exercises 'despotic controls and suppression' over opponents; many are exiled or executed. Majles while several tribes are forcefully re-settled. All resistance is 'cruelly suppressed' (Kiddie, 2006:88) Iran continues to be agricultural underdeveloped and lacking organization, irrigation and	1926	Commission of Inquiry promotes protectionist policies to support substitute crop promotion

transport, however, police and military are well organised, highly efficient and ‘compare favourable with police forces in other countries’ (Millspaugh, 1926:10)		
Oil production increases from pre-World War One level of 80,800 tons to 4,556,00 tons Millspaugh resigns after disagreements with Reza Shah	1927	
	1928	State monopoly created. Licenses farmers; no restriction on licenses. Support for substitute cops offered Law on Punishment of Opium Traffickers criminalises unlicensed possession and distribution
Many poorer farmers lose land to landlords after law requiring registration of land ownership is enforced	1929	Monopoly unable to procure harvest and offers credit
Tax’s from sugar and tea used to extend rail infrastructure. Civil service and military strengthened	1930	League of Nations expresses displeasure at poor export and production controls and existence of Iranian opium in illicit markets
	1933	Monopoly reorganised; 20 percent of shares sold to private merchants
Shah’s modernisation produces results: electricity extended to almost all major cities; manufacturing plants were establishes (mostly textile and agricultural processing); airline service created, telephone and radio communications expanded; road surface increased ten	Mid-1930s	

<p>times since 1925; journey from southern ports to Tehran reduced from 2 months to 2/3 weeks. However, lack of transport remains prevents development in many areas</p> <p>Agriculture received little investment during modernisation and thus remained backward which ‘encouraged low productivity’. All farmland owned by around 2-5 percent of population, mostly Majles and the military; Shah the biggest landowner. ‘Peasants were often hungry, diseased and malnourished’ (Keddie, 2006:97)</p>		
	1936	<p>Monopoly begins buying from farmgate and paying in cash. To reinvigorate other agricultural industries ten provinces are prohibited from cultivating poppies</p>
<p>‘Landlordism and declining rural standards were the weakest point of Reza Shah’s modernisation’. Agricultural loans offered to improve poor land and agricultural schools established, however labour is so cheap that landlords refused to invest in modernisation. (Keddie, 2006:97)</p>	1937	<p>A further seven provinces are prohibited from cultivating opium</p>
	1938	<p>A further 25 districts are prohibited from cultivating opium</p> <p>League of Nations declares Iran as no longer a major exporter of opium</p>
<p>Allies with Germany in World War Two. Invaded and occupied by America, Britain and Russia (Ansari, 2006). Modernization drive ends and Shah abdicates in favor Mohammad</p>	1941	

Reza		
<p>Car and van ownership increases from 600 (1928) to 25,000 (1942)</p> <p>Millspaugh returns and reports that government is more corrupt; Majles a instrument of the rich. Poor harvest causes famine and riots in Tehran. Many tribes rearmed and began to reassert independence</p>	1942	
<p>Millspaugh introduces (sparsely enforced) income tax and promotes free trade. Majles moves to take control of Iranian oil from foreign interests</p> <p>World War Two has devastated railways and seaport infrastructures. Cost of internal transport of freight rises five times whilst widespread corruption in customs administration almost completely deregulates foreign trade</p>	1943	
<p>Massive inflation related to spending by foreign military stationed in Iran</p>	1944	76.3 percent of all opium unaccounted for
<p>British and Russian forces end occupation (Ansari, 2006)</p> <p>Azerbaijan and Kurdish separatist movements 'brutally' suppressed</p> <p>Iranian farmers amongst the poorest in the world due to: landlord exploitation; unproductive agri-practices and poor seeds; and state monopolies buying below market price. As access to machinery increased many landlords evicted farmers, thus increasing rural unemployment. Law requiring landlords to give farmers 15 percent of their harvest share receives minimal compliance</p>	1946	Official production ceases
	1949	UN quota system introduced giving Iran a 15 percent of global market. Production

		recommences, although domestic distribution prohibited China prohibits opium and Iran becomes largest source of illicit opium in Southeast Asia
No city has a modern water system and per capita consumption of electricity and cement was 'well below' Egypt or Turkey	Pre-1950	
US support agri-development program (including construction of irrigation dam and manufacturing plants), however, rural reform remains insufficient	1952	
British and US intelligence services supports coup that overthrows PM and strengthens Shah, who becomes increasingly dictatorial	1953	
Iran takes control of 50 percent of its oil industry and makes profit from oil for first time. Profits used to fund rural-modernization drive, however, mismanagement, inter-ministerial conflicts and corruption reduce efficiency of development Disparity between rich and poor continues to grow	1954	
Shah dismisses and does not replace elected PM	1955	Law Banning the Cultivation of Opium Poppy and Use of Opium criminalises production. Forced eradication commences
Shah's secret police (SAVAK) begin infiltrating political opponents and with 'jail, torture, or even death as the possible stakes, it is not suppressing that even underground or	1957	

exile oppositional groups were decimated ... or that ... people were increasingly hesitant about discussing politics' (Keddie, 2006:134)		
Three new oil agreements permit Iran control over 75% of profits	1958	Iran declares area under cultivation is practically nil; statement supported by foreign observers
	1959	Punishments for illicit production increased
Late-1950s economic boom beginning to slow Shah ejects elected Majles politicians and appoints his own PM. Open opposition to Shah emerges	1960	
Farmer's interaction with the state limited to monopoly procurement agents, tax collectors or military recruiters	Pre-1961	
PM and Shah dissolve Majles	1961	
Beginning of period of economic growth and internal stability (through political repression) (Ansari, 2006), for example, military kill excess of 100 protesting against arrest of Ayatollah Khomeini (for preaching against Shah) 'White Revolution': Rural land reform and modernization. While state subsidies modern agri-machinery inadequate agricultural education results in farmers procuring	1963	

unsuitable, or inappropriately using, machines. Ineffective administration, limited extension services or agri-education, limit impact of land reform on poorer farmers ⁷		
Status of Forces Convention (which protects US citizen's immunity from prosecution) causes discontent amongst Iranian nationalists. Ayatollah Khomeini exiled for preaching against Shah (Ansari, 2006)	1964	
	1968	Prohibition rescinded and farmers regulated by state monopoly. All opium produced for domestic consumption
SAVAK repression increases against opposition; increase in number of political prisoners. Commercial farms established. Farmers 'persuaded' to turn their land over to large-corporations and paid a wage, ⁸ however, increased use of machinery creates mass unemployment. Focus of farms on exports lowered food production and created a reliance on foreign imports ⁹	Late-1960s	
US begins supplying Iran with enriched uranium. France begins supply five nuclear	1974	Heroin manufactured in Tehran on an

⁷ Rey (1966:34) reported that 'agricultural output is limited by exploitative social structures, ancient techniques and the natural poverty of much of the country'.

⁸ Even before the establishment of commercial farms few peasants owned productive land. The majority was owned by landlords whereby farmers paid landlords four fifths of the crop as rent (Rey, 1966).

⁹ Commercial farms were dismantled after 1978, which may suggest they were unpopular and unprofitable (Keddie, 2006).

power plants. Canada and UK agree to train Iranian nuclear scientists (Ansari, 2006)		industrial scale
<p>Widespread opposition to the Shah. Many ‘saw as bad everything the regime said was good’ (Keddie, 2006:229). The powerful clergy are alienated. Riots, strikes and mass demonstrations lead to the deaths of 70 protestors in Qom and 500-900 protestors in Tehran. The imposition of martial law¹⁰ increases protests and strike action. Many soldiers refuse to fire into crowds and actively support protests</p>	1978	
<p>Islamic Revolution: Khomeini returns from exile. Anti-Shah militants open prisons and, attack police and military bases throughout Iran; hundreds die. The Islamic Republic of Iran is proclaimed following a referendum signed by 98 percent of the population. Some ethnic groups and leftist militants oppose new regime: all are violently defeated</p> <p>Many rural poor are loyal to the Revolutionary Government for: subsidizing housing and food; promoting education and health in villages; confiscating and redistributing property and land of former elite.¹¹ Many cultural identified with conservative clergy, opposed consumption patterns of ‘westernised’ rich and abhorred former regime (Keddie, 2006:256)</p> <p>Shari’a law codified. Judiciary controlled by Khomeinists. Purge of non-Khomeini military and bureaucracy begins. New Constitution mandates that Khomeini: has divine</p>	1979	Production and consumption increase as Shah’s repressive drug control mechanisms are dismantled

¹⁰ Public meetings of 3 or more people banned, universities and media closed.

