The sequential and moral (dis)order of public disputes:

How speakers resist, partition and do being reasonable

in talk-in-interaction

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Abstract

This thesis puts forward a strong argument for why more up-to-date interactional research is needed into disputes and why disciplines, methodological approaches and theories should come second to the phenomenon. This thesis investigates how people behave in disputes. Disputes are a ubiquitous part of everyday life – we know a great a deal about disputes in particular contexts, how people disagree, and how disputes can be resolved. However, little is known about the specific interactional features of public disputes. Public disputes are disputes which occur in a public place where there are onlookers – for instance, on public transport, on the radio, or during protests, for instance. These are activities which regularly occur throughout everyday life as our opinions, beliefs, views, identity and/or knowledge etc. clash. This research examines actual, naturally-occurring disputes between strangers in public. The focus is on the ways that people challenge those contestations, resist those challenges, and manage their relationship with their co-disputant.

The data comprises a corpus of over 100 recordings of disputes between members of the public. The data were collected, transcribed, and analysed within an ethnomethodological framework using a combination of conversation analysis, membership categorisation analysis, and discursive psychology in order to demonstrate how the phenomenon is handled sequentially and rhetorically. This combination of approaches centres the phenomena rather than focusing on the application of methods. The three analytic chapters are organised around different features of disputes and address the overall structural organisation of a dispute.

The first analytic chapter inspects *enticing sequences*, which is a way that a challenge can be produced that reverses the logic of the other's argument. This chapter (Chapter 3) builds on previous research, and lays the groundwork for the other chapters, to show the

sequential placement and forms of *resistance* to challenges. This illustrates resistance as a solution to the practical problem of being trapped in a challenge with nowhere to go. The second analytic chapter investigates how people do *partitioning*, that is, how they exploit the boundaries of their situated identity, or category (i.e. from radio caller to father). This chapter (Chapter 4) shows how people reconfigure their relationship with their co-disputant(s), and how certain actions (i.e. requests, directives, instructions) trade on the relevance of this new relationship. The final analytic chapter examines how people work to appear 'reasonable' in a dispute. People seek to win a dispute and one way of accomplishing that is to be the 'reasonable' person relative to the other's unreasonable behaviour. In this chapter (Chapter 5), I unpack this to show how, through meta-talk, people present their behaviour as reasonable, or the other's behaviour as unreasonable, to produce a purportedly-rational argument. I reveal that whilst participants rarely express *reasonableness*, they do respond to transgressions of conversational norms (i.e. turn-taking, sequence). Consequently, this accomplishes a turn-at-talk and a chance to control the direction of the dispute.

The thesis presents a state-of-the-art examination of disputative interactions and contributes significantly to our understanding of the structural organisation of disputes and how people behave in public places. Throughout the course of the thesis, I establish frameworks for future research that combine ethnomethodological approaches, deals with the 'messiness' and difficulty of public video-recordings, and develops an understanding of what a dispute actually is.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF FIGURES

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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INTRODUCTION

Disputes are a feature of our everyday life. They occur and may be characterised in different ways, though they largely regard at least two oppositional stances or opinions being taken by participants regarding some item, event, or view. What actually constitutes a dispute, conflict, argument, debate or discussion will be unpacked over the course of this chapter; crudely, however, a dispute in interactional terms is the manifestation of a challenge to some prior turn, which escalates. The complexity of understanding the makeup of a dispute occurs across a number of disciplines: psychology, linguistics, sociology, philosophy etc. For the purposes of this thesis I will largely draw on the work based in those four disciplines.

In the vernacular sense a dispute is a disagreement, or some competition, which arises from differing opinions, interests or principles. These are then generally understood as violative of some 'ordinary' conduct and represent a breakdown in 'normal' conversation. In the literature, disputes tend to be characterised as aggressive, destructive, disruptive and hostile (Collins, 2008). The studies I have identified herein employ a wide variety of research methods, including case studies, ethnographies, quantitative surveys, interviews, focus groups, critical discourse analysis and conversation analysis. A number of these studies treat disputes as a social problem requiring resolution, and have the objective to further a framework that improves upon mediation techniques and approaches; however, there is a small body of research that criticises this perspective and treats disputes as a constructive process (Church, 2009; Marcus, 1985; Nelson, 2001; Simmel, 1955). I have particularly focused on studies which adhere to empirical findings that treat disputes as neither a problem nor constructive, but a ritual of our everyday lives that informs us about interactional practices, culture and relationships.

I pay particular attention to those studies for two reasons. First, it adheres to the interactional research tradition (Goffman, 1983; Sacks, 1984), as my subsequent chapters examine the sequential organisation of disputes as they are managed by participants. Second, I am interested in how disputes figure as interactional procedures and the resources employed by participants in their accomplishment. This perspective does not exclude literature from other fields, but rather remains in accordance with ethnomethodological principles (Garfinkel, 2002) (Chapter 2). In this sense, disputes are activities rich in features that can inform us of normative orientations to social order through violations of that order (Garfinkel, 1963). The literature review goes some way to explicate the large and varied body of research on disputes. Disputes are a well-established research topic and many of their features are understood by analysts and members alike. They are important to research because they are a primordial site of social order – that is, the norms of how people behave in everyday life ostensibly break down and new 'norms' are created. Kotthoff (1993) points out that disputes suspend the 'normal' routine of interaction and it's these "violations" of the everyday that illuminate members' own orientations to the routine accomplishment of talk-in-interaction. Herein, I examine the social order and structural organisation of disputes to investigate three phenomena: how participants suppress and resist ongoing challenges, how participants reconfigure their relationships in the suppression and bringing off of a challenge, and how participants metadiscursively produce themselves as reasonable.

Chapter summaries

In Chapter 1, I begin by exploring disputes at the macro-level with a discussion on what constitutes a 'dispute'. I examine the history of research into disputes from a social scientific perspective – how they have been traditionally investigated across disciplines. I move to more specific interactional research on disputes to make a case for the "moments and their

men" (Goffman, 1967, p.3), overviewing some interactional research and providing some example contexts where dispute research has typically been conducted. I then propose a taxonomy of disputes (specific for the research in this thesis) – this is done in order to clarify the differences between terms. I showcase the varied usage of language such as 'dispute', 'conflict', 'argument', 'quarrel' etc. in the literature. I explain that each term has its own connotations and propose that (1) agreeing on a single term is pointless, (2) we should not "spin our wheels" trying to define a phenomena (see Janicki, 2017), and (3) that it does not matter a lot because we should be focusing less on analytic terms and more on language-in-use. Characterising these activities as disputes is not about the word "dispute": the word is just a convenient shorthand of a recognisable sort of sequence.

Following this, I ask "why do people argue?" to illuminate some of the reasons that researchers have ascribed participants for disputing. I then unpack the interactional activity of disputing – first, I review literature so that a 'dispute' can be identified, and its composition examined. I consider the broad structural organisation of a dispute, from how it begins and is ratified by members themselves (Coulter, 1990) to how it ceases to be a dispute (Church, 2009). However, as will become apparent in Chapter 2, these are not primary concerns for this research – so I will move on to how a dispute unfolds sequentially for members. In this section, I investigate some core sequential features of a dispute: challenges, resistance and (dis-)alignment, affiliation, preference, agreement, and their relevance for the findings revealed throughout the analysis. Furthermore, I discuss how these features are relevant for the *moral order* of disputes: I review literature which investigates how participants manage their identities and relationships through disputes. I then summarise the chapter and explain how this literature is applicable for the research presented in this thesis; finally, I ask four

questions which will guide the research and which I will return to in the discussion chapter.

Next, in Chapter 2, prior to the analytic chapters I set the scene for how I actually conducted this research. I describe how the data was collected and detail the practicalities for collecting data from an internet source. Building on the prior discussion of what constitutes a dispute, I explain the types of data which I am examining in this thesis – specifically, the three contexts where I am examining these disputes (radio, protest and public) – and how data was found and selected from these environments. I then detail transcription, storing the data, and importantly, ethical considerations for these recordings – here I will discuss the lack of relevant guidance on dealing with these data and propose some ways of ensuring and upholding the British Psychological Society (BPS) (2018) ethical guidelines. Following that, I describe the analytic particulars of Conversation Analysis, Membership Categorisation Analysis and Discursive Psychology, grounding them in their common root: ethnomethodology. As well as discussing how these methods are applied in the analysis, I explore how these methods can work together and be mutually beneficial – concluding that the phenomena is central to the analysis and that we should not get held up by the application of the methodology.

The following three chapters comprise the analysis. These are ordered to mirror the literature review and methodological approach, and to represent the move from challenge to resistance. Chapter 3 focuses on a particular type of challenge and how it can be resisted: enticers. I investigate *enticers* as a routine way that speakers in disputes manufacture a challenge that reverses the logic of the others' argument. I build on Reynolds' (2011; 2015) and Reber's (2019) work to show what happens when these challenges are not canonically brought off in the face of resistance. I illustrate the sequential placement of *resistance* to

these challenges – specifically, that resistance occurs at the earliest point that the challenge is projectable (in accordance with Reynolds' 'phases'). I also show some forms that resistance may take and how this resistance is dealt with by the challenger. Significantly, I show how resistance is a solution to the interactional bind placed on the target of the challenge and how speakers (1) ostensibly comply to resist, (2) pursue an enticing challenge, and (3) resist by reversing the trajectory of the enticer.

In Chapter 4, I retain focus on the structural organisation of disputes by investigating how alternate categories are deployed to render certain actions as non-sanctionable. I show how members exploit the boundedness of identity categories in order to bring off or suppress challenges in disputes. I reveal how people (re)configure their relationship as a practical accomplishment through being heard (or seen) as an incumbent of a different category device. This shows how members themselves display the rights and responsibilities that certain devices afford, and more specifically, those actions which trade on the relevance of particular categories. I demonstrate how the practice of *partitioning* unfolds throughout a sequence – how these 'new' categories are mobilised, the actions that trade on them, and how they are ratified by the other participant(s) in and through a dispute.

In Chapter 5, I conclude the analytic chapters by focusing on how *metadiscursive* moves (talk about the conversation itself) are done in the service of doing being reasonable as a practical accomplishment for bringing off challenges. I describe three ways that these moves are constructed by speakers and unpick how this feature of a dispute speaks to the structural organisation as more important than the content of the dispute for 'what-we're-doing'. I consider how speakers present their own conduct as ordinary and rational relative to the other speaker; I also show how speakers present the other participant(s)' conduct as

violative in some way; and finally I show how speakers do being rational and manage the subjectivity of the argument in a dispute. I suggest that doing being reasonable is a concern for disputers, and more importantly, shows how members treat the structure of the dispute (and thus the activity) as a resource which is perhaps more valuable than the content of their turns.

In the final chapter, I will discuss the findings from this thesis, and how my thesis contributes to and expands our understanding of *disputes* from an interactional perspective. I describe the key themes that shape and are shaped by the nature of the interactions examined: morality and categories, sequence and accounting, and disputes. I suggest that members do (dis)order as a structural concern, and reflect on what disputes ontologically are in the emic sense as well as how participants themselves systematically produce disputes as an ongoing activity. I consider how participants may achieve a 'win' by simply achieving a turn and thus being able to control the direction of talk, even for just a moment. I discuss limitations of this thesis, including the 'answers' that this research can provide and the nature of the recordings analysed. I make the case that analysts should not avoid this 'messy' data, and that it can offer fruitful insights into how members do being in public, and do being in a dispute. I then propose directions for future research whilst underscoring the relative scarcity of research on the phenomenon investigated within this thesis. Finally, I offer possible practical implications for professions which encounter disputes and for research on disputes as a whole. I will then conclude by drawing together the key themes of this thesis to consider how disputes are part of the social fabric of everyday life.

Overall, this thesis will employ a novel cross-ethnomethodological approach to reveal interactional features of public disputes which occur across environments. I provide

instructions on how to access this type of data, how to analyse this type of data and why we should not restrict ourselves to a particular approach. This thesis contributes to our knowledge about disputes – how they are actually constituted and performed in and through talk-in-interaction by members themselves.

Chapter 1:

Disputes: Reviewing what we know

1.0 Introduction

Disputes, arguments and conflict are a part of our everyday life: they occur everywhere, between any number of people, and are considered by many as a *problem*. Disputes are, however, also a solution to a problem – when opinions, knowledge, or the subjective reality of a person's world clash with another person's, then there are three options: ignore this clash, discuss this clash, or dispute. These three options span numerous interactional contexts from people on a bus to the Court of Justice of the European Union, for instance. There is a vast amount of research on disputes that explores motivations, reasoning, and behaviour in and during disputes. I will be drawing primarily on ethnomethodological and conversation analytic (EMCA) literature which are the studies of members methods and is devoted to discovering the witnessable social order and sense-making practices. In figure 1 I have outlined some of the key initialisms which will be used and unpacked throughout this thesis.

CA	Conversation Analysis	A method to study talk-in-interaction.
MCA	Membership Categorisation Analysis	A method to study who-people-are and what-they're-doing.
DP	Discursive Psychology	A method to study psychological matters as produced in talk.
EM	Ethnomethodology	The study of social order.
TCU	Turn-Construction Unit	Units of talk that comprise a turn at talk.
TRP	Transition-Relevance Place	Points of possible completion of a turn at talk following a complete TCU.
SRP	Standard Relational Pair	A pair of people that go together e.g. mother-baby

Figure 1. Initialisms.

For ethnomethodological research, the focus is squarely on members' own methods, relying on an empirical look at what people do, and not what people think they do. Consequently, some approaches to do EM are CA, MCA and DP which are the examination of members' methods as done in and through talk-in-interaction. I will return to unpack these terms in greater detail in Chapter 2 (section 2.2); for now however, they are the principle approaches of most of the literature examined herein. This chapter reviews some of this literature to provide a background for the analysis in Chapters 3, 4 and 5.

In this chapter, I will review literature which underscores *why* we should focus our analytic efforts on disputes. I will problematise some of this literature for its dealing with terminology – as confusion arises over what a 'dispute' is versus a 'conflict' – and in doing this, I propose a taxonomy which is appropriate for this particular type of data (though I explain that we should not overly concern ourselves with definitions). I will then, in section 1.2.2, consider what a dispute actually is, and how, as analysts we can 'know' that people are doing disputing, and particular contexts and compositions of disputes. Building on this in section 1.4, I will examine the structure of disputes – how they begin, how they end, and how they unfold. I then specify my focus by reviewing literature that examines the sequential and moral organisation of disputes. I describe some key terminology (which will be expanded upon in Chapter 2) that is helpful in revealing the structure of a dispute and for the analysis. Finally, in section 1.5 I will summarise the chapter to discuss how this extant research will be used to inform and be informed by the findings of subsequent chapters, and I will also outline four key questions that I will return to throughout this thesis. This review will demonstrate the need for more up-to-date interactional research on disputes, and the usefulness of interactional research to reveal the taken-for-granted understandings of how disputes unfold.

Further, the review will expose the disparate bodies of research on disputes in terms of how different disciplines have conceived and examined disputes.

1.1 Disputes as topic of research

Disputes as a topic feature in a large extant body of research stretching back to the founding of research methods and theoretical frameworks in the social sciences (Durkheim, 1893; Hobbes, 1651 [2016]; Weber, 1978). There have been a number of approaches to studying disputes: surveys to explore how group performance is impacted by intragroup conflict (Chun & Choi, 2014), focus groups to reveal how sexism can be used to resist during couples' conflict (Overall, et al. 2011), conversation analysis to show how disputes manifest, and the function of disputes between children (Maynard, 1985a; 1985b), discourse analysis that investigates the delicate nature of how disputes are negotiated (Jacobs & Jackson, 1981; Tracy & Agne, 2002), etc. The analysis of disputes has also led to the founding of various fields, theories and models: argumentation theory (van Eemeren, et al., 2014), negotiation theory (Ting-Toomey, 1988), game theory (Rapoport, 1974), model of argument (Toulmin, 1958), etc. Consequently, there have been a number of works, and many more since those, which have sought to explain, examine, and theorise conflict as both a societal and individual phenomenon. It is only in relatively recent times that the social sciences have taken the 'linguistic turn' to establish an interactional tradition of research (Goffman, 1983) and examine "not, then, men and their moments. Rather moments and their men" (Goffman, 1967, p.3). It is in this tradition in which I focus on the ritual behaviours of people during disputes.

For interactional research, disputes are a fruitful area of investigation yielding insights into frame analysis, crisis negotiation, mediation, courtrooms, therapy, police encounters etc.

Agne (2007) exemplifies this with his analysis of how profound disagreement during negotiations is an obstacle and how reframing is (in)effective in some ways for overcoming this. Moreover, Agne & Tracy (2001) consider how conflict is shaped through talk and how a particular shaping blamed the perpetrator and contributed to a dire outcome at the Waco Siege. How disputes get shaped is ultimately a members' concern over what can/should and cannot/should not be said, this is understood as the 'frame' of talk. Goffman (1974) describes these 'frames', and more recently Tracy and Hodge (2019) use 'genre'. These terms foreground the discursive work and overall structural organisation through which participants' "reactions to what actually gets said are heavily coloured by these expectations" (O'Driscoll, 2019, p.171). These studies show the usefulness of dispute research: tracking what the interactional particulars afford, seeing where the outcomes of these situations arise and thus how talk may be manipulated to prompt or prevent these outcomes. As such, dispute research benefits an array of areas: ways to counter resistance in crisis negotiation (Agne & Tracy, 2001; Sikveland, 2019), overcoming barriers to mediation (Stokoe, 2013); retaining person-centredness in therapy (Muntigl et al., 2013); ways of averting conflict in the jury room (Pomerantz & Sanders, 2013); and ways of 'othering' the defendant in courtroom settings (D'hondt, 2009) etc. This research interest lies in a desired outcome – how (non)employment of interactional feature(s) can craft pathways to those outcomes.

In this section, I will review the taxonomy of disputes and how it relates to 'conflict-talk', 'arguments', 'quarrels' etc., which will also be unpacked throughout the chapter. I will then discuss why disputes are a fruitful topic for ethnomethodological research. Following this I will review studies that examine *why* people dispute and finally, I will summarise by drawing on literature that answers the question: what constitutes a dispute?

1.1.1 Taxonomy of disputes

There are endless ways to describe *disputes*, with each term seemingly describing a specific quality of interaction. In this section, and throughout the chapter, I will differentiate between some of those terms to clarify the differences between disputes, conflict, and disagreement. This taxonomy is applicable for various interactional contexts where disputes can occur; however, my focus is on public disputes and how 'dispute' most appropriately captures the interactional activity. Throughout this thesis I will be using some form of the word 'dispute' to describe the interactional activity that the participants are engaged with. Various authors (see Ardington, 2003; Evans & Schuller, 2015; Hardaker, 2013; Kádár, 2014; Kampf, 2015; Waldron, 2012) contribute to defining aspects of disputative talk: 'heckling', 'insulting', 'trolling', 'hate speech' – though they largely also take the stance that getting bogged down in the specifics of what is, for instance, 'hate' or a 'troll', is not useful. In addition to contributing to definitions, these papers also describe the different ways that researchers treat these terms for their own purposes, which Janicki (2017) suggests is a problem in and of itself. For ethnomethodological studies, however, the understanding of a dispute ought to remain rooted in the data.

The most common terms to describe some oppositional interaction are: disputes (Goodwin, 1982), conflict-talk (Reynolds, 2011; 2013; 2015), conflict disputes (Agne, 2007), and adversarial discourse (Church, 2009). These are often conflated, and authors from other disciplines have proposed taxonomies (see Fenn, et al., 1997) that go some distance to clarify. Holsti (1966) uses *disputes* as constitutive of a *conflict*, that is, disputes are the tensions between participants and that chains of disputes may cause conflict – and that disputes may be resolved but the conflict remains ongoing. Similarly, Meirowitz et al. (2019), on militarisation, distinguish 'disputes' as the emergent (or 'first step') interactions that can

be ongoing and may or may not lead to conflict. In this sense, *conflict* is described as subsuming *disputes* and that a conflict is in some way an escalation of a dispute.

Alternatively, Tracy and Hodge (2019) in reviewing language, communication and interaction studies on conflict, explain that 'conflict' most regularly refers to interpersonal conduct whereas 'disputes' are reserved for institutional settings. Their usage of 'dispute' is on the basis that participants 'do conflict' in institutionally specific ways in the service of displaying their own moral reasonableness and the other's moral unreasonableness. Capturing these varied usages, Church (2009) notes her usage of 'adversative discourse' skirts the problem of the differences in terms – in that we should not be overly concerned with the descriptors – and that 'adversative discourse' describes the interaction in a way that captures the oppositionality without casting a specific understanding such as quarrel, argument, conflict, etc.

Quarrels are also a way of describing a dispute, though Antaki (1994) explains that an argument is a specific interactional feature as a part of a quarrel; though *quarrel* appears to have fallen out of usage in dispute research. In some sense then, disputes are action-oriented and activity based, whereas 'conflict' is used as a descriptor of a protracted (or serious) disagreement between two parties. This resonates with their uptake, with authors noting that disputes may be momentarily resolved, but conflict has to be managed over larger timescales (Davies, et al. 2005; Liberman, et al., 1997). In the EMCA sphere, Argaman (2009) states that disagreement is key – that disputes regard matters of ownership, physical materials and space and regard social control (see also Cobb-Moor, et al. 2008, p.587); furthermore, conflict lacks the 'interpersonal niceties' and is described as hostile (see also Lorenzo-Dus, 2008, p.81). There are exceptions to this usage (see Reynolds, 2011; 2013; 2015).

Defining terms across the spectrum of conflict research poses a problem for many researchers. Janicki (2017) notes that this problem is independent from the discipline – that it regards the authors' philosophical position which translates to a stance toward a particular concept/term. As Wittgenstein (1953) notes, the essentialist view to pose questions such as 'what is a dispute' and expect an answer is untenable. Wittgenstein explains "what still counts as a game and what no longer does? Can you give the boundary? No" (p.33). This is not a problem, and we will likely never *know* what the theoretical differences are. What EMCA approaches can do is to detail the interactional particulars that *look* like (and are treated) as disputative. Moreover, Janicki (2017, p.64) concludes "non-essentialist philosophic position […] allows researchers to move forward rather than spin their wheels at the very initial stage of trying to define the phenomena". For the purposes of this analysis, I acknowledge there are not clear delineated boundaries between the concepts – however, I will exclusively use 'disputes' to describe the collaborative activity of disagreeing. I do this for two reasons: (1) these disputes are time-constrained, relatively short (see Smith, 2017), and do not feature physical violence; and (2) it reserves 'conflict' for those moments when the dispute escalates to include multiple parties and/or physical aggression. Over the course of this chapter, I will return to this discussion to further specify *disputes* and discuss what constitutes them as well as cover the limited empirical research that examines disputes in public.

1.1.2 What actually is a dispute?

Following the previous section that goes some way to provide a taxonomy of disputes and clarifies my usage of the terms – this section examines what constitutes a dispute. In this section, I consider both interactional and non-interactional studies to discuss how disputes are

identified, what they are, and what work still needs to be done to understand them. I will explore the interactional research toward the end of the section to provide an understanding of what a dispute is that is empirically grounded in the interactional particulars.

Disputes capture an array of synonyms that are used to describe specific instances where people are being adversarial: Church (2009) uses 'adversative discourse' to describe mutually articulated disagreement; Antaki (1994) uses 'argument' to describe talk which supports a position inside of a 'quarrel' as synonymous with 'dispute' and 'squabbles'; Brenneis (1988) and Kotthoff (1993) both use 'dispute' to capture an array of interactional practices and a suspension of the 'normal' preference order of cooperative interaction; there is fighting (Jackson & Jacobs, 2009; Jackson-Jacobs, 2013), which are physical episodes of conflict; and other terms such as: discussing, debating, conflict (Grimshaw, 1990; Reynolds, 2011) that describe a social action. The term 'dispute' also gets used in the social sciences to deal with macro-level social forces in adversarial situations between groups (Drury, Reicher & Stott, 2003). Thus, these terms encompass a wide range of meanings across research, even in the social sciences. Indeed, in interaction, a dispute is fundamentally composed of opposition to some prior utterance(s) or action(s) of another speaker or group. Moreover, disputes are treated as serious (genuine) disagreements (Jackson & Jacobs, 1981; Leung, 2002; Scott, 2002). In sum, there are varied terms which provide descriptions of a social situation where two *opinions* meet. This is what is understood as constituting a dispute in the majority of the literature reviewed.

I have no objective to giving a definition of 'dispute' – instead, remaining non-biased toward any particular definition and unpacking its applicability to certain interactional contexts. We know a great deal about disputes, though there are still features of disputes to

illuminate and unpack, and definitions presuppose that we already know everything worth

knowing (Sacks, 1995). The emphasis in this chapter and throughout this thesis is that

disputes are illustrative of people (re)configuring their relationships between one another. I

am not concerned with producing a theoretical framework like those found in argumentation

theory, reasoning theory or negotiation theory (see Ehlich & Wagner, 1995; van Eemeren, et

al., 1991; van Eemeren, et al., 2002); nor is this research concerned with the *argument*, but

rather, the *arguing*-with (Antaki, 1994; O'Keefe, 1977). Consequently, this limits what I am

treating as constitutive of a dispute, with the emphasis on the moment-by-moment opposition

observable in the talk, versus talk about disputes (Stokoe, 2013; Stokoe & Sikveland, 2016;

Weatherall, 2015). Thus, there is a gap in the empirically-grounded research warranting an

exploration of precisely how micro-practices of talk speak to what a dispute is.

From politeness research, O'Driscoll and Jeffries propose a definition of a dispute:

"any situation or behaviour involving parties (individuals or groups) who are, or consider

themselves to be, instrumentally, intellectually and/or emotionally opposed or simply

antagonistic toward each other" (2019, p.4-5). However, their definition does not accurately

pin down the particular constitution given the multitude of contexts in which a dispute may

occur and does not take into account that opposition may not necessarily constitute a dispute.

Graham (2017), building on Eckert and McConnell-Ginet (1992), explains that interaction,

and manifestations of conflict, are fluid and that the boundaries between the states of

antagonistic, aggressive and violent are not a priori clear but rather based in the participants'

responses; moreover, each community of practice (see Lavé & Wenger, 1991) has its own set

of expectations and rules that render it difficult for analysts to locate and describe

manifestations of a conflict (Marra, 2012). Therefore, it is worth looking to interactional

research to ground an examination of disputes in what actually gets done by people, rather

than relying on what they (or we) think constitutes a dispute.

In ethnomethodological research, there has been much work on dealing with disputes where participants are facilitated by a third-party to recount versions of a dispute. For instance, Stokoe and Edwards (2007) examined neighbour disputes to systematically show how identity categories figure in disputes. Similarly, Ehrlich (2007) focused on legal discourse with trials as a form of dispute resolution whereby versions of the dispute are presented to some third-party. Ehrlich draws on Atkinson and Drew (1979) to note how these versions are supplanted with accounting components that cast the blame on the other party. These studies ostensibly regard *disputes* but are concerned with how alternate opinions or 'sides' are presented; furthermore, disputes as a matter of sides is an institutional concern whereby an 'offence'/dispute has occurred and needs to be dealt with, often by a third-party to solicit *what happened* after the fact. Kidwell (2018; 2009), Kidwell and Kevoe-Feldman (2018) and Kidwell and González Martínez (2010) show the presentation of sides and how disputes are pre-empted by police officers by mobilising specific interactional resources (pre-beginnings and unconstrained questions) to craft alignment. Moreover, they observe the citizen/suspect response is constrained by those resources insofar as how the citizen/suspect offer accounts (to restore normalcy), do story-telling (to circumvent opportunities for resistance), apologise, or display their own understanding. These disputes do not represent participants on an equal footing, however. Police officers are able to define the citizen/suspect's actions to decide on the consequences of those actions and this is managed by seeking alignment at the earliest possible points to avoid any disputes – as such, interactional research shows that it is in the *uptake* where a dispute is ratified by the citizen/suspect and the officer.

What makes a dispute a dispute is not an abstract definition then – the evidence is found in the interactional particulars. There is regularity across studies with how disputes are

constituted by members through talk. The sequence of a dispute follows an initial

oppositional turn after an 'antecedent event' (Church, 2009; Maynard, 1985a); from there the

dispute develops with counter-assertions, with the turns seen to be affected by the prior

utterance(s) through the use of either 'simple' strategies (rejections, denials or contradictions

(Phinney, 1986)), or elaborated responses (reasoning, explanations, justifications, queries

(Antaki, 1994; Phinney, 1986)). Moreover, Goodwin & Goodwin (1987) noted (in children's

disputes) that escalation occurs when a responsive turn mirrors the prior challenging turn (in

syntactic structure) and embeds that prior challenging turn inside of the responding turn.

Furthermore, they go on to point out that they view disputes as the development of

interrelated utterances, with the participants manipulating the syntactic structures of prior

moves.

The constitution of disputes, then, is found in their uptake. Disputes can only occur

with counter-opposition to some already oppositional turn. There are a number of strategies

which then get deployed in how speakers treat the previous actions, and those strategies are

not randomly deployed but are produced "as to be understood in particular ways; they

interpret their own and other person's conduct as indexing, indicating and revealing some

particular meaning" (Pomerantz & Mandelbaum, 2005, p.151). Disputes are dynamic and

sustained through participants building on the prior turn rather than isolating those turns

(Church, 2009; Coulter, 1990; Hutchby, 1996a). Therefore, the doing and understanding of a

dispute is retrospective – those oppositional responses cast the first turn (in which they are

responsive) as an arguable (Hutchby, 1996a; Maynard, 1985a). Where a response does not

resist, disalign or otherwise treat the prior turn as disagreeing, then that typically results in a

termination of the dispute (Church, 2009). For the purposes of collecting data, and thus

deciding on what counts – I adapt Church's (2009) and Reynolds' (2013) definition: that any

adversarial discourse, where an opinion is contested, where two or more stances are produced, where there is provocation, or where an offence has occurred and is being dealt with through talk, characterises a dispute. In the following section, I will explore *why* people dispute to highlight that asking that question is counterproductive: we can ascribe certain motivations, but these would be based in what people *think they do* and not *what they do*. I will conclude by making a case for interactionally-grounded research into disputes.

1.2 Why do people argue?

Disputes occur everywhere, every day between people and over any topic, though Antaki (1994, p.159) notes that those topics, while individual, are "limited by the stock of things that society at any one moment determines to be controversial"; furthermore engaging in a dispute is not done without reason (Grimshaw, 1990). What is of grave concern to some participants in one moment in one environment is malleable, and not particularly useful in examining the structural organisation of disputes. Disputes are organised, and participants' conduct in disputes is produced in orderly, systematic ways (Coulter, 1990; Maynard, 1985a; Reynolds, 2015).

People argue about categories and particulars – what constitutes something and the implications that one may draw from them. Talk in disputes is governed by some ritualised behaviours or *rules* (Collins, 2008; Coulter, 1990; Goodwin & Goodwin, 1990), and those *rules* inform us not only about how society operates and is reproduced by people, but also those peoples' psychology insofar as what is reasonable to say about that disputed topic (Billig, 1991). Disputes provide us with insights into the social representations of society regarding the things that people are invested in. Those representations are constructed and negotiated in disputes, and concurrently reflect and produce cultural experiences – disputes

function as a social structure that helps reproduce authority, relationships, and other patterns which transcend the dispute itself (Church, 2009; Maynard, 1985a).

In various contexts, a dispute may be an activity that produces a 'win' or is a point-scoring exercise. For instance, the United Kingdom's Prime Minister's Questions (PMQs) during parliamentary sessions are adversarial with personal attacks and aggravation that is not only sanctioned, but rewarded (see Allen et al., 2014; Bull & Wells, 2012; Bull & Strawson, 2019), as such disputes in the sense of opposition are expected. Goffman (1967) notes this as aggravation, which occurs whereby the antagonist seeks to score points at the other's expense. Similarly, disputes in police interrogations are one method through which suspects can achieve a 'win' (David, Rawls & Trainum, 2017); as such, disputes may be a productive method to achieve some desired outcome depending upon the context. Treating disputes as point-scoring for some ultimate outcome is reminiscent of Wittgenstein's (1953) language games, wherein it is through the use of language that meaning is achieved – it is how 'things' are used, where they are used, and when they are used that provides a sense of their meaning. Rawls (2008) develops this to explain that meaning is dependent on constitutive rules and that all participants understand they are engaged in the same practice. The *dispute game* may be played – whereby every turn constitutes a move in the game: in the examples from the literature just described, the dispute is not a fair game, as the interaction is fixed in favour of the questioner; however, in public disputes they are usually fair (but competitive) games (Caillois, 2001) to the extent that there are no institutional norms about one person having more clout than the other. The dispute game is played as two teams, with each trying to score a point and win the game; and the game does not only regulate the playing, but creates the very possibility of playing (Wittgenstein, 1953). In this sense, the

'win' is constituted by the game – in certain disputes a win will allow the continuation of play, whereas in other disputes points may be scored without any practical consequences.

For members, disputes are productive, rule-governed, constructive and ultimately, a shared activity (Brenneis, 1998; David, Rawls & Trainum, 2017). They afford interactional opportunities for cooperation and an increased understanding of oneself, others and their local culture (Eisenberg, 1987). This refinement is detailed by Hay and Ross (1982) and Putallaz and Sheppard (1995) who explain that disputes are necessary in peer relationships to stimulate an improvement of our social skills and social acceptance; and they do not tend to cause permanent relationship problems or discord but rather, are quickly forgotten. That notwithstanding, these studies focus on peer relationships where those participants will seemingly see one another again; comparatively, in my data that social contract does not exist, because the disputants are either strangers to one another or have an institutional relationship where they are unlikely to interact again – this context then offers a window into how people establish relationships that are only constituted by a dispute. In this sense, there are two strands on understanding disputes: (1) members' own conduct through their ability to manage those disputes and how they produce and negotiate locally determined roles and responsibilities (Chen & French, 2008; Stalpers, 1995); and (2) disputes as co-operative and beneficial to relationships through indexing competence and social knowledge as well as being demonstrative of how participants reproduce their own social world, moral order, and culture.

People argue for a range of reasons in which they are invested, and though to maintain empirical rigour we cannot psychologise and ascribe motivations for engaging in a dispute, we can examine those outcomes which suggest some benefit for participating.

Disputes are not an aberration of talk, but as studies show, they are delicately and carefully managed, which suggests they are a useful environment for conducting certain business (even if that business is espousing one's own world view). As Goffman puts it

> "from the bridge that people build to one another, allowing them to meet for a moment of talk in a communion of reciprocally sustained involvement. It is this spark, not the more obvious kinds of love, that lights up the world." (1967, p.116-7).

This section has described some research which ascribes reasons for disputing, and other research which describes the outcome of disputes as the motivation for disputes. These are not outrightly problematic, but nevertheless do not consider that disputes are a members' activity and that the *why* people argue, unless availed in the talk, is of secondary relevance to the *how* people argue. Disputing is often less about *winning* and more about an environment where oppositional positions are being espoused. The following section explores this, specifically by focusing on extant interactional research that can provide answers to these questions.

1.2.1 What can interactional research tell us about why people argue?

This section builds on the prior one to discuss two core components of all disputes: openings and outcomes. In the following two subsections I will review interactional literature that has specifically shown the procedures that occur at the beginnings and ends of disputes. This is done to answer the above question: *why* people dispute. Interactional research has revealed how disputes can arise in talk (and thus how we know it is a dispute and not just ordinary talk) and how disputes arrive at an outcome. Consequently, examining the structure of talk can go some way to answering just why disputes occur – either as beginning by some

infraction or having an outcome that is not necessarily a 'win'.

1.2.1.1 Dispute openings

Disputes can be initiated in almost endless ways; in this section I will focus on the general structural organisation of how a dispute begins. This is done to highlight interactional research as a way of showing how disputes emerge and are ratified as disputes by participant(s). There are various acts which a participant may use to express some initial opposition to an earlier point in the sequence. Eisenberg and Garvey, in their study on children, explained that a dispute is "a sequence which begins with opposition" (1981, p.150). The opposition must be overt, or at least attended to as overt enough to warrant a dispute (Church, 2009). It is in the uptake that a dispute is either (a) ratified, and it begins/continues, or (b) is conciliated to initiate a cessation of the dispute (Ross & Conant, 1995). What counts as opposition is endless (Maynard, 1985a) as opposition can occur in response to any previous action (and so any previous talk may be interpreted as the initiation of a dispute).

Nominating a start of a dispute has implications for the following analysis of that dispute. There are two understandings for the start outlined by Church (2009): (a) the first act of opposition, or (b) the action that provokes that act of opposition. The latter is commonly referred to as the 'antecedent event' (Church, 2009) or 'arguable' (Maynard, 1985a). Some studies (see Eisenberg & Garvey, 1981; Laursen & Hartup, 1989; Phinney, 1986; Shantz, 1987) include interactions that are constituted by only the two turns: the antecedent event and initial opposition. However, identifying that initial move is further complicated given that a single move of opposition does not constitute an episode of dispute, and thus the initial opposition is only rendered a part of the dispute retrospectively (e.g. 'accidental' bumps; see

Katz, 1988). Maynard (1985a, p.5) explains: "initial opposition does not constitute an argument […] its status as part of the argument is dependent on whether it is treated as a legitimate repair initiation or whether it is let to pass or whether it is itself counteracted". A speaker's single turn which opposes the other's position, prior turn, or conduct requires some acceptance by that other speaker through opposing that opposition.

The instigation of a dispute is difficult to determine through identifying those initial moves, nor is it particularly useful – it involves analysts classifying turns as part, or not part, of the dispute, which is a members' concern. It is a members' concern insofar as classifying those turns as oppositional or as the dispute source casts the speaker as the disputer or disputee. In this sense, features such as 'blaming' (Wodak, 2006) seed a dispute as it positions the other speaker as perpetrator (Goffman, 1967; Márquez-Reiter & Haugh, 2019). That notwithstanding, the determining of peoples' roles in the disputes (e.g. the disputer and disputee) is often an analytical assumption with implications for subsequent analysis. As such, rather than focusing on the first two moves of antecedent event and opposition where these roles may be configured, some authors examine a three-part sequence of how disputes are initiated (through opposition), ratified (with further opposition) and accepted as a dispute by the initiator (through more opposition). Indeed, the dispute activity may then be understood as ratified by all participants, and not just a single episode of opposition which could have been remedied if the initiator did not accept the respondents ratification of the dispute, e.g. initiate a repair sequence to quell the incipient opposition.

In his book, Antaki (1994) draws on van Eemeren and Grootendort's speech act model whilst applying Coulter's (1990) quarrel analysis to focus on a three-part sequence to identify a dispute-initiation: (1) speaker A takes a turn, (2) speaker B attends to the *disputable meaning* of that utterance, and (3) speaker A confirms that disputable meaning.

The dispute then gets ratified by the minimum number of participants required for a dispute to occur. If there is a breakdown in this sequence, or a disruption, then the dispute remains potentially available as an activity, but requires recognition and authorisation through a re-doing or restarting of this three-part sequence. Coulter (1990) and Cromdal (2004) explain that any speaker may attempt one of those moves in and through the talk, and it is in their co-participant's uptake as to whether their move is ratified. All of these studies, despite differences, focus on how disputes arise out of oppositional turns and thus they treat the dispute as a 'response-centred event' (Hutchby, 1996b). These findings show the *why* people argue is not about psychological motivations, but about when opposition to some event/issue/opinion is done, that opposition is treated as opposition and then confirmed by the initial opposer that the original opposition was indeed opposition.

The beginning of a dispute as centred around the participants' disagreeing response may be examined through the interactional preference structure, in the sense that responses to the first turn propose a *preferred* or *dispreferred* course of action (Bilmes, 1988; Pomerantz, 1984). Preference for agreement is not that speakers should always agree but it is about the accomplishment of social action and that agreeing tends to be unmarked whereas dispreferred disagreeing responses tend to be marked in some way. Those disagreeing second turns then typically require additional interactional work (pauses, indirectness, justifications, hesitations etc.) in order to formulate those expressions of disagreement. Moreover, where there is disalignment and different expectations for appropriate behaviour, then conflict may arise given the deviation from some local norms; however, this can serve to facilitate a renegotiation of what constitutes appropriate behaviour (Graham, 2007). That notwithstanding, Goodwin (1990) found that contrary to disagreement being dispreferred with those typical markers of dispreference, disagreement was produced with explicit expressions of polarity and/or a repeating of the turn being opposed in order to bring attention

to and challenge it. This finding is supported by Kuo's (1992) work, which observed that markers of opposition, rather than markers of dispreference, occupy turn-initial positions in disputes amongst friends. Kuo's work suggests that these direct strategies to disagree index the relationship between friends. Furthermore, disagreement affords specific turn markers and rhetorical strategies (Georgakopopulou, 2001) that mark the opening move of a disagreement. These markers then, may be used at the initiation of a dispute and also to maintain or escalate that dispute.

The relationship between the initial turns of the initial sequence of the dispute appears to be the primary indicator of why the dispute has occurred whilst also informing the speakers of how the dispute will be organised. Leung (2002) noted that in any dispute, the beginning can follow any trajectory. Research confirms this, including seemingly innocent questions that attain mutual agreement with a 'norm', and subsequently that agreement is challenged on the basis of the target not adhering to that 'norm' (Gruber, 2001; Reynolds, 2015); the 'you say X but what about Y' device used on radio call-shows where a host responds to the caller's opinion by highlighting a specific item in the caller's opinion as challengeable without directly challenging the entire opinion (Hutchby, 1996b); threats in children's disputes that are used as vehicles to espouse and introduce issues instead of ostensibly defeating the opposition (Niemi, 2014); he-said-she-said accusations in children's talk, which are produced as ways of complaining about someone without openly insulting them and which designedly do not project a clear outcome (Goodwin, 1980; 1990); format tying through strategic use of the surface features of talk (i.e. meta-talk) that can (re)construct their position or relationship as in opposition (Goodwin, 2006; Goodwin, 1990; Goodwin & Goodwin, 1987); blaming whereby attorneys can reallocate blame to the opposing side and thus render blame as a blameworthy action (Ingrids, 2014); denials which avoid culpability of a prior complaint and sustain the sense of one party being a complainer and the other being a

complainee (Dersley & Wootton, 2000); the interpretation of events whereby some event or issue is treated as a subjective experience and is open to the descriptive practices of the disputers (Cobb & Rifkin, 1991; Stokoe & Hepburn, 2005). These varied studies showcase a wide range of devices, practices and actions which get brought off in the initiation of a dispute. The disputes are organised with respect to those practices, devices and actions as sustained 'chains of action' (Church, 2009; Coulter, 1990); in non-disputative talk, the sequence is prospectively formed by the mutual relationship of the prospective first action and the retrospective second (Schegloff, 2007a). However, in disputes participants work to resist those projected actions, otherwise the dispute would end (Church, 2009). Going along with the projected action, and thus allowing the other interlocutor to complete their project or action is a concession of sorts – it returns to the 'normative' frame of talk, the orderliness of turn-taking and the collaborative working toward completion of a project or action; therefore, resistance blocks those projected actions, stalls progressivity and importantly, does not concede.

Disputes occur over at least three turns and in those three turns the dispute is organised with respect to the sequence proposed with the initiating device/practice/action – the activity takes hold where the original action (antecedent event) is defended and not treated as a prompt for repair (Maynard, 1985a). This relies on a capturing of the interactional sequence wherein a dispute is brought off; unfortunately, it is not always that case that the dispute opening is captured, and there is limited research which examines how the dispute is retrospectively reconstituted by the members. This means that as analysts, we do not have access to the antecedent event, the opposition, or its ratification, but only the members' own understandings of that three-part structure as displayed in the ensuing talk.

In sum, it has been found that particular three-part turns constitute a dispute (Antaki, 1994; Coulter, 1990; Dunn & Mumm, 1987), and that we cannot concretely say a dispute has been initiated after two turns, as it may be understood as a repair operation or let pass (Maynard, 1985a). Consequently, it is the speaker who has caused the antecedent event that may ratify and thus authorise the dispute to progress. The antecedent event may be any topic, view, issue etc. that is opposable by the other speaker and follows a trajectory which is dictated by the practice/device/action which has initiated the dispute. There is a space in the existing literature for research which examines those disputing-initiating moves in a post-initial position – more specifically, identifying the moves which progress, initiate or resist dispute trajectories. In the next section, I consider the outcomes of disputes in terms of why people dispute and question whether it is possible to win a dispute.

1.2.1.2 Dispute outcomes

Thus far I have reviewed the (primarily ethnomethodological) research on dispute openings. In this section I will review literature which concerns the cessation of disputes. There are a number of methods members can use to end a dispute. Members' methods do not regularly end the dispute in agreement (Church, 2009). Some of the methods used are: walking out and leaving the interactional space where the unilateral departure terminates an ongoing complaint sequence, but not necessarily the dispute (Derlsey & Wootton, 2001); compromise or withdrawal in family interactions where the adult is far more likely to compromise in order to introduce a new topic, and withdrawing is the most socially disruptive as it halts any transition to that new topic (Vuchinich, 1990); de-escalation through mediation where institutional conventions of mediation are exhibited to prevent, resolve and manage disputes which could arise during mediation (Greatbatch & Dingwall, 1997).

The most abrupt resolution to a dispute is to physically leave the interaction. Dersley and Wootton (2001) observed that these walkouts are predicated by some harmful escalation of the dispute; however, though they halt the dispute in that moment, the resolution is temporary as "the nature of the division will need to be addressed" (p.613). In this respect 'resolution' does not cover this outcome – instead, it's a manifestation of an interactional impasse. The participants reach a point where escalation of the confrontation has occurred and the sequential trajectory may propose future conflict, thus restricting the space of some collaborative resolving of the dispute; it is at these points where the authors identified walkouts as happening. This relies on participants being in spaces which afford walkouts, however.

The walking out of a dispute speaks to the problems with resolving a dispute. Once begun, a dispute is an activity that is collaboratively produced by the speakers and as such 'doing disputing' renders disincentives for termination of the dispute (Reynolds, 2011). Those disincentives are the initiating dispute moves outlined in the earlier section (1.2.1.1), insofar as the escalation of the dispute (and thus initiation of new trajectories) thwarts de-escalation or cessation. Leung (2002) explains that disputes arise through the taking of different positions, therefore the primary resolution is through some move toward a similar position. A change of state by a participant, or even an acknowledgment of the other speaker's position, may lead to resolution – often marked with tokens that indicate a change of perspective (e.g. 'oh' (Heritage, 1984a; 2016), 'I mean' (Goodwin, 1990), 'Ach' (Golato, 2010), 'aha' (Weidner, 2016)). The move toward a similar position is, however, accountable for participants in disputes, as otherwise it could be construed as disingenuous in some way, and is certainly marked – and so interactional work ought to be done by the participant to move out of the frame of the dispute.

There is very little research in the ethnomethodological literature that details the

sequential organisation of dispute resolutions in public disputes. These are often

characterisations of actions – Vuchinich (1990) identified some of the characteristics of turns

which are present toward the end of a dispute: submission to the other speaker's position,

third-party intervention, joint compromise, stand-off between speakers, and withdrawal.

Vuchinich noted that the structures of talk display some dominant/submissive relationship

between the speakers or some consensus on the compromise they have arrived at. Moreover,

there are not clear departures from the dispute, but a move from the ongoing dispute to a new

topic or activity and so members pay little attention to closing sequences in disputes. This is

corroborated by Ditchburn's (1988) study on young children's play who that found topic

change constitutes a de-escalation (if collaborative) as the speakers ratify the shift and thus

the abandonment of the dispute. Additionally, Greatbatch and Dingwall (1997) on mediation

services also found that shift topics as proposed by a mediatory can deescalate a dispute,

though the practices they identified (also including: soliciting clarification and sanctioning

the other's conduct) are generic practices in interaction. These findings suggest that

participants do not generally move toward initiating a de-escalation and resolving a dispute

through agreement, but that they attempt a dispute cessation without submission or making

concessions. This interactional research goes some way to identify certain outcomes of

disputes but it is not extensive.

