From the Ashes of History: Trauma, National Identity and State-Building in India and Israel

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Abstract

Despite violence's enormous role in international politics, mainstream International Relations (IR) scholarship tends to focus primarily on its immediate impacts on the balance of power, neglecting the lingering impact of trauma. In recent years, a vibrant (albeit inchoate) literature has developed on trauma's legacy in international politics, but it has largely focused on trauma's sociocultural impacts in Western contexts, neglecting how trauma's material reification can exacerbate its effects in developing societies. This thesis theorizes collective trauma holistically as a vital force in international politics, embedded in the inequalities, injustices and institutions that define the international system. It begins by theorizing identity discourses as comprised of competing narrations of memory (including traumatic memory). The identity narratives that constitute these discourses weave together experience and knowledge, bridging the divide between the individual and the social to create the logics of policymaking. The second chapter explains how collective traumas complicate identity discourses due to the complexities inherent in their narration. The thesis then turns to two case studies of post-independence developing states that demonstrate this theorization's utility in analysis. First, I argue that, in post-independence India, economic nationalist discourse interpreted the diverse suffering imperialism generated as a collective trauma. This trauma's narration legitimated a consensus logic that autarky was vital to India's security, influencing foreign economic policymaking for decades. Next, I examine the role of Holocaust memory in Israeli foreign policy discourse after independence. I argue that the 1961 trial of Adolf Eichmann augured a shift in this discourse from official repression to what I term 'victimhood nationalism', an identity that drew on collective trauma to legitimate the projection of grievances onto Israel's enemies in the Arab world. The thesis concludes by reflecting on how deeper understanding of trauma studies' diverse interdisciplinary insights can further existing debates in international politics and history, as well as how examination of trauma's macro-political dimensions can further the field of trauma studies.

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Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction: Out of the Ashes of History: Trauma, National Identity and State-Building in India and Israel

1.1 The Traumatic Roots of International Politics

The international arena has, to a significant degree, been forged in trauma. Many of the borders, norms, identities and other institutions that today motivate international politics emerged historically from immense collective violence and suffering, both physical and psychological. This observation may seem like a statement of the obvious to passive observers or practitioners of international politics; for example, the 1945 charter of the United Nations (UN), recognizes the traumatic roots of its foundation, stating as its first goal "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind."[1] But recognition of this trauma's complex legacy is hardly the norm in International Relations (IR) scholarship. This thesis is motivated by the idea that the collectively traumatic[2] encounters that have helped constitute and shape the international arena are not simply materially important to rational actors, they can also be socially and psychologically devastating over the long-term, producing multi-faceted legacies that transcend borders, lead to persistent inequalities, constitute identities, and motivate action. Just as recent scholarship has uncovered how emotions are vital to understanding key dynamics in international relations like security and cooperation, this thesis endeavors to orient scholarly attention to how traumatic encounters lie behind so much of what scholarship takes for granted in the international arena—in particular, behind the formation of so many nation-states.

To be sure, recognizing trauma's virtual absence from IR scholarship does not imply that the discipline has entirely neglected violent *events* like war, natural disasters, forced migration or colonialism; but, to date, most IR scholarship work has treated these events as relatively discrete episodes to be understood primarily via the immediate changes their physical destruction produces in the balance of power, international political economy, or security calculations. By neglecting the complex legacy these encounters[3] can produce, this approach tends to sanitize trauma's complex longer-term psychological, sociocultural and socioeconomic resonance. In many ways, this sanitization is to be expected, given IR's traditional domination by rationalist theory, which often

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[1] "Charter of the United Nations," United Nations, accessed January 3, 2019, http://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/.

[2] For further discussion of the difference and continuities between "individual trauma" and "collective trauma," both of which fall under the broader label of trauma invoked throughout this thesis, see chapter 3.

[3] As I explain in further detail later in this thesis, I favour the language of traumatic encounters over traumatic events to deliberately orient attention to trauma's longer-term impacts.

takes for granted status quo arrangements forged in fire and assumes self-interested actors will remain purely wealth-, power-, and security-seeking egoists in trauma's wake. The classic neorealist analogy of the international system as a billiards table with states as balls bouncing off one another has no room for complex evolutions in identity following collision—it only accounts for the ricocheting of similar, pre-existing, structurally-sound objects. In more recent neopositivist iterations of IR scholarship's mainstream, rationalist and behaviorist assumptions have often furthered this sanitization by distilling the complexities of horrific legacies into impersonal statistics or variables. Trauma, this thesis will demonstrate, poses a dilemma for rationalist social science, which cannot easily accommodate a nuanced, latent, historically-contingent and non-systematic phenomenon that produces variegated responses across time and space, some of which reinforce or exaggerate traditional expectations of behavior, and some of which undermine them.

Yet, despite its context-dependent mutations and the difficulty in settling on a singular, precise definition of the phenomenon, I argue that trauma is an undeniably potent force in international politics that can reshape identities and motivate action. Indeed, this complexity is part of what makes trauma such a fascinating and potent phenomenon, warranting further scholarly attention. Because of trauma's wide-ranging manifestations across time and space, I advocate understanding trauma as less a definitive or specific phenomenon and more a sensitizing concept[4] that can help bring together interdisciplinary insight into the ways in which violence, oppression and suffering linger beyond their immediate physical impacts, interacting with local conditions over time to produce historically-specific effects. As Gabriele Rosenthal argues, the development of such sensitizing concepts—which are commonplace in the social sciences—can serve in the crafting of Weberian ideal-type[5] theory for empirical analysis, helping to guide the creation of analytical narratives that elucidate case-specific nuance and reflect on vital international processes.[6] In many ways, this broad understanding of trauma follows from the term's diversity of historical uses. As Ian

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[4] For an introduction to how "sensitizing concepts" guide empirical investigation, see Blumer's seminal essay distinguishing them from what he labels "definitive concepts."; Herbert Blumer, "What Is Wrong with Social Theory?," *American Sociological Review* 19, no. 1 (1954): 3–10.

[5] Gabriele Rosenthal, "A Plea for a More Interpretive, More Empirical and More Historical Sociology," in *The Shape of Sociology in the 21st Century: Tradition and Renewal.*, ed. Devorah Kalekin-Fishman and Ann Denis (Los Angeles, CA: Sage, 2012), 202–17.

[6] For Weber's articulation of the 'ideal-type' and its application to empirical research, see Max Weber, "The 'objectivity' of Knowledge in Social Science and Social Policy," in *Max Weber: Collected Methodological Writings*, ed. Hans Henrik Bruun and Sam Whimster, trans. Hans Henrik Bruun (London ; New York: Routledge, 2012). For an understanding of how this model can guide work in IR, see Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, *The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the Study of World Politics* (London: Routledge, 2011), 112–55.

Hacking has outlined, trauma as a concept has evolved substantially over the past two centuries. Originally defined as a lingering physical wound, the term was adapted in the modern era to psychological inquiries into delayed stress and, later, into social science enquiries into breakdowns in community and norms.[7] As this thesis sets out to explore the nuance and complexity of trauma in international politics, it embraces this ambiguity in trauma's definition and uses it as an impetus to draw on the diverse insights of the interdisciplinary field of trauma studies, which bridges the humanities, social sciences and medicine, for the benefit of IR. Only through such expansive theorization, I argue, can scholarship truly begin to account for the breadth of trauma's impacts on international politics.

In bringing trauma studies' interdisciplinary insight to IR, this thesis builds on noteworthy critical constructivist IR literatures that have, in recent decades, begun to challenge the field's traditional rationalist assumptions and reflected on the violence and oppression of the international arena in new ways. Four of these warrant examining in greater detail, due to their importance in orienting and framing this thesis. The first deals with emotions in world politics.[8] As early as 2000, Neta Crawford pointed out that much rationalist IR scholarship relies on largely unexamined assumptions about emotions, particularly how fear and anxiety fuel desires for security and governance. For example, classic theories of the security dilemma and deterrence depend on notions of subjective fear, while the cooperation neoliberals traditionally describe building over time between actors relies on subjective trust, a belief that often depends on emotional reinforcement.[9] By treating emotions as essential to social life, this literature has problematized the traditional dichotomy between emotions and rationality, demonstrating emotions' deep intertwining with so-called rational decision-making.[10] Subsequent theoretical investigations have built upon early insights and discussed the impact of an array of different emotions in IR, while a recent wave of scholarship has begun to examine how emotions, which are often regarded as ephemeral or internal motivators,

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[7] Ian Hacking, *Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 183–97; See also Ruth Leys, *Trauma: A Genealogy* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2000).

[8] Literature on emotions in world politics is vast. For a few noteworthy and well-cited works that directly challenge previous rationalist assumptions, see Jonathan Mercer, "Emotional Beliefs," *International Organization* 64, no. 1 (2010): 1–31; Todd H. Hall and Andrew A. G. Ross, "Affective Politics after 9/11," *International Organization* 69, no. 4 (2015): 847–79; Khaled Fattah and Karin M. Fierke, "A Clash of Emotions: The Politics of Humiliation and Political Violence in the Middle East," *European Journal of International Relations* 15, no. 1 (2009): 67–93; Neta Crawford, "The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships," *International Security* 24, no. 4 (2000): 116–56; Todd H. Hall, *Emotional Diplomacy: Official Emotion on the International Stage* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015).

[9] Crawford, "The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships."

[10] See Jonathan Mercer, "Human Nature and the First Image: Emotion in International Politics," *Journal of International Relations and Development* 9, no. S3 (September 2006): 288–303.

can become institutionalized when transmitted socially over time.[11] Though still in its early stages, this 'emotional turn' has borne impressive empirical fruit uncovering how subjective emotions can manifest on the international stage and shape states' behavior, complicating or obviating prior theoretical models.

Yet, applying this work's insights directly to the study of trauma has proven difficult for multiple reasons. First, much of the early theoretical work in this 'emotional turn' addressed emotions generally, embedded within the context of rationalist IR, rather than exploring how emotions might undermine core assumptions of the field. Oftentimes, this work references as examples a few key sweeping emotions like fear and anger without nuancing these broad labels or considering how research into opposing emotions might require different theorizations and methodologies.[12] Second, despite this theoretical work's insight, the question remains whether certain emotions are too subjective and idiosyncratic to model systematically or whether appraisal and action tendencies can guide quantitative or comparative analysis.[13] This has led to considerable methodological debates on how to apply broad theoretical insight on emotions in international politics to empirical analysis.[14] Third and finally, though trauma certainly inspires an array of emotions—chief among them anger, fear, grief and helplessness—its emotional aspects do not exhaust the phenomenon's contours. Karin Fierke, for example, has drawn a dichotomy between grief, an emotional response to suffering, and trauma, the emotional numbing that can result from isolation and breakdowns in community.[15] Alternatively, Emma Hutchison's recent work has uncovered how the emotions trauma inspires can, in some cases, forge communities across borders

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[11] Jonathan Mercer, "Feeling Like a State: Social Emotion and Identity," *International Theory* 6, no. 3 (2014): 515–35; Brent E. Sasley, "Theorizing States' Emotions," *International Studies Review* 13, no. 3 (2011): 452–76; Neta C. Crawford, "Institutionalizing Passion in World Politics: Fear and Empathy," *International Theory* 6, no. 03 (November 2014): 535–57.

[12] See, for example, Adam B. Lerner, "Book Review: Emotional Choices: How the Logic of Affect Shapes Coercive Diplomacy," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, January 24, 2019 (online first).

[13] For more on this debate, see Robin Markwica's recent comprehensive study. Though he acknowledges the limitations in so doing, Markwica identifies five 'key emotions' (fear, anger, hope, pride, and humiliation) and develops a 'logic of affect' to analyze how they tend to impact decision-making. Robin Markwica, *Emotional Choices: How the Logic of Affect Shapes Coercive Diplomacy* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2018).

[14] For more on the methodological difficulties involved in studying emotions, see Maéva Clément and Eric Sangar, eds., *Researching Emotions in International Relations: Methodological Perspectives on the Emotional Turn.* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).

[15] Karin M. Fierke, "Whereof We Can Speak, Thereof We Must Not Be Silent: Trauma, Political Solipsism and War," *Review of International Studies* 30, no. 04 (October 2004).

that resonate beyond precipitating traumatic events' immediate emotional impact.[16] While intimately connected to trauma and its legacy, emotions constitute only one aspect of the larger phenomenon.

In addition to its intersections with IR scholarship on emotions, the field of trauma studies has traditionally sat adjacent to that of memory studies and thus work on collective memory in IR has also offered a second set of insights on trauma's importance to international politics. As Avishai Margalit has written, memory is "*knowledge from the past*…[and] not necessarily knowledge *about* the past" and thus examination of memory's impact on IR has oriented scholarly attention away from brute historical facts to engagement with how events and encounters have been processed, mythologized and politicized over time.[17] Much like IR's expanding literature on emotions, literature on memory's importance to international politics is diverse, with multiple traditions, orientations and methods for empirical application.[18] Taken together, this burgeoning literature speaks to the "undeniable" empirical importance of memory across international political contexts.[19] For example, as Duncan Bell argues, memory is vital to nearly all conceptions of identity and thus to ideas of the nation, a form of political community organized around a unifying identity that takes precedence over others in political life.[20] In this thesis' first chapter, I theorize identities as fundamentally constituted by narrations of memory that endow otherwise disparate social knowledge and experiences with continuity and meaning for actors through time and space. Further, I argue that important contemporary political formations like the nation and state depend on mobilizing identities or contesting existing hegemonic accounts, implying collective memory's inherent politicization and institutionalization. Despite the difficulty inherent in linking an amorphous concept like memory to policy outcomes, work on memory in international politics has increasingly engaged with its more tangible impact on power, institutions and policymaking, leading to an array of interesting empirical results.[21]

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[16] Emma Hutchison, *Affective Communities in World Politics: Collective Emotions after Trauma*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations 140 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

[17] Avishai Margalit, *The Ethics of Memory* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 14.

[18] For a useful introduction, see Duncan Bell, ed., *Memory, Trauma and World Politics: Reflections on the Relationship between Past and Present* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

[19] Kazuya Fukuoka, "Memory, Politics, and International Relations," *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* 12, no. 1 (2011): 143.

[20] Duncan Bell, "Introduction: Memory, Trauma and World Politics," in *Memory, Trauma and World Politics: Reflections on the Relationship between Past and Present*, ed. Duncan Bell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 5–6.

[21] For more on this engagement, see Jan-Werner Müller, "Introduction: The Power of Memory, the Memory of Power and the Power over Memory," in *Memory and Power in Post-War Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past*, ed. Jan-Werner Müller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

But again, scholarship has faced some difficulties adapting insight on memory in world politics to the study of trauma. A chief reason for this is conceptual. Though often conjoined into the phrase traumatic memory, trauma and memory are oftentimes conceptualized as somewhat at odds, with trauma defined in much scholarship by its ability to *suppress* or create a *disjuncture* in memory formation. Relatedly, the study of trauma in literary theory, history and psychoanalysis, has often examined traumatic events' ability to disrupt language and narration, while memory studies has traditionally highlighted the importance of language and narrative to *constituting* memories out of otherwise disparate experiences and records of fact. For this reason, Jenny Edkins, a leading scholar of memory and trauma in world politics, has observed that, in the case of trauma, "[i]t can be many years before memory surfaces in the public arena or indeed before there is a willingness to listen to survivors' testimony."[22] Indeed, as this thesis will explore, the already difficult relationship between memory and trauma is further complicated by political elites' frequent instrumentalization of trauma, articulating problematic accounts of traumatic encounters on behalf of those who more directly experienced suffering. While memory studies literature offers ample insights suitable for adaptation to the study of trauma, this thesis also remains cognizant of the mnemonic disjuncture trauma can cause, as well as how language serves as an imperfect medium for creating memory from suffering.[23] Identities formed from the memory of trauma can thus create idiosyncratic meaning structures and motivate policies in ways that require theorization beyond that of existing work on memory.

Over the past few years, influenced by these literatures on emotions and memory in international politics a third noteworthy yet still inchoate literature more specifically focused on trauma in world politics has emerged. Though, in chapter 3, I problematize the assumptions lying behind many of these contributions, for the time being it's worth noting that this literature is sparse and has largely focused on a few, isolated traumatic *events* that have taken place in Western contexts, rendering it largely silent on the traumatic origins of larger aspects of the international system. Similarly, this literature's limited applications have largely adapted theory directly from disciplinarily siloed work in psychoanalysis, psychology, social theory and literary theory and thus have encountered difficulties in theorizing the phenomenon sufficiently broadly for application to international politics, as this thesis does. Theorizing the full range of trauma's impacts on international politics, I argue, necessitates incorporating interdisciplinary insight into both its

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[22] Jenny Edkins, *Trauma and the Memory of Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 2.
[23] See Elaine Scarry, *The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1987).

interpretation by individuals and its macro-level socialization, as well as how these layers interact with the power structures and policymaking that are central focuses of the IR discipline. Further, I argue scholarship must ambitiously connect theorizations of trauma and its impacts on identity to power and policymaking, rather than focusing solely on trauma's socio-cultural manifestations. Though these connections will necessarily be complex and labile, theorizing and empirically uncovering them will be the chief challenge of scholarship interested in demonstrating the importance of trauma in international politics. In this thesis, I demonstrate that discourses about trauma's legacy can constitute identities, constructing the "problems, objects and subjects" of politics and thus "also simultaneously articulating policies to address them."[24]

Finally, aside from these recent strands of critical constructivist IR literature on emotions, memory and trauma, this thesis also seeks to draw insight from and build upon the vast interdisciplinary field of postcolonial studies, especially in its limited application to IR. This connection follows naturally from this thesis' empirical focus on the traumas of two new states emerging from colonialism; postcolonial studies scholarship has a long history of examining the diverse long-term psychological, sociocultural and political impacts of colonial oppression, dating back most notably to the pioneering work of Frantz Fanon. Originally from Martinique, Fanon trained as a psychiatrist in France and went on to work in Algeria, where he resigned from a French hospital in support of the Algerian independence movement. Fanon's unique experiences gave him tremendous insight into colonialism's multifaceted impact; he theorized colonialism as an ontological and epistemological system whose logics depended on persistent structural violence. This violence, he argued, had long-lasting impacts on the colonized, altering their psychological well-being, subjectivity, and interactions with sociopolitical institutions.[25] Postcolonial scholars of IR have since adapted Fanon's thought and that of numerous other influential theorists like Homi Bhabha, Ashis Nandy, Edward Said and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak to the study of international politics. Their work has exposed the inadequate attention traditional IR has paid to colonialism and its legacy, as well as the Eurocentric and Orientalist roots of many key concepts and dynamics in the discipline.[26] More specifically, postcolonial studies scholars like Sankaran Krishna and Sudipta

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[24] Lene Hansen, *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War*, The New International Relations (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006), 19.

[25] See Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. Richard Philcox (New York, NY: Grove Press, 1961).

[26] For more on postcolonial IR theory, see Maja Zehfuss, "Critical Theory, Poststructuralism, and Postcolonialism," in *Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse-Kappen, and Beth A. Simmons, Second edition (Los Angeles, CA: Sage, 2013).

Kaviraj have shed enormous light on the paradoxical challenges of postcolonial state-building, which inform my empirical chapters on India and Israel.[27]

Yet, despite the utility of postcolonial studies literature's insights for this thesis, I do not position it within this canon for two major reasons. First, though India was certainly colonized and the Indian state that emerged from British rule has long been analyzed via the lens of postcolonial studies, Israel does not fit neatly into this mold. To be sure, in the period before independence Israel's leaders did struggle against Britain's colonial regime, encountering many problems similar to those facing India's nationalist leadership. But the Zionist movement that eventually created the state of Israel sought to establish a homeland for white European Jews in Palestine and, at many points, used violence against indigenous peoples to do so. This goal has been significantly problematized by postcolonial studies literature and even compared to the colonialism of European powers.[28] Alternatively, insight from the field of settler colonial studies has been applied to the study of Israel[29], though I argue that comparisons of Israel to other settler colonial states like Australia and South Africa are ill-suited to uncovering the role of the Holocaust and European antisemitism in shaping Zionist identity and the policies of the Israeli state. For this reason, this thesis finds trauma a more suitable lens for comparing the two contexts. Recognizing the Western-dominance of much existing trauma studies literature, this thesis endeavors to theorize trauma sufficiently broadly to transcend spatial limitations and compare the impacts of different types of oppression and violence faced by Indians and Israelis.

Second, postcolonial studies, especially in its applications to IR, has traditionally resisted the predominance of supposedly 'universal' IR concepts like the nation, the state, security and sovereignty, due to their historical contingency and embeddedness in oppressive European knowledge structures. In this sense, postcolonial IR scholarship typically theorizes in what Robert Cox labels an emancipatory or 'critical' manner, reflecting on the origins of the existing order rather than trying to answer empirical problems posed by existing literature, whose articulation depends on somewhat stable existing concepts. While this thesis' invocation of trauma endeavors to critically

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[27] Sankaran Krishna, *Postcolonial Insecurities: India, Sri Lanka, and the Question of Nationhood*, Borderlines, v. 15 (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999); Sudipta Kaviraj, *The Imaginary Institution of India: Politics and Ideas* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2010), 222.

[28] For more on this, see, for example, Derek J. Penslar, "Zionism, Colonialism and Postcolonialism," *Journal of Israeli History* 20, no. 2–3 (June 2001): 84–98.

[29] See Lorenzo Veracini, *Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Lorenzo Veracini, *Israel and Settler Society* (Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2006).

examine and historicize these concepts' emergence in its theorizations, I also retain empirical goals more aligned with what Cox labels 'problem-solving theory', in that I endeavor to mobilize theory to offer insight into puzzles in the historiography of India and Israel's foreign policy.[30] For this reason, though this thesis recognizes the problems associated with many IR concepts' usage across time and space, it defaults to many concepts that had already become dominant in the discourses its empirical analysis addresses. For example, while this thesis recognizes the paradox inherent in Indian 'nationalism'—a form of political identity whose roots lie squarely in colonialist Europe—it aspires to simultaneously deconstruct nationalist discourse's contingent historical emergence in India, exploring the very real impact it had on policymaking. Similarly, though this thesis endeavors to theorize trauma as a sensitizing concept suited to understanding its varied impacts across time and space, it recognizes the problems associated with such a universalizing concept and endeavors to combat the Western domination of the medical and psychoanalytic fields from which it emerged. In this sense, though deeply influenced by postcolonial theory, this thesis' ambitions lie more in what Sanjay Seth labels "non-Western IR theory"—a reimagination of the discipline from the perspective of those it has traditionally marginalized.[31]

Considering these existing critical constructivist sub-literatures as a point of departure, in this thesis I endeavor to theorize trauma in a way that will help move past IR scholarship's typical focus on singular 'events' in Western nations with relatively more resources to mourn and rebuild. Instead, I orient attention to traumatic 'encounters'—the longer-term results of mass violence, colonialism, racism and oppression that become embedded and institutionalized in developing societies, producing diverse, multi-faceted and oftentimes self-reinforcing traumatic experiences. Specifically, I ask: "How and to what extent do foundational traumatic encounters impact new states and their actions in the international arena over the long-term?" To answer this question, I construct ideal-type theorizations of identity and trauma, which I then apply to two fascinating historical cases of new states outside of Europe gaining independence in the wake of collectively traumatic episodes and partitions (India and Israel). This application, in turn, serves to sharpen my ideal-type theorization, creating a feedback loop between theory and empirical interpretation fruitful for both

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[30] Robert W. Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 10, no. 2 (June 1981): 126–55.