¹¹ Foundation of the Disposed confiscated all companies, property, agricultural land and factories linked to previous regime

<p>authority and is answerable only to God; controls the army, and can disqualify Presidential candidates. Guardian Council (appointed by Khomeini) can reject Majles legislation if perceived to be incompatible with Islam or Constitution</p>		
<p>Iran-Iraq war begins</p> <p>Cultural Revolution: Vigilante groups suppress ‘non-Islamic’ ideals (i.e. music, western films, rights of women). Many universities closed and intellectuals dismissed or executed (Keddie, 2006). ‘Rehabilitation Centres’ created for prostitutes, where they received religious ‘re-education’ before being given to a suitable husband: those not ‘rehabilitated’ are publically flogged (Malarek, 1980)</p> <p>Khomeinists take complete control of all institutions except Presidency. One-third of all enterprises and labor force nationalized and economic slumps (rampant inflation, reduced price of oil and money shortages)</p> <p>Centre is unable to exert authority over peripheral areas, especially the Kurdish and Baluch regions (Babcock and Kotkin, 1980)</p>	<p>1980</p>	<p>Bill prohibits all intoxicants and mandates: forced eradication; prison sentences for farmers; communal punishments. 176-240 executed and 20,00 imprisoned for drug offences in seven weeks</p> <p>Iran and UN declare country opium-free</p>
<p>Western trained lawyers replaced by Shari’a and religious scholars. Clerical interrogators (who are also prosecution and judge) authorized to give indefinite series of 74 lashes until they obtain ‘honest answers’; which can be used as evidence in court.</p>	<p>1981</p>	

<p>Clerics also administer prisons where they torture prisoners into making public ‘confessions’,¹² (Abrahamian, 1999:139)</p> <p>Following failed coup, 2,665 are executed in six months (Keddie, 2006); a further 50 Kurdish, Baluch and Turkmen separatists are also executed (Abrahamian, 1999). Between January 1980 and June 1981 <i>at least</i> 906 people were executed for (non-counterrevolutions) ‘crimes’ (i.e. prostitution, drug possession). Methods of executions included: public stoning; shooting; and hanging (Bakhash, 1986)</p>		
<p>Khomeini and followers gradual increase their authority; often violently disposing of opponents. However, as several centres of power existed Iran never became a dictatorship, including the elected president and parliament alongside the authoritarian clergy</p>	1983	
<p>Prison conditions improve slightly after clergy agree to Majles and UN inspections (Abrahamian, 1999)</p>	1984	
<p>Excess of 12,500 ‘counterrevolutions’ killed through execution, conflict or torture (Abrahamian, 1999)</p>	1981-1985	

¹² Other forms of torture included: the crushing of fingers; deprivation of sleep; breaking limbs; cigarette burns; submission in water; threats to family; insertion of sharp objects under finger-nails; participating in mock and actual executions. Flogging the soles of the feet was the most prevalent as it was ‘officially’ sanctioned by an interpretation of Shari’a. Cells were overcrowded; some contained 35 people in a room built for 15. Suicide and psychosis were common (Abrahamian, 1999:139/169-73).

<p>Ceasefire with Iraq. War caused huge infrastructural damage, including loss of oil refineries. Per capita incomes dropped by 40 percent during War while agricultural self-sufficiency and unemployed were ‘worse than ever’ (Keddie, 2006:264)</p> <p>Five Year economic plan stresses privatization, modernisation of agricultural and infrastructural development. While productivity gradually improves (Keddie, 2006) the elite begin exploiting natural resources for personal gain, while large-scale corruption and poor long-term planning become obstacles to the development of a modern economy (Ansari, 2006)</p>	1988	Tehran Home Service and Anti-Drug Law signify resumption of anti-drugs campaign
<p>Khomeini dies leaving ‘Iran with a relatively strong government but with huge economic, social, and international problems’ (Keddie, 2006:262)</p>	1989	<i>Val Adiyat</i> campaign
<p>Country is characterized by a ‘pall of intolerance and fear’, including: torture and forced confessions; extrajudicial assassination of political opponents; indefinite pre-trial incarceration; corporal punishment, mutilation, sexual abuse and psychological torture of political prisoners and drug traffickers (HRW, 2000:n.p.; also AI, 1986).</p>	1980s	
<p>Workers riot in several large cities in opposition to increased oil prices and declining living standards; all are brutally repressed (Keddie, 2006) by military and vigilante groups (HRW, 1993)</p> <p>HRW (1993) reports that Iran has one of the worst human rights records in Middle East. Published execution statistics are likely conservative. True figure is much likely, especially in Kurdish and Baluch regions. Citizens are arbitrarily detained and prison</p>	1992	

conditions are inhumane (HRW, 1994)		
Increased conflict with Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran and two smaller separatist groups displaces at least 10,000 individuals (HRW, 1994)	1993	
Eleven die and 500 seriously injured in riots in opposition to increasing. Majles demands that military to shoot to kill (HRW, 1996) Several Kurdish leaders extra-judicially executed. Increased shelling of villages forces displacement of Kurdish civilians (HRW, 1995)	1994	
US impose oil and trade sanctions over Iran's alleged sponsorship of terrorism, nuclear ambitions and hostility to Israel Protests continue against increasing poverty; many suppressed by vigilant groups. Violence between state and Kurdish separatists continues (HRW, 1996)	1995	
	1996	Canada and US cease reporting Iranian production
Violent suppression of political opponents, protestors and minorities continue (HRW, 2000)	1997	
Protests violently suppressed by vigilantes and police. Use of corporal punishment (especially flogging) and public execution increases. Prison conditions remain poor and violate human rights standards (HRW, 2002).	2001	

All un-cited information from Keddie (2006) or Chapter 5.

Annex 1:3. Turkey

	1900 BC	Opium first cultivated in Anatolia
	1805	Opium first exported to China
	1828	State monopolises opium production
	1839	UK force end of opium monopoly system. Export to British pharmaceuticals begins.
	1858	China legalises opium imports - Turkish share of Chinese market increases
	1905	Turkey is primary sources of opium to China
<p>Treaty of Lausanne declares Turkey a sovereign state and provides much former territory independence.¹³ Assembly declares Turkey a Republic and passes new constitution.</p> <p>Ten years of near constant violent conflict have left Turkey ‘depopulated, impoverished and in ruins to a degree almost unparalleled in modern history’. Devastated rural infrastructure facilitated famine and the population of Anatolia, hardest hit by conflict, had declined by 20 percent (Zürcher, 1998:172).</p>	1923	

¹³ Treaty provided Armenia, Kurdistan, Palestine and Syria independence from Turkey

Kurdish uprising in Diyarbakir: One-third of Kurdish-Anatolia occupied by insurgent forces (Robins, 1993) protesting against the banning of the Kurdish language and forceful resettlement. The uprising ended within a year after many leaders were executed and 20,000 were forcefully resettled. Small insurgencies continued throughout the late-1920s/1930s	1925	
Abolition of tithes system and other reforms increase agricultural productivity by 90%	1923-1926	
Economy effected by world economic crises and drought	1929-30	
	1920s	Opiate manufacturing for non-medical consumption established
Kurdish revolt violently suppressed by military (Robins, 1993)	1930	Turkey is worlds primary source of licit and quasi-licit opium. High levels of diversion
Turkey officially declared a one-party state. Law allows government to close any newspaper which contradicts government policy	1931	
	1933	First national drug control laws close opiate manufacturers. Council of Ministers designate provinces permitted to produce opium. Begins crop substitution
Kurdish uprising in Dersim (Tunceli) (Zürcher, 1998) suppressed by military. Kurdish violence remains minimal until the late-1970s (Robins, 1993).	1937	

	1938	TMO created. Regulations on production remain minimal
World War Two: Turkey agrees to support France and UK against acts of aggression in Mediterranean in exchange for £16 million loan and £25 million in military credit. Good economic growth of the 1930s dropped sharply during World War Two, Turkey does not recover until 1950s	1939	
	1940	Council of Ministers cut permitted opium producers to 42
Signs treaty of friendship with Germany whilst remaining neutral	1941	
	1931-1941	Turkey one of worlds three largest producers of illicit opium
Joins UN and declares war on Germany and Japan, although takes no military action. Land Distribution Law: 99.75% of landownership consists of small farms of less than 125 acres; many own 6-12 acres and survive below the poverty line. Law distributed to poor farmers: unused state land; reclaimed land; land without clear ownership; and land expropriated from those owning excess of 125 acres	1945	
Democratic elections; massive vote-rigging and corruption	1946	
Four-fifths of workforce are employed in agriculture and 90% of exports are agricultural. However, agricultural methods are primitive and productivity is low (Erinc	1940s	

and Tuccilek, 1993) The state, including tax-collection and criminal justice institutions, had ‘became more effective and visible’, in rural areas; this provoked significant discontent (Zürcher, 1998:216)		
	Late-1940s	Turkish-Italian opiates main source of US heroin All districts close to borders prohibited from producing opium
First free and fair elections (Gunter, 1989). New Government emphasis rural development as central to economic growth	1950	
Joins NATO	1952	
Period of economic growth supported by increased agricultural production and liberalization of trade policies (Cecen <i>et al.</i> , 1994). ¹⁴ Rural living conditions unaffected by economic growth. For example, while electricity production had increased ten fold between 1923-43, in 1953 just 0.025 percent of 40,000 villages possessed electricity	1947-1953	

¹⁴ Cheap credit was provided to farmers and the TMO paid artificially high prices for agricultural produce. Rural development resulted in: an increase in the number of tractors operating from 1,750 (1948) to over 30,000 (1952); an increase in arable land from 14.5 million (1948) to 22.5 million (1956) hectares; construction of 5,400km of hard-surfaced roads; a 102,000 increases in imported cars and trucks. Additionally, excellent weather condition yielded good harvests which added to a national growth rate of 11-13 percent (Zürcher, 1998:235).