Church (2009) explains that early work on disputes overestimated the extent to which

resolving a dispute actually occurred. She points out that this was a consequence of the non-

empirical data used by researchers. More recent studies (such as Church, 2009) show that

resolutions to disputes are not accomplished, and that an agreement is not always reached.

The termination of a dispute appears to occur through a breakdown in turn taking where

speakers do not take their turn at talk, which permits participants the space to withdraw

without losing face (see Donohue & Kolt, 1992; Vuchinich, 1990). Jackson-Jacobs (2013) observed a similar phenomenon whereby remedial matters in a dispute are brought about by a breakdown. He notes that the breakdown does not resolve independently existing disputes, but that the breakdown is a members' method to manufacture a resolution.

There are a number of studies which explicitly study resolving disputes; however, these studies regard mediation. Mediation in one sense, and as described above, may involve the intervention by a third-party whereby they take a neutral position to propose a trajectory that leads to a resolution. In public disputes this may occur, though it tends to have minimal impact on the resolution of the disputes if the third-party is not ratified as impartial. The other sense of mediation for resolution involves professional mediation services, which are facilitated institutional interactions managed by a neutral facilitator with the aim for non-adversarial resolution (see Firth, 1995; Garcia, 1991; Glenn & Kuttner, 2013; Maynard, 2010). As Glenn and Susskind (2010) and Stokoe and Sikveland (2016) explain, most of this previous research has been based on self-report data, surveys and interviews. Despite the differences in data collection, in these institutional interactions the participants are already orienting to some resolution, and the disputes are characterised as drawn out over a long period of time with multiple episodes constituting the dispute (Garcia, 1991). This renders the resolution as an intended outcome unlike public disputes where the outcome is often the opposite – no resolution.

This section has reviewed literature that answers *why* people argue. First, I explored literature which revealed motivations and reasons for people arguing, for instance, how some environments 'reward' people for disputing, and how disputes can support the development of social relationships and skills. I then examined what interactional studies have to say about *why* people argue – specifically, focusing on the openings and outcomes of disputes. I

detailed literature that demonstrates how interactional research can precisely show what actually occurs in disputes i.e. how they arise, to demonstrate that *why* is not the question that should be asked. Rather, we should leave the motivation and reason ascription to the disputers themselves and ask how they go about availing those motivations and reasons in and through the dispute. Specifically, I outlined the three-part structure of dispute initiation whereby speakers oppose and ratify the opposition to collaborate in doing disputing and discussed the limited literature on those 'reopening moves', i.e. how new trajectories or challenges are brought off in the dispute. Finally, I described possible outcomes of disputes. Those outcomes are ways that disputes can end but do not speak to the difficulty of having a resolution for a dispute. Indeed, people do not ostensibly *win* or *lose* in disputes as evidenced by the existence of mediation services, which points to the difficulty of resolving disputes. The purpose of a dispute then, as empirically-grounded research shows, is that it affords a particular frame and structure through which people are able to suspend certain conversational 'norms' of mundane talk to espouse opinions, challenge, and resist. In the following section I will detail those specific practices.

1.3 Interactional approaches to disputes

Thus far I have drawn on a number of interactional studies which have examined disputes; in this section I will expand on these studies to specifically exhibit the insights generated by paying close attention to talk-in-interaction in disputes. M.H. Goodwin's early work (1980; 1982; 1983; 1987; 1990) on children's disputes set much of the groundwork for future studies that examined interaction in disputes. She challenged the assumptions that working-class children's talk was too deficient for systematic analysis and that disputes are forms of deficiencies (Allen & Guy, 1974 cf. Goodwin, 1990). Goodwin investigated how children do disputing, specifically how opposition is built through ways such as: pointing to

inconsistencies in prior talk to remove the grounds for disagreement; recycling their position to sustain a dispute; format tying where speakers tie their argumentative move to an earlier point in the sequence by modifying a repeat of an earlier turn to display their adversarial stance. Goodwin's investigation clearly underscored why interactional approaches are useful and valid and why focusing on areas of social life that are otherwise considered 'messy', 'deficient' or 'troublesome' can provide fruitful insights into the social order of everyday life.

In more recent times, and building on the pioneering work of Goodwin, Reynolds' work (2011; 2015; Reynolds & Fitzgerald, 2015) focuses on an under-researched area of interaction – disputes in public. These are disputes which occur in public spaces (e.g. radio, on the street, on public transport etc.), they usually involve two participants unknown to each other, and are available to onlookers/overhearers. He synthesised different ethnomethodological approaches, i.e. different methods in the study of interaction, to examine how speakers work to construct social norms and subsequently bring off challenges based on those norms. In doing this he showed how people produced themselves as 'agents of social order' to cast their opponent as normatively challengeable despite their largely symmetrical power relation. Reynolds argues that in disputes, this practice of manufacturing social norms does not result in a 'win' nor even force a concession, but it does 'reset' the talk, with the challenger controlling the direction of the subsequent talk. Reynolds showed the shift between disputative talk to non-disputative talk whilst remaining in the frame of the dispute; consequently, that parties construct and do norms-in-action and by doing so can position their opponent as failing to adhere to certain norms. His investigation pioneers a novel interactional approach by combining ethnomethodological approaches and examines a unique context: public disputes. His work, building on the similarly novel work of Goodwin, produces a clear framework for combining interactional approaches, for the close

examination of ostensibly disordered talk, and for further research that reveals how participants challenge and treat the 'norms' of social life.

To build on Goodwin and Reynolds' work, I will first detail some features that are central to understanding social interaction. This section does three things in that regard: first, I explain how talk is sequentially organised. Specifically, I explore the practices that constitute *challenges* in a dispute as well *resistance*, and how these practices sequentially unfold and are interrelated. In doing so I will also examine disagreement, disalingment and disaffiliation with regard to how participants unproblematically do all three without disrupting the disputing activity. Second, I will review literature which focuses on moral order in disputes – how people configure who they are and their relationships with one another, and how they mobilise categories, during disputes. This is done in order to build on the prior two sections which focused on how disputes begin and end, to show how disputes unfold on a turn-by-turn basis.

1.3.1 Sequential organisation of disputes

In previous sections, I outlined the general structural organisation of disputes – specifically on the sequential ratification of a dispute. In this section, I will detail three specific sequential phenomena which are discussed throughout this thesis. First, I explain a 'challenge', what a challenge is, what its function is in a dispute, and how they are manifest in and through the talk. I will then outline a potential (and common) response to these challenges: *resistance*. In this section I provide an overview of what constitutes resistance, its sequential placement, and its pertinence for disputes. I will finish by examining (dis)agreement, (dis)alignment and (dis)affiliation and how these are expressed in and through sequences and their interrelatedness.

The importance of studying sequence organisation was established by the ground-breaking work of Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974) and has since been the underlying basis for much, if not all, future Conversation Analytic work. Sequence is important as it does not restrict analysis to a single turn at talk but to multiple turns so that we can examine the action as it unfolds and is treated by the other participant(s).

1.3.1.1 Challenges

Challenges constitute a large part of what occurs during a dispute. In a vernacular sense, a challenge is a difficult task and to challenge is to provide opposition against some turn/item/practice/action. In disputes they occur as initiating actions that position the challenger as taking some adversarial stance toward the other speaker's prior turn(s). There is little EMCA research on the interactional phenomenon that occupies the space of a *challenge*. Sacks explores 'challenges' in the context of games (1995, p.360), in that any turn has a variety of interpretations and that a 'challenge' is one of those possible interpretations and their primary operation is to select next speaker (p.667). Moreover, he explains that challenges are rendered in their uptake and it's through some denial, rejection or more general resistance of that challenge that we can understand the turn as a challenge; therefore, a 'challenge' is grounded in how participants treat it as a challenge and not, for instance, as a warning. This has limitations for how we understand a challenge – as speakers can challenge without that challenge being treated as such, the following section goes some way to pin down what a challenge is, and how, as analysts we can treat turns as challenging.

Any interactional phenomenon may largely constitute a challenge, insofar as oppositional talk retains all of the sequential properties of mundane talk. Challenges should not be understood as a single phenomenon which does opposition, but rather a taxonomy of actions/devices/practices that afford the speaker the opportunity to straightforwardly counter

some prior turn. Reynolds (2011; 2013; 2015) has largely conceptualised challenges as 'phases' to illustrate how a specific type of challenge – an enticer – gets brought off. He explains that parties to the dispute are rendered as 'challenger' and 'target', and that these are the component parts of any dispute (Goodwin & Goodwin, 1987). The initiating side of the sequence, trajectory or device can be understood – in that moment – as the challenger, with the responder understood as the target. These roles may (and probably will) be reconstituted by the members themselves throughout the talk as they seek to challenge the opinions, views, beliefs etc. of the other speaker.

An area of EMCA literature where *challenges* are discussed is in terms of epistemics. Parties in talk continuously display their epistemic 'status' in relation to one another (who knows what, who has the rights to know what, and the degree to which participants are well/ill-informed or to what degree they are committed to their talk). Participants' statuses are manifested through their word choice, turn design and action formation, which constitutes the participants' epistemic stance (Heritage, 2011; 2012a; 2012b; 2013). Parties in mundane conversation maintain congruency between the apparent epistemic stance in a turn and their displayed epistemic status in relation to the topic and the other party's epistemic status (Heritage, 2013). This notwithstanding, disalignment between parties can and does occur. Thus, *challenges* occur through participants negotiating whose view is more legitimate, or who has mastery over the accessible matters and within whose epistemic domain those matters fall (Heritage & Raymond, 2005; Heritage, 2012a). In disputes, as in all talk, epistemic status and stance "supply the basic axes around which variations in practices, actions and outcomes will be organized" (Raymond, 2018, p.66).

Challenges then, avail an adversarial stance, initiate trajectories, and create contingencies for the next speaker with respect to how they will respond. Koshik explains that "[wh-questions] can be used as challenges because they convey a strong epistemic stance of the questioner, specifically a negative assertion" (2003, p.52). Challenges do not have to convey disagreement or disaffiliation with the other speaker, but they are sequentially implicative (Schegloff, 1987) and may comprise a non-aligning response to the prior turn whilst also initiating a new/different trajectory. Consequently, turns are designed as harder to challenge than others, often because their lack of specificity and ambiguous natures renders them easily defensible against such a challenge (Kitzinger, 2000). Therefore, challenges can be understood as emerging as responsive to some prior turn that avails an oppositional stance toward that prior turn whilst also initiating a new/different trajectory. However, this oppositional stance and new/different trajectory can only be ratified by their uptake.

Challenges are a fuzzy category in EMCA – it does not have the quality of a technical term, but it is something that is observable in disputes and thus something that can be pinned down. The research outlined above goes some way to identify what a challenge could possibly look like, and how a challenge can possibly function, but precisely how challenges can be deployed to initiate a new trajectory of talk and thus possibly *win* a turn-at-talk requires more research.

1.3.1.2 Resistance

Resistance as something accomplished in and through talk-in-interaction has been examined across a number of interactional contexts. These contexts influence what the resistance will look like, as each context constrains and affords resources for the participants. For instance, patient's can resist by introducing obstacles to compliance as a resource to actively

participate in the ongoing activity (Barton, et al., 2016); in emergency calls, callers can politely issue resistance so not be designedly obstructive yet block a trajectory of action (issuing CPR) (Berger, et al., 2016); in family mealtimes where the issuing of a threat sets up response options to either comply with the threat (e.g. finishing a meal to be able to go to the ballet) or resist (e.g. spitting out food as a response to the threat of no pudding if the meal is not finished) (Hepburn & Potter, 2011); in sales calls where salespeople work to minimise the grounds for resistance to occur by pre-empting those reasons for resistance (e.g. mentioning the difficulty of arranging a meeting and providing a solution in the same turn) (Humă, Stokoe & Sikveland, 2019); in counselling where patients resist talking about personal experience by producing themselves as the 'owner' of those experiences (i.e. claiming primary rights to talk about that experience) (Muntigl et al., 2013) etc. Resistance, across these studies, is generally understood as a practice enacted in and through talk that does not comply with, or evades, the prior turn in some way. This design may be straightforwardly aligning, or seemingly affiliative (Stivers, 2010), yet it infers some trouble with some prior turn (Drew, 2018). One of Sacks' (1995, p.xvii) first inclinations toward the analysability of talk was through hearing resistance – how the procedural rules of talk are flouted in unproblematic ways for members. Resistance is squarely considered as a difficulty of some sort where speakers are not going along with what is being attempted. Consequently, this marks resistance as a fruitful avenue of research for disputes as it is not only a phenomenon itself, but also exhibits a members' ratification of disputes, i.e. not accepting or going along with the challenger's opposition.

Resistance has rarely been addressed empirically – the focus for EMCA has been on the precise operations of talk in interaction (e.g. sequence, repair, action) rather than those 'products' which are accomplished through the use of those operations. Resistance can be done in and through talk; it can be a members' project, or a members' practice, and is

accomplished through various actions depending upon what is being resisted, and this may include: Clark and Pinch (2001) who argue that inaction or minimal contributions in sales-calls are obstacles for the salesperson despite earlier literature considering them as evidence of 'thinking'; incipient compliance to a directive which provides a space for resistance to occur as it projects compliance as about to occur yet defies the speaker's entitlement to issue a directive (e.g. a child being asked to 'eat nicely' responding by looking as if they are going to eat yet perform other actions (having a drink) to push their compliance deeper into the sequence) (Kent, 2012), etc. Evaldsson (2017) treats resistance as a participant's agenda that is built through denials, justifications, counteraccusations and substitutions (and presumably other interactional features). Widdicombe (2017) on the other hand, examines question-answer sequences and explains that questions may be designed to alleviate the answerer's potential resistance to the sensitive issues involved with self-identification. Indeed, for members, resistance is attended to as a resource or obstacle – it may be operationalised in a number of ways to suppress an action or activity, and it may also be pre-empted through turn-design in order to manage delicate business.

Resistance is powerful – it can be brought off through various actions and can be done at any moment in and through the talk. In disputes, resistance is treated as a preferred response. As discussed in an earlier section, disputes are collaboratively constructed, and this is done through oppositional turns; and so resistance is a relevant product for every turn produced by the speakers. It is thus difficult to pin down precisely what constitutes resistance, though very generally resistance is the not-going-along-with, or outright rejection, of a course of action, and as such has to be managed by the challenger. Resistance gets managed through turn design (Drew, 1987) wherein challenges are done in ways to obstruct potential resistance. Sikveland, Kevoe-Feldman, and Stokoe (2019) demonstrated this by showing how police negotiators levy challenges at people in crisis to subvert their resistance

and achieve a turning point (i.e change the suicidal person's stance toward the negotiation). Reynolds' (2015) enticers are an example of this – they seek to suspend a presupposition and trap the target into a line of argument before producing a challenge that is difficult to dismiss given the target's earlier response. Similarly, Drew and Holt (1988) and Kitzinger (2000) showed how the design of idioms renders them difficult to resist, as they are produced in ways which are unspecific and ambiguous and thus easily defensible against any possible resistive interpretation of them by another speaker. It's in these ways that the design of resistance informs us about how participants themselves are managing the 'problem' of resistance and the degree to which a resistive turn has disrupted the progressivity of the other speaker's agenda (Muntigl et al., 2013; Stivers & Robinson, 2006).

Hester and Hester (2010) underscore that resistance is accomplished through actions (rebuttals, accounts, mimicry etc.) that oppose an earlier turn: they show how resistance may be used to do non-compliance with an implied category (thereby not accepting that category) and serve as a springboard to gain the upper hand. Similarly, Kent (2012) also showed how resistance is used to refuse ceding control of their actions to a directive speaker and to 'buy time' which incrementally denies, or just delays, compliance. These findings explicate resistance as culminating in disobedient or defiant outcomes. Consequently, theoretical conceptualisations of 'resistance' have been unpicked as interactional phenomena, which have led to a re-examination Milgram's 'obedience' experiments (Gibson, in press; Hollander, 2015; Reicher & Haslam, 2011). This critical work has shown the usefulness of taking an interactional approach to data – in the original Milgram experiment, subjects administered electric shocks to participants, finding that people are more than likely to comply (Milgram, 1974). However, the re-examination from an interactional perspective highlighted that resistance occurs when requests for the subject to administer a further electric shock is framed as an order (see Reicher & Haslam, 2011). Hollander (2015) argues

that the directives issued make compliance or non-compliance a relevant response, and so subjects mobilise a range of practices that can be considered as defiant or obedient. Hollander showed how the responses go along with the activity by pushing forward the talk, and yet build resistance implicitly or explicitly throughout their turns to postpone administering the shocks. This careful examination of the talk showed how, though compliance occurs at the level of the activity, at most opportunities the subjects will attempt defiance and halt the continuation (if only temporarily) of that activity.

In his work, Hollander (2015, p.429) stresses that these cases "are only possible instances that may or may not be amenable to grounded analysis as resistive", though resistance is a *possible* and can be treated that way by the participants independent from the response (Schegloff, 2006). Hollander goes on to outline six forms of resistance whereby the participants postpone continuation or project discontinuation with the ongoing activity (in this case, the obedience experiments): (1) silence and hesitation, (2) imprecating, (3) laughing, (4) addressing the learner, (5), prompting the experimenter, and (6) attempting to stop the experiment with accounts. Gibson (in press) builds on this to discuss how participants resist through crafting shared membership with the experiment on some basis other than experimenter-participant-subject, thereby reconfiguring their relationship in order to account for disobedience. Sacks (1995) analyses this kind of relational reconfiguration as the practice of *partitioning*; I will discuss this in the analysis. These operations are interpreted as possible points of resistance; however, they are understandable as resistance by way of the experimenter (the respondent) designing their responsive turns in ways which manage the interactional consequences of a disruption to the activity's progressivity.

Thus far I have broadly reviewed literature which has examined resistance as the product of various interactional phenomenon; however, for disputes, understanding

'resistance' as a unique practice is difficult, given that almost every turn is resistive in some way. Consequently, those studies reviewed unpack resistance in the course of an interactional project (e.g. getting children to eat more vegetables); there is limited research that captures how *resistance* is brought off when the participants are actively engaged in disagreeing with one another. Dooley et al. (2019) go some way to identify different forms of resistance: active or passive. They define passive resistance as delayed, withheld or minimal responses, whereas active resistance takes the form of explicit statements of non-agreement. Moreover, they note "the social delicacy in disagreement means active resistance […] occurs more infrequently" (p.213). Though their study examined people with dementia resisting treatment, this model goes some way to explicate different forms of resistance and what they accomplish. Passive resistance (as less explicit forms of disagreement) as being more common in their findings and in the previously mentioned studies, may be built into speakers' turns during a dispute; however, active resistance – where participants effectively work to disagree – is what constitutes a dispute.

To sum up, interactional research into resistance provides us an empirically grounded examination of how members accomplish resistance. Resistance is disobedience (Gibson, in press), yet disputes are a specific activity where disobedience is presupposed and so participants work to be seen as actively disagreeing so that they do not concede their own position. While EMCA has only recently begun investigating how members manipulate various operations to suppress, or do non-compliance, those studies already provide details of how resistance unfolds sequentially. That notwithstanding, a great deal of the research thus far has focused on institutional interactions i.e. interactions where there is some apparent 'goal' or activity to be completed. Consequently, there is very little interactional research which focuses on resistance in disputes and even less which details the forms of resistance

and their sequential placement.

1.3.1.3 (Dis)- agreement/alignment/preference/affiliation

Disputes are characterised by disagreement; disagreement occurs when a speaker's views differ from those expressed by other speakers (Sifanou, 2012). Ishihara (2016) defines three types of disagreement: mitigated, unmitigated and aggravated. The first two broadly map to Pomerantz' (1984) weak and strong disagreements (produced with or without delay, hedges, pauses etc.). Ishihara's third category are those disagreements which are upgraded and capture the explicitness of the disagreement. Understanding disagreement as a form of disputes has been purported (see Grimshaw, 1990; Kakavá, 1993; Waldron & Applegate, 1994) with disagreement considered as incompatible views.

> "The very existence of conflict and schism in social life depends on the possibility of there being alternative and competing accounts of the same social event" (Drew, 1998, p.322).

On the contrary, some authors (e.g. Goodwin, 1982; Schmitt & Márquez-Reiter, 2019) view disagreement as a part of dispute though not necessarily constitutive of a dispute. Schmitt and Márquez-Reiter (2019) note that disagreements are regularly found in a dispute's initial moves as disagreement reveals and allows underlying conflict to emerge. In any case, disagreement is central to how disputes unfold.

Disagreement is a presupposed feature of a dispute as all parties will engage in some oppositional behaviour that necessitates disagreement. Disagreements are tied into preference structure (Pomerantz, 1984) as being dispreferred responses. Disprefered responses are not keyed into what people *(dis)prefer* for the next turn but rather, what action is being done and

the delivery of that action i.e. hedged or following a pause. Sacks (1987) explains this as preference for contiguity – that if an agreeing answer occurs then it occurs contiguously and quickly, whereas a disprefered response may be delayed and "pushed rather deep in to the turn" (p.58). This is a structural consideration, preference structure regards how turns are marked rather than the individual's wishes and that any turn following a delay may be heard as a rejection, declination or some disagreement (Heritage, 1984a). Moreover, preference is action-oriented – that is, for every action that a person does there is always an alternative which has different implications for the sequence trajectory and participants' relationship. In disputes, however, preference structure is somewhat 'reversed'. Pomerantz (1984) discusses this in terms of the local context in which the response emerges, as such, in disputes those markers of a disprefered response (delays, pushing the response deep into the turn) do not regularly occur. For disputes, preference relies on the action being done – specifically, to reveal why this particular way of espousing a view, demanding, instructing etc. is being done over possible alternatives.

> "there is no shortage of dispreferred responses in talk-in-interaction. Every social setting is a world full of diverse interests and turf and stances, all being managed (among other ways) in talk-in-interaction, and these are not suppressed or dominated by the organisation of preference/dispreference" (Schegloff, 2006, p.72).

In the local context of disputes, parties are engaged in oppositional talk and every turn constitutes a 'win' through achieving speakership to further do opposition. This facilitates an alternate preference structure where turns which disagree are produced as a preferred response. Consequently, disputes are highly constrained, collaborative environments with constrained and collaborative management of allowable disagreement reversed with respect to mundane everyday talk.

Incipient conflict may be marked through disalignment (Glenn, 2019). For instance, Heritage and Sefi (1992) explain that someone giving advice represents a claim that they are more knowledgeable and thus problematises the recipient's competence by displaying their own knowledge, and rights to espouse that knowledge. Furthermore, Shaw and Hepburn (2013) detail how people show unwillingness or hesitation to occupy the role of advice recipient. It is in this sense that the disalignment occurs through the advice-giver orienting to some fault or deficiency with the recipient. Disalignment between turns does not necessarily constitute a dispute but the disaligning does afford moments of disruption or resistance which can mark incipient conflict between speakers. Similarly, disalignment between turns is unlike disalignment between speakers (Schegloff, 2007).

Relational disalignment can occur whilst the speakers are structurally aligned – this is known as (dis)affiliation. This is present when a speaker displays some experiential, emotive or some otherwise affective stance toward a topic or action and in doing so affords the other speaker(s) opportunities to (dis)affiliate with that stance. A speaker may affiliate with a stance if that speaker's turn supports the espoused stance and/or agrees with the preferred response; Stivers et al. (2011, p.21) describe affiliation as turns which "match the prior speaker's evaluative stance […] and/or cooperate with the preference of the prior action". On the contrary, a speaker may convey disaffiliation with their co-interlocutor if the response spoils solidarity between them (see Heritage, 1984a). In this sense, collaborative complaining sequences (where speakers complain about some third-party) are achieved through *affiliative* turns which progress the sequence as collaborative. Howbeit, *disaffiliation* may occur if the reception of the complaint is resistant to the prior turn or is delivered with prosodic downgrading (see Couper-Kuhlen, 2012; Drew & Walker, 2009), though disaffiliation is rendered in its uptake, as no response is inherently (dis)affiliative (Lee & Tanaka, 2016;

Stivers, 2008). Stivers (2008) shows the inextricable boundedness of (dis)affiliation and (dis)alignment with a discussion of how participants do storytelling. Stivers explains that in storytelling, turns can be structurally fitted with the in-progress activity but disaffiliate with regards to the unfittedness of one's stance with the other speaker(s)'.

Disputes take for granted disagreement as a core feature with which they are organised, and (dis)preference, (dis)alignment and (dis)affiliation provide analytic tools to illuminate the structural and relational work which is done in and through talk-in-interaction. In this regard, I follow Butler et al. (2011) and Stivers et al. (2011) who illustrate the interrelatedness of alignment and its 'structural character', and affiliation and its 'evaluative character', to demonstrate how relational issues are managed in and through the organisation of the interaction and how they intersect. Consequently, though the participants may be disaffiliated through their antipodal positions, they are, in fact, aligned. As discussed in the previous sections, participants collaboratively produce 'disputes' as a joint activity and as such are *structurally* aligned even if they are not *relationally* aligned. In the following section, I unpack the consequence of affiliation and alignment by exploring the moral properties of talk.

1.3.2 Moral order

Affiliation and alignment regard peoples' stances and positions toward views, opinions, beliefs, events, items etc. in talk. It is through these interactional details of how people manage whether they are affiliated or aligned with their co-interlocutor that we can begin to see how people treat the world around them – and thus what they treat as good/bad or right/wrong. Morality is an intrinsic property of disputes (and all interaction). It has a large extant body of literature across the social sciences. Morality is an abstract notion between

right and *wrong*, or *good* and *bad*. Bergmann (1998) discusses this in terms of how the possibility of choice presupposes an attribution of responsibility – so morality is not an abstract notion, but rather it is grounded in orderliness and normativity. Indeed, morality is done in and through social interaction and is salient for disputes as speakers may generate opposition on the basis of the possibility of choice, whereby a speaker may ascribe blame because of the other speaker's chosen path.

Morality and the moral order underpin intersubjectivity and they are core to the conducting of any interaction (Goffman, 1967). Indeed, the moral order describes the orderly conduct in any given interaction – it describes the way in which members' rights and obligations are laminated in and through the talk. The orderliness of the moral order relies on members' use and is anchored to the local environment. Transgressions of these rights and obligations may lead to a disagreement (Kent, 2012), trouble (Jefferson, 2015), and/or a face-threat (Goffman, 1981). Disputes then, are inexorably tied to morality. Though Grimshaw (1990) notes that disputes 'leave' the orderly, it is rather a reconstitution of orderliness – what is ordered for this environment whereby the members enter a new *game*. Garfinkel (1967) sought to examine this with his 'breaches' where routinised activities were violated in some way, which may lead to a dispute because of the transgression. This disrupted peoples' common-sense understandings of how interaction ought to happen thus highlighting that conduct as irregular, and 'wrong/bad' according to those common-sense understandings. However, unlike recent linguistic pragmatic work (see Kádár et al., 2019; Horgan, 2019), understanding *disputes* as inherently transgressive of how we act is problematic for ethnomethodology – disputes are (as will be shown throughout the analysis) highly ordered and are conducted with respect to what is *ordinary* for this context, and a dispute's

'ordinariness' may be transgressed. As such, the interlocutors fashion a moral order as they negotiate what is ordinary, and what counts as transgressive for their environment.

Morality is negotiable, and thus what counts as right/wrong, or bad/good and how people ought to act is shaped by interlocutors in their specific environments. Kádár et al. (2019, p.24) explain that "genuine conflict and aggression […] may ultimately never become fully ordinary", which may be true insofar as disputes are seen as violating the mundanity of everyday life – but people regularly and unproblematically engage in rule-governed disputes, so disputes are *ordinary* in an interactional sense for those involved. Moreover, participants in the dispute may metadiscursively invoke an alternate moral order of non-disputative talk (what Kádár et al. (2019) term 'ordinary') as a resource for bringing off challenges; therefore, members themselves exhibit the *ordinariness* of the dispute through sanctioning non-disputative behaviour.

1.3.2.1 Attending to transgressive talk

Public disputes are understood as departures from everyday, mundane and public talk, i.e. they are transgressions of how people ought to act in public. This section will focus on a single way that speakers treat a normal structure of talk: how speakers talk about talk and deal with transgressions against that 'normal'. Throughout the previous sections I have detailed certain features which have been described in the literature; in this section I will explore a resource which can be drawn on at any moment in the talk to accomplish a challenge or resistance. That resource is meta-talk, or meta-discourse: meta-discourse refers to participants' conduct above and outside of the current interaction. It is the language that speakers use to describe what speakers are doing in their talk (Craig, 2008). Craig (1999) defines two types of meta-discourse: meta-talk which constitutes research and theory about

talk, and the practical meta-talk of everyday life. The first is an analyst's concern and the second is what occurs during disputes. This is a member's resource – where there is a mispronouncing, a noticeable absence of talk, or some otherwise noticeable item of talk that is marked, then this can be furnished in the talk as meta-talk. For instance:

Speaker 1: WHAT ARE YOU DOING?

Speaker 2: Why are you shouting at me?

Speaker 1: Oh sorry I didn't mean to

Speaker 2: it's okay

In the above example, speaker 2 holds speaker 1 accountable for the delivery of their talk and in doing so disrupts the adjacency pair of question/answer (though it could be heard as a request to stop whatever it is that speaker 2 is doing). Drawing on meta-talk is a unique and readily available resource for participants (Lucy, 1993): it provides opportunities to challenge or resist in delicate ways which do not need to consider the other's stance, but rather their conduct. Meta-talk is a readily available resource that pushes the talk forward in a way that (1) does not reach a point of closure (on the other's terms), and (2) restricts the grounds to argue back. The restricting is accomplished as meta-talk does not directly address a particular person, but speaks to the good of society (at least within the dispute frame).

There is a relative scarcity of research on meta-talk. Tracy (2011; 2016) discusses how judges use meta-talk whilst attending to their 'neutral' position, though Tracy does note that meta-talk is not needed when making an argument but rather for referring to those arguments that are being made. In psychotherapy, meta-talk is regarded as good thing for participants as it permits a reflection on prior talk to move up 'perceptual hierarchies' (Cannon et al., 2019). Burdett et al., (2019) underscore this finding to explain that meta-talk reflects an orientation on how their own experience, as conveyed in and through talk, may be

received in different ways depending upon the perspective of the receiver. As such, they explain that meta-talk gets deployed to deal with and anticipate a possible reception of the participants' prior talk. Though this research does not focus on disputative talk, their findings offer a framework for understanding how meta-talk functions in a particular environment.

Interaction is suffused with meta-talk, which Yankah (1995) examines through how speakers in formal interaction (i.e. orators) can have their role spun around through doing meta-talk; moreover, this 'spinning around' regards how meta-talk continually references the 'norms' of communication with the situated discourse within which it occurs. This is similar to Romaniuk (2015) who examines 'meta-sexist' talk in political discussions: she explains that 'meta-sexist' talk gets minimised, trivialised and ultimately used to undermine the legitimacy of the accuser's position. She shows the risk and the cost of doing meta-talk which directly accuses and refers back to some prior turn. Meta-talk then, is a readily accessible and easily usable resource for members but it has its risks – holding someone accountable for their prior talk is a sanctionable move. Meta-talk is thus inexorably tied to the moral order. The aforementioned research indicates that meta-talk is usable to treat prior turns as in some way problematic or disruptive and thus characterise the other speaker's behaviour as unreasonable or immoral in some way. Meta-talk is an omnipresent resource for all participants in talk and reveals their own reasoning and attendance to sense-making practices, i.e. what a 'normal' structure of talk ought to look like. Consequently, meta-talk in disputes is a fruitful avenue for research, as disputes regard some violation to the 'normal' structure of everyday talk and thus evidence ought to be found, in how and when members do meta-talk, that the members themselves are attending to that violation of the normal as accountable behaviour.

1.3.2.1 Culture and relationships

In this section I will review literature that examines how people, in disputes, reproduce culture and how speakers configure their relationship with their co-disputant in talk. One way to get at these features of talk is through Membership Categorisation Analysis. I will largely focus on membership categorisation analytic literature herein, though I will also outline Membership Categorisation Analysis as an analytic approach in the Methodology (Chapter 2). In disputes, speakers recurrently work out 'who-they-are and what-they're-doing' (Fitzgerald, 2012), and as such exhibit their methods for sense-making. To this end, an overlooked consideration of disputes are the situated aspects of identity work (Watson, 1997) and the practical actions that a speaker's identity affords. Work on disputes which focuses on who-the-speaker-is is varied, but is largely limited in scope to institutional interactions. Stokoe (2003; 2009) for example details the mediation services' dealing with neighbour disputes: Stokoe shows how speakers' categories i.e. who they are, are used to accomplish actions in the service of complaining and how this categorisation work maintains normative gendered practices. Additionally, Stokoe (2010) builds on these findings to examine the denial of accusations in police interrogations, highlighting how discourses of male violence get maintained through everyday talk. These studies showcase the usefulness of examining who speakers are and how they work that out in order to tease out how those categories are purposefully deployed by people to accomplish some action. Examining categories and their deployment can reveal to us the discriminatory, inculpatory, and/or moral practices of everyday life.

There are two broad ways with which research has focused on speakers' identity, relationships and the production of culture to illuminate disputes in some way. First, there are some which examine how discourses of conflict get propagated through category work –

most notably, Eglin and Hester (2003) in their analysis of the Montreal Massacre. They show that the victim/perpetrator categories are situated as locally ordered practical actions. Similarly, Leudar and Nekvapil (1998) and Leudar et al. (2004) show that categories are deployed in ways which are related to the actions being brought off, and it is through these actions that speakers can work to delimit their moral, social and religious characteristics. Furthermore, they explain that parties to a dispute are not incumbents of independent categories but rather, are incumbents of a "double contrastive identity" (2004, p.262) whereby they all belong to the *us* and the *them* are united as opposition inside of the dispute frame – be it a religious war (2004), a battle of civility (1998), or claims to nationhood (Housley & Fitzgerald, 2001). These studies demonstrate how discourses of conflict – massacres, religious war, civil unrest or devolution of power – get produced on the micro-interactional level as category disputes.

The second way that authors focus on identity, relationships and culture is through examining the moral order. Who speakers are and how they exhibit that is morally implicative – this is clearly illustrated when one category takes precedence over another such as a 'mother' assuming the categorial identity of 'police commissioner' (and its associated rights, responsibilities and concerns) to work as the reason for fulfilling or failing the category-bound obligations of 'mother'. Therefore, categories are highly consequential in disputes (see Jayyusi, 1984) and related to problems of: what to do in a particular situation, assessing what the other speaker did, ascertaining what the other speaker will do, or adducing why the speaker did that. In Jayyusi's words: "[categories] are tied into normative *action contexts* – and the questions above are all questions about *actions*" (p.137). Consequently, categories avail members' understandings of their own, and the other speaker(s), values, as well as the relative moral implicativeness of certain acts in certain environments. Radburn

and Hosley (2011) demonstrate this to reveal how conflict can occur in poker. They present an analysis which shows how speakers claim the rights to occupy certain categories, with members of 'poker playing' negotiating and legitimising themselves as professionals and not mavericks, or gamblers.

Categories in disputes have broadly been examined as contributing to a larger discourse of conflict or as morally implicative in the local environment. Examining categories may also reveal how disjunctures between them can cause, or even remedy, a dispute, as (Eglin (1979), in his analysis of a newspaper article and press release, showed through the ways that members' create disjunctures that rationalisation can occur by making 'reality' appear differently. Moreover, Reynolds' (2015) research largely focused on how groups are organised in disputes, particularly the categorisation work that those members accomplish. It is impossible to complain about someone without invoking who that person is. Categories then are an interesting and highly consequential area of research in disputes, as it is not about what identities the people possess, but how they deploy who-they-are (to each other) and thus what challenges can be produced or how resistance can be shaped in the talk. This shows how fruitful disputes are as an area of membership categorisation research – there are multiple avenues that reveal the sense-making practices of people during disputes.

1.4 Discussion

This review represents an initial organisation of some key areas of research that directly speak to what a dispute is and how people do disputing. The literature has gone some way to pin down exactly what a dispute is and some of the features common to disputes (depending on the environment within which they occur). Throughout this chapter I highlighted how

interactional research provides a unique approach for understanding disputes and revealing the specific practices that occur in disputes. In this chapter I reviewed literature relevant to the analysis of this thesis – specifically, examining the interactional details of disputes. I began by providing an overview of disputes as a topic of research and how they have been examined across various disciplines. I then provided a taxonomy of a dispute, where I drew on existing literature to differentiate between specific definitions before concluding that, although I can provide a differentiation between terms and justify my own use of 'disputes', that ultimately it serves little benefit to the actual analysis. In doing this, I drew on Wittgenstein to explain that the boundaries of these terms are fuzzy and that often the terms are only used to describe a specific practice within a dispute. I concluded with a justification of my use of 'disputes' as constitutive of the activity whereby members have taken oppositional stances (in some regard) yet retaining 'conflict' as an escalation, or as a drawn-out (collection), of disputes.

Next, I explored *why* people argue. Here, I began by exploring literature that ascribed reasons and motivations for why people ague. I then reviewed ethnomethodological literature to discuss how *disputes* may be framed as a social problem and requiring of a resolution (thus hinting at the idea that disputes are dysfunctional); however, I countered this by discussing the product of a dispute. I illustrated the openings of disputes and some outcomes of disputes – this respecified the question of *why* people argue through showing what actually causes disputes in the first instance, and the difficulty with reaching an outcome. I demonstrated how a dispute begins: as three moves from an 'antecedent event', and what those outcomes could be: walkouts, stand-offs, mediation etc. I concluded by explaining that disputes are not an aberration of talk, but rather a particular context that affords oppositional stances to be brought to the fore.

The final section regarded certain practices features of disputes – here, I reviewed literature which deals with interactional features and outlined instances where more research is needed, specifically around challenges, resistance, and meta-talk in disputes. For challenges and resistance, I discussed the fuzziness of the terms – that they do not have the quality of a technical terms yet are observable in disputes. Indeed, research is needed to pin down what challenges and resistance may look like, where they occur during a dispute and more importantly, how people deal with the interactional contingencies of challenges and resistance. The body of research reviewed throughout this chapter highlights what we already know about disputes and its implications for what could be avenues for future exploration. Though the literature examined focused solely on disputes, or conflict in some manner, there have been very few conversation analytic studies which examine structural features of talk across different disputative contexts. There has been little research (see Reynolds, 2015; Reber, 2019) on how participants *resist* a challenge. For example, how can participants *safely* suppress a possible enticing challenge? And what does this resistance look like? The examination of how Reynolds' enticers are resisted shows how members, at the earliest possible point of projection, take a turn which designedly disrupts the trajectory or tacitly pushes back against the base of the enticer. Additionally, what occurs in response to this resistance? The bringing off or suppression of challenges is also underexplored – specifically, understanding what a challenge actually is and how this influences and is influenced by who the people are (to each other) as demonstrated in the talk.

One thing is for certain – the extant interactional literature typically focuses on single environments of disputes (classroom, mediation, workplace etc.), but none looks across environments to uncover the common features of talk which can be found in those different environments. So, examining features of disputes across contexts not only informs us of members' routine practices for doing disputing, but also how these practices converge or

diverge from non-disputative talk. This thesis undertakes an empirical analysis of public disputes. This offers insights into what constitutes a public dispute by looking across different interactional contexts, and also how a public dispute sequentially unfolds by applying interactional methods. By employing three interactional methods (Conversation Analysis, Membership Categorisation Analysis, and Discursive Psychology), this thesis offers an original contribution to the sequential, moral, and psychological understanding of people arguing. The synthesis of these approaches serves to uncover how people behave within public disputes. This adds to existing psychological, sociology, and linguistic research on disputes by demonstrating how people themselves understand public disputes – without relying on any previous argumentation theories to account for certain behaviours. Whilst ethnomethodological approaches are inductive, the research within this thesis is largely guided by some core enquiries:

(1) What resources are strangers afforded in a dispute? (Chapter 3).

(2) What are members' practices for doing resistance in disputes? (Chapter 5).

(3) What are the categorial implications of disputing? (Chapter 4 and 5).

(4) How is the relationship between participants (re)configured during a dispute? (Chapter 4).

The following chapter will focus on the methodological approach, including: how data was collected, how it was organised and chosen, and the ethical considerations. I also outline my analytic approach used to address the above-mentioned questions and detail how this approach is appropriate given the background laid out throughout this chapter.

Chapter 2:

Methodology

2.0 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I (1) provided an overview of existing research on disputes and what constitutes a dispute, (2) gave an overview of the structural organisation of a dispute, and (3) detailed the sequential and moral organisation that features in disputes. This situated disputes and generally 'conflict talk' in the wider 'macro' social scientific literature and moved toward the 'micro' interactional features as the point of inquiry for this thesis. This chapter builds on the prior one by detailing whereabouts and how the dispute data was collected and handled. I will also explain the analytic methods that inform and produce the findings in this thesis.

This research is empirically grounded, and the research procedures reflect the importance of starting with the data. Section 2.2 describes the approach taken to assembling a collection of disputes, the availability of this data, and the choices made. Section 2.2.2 will unpack the three types of public dispute data used. Section 2.2.3 details the data selection process and how the data were transcribed, and it also discusses the ethical considerations of this research during data collection and storing – specifically, the use of online, publicly-available videos as a resource for researchers. In Section 2.3, I provide a description of the analytic procedure and framework. I will consider the relationship between Conversation Analysis (CA), Membership Categorisation Analysis (MCA) and Discursive Psychology (DP) as Ethnomethodological approaches to be drawn on as tools in the tool-box that are

mutually beneficial in making claims about members' methods. Finally, in Section 2.4 I will summarise the chapter.

2.1 Data collection

This first section describes the steps taken to assemble the data collection that empirically grounds the thesis. First, I briefly justify interactional data sources before introducing the data source – online recordings – and the sub-collections formed from this data source. Then, I discuss the procedures for choosing and capturing the data.

2.1.1 YouTube as a data source

Ethnomethodological approaches involve the study of members' methods, and as such the individual methodologies, such as CA, tend to be applied to recordings of naturally-occurring interactions in everyday conduct. CA's focus is on how interactions unfold for the members on a sequential turn-by-turn basis, rather than using retrospective methods to capture what members think happened, such as through interviews. This thesis examines pre-existing recordings which is data that has been recorded without research purposes in mind, thus the recordings are natural – insofar as they pass the dead social scientist test (Potter, 2002), and they allow for repeated listening, which provides for detailed transcriptions (see Section 2.2.3.1) and close micro-level analysis (see Section 2.3) of the why that particular thing happens in that particular place.

Data for this research consists of both audio and video-recordings of people going about their everyday lives conducting everyday business. These recordings are of some violation of the everyday 'unproblematic' conduct of people – disputes. It's in the violation

of some social norm (see breaching (Garfinkel, 1967)) that these interactional events become noteworthy for the overhearing audience (Heritage, 1985) and thus those in the overhearing audience (also known as bystanders) become the video-recorders. Just like the early tape recorders permitted Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson a close look at telephone recordings, new and ubiquitous technology (specifically smart phones) has allowed interactions across a variety of contexts to be recorded, permitting researchers' insights into people's everyday (and until now uncovered) lives. This notwithstanding, not every facet of everyday life is recorded but rather, people capture those interactions which are noteworthy – such as home movies (Strangelove, 2010; Robles, 2012), police encounters (Goldsmith, 2010; Smith, 2011) or pranks (Weatherall et al., 2016).

Ethnomethodological studies have benefitted from these technological developments, not only involving new ways to precisely capture interactions which would be otherwise unavailable, but also the recording procedure and distribution as forms of data in their own right (see Broth, 2006; Heath, 1992; Laurier & Brown, 2011; Pihlaja, 2014). Platforms that offer amateur videos to be uploaded offer a rich source of data. YouTube in particular is one of the largest of these platforms providing an abundance of naturally-occurring material that researchers can analyse. Despite this abundance of data, there has not been an abundance of studies using EMCA approaches to this data (Laurier, 2015; Silverman 2007), with EMCA being slower to take advantage of this as a source of data. EMCA studies that do use YouTube as a data source usually do so for its archival purposes, drawing on previously broadcasted material (Butler & Fitzgerald, 2011; Llewellyn & Butler, 2011) rather than as a source of amateur, ostensibly unedited recordings. The 'amateur' content is created outside of professional routines and practices and thus retains the temporal and sequential properties of the original event (Laurier, 2015). Amateur content is still edited: the purpose of the original

event shapes its recording (when the recording begins and ends), and what the camera operator captures (where the camera is pointing).

The seemingly ubiquitous nature of video recording is often focused on specific interactional events, which can be understood as events the camera operator finds noteworthy; the equipment used by recorders often varies with most using mobile phones, some using action cameras, and more rarely (for in vivo recordings), video cameras. These videos regularly occur in public places and are uploaded with little concern for the participants in the video, who often remain identifiable to viewers. The identifying of participants is often done by members in the video comments and more generally on social media where the participants in the video may be subject to abuse and harassment. I will detail my response to this in section 2.2. (ethics).

2.1.1.1 Practicalities

The data was primarily collected from websites where recordings are hosted; this was primarily YouTube, but also some radio-specific websites (such as LBC radio). I started with a number of search terms that generally described some conflict; these terms were drawn from the literature discussed in Chapter 1 and also taken from the Oxford Dictionary of English. The initial search terms used were established by those sources, but the full list of terms was intuitive, as I discerned what members themselves titled their videos: "dispute(s)", "argu*", "conflict", "altercation", "squabble", "row", "barney", "fight", "fracas", "feud", "freakout", "spat", "quarrel", "tiff" and "scrap". From the videos identified with those terms, I followed videos recommended by the YouTube algorithm. From this, I discovered the member's term "public freakout" and compilation videos – these are collations of video recordings of disputes collected by and for YouTube users. The large amount of data

available on YouTube presented the problem of when to stop – so, rather than creating an enormous corpus of my own and dealing with the problems that it would present, I curated videos on YouTube into personal 'playlists', which are collections of videos available to the user on YouTube (see figure below). The videos were added to the playlist if they (a) contained a dispute between two or more participants, (b) audio/video was clear enough to make sense of what was happening, and (c) appeared to be and were oriented to as naturally occurring so were recorded by bystanders or one of the involved participants. Videos were discarded if they were deemed in some way artificial, i.e. as 'reality television' or as 'how to argue' guidance videos.

Figure 2. A playlist on YouTube.

This rendered YouTube as the primary data storage site, thus saving time from downloading every video featuring a dispute and taking up saved storage space on my hard drive. However, given that videos may be removed from the site for various reasons[1], those videos which I deemed as clear examples of the identified phenomenon or those which were of interest were downloaded immediately. Where the recordings could be downloaded via those websites, I did so – on YouTube, I used a VLC video downloader (see Appendix C). YouTube permits access to content (videos) for personal and non-commercial usage in accordance with local laws and regulations; as such, my usage is "non-commercial research" and adheres to the "Fair dealing with a work for the purposes of research for a non-commercial purpose does not infringe any copyright in the work" (Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, p.47). In the next section I expand upon my data sub-collections.

2.1.2 Types of data

In searching for data, I began only collecting 'disputes'; however, through my collection, three data themes were selected which allowed me to breakdown and manage my collection. I initially created a coding system which identified the context, the subject of the dispute, and a crudely defined numerical representation of aggression; however, this proved ineffectual for understanding my collection. As such, I created three sub-collections which partitioned the recordings on the basis of their environments: radio, public and protest. These are analyst's distinctions and are not necessarily important for members (unless attended to), but they are useful distinctions to help inform the collection of disputes.

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[1] See YouTube's terms of service for more information on video removal [https://www.youtube.com/static?template=terms]

In total, I have 282 recordings of 'public disputes' of approximately 100 hours. The 'recordings' are the full-length versions of the data extracts, and 'clips' are the short, extracted instances of the phenomenon from those recordings (of which there may be multiple). As described above (2.1.1.1), the actual downloaded data is 20 hours of recorded material. Figure 3 details the entire collection stored on YouTube, downloaded, and broken down by type.

Type	# Hours		# Recordings	
	Full	Downloaded	Full	Downloaded
Radio	22	4	92	18
Protest	10	1	18	5
Public	68	15	172	42

Figure 3. Collection details.