[31] Sanjay Seth, "Introduction," in *Postcolonial Theory and International Relations: A Critical Introduction*, ed. Sanjay Seth, Interventions (London: Routledge, 2013), 2.

historians and IR scholars.[32] In this sense, despite this limited empirical focus on new states, this thesis' theorizations prove widely relevant across the humanistic social sciences. As Yale H. Ferguson and Richard Mansbach write, "[a]ll polities are evolving ("becoming" in our terminology) and, while some endure, none lasts anything like 'forever.'"[33] Considering how central identity is to this process and the long-term resonance of traumatic encounters, examination of these two concepts' relevance in my two cases can shed new light on how *many* different political contexts have grappled with the long-term consequences of immense violence and suffering. In so doing, this thesis will also demonstrate the broader importance and empirical utility of renewed scholarly attention to the immense and diverse traumas that have proven so consequential in shaping the international arena's actors.

Given this orientation and the inevitable complexities that arise from my interdisciplinary influences, this thesis' central theoretical argument is a relatively modest one—that traumatic encounters can radiate out across time and space, embedding in sociocultural, material and psychological environments, shaping identity and policymaking discourses over the long-term. While this dynamic undoubtedly manifests in diverse ways, I argue that it is particularly important to understanding new states constructing and reimagining their identities in the wake of foundational traumatic encounters. Identities shape notions of self in relation to others, framing the international arena for actors in ways that motivate foreign policies. For this reason, identities can foment grievances and antagonisms, lead to insecurities and amities, and even create a sense of transhistorical purpose for the national unit. In turn, international interactions resulting from policy decisions rebound back on these identities—the results of international politics likewise shape understandings of self and other. In this sense, identity and foreign policymaking discourses should be thought of as mutually constitutive.[34] Traumatic encounters can play an enormous role in this process. As actors bear witness to traumatic encounters and these encounters are incorporated into identity discourses, traumas can also shape the logics of policymaking. Trauma can complicate identity discourses due to its impacts on language, emotions, communal ties, and social trust, as well as the issues it poses for political representation. For example, past trauma can shape how new states experience the 'fear' that drives quests for security, how they conceptualize their sovereignty, the

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[32] For more on this feedback loop between ideal-type theorizations and interpretive empirical analysis, see Asaf Kedar, "Ideal Types as Hermeneutic Concepts," *Journal of the Philosophy of History* 1, no. 3 (October 1, 2007): 318–45.

[33] Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, *Remapping Global Politics: History's Revenge and Future Shock* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 107.

[34] See Hansen, *Security as Practice.*

trust citizens and states exhibit in various institutions, and the relationship between elite policymakers and subalterns.

This thesis' first two chapters theorize the complex effects trauma can have on mutually constitutive identity and policymaking discourses. Then, this thesis' two historical cases of India and Israel demonstrate the utility of this theory in uncovering previously neglected contours of post-independence state-building in India and Israel. Though both of these cases examine specific issue areas and specific articulations of identity impacted by trauma, their contours serve to illuminate both the utility and limitations of this thesis' ideal-type theorizations. Despite the difficulty inherent in trauma's articulation and analysis, trauma has proven enormously important in shaping an array of state and other group identities and behavior in the international arena and, thus, I argue that it warrants further consideration in IR scholarship. Ultimately, by beginning the process of theorization and empirical feedback, this thesis endeavors to introduce trauma as a vital concept to the study of international politics—its theorization can both help further understanding of key historical dynamics in the international system and sharpen future case-specific investigations.[35]

1.2 Methodology and Methods: Reading Trauma in Identity and State-Building Discourses

Given this thesis' theorization of trauma and the identity discourses it impacts as Weberian ideal-types that guide construction of case-specific analytical narratives, it rejects consideration of trauma as an independent variable for the purposes of purified causal identification. Instead, rather than placing ontology prior to epistemology, this thesis starts from the premise that traumas, the identity discourses within which they are narrated and the policymaking discourses these identities co-constitute are ontologically and epistemologically interwoven.[36] Though this thesis refrains from extrapolating from this orientation to a larger metaphysical claim, I do begin from the premise that, in the context of social science inquiry, "neither ideas nor materiality have a *meaningful* presence separate from each other."[37] As Patrick Thaddeus Jackson argues, this "monist" orientation should not be misunderstood as advocating complete relativism. Rather, instead of claiming that "no such

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[35] For more on this distinction between analytically general concepts and lawlike generalizations, see Jackson, *The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations*, 2011, 154–55; Kedar, "Ideal Types as Hermeneutic Concepts."

[36] Broadly speaking, this approach falls within what Patrick Thaddeus Jackson has grouped together as the 'analyticist' tradition of Max Weber, Kenneth Waltz, and more contemporary scholars like Jutta Weldes and Lene Hansen. In particular, Hansen refers to this set of philosophical wagers, coupled with this focus on discursive production of meaning rather than causality (as I do in this thesis), as poststructuralist. See Jackson, *The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations*, 2011, 112–55.; Hansen, 16–19.

[37] Emphasis added, Hansen, *Security as Practice*, 19.

external world exists" outside of analysis, I begin from the philosophical wager "that no sense can be made of the idea of such an external world either as existing or as putting objective limits on our production of knowledge."[38] For this reason, this thesis understands traumas and the identity discourses they impact as fundamentally constituted by narratives, approaching its subject matter through interpretive narrative analysis. Narratives are representations (chiefly visual or linguistic) with implied causal linkages. They endow the otherwise variegated 'stuff' of life—including, however contentiously, its traumatic encounters—with social meaning through time and space. In so doing, they link individuals to the social realm, and, in the aggregate, they constitute discourses that motivate action. For this reason, contrary to its typical dismissal by social scientists as an epistemological 'other' relegated to the humanities, I argue that narrative analysis is a vital tool for social science discourse analysis.[39] Only through narration (and the problems therein) can traumatic encounters exert their sociopolitical influence, just as the pivotal discourses impacted by trauma construct the objects, subjects and logics of mutually-constitutive identity and policymaking discourses.

Building on this wager's intertwining of ontology and epistemology, I reject neopositivist research's hunt for pristine ontologically prior causal mechanisms between isolatable variables. Instead, I understand causality more commonsensically, as deeply embedded within overlapping intersubjective social meanings.[40] For this reason, I have structured my research question around discursive 'impact', rather than asking 'how (or when) does trauma *cause* certain actions?' Yet, despite the problems this interpretivist orientation poses for many common large-N methods in the IR discipline, it does not necessitate succumbing to intellectual chaos that dismisses problem-solving altogether. Indeed, I seek to mobilize my theoretical contributions as ideal-types to address vital questions in the historiography of Indian and Israeli foreign policy, reflecting continually on alternatives to the analytical narratives I forward to eliminate bias. Further, though I do not view text selection through the positivist logic of isolating representative data points along a distribution[41], my analysis maintains critical reflexivity towards the contextual meanings it interprets, continually

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[38] Jackson, *The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations*, 2011, 135.

[39] See Margaret R. Somers, "The Narrative Constitution of Identity: A Relational and Network Approach," *Theory and Society* 23, no. 5 (1994): 605–49.

[40] For more on this understanding of causality, see Vincent Pouliot, "'Sobjectivism': Toward a Constructivist Methodology," *International Studies Quarterly* 51, no. 2 (June 2007): 363.; Jackson, *The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations*, 232.

[41] See, for example, Dillon Stone Tatum, "Discourse, Genealogy and Methods of Text Selection in International Relations," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, online first, November 21, 2018, 1–21.

considering them alongside alternatives. Following the insight of Vincent Pouliot, I understand application of my theoretical insight via a three-part "sobjectivist" logic, linking the texts and interpretations of certain prominent elite figures within identity and policy discourses to what becomes 'experience-distance' objectified social fact.[42] In what follows, I outline this three-part logic, as well as the text selection methods that accompany it. Though my empirical chapters' analytical narratives move fluidly between the steps, understanding their logics as deeply intertwined and none as epistemologically prior to the others, separating them here helps orient an understanding of how discourses form and change over time. In this sense, they serve less as a formal organizational tool for crafting my empirical chapters than a suggestive methodological primer demonstrating how a researcher can minimize unnecessary bias and noise in applying ideal-type theory to the construction of historically-grounded analytical narratives.

The first step of Pouliot's "sobjectivism" involves zooming in on local understandings and "recovering as faithfully as possible the meanings that agents attribute to their reality."[43] For the purposes of this thesis, this involves close readings of primary sources with an eye towards understanding how actors narrate their identities and legitimize actions. Further, it involves immersing oneself in the discursive worlds of these actors to understand these meanings in context—a process vitiated by the second and third steps. Uncovering these meanings can never be 'atheoretical' and, indeed, in this thesis I draw frequently on the frameworks and terminology of my theoretical ideal-types to guide analysis. But, in order to prevent such application from becoming what Weber labeled a deterministic "Procrustean bed" for empirical inquiry[44], I do not heavy-handedly *impose* theory—rather I treat my theorizations as suggestive, providing vital shared language and background understandings that inform case-specific analysis. For this reason, I deliberately endeavor throughout to transparently justify my interpretations and consider them alongside multiple alternatives, including those in existing scholarly literature. Rather than relying on questionable isolated readings, I demonstrate in a significant number of primary sources how my theorizations of identity and trauma further understanding of the emergence of discursive patterns. While Pouliot suggests ethnographic or qualitative interview techniques for gathering 'texts' for this step, given that most of the principal actors involved in the two historical cases are now deceased,

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[42] The term 'sobjectivism' is Pouliot's own neologism, intended to draw attention to the impossibility of pure subjectivist and pure objectivist methodology. Pouliot, "Sobjectivism."

[43] Pouliot, 368.

[44] Weber, "The 'objectivity' of Knowledge in Social Science and Social Policy," 127.

this thesis draws instead on ample archival materials, including official documents, correspondence, speeches and memoirs. Though drawing on these resources precludes asking specific questions of research subjects and introduces the selection bias of availability, reliance on historical materials does have the benefit of eliminating biases that may appear due to the researcher's presence and leading questions. In reading these texts, I consider not only content, but also the text's contextual creation and genre, understanding, for example, memoirs' tendencies to glorify and sanitize the past, policy documents' tendencies to downplay emotions, and speeches' orientation towards their audiences.[45] Such considerations of genre are especially important in identifying the legacy of trauma in legal and policy documents, which often couch references to subjective factors like emotions and memory in bureaucratic language.

The next two steps of 'sobjectivism' involve stepping back from the close readings of the first and understanding meanings more deeply in context. In the second, scholarship endeavors to recover texts' 'objectified' social meaning in its historical context, typically through interpretivist discourse analysis that examines meanings' creation through textual interplay or, as poststructuralists often refer to it, 'intertextuality.' Notably, this involves when possible looking not only at multiple texts from similar sources within a discourse, but also comparing interpretations with other adjacent texts that have been deliberately excluded from the primary analysis—for example, though in this thesis I largely omit secondary media accounts to focus on the language used by policymaking principals, I have consulted ample newspaper archives in my research to support my interpretations of primary texts. Discourse analysis methods involve not only examining common themes and references across texts, but also how texts produce subjects and objects' identities and normalize, stabilize or disrupt power relations.[46] Further, discourse analysis emphasizes that, while texts may have individual authors, "it is very rare for a text to be the work of any one person" in the sense that texts are sites for negotiations between discursive differences, revealing traces of power dynamics and alternative ideologies.[47] Within discourse analysis, some scholars have employed more formal techniques like metaphor analysis, graphical argument analysis and predicate analysis to orient

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[45] For more on considerations of genre, see Hansen, *Security as Practice*, 49–64.

[46] Jennifer Milliken, "The Study of Discourse in International Relations:: A Critique of Research and Methods," *European Journal of International Relations* 5, no. 2 (1999): 225–54.

[47] Ruth Wodak, "What CDA Is about: A Summary of Its History, Important Concepts and Its Developments," in *Methods of Critical Discourse Studies*, ed. Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (London: Sage, 2001), 11.

research[48], while others regard these methods as unnecessarily rigid impositions on interpretive analysis. Though, in chapter three, I elaborate more specific techniques for 'reading' trauma drawn from literary criticism and psychoanalysis, I refrain from adopting this insight into my broader discussion of methodology so that it remains an analytical tool and not a larger organizational principle. As the cliché goes, when holding a hammer, every problem begins to look like a nail; despite this thesis' emphasis on traumatic encounters' legacies in identity discourses, I try not to impose this lens onto aspects of my empirical analyses better suited to alternative understandings.

Third and finally, a 'sobjectivist' research agenda introduces the elements of time and history into analysis, understanding how the intersubjective production of objectified social meaning gleaned in the second step changes over time and why. On this point, emphasis on the construction of narratives and narrative analysis is particularly useful; narratives are inherently relational and diachronic, weaving together otherwise isolated representations. In addition to constituting discourses during isolated moments in time, narratives are a tool historians use to imply causality and meaning over time.[49] By emphasizing the construction of narratives, both by primary actors at various stages in the analysis *and* by media figures and historians writing after the fact, I understand scholarly interpretation as its own evolving discourse. Though I endeavor to reconstruct the meanings of texts at the time of their writing, I also understand that the production of this history from otherwise disparate meanings and events recovered from the past is *itself* a process of narrative meaning-making. For this reason, during this third step I endeavor to not only identify changes in discourses, but also understand how my analysis fits into changes in *interpretation* of these discourses. In so doing, I deliberately place my analysis in dialogue with an existing corpus of scholarly accounts, understanding these alternative narratives of historical change as themselves constitutive of a discourse within which my own work has emerged. This is not to say that I do not question the meanings established by existing histories; rather, interplay between these three steps allows me to uncover how and why certain interpretations emerged over time and whether they are borne out or belied by further close readings of relevant texts. Though, oftentimes, this interpretive approach may limit researchers to solely incremental empirical progress, as they will inevitably be wedded to

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[48] Milliken, "The Study of Discourse in International Relations"; George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live by: With a New Afterword* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2011).

[49] Erik Ringmar, *Identity, Interest and Action: A Cultural Explanation of Sweden's Intervention in the Thirty Years War*, Cambridge Cultural Social Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 26–28.

existing interpretations, it also understands the process of interpretation as ongoing and not beginning from some artificially delimited distance from the intertextuality in question.

Though these three steps provide the outline of an interpretivist methodology suitable for this thesis' case studies, their lack of formality requires considered text selection, as otherwise marginal texts might unduly influence analysis or significant ones might be unnecessarily omitted. Unfortunately, discourse analysts have not spent as much time outlining specific methods of text selection as on articulating their larger methodological considerations. In a recent article addressing this issue, Dillon Stone Tatum suggests viewing texts as cases, compiling a large representative set of them and selecting among them randomly.[50] Unfortunately, this method proves ill-suited for my analysis for multiple reasons. First, the poststructuralist concept of intertextuality entails texts' inseparability, as their meaning-making capacity stems not only from the endless ricochet of meanings *within* them, but also *between* them (intertextuality). Texts are not to be viewed as discrete cases with inherent meaning, but rather as coming together to produce intersubjective meanings within discourses. Second, while random selection of texts might be a useful tool for cutting down an excessively large number of potential texts with unknown relevance—for example, a cache of thousands of mainstream newspaper articles covering the same event—it is ill-suited for a discourse in which a few elite actors and texts dominate. In my discussion of Indian planning debates, for example, key texts like the big business-led Bombay Plan or the Indian National Congress' National Planning Committee's reports cast massive shadows over the rest of the discourse and thus neglecting them to achieve randomness would be foolhardy.

Instead, in this thesis I endeavor to select texts by, first, sharply delineating the historiographic questions I'm investigating and the primary relevant actors and time periods to addressing them, and, second, incorporating as many possible texts within the discourse that fall within these criteria. Given my focus on trauma's interpretation and representation in national identity and policymaking discourses, I focus specifically on texts attributable to the elite actors and voices that exert outsize influence on them. This approach follows the work of Lene Hanson, who offers four models for foreign policy discourse analysis text selection, ranging from a sharp focus on solely official government documents in Model 1 to a much broader focus that includes voices of social activists, marginal media sources and contemporaneous academic discourse in Model 4.

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[50] Dillon Stone Tatum, "Discourse, Genealogy and Methods of Text Selection in International Relations," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, November 21, 2018, 1–21.

Because my case studies focus on pre-independence nationalist movements *transitioning* to state-building, they are ill-suited for Hansen's most restrictive Model 1, which limits text selection to official government sources. Instead, I adopt selection principles more in line with her Model 2, which includes not only official government documents but also widely-cited opposition documents, speeches, memoirs and editorials written by key elite figures, along with other similar related sources.[51] This focus limits analysis to those actors closest to policymaking processes, though it does have the effect of considering trauma solely through the lens of elite representation. In chapter 3, I reflect more specifically on the problems such elite representation of traumas chiefly experienced by subalterns poses for analysis.

In the context of my cases, Model 2's filters still include an enormous number of texts from both before and after formal declarations of independence, so to delimit it further I adapt two more principles for text selection: first, I grant primacy to primary documents espousing views to secondary ones responding to these views or characterizing them and, second, I focus more on frequently-cited, influential texts over marginal ones.[52] In order to employ these principals I began by reading multiple widely-cited, oftentimes contradictory historical accounts of the encounters and periods in question in order to develop an understanding of the key participants in various debates and which texts of theirs warranted most consideration. To help combat biases introduced within existing historical accounts, I further sought to include texts referenced by primary sources that I encountered during the course of my analysis, but that have not been mentioned in prominent historical accounts. Once I developed a sense of the most important participants in these debates and most important moments in time to examine, I compiled as many primary sources as possible from archives, official government sources, published speeches and documents, memoirs, and other materials. Though undoubtedly this selection process favored elite voices and introduces biases of availability and translation[53], I have endeavored to remain cognizant of these limitations throughout my analysis and to temper my claims through careful consideration of alternative 'subaltern' histories. Further, I have strived for the intellectual humility and empathy necessary to engage with

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[51] Hansen, *Security as Practice*, 57.

[52] Hansen, 73–74.

[53] Because of independence-era India and Israel were both multi-linguistic societies, relevant texts for this analysis were originally written in a wide range of languages. I used my language abilities when possible (I am a fluent speaker of English, Spanish and French, an advanced speaker of Hindi, and an intermediate Hebrew speaker), but also drew frequently on primary sources available in translation. I understand that this dependence on translated sources might prove limiting to analysis and have endeavoured to combat these limitations by seeking feedback from native speakers.

traumatized subjects in vastly different contexts from my own, especially considering my positionality as a privileged American white male researcher. While my background and the institutional backing of the University of Cambridge afforded me access to an enormous array of sources, I also understand the power dynamics inherent in my accessing and interpreting foreign sources from the confines of the Ivory Tower. Though eliminating such biases in research may be impossible, I have opted throughout for heightened transparency and reflexivity to prevent them from undermining my research's goals.

1.3 A Note on Case Selection

Because of my methodological orientation and use of Weberian ideal-type theory, I do not view case selection according to the neopositivist small-N criteria for nomothetic generalization. Nevertheless, this thesis' cases have still been carefully selected along multiple axes to maximize their analytical insight. I envision my cases as two separate Weberian-style analytical narratives—each draws on ideal-type theory to elucidate case-specific contours and contribute to specific debates in international political history. Because of this emphasis on historical complexity and interplay with existing historical discourse, my cases are somewhat longer than is typical of small-N research and, due to word-limit constraints, I have only been able to include two. Yet, despite their limited number and my methodological approach, their thoroughness and different historiographic focuses allow them to come together and yield broader insight into how scholarship should conceive of trauma and its impact on identity discourses, which I reflect on in my conclusion. This insight is largely for the purposes of refining ideal-type theory and guiding scholarship's consideration of new contexts, rather than the production of 'social laws' or empirical generalizations. Nevertheless, in this section I argue that small-N methodologists' insight into case selection can still shed important insight into how to conduct an analytical comparison of these cases that maximizes insight. For this reason, I argue that this thesis' two empirical case studies, which deal with two new states emerging from immense foundational traumas (India and Israel), are illuminating for the challenges they pose to existing IR theory, for broader insight into common challenges facing new states emerging from foundational traumas, and for their idiographic insight into outstanding puzzles in the historiography of India and Israel's foreign policy.

First and foremost, in the aggregate, these cases can be thought of as 'deviant' or 'crucial' in the sense that they both challenge existing scholarship's overlooking of trauma's long-term impacts and suggest the need for new theoretical tools to understand traumas' impact on international

politics. Though largely theorized in IR or comparative politics scholarship by neopositivist qualitative researchers, the logic of deviant and crucial cases (though distinct) can be adapted to other research programs interested in challenging dominant theories. Deviant cases are those which are not fully explained by existing theoretical models and thus suggest the need for theoretical innovation[54], while crucial cases are those not fully explained by existing theories but for which new, developing theories *do* provide further insight.[55] The logic behind examining such cases is simple, transcending various methodologies—if existing dominant theories reach a roadblock in explaining certain cases, but other theoretical insight (perhaps from other disciplines or methodological orientations), suggests a possible new path forward, then these cases prove apt for reflecting on theoretical innovation. In my first case study, I argue for the need for novel critical constructivist theory for explaining India's post-independence foreign economic policy, as it remains under-examined in existing historiography and does not meet rationalist expectations of what might be expected of a weak post-independence state pursuing wealth-, security- or power-maximization. India's closed economic orientation led to slow economic growth for decades that was later pejoratively dubbed the "Hindu rate of growth."[56] Though one might argue that, at the time of Indian independence, the country's policymakers had insufficient evidence linking a closed economic orientation to eventual slow growth, this begs the question of why India did not, in conjunction with this closed economy, seek deeper relations with other closed socialist economies or why India continued with such policies for approximately 40 years, even after other Asian economies with more export-oriented economic strategies achieved higher growth rates. As I demonstrate in this case study, numerous leading historians and IR scholars have explained this longstanding attachment to an autarkic economic orientation by referencing 'anti-imperial sentiment' or fears of neo-colonialism rather than rational self-interest. These sentiments, I suggest, are under-theorized and interdisciplinary insight from trauma studies can elucidate new dynamics within this foreign economic policy discourse. In turn, by demonstrating the utility of my ideal-type theory, this

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[54] Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman, "Case Study Methods in the International Relations Subfield," *Comparative Political Studies* 40, no. 2 (February 2007): 176–77.