As agricultural practices failed to improve and rural tax collection remained minimal by 1954, the agri-boom was over and economic growth fell from 14% to 4%	1954	
	1955	Iranian opium ban may have motivated increased diversion
State control of media increases; political meetings prohibited except during election campaigns	1956	
Receive \$359million in aid from IMF	1958	
Riots in Istanbul and Ankara universities suppressed by military. Army coup removes elected – although oppressive (Gunter, 1989) - government ¹⁵ to ‘prevent fratricide’ (Zürcher, 1998:252)	1960	
Constitution accepted by referendum and includes full bill of civil liberties. Checks and balances established by creating dual house legislative and allowing independent judiciary (including constitutional court) full media and academic freedom. However, new Government is unstable and three coalition’s are formed in year (Karpat, 1964)	1961	Council of Ministers cut permitted producers to 35 US declare that 70% of its illicit heroin sourced from Turkey. Turkey does not refute allegation
	1962	Council of Ministers cut permitted producers to 25
Military colonel executed for failed coup (Karpat, 1964)	1963	

¹⁵ Fifteen politicians were executed and 31 sentenced to life imprisonment

Becomes associate member of European Community	1964	Council of Ministers cut permitted producers to 16
	1966	Iran declare that 25% of its illicit opium sourced from Turkey
	Mid-1960s	US declare that 60% of its illicit heroin sourced from Turkey
‘Sluggish’ economic growth, especially in agriculture (Cecen <i>et al.</i> , 1994)	1955-1965	
Left-wing and right-wing, militants begin campaigns which include: violent protests; bombings; kidnappings; and robberies	1968	Council of Ministers cut permitted producers to 11. Production prohibited in border provinces
	1969	Council of Ministers cut permitted producers to 9
Between 1963-68 economy growth averages 6.4 percent and ‘per capita national income... is relatively high’ (FCO, 1969:3) resulting in income increase averaging 20 percent (Zürcher, 1998). Largest growths in manufacturing and construction; agriculture grew by just 1.9 percent. Agricultural practices remain ‘backward’ in Anatolia and Eastern Turkey whilst developing at a ‘satisfactory rate’ in coastal areas. Large-scale irrigation projects have begun to rectify insufficient irrigation (FCO, 1969:1)	1960s	TMO procurement policy improved to prevent diversion
Armenian terrorism emerged in the 1970s. The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberating of Armenia attacked Turkish diplomats and civilians in foreign countries. It was	Early-1970s	

partly funded by revenue from illicit drugs trafficking		
<p>Demirel resigns from cabinet in February and returns in March with small majority, this adds to political instability. As student and trade union protests become more frequent, marshal law is passed in Istanbul (Sarell, 1970)</p> <p>The state continues to be reliant on foreign aid (especially World Bank, Germany, UK and Japan). Reliance on US is reduced as Turkey moves closer to Europe (Sorrell, 1970).</p>	1970	Council of Ministers cut permitted producers to seven
<p>Political violence increases. Military demand that a new government be formed to ‘end the anarchy’. Demirel resigns and is replace by military with Erim (Zürcher, 1998:273), hence, new government accountable more to the military than the public (Robbins, 2007)</p> <p>Martial law declared in 11 provinces (including all large cities) and military arrest 5,000 suspected terrorist and non-violent left-wingers. Widespread reports of torture (Sayari and Hoffman, 1991; Sorrell, 1971)</p> <p>Economy prospers due to good harvest and remittance from Turkish workers abroad (Sorrell, 1971)</p>	1971	Opium farmers licensed. Unregulated possession criminalised
<p>Constitution altered to limit civil liberties, press, academic and constitutional courts freedom</p> <p>Central Government ‘reaches down into Turkish society’ and, while bureaucracy is inefficient and slow, the local army, police and gendarmerie ‘enjoy wide authority’ (FCO, 1972:2)</p>	1972	Opium ban. Turkey receives US\$15million in aid. Crop substitution begins Opium-free
Ecevit elected to coalition government by rural votes (FCO, 1972). Urban terrorism	1973	

resumes (Sayari and Hoffman, 1991) and rising unemployment facilitates large-scale economic migration to Europe		
Invades northern Cyprus, US imposes trade embargo	1974	Ban is repealed due to public pressure and seven provinces permitted to produce opium straw. INCB impressed with controls
Good harvest adds to continued improvements in rural conditions. Overall economic growth of 7-9%, although unemployment increased (Lane, 1975) ‘Turkish political life continues to contain a traditional element of violence’. However, violence does not threaten stability. Corruption, while widespread in society and politics, is minimal in military due to intense patriotism (Fullerton, 1975:3)	1975	US admit controls are ‘remarkable effective’
Urban terrorism continues to increase (Sayari and Hoffman, 1991) Period of economic growth ends as oil crises drives Turkey into deep recession (Cecen <i>et al.</i> , 1994)	1976	
Balance of payments in ‘acute crises’ (Dodson, 1977:3) and unemployment at 15 percent; rural areas are hardest hit due to poor harvest (FCO, 1977). Terrorist attacks kill 230 (Gunter, 1989)	1977	
US trade embargo lifted. Kurdish Workers Party established and ‘Grey Wolves’ kill 100 individuals: martial law in 13, later extended to 20, provinces	1978	
Urban terrorism escalates bringing ‘Turkey to the brink of large-scale social strife.... the work of a staggering number of terrorist organizations that included, in addition to the	1979	

Marxists, the ultra-rightists and the Kurdish separatists' (Sayari and Hoffman, 1991:10). Between 1,200-1,500 were killed by militants who seize control of entire urban areas (Gunter, 1989).		
Turkey is characterised by 'an escalating tide of anarchy and terrorism.... and a sinking economy that saw crippling shortages of important consumer items, raging inflation, and rising unemployment' (Gunter, 1989:65). Terrorist attacks resulted in the death of 4,500 between 1976-1980 (Sayari and Hoffman, 1991)	Late- 1970s	
Military coup establishes the tenth governments since 1971 (the second imposed by the military) (Gunter, 1989). Martial law is imposed and repressive military campaign against Kurdish population begins (Robins, 1993)	1980	
Military arrests 122,600 militants and leftist supporters; torture is widespread. However, terrorist attacks decline by 90%	1981	18/20 Rule established
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) launches insurgency in southeast	1984	
HRW (1989) reports that police torture 50 percent of civil criminals and 90 percent of political prisoners: those involved in crime expect to be tortured (Gunter, 1989)	1989	
While south-east has always been the poorest part of Turkey with little social welfare and significantly lower per capita income the situation was aggravated in the 1980s when economic boom bypassed rural Anatolia; especially the Kurdish south-east. During the 1990s: per capita income was less than half of national average; unemployment was double the national average; and only 18 percent of children receive a basic education	1980s 1990s	

(Robbins, 1993). Torture, nationally widespread, was more pronounced in southeast (HRW, 1990)		
HWR (1992:n.p.) report a further deterioration of human rights: ‘more people died in detention under suspicious circumstances... more people were shot and killed by security forces in raids on houses, attacks on demonstrations and other suspicious circumstances. Torture continued to be rampant’	1991	

All un-cited information from Zürcher (1998) or Chapter 6.