The 20 hours downloaded were chosen as possible instances of the analytic foci. I will detail the basis on which these recordings were downloaded in section 2.1.3. In this section, I will detail each environment and how these environments shape the disputes. I will then finish with a discussion about the context and composition of these environments, specifically, highlighting ways that link these as environments for a dispute.

2.1.2.1 Radio

The first sub-collection from my data set were collected from radio interactions. These are disputes that occur during radio phone-ins and radio interviews. There have been a number of EMCA studies which have focused on radio interaction (see Clayman, 2004; Dori-Hacohen, 2014; Fitzgerald & Housley, 2002; Goffman, 1981; Hutchby, 1992; Kilby & Horowitz, 2013; Whitehead, 2015 etc.), each focusing on some sequential and structural organisation of talk

on the radio. The recordings collected were produced post-2010 and predominantly between 2012-2016; they occur across a variety of countries (though mostly UK), in a range of time slots from public and independent radio stations. Unlike the previously listed studies (besides Whitehead, 2015), the analysis does not regard features of radio-talk, but rather the institutional setting as a fruitful site for disputes to occur, for two reasons. First, in the recordings collected, the participants (in whatever configuration) are prompted by the host to discuss potentially controversial topics in order to solicit views to be challenged; furthermore, the hosts in these recordings rarely maintain their 'neutral' stance (Clayman, 1992). Second, the radio interactions mirror other types of disputes collected, by the virtue that they are produced to provide a space for discussion between the host/guest/caller, and they are also available to an overhearing audience, which is thus a resource for the participants to draw upon (Ames, 2013; Heritage, 1985; Hutchby, 2006). The radio recordings differ to the other recordings due to their institutional character, and though the interaction is designed to stoke controversiality – the focus is on the dispute that occurs around these controversial topics.

The radio interactions share the interactional phenomena identified across the other environments; however, these phenomena are sensitive to their local environment and thus shape and are shaped by their context. I will explain my use of protest data in the following section.

2.1.2.2 Protest

The second sub-collection identified comprises 'protestor interactions'. These are interactions that occur during protests between two or more opposing sides of multiple people who gather in public spaces (e.g. protestors clashing with counter-protestors). Like the radio interactions, the configuration of participants can vary from 'protestor-protestor', 'spokesperson-

protestor', 'protestor-police officer', and 'protestor-bystander'. These memberships are organised horizontally rather than in a hierarchical structure (as to who is leading the protest). These roles are dynamically constituted by the members in and through interaction. There are very few EMCA studies that examine interaction during protests (but see Keel, 2017; McIlvenny, 2017; Reynolds, 2015), though there is some upcoming work (see Bodden, 2019). This is a hugely fruitful area of research for EMCA given the recent availability of recordings from inside protests.

The protests recorded occur post-2011 and largely coalesce around particular events: Occupy (2011)[2]; the US presidential race (2016)[3]; Brexit (2016)[4]; and Charlottesville (2017)[5]. The recordings of the protests are somewhat unlike the other sub-collections in that this collection is assembled from serendipitous recordings of the protest (often for evidential sake), purposefully filmed by the spokespeople (or their entourage) for uploading to their social media, and include recordings of noteworthy interactions; or, constitute an assemblage of all of these (as there may be multiple recordings of the same event). The protest interactions then are characterised as multi-party interactions and are organised by the participants in and through the interaction regarding who has primary speakership. Additionally, unlike the other contexts, the counter-protest environment specifically affords two oppositional sides to meet and dispute, thus disputing is expectable for protestors and does not violate the local expectations of that environment. Next, I will detail the sub-collection of public data.

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[2] See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occupy_movement
[3] See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2016_United_States_presidential_election
[4] See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2016_United_Kingdom_European_Union_membership_referendum

[5] See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unite_the_Right_rally

2.1.2.3 Public

The third sub-collection from my data set is that of 'public disputes'; these are characterised as arguments that occur in public environments, primarily on public transport and on the street. The former is what largely constitutes the available recordings on YouTube, which may be accounted for as public transport is a confined space where the participants, including the recorder(s), are not necessarily able to leave until their stop, or until they are removed from the transport; thus, the disputes are more likely to be extended rather than a brief exchange of words (which may occur in more open spaces).

There are a number of EMCA studies that examine public interactions and spaces; however, the majority of those studies investigate situated practices in, and the gestalt of, public spaces (see Carlin, 2003; D'hondt, 2009; Haddington et al., 2012; Heath, Hindmarsh & Luff, 1999; Laurier, Whyte & Buckner, 2001; Licoppe & Figeac, 2018; Smith, 2017a; Watson, 2005). Very few studies examine disputes in these public spaces (but see McIlvenny, 1996; Reynolds, 2015; Smith, 2017b).

In this sub-collection, the data is largely drawn from UK contexts with other English-speaking countries (USA, Australia and Canada) also included. The recordings were uploaded between 2011-2016. Due to these recordings capturing 'momentary breaches' in everyday public life, the dispute has normally begun prior to the recording starting (unlike radio interactions where the recording is happening irrespective of the dispute). As such, the cause of the dispute is often constructed by the participants in and through the talk, so my descriptions of those events that occasion the dispute are grounded in members' own descriptions. The disputes are regularly constructed as regarding two things: X-ist or X-ism

in talk or some violating behaviour for the environment, or an assemblage of these. Throughout the course of the dispute, the 'topic' often changes and is reconstituted by members, so it is difficult to pin down exactly what a dispute regards, with the analysis largely dealing with participants' recharacterising the dispute.

The recordings themselves are events that the participants – either those in the dispute or bystander(s) – find noteworthy to record. These recordings often privilege a particular perspective of the dispute (usually a bystander's perspective), and this is a perspective that the participants in the dispute may not have access to, thus allowing us (the post-event audience) access to conduct not necessarily available to the participants. The claims being made through the analysis, then, are grounded in how the identified phenomenon is taken up by the respondent rather than as isolated turns at talk/conduct. Moreover, these recordings and the recordings from the protest sub-collection are not covert, and do get attended to by the participants; however, this is not problematic as the camera operators are members involved in the interaction and the act of recording is a resource for participants in the dispute. The sub-collection of disputes in public forms the majority of the cases shown throughout the analysis; this is in part due to the affordances of public spaces in that they do not strictly facilitate disputes (and this is attended to by participants), unlike radio shows and protestor interactions, which do afford spaces for adversarialness. Therefore, participants in public disputes carefully manage this contingency, rendering their talk as accountable for disputing in ways that talk in the other sub-collections do not.

2.1.2.3 Context and Composition

This section has shown three environments that disputes can occur in and has highlighted the differences between those environments. Though different, they all involve disputes in

public. Previous interactional literature (as described in Chapter 1), has examined disputes in specific contexts between different people: e.g. Classrooms (Cobb-Moore et al., 2008; Danby & Baker, 2001); children (Goodwin, 1982; Theobald, 2013), families (Goodwin, 2006; Noy, 2012; Vuchinich, 1990), courtrooms (D'Hondt, 2009; Ingrids, 2014), neighbours (Stokoe, 2003; Stokoe & Edwards, 2007), radio (Hutchby, 1996a; 1996b) as well as how narratives are produced in and through disputes (Eglin & Hester, 2003; McKenzie, 2001). These contexts shape and are shaped by the disputes – each context and the participants themselves have certain affordances that mean the disputes are composed by the members in different ways. The aforementioned environments (radio, protest and public) are all tied by their context as public disputes and their composition as inherently multi-party.

Multi-party disputes are a unique kind of activity governed by rules which are not dissimilar from those already outlined. This section goes some way to highlight the particular affordances of multi-party disputes and sketches how opposition between multiple interlocutors is formed. Thus far the research examined in the literature review (Chapter 1) has largely focused on private disputes – disputes in non-public places – between friends, children or peers. This is in stark contrast to public disputes, which may be between any configuration of people (e.g. between strangers and/or between organised groups (Fine, 2010)). Comparatively, there is less research on these spaces. Reynolds (2011) reviews this literature and outlines the exceptions to this: media disputes (Hutchby, 1996a; 1996b) and politics (Antaki & Leudar, 2001; Billig, 1989; Harris, 2001; Rapley, 1998; Reber, 2019; Robles, 2011). These studies coalesce around opposing sides representing societal interests and are organised around 'winning' (Hutchby, 2011; Leung, 2005; Sivenkova, 2008). This research largely considers how opposition in the media and politics is 'talked into being' (Heritage, 1987), and how those institutional roles and their associated obligations and

responsibilities are constituted. This is similar to Billig's (1989; 1991) observations about how speakers strategically espouse their position or oppose the other position, and in doing so how this speaks to the speakers' own psychology.

Goodwin and Goodwin (1990) criticise 'multi-party' as a descriptor of interactions that feature more than two speakers. They argue that it does not sufficiently distinguish between two-party and three+ party interactions. Though this term is used elsewhere (e.g. Maynard, 1986b; Butler & Wilkinson, 2013; Mondada, 2013b, etc.), their argument considers that differentiating between two and three party interaction treats multi-party as special in some way and as operating under different principles, which is not necessarily the case. This thesis then, considers 'multi-party' as three or more participants regardless of speakership – this is slightly problematic insofar as the 'overhearing audience' is often a non-active participant (as in the case of radio interactions), but is a resource for the currently speaking participants to drawn on or recruit. Sifanou (2019) describes this 'localness' as the gestalt contexture relevant to the behaviour of all members. Moreover, this is also theorised by Goffman (1981) who distinguishes between ratified participants and overhearers, explaining that regardless of the participants' precise roles – their physical position and their relation to what is being said – that people ritually design their turns for both those ratified and those who are overhearing.

One aspect of multi-party disputes is the constitution of the us versus them (Simmel, 1955) which is particularly pertinent in counter-protestor interactions where the sides, by virtue of their existence are constructed as oppositional. Though there has been little CA research in this regard (Gruber, 2001; Reynolds, 2011; 2015). A consequence of multi-party disputes is the sustaining of multiple sides; Goodwin and Goodwin (1987) and Kashangaru (2009) argue that a dispute may only ever sustain two sides and that where a third-party

offers an alternate stance that does not align with either side, then it is possible to treat it as a new set of sides to the dispute, therefore creating a schism (Egbert, 1997; Kashangaru, 2009). Moreover, where a third-party enters the dispute, they enter either with respect to the us-them configuration to align with one side, or work to sustain some form of neutrality (Clayman 2002; Garcia, 1991).

Disputes which involve a third-party entering the fracas highlight the opportunity for collusion and collaboration between participants. With the two distinct positions attributable to two sides, a third speaker may align themselves with one of those sides (Church, 2009), though that alignment may or may not be accepted by the original disputer even though those aligning moves are designed as offers of collaboration (Maynard, 1986a); however, Maynard notes that acceptance is not usually explicit, but is displayed through non-rejection. Offers may receive rejection if they are not sufficiently tied to the original opposing turn/view, so an offer of collaboration has to manage these contingencies through retrospectively constructing what a display of alignment to their side looks like. Moreover, receiving unsolicited support from a third-party is known as 'piggybacking' (Goodwin & Goodwin, 1990), which is the achievement of the actions by a third-party who has demonstrated their willingness to behave at the suggestion of the opposition's side.

Danby and Baker (1998) examined multi-party disputes and observed that they normally begin as two-party disputes, with other speakers quickly taking a side. However, Maynard (1986a) argues that a dispute does not consist of, or belong to, two sides, and that one can oppose another person's position, stance or claim by straightforwardly aligning with a counter position, stance or claim. Consequently, a multi-party dispute occurs first as a two-party dispute with other speakers aligning to one side or the other, though the alignment needs to be ratified with the others on that side. A third-party may also produce a schism to

craft an alternate dispute rather than produce an aligning turn. In this sense, third parties need not collaborate in a dispute but introduce a new trajectory, stance or position which is afforded by the platform of the dispute.

For multi-party disputes, there is a large body of literature which covers intragroup conflict where the internal structures or rules break down and the group's harmony or productivity is threatened (Chun & Choi, 2014; Kerswill & Mahama, 2019; Schmidt & Branscombe, 2001). This thesis does cover this type of dispute, and whether intragroup disputes yield any differing findings from the interactional phenomenon identified in disputes is not clear. Additionally, much of the literature on multi-party disputes focuses on negotiation theory to facilitate some joint decision making (e.g. Aakhus & Vasilyeva, 2007; Ehlich & Wagner, 1995; Garcia, 1991; van Eemeren, et al., 1991; van Eemeren, et al., 2002). For all of the environments examined throughout this thesis they are (potentially) multi-party, that is, the environments afford the possibility for these to become multi-party and in some sense they are already multi-party given that the video-recorder is a (passive) participant who makes choices over what and who to record. Indeed, interlocutors act according to the physical and relational configuration of other people in those spaces – and will work to reconfigure those configurations for the benefit of their own agenda.

2.1.3 Data selection

To select data for the analysis, I first identified some candidate phenomenon – moments of talk that I found interesting, noteworthy, or appeared to be accomplishing something in line with the core questions posed in the literature review. The candidate phenomena were selected on the basis that they regarded the sequential, or moral orders of disputes. Specifically, Chapter 3 considers how interlocutors influence the sequential organisation of

talk; Chapter 4 considers how relationships are changed in disputes; and Chapter 5

crystallises the thesis by examining how people talk about the norms and expectations of how

people act in disputes. The initial (candidate) cases were transcribed and presented at Data

Sessions and at research conferences to refine the analysis and capture the analytic foci for

the chapters. Once some candidate phenomenon (and thus a focus for the analytic chapters

had been identified) I downloaded 20-hours of data from the larger 100-hour corpus which

appeared to contain the phenomenon, or a variant of those phenomena. These 20-hours were

orthographically transcribed which enabled a closer look at the recordings, and allowed for

initial observations to be made without the need to produce full Jeffersonian (2004)

transcripts for the whole collection. Following this step of identifying the clearest cases

which demonstrated the phenomenon identified, I then produced full Jeffersonian transcripts

of each instance of the phenomena.

This was an iterative process occurring through the analytic process. Those selected

phenomena were then presented at data sessions and in conference presentations; these are

core tools in the Conversation Analytic toolbox which adds to its methodological rigour,

incorporating socialisation into the EMCA community and validation of findings (Stevanovic

& Weiste, 2017). Once a phenomenon had been selected as a basis for an analytic chapter, I

then proceeded to build a collection of candidate instances through detailed Jeffersonian (and

Mondadian-lite (Mondada, 2018) see Appendix B) transcripts, which will be covered in the

following section. Those collections afforded me the scope to select the clearest examples

that best demonstrate that interactional feature or practice in action for the chapters (see

Appendix D for a full list of all data used in this thesis).

2.1.3.1 Transcription

After selecting a phenomenon for analysis, I refined those initial transcripts using the CA transcription system developed by Gail Jefferson (2004). To do this, I used Adobe Audition[6] and Audacity[7] for data playback and Microsoft Word[8] for typing. I used both playback programs for different purposes, though they include similar features useful for detailed transcripts: adjustment of playback speed, measurement of gaps and pauses, adjustments that can improve audio quality and anonymising features. I used Adobe Audition for video transcription which allowed for the video to be played during transcription, which Audacity does not permit.

I used the Jeffersonian transcription system (see Appendix A), which is the system developed by Jefferson (2004) and regarded as standard practice in Conversation Analysis. Moreover, I referred to Hepburn and Bolden's (2017) transcription book, as this expanded the original collection of symbols to include other vocal elements. I also, for data presented in the thesis, employed a Mondadian-lite transcription (Mondada, 2018; 2019) in order to capture embodied conduct that would not otherwise by captured by a Jeffersonian system. This largely includes moments where there is an initiation of embodied conduct marked by a "*", a continuation of that action "--->", and cessation of that action with a "*". However, I did not employ the full Mondadian system, as embodied conduct is not strictly the focus on the phenomena analysed and so the notation was only used where necessary to represent the embodied conduct when relevant for the analysis.

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[6] Adobe Audtion is available here: [https://www.adobe.com/uk/products/audition.html].

[7] Audacity is available here: [http://audacityteam.org/download/].

[8] Microsoft Word is available here: [https://products.office.com/word/].

The symbols available from the Jeffersonian transcription system afford the transcriber a method of producing a detailed representation of the data for the purpose of examining sequences of talk. The use of transcripts is to display the characteristics of talk-in-interaction for fine-grained analysis, therefore the primary elements captured in a Jefferson transcript are: temporality and sequentiality of talk (turn taking, pauses, overlapping talk etc.), the delivery of talk (pitch, volume, intonation, quality etc.), and other elements produced by the speakers (laughter, crying, sighing, breathing etc.). Transcriptions remain as standard practice in Conversation Analysis to represent the data, but transcribers should not rely on one static system for their production and should incorporate additions and extensions to Jefferson's system with the purpose of making as much of the interaction as possible available for inspection. Transcripts are a malleable resource for building claims and identifying phenomena, and though they are not 'data', they constitute a crucial step in the analytic procedure for both analysis and dissemination (Hepburn & Bolden, 2017). The phenomena identified and examined in the thesis were selected through this transcription process. First, orthographic transcripts were produced, which allowed for a sprightly look over the whole collection to then mark items of interest. Second, the refining of those transcripts occurred, where I identified some interesting feature(s); and finally, further refinement was added to provide as detailed as possible representation of the data for inspection and presentation.

2.1.3.2 Ethical considerations

My data involves members of the public arguing and acting in a manner that they themselves would probably regard as violating social norms; and their reasons for disputing are ostensibly problematic. The violation of sequential and moral norms throughout the

recordings means this data is often difficult to work with, as the audio quality can be poor and the content may be offensive. The content of the disputes can be extreme and prejudiced and the recording may have unintended consequences for the disputer's life. As such, this is an ethically thorny area with current ethics guidelines not yet capturing the intricacies and possible ramifications of this data on those involved and those witnessing a large amount of this data. Both Loughborough University (n.d.) and the (BPS) (2018) have a number of guidelines to adhere to whilst conducting research; their four principles to uphold are: (1) respect, (2) competence, (3) responsibility, and (4) integrity. The BPS has an internet-mediated research ethics guideline (2017) but this does not accurately reflect all data, with considerations still grounded in traditional research procedures. For instance, valid consent is not needed when those observed "would expect to be observed by strangers" (2018, p.25); similarly, for privacy and anonymity, researchers "will respect the privacy of individuals, and will ensure that individuals are not personally identifiable" (2018, p.9). There are also specific guidelines regarding work with vulnerable populations: children, persons lacking capacity and those in a dependent/unequal relationship. Given the relatively recent emergence of videos being produced in this manner (for YouTube and public consumption), there are relatively few specific ethical guidelines. In this next section I will outline the procedures of following the available guidelines, and how the research was conducted in accordance with Loughborough University's and the BPS's ethical guidelines.

2.1.3.2.1 Consent

I was unable to obtain informed consent from any of the participants featured in my data sets, due to the nature of the videos. The disputers featured in the videos are rarely those involved in making the recordings, and the camera operators themselves may not be one who uploaded the video to YouTube. Whilst neither Loughborough University nor the BPS's guidelines

require informed consent from pre-existing data – that is, data available in the public domain – the participants themselves may have been surreptitiously recorded or had recordings in which they featured posted without permission. Furthermore, they may be espousing controversial views: "particular account should be taken of […] the possibility of intruding upon the privacy of individuals who, event while in a normally public space, may believe they are unobserved" (BPS, 2018, p.25). I dealt with this in three ways: first, if the data involved someone who is purposefully publicising themselves (a radio presenter, celebrity, host etc.), then they would not be anonymised. Second, if the recording involved children, then it was not added to the collection. Thirdly, if it was unclear that the participants (1) were aware of the recording, or (2) indicated any unwillingness (e.g. saying things like "stop recording", "turn it off" etc. or purposefully moving outside of shot), or (3) explicitly identified themselves, or any other participant, then the recordings were not collected.

These three guidelines go beyond what Loughborough and the BPS require, and given that the recordings often receive more viewers than readers of my thesis, it might seem redundant. However, some of these videos lead to people being 'exposed' on social media for their supposed views, with other users weaponizing those recordings as 'evidence'; oftentimes the mass exposure is achieved before a correction / alternate understanding is produced (see Ronson, 2015). With this in mind, relying on the data as 'public' is not unproblematic: I am reproducing the speakers in text, which is a political act (Hoey & Raymond, 2018), and doing so treats these recordings as static artefacts (as is often done on social media). The increased recognition of YouTube videos as a source may lead to an uncritical acceptance of the videos as data. It is thus important to reflect on this as an emerging data source which is rich and ripe for innovative insights. However, we should pay particular attention to issues around how it informs our findings, how we protect those

involved in the videos, and how we deal with the single and privileged perspective that the recordings afford.

2.1.3.2.2 Storing data

The full collection was stored in private playlists on YouTube (see figure 2). This means that only I, as a registered user on YouTube, could access these playlists. The cases chosen for analysis were stored in an Office 365 Group (see Appendix C). Office 365 Groups are shared folders which can be used to securely access data. The data is securely stored on Loughborough University servers with encryption; Office 365 Groups allow password protected access to that data for selected members of that group (me and my two supervisors). Storing data in this way ensures no data ever need to be transferred between devices, reducing the risk of interference; nor did the data have to be stored on any physical devices (which may be prone to loss or damage). All data regarding the thesis, including recordings, transcripts and writing was stored in this way.

In the next section, I describe the ways I analysed the data corpus. First, I discuss the methodological approach that informed the thesis: *ethnomethodology*. I then discuss the specific methods employed: Conversation Analysis, Membership Categorisation Analysis and Discursive Psychology and how and why they are assembled.

2.2 Data Analysis

The analytic procedures employed in this thesis are Conversation Analysis, Membership Categorisation Analysis and Discursive Psychology. Each of these methods investigates social interaction. They each share a common origin: *ethnomethodology*. Each analytic chapter presents a core phenomenon. These phenomenon were selected as they demonstrated

some core sequential or moral feature of a dispute (see section 2.1.3). The analysis is presented as three stand-alone chapters which each focus on a phenomenon that occurs in public disputes. Though these chapters are self-contained, they each offer original contributions to the sequential and moral features of public disputes. Crucially, together they offer insights into the overall structural organisation of disputes. The analysis is more than the sum of its parts. Each analytic chapter uses 10-11 extracts, across 2-3 subsections which clearly demonstrate that phenomenon. These extracts are analysed using the methods outlined below to examine the ways that the phenomenon occurs i.e. it's sequential and categorial features, and how the interactional phenomenon unfolds in a way which is sensitive to its local environment (e.g. protestors on the street vs. people on the bus). Throughout this section I will first provide an overview of ethnomethodology in order to make sense of the three methods' compatibility and boundaries. I will then detail Conversation Analysis, Membership Categorisation Analysis and Discursive Psychology.

2.2.1 Ethnomethodology

This section details *ethnomethodology* (EM), which is a branch of sociology that emerged in the 1960s with a focus on the common-sense, normative assumptions and shared understandings people have, and how members actually transact, free from macro-sociological theories. I will discuss Garfinkel's work to establish EM, particularly how his work was influenced by Wittgenstein and arose at the intersection of Schutzs' actor-centred approach (phenomenology) and Goffman's actor+context-centred approach (the participation framework). This will be a brief overview and for a fuller discussion see: Heritage (1984); Maynard (1991); Maynard and Clayman (1991); Hammersley (2019). My discussion of Garfinkel's EM is done to explore and understand how EM understands members'

understandings and some of the criticisms levied at EM.

Ethnomethodology, or the 'radical' form of sociology (Berard, 2003; Firth, 2009), is a form of inquiry into the normative, taken-for-granted, common sense assumptions and practices through which members of a society operate. The term 'ethnomethodology' was coined by Harold Garfinkel as a way to analyse the social organisation of the world from members' own perspective rather than "'objectively' or 'scientifically' deduced categories, constructs or schemes" (Firth, 2009, p.68). It is a way to get at "a member's knowledge of [their] ordinary affairs, of his own organized enterprises, where that knowledge is treated by us as part of the same setting that it also makes observable" (Garfinkel, 1974, p.17). Garfinkel (and later Sacks' (1970)) work was heavily influenced by Wittgenstein's (1953) concept of *language games* wherein Wittgenstein advocates that language is a rule-governed endeavour with specific activities having their own specific forms of rule-governed language with concepts that are meaningful regardless of having a clear definition. Garfinkel and Sacks thus borrowed *indexicality*[9] from linguistics to argue that even if speakers share a meaning of a concept within a conversation, alternate meanings may emerge, and so the meanings speakers use between one another are not always the same and depend on the context of their use. This is not a hindrance, but rather a resource for members in doing shared understanding.

Garfinkel's development of ethnomethodology arose in response to Parson's (1937) 'voluntaristic theory of action', which asserts that social order is constructed and maintained as a consequence of an individual's internalisation of their culture's shared social norms. Garfinkel (1967) criticised this as it treats individuals as 'dopes' acting passively. The theory

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[9] Indexicality is defined as being linguistic forms which change their reference from context to context, most indexical forms are developed from Kaplan's (1989) Demonstratives.

was ignorant to members' own actions, and thus EM provided a significant development in attending to the way those actions are seen but go unnoticed. Garfinkel's response to Parson was influenced by Alfred Schutz (Maynard & Clayman, 1991). Schutz's (1962) work on lifeworlds (lebenswelt) described the invariant structures of the lifeworld— the taken-for-granted common-sense reality enjoyed (or not) by people. Though Garfinkel and Schutz had similar considerations of common-sense knowledge, their solutions differed, with Garfinkel arguing for empirical investigation over Schutzs' actor-centred-approach. This broad scope of Schutz mirrored Goffman's, who was also exploring the social and subjective aspects of experiences (1983). However, Goffman's (1983) 'interaction order' examined the *rules* of the game and how meaning is established by using and violating those rules, taking an actor + context-centred approach (see Maynard (1991) and Rawls (1987) for a detailed discussion).

Schutz's work focused on the motives of actors being approximately understandable, in principle, by other actors, which is dissimilar from EM's Garfinkelian approach in that there are no actors, but only the actions which produce those actors. Schutz explored 'the system' as having an interpretive reality, understanding that as individuals we confront the world and it is unproblematic for others to assume that they also understand the world through a similar lens. Thus, Schutz unearthed how *action* is derived from the actor during their everyday life without transposing the subjective actors' position into his own. This therefore means that the routine accomplishment of everyday life is a taken-for-granted, primarily objective phenomenon with each of us owning our individual subjective perspectives.

These common-sense understandings or 'reciprocity of perspectives' (Schutz, 1962) are that even when the viewpoint differs, it remains socially organised. For instance, an

aeroplane pilot is expected to be more knowledgeable about flying than I am. Thus, it is important within ethnomethodology to treat everyday life as being practically accomplished by its actors and it is not in the ether but rather, it is accomplished as an ongoing process in and through the interaction (Denzin, 1993). Every time we engage in an interaction, we are also engaged in the reciprocal consequences and procedural consequentiality (Schegloff, 1992a) which are solicited from the other co-present actors.

In EM terms, understandings are accomplished procedurally and contextually and not on the basis of pre-established shared meanings; thus, what is said is invariably assessed in a particular, local context by a particular person in a particular moment. These understandings are understandable as the self-accounting properties of practical actions (McHoul, 1998). This is in contrast with mainstream sociology of the time, which treated sociologists' knowledge as superior, with a focus on macro theories (structural-functionalism and conflict theory) to examine the structures of society. Garfinkel was interested in the micro situations that produced those structures, stating that "'members' accounts are constituent features of the settings they make observable" (1967, p.8). This is a primary reason for CA's emergence from EM, as it permitted a way to study human action[10]; like EM, CA thinks of context as something endogenously generated within talk. Schegloff, a founder CA, considers context in two distinct ways (1992b): context can be outside of the interaction as social categories, relationships and settings, but it can also be inside of the interaction by way of being co-constructed by participants in and through talk.

In more recent times EM has diversified to include more ethnographic procedures (Dingwall, 1981; Maynard, 2003; Pollner & Emerson, 2001) and further integrate

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[10] Although only the action manifested in and through talk.

Goffmanian concepts (Smith, 2017). EM is a continually developing field of inquiry; it is built upon radical foundations as it challenges presuppositions about human conduct. There is an assortment of EM methodologies to inform our understanding of the ways through which members understand, are governed by and use their repertoire of actions. EM did not set out to understand how members within institutions interact, instead remaining 'institutionally indifferent' (Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970); over time studies emerged which produced institutionally-sensitive work through which we can observe how members produce their own *sense-making devices* (Cicourel, 1968). The remit and diversity of EM has continually expanded since its inception, and it has developed new strands to explore new phenomenon in new types of data which have validated EM studies. In 1990 Boden stated that EM is here to stay, with other authors commenting that EM has a rich and diverse future at the centre of sociology (Hilbert, 2001; Maynard and Clayman, 1991; Housley, pers. comm.), though decades on from those comments it remains fairly liminal within sociology.

This section explained and explored EM as an approach to uncover taken-for-granted common-sense understandings that pervade everyday life. I discussed its development by Garfinkel and his influencers. I also situated EM in the broader sociological concerns of 1960s/70s and its development in more recent times. The following section builds on these historical underpinnings to discuss how Conversation Analysis was founded in order to do EM.

2.2.2 Conversation analysis

Conversation analysis (CA) emerged around the 'linguistic turn' and is an approach through which we may understand human interaction and everyday talk. CA was founded as a way of doing EM. Sacks' favouring of naturalistic data is inherently EM, that is, it focuses on data

which is 'out there' in the world and exists independently of research. The original scope of EM is that it does not seek to reproduce existing sociological accounts of phenomenon 'top-down', but rather accounts for the members' own accounts and interpretations 'bottom-up' (Maynard & Clayman, 2003). The two key figures, Garfinkel and Sacks (1970), set out the method of investigation whereby we examine *how* things are done rather than applying our own analytic assumptions, or else we face the 'penalties for presumptions' (Heritage, 1984a).

CA then, seeks to answer the question "Why that now?" (Schegloff, 1973, p.301) to provide answers for the reasons why particular aspects of conversation, and subsequently behaviours, are not in the ephemeral intentions and/or motivations of individuals (Iedema, 2003), but are located within the structural logic of the practices themselves. Human interaction has been researched in different ways across multiple fields from linguistics, sociology, psychology and education studies amongst others (since language is key to how humans (and other creatures) act and communicate). CA developed out of Sacks' focus on the organisation of text and talk (that focus developed out of Garfinkel and Goffman's work (see Silverman, 2004)), rejecting the macro-sociological trends of the time. In favouring this interactional approach, Sacks' notion for sociology is that it should be as naturalistic and observational as possible. Goffman provided a basis for CA through his pioneering work on the 'interaction ritual' (1967 [1955]) wherein he was concerned with conventions, mechanisms and ritualised sequences of talk. Sacks' interest in the 'machinery' of talk and the practices of talk, rather than the subjective meanings of talk (Housley, et al. 2017), lead to revealing how behaviours are routine and reoccur. Sacks argued against artificial examples, favouring naturally occurring recorded conversations as data (Atkinson & Heritage, 1984) (though Goffman was (at that time) unconvinced that level of detail was necessary (1983)). In 1974, to critique the Chomskian approach that talk is "too disordered for linguistic study,"

(Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1998, p.5), Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson published their 'Simplest Systematics', which served to demonstrate that all units of talk are neither arbitrary or meaningless and that there is "order at all points" (Sacks, 1984, p.22). This pioneering work showed that the CA enterprise had direct relevance to most, if not all, of the social sciences by showing how social order is accomplished through turn-taking.

2.2.2.1 Examining talk-in-interaction

Conversation Analysis focuses on the sequential organisation of talk. In this section I will detail what exactly that means, and some of the points of departure for analysis, namely: turn-taking, turn-design, and social action. First, the core topic for sequence organisation is *turn taking:* turns at talk are comprised of turn construction units (TCUs), and it is through turns that action is designed and accomplished (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1974). In mundane talk, turn-taking is largely organised as 'one speaker at a time' in order to get things done without interruption; however, in disputes, *getting things done* is problematic. Having a turn at talk to espouse a view, opinion or otherwise pursue an agenda permits a momentary 'win' (see Chapter 3). Consequently, the 'ordinary' order of 'one speaker at a time' is uncommon with the (dis)order of the turn-taking system obscuring talk (see Whalen & Zimmerman (1998) on hysterical callers). Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974) propose a turn-taking system with two components: a turn-constructional component and a turn-allocation component which are organised with respect to a basic set of rules.

> (1) For any turn, at the initial transition-relevance place of an initial turn-constructional unit:
>
> > a. If the turn-so-far is so constructed as to involve the use of a 'current speaker selects next' technique, then the party so selected has the right and

is obliged to take the next turn to speak; no others have such rights or obligations, and transfer occurs at that place.

    b. If the turn-so-far is so constructed as not to involve the use of a 'current speaker selects next' technique, then self-selection for next speakership may, but need not, be instituted; first starter acquires rights to a turn, and transfer occurs at that place.

    c. If the turn-so-far is so constructed as to not involve the use of a 'current speaker selects next' technique, then the current speaker may, but need not continue, unless another self-selects.

(2) If, at the initial transition-relevance place of an initial turn-constructional unit, neither 1a. nor 1b. has operated, and, following the provision of 1c., current speaker has continued, then the rule-set a-c reapplies at the next transition relevance place, and recursively at each transition relevance place, unit transfer is effected.

(Taken from Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974, p.704)).

In this sense, turn-taking is not predetermined by participants and as such it affords opportunities for parties in a dispute to design turns in ways which place disagreement as sequentially next to thus manufacture opposition (Leung, 2002). Turns do not haphazardly occur, but every turn references and builds upon the prior. The continual opportunities to refer to and build upon the prior turn permit the maintenance of intersubjectivity through the linking of turns (Heritage, 1984a). These rules are applicable for almost all naturally occurring interactions; however, disputes are purposefully disordered and one way that the disorder may be produce is through flouting these rules. Hutchby (1992) and Kuo (1994) both explain that overlapping talk is a means to be confrontational, and Scott (2002) notes that the

high occurrence of overlap in disputes demonstrates the fierceness to take the floor and dominate the conversation.

Secondly, *turn design*: speakers design their turns in a multiplicity of ways (grammatical form, word choice etc.) to do some kind of action. Turns are designed to be the upshot for what has been done in the prior turn and create contingencies for the following turn, so in this sense, how speakers design their turns shapes the interaction. In Chapter 4, I will discuss how speakers design their turns to be heard as having certain identities in order to create contingencies for the other speaker to comply with their turn. In the basic sense, turns are designed as *adjacency pairs*. These are sequentially ordered turns that consist of at least two turns where the second turn is responsive in a way that is expected by the first. This expectation is known as 'conditional relevance' (Schegloff, 1972) whereby the first turn in a pair constrains the type of turn that is acceptable as a response. Some examples of an adjacency pair are: greeting/greeting, question/answer, accusation/denial, offer/acceptance. These pairs display the respondent's understanding of the prior turn, and a failure to acknowledge the first turn is accountable for the notable absence (Schegloff, 1968). This is not a general rule however, and the exceptions indicate some other type of sequential work.

Adjacency pairs are a fundamental part of turn-taking and occur throughout all conversation. These pairs account for the maintenance, the escalation or the resolution of disputes. Without the intricate sequential work whereby turns have a locally determined meaning and speakers have an obligation to attend to the prior turn (and be held accountable for their prior contribution) then disputes would not be able to occur. This is noted and examined by Church (2009) and Jacobs and Jackson (1982), who emphasize the collaborative nature of disputes available to analysts through this rule-governed sequence. These

fundamental features of all talk permit analysts a closer look at the specific sequential work which occurs in different environments and in doing so allows for the examination of social order and its manipulation. In the following sections I will examine some consequences of this type of social order — challenges and resistance — before returning to the nuts and bolts of sequence organisation with a discussion regarding the structural and evaluative character of turns at talk.

The third basic concept uncovered through turn design is that of *social action*. Social action is the accomplishment and understanding of actions in and through talk (e.g. requests, offers, invitations, tellings etc.); how these actions are constructed is contingent upon its sequential position and how speakers orient to those actions. Action, in CA terms is derived from the phenomenological tradition of actions being recognisable by co-participants (Schegloff, 2007a) and builds on speech act theory (Austin, 1962; Grice, 1975; Searle 1969; 1975), which is also concerned with *action*. Speech act theory explains how analysts do not begin with categories of named actions, but rather the analysis is grounded in demonstrating that it is a particular action to which the co-participants are responding. Finally, what draws these all together is *sequence organisation*, which is the "vehicle for getting some activity accomplished" (Schegloff, 1997, p.2). Sequence organisation is primarily understandable through *adjacency pairs*, which (as explained above) are turns at talk that go together: the first pair part which may be a request, or question, or instruction and the second pair part which is in response to the first pair part (e.g. granting, answer, compliance) (Schegloff, 2007a). These basic concepts underpin all of CA research, and this thesis. Through these ways of understanding how people use language we can examine their relationships and how people do social order.

CA, then, is concerned with the detailed observations and analysis of talk-in-interaction (Schegloff, 1992a) through which social realities are constituted (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1974). Drawing these areas together is *intersubjectivity* which is the joint, or shared knowledge between people that is achieved in and through action and sequence organisation (Sidnell, 2010). Schegloff (1992) explains that intersubjectivity is the common culture which the individual's grasp of reality is mediated in and through. Schutz (1962) purported that for social actors to make sense of the world, despite their experiential differences, they adopt a *reciprocity of perspectives* which CA elaborates and what constitutes the "architecture of intersubjectivity" (Heritage, 1984b, p.254). Disputes largely concern knowledge and opinion – how speakers, through talk, claim to have more rights or responsibility over particular events, issues or topics. Experiential differences are points of contention and are negotiable in disputes; in effect, the clashing of individual realities constitutes a social reality where speakers dispute rather than debate.

The components described above do not represent all possible ways of doing CA, but they are the basis for CA as a method for analysing interaction. For my analysis, I employ CA to reveal the sequential and turn design properties of disputes. As outlined in the literature review (Chapter 1), the two common structural features of all disputes have been largely examined – how disputes begin (with the three-part structure (Coulter, 1990), and how they end (see Church, 2009). However, using CA, I investigate how the *structure* of the dispute speaks more to participants *doing disputing* rather than the *content* of the talk itself. CA provides the necessary tools to demonstrate those (common) structural properties of talk as disputative and not debating, discussing or some other activity. Consequently, I use CA to empirically unpick how speakers *repair* 'disordered' talk for adversarial ends (Chapter 5), how speakers design their turns to manage interactional contingencies of achieving

compliance (Chapter 4), and the points at which speakers place resistive turns in response to a challenge (Chapter 3).

This section has given an overview of CA and how it is used within research. It ought to be emphasised that CA has been used across a range of contexts and disciplines, becoming increasingly expansive; but CA's interest is always on what emerges from within the data. The following section examines Membership Categorisation Analysis.

2.2.3 Membership Categorisation Analysis

Membership categorisation analysis (MCA) was founded by Sacks through his invention of 'membership categories' and 'membership category devices', these were most famously introduced in his lecture 'the baby cried, the mommy picked him up' (1966) and subsequently widely published in his chapter 'the search for help'[11] (1967). This area grew out of EM as a way to understand how members understand one another and how we understand how members belong together. MCA's enterprise was largely eclipsed by CA in the analysis of relationships and the moral order through categories – Hester and Eglin (1997), building on Sacks' work, critiqued the analytic separation of the tasks the phenomenon is embedded with, which thus became a starting point for subsequent MCA work. Further developments have positioned MCA as an important analytic tool for how we understand people's discourse and reveal the who-they-are-and-what-they-are-doing (Butler & Fitzgerald, 2010). Sacks (1972) was concerned with conversational practices and a praxeological approach to doing identity, asking *how* (1974), through the methodological apparatus, participants in interaction can explicate the common understanding of recognising

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[11] Though 'the search for help' was based on his earlier dissertation work and is distinct from the 'the baby cried' (stories by children) paper.

one another as members of particular groups. The analysis of the membership categorisation devices and of the common-sense knowledge is organised by reference to its categories and is, in its fashion, an analysis of culture.

> "As members of this society, you can routinely write descriptions of all sorts of events. You might, then, write yourself a bunch, where you also have a film or a tape, then sit down and try to see how is it that you build those, i.e., try to reproduce your descriptions. If you do that, you ought to get an apparatus which would be, in part, *an analysis of some culture*."
>
> (Sacks, 1995, p.469, emphasis added).

The recognition of each identity is hearable as a member of a collection of categories: 'mother' is in the collection 'family' and 'teacher' is in the collection 'occupation' (Silverman, 1998). These collections are what Sacks (1972, p.332) calls *membership categorisation devices* (MCDs). The application of MCDs is governed by the members' rules, which Sacks observed. First, his rule of *economy* states that a single category from an MCD is referentially adequate. In this sense, hearers/readers will see the unmentioned relationship that those categories belong to (e.g. employer/employee, father/daughter (Silverman, 2001)). Second, his rule of *consistency* states that if a category from an MCD is used to categorise a member of a population, then all other members of that population may be categorised with categories from that device (e.g. seeing employer/employee as being each other's employer/employee in the same workplace). Further to his consistency rule, Sacks suggests a 'hearing' maxim: when two or more categories are used to categorise two or more members, and those categories are hearable as categories from the same collection, then 'hear them that way'. In Sacks' (1966) lecture he notes that we hear 'the mommy' as the 'mommy of the baby' as it constitutes a 'team', which he suggests is a property of *duplicative*

organisation wherein a set of categories defines a unit and places members into this unit (1972; Silverman, 1998). This helps us understand that 'baby' and 'mommy' are likely to be a part of the same 'unit'. Silverman (1998) expands this definition insisting that it is not just likely, but rather it is a requirement, to hear the 'baby' and 'mommy' as belonging to the same unit, otherwise to other members it would appear "odd" (1998, p.81).

Given that the 'mommy' is the mommy of the 'baby', these go together (in duplicative units), which Sacks (1972) calls *standardized relational pairs* (SRPs), which are collections of related categories that "constitutes a locus for a set of rights and obligations concerning the activity" (1972, p.37). Sacks terms this as *Collection R*. These SRPs make relevant, and observable, an absence of the second part of a pair; the observability of an 'absence' illustrates what Sacks' describes as the *programmatic relevance* of some categories – in that the hearer can see or make issue with non-incumbency (Jayyusi, 1984) (e.g. children becoming 'game players' makes it programmatically relevant for there to be other 'game players' to initiate play (see Butler & Weatherall, 2006)). Just as Collection R consists of devices which have obligations to offer help of a particular kind, there are devices of specialists which have obligations to help those (clients) with troubles. These devices of specialists constitute *Collection K*, which implies the activities of professionals and their clients, for instance in a medical institution the healthcare professional has the obligation, predicates and interactional resources available to assist patients. Certain activities are understandable as being achievable only, and expectably, by members of a particular category; these are known as *category-bound activities*. An example of such a bound activity is 'crying' which is bound to 'baby'; following the viewer's maxim, if you see an activity being done by a member of a category to which that activity is bound, then 'see it that way' (Sacks, 1995). Jayyusi (1984) explains category-boundedness through which the invoking of

an alternate categorization of 'patient' as 'sickly' the 'doctor' as 'employee' means that they are no longer co-selected and therefore do not exhibit sufficient orientation to the category-boundedness of the activities with which they are engaged; however in being 'patient' and 'doctor' there is an *implicative fit* which is that the intelligibility of the categories is co-dependent on one another.

The primary purpose of Sacks' MCA is to detail the cultural machinery through which members produce descriptions and make category selections (though most analysis is interested in how people make descriptions and categorisations and largely neglects the 'cultural machinery'). These categories are endless in number and are often invoked to accomplish a certain activity as categories come with certain rights, obligations and predicates making them 'inference rich' (Sacks, 1992, p.40). *Inference-rich* means that category devices contain knowledge which members of a particular culture have about that culture, for instance a woman may also be categorised as a 'mother', 'sister' or 'daughter' with each category carrying different predicates, rights and obligations which an incumbent of one of those categories would be expected to possess (Stokoe & Attenborough, 2015). Inference rich categories can be incorrectly invoked when members are hear/see-able as an alternate category; this mis-categorisation (and subsequent public indignation) informs us about a particular culture.

2.2.3.1 Context

Context is the environment, circumstances, and backdrop for interactions – context is the cultural particulars which interlocutors may access during interaction. This section will explore context, how it is used by members, and how analysts may fashion a defensible account for the conduct of participants from context. To ethnomethodologists, actions are

reflexively related to context. Actions aid in the construction of an elaboration of the context to which they belong (Firth, 2009; Heritage, 1984b). Rather than subsuming common sense knowledge, ethnomethodologists assert that this common-sense knowledge can be studied in its own right. Although categories are embedded in and through context and determined by the participants in the interaction, Billig (1987) explains that categorisation is an integral part of the world as categorisation is based upon the simplification of the world and thus a way of ordering information. Consequently, the ordering of information into categories can be prejudicial, as the categories may be operated as ways to differentiate a type of information against another type of information. It is serendipitous that, as conversation analysts, we are interested in the social organisation of talk and thus everyday life, and we can examine the categorisation work which lends itself to the organisation of the social world (Hamilton, 1979). This returns to the 'culture-in-action' explained by Hester and Eglin (1997) as it is not the culture which we as analysts are able to explore, but rather the descriptions and categorisations which engineer the type of culture which the participants are involved with (e.g. Remainers-Brexiteers as 'us-them' to tie the behaviour of the 'them' as morally problematic).

This approach understands the *in-action* aspects of categories as being not simply mental schema which are producible only through language as a 'vehicle for thoughts', but as categories that reflect culture and are integral to doing interaction. That is, categories are fashioned through the social actions people perform (e.g. requesting, complaining etc.), and not pre-existing boxes that we place people within. The EM switch which Garfinkel and Sacks (1970) outlined concerns the method of investigation whereby we examine *how* things are done rather than applying our own analytic assumptions. Descriptions and the invocation of category memberships may be done as unproblematic, such as the action "I'll get my

husband to do X" (Kitzinger & Wilkinson, 2017), where 'husband' is a gender-defined term but here the basis of entitlement does not overtly require the gender component; gendered linguistic terms can be employed as a resource within the action. In Kitzinger and Wilkinson's example, the action displays an entitlement to do a request with low contingency by invoking the category membership 'husband' (i.e. they have a suitable relationship to fulfil that request).

There is a danger for analysts in focusing on how descriptions are routinely achieved and how normative assumptions are built into how these descriptions are done. Schegloff discusses this in that there is "a key difference […] between […] the linguistic form and the action it is used to do – on any given occasion" (2007, p.456); this is echoed by Kitzinger (2017) who asserts that participants in an interaction are not always 'doing gender' and that analysts should not rely on the fact of a term being linguistically gendered as evidence for it 'doing gender'. It is still important, however, that we consider linguistically gendered terms as not necessarily *doing* gender but that "[members] recurrently gender contexts in a variety of ways, and since gender indicators also mark many aspects of context, we rarely notice how we use these features to gender our social world" (Hopper, 2003, p.208). Consequently, gender (and other) categories do not exist as pre-existing identities but may be invoked or disattended to – they are not always attended to but are there for talking (Edwards, 1991) and are locally producible to do social actions.

This means that in the analysis of categories one cannot take the description as unproblematic: almost any locally adequate explanation of a category's action entails (in an indexical fashion) extended cultural material, not all of which analysts can unpack empirically. The high entitlement of the "get my husband to do it" involves more than the

formulation of the description: the status of 'husbands' in a spouse pair, the assumptions about who tells who to do what in certain relationships (with gender as having possible relevance), etc. These are things we can speculate about but not necessarily demonstrate empirically. Edwards (1991, p.516) explains that as analysts we can recognise the "'obvious' referentiality of categories" and that the deployment of categorisations in talk is analysable by its situatedness (indexicality) and its orientation (rhetoric). For instance, "get my husband to do X" is clearly addressed to another party but we cannot fully understand it without its sequential context. We cannot view language as a vehicle for thought but rather the actual activity of talking is and ought to be the primary focus of understanding categorisation (Fitzgerald & Rintel, 2015). Consequently, in public disputes where participants work to manage their relationship(s) with their co-interlocutor, and (re)produce culture – it is through the analysis of categories, and the actions that occasion them which bring to the surface issues of relationships and culture.