[55] Andrew Bennett, "Case Study Methods: Design, Use, and Comparative Advantages," in *Models, Numbers, and Cases: Methods for Studying International Relations*, ed. Detlef F. Sprinz and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2008).

[56] Dani Rodrik and Arvind Subramanian, "From 'Hindu Growth' to Productivity Surge: The Mystery of the Indian Growth Transition" (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, March 2004), http://www.nber.org/papers/w10376.pdf.

investigation also functions well as a 'crucial' case that suggests its application might likewise prove fruitful in other cases.

Similarly, I argue that the case of Israel's post-independence rapprochement with West Germany and Israel's later decision to use the 1961 capture and trial of Adolf Eichmann to project grievances from Germans onto neighboring Arab states are not well explained by existing accounts, making it a 'deviant' case suitable for analysis according to new theory. Of course, rationalist IR scholars might argue that shifting grievances away from European powers in the 1950s that did not actively threaten Israeli security to Arab states that did constituted a purely instrumental, self-interested use of identity. But, even granting this point, the question remains of how and why this strategic manipulation of identity was able to overcome significant protest from vast portions of the Israeli public, and why Israel did not pursue similar reparations agreements from other European states that had also victimized the Jewish people (for example, East Germany and Austria).[57] Further, even in cases where such projection poses tactical advantages, I argue that projecting grievances from one party to another cannot fully be explained by rationalist expectations, as this instrumentalization of collective trauma may violate public trust if resulting narratives do not resonate ideally with the domestic population. Finally, if Holocaust trauma did not impinge on tactical Israeli foreign policymaking, why would Ben-Gurion have ordered a risky covert operation to capture Adolf Eichmann from Argentina, enflaming tensions with a country with a significant Jewish population and fascist tendencies to bring to justice an individual who at that point was living a quiet life working at a Mercedes-Benz plant in Buenos Aires? Existing historical accounts have alternatively explained Eichmann's capture and trial via its importance to congealing Israeli national identity in the face of changing threats, but, to date, the IR implications of this identity shift have yet to be explored. For this reason, I again argue that Israel serves as a 'deviant' and 'crucial' case, demonstrating the utility of applying this thesis' theorization of trauma in identity and foreign policymaking discourses to existing theoretical accounts.

Beyond demonstrating the added value of considering trauma's impacts on identity and foreign policymaking discourses, Israel and India also share a number of common features that allow their comparison to help demonstrate trauma's diffuse, multi-faceted engagement with different historical contexts. In neopositivist research, a similar vision is often referred to as 'most-

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[57] For more on these protests, see Tom Segev, *The Seventh Million: The Israelis and the Holocaust* (New York: Henry Holt, 2000).

similar' comparison, in which the two cases are thought to share all salient qualities except for one, allowing for comparison of the causal impact of that difference.[58] According to the methodological orientation outlined in this introduction, though, such a comparison is highly problematic for multiple reasons beyond skepticism of lawlike generalizations about the social world. First, in the highly intertwined and intersubjective international arena no two cases can truly be thought of as discrete and thus suitable for comparative analysis—all cases, especially those from the same time period like post-independence India and Israel, are intertwined via numerous shared underlying conditions and factors. Second, in practice, no two 'most-similar' macro-level cases, particularly *nations* or *states*, share *all* salient qualities, making this model a poor fit for much IR scholarship interested in the complex realm of macro-political relationships. Third and finally, because this model suggests that the remaining factor's impact is deterministic and thus suitable for nomothetic generalization of social laws, it tends to ignore the complexities of social environments in which relevant actors are reflexive and demonstrate agency that can defy such lawlike rules.

Nevertheless, I argue that adaptation of this "most-similar" model's logic to consideration of cases with some notable commonalities does facilitate ideal-type theory's refinement, as well as a more nuanced focus on salient features within specific cases, furthering my goal of producing analytical narratives. Though perhaps, Israel, a tiny Middle-Eastern country formed by European refugees that grew to accommodate immigrants from across the globe, and India, a South Asian country that, from its independence, hosted the world's second largest population, might seem on the surface quite different, I argue that during the period in question both states shared a number of key qualities that facilitate such a comparison. Both hosted vibrant, well-organized, pluralistic but democratic left-leaning nationalist movements (the Jewish Agency and World Zionist Organization for Israel and the Indian National Congress for India) that achieved independence in the aftermath of World War II after decades resisting British colonialism. Both began their statehood as democracies after problematic partitions that led to massive population transfers and immense violence. And both Israel and India formed in the wake of immensely traumatic encounters— chiefly, the Holocaust for Israel's predominantly European Jewish population and the horrific Bengal famine, partition violence and wartime repression experienced in the Indian subcontinent.[59]

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[58] Bennett and Elman, "Case Study Methods in the International Relations Subfield," 174–76.
[59] For an existing comparison of these two cases, see Jonathan D Greenberg, "Generations of Memory: Remembering Partition in India/Pakistan and Israel/Palestine," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 25, no. 1 (2005): 89–110.

Yet, despite these similarities, the traumatic encounters they experienced were of a vastly different nature. Whereas Indian nationalist discourse portrayed their nation's diverse suffering under colonialism as stemming from an extended experience of political economic subjugation, Zionist discourse interpreted Holocaust trauma as the result of a lack of sovereignty and widespread, global antisemitism that posed a continual existential threat to the Jewish people. Though this thesis endeavors not to essentialize about the impact of vastly different traumas or take for granted nationalist narratives that linked diverse traumatic experiences together, by comparing the different ways post-traumatic narratives assigned blame, legitimated grievances, and constructed international threats, comparison of these two cases can help shed light on how the nature of traumatization impacts policymaking discourses.

Finally, because of their length, detail and thorough engagement with existing literature in the historiography of India and Israel, these two cases may shed most of their insight when read independently as single-outcome, idiographic case studies or Weberian analytical narratives.[60] Both my India and Israel case studies begin by posing more specific research questions long debated by historians of the two states. In the case of India, I demonstrate that economic historians and historians of Indian foreign policy have long neglected or essentialized emotional or mnemonic influences on foreign economic policymaking, while postcolonial scholars have theorized some of these influences from a theoretical distance ill-suited to explain more specific changes over time. Likewise, in the case of Israel I demonstrate that, despite some work by Israeli historians on the Holocaust's legacy in political discourse, they have largely neglected newer, critical theoretical insight that can help unravel changes in Holocaust memory's resonance over time, particularly as it shapes foreign policy. Though my first two chapters' theory development orients these empirical chapters' responses to these lacunae, I endeavor not to be overly prescriptive in application of this theory, just as my theoretical insight endeavors to not be overly deterministic. For this reason, I argue that these cases can be read independently as suitable contributions to historical debates.

Taken together, these three approaches to reading this thesis' cases allow engagement with its arguments in the style of a 'choose your own adventure' novel. Those most interested in theory development might elect to view these case studies as deviant and crucial—hopefully, this reading

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[60] John Gerring, "Single-Outcome Studies: A Methodological Primer," *International Sociology* 21, no. 5 (September 2006): 707–34.; Wolfgang Krohn, "Interdisciplinary Cases and Disciplinary Knowledge," in *The Oxford Handbook of Interdisciplinarity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 31–49.

will inspire them to advance further research into different traumas' impact across the globe, as well as trauma's interaction with other unique dynamics in international politics. Those who have already accepted the general argument about the importance of directing theoretical attention to latent trauma in the international system might be more inclined to read them as 'most-similar' cases, which, through comparison of historically-specific variations, inspire new reflections on how different types of trauma are coherently narrated into identity and policymaking discourses. Hopefully, this will lead them to develop this research by either developing this thesis' theoretical insights, deepening and problematizing these cases' insights, or applying its theory to other relevant cases with different salient features. Finally, even those scholars most skeptical of theory development can engage with these cases for their deep engagement with primary sources and analyses of important discourses in Indian and Israeli history. They, too, can advance this research by nuancing these analytical narratives and putting them into conversation with further alternative historical accounts.

1.4 Outline of Chapters

This thesis proceeds in four subsequent chapters, separated into two parts, followed by a concluding chapter reflecting on its findings and future paths for research. The first chapter discusses the sensitizing concept of identity as it has been applied to IR scholarship, focusing specifically on outstanding debates on identity's ontology and how these debates impact the contested relationship between nation and state identity. Building on this thesis' foregrounding of the ontological and epistemological importance of representation, namely *narrative* representation, this chapter draws on the narrative identity approach of Paul Ricœur, Margaret Somers, and others, to argue that narratives bridge the divide between the individual-social (agent-structure) by weaving together different types of memory. In this sense, I argue that identities are ontologically fluid constructs that can be strategically re-narrated by political actors for various purposes. Drawing on Endel Tulving's seminal typology of memory, I argue that identity narratives which draw more on generalizable semantic memory (knowledge) are most useful in creating in-group solidarity and mobilizing populations, while those that draw on more labile, individualized episodic memory (experience) are powerful tools in countering hegemonic identity's imposition. In the final section of this chapter, I apply this theoretical insight to IR and political theory arguments about the contested relationship between nation and state identity, specifically in the context of new states emerging from colonialism. I argue that identity negotiations lie at the heart of the tense moment in which a

nationalist movement assumes control of a residual colonial state. For this reason, I orient my study towards these negotiations and their potential to assist in understanding the logics of state-building and post-independence statecraft.

In my next chapter, this thesis' third, I complicate the second's discussion of national identity by introducing collective trauma. Building on interdisciplinary trauma studies' insight, I argue that narratives of collective trauma are built on paradox. Traumatic experiences tend to suppress language and memory formation in individuals, but also have inherent social elements—most importantly, they oftentimes lead to a desire to bear witness and craft sociopolitical responses to prevent future suffering. Further, I argue that too often literature on trauma studies in IR over-emphasizes the collective psychological and sociocultural aspects of collective trauma, neglecting the way that collectively traumatic encounters become embedded materially in societies, creating reservoirs of memory that can be reignited through narrative in variable ways over time. This insight, I demonstrate, can help trauma studies overcome its longstanding Western bias by moving past a focus on traumatic 'events' and distinguishing between the legacies of trauma in those communities with the material resources to 'work through' them and those without. I proceed by offering three frameworks for uncovering how these reservoirs of trauma often impact developing societies—scholars can orient attention to the trauma of poverty itself, collective trauma as material absence and the lack of trust in institutions that collective trauma can foment. I conclude this chapter by reflecting on the methodological difficulties posed by collective trauma, suggesting a few addenda to this thesis' discourse analysis methods to help uncover latent trauma in political rhetoric.

Part two, beginning with my fourth chapter, turns to trauma's impact on economic nationalist identity discourse in India during the period around independence, before the Second Five-Year Plan institutionalized Mahalanobis' autarkic economic model. Contrary to most scholars' interpretations of this model as based in Soviet socialism, Baldev Raj Nayar has argued that its roots lie in economic nationalist discourse, which portrayed industrialization and self-sufficiency as vital to a particular vision of India's security.[61] This chapter builds on Nayar's work by unpacking the roots of this economic nationalist discourse and its vision of economic security, paying particular attention to how narrations of trauma created a logic equating liberal economic policies with the devastating

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[61] Baldev Raj Nayar, "Nationalist Planning for Autarky and State Hegemony: Development Strategy Under Nehru," *Indian Economic Review* 32, no. 1 (1997): 13–38; Baldev Raj Nayar, "The Political Foundations of Economic Strategy," in *The Modernization Imperative and Indian Planning* (Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1972).

famines and related violence of the colonial era. The chapter's first section theorizes economic nationalism as a form of identity discourse that seeks both to identify the 'economic nation' and motivate policymaking. Next, it turns to Indian economic nationalism's 19th century roots, examining how 'drain theory' drew on narrations of poverty to justify its policy proposals. In the subsequent section, it turns to the four most influential strains of economic nationalism around independence: Gandhian, Marxist, big business, and Nehruvian. Though these groups differed substantially on many key issues, this typology demonstrates this discourse's convergence upon the idea that past colonial trauma necessitated an autarkic development model. This discourse emphasizing the merits of autarky, I argue, was not simply of rhetorical importance—it helped ideate the closed development model that influenced Indian foreign economic policymaking for decades.

The second case study, my fifth chapter, turns to security discourses in Israel and how, over time, official narratives projected post-Holocaust grievances away from Germany and its European collaborators to Israel's Arab neighbors. To describe this projection, I theorize a type of identity called 'victimhood nationalism' that attempts to strip the term 'victimhood' of its pejorative normative associations in everyday discourse by theorizing it as a narration of collective trauma. I argue that, while this projection of grievances might not be 'rational' according to conventional understandings of the term in IR, it can serve *strategic* purposes for certain actors, especially in the context of international politics where no power monopolizes administration of justice. In the case of Israel, I argue that, while Ben-Gurion's government officially suppressed public dialogue about Holocaust trauma during the late 1940s and early 1950s, his opposition realized the potency of this memory and drew on it to challenge Ben-Gurion's hegemonic state-building project. To help address the Holocaust's legacy and prevent grievances from impacting strategic rapprochement with West Germany, I argue that the 1961 trial of former high-ranking Nazi SS officer Adolf Eichmann provided a suitable public forum—what journalist Tom Segev has described as "national group therapy"[62]—for Ben-Gurion's government to strategically re-narrate traumatic experiences as victimhood nationalism. Government officials used this forum to orient outstanding Holocaust grievances away from Germany and its wartime allies to Israel's contemporary Arab neighbors, whom Israeli leadership portrayed as the leading forces of global antisemitism a decade and a half after the fall of the Third Reich. This victimhood nationalism, I demonstrate, not only served Israel's

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[62] Segev, *The Seventh Million*, 351.

strategic international interests, but also helped to integrate the hundreds of thousands of Jewish immigrants Israel welcomed from across the Arab world. Further, this shift proved important in shaping Israeli security discourse in the lead up to the 1967 Six-Day War.

In this thesis' final chapter, I return to the multiple possible readings of its theory and cases, as well as the insight that these readings offer moving forward. Further, I reflect on the importance of addressing traumatic legacies in the international system through historically nuanced work, suggesting new avenues for this research agenda. Though a diffuse, labile and multi-faceted phenomenon, I argue that theorizing trauma's impact on identity discourses proves immensely useful in furthering scholarship's understanding of lingering and latent dynamics in international politics. Trauma can contribute to new identities and solidarities, provoke longstanding grievances and animosities, and inspire complex emotions that do not manifest systematically across time and space. While this thesis only scratches the surface of this immense impact, its insights allude to the enormous potential of orienting IR scholarship's attention to trauma, as well as the potential benefits deeper consideration of international politics might offer the interdisciplinary field of trauma studies.

Part 1: Theorizing Identity and Trauma

Chapter 2: Theorizing Identity as a 'Useful Fiction' in the Study of International Politics: Reframing the Debate Between Nation and State[63]

2.1 Introduction

      Since the advent of constructivism in International Relations (IR) in the late 1980s and early 1990s, identity has loomed over large swaths of the field as a veritable 'master variable', tasked with immense explanatory power. Elaborating and complicating Alexander Wendt's maxim that "[i]dentities are the basis of interest,"[64] numerous scholars have questioned rationalist scholarship's traditional dismissal of identity as either exogenous to international interaction or epiphenomenal and placed questions of identity in the center of the discipline. Early scholarship in this wave of identity literature sought to address an important aporia in IR scholarship that emerged as older schools proved unable to adequately account for the largely peaceful breakup of the Soviet Union and the reassertion of national identity among varying groups across the globe. How, they asked, could rational expectations account for the resurgent sub-national identities, new state formations, and array of redrawn boundaries that succeeded the fall of the Soviet Union?[65] Over the last two decades IR literature on identity has sought to address these questions and vigorously debated whether identity should be understood as an independent variable exogenous to interaction, a dependent variable impacted by international dynamics, mutually constitutive with the relations it impacts, or even an abstraction encompassing a diverse array of underlying sociological trends.

      Yet, as this identity literature has developed, it has also spawned a noteworthy backlash. Following in the wake of Brubaker and Cooper's seminal 2000 article criticizing the concept of identity[66], numerous scholars have responded to IR's relatively recent obsession with identity by questioning whether the field's oftentimes malleable and omni-applicable applications of 'identity'— especially state and national identity—don't elide more important underlying social and psychological questions. Instead of this unwieldy and vague concept, this scholarship has alternatively suggested exploring the nuances of labile social cognition, multiple overlapping affiliation processes or even reconsidering the ontology of the nation-state to better break down the

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[63] A prior version of this chapter was awarded the 2018 Emanuel Miller Prize in Philosophy of Social Science from St. John's College, the University of Cambridge.

[64] Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (1992): 398.

[65] Aleida Assmann, "Transformations between History and Memory," *Social Research* 75, no. 1 (2008): 61.

[66] Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, "Beyond 'Identity,'" *Theory and Society* 29, no. 1 (2000).

emergence of qualities like 'identity'. Out of this morass emerges the question of what, if any, aspects of identity are worth salvaging? Despite the backlash, the concept of identity frames numerous important sub-literatures that today shape the horizon of IR, including on ontological security, emotions, and—most importantly for the purposes of this thesis—trauma. Does the concept accurately describe the outcome of multiple ongoing personal and group social psychological processes? Or is it simply fool's gold, distracting IR scholarship from more fundamental issues? Without theorizing identity accurately, these questions will linger and undercut important new scholarship.

In this chapter I argue that even though identity as a sensitizing concept has inspired artificial and imprecise definitions, it remains a 'useful fiction,' worth salvaging in IR scholarship not so much to refer to a precise *unitary* phenomenon with a fixed ontology, but rather as a heuristic ideal-type that facilitates the interdisciplinary debates necessary to address the impact of multi-layered phenomena like trauma. The term, I argue, constitutes a meaningful, coherent and useful category of analysis that is reasonably well correlated with its invocation in political practice.[67] When well-conceptualized, the term need not 'reify' essentialist notions of identity. Instead, I argue that identity should serve as an ideal-type to help IR scholarship understand the overlapping pushing and pulling influences on individuals and groups that shape articulations of self and other through time and space, especially as these articulations construct the subjects, objects and logics of policymaking discourses.[68] In this sense, this chapter draws on the narrative identity approach, which emphasizes how narrative representation endows self-understandings with the temporality, relationality, and causal emplotment necessary to account for identities' political potency.[69] Narratives endow

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[67] For more on this distinction between categories of analysis and practice, which stems from the work of Pierre Bourdieu, see Brubaker and Cooper, 5–6.

[68] Because of this chapter's emphasis on the ontology of identity, I deal only in passing with what I consider second-order questions on how multiple identities interact and compete in societies and individuals, oftentimes forging new intersectional identity narratives. Nonetheless, I premise this chapter on the idea, which is common in nearly all literature on identity, that individuals and groups can have multiple identities and that these identities are of varying levels of exclusivity. A particularly insightful theoretical framework for the idea of multiple overlapping identities comes from Ferguson and Mansbach, who refer to "nested identities/loyalties" existing within individuals that persist over time, awaiting activation due to political entrepreneurship or specific social situations. Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, "Post-Internationalism and IR Theory," in *A World of Polities: Chapters on Global Politics* (London: Routledge, 2008), 216–33.

[69] The interdisciplinary literature on narrative identity is vast and varied. For a few pivotal texts that frame this chapter's understanding of the narrative identity approach, see Margaret R. Somers, "The Narrative Constitution of Identity: A Relational and Network Approach," *Theory and Society* 23, no. 5 (1994): 606; Margaret R. Somers and Gloria D. Gibson, "Reclaiming the Epistemological 'Other': Narrative and the Social Construction of Identity," in *Social Theory and the Politics of Identity*, ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1994); Paul Ricœur, "Narrative Identity," *Philosophy Today* 35, no. 1 (1991): 73–81; Paul Ricœur, *Time and Narrative*, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin, vol. 3, 3 vols. (Chicago, IL:

otherwise disparate events and actors with social meaning, constituting relational identities that frame the logics of social action in context. Indeed, narratives do not merely *represent* identities that shape action—they *constitute* these identities, making them an "*ontological condition of social life*,"[70] and narrative analysis its epistemological bedfellow. Without the relationality of narrative, identities would be mere decontextualized labels that serve no purpose in politics.

But the acknowledgment that narrative constitutes identities leaves open important questions relevant to actually *conducting* narrative identity analysis in IR. To guide my subsequent chapters' examinations of post-traumatic identity narratives in international politics, in this chapter I argue that identity narratives should be understood as having a *fluid ontology*, shifting via both re-articulation and re-narration to include different compositions of personal experience and social knowledge. In this sense, identity narratives are "flexible knowledge structures" that readily bridge the divide between agent and structure.[71] For this reason, I reject the rigid dichotomy between individual and collective identity that has mired much IR scholarship, regarding these two phenomena as fundamentally two sides of the same coin, intertwined in identity narratives' relationally and temporally-bound self-other distinctions. To demonstrate this fluidity, I organize various existing approaches to identity prevalent in IR literature along an ontological spectrum, ranging from the rigid, atemporal, essentialist notion of *category identity* on one end to the more nuanced, relationally and temporally-bound notion of *individualized identity*[72] on the other. This spectrum is both meta-theoretical (suitable for organizing scholarly conceptualizations of identity) and theoretical (suitable for understanding the implied ontological commitments of different articulations of identity). Though no prominent definitions of identity fall purely on this spectrum's extremes, this chapter argues these extremes constitute useful outer limits that further understanding of the incentives various groups and individuals have in framing different identities, as well as these identities impact

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University of Chicago Press, 2008); Anthony Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991).

[70] Emphasis original. Somers and Gibson, "Reclaiming the Epistemological 'Other': Narrative and the Social Construction of Identity."

[71] See Ramesh Srinivasan and Jeffrey Huang, "Fluid Ontologies for Digital Museums," *International Journal on Digital Libraries* 5, no. 3 (May 2005): 193.