Annex 1:4. Thailand

	1282	Opium introduced to Siam
	1360	Opium consumption and trade prohibited
	1851	Opium smoking legalised for Chinese migrants
	1908	Opium monopoly established (supplied by India)
	1921	Opium consumption prohibited
	1929	Opium production criminalised. Forced eradication
	1932	Opium monopoly resumes distribution; production remains prohibited

	1938	Chiang Rai opium farmers licensed
Siam renamed Thailand (BBC, 2010)	1939	
Military coup (BBC, 2010).	1947	All opium production prohibited (highland production tolerated)
	1949	All opium production licenses revoked
Highland's remain almost completely outside of Thai administration (Kammerer, 1988)	Pre-1950s	
BPP begin operating in Northern highlands to counter potential Communist infiltration (Marks, 1973); includes extending Thai education (Kammerer, 1988)	1955	
Good economic progress promotes political stability. Communist insurgency increases with 30 people a month being assassinated on average (Darling, 1967)	1956-7	
Programme to resettle highland peoples is unpopular as new villages are under-developed (Marks, 1973; Kemmere, 1988)	1959	Production, trade and consumption prohibited (highland production tolerated). End of semi-official state support
Highland development included in <i>National Master Plan for Economic Development</i> (1961-1965) (Jinawat, 2001). Small-scale highland development administered through 'Mobile Development Stations' (Nuechterlein, 1967)	1960	
Communists begin extensive highland recruiting programme (Marks, 1973)	1963	
	1964	Five-Year Plan emphasizes crop substitution

Survey of highland socio-economic conditions conducted (Chareonpanich, 1987)	1965	
<p>On average one person a day is assassinated by Thai Communists (Darling, 1967). In the first major conflicts between Thai forces and highland Communists the Thai military use artillery and napalm to destroy villages: decimating the highland economies. Plans are formulated to resettle 55,000 highlanders (Gua, 1975; Marks, 1975). More extensive rural development programme begins with extension of new/improved crops and advise from agricultural experts (Neuchterein, 1967).</p> <p>Thailand is in a good position to deal with the insurgent threat as it has: been unified under a strong government who have posses authority throughout the state for eight years; increased the number of police and military stationed in the Northeast; a average economic growth of 7%; and the ‘most experienced and efficient civil service in Southeast Asia’. With the exception of northern highlands transport, social services and education development are the priority (Neuchterein, 1967:126)</p> <p>Corruption is high and represents a ‘modest threat’ to stability (Darling, 1967:123)</p>	1967	
At least 100 highland villages attacked with artillery and napalm (Kammerer,1988). Resettlement continues (Gua, 1975)	1969	Royal Project commences
	1960s	Forced eradication centred upon military attacks and forced resettlement. However, increasingly perceived as counterproductive
Country is ‘stable and united’. Economy is healthy and has been ‘booming for ten years’	Late-	Policy of highland integration begins. Road

<p>There is no famine or ‘grinding poverty’ and ‘by and large the masses are well fed’ . However, corruption ‘is a national past time’ and police are ‘petty tyrants’ (Pritchard, 1970:3; also FCO, 1973; Watts, 1970). There is considerable investment in large- infrastructural developments (i.e. roads and electricity) (Watts, 1970), including the first road built through the highlands (Kammerer, 1988).</p> <p>While the majority of opium farmers ‘appear to have more than enough to eat’, the average highlander income is significantly below the national average (UN, 1969:10)</p>	1960s	construction is an early priority
<p>Field-Marshal Thanon (PM) declares marshal law, abolishes Cabinet, Parliament and Constitution (Mare, 1972)</p>	1971	Doi Suthep crop substitution research centre established (Kuzmarov, 2008)
<p>Corruption is high ‘even for Tai standards’ . Economy and security situation deteriorate; (Mare, 1972:2): 60 Thai military are killed and 200 injuries in insurgency (Marks, 1973)</p>	1972	CRCDP commences
<p>Hundreds killed during aerial bombing of highland Hmong villages (Gua, 1975). Highlanders lack modern medicine and medical care which, coupled with malnutrition and poor sanitation, ‘create an almost constant environment of disease and death’ (Roth, 1974:6)</p> <p>Coup ‘by popular protest’ (Chapman, 1974:n.p.) removes military Government. Free elections elect new government (BBC, 2010) who enacts policies against official corruption; which reduces the crime rate by one-third by 1976 (Darling, 1978)</p>	1973	US ‘War on Drugs’ ignites interdiction campaign
<p>Rural protests over lack of developmental assistance and corruption force agricultural reforms (FCO, 1975) including improved access to: superior fertiliser; bank credit;</p>	1974	

increased minimum prices; and land redistribution to tenants if landlord is unable to develop land. The area under cultivation and yield increase. Agricultural methods had previously been primitive and stagnated productivity (Barclays Bank, 1976).		
Highland insurgency continues, however, government is committed to containing insurgency through rural development rather than conflict (Cole, 1975)	Early/mid 1970s	Increased access to modern agricultural techniques increases opium yields. Local police and national military facilitate production
	Mid- 1970s	Opium yields fall due to adverse weather conditions Highland development becomes national objective
Communist insurgent number annually increase by 4 percent to 9,000. Insurgency is 'small but a nuisance' (Darling, 1978:153).	1977	
Military action against insurgents is now limited to defending roads against attack (Sharland, 1978)	1978	
	1979	HAMP commences First aerial surveys of opium cultivation
	Late- 1970s	All highland areas are open to DOA and law enforcement
	1980	Minimal voluntary eradication. Military attack Shan United Army

		Improved weather conditions increase yields and increase heroin manufacturing
	1981	TG-HDP commences
	1982	DOA designated most appropriate means of opium suppression
Mass defections have reduced the Communist Party threat while the economy performed well 'compared to rest of world economies' (Punyaratabandhu-Bhukdi, 1984:191)	1983	Forced and negotiated eradication increase Third Army development projects commences
	1985	TNCA-HDP begins All major trafficking groups/ manufacturers have been expelled from Thailand
Economy very good. Strong expansion in nearly every sector, including agriculture, although tourism and manufacturing are strongest sectors. There is extensive foreign private investment. (Niksch, 1989)	1988	
Thailand is only net exporter of agricultural produce in Asia (Potulski, 1991)	Late-1980s	
Road density in Northern Highlands at 0.122km/sq.feet against national average of 0.146km/sq.feet. This represents the opening of the highlands (Lee, 1994)	Early-1990s	
HRW (1993-1999) reports of abuses are limited to treatment of refugees – there is no	1990s	

<p>evidence of the systematic abuse of highland peoples</p> <p>Corruption is low within the ONCB, Narcotics Suppression Bureau and Third Army (INCRS, 1993, 2001)</p> <p>National economic growth accelerates demand for highland produce and improves transport infrastructure (Hau, 2002; Renard, 2001). Highland attract significant private development, especially for tourism (Fox, 2009)</p>		
<p>Military coup (17th since 1932) overthrows democratically elected Government (HRW, 1993)</p>	1991	
<p>One-hundred die or disappear as military suppress protest against coup. Military resign and elections are held (Bunbongkarn, 1993)</p>	1992	
<p>Economic growth continues to improve. While electrics and industrial materials are the largest growing export good, 60 percent work in agriculture where growth is lowest. In short, the gap between rich and poor has widened (Snitwongse, 1995)</p>	1994	Opium-free
<p>Government resigns over allegations of corruption. Elections are criticised for large-scale vote buying). Economic growth slows (King, 1997)</p>	1996	
<p>Thai politics remains highly corrupt: public funds are diverted or contracts sold in order to finance vote buying (Bowornwathana, 2000)</p>	1997	
<p>Economic recovery begins (Bowornwathana, 2000)</p>	1999	
<p>Extensive vote-buying during national elections (Montesano, 2001).</p>	2000	

	2002	Declared Poppy Free by UN
'War on Drugs' (methamphetamine not opium) results in massive human rights abuses (see Vongchak <i>et al.</i> , 2005).	2003	Declassified by UNODC as 'other Asian countries'

All un-cited information from Chapter 7.

Annex 1:5. Pakistan

British fail to subjugate tribes of NWFP/FATA and enter into series of treaties agreeing to tribal autonomy in exchange for loyalty to British Empire (Embree, 1977; Keppel, 1911)	>1849	
	Pre-1947	Consumers supplied from Afghanistan and India. Minimal NWFP/FATA production
India/Pakistan partitioned. Hundreds of thousands die in widespread communal violence, millions made homeless	1947	Small-scale licit opium poppy cultivation
	1949	Experimental opium farms established
Following assassination of PM 'national politics entered a chaotic period during which the bureaucrats were increasingly transformed from the states servants to its masters' (Talbot, 2009:139)	1951	
Governor-General dismisses PM and Constitutional Assembly and imposes martial law	1953/4	
	1955	End of Indian opium supply Opium monopoly established. Farmers

		licensed
	1956	Licit production begins in NWFP
Military removes President. Coup resulted from growing industrial unrest fuelled by inflation the militaries desire to maintain marshal law, which was due to be repelled	1958	
Martial law repelled	1960	
Second Indo-Pak War over Kashmir	1965	
	1967	Dangerous Drugs (Import, Export and transhipment) Rules passed
Students, lawyers and organised labour - supported by former foreign minister Bhutto - stage violent protest; hundreds die in clashes with police (ICG, 2008). Bhutto arrested for assassination attempt on President in Peshawar	1968	
Violence increases in some Eastern Pakistan (now Bangladesh) towns. President releases Bhutto, removes three year state of emergency and resigns after inviting Army Chief of Staff to be President. Fundamental Rights imposed in 1963 Constitution are suspended, civil courts are barred from challenging military courts and civil cabinet becomes subservient to military	1969	
Since 1958, 'rapid strides' made in manufacturing. While economic growth averaged 5.5 percent annually, as wealth was situated in the hands of the minority, prices rises (especially manufactured goods and food) increased the number of impoverished people	1960s	Foreign and domestic demand inflates illicit production and diversion from regulated production