The situatedness for categories in doing 'culture-in-action' is explicated to be the way with which members collaboratively render visible the orderliness, stability and rule-adhering quality of their conduct in doing being members of a category (Pollner, 1979); furthermore the situatedness of categories in action is done so that members are visibly doing categorisation by way of doing the types of activities and interacting in the type of way which members of those particular categories would interact (for instance, see Pollner (1979) on a lay-person not knowing how to act in court). Doing 'membership' through sequences of talk can highlight certain asymmetrical distributions of knowledge that reflexively categorises the participants in the interaction. For example, a manager doing directing and a footballer complying with the directing gives 'authority to' that manager. Sacks (1967) and Watson (1986) detail this in their analyses of 'crisis' calls wherein callers, in speaking to an

'authority', give the resources for the 'authority' to claim this type of membership and in doing so position themselves as belonging to the membership of 'caller', or 'advice-seeker'.

In sum, talk designedly does categorisation. Categories are taken-for-granted and thus 'invisibly' talked into being, and it is an analyst's (and sometimes a member's) job to empirically reveal how these tacit categories are made relevant. As Stokoe (2012a cf. Edwards, pers. comm.) explains: the job of the analyst is not to specify those categorisation practices more than the members themselves (which can be purposefully designed as ambiguous for members), but rather the analyst's job is to show how those relevant activities and predicates get bound to categories and thus what this tells us about the social and moral order of everyday life.

Two of my objectives (see Chapter 1) are to investigate the categorial implications of disputing and to examine how the relationship between participants is (re)configured during disputes. MCA is an analytic approach which can answer these. Public disputes regard adversarial positions and first encounters – the participants have to actively configure the 'who they are to each other' to challenge the other's opinions and/or character. The implications of categories on disputes will be shown in Chapter 4 where the analysis reveals how actions are tied to categories in order to accomplish (non)compliance. This speaks to the moral order and the situatedness of categories through how members display a hierarchical distribution of rights and responsibilities. Similarly, in Chapter 5 using MCA, I unpack the interactional moves that members make in order to ascribe the attribute of 'reasonableness' to themselves. In this analysis, MCA provides the tools to empirically demonstrate how attributes and predicates get bound to certain categories. Ultimately, I am using MCA to reveal the cultural machinery that is present in disputes – the presuppositions members make,

the bounding of attributes and predicates to one another, and how members make sense of their 'us' and 'them' relationship in a dispute.

This section has provided an overview of MCA through examining the tools and terminology which are operationalised to support our understanding of how members orient to and perform their culture-in-action. I explained MCA's historical roots and its emergence as a way of doing EM to investigate the 'cultural machinery' of everyday life, and how through MCA, we can *see* the common-sense, taken-for-granted nature of everyday life through members' own category usage. Moreover, I explored some examples to unpack the problems with the conflation of index and rhetoric – how the basis of the entitled request "I'll get my husband to do X" may not hang on *gender* even if *gender* has been made relevant to explain that it is *where the action is* that renders the category visible to members and analysts (this will be discussed further in the following section). In the following section I will discuss MCA's relationship with CA. I will then discuss Discursive Psychology before summarising.

2.2.3.2 CA and MCA

The relationship between CA and MCA has had what Butler (2008, quoting Watson (1997)) notes as a gestalt switch — meaning that attention to one often excludes the other. However, MCA is more closely aligned with its EM roots than CA is, which is exemplified with its concern with the practical reasoning, and moral or normative ordering of talk-in-interaction (Butler, 2008; Housley & Fitzgerald, 2002; Jayyusi, 1984). The issue between the two is highlighted through the incumbency of multiple categories and the selection between a multitude of correct categories, understanding the action occurring can only be done through the speaker making relevant a category. This is understood as detailing the members' own orientations as opposed to the analyst's pre-thoughts or assumptions.

The invocation of categories in conversation is often conflated with 'doing description' of persons or 'doing person reference' (Enfield & Stivers, 2007; Schegloff, 2007b;). This critiques MCA work on the basis that MCA investigates members as just doing describing, or just doing person reference; however, MCA has a greater range of functions than simply examining doing reference or doing describing. Categorisations are the ways in which talk is constructed; the complex consequentiality of conversation and how this permits categorisation (Mondada, 2003; Pollner & Zimmerman, 1970; Watson, 2015;). Participants' own usage of categories is more than doing description or recipient design: MCA details members' own in situ and in vivo accomplishments of their rights, obligations and predicates (Smith, 2017) and how the organisation of these categories moment-by-moment provides a foundation of the 'common scene' (Hester & Francis, 2003). Jayyusi (1984) explains that these 'common scenes' are category rich and have a complex moral context: the categorisation devices used comprise the scenes, are tied to, and are relevant for the actions of those members. MCA as a means of analysis thus provides us with the tools to understand the consequential machineries within interaction used by members and how these machineries inform the culture-in-action.

The methodological approach follows the Sacksian tradition of starting with 'unmotivated looking' at data to uncover phenomena. Despite the common foundations between MCA and CA, they have had 'divergent trajectories' (Stokoe, 2012a, p.278) with some (e.g., Schegloff, 2007b) criticizing MCA for not engaging with the sequential organisation of talk and others (Watson, 1997) criticising CA for setting categorisation relevancies at zero. The analytic focus of CA is principally to explore data corpora to examine the structural patterns of talk-in-interaction, whereas MCA produces studies of

particular interactional settings with a focus on the culture-in-action accomplished in and through categories, identity and morality (Eglin & Hester, 1999; Housley & Fitzgerald, 2007; Jayyusi, 1984; Plunkett, 2009; Summerfield & McHoul, 2005). Housley (pers. comm.) argues that taking a particular EM approach to data is not sufficient: we should instead be informed by and unify the different ethno approaches to be more holistic in our approach to move beyond the "narcissism of small differences" and the 'armed camps' (Silverman, 1998), as we have more common ground than differences. Similarly, Fitzgerald (2017) notes that in many instances, the application of the methodology is taking over the focus on the phenomenon and thus the methodology is both the beginning and the end – this means that we, as analysts, should keep a focus on the phenomenon rather than our approach. The phenomenon should be centre to the analysis – it ought to be unpacked to demonstrate how it is used, what it does, and how it is handled sequentially and rhetorically (Antaki et al., 2003).

2.2.4 Discursive Psychology

Discursive Psychology (DP) developed through the 1970s, emerging from the 'crisis' in social psychology as a way to challenge positivism (Gergen, 1973; Tajfel, 1981). Although this emergence was independent of, but influenced in part by EM work, it was borne out of a similar influence in Wittgenstein (Condor, 2003). It was within this environment that Jonathan Potter, Derek Edwards and Margaret Wetherell reoriented the focus of psychology from cognition to language (Wetherell & Potter, 1987). DP's focus is on the psychological phenomena which gets produced and recognised in and through talk (Potter & Hepburn, 2007); as such its view is that psychological matters are inherently social, and interactional. DP came about as a means of challenging cognitive psychology's dealing with mental states as reflected in people's actions and behaviour, that may have been only dealt with by investigating cognitive processes (Hepburn & Wiggins, 2007). In this section I will outline

DP, its emergence, and its relationship with CA and MCA. I will then discuss the centring of a phenomenon to the analysis and the mutual benefit of using the three approaches.

DP is based on Garfinkel's (1967) work to respecify research from theory to the lived, moment-by-moment practices in interaction as a rationale to criticise psychology (Edwards, 2005). Indeed, DP is a means to challenge the notion that human conduct is only understood through the cognitive processes (Edwards, 2006; Hepburn & Wiggins, 2007). Unlike CA, however, DP is also grounded in controversies in the sociology of scientific knowledge from the 1980s (see Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984). These controversies stem from how scientific knowledge was treated as *assumed* and grounded in the natural context of the phenomenon. Thus, the DP programme sought to recast the methods of study in psychology (see Billig, 1987). Edwards and Potter (1992) pioneered the DP programme which drew on those influences and crystallised various approaches (critical discourse analysis, rhetorical analysis and CA). These approaches are diverse and study social psychological phenomenon, such as: attitudes, emotion, categorisation, stereotypes, etc. (Tileagă & Stokoe, 2015). Humă (2019, p.69) identifies the four key tenants of DP: "(1) a focus on social action, (2) the situated production of discourse, (3) discourse as a construction and accomplishment, and (4) the constructing function of discourse".

DP treats talk as a resource through which people display their attitudes, emotions, and knowledge, and take stances and positions with respect to objects and one another (Edwards & Potter, 1993). DP considers that 'discourse' is constructed through people's linguistic and cultural resources, and (it emphasises) that discourse (as constructed by people themselves) is the resource through which people's social and moral reality is constructed, altered and/or undermined. Like other EM approaches, DP emphasises the strict

methodological rigour of investigation, particularly on the *situated*-ness (Potter & Hepburn, 2007) of interaction – sequentially, institutionally and rhetorically. This gets unpacked by Potter (2003) who details these three contexts: *sequentially*, where talk is contingent on the prior turn and creates contingencies for the following turn*; institutionally*, where discourse is shaped by the context within which it occurs; and *rhetorically*, where discourse can promote particular versions whilst undermining others.

This thesis employs DP as a method of analysis by drawing on CA's toolkit, as well as DP studies which examine talk-in-interaction. DP, like MCA and CA, has a number of EM-informed underpinnings. Understanding traditional psychological topics such as memory, attitudes or other mental content can be done through the investigation of talk, and the actions to which people attend, it is thus *action-oriented* (Potter and Hepburn, 2007). DP is also used to show how talk-in-interaction shapes reality and not as a *re*presentation of some other event: it is thus *constructed* and *constructive* (Potter and Hepburn, 2007). DP serves to criticise existing psychological conceptualisations of topics whilst also respecifying those topics (e.g. memory, attitudes and emotion), specifically how those mental phenomena are accomplished in and through talk (see Edwards, 1997; Edwards & Potter, 1992; Edwards, 1994). In each of the analytic chapters, I discuss how attitudes are accomplished as people take positions against one another – similarly, how emotion (or apparent lack thereof) is a sanctionable resource for people (see Potter & Hepburn, 2003). This thesis also unpacks how people handle psychological themes in and through talk (emotion, prejudice, accounting), and how these are produced by way of people's descriptions and categories (Edwards, 1991; Edwards, 2005). For instance, I show how Edwards and Potter's (2017) subject/object-side assessments get combined (in Chapter 5) in order to render a matter about the world as factual whilst also ascribing their stance toward that ostensibly factual matter.

DP's relationship with CA is, like MCA's, intertwined but with points of divergence. Antaki (2008) sets out the differences. CA (and often DP) is concerned with the practical accomplishment of interaction in real time but DP is more concerned with displays of, and the deployment of, psychological states, descriptions of the world, and promoting interests. DP readily draws on CA (Antaki, 2004), because CA offers the most developed approach from which DP can be used to make claims (Potter and Hepburn, 2007); however, the key differences are that the constructionist theme that runs through DP is less central to CA, and DP's interest lies in the category and descriptions of people, things or events with DP emphasising the 'constructed and constructive' perspective (Kent and Potter, 2014). In this sense, the divergence lies in DP's attention to how members' produce, manage and resist particular social realties in and through discourse.

This section gave an overview of Discursive Psychology and its relationship to the other methods employed from the EM canon. I described how DP came about in response to controversies around the sociology of scientific knowledge and as a reworking of traditional psychological methods. I underscored the four tenants of DP's focus: social action, the situatedness of discourse, discourse as constructed and accomplished, and the function of discourse. I will explain how these methods are combined before summarising the methodological framework of this thesis.

2.2.5 Combining methods

CA has long been combined with other methodological approaches outside of the EM wheelhouse, e.g. corpus linguistics (Riou et al., 2017), cognitive grammar (Etelamaki & Visapaa, 2014), and historical linguistics (Keevallik & Habicht, 2017). However, both MCA

and DP are inside of the EM wheelhouse and thus overlap in their treatment of language and interaction as central to their analysis. The sequential concerns and toolkit provided by Conversation Analysis sits nicely with the categorial focus of both Membership Categorisation Analysis and Discursive Psychology (see Baker, 1984; Edwards, 1991; Hester & Eglin, 1997; Housley et al., 2017; King & Locke, 2015; Speer, 2002). Similarly, DP and MCA pay attention to how *descriptions* are produced (Edwards & Potter, 2005; Edwards & Potter, 2017) – specifically how, certain mental and relationship phenomena are constructed (Edwards, 1997; Potter, 2006). Throughout this thesis the analysis of the sequential organisation of disputative talk will be examined in terms of the categorial, descriptive and relational dimensions. I will consider how the members display categories and descriptions as situated and sequentially organised. CA provides the robust methodological rigour from which a systematic examination of categories, relationships and descriptions can occur.

Therefore, central to the analysis is a concern with how members produce understandings of their social realties as morally, socially and sequentially organised in and through talk-in-interaction. This will extend the remit of CA, MCA and DP in developing an integrated approach whereby the phenomenon is always central to the analysis. In the analysis presented herein, the phenomenon grounds the approach – I will unpack each phenomenon to showcase its usage, what it does and how members handle it sequentially and rhetorically by using the most appropriate approach where necessary to examine each of those aspects. It is through combining these approaches that they offer a rich tapestry of resources to draw on to produce a methodologically rigorous and EM empirically grounded analysis of disputes.

2.3 Discussion

In this chapter I have described how I selected and collected this data. I explained the responsibilities of data collection from online sources and the procedures of creating a corpus of this kind in line with legal and ethical guidance. These procedures for collection and selection underpin the research presented in this thesis. Importantly, I reflected on my use of three sub-collections and the ethical considerations beyond standard guidelines. Moreover, I discussed the analytic particulars of an ethnomethodological approach and my methods: Conversation Analysis, Membership Categorisation Analysis and Discursive Psychology. I explained the relationship between these methods and their benefit to the investigation of social interaction.

In the following three chapters, I will present the findings of my analysis. These chapters will present a single phenomenon that address the theme of my thesis: how participants constitute a dispute. In this sense, I begin with Chapter 3, which investigates how members produce *resistance* to an on-going agenda. In Chapter 4, I build on Chapter 3 to further detail the structural features of disputing and examine more closely the relationship work that speakers accomplish during disputes, primarily from a Membership Categorisation Analytic perspective. I shall investigate *partitioning* as a members' practice for bringing off and supressing challenges in and through talk in interaction. Finally, in Chapter 5, I address how participants in disputes *metadiscursively* formulate their own and others' conduct in the production of some *reasonable* category. This explore how members themselves treat the structure of the dispute and build on the findings of chapters 3 and 4 to uncover members sense-making in disputes. This final chapter reflects the methodology and chiefly employs a Discursive Psychological approach. These are ordered to reflect a journey from a focus on structure and sequence of a dispute, to structure and categories of a dispute, and finally to

how members themselves treat the structure of a dispute. By employing CA, MCA and DP as a combined ethnomethodological approach, I will offer original analysis of three specific practices for how participants do disputing.

Chapter 3:

Resisting a normative challenge

3.0 Introduction

This chapter represents the first step in the analysis – herein, I will describe a practice found across the dispute contexts (as outline in Chapter 2). This chapter takes a primarily Conversation Analytic (CA) approach and pays attention to the sequential organisation and structure of a dispute. To begin with, the practice I am first examining is that of *enticing* which has been previously detailed by Reynolds (2011; 2015); however, I will be focusing on responses to these enticers. This offers a novel examination of how participants prevent their position being challenged; indeed, as Reynolds (2015, p. 15) notes "the device [enticer] is not an altogether one-sided affair", and that the "basic disagreement remains" – as such the scope of this analysis to explore the 'other side' and how targets can evade attempts at social control. This chapter examines the sequential placement and forms of resistance in response to an ongoing enticing challenge. Thus, I will explore the strength of resistance to these challenges (working from weak to strong throughout the chapter) and I will discuss how this interconnects with who-the-speakers-are and the overall structural organisation of the disputes.

In this chapter I will show how participants, in and through the structure of the dispute, resist a challenge at its earliest projectable point. This chapter will be structured as follows: first, I will provide an overview of *enticing* in disputes – how they reverse the logic of the target's argument. Second, I will then present an analysis of nine extracts (across six sequences) in three sections (complying with a challenge, pursuing a challenge and reversing

a challenge). I will then discuss these findings to consider how resistance may be smuggled into turns and the design of turns which restrict what a possible next turn could be.

Parties in disputes challenge the opinions, views and attitudes of one another in and through talk. A 'challenge' is a practice which delivers some assertion (Koshik, 2003), that is, invites the other to defend their position when that position has been compromised. Responding to challenges is a problem for members and so, *resistance* is a member's solution to this problem. One way that a challenge may be brought off is through 'enticing' sequences which are manufactured in order to reverse the logic of the other's argument (Reynolds, 2015). The extract below, as collected by Reynolds (2015), is taken from a protestor dispute between pro-life, and pro-choice activists.

Extract 1 (Adapted from Reynolds (2015, p.301)).

```
01 T:   [>but we're talking about< <human beings.>] we're not talking about
02      destro:ying anything. you're ju:mping to conclu[sions. ]
03 C:                                          [>let me a]sk you something.
04      =do you eat eggs.<
05       (2.0)
06 T:   <yes.>
07 C:   that's a foe:tus. couldn't it be¿ if there's a blood thi:ng
08      [it's->it's a foetus.<]
09 T:   [<we are talking >   ] about <the pi:ll ki:lling wo:men.>
```

This enticing sequences unfolds by providing a momentary cessation (line 03-06) of the dispute ("let me ask you something.") and rely on an affiliative/aligning move ("yes", line

06) in the service of challenging some attested hypocrisy in the answer ("that's a foetus", line 07). The enticing move occurs in line 03-04 where a straightforward, ostensibly non-disputative question is asked to solicit a certain answer; in this case, a 'yes'. This creates the grounds for C to challenge T, as T eats eggs therefore he is a murderer (which is incongruous with his liberal views).

Enticing a response is accomplished by producing a seemingly unproblematic, straightforward and uncontroversial question or statement which, on the surface of the talk, does not openly oppose the target, but establishes a basis for some upcoming opposition (Reber, 2019; Reynolds, 2011; 2015; Sacks, 1995). These questions, either explicitly or implicitly, are produced as 'innocent'; yet "asking a question is not an innocent thing to do" (Steensig & Drew, 2008, p.7), and innocent questions are thus inapposite to the local environment within which they occur. Indeed, Clayman and Loeb (2018, p. 128), in their analysis of political positioning questions (i.e. determining politicians' stance on certain issues) note that "such questions are not primarily concerned with critically interrogating viewpoints […] but rather accountably linking politicians to positions for the record". Enticers get produced to manipulate knowledge or interactional resources to set a trap, which creates some attribute, or 'norm' (i.e. a normative framework) and is designed to accomplish some action such as recruiting the target's position against their own argument (Reynolds, 2011; 2015) and/or claiming power and (counter) accusing (Reber, 2019).

3.0.1 Enticing

Enticing can occur across different environments (see Reber, 2019). They function as a device which challenges the normative position of another, and as such occur through disputes. As Clayman and Heritage (2014) on 'first actions' describe, that when a person is

confronted with a turn that proposes a future action (e.g. a straightforward question), that it is

dealt with according to a perceived distribution of 'benefits' – i.e. what are the likely

outcomes of answering a straightforward question in a disputative environment. Disputes are

systematically organised by participants whose conduct is produced as orderly for their local

context (Coulter, 1990; Maynard, 1985a; Reynolds, 2015). Two ways that a dispute is

organised is through *challenging* and *resisting*. Challenges do not have to convey

disagreement or disaffiliation with the other speaker; but, challenges are sequentially

implicative as they initiate a new/different trajectory, and can thus be non-aligning to the

previous turn(s). Similarly, resistance is managed through turn design (Drew, 1987; Drew,

1992) and challenges are done in ways to pre-empt potential resistance. Enticers are an

example of this – the device suspends a presupposition and traps the target into a line of

argument before producing a challenge that is difficult to dismiss given the target's earlier

response.

These devices, according to Reynolds (2015), rarely achieve a 'win' in the conflict-

talk, but instead accomplish a resetting of the conflict to halt the target's line of argument and

assert some control over the (new) direction of talk. They may be deployed to negotiate,

claim power and/or accuse (Reber, 2019). The production of this type of challenge then,

positions the other as responding to the course of action being done by the producer.

Additionally, the enticing provides for a pivot to a challenge sequence through initiating a

new course of action, and although serving to cease the in-progress line of argument, it also

maintains the gestalt of the overall argument to afford new or reintroduced arguables. To

illustrate this, Reynolds (2015) detailed what he calls the "five distinct phases" of an enticing

sequence, describing how someone is rendered a suitable target for the challenge which is

built on by Reber (2019). The figure below is adapted from Reber's (2019) work and

showcases the full sequence of which the 'enticer' occurs in phase (c), with the additional phase (d) as the point at which some form of resistance occurs which will be discussed throughout the analysis.

Figure 3. The phases of an enticer, adapted from Reynolds (2011, p.52, 2015, p.304) and Reber (2019).

The described use of an enticer is to bring off a challenge through in-the-moment compliance towards ultimately adversarial ends. Oppositionality between participants characterises 'disputative interactions' in that participants are collaboratively engaged with the disputed topic and furnish the talk with adversarial features such as disagreement (Antaki, 1994; Coulter, 1990; Hutchby, 1996a; Maynard, 1985a). The full enticing sequences presented here are, at their core, disaffiliative in that they furnish talk with some inapposite activity. On a moment-by-moment basis a speaker may align with the prior turn, have a preferred turn shape, and may appear affiliative (e.g. "of course"), yet their outcomes avail an adversarial stance by the challenger to the target[12]. These enticing sequences seek to make the target 'ordinary' i.e. attending to presupposed social norms – at least in the service of demonstrating some oppositional, or problematic views or action of the target.

---

[12] Challenger/Target is an analyst's category to characterise that current configuration of members depending on who has control of the direction of talk i.e. who is doing the 'enticing' versus its recipient.

This chapter examines cases where the enticing sequence is derailed in some manner, specifically, by focusing on phase (d) as the point of derailment. I will show some cases of resistance to an enticer through the treating of seemingly straightforward questions as objectionable; moreover, this serves to answer (1) how resistance is manifest in and through talk, (2) if an enticer may be successfully derailed, and (3) if an enticer may be recovered and pursued following some resistance.

3.1 Analysis

In this section, I show how enticing questions are resisted. I focus on the sequential placement of resistance according to the phases of the overall enticing sequence; the analysis also presents some forms of resistance and discusses their strength in terms of what they accomplish, i.e. what their upshot is and to what extent the challenge is pushed back. Though I use the terms "weak/strong/passive/active", these are grounded in whether the resistance complies with the challenge (i.e. aligns), or outrightly suspends the challenge (i.e. disaligns). The analysis is structured as follows: first, I will detail some cases where there is weak resistance – that is, the target does not suspend challenge but displays features that push against the challenge. Second, I will demonstrate a pursuit of a challenge. In this section I will show how the challenger deals with the target's resistance by re-pursuing the challenge (with a different tack). I will also explore how resistance can be built across turns to make it difficult for the challenger to continue their challenge. Finally, I will demonstrate an example of strong resistance to an enticer, i.e. how a target outright rejects the enticer and reverses the challenge back onto the challenger.

3.1.1 Complying with the challenge

The focus here is on how participants go along with the prior (and potentially challenging)
turn. The analysis shows that when participants do go along with the prior turn, they do so in
ways that mark their turns as non-compliant or as attending to something other than the
challenge. Reynolds' (2011) work outlined the practice of doing challenges via the use of
these interrogatives in which enticers occurred and so the examples presented by Reynolds
display successful attempts at challenging by the challenger. The extracts presented herein
show that this is not always the case, and how participants work to push back against these
challenges.

This extract comes from a UK radio station in 2017. The radio host (Hos) has invited
listeners who identify as "alt-right[13]" to call in to have a "discussion of views". Tom has
called in and has been answering questions regarding his views. Immediately prior to this
extract they had been discussing the racially motivated protests in Charlottesville USA in
2017, with the host questioning Tom on how he can reconcile being a member of the alt-right
given the murder of a left-wing counter-protestor.

Extract 2 'I think you're racist' [07:46-09:27]

```
01 Hos:  j-just a fi↑nal thought T#om. (0.9).hh
02       >wh- wh- wha-< what would happen if you
03       fell in love with a <°black woman.> or a-
04       (0.7) brow:n. person°. What would happen?
05 TOM:  erm .h(huh) .hh (0.7) well I- (0.5) personally
06       I- I wouldn't (0.2) you'know it's not a- (0.2)
07       through:h. is- it's a- >generally through< (0.4)
08       my in group pref'rence that I would (1.0) would
09       prob'bly- I would prefer to be-(0.7) you'know
10       in love- (0.3) with somebody of my ow:n? (.) group
11       (0.3)[by ((area/average))]
```

```
12 Hos:         [-you:r in:          ] group <preference>
13         °what does that m'n?°
```

The host produces a wh-question as an enticer – that is, it possibly sets up a challenge toward Tom's espoused views by inviting an implication that 'something bad would happen' (Koshik, 2003). "What would happen if you fell in love with black woman or a brown person" notes a problem with who Tom is – though it is asking for information, it conveys a negative assertion, i.e. 'something bad would happen', and so by asking the question in the first place implicates Tom's right-wing membership as problematic. The question is designed to highlight a possible contradiction: that is, if he did fall in love with a black woman he would be in a self-contradictory position.

Here, the host dispatches from the prior talk and initiates a new sequence (phase b) with "just a final thought Tom" (line 01), with the "just a final thought" produced as a pre-construction that proposes a pre-closing sequence (Dori-Hacohen, 2011). The action is an interrogative done in lines 02-04, which crafts the presupposition that falling in love with a black woman or brown person is problematic for Tom. The prospective understanding of Tom proffered (that he has a problem with people of colour) is produced with delicacy through a hypothetical to make the question's terms "difficult (though not impossible) to resist" (Peräkylä, 1995, p.309). With the question formatted as *what would happen if* (line 02) + hypothetical (line 03-04) + *what if* (line 04), it marks the upcoming talk as "up front" to ensure an aligned recipient (Speer, 2012), and secures a response constrained to the terms of the question (phase c). This question entices Tom to confront the bounded attributes of his alt-right membership through suspending the presupposition that loving a person of colour is uncontroversial, and by doing so the question prepares the grounds for a subsequent and projectable challenge.

Tom's response attends to the imparted challenge and indicates some trouble with the question. His turn is peppered with speech perturbations and disfluencies; it begins with a "well"/"personally" (line 05), which avoids disagreeing with the hypothetical, but is epistemically independent from the prior, proffering a 'my side' response (Jefferson, 1987) to revise the terms of the hypothetical. Tom aligns with the activity (answering the host's question) but resists the presupposition by responding in terms of his category membership norms "in-group preference" (line 08) (phase d). Additionally, his turn incorporates some minimising faculties – "generally" (line 07), "probably" (line 09), "you know" (line 09) – which collaborate with his resistance. The theoretical scenario then is responded to as an empirical matter, with Tom asserting himself as a member of group who does not mix with people of another race; thus, the pre-conditions for a mixed-race relationship are non-existent.

In extract 2 the host's hypothetical entices Tom and sets up a disjuncture between his membership and an activity not associated with that category. If Tom accepts that he could fall in love with a woman of colour, then the host can highlight the contradiction between Tom's political positions. So, Tom says (cautiously) that he would not fall in love with a woman of colour, and this gets him out of projectable trouble (although there is trouble ahead for Tom as the host pursues the question, but crucially, not the sort of trouble that he would be in if he conceded that he could fall in love with a woman of colour; he's fended that off – at least temporarily). Certainly, Tom's response is produced as tied-to, but independent from, the host's hypothetical, privileging his own perspective; moreover, Tom resists the enticing question by attending to his category norms, which retrospectively recasts the scenario as factual rather than moral. Consequently, Tom's going-along-with the Host's challenge by

providing an aligned response (though dispreferred) does not outrightly resist against the challenge but his indications of unwillingness to affiliate with the host displays Tom as pushing back against the presupposition being assembled by the host – though the upshot of his turn reinforces his position as racist.

3.1.2 Pursuing a challenge in response to resistance

The following extracts detail the pursuit of an answer to the enticing question (phase c) – wherein some norms or attributes are treated as acceptable (i.e. a normative framework) – is established (phase b) followed by a prospective description of the target, which binds the target to a category that is incongruous with their argument/views. I examine how the targets of these challenges build resistance over a number of turns in response to block access to a third position turn; furthermore, I show how certain forms of weak or passive resistance push back against the enticing challenge, but do not necessarily avert the interactional trajectory of the enticer, unlike strong or active resistance.

In this example, Sam is calling the UK radio station 'Leading Britain's Conversation (LBC)' a news, travel and weather station that often discusses politically divisive topics. Sam has called in response to a segment on the recent burkini[14] ban in France (August 2016); Sam has called to respond to a previous caller who condemned the banning. Here, Sam advocates for all women to cover up, indicating that morals are on in the decline in Britain. The host (Hos) has taken an oppositional position. Throughout the next three extracts, we will see the host attempt to highlight a contradiction; that is, if Sam's wife is more openminded, that puts Sam in a difficult position, so the host tries to lead Sam into that self-contradictory position.

---

[14] A portmanteau of 'burqa' and 'bikini' to describe a swimwear garment that covers the whole body besides the face, hands and feet.

Extract 3.1 'Bikinis' [03:01-03:49]

```
01 Sam:  >ye↑ah well course you do< because mostly
02       you're perverts
03 Hos:  oh I see so- so because I perhaps
04       like i- g- appreciating the
05       fe[male fo:rm. I'm a      ]pervert. now am I?
06 Sam:    [if you're not going to-] watching naked women
07 Hos:  bo:[y.]
08 Sam:     [wel]l of course you are
09 Hos:  of cours- right so any many who likes looking
10       at a woman in a bikini or .hhh possibly even
11       if they go to the beach in south of Fra:nce
12       and there some very ni:ce. .hh women wandering
13       around with just bikini bottoms on they're are
14       all pe:rverts:
15       (0.2)
16 Sam:  yeah- they all perv they all gorp at them and
17       [keep] staring at them of course.
18 Hos:  [jee-] okay
19 Sam:  >is that what you [do<      ]
20 Hos:                    [an how-] how mu- (.) p'don (.)
21       [no I don't KEEp star]ing
22 Sam:  [is that what you do ]
23 Hos:  I don't sit there LEEring at them and I think
24       [my partner will probably have a view if I did?]
25 Sam:  [(        ) ha↑haha                             ]
26       ha↑haha
27 Hos:  yea? How many children do you have Sam?
28 Sam:  £si↑x£
29 Hos:  s:i#x. do you mind my asking the age range?
30 Sam:  eh. £eleven to- o:ne£
31 Hos:  °°ahright°° °well look after >them<°
32       >do you hav-< Do they have an enlightened mo:ther.
33       (0.7)
34 Sam:  £of course they do.£
35 Hos:  they have R[Ight. so they are getting-]
36 Sam:             [their ver- modest        ]
37       their very modest and good mother.
38       [(will/would)] cover up all the time
```

The analysis will show the manufacture of a relevant description that challenges Sam on the basis of his previously espoused views, thereby reversing the logic of his argument. The enticing question works to cast Sam as being an inadequate father, because at least his

children have an 'enlightened' mother. This is achieved by rendering Sam as a member of the family device, which promotes his rights and obligations to align with the enticing question and occasions the challenge. The generation of the challenge is resisted by Sam, which results in the host reformulating his turns in order to address, or counter-resist. The question entices an answer which will generate a contrast between Sam and the mother.

Prior to this sequence the host has attempted to move into a closing but Sam has taken control over the direction of talk to produce a description of the host (and men like him) as perverts. Lines 01-26 detail that description and show how the target of the analysis (lines 27 onwards) arise. From line 27, the host receipts Sam's laughter with "yea" and pushes the sequence in a different direction by soliciting some straightforward objective information about Sam's children, which is hearable as pre-constructing (phase c). The pre-construction projects a closing with the summarising in line 31 ("well look after them"), obtains the floor and proposes an interactional trajectory in line 32. In building the pre-closing, the host makes relevant a categorisation of Sam as father, and as husband in line 27 and 32; this does partitioning work (Butler, 2008; Sacks, 1995) by making relevant different category predicates and the interactional affordances those predicates impart. Doing this allows for the "safe" generation of a contrastive challenge (Butler, 2008); it produces Sam as an inadequate father (because his children have at least one 'enlightened' parent) as his views are incongruent with being an adequate, enlightened person.

The pivot affords the host the position to pause the on-going closing trajectory ("well look after them") and initiate an enticing sequence (the additional turn construction unit marked with increased speed in line 32). The challenge sequence begins with a polar interrogative ("do you hav- do they have an enlightened mother", line 32), which is hearable

as an enticing question (Reynolds, 2015) as it is produced abruptly and inappositely in terms of both sequence and design; moreover, the question foreshadows some action (the challenge) (Clayman, 2002), which is attempted in line 35.

The challenge in line 32 begins with a repair from the recognitional referent 'you' to the children's perspective 'they', invoking the family category device and in doing so making relevant a response that assumes a *yes* answer (as in, the children have an enlightened mother). This interrogative is a request for information about the children's mother with a candidate assessment. The question sets up the basis for a challenge (i.e. at least Sam's children have one adequate parent): it explicitly invokes the asymmetrical-relational pair 'mother/child', produces the host as not-knowing, and makes sense of the question through implying the symmetrical pair 'mother/father', which bounds Sam with rights to know. The supposed answer is a *yes*, with declination rendered unfitted to the category boundedness of Sam to the mother.

Sam treats the question with a gap (line 33) that is responsive to the inapposite nature of the question (Stokoe, 2018), following which Sam produces an upgraded, non-polar response in line 34 ("of course they do"). This, on the surface, looks affiliative with the host's normative basing; however, it is hearable as contesting the askability of the question (Stivers, 2011) by treating the question literally (i.e. as a silly question (Stokoe & Edwards, 2008)). Sam's "of course they do" aligns with the question by providing an answer but pushes back by refuting the need to ask in the first place without halting the interactional trajectory. Treating the response in line 34 as a *yes*, and redoing Sam's response ("they have right"), the host progresses the challenge with a projectable challenge (that they are getting *some* good parenting) in line 35 ("so they are getting-"), which is produced to generate a contrast

between Sam and the 'mother'. This can be seen with the initial reformulating of Sam's response from "of course they do" to "they have"; and the "right" is hearable as a sequence closing third (Schegloff, 2007a) with the following "so" formulating the upshot of the prior (Schegloff, 1987). Specifically, the new sequence projects a challenge emergent from Sam's response.

Sam, in overlap, disaligns to infer his own understanding and provide an alternative to deflect the possible challenge. In line 36-38, Sam invokes his epistemic domain to retrospectively produce an understanding of what the predicates of 'enlightened mother' are. The retrospective work resists the implicature of the enticing work being done by the host through deflecting the trajectory of the challenge project; this then avoids complying with the contrastive work to reintroduce Sam's opinions and tacitly counter the direction of talk. As in extract 2, we see a presupposition being subverted. In this case, Sam conveys that an enlightened mother would cover up, subverting the host's use of 'enlightened'.

Extract 3.2 'Bikinis' [03:01-03:49]

```
39 Sam: [(will/would)] cover up all the time
40 Hos: [I said sorry]
41      when I say enlightened more broad-
42      ah- more broadmi:nded mother. do they have a
43      broadminded mother or is she-
44 Sam: yeah she's broadminded she's not sh- sh-
45      she's not- she doesn't have low self-esteem
46      where [she feels like she]
47 Hos:       [°no- I'm try-°    ]
48 Sam: [has to get naked in front of other men. ]
49 Hos: [what am I trying to get across here°.hhh]
50 Sam: n↑o that's what I'm getting across.
```

Extract 3.2 sequentially follows 3.1 where we observed Sam's retrospective work to produce an alternative understanding in order to resist the implicature of the host's question. Here, the

host initiates a repair in line 40, which orients to a misunderstanding of 'enlightened' ("when I say enlightened") i.e. the trouble source is Sam's description of his wife which reveals his apparent misunderstanding of what enlightened means. This is in partial overlap with Sam's turn (see extract 3.1). The production of the alternative description (Sidnell & Barnes, 2010) as 'broadminded' and not 'enlightened' works to progress the project of the challenge and prevent it from being completely subverted by Sam. Indeed, the host continues to entice an answer which will generate a contrast between Sam and his wife.

This gets done in lines 42-43 ("when I say enlightened more broad- ah- more broadminded mother") through explicitly attending to the retrospection, which asserts the host's domain of knowledge in the repair operation and attends to this formulation as a displaced response that is interfering with the progression of the challenging project (Bolden, 2010). The enticing question comes in lines 42-43 formulated as a polar design which embeds the invitation for a type-conforming *yes* (Koshik, 2015; Raymond, 2003).

The host's intonation and syntax "is she" do not indicate this as being a point of possible completion (line 43); however, Sam self-selects, which serves to interrupt the generation of a possible contrast that may have challenged Sam's previously espoused views. Sam pushes back against the trajectory, building his resistance against the enticing sequence. Doing an interruption in this sequential position affords the next turn to be in alignment regardless of the answer, and as such, Sam attends to the question in a subversive way. The "yeah" (line 44) in response manages this with its positive valence to align with the prior question (Gardner, 2001; Gerhardt & Beyerle, 1997). Sam affirms the broadmindedness ("yeah she's broadminded", line 44), and thus bolsters his stance against the projected but unspoken alternative. Sam's turn gets brought off like his previous description of enlightened

wherein he accepts the prospective description and then ascribes the predicates of that description. The ascription work occasions some perturbations ("she's not sh- sh- she's not-"), which project a refutation of some predicates rather than ascribing an alternative understanding of the description. The understanding produced by Sam in lines 45-46 is congruent with his earlier turn "very modest" (extract 3.1, line 37) and previously espoused opinions (women ought to cover up) which are hearable as implicating those that wear bikinis as having low self-esteem. This exhibits some contestable matter with the prior turn, and this continuation builds on the aligned response to resist against the host's trajectory (casting the mother as not being broadminded).

The host self-selects and comes in to overlap at a point where it is hearable that Sam has redescribed what it means to be broadminded. In line 48 ("no- I'm try- what am I trying to get across here"), the host designs his turn as doing self-talk, which makes available a trouble that he is having in getting his point across adequately resulting in Sam's misunderstandings. Sam's responsive turn explicitly displays an orientation to his resistance and redescribing work (line 50: "no that's what's I'm getting across") to privilege his right to put his point across and thus his agenda.

To summarise, in this example a description gets occasioned by the host through the crafting Sam as 'father'. This parental category reverses the logic of Sam's argument (i.e. that one cannot have those views and be a good parent), which renders Sam in alignment with the ongoing project but susceptible to the contrastive challenge being generated by the host. Additionally, this example displays how resistance to challenges and their responses are managed by the participants on a turn-by-turn basis; this will be further exemplified in the

following extract which sequentially follows.

Extract 3.3 'Bikinis' [03:01-03:49]

```
51 Sam:   n↑o that's what I'm getting [across.]
52 Hos:                               [.hhh    ]
53        is she mo::re #ehh: r:e#laxed (.) than you:
54 Sam:   Nick it's none of your £busin'ss about my wife£
55        to be fair (.) yeah £we're on radio yeah£
56 Hos:   ahright okay look after the children enjo- .hhh
57        have I enjoy- well >I s'pose have enjoyed speaking
58        t'y'< I'm pretty horrified by some of your views.
```

This extract concludes the conversation: the host forces an ultimatum to furnish Sam with a description that is inapposite within the family device. Here the call ends, and the challenge is closed. Following Sam's resistance to the potential challenge through his describing work – and then his explicit orientation to it not being a misunderstanding but rather, an attempt to subvert the possible challenge – the host progresses the project to bring off said challenge. This is an instance of strong resistance as there is a full refusal by Sam to answer the question.

In line 53, the host redoes the enticing question, which gets produced as contiguous with the prior sequence ("is she more relaxed") rather than as a stand-alone first-pair part. This attends to Sam's prior turn (extract 3.2, line 50) where his agenda comprised a part of the shared, and accessible knowledge in the interaction. Thus, the host's turn is another go at producing an interrogative that will be adequately understood by Sam. The turn entices an answer which generates a contrast between Sam and the mother by being brought off with the increment "than you" (line 51), which makes relevant a second pair part that describes both

Sam and the mother[15].

Sam treats this as a challenge by rejecting the question. This is achieved by attending to the project of Nick questioning Sam about his wife. Sam's turn with the pre-positioned address term "Nick" (line 54) does not force recipiency (Lerner, 2003), but rather uses "Nick" to reproach the host for not having responded appropriately (Clayman, 2010; Rendle-Short, 2007); that appropriateness portends revealing personal information ("we're on radio yeah", line 55) as inappropriate. Sam manages this rejection by framing the host as a non-incumbent of his family device ("none of your business about my wife", line 54), with the hedge "to be fair" (line 55) + account ("we're on radio yeah", line 55) to highlight the inappositeness of the question. This counters the turn with a non-conforming response containing a built-in account that (1) invokes the overhearing audience, (2) rejects the host's request for epistemic access to the relationship, (3) orients to the talk as inapposite and, (4) invites agreement with the new direction with the pre-positioned address and turn-final "yeah". The host does not contiguously pursue the challenge and instead returns to the sequence closing ("ahright okay look after the children enjo-", line 56). However, the host pivots from the sequence closing to criticism, having failed to complete the challenge sequence as projected: here the host brings off a subject-side assessment in the closing sequence in line 58 ("I'm pretty horrified by some of your views"), which displays an adversarial stance toward Sam and his views. This criticism is hearable as a summary with the phone disconnection hearable in line 56, which allows the host to get the final word, and to distance himself from Sam's views.

---

15 Yes = Sam is not relaxed
No = the mother is not relaxed

Throughout extracts 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, we observed the attempts by the host to progress the challenging project and craft a prospective understanding of Sam. This was done to make relevant a description or assessment, and thus challenge Sam on the basis of his views being non-normative and in contrast to someone (the mother) with whom he is in a standard relational pair. Sam attends to the host's on-the-surface talk as being problematic and resists the implicature by retrospectively producing alternative understandings. Sam worked hard to forestall progression to the projectable challenge, and he succeed (cf. Tom in extract 2). Sam builds his resistance in response to the host's turns to block the host's access to a third position turn: initially Sam contests the question but does not strongly resist (staying aligned with the activity). The host displays an orientation to Sam's epistemic domain through treating the retrospection as misunderstanding rather than resistance with his repair operations, instead of rejecting or confronting Sam's alternative understandings. Consequently, it is not until the third attempt by the host at asking the question (designed as a polar question that limits what can be done in response) that Sam outrightly resists the challenge and suspends the talk's trajectory.

The following extract demonstrates a similar sort of sequence where a projectable challenge is forestalled by the target of that challenge. This demonstrates a members' resistance to a challenging project, and the pursuit of the challenge project in response to that resistance. Like the previous extracts, this occurs in public with an overhearing audience; however, here, unlike the radio call-in, the overhearing audience is visible as this dispute occurs on a train in London. The dispute arises as Sue requests that Ann turn her music down as the sound from Ann's headphones was disturbing Sue's reading. This request is rejected by Ann, and escalates to name-calling, and a dispute over what is appropriate conduct for public transport. Immediately prior to this sequence, Sue has made a request for Ann to move

and has called Ann a "little schoolgirl".

Extract 4 'you're unemployable' [02:46-03:18]

```
01 ANN:   y↑ou're calling me a sch↑↑oolgirl and you're
02        DA:ring me. (0.9) mate. (1.4) grow up
03        (0.6)
04 SUE:   NO you are very rude >and you have no< manners
05        d↑o you ha↑ve a job?
06 ANN:   °do [you°    ]
07 SUE:       [do you ] wor:k yes I do >have a j'b<
08 ANN:   tha↑t's good for [yo↑u:    ]
09 SUE:                    [d↑o you ] ha↑ve a jo↑↑b?
10 ANN:   tha↑t's good for yo↑u? O:h WⓄw:?
11 SUE:   do you work?
12 ANN:   O:h WⓄw:?=
13 SUE:   =>are you emp<loy:ed.=
14 ANN:   =round of app*lause for the working lady*
15                      *clapping------------------*
16 SUE:   so what you're unemploy:ed. >well I'll tell
17        you what< I kno:w why. because you're unemployable
18 ANN:   [I me'n-   ]
19 SUE:   [no employ]yer will touch you
20        (0.5)
21 ANN:   m[ate I wouldn ]'t wanna work for you↑::?
22 SUE:    [you are so g-]
23        I wouldn't eithe-
```

This analysis will show an enticing question getting derailed during the first phases (Reynolds, 2015). I will detail the (1) attempted enticer, (2) the participant's methods for resisting the enticer, and (3) the pursuit of the challenge project. The enticing question gets done in line 05 by Sue ("do you have a job") which responds to Ann's rebuttal against being called a schoolgirl. Sue exploits Ann's rebuttal (that she's not a schoolgirl) to ask whether Ann has a job (i.e. if she is not a schoolgirl, then she would be normatively expected to work; if she says she does, then the contradiction with her present behaviours can be exposed). Like the previous extracts, this extract displays (1) a projected contradiction: should Sue confirm that she has a job?; i.e. she could not behave like this in the workplace; and (2) resistance which is designed to forestall progression to the projectable challenge (in the form of the

display of a self-contradiction).

Similar to the prior extracts, the enticing question (phase c) occurs at a juncture where Sue has done a possible evaluative sequence closing third ("no you are very rude and you have no manners" line 04), but has extended the turn to produce a first pair part (line 05), which serves to progress the conflict activity and manage the contingency that Ann could refute the evaluation. The enticing question ("do you have a job", line 05) resets the talk and allows Sue to have control over the direction of the subsequent talk. Unlike the prior extracts, which assume a particular polar answer in order to progress the challenge, either a 'yes' or 'no' could put Ann in a difficult position. If Ann is unemployed i.e. 'no', then the outcome can be a 'no one will employ you' (see line 19); if Ann says she is employed i.e. 'yes', then Sue would have the grounds to point out the contradiction between her present behaviours, and normative expectations of how one ought to behave. This is hearable as doing an enticing question in this interactional environment, as it is designed as though straightforwardly soliciting information, but this information is necessary for the action to follow. This is then observable in lines 16-17 where one of the possible challenge gets brought off; however, before this Ann does orient to the enticing questions in line 09, line 11 and line 13 in a variety of ways, all of which deflect and resist the challenge sequence.

Ann attends to this as a enticing question in line 06 by redoing the question as initiating a new adjacency pair rather than as an aligning second pair part, turning the question back on Sue. This displays an adversarial stance toward the question (Bolden, 2009) and actively resists going along with the trajectory. Sue reformulates the enticing question in line 07 ("do you work") in overlap with Ann's question reversal but responds to Ann's line 6 turn ("yes I do have a job", line 07). The additional information gets deployed to mark the

talk as responsive to line 06 and ostensibly registers Sue's normative framing of having a job. The response done by Sue affords Ann the space to produce an assessment in the third position ("that's good for you oh wow"), which (1) displays an adversarial stance through sarcastic praise, and (2) makes available, to the overhearing audience and Sue, an ascription of Sue's challenge (of being unemployed as a bad thing). This turn in line 08 and the repeated turn in 10 are doing sarcasm: the formulation appears affiliative, but within this local context of the dispute, it is non-normative to affiliate with the opponent. Structurally, the "that's good for you" (line 08) sequentially deletes Sue's turn by taking the slot in which an answer to her question could go. Sue has no option but to repeat that turn or it will not get answered as the interactional space has been taken by the pseudo-praise. Sue reattempts the enticing question three more times in line 09, line 11 and line 13 as a means to progress the project of the challenge: in each instance Sue provides candidate terms ("job", "work", "employed") to solicit a fitted response, which Ann resists giving. Here, 'job' is produced as a noun, 'work' as a verb and 'employed' as an adjective. This move between alternatives is pertinent as the differing grammatical functions of each term affords differing interactional resources. This is observable in lines 16-17 where Sue abandons the enticing question phase and progresses with the challenge sequence ("because you're unemployable") (yielded by "are you employed" in line 13).