[72] I have elected to use the word *individualized* here to emphasize how, as more relationality and temporality are introduced into identity narratives, they necessarily become more specific to an individual's experience, closer to ideal-typical notions of individualism and atomism prevalent in much social science theory. However, I recognize that this terminology might be misleading, as identities articulated towards this end of the spectrum (though not on its extreme) oftentimes can apply to groups and movements seeking to counter hegemonic identity claims. Likewise, at times identities towards the category end of the spectrum can be assimilated unproblematically into individuals' senses of self. Ultimately, I elected to employ this terminology precisely because the confusion it creates furthers a central goal of this chapter: breaking down the rigid dichotomy between individual and collective identity.

on policymaking. In fact, each extreme may be impossible to even *conceive* of accurately, due to the limitations inherent in cognition. Pure category identities are impossible to think about because moving toward this far end on the spectrum implies jettisoning relationality, which is implicit not only to identity constructions[73], but also to the very language necessary to narrate identities. Likewise, moving towards the far extreme of pure individualized identities necessarily hinders cognition because it also necessitates eschewing language, a system of socially-constructed shared knowledge, in favor of the potentially oxymoronic idea of pre-linguistic thought or what Lacan refers to as 'desire.'[74]

To better understand how different narrations of identity occupy different positions along this ontological spectrum, I break down the memory content that constitutes them into two categories—experience and knowledge—drawn from psychologist Endel Tulving's seminal distinction between episodic memory and semantic memory. Episodic memory refers to the personal encoding of lived experience, while semantic memory refers to socially-accessible knowledge and 'master' narratives.[75] As individuals, groups and political entrepreneurs offer new identity narrations, drawing on different mixtures of experience and knowledge, they fundamentally alter identities' ontologies, describing them as either closer to Durkheimian, socially-emergent categories or particularistic, relationally and temporally-bound individualized descriptions bound to individual interpretation. Thus, even though no definition falls on either impossible end of this spectrum, I argue that *any* commitment to a singular ontology of identity is necessarily foolhardy. This is especially the case in a macro-social field like IR that necessarily must mediate between agent and structure at multiple levels of organization. By understanding identity as ontologically fluid, I demonstrate that different narrations of identity draw on different ontologies for various strategic

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[73] Iver B. Neumann, "Self and Other in International Relations," *European Journal of International Relations* 2, no. 2 (June 1996): 139–74.

[74] For more on this, see Charlotte Epstein, "Who Speaks? Discourse, the Subject and the Study of Identity in International Politics," *European Journal of International Relations* 17, no. 2 (June 2011): 327–50.

[75] Social psychology has repeatedly documented how the two types of memory are interconnected—factual knowledge is always colored by experience, while, because of the limitations of memory recall, semantic memory helps fill in the gaps of episodic memory—and thus both types should be considered archetypes similar to the two ends of the ontological spectrum of identity. Endel Tulving, "Episodic and Semantic Memory," in *Organization of Memory*, ed. Endel Tulving and Wayne Donaldson (New York, NY: Academic Press, 1972).; See also Daniel L. Greenberg and Mieke Verfaellie, "Interdependence of Episodic and Semantic Memory: Evidence from Neuropsychology," *Journal of the International Neuropsychological Society* 16, no. 5 (September 2010): 748–53.

and ideal purposes, allowing for more or less room for multiple overlapping identities and intersectionality, more or less social emergence or individuation, and more or less overt relationality.

THE ONTOLOGICAL SPECTRUM OF IDENTITY

Narrated to include abstraction, de-contextualization, typologization

Narrated to include relationality, process, and nuance

CATEGORY IDENTITY

- Unitary, essentialist and exclusive
- Stable social constructs that persist through time and space
- Pure semantic memory
- Post-linguistic Durkheimian social facts yet necessarily expressed in language
- Atemporal/Acontextual
- Suitable for promoting cohesion

INDIVIDUALIZED IDENTITY

- Intersectional, particularistic, overlapping and labile
- 'Identities' as fabrications describing regularities in dynamic identification processes
- Pure episodic memory
- Pre-linguistic yet necessarily mediated by language when socialized
- Relationally/temporally bound
- Suitable for countering hegemonic identity narratives

Figure 1. A representation of the ontological spectrum of identity.

The ontological spectrum of identity in Figure 1 organizes this chapter's first section—a brief genealogy of the concept of identity in IR scholarship. The goal of this genealogy is not to impose an artificial linearity onto the development of IR scholarship on identity, which is better characterized by its fruitful proliferation and lively internal debates. Rather, this genealogy aims to examine how a few important trends in IR scholarship have promoted problematic conceptualizations with relatively fixed ontologies, as well as to help organize this chapter's engagement with a few other aspects of this identity literature that cannot be fully accounted for by examining solely its ontology. These include the debate between primordialists and constructivists (or primordialists and modernists in sociological literature[76]), the issue of intersectionality versus exclusivity in different identities, and the role of the 'other'. I conclude this section by addressing why some scholars have recently decided to reject the concept of identity altogether in favor of various alternatives.

In the subsequent section, I build upon the narrative identity approach's insights by responding to three further debates that emerge from this genealogy: the semantic debate over whether the term identity warrants retention in scholarly literature, the ontological debate over how

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[76] For examples of this modernist sociological take on identity, see Benedict R. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, (London: Verso, 1991); Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity*.

to conceive of identity's existence between agent and structure, and, finally, the idealist-instrumentalist debate relating to identity's potential epiphenomenality. First, I argue that the term warrants retention as a 'useful fiction' to organize scholarly analysis and, second, that identity should be conceived of as ontologically fluid, bridging the artificial dichotomy between individual and collective as it inspires logics of action. To demonstrate this fluidity, I draw on psychological literature on episodic and semantic memory and argue that differing ontologies of identity rely on differing compositions of memory. I argue for a conceptualization of identity that focuses less on a rigid ontology and more on the policymaking logics various political actors' articulations of identity inspire. Third, I draw on this section on ontological fluidity to reinforce Margaret Somers' insight on narrative's ability to expose the artificiality of the idealism-instrumentalism debate, especially as it exists in IR. Taken together, these three sections help elucidate this thesis' subsequent discussions of identity in historical political discourses, especially as these discourses are impacted by collective trauma. In this chapter's final section, I further demonstrate this conceptualization's relevance to the field of IR by applying it to a pivotal debate in international political theory between national and state identity, particularly in new, post-independence nation-states. Indeed, before turning to the added complexities trauma imposes on identity narration, this section demonstrates how the concept of identity can help frame the challenges faced by the nationalist, anti-colonial movements in India and Israel that constitute this thesis' empirical focus.

2.2 A Genealogy of Identity in IR

Though identifying a 'first mover' in the constructivist IR paradigm helped draw attention to identity issues remains difficult—especially considering that the English School and various scholars of political sociology incorporated numerous constructivist elements long before the school's codification in IR[77]—two 1989 books from Friedrich Kratochwil and Nicholas Onuf helped launch what Emmanuel Adler has termed the early, "modernist linguistic" constructivist tradition and augured the broader movement's emergence. [78] While Onuf's work paid little attention to individual actors' identities, Kratochwil at multiple points invoked a largely Durkheimian ontology

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[77] See Christian Reus-Smit, "Imagining Society: Constructivism and the English School," *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 4, no. 3 (October 2002): 487–509.

[78] Friedrich V. Kratochwil, *Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).; Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1989); Emanuel Adler, "Constructivism in International Relations: Sources, Contributions, and Debates," in *Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse-Kappen, and Beth A. Simmons (Los Angeles, CA: Sage, 2013), 116.

to argue that an emergent group, societal or national identity constituted a "love-object" with which individuals identified.[79] This conception treats identity as both idealist—appealing to the sincerely-held emotions of individuals—and of instrumental utility for actors interested in ordering society and mobilizing populations. Yet, ontologically, Kratochwil's conception falls far towards the category identity end of the spectrum, perhaps moving only slightly towards the middle due to his emphasis on discursive production. He hypothesized a largely unidirectional relationship in which "[p]ersonal identities …depend on the creation and stabilization of such 'love-objects,'" and "the individual identifies himself/herself with the collectivity and attains in this process also a 'self'…guaranteed by the structure of relations."[80] According to his vision, individuals' ability to resist, contest or reimagine the multiple identities imposed on them was of little importance to IR. Instead, collective identities came off as stable social categories that they can either affiliate with or decline.[81] The language of "love-object," which fetishizes identity as an inaccessible static Platonic ideal, furthers an ontology of identities as Durkheimian 'social facts' imposed upon individuals.

The next major incursions into identity came via the work of Alexander Wendt and his "modernist" constructivist[82] collaborators throughout the 1990s. Beginning with his seminal article "Anarchy is What States Make of It," Wendt questioned realists' logic that an anarchic international arena's logic of self-help eliminated the possibility that states could undergo complex identity transformations. Instead, he asserted that identities and international interaction are mutually constitutive, and that this mutual constitution is a vital systemic dynamic of international politics. Wendt employed a largely Durkheimian collective ontology of state identity in IR, but noted in his original article on identity that he was artificially and "self-consciously bracket[ing] the first- and second-image determinants of state identity," a result of his "suggestive" anthropomorphism of the state that strategically ignored the complex social construction of large group actors.[83] In this article, state identity was not reducible to individuals, though Wendt did not rule out the idea that individuals and domestic actors could influence Durkheimian identity constructions in other levels of analysis. Yet, in his magnum opus *Social Theory of International Politics,* Wendt leaned into this

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[79] Kratochwil, *Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs*, 65–66, 126.

[80] Kratochwil, 66, 126.

[81] This unidirectional approach also characterizes William Bloom's 1990 'psychological' intervention into identity in IR. William Bloom, *Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

[82] Adler, "Constructivism in International Relations: Sources, Contributions, and Debates," 116.

[83] Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 396, 397.

anthropomorphism, arguing that states are corporate, intentional actors akin to people, and that they therefore have cohesive identities, "a property of intentional actors that generates motivational and behavioral dispositions."[84] Wendt subsequently posited four types of identities states can have—personal or corporate, type, role and collective or social identity—differentiated by whether they pre-suppose an ontological "other," whether or not they are inherently social and/or exclusive, and their causal powers.[85] Rather than discuss the nuances of this typology, I highlight the distinctions to draw attention to the fact that all of Wendt's classifications veer sharply towards category end of the ontological spectrum, dropping his prior references to the complex, dynamic first- and second-image *constitution* of states and (implicitly) state identities.

Though Wendt's deliberate inclusion of relationality and temporality in certain types of identity and previous references to bracketing move his definition slightly away from the category identity end of the spectrum, his frequent Durkheimian invocations of the supervenience of collective knowledge (including, presumably, collective identity) and overlooking of the domestic constitution of state identities place him firmly on this left side of the spectrum.[86] Wendt's advocacy of the state as person (with a vaguely unitary corporate identity) has proven controversial for many leading constructivist scholars, but his ontology of identity proved influential in much other theoretical and empirical work. For instance, in a theoretical chapter in Katzenstein's influential volume *The Culture of National Security*, Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein notably refer to identities as a "useful label, not as a signal of commitment to some exotic (presumably Parisian) social theory."[87] Yet, because the volume largely focuses on the *impacts* the interplay between international politics and state identity has on security without further unraveling the ontological issues inherent in this label's unproblematic usage, the definition tended to reify Wendt's ontology. Wendt's bracketing, in this volume and other works, led to a tradition of scholarship that legitimated a Durkheimian ontology of state identity firmly veering towards the category identity end of the spectrum.

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[84] Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 215–33; See also Alexander Wendt, "The State as Person in International Theory," *Review of International Studies* 30, no. 2 (April 2004).
[85] Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 224–30.
[86] See also Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State.," *American Political Science Review* 88, no. 2 (June 1994): 384–96.
[87] Ronald L. Jepperson, Peter J. Katzenstein, and Alexander Wendt, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1996), 34.

Much literature during the 1990s and early 2000s on identity built on this Wendtian conception of state identity, addressing identities at multiple levels as relatively coherent and static variables to be mobilized in rationalist analysis. For example, in his widely-cited 1998 monograph on *national* identity in the former Soviet Union, David Laitin articulated a vision of identity in contrast to what he identified as Stalinist primordialism. His model depended on a rationalist marketplace of ideas in which larger identity dynamics were the outcome of domestic "cultural entrepreneurs" searching for "buyers" of their identity products.[88] This conception undermined the supposed irreducibility of Durkheimian social facts, as collective identities could potentially be traced to individual actors' 'selling' and 'buying' new identities in a marketplace. In this sense, Laitin's work also helped transform identity into a quantifiable variable, suitable for analysis in formal and game theoretical models. Drawing on Thomas Schelling's concept of "tipping point[s]," Laitin explained how old identities could resurface and, when adopted by a critical mass of people, transform international politics and lead to new state formation.

Yet, understanding identities via individual buyers and sellers in a rationalist framework did not necessarily make Laitin's conception more *individualized*, according to the ontological spectrum outlined in this chapter. His conceptualization of identity's ontology still falls somewhere on the middle-left of the spectrum for two key reasons. First, though he admits that a national or state identity is the subject of constant competition, he conceives of this competition more as between actors each offering exclusive, relatively rigid collective identities, rather than as a fully discursive process of refinement and re-articulation that negotiates a social composite. Second, and relatedly, he denies the possibility that multiple overlapping labile identities can combine into unique, intersectional articulations. "Multiple identities…can coexist within a person only insofar as choice is not necessary," Laitin writes. "[W]hen the actions or behaviors consistent with one identity conflict with those of another identity held by the same person, … people are compelled to give priority to one identity over the other."[89] Though this assertion may prove parsimonious for the formal modelling of identity as a variable, obviating the nuance inherent to intersectionality, it is belied by ample psychological and sociological research[90] as well as the narrative identity approach's insight

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[88] Laitin, *Identity in Formation*; See also James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity," *International Organization* 54, no. 4 (October 1, 2000): 845–77.

[89] Laitin, *Identity in Formation*, 23.

[90] See, for example, Regine Bendl et al., "Intersectionality, Social Identity Theory, and Explorations of Hybridity: A Critical Review of Diverse Approaches to Diversity," in *The Oxford Handbook of Diversity in Organizations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

into the historical and contextual specificity of identity's articulation. And though not necessarily indicative of an ontological commitment, Laitin's rigid instrumentalism reflects an improbably thin conception of identity's value to IR scholarship, reminiscent of realist and liberal scholarship's dismissal of identities as epiphenomenal *post hoc* rationalizations for unsavory behavior seeking material gain.

As essentialist and instrumental notions of identity à la Laitin continued to predominate in neopositivist (typically American) IR scholarship, by the early 2000s the Durkheimian ontological specter over the study of identity in IR began to wane in favor of definitions that emphasized the role of language and discourse in the social construction of identities.[91] These definitions began to reflect far more on identity's theoretical dependence on relationality—including the key ontological distinction between self and other.[92] A major influence on this work was been the introduction of narrative into conceptions of identity (indeed, narrative's centrality to identity frames this chapter's engagement). This work built on French philosopher Paul Ricœur's concept of "narrative identity" and English sociologist Anthony Giddens' notion of the "narrative of the self" as the reflexive basis for self-identity.[93] While both scholars understood identity as fundamentally *narrated*, this entailed different ontological commitments for each, as Giddens' work emphasized how narratives were constructed in relation to factual life experiences, while Ricœur believed identities were an ideational resource that individuals could reshape and reinterpret according to their needs, creating justifications and logics for action.[94]

Social theorist Margaret Somers, elaborating on this tradition, has articulated a more thorough account of narrative identity as an "*ontological condition of social life*" that grounds this chapter's subsequent sections on identity's ontological fluidity.[95] Somers emphasizes how narratives contain four features particularly relevant to social science analysis of identity: "1) relationality of parts, 2) causal emplotment, 3) selective appropriation, and 4) temporality, sequence, and place." Each of these features reveals how notions of self are tied into "constellations of *relationships*,"

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[91] For a more thorough account of this turn away from behaviorist and rational choice approaches, see Rogers M. Smith, "Identities, Interests, and the Future of Political Science," *Perspectives on Politics* 2, no. 2 (June 2004).

[92] Neumann, "Self and Other in International Relations."

[93] Anthony Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991); Paul Ricœur, *Time and Narrative*, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin, vol. 3, 3 vols. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2008); Paul Ricœur, "Narrative Identity," *Philosophy Today* 35, no. 1 (1991): 73–81; For another influential approach to narrative identity, see David Carr, *Time, Narrative, and History* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991).

[94] Richard Ned Lebow, "Identity," in *Concepts in World Politics*, ed. Felix Berenskoetter (Los Angeles, CA: Sage, 2016).

[95] Somers and Gibson, "Reclaiming the Epistemological 'Other': Narrative and the Social Construction of Identity."

necessarily embedded in time, space and causal chains.[96] These relationships endow social action with meaning and frame the logics of identity-related decision-making in social context. Though their engagement with narrative identity literature has varied, numerous IR scholars have drawn on the narrative identity approach in the years since these theoretical interventions. For instance, Consuelo Cruz, in an approach to narrative most resonant with Giddens, emphasized the importance of rhetorical framing in understanding identity constructions, while also emphasizing that identity is not reducible to language as narrations must remain 'realistic' to be rhetorically potent.[97] Erik Ringmar, by contrast, far more forcefully argued for the narrative *constitution* of identity, drawing upon a notion of narrative identity reminiscent of Somers and Ricœur to analyze Sweden's intervention in the Thirty Years War and the ontology of the state.[98] Likewise, in the last decade, a separate, notable literature on ontological security in IR has drawn on a variety of Giddens' work.[99] Narrative has even proved important in post-structuralist discourse analysis approaches like that of Lene Hansen, analyzed in greater detail in this thesis' introduction, though Hansen focuses more on collective identities as the product of macro-discursive production, rather than on individuals' interpretation and re-articulation.[100]

The introduction of narrative into IR identity scholarship constituted an important step in questioning the Durkheimian ontological underpinnings of previous constructivist scholarship for multiple reasons. First, narrative provided a means for breaking down Durkheimian social facts by demonstrating how individuals' articulations of their self-understandings are mutually constitutive with their social contexts, how articulations of identity spread through networks, and how individuals are capable of editing and reinterpreting socially-available 'master narratives' to provide rationales for action. This addition helped not only nuance understandings of identity in IR, but also contextualize existing empirical debates that had previously addressed identities with ahistorical category identity-style approaches. Second, as I discuss in greater detail in a subsequent section,

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[96] Somers, "The Narrative Constitution of Identity: A Relational and Network Approach," 616.

[97] Consuelo Cruz, "Identity and Persuasion: How Nations Remember Their Pasts and Make Their Futures," *World Politics* 52, no. 03 (April 2000): 275–312.

[98] Erik Ringmar, *Identity, Interest and Action: A Cultural Explanation of Sweden's Intervention in the Thirty Years War*, Cambridge Cultural Social Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Erik Ringmar, "On the Ontological Status of the State," *European Journal of International Relations* 2, no. 4 (December 1996): 439–66.

[99] See, for example, Jennifer Mitzen, "Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma," *European Journal of International Relations* 12, no. 3 (2006): 341–70; Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations*; A. Zarakol, "Ontological (In)security and State Denial of Historical Crimes: Turkey and Japan," *International Relations* 24, no. 1 (March 1, 2010): 3–23.

[100] Hansen, *Security as Practice*.

emphasis on narrative offered a means of transcending the idealism versus instrumentalism debate that persisted between constructivists and rationalist scholars. Though Wendt posited that some interests (for example, in wealth, security and power) could be thought of as separate from identity, this distinction only further complicated the issue of what, then, identity could explain and in what instances it was merely epiphenomenal—a *post hoc* rationalization overlying complex schemes for material gain.[101] Finally, ample psychological work provided experimental and clinical evidence for the importance of narrative in identity construction, creating a link between IR literature and psychological literature that has proven fruitful for more nuanced analysis of how language mediates individuals' relationships with large collectives.[102] By emphasizing the importance of nuance and interpretation, IR scholarship drawing on narrative identity helped move conceptualizations towards the individualized end of the ontological spectrum. Though some accounts have oversimplified various narratives' complexity and uncritically invoked identity-dependent concepts like the nation in their analysis, most of this scholarship has viewed temporality, relationality and interpretation as inherent to the process of identity construction.

The next major shift in IR scholarship's engagement with identity stemmed from Brubaker and Cooper's seminal 2000 article "Beyond Identity," which proved influential across multiple disciplines. In the article, the two authors argue that definitions of identity in prevailing social science and humanities debates, are either too strong and essentialist to be plausible or too weak and ambiguous to be of any analytical utility. They describe how taking identities unproblematically from "social and political *practice*," (ie, political actors' invocations of 'identity') into *analysis* in social science can serve to reify the categories, unintentionally reinforcing their potency and leading to what in physics is known as an "observer effect" and in psychology as an "experimenter effect." Brubaker and Cooper's insight here depends on the pre-linguistic 'existence' of social phenomena, independent of discourse, and thus notably differs from this thesis' approach, which views social epistemology and ontology as fundamentally intertwined. But their insight into reification does resonate historically when examining the role identity has played in social science and social policy. For example, scholars of Indian history have persuasively argued that, by conducting censuses inquiring into caste identity and subsequently including caste in their administrative policies, the

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[101] Felix Berenskoetter, "Identity in International Relations," in *The International Studies Encyclopedia*, ed. Robert A. Denemark, vol. VI (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2018), 3598–99.

[102] See, for example, Paul Kowert, "Agent versus Structure in the Construction of National Identity," in *International Relations in a Constructed World*, ed. Vendulka Kubalkova (Routledge, 2015), 101–22.

British colonial government's researchers contributed to the rigidity and potency of a previously malleable affiliation.[103] This historical trajectory has contributed to caste's continued importance in Indian society even more than 70 years after independence from the British.

Notably, Brubaker and Cooper even reject Somers' more nuanced and dynamic account of narrative identity, arguing that its invocation of the term remains problematic. "People everywhere and always tell stories about themselves and others, and locate themselves within culturally available repertoires of stories," Brubaker and Cooper write. "But in what sense does it follow that such 'narrative *location* endows social actors with identities—however multiple, ambiguous, ephemeral, or conflicting they may be?'" According to the authors, Somers' insight on narratives' ontological importance is novel enough; she does not need to add in the vague concept of identity. In a sense, Brubaker and Cooper fall on the far right of this chapter's ontological spectrum, as they seem to believe that any academic invocation of identity reifies an essentialist vision of complex processes and places a linguistic imposition on a 'real' underlying phenomenon in question—the social and psychological dynamics involved in creating notions and logics of selfhood through time and space. But, in another sense, they reject the spectrum entirely, arguing that identity should be viewed as an artificial social construct imposed on disparate experiences to which analysis need not be wedded.