from 8.65 to 9.33 million (Talbot, 2009:171)		
First national elections based on universal suffrage. Martial law remains	1970	
Attempts by East Pakistan to secede lead to civil war. India intervenes on side of East Pakistan which eventually realises independence as Bangladesh. Conflict forces President to step down and severally diminishes military resources	1971	Monopoly control loosened
Basic industries (i.e. metal production, motor vehicles and agri-machinery, cement and public utilities) and education are nationalised	1972	
Tribal uprising in Baluchistan is violently suppressed by 80,000 troops; 9,000 die in conflict. PM claims military 'overrode' his plans in order to 'spread their tentacles throughout Baluchistan' (Talbot, 2009:226)	1973	PNCB formed.
US arms embargo lifted while dependence on Chinese arms increases. Arms race with India creates budget deficit and reduces resources for social goods	1975	First heroin and morphine laboratories reported
Baluchistan tribal insurrection ends Major programme of electrification and transport infrastructural development begins	1976	Buner project commences
Riots erupt over allegations of vote-rigging (which had been part of all previous elections) and result in imposition of martial law in Karachi and Lahore, followed by bloodless military coup Agri-manufacturing is denationalised	1977	
Pakistan becomes US ally after Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Iranian Revolution Political parties and meetings banned. Torture of political opponents is widespread	1979	Peak of production creates opium surplus Hadd Ordinance: NWFP ban enforced through

(Gustafson and Richter, 1980) Shari'a laws (Hadd Ordinances) prohibit adultery, theft, false witness and intoxication ¹⁶ whilst imposing punishments including death by stoning and flogging		extensive surveillance, eradication and law enforcement. Production ceases in settled areas Domestic consumption increases
Economy doing well. Highest ever recorded grain output	1980	
Thousands of political opponents arrested; many are flogged. Civil courts are banned from reviewing decisions of military courts, which are described as 'rough but efficient' (Weinbaum and Cohen, 1983:126) Under the Special Development Plan for Tribal Areas physical infrastructures are extended to remote areas (Khan, 1991)	1982	Buner Opium-Free MDP commences
Imposition of Hadd Ordinances factors in sectarian violence in Sind resulting in: 1,999 arrests; 189 deaths; and 126 injuries.	1983	SDEP commences and mainstreams DOA projects with general rural development GAAD commences Hadd Order (Amended) increases punishments for manufacture and distribution State narcotics laws extended to FATA
	1984	Campaign against heroin refiners begins
Martial law and ban on political parties lifted	1985	DDP commences

¹⁶ The Hadd Ordinances did not deter crime, if 'anything they encouraged the brutalisation of society' (Talbot, 2009:277). As of 1988 no Hadd punishment was officially sentenced as Supreme or Federal Courts tended to overturn Shari'a courts (Kennedy, 1988).

		Minimal forced eradication campaign in NWFP Malakand Opium-Free
<p>Violent conflicts in Pashtun areas of Karachi may have been orchestrated by drug traffickers and land developers. There are extensive protests in NWFP and Baluchistan over: Kalabagh dam; Baluch resentment against Pashtun settlers; Afghan refugees in NWFP;¹⁷ and the right to produce opium. The military suppress all disturbances (Hollen, 1987; Talbot, 2009)</p> <p>A survey found that: a literacy level in rural areas of 20 percent; less than 30 percent have access to clean drinking water or health facilities; incidence of malnutrition are high (Williams and Rudel, 1988)</p>	1986	Two military officers are arrested for heroin trafficking; both escaped from jail
	1987	Forced eradication increases. Violent resistance shifts sequencing policy. Aerial eradication first used Gadoon-Amazai Opium-Free Interdiction shifts heroin laboratories from NWFP to FATA

¹⁷ Since 1973 four million Afghan refugees had entered Pakistan (Cheema, 1988)

<p>Soviet Union leave Afghanistan. Since 1979 excess of 4,000 were killed in Pakistan by terrorist attacks engineered by Soviet/Afghan secret services. The use of the ISI in the Afghan conflict ‘destabilised Pakistan’s fragile democracy through its unchecked interventions, unaccounted for funds and.. rivalry with other intelligence-gathering agencies’ (Talbot, 2009:269).</p>	<p>1988</p>	<p>Increased external pressure on Pakistan to control opiates trade. Government begins disengaging from the trade KDAD commences</p>
<p>Whilst inspiring to be an Islamic ‘ideological state’ the government is ‘authoritarian’ (Talbot, 2009:245) and the police, who are subservient to the military, are used primarily to suppress political opposition (ICG, 2008)</p> <p>Pashtun and Baloch political opposition to the centre was ‘muted during the Zia era’. Cooperation was gained through releasing 9,000 Baloch prisoners while Pashtun’s were brought into the political elite (through military involvement). Pashtun NWFP/FATA areas received ‘considerable economic development’ (Talbot, 2009:252)</p>	<p>1977-1988</p>	
<p>Governor of NWFP is arrested for murder and suspected of drug trafficking (Ali, 1989)</p> <p>Government attempts to exert civilian control over ISI, however, replacement of leaders is boycotted by ISI</p>	<p>1989</p>	<p>FATA Development Project commences</p>
<p>Throughout-1980s a ‘Kalashnikov culture’ emerged in major cities, fuelled by imports of modern weaponry and drugs from the Afghan frontier (Talbot, 2009:41)</p>	<p>1980s</p>	
<p>1990s economic crises, founded upon structural weaknesses, including: weak tax-base; low savings rates; lack of export diversification; underdevelopment of human capital; and low agricultural productivity.</p>	<p>1990s</p>	

<p>PM dismissed by President on incompetence and corruption charges. Mass vote-rigging in national elections</p> <p>Pressler Amendment: US suspends aid worth US\$564 million in protest at nuclear ambitions (counter-narcotics aid continues)</p>	1990	
<p>Economic liberalisation programme commences; privatisation process is limited by corruption</p> <p>Hundreds are arrested, some are tortured, in campaign against opposition political party. The rape of a friend of the opposition leader sparks mass protests: police baton charged protestors</p>	1991	
<p>Pak-US relations at all time low. Pakistan is placed on list of potential terrorist state for six months and trade sanctions are imposed. Pakistan begins crackdown on Islamist militant groups; including client groups in Afghanistan</p>	1992	
<p>President and PM resign under pressure from military. Newly elected government projects international image of assisting West in campaigns against drugs and terrorism</p> <p>Crime rate is high; 3,300 murders and 4,500 abductions is reported in Punjab alone</p> <p>HRW (1993) report that torture and death in police custody occurred throughout Pakistan; many officers tortured individuals to extract bribes</p>	1993	
<p>Militant groups demand imposition of Shari'a law in Mardan (NWFP). Frontier Corps suppress armed Islamist insurrection before enacting Shari'a. Reports surface that drug traffickers facilitated the insurrection. A conflict between political parties in Karachi laves</p>	1994	

500 dead Torture in police custody is endemic and includes the crushing of testicles and sexual abuse (HRW, 1995)		
Transparency International rank Pakistan the second most corrupt state on earth Police and quasi-military Rangers indiscriminately shoot into crowds as violence increases in Karachi. Protestors are arbitrarily arrested and detained, many are tortured (HRW, 1996)	1995	Law enforcement against manufacturers increases Ordinance No.XLVII prohibits cultivation
Violence between students in Upper Kurram Valley leaves 100 dead PM dismissed by President on corruption charges. Opponent (and brother) of new PM is assassinated; the police officer who witnessed the shooting commits suicide a week later	1996	
Violence in Karachi leaves 400 dead (HRW, 1998).	1997	End of heroin manufacturing in Pakistan
‘Grandiose’ infrastructural developments exuberate foreign debt crisis and deepen recession (Talbot, 2009:309)	1997-1999	
Pakistan conducts nuclear tests whilst incidence of poverty and economic inequality increase Torture in police custody is endemic. Widespread rioting after the death of a 14 year-old in police custody in Mansehra (NWFP) leaves 100 injured (HRW, 2000)	1998	Dir Opium-Free Ordinance No.XLVII extended to NWFP
Former PM convicted of corruption while current PM is overthrown by military coup Excess of 1,000 killed during clash with India in Kargil (Indian-held Kashmir) 4,000 ‘ghost schools’ and numerous ‘ghost health-centres’ costing the state Rs.1.4	1999	Opium-free