The challenge done by Sue in lines 16-17 is delicately delivered in that it is not occasioned by a fitted response to the enticing question, and so knowing if Ann is employed is outside of Sue's epistemic domain. The challenge is deployed with "so what", which crafts the upcoming upshot as emergent from the pre-sequences i.e. treats absence of any response as a negative answer. The "you're unemployed" then sets up the premise for the challenge and the idiomatic "well I'll tell you what", which projects that the next part of her turn will be

perspectival, non-straightforward, and anticipate resistance/disagreement. Consequently, Sue prefaces the challenge with "I know why", which positions this as knowledge that is available to anyone and is a logical ascription from Ann's ascribed predicates (rude, no manners). The upshot is an insult produced as "because you're unemployable no employer will touch you" in line 17, which is a conclusive evaluation of Ann on the basis of Ann's actions in this conflict as not just being locally situated to this interaction, but her unemployable disposition (see Edwards, 1997). Not only does this display Ann as belonging to the category of 'unemployable' and harbouring the associated predicates, it ratifies Sue's 'employed' category and Sue's rights to make claims about Ann's behaviours/predicates. Ann opposes the target challenge in line 21 by countering Sue's 'unwanted employee' with an 'unwanted employer' categorisation ("I wouldn't wanna work for you").

This extract demonstrates how (1) enticing questions get attempted, their sequential positions and how they set up some normative basis for a challenge; (2) members' methods for resisting the enticing question through contesting and non-compliance with the course of action whilst making explicit, or available, the implicature (the challenge sequence) to the overhearing audience; and (3) the continued pursuit of the project, where the redoing of the enticing question with alternatives does not get brought off: the challenge then gets delicately delivered in a way that is tied to the prior non-responses and the challenger's own categories. Ann strongly builds her resistance to Sue's challenges by disaligning and producing responsive turns, which place interactional obstacles in the way of Sue getting an answer and block her access to a third position turn.

The next extract features a dispute during an immigration protest in the US between Mas and Art. Art, a right-wing "political commentator", is protesting a proposed change in

the US's immigration policy; he is accompanied by one other person filming his encounters.

Mas, a "Jewish liberal", is counter-protesting. In this sequence Mas challenges Art by

asserting that he's not making the world a better place, specifically regarding his views on

healthcare policies. Immediately prior they have discussed a different protest and Art has

addressed the camera to call Mas a bigot.

Extract 5.1 'giving them truth' [15:26–16:01]

```
01 ART:  How is that ju:st. (0.2)
02       how is that acceptable=
03 MAS:  =So what're you doing to make the
04       world a better pla[ce tell me]
05 ART:                    [I'm alrea ]dy
06       doing it now I'm educating others
07       >I've reregistered voters< (.) I'VE
08       HElped people i[n Cudahy get a new voi:ce.  ]
09 MAS:                 [Are you helping people who a]re
10       sick and who are ill?=
11 ART:  =yes I am
12 MAS:  How are you doing tha'.
13 ART:  I'm doing that [by: I'm giving them tru:th]
14 MAS:                [by trying to ((         ))]
15 ART:  I'm doing that by >giving them scriptu'e<=
16 MAS:  =by taking awa[y their access       ]
17 ART:               [I give it them >>by he]lping
18       them get<< foo:d=
19 MAS:  =to: basic er basic necessi[ties    ]
20 ART:                             [who's ta]king
21       who from what.
```


This analysis showcases Mas doing enticing to craft a description/assessment of Art that is

incongruous with his espoused opinions to reverse the logic of his argument. The enticed

answer is achieved through recurrent enticing questions that seek extended responses to

impart a prospective understanding of Art. The continual challenges target Art in different

ways. This then demonstrates (1) enticing as a practice to keep the target engaged in talk over

which you have control, (2) bait the target into a line of argument that is a reversal of their

espoused opinions, and (3) resistance through complying with one's own category-bounded terms.

In line 03, the first attempt at a recognisable enticing question (phase b + c) occurs ("so what're you doing to make the world a better place"), which expects an answer and imparts a force that predicts that whatever answer is given will be challenged in some way (i.e. asking presupposes some possible deficiency in the first instance). This turn gets built as a question but with a tag imperative directive indicating expected compliance. Art complies, and in overlap with Mas' directive, prefaces their turn with "I'm already doing it" (lines 05-06), which suppresses the upshot by disaligning from the terms of question (phase d) to push back against an inference that he's not making the world a better place. The fitted response (lines 06-08) is done as Art provides an extended answer as a list to illustrate the morality of his position (as a good human who helps others) in order to counter the force imparted by the question, which is an accusation of Art of being immoral.

Mas' response (lines 09-10) is produced as a second inquiry within the category of 'making the world a better place', which attends to Art's resistance ("are you helping people who are sick and who are ill?"); this polar interrogative more closely resembles an enticer (Reynolds, 2015) in that it assumes a particular answer that projects a challenge that occurs in line 16. This 'obvious' answer is a yes, predicated by the pre (lines 03-04). Art's response treats the *yes* as preferred, with it being delivered quickly (line 11). Although preferred, it is treated as insufficient by Mas: "how are you doing tha'" (line 12) (As the 'yes' draws on Art's epistemic domain, which does not occasion a challenge). There is passive resistance to the challenge project with "I'm doing that" (line 13), with the repeat-prefaced response rejecting the appropriateness of the action (Bolden, 2009), attending to Mas' agenda, and

displaying an adversarial stance to the prior turn. The resistance is attended to by Mas, who, in overlap with Art's fitted response, progresses the challenge project (lines 16-17: although this turn is inaudible, there is a reformulation in line 16). Art restarts with the repetition of line 13 and produces an additional list item initiated by the "truth" description with "scripture", which is hearable as an expansion to lines 06-08. Art's expansion to this turn does not sufficiently suppress Mas' upshot (projected from lines 03-04 and lines 09-10) – "by taking away their access to basic necessities" – which gets grammatically tied to Art's prior turn with the turn-initial 'by'; there appears to be some adjustment to this challenge by Art in line 17, who in overlap redoes his response with an upgrade.

The below extract follows the prior one; here Mas pursues the challenge project in response to Art's continual pushbacks (phase d) by reinitiating the enticing question (phase c). This demonstrates a members' method to counter resistance through a redoing of the question phase to reinitiate the challenge.

Extract 5.2 'I have a hat on my head' [16:01–16:24]

```
01 MAS:   ↑WEll↑ for one thing you're a big Trump
02        supporter (.) correct?
03 ART:   and it's awesome [I'm proud of it ]
04 MAS:                   [correct? are you]
05        so you would li[ke to take away health care]
06 ART:                 [I HAVE A HAT ON MY HEAD ANd]
07        he asked me if >I'm Trump supporter<=
08 MAS:   =you'd like to take away health care from
09        y'know mill[ions of Americans          ]
10 ART:              [HOw am I taking health ca]re
11        from people
12 MAS:   you would like to
13 ART:   HOW am I
14 MAS:   because you support the president's agenda
15        which is to take away health ca[re from    ]
16 ART:                                  [no it isn't]
17 MAS:   million[ns of (.)   ]Americans.
```

```
18 ART:          [that's a lie]
19        notice how they lie
```

Following extract 5.1, Mas' turn in response to Art's question immediately projects some

disfluency with the question ("Well") and an extended turn at talk ("for one thing")

(Heritage, 2015). The disfluency accords with the insertion sequence that Mas' answer is

contingent somehow on Art being a Trump supporter; the shift to proffer the category of Art

as a Trump support projects an upcoming challenge. Mas initiates the enticing question

(phase a+b) by mobilising an alternate category for Art "you're a big Trump supporter (.)

correct?" (lines 01-02); this question prefers a 'correct' given its design ("you're a") and

Art's attire (line 06). Through mobilising this understanding of Art, Mas manufactures an

incongruity between Art's actions and the predicates of belonging to the category of 'Trump

supporter'; this is observable later in the extract where the incongruity is done as "you would

like to take away health care" (line 05) and "because you support the president's agenda"

(line 14). Art claims primary rights to assess (see Clift, 2016) by providing an aligned but

disaffiliative response ("and it's awesome I'm proud of it" line 03). This response is a

combination assessment where the "and it's awesome" is an object-side followed by "I'm

proud of it", which is a subject-side assessment (Edwards & Potter, 2017); this form displays

an orientation to epistemic independence from the prior action with a reassertion of Art's

own epistemic rights (phase d). Mas begins the production of a canonical enticer (phase c)

("so you would like to take away health care", line 05) as it manufactures a challenge based

on the suspension of a presupposition.

However, the target produces their turn at a non-transition relevance place and in

overlap ("I HAVE A HAT ON MY HEAD", line 06). This turn outrightly rejects the

challenge through momentarily disengaging with Mas to talk to the overhearing audience (the

camera). Mas' "you'd like to take" (line 08) resumes his "you would like to take" (line 05) with the upgraded "millions of Americans", which is a response to Art's "who's taking who from what" (extract 5.1, line 20); this renders his Trump-insertion as the premise for his claim "you want to take away health care", which is serving as the answer to Art's prior question (extract 5.1, line 20). Mas' turn is hearable as accusing, whilst treating "take away health care" as an attribute of Art's membership; this receives a reversal of interactional trajectory ("how am I taking health care from people", line 10) through treating the accusation as a factual matter, though it does not refute the challenge being brought off by Mas. The answer comes in line 14 ("because you support the president's agenda which is to take health care away from millions of Americans"), where the challenge gets put on the record – that is, the "taking away healthcare" is a responsibility of 'Trump' whilst Art's attribute of "support the president" is tied to that responsibility. The combination of the enticing question and challenge makes explicit the challenge agenda to the target and overhearing audience. The sequence concludes with a rejection of the challenge with "that's a lie" in line 18, which is afforded by the detailing of the challenge so that Art may invoke his epistemic primacy as a Trump supporter.

Here then, Mas enticed Art to manufacture a description of him inapposite to his category of 'Trump supporter' and his espoused views. This was done through reinitiating enticing questions (phase c) in response to Art's pushback (phase d). This demonstrated one way of resisting an enticed response, through complying with the enticing question but providing an answer that corroborates one's own category predicates. This is ostensibly weak resistance by going along with the course of action, yet its upshot is strong insofar as it averts the course of that challenge. Moreover, this extract shows a solution to this resistance –

reinitiating the enticing question (phase b) to pursue and bring off the challenge (phase d).

Extract 6 occurs during a protest. The protest is an anti-Trump demonstration on an American highway. Ant belongs to the anti-Trump protestors and has initiated an interaction with Tru, a counter-protestor who has explained that he is here to challenge the anti-Trump protestors and is, himself pro-Trump. Immediately prior to this sequence, Ant and a different pro-Trump counter-protestor were contesting whether illegal immigration is an actual issue for America.

Extract 6 'Americans will pick strawberries' [12:41-12:56]

```
01 ANT:  >d'you know what Donald Trump says. he says<
02       (.) oh they're taking our jo:bs.
03       d'you know what th' illeg'ls do:?
04 TRU:  what do they do:=
05 ANT:  =pick <stra:wberries cucumbe[rs>]
06 TRU:                              [Oka]y an-=
07 ANT:  =orang>es? are you gonna do that?<=
08 TRU:  =they're still illegal
09 ANT:  you're AM[erican no-]
10 TRU:           [YES yes   ] yes
11       m[aybe americans will do tha]t.
12 ANT:   [YAhh Ahh you lie          ]
13       you lying
14 TRU:  yes? (.) maybe americans will
15       pick s[trawberries.  ]
16 ANT:        [no they won't.]
```

Ant initiates a new sequence with a pre-telling ("d'you know what Donald Trump says"), which, given the local context, infers that he is leading to a point that challenges Trump. The telling occurs as reported speech in lines 01-02 ("he says (.) oh they're taking our jobs"): the 'they're' is a reference to illegal immigrants as clarified in line 03, and the 'our' crafts co-membership of Americans. This turn is hearable as setting up the basis for a challenge, for which the pre-telling in line 03 (phase b) projects a contrast – that what the "illegals" actually

do is different to what Trump says they do. Tru responds with a more than straightforward go-ahead ("what do they do") in line 04.

The response by Ant in line 05 is a continuation of the enticing question, further establishing a basis for a challenge sequence, of which Tru receipts and begins a turn-at-talk that is halted as Ant upgrades the basis in line 07 with a completion of the three-part list ("pick strawberries cucumbers oranges"). The enticing polar interrogative then occurs in line 07 ("are you gonna do that"), which assumes a *no* response as observed later in line 12. This is designed to challenge the reported premise in line 02 of the illegal immigrants taking jobs ("he says (.) oh they're taking our jobs"); this is hearable as doing pre-challenging in that the assumed responses makes relevant a third position assessment that ought to counter the logic of the reported speech. Tru, in line 08, resists the enticing question by giving a non-fitted response to counter the hypothetical through attending to the empirical basis of immigrants being 'illegal' ("they're still illegal"), which undermines the reasonableness of the claim that "illegals" are contributing members of society by doing jobs others will not. With a pursuit of the challenge project, Ant does not do an alternative like in the other extracts, but rather attempts to invoke some co-membership in line 09 ("you're American no"). This recasting shifts the target from Tru to reinforce the presupposition that no American citizens perform these tasks. Thus, Tru accepts the presupposition that Americans do not perform these tasks, but he resists the implication by providing the alternate "maybe they will" (line 11).

In overlap with the recasting, Tru ostensibly aligns with Ant. The course of action here is the challenge, but it could also be to cease Ant's control over the direction of talk; however, with the turns in lines 09-12 occurring in overlap, it becomes unclear what is responsive to what as line 12 appears to be responsive to line 10, and line 13 to line 11.

Certainly though, the challenging project gets brought off with exuberance by Ant in line 12, line 13 and line 16 as responsive to the answers given by Tru in line 11 and line 14. The challenge then is to disprove the logic of the reported speech in line 02 by recruiting Tru, as a Trump supporter, to reverse logic of his own argument. The reversal of logic is often the upshot of enticers, but in the previous extracts, the challenger's pursuit of the project subsumes the target's resistive responses in order to make relevant some assessment or description of issue/event/person; while in this case, it is to make relevant the assessment that Trump, and the pro-Trump protestors, are liars.

The extracts in this section have shown how resistance gets built across and through turns. The analysis revealed how certain forms and positions of resistance passively push against the challenge trajectory – i.e. go along with the activity – but highlight something contestable with the prior turn(s). These weaker forms of resistance that align with the activity do not restrict the challenger, though they can influence its design as they deal with the contingencies which arise from the pushback. It is those active forms of resistance that are built following earlier contestations, which derail the challenge's trajectory. For instance, the target of the enticer outrightly rejecting the ongoing action – disaligning from the prior turn – can push the sequence forward on an alternate trajectory. This manoeuvre appears to successfully halt the challenge, though the halting can be treated as accountable.

3.1.3 Reversing the challenge

The next extract details a reversal of the challenge where the response to a enticing question holds the questioner to account for asking the question in the first place. This example occurs in a public context, and as well as being done to covertly make relevant some prospective description and understanding of the other, it is also employed to solicit a response that

ascribes some predicates to a category. In extract 7, Godfrey (GOD) is a right-wing politician

in the UK and prominent spokesperson for his party, and INT is a journalist from a UK TV

company. The clip begins with a group of journalists waiting outside of a building for

Godfrey to leave; when he does the group follow him with this journalist asking a question.

This sequence is the first point at which these two people talk.

Extract 7 'no black faces' [00:35-00:47]

```
01 INT:  now >miste' mister bloom< what do you
02       make of the front- cover of this a- (0.8)
03       your ah- THe conference bro:chure with
04       no black faces on it.
05       (1.7)------Godfrey gaze in Int's direction------>
06 GOD:  WHat a racist comment is that >how dare you.<
07       that's an appalling thing to say .hh you're
08       picking people out for COLour of their skin you
09       disGUst ME get outa my way
10       (2.0)
11 INT:  >we- but I me'n< I'm making the point that you
12       haven't erm (0.6) got
13 GOD:  you're an appalling man
14       (1.0)
15 INT:  we- what's appalling about [making that point]
16 GOD:                             [racist           ]
17       you sir are a r:a:cist
18 INT:  wh↑y-wh↑y am I racist for saying there aren't-
19       [there aren't any black people]
20 GOD:  [you tell me this             ]
21       and you've checked out pe- the colour of
22       people's faces (0.5) DISGRaceful (0.5) you're
23       disgraceful
24 INT:  w↑e- wh↑at?
```

The enticing question occurs in lines 01-04 where the journalist seizes the attention of

Godfrey ("miste' mister bloom") with a interrogative ("what do you make of the front cover

of this a- your ah- the conference brochure") that solicits an answer from Godfrey's

presumed epistemic domain; however, an early indicator of the challenge occurs in line 02-03

with the repair from ("this") to ("your"), and that 'pouncing' on him as he leaves a building

suggests the act of asking is the challenge i.e. designed for Godfrey to face the issue. The

design of the enticing question is such that it possibly invites an assessment, or description from Godfrey ("what do you make") which would go against his political party in some way – that the black faces are intentionally absent (e.g. racist) or accidentally absent (e.g. a mistake/incompetence).

There is a 1.7 second gap where Godfrey gazes at the journalist, indicating some trouble with the prior turn, before resisting the enticing question. The resistance occurs with Godfrey delivering an attack to turn the tables ("what racist comment is that", line 06) which understands the 'racist' aspects of the journalist's question. Van Dijk (1992) details this type of rebuttal in counter attributions of racism as responses to initial accusations of racism. There is then an idiomatic increment ("how dare you"), which targets the producer prior to an object-side description of the enticing question in line 07 ("that's an appalling thing to say") and makes available the explanation in line 08. The turn concludes with the subject-side "you disgust me" in line 09, which shifts the target of the challenge to the journalist with the assessment, thereby reversing the challenge. The reversal ceases the challenge project, takes first position, and directs the direction of talk with the journalist now responsive to the accusation of racism. There is some orientation to this trouble in line 10, and a projected disagreement in line 11 – although before the journalist can complete his repair and provide an alternative understanding, Godfrey pursues his challenge in 13 ("you're an appalling man"). The challenge culminates with the explicit categorisation of the journalist as a racist. This serves to avoid or mitigate the relevant assessment or description of Godfrey as being racist due to the brochure, as the direction of talk now concerns the noticing, rather than the production, of the brochure. The derailing of the journalist's challenge gets accomplished by recasting the challenge in line 17 ("you sir are a racist") to control the direction of talk, thereby rendering the initial direction pursued by the journalist untenable without being

challenged as 'doing racism'. This demonstrates a method through which these enticing questions can be resisted, similar to extract 4, line 14 ("round of applause for the working lady"), which does a categorising the categoriser move (Whitehead, 2009) to counter the enticing question on the basis of the rights of the producer to do such a challenge or produce such a description or assessment. Both of these extracts involve responding to a question with a first-pair-part and do 'not answering' in this particular way.

In this section I have examined a way that the target of an enticer can actively resist that challenge. This example shows how the target of the challenge reverses that challenge back onto the challenger; this disaligns by not answering the question and instead holding the challenger to account for asking this question in the first place. This uses the challenger's turn against them: they are the ones ascribing these racists views and so they think in those racist terms. Unlike those earlier examples where the target contested some prior turn, this reversal does not provide the interactional contingency for the challenger to pursue their challenge, instead leaving them responsive to what has just happened. In that sense, it is a wonderful demonstration of the power of locality and immediacy in talk.

3.2 Discussion

In this chapter I have investigated the suppression of challenges during disputes in talk-in-interaction. The challenger, through invoking these enticing sequences, seeks control over the other speaker and it is this evasion of social control that Reynolds (2015) mentions as an enticing sequence's inherent weakness. It is during these disputative interactions that manufacturing challenges and thus controlling the direction of talk constitutes a local victory and is the reward for the successful production of an enticer, although the sequence does not usually result in a win or concession of the dispute (Reynolds, 2015). Resistance then, for

members, is a solution to the problem of an interactional and/or categorial incongruity crafted by the challenge through the reversal of the logic or production of an inapposite category.

I found that resistance to an enticing sequence occurs following the enticing question (phase c) to halt the on-going trajectory and thwart the apex of the challenge (phase e). Resistance takes various forms which produce different contingencies for the other speaker. The types of resistance crudely specified at the beginning of this chapter ("weak/strong/passive/active") map onto the outcomes which those resistive turns have. For instance, the weaker or passive forms of resistance push back against the challenge but do not necessarily halt its progress, whereas the stronger or active forms of resistance outrightly push against the trajectory and suspend the challenge from going any further (blocking access to the third position for the challenger). The selection of format may correspond to its sequential position, i.e. the earlier forms of resistance are passive, as the challenge is only projectable at those points; thus, it has high contingencies. Conversely, later forms tend to be more active (i.e. disrupt the trajectory) as the resistance has built to this point and the challenge is apparent so it has lower contingencies (i.e. resistance is not necessarily an unexpected response).

The smuggling of a challenge through a seemingly straightforward question begets the smuggling of resistance through seemingly straightforward compliance. Given Steensig and Drew (2008) write "asking a question is not an innocent thing to do" (p.7), the degree to which an 'enticer' can ever be 'straightforward' is questionable. The interrogatives Reynolds examined seemed 'odd' in the context of the disputes – as suddenly off-topic, factual, personal etc. These are straightforward questions in some ways, but questions can be both non-innocent and straightforward and the 'odd questions' require getting a third position turn

and are most obviously a trap. Moreover, as shown in the final examples, producing an unfitted turn in second position prevents access to a third position turn thus disabling the 'trap' opportunity. Considering resistance as a solution to a challenge will likely prove useful in understanding members' orientations to 'innocent questioning'. For that reason, a response to any question avails an opportunity for a divergent understanding and to push back against a possible understanding or inference. In the following chapter I will explore resistance and challenges in further detail by considering their categorial and moral implications and how people manage their relationship during a dispute.

Chapter 4:

Partitioning: Exploiting category boundaries

4.0 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I examined how members resist enticing sequences by showing how speakers work to push back against or suspend the interactional trajectory at various points. In this chapter, I build on this to focus on another members' method for accomplishing a challenge or doing resistance: *partitioning.* This chapter explores how the boundaries of categories in disputative interactions are exploited by the partitioning of Membership Categorisation Devices. 'Partitioning' regards the application of a new category device (i.e. politician/remainer/brexiter/voter as the device 'Brexit[16]') which reconstitutes how we 'see' people (e.g. as a 'remain voter', rather than as a 'Conservative[17] member'). In doing this, it affords certain actions to be done under the guise of the new category device (e.g. complaining about a 'Conservative member' on the basis that they're a 'remain voter', and not a co-member as Conservative). I will demonstrate partitioning as an interactional accomplishment in the following section (4.0.1). In this chapter, I investigate how the invocation of a new device affords a particular action (challenge, complaint, account etc.) and thus allows the members to bring off those actions under the guise of ordinariness, thus rendering them harder to sanction.

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[16] 'Brexit' describes the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the European Union.
[17] The Conservatives are a centre-right party in the United Kingdom.

In a number of ways, this current chapter crystallises the thesis' core enquiries in that the analysis will (1) uncover a members' practice for doing resistance, (2) the categorial implications of and in disputing, (3) how the relationship is actively (re)configured throughout the dispute, and (4) a resource that strangers are afforded in doing disputing. These aims will reveal how partitioning is accomplished, what partitioning accomplishes, and what this tells us about disputes more generally. There is very little research on *partitioning* (see Butler, 2008; 2016; Evans & Fitzgerald, 2016; Nishizaka, in prep; pers. comm.; Poulios, 2016; Sacks, 1995; Stokoe, 2012a). This chapter offers a novel analyses of how divisions are cemented in and through talk-in-interaction through how members negotiate their relationship. When members do partitioning, they are markedly reconfiguring their relationship with the other participants through doing category work – that is, trading on this 'new' category which affords certain actions to be brought off alters the constitution of members in that space and to which device they belong. Consequently, partitioning is tied to the moral order and acts of (dis)affiliation whereby speakers can be seen as 'together' or 'apart' depending on the action which is being accomplished. Thus, this chapter explores the relationship between disputants by focusing on the structural organisation of talk and the categories and devices used.

This chapter is organised as follows. In the following section, I describe and define partitioning by showing a clear example of partitioning, I will then locate partitioning in the broader literature on alternate, and recategorisation work to specify how and why this is unique. I will then detail the findings from the analysis, first showing two extracts where a speaker uses partitioning to produce a challenge. Second, I show six extracts (across two sequences) where there is remediation and resistance against a course of action that is accomplished by way of partitioning and third, I detail how speakers ostensibly do

'distancing' through partitioning. Finally, I discuss these findings and why partitioning is a useful lens for the close examination of the moral order and membership categorisation analysis more broadly.

4.0.1 Partitioning

People can generate co/cross-membership by introducing an alternate category device to exploit the boundaries of categories, and thus reconfigure who the participants are to each other. In this sense, the reconfiguration affords people to produce actions as fitted, and relevant to the current sequential environment (i.e. a man politician, and a woman politician discussing women's reproductive health care – by introducing the category device 'gender' to cover the category device 'politician', it casts the woman of having epistemic authority and is thus able to accuse the man of having insufficient knowledge/rights/access over the topic). To illustrate *partitioning*, the below extract shows how two co-members (i.e. ostensibly within the same category as pro-Brexiteers) become partitioned so that one can challenge the other as an inauthentic member. In this extract, David Davies (a Conservative politician who is pro-Brexit) is arguing with Amy (a member of the public who is also pro-Brexit). Amy is antagonising David, as a politician, for the capitulation over Brexit i.e. the UK not yet leaving the EU. Immediately prior to this Amy has accused David of being anti-Brexit.

Extract 1 "you're a liar" (taken from Joyce & Walz, frth)

```
01 DD:   I- I actually was campaigning for Brexit
02       and have been for years so I don't need to
03       be- given lectures by people like y-
04 BA:   did you- did you vote for the dea:l.
05 DD:   I did vote for the deal but.
06 BA:   Y'↑O VOTED FOR THE DE↑AL
07 DD:   ye[a↓h]
08 BA:    [OH ] MY GOD and tha- have you read the deal?
09 DD:   yeah I read the deal=
10 BA:   =and it means not to leave=
11 DD:   =and how many of eM Pees how many- [yeah  ]
12 BA:                                      [grea↑t]
```

```
13      does it- it means we do↓n't leave=
14 DD:  =how many eM Pees=
15 BA:  =so you're a liar you did not vote to leave.
```

David rejects Amy's assertion that he is anti-Brexit: "I actually was campaigning for Brexit" (line 01). This establishes their co-membership as pro-Brexit campaigners and subverts Amy's attempted challenge (i.e. if he was anti-Brexit then he would be going against the referendum result, and against Amy's position). However, instead of engaging with this, Amy partitions them: Brexiteers who voted for the deal[18], and those who did not ("did you vote for the deal", line 04). Later, voting for the deal is treated as a predicate of people who are remainers ("it means not to leave", line 10). Indeed, by dividing these two populations it covers the 'Brexit-voters' device (to which they are both co-members), thus affording the space for Amy to conclude that David is an inauthentic member. This is accomplished because his 'cover' (of deal-voter) is incompatible with the predicates of leave voters (that authentic leave-voters would not have voted for the deal): "so you're a liar you did not vote to leave" (line 15). Partitioning then allows Amy to continue her project of antagonising David – by dividing the social world it ignores their alliance (as leave voters) and drills into their differences.

Throughout this chapter, I investigate three ways in which *partitioning* is used as a resource to accomplish an interactional move within the dispute. Specifically, I explore the interactional consequences of partitioning through how category devices are deployed and ratified. I do this in three ways. First, I examine how a reconfiguration of members can be done in the service of *producing* a challenge. For partitioning, the *production* of a challenge can be accomplished by creating an incongruity between who the participant is (i.e. what

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[18] The 'deal' refers to a the prime ministers withdrawal agreement which was a proposal that would establish the terms of the UK's exit from the EU.

rights, responsibilities, and obligations they have), and their current behaviour (i.e. as a pro-Brexit person they cannot have voted for the Brexit deal).

Second, I investigate how partitioning achieves a remediation of a challenge, or issue. This is done in contrast to the production of a challenge whereby a speaker can produce themselves as a co-member (i.e. within the same category device) to render that challenge as inappropriate in some way. The remediation of a challenge is done in ways which go along with the current sequential trajectory, with the speaker providing an aligned (and perhaps affiliative) response, but pushes the sequence in a new direction. For example, a member of the public responding to a police officer's demand (e.g. to leave the area) by asserting themselves as 'police commissioner' to thus suppress that demand and subsequently make a request for privileged information (e.g. about what's happened in the area).

The final outcome of partitioning that I investigate is through its use to *distance* a speaker from some non-desirable characteristic in that moment. This will build on Poulios' (2016) work to reveal that participants replace a category device with another, though I will question whether 'distancing' captures what partitioning accomplishes. For example, the police pulling a driver over for picking someone up at a drug dealer's house and the driver replacing the relevance of 'suspect-driver' with 'taxi-driver'.

4.0.1.1 Mobilising identities and Alternative categorisation

Identities are relevant for action-in-interaction and they are the basic link between individuals and a social structure: they are consequential for the outcomes of the actions that they occasion (Raymond & Heritage, 2006). Schegloff (1991, p.50) states that characterisations of the participants ought to be grounded in what is demonstrably relevant to the participants

themselves "at that moment that whatever we are trying to provide an account for occurs".

Raymond and Heritage (2006, p.680) draw a distinction between the 'institutional talk' program and the "open sea of ordinary conversation" where participants' features are endlessly omnirelevant and omnipresent. The recurrent way that Conversation Analysts move forward in the analysis of identities is by examining their manifestation (Antaki & Widdicombe, 1999; Beach, 1996; Kitzinger & Mandelbaum, 2013; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Raymond & Heritage, 2006; Tracy, 2002; Tracy, Myers & Scott, 2006; Widdicombe, 1998). In this chapter, I show through the lens of membership categorisation analysis how 'identities' are made relevant on a moment-by-moment basis and are introduced to reconstitute the relationship between the participants in and through talk-in-interaction, in order to accomplish some action.

Sacks' (1995) economy rule explains that a single category may be referentially adequate to understand a person; however, there are numerous studies which detail alternative categories being employed (Butler, 2008; Cruz, 2014; Jayyusi, 1984; Schegloff, 2007a; Stokoe, 2012b; Widdicombe, 2017). This does not imply that we should throw Sacks' definition out the window but rather clarify how members mobilise these alternative categories. Single categories are *referentially* adequate to locally accomplish an action, providing the single category is warranted, and more than one category can be *relevantly* available. Indeed, this is analogous to flouting the Gricean maxims (see Grice, 1975) to generate implicature; it does not disprove the rule, but rather shows what circumstances deviating from expectations are productive for action. For instance, a 'mother' (who is also a 'police commissioner') may be a referentially adequate category to produce a complaint on behalf of her children, though her 'police commissioner' category remains relevantly adequate and thus the complaint may be rebuked by operationalising the 'police

commissioner' as an alternative, but single, category. It is then not about what categories are usable, but what the category that is being used is doing and what about that category is it practically accomplishing. Category boundaries thus get partitioned to accomplish an action (in the above example, rebuking a complaint), which imparts different affordances for the recipient of that action. Partitioning avows the alternate category as referentially adequate in a particular sequential location as a pre to some upcoming action, or relevantly adequate for the in-situ action.

Alternate categories (Butler, 2008; Stokoe, 2012a), category-transformations (Hester & Eglin, 1997), recategorization (Housley, 1999; Leydon et al., 2013; Watson, 1978), and category types (Jayyusi, 1984) deal with changes in the constitution of members belonging to particular categories and devices. These varying descriptions of people serve to manage the in-situ talk-in-interaction and the configuration of relationships between members themselves. As Hester and Eglin (1997) explain, categories get constituted in their uptake – and in that uptake they reflexively constitute who the speakers are to each other. For instance, shopkeepers and customers operate with respect to each other, and it's in this realisation of categories (in a gestalt contexture) where the categories are hearable as being in mutual relationship to each other (i.e. shopkeepers treat customers as customers and not as shopkeepers, and in doing so constitute themselves as shopkeepers). In this sense, for any category there is an alternate category available to participants: that may be a generic category ("person/guy"), an equivalent/symmetrical category ("mother-father"), an asymmetrical/hierarchical category ("student-teacher"), or some other category which is inconstant with the current/prior category ("teacher-female").

Moreover, partitioning is a distinct practice from recategorization as described in Watson (1978) whereby a recategorization is accomplished as a repair operation – speakers correct some misunderstanding, mishearing, or provide a more accurate description as a solution to a trouble in the talk. Indeed, Housley (1999) and Leydon (2013) both treat recategorization as part of repair, and as deployed to shift the category (and its associated predicates) to accomplish a certain activity. Housley's (1999) example is taken from joint decision-making whereby the 'decision' over how who gets to use an 'office space' is accomplished by shifting 'office space' to 'registered office' (a community space) – and this recategorization of space achieves agreement.

Partitioning then, is accomplished with regard to cover categories – and as described above, these are categories which 'hide', or 'replace', or take precedence over the previously operative category. For instance, pro-Brexit members can be divided on the basis of having voted for the withdrawal deal or not – the 'pro-Brexit' category is covered by 'voters for the deal' and 'voters against the deal'; actions will then trade on those covers, i.e. disagreeing/antagonising (as in Extract 1) because of the cover 'voters for the deal', and not because of the pro-Brexit category. The (a)symmetrical relationship between the single category and the cover category may be oppositionally produced or complementary to the action ("police commissioner-mother" vs "police commissioner-woman"), though opposition and complementariness are treated with respect to the culture-in-action produced by the members themselves. Specifically, cover categories deal with the practical problem that obligations and entitlements of one category (bridge player) do not get precedence over the obligations and entitlements of the alternate category (police officer) in particular contexts (e.g. bridge players can sanction someone for bidding 'no trumps' when they have a void

suit19, but they could not arrest someone for speeding). However, and with regard to conflict,

cover categories can work as the grounds for failing to fulfil category-bound obligations (an

incongruence may occur if the obligations of a bridge player are treated as having precedence

over the obligations of a police officer). This disjuncture between the cover and its category

is discussed by Jayyusi (1984) who details three types: *Category-disjunctives* where there is a

deletion of an avowable category which is substituted for an alternate category that is

contrastive in its upshot. *Contrastively-usable-categories* which do not revise the

applicability of the alternate category but trade on its categorial relevance; these are used to

describe an incumbent of the category in a way which attributes an alternate behaviour.

Category-feature-disjunctives arise from a disjuncture between the category and its local

environment: they provide for an oppositional or substitutive alternative. This renders cover

categories as morally implicative and assessable in terms which are category-relevant but

able to violate category bound obligations and entitlements.

In the following sections I present an analysis of members demonstrably exploiting a

membership categorisation device partition in the accomplishment of some action. First, I

provide a description of Sacks' (1995) 'partitioning a population' wherein I consider

partitioning as a members' concern. Then I examine ten extracts from the data to illustrate

how partitioning is used to (1) bring off a challenge, (2) remedy a conflict and (3) permit a

speaker to distance themselves from a category attribute. These extracts best represent

partitioning as it occurs in a disputative environment; in each case, the participants are

working to create a division, or alliance as part of their interactional project. Finally, I

summarise the findings and conclude with some avenues of inquiry for partitioning, and for

---

19 One cannot bid 'no trumps' if they have a void, or singleton of any suit (spades, hearts, diamonds, clubs). At most a player can have one doubleton (see Klinger, 2001).

membership categorisation analysis.

4.1 Analysis

In this section, I show how partitioning is interactionally accomplished and dealt with in disputes. I focus on the accomplishment of a social action and the methods with which partitioning is exploited by the participants. For each example, I first discuss the local context, I then detail what occasions the partitioning and how it is managed in and through the talk, and finally I examine how the action which has occasioned the partitioning is treated by the other participant(s). I begin with examples that detail how, through exploiting the partition, categories are mobilised to establish grounds for a challenge. I will then show how partitioning is exploited to remediate an in-progress challenge.

4.1.1 Partitioning to *produce* a challenge

One way in which partitioning occurs is through the production of a challenge. The following examples outline two ways of exploiting category boundaries: (1) in order to craft some incongruence with the participants' categorial relevance and (2) renegotiating the relevance of a certain category (see Sacks' (1995) rule of economy) to generate a disjuncture by promoting one's obligations and entitlements so as to diminish the other's own obligations and entitlements.

The first extract (as previously shown in Chapter 3, extract 3) is taken from a radio call-in from 2017. Sam is calling the UK radio station 'Leading Britain's Conversation (LBC)' (a news, travel and weather station that often discusses politically divisive topics). Sam is responding to a previous caller who has championed the banning of the burkini.

Instead, Sam is advocating for all women to cover up, indicating that morals are on in the decline in Britain. The host (HOS) has taken an oppositional position. Immediately prior to this extract, Sam has been discussing how bikinis ought to be banned, that homosexuality is vile and disgusting, and that the host leers at women in bikinis. In this extract the host exploits the partition, which (1) renders the family category device as categorially relevant and (2) produces a contrast between a symmetrical standard relational pair to challenge Sam.

Extract 2 'Bikinis' [03:01-03:49]

```
01 Sam:   yeah- they all perv they all gorp at them
02        and [keep] staring at them of course.
03 Hos:       [jee-] okay
04 Sam:   >is that what you [do<      ]
05 Hos:                     [an how-] how mu- (.)
06        p'don (.) [no I don't KEEp star]ing
07 Sam:             [is that what you do ]
08 Hos:   I don't sit there LEEring at them and I think
09        [my partner will probably have a view if I did?]
10 Sam:   [((inaudible))haha                              ]
11        hahaha
12 Hos:   yea? How many children do you have Sam.
13 Sam:   £si↑x£
14 Hos:   s:i#x. do you mind my asking the age range?
15 Sam:   eh. £eleven to- o:ne£
16 Hos:   °°ahright°° °well look after >them<°
17        >do you hav-< Do they have an enlightened mo:ther.
18        (0.7)
19 Sam:   £of course they do.£
20 Hos:   they have R[Ight. so they are getting-]
21 Sam:              [their ver- modest         ]
22        their very modest and good mother.
23        [(will/would)] cover up all the time
24 Hos:   [I said sorry] when I say enlightened more broad-
25        ah- more broadmi:nded mother. do they have a
26        broadminded mother or is she-
27 Sam:   yeah she's broadminded she's not sh- sh-
28        she's not- she doesn't have low self-esteem where
29        [she feels like she has to get na:ked in front
30        of other men]
```

```
31 Hos:   [°no- I'm try-° what am I trying to
32        get across here°.hhh]
33 Sam:   n↑o tha?t's what I'm getting across?
34 Hos:   is she mo::re #ehh: r:e#laxed (.) than you:
35 Sam:   Nick it's none of your £busin'ss about my wife£
36        to be fair (.) yeah £we're on radio yeah£
37 Hos:   ahright okay look after the children enjo- .hhh
38        have I enjoy- well >I s'pose have enjoyed speaking
39        t'y'< I'm pretty horrified by some of your views.
```

The analysis of this extract will focus on how the action of a challenge is produced by the radio host (HOS). The challenge is produced by exploiting the partition to render Sam's views (produced as a radio-caller) as incongruous with the cover category reintroduced by the host of 'father' as part of the family device.

Prior to this, Sam has used his children as grounds for his argument (i.e. women should cover up because he does not want his children to see them); this allows the host to reintroduce his children, as he does in line 12: "how many children do you have Sam?" with a further question in line 14 ("asking the age range?"). The radio phone-in device remains in operation throughout with respect to how the interaction is organised, but these questions make the caller's membership as father locally relevant, though the action to which this line of enquiry is attending remains opaque at this point. We can see the partitioning occurring here as the host is trying to make some categories relevant (mother/father) as part of his attempt to lead Sam into a self-contradiction: "how many children do you have Sam?" (line 12). These categories 'cover' the category previously in operation (chastiser of people who are morally corrupted), and by doing so change the trajectory of talk, and introduce an alternate body of common-sense knowledge (Schegloff, 2007a). Sam positions himself as a moral commentator, but the host subverts this by transposing the same actions (i.e. condemning others for being gay / wearing bikinis) in the family context – his children

become collateral damage by bearing witness to Sam's behaviour. The host is reconfiguring the relationship, not between himself and Sam, but between Sam and the targets of his judgements.

The host occasions the asymmetrical parent-child device rather than the symmetrical husband-wife device, notably with the repair "do you hav- do they have" (line 17) to treat Sam as having the epistemic rights to know about amount and age of the children as well as the attributes of this specific 'mother' person. The cover of 'family' over 'chastiser of people' is morally implicative and assessable as Sam is treated as violating some normative obligations as a father (i.e. loving his children) given the views he espoused as 'chastiser of people'. Indeed, in lines 12-14 the host treats Sam – as a co-member of the family device – as having the epistemic rights to (dis)confirm an attribute of another member with whom he is in a standard relational pair (mother-father) ("do they have an enlightened mother"). Subsequently (in line 17) the host splits the standard relational pair into two parent-children sets – children with a bigoted parent, and children with an enlightened parent – which, given an enlightened parent, assumes the children's welfare and instructs care for the children, projecting a contrast between both of them. This means that the host accomplishes partitioning to challenge Sam on the basis of his espoused opinions (i.e. as chastiser of people) being incompatible with his membership within the family device (as a father), and as such he can be seen as a bigoted parent (thankfully, unlike the mother).

In the next extract Tucker Carlson (TC) on his show (Tucker Carlson Tonight) is discussing the confirmation of Brett Kavanaugh by Susan Collins onto the supreme court of the United States. Tucker, a conservative political commentator, is discussing this confirmation with Monica Klein (MK), a political strategist. The previous 3m 40s have

comprised a discussion surrounding the rumours that Susan Collins' honorary degree will be removed on basis that she "lacks integrity" due to her confirming Brett Kavanaugh onto the supreme court. This discussion has reached a point where TC has been making attempts to characterise/assume Monica's position as 'chilling' and 'scary' (line 10), despite Monica arguing that Tucker is wrong in his assumptions. This extract concludes their discussion. Herein, Monica exploits the partition by mobilising a symmetrical but contrastive category in order to promote her own rights and entitlements in the 'gender' device whilst counter-challenging Tucker through casting him as a cross-member within this device.

Extract 3 'saying something that's obviously true' [03:40-04:37]
(taken from Humă, Joyce, Ferraz de Almeida, Doehring & Ristimäki, in prep)

```
01 MK:  [maybe we just disagree on the              ]
02      word inte#grity?# is (.) I don't think she has it
03 TC:  wel'e- (0.7) integrity means ho:nesty
04      (.)[decency]
05 MK:     [I don't] think she has honesty or
06      decency I don't think Brett Kavanaugh does
07      either and I think it's ridiculous that
08      she confirmed him for the >supreme
09      co[urt< and I think she will be vo:ted o]ut
10 TC:    [I think th't your world view is scary]
11 MK:  because women are extremely frustrated with
12      Susan Co↑llins ri↑ght now because she's
13      [supported a sexual predator  ]
14 TC:  [well not every woman feels th]at way
15      and [you don't speak for all women j]ust so you know.
16 MK:      [okay but there is a thirty-     ]
17      oka[y thank  ] you f'r [mansp ]laining that t(h)o me
18 TC:     [°mo↓nica°]          [°okay°]
19      (0.6)
20 TC:  .hhum I'm not mansplaining? (0.4)I'm saying something
21      that's obviously tru:e.
22 MK:  [there    is    a     thirty     per]cent gap
23 TC:  [°I appreciate you coming out thanks°]
24 MK:  in between democrats and republicans
25      >the fact th't [women  are  su]pporting democrats
26 TC:                  [°°swell yeah°°]
27 MK:  thirty per[cent mo]re<
28 TC:            [got it°]
```

```
29 MK: [because the republican party is offending wo↑#men# ]
30 TC: [I read t-I read the polls I just don't think people]
31     w- disagree with- (.) °okay° >thanks a lot monica<
32     good to [°see you again.°]
33 MK:         [nice talk to you]
```

First, let us examine how the partitioning gets occasioned. In line 01-02, Monica provides an

understanding of the argument, though this is done in overlap and so produces an extension

to her turn ("we just disagree on the word integrity is (.) I don't think she has it"), which

reaffirms her position. In response Tucker produces a definition of integrity, which displays

some epistemic authority as his membership of 'host', and treats the definition as taken-for-

granted. Tucker's definition is tacitly accepted by Monica, though she pursues her previous

line that Susan Collins does not have integrity warranted by Tucker's definition that Susan

Collins lacks honesty and decency (thereby rendering her without integrity). This gets

managed as a my-side formulation with the prefaced "I don't think she has honesty" (line 05

and 06) and "I think it's ridiculous" (line 07 and 09). This displays their adversarial stances

for competing claims with both Tucker and Monica attempting to discredit one another's

understanding.

We can observe the first mobilising of an alternate understanding at a possible

transition-relevance place and in overlap ("I think tht't your world view is scary", line 10).

This is not attended to by Monica; instead she continues her turn and is thus hearable as

speaking on behalf of women ("because women are extremely frustrated with Susan

Collins") in lines 11-13, which introduces the gender device with 'woman' as a cover

category for Monica – that is, Monica is hearable as speaking as a woman, and not simply as

a political commentator (though this also remains in operation). Tucker attends to 'woman'

by holding Monica accountable for that assertion "well not every woman feels that way just

so you know and you don't speak for all women" (lines 14-15), which is produced in overlap

at a non-transition-relevance place. The particularisation (Billig, 1987) done by Tucker in line 15 counters Monica's category-based claim; reflexively, Tucker's mobilising of Monica's category as a woman provides a warranted basis for Monica to use his category of 'man' to explain his actions (Stokoe & Edwards, 2007). Tucker's uptake of the proffered category of 'woman' provides a basis for Monica to produce the accusation.

Monica's turn is produced as a safe action (Sacks, 1995) as it has the format of 'praise' which acts as a vehicle for the accusation to be produced. This is seen in line 17, where the partitioning occurs; the accusation of mansplaining is produced to pause the in-progress sequence by describing the prior turn and push the sequence forward in an alternate direction whilst sequentially deleting Tucker's turn in lines 14-15. The partition is exploited through a reconfiguration from co-members of 'political discussants' to cross-members of gender – that is, invoking her membership of 'woman' avails the category-bounded challenges that can be brought off against Tucker with 'mansplaining', and promotes Monica's right to speak as a member of that category. The accusation sequentially deletes Tucker's prior challenge of particularisation and momentarily disrupts the activity of the talk show. Tucker responds with a preferred denial (Atkinson & Drew, 1979) which is produced as a contrast-structure "I'm not mansplaining", though Monica resumes her talk from lines 18-20 in line 29, returning to the talk show activity. Tucker, as host, initiates a closing in line 30 and the activity is concluded.

This extract demonstrates how the partition may be exploited in order to promote one's rights, responsibilities and obligations to a particular category. Here, Monica was challenged on the basis that she did not speak for all women, and so introduced an alternate understanding to promote her rights, responsibilities and obligations as a member of that

category. This reflexively counter-challenged Tucker on the basis of him being cross-member to render him as having limited rights to challenge Monica on the basis of her being a 'woman' member. The conflict here is unlike the prior extract where Sam is challenged for not fulfilling certain obligations; here, Tucker is challenged by Monica exploiting the partition between the 'discussant' and 'gender' devices which manufactures a disjuncture with the upshot being that Tucker, as an incumbent of the contrastively usable category 'man', is ascribed an attribute of an alternate behaviour 'mansplainer'.