In IR scholarship, skepticism reminiscent of Brubaker and Cooper's has expanded considerably, especially within post-positivist and critical constructivist work outside the American mainstream. Numerous scholars have cited "Beyond Identity" to help unravel the category style identities implicit in the discipline's past invocations of identity and have argued for paying more attention to the complex macro-social processes of identification that shape the field.[104] For instance, in an influential 2011 article critiquing Wendt's work on identity, Charlotte Epstein draws upon Lacan's notion of the split subject, made up of both prelinguistic desire and the social imposition of language, to argue that the pre-social 'self' implicit in much constructivist identity scholarship rests on methodological individualism made impossible by language's social dimensions. Instead, Epstein argues for a focus on subject-positions, produced within discourses, rather than on subjectivities, "a much more extensive, and consequently unwieldy, category, where all the hyper-individualized characteristics of identity are relegated—including those that are not so readily

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[103] Bernard S. Cohn, "Notes on the History of the Study of Indian Society and Culture," in *Structure and Change in Indian Society*, ed. Milton Singer and Bernard S. Cohn (London: Routledge, 2007), 3–28; Gyanendra Pandey, *The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2012).
[104] See Berenskoetter, "Identity in International Relations."

transferable to the analysis of collective political units, let alone states."[105] This emphasis on discursive production rather than identities or identity narratives pertaining to individuals or groups has two notable results. First, it obviates the levels of analysis issues implicit in Durkheimian notions of the irreducibility of emergent social facts. According to this vision, subject-positions in discourse can be attributed to all sorts of actors, including individuals, social groups and states, whereas subjectivities are less relevant for macro-social scholarship on discourse. Second, Epstein's work articulated a vision of identity as an "imaginary construct" that draws together numerous aspects of the dynamic process of identification.[106] This emphasis on the term identity's artificiality rhymes with this chapter's invocation of identity as a "useful fiction" to describe narrations and patterns in narrations over time, though this chapter also views the term identity as useful for understanding rigid category-style identities' instrumentality. Notably, though, Epstein retains the term 'identity' as a category of analysis, despite its "conceptual fuzziness," as a means of engaging Wendt and other "modernist" constructivists in interdisciplinary debate.[107]

Other IR literature, though, has rejected Epstein's retention of the term identity as an "imaginary construct" and advocated eschewing the term in favor of alternative conceptualizations. For example, Bern Bucher and Ursula Jasper, have argued against the atomism implicit in scholarship that views identity "as a property of the secluded individual" and instead advocated a turn to studying "bundles of identifications that acquire a temporarily privileged status within a specific discourse."[108] Ontologically, this vision veers far towards the individualized identity end of the spectrum—it breaks down any notion of a unitary individual or group and attributes identifications to labile actors to whom discourse attributes these 'bundles' temporarily. Yet, its emphasis on identities' lack of individual specificity also moves it in the opposite direction. Maja Zehfuss, on the other hand, draws on Derrida to problematize Wendt's notion of unitary actors established prior to interaction, though she does not offer a fully novel account of identity or say explicitly whether the term, in other contexts, can be used without encountering similar issues. According to her account of Germany's identity evolution, identity is necessarily "contingent, elusive, and even necessarily contradictory"—this position raises the question of whether the term

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[105] Epstein, "Who Speaks?," 343.
[106] Epstein, 334.
[107] Epstein, 328.
[108] Bernd Bucher and Ursula Jasper, "Revisiting 'identity' in International Relations: From Identity as Substance to Identifications in Action," *European Journal of International Relations* 23, no. 2 (June 2017): 392–93.

should be dropped in favor of a different, more nuanced concept and debate.[109] Richard Ned Lebow has perhaps been the most vocal anti-identity advocate over the past decade, arguing against constructivist accounts of identity and instead articulating a vision of multiple overlapping and labile processes of identification.[110] He argues that the term necessarily oversimplifies the "composite of multiple self-identifications that are labile in character and rise and fall in relative importance" over time and, thus, that the numerous IR sub-literatures dependent on identity rest on faulty premises.[111]

Yet even as theoretical literature questioning the basis of identity has proliferated over the past two decades, enormous amounts of empirically-oriented work in IR has continually drawn on Somers' narrative identity approach, Laitin's more instrumentalist understanding, and Wendt's "bracketed" definition to produce real insights into the logics of international political action. Current IR scholarship on identity lacks a unifying definition, with some scholars drawing on what are certainly flawed yet informative conceptualizations to glean empirical insights and others trying to pull the rug out from under their colleagues by questioning the existence of 'identity' altogether. What, then, should scholars make of this cacophony?

2.3 Conceptualizing Identity and its Fluid Ontology: Three Key Debates

The last section's genealogy alludes to the multiplicity of debates that have shaped IR scholarship's engagement with identity. These include divides between primordialists and social constructivists and modernists, individualist psychological and collectivist sociological approaches, organicists and statists, as well as between more static and exclusive or dynamic and intersectional definitions. Likewise, an examination of empirical applications reveals an ongoing tension between methodologies that grant primacy to the peripheries or boundaries of identities and those that search for a teleological center, as well as between those that emphasize discourse as productive of identity, reflective of it or mutually constitutive with it. Further, I have emphasized how the inclusion of narrative into recent decades' conceptualizations of identity has shifted scholarship's focus away from what different identities *are* in the abstract to what they *do* in context—indeed, this emphasis on identity narratives' meaning-making informs my subsequent analysis of trauma's impacts on identity and policymaking discourses. By establishing continuity for groups and articulating their

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[109] Maja Zehfuss, "Constructivism and Identity: A Dangerous Liaison," *European Journal of International Relations* 7, no. 3 (September 2001): 341.
[110] Lebow, "Identity"; Richard Ned Lebow, *A Cultural Theory of International Relations* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
[111] Richard Ned Lebow, *National Identities and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 7.

interests across time and space, identity narratives shape the logics of decision-making, making them a vital force in international politics. And, as Lene Hansen has demonstrated, the logics emerging from identity discourses help explain their centrality in shaping political *action*.[112]

Yet, as my genealogy also demonstrates, the narrative identity approach has also spawned a notable backlash which has raised vital questions for scholarship, chiefly about the *utility* of the term identity in scholarship, as well as the ontological status of identity, lodged as it is between the individual and social realms. Further, the specter of rational choice paradigms like realism and liberalism, coupled with the predominance of behaviorism in neopositivist research, has left open questions about the instrumentalism/idealism debate that questions identity's potential epiphenomenality. To better conceptualize identity for the purposes of this thesis, in this section I build upon existing scholarship on narrative identity and tackle these three issues head on. First, I address what I term the semantic debate, arguing that the term identity is a meaningful, coherent and useful one in scholarly analysis—a vital sensitizing concept that serves the purpose of fostering interdisciplinary debate. Then, I turn to the question of how identity narratives bridge the divide between individual and social. Drawing on psychological work on memory and Endel Tulving's seminal typology, I argue that identity narratives should be understood as ontologically fluid—new narrations of the same allegiances can draw on different types of memory content to occupy different positions along the ontological spectrum and, ultimately, create different logics of action. Finally, building on this understanding of identity's ontological fluidity, I argue that the instrumentalism-idealism debate paints a false dichotomy for scholarship, which would be better-served by an interpretivist, context-specific approach to analyzing mutually-constitutive identity and policymaking discourses. Together, these arguments illustrate why identity is, indeed, a "useful fiction," a necessary heuristic ideal-type that informs this thesis' understanding of trauma's impact.

2.3a The Semantic Debate: Why 'Identity' is Meaningful, Coherent and Useful

In "Beyond Identity", Brubaker and Cooper initially frame what I term the 'semantic debate' on identity as a question of to what extent identity, which is so frequently invoked as a "category of practice" in popular political discourse, warrants retention in scholarship as a "category of analysis."[113] They note that social science's unproblematic retention of the term identity may unintentionally reify 'identity', rather than critically analyzing the term's invocations in political

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[112] Hansen, *Security as Practice.*
[113] Brubaker and Cooper, "Beyond 'Identity,'" 4–6.

discourse. I believe this sharp dichotomy between the two is problematic, in that it creates an impossible task for scholarship to pursue a supposedly 'objective' social reality from preponderant intersubjective social fictions. This dichotomy is belied by this dissertation's methodological orientation, which views theory as central to shaping the social world, and it threatens to undermine so many important social science categories with equally fuzzy boundaries and unclear ontological standings due to the risks of reification.[114] Social science terminology may be imperfect—discourse-dependent, contextually-bound, and murky around the edges—and in need of continual explanation and disciplining. But I argue that the true test of whether scholarship should retain terms like identity as sensitizing concepts is the much simpler and more useful question of whether they are largely meaningful, coherent and useful in the scholarly discourse in which they are invoked. In the case of this chapter, I argue that the term 'identity', as it is invoked in IR scholarship, meets all three criteria and thus warrants retention. This assertion does not, however, entail any specific commitment to identity's ontological status, a subject I address in the next section. Even if identity is a meaningful, coherent and useful term, it could simply be a 'possible object' like a unicorn[115] or, as I argue in the next section, it could be a socially-constructed fiction with a fluid ontology, subject to change as it is re-narrated.

Critics of the term "identity" tend to reference the term's divergent and muddled usages in everyday discourse, which they argue do not hold together even as a sensitizing concept. This often leads to arguments that either the term is not coherent, not meaningful, or both. For example, Brubaker and Cooper begin their article "Beyond 'Identity'" by quoting George Orwell to argue that the term 'identity' has no consistent meaning in contemporary discourse and that no plausible definition emerges from varied interpretations.

> 'The worst thing one can do with words,' wrote George Orwell a half a century ago, 'is to surrender to them.' If language is to be 'an instrument for expressing and not for concealing or preventing thought,' he continued, one must 'let the meaning choose the word, and not the other way about.'

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[114] For more on the impossibility of this "firewall" between concepts' political and analytical uses, see Lebow, "Identity," 114–15.

[115] For more on this distinction, see Takashi Yagisawa, "Possible Objects," in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2018 Edition)*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, 2018, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/possible-objects/.

They follow this quotation by arguing that "the social sciences and humanities have surrendered to the word 'identity'" and that the word is used in such divergent and malleable ways that it is not a suitable for social science analysis.[116] Thus, in their reading, 'identity' is not coherent because of its multiple definitions, not meaningful because none of these definitions are both plausible and robust, and not useful because of these limitations.

Yet, this argument about commonplace social invocations of identity has also been turned on its head with differing results. James Fearon, for example, argues that the issue with identity as a concept in social science is not so much that ordinary language offers only an ambiguous definition, but rather that invocations in academia have proliferated and spun off so much from ordinary language that they no longer reflect what people understand when they hear the term. In this sense, the problem is not that the category of analysis reifies proliferating and unclear articulations in practice, but rather that the category of analysis does not adequately reflect a veritable consensus *available* if scholarship truly examined popular discourse. Fearon argues that the term's invocations in ordinary language point to two common and theoretically robust possible definitions of use to social scientists. In this sense, Fearon argues that the term is meaningful and useful, but not coherent. He posits two new definitions of two types of identity—personal and social category—to promote such coherence in discussions on either subject.[117]

I argue, first and foremost, that the term identity is meaningful, despite its contested ontological status. Though Brubaker and Cooper are right to point out that the term is often used by scholars of different traditions and disciplines with different definitions, the term's meaning derives from the *potency* of identity narratives in political discourses, whether these narrations 'exist' or not in the 'real world' outside of social construction. Take, for instance, a relatively representative definition for identity from the Oxford English Dictionary: "the quality or condition of being the same in substance, composition, nature, properties, or in particular qualities under consideration; absolute or essential sameness; oneness."[118] Though scholars like Brubaker, Cooper, Epstein and Lebow are right to point to the idea that this 'essential sameness' can be a mirage that glosses over multiple complex and labile underlying identification processes that constitute individuals' and groups' changing self-understandings over time, it is undeniable that a *perception* of sameness is a

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[116] Brubaker and Cooper, "Beyond 'Identity,'" 1.

[117] James D Fearon, "What Is Identity (as We Now Use the Word)," *Unpublished Manuscript, Stanford University, Stanford, CA*, 1999.

[118] Cited in Derek Sayer, *Going down for Air: A Memoir in Search of a Subject* (Oxford: Routledge, 2015), 149.

potent political force in individuals and groups. In this sense, identity is a socially-constructed term in scholarly analysis akin to 'hegemon' or 'anarchy'—though fictional ideal-types, these terms are useful analytical tools to the extent that what they represent shapes actors' understandings of politics and political action. Articulations of identities that emphasize this sameness over time are a common tool for actors interested in delineating an in-group and out-group, creating group cohesion, and mobilizing that group around an agenda. Political entrepreneurs frequently refer to what it means to be an Englishman, a liberal, or a Muslim, and what policies this identity necessitates, implicitly narrating a perception of sameness through time and space. Though an unintended consequence of scholarship examining this perception might be its uncritical reification, the solution to this issue is not for scholarship to *ignore* the potency of the fiction, but rather to examine its limitations and boundaries, as well as its discursive roots. These narrations may draw on problematically essentialist ontologies, but identities defined in this way *do* influence individuals' political affiliations and actions, making them vital for retention in scholarly inquiry. In many cases, articulations of such category-style essentialist identities resonate with individuals and individuals internalize them unproblematically into their political consciousness, questioning them only in extreme situations when they come into conflict with other identities or priorities.

To understand this point, it helps to think about a category-style identity that is particularly common in contemporary political discourse: human being. Most people do not think about how this identity necessarily implicates linguistic, temporal and relational components, because these components are typically implicit rather than explicit in everyday discourse. Nor is it common in contemporary politics for individuals or groups to contest the resonance or significance of this identity in any meaningful way—for the most part, individuals internalize the identity of being a human being during their youth, only think about it when pressed and simply assume that human life has some inherent value worthy of action to protect it. Assuming otherwise would be considered sociopathy. Yet, the identity of 'human being' is also a powerful political tool when narrated, determining who deserves rights and benefits and who is excluded from this moral community. Historically, racist and genocidal regimes have legitimated their oppressive actions by attempting to problematize the category of human being and classifying some as sub- or non-human. Likewise, the question of when, exactly, a fetus becomes a human being shapes political debates over abortion, blurring the identity's boundaries. But even though the borders of this identity, as well as its contingency, relationality and dependence on linguistic construction can be murky, when articulated

as a universal category-type identity it is a powerful political tool. Indeed, its unifying potential has become a primary motivation for potent transnational human rights narratives in international politics. Though questions about what commitments this identity entails and how it interacts with other identities in varying contexts are complex, the sensitizing concept of identity is vital to creating an analytical category via which scholarship can conduct comparative analysis between it and other narratives that similarly delineate and mobilize an in-group or 'other' an out-group.

While some scholars have suggested replacing the term identity with identification to focus on the process of constructing and balancing different identities in individuals and groups, I argue that switching to a term that emphasizes process over substance is not fundamentally different from understanding identity as inherently multiple, intersecting and prone to contestation. The term identity, as conceptualized in this chapter, refers to a generalization about narratives at a snapshot in time. It thus assists in orienting scholarship to how, despite the dynamism of identification processes, at times identities can congeal into political forces, sharply delineating in-group and out-group with enormous political consequences. Further, the term identification has the potential, once adapted into scholarship, to over-compensate for identity's supposed shortcomings and over-emphasize process relative to substance in identity contestation, obviating the purpose of shifting terms.[119] The problem here is not so much with the term 'identity' and its static insinuations in much prior scholarship, but rather with a tendency in both political discourse and empirical application to distort terms away from their more nuanced origins. Making the shift to the term identification, thus, would not resolve any of the issues inherent to political discourse's relatively loose invocations of identity, but would threaten to distract from the significant tendency in political discourse of various actors attempting to stabilize their preferred identity narrations and, oftentimes, promote them as social facts that should shape action. I suggest that a better alternative is to redefine identity to have a fluid ontology so that scholarship can retain the term and understand how it bridges the divides between process and substance, individual and social.

In contrast to Fearon, though, I argue that even though scholarly definitions of identity vary considerably, the term is *coherent* as a sensitizing concept in the sense that it refers to a singular phenomenon, however complex, varied and diffuse its effects may be. Fearon begins his article by

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[119] For more on this complex distinction between substance and process in IR, see Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and Daniel H. Nexon, "Relations Before States: Substance, Process and the Study of World Politics," *European Journal of International Relations* 5, no. 3 (September 1999): 291–332.

parsing numerous definitions of identity employed by both scholarly literature and in ordinary language. Ultimately, he concludes that beneath these diverse invocations is a "common underlying concept" that has something to do with "recognition" and a "basis of self-respect and dignity."[120] Yet, despite this assertion, Fearon goes on to posit that common language usages of the term 'identity' point to two meaningful, intertwined, yet fundamentally distinct possible scholarly definitions, which he labels the "social" and "personal." Whereas social identities refer to categories that determine in-group and out-group, personal identities refer to distinguishing characteristics in which individuals take pride or derive dignity.[121] To illustrate this point, Fearon draws on the example of a man who wears a colorful bowtie to work every day. Though the man very well may take pride in this idiosyncrasy and feel that wearing these bowties marks part of his personal identity, Fearon asserts that this trait does not ostensibly link the man to a prominent, politically-salient social group. For this reason, Fearon asserts that identities can exist which have no clear linkage to a group and simply exist to distinguish an "individual from other *individuals*."[122]

I argue this distinction between personal and social identity breaks down upon further examination for multiple reasons, indicating Fearon's cleavage between social and personal identity is artificial and that there is an underlying coherence to the sensitizing concept of 'identity' in political discourse. First, personal identity does not simply serve to distinguish an individual solely from other individuals, but also typically distinguishes an individual from groups. Even if this man in question is the only man in the world to wear such colorful bowties and thus he feels no solidarity with other bowtie-wearers (an unlikely proposition), his choice would not simply serve to differentiate him from other individuals with utterly distinct fashion choices, but rather to distinguish him from what he views as stylistic *trends* among the masses, necessarily alluding to important social groups with political salience.[123] In this sense, no individual characteristic that can truly be thought of as constitutive of identity can be thought of as apolitical and asocial. Though Fearon's example of colorful bowties may appear to signify little politically or socially, this is surely only the case within a limited academic context. Bowties necessarily imply affiliation with a social

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[120] Fearon, "What Is Identity (as We Now Use the Word)," 6, 6, 3.

[121] Fearon, 2.

[122] Fearon, 21–22.

[123] Though this point that fashion choices are necessarily politically-mediated is almost self-evident, a recent volume, following in the tradition of seminal fashion scholar Valerie Steele, has offered a luminating account on fashion's political mediation. Andreas Behnke, ed., *The International Politics of Fashion: Being Fab in a Dangerous World* (London; New York, NY: Routledge, 2017).

and economic class (alluding to the important distinction between white and blue-collar employment) and colorful dress, in various contexts, has likewise implied rebellion against conservative social mores. Second, and relatedly, if instead Fearon had chosen an example of a trait *truly* unique to all individuals—say this man's fingerprints—it could hardly be thought of as evoking the same sense of pride (though fingerprints are still of use in distinguishing the individual from larger groups). The individual in question takes pride in his unique style of dress because he *chooses* that style and all social choices are necessarily politically and socially-mediated. Third and finally, Fearon's example neglects the fact that even an identity applying to a group of one can be politically and socially salient. Take, for instance, numerous historical cases of emperors or kings who believed themselves uniquely divinely ordained to rule, or the Prophet Muhammad, whom Muslims believe possessed an identity of being the divine's final prophet. These identities, though applying solely to individuals, have had enormous political and social significance and thus cannot be relegated to the category of purely 'personal.' Though different identities involve different amounts of implicit and explicit political mediation, every construction of in-group and out-group necessarily has social and political dimensions, linking individuals to society through delineations of self and other. In this sense, what Fearon alludes to in his manuscript is not so much a theoretical distinction that undermines the coherence of the term identity, but rather a methodological issue about how to move between levels analysis when identities are understood as distinguishing individuals from groups, groups from other groups and groups from individuals.[124] For this reason, I argue that the term identity is coherent in that it refers to a singular phenomenon, however complex and multi-faceted it may be.

Finally, even if the term identity is both meaningful and coherent in everyday language and academic scholarship, it might not prove a useful term for analysis and thus scholars should jettison it in favor of a more useful term. I argue, though, that due to its meaning and coherence, as well as numerous disciplines' long history of studying identity from different angles with differing methodologies, it is a highly useful term to promote interdisciplinary, historically-grounded discussions. Notably, of the scholars cited here that reject the term identity, only Brubaker and Cooper argue that even conceptualizations of the term that reference how identities can be multiple, labile and contested are not 'useful fictions' for analysis.[125] Epstein, for example, rejects prevailing

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[124] I address this levels-of-analysis issue in the next section.
[125] Brubaker and Cooper, "Beyond 'Identity,'" 11.

definitions of the term's emphasis but ostensibly finds it a useful means of connecting her IR scholarship to Lacan's psychoanalytic social theory of identity.[126] Likewise, Lebow, despite rejecting the term in his later work, has in the past found it a useful means of linking scholarly literatures from psychology, sociology, philosophy, and political theory.[127] By contrast, Brubaker and Cooper argue that these "weak" definitions of identity, "in their concern to cleanse the term of its theoretically disreputable 'hard' connotations…leave us with a term so infinitely elastic as to be incapable of performing serious analytical work."[128]

Brubaker and Cooper's logic here, I argue, threatens to throw the baby out with the bath water. Plenty of pivotal social science terms are quite elastic (e.g. the state, power, wealth, etc.), but still serve to foster interdisciplinary debates and organize disparate conversations about important phenomena. Without the term 'identity' to link scholarship from social and political theory to important work from other disciplines, scholarship on identity may remain problematically siloed. For example, if IR scholarship operationalizes conceptualizations too far to the individualized side of the ontological spectrum for the purposes of adding historical nuance and rejects those on the category side, it might neglect important insight from disciplines like social psychology or economics, which frequently rely on methodological tools like surveys that tend to impose more category-style identities through multiple-choice questions. On the other hand, if IR scholars rely too much on category-style conceptions, they are at risk of neglecting insight from history and other humanities disciplines into how identities change over time and develop nuanced connotations depending on their interpretation. As psychologists McLean and Syed write, many of the tensions in the study of identity "partly arise from researchers who are essentially studying the same thing but from different perspectives and who do not frequently interact with one another."[129] As this section demonstrates, this is certainly a problem in Fearon's analysis of the man with the bowties, as his nuancing of identity for political science neglects less problematic invocations in work from other disciplines on the politics of fashion and performative aesthetics. In this sense, social and political

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[126] Epstein, "Who Speaks?"

[127] Lebow's later work seems to reject the term to highlight his contrast with prevailing definitions of identity in other scholarship. To me, though, his description of individuals' self-understandings consisting of a "composite of multiple self-identifications that are labile in character and rise and fall in relative importance" could constitute a coherent and meaningful definition for the term identity itself. Lebow, *National Identities and International Relations*, 7.; Richard Ned Lebow, "Identity and International Relations," *International Relations* 22, no. 4 (2008): 473–92.

[128] Brubaker and Cooper, "Beyond 'Identity,'" 11.