<p>billion annually are identified by a survey into official corruption</p> <p>Torture in police custody and prisons is endemic. In NWFP the beating of a 13 year old prisoner for complaining of sexual abuse ignites rioting: 20 children are injured (HRW, 2000)</p>		
<p>Parliament dissolved by bloodless military coup</p> <p>Afghan invasion: US lifts sanctions imposed after Pakistan's nuclear tests and Canada and Europe provide financial aid (Talbot, 2009). Taliban and Al Qaeda take refuge in NWFP and FATA (ICG, 2006). Protests against Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan ignite protests in Baluchistan (HRW, 2002). President bans two Islamic militant groups and takes steps to curb religious extremism</p>	2001	Declared 'Poppy free' by UNODC
<p>Unconstitutional and possible corrupt (HRW, 2003) referendum keeps President in power</p> <p>National military stationed in FATA for first time since partition to reduce authority of Political Agent's (Nawaz <i>et al.</i>, 2009)</p>	2002	
<p>Sectarian violence in Karachi leaves 17 dead and 40 injured. Attempt to assassinate PM fails</p> <p>Military operations against Taliban begin in Waziristan (ICG, 2006)</p>	2004	
<p>Dozen are killed in a suicide bomb targeting the former PM, who is later assassinated</p> <p>Intensified conflict with far-right Islamist militants in NWFP, FATA and Baluchistan. Violence in Swat displaces 4,500 (Tellis, 2008)</p>	2007	

Parliamentary elections. President resigns after coalition government launch impeachment proceedings	2008	Insurgency limits capacity to eradicate opium poppies
‘Swat Taliban’ seize control of Buner (Dawn, 2009) and displaces 1.7 million (Rummery and Caux, 2009)	2009	
‘Pakistan can be best typified as a populous, rapidly growing middle income country in which agriculture [whilst remaining important] is losing its predominance... However, social welfare had lagged behind economic growth, bringing with it marked rural-urban and general disparities’ (Talbot, 2009:23).		

All un-cited information from Talbot (2009) or Chapter 8.

Annex 1:6. Laos

First Hmong migrations from China	1820-40	
Becomes French protectorate	1893	
	1899	Opium monopoly established
	1905	Monopoly procure domestic opium.
	1907	Monopoly increase opium procurement drive
	1908	
	1914	Uprising in Northern Laos in response to French interdiction of illicitly imported

		Chinese opium
	1918-25	Unsuccessful endeavour by monopoly to control highland production
	1938	Inability of foreign suppliers to reach monopoly stimulates domestic production. State has minimal control over production
French reoccupation of newly independent Laos prompts first Indochina War	1946	Opium consumption and production prohibited. Unofficial toleration of highland opium
Gains 'independence' as part of French Union	1949	Opium production prohibited in China
	1950	Monopoly closed. French intelligence agencies operate unofficial monopoly supplied from highlands
Viet Nam invades Laos	1953	
First Indochina War ends with Laos gaining full independence as a monarchy. Civil war breaks between monarchists and Pathet Lao	1954	
	1955	Opium production prohibited in Iran. India ceases exporting opium for non-medical/scientific purpose.

Lowland government neglects highland peoples and are ignorant of highland cultures. Northern Laos possess less than 50 miles of dirt-surfaced road (Holiday, 1957)	1957	
Attempted military coup forces governments resignation and prompts Second Indochina War	1959	First report of significant opium production
Political violence follows attempted assassination of Foreign Minister	1962/63	
Attempted military coup. Pathet Lao take Plain of Jars and US begin aerial bombing campaign against Pathet Lao	1964	
Conflict between police and military over control of drugs, gambling, prostitution and gold smuggling forces Royal Lao military general into exile. Generals divide control of illicit activities amongst themselves	1965	First heroin laboratories discovered
Lao Air Force bomb Lao Army headquarters in dispute over control of opium trade	1966	
US bombing of Laos internally displaces 20,000 and forces many to take refuge in caves and forests	1968	Displacement of opium farmers by military bombardment reduces production
British FO report states: 'Laos is poorest and most backward of the former French Indochina states – French left little infrastructure, communications are poor, education system rudimentary, and administration inefficient' (Rai, 1970)	1960s	
	1971	Consumption prohibited. Unofficial toleration of highland production continues amidst limited resettlement and crop substitution projects and forced eradication

Cease fire ends Second Indochina War. Coalition government formed with Lao Peoples Revolutionary Party (formerly Pathet Lao).	1973	Opium production prohibited in Turkey. Increased opium production for export to US and later Australia and Europe.
During War over two million tonne of bombs are dropped by the US on Laos; damaging or destroying 3,500 villages and killing 200,000. A quarter of all Laotians are internally displaced	1959-1973	
Lao Peoples Democratic Republic formed. Royal Lao Army instructed not to resist invasion by Lao Peoples Revolutionary Party. King abdicates whilst migration of Royal Lao politicians, military leaders, many Hmong peoples, and the most educated reduces government efficiency. ¹⁸ Most of countries wealth also migrates Purges: Between 10-20,000 individuals perceived as opponents to the regime are imprisoned in re-education/forced labour camps (Brown and Zasloff, 1980)	1975	
Transport, oil and distribution of goods nationalised. All people must attend public meetings to hear propaganda ¹⁹ while controls on movement are imposed	1976	Resolution No. 3: Farmers sanctioned to produce opium for sale to monopoly
Government appeals to UN to help with 100,000ton rice shortfall Hmong uprising: After insurgents attack highland outposts, the Government and	1977	

¹⁸ An estimated 10 percent of the population of Laos eventually migrated due to ‘insecurity and fear... discrimination, or to escape deteriorating living standards’ (Stuart-Fox, 2006:168).

¹⁹ Meetings were unpopular as people feared being singled out for ‘failing to endorse the new policies with sufficient enthusiasm’ (Stuart-Fox, 1997:173).

Vietnamese troops kill hundreds ‘perhaps thousands’ through artillery, airstrikes (Stuart-Fox, 1997:177) and possible chemical weapons (Brown and Zasloff, 1980; Lee, 2000)		
Military attack Hmong villages opposing forced resettlement (Brown and Zasloff, 1979)	1978	
In response to collapse of rice production (due to collectivisation of farmland) (ADB, 2005) more liberal agricultural economic policy are enacted. Free market in non-commercial agricultural crops are permitted and low agricultural taxes are introduced. The state rice monopoly set-price is increased to near market value (Stuart-Fox, 1997). The military are mandated with agricultural and infrastructural development whilst possessing rights to exploit timber reserves and some farmland; this develops system of nepotism (Stuart-Fox, 2006)	1979	
Hmong insurgents remain active but present little threat to stability (Bedlington, 1982) Government is ‘weak in both leadership and infrastructure’. Mismanagement, corruption and closing of Thai-Laos border have weakened economy. Agriculture remains unproductive (Bedlington, 1981:102) and exports (coffee and opium to socialist states and timber and electricity to Thailand) amount to less than value of imports. While dependent on foreign aid the lack of skilled personal and inefficient bureaucracy results in ineffective spending of aid	1980	
Insurgents attack development projects and government installations, killing one World Bank employee. Vietnamese troops are used in counter-insurgency efforts	1984	
The highlands are wholly ignored by development work and is thus less-developed than	Mid-	

the lowlands where: the average income (US\$98 per annum) and rice yields are amongst the lowest in the world; industrial output is significantly below the average for a 'least-developed country'; the transport infrastructure is insufficient. Taxation revenue is limited by the large black market (Stuart-Fox, 1997; see Thayer, 1984).	1980s	
First nationwide census is possible after country is unified under one administration (Donmen, 1986)	1985	Resolution No. 7: Opium declared a primary commodity
New Economic Mechanisms: Principles of market economy introduced by Government	1986	
Drought and decrease in electricity production brings economic downturn Second Five-Year Plan targets improving productivity of cash crops: 10% of government spending goes to agri-development and one-fifth to infrastructural development (Joiner, 1988)	1987	INCB visit
Decentralisation of economy; state farm-land is distributed to families for private use. Laos opens-up or strengthens diplomatic ties with western nations	1988	
Receives loan from ADB (2005) for rural development	1989	PADP and HCSP commence
Relationships with China and Thailand improve	1990	Penal Code Article 135 prohibits possession of opium
Agricultural reform remains the basis of the Third Five-Year Plan, however, Laos exhibits 40,000mt rice deficit. US firm, Hunt Oil, begin exploration for oil in South Laos (Gunn, 1991). However, foreign investors are limited by lack of transport and communications infrastructure. There are few usable roads (the provincial capital of	1991	US Anti-Narcotics Committee begin building 51km road through Houaphan province