In this section I have shown how the partition can be exploited in order to bring off some challenge which is generated by some incongruity, or disjuncture between alternate categories or alternate understandings. The two examples outline two different ways this is accomplished. The first introduced the cover category 'father' to highlight an incongruity between the obligations of one category and the local context (being a bigot being incompatible with being a good parent). The second introduced the cover category 'woman' which afforded a challenge on grounds of the disjuncture between their two memberships 'man'-'woman' and the ascribed behaviour of 'mansplainer'; it reconfigured who the participants are to each other – not as political commentators discussing an issue (with a fairly even distribution of knowledge rights – i.e. knowing about the supreme court nominee), but as a man and a woman (with an uneven distribution of knowledge rights – i.e. women having authority over their reproductive healthcare). In these examples the invoking of an alternate category device reconfigures who these people are to each other; the partitioning reframes the talk to step outside of the current matters being discussed in order to disrupt that prior talk. In contrast, the following section shows how the partition can be exploited in order to reconfigure members relationships in a way which supresses a projectable, or in-progress challenge.

4.1.2 Partitioning to *remediate*

A further way that partitioning occurs is through remediation of a trouble, or the stopping of a challenge. The remediation of a challenge means that the challenge is stopped, but the stopping of a challenge does not necessarily mean that it has been remediated – in the previous extract, Monica stops Tucker's challenge by producing her own challenge (accusing him of mansplaining) – and so does not remediate (by being seen as co-members); however, these examples will demonstrate how partitioning who-these-people-are-to-each-other seeks a solution, and leads to a (momentary) remedying of the challenge/issue. And indeed, 'remedying' is a subjective act – who gets to say what a remediated course of action looks like? Consequently, these examples will largely regard attempts to be heard/seen as being in an alliance (as co-members) with their co-interlocutors.

The first example involves a passenger (PAS) on a train in the UK in 2012 who has been found to not have a valid ticket to travel by the train guard (TG1) and so must pay the £3 ticket cost and a £20 fine. The previous 12 minutes have comprised the passenger complaining about the payment, accounting for not having a valid ticket, and not complying with the institutional business of purchasing a ticket. Immediately prior, the passenger and train guard have called over a second train guard (TG2) to assist in remedying the situation, and TG2 repeats the institutional processes of payment and the process of formally complaining to the company.

Extract 4 'actually a nice guy' [12:54–14:37]

```
01 TG2: then you've got seventeen- yu've got twenny one
02      days to make your appe[al <and say why.>
03 PAS:                       [I'm willing to do that but I
```

```
04        think err your colleague here is inadequate. and
05        that if eet wasn't for you here he wouldn't have
06        known any of these things. >so I am willing to do
07        that. and thank you very much for being here?< but I
08        think you have no idea what you' doing?
09 TG2:   well listen- my
10        colleag[ue has been doing this for a while.]
11 PAS:        [your colleague- your colleague     ]
12        [was actually closing this]
13 TG2:   [and hhe has-              ]
14 PAS:   and he was gonna h- he- he's pissed off. so he's not
15        act'lly a-acting l-like you[you're meant to act']lly
16 TG1:                             [okay s-sorry       ]
17 PAS:   [deal with a passen- general public.]
18 TG1:   [I've be'n- I've been actually quite]
19        >I've been actually quite<
20 PAS:   no you haven't [and I'm not even willing to-]
21 TG1:                  [No yes I have?              ]
22 PAS:   no you haven't=
23 TG1:   =alright
24 TG2:   I j- I just think you have a stronger personality
25        than. (.) he does he has to be polite i[n here so:.]
26 TG1:                                          [I 'ave to  ]
27        be polite b- but unfortunately you've y-y-y you-you-
28        you've (1.3) >no I'm not gonna do this no I'm not
29        gonna do this< this is wha you said the whole time=
30 TG2:   =he's actually a nice guy okay take the
31        three pounds an'?
32 TG1:   >okay< [so you have to pro]vide us with your details
33 TG2:         [you do have to    ]
34        provide your name and address
35        [in order to make a card payment]
36 TG1:   [just (throw in / thirty) five  ] quid please?
37        (5.0)
38 PAS:   and I'll have to provide you with my address
39        when you said- ah'I don't have to do that now.
40 TG2:   [no if] you were paying in full then [don't have to]
41 TG1:   [but  ]                              [it's a card  ]
42        [payment so basically they (   )-  ]
43 TG2:   [but because you're making a card p]ayment the way
44        they have to correspond with you.
45 PAS:   right s:ure.
```

In this extract TG2 exploits the partition which (1) accounts for a co-member's actions, (2)

accounts for a co-member, and (3) remedies the trouble so that compliance with the passenger is accomplished. Through exploiting the partition, a pn-adequate device (a general category to which anyone can belong) is invoked which crafts a disjuncture between the train guard as an institutional member and the train guard as an ordinary, everyday member. In lines 01-02, TG2 has taken an extended turn at talk to give an explanation of the institutional process of making a complaint to the train company so that the passenger may receive a refund of the £20 fine; this displays TG2's responsibility as a train guard to be knowledgeable about the institutional processes and his rights to do informing of those processes.

The passenger produces a complaint ("but I think err your colleague here is inadequate") in line 04 that attends to TG1's purported failure to fulfil his responsibilities as a train guard. TG2's response in line 09 has a tacit display of co-membership with TG1 through reusing the passenger's term, "colleague". The passenger, in line 14 and 15, highlights this failure ("he's pissed off. so he's not act'lly a-acting l-like you"); the guard's responsibility is transgressed with "he's pissed off" and the co-membership yields the challenge with "he's not act'lly a-acting l-like you". This is dealt with by remedying the passenger's negative assertion (that TG1 is not a good train guard), which will result in compliance from the passenger with the train guard's project (getting the passenger to pay for their ticket). The passenger self-repairs from "passenger" to "general public" (line 17) which is a generalised category that anyone can belong to (i.e. the upgrading TG1's failure to deal with all people, not just passengers). This opens the door for TG2 to interject with an account-for (Flint & Merrison, forthcoming) in lines 24 and 25 "I just think you have a stronger personality", providing a reinterpretation of the offence as being expectable because of their relationship imbalance.

In line 30, TG2 exploits the partition as he invokes the category gloss of "nice guy" as a general category which mirrors the passenger's use of 'general public' i.e. outside of the specific passenger-train guard relationship. This general category glosses who TG1 is – it is a descriptor which is applicable across all of his memberships, and indeed, goes outside of the narrow 'train guard' relationship, like the passenger did with 'general public'. The partitioning reconfigures the passenger-train guard relationship to a general public-general public relationship whereby the institution (the train) accounts for the passenger's complaint, but that, as co-members of 'general public', they do not have sufficient reason to be arguing. This revision of TG1 remedies the passenger's complaint through allaying the relevance of the passenger's assessment in line 04 and dealing with a possible negative assertion conveyed (i.e. TG1 is fulfilling his train guard responsibilities ("he has to be polite in here", line 25), and the passenger's complaint toward TG1, as a train guard, is inapplicable given that he is a 'nice guy'). The remedial work disavows the passenger's complaint and achieves compliance with the on-going task.

The exploitation of the partitioning is uncontested, with TG1 returning to the omnirelevant 'train guard' device in line 32 to conduct the institutional business of "okay so you have to provide us with your details", with the "okay so" arising as a move accepting and building on the prior turn. The partition exploitation – allowing TG1 to be seen as outside of the category 'train guard', that he is, in fact, a 'nice guy' and also a member of the public – successfully deals with the passenger's complaint as she begins completing the form. The challenge is then remediated with the partitioning relying on the omnipresent pn-adequate devices (person, guy, man, woman etc.) to act as a cover for the single category of 'train guard', which achieves compliance by moving from an asymmetrical device (passenger-train guard) to a symmetrical device (nice guy-person). We can see this dispute as resolved given

the dispute ceases and the participants align through compliance.

This next interaction occurs in the US: the police (PO) have pulled over a car that is not correctly registered. The passengers are all young adults and one of them has called their mother, Caren Turner (CM) to arrange for her to pick them up, as they are no longer able to drive their car. Caren arrives and begins questioning the police regarding their reason for impounding the car. The police will not answer her questions as she is not the driver, so she pursues her line of questioning and begins to invoke alternate categorisations to solicit an answer – that is, she attempts to remediate the problem by introducing herself as a mother, as being the police commissioner, and as being a member of the public. Though this extract features institutional business, and complaints, it can be understood as a dispute on the basis that: (1) Caren is a third-party to the initial business, (2) Caren and the police officer are pursuing different trajectories, and (3) their versions (and espoused opinions) of what ought to occur clash as to who has the legitimate authority to assert their version; therefore, the contestation of opinions and disagreement mark this as disputative.

This interaction unfolds over the next four extracts in order to show how partitioning may occur over an extended sequence (like Butler's (2008) fairy club).

Extract 5.1 "do you know who I am" [01:10-01:45]

```
01  CM: hi is- I'm a resident >here you go<
02  PO: °>it's fine<° we don- I don- I don't need that?
03  CM: okay fine [I'm Caren Turner.  ]
04  PO:          [you're jus' here t-]
05      you're just here as a ride alright?
06  CM: no I'm no:t=
07  PO: =okay
08  CM: I'm here as A concerned citizen
09      a[nd  ]friend of the mayo:r,
10  PO:  [okay]
```

```
11       okay
12  CM:  and be'n in Tenafly for twenny years I take full
13       responsibility for them? and what is ther- reason
14       they were pulled over=
15  PO:  =he- the driver has all the information
16       he'll tell you.
17  CM:  >>no no no no no.<< I need to know
18  PO:  no you don't need to know
19  CM:  okay?
20  PO:  you ar' not involved here you're picking
21       them up?=
22  CM:  =>no no no< I'm involved (0.2) trust me
23       [I'm very involved ]
24  PO:  [well I'm not going]
25       to tell you he's the driver of the automobile?
26       (0.3) he's over eightee:n (1.1) that's all you
27       need to know.
28  CM:  ehm
29       (2.0)
30  P2:  >okay okay<
```

This analysis will highlight the attempts by Caren to exploit the partition in order to achieve compliance like in the prior extract. There is minimal uptake of Caren's proffered categories by the police as they treat the single category of 'mother/guardian' as adequate for their interactional business. In this extract I will focus on the mobilising of alternate categories and explicate how this reconfigures the participants' relationship and thus observably affords particular actions.

Extract 5.1 marks the beginning of this interaction. This is the first point at which Caren and the police interact. Caren introduces herself as a "resident" in line 01 whilst handing the police a document (later to be revealed as her police commissioner credentials, line 32); although Caren introduces herself as a resident, she is seeable as a co-member of the group from the car who need transport. The category proffered here has minimal valence other than accounting for her presence. The police focus on her membership of 'transporter of these people' with a rejection of the credentials with "it's fine", "I don't need that," and an

orientation to Caren's obligation to transport them: "you're just here as a ride" (line 05), and "you're picking them up" (line 20). The minimal responses produced by the police mark a move toward a closing and conclusion of their business (the impounding of the car): "the driver has all the information" (line 15). This is whilst Caren attempts to partition categories by negotiating the relevant category (and thus how they can make sense of her turns) in an attempt to remediate the impounding of the car. Her negotiation includes: "I'm Caren Turner" (line 03), "I'm here as a concerned citizen" (line 08), "friend of the mayor" (line 09): these are produced as responsive to the minimal acknowledgment tokens by the police and prior to the request on line 14, and speak to the action entitlements that can be claimed through those categorisations. At this point, though there is little uptake by the police officers, self-identifying by her full name and 'friend of the mayor' provides for the officer to recognise her as someone with influence which alludes to her institutional clout as a police commissioner.

Caren's self-identifications serve to reconfigure the who-they-are: as Caren is seeable as a person providing transport, these alternate categories produce an alternate understanding that Caren is doing more than simply transporting. The request for information in lines 13-14 "what is ther- reason they were pulled over" is prefaced with Caren establishing herself as a co-member – "I take full responsibility" – at least as a co-member in an asymmetrical category set (parent-child) in the 'family' device (i.e. as mother she is responsible for her children). The action in lines 13-14 ("what is ther- reason they were pulled over") is designed as an interrogative, but given Caren's position and influence, it is hearable as requesting some remedial action (for them and their car to be released). Here then there is some potential exploiting of who Caren is, as someone who is not straightforwardly here to collect the group and is doing more than is necessarily required to deal with the business at hand. The police

officer attends to Caren's co-membership with the comment "the driver has all the information he'll tell you" (line 15) which, though non-aligning, provides a solution to the request though not the solution sought by Caren. Moreover, in the continuing turns, the police officers treat Caren as an ordinary member of the public (and not eligible to know): "you don't need to know", "you ar' not involved you're picking them up" (line 20), and "that's all you need to know" (line 26). This understanding is resisted by Caren, who stops their trajectory with "no no no" (line 22) and "I'm very involved" (line 23) which, like the request in line 14, does more than countering the police officer's turn in line 20 and alludes to her institutional clout mentioned earlier (e.g. as friend of the mayor).

Though not explicitly produced, this extract displays the defeasibility of partitioning. Caren's turns are treated as straightforward actions (request, rejection, assertions), but carry an implicature that alludes to her institutional clout. Caren negotiates the relevant category memberships and the action entitlements that can be claimed through those categorisations. The police avoid Caren's allusions and continue to treat her as 'ordinary member' (someone providing transport). We can see here then that Caren has attempted to partition and reconfigure her relationship with the police officers by introducing some asymmetrical categories ("friend of the mayor-police officer", "Caren Turner-policer officer") and thus cover her category of 'transport provider', or 'citizen' to which the officers have been treating her. This is in the service of achieving a remedial outcome – the releasing of the car. The police officers, however, retain their current asymmetrical pair ("police officer-citizen"), rendering Caren as having insufficient obligations and entitlements to accomplish certain actions (like requesting information) and successfully remediating the problem of the car impounding. The introduction of these alternate categories by Caren does afford certain actions to be accomplished, which can be observed in the following extracts. The extracts below provide an

example of embodied exploiting of the partition, which is the physical reconfiguration of members in a space to produce some action.

Extract 5.2 "do you know who I am" [01:10-01:45]

Extract 5.3 "do you know who I am" [01:45-02:30]

```
31  CM: if you c'n-
32  P2: w-we don't need to see credentials=
33  CM: =°oka↑y° [°oka↑y°]
34  P2:         [#w:   ] #we've [explained already]
35  CM:                        [I- you need an-  ]
36      you need a-
37      (2.0)
38  CM: if you can give me a little bit of (.)
39      s:pace here.
40      (2.0)
41  CM: [°what is the nature of°]
42  PO: [who-  who  is   this? ]
43      [are you a commissioner?]
44  CM: [°I'm the commissioner° ]
```

```
45      °°I am the commissioner°° (1.2) one of the
46      commissioners
47      and I'm heading up?
48  PO: do you have an eI Dee with tha↑t?
49  CM: that is my eI Dee and that is my business card
50      (0.5)
51  CM: I am the commissioner? (0.2) of the port
52      authority.
53      and I'm heading up over four thousand police
54      °officers° okay?
55  PO: °okay°
56  CM: SO if there's a pro↑blem? I think I have-=
57  PO: =there's no problem?
58  CM: well I think there is a problem.
59  PO: it's an unregistered vehicle
60  CM: okay let's hear what is- why were they pulled
61      over first of all.
62  PO: miss [I resp-]
63  CM:      [>NO  DO]n't< call me miss I'm commissioner
64      thank you.
65  PO: commissioner.
66  CM: yes=
```

Following the prior extract, this extract showcases an example of embodied partitioning accompanied by the articulated actions. The unsaid membership of 'police commissioner' is explicitly articulated in order to remedy some trouble; however, articulating that trouble or accomplishing an action gets delicately managed given the now-asymmetrical category pair ("police commissioner-police officer") produced by Caren. This asymmetrical pair renders certain actions, such as an instructing to let these people go as a breach of the police officer's obligations (to uphold the law). The remedial work of releasing the car, and thus fixing the problem, is prevented by the police officers – and though there is little uptake, we can examine how Caren's solutions trade on her partitioned categories.

The embodied partitioning begins with Caren explaining that she is "very involved" (lines 22-23, extract 5.1). This assertion by Caren that she is involved alludes to some alternate category. It is at this point that Caren hands something (not seen on camera) to the police

officer who, in line 32, hands back the document after inspection (as shown in the comic strip above) whilst asserting that "w- we don't need to see credentials"; the document which the police have been handed is Caren's police commissioner badge. The handing over of the badge is done without any accompanying explanation as to why these credentials are being shown at this point, and it is not until line 48 where the police inspect the credentials ("do you have an ID with that") that the badge becomes visible to the police as a police commissioner's badge. The attempted handover of Caren's credentials thus offers a revision of the prior request, now that Caren has produced a slightly more explicit understanding of her cover category as a 'police commissioner', and can thus remediate the problem of the car being impounded.

Despite Caren's efforts to introduce, and trade on an alternate category, the police reject the actions Caren is attempting to accomplish: "we've explained already" (line 34). In response to this turn Caren explicitly partitions the group by altering the constitution of members in the physical space. This is done as a hand movement and initiated in lines 38-39 "if you can give me a little bit of space here"; the accompanying hand movement selects a target for the turn, directs the movement, and creates physical distance between Caren and the group to which she had been seen as a co-member ("I take full responsibility", line 12-13). Caren then positions herself closer to the police whilst producing her turn on line 41, which is done in overlap with the police confirming who Caren is ("are you a commissioner") which is affirmed by Caren ("I'm the commissioner") in line 44 and revised to be fitted to the police officer's turn in line 45 ("one of the commissioners"). Here then, is the first point at which the police acknowledge the alternate understanding being pursued by Caren, though they ask for further proof of who they are "do you have eI Dee" (line 48); the unspoken category (police commissioner) has now been produced following the reconfiguration of members in the space. Caren mobilises the concrete feature of the badge to indicate to the police officers that she can

see a relationship (as someone that is their superior) and invites the police officers to see that same relationship and understand her actions with reference to that relationship.

The delicacy to which these actions are being accomplished by Caren and the police officers speaks to the obligations and entitlements of the relationship between their categories. That is, the projected action of requesting information "if there's a problem I think I have a right" (line 56) is not a straightforward request, instead relying on the policer officer's common-sense knowledge to treat this turn as a request rather than an assertion; the police officer rebuts the premise for the assertion with "there's no problem" (line 57). So despite Caren's efforts to avow her responsibilities as a police commissioner ("heading up over four thousand police"), smuggle in some other action ("I think I have a right"), and achieve remediation of the situation (releasing the car), there is no uptake so those actions remain sanctionable. Let us see what happens next.

Extract 5.4 "do you know who I am" [11:44-12:40]

```
66 CM: GET AWAY from me?
67     (2.0)
68 PO: you keep coming [to me  ]
69 CM:                 [I'm A:S]KI-
70     >no no< I came to [see his address ]
71 PO:                   [thi- thi-this is]
72     a police employee.
73 CM: I came to get his ahdress.
74 PO: this is a police contractor (with the police)
75     (1.3)
76 CM: you've made five people miss (br/lunch) time (.)
77     I hope you're happy (.) >you're an ass<
78 PO: just doing my [job  ]
79 CM:               [and y]ou-
80     NO °no you're not°
81 PO: °°ohkay°°
82 CM: °you're not°
83 PO: you're all free to go how about that
84 CM: how abou:t-
85     (8.8)
```

```
86 CM: I'm not even gonna talk to you because
87     it's not worth it.
88     (0.7)
89 CM: th[ank   ]
90 PO:   [I agr-] I agree
91 CM: you:: ARe not a nice person.
92     (0.4)
93 CM: an five cry:ing. .h you've ruined their easter
94     you've ruined their pa:ssohver. You've got someone
95     >an investment banker< from Lo:ndon you've ruined
96     this- >they were just goin' for a hike?< an' you've
97     can't even- I hope you're very happy because you seem
98     to have a smug ahss look on your face and this seems
99     to please you?
```

In this part of the extract we can observe Caren manoeuvring away from the 'police commissioner' category to reintroduce her non-institutional 'ordinary member' category. This affords her (and she attends to) the necessary obligations and entitlements to produce a challenge on the grounds that the police are not fulfilling their obligations, thereby violating their category-attributes, and not adequately acting as police officers. Her complaint about the police officers trades on her 'citizen' membership, and does not explicitly display remediation work, but rather – it comments on the failed remediation (by complaining about the police's (in)action), and it is through this failure that Caren's remedial work across this extended sequence can be seen.

The extract begins with Caren issuing the directive "get away from me" (line 66), though she moves toward the officer, which is oriented to by the officer with "you keep coming to me" (line 68); this is produced as an on-line comment on the conduct of the police officers as adversarial. This is resisted by the police who assert their category "this is a police employee", "this is a police contractor" (line 71 and 74): these turns display an orientation by the police that Caren is not treating them as having sufficient rights and entitlement to (1) deny her access to the requested information, and (2) the authority (over Caren) to impound the car. In line 10 Caren embeds a troubles-telling, revealing her stance toward the

impounding "you've made five people miss (br/lunch) time", which also treats herself as a co-member (there are four members from the car plus herself) and thus as being entitled to be a complainant. This then is partitioning, as Caren produces the alternate understanding of herself as a co-member of this group with the ratio becoming 5:2. Consequently, her negative assessment of the police officer "you're an ass" (line 77) trades on her co-membership with the group (i.e. as a citizen, and not as the officer's superior), and the officer's failure to engage in remedial work.

Caren's turn is receipted by the police officer with "just doing my job" (line 78), which orients to the partitioning, that is, the turn reasserts their institutional entitlements to impound the car ("my job"); however, this also alludes to some co-membership by invoking an alternate understanding of themselves as an ordinary member orienting to some category-bound responsibilities to enforce the law with the minimising faculty of "just doing" (Holmes, 2014). The response engenders an interactional asymmetry between Caren and the policer officers – that is, Caren is pursuing a trajectory to remediate the situation and stop the impounding of the car through mobilising herself as a co-complainant, whilst the police officers pursue the matter as institutional business. The solution is rejected by Caren – "no no you're not" (line 80) – on the basis that the police officers are violating their category-bound responsibilities, which is treated with a minimal acknowledgment by the police officer in line 81 with "okay". The minimal acknowledgement ("okay") is treated as insufficient / in opposition by Caren through the repetition of her turn on line 82 ("you're not").

Thus far we have seen Caren introducing multiple understandings of herself and the police officers and treating those categories as affording different actions. The police officers are offering very little uptake to Caren's challenges and implicit actions, thereby attending to

their category-bound attribute of 'upholding the law' – preventing Caren from successfully

remediating the situation. The next extract concludes the sequence. The final extract of this

sequence brings to a close Caren's attempts to accomplish an action (letting the group drive

on unimpeded) after various tries at mobilising alternate categories.

Extract 5.5 "do you know who I am" [12:40-13:25]

```
100 CM: I don't know why it's so hard to say what
102     (   ) or where the car (    )
103     (1.1)
104 CM: [wh:y ]
105 PO: [cause] you work with police officers right
106 CM: yeah I work with (      )
107 PO: I'- I'm just little bit disappoi:nted that
108 CM: you don't get to be disappointed in me
109 PO: you don't seem like a very good (1.2)
110     ve[ry good  ] police support.
111 CM:   [you don't]
112 PO: I dunno
113     (0.5)
114 CM: [NO    ]
115 PO: [we th]ought you'd have more of an inside eh:
116     look at t[he job]
117 CM:          [you kn]ow what Ma:tt
118     (2.0)
119 PO: just caught me by surprise °based off your
120     demeanour a little bit°
121 CM: Yeah ohkay=
122 PO: =using inappropriate words and such.
123 CM: yea:h yea:h yeah yeh you know what Matt?
124     (1.0)
125 CM: this isn't gonna go down nicely?
126     (0.7)
127 PO: oh↑kay
128 CM: you're no::t a nice person?
129     (0.5)
130 PO: oh↑kay=
131 CM: =an' it really hard for me to understa:nd why you
132     can't say the PRO:Blem is: (0.8) the:y don't have
133     this or do they do have that (0.5) >two sentences<
```

The extract continues from the prior with Caren complaining about the police officer's

adherence to their category obligations. This is receipted by the police officer with a

projectably extended turn-at-talk ("you work with police officers right", line 105) which attends to the relevance of Caren's membership as a policer commissioner whilst treating her as partial member and not necessarily as part of a category set to which the police officers belong. This demonstrates that although category boundaries can be exploited to afford the opportunity to produce some social action, those categories remain relevant and members can thus be sanctionable for those actions which are incongruent with the partitioned categories. This is displayed by the police officer here who, after producing the pre in lines 105, then produces an assessment "I'm just a little bit disappointed", which is designed as a challenge toward Caren on the basis of her current actions being attributed to the alternate category produced earlier (as a police commissioner).

The disappointed evaluation gets challenged "you don't get to be disappointed in me" (line 108), rendering the police officer as having insufficient rights to assess, which is fitted to the police officers' mobilising of Caren's alternate 'police commissioner' membership in the prior turn. Caren's turn is produced at a non-transition relevance place but at the point at which police officer's turn is projectably bringing off a challenge ("a little bit disappointed that") – that is, with Caren producing an interjection in line 108 of the police officer's trajectory (toward an accusation), she attempts resistance by delaying his turn or at least produces a denial as a preferred response turn shape (Atkinson & Drew, 1979). The accusatory challenge is brought off in the next turn in line 109 "you don't seem like a very good […] police support", accounted for in line 115 "we thought you'd have more of an inside look at the job", which incrementally upgrades the challenge to Caren's membership as a police commissioner. On line 123, Caren stops the in-progress action (the challenge) "yeah yeah yeah yeh" (Stivers, 2010) and does a pre-telling "you know what Matt?". Caren's turn is designed as a pre-telling of some new information that is directed to the police officer

with the use of his forename, which reconfigures her rights to be entitled to use the officer's name. The telling occurs in line 125 "this isn't gonna go down nicely": because of the failure to resolve the problem, there is a threat of some future consequence. This is produced with the general category of "nice person" in line 128. Like the previous extract, this glosses the police officer's rights and responsibilities as a police officer to categorise the categoriser (Whitehead, 2009) i.e. Caren as having rights to assess who is a 'nice person' as she is a nice person.

The partition exploiting conducted by both the police officers and Caren in this extract displays a continuous negotiation of who-they-are and what-they're-doing; in extract 5.1 we can observe Caren returning to her membership as 'mother/carer' to be seen (and thus treated) as a member of the non-police group so that she is hearable as a co-complainant rendering her complaint as non-sanctionable, since she is also someone who has suffered. However, the tables are turned in the proceeding part as the police officers finally orient to Caren as police commissioner from her earlier attempts at remediating the issue. The officers then, do not treat Caren as a cross-member 'mother-police', but as a co-member 'police commissioner-police' which renders Caren as sanctionable for her complaint. Caren's complaint is sanctioned on the basis of this partitioning, as the police officer challenges Caren as category-bound to the attributes of a police commissioner, which in this instance regards Caren's unprofessionalism.

These extracts have shown how partitioning can be used to seek a remediation of a situation, in this case, the release of the car. The success of the remediation is not of importance for the analysis – rather, it is how interlocutors work to achieve a course of action desirable to themselves through introducing alternate categories on which certain actions can

trade. The observations throughout this section show speakers craft themselves as co-members in order to halt and in-progress challenge. Indeed, these alternate categories render particular actions (like complaining) as being relevant and fitted to the ongoing activity. Moreover, by partitioning the members in these spaces it reconfigures the moral order by which the participant's relationship is organised i.e. the cover category alters who the people are to each other and what responsibilities they have to each other, and not attending to these responsibilities transgresses a social norm, and possibly the law. Consequently, how people treat each other through the actions they produce is culture-in-action insofar as those people, their relationships and the context are crafted in and through talk-in-interaction.

4.1.3 Partitioning to 'distance' a category

The final extracts will show what Poulios (2016) explains as 'distancing' oneself from less desirable categories – Poulios shows how 'old' actors renegotiate what it means to be old, and that by introducing an alternate understanding of themselves (in their cases as 'theatre actors') it can defend against the negative assertion that they are elderly. I argue that, although participants do 'distancing' in one sense, it does not adequately capture what is happening – rather, it is how one category is replaced by another in order to evade a negative assertion and prevent their co-interlocutor from accomplishing their course of action.

This interaction comes from the US; here the police (PO) have pulled over a car. The car is an Uber (a taxi-like service) which has been pulled over as the police have seen the rider (RI) leaving a 'drug house'. The police are questioning why the car's occupants have been visiting the drug house, with them both insisting that it was to pick up a cheque. The driver (DR) is resistant to the police searching his vehicle given that he is just an Uber fulfilling his rider's request to drive between places – there is a dispute over the

appropriateness of the police's actions (questioning the driver). In this extract the partitioning occurs to replace the category of 'suspect' with 'uber/taxi driver', that is, the attributes of 'uber/taxi driver' who is 'just doing his job' are invoked to replace the relevance of the attributes of 'suspect'. In this case the attributes of 'suspect' are constructed by the police as visiting a 'drug house' and having possible illegal items in the car, whereas the attributes of 'driver' disavow culpability, rendering the driver as innocently doing his job.

Extract 6 'you're leaving a drug house' [01:20-01:50]

```
01 PO:   okay. do you have anything on you sir: anything on
02       vehicle that you'd need to be concern'd about?
03 DR:   no not[hing at all].
04 PO:        [would you  ] mind if I look,
05       (0.3)
06 DR:   I- I do mind because [I haven't] done anything (.)
07 PO:                        [okay,    ]
08 DR:   [but I mind.]
09 PO:   [okay.      ]
10       (0.6)
11 PO:   what- you- you- you're leaving a drug house,
12       (0.7)
13 DR:   okay (guy) (.) I don't know I- (.)
14       I showed you my uber drive. =somebody
15       just had me drive them to
16       [somewhere and got them back.]
17 PO:   [I understand that           ] you go to a
18       drug house you drop somebody o:ff,
19       (0.4)
20 PO:   [and  ] they came right back to your car,
21 DR:   [okay,]
22       (0.5)
23 PO:   and he says he want to go pick up a cheque,
24 DR:   okay,
25 PO:   and he [has-
26 DR:          [it] (.) it [has nothing  ] to do with me
27 PO:                      [(this mendez)]
28 DR:   and[it's] my car.
28 PO:      [(-)]
29 DR:   if you want to search him by his permission
30       [that's fine.]
31 PO:   [ you have an]ything
32       on you mister le[wis here] to be concerned about?
33 RI:                   [no: sir]
```

```
34 RI:   no: not a thang sir.=
35 PO:   =alright why don't you step outside and check
36       you (a quick.)
37       (9.8)
38       ((RI steps out of car))
```

Prior to this extract beginning, the driver and the rider have been speculating the reason for being pulled over whilst waiting for the police to approach the car. As with most traffic stops by police, the police address the driver, who has the responsibility for the vehicle; this may be different for a taxi. However, with this being an Uber, there are few (if any) signs that indicate that this is a professional driver collecting a fare, and not just someone offering a lift to a friend. The extract begins with the police treating the driver as a suspect ("anything on you sir:", line 01), ("would you mind if I look", line 04), ("you're leaving a drug house", line 11") which reinforces the asymmetrical pair of 'police-suspect' rendering themselves with rights to direct, assess, inform, request etc. and thus the citizens (the driver and rider) with obligations to comply. These get receipted with resistance "I do mind because I haven't done anything" (line 06) whilst accounting for this reluctance to comply with "I showed you by uber drive" (line 14) displaying incumbency of a cross-category engaged with the ordinary, category-bound activity "somebody just had me drive them to somewhere" (line 15). This exploits the partition, in that the current constitution of members in this device is 2:1 (two suspects to one police officer) so in doing partitioning it rearranges the constitution of members to 1:1:1 (one suspect, one driver, and one police officer).

We can see this as partitioning as the 'driver' category does not categorically belong with the 'law enforcement' device (police-suspect), and so this cover category establishes cross-membership with their device. This 'driver' category then, as a cover-category, serves to sanction the ascribed activities to treat them through the lens of ordinariness. There is uptake of this proffered cover category by the police as they pivot to target the rider as a

suspect "you have anything on you mister Lewis" (line 32). This follows some avowing of the driver's attributes as an uber driver: "you drop somebody o:ff" (line 18), which regards his responsibilities; "nothing to do with me and it's my car" (line 26-28), which repudiates any relationship with the rider; and "he says he want to go pick up a cheque" (line 23), which is reported speech that disclaims any validity and reinforces his category of driver with 'taxi driver talk' as an activity being made relevant. Though there is no explicit acceptance of the driver's proffered cover category by the police officers, that course of action (questioning the driver) gets abandoned in favour of questioning the rider.

To summarise, the partition can be exploited in order to replace the relevancy of a category by introducing an alternate category. This example outlines how one may 'distance' themselves from a category which has been ascribed (in this case, 'suspect') by introducing a cover category which is a cross-member with the other participants in the interaction. Rather than use the term 'distancing', which glosses the structural organisation of the interaction, we may instead understand this outcome of partitioning to be accomplishing an alternate trajectory of action which gets occasioned by the cover-category. Here the police officers pivot to question the rider rather than the driver.

The following extract is taken from a UK based radio station in 2014. Here Elizabeth Jones (Liz), who is the vice chairperson for a far-right UK political party (UKIP), has been invited onto the show to debate their tax policies. Liz is debating Helen Pattison (Hel), a member of the socialist party and Mahmood Faze (Mah), a liberal democrat. The host is Adam Awedu (Hos). Immediately prior to this extract Liz has outlined the merits of a flat-rate tax system which Helen and Mahmood have opposed. This extract shows how an alternate device can replace the omnipresent and current in-use device in order to remedy a

disruptive turn and minimise a political point that is being made. Here, Liz initially highlights some problematic conduct that has disrupted her interactional trajectory. Liz is then sanctioned for her own problematic conduct; it is in this sanctioning that the partitioning occurs.

Extract 7 'DON'T INTERRUPT ME!' [13:40-14:44]

```
01 Hel: =bec'use big business and- rich people
02      [get] away with tax avoidance and that's wh'-
03 Liz: [no.] rig[h- no- as long a]s they're-            ]
04 Hos:          [how- we- how we-]
05 Hel:              [how can they get away with it they don't]
06 Liz: WILL YOU SHUT UP?
07 Hos: no no- le- let's let's be
08 Mah: calm down (.) please it's an intellectual discussion
09 Hos: no eh- h[ow would it-]
10 Liz:         [I've jus-   ]I'VE just had really enough.
11      since two thousand and ten I've had the left wing
12      [shouting and shouting and shouting at? m↑e?    ]
13 Hos: [explain it to us explain it- explain it to us-]
14 Liz: and I'm not go[ing to tolerate it anyMOre it]
15      ends now
16 Hos:              [e-    e-   eh. Listen       ]
17      this is the opportunity for us to
18 Mah: if you're calling up the station (I'm not shouting)=
19 Liz: =I won't discuss wi[th you]
20 Hos:                    [no no ]=
21 Hel: =>I'm not gonna shout<=
22 Hos: this is the opportunity for us to explain ourselves
23      [so explain- our pro- and tell them-]
24 Liz: [yes of course and I will explain my]self
25      I:F [you be quiet >whilst< >>I] explain myself<<
26 Hos:     [we did it to a- we are-  ]
27 Liz: >DO NOT INTERRUPT ME<
28 Hos: let us- let us
29 Liz: [RIGHT]
30 Hel: [>ehah]ah< I've never been spoken to so rude
31       in m[y entire life?]
32 Hos:     [well you so-  ]you so-            ]
33 Liz:     [WEll good     ]well aren't you lu]cky then
34      tonight's the fi:rst it won't be the la:st
35 Hos: this is- voice of African radio=
36 Liz: =if you're gonna go for politics
37 Hos: this is afro- afro beat ninety four the voice
38      of Africa:n radio we discuss anythi' her'?=
```

```
39 Liz: =yes
40 Hos: .hh ehh and we want to clear. the air whatever
41      happens here (.) it's: part of the game
42      [we ]make it fairer.
43 Liz: [yes]
44 Hos: and is good for all of us The Socialist coalition
45      Of the socialist party who explain th-
```

The extract begins (lines 01-05) with the prior discussion where the participants are discussing the implications of alternate tax-systems in the UK. There is interjacent overlap between three of the participants, which is attended to by Liz in line 06 with "will you shut up" and expanded in lines 10-12 to cast the other participants as "left wing" and thus ascribing their shouting as a left-wing disposition. This attends to the participants within a political device through speaking to them as co-members and thus their "shouting" behaviour is problematic relative to Liz's own 'ordinary' behaviour – doing this move treats all participants as belonging within the same moral order and thus sanctionable on that basis.

The host, following transgressive talk (for the local environment) appeals to the other participants to act in accordance with the local norms: ("explain it to us", line 13), ("listen this is the opportunity for us", lines 16-17). These turns seek a cessation of the disruptive trajectory where the participants are blaming one another for the disruption. There is uptake to the hosts turn with Mahmood attending to the radio device "calling up the station" (line 18); however, Liz rejects the host's plea for civility with "I won't discuss with you" (line 19), which is hearably directed at Helen (who is positioned as having caused the original infraction) and characterises Liz's own actions as inapposite to Helen's (discussing vs. shouting). Helen rejects this as a problematic attribute for this category device of radio talk show (where ordinary conduct precludes shouting): "I'm not gonna shout" (line 21). This is displayed in both the host's turn "opportunity to explain ourselves" (line 22) and in Helen's uptake, with 'discussion' being a predicate of the device 'radio show'. Helen treats

'discussion' as inapposite through her rejection of an uninvoked attribute of 'shouting'. Thus far, the radio show guests have responded to the meta-talk disruption caused by Liz by attending to their co-membership as 'radio show guests', with the bounded predicates of doing 'discussing' and 'explaining' relevant for this device.

The partition is exploited to reconfigure the participants from the 'radio' category device to a more general category device; thus far, the participants' actions have been done under the 'politics' and 'radio' category devices insofar as blaming is done on their disposition as left/right-wing member. The partitioning is accomplished through covering of these relevant devices through the "entire life" which goes outside of the both devices and speaks to all of Liz's (countless) memberships. It is understandable in this local context of radio-show that the other participants are also speaking across their memberships. The other party's uptake of the partitioning is through well-prefaced assessments ("well good", line 33), which can be heard as sarcastically availing an undesirable stance toward the partitioning work – however, the host initiates a closing in line 34 by talking to the audience to mark this segment as finished. Helen invokes the cover category to replace the relevance of the 'politics' and 'radio' show and to distance herself from the disruptive behaviour of interrupting and shouting; it also challenges Liz as being in breach of the expectation that on political radio shows the participants ought to act respectfully to one another.

This extract shows how partitioning can be used to distance oneself from an ongoing challenge (where a particular category is being targeted) and how a category disjuncture can be brought about to cast the other as transgressing their category responsibilities. Here Liz highlighted her own conduct though this invited a reflexive uptake by Helen and the host regarding their own conduct. Following an attempt to readjust the interactional addressee to

the topic rather than the metadiscourse, Liz remedies this attempt and is thus held accountable with the partitioning work done by Helen in which she renders herself as innocent and not *currently* belonging to the same device as Liz, who is cast as disruptive to the ongoing activity.

In this section I showed how the practice of partitioning does 'distancing'. Achieving 'distancing' is useful across contexts, but particularly in disputes – being able to be avoid vilification means that interlocutors, because of some alternate category device, are able to refute a problematic attribute/characterisation on the basis that it is incongruent with who they are. This responds to Poulios' (2016) work to further specify what *distancing* means for members and for analysts. The findings reveal that by introducing a cover category it ostensibly creates 'space' between two alternate categories. Specifically, however, a speaker doing this move to introduce a cover category splits the category device so that it renders the other speaker as being transgressive of some social norm or category attribute. Moreover, rather than seeing it as the distance between category and attribute, it accomplishes an alternate trajectory of action as made relevant by the cover category. These observations are reflected in the discussion section below within the broader practice of partitioning.

4.2 Discussion

In this chapter, I have examined how people introduce alternate understandings of themselves and the situation through exploiting the partition. I focused on how, through partitioning, people are able to reconfigure their relationships with their co-interactants. I demonstrated that, in the context of disputes and through the reconfiguration of relationships, that challenges may be both brought off or remedied, which shows the multifaceted applications of partitioning for members in and through talk-in-interaction. This extends our knowledge of

social interaction, particularly through the lens of membership categorisation analysis. My approach is underpinned by an examination of the moral order, how this is negotiated amongst parties to a dispute, and how it is collaboratively constructed. Whilst this chapter focused on specific organisations inside of a dispute (challenging, resisting, and distancing), the analysis has shown the delicate categorial work that speakers do and their attendance to certain categories and their affordances and constraints.

This chapter contributes to interactional research on relationships by examining a previously under-researched phenomenon: how relationships may be reconfigured in order to accomplish some social action. EM/CA studies have tentatively investigated partitioning as a phenomenon through which actions can be accomplished 'safely', and how relationships get reflexively constituted. However, to date, there are relatively few studies which explore how, through exploiting the partition between categories, that relationships get reconfigured with the purpose of accomplishing some social action. This chapter then offers insights into the boundaries of Membership Categorisation Devices by showing how people use these bounded devices to invoke alternate bodies of common-sense knowledge (Schegloff, 2007a). By invoking family categories or generic personality categories to 'cover' institutional (radio talk show/mass transit) categories, participants challenge, resist, and/or remedy resistance by smuggling potentially-sanctionable actions under seemingly-innocent moves. This provides participants a resource for producing or repairing the disorder brought about by resistant and conflicted interactions. For instance, in the production of challenges, speakers' turns are hearable as reconstituting the category device and in doing so casting their challenge as appropriate ('how many children do you have', Extract 2 and 'not every woman feels that way', Extract 3). These produce a disjuncture between the target's prior talk and the new 'cover' device – and it places the onus on the target to respond in a manner that would

transgress their previous, or current, category. The invocation of a 'new', or different category device changes who these people are to each other. Exploiting the partition between devices reframes the talk so that people can 'step outside' of the current ongoing matters as way of disrupting that prior talk.

Remedying a challenge/issue, or more broadly the action or implication which has been done in the prior turn, is a recurrent feature described in this analysis. The remedying occurs in ways which solicit compliance ('he's actually a nice guy', Extract 4) to progress some institutional agenda, or by availing oneself with the rights and responsibilities to misappropriate a challenge in the first place ('do you know who I am, Extracts 5.1-5.5). Remediation is useful across contexts (e.g. Kidwell & Martínez, 2010; Rhodes et al., 2006; Yu, Wu & Drew, 2019) in order to moderate the ongoing talk and thus reduce or deal with the hostility from the prior turn, and partitioning is one way that remediation can be achieved. The final way that I examined partitioning was through its usage to 'distance' ('show you my uber driver', Extract 6 and 'never been spoken to so rude in my entire life', Extract 7). I showed that although a possible understanding of these turns is to 'distance' the speaker from a prescribed characteristic which has been built in prior turn(s), the actual work done by the speaker through partitioning is to replace one category in that moment. This distancing then, goes outside of the prior talk to do more than simply challenge or remediate, but affords the opportunity for the speaker to craft themselves as reasonably attending to (their) moral order, similar to the findings shown in the next chapter on meta-talk.

Therefore, this analysis has shown members' own demonstrable orientations to invoking alternate bodies of common-sense knowledge in bringing off some action. Previous examinations of partitioning have focused on the viewer's maxim (Sacks, 1995), affording

the generation of safe actions (Butler, 2008), how children organise who is included or excluded from play (Butler, 2016), to sanction others' behaviour among friends (Robles, 2019), distancing oneself from a prescribed attribute (Poulios, 2016), and the embodied practice of basketball training (Evans & Fitzgerald, 2016). This chapter builds on these studies and furthers the remit of partitioning to demonstrate how it is accomplished in generating a challenge, as a resource for non-compliance, and in remedying resistance. This chapter reveals the mundane reasoning and sense-making practices (Butler et al., 2009) used in the local production of social (dis)order. In the following chapter I will return to the structural aspects of a dispute by focusing on how participants treat that (dis)order in and through talk-in-interaction.

Chapter 5:

Doing being (un)reasonable

5.0 Introduction

In this chapter I will illustrate how speakers negotiate reasonableness in interaction, specifically how people interactionally produce their conduct as orderly and conforming with the local context's norms – that is, what it takes to be seen as not 'breaking the rules' of how people ought to act in certain environments. This chapter focuses on how interlocutors explicitly talk about what conduct is (un)acceptable; by examining how people in disputes talk about talk, it informs us of how members themselves fashion morality as an interactional accomplishment (i.e. what conduct is good/bad or right/wrong).

Disputes are ritually organised, with participants attending to and collaborating in the co-construction of disputes as joint activities. One such way that disputes are organised is through attending to the moral order whereby speakers leverage their knowledge, or position their own talk as common-sense, with respect to their co-interlocutor(s). Namely, a speaker can appeal to *their* moral order as *the* moral order (by which all talk and conduct should adhere) in order to claim that the other speaker's conduct as transgressive in some way. Whilst these claims are managed delicately throughout the sequences, they do convey a negative assertion toward the conduct of their co-interlocutor and are therefore challenging. Indeed, in the fictional example below, a challenge toward a speaker's stance is produced, but the challenger is held to account for making the challenge (that they are rude), and thus the target is able to subvert the challenge. For example:

Speaker A: I THINK YOUR OPINION IS JUST RUBBISH!

Speaker B: Why are you shouting and being so rude?

In this invented example, Speaker A asserts their position toward Speaker B's prior opinion with a *just* that suggests the concept is unreasonable and without grounds (see Goodman & Burke, 2010). Rather than rejecting A's assertion, B generates a counterchallenge toward A by appealing to their moral order (as being calm and polite) to dismiss their turn. B sanctions A on the basis that their *conduct* and not their *talk* is transgressive, which neatly packages their turn as responsive to the prior (without acknowledging the content of challenge) and frames A as unreasonable and the one who is doing challenging. In this sense, B's turn fashions a witnessable account of A's conduct to undermine A's position and dismiss the content of A's turn (see Potter, 1996 on *stake*).

Constructing one's actions as reasonable is done to provide a morally creditable account to one's argument (Greenland et al., 2018), particularly if there is an audience (Heritage, 1985). The construction of reasonability is done at the interactional level and at times when claims, accounts or descriptions could be contested and thereby heard as unreasonable, or irrational (Edwards, 2005). For these reasons, drawing attention to one's conduct as problematic does two things – it indicates how one should act and how one should not act (Billig, 1998). As Billig (1998, p.208) goes on to explain, "practically every utterance, if delivered inappropriately, carries the possibility of moral censure […] as such, everyday we practice this conversational morality habitually. As we make habitual utterances which have never been said before, we run the risk of transgressing the morality which permits such utterance". This then is two-fold, in the sense that any utterance may be possibly transgressive of morality but also, rendering that utterance as transgressive is a resource to

produce the other speaker as irrational.

Showing reasonability and being a 'moral citizen' is recurrent feature of disputes (see Clarke, Kitzinger & Potter, 2004; Condor et al. 2006; Every & Augoustinos, 2007; Rapley, 2001). It can be brought off in various ways, often done in the service of some other action and to cast the other as behaving in some non-orderly, problematic way. These issues of what conduct counts as 'normal' and 'ordinary' are given attention through observing and reporting that conduct which, as moral activities (Atkinson, 1982), constitute an interlocutor's understanding of the dispute's gestalt, and who occupies categorial roles in that dispute (such as: aggressor – victim). This chapter will reflect the methodological ordering discussed in Chapter 2 to take a chiefly Discursive Psychological approach and primarily draw on DP literature where appropriate. This chapter will be structured as follows: in the analysis, I demonstrate two ways that members accomplish 'appearing reasonable': (1) presenting one's own conduct as ordinary, and (2) presenting the other's conduct as non-ordinary. Finally, I provide a summary and discuss the findings in the context of the categorial demands of participants in disputes. The following section details explicit orientations to *reasonableness*: these extracts represent where speakers invoke 'reasonable' as a move toward a concession of a point, but do not necessarily represent orientations to conduct as being *reasonable*, which the findings in the main body of the analysis will subsequently demonstrate.