[129] Kate C. McLean and Moin Syed, "The Field of Identity Development Needs an Identity: An Introduction to The Oxford Handbook of Identity Development," in *The Oxford Handbook of Identity Development*, ed. Kate C. McLean and Moin Syed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

theorists' efforts to eschew the term to prevent association with past intellectual confusion may lead to more siloed literature and therefore be counterproductive. Even if all disciplines adopt some new, more nuanced definition, such a shift might serve as an unnecessary symbolic rejection of past scholarship on identity. Though this literature might have neglected some of the nuance and dynamism inherent in identification processes, it still has ample theoretical and empirical insight to offer. The term identity thus remains a meaningful, coherent, and useful way to organize past and future literature and thus warrants retention, albeit with a more nuanced definition that highlights its ontological fluidity.

2.4b The Ontological Status of Identity Narratives

Throughout this chapter, I have articulated a vision of identity as neither a rigidly cognitive and individual nor purely socially-emergent phenomenon, but rather a heuristic term used to group together diverse socially-mediated narratives of self-understanding. This conceptualization, though, raises the question of identity narratives' ontological status—specifically, *how* they bridge the divide between individual/social (agent/structure). If scholarship can invoke the term to describe both individuals and collectives, as well as perceptions of continuity *and* dynamic processes of identification, what properties can scholars consistently attribute to identity? In this section, I theorize identity as having a fluid ontology, making debates over the distinction between individual identity and collective identity of less importance than the empirical question of how different articulations of identity are composed. I argue that identity is composed primarily of articulations of memory—both deliberately mythologized and merely selectively retold—and that the diverse possible memory compositions of identity contribute to its fluid ontology. Drawing on psychologist Endel Tulving's influential distinction between episodic and semantic memory (which, for simplicty's sake, I refer to as experience and knowledge), I then discuss how different types of memory compose different types of identities, changing identities' ontologies as they are re-narrated.

Nearly all conceptualizations of identity from the array of social science and humanities disciplines that deal with the term include some notion of memory as either mutually intertwined with identity, the clay from which individuals and groups construct identity, or both.[130] This is not to say that identities cannot be projected forward into the future—indeed, this forward-thinking often accounts for their salience in policymaking discourses—but rather that this projection is dependent

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[130] Duncan Bell, ed., "Introduction," in *Memory, Trauma and World Politics: Reflections on the Relationship between Past and Present* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

upon their constitution via articulations of memory. As historian John Gillis writes, the terms memory and identity have "parallel lives…alert[ing] us to the fact that the notion of identity depends on the idea of memory, and vice versa. The core meaning of any individual or group identity, namely, a sense of sameness over time and space, is sustained by remembering; and what is remembered is defined by the assumed identity."[131] Likewise, though Aleida Assman draws upon a sharper dichotomy between individual and collective identity than I have in this chapter, she similarly articulates a vision of memory as the material from which identity is built. "Institutions and larger social groups, such as nations, governments, the church, or a firm do not 'have' a memory— they 'make' one for themselves with the aid of memorial signs such as symbols, texts, images, rites, ceremonies, places, and monuments. Together with such a memory, these groups and institutions 'construct' an identity."[132] According to Assman, identity narratives are constructed via selective articulations of the past that place a group in time and space and endow it with a sense of a shared, purposeful and cohesive future. Though existing identities certainly also influence the selective process of remembering[133], in this section, for the purposes of simplicity, I focus largely on one direction of this two-way process—how memories constitute identities. Memories provide social entrepreneurs with content to distinguish in-group and out-group through time and space. To argue that an in-group has a common future, one must narrate a common past that constitutes the in-group.

Yet, despite IR scholarship on identity's nearly ubiquitous references to memory as vital for identity construction, far less attention has been paid to dissecting what *types* of memory articulations contribute to identity. This has not only prevented scholarship on memory from informing analysis of identity narratives, but also created a relative discord between neurological, psychological and sociological scholarship offering numerous instructive typologies and insightful analyses of memory functions and the parallel literature on identity in social science and the humanities, which tends to rely on a generic, broad vision of memory as all common knowledge and narrations of the past. Drawing on the work of Endel Tulving, I argue that a useful typology for narrative analysis of the memory articulations that constitute identity is the divide between episodic and semantic memory,

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[131] John R. Gillis, "Memory and Identity: The History of a Relationship," in *Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity*, ed. John R. Gillis (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 3.
[132] Assmann, "Transformations between History and Memory," 55.
[133] See, for example, Alin Coman and William Hirst, "Social Identity and Socially Shared Retrieval-Induced Forgetting: The Effects of Group Membership.," *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General* 144, no. 4 (2015): 717–22.

which I refer to throughout this thesis via the simpler terms of experience and knowledge.[134] Unlike procedural memory, which refers to skills, movements and abilities that are not typically held in conscious thought, both episodic memory and semantic memory are types of declarative memory[135]—conscious processes mediated by language that are, thus, more directly adapted into politicized narrations.[136] Neuropsychological research has indicated that the two types of memory depend largely on different areas of the brain—the anterolateral temporal lobe for semantic memory and the medial temporal lobes for episodic memory—and, thus, individuals can demonstrate impairment in one system but not the other. But the two systems are also inextricably intertwined and interconvertible, paralleling the way identity constructions rely on intertwined mnemonic content, a mix of experience and knowledge.[137] Despite criticism of the distinction by some psychologists due to the two systems' deep entanglement, Tulving's typology has proven instructive for scholars from numerous fields.[138]

Episodic memory refers to autobiographical *experiences* shaped by the perspective of the individual, the fragmentation implicit in encoding, changes in recall over time, and the causal emplotment human beings artificially impose on otherwise disparate events.[139] Though they originate in the minds of individuals, episodic memories are encoded against a backdrop of socially-mediated knowledge and their articulation as narrative requires representation, oftentimes implicating the social-ordering system of language. Once articulated, these experiences can spread

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[134] Tulving, "Episodic and Semantic Memory"; Endel Tulving, "Episodic Memory: From Mind to Brain," *Annual Review of Psychology* 53, no. 1 (2002): 1–25.

[135] See Louis Renoult et al., "Personal Semantics: At the Crossroads of Semantic and Episodic Memory," *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 16, no. 11 (November 2012): 550.

[136] Of course, procedural memory can in certain contexts be thought of as constitutive of identity and certainly is impacted indirectly by politics. A well-known example of identity dependent on procedural memory comes from the 'shibboleth' test of the Bible. According to the parable, Gileadites asked foreigners to pronounce the word 'shibboleth' to determine whether they were enemy Ephraimites, who typically could not pronounce sibilants, as these sounds were not present in their native language. Still, for the purposes of this chapter, I am limiting discussion to conscious memories. In this sense, the 'shibboleth' test can be interpreted as dependent primarily on the semantic memory or common knowledge of what skills different groups possess, rather than the pure procedural memory of the skills themselves. I recognize that the distinction, in many contexts, becomes muddled. See Tim Mcnamara, "21st Century Shibboleth: Language Tests, Identity and Intergroup Conflict," *Language Policy* 4, no. 4 (November 1, 2005): 351–70.

[137] Indeed, this intertwining constitutes a vital subject of contemporary psychological research. See, for example, Muireann Irish et al., "Considering the Role of Semantic Memory in Episodic Future Thinking: Evidence from Semantic Dementia," *Brain* 135, no. 7 (July 2012): 2178–91.; Louis Renoult et al., "Personal Semantics: At the Crossroads of Semantic and Episodic Memory," *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 16, no. 11 (November 2012): 550–58.; Muireann Irish and Olivier Piguet, "The Pivotal Role of Semantic Memory in Remembering the Past and Imagining the Future," *Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience* 7 (2013).

[138] See Greenberg and Verfaellie, "Interdependence of Episodic and Semantic Memory."

[139] Aleida Assmann, "Memory, Individual and Collective," in *The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis*, ed. Robert E. Goodin and Charles Tilly (Oxford: Oxford Univerity Press, 2006), 3–4.

and transform into social common knowledge, a type of semantic memory, in a process oftentimes shaped by political mediation. Thus, though the identities in which they predominate veer towards the individualized end of the ontological spectrum, they cannot exist on the most extreme end, purely as the property of the individual. Even if an individual produces an episodic memory of an experience taking 'a trip to the grocery store alone at 3 PM yesterday,' this memory necessarily implicates socially-constructed systems of telling time ('3 PM' and 'yesterday'), socially-defined language (including, importantly, the culturally-specific notion of what a 'grocery store' is and looks like), and even (implicitly) the common social knowledge of what the activity 'grocery shopping' entails. If this experience were incorporated into an identity narrative—say, helping constitute an identity as an animal rights' activist because the trip to the grocery store was not to shop, but to protest meat consumption—it would necessarily implicate even more overt sociopolitical context and content, deviating further from what might be conceived of as the individual's purely internal experience of the trip. Such an identity narrative may include more individualized experience from the protest, but would include other more social content, beyond language and time, including knowledge of the animal rights' movement and the group organizing the protest, as well as of meat production techniques and the impact of protests in different political contexts.

Semantic memory, on the other hand, refers to "the learning and storing capacity of the mind," which I refer to throughout this thesis via the simpler term *knowledge*.[140] It involves what are typically considered facts, common understandings and social 'master narratives' (for example, 'In 1492, Columbus sailed the ocean blue'), as well as more specific stories about public events (say, the September 11 attacks). Importantly, it also includes language, a system of socially-accepted symbolic knowledge used to describe events. When added to identity narratives, it helps create sharper delineations of in-group and out-group that include less specific relational, temporal and spatial context than episodic memory narrations. But this content is always present in some capacity. For instance, when a French politician invokes a vague, ostensibly transhistorical notion of what it means to be French, she implicitly distinguishes a Frenchman from an Englishman or German. She invokes a sense of common knowledge, perhaps about French people knowing the French language or about the country's culture. But, notably, this invocation of 'French-ness' as common knowledge seeks to elide or brush over the nuances in how different French people *experience* their identities, as well as the fact that French identity is a historically-contingent, relationally-determined social

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[140] Assmann, "Transformations between History and Memory," 51.

construction, constantly reshaped by political forces. Completely eliminating this relationality and temporality, which persists in the subtext of language, would be impossible. Such relationality and temporality are implicit at every stage—a social system of signs necessarily depends on personalized encoding, unique individual understandings of common terms, and the context and circumstance of every utterance. Identity narrations that depend more on semantic memory (social knowledge) tend to omit more explicit reference to this relationality and temporality, as well as the entanglement of French-ness and one's *experience* of being French, instead appealing to vaguely transhistorical groupings that promote cohesion, downplay within-group differences and emphasize differentiation from the out-group.

Much like category identities and individualized identities, semantic memory and episodic memory are necessarily intertwined and interconvertible. Thus, neither can truly be conceived of completely independently and I avoid in my subsequent empirical analysis reductive attempts to isolate them entirely from one another within historical examples. Experiences are always framed by language and social knowledge, while knowledge must be learned via experience, subtly individuating interpretations of social scripts. Further, as Greenberg and Verfaellie write in a review article on the two systems, their interdependence "go[es] beyond the straightforward (and banal) observation that every task involves multiple forms of memory to some degree or other. Rather, they highlight systematic interdependencies in a variety of tasks: they show, for instance, that the contribution of episodic memory varies across different types of semantic retrieval, and that the encoding of new episodic memories varies with the integrity of the semantic knowledge base."[141] Identity narration—due to its frequent articulation in language systems, its rootedness in common knowledge, and its dependence on resonance with personal experience—is a prime example of one of these complex 'tasks' that involves both semantic and episodic memory. But, despite the two types of memory's intertwining, they create an axis along which different articulations of identities can be differentiated by the relative emphasis they place on knowledge or experience. As identities are re-articulated and re-narrated to include more reference to common knowledge (semantic memory) they tend to apply more to social groupings and veer towards the category identity end of the spectrum. As they are re-articulated and re-narrated to include more emphasis on personal experience (episodic memory), they become increasingly individualized and apply increasingly to smaller groups and, eventually, only individuals. Thus, these re-articulations do not just change the content of the identities they

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[141] Greenberg and Verfaellie, "Interdependence of Episodic and Semantic Memory," 3.

describe—they also fundamentally alter their ontologies between the individual and social realms. This dynamic is illustrated in the example provided by Figure 2 below.

AN IDENTITY NARRATIVE'S ONTOLOGICAL TRANSFORMATION AS IT IS RE-NARRATED WITH DIFFERENT MEMORY CONTENT


Figure 2: How different memories' inclusion in identity narratives transforms the identity's ontology from the category end of the spectrum to the individualized.

As this figure demonstrates, this distinction between experience and knowledge offered by Tulving's typology does not simply add new vocabulary to the analysis of identity. It also provides a useful and simple means of framing narrative analysis and breaking down what I see as an artificially rigid barrier in scholarship on identity between individual identity, oftentimes conceived of as purely the property of individuals' brains, and collective identity, the pure property of the Durkheimian social realm.[142] Though little scholarship is foolhardy enough to argue that individual experience does not implicate social knowledge and that collective social facts do not depend on individuals' interpretations, IR scholarship's oftentimes rigid distinction between the two types of identity has obscured the extent to which the fluidity between the individual and collective in the process of forming memory makes *any* dichotomy suspect. Unlike the distinction between individual memory and identity and collective memory and identity, both semantic and episodic memory exist simultaneously in individuals' brains and both are mediated by social processes. Even episodic memory (experience), the more individualized of the two, can only be encoded via the brain's store of social knowledge, including language, other symbols, context and connotation. Alternatively, the artificiality of the brain/social dichotomy can be problematized via top-down analysis of the intertwining of

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[142] For more on this, see Jeffrey K. Olick, "Collective Memory: The Two Cultures," *Sociological Theory* 17, no. 3 (1999): 333–48.

knowledge (semantic memory) with experience (episodic memory). Even articulations of identity as banal social knowledge—for instance, 'French people come from France' or 'Dutch people come from the Netherlands'—rely on individuals learning these facts via experience and encoding them in nuanced ways with nuanced associations. Brains are not passive receptacles for imposed social knowledge. Individuals (especially politically active ones) interpret and process social knowledge in nuanced ways, adding their own unique twists to them and implicating both the contents of the brain and the social world. Identity narrations move fluidly between the individual and social realms, obviating the distinction between them. For this reason, identity has no fixed ontology, but rather can be articulated and re-articulated as closer to a property of the Durkheimian social or closer to the property of the individual psyche. Though individual brains are important storage sites and actors in this process, they cannot be bracketed off in analysis and isolated from the social world.

2.4c Overcoming the Instrumentalism-Idealism Divide

Before continuing to applications of this chapter's theoretical framework, it's worth returning to an issue to which I alluded previously—the instrumentalism-idealism divide—as it has, to a significant degree, overshadowed much of IR and political science's engagement with identity for decades. Further, throughout the thesis I refer to how political actors with varying incentives and motivations can re-narrate existing identities by deploying various types of memory content. By employing 'incentives', 'motivations' and their synonyms, I realize that my conceptualization might be misinterpreted as exemplary of a purely instrumentalist approach to identity. However, in this section I build on prior narrative identity scholarship to argue that an understanding of identity's narrativity and ontological fluidity undermines any sharp dichotomy between instrumentalist and idealist accounts of identity. This vision provides a potent rationale for this thesis' interpretivist historical methods that treat instrumental and ideal motivations for various identity articulations as deeply intertwined, distinguishable only in context, and suggests that instrumental and ideal approaches to identity are perhaps more reconcilable than previously thought. Indeed, I argue that the two aspects of identity are best thought of as mutually constitutive: identities can only be instrumentalized because they appeal to innate human desires for belonging and continuity, and people, to some degree, desire this belonging and continuity due to the material benefits they bring. Unraveling this nexus is not only impossible outside of specific cases—it also leads to a tendency to oversimplify identities' context-specific complexities and impoverish IR scholarship.

Though purely instrumentalist and rationalist accounts differ substantially in the importance they place on various political 'uses' of identity as well as the way they model the supposed rationality of adopting various identities to achieve in-group benefits, these approaches are typically joined in their belief that identities are predominantly epiphenomenal means of organizing in the pursuit of more important underlying drives, rooted in human nature (most often wealth, power and security). As discussed previously, a key figure arguing for an instrumentalist account of identity has been David Laitin, who argued that citizens of new states in the former Soviet Union learn new languages that don't align with their previous identities primarily for three reasons: to increase their expected lifetime earnings, because punishment from the in-group for learning the new language is low, and because the in-group offers few benefits to those who retain linguistic purity and do not learn the second language.[143] Emphasizing primarily the economic benefits of bilingualism versus monolingualism and rejecting any meaningful notion of intersectionality or hybridity, Laitin paints a vision of learning a new language as a rational endeavor for wealth-maximizers recognizing the constraints of the marketplace. Accordingly, any idealist notion of language acquisition as a means of connecting to a local community or culture becomes, at best, ancillary, and, at worst, an irrelevant distraction. Laitin's conceptualization's parsimony is exemplary of and has indeed inspired much political science that has viewed identity as epiphenomenal.

But as Rogers M. Smith points out, Laitin's simplified instrumentalist model is inevitably incomplete, as it does little to explain the more fundamental questions of *why* an in-group might penalize those who learn other languages or lionize those who remain linguistically pure. Indeed, by reframing his analysis away from this *why* question Laitin's theorization in many ways offers a red herring.[144] Smith's observations rhyme with the views of Margaret Somers, who argues that the inclusion of narrative and the interpretivist methods that often accompany it into the study of identity can reveal how instrumentalist and idealist accounts of identity are ultimately inseparable, making any rigid dichotomy between the two necessarily foolhardy. Somers argues that identities are historically embedded in a series of institutional, social, cultural and political relationships, and thus able to assume multiple meanings depending on who is articulating and interpreting them and the context in which these articulations occur. The instrumentalism of assuming one identity over another, as well as 'ideal' accounts of identity as an integral part of the human experience are

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[143] Laitin, *Identity in Formation*, 28–29.
[144] Smith, "Identities, Interests, and the Future of Political Science," 305–6.

ultimately deeply context-specific—in some cases, people rationalize shifting identities or alter existing ones purely for the pursuit of material wealth or power, but in some cases their 'ideal' senses of self might lead them to adopt what purely economic analysis might deem 'irrational' identities or pass on opportunities to increase their wealth. Drawing on an example of what might be considered an archetypal 'instrumentalist' invocation of identity by German workers to demand higher wages, Somers points out that an emphasis on the context-specific narration of these identities can equally uncover 'ideal' concerns behind these desires, as wages "served every purpose from maintaining social honor, to preserving families, to asserting independence in the face of newly imposed factory regimes." Idealism and instrumentalism, she concludes, are deeply intertwined and the "meaning imputed to the appropriation of material life should not, therefore, be presumed until historically explored."[145] This insight might seem banal in the abstract, but is of enormous importance when applied to the field of IR, which too often promotes generalizable and ahistorical rational choice models of identity that are more easily quantified but less revelatory of identities' true potency.

This chapter's emphasis on identity's fluid ontology reinforces what Somers' astutely observes as instrumentalism and idealism's entanglement in the complex process of identity narration. As Figure 2 demonstrates with relation to 'American' identity re-narrated and re-constituted to be either more categorically rigid and dependent on semantic memory or more individualized and dependent on episodic memory, different narrative constructions of similar abstract allegiances can provide different emotional resonances and serve different purposes depending on their context. For example, when interviewing for a job in London at an American firm, an individual may emphasize a version of 'American identity' farther to the left side of the spectrum, drawing on common knowledge with the Americans interviewing her, who might be from different regions of the United States and have vastly different experiences of 'being American.' But that same person, when discussing migrating to London for work with her family, might return to a more individualized account of her identity, constructed with an emphasis on childhood experiences with family, as a reason not to leave her homeland. Ostensibly, these two narrations refer to the same abstract allegiance—the individual's American citizenship—but they draw on different content for both instrumental and ideal reasons. In the case of applying to the job in London, the individual may draw on her 'American-ness' in an effort to bond with her interviewers and secure the job, but she also likely would not adopt this identity for *purely* instrumental reasons, worrying perhaps that if

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[145] Somers, "The Narrative Constitution of Identity: A Relational and Network Approach," 628.

she articulated a nationality to which she did not feel any ideal attachment might make her feel or the interviewers see her as phony or obsequious. Likewise, in discussing her American identity with family in the context of a discussion on whether to take a job in London, she might re-articulate her American identity in a way compatible with a decision she subtly desires for another reason— perhaps a higher salary in London or a romantic interest waiting across the pond. In each case, instrumentalism and idealism cannot be fully disentangled with more rigorous analysis and thus, following Somers, in this thesis I pay particularly close attention to context and interpretation to understand identity narrations' roots. Though it does not overcome the difficulties of this entanglement, this chapter's emphasis on ontological fluidity does provide a new and useful axis for comparative analysis of these narrative constructions that can help unravel the complex interplay of instrumental and ideal motivations. Though scholarship might encounter difficulty unraveling individuals' true underlying motivations in adapting certain identities or expressing them in certain ways, it certainly can deconstruct the types of memory used to articulate them and this deconstruction will provide important insight for such analysis.

2.5 Contesting Identities: Between the Nation and State

Though this chapter's conceptualization of identity stems from its engagement with the term as it is invoked in IR scholarship, it could conceivably be applied to multiple disciplines. Indeed, this intervention is a broad social theoretical one, providing a framework for not only this thesis' exploration of trauma in new states, but also potentially an array of future work across the social sciences and humanities. Yet, due to IR's necessary mediation between individuals, the groups they form and the macro-political structures and institutions that emerge from these social relations, I argue that an emphasis on identity's fluid ontology—different identity narrations' ability to bridge the divide between particularistic experience and collective social knowledge—is particularly well-suited to the discipline. In this section, I demonstrate this suitability with regards to specific structural international political issues raised by this thesis' later cases—the social identity negotiations that occur both within the nation and between the nation and the state in new states, formed after decolonization. Before engaging with the complexities added by consideration of collective trauma, this discussion provides a suggestive backdrop for understanding the larger structural challenges facing the two institutionalized nationalist movements under the study—the Indian National Congress in India and the interwoven Jewish Agency and World Zionist Organization in Israel.

Understanding identity's role in the pivotal relationship between the nation and state, though, requires stepping back and considering how IR theory, political theory and political sociology have defined states and nations, as these terms' boundaries are highly contested and which definition one selects plays a significant role in how one understands their roles in identity negotiations. Defining these terms is easier said than done and the multiplicity of definitions from Marxists, institutionalists, pluralists, and others attests to the many possible ways of not only defining the state, but also of understanding its legitimacy (or illegitimacy) and uncovering the biases (patriarchal, Orientalist, classist, etc.) inherent in its historical incarnations.[146] For the purposes of this thesis, which focuses on the immediate post-World War II era when states dominated international politics in practice, I will avoid some of this debate's focus on boundary cases by beginning with the classic definition drawn from Weber's 1919 essay "Politics as Vocation," which undoubtedly has become the most common in the field of IR, applied in numerous settings in the century since its formulation.