Phongsaly is unreachable by road), no railway and air-travel is ‘an adventure’ (Johnson, 1992:85, 1993). It lacks an educated workforce and the insurgency threatens economic growth. It is the ‘most backward of the centrally planned states’ (Gunn, 1991:93) Protests by 1,500 highlanders lead to 40 deaths (Gunn, 1991)		
Australia builds bridge across Mekong into Thailand (Johnson, 1992) and ADB (2005) provide loan for rural development	1992	GoL/UNDP socio-economic survey XKHDP and NADPP commence
Study finds that the northern provinces are the poorest and the GDP of the three poorest (Phongsaly, Luang Namtha and Houaphan) is 60% lower than national average. In Phongsaly/Luang Namtha indicators included: infant mortality of 94/119 per 1,000; 3.1/8.5% electricity use; 0.4 /5.1% had access to safe drinking water (Bourdet, 1998)	1993	LADP begins
Heads of companies constructing roads and irrigation projects sentenced to long sentences for corruption and bribery (Donmen, 1995)	1994	Comprehensive Drug Control Program for Lao PDR specifies gradual approach Penal Code amended to prohibit opium production Resettlement begins
‘Structural adjustment’, supported by ADB, IMF, World Bank, and UN provides increased revenue collection and more effective monetary policy (ADB, 2005)	1990-94	
Urban wealth has increased as the rural economy has stagnated due to low agricultural productivity From the mid-1980s 35-45% of capital expenditure goes to road building; which remain	Mid-1990s	

basic (Bourdet, 1996)		
Political commitment to economic liberalisation weakens and structural change slows (ADB, 2005).	1995	Green Anti-Drug Project commences
US lifts aid embargo (Bourdet, 2001) Security forces have abused detainees and suspects: police arbitrarily arrest and detain suspects' whilst intrusive surveillance is the norm. Prison conditions are below international standards (US State Department, 1999)	1999	
From early-1990s percentage of people living in poverty decreased from 24% to 12% in Vientiane and from 58% to 53% in northern provinces; in Oudomaxy and Houaphan three out of four people live in poverty. The economic reforms introduced in the 1990s widened the poverty gap between the central and northern provinces (Bourdetm, 2001)	1990s	
The GoL invests 'heavily and imprudently' in large-scale irrigation systems, the cost of which is increased by inflation (ADB, 2005:7) rates of 128% (Bourdet, 2001)	1997- 1999	
Political situation is unstable after a series of bombings in capital (Bourdet, 2001, 2002) and a number of small-scale attacks on travellers in North/North-Central. In response, police burn highland villages, and beat villagers. In general, in urban and rural areas militia, workplace and neighbourhood committees conduct intrusive surveillance for the police. Police coercive compliance through threat of custodial sentences and long-periods of pre-trial detention. Prison conditions are cruel and inhumane: prisoners are placed in wooden stocks and hand manacles; medical facilities are poor (US State Department,	2000	LGDCP commences

<p>2000).</p> <p>Poor and slow decision making increases damage of Asian Economic crises (Bourdet, 2001, 2002).</p>		
<p>WFP launches three-year initiative to feed 70,000 malnourished children; country is still recovering from economic crises of 1997-1999 (BBC, 2010)</p> <p>Torture of suspected insurgents whilst in police custody is common (US State Department, 2001)</p>	2001	<p>Decree 14 orders opium-free by 2006. The Balanced Approach to Opium Elimination mandates ‘accelerated rural development’</p> <p>Amended Penal Code criminalises opium production</p>
<p>Hmong insurgents attacks several civilian and military targets. Militia and Committees remain responsible for surveillance and maintaining public order (US State Department, 2002)</p> <p>Percentage surviving below the poverty line is reduced from 45% (1993) to 33% (ADB, 2005)</p>	2002	<p>Death sentence for possession of over 500 grams of heroin imposed</p>
<p>Military operations increase the counter amplified Hmong insurgent attacks. In Houaphan Province: several dozen insurgents and 12 soldiers die; 100 villagers are arrested; and 1,000 displaced (US State Department, 2003)</p> <p>Prison conditions are ‘life threatening’ (US State Department, 2003:n.p.)</p>	2003	<p>Eradication campaigns begin</p>
<p>700-800 Hmong insurgents surrender after state guarantees amnesty and resettlement support. Military attacks against remaining insurgents increases and terrorist attacks continue (US State Department, 2004)</p>	2004	<p>WFP provides emergency relief to farmers</p>

<p>While terrorist attacks continue (US State Department, 2005) the Hmong insurgents have been mostly suppressed and the government is stable (Forbes and Cutler, 2006)</p> <p>There are ‘no real human rights or political freedoms’ (Forbes and Cutler, 2006:177), however, abuse in custody has decreased (from high-levels). This said, police continue to use detention to extract bribes or force compliance: corruption is extensive in criminal justice system. In both urban and rural areas militia, civil committees (i.e. Women’s Union) and secret police provide extensive and intrusive surveillance network (US State Department, 2005)</p> <p>‘Poverty remains a serious issue but is slowly declining’: the ADB report that the proportion of population living in poverty declined from 46% to 31% over ten years (Forbes and Cutler, 2006:177). However, as northern highlands ‘has an ethnically diverse population of over 2 million people scattered over 5,000 villages across rugged mountainous terrain’ the ‘provision of services (e.g., education, health, and transport) [is] difficult // [and] characterized by inadequate market access, poor distribution networks, and lack of all-weather roads’ (ADB, 2005:6-7).</p>	<p>2005</p>	<p>Opium-Free</p>
<p>2009</p>		
<p>While the numbers living in poverty declined to 27.1% in 2008, inequality has increased with poverty levels significantly higher in remote highlands ‘where agricultural productivity is low and poverty reduction activities are limited’. (Jönsson, 2010:243-244).</p>		

References: All un-cited information from Stuart-Fox (1997) or Chapter 9.

Annex 1:7. Viet Nam

First Hmong migrations from China	1820-40	
Becomes French protectorate	1893	
French declare Hanoi capital of Indochina (Templer, 1999)	1890	
	1899	Opium monopoly established
	1905	Monopoly procure domestic opium.
	1907	Monopoly increase opium procurement drive
Ho Chi Min demands self-determination from French (Keylor, 2001)	1919	
	1918-1925	Unsuccessful endeavour by monopoly to control highland production
Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) founded (Keylor, 2001)	1930	
	1938	Inability of foreign suppliers to reach monopoly stimulates domestic production. Control over production is minimal
ICP organises Vietminh guerrillas against Japanese during World War II (Keylor, 2001)	1941	
Vietminh seizes power from Japanese and declare independent Democratic Republic (Keylor, 2001). Conflict created famine in which 2 million die (Templer, 1999)	1945	

6,000 Vietminh die in French re-occupation. Vietminh occupy countryside and begin organising guerrilla movement against the French – First Indochina War begins (Keylor, 2001)	1946	
Vietnam invades Laos (Stuart-Fox, 1997)	1953	
Geneva conference temporally splits country into North/South at the 17 th Parallel. It is agreed that country will reunify within two years under a UN supervised election (Keylor, 2001)	1954	Production prohibited in North Viet Nam
Communist insurgency in South Viet Nam commences (BBC, 2010)	1957	
North Vietnamese military begin supporting Viet Cong (Keylor, 2001)	1959	
Viet Cong overthrow South Vietnamese President (BBC, 2010)	1963	
American bombing raids on North Viet Nam commence (BBC, 2010).	1964	
500,000 US soldiers stationed in South Viet Nam (BBC, 2010).	1967	Demand for SE Asian opium inflated by US military stationed in Viet Nam
US begin to reduce ground troops (Keylor, 2001).	1969	
American troops leave after ceasefire agreed (BBC, 2010)	1973	
North Viet Nam invades South to unify country (Keylor, 2001). The conflict has slowed the economy and reduced agricultural productivity (Finklestein, 1987)	1975	
Socialist Republic of Vietnam is proclaimed (BBC, 2010): hundreds of thousands emigrate (McWilliams, 1987)	1976	

Tens of thousands of prostitutes and ‘hundreds of thousands of’ drug consumers are arrested and placed in re-education camps; many die from malnutrition and malaria (Templer, 1999:242)		
Government confiscates the possessions of ethnic Chinese who are later forced to move to infertile highland areas or migrate (Keylor, 2001; Templer, 1999)	1978	
To increase agricultural productivity relatively liberal quota and contract systems ²⁰ are established, purchasing prices are increased and banks allowed to lend money to local entrepreneurs (Cima, 1989)	1979	
‘Socioeconomic malaise’ continues. The economy is weaker than during the War years; farmers are hardest hit as a 12% grain shortfall means they are unable to ‘meet the 1,500 calories a day considered to be subsistence level’. Country is kept afloat by Soviet aid (Pike, 1982:72) A minimum of 120,000 political prisoners remain in ‘re-education’ camps. While they are subjected to hard labour, few are tortured or executed (McWilliams, 1983)	1981	
While ‘free market-oriented’ reforms increase rice yields calorie intake remains low while the state is unable to adequately provide basic needs (McWilliams, 1987)	1982	
There is minimal industrial manufacturing due to insufficient: energy; raw materials;	1983	

²⁰ Farmers leased land within communes and once a quota was met the surplus could be sold privately (Duiker, 1985).