5.0.1 Orientations to reasonability

Doing being reasonable is, in most contexts, an orderly thing to do. There appears to be an orientation across disputes of being a 'reasonable' person, that is, being seen as reasonably responding (and *not* disputing) is treated as orderly conduct – despite the fact that they are

doing disputing. However, what constitutes 'reasonable' as a moral category is unclear – in disputes one recurrent way participants claim incumbency of that category is by doing being 'ordinary' (Sacks, 1995). However, I am not treating 'reasonable' as equivalent to 'ordinary'; one of the ways that 'reasonability' is constructed by members is by attending to what is 'ordinary' (irrespective of environment), throughout this chapter I will tease out some of the ways that one can appear as a 'reasonable' person in a public dispute. *Reasonable* as a moral category (i.e. conduct that is treated as good/right) can be understood to be a member's resource to sanction the other speaker. How members manage and negotiate 'reasonableness' in and through talk is what the analysis focuses on. Explicit orientations to doing being reasonable are rare in my data set: throughout the entire corpus there are only six cases where some form of 'reasonable' is mentioned in the talk. I will present three instances of these explicit orientations to highlight how interlocutors treat 'reasonable' to (1) characterise their own actions, and (2) characterise an other's actions. This is done to demonstrate how 'reasonable' is understood by members themselves, and although this slightly differs to the primary analytic focus (on metatalk), it provides a starting point for how interlocutors describe behaviour as reasonable. The main body of the analysis will build on these brief analyses to uncover '(un)reasonable' as something which can be appealed to, accused of, or simply described. In these cases, *reasonable* is regularly oriented to as a description of some on-going action other than the avowed crux of the dispute.

This first two extracts are taken from a US talk show. TC, a right-wing commentator, is discussing an advert which attacked the US Republican candidate for the Governor of Virginia, Ed Gillespie with LJ, a member of the Democrat party. Here, TC is conveying that they are making concessions and staying calm, despite LJ's non-cooperation.

Extract 1.1 'trying to be reasonable' [05:20-05:39]

```
01 TC: what did that have to do with ed Gillespie
02     (1.2)
03 LJ: [It has to do- ]
04 TC: [I mean- look I]'m trying to be reasonable I'm not
05     sure you're capable of it but I'm trying to walk
06     through it slowly and a:sk you why what happened
07     in Charlottesville relate to >Ed Gillespie< why
08     is he responsible for it. I mean maybe I'm too
09     literally maybe I'm caught in y'know ancient
10     linear thinking #here.
```

Here, in line 08, TC makes the claim "I'm trying to be reasonable," which points to some difficulty and the potential for claims to the contrary to be made. This goes outside of the current discussion to metadiscursively highlight a problem with the on-going talk; we can observe this in the rest of TC's turn: "I'm trying to walk through it slowly" (lines 09-10). TC's describing of what he's doing, then, renders LJ as (purposefully) not understanding. In overlap with LJ, TC initiates repair (line 04) arising from the gap (line 02) thus 'reasonable' formulates his stance and points to the issue that LJ is being uncooperative in not providing an answer, thus limiting TC's understanding as he cannot get the required information from LJ. The following extract occurs 16 seconds later, in this time LJ has been refuting TC's turn from extract 1.1.

Extract 1.2 'deeply unreasonable person' [05:55-06:05]

```
01 TC: =°you're a [hater° °°thanks°°  ]
02 LJ:            [what you care about] it is what it
03     depicts .hh you: wanna show that the confederate
04     flag is a part of our heritage I salute
05     o[ne flag that's the American flag ]
06 TC:  [°I never said anything okay fine°] °°we're
07     done°° you're a deeply unreasonable person
08     I hope you never get near power
```

TC uses 'reasonable' again, but this time to cast LJ as "deeply unreasonable" (line 07). This highlights LJ's conduct as problematic, specifically targeting the lack of attempts made to

remedy the conflict. This usage of 'reasonable' speaks to LJ and the overhearing audience

(the TV show's audience) and furthers the use of 'reasonable' in the prior extract as his

stance to explicitly produce LJ as holding views which are comparatively

problematic/unreasonable.

In the next extract, there has been a traffic incident with the Mom and her young-adult

daughters standing outside of their car waiting for the police to arrive. A person (the camera

operator: REC) has begun filming them for an unknown reason (ostensibly to document the

incident) and one of the daughters (GIR) is trying to take the mother away from the

conversation. At this point in the conversation, GIR has asked REC to stop filming and

asking questions about how the traffic incident occurred. He refuses this in lines 01-04.

Extract 1.3 'being very reasonable' [06:33-06:53]

```
01 REC: If I walked up to you in the street
02      when you were doing something and I
03      asked you what you were doing would
04      you have a responsibility to answer me
05 MOM: if they were filming you yeah.
06 REC: No and I know and you know what you
07      know your mother is being very reasonable
08      I understand where she's coming from.
09 GIR: I'm so uncomfortable right now
```

Here 'reasonable' is used to characterise the mother's actions "your mother is being very

reasonable" (line 07), which excludes GIR from the 'reasonable' moral category thus

pointing to a problem with GIR's conduct. REC sympathises "I understand where she's

coming from" (line 08) to affiliate with Mom. This turn is straightforwardly affiliative with

the mother's actions, and arises from REC's interrogative "would you have a responsibility to

answer me" (line 04), solicits an answer from the mother. The mother extends her turn

though and provides a qualification to describe REC's behaviour – in response, REC displays

his own reasonableness by showing his understanding to 'meet her half-way' in the service of characterising GIR's action (of extracting her mother) as unnecessarily adversarial in light of the 'conversation'.

Concrete descriptions of being reasonable are produced to accomplish a number of in-the-moment actions, but they all regard some on-going conduct that is either problematic or worthy of highlighting. 'Reasonable' then, along with 'ordinary', is a morally-loaded term – this language is used to position oneself as acting in accordance with some tacit local expectations and in disputes, thus serves to present that speaker's own agenda whilst diminishing the others' agenda on the basis that it violates those tacit local expectations. Unlike ordinariness, which refers to that which is expectable, and can be examined on the basis of interlocutors working to adhere to their environment's 'norms' (i.e. doing being a patient in a doctor-patient interaction); being 'reasonable' is a category that is produced in public disputes to both (1) characterise the producer as acting appropriately (i.e. not disputing), and (2) characterise the opponent as acting inappropriately (i.e. disputing). The following section presents an analysis of doing being reasonable where I will show how speakers present their own conduct as reasonable and diminish the other's conduct as unreasonable.

5.1 Analysis

In this section I will demonstrate two ways that members appear reasonable via concrete practices in disputes. In the first section I will outline how one may present the other speaker(s)' conduct, I will then outline how the speaker may present their own conduct. The analysis considers how 'reasonable' gets constructed by participants – that is, how members metadiscursively trade on some previous (or on-going) conduct to make orderliness (for that

environment) a relevant and desired category.

5.1.1 Presenting an other's conduct as unreasonable

The following extracts show how participants in disputes present the other's conduct as being objectionable in some way. Objectionable conduct, in this sense, is treated as the other acting in breach/violation of the objector's moral order (presented as *the* moral order). This highlighting of objectionable actions produces a reflexive understanding of the objector as acting in accordance with a moral order and as entitled to object to the other's conduct. The circumstances whereby these objections occur are examined in the following extracts; the analysis shows: (1) how an objection presents the other's conduct, and (2) rearranges the structural organisation of the talk to return to a normative sequential order.

The first extract comes from a dispute between protestors. Jayda Fransen (Jay) is a representative of Britain First, a far-right political party in the UK. Here she is holding a rally and is approached by Ali Dawah (Ali), a youtuber. The interaction begins with Ali calling over Jayda to discuss aspects of Islam. Immediately prior to this extract Ali and Jayda have been drawing comparisons between Britain First and Nazism; it is whilst discussing this comparison that their contrasting opinions are disputed. This extract shows how an appeal to normative turn-taking practices presents the other's conduct as inappropriate – that is, by not allowing someone to speak and turn-take in a reasonable way, they can be held to account for acting adversarial (despite this being a disputative environment!).

Extract 2 'can I talk' [08:30-08:53]

```
01 Jay:  >cause you've just said< that those who follow the Nazi
02       ideology are as bad as the Nazis killing?=
03 Ali:  =yes=
04 Jay:  =the Muslims following Isl[a:m] as an ide[ology] are as
```

```
05 Ali:                              [yes]            [yes  ]
06 Jay:  bad as the musl[ims ki]lling?=
07 Ali:                 [no- no]
08 Jay:  =because it's *i:n t[he book  ]        *
09 Ali:               *..head shake-------,,,,*
10                             [no °no-° ] °°no°°*
10 Jay:  ye↑s it is ye↑s i[t is you've ju]st
11 Ali:                    [I've heard you]
12 Jay:  clo↑sed your own case?
13       >can I- can I talk<
14 Jay:  d'you know what you need to do.
15 Ali:  °yeah°
16 Jay:  you need to::. accept Jesus into your heart.
17 Ali:  >I already have<
```

This extract examines how Ali tacitly objects to Jayda's conduct to present that conduct as relevant and violative in order to secure a turn and pursue their own, alternate trajectory. The turn inspected is "can I- can I talk" (line 13), produced by Ali. Jayda reformulates Ali's point in order to transform it into her own my-side argument; this is accomplished through seeking agreement with reported speech ("cause you've just said", line 01). This reported speech repeats an earlier turn by Ali, and establishes the grounds for some upcoming challenge, though at this point the turn achieves a preferred acceptance ("yes", line 03). This permits Jayda to bring off her challenge, which uses Ali's argument to compare Islam to Nazism. This does enticing (see Chapter 3) whereby the first turn by Jayda is treated as straightforwardly soliciting a preferred response, but subsequently reverses the logic of Ali's turn by suspending the presupposition that Muslims are unlike Nazis. Whilst Jayda takes her turn to produce the enticer, Ali intersperses 'yes' in overlap (line 05), which work as response tokens to Jayda's ongoing action; yet the frequent production and non-transition relevance place placement provides for Ali to have an aligning and non-disruptive turn at talk.

Ali's 'yes' (as a continuer) is changed to 'no- no' (as a disagreement) at the point at which Jayda's turn is projectably doing challenging ("as bad as the muslims killing", line 06) – this is done in overlap and is not receipted at this point by Jayda, who continues ("because

it's in the book", line 08). Ali outrightly rejects Jayda's challenge with "no no no", though Jayda counters this turn with a reformulated repetitive response ("yes it is yes it is", line 10) and produces a further increment; however, it is at this point that Ali engages in the metadiscourse ("I've heard you", line 11), which is accompanied by a gesture to his ear which is in the service of showing his readiness to take a turn, or at least halt Jayda's turn. Ali's turn highlights a trouble with Jayda's conduct – that she is not allowing/recognising his turns. This is crystallised in the following transition relevance place where Ali says, "can I- can I talk" (line 13), which is designed as contingent on Jayda's (tacit) approval (Curl & Drew, 2008). This request is used in the service of highlighting Jayda's failure to turn-take in a reasonable way – asking to take a turn suggests that normal turn-taking practices have been disrupted. Ali is demonstrating that he cannot take a turn, and as such, extreme remedial action is needed (i.e. a request). This turn is not so different from formulations such as 'can I just say' which attend to a turn-taking violation by managing the sense to which it is interruptive (see O'Reilly, 2006). Jayda disaligns to resist the implicature of Ali's turn, highlighting her conduct by sequentially deleting Ali's turn; nevertheless, Jayda's response "you need to accept Jesus into your heart" (lines 14-16) launches a new action sequence by using a three-part sequence structure ((1) "d'you know what you need to do", (2) you need to accept Jesus into your heart) to place Ali in the position of 'requesting' a third-part (see Sacks (1995) on misidentifications).

In this regard, Jayda neatly gives the floor to Ali by addressing them in line 14 with "d'you know what you need to do". This provides recipiency for Ali in order for Jayda to then complete the third-part of the sequence with "you need to accept Jesus into your heart" (line 16). Sequentially, this solves Ali's orientation to normal turn-taking practices being disrupted by doing canonical turn-taking (one speaker after another) and sequentially deleting

his request with the new sequence. Consequently, Jayda's turn also treats Ali as violating a moral order in some way by not having 'accepted Jesus'.

This extract shows how a challenge may be subverted by the target. Here, Ali addresses the metadiscourse as a tool to highlight Jayda's way of talking (the structure of talk) rather than engage with the content of her talk. Conversing normally (i.e. taking turns) is a pre-requisite for doing discussion and criterial for being reasonable. Doing being reasonable is done by attending to a normative turn taking structure, rather than as a request or as a turn-initial projection (given that the turn does not project any upcoming talk nor is a request fitted since Ali is, and has been, talking). Therefore, attending to normative turn-taking practices highlights Jayda's conduct as transgressive in contrast to Ali's own conduct, which is rendered as reasonable by comparison (appealing to ordinary turn-taking). Jayda resists this characterisation by treating the turn unambiguously as a request, forcing recipiency and providing an alternative to doing 'talk' with 'accepting Jesus' (you do not need to talk, you need to accept Jesus).

The following extract is taken from a UK based radio station in 2014, and previously shown in Chapter 4 (extract 6). Here Elizabeth Jones (Liz) (the vice chairperson for a far-right UK political party (UKIP)) has been invited to debate UKIP's tax policies. Liz is debating with Helen Pattison (Hel) (member of the socialist party) and Mahmood Faze (Mah), (liberal democrat). The host is Adam Awedu (Hos). Previously, Liz has outlined the merits of UKIP's proposed tax system, which Helen and Mahmood have opposed. Their opposition has been disruptive and has hijacked Liz's interactional trajectory, to which Liz exclaims "will you shut up"; this is unfitted to the ongoing talk, thereby suspending the tax-talk and inviting others to address the metadiscourse.

Extract 3 'do not interrupt me' [14:20-14:44]

```
01 Liz:   I will discuss wi[th you]
02 Hos:                  [no no ]=
03 Hel:   =>I'm not gonna shout< yeah?=
04 Hos:   =this is the opportunity
05        for us to explain ourselves.
06        [so explain- our pro- and tell them-]
07 Liz:   [yes of course and I will explain my]self
08        I:F [you be quiet >whilst< >>I] explain myself<<
09 Hos:       [we did it to a- we are-  ]
10 Liz:   >DO NOT INTERRUPT ME?<
11 Hos:   let us- let us
12 Liz:   [RIGHT]
13 Hel:   [>ehah]ah< I've never been spoken to
14        so rude in m[y entire life.]
15 Hos:              [well you so-  ]you so-          ]
16 Liz:              [WEll good      ]well aren't you lu]cky
17        then tonight's the fi:rst it won't be the la:st
18 Hos:   this is- ((boys)) of African radio?=
```

This extract shows the reflexive, and interactionally managed constitution, of reasonableness. Here Liz initially highlights some troublesome conduct that has disrupted the interactional trajectory; however, she becomes accountable for her own conduct as being disruptive to the ongoing activity of 'radio show'.

The extract begins with Helen rejecting a problematic attribute for the participants of the category device of radio talk show ("I'm not gonna shout", line 03), which is responsive to Liz's ascription of 'discussing' (line 01). Helen treats Liz's use of 'discussing' as reflexive: with Liz claiming that she is willing to discuss, it points to a failure of Helen to 'discuss', and so Helen treats it that way and reveals her own willingness to engage in that discussion by not shouting. This is displayed in Helen's uptake, with 'discussion' being a predicate of the category device 'radio show'. Helen reflexively renders discussion as doing being reasonable with her treatment of 'discussion' as inapposite through her rejection of an uninvoked attribute of 'shouting'. Furthermore, the host interjects with an assertion ("this is

an opportunity for us to explain ourselves", line 04), which attends to the relevance of 'radio show'; in addition, he issues an instruction "so explain-" (line 06), which provides a space for the following turn to repursue a trajectory that deals with the tax topic rather than addressing the metadiscourse. However, the host's turn is done in overlap with Liz, whose uptake affiliates: "yes of course I will explain myself" (line 07). This aligns with her prior doing of 'being ordinary' in this radio show device – that is, acting in accordance with the environment's norms. The "of course" (line 08) problematises the instruction – it looks backwards rather than forwards in the sequence. It contests the 'tellability' of the host's turn (Stivers & Rossano, 2010), and the presupposition that Liz needs telling or an instruction as to what this interaction is an opportunity for.

Liz attaches an if-conditional to her acceptance "if you be quiet whilst I explain myself" (line 08), thereby rendering the reason for trouble as the other members: the "you" is ambiguously produced to refer to all members and not just the host. There is some simultaneous talk, which is attended to by Liz by speeding up her talk and exclaiming "do not interrupt me" (line 10). This formulates the others' talk as breaching conversational norms and treats interruption as a member's issue (Bilmes, 1997; Eglin, 2000). In response to Liz's formulation of their ongoing conduct, Helen renders Liz accountable for her own conduct with the extreme case formulation: "I've never been spoken to so rude in my entire life" (line 13), which questions the appropriateness of Liz's behaviour.

This extract shows how the activity of disputing is managed via the structure of talk rather than its content. In this sense, doing being reasonable is a structural concern of talk as participants treat one another's talk as violating conversational norms. Here Liz formulated her own conduct, though this invited a reflexive uptake by Helen and the host regarding their

own conduct. Following the host's attempt to formulate 'the context' (why they are there) and orient to the radio category device and its application, Liz treats the formulation of 'the context' (the opportunity to discuss) as self-evident, and proposes that she does not need telling: it's the (mis)conduct by the other participants that are preventing her from doing what should be done.

The next extract is slightly different: it demonstrates a similar phenomenon where a participant addresses their own and the other speaker's conduct from an earlier sequence in order to negotiate who is being 'ordinary' and who is violating the local norms – however, in this example, though a similar outcome is achieved, it is done without using metatalk. Here, Holly and Pippa are arguing over a seat on the train. Holly has characterised Pippa's request (to move her bag from the seat) as racist, subsequently rejecting that request and calling her out for racism. Pippa is surrounded by friends (Jane + Pa4) who interject with support and create conversational schisms from the primary dispute between Pippa and Holly. Holly works to present the others as being aggressive and pompous – that is, by describing and ironicising the conduct of the other interlocutors, Holly presents herself as the target of their attacks (and thus they are cast as being unreasonably aggressive toward her). Immediately prior to this extract, Pippa has told Holly to calm down, which has occasioned this sequence of why 'calming down' is an unreasonable request. The encounter is being filmed by two uninvolved passengers (Fi1 and Fi2).

Extract 4 'don't speak to me like that'

```
01 Hol:  no you are there is a se't here there is
02       many seats on this trai:n you came at me
03       CLIcking your f[inger tapp]ing your la:p.
04 Pip:                 [>ok ok<  ] a
05 Hol:  asking me to move my bag-=
06 Pip:  =a:t what point-
```

```
07 Hol:   you don't speak to me like tha'=
08 Pip:   =at-
09 Hol:   I don't know you you don't know me,
10        [you don't speak to me] like that
11 Fi1:   [respe-                 ]
12 Pip:   [at what point        ]at what
13 Jan:   a:lice-
14 Pip:   *↑nono no no no not ra:cism?
15 Hol:   *-------gazes down at phone in hand--->
16 Fi1:   you tell 'em?
17 Fi2:   yeah tell '↓em
18 Jan:   she's a fucking cunt.
19 Pip:   *n↑ono↑NO no↑t        * what I'm sa↑ying
20 Hol:   *--looks up from phone*
21 Pip:   I don't understand where racism comes:
22 Jan:   (  )you're better than her you're better than her?
23 Fi1:   ((HOLD Y[OUR own   ]))
24 Jan:          [Look at he]r fucking shoes ((    ))
25 Pip:   >no no no< don't start on tha:t.
26 Hol:   £oh lhuoho£- oh yeah she's better than me
27        look at my shoes what am I wearin':. look at
28        yOU what's in your hai:' what is in your hair?
```

This extract displays how some earlier sequence is invoked metadiscursively in the accomplishment of positioning oneself as ordinary and reasoned in respect to the other as violating some local expectations. Here, Holly presents Pippa's conduct as unreasonable through reporting on that conduct – this renders Pippa (and her friends) as the aggressor, and Holly as the victim of their aggression.

The sequence begins with a preface that establishes the basis for Holly's disagreement with her assertion ("there is many seats on this train", line 02); this is followed by the cause of the dispute ("you came at me clicking your finger tapping your lap", line 03). This turn then establishes the grounds to excuse Holly from blame – that she need not have moved her bag in the first place as there were many seats available; moreover, it presents Pippa's conduct as the source of the dispute ("clicking your finger tapping your lap") – it is her conduct which is to blame, and not anything that Holly has done. Holly's talk is delivered as

an extended turn, which restricts the space for Pippa to take a turn-at-talk without interrupting or overlapping Holly (though Pippa does make attempts to take a turn at relevant places).

Holly is pursuing a trajectory that blames the other speakers and is hearably defending herself against their reported insults ("you don't speak to me like tha'", line 07) – again, presenting their conduct as inappropriate. This is while Pippa pursues a trajectory that rejects an earlier characterisation of herself and her friends as racist: "no no no not racist" (line 14); however, the rejection does not receive explicit uptake from Holly, who is instead disattending whilst looking at her phone. Meanwhile there is some commentary from Pippa's friend (Jane) and the camera operators (Fi1 and Fi2), who oppose Pippa's attempt at rejecting the earlier racism accusation and stoke the dispute: "tell 'em" (line 16), "she's a fucking cunt" (line 18), "you're better than her" (line 22). This stoking is perhaps responsive to Holly positioning herself as the victim as it calls her out for also being disputative.

It is not until line 24 where Jane does "look at her fucking shoes" – which provides an observation of Holly's appearance that is hearable as mocking – that Holly responds. There is already some orientation to Jane's turn being problematic by Pippa ">no no no< don't start on that" (line 25), which appeals to remedying the dispute through disavowing her co-member's turn by casting it as reprehensible. Holly's uptake of Jane's turn provides an interpretation through self-depreciation, "oh yeah she's better than me" (line 26), that sarcastically goes along with the mocking. In this environment an affiliative turn transgresses local expectations, thus the self-deprecation is rendered ironic, and highlights the insult that has been levied against Holly (particularly with the increment "oh yeah she's better than me" in line 26). Crucially, by faux-accepting Jane's insult (and not going meta), "she's better than me" also presents Jane as being the aggressor: though this does not directly speak to Jane's

behaviour, it does speak to Jane's character (and her alleged pomposity). Holly's presentation of Jane, and her conduct, displays an orientation to herself as the target/victim, which may be drawn upon as a resource to portray Pippa and her friends as violating local expectations (i.e. they're the aggressive, pompous people in this interaction).

The three extracts in this section display how members present the conduct of the other speaker in order to render themselves as 'reasonable', and acting in accordance with local expectations. A dispute disrupts the orderliness of those local contexts, thus 'orderliness' may be easily deployed as a challenge with minimal management, unlike other challenges that are managed through preface work. Presenting the other's conduct as unordinary (or unreasonable) occurs through metadisursively producing a report or observation of some earlier point in the dispute that casts the other as violating the local expectations, which renders them as the aggressor or cause of the dispute. This reflexively casts the speaker as 'ordinary', invoking the relativity of categories (Sacks, 1995) whereby the speaker is seen as belonging to a category with respect to their co, or cross-members. More to this, as the meta-talk observes some trouble with the prior turn(s), it does so in a way which attends to the structure of talk. This goes 'outside of the talk' and so the metadiscursive turn does not directly address the prior turn (possibly averting some challenge) but addresses the audience as speaking 'for the good of society/norm etc.'. In this sense, meta-talk is not just about the interaction but larger social norms to which the participants are attending. Consequently, this neatly packages the casting of the other speaker as unreasonable, evades the prior turn and puts the onus on the other speaker to account or reject the metadiscursive turn.

5.1.2 Presenting one's own conduct as reasonable

This collection regards how participants in disputes promote their own conduct as unobjectionable to recast the other's conduct as objectionable. Here then, it is not that the members are objecting to conduct, but rather that they are attending to their own conduct as non-violative of a common-sense moral order. Like the prior extracts, this reflexively understands one's own action as ordinary to recast the other's objection as unwarranted. The two lines of action (depicting one's own conduct, and depicting another's conduct) tend to go hand in hand – as such, for each extract presented in this section, I will detail the core practices and how these relate to the presentation of conduct. The analysis here will show two things: (1) how a promotion of one's own conduct recasts the other's objection as unwarranted, and (2) the attending to a normative sequential and/or moral order to subvert the other's disruption. The first two extracts will reveal how participants attend to a normative sequential order, and the latter two extracts will reveal how participants attend to a normative moral order.

This following extract takes place on the London underground. Chad (who is wearing a bright red suit) is exclaiming that Trudy is racist, characterising some prior action (a request to move) as being done because of his race. Trudy is rejecting this understanding, instead accusing him of bumping into her. Neatly, this extract also contains rebuttals which present another's conduct (section 5.1.1) as troublesome. Immediately prior to this extract Trudy has stated that she does not have a problem with "you guys" and that she is not racist as she has "black friends"; Chad rejects this assertion and begins to challenge the action of which he has been accused.

Extract 5 'why are you shouting' [00:20-00:37]

```
01 Cha:  I WOULD HAVE bumped into you when I was THERe
02       how is that possible this is what
03       ((demarcates us))
04       [this is what ((demarcates] us?))
05 Tru:  [and why are you shouting?] and
06        wh[y are you shouting?]
07 Cha:    [cause I don't even ]
08       know you you just started on ME?
09 Tru:  I said [politely (.) pl:ea::se move.
08 Cha:         [I mind my own business Im not a violent
09       person am I dressed like a vi[olent >>person.<<
10 Tru:                               [you are very
11       aggressive obviously?
```

This extract demonstrates the sequential position and moral work accomplished through promoting one's own conduct; here Trudy rebuts a challenge with a promotion of her conduct, thereby veiling herself with 'ordinariness' through tarnishing Chad with a description of actions inapposite to her ordinariness.

This extract begins with a renegotiation of the terms Trudy is challenging ("I was there how is that possible", line 02) to invalidate her claim. Trudy receipts Chad's prompted revision with a highlighting of his conduct ("and why are you shouting", line 05); this is the first move by Trudy to attend to some ordinary conduct, in that 'shouting' is treated as a marked activity, thereby rendering her as in accordance with doing ordinary conduct. In addressing the metadiscourse, this crafts her turn as not directly responsive to the prior (though it does formulate the prior turn in terms of the nature of its delivery).

Chad attends to Trudy's turn by providing a second fitted response to rebut her presentation of self ("I don't even know you", line 07). Chad continues with his turn ("you just started on me", line 08) that shifts the trajectory to readdress the topic of 'who caused the offence' to resist Trudy's highlighting of ordinariness. Trudy's uptake of this shifted

trajectory reports her speech as evidence ("I said politely (.) please move", line 09) for her ordinariness to counter the inference from Chad's "you just started on me" so as to re-describe her action as unproblematic. This turn promotes Trudy's conduct as unnoteworthy: "I said politely" with evidence "please move" does not dismiss Chad's claim that Trudy "started on me," but renders Chad as accountable for his response through metadiscursively pointing at his conduct. Though this turn is produced in overlap with Chad, there is an orientation in his treatment of Trudy's prior turns – "I'm not a violent person" (line 08) – which responds to Trudy's presentation of his conduct by denying a specific attribute which has, thus far, been implicit (Stokoe, 2010).

Chad's response to Trudy's presentation of his conduct is done as two TCUs: the first, "I mind my own business" (line 08), is produced completely in overlap at a non-TRP and does the business of attending to the local expectations (on public transport, attending to others' business is violative). The second TCU, "I'm not a violent person" (line 08) then, upgrades the prior TCU but occurs at a possible TRP following "I said politely" and speaks to the interpretation of his conduct being produced by Trudy. Chad's turn concludes with an incremental question "am I dressed like a violent person" (line 09) to which Trudy responds with a redescription "you are very aggressive obviously" (lines 10-11) that counters Chad's claim of non-violence. This solves the problem of answering Chad's question – that is, wearing a bright red suit is treated as a non-violent attribute, therefore the fitted response is 'yes', which would suspend the presupposition that Chad's conduct is non-ordinary; thus Trudy's solution is to answer by revising the terms of his claim.

In the continuation of the prior extract we can observe the tussle between interactional trajectories and their addressees. In the first instance Trudy moves to address the

metadiscourse to rebut Chad's invalidation of her claims; this garners a multi-TCU turn that

pivots from treating her turn as a first to readdress the dispute topic. Trudy's promotion of her

own conduct avows 'ordinariness' through treating it as unnoteworthy, rendering Chad's

response as the 'arguable' (Maynard, 1985a), which tarnishes him with a category of non-

ordinary actions. The upshot is that Chad attends to this non-ordinary category of actions as

'violent' and rejects that ascription in a way that creates a problem for Trudy.

Extract 6 'who ask you politely' [00:40-00:58]

```
01 Cha:  I don't have to speak to you man you ((depress))
02       [sorry]
03 Tru:  [yeah ] you said and the- then start (.)
04       [shouting yeah          ]
05 Cha:  [mind your business man] I don't want to speak to
06       you I don't even know why I- (.) come sit- stand
07       be-beside man (.) why should I even see you
08       today I don't even want to see you today I don't
09       even want to see people like you when I come
10       out of my house I fuck with at
11       [I see people ((bu]nch of people))
12 Tru:  [people like me?  ] Who ask you politely?
```

This extract sequentially follows extract 5 where the dispute continues. Chad asserts his

ability to disengage with Trudy "I don't have to speak to you" (line 01), which reinforces his

prior assertion ("I mind my own business", extract 3, line 08); this turn places its outcome

as independent from Trudy's actions and tied to local expectations. Moreover, this turn

pursues a particular trajectory that crafts Chad as independent from Trudy in the sense that it

positions Trudy as the aggressor whilst continuing the argument. Trudy receipts Chad's turn

("yeah you said", line 03) as known, and counters his inference by reciprocating with a tit-

for-tat formulation (Mandelbaum, 2003) that pushes back against the implication that Trudy

is responsible for the dispute ("and then start shouting"). Chad reformulates his point to

"don't want to speak to you" (line 05) from "don't have to speak to you" (line 01), which

deals with Trudy's counter by invoking his own personal feelings rather than local

expectations of public conversations. This turn is followed by two increments: (1) "I don't even know why I come sit- stand beside", and (2) "why should I even see you today", which claim innocence and position Trudy as the aggressor.

Chad displays his acting as an ordinary public transport user (that being in any other location would be unproblematic), thus positions Trudy as having caused the dispute. Furthermore, Chad ambiguously and reflexively infers a category "people like you" (line 09) for Trudy which is inapposite to his own 'ordinary' category through his doing of ordinary activities, e.g., "when I come out of my house" (lines 09-10). The ambiguous production is defensible against any direct denial of a category, though its strength is also its weakness in that its uptake can be "people like me? who ask you politely" (line 12). The repeat of "people like you/me" points to the unit of talk being dealt with by "who ask you politely"; Trudy resists the inference of some non-ordinary category ascription. This pushes back against Chad's inferential work to characterise Trudy as the aggressor by providing a reinterpretation of her actions to highlight an incongruous (and perhaps illegitimate) claim made by Chad.

In this extract, the two speakers negotiate an understanding of one another by managing their own morality. Chad pursues a trajectory which frames his actions and talk as being ordinary, everyday, and thus unproblematic, and positions Trudy as the problem. Trudy reciprocates Chad's framing by resisting the inferential work that casts her as the cause and acting as 'un-ordinary' as relative to Chad's ordinariness and the local expectations of their environment. For both Chad and Trudy, being 'ordinary', or at least providing an interpretation of their own actions as ordinary, serves to progress the argument whilst blaming the other in a way that does not require the explicit use of any category that may cause a trouble, instead relying on violations of this environment's (public transport) local

expectations.

The following extract is taken from a radio call-in by a self-identified Muslim parent to LBC, a UK radio station. He is discussing segregating boys and girls in UK schools with the host, James, and how this may be reconciled with his own Islamic culture. The host is questioning his views as being incongruous with western culture and values. This extract is not about violations in turn-taking or sequence, but metatalk about how people ought to act in certain environments – that is, how the participants negotiate what is acceptable conduct for who they are, and what they are doing. Immediately prior, they have been discussing Cal's answer to "why do you think boys and girls should be kept apart", which the host disagrees with on that basis that it is discriminatory.

Extract 7 'you've misanswered it twice'

```
01 Hos:  d'hey hey hey d-no you need to understand
02       what my question is because you'v- you've
03       misanswered it twice? .hh why do you personally
04       think it's a good idea (0.3) or even perhaps
05       important to keep nine year old boys separate from
06       nine year old girl. .h
07 Cal:  James. you might not like my answer (0.2)
08       but that is the a:nswer (.) you might not
09       agree with it but it's
10       t[he °answer°.        ]
11 Hos:   [but then its dis]crimination.
12 Cal:  no n- according to you:r spin on it [°you migh-°]
13 Hos:                                      [ no no not ]
14       at all y-you're saying that boys and girls must
15       be kept separate because it >says so in a
16       religious book< that's the >definition of
17       discrimination<
```

This extract shows how the target (Cal) can resist the host's attempt to challenge his answer on the basis that the original answer was incorrect. That is, how Cal progresses his own trajectory and promotes his own views and beliefs in response to a direct challenge; this

extract demonstrates the moral work done to privilege a perspective whilst playing down an alternate understanding. Cal and the host are engaged in metadiscursive talk whereby their talk attends to some earlier sequence, with their dispute arising as a consequence of some trouble in that earlier sequence.

Lines 01-06 show the host's presents Cal's answer as insufficient, with the host soliciting a specific 'personal' answer to the question of why Cal believes girls and boys should be segregated in UK schools. This appears to be an attempt to challenge Cal's religious beliefs, given that he has answered this question in accordance with what it states in the Quran. Cal's response begins with a disclaimer ("you might not like my answer (.) but that is the answer", line 01); this turn is designed as two parts to first scrutinise the host's understanding ("you might not like my answer"), which privileges his own perspective and trades on the local environment where espousing views is ordinary – and that the host should not attempt to change his answer, but by doing so "according to your spin" (line 12), the host is acting unreasonably. This gets upgraded with "but that is the answer", which promotes his answer as unambiguously sufficient, dismissing the host's trouble ("you may not like") through not providing an explanation or repair. Cal reformulates his prior TCU ("you might not agree with it but it's the answer", lines 02-03) that places 'agreeing' as an unrequired second to pre-empt any push back by the host. It also reaffirms his dismissal, though the host interrupts with "but then it's discrimination" (line 11), managed by the "but" which connects this with Cal's "you might not agree with it but" as a consequence (and hedged accusation). The accusation of discrimination is produced as a possible understanding of Cal's answer but is open to revision depending on whether Cal changes his answer, thus managing the potential for outright denial of the accusation. Cal pursues his earlier turn by attending to the host's interpretation of the answer being discriminatory as "according to your spin on it" (line

12); this calls out the host's agenda by putting on the record the host's attempts to subvert his answer. The calling out receives an immediate rejection ("no no not at all", lines 13-14) with a pivot to reorient the talk to the host's trajectory with the preface of Cal's prior talk: "you're saying that" + a challenge arising from his prior talk: "definition of discrimination".

The extract displays how participants manage metadiscursive talk: through remaining 'on-topic' but referring to some earlier sequence, it permits certain challenges against the individual's character that would otherwise be unfitted. In this extract the host identifies a trouble with Cal's earlier answer (that he has not provided a fitted one), but rather than provide a correction or explanation to remedy that trouble, Cal pursues a trajectory that rejects the existence of the trouble for him. We can see then that privileging or presenting a perspective in a way that is tied to in-situ membership (that Cal, as caller, has the rights to provide an answer) affords opportunities to call out others not orienting to their memberships. In this extract then, both of the interlocutors are engaged in talk about talk – namely, what counts as an answer. They both make attempts to characterise one another's conduct as troublesome in some way ("your spin on it" and "you need to understand what my question is because you'v- you've misanswered it twice"); each is appealing to reasonable conduct for their category (i.e. as radio host, they should not change a host's answer, and as host, they should provide fitted answers to questions).

This next extract follows extracts 4 and 5 where Holly and Pippa have been arguing over a train seat. Pippa's remedial efforts in the previous extracts to support some de-escalation between Holly and Pippa's friends have not worked. In this extract the dispute continues between Holly, and Pippa's friend: Jane. Though not shown in the recording, the context indicates that Jane has been the primary escalator of the dispute thus far. Herein,

Holly presents her own conduct as that of the victim, and herself as the target of Jane who is violating the moral order by acting inappropriately by being hostile (despite being in a dispute). This extract blurs the line between the two sections (like extracts 4 and 5) whereby the presentation of Holly's own conduct has ramifications for how Jane is understood. Immediately prior to this extract Holly has been accusing Pippa and her friends of believing in racial stereotypes.

Extract 8 'shut up before I hit you'

```
01 Hol: ((you this)) you're showing yourself
02      you're so cla:ss:y well done I work
03      for gu[ugle I have a job,]
04 Jan:      [je:::sus  oh my   ]god.
05      you can >write a fucking news article< o↑h m↑y g↑od
06      [shit] th[at (hurt) me since I was fucking eighteen]
07 Hol: [ye:s]   [and you work for google you can use a    ]
08      computer Yeah? you're such a classy woman.
09      (.) look at you [work f'r] google?
10 Pip:                 [>nonono<]
11 Hol:  don't you look so
12         cla[ssy don't you look so classy ]
13 Jan:      [>do you want a fucking punch<]
14 Hol:  don'[t you look so classy]
15 Jan:  SHU↑T THE FU↑CK UP BEFORE I FU↑CKING HIT YOU?
16 Hol:  {V!}COME ON TH[E>N{V!} COME ON (.) COME ON]
17 Pip:               [no no NO   NO NO          ]
18 Hol:  FU↓CKING HIT ME THEN Y[OU C]UNT?
19 Pip:                        [NO: ]
20 Hol:  {V!}CO↓ME ON TH[EN WHA- ]
21 Pip:                 [Leave it]leave i[t leave it    ]
22 Hol:                                  [no don't ta:lk.]
23      if you wanna hit me hit me bitch
24      I'm here (.) I'm HEre?
```

In line 1, Holly does sarcasm by producing a description ("you're so classy"), which is ironicised (Edwards, 2005) as Jane's talk is in opposition to the attributes of 'classy'; this is done four times (lines 02, 08, 12 and 14). In the second instance (line 7) ("you're such a classy woman") the description gets done with a marker of gender, which displays a

specification of the description and makes explicit the inference of 'classy' being a gendered term. Holly also does a repetition of Jane's talk ("I work for google", line 03), upgraded with "I have a job"; here Holly, by repeating Jane, draws attention to the turn which gets designed to display a problem insofar as Jane has positioned themselves as better than Holly, which makes relevant Holly's invoking of racism. In response to Holly, Jane produces an exclamation of disbelief ("oh my god", line 04) and the possibly ironic: "you can write a fucking news article" (line 05). Holly produces her next turn in overlap with Jane, to do a riposte to orient to Jane's disregard of 'google' ("and you work for google", line 07) and feign amazement at her skills ("you can use a computer", line 08). This feigned amazement by Holly serves to resist Jane's diminishing as it offers a retort to Jane's comment ("write a fucking news article") with "and you work for google". Holly continues with further mocking (lines 08-12) and, produced in overlap, Pippa uses a repeated saying to attempt to stop the course of action ("nonono"). This repeated 'no', immediately, and straightforwardly seeks a stop to the current in-progress action (see Stivers, 2004).

In orienting to Holly's talk, Jane produces a high entitlement request with a threat ("shut the fuck up before I fucking hit you"), and like in the previous fragments, Holly responds with a similar turn ("come on then come on (.) come on fucking hit me then you cunt"). This turn aligns with Jane, insofar as doing goading/threatening goes along with the proposed activity of threatening/hitting. Jane becomes an incumbent of 'disputers' as produced on the basis of the threat. Consequently, any responsive turn by Holly would be non-compliant with Jane's threat and thus display a congruent stance toward the proposed activity (hitting); as such, Holly's continuation in line 23 "if you wanna hit me hit me bitch" does not counter but incites the proposed activity. Jane's threat hinges on the demand 'shut up', for which a compliant response would be no response – however, by taking a turn Holly

is able to reasonably incite Jane and cast her as the aggressor. In this case, by attending to the structure of talk, Holly is able to provide a fitted, non-compliant response and cast Jane as disputative.

In this example, we can see the local norms of arguments being displayed with Jane producing a high entitlement request and Pippa producing multiple sayings of 'no' to halt the course of action in progress as the dispute escalates across these high contingency turns. Across her turns, Holly deals with Jane's threats by highlighting Jane's conduct as hostile – and as "not classy"; indeed, this can be claimed as 'highlighting' here as the claim of classiness is ironicised i.e. "don't you look classy" means that Jane is not acting with the attributes of someone who is actually classy. This works to present Jane's conduct as violating the moral order – by acting hostile (despite being in a dispute), Jane is sanctioned for being the aggressor. Consequently, Holly utilises the structural organisation of talk in order to incite Jane and present her conduct as hostile, and thus transgressive of ordinary, everyday conduct.

These extracts have shown how a speaker may promote their own conduct as orderly, in contrast to the prior extracts where the other speaker's conduct is promoted as disorderly. Like the previous section, however, by presenting one's own conduct as reasonable and ordered, it reflexively casts the other interlocutor(s) as not being reasonable or orderly. This way of explicitly doing being ordinary marks the others speaker's conduct in some inferential way as non-ordinary in the dispute. Moreover, this collection shows how the speaker may subvert the other's challenges through the attendance to the everyday ordinary (normative) expectations of how one ought to behave in public. Presenting one's own conduct as ordinary (and reasonable) is achieved through metadiscursively producing a report or observation of

some earlier point in the dispute. This mobilises 'ordinary' as a relevant category for the speaker, rendering them as attending to local expectations – that is, their behaviour does not violate or breach norms, and is orderly (in the sense that their turn ostensibly progresses the talk), despite their engagement in the dispute. This reflexively casts the other as the aggressor and cause of that dispute. Speaking to the structure of the dispute (and the overhearing audience) is a useful way of pushing back against the other speaker – it attends to some social norms of how people ought to behave (e.g. politely) and thus casts the other as transgressive. Consequently, invoking this moral order accomplishes what the first section described: a turn which does not directly respond to the prior and is difficult to respond to as it does not directly address the other disputer.

5.2 Discussion

This analytic chapter has employed a primarily Discursive Psychological approach to outline two ways that participants in disputes manage subjectivity in attending to some (un)reasonable behaviour. These two ways are: (1) presenting one's own conduct reasonable, and (2) presenting an other's conduct unreasonable. I began this chapter by showing examples of explicit orientations to *reasonable* in talk, in which concrete descriptions of 'reasonable' are used to concede and point backwards to some problem in the talk. These stand relative to the examples shown throughout this thesis where 'reasonable' is not explicitly used, but rather invoked as a moral category to which participants belong. Participants (re)work witnessable conduct to sustain (un)reasonableness and provide a rational account for that conduct (see Clarke, Kitzinger & Potter (2004) on normalising accounts).

Presenting another's conduct as unreasonable has a similar force where the speaker points to some violative or breaching behaviour by the other participant(s) in order to cast them as being non-ordinary (or unreasonable) – this reflexively casts the speaker with the rights to do this reporting and thus renders them as doing being ordinary. Throughout my collection this appears to be exclusively used to bring off a challenge and pursue the challenger's agenda. Extract 2 showed how Ali attended to the structural organisation of the talk in order to present Jayda's conduct as transgressing 'normal' expectations of conversation. Similarly, in the following extracts (3 and 4), going metadiscursive and attending to that structure highlights a failure of the other speaker to turn-take in a reasonable way. These extracts demonstrate a members' practice – not to cease the dispute – to achieve an uninterrupted turn-at-talk. Consequently, in disputes, despite their disruptive nature, participants orient to their turns at talk as momentary 'wins' as they (1) return the talk to some 'normal' structure, and (2) allow the speaker to pursue their trajectory.

Presenting one's own conduct gets brought off to cast the speaker as acting in accordance with the local expectations: in doing this it reflexively casts the other as the aggressor and as not acting in accordance with local expectations. Going meta, and 'outside of the talk' is a lay-analysis of the conversation by members and is a practice which attends to the structure of a dispute rather than its content. In this sense, by attending to the structure of a dispute, the speaker is able to attain a turn-at-talk to craft *the(ir)* moral order to which the other speaker(s) is accountable. Extract 5, 6 and 7 showed how a speaker describes their prior talk as being unproblematically done; these backward-looking turns do not directly address the prior turn but do formulate it by the nature of its delivery. Extract 8 showed a similar feature but that gets accomplished so that a speaker can reasonably incite the other. Consequently, responding in this metadiscursive way to present one's own prior conduct

disrupts the sequence to launch a new sequence that is contingent on the prior, yet independent from it.

Across all of the extracts presented, the two lines of action (depicting oneself, and depicting another) are interlinked and co-occur. Moreover, each extract where metatalk is produced largely regards two components: the sequential organisation of talk (i.e. not answering the question), and the moral order (i.e. acting inappropriately for the environment). Indeed, this chapter could have been divided along those lines, but that would miss the nuance of what the outcome of the work – sequential, or moral – has. In the first section, by presenting another's conduct as unreasonable in some way, it allows a sequential position which is responsive to the prior turn, but does not directly address that turn. In the second section, by presenting one's own conduct as reasonable, it can subvert a negative assertion (on the basis of its applicability). Discursive Psychology has a long tradition of examining how speakers attend to their notion of 'the world' and the(ir) moral order grounded in the witnessable here-and-now. Indeed, Edwards (2007) discusses how the reworker of the discourse displays their disposition to *see* the ordinary and *assume* ordinary explanations. For example, Potter and Wetherell (1988) examine how people work to not be seen as racist, but more importantly, elaborating the relationship between the individual and the 'world'. This contributes to Discursive Psychology through reiterating and adding to the work that shows how individuals work to be seen in a way that is conducive to their agenda.

This chapter has examined two ways that speakers produce themselves as *reasonable* and as being *rationally* accountable. Through deploying metadiscursive talk to focus on the *structure* of the dispute rather than the *content*, it affords speakers a turn that (1) allows them to pursue their own trajectory, and (2) be ostensibly aligned/affiliated with the other

speaker's activity/stance yet resist the specific challenge of their turn. Being *rationally* accountable is a practical accomplishment that is reflected in and through talk-in-interaction. As Edwards (2007, p.47) explains: "there are special arenas of social life where doubt and dispute, or motivated bases of saying things, are themes endemic to the setting". In disputes, the talk reflects a sensitivity to rational accountability in the there-and-then of witnessing and the here-and-now of its telling. Indeed, despite the 'special arena' status of the dispute, being reasonable and rational operate as pervasive across contexts as speakers contend to be ordinary (Garfinkel, 1967) – disputing, like most interactional activities, is governed by those disputing with respect to a normative sequential order (i.e. taking turns one at a time). People cannot escape the social fabric of everyday life – cooperating in interaction (even through disagreements) is treated as favourable (at least, for the purposes of encouraging further disagreement). This chapter has served to outline one of the key findings of this thesis: how speakers treat the structural organisation of a dispute rather than the content of turns. I will explore this further in the discussion (Chapter 6).

Chapter 6:

Discussion

6.0 Introduction

This thesis makes an original contribution to work on dispute research across disciplines, particularly in psychology. I used an empirically-grounded interactional approach to study how people behave in disputes, without relying on what participants think they do in disputes (cf. Chun & Choi, 2014; Overall et al., 2011). Specifically, this original research (1) provides an empirically-grounded and interactionally-focused examination of disputes, (2) showcases a methodological framework for combining ethnomethodological approaches, and (3) investigates how people produce their moral and social order in public. Throughout this thesis I discussed the sequential and moral orders of public disputes by identifying and analysing interactional and relational features involved in their production and organisation. The guiding questions for this thesis were as follows:

(1) What resources are strangers afforded in a dispute? (Chapter 3).

(2) What are members' practices for doing resistance in disputes? (Chapter 5).

(3) What are the categorial implications of disputing? (Chapter 4 and 5).

(4) How is the relationship between participants (re)configured during a dispute? (Chapter 4).