> In the past, various entities—starting with the clan—have known physical force as a normal means. Today, contrary to the past though, we are compelled to say that the state is the only human *Gemeinschaft*[147] which lays claim to the monopoly on the legitimated use of physical force. However, this monopoly is limited to a certain geographical area, and in fact this limitation to a particular area is one of the things that defines a state.[148]

Here, I have deliberately included the entire definition in Weber's own words for three reasons. First, I want to emphasize that Weber's definition includes claims to a monopoly of violence over a specific territory as only "one of the things that defines the state," implying that states potentially have other defining characteristics. To Weber's criteria I would add a corollary: that this monopoly is also delimited *temporally* in addition to *spatially*. This addition extends beyond Weber's observation that the state itself is a modern incarnation that differs qualitatively from political structures of "the past." It also recognizes that the claims individual states make to monopolized violence within a territory are often framed as historically contingent, facilitating an

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[146] For more on this contestation, see John Hoffman, "Defining the State," in *Gender and Sovereignty: Feminism, the State and International Relations*, ed. John Hoffman (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 73–90.; Iain McLean and Alistair McMillan, eds., "State," in *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics*, 3rd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

[147] Typically translated as 'community', though also potentially understandable as 'political community' or via its relationship with *Gesellschaft* (society).

[148] Max Weber, "Politics as Vocation," in *Weber's Rationalism and Modern Society: New Translations on Politics, Bureaucracy, and Social Stratification*, ed. Tony Waters and Dagmar Waters (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 136.

aspect of state identity as the contrast it can provide with the period before its consolidation (e.g., the colonial period for many Third World states or the tyrannical *ancien régime* in post-revolution France).[149] States often promote identities deliberately in contrast to the regime that came before or the chaos that might follow them.

Second, I want to reiterate Weber's inclusion of the words "lays claim," which is often overlooked in post-Weberian scholarship on the state. Though states *aspire* to monopolize violence in a given territory during a given time period and international politics' deference to sovereignty often legitimizes these aspirations, Ferguson and Mansbach note that "states have *never* enjoyed a monopoly of political behavior" (or violence) in practice, challenged as they are at every stage by kinship groups, local governance structures, non-state actors and various other groups.[150] Indeed, recognizing that Weber's criteria of a "monopoly on the legitimated use of physical force" is only a *claim* enables examination of how non-state actors like the nation counter this force in identity negotiations. As this thesis will show, nations and sub-state nationalist movements often contest this monopoly on violence through the medium of identity. Third and finally, I want to emphasize how Weber's notions of a 'claim' and 'legitimacy' implicate a group of people outside the state apparatus that are somehow necessary for the state's existence. Whereas some definitions of the state seem to over-emphasize the state *apparatus*[151]—the agency or organization that institutionalizes this attempt at legitimated monopolized violence—Weber's definition clearly implicates an ontological other vital to its existence. Accordingly, states are incomplete without a group of people beneath them receiving these claims and legitimating their power. This, of course, raises the question of how to delineate this group via an identity and obtain its collective consent.

In contrast to this top-down definition of the state that focuses on its institutionalized legitimacy, nations are typically understood via the bottom up—as an "imagined community"[152] that

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[149] Understanding the state's temporal delimitations also helps explain apocalyptic politics and give transhistorical relevance to the aphorism often attributed to Louis XV's lover Madame de Pompadour's saying about the potential fall of the French monarchy "*après nous, le deluge*" (after us, the flood).

[150] Ferguson and Mansbach, *Remapping Global Politics*, 108.

[151] This is especially true in recent debate about the 'deep state' in American politics as the residual bureaucratic apparatus opposed to the democratic will of the people. See Daniel Drezner, "Let's Talk about Donald Trump vs. the 'Deep State,'" *The Washington Post*, April 9, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2018/04/09/lets-talk-about-donald-trump-vs-the-deep-state/; Joseph Bernstein, "The Guy Who Wrote The Book On The Deep State Wishes Trumpworld Would Shut Up About The Deep State," *BuzzFeed News*, April 5, 2018, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/josephbernstein/deep-state-mike-lofgren; Mike Lofgren, *The Deep State: The Fall of the Constitution and the Rise of a Shadow Government* (New York, NY: Viking, 2016).

[152] Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.

develops a political consciousness and specific types of political aspirations. Two pivotal theorists of nationalism—Ernest Gellner and John Breuilly—have conceptualized these political aspirations primarily via their relationship to the state, noting the intertwined modern historical development of nationalism and the state apparatus. Gellner, for example, writes that "nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent," adding that this nationalism is, above all, a "*sentiment*" and a "nationalist *movement* is one actuated by a sentiment of this kind."[153] Of course, this definition does not unravel what forces and factors cause individuals to conceive of specific boundaries for a national unit (primarily a question of how they narrate this nation's *identity*) and Gellner goes on to dispute the transhistorical relevance of the Weberian conception of the state.[154] But, in the 20th century post-World War II context in which Gellner was writing, he does not dispute that states are the predominant 'political unit' relevant to nationalism. This conceptualization parallels that of Breuilly, who argues that nationalism distinguishes itself from other identity-motivated movements in that it is a form of "political behaviour in the context of the modern state and the modern state system."[155] He continues to say that nationalism refers to "political movements seeking or exercising state power and justifying such action with nationalist arguments." These arguments typically include the ideas that the nation has an "explicit or particular character" (what I term an *identity*), that this character or identity takes precedence over other values or commitments with which it conflicts and that the nation must be independent to achieve these goals, typically understood via the political sovereignty of the state.[156]

But, however one conceives of the transhistorical relevance of the aforementioned conceptualizations of states and nations, what's clear is that in the modern era—particularly the nation and state-dominated post-World War II era—the nation and the state have had an intrinsic relationship. I argue that at the heart of this relationship is the notion of identity; efforts to make the nation and the state congruent reshape the two entities' identities and conflict between the two is often premised on identity discordance. To legitimize their claims to a monopoly on power, states must *define* the target audience of their claims and provide a narrative rationale for this audience to collectively cede its right to use of physical force within a delineated time and space. Delineating this in-group and contrasting it with the out-group requires that the state promote an identity, especially

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[153] Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 1.
[154] Gellner, 3–4.
[155] John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, 2nd ed (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), 1.
[156] Breuilly, 2.

among those it governs. Over the course of this thesis, which focuses on post-independence Israel and India, I will refer to this as 'state identity' and clarify in various contexts whether it refers to the identity promoted by the colonial state apparatus or the post-independence state that inherited many of the colonial state's powers and institutions. State identity is inextricably linked with the power of the state apparatus that promotes and defines it, though those interested in bolstering state power also recognize that, should this identity drift too far from that of the nation that legitimizes it, the state could lose legitimacy. On the other hand, nations also require identities to delineate their boundaries and distinguish them from other competing groupings through time and space. For a nation to claim a right to assume political power, it must define the in-group and distinguish itself from the out-group, both projects that require an identity. Further, this identity must be narrated to take precedence over other identities (at the very least in the political sphere) such that nationals legitimize the national unit becoming the predominant political unit, monopolizing physical force over a delineated time and space.

When the identities promoted by the state and nation align, the situation of congruence that Gellner describes can lead to the creation of a stable nation-state. In this ideal case, identity serves as the glue sticking the legitimized state apparatus to the nation that it governs. Indeed, in many prosperous contemporary states the identity promoted by the state and that felt by the nation coincide relatively seamlessly, leading to few truly existential or revolutionary political debates over the legitimacy of the state apparatus' monopoly on violence or the rights of nationals or sub-national groups governed by the state. But as history has shown, for a variety of reasons this congruence is often unobtainable and highly contested. Depending on who exerts power within the political culture of the state and who is included in the nation in political discourse, the two entities are often poor fits and the nation-state ideal is unobtainable. Nations and other interest groups within them often reject, contest or resist the state's claim to monopolized violence, while those individuals or groups controlling state apparatuses often seek to contest or quell alternative identities to that of the state.[157] To be sure, in specific instances this contestation may stem from specific policy issues and the distribution of scarce resources. But in the long term the contestation that emerges in these debates is mutually constitutive with the identity negotiations at the heart of the nation-state union.

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[157] Richard Mansbach and Edward Rhodes, "The National State and Identity Politics: State Institutionalisation and 'Markers' of National Identity," *Geopolitics* 12, no. 3 (2007): 426–27, .; Rogers Brubaker, "Nationalizing States in the Old 'New Europe' – and the New," in *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 79–106,.; Mostafa Rejai and Cynthia H. Enloe, "Nation-States and State-Nations," *International Studies Quarterly* 13, no. 2 (1969): 140–58.

These negotiations are never solely about policies determining the distribution of resources and power—they are also necessarily about identifying the in-group that wields these resources and power and the out-group that is excluded from them, representative of identity and policy discourses' mutual constitution. At the heart of the nation-state is this negotiation over identities that define the two entities through time and space. Thus, I employ the term 'nation-state' as an ideal-type, approached only in limit contexts where nation and state identities align unproblematically. Oftentimes nation-states are unhappy marriages and the hyphen between the terms conceals enormous varied tensions.

Despite the contextual specificity of identity struggles between nations and states, during certain historical moments transnational forces can have a cascading effect and undermine the stability of nation-states across the globe. For example, Richard Mansbach and Edward Rhodes point to three forces—the fall of the Soviet Union, globalization's multifaceted impact, and technological advances that permit new forms of organization—which led to a resurgence of identity incongruence between nations and states in the post-Cold War era.[158] Ultimately, this incongruence led to the emergence of many new states across Eastern Europe and Central Asia. This thesis, however, examines an earlier transnational force—decolonization—which created a variety of novel dynamics in identity negotiations between nations and states across the globe throughout the mid-20th century.[159]

As Mostafa Rejai and Cynthia Enloe observe, the nation-states of post-World War II Europe often saw their national identities form before the development of the modern state apparatus as a form of legitimated political authority. This situation differed substantially in post-colonial contexts. Although many colonial states handed over a residual state apparatus to a nationalist movement that had already been successful in garnering support from certain segments of the population (typically elites), when these movements assumed control of the state's political authority their vision of national identity was rarely widespread. Thus, to legitimate their control over the state apparatus, they drew on state powers to coax the nation's identity into line with their hegemonic vision. This was utterly unlike many previous negotiations in European contexts, in which more widespread nationalist movements sought to bring state power into line with their vision of national identity

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[158] Mansbach and Rhodes, "The National State and Identity Politics," 427–28.

[159] For more on the transnational spread of decolonization, see Neta C. Crawford, *Argument and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decolonization, and Humanitarian Intervention* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

(e.g., the French Revolution). Though the negotiation between nation and state is always dialectical, Rejai and Enloe point out that the driving force in most European cases was the nation wrestling political authority into the form of the legitimized state, whereas, in post-colonial contexts, it was states, controlled by elites, wrestling nationalist consciousness into line with their visions. To emphasize this flipped dynamic, Rejai and Enloe refer to Third World countries as state-nations rather than nation-states.[160] Indeed, the dynamic these authors identify was reinforced by the fact that many post-colonial states' boundaries were artificially determined by outside observers and thus their populations often possessed an enormous array of political identities that could threaten state legitimacy and control.

Of course, post-coloniality did not prevent the successful consolidation of nation and state identity in many parts of the world. Indeed, post-colonial states' responses to the tension decolonization imposed on identity negotiations ran the gamut from dissolution into horrific civil wars or fragmentation into pieces to promotion of a new, compromise post-colonial identity that unified the nation and state relatively seamlessly. But while this chapter's theorization of identity does not *predict* how these negotiations would play out in different cases, it does serve as a lens through which to examine the complexities of post-independence identity negotiations. By breaking down the memory content behind narrations of identity, this conceptualization helps elucidate the complex incentives and factors that motivated different narrations of identity within these negotiations. Though the course of these identity negotiations differed substantially due to historically contingent factors, two important trends from before and after independence are worth considering before proceeding to this thesis' subsequent theoretical discussion and empirical applications.

First, colonial states often exerted hegemonic control over systems of administration, justified via Orientalist 'othering' of the governed as 'barbaric' or 'uncivilized' masses, but they often lacked a deep connection with or control over the nuanced societies they governed. As the nineteenth century's crisis in colonialism (specifically resulting from the 1857 Indian Rebellion) exposed this lack of control, colonial powers often pursued policies of 'divide and rule', promoting incompatible, more particularistic sub-national identities, which hardened divisions between religions, language groups, classes and castes in the hopes that they would prevent the formation of

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[160] Rejai and Enloe, "Nation-States and State-Nations."

a unifying national identity and a nationalist movement that could challenge foreign rule.[161] In this sense, though the imperial project was premised on simplified Orientalist category identities, imperial policies often encouraged a proliferation and resurgence of identities more towards the right end of the spectrum, which emphasized the diversity of lived experience under foreign rule and challenged the salience of unifying nationalist movements. In the meantime, those interested in continuing imperial power had enormous incentives to present the colonial state's identity as unified, categoric and hegemonic—the opposite of the fractious population they governed. Still, especially in the period of late colonialism when anti-colonial nationalists engaged in the domestic politics of the imperial power, this imperial hegemony was often revealed as a façade, broken down by playing on political divisions within the imperial power. Indeed, because imperial powers could so rarely summon sufficient unified coercive force to mandate their rule over the vast territories they governed, identity negotiations proved vital in mobilizing certain groups in their favor and separating others to prevent their mobilization. Oftentimes, the identities instrumentalized by the colonial power—be they towards the left end of the spectrum or right—clashed with self-understandings informed by experiences on the ground.

A second key trend of these post-colonial identity negotiations stems from the nature of nationalist movements which emerged to combat colonial power, primarily in the late 19th and 20th centuries. In their initial stages many nationalist movements focused largely on countering abuses of colonial power and thus articulated an identity that countered the imposition of colonial rule by adapting inclusive Western ideas about democracy, representation and civil society to colonial contexts' conditions.[162] For this reason, scholars like Partha Chatterjee have labeled anti-colonial nationalist movements a 'derivative discourse'[163]; these movements were often premised on ideas drawn from Western contexts and developed over time to accommodate the diversity of experience among the colonized on whose behalf they advocated. The proliferation of political consciousness among various groups served the goals of many nationalist movements in their initial stages by providing multiple avenues for incorporating diverse lived experience into counter-hegemonic anti-

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[161] See, for example, Karuna Mantena, *Alibis of Empire: Henry Maine and the Ends of Liberal Imperialism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010).; Mahmood Mamdani, *Define and Rule: Native as Political Identity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012); A. J. Christopher, "'Divide and Rule': The Impress of British Separation Policies," *Area* 20, no. 3 (1988): 233–40.

[162] Rejai and Enloe, "Nation-States and State-Nations," 149.

[163] Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1993); Ashis Nandy, *The Illegitimacy of Nationalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

imperial agitation. Yet, as these nationalist movements grew in strength and independence seemed on the horizon, these groups increasingly used their own hegemonic control over anti-colonial agitation to impose a unified vision of a post-independence identity—a national identity dependent on common knowledge and sharp delineations between national and outsider. This unified identity was necessary to justify the movement's seizing of the colonial state apparatus and legitimized its assumption of state power, which in turn it used to further consolidate the movement's vision of identity. For this reason, it's unsurprising that in the final decades of British colonialism in India the Indian National Congress' (INC) relationship with other anti-colonial nationalist groups with differing identities like the Muslim League, the Communist Party of India, socialists within the Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha grew tenuous. Likewise, in the years before independence the Zionist movement both rejected Ze'ev Jabotinsky's Revisionist Zionism and worked to cleanse territories of local Arab populations. When the INC and Zionist movement finally seized control of state apparatuses in 1947 and 1948 respectively, they used the powers associated with them to impose more rigid, category-style identities in line with their visions of the post-independence state, encountering new opposition from sub-national groups opposed to their leadership.

These trends are, of course, oversimplified and suggestive, requiring substantial nuancing when applied to this thesis' historical discourse analysis. But, without being overly proscriptive in later empirical analysis, these trends do allude to the utility of understanding identities as ontologically fluid and examining how different narrations in context drew on different mixes of experience and to reframe the relationship between the nation and the state through history. When empirical analysis turns to examinations of competing identity narrations in both India and Israel, Tulving's typology of memory will help inform analysis. Likewise, an understanding of the interplay of instrumental and ideal factors helps move analysis beyond false dichotomies advocated by past rational choice or idealist approaches and instead interpret narrations in historical context. Ultimately nations and states, despite their preponderance in the post-World War II era, are broad terms that refer to a tremendous diversity of actors with varied histories and understandings of self. Understanding how these actors narrate and interpret their identities plays a vital role in understanding when and why they are prone to stick together or peel apart.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter has made four general theoretical contributions, followed by an application to more specific international political issues. First, it has demonstrated that the term identity, as it is

currently used in IR scholarship, is meaningful, coherent and useful and thus warrants retention as a 'useful fiction' or sensitizing concept ideal-type in future scholarship. Second, it has shown that identity has no rigid form, but rather is ontologically fluid. Different articulations of identities readily bridge the gap between the individual and collective and alter identity's composition and structure. To understand this ontological fluidity, I have introduced Endel Tulving's seminal typology of memory as a tool to analyze how experience and knowledge weave together in different identity narratives and bridge the divide between the individual and the social. Identity narratives relying on more experience (episodic memory) draw more ambiguous lines between groups, but also are more specific and resonant to individuals and smaller groups with shared context-specific experiences. On the other hand, identity narratives that rely on more common knowledge (semantic memory) draw sharper divisions between in-group and out-group and are often suitable for consolidating and mobilizing the in-group and presenting the delineation as vaguely transhistorical or natural. Fourth, it has argued that, by understanding identity's ontological fluidity, the instrumentalist-idealist divide dissolves and identity narratives can be understood as contextually-specific and historically-contingent, interpreted differently by distinct audiences.

Though this chapter's theorization of identity is of broad social theoretical utility, I have argued that it is particularly well-suited to understanding an important site of identity negotiation in international politics: the hyphen that serves to connect the nation and the state into the nation-state. In particular, this theorization provides a useful framework and vocabulary for empirical analysis of decolonization, demonstrating key ways this transnational force shaped pivotal identity negotiations between nations and states that ultimately determined policymaking. In the next chapter, I turn to a factor that further complicated this relationship in newly independent states—trauma. As I will demonstrate, trauma creates multi-leveled crises in representation that heighten the difficulty inherent in narrating experience as identity. These crises exacerbate the tension inherent in elite articulations of subalterns' experience, with enormous consequences for the identity negotiations between the post-colonial state and its subjects. Trauma, I will demonstrate, can reshape identities and reframe their logics, serving as a pivotal factor in many states' founding and development.

Chapter 3: Theorizing Collective Trauma's Impact on Identity Negotiations in New States[164]

3.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I argued that identity narrations—which are of vital importance to numerous disciplines, including IR—are ontologically fluid. As identity narratives incorporate different mixtures of knowledge and experience, they bridge the individual and social realms, transitioning ontologically from highly individualized, relational narratives to more static invocations of common social knowledge and vice-versa. Yet, for the purposes of simplicity, I deliberately avoided scrutinizing the vital question of memory's narratability—the extent to which actors can readily emplot memories into meaning-making narratives suitable for social transmission. In practice, facile emplotment is hardly the norm. While certain memories—especially banal ones with little emotional content—do translate relatively easily from either experience or implicit social knowledge into identity narratives and larger political discourse, some defy easy representation. Indeed, this thesis' empirical focus on 'new' states emerging from colonialism is premised on the idea that these liminal and border cases can oftentimes be the most interesting, important and revelatory in examining the contours of international politics. Relatedly, examination of these more difficult cases provides insight into the identity construction process' reverse direction: how the widely-accepted identities that delineate groups interacting in international politics can exert an influence on the formation and retention of the memories that, in turn, constitute these groups' senses of self. Though this direction is not the primary focus of this thesis, this chapter's discussion demonstrates the potential importance of such feedback. Identity construction is a historically complex, contextually-specific process that can benefit from multiple angles of theorization.

In this chapter I turn to collective trauma—a force that has historically problematized identity narrations in many post-colonial states and proven particularly important in both of this thesis' cases, India and Israel. Indeed, as this thesis' introduction has argued, collective trauma is a vital subject for IR, evidenced not only by the recent emergence of a noteworthy IR sub-literature on trauma[165], but also by the history of the discipline at large. Surveying IR scholarship over the last

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[164] Portions of this chapter were adapted from Adam B. Lerner, "Theorizing Collective Trauma in International Political Economy," *International Studies Review*, 2018, online first.

[165] See, for example, Jenny Edkins, *Trauma and the Memory of Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Jenny Edkins, "Forget Trauma? Responses to September 11," *International Relations* 16, no. 2 (2002): 243–56.; Emma Hutchison, *Affective Communities in World Politics: Collective Emotions after Trauma*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Emma Hutchison, "Trauma and the Politics of Emotions: Constituting Identity, Security and Community after the Bali Bombing," *International Relations* 24, no. 1 (2010): 65–86; Emma Hutchison and Roland Bleiker, "Emotional Reconciliation: Reconstituting Identity and Community after Trauma," *European Journal of Social Theory* 11, no. 3 (2008):

decade reveals how traumatic events—including wars, oppression, ethnic violence, natural disasters and impoverishment—form the bulk of the discipline's empirical focus. Just as medical research tends to pay disproportionate attention to diseases of the body, research on international politics tends to focus on such diseases of the international system.[166] Yet, despite this focus and new sub-literature, IR scholarship has tended over the last half century to analyze collective traumas solely via their immediate impact on statecraft and the balance of power[167], neglecting the ways in which their legacies become deeply imbricated in international politics over time. In this chapter I argue that traumatic encounters exert diverse, lasting impacts on international politics over time, visible not only in their direct material impacts but also in the political identities they constitute, realign or dismantle and the mutually constitutive policy discourses these identities shape.

To be sure, the previously cited recent scholarship on collective trauma in IR represents a vital (albeit inchoate) contribution to this effort, offering both novel theorizations and relevant empirical applications.[168] But, to-date, this work has primarily analyzed collective trauma's impact via its sociocultural and collective psychological manifestations, neglecting its oftentimes equally pernicious long-term material consequences, as well as how these levels can interact in identity and policymaking discourses. In many ways, this is the natural result of adapting theory from cultural studies, sociology and psychoanalysis to the social sciences and parallels the limitations many

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385–403.; Karin M. Fierke, "Whereof We Can Speak, Thereof We Must Not Be Silent: Trauma, Political Solipsism and War," *Review of International Studies* 30, no. 4 (2004).; Maja Zehfuss, *Wounds of Memory: The Politics of War in Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). ; Erica Resende and Dovile Budryte, *Memory and Trauma in International Relations: Theories, Cases and Debates* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2013).