spare parts; and skilled labour (Chanda, 1984)		
Industrial growth begins to rise from the ‘abysmally’ low-levels of 1979. While food consumption remains low the state begins to approaches food self-sufficiency (albeit with 200,000mt grain deficiency). USSR exchanges aid for cheap labour supply (Duiker, 1985).	1984	Facilitation of licit production
Economy is in ‘shambles’: Viet Nam is one of the world's poorest nations and people remain malnourished. Inefficient governance has created widespread unemployment and a massive black market (Finkelsteign, 1987:982)	1985	
Doi Moi (Renovation) campaign initiated. Country is opened to foreign investment and aspects of free-market economy are introduced (Han, 1989)	1986	First report of substantial illicit production
Remains one worlds poorest nations: living standard is lower than in 1975 (Cima, 1989) Agricultural productivity is low and the bureaucracy is ‘ill-equipped to make economic decisions’ (Cima, 1989:786)	1988	
Foreign Trade Office created to attract investment in infrastructure; European companies agree to explore for oil and petrol (Cima, 1989)	1989	
Improvements in productivity have increased yields to a point whereby rice can be exported. However, bureaucratic inefficiency, outdated technology and lack of investment in raw materials limits further improvements productivity (Pike, 1991)	1990	End of licit procurement Illicit production peaks
Ten-Year Socio-Economic Development Plan launched (Hung, 2000). Emphasis is upon improving agricultural (especially rice) productivity for domestic consumption (Templer, 1999)	1991	Article 61 prohibits opium production

<p>Torture and abuse in police custody remain a series problem. ‘Administrative detention’ is more common than judicial detention. While surveillance remains intrusive, high-levels of corruption limit its impact (i.e. those with resources can bribe civil committees and police to look elsewhere) (HRW, 1992).</p>		
<p>While high-unemployment, low-productivity and ineffective management continue the ‘lot of the people has improved’ even if there is mass corruption, continuing poverty and ‘annoying surveillance’ (Avery, 1993:67). Prison conditions are inhumane (HRW, 1993)</p>	1992	Negotiated and forced eradication commence
<p>Tanks and tear-gas suppress 2,000 protestors (HRW, 1994)</p>	1993	Decree 06/CP provides for eradication and DOA
<p>US lifts 30-year trade embargo and direct foreign investment increases (BBC, 2010) The country has severe infrastructural problems, including: just 5,841 of 52,819 roads are paved; there are few bridges; only three airports are suitable for international traffic; rail travel is slow; there are just four telephones per 1,000 people; and three-quarters of the rural population cannot access safe drinking water (Goodman, 1995).</p>	1994	Opium-Free
<p>Repression of opposition to Communist rule increases as links to outside world are strengthened (HRW, 1996)</p>	1995	
<p>America invests US\$700 million into 50 socio-economic projects while the World Bank loans US\$1.5 billion. The economy grows in all major sectors: exports increase by 27%; Viet Nam becomes worlds sixth largest coffee exporter; and oil production increases. However, productivity remains low. Five-Year Plan targets development of remote</p>	1996	Ky Son commences Second eradication surge

mountainous areas (Womack, 1997)		
	1997	Production and possession criminalised
<p>Rural unrest increases against: high prices; corruption; land confiscation;²¹ taxation; and compulsory labour for infrastructure (HRW, 1999) rural development increases in response (Fforde, 2009; Hung, 2000)</p> <p>Many protestors are placed under ‘administrative detainment’ which can include: detention without trial (HRW, 1999); intrusive surveillance; and restrictions on movement, residence and employment. Police brutality is common and prison conditions are below international standards (US State Department, 1999).</p>	1998	DOA officially mainstreamed (in response to reverse conditionality)
<p>There are sporadic reports of rural protests. Protestors are beaten and kicked and placed under administrative detention. Prison conditions remain below international standards and are characterised by: forced confessions; forced labour; and inadequate food and medical-care (HRW, 2000)</p>	1999	
<p>5,000 demonstrate in Central Highlands against: official corruption; religious intolerance; and state intrusion on their land. The police and military restore order and, to prevent future disturbances, increase funding for education and agricultural productivity (Thayer, 2002)</p>	2001	National Drug Control Action Plan

²¹ Many farmers are forced to sell their land for infrastructural and business development. As land is in short supply violent evictions by the police are common and often result in conflict - compensation is seldom sufficient (Templer, 1999)

1990s

Average per capita income doubled from US\$146 (1991) to US\$300 (1998) whilst the percentage of the population living below the poverty line decreased from 70% (mid-1980s) to 30-40% (2000) (Hung, 2000). It went from being food insecure to ‘the world’s largest exporter of rice’ - agricultural exports trebled between 1988-1996. Tourist numbers increase from less than 30,000 in the late-1980s to over 1 million by 1994 (Templer, 1999) and 3.3 millions within the first three months of 2008 (Han, 2009). By 2000 it was ‘perhaps the best-performing country in Southeast Asia’ (Fforde, 2009:485). However, the country remained generally underdeveloped (Hung, 2000) agricultural productivity and living conditions in the north significantly lagged behind the south. Official corruption remained extensive (Templer, 1999)

2000s

The police and prison guards commonly tortured prisoners and suspects, who were shackled in dark cells (HRW, 2000, 2001) in conditions which fell ‘far short of international standards (HRW, 2005:n.p.). The use of administrative detention remained widespread throughout Viet Nam (HRW, 2003). Economically Viet Nam represented a ‘broad dynamic picture of economic development, political and social stability’ (Han, 2008:185) driven by tourism, foreign direct investment and exports (Amer, 2010). The percentage living in poverty declined from 58% (1992) to 24% (2004) (Luong, 2006).

References: All un-cited information from Chapter 9.


Annex 2. Selected socio-economic indicators

Annex 2.1. Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (rank score of 100)

Sources for Annex 2:2: adapted from World Bank. (2008). *World Wide Governance Indicators*. (Consulted 3 January 2009).

http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/sc_country.asp

Year	'08	'07	'06	'05	'04	'03	'02	'00	'98	'96
Afghanistan	1	2	1	3	2	3	4	0	0	4
Burma	9	13	22	20	19	13	13	9	12	12
Iran	14	13	13	16	15	18	22	32	28	25
Laos	44	40	46	37	27	18	36	23	32	85
Pakistan	1	1	5	5	6	7	10	15	11	9
Thailand	13	17	20	28	32	47	59	58	60	48
UK	66	67	65	61	63	64	75	84	78	77
Viet Nam	56	56	61	59	55	52	57	54	59	56




Annex 2.2. Government effectiveness (rank score of 100)

Sources for Annex 2:3: adapted from World Bank. (2008). *World Wide Governance Indicators*. (Consulted 3 January 2009).

http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/sc_country.asp

Year	'08	'07	'06	'05	'04	'03	'02	'00	'98	'96
Afghanistan	9	8	5	9	13	8	3	0	0	-
Burma	2	2	3	2	3	7	6	7	7	6
Iran	25	25	27	26	33	37	35	41	31	21
Laos	18	18	22	13	16	12	25	24	25	60
Pakistan	26	31	34	34	34	35	32	27	25	32
Thailand	59	61	65	66	64	65	63	61	60	73
UK	94	94	94	94	94	93	94	94	98	94
Viet Nam	45	44	45	46	37	41	36	39	29	45




Annex 2.3. Control of corruption (rank score of 100)

Sources for Annex 2:4: adapted from World Bank. (2008). *World Wide Governance Indicators*. (Consulted 3 January 2009).

http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/sc_country.asp

Year	'08	'07	'06	'05	'04	'03	'02	'00	'98	'96
Afghanistan	1	1	3	2	2	1	1	0	0	
Burma	1	1	0	0	0	3	3	4	4	6
Iran	29	37	39	38	39	48	50	38	36	20
Laos	6	11	11	11	12	13	20	19	28	7
Pakistan	25	22	24	17	14	29	25	28	21	15
Thailand	43	45	51	54	50	50	46	50	58	43
UK	93	94	94	95	94	96	95	97	97	96
Viet Nam	25	29	23	24	23	33	32	27	29	32




Annex 3. Global production data


Annex 3:1-3. Global production data (high estimate parameters)

Sources: Annex 3:1-6 adapted from Figures 4:1; 4:2; 5:3; 6:2; 7:4; 8:6; 9:3; 9:8; 11:1. Burma: adapted from, Holahan and Henningen (1972); Magnussen *et al.* (1980); NNICC (various years); NNICC (various years); INCSR (various years); RCMP (various years); UNODCCP (various years); UNODC (various years).


Annex 3:1 Major Asian/Middle Eastern opium producers: Illicit opium production/diversion (1945-2008) (0-35,000mt)



Annex 3:2 Major Asian/Middle Eastern opium producers: Illicit opium production/diversion (1945-2008) (0-35,000mt)




Annex 3:3 Major Asian/Middle Eastern opium producers: Illicit opium production/diversion (1945-2008) (0-35,000mt)




Annex 3:4-6. Global production data (low estimate parameters)

Annex 3:4 Major Asian/Middle Eastern opium producers: Illicit opium production/diversion (1945-2008) (0-35,000mt)



Annex 3:5 Major Asian/Middle Eastern opium producers: Illicit opium production/diversion (1945-2008) (0-35,000mt)



Annex 3:6 Major Asian/Middle Eastern opium producers: Illicit opium production/diversion (1945-2008) (0-35,000mt)