I found that people employ a variety of intrinsic and extrinsic resources to the interaction, from negotiating category membership to recruiting other participants to talking about the dispute. I revealed that resistance occurs when a response is given which does not structurally align and/or relationally affiliate with the prior turn(s); moreover, the findings

indicate that the inference-rich nature of categories/devices are a feature of / offer resources in disputes. I also found that speakers strategically reconfigure their relationship with their co-disputants through category work in order to manufacture a logical, or moral incongruity with their behaviour.

As outlined in the literature review, there has been little attention paid to public disputes of this nature (strangers arguing in public spaces), and even less examining interactional features in these environments. As such, there is a need for more (interactional) research that is reflective of what actually happens in public disputes. More precisely, it contributes by examining and developing very specific and underexplored practices (partitioning, doing being reasonable, and resisting enticers) that have a limited literature and have not been examined extensively. I bring together conversation analytic work on disputes across contexts to demonstrate the patterns of behaviour which are endemic, not to those environments, but to the activity of disputing. Therefore, this thesis shows how categories, sequence and morality are related to update (and correct) prior research on disputes. In this chapter I summarise my findings so to provide a description of the sequential organisation of particular interactional features of public disputes. I will then discuss how these findings interconnect before considering the implications of my findings for work on morality, sequence, categories, accounting and disputes in the wider literature. I will then reflect on some limitations of this thesis, before finally exploring future avenues for research and dissemination.

6.1 Summary of thesis

The analytic chapters provide a sequential and categorial analysis of an array of public disputes. These disputes are characterised by some initial infringing behaviour/thought (and

possibly further infractions) and can be considered as 'first encounters' (Pillet-Shore, 2018), with participants having never spoken prior to this dispute. The research gave unique insights into a relatively under-researched area of public life. This is because it is only in recent years that such data has been accessible – one cannot set out to go and collect naturally-occurring public disputes without a raft of logistical and ethical issues to deal with. It has only been since the popularisation of internet videos (particularly on YouTube since 2005) and the prevalence of mobile recording devices that these moments of public life can be captured and publicised.

The phenomena identified (blocking access to a third turn, partitioning, and doing being reasonable) were investigated through how they are done in disputative talk. In each chapter, I showcased 10-11 extracts that detailed the sequential, categorial, moral, and relational features that achieve the outcomes of investigation (e.g. what steps are taken to block access to a third turn, or how do people divide the social world). Though every case is unique (in that, no interaction is ever the same), I demonstrated the systematic patterns of people's conduct which lead to those outcomes. For instance, one outcome is that an ostensibly straightforward question in a disputative environment (irrespective of the local environment) will receive resistance, and that resistance can take two forms: weak, or strong. In that analysis, I highlighted how these different forms of resistance forestall progressivity in different ways, but they achieve the same outcome (that a third turn is blocked).

Most conversation analytic research on disputes largely considered them in particular environments (see Komter, 1991; Pillet-Shore, 2016; Pomerantz & Sanders, 2013; Vuchinich, 1990), as activities which help develop social skills (David, Rawls & Trainum, 2017), as matters to be resolved (Greatbach & Dingwall, 1997), or as the interactional moves

through which disputes begin (Coulter, 1990; Maynard, 1985a) or end (Church, 2009). Consequently, as I outlined in the literature review, there is work which focuses on categories, relationships and social interaction but does not necessarily foreground 'disputes' (but perhaps discusses them) – indeed, this thesis adds to that work but foregrounds disputes as the focus of investigation and more generally, highlights that we need know more about the interactional practices within disputes and how these shape and are shaped by relational issues.

6.1.1 Chapter 3: Resisting a normative challenge

In the first analytic chapter, I offer a novel examination of how participants prevent their position being challenged and evade social control. I investigated the suppression of challenges during disputes in talk-in-interaction. The findings contribute to our understanding of resistance in disputes, and offer insights into the ways that people manufacture obstacles in response to challenges. This has potentially important implications for showing how people can demonstrably resist or challenge views (e.g. how to 'just say no', or how to confront prejudice). This chapter developed Reynolds' (2011; 2015) and Reber's (2019) work on enticers. I investigated resistance within challenge sequences, showing the forms that resistance to a person's position/point/agenda may take. I showed the challenger's perspective whereby the manufacturing of a challenge controls the direction of talk and thus constitutes a local victory by influencing the trajectory of the dispute. However, the findings revealed that the influence of the trajectory may be short lived as the target may contest or push back against the producibility of the challenge at points where some other response has been made relevant (which somewhat ratifies it as a challenge). At those early points the resistance can be active to straightforwardly and unambiguously reject the challenger's trajectory to suspend the ongoing activity; resistance may also be passive where the target

aligns by answering, but exhibits some problem with the prior turn(s) through pushing back against the trajectory. What people do in disputes can be seen to be furthering their agenda or resisting the other speaker's agenda. Indeed, Stivers and Hayashi (2010), discuss how questions can set the agenda and answers which transform that agenda are "the least cooperative form of transformation, since what question recipients provide as a response is furthest removed from the question posed to them" (p.21-22). As such, this chapter contributes to work on question-response systems (see Heritage & Raymond, 2012; Stivers & Hayashi, 2010) and goes some way to explore the terrain of question responses that fall between the prototypical (yes/no) and non-answers ("I don't know").

The three sections in this chapter correspond with the three ways that resistance can occur in response to a challenge. The first section demonstrated how a target aligns with the challenge yet treats the challenge as a trouble – in this case the resistance did not stall the challenge trajectory but did speak to how the target pushes back in their answer. The second section showed how resistance may be built throughout the sequence. In these extracts the findings illustrated the various forms of resistance and the outcomes of that resistance. I explored how participants may begin with passive forms of resistance which do not suspend the trajectory, allowing the challenger to pursue their challenge, but that the target may build on this earlier resistance to then outrightly resist against the challenge once that challenge has been availed in the talk. The final section displayed the most outright rejection of the challenge; the final extract in particular showed how a target may reverse the challenge at that earliest possible point to control the direction of talk and hold the challenger accountable for asking the question in the first instance.

The analysis contributes to existing research to show that resistance does not always disrupt the interactional trajectory of a speaker (see Muntigl et al., 2013; Stivers & Robinson, 2006) and may indeed be passively produced, though not in Dooley et al.'s (2018) sense of minimal responses – rather as contestations against the challenge. Gibson's (in prep) understanding of resistance as disobedience does not fully capture the range of forms and functions that resistance has. It may lead to non-compliance (see Kent, 2012), but at those early points, it is a display of unwillingness to cooperate with the challenge by highlighting a problem with that challenging turn which pushes back against the direction of the talk in those moments. Consequently, the challenger may abandon their challenge or pursue the challenge and deal with the contingencies that the resistance has crafted. In disputes, resistance offers a way of responding to a turn to display a participant's adversarial stance toward the other without stalling the progress of dispute.

6.1.2 Chapter 4: Partitioning: Exploiting Category Boundaries

In the second analytic chapter, I produced a novel analysis of how divisions are cemented in and through talk-in-interaction through how members negotiate their relationship. I investigated how people introduce alternate understandings of themselves and the local environment in the service of producing an action. Specifically, I examined the relationship work which occurs in and through disputes, focusing on the participants' relationship in terms of how the dispute and the actions being produced are organised. I employed a primarily membership categorisation analytic approach to reveal instances where *partitioning* occurs. I explained what partitioning is – a practice whereby the boundaries of categories are explored (Sacks, 1995) and thus who the incumbents of those categories are changes. I built on Butler's (2008) work to focus on how "the application of different categories also shifts the kinds of relationships between members" (p.156) to reveal how categorial and relational

work is conducted in disputes. I demonstrated that, in the context of disputes, a reconfiguration of the participants' relationship affords challenges to be brought off or suppressed. Moreover, I examined Poulios' (2016) claims that partitioning 'distances' to further specify his findings and reveal the specific interactional outcomes of partitioning.

The analysis offered insights into how speakers treat the boundedness of membership categorisation devices and how this boundedness offers a resource through which challenges can be brought off or suppressed. For instance, I presented examples where a family device replaced (and covered) the relevance of the institutional 'radio' device, and through this reconfiguration the speaker was able to, in the first instance, push back against the rights of the radio presenter and finally reject the premise for his challenge. In that example, the speaker was able to suspend the dispute and bring the talk to a close. In other examples, the cover category was produced to smuggle potentially-sanctionable actions under seemingly-innocent moves or the cover category was invoked to sanction the target on the basis of some disjuncture between the currently operated category and their prior talk. Consequently, these cover categories operated with respect to some social norm, similar to the practice outlined in Chapter 3 whereby the social norm being produced is done so that the target can be seen as transgressing that norm.

This chapter showed members' own demonstrable orientations to invoking alternate bodies of common-sense knowledge and their mundane sense-making practices through how alternate category devices organised the ongoing dispute. This chapter illustrated a particular practice pertinent in disputes (and in other talk) that is deployed so that members can manage the contingencies of bringing off particular actions. The analysis highlights how partitioning manages access to resources and participation in the dispute – specifically, the generation of

certain actions, who can and is participating in the dispute and on what grounds they are participating. Unlike previous studies where partitioning organises the overarching structure of who is participating in activity and on what grounds (Butler, 2016; Evans & Fitzgerald, 2016), in these disputes it configures who these people are to each other. In that sense it is a powerful practice for the reconfiguration of relationships (see Butler, 2008) and for bringing off or suppressing challenges.

6.1.3 Chapter 5: Doing being (un)reasonable

The final analytic chapter contributes to our understanding of the normative practices of disputing – in this analysis, I show how participants explicitly attend to violative conduct as a way of being seen as reasonable. This builds on the prior chapters to detail how speakers do being reasonable in disputes, and to discuss how structural organisation of disputes can be used as a resource to that end. In this chapter I focused specifically on how members themselves treat the structure of disputes. This chapter addresses how speakers display an orientation toward the dispute and thus provides evidence for what actually constitutes a dispute. The analysis focused on two ways that speakers manage subjectivity and (un)reasonableness in and through disputes. These are: (1) presenting one's own conduct as reasonable, and (2) presenting an other's conduct as unreasonable. I situated these against explicit orientations to *reasonable* to show how the explicit usage and meta-talk described in the chapter are both backward-looking (in terms of recasting the prior talk) and are used in ways that concede. The findings show that being a *reasonable* person is invoked as a moral category through how participants (re)work witnessable conduct and produce a purportedly rational account for that conduct through metadiscursive moves. Producing rationality is rhetorical (see Billig, 1987) whereby *rational* is not logical, but rather the efforts to produce that rationality are seeable as grounded and reasonable (Simons, 2013).

The analysis showed how people made use of the metadiscourse during disputes, by 'talking about the talk' that comprised the interactions. Comments on the production of interaction included mentions of turn taking (e.g. "can I talk"), word choice, turn design, social actions and stance taking. I discussed how meta-talk was used in ways that (1) maintained the progressivity of the dispute, (2) resists reaching a point of closure (on the other speaker's terms), and (3) restricts the grounds to argue back as the meta-talk does not directly address the other speaker but rather speaks to an audience other than that speaker.

The chapter presented two ways that doing being (un)reasonable is accomplished. First, by presenting the other's conduct as unreasonable, I revealed how speakers point to the other speaker's transgression of the interactional order – this appeared to be exclusively used to challenge the other speaker in a way that does not attack their position but dismisses their turn. It highlights the failure of the other speaker to turn-take in a reasonable way and consequently disrupts the speaker's ongoing action. Second, by presenting one's own conduct as reasonable, in this section I demonstrated how speakers described their own conduct as according with social order and the local expectations. Although this highlighting points to the speaker's own conduct, it achieves a similar outcome to the first way – it casts the other as transgressing that social order and promotes their own behaviour as successfully according with that social order. Indeed, speakers have the opportunity to disrupt the other speaker's talk but also, rather than simply retaining speakership, speakers could launch a new sequence that is independent from the prior talk.

This section has summarised the three analytic chapters. I have highlighted the core findings that speak to the structural organisation of disputes and how these interconnect with

turn design. These chapters are tied together through the close examination of public

disputes, and the three themes which run throughout this thesis: morality and categories,

sequence and accounting, and disputes. In the next section I will unpack each of these themes

to discuss the contribution to each of them this thesis makes.

6.2 Research contributions

Overall, my thesis has contributed to the small body of empirically-grounded interactional

research on public disputes. The spectrum of public disputes analysed serves to showcase

three regularly occurring interactional features as occurring across contexts but tied to the

activity of disputing. These features can occur in mundane or institutional talk as discussed in

the analytic chapters, and show how people display adversarial stances against a prior topic,

turn or person. Findings from the analysis have illuminated some ways in which speakers

challenge and resist challenges in disputes – from the sequential organisation of these actions,

to the moral implicativeness of their conduct, to the design of their turns. I have extended our

understanding of what actually happens in disputes by examining how members complain,

account, accuse, reject, rebuke, and admonish one another in and through talk-in-interaction.

Significantly, my thesis has deployed a methodological framework for using three

EM approaches for undertaking interactional research into these relatively under-researched

areas. The combination of MCA/DP/CA to approach interaction highlights the

interwovenness of sequence, turn design and morality as they are done on a turn-by-turn

basis. Indeed, this thesis moves beyond methodological differences to focus squarely on the

phenomenon to provide the fullest picture of what that practice/operation/action

accomplishes sequentially and rhetorically and how it may be consequential for who the

people are, and what they are doing. For these reasons, I would advocate for working trans-

approach within EM so as to not be restricted by the small methodological differences and also that the focus on methodology does not detract from the focus on the phenomenon. I have engaged with new and ethically uncertain issues of data collection whereby the 'ethical guidelines' are still being written with some guidelines (see BPS, 2018) characterising this as 'public data' which does not adequately capture the specific characteristics or deal with vulnerable participants (for a more extended discussion on ethics and transcription see Chapter 2). This thesis, in particular Chapter 2, offers an instructive framework and advocates for future research into and using online video sources – it's a bounteous area of data that showcases a variety of hitherto un(der)researched places of everyday life.

6.2.1 Morality and Categories

In the following section I will report the contribution that this research makes to work on morality and categories in talk-in-interaction. The findings from the analysis demonstrated different features of talk which constitute to and are constituted by the moral and sequential order of interaction. My analysis corresponds with Bergmann's (1998) 'lived morality' as morality is something which is constructed in and through interaction (see also: Edwards, 1991; Jayyusi, 1984; 1991; Silverman, 1997). However, I argued that seemingly disordered talk is purposeful, and a useful tool for participants, rather than an orientation to an alternate 'order'. It is things like disruption that create, or make the activity identifiable as disordered. In this sense, matters of disputing are talked into being by the disputers themselves, as Bergman (1992, p.154) explains:

> "there is not first an embarrassing, delicate, morally dubious event… instead, the delicate characteristic of an event is constituted by the very act of talking about it cautiously and discreetly".

One of the approaches employed in this thesis was membership categorisation analysis and as such, a central focus was on members' use and uptake of categories in and through disputes. This work contributes by examining disputative episodes of interaction using MCA, to explore how categories are displayed in and through extended sequences of hostility and why those categories are mobilised. This builds on work by Eglin and Hester (2003); Housley and Fitzgerald (2001); Leudar and Nekvapil (1998) who all show similar themes with how conflict constitutes and is constituted by dispute. In general, these studies illuminate the link between micro-category usage and the macro-level social order of hostility. I too illuminate this link through the findings, showing categories as inference rich cultural devices, though my findings demonstrate a particular practice through which this occurs. Participants typically invoke other categories (over the omnipresent and relatively anonymous category of 'member of the public') which cut across that general co-membership, such as 'employed', 'father', or 'service provider' as resources that warrant challenges or resistance. Consequently, these other categories are produced to make visible certain associations (Sacks, 1979), become a resource for action (Stokoe, 2012a), are constituted by those actions, and position participants relative to one another. Categories and devices are situated in disputes and serve as resources for doing morality; that is, they produce a framework of appropriateness and the local moral order of who the participants are to each other (Nikander, 2000).

Who the participants are to each other speaks to the relationship work which participants do in and through disputes. In the analytic chapters I considered the relationship between the disputants as 'new' and thus without the 'baggage' of pre-existing rules and rituals of how these people act with one another. People in disputes occupy categories which configure their relationship to one another in certain ways – for instance, claiming

incumbency of 'train guard' positions them in a hierarchical relationship with 'passenger'; conversely, claiming incumbency of 'nice guy' reconfigures the relationship to be symmetrical with the passenger i.e. through use of a 'human' device in which they are co-members (Chapter 4, extract 3). Configuring the relationship is a resource for participants in these disputes – the making relevant, and consequential of 'who they are to one another' influences the distribution of rights and responsibilities according to their local interactional context.

The analysis reveals the implications of this relationship work on how participants deal with challenges and resistance (and whether they are ratified as successful). I argue, along the lines of Leudar et al.'s (2004) finding, that in public dispute, it is not a case of 'us' versus 'them' (or aggressor versus victim) as independent category pairs, but as coordinated by the very actions that are being performed in those moments. Indeed, participants dispute on the basis of who-they-are to the other speaker(s) and the who-they-are is fluid is renegotiated in and through the talk. This is developed by Tileagă (2005; 2010) who notes that the *us* and the *them* are representations of the extreme differences between participants. Specifically, in these public disputes, speakers work to be seen as the 'us', as the ordinary, reasonable member of society in this local environment and cast the other(s) as beyond comparison and outside of their moral order. As shown in Chapter 5, speakers must walk the interactional tightrope of espousing their view/opinion/belief whilst not being treated as the perpetrator, aggressor or cause of the dispute.

Speakers, through categorisation work, position themselves against certain interactional trajectories insofar as the predicates and attributes of their category preclude them from the accusation, challenge, or some otherwise problematic action. This is one way

that resistance can be brought off by participants, given that categories are easily invokable in 'first encounters' and are not easily refutable (on an evidential basis at least). Indeed, categories as cultural devices, and their associated rights, responsibilities and obligations, can be mobilised to align with their own position to reinforce that position and manage resistance against other (incongruent) positions.

Participants treat one another on the basis of one another's talk as being a local problem that ought to be dealt with. Speakers can claim incumbency of categories which have the rights and responsibilities to challenge, accuse and call-out problematic conduct in that environment. For example, being seen and heard as employed (and a contributing member of society) provides the rights and responsibilities to call-out problematic conduct on the basis of employment status.

In this section, I discussed morality as a feature of disputes and how disruptions, transgressions and otherwise violative behaviour represents the moral order in disputes. Morality is an ongoing members' concern that is made evident in recognition of social norms, in a transgression to those norms and in the consequences of a possible transgression. Indeed, members reify their positions as correct, or in some way legitimate, on the basis of who-they-are and who the other speaker is. For instance, they can highlight the other's conduct as a transgression in order to cast them as the disruptor and themselves as the victim. More specifically, it is not the content of the dispute (e.g. different opinions, views, positions) which are inherently adversarial or disputative, but rather it is *how* participants exhibit these opinions, views and positions as oppositional and how they deal with transgressions to social norms that speaks to what a dispute is. To this end, I outlined the importance of paying close attention to members' category usage as constituted by and for actions. Categories are

implicative to the action which is being brought off and the relationship which is being configured between the participants during a dispute. Consequently, members' category usage informs us about their sense-making processes and the local reasoning through which opinions and views are espoused in disputes. The following section builds on category work to discuss the relevance of sequence, resistance and challenges in disputes.

6.2.2 Sequence, Resistance, and Challenges

I began this thesis by outlining the basic structural organisation of a dispute from how disputes begin (for example, see Coulter's (1990) dispute-initiation sequence) to how disputes end (see Church, 2009; Dersley & Wootton, 2001; Vuchinich, 1990). I also outlined some sequential features of disputes, noting that *challenges* may push forward some (new) trajectory and in response, *resistance* is a relevant next turn to occupy that space. The primary interactional features that characterise disputes are disagreement, disalignment, dispreference and disaffiliation. The findings show these occurring throughout the public disputes, which is not unexpected i.e. they are the very features that constitute a dispute and make it a candidate for inclusion in a collection of disputes. For instance, *alignment* is achieved by participants as they go along with the disputative project (Schegloff, 2007a), though the dispute is marked by disalignment at points where alignment is clearly prompted i.e. speakers align at the level of the activity (disputing) but disalign at the level of the project (e.g. an unfitted turn to resist a challenge). For instance, in Chapter 3, I explored how resistance may be conceptualised in terms of its outcome i.e. that it may *align* with the prior turn yet avail a disaffiliative stance. Indeed, disaligning and/or disaffiliating within a turn constitutes alignment at the activity level as disputes are constituted by not-going-along with

the other speaker.

Speakers in a dispute may design their turns as aligning or affiliative and thus cooperative with the other speaker(s), but remain in a dispute. In these instances, the speakers are ostensibly cooperating, but these turns are marked insofar as they are produced in the service of some upcoming challenge, otherwise the dispute would have ended. For example, an enticer which 'suspends' the dispute by asking a straightforward question in the service of crafting an incongruity between that position and their previously espoused position. In Chapter 4, I showed how participants may endorse their co-participant's position to affiliate at certain moments (and become co-members within a category device), but in the service of pursuing their own agenda to seek compliance, produce a logical incongruity or otherwise end up as taking different positions. Given these sequential features of disputes, partitioning configures how speakers may be sanctioned for their behaviour. Speakers' sanctions are disaffiliative in nature as they regulate the other's behaviour in some way – though this is a careful tightrope that must be walked as the sanctioner treats themselves as having the rights to sanction, which is a sanctionable position as they themselves may be sanctioned on that basis (see Chapter 3, extract 5).

This thesis also contributes to the literature on *resistance*. In the literature review I outlined how resistance has been conceptualised and highlight some of the forms resistance can take in and through talk. Moreover, I identified the gap for examining resistance in non-institutional settings where there is not a goal or activity to be pushed back against. With this in mind, the first analytic chapter specifically examined the forms and sequential placement of resistance in response to a challenge. I identified different forms of resistance as weak or strong, drawing on Dooley et al.'s (2019) study on active/passive resistance – I observed how

the outcomes of that resistance allow it to be characterised in those terms. Specifically, I showed how resistance which pushes back against the prior turn but aligns and thus does not outrightly disrupt the trajectory can be considered 'weak', whereas resistance that outrightly rejects or disaligns from the prior turn and thus disrupts the interactional trajectory can be considered 'strong'. These terms are analysts' categories but are grounded in those particular interactional outcomes. This research highlights the need for more EMCA research into resistance and its conceptualisation as something people do in talk. Specifically, this research builds on existing studies on resistance (e.g. Hepburn & Potter, 2011; Humă, Stokoe & Sikveland, 2019; Muntigl et al., 2013 etc.) to show how resistance actually manifests in and through interactions across various contests in order to precisely identify those social actions which constitute resistance (e.g. rejection, refusal, non-responses, transformative answers etc.).

The findings also present an understanding of *challenges*. In the literature review I discussed challenges as a fuzzy category which do not have the quality of a technical term, but are nonetheless observable in disputes and can be pinned down. I described literature that details phases of a challenge (Reynolds, 2015), or how leveraging epistemic status produces a challenge (Heritage, 2013), or how disputants produce themselves as challenger and target (Goodwin & Goodwin, 1987). Thus, I investigated challenges not as individual social actions but in Koshik's (2003) terms as actions which convey a negative assertion toward another speaker, and are marked by the challenger as having control over the direction of talk. Moreover, in the extracts presented, there are very few challenges that may be considered 'successful'; however, the terms of 'success' do not precisely describe challenges as an operation that do achieve a momentary win as the producer is able to control the direction of the talk.

This thesis has shown the importance of paying close attention to the sequential organisation of disputes and the precise operations by which resistance and challenges occur. This tells us about the dynamic nature of social interaction and how the fabric of social life is not static, but ever changing, and is produced in social interaction. The findings of this thesis highlight how participants do being disputative by disalinging with a straightforward question, by claiming incumbency of an alternate category in order to alienate or suppress the other speaker(s) rights and responsibilities, or by being (un)reasonable. I suggest that this (dis)order is a feature of the first encounter (not having pre-established rituals, but instead relying on rituals for interacting with strangers) and that for speakers, to be ratified as a disputer, have to be seen to be invested in doing disputing or else be accountable for their inattention toward the disputative matters.

6.2.3 Disputes

This thesis contributes to the empirically-grounded literature on disputes, providing an up-to-date look at the very specific things which people do in disputes. More specifically, it contributes to the small body of literature on public disputes. This has been done by examining those very specific things which people do in disputes from a CA perspective; additionally, it provides a look into what disputes ontologically are in the emic sense, and how participants themselves systematically produce disputes as an ongoing activity. As described in the literature review, previous work has debated what makes a dispute with authors such as Goodwin (1982) and Schmitt and Márquez-Reiter (2019) viewing disagreement as not constitutive of a dispute (though a part of one) – my findings support their view. The analysis shows that participants can work to be seen as not-disagreeing, usually toward some adversarial ends – for instance, in Chapter 3, being momentarily in

agreement in order to point to some hypocrisy in a co-interlocutor's argument. Moreover, throughout this thesis I demonstrated that, for both analysts and members, the content of a dispute does not necessarily constitute a dispute but rather, it is the structural organisation of the dispute which informs analysts (and participants to some extent) that they are doing disputing. Indeed, members and analysts purport concern with what disputes are about (Allen, 1995; Carnevale & Pegnetter, 1985; Terry, 1987), yet in the majority of the data analysed, this appears to be secondary to the overall structure of what's happening on a turn-by-turn basis.

I would suggest that this attendance to structure over content is specific to this type of dispute where participants are engaged in activities at the intersection of 'first encounters' and 'disputes'. Comparatively, in family disputes where the participants are known to one another, and in formal debates, then the matters at hand (the content) may take more precedence in being dealt with as *doing disputing* may not necessarily be useful for what the participants are seeking to accomplish (such as: getting a child to do homework (Flint, pers. comm.), doing participatory democracy (Mondada, 2013b), or mediating messages (Hutchby, 1997)) and so the *content* is more important than the *structure* (and as being seen to be doing disputing). In spite of this, content and structure are interrelated and not independent from one another. Across the analytic chapters I showed how participants formulate sequences in ways which are systematically related to the content of the dispute. For example, in Chapter 5 I discuss the grounds (content) of a dispute (factual versus theoretical matters) being mobilised in ways that counter-challenge and/or undermine the other speaker's position. In that instance the content of the dispute was exploited within and across sequences so as to craft incongruities with the others position, or to render them as an incumbent of a

problematic category (such as aggressor).

The contribution to understanding disputes then is grounded in the ritual behaviours which occur in and through disputative talk – a dispute is characterised by the 'normal' rules and rituals of everyday life ceasing to operate and being replaced by an alternate set of rituals. The dynamic ordering of talk is a members' resource allowing them to negotiate what the rules and rituals are (i.e. how people do being in a dispute) and what may be rendered as accountable or as a violation to this order. Consequently, social order gets manipulated, reworked and exploited in and through talk-in-interaction. The order of a dispute is *disorder*: sequential and moral norms of everyday life serve as a key resource in doing disputes – an orientation to both offer mechanisms for holding people to account for their behaviour within the dispute and more generally, it's made visible in ways that it hardly ever is in other contexts. Speakers rhetorically deploy their recognisance of their sense-making practices and mundane reasoning through their own careful manipulation of talk.

The interactional features identified and analysed throughout this thesis are drawn from a variety of interactional contexts (public, radio, and protest), and in a variety of interactional environments (e.g. on public transport, in police encounters, on political talk shows). This limits the claims which can be made about those specific environments, and moreover, each environment influences who the participants are to each other and how they act (Butler & Fitzgerald, 2010). The variety of contexts and environments within which these phenomenon occur serves to showcase that the interactional features identified are not tied to specific contexts, nor do they occur because of some institutional business (i.e. radio talk, or police business). The features analysed occur across contexts. This means, as Rawls (2008) also describes, that there are a features of how people do disputing which are the 'constitutive

rules' – meaning that, although the way in which turns and actions are designed is sensitive to those local environments, they have the same outcomes (e.g. blocking access to a third turn) which marks the participants as being engaged in disputing.

Disputes as examined empirically using interactional approaches can be considered as 'difficult' data – the recordings are usually unclear, there is an abundance of overlap and shouting, the opinions being espoused can often be discriminatory and offensive and the interactions can seemingly have no purpose other than to do disputing. This thesis builds on conversation analytic work on disputes (e.g. Church, 2009; Coulter, 1990; Goodwin & Goodwin, 1987; Reynolds, 2015 etc.) to put forward a case for more cross-context investigations of disputes. The interactional features discussed in the literature review are context-specific (e.g. children's disputes (Church, 2009); police disputes (Kidwell, 2018); neighbour disputes (Stokoe & Edwards, 2007) etc.), and as such the claims that they make are restricted to those environments. This thesis brings together that research to show how it is applicable (but sensitive to) other interactional environments. Indeed, the analysis in Chapter 5 supports David, Rawls and Trainum's (2017) work on how disputes are rule-governed. It shows that although there are certain 'special arenas' of everyday life where doubt and dispute is endemic (Edwards, 2007), disputes are organised with respect to how people treat the interaction (i.e. we should take one turn at a time).

This notwithstanding, disputes offer a site of interaction where complex practices occur over extended sequences, and they reveal members' mundane sense-making practices over who-they-are and what-they're-doing and how they talk the who-they-are into being. These reasons were showcased throughout this thesis – contributing a starting point for future

research and to demonstrate the fruitfulness of disputes as an area of empirically-grounded research that we should not be apprehensive about.

This section outlined some of the core research contributions which this thesis makes. I reported on the findings which speak to morality and sequence, categories, accounting and more generally on disputes. These four contributions demonstrate the gap in the literature and provide a springboard for future research. In the following section I will discuss some of the limitations of the present study and how they may be rectified. I will then explore some possible avenues for future research which build on my findings.

6.3 Limitations and Future directions

In this section I outline some limitations with the thesis. These limitations do not detract from the research presented in this thesis, rather they reflect on possible problems with the data collection and methodological approach which could be rectified in future work. I will also discuss possible future avenues for research which build on the thesis, identify further gaps in interactional literature on disputes and explore possibilities for public engagement in translating the findings beyond the intended scholarly audience.

6.3.1 Limitations

It can be argued that the thesis is limited methodologically over the claims it is able to make, and also limited in this regard by the varied nature of the data used. The former is a limitation to what the research can offer in terms of 'answering' problems using EMCA approaches. The approach taken is described concisely by Sacks (1984, p.413)

"the idea is to take singular sequences of conversation and tear them apart in such a way as to find rules, techniques, procedures, methods, maxims […] that can be used to generate the orderly features we find in the conversations we examine"

The close examination of talk then does not seek to provide solutions to problems, but rather understand members' own solutions and work out what those problems are (Maynard, pers. comm.). In this regard, this thesis does not attempt to solve, mediate or otherwise provide a solution to public disputes. This could be argued as a limitation to the scope and purpose of the research; however, unpicking those interactional features offers insights into the 'technology of disputes' and goes some distance to develop the taxonomy of disputative talk outlined in Chapter 1, insofar as understanding how a dispute is actually structured rather than relying on its content allows us to see those differences. Therefore, this research is limited in its ability to provide some solution to the 'problem' of public disputes, but it can show those structures that constitute a dispute, how they unfold and how they are successful or not (to the participants) which allows for the accurate identification of disputes.

A further limitation to the study regards how the disputes were recorded and subsequently collected. The video/audio recordings were largely taken and uploaded for two purposes (though not mutually exclusive): for entertainment whereby the dispute is recorded by a member of the public and then produced for the enjoyment of others – this concerns the radio disputes and the public disputes which are regularly uploaded to YouTube with captions that point to them as humorous. The second purpose is for evidential and/or noteworthiness – these are the police encounters and the public disputes. The police encounters are filmed by the police, and often by the public and often get uploaded by News channels as newsworthy; similarly the public disputes are recorded by bystanders because (1) they are breaches of everyday expectations of how people ought to act in public, and/or (2)

they are evidencing what actually happened in case of future police involvement. As such, these reasons preclude recording moments where disputes are not escalated or made 'noteworthy' in some way and so the disputes collect tend to be on the 'extreme' end; they also mean that the beginnings of disputes are rarely captured – only when the dispute has become noteworthy and the recorder has a chance to begin filming. Indeed, because of this I miss an important component of disputes (with the exception of radio disputes) – how they start. Missing this and other information about the context or actions can limit access to members' understandings and make it difficult to follow the course of events. There are also issues with the recording itself – poor camera angles, poor sound quality, poor video quality – the recordings are only a partial record of what has transpired – however, that is always the case (as we can never be 'in' the participants' experiences) but it is particularly salient here.

An additional limitation tied to the prior is that of data selection and the possibility that data may have been edited. As I outlined in Chapter 2, I used a number of inductive search terms and relied on YouTube's algorithm to recommend similar videos. The data collection then was formed around those specific terms – possibly excluding other types of disputes which may be described using other members terms unknown to me. Furthermore, though I made every effort to exclude those data that appeared edited in any way, it can sometimes be very difficult to tell if editing has occurred and to a certain extent, all of these videos are produced for YouTube. This limitation is partially remedied by using the next-turn proof procedure to see how it is responsive to the prior turn and if it sequentially makes sense (in an analyst as member sense) but this is not infallible.

On this, Laurier (2013) and Strangelove (2010) both note that the recording and video publisher are also members and analysable as such. This raises a limitation (or at least an important question); these recordings offer a single and privileged perspective of these

interactions and analysis may only have access to that perspective (e.g. people who (a) have access to a recording device, and (b) are comfortable recording in public). 'Exposing' these perspectives is not a concern as the original videos often garner thousands and millions of views; however, a concern is how this perspective shapes what the research can look like. It relies on analysts to judge whether a perspective is being privileged and whether or not to include someone in the analysis. There are some guidelines (see BPS, 2018) around vulnerable people – but what this means in practice is fuzzy as we are unlikely to have access to how these people would report themselves (e.g. vulnerable, a child, non-consenting). These are not new concerns for researchers, however and there are not straightforward answers.

6.3.2 Future directions

This thesis builds on previous research but also provides a starting point for future research. There are four major directions for future research identified through the analytic chapters. First, there is a need for expanding the empirical exploration of 'ordinariness'. I built on Sacks' (1995) 'doing being ordinary' to uncover what 'reasonable' means for members; however, I only scratched the surface and future research should consider explicit orientations to doing being reasonable and also unpack members sense-making practices for 'being reasonable' in and through talk. Second, partitioning has been scarcely researched and as such further research ought to be considered to explore how the social world is divided and put-together as a moment-by-moment accomplishment. A possible venture is to consider embodied features of interaction regarding how categories are deployed and understood; this will not only build on partitioning research (see Butler, 2008; Evans & Fitzgerald, 2016; Poulios, 2016; Stokoe, 2012a) but also provide insights into how embodied practices shape and are shaped by culture-in-action. Third, a future line of research ought to specify the

interactional particulars of *resistance*. There is a small body of literature on resistance-in-interaction, and it can be understood as an obstacle to overcome (Humă, 2019) – however, there are questions over what can be said to be resistance and how resistance may be a useful (and perhaps trainable) resource for people. Though I broadly conceptualised turns in disputes as challenging or resistance, drawing on extent bodies of literature which describe actions in those terms – there is very little research which pulls together turn design, sequence organisation and the moral order under the more general understanding of *resistance*. Finally, this thesis utilises a fairly underexplored corpus of data – a possible direction for future research is to expand upon this thesis' use of data to explore the lesser researched or even known environments of everyday life, this includes (but is not limited to): self-recorded videos of activism, protestor confrontations, and other areas where disorder *is* the purpose.

6.3.2.1 Theoretical Implications

This thesis offers empirical insights into the interactional machinery of disputes. As discussed in the literature review, empirical interactional research answers questions grounded in what actually happens rather than relying on an ascription of motivation or reason. I discussed how answering *why* people argue is not a fruitful avenue for EMCA research as it unnecessarily ascribes motivations for the participants' behaviour. Thus, this research contributes two key implications for theoretically-driven research into disputes: first, that an interactional investigation of disputes yields findings which can have concrete practical implications for those involved in disputes (see following section); second, that disputes are highly ordered, ritualised and rule-governed, but that orderliness is a particular frame inside of the overarching dispute frame.

Goffman (1959; 1974) describes frames as interpretations of events which manage the impression others will have on those events and help people navigate those events. The analysis showed how people actually negotiate frames i.e. how the dispute frame is (re)produced. In Chapter 3 the findings reveal that through manufacturing a challenge on the basis of some social norms that participants craft a structure for the other participant to navigate (see Streek, 1986). Chapter 4 shows how participants manage who-they-are and thus the interpretation that the other speaker is availed of them – (re)configuring the frame so that the action they are producing can be made sense of by the other participants (see Goffman, 1955). Similarly, Chapter 5 shows how participants explicitly manage two frames – the dispute and 'normal' everyday talk. Participants neatly transpose the latter frame in ways that then cast the prior talk as belonging to the dispute frame i.e. highlighting the other's conduct as disputative for the 'normal' frame of society. In these senses, participants are not negotiating the frame of the dispute (see Nielsen et al., 2012), but rather are guiding and navigating the dispute through frames of social norms and who-they-are.

6.3.2.2 Practical Implications

EMCA in fairly recent times has seen the fruits of its analysts' work translated into communication training for practitioners in across different fields (see: medical interactions (Heritage et al., 2007; Pino et al., 2016), police interviews (Stokoe, 2013), phone helplines (Hepburn & Potter, 2007), mediation services (Stokoe & Sikveland, 2016), and crisis negotiations (Stokoe & Sikveland, 2019)). The insights generated by paying close attention to the interactional particulars in these environments has provided an empirical basis to create or improve training. These studies have examined particular institutional environments where there is some institutionally desired outcome. This is unlike my data where the strangers appear not to have some predetermined goal to accomplish. However, this research

empirically unpicks how disputes unfold which is extremely useful for people who (1) are involved in doing disputing (e.g. crisis negotiators), (2) want to avoid disputing (e.g. police officers) or (3) want to prevent disputes from occurring (e.g. mediation). Similarly, examining the structures of talk through which participants can successfully bring off challenges is supremely useful as it provides a framework through which we may challenge the difficult to challenge moments of everyday life, such as discriminatory or offensive talk i.e. the research speakers to fundamental aspects of human interaction that may not be unique to disputes.

Challenging others is one side of the coin, the other is *resistance* and how we can successfully resist against another's course of action. Resistance is a cornerstone social scientific topic and one which is regularly used in tandem with *persuasion*. There is ample literature on how to do persuasion and the best ways to convince people, yet there is a relative scarcity of research that consolidates *resistance*. Resistance is a useful skill for everyone from an early age (Kent, 2012), for instance: how to reasonably resist in ways which are not sanctionable (see Kitzinger & Frith, 1999). This is a fruitful avenue for future research and has practical implications across environments and disciplines.

This section has discussed some of the limitations of this thesis. I explained possible problems with the claims being made, the data and the data collection procedure. In each of these instances, I provided an explanation as to why they should be considered as limitations but do not detract from the research findings. I then discussed some ways that future research could build upon and improve the work carried out here. I specifically mentioned research on doing being reasonable, on partitioning and on the use of this type of data. This was a non-exhaustive list of possible directions. This thesis, epistemologically, provides some starting points for future researchers who may otherwise be put off by difficult data/phenomenon to

show that they need not be nervous about analysing complex practices and that this thesis highlights some specific features of talk to start the analysis with.

6.4 Concluding comments

This chapter summarised the thesis and discussed the analytic findings as the product of this thesis. Moreover, I outlined the four primary research contributions: (1) morality and sequence, (2) categories, (3) accounting, and (4) disputes. I explored some limitations of the thesis before speculating how these limitations may be rectified in future studies as well as possible avenues of research which arise out of this thesis.

Parties to a dispute effectively do two things: challenge and resist; and in doing so they achieve control over the interactional trajectory. People can claim a 'win' of the dispute by getting the other to concede to a challenge – however, when there are virtually no stakes for the future relationship then concessions rarely occur. This notwithstanding, participants may realise momentary 'wins' by taking a turn. Every opportunity to espouse a view, to challenge the other speaker(s), or to resist against a challenge means an opportunity to (1) control the direction of talk, (2) 'prevent' other speakers, and (3) configure the moral order of the dispute. Consequently, these three products of turn taking move the dispute in a direction favourable to the current speaker.

Ethnomethodological approaches offer insights into the fabric of social life and reveals the mundane sense-making that participants are engaged with in and through all talk-in-interaction. For instance, categories and relationship work which are seemingly unwarranted in disputative first encounters are highly consequential for the talk; similarly, disputes are windows into how participants negotiate the moral order and do work to be seen as incumbents of certain categories thus examining these practices through methods grounded

in what actually happens affords us with these clear insights and understandings of the social world.

Public disputes are peculiar. They feature countless transgressions and violative behaviour against a presupposed normative understanding of how people should act in public. Such features include, but are not limited to: overlapping talk, enticing challenges, resistive moves against prior turns, disaffiliative stances against the other speaker, and disalignment. In many ways, responding to these features with similar features (X begets X) ratifies the activity of disputing. I would like to conclude by admiring the delicate co-ordination that occurs in disputes. Though disputes are ostensibly breaching expectations of social order, they shine a light on members' constitution of social and moral (dis)order.

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Appendix A: Jefferson Transcription Symbols

Taken from Hepburn & Bolden (2017) and adapted from Jefferson (2004).

Symbol	Name	Use
`[ text ]`	Brackets	Indicates the start and end points of overlapping speech.
`=`	Equal Sign	Indicates the break and subsequent continuation of a single interrupted utterance.
`(# of seconds)`	Timed Pause	A number in parentheses indicates the time, in seconds, of a pause in speech.
`(.)`	Micropause	A brief pause, usually less than 0.2 seconds.
`.` or ↓	Period or Down Arrow	Indicates falling pitch.
`?` or ↑	Question Mark or Up Arrow	Indicates rising pitch.
`,`	Comma	Indicates a temporary rise or fall in intonation.
`-`	Hyphen	Indicates an abrupt halt or interruption in utterance.
`>text<`	Greater than / Less than symbols	Indicates that the enclosed speech was delivered more rapidly than usual for the speaker.
`<text>`	Less than / Greater than symbols	Indicates that the enclosed speech was delivered more slowly than usual for the speaker.
`°`	Degree symbol	Indicates whisper or reduced volume speech.
`ALL CAPS`	Capitalized text	Indicates shouted or increased volume speech.
`underline`	Underlined text	Indicates the speaker is emphasizing or stressing the speech.
`:::`	Colon(s)	Indicates prolongation of an utterance.

`(hhh)`		Audible exhalation
`? or` `(.hhh)`	High Dot	Audible inhalation
`( text )`	Parentheses	Speech which is unclear or in doubt in the transcript.
`(( italic` `text ))`	Double Parentheses	Annotation of non-verbal activity.

Appendix B: Mondadian Transcription Symbols

Taken from Mondada (2016). Available at:
https://franzoesistik.philhist.unibas.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/franzoesistik/mondada_multim odal_conventions.pdf

Symbol	Use
** ++ ΔΔ	Gestures and descriptions of embodied actions are delimited between two identical symbols (one symbol per participant and are synchronized with corresponding stretches of talk
*--->	The action described continues across subsequent lines
---->*	until the same symbol is reached
>>	The action described begins before the excerpt's beginning.
--->>	The action described continues after the excerpt's end.
.....	Action's preparation
----	Action's apex is reached and maintained
,,,,,	Action's retraction
ric	Participant doing the embodied action is identified when (s)he is not the speaker
fig #	The exact moment at which a screen shot has been taken is indicated with a specific symbol showing its position within the turn at talk

Appendix C: Practicalities

Data Storage:

Loughborough's Policy 3 – Information categories and controls:
https://www.lboro.ac.uk/services/registry/information-governance/policy3/

Loughborough's Office 365 - https://www.lboro.ac.uk/services/it/staff/storage/


Figure 4. Example of an Office 365 group folder.

Data Capture:

Data for this thesis was captured using VLC Player, a freely available piece of software. The below guide details each step for downloading a video from online sources (YouTube etc.).

VLC Video downloader -- https://www.videolan.org/

Step 1. Download VLC Player for OSX or Windows (comes as standard on most Windows machines).

Step 2. Open VLC Player and navigate to 'Open Network' (see figure 5).

Figure 5. VLC Player interface on OSX and file system.

Step 3. Input video URL and select 'Open' (see figure 6).

Figure 6. Opening the video source in VLC Player.

Step 4. Navigate to 'Media Information' and copy the location URL (Cmd + C on OSX), (Ctrl + C on Windows) (see figure 7).


Figure 7. Selecting Media Information and Location.

Step 5. Paste URL into browser (Cmd + V in OSX), (Ctrl + V in Windows).

Step 6. Right-click on the video and select "Save Video As…" (see figure 8). Select the file location and a title.

Figure 8. Saving the video.

Appendix D: Data

Extract #	Extract Name	URL	Time
Chapter 3: Resisting a normative challenge			
Extract 1	I think you're racist	https://youtu.be/HPfN_CVLnkI	[07:46-09:27]
Extract 2.1	Bikinis	https://youtu.be/y5AM_ckVRrs	[03:01-03:49]
Extract 2.2	Bikinis	https://youtu.be/y5AM_ckVRrs	[03:01-03:49]
Extract 2.3	Bikinis	https://youtu.be/y5AM_ckVRrs	[03:01-03:49]
Extract 3	you're unemployable'	https://youtu.be/XFIwMTRj6J0	[02:46-03:18]
Extract 4.1	giving them truth'	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sMLQoBLo8xo	[15:26-16:01]
Extract 4.2	I have a hat on my head'	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sMLQoBLo8xo	[16:01-16:24]
Extract 5	Americans will pick strawberries	https://youtu.be/xPOxX_8H2s4	[12:41-12:56]
Extract 6	no black faces	https://youtu.be/jzPBn5SLcxE	[00:35-00:47]
Chapter 4: Partitioning: Exploiting category boundaries			
Extract 1	Bikinis	https://youtu.be/y5AM_ckVRrs	[03:01-03:49]
Extract 2	saying something that's obviously true	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t6pNxshjQMQ	[03:40-04:37]
Extract 3	actually a nice guy	https://youtu.be/onKFay453Uw	[12:54-14:37]
Extract 4.1	do you know who I am	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y5zx1xzzi7k	[01:10-01:45]
Extract 4.2	do you know who I am	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y5zx1xzzi7k	[01:10-01:45]

Extract 4.3	do you know who I am	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y5zx1xzzi7k	[01:45-02:30]
Extract 4.4	do you know who I am	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y5zx1xzzi7k	[11:44-12:40]
Extract 4.5	do you know who I am	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y5zx1xzzi7k	[12:40-13:25]
Extract 5	you're leaving a drug house	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8BVT6Lzebxg	[01:20-01:50]
Extract 6	DON'T INTERRUPT ME!	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=piyrtI43sK4&t	[13:40-14:44]
Chapter 5: Doing being (un)reasonable			
Extract 1.1	trying to be reasonable	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3fDF1lN-LPc&t=59s	[05:20-05:39]
Extract 1.2	deeply unreasonable person	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3fDF1lN-LPc&t=59s	[05:55-06:05]
Extract 1.3	being very reasonable	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4rRrwMV8Has&t=129s	[06:33-06:53]
Extract 2	can I talk	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oJ0HsV0Jcvs&t=535s	[08:30-08:53]
Extract 3	do not interrupt me	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=piyrtI43sK4&t	[14:20-14:44]
Extract 4	don't speak to me like that	No longer available.	
Extract 5	why are you shouting	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uxTkhG3K99k&t=2s	[00:20-00:37]
Extract 6	who ask you politely	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uxTkhG3K99k&t=2s	[00:40-00:58]
Extract 7	you've misanswered it twice	No longer available.	
Extract 8	shut up before I hit you	No longer available.	
Extract 9	Nazis that were shooting people	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oJ0HsV0Jcvs&t=535s	[07:30-08:05]

Extract 10	moral decline in Britain	https://youtu.be/y5AM_ckVRrs	[03:01-03:49]
Extract 11	vacuous ambiguous term called religion	https://youtu.be/y5AM_ckVRrs	[03:01-03:49]