[166] Much of this grim empirical focus (and oftentimes gloomy outlook on the prospects for change) stems from the primacy of Realism as a paradigm in post-war IR scholarship. Realism has often been described as espousing a pessimistic view of the prospects for cooperation ameliorating international politics, based in Machiavelli's critique of moral tradition and Hobbes' ideas of the state of nature. See Korab-Karpowicz, W. Julian, "Political Realism in International Relations," in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2018 Edition)*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, 2018, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism-intl-relations/; John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security* 19, no. 3 (1994).

[167] The most notable, commonly-cited example of this phenomenon is the Thirty Years' War that led to the Peace of Westphalia. Early IR theory often held this peace was foundational in creating the contemporary international system, though this idea has been significantly problematized. See Stephen D. Krasner, "Westphalia and All That," in *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*, ed. Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993).

[168] Trauma studies scholarship has also been applied in varying capacities to analysis of domestic politics, as well as numerous other disciplines. For that reason, this chapter draws from ample scholarship from political theory more generally, as well as theoretical insight from historiography, psychoanalysis, social psychology, sociology and literary studies that is not explicitly political. Indeed, this thesis' holistic constructivist theoretical orientation necessitates connecting the more localized theoretical issues of traumatic memory formation and narration to the large-group transmission, institutionalization and macro-politicization inherent to international politics. I anticipate that many of this chapter's conclusions, like those of the previous one, are equally applicable to local and international contexts, despite this thesis being primarily geared towards an international studies audience.

scholars have identified in similar applications of postcolonial theory to issues of international political economy (IPE) and development. As Christine Sylvester writes in an article on integrating postcolonial studies with social science work on international development, "development studies does not tend to listen to subalterns and postcolonial studies does not tend to concern itself with whether the subaltern is eating."[169] This insight applies equally to studies of collective trauma in world politics, as traumatic events' legacies do not solely manifest as collective psychic wounds imbricated in political culture—they are also often economically devastating and disproportionately likely to deplete the wellbeing of Third World nation-states generally, and subalterns within them more specifically. This economic inequality persists through generations, oftentimes reinforcing or shifting traumatic encounters' initial effects, and has a profound impact on world politics.

For the purposes of this thesis, which focuses on collective trauma's impact on state-building in new states, emerging from war and colonialism, I argue that an adequate conceptualization of collective trauma's impact will necessarily incorporate not only its more intangible sociocultural and psychological dimensions, but also its legacy's economic reification, as well as the interplay between these material and non-material levels in pivotal identity and policymaking discourses. Indeed, for India and Israel a chief impact of the collective traumas their nations' experienced was their detrimental economic impact and theorizing the sociocultural separately from the material would neglect a key aspect of trauma's long-term salience. Such a unified theorization will prove vital for this thesis' empirical examinations, but will also speak to broader debates on the lingering impacts of economic injustice and Third World states' behavior in the international system. Mohammed Ayoob, for example, has written at length about the attributes of Third World states in the international system, crafting the alternative paradigm of "subaltern realism" to explain what more traditional IR theorists have alternatively dismissed as idiosyncratic behavior. Defining the Third World as, "among other things, a perceptual category," Ayoob writes that, beyond their relatively weak economies and state apparatuses, Third World states distinguish themselves in the international system via incorporation in their identities of "a *feeling* of deprivation (more at the collective-psychological level than at the individual-material level as far as Third World elites are concerned)."[170] Trauma studies' insights can help contribute to a robust, theoretical lens to

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[169] Christine Sylvester, "Development Studies and Postcolonial Studies: Disparate Tales of the 'Third World,'" *Third World Quarterly* 20, no. 4 (1999): 703.

[170] Original emphasis. Mohammed Ayoob, "The Third World in the System of States: Acute Schizophrenia or Growing Pains?," *International Studies Quarterly* 33, no. 1 (1989): 73. See also Mohammed Ayoob, "Inequality and Theorizing in International Relations: The Case for Subaltern Realism," *International Studies Review* 4, no. 3 (2002): 27–48.

analyze this otherwise undertheorized and amorphous notion of a collective-psychological '*feeling* of deprivation,' especially as policymaking elites problematically articulate it on behalf of subalterns. But, because historical traumas have psychological *and* material consequences, application of trauma studies' insights will also facilitate a theoretical linkage between these new, developing states' relative economic weakness and this '*feeling*' of deprivation. Both conditions have shared historical roots and can be viewed as, in various ways, mutually reinforcing.

In this way, reconnecting the economic outcomes of traumatic historical events with their more intangible collective-psychological and sociocultural impacts can help address the notable Western bias of trauma studies literature that is especially apparent in its limited application to IR. Though early trauma studies scholarship often employed boldly universal language[171], since its inception the field has frequently been attacked for ignoring non-Western contexts. This criticism applies equally to trauma studies' empirical applications and its theoretical neglect of the unique traumas subalterns experience or how these traumas impact the political groups in which they participate, including the states in which they live. As Stef Craps writes, trauma studies scholarship tends to employ a definition of trauma imbued with "a modernist aesthetic of fragmentation and aporia," that can have the unintended consequence of relativizing traumas, ignoring the complex relationship between the severity of experience and its narration into identity.[172] Over time, as this tendency has persisted in scholarship, it had lead to neglect of the complex reinforcing psychological and material impacts of racism, colonialism and other oppressions chiefly affecting Third World nations and subalterns within them. Further, as Ann Cvetovich has noted in her analysis of queer trauma, certain groups' lack of economic resources and political voice can reinforce historical traumas and prevent the process of 'working through' necessary for these traumas to be processed and overcome.[173] This bias is especially apparent in literature on collective trauma in IR, which frequently adopts Western-oriented theory to analyze Western contexts. Though incorporation of collective trauma's dual material and non-material impact does not necessarily eliminate potential for similar types of bias reappearing, it will allow for another layer of comparative analysis to distinguish the traumatic experiences of subalterns from those of elites, as well as the traumas of emerging and

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[171] In one of the most well-known early works of trauma studies scholarship, Cathy Caruth, for example, boldly stated that "history is precisely the way we are implicated in each other's traumas." Cathy Caruth, *Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016 [1996]), 24.

[172] Stef Craps, *Postcolonial Witnessing: Trauma out of Bounds* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 2–4.

[173] Ann Cvetkovich, *An Archive of Feelings: Trauma, Sexuality, and Lesbian Public Cultures* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003).

Third World states from those of developed ones. Such analysis would emphasize that collective traumas are not solely reproduced socio-culturally and psychologically over time, but are also reified *materially*, compounding post-traumatic suffering with the suffering of poverty and distinguishing those who possess the resources to 'work through' traumas from those who do not. This addition will serve to open the field to more nuanced empirical analysis of new states' experiences and identities.

To better theorize collective trauma's diverse impacts and narration into international politics, this chapter proceeds in four sections. First, drawing on the work of sociologist Jeffrey Olick, it begins by outlining how a dichotomy between two different conceptualizations of collective memory has led to two alternative cultures of trauma studies literature that has persisted in this literature's limited application to IR.[174] Some of this insight on the ontology of collective trauma—a form of collective memory—resonates with that of the previous chapter's insight on the ontology of identity, providing a useful avenue for conversation between these theoretical chapters in application to my empirical cases. But because of the particular issues involved in specifically *traumatic* memory's formation, I argue that this dichotomy is particularly problematic for trauma studies scholarship and warrants renewed investigation before theorizing collective trauma's impact on international politics. In the subsequent second section, I attempt to overcome this divide by advocating a novel, unifying conceptualization of collective trauma. This conceptualization emphasizes the role of identity narratives in grappling with the paradox inherent in collective trauma, as well as in mediating between its material and non-material instantiations. In the third section, I build on this theorization by specifically identifying three frameworks for understanding how, after their immediate impacts, traumas become embedded in material, social psychological and sociocultural conditions, creating lingering effects over time for the identities of the nations and states they impacted. The goal of delineating these frameworks is not to create new, unnecessary divisions within scholarship on collective trauma in international politics, nor to provide a comprehensive typology of collective trauma's impacts. Rather, these frameworks demonstrate the applicability of this chapter's theorizations to developing states, helping direct analysis in my subsequent empirical chapters. Finally, in the fourth section I turn to the methodological issues posed by collective trauma and discuss the complexity inherent in identifying collective trauma in discourse analyses. Drawing on insights from literary studies and historiography, in this section I demonstrate that scholarship

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[174] Jeffrey K. Olick, "Collective Memory: The Two Cultures," *Sociological Theory* 17, no. 3 (1999): 333–48.

interested in the complex impact of traumatic events must stay attuned to its latent appearance in sociocultural representations, particularly in figurative language and abstract representation. This addition will assist analysis of identity narratives during the pre- and post-independence period in India and Israel.

3.2 Existing Approaches to Collective Trauma: Two Prevailing Cultures

Collective trauma[175] is often considered a subset or variant of the larger category of collective memory and thus scholarship on the subject spans across the numerous fields that deal with memory, including psychiatry, neurobiology, sociology, history, political science and psychoanalysis, among others.[176] Jeffrey Olick has described "two cultures" of collective memory theory, which I would argue exist as well in scholarship on collective trauma.[177] First, the "collected memory" tradition begins with an individualistic ontology and addresses the collective first and foremost as an aggregation of individuals. As with more individualized identity narratives, it privileges individuals' experiences of trauma as forming the basis for affiliation with a collective and questions the ability of social knowledge systems like language to capture trauma's nuance. Second, the 'collective memory" tradition draws upon a Durkheimian (and Halbwachian) approach to theorize collective memory as a *sui generis* sociocultural phenomenon which emerges as shared social knowledge divorced from individuals' unique experiences, forming identities farther to the category end of the spectrum. Beyond their resonance with the previous chapter's ontological spectrum, these

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[175] It's worth noting here that I employ the term 'collective trauma' throughout this article to refer to the broader phenomenon in question, while Olick uses the term "collective memory" to refer to theory drawing on a Durkheimian ontology. Further, I selected this term over alternatives like 'national trauma' or 'cultural trauma,' which have been employed by scholars writing on similar issues with different emphasis. I have elected not to employ the term national trauma, despite this thesis' ample discussion of trauma's impact on national identity, because it elides discussion of vital contestation over trauma narratives that take place within national groups over how (and whether) to narrate collective traumas into group political identity. On the other hand, I avoid the term 'cultural trauma,' which frequently appears by scholars within the Durkheimian tradition, as it has been crafted to deliberately downplay analysis at the individual level and thus proves ill-suited for adaptation to IR, which necessarily must theorize the interplay between agents and structures. I have settled on the term collective trauma precisely because it seems to avoid these two terms' pitfalls, while understanding that it perhaps lacks specificity that these other terms offer.

[176] For some of the most influential trauma studies literature, see Jeffrey C. Alexander, *Trauma: A Social Theory* (Cambridge: Polity, 2012); Jeffrey C. Alexander, "Toward a Theory of Cultural Trauma," in *Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity*, ed. Jeffrey C. Alexander et al. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004); Caruth, *Unclaimed Experience*; Cathy Caruth, ed., *Trauma: Explorations in Memory* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); Judith Lewis Herman, *Trauma and Recovery: The Aftermath of Violence--from Domestic Abuse to Political Terror* (New York, NY: Basic books, 1992); Ronnie Janoff-Bulman, *Shattered Assumptions: Towards a New Psychology of Trauma* (New York, NY: Free Press, 1992); Dominick LaCapra, *Writing History, Writing Trauma* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001); Dominick LaCapra, *Representing the Holocaust: History, Theory, Trauma*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); Ruth Leys, *Trauma: A Genealogy* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2000); Bessel A. Van der Kolk, *The Body Keeps the Score : Brain, Mind, and Body in the Healing of Trauma* (New York, NY: Viking, 2014)..

[177] Olick, "Collective Memory: The Two Cultures."

two cultures parallel longstanding debates in social theory between individualism and holism or agent and structure. But, as this section will demonstrate, these debates and my ontological spectrum do not map perfectly onto divides in theoretical literature on collective trauma. This is partially due to the longstanding influence of Freudian psychoanalysis in trauma theory—a significant literature on collective trauma also begins with an individualistic ontology but analogizes from the individual psychic experience to that of a group, rather than viewing the group as many interconnected individuals.[178]

Olick notes that each of these cultures offers benefits and shortcomings and ultimately advocates retaining the term collective memory as a "sensitizing term" to draw attention to the social dimensions of memory in both individuals and groups.[179] While I agree with this nuanced approach to the subject and advocate viewing trauma as a sensitizing concept, due to the complexities inherent in *trauma* as a type of memory, I argue that further theorization beyond Olick's is required. This is especially the case in application of trauma studies theory to international politics, a field which, as the previous chapter has noted, must mediate between individual agents and macro-level social institutions and thus requires a cogent account of how trauma specifically lends itself to identity narratives bridging this divide. Though the most successful applications of trauma studies scholarship to IR have generally been contingent and context-specific, in this section I demonstrate that the limitations imposed by these two cultures' ontological underpinnings persist subtly in much of this literature. I begin this section by briefly outlining how these two cultures have grappled with the nuances collective trauma imposes on notions of collective memory, as well as the limitations imposed by these applications. Then, adapting recent work by Emma Hutchison, I articulate a novel, unified conception of collective trauma, which emphasizes the role of identity narratives in mediating between trauma's individual and collective aspects, as well as articulating its material and non-material instantiations.[180] This conceptualization, I demonstrate in the subsequent section, can

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[178] Perhaps the most notable example of this analogizing is Freud's *Moses and Monotheism*, in which he argued that the historic foundations of the Jewish people's identity lay in a shared traumatic memory of the early Israelites murder of Moses. This text has proven quite influential (and controversial) in trauma studies, notably due to Cathy Caruth's incorporation of its insights in *Unclaimed Experience*.; Sigmund Freud, *Moses and Monotheism*, trans. Katherine Jones (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1967 [1939]); Cathy Caruth, *Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History*, Twentieth Anniversary edition (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016 [1996]).

[179] Olick, "Collective Memory," 346.

[180] Hutchison, *Affective Communities in World Politics*.

help uncover lingering reservoirs of collective traumatic memory that resurface during pivotal moments of identity narration that occur during state-building.

3.2a The 'Collected Trauma' Tradition

The first of Olick's two cultures of collective memory studies, which he labels the "collected memory" tradition, employs a largely individualistic ontology and begins by defining trauma via its effects on the psyche.[181] Though this tradition does not entirely neglect the importance of social knowledge like language and politics in narrations of trauma, it tends to privilege individuals' psyches as the loci of traumatic experience and grant them primacy in analysis. In so doing, it emphasizes trauma as raw experience that can only problematically be incorporated into individuals' mnemonic schema, that can suppress the language and representation necessary to rearticulate experience, and that can foster in individuals an ineluctable sense of betrayal in social and political institutions. To be sure, these individual psychic indicators undoubtedly impact the way people articulate and interpret identity narratives. But by emphasizing trauma as, first and foremost, pre-linguistic *experience*, rather than as primarily mediated by larger, politically-potent meaning-making social knowledge, this literature tends to treat collective trauma as a collection of individuals that have undergone related traumatic experiences, rather than an emergent sociocultural phenomenon. Within this culture, some scholarship has largely relied on a positivist behavioral science epistemology, employing data from clinical and experimental work, as well as social surveys, to address the persistence of trauma in a collective. Though scholarship by James Pennebaker and Becky Banasik, Daniel Bar-Tal, Ronnie Janoff-Bulman and others has provided noteworthy insight on trauma victims' processing of political memories and politically-oriented emotions[182], this literature has yet to find significant application to IR.[183]

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[181] Olick, "Collective Memory: The Two Cultures," 338.

[182] James W. Pennebaker and Becky Banasik, "On the Creation and Maintenance of Collective Memory: History as Social Psychology," in *Collective Memory of Political Events: Social Psychological Perspectives*, ed. James W. Pennebaker, Darío Páez, and Bernard Rimé (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997); Daniel Bar-Tal, "Sociopsychological Foundations of Intractable Conflicts," *American Behavioral Scientist* 50, no. 11 (2007): 1430–53.; Daniel Bar-Tal, "Why Does Fear Override Hope in Societies Engulfed by Intractable Conflict, as It Does in the Israeli Society?," *Political Psychology* 22, no. 3 (2001): 601–27.; Daniel Bar-Tal et al., "A Sense of Self-Perceived Collective Victimhood in Intractable Conflicts," *International Review of the Red Cross* 91, no. 874 (2009).; Ronnie Janoff-Bulman and Sana Sheikh, "From National Trauma to Moralizing Nation," *Basic and Applied Social Psychology* 28, no. 4 (2006): 325–32.; Ronnie Janoff-Bulman and Ramila Usoof-Thowfeek, "Shifting Moralities: Post-9/11 Responses to Shattered National Assumptions," in *The Impact of 9/11 on Psychology and Education: The Day That Changed Everything?*, ed. Matthew J. Morgan (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 81–96.; Janoff-Bulman, *Shattered Assumptions*.

[183] Though her conception of trauma does not rely on this epistemology, Vanessa Pupavac has offered extensive critique on state-sponsored efforts to promote "therapeutic governance" dependent on a medicalization of trauma, particularly

Outside of this more positivist psychological literature that tends to aggregate individuals in examining collective trauma, ontologically individualistic scholarship on trauma stemming from the psychoanalytic tradition pioneered by Freud has inspired a scholarship on collective trauma in IR that follows Freud's strategy of analogizing directly from individual to group.[184] In their most extreme version, such analogies suggest that it is the *group itself* which undergoes a traumatic experience and not solely a collection of interconnected individuals who then share their experiences. While Cathy Caruth pioneered this approach in literary theory and Dominick LaCapra has done vital psychoanalytically-inspired historiographic work[185], Vamik Volkan and Jenny Edkins have become its leading voices in IR. Volkan's work largely focuses on collective trauma's tendency to persist in large-group identity—he coined the term "chosen trauma" to refer to emotional responses to traumatic encounters that become embedded in a group's identity when the events are not properly mourned. Identities formed via 'chosen traumas', Volkan observes, pass through generations, transmitting grievances that can foment violence even after the perpetrators of original traumas have passed.[186] Edkins, on the other hand, draws on both psychological and psychoanalytic theory to conclude that trauma leads individuals and groups to experience a sense of betrayed trust in social institutions.[187] In turn, this sense of betrayed trust exposes an irony at the heart of the contemporary nation-state, which, according to the Weberian tradition, ensures security for its citizens by aspiring to a legitimate monopoly on violent coercion over a delineated space and time. Though most seldom consider this penumbra of coercion in their daily lives, traumatic events throughout history have often exposed this presumed security as a façade, reinforced by the state's

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in conflict zones and has thus criticized state efforts to impose a psychologically-inspired definition of trauma and its associated treatment and management. Her work, though, largely focuses on humanitarian intervention, NGOs, and the medicalization of trauma by states, avoiding the question this article seeks to address of how and if collective trauma can be understood as both a material and non-material force in international politics. Vanessa Pupavac, "Pathologizing Populations and Colonizing Minds: International Psychosocial Programs in Kosovo," *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 27, no. 4 (2002): 489–511.; Vanessa Pupavac, "Therapeutic Governance: Psycho-Social Intervention and Trauma Risk Management," *Disasters* 25, no. 4 (2001): 358–72.

[184] See Sigmund Freud, *Moses and Monotheism*, trans. Katherine Jones (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1967 [1939]); Josef Breuer and Sigmund Freud, *Studies on Hysteria* (London: Penguin, 1991 [1895]); Sigmund Freud, "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego," in *Standard Edition*, vol. 18 (London: Hogarth Press, 1957 [1921]).

[185] See Caruth, *Trauma*; Caruth, *Unclaimed Experience*; LaCapra, *Writing History, Writing Trauma*; LaCapra, *Representing the Holocaust*.

[186] Vamik Volkan, "Chosen Trauma: The Political Ideology of Entitlement and Violence," 2004; Vamik Volkan, *Psychoanalysis, International Relations, and Diplomacy: A Sourcebook on Large-Group Psychology* (London: Karnac Books Ltd, 2014); Vamik Volkan, "On Chosen Trauma," *Mind and Human Interaction* 3, no. 13 (1991): 1; Vamik Volkan, "Transgenerational Transmissions and Chosen Traumas: An Aspect of Large-Group Identity," *Group Analysis* 34, no. 1 (2001): 79–97.

[187] Jenny Edkins, *Trauma and the Memory of Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Jenny Edkins, "Forget Trauma? Responses to September 11," *International Relations* 16, no. 2 (2002): 243–56.

"processes of enforced exclusion," embodied in the often-arbitrary distinctions between citizen and alien or criminal and bystander.[188] This 'enforced exclusion' shapes the vital notion of state sovereignty that structures the international system and is a chief goal for nationalist leaders post-independence state-building seeking to delineate the in-group from out-group.

Though both Volkan and Edkins endeavor to theorize the translation of individuals' experiences of trauma into collective traumas that impact international politics, both scholars and those writing in their wake to varying degrees exhibit a problematic tendency to project insight on trauma's workings in the psyche onto larger, more complex scenarios mediated by numerous exogenous factors, including power, culture and material resources. For instance, Volkan argues that when a large-group develops a "chosen trauma" that becomes embedded in its identity, it will "regress under shared stress" and, like an individual, exhibit unconscious urges like Oedipal hostility that are "shared by all members of the group."[189] Further, he draws on Freud's *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* to argue that group dynamics cause the "effacement of dissimilarity among individuals," which in turn causes unconscious tribal urges to surface among most individuals within the group.[190] These unconscious urges, he argues, spur a group identity based on shared unconscious urges, thus legitimating his analogizing. Edkins, by contrast, articulates this translation process from individual to social somewhat indirectly by employing a psychoanalytic conception of the self, formed via a dialectic between social interaction and the residual "traumatic real," reified in the dialectic between state-sponsored linear time and trauma time. And though Edkins theorizes how state power mediates traumatized individuals' socialization of their experiences, she too projects traumatized individuals' experience of betrayed social trust onto larger groups by employing Foucault's notion of the "solidarity of the shaken" in her discussions of large-scale dissension from state narratives.[191] Likewise, Kate Schick, who has alternatively drawn upon LaCapra's adaptation of Freud's distinction between 'acting out' and 'working through' trauma, justifies this theory's application to the nation-state context in IR by stating that "such behavior is seen not only in individuals, but also in larger groups."[192]

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[188] Edkins, *Trauma and the Memory of Politics*, 7.
[189] Vamik Volkan, *Bloodlines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 26–27.
[190] Freud, "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego"; see also Yaacov Y. I. Vertzberger, "The Practice and Power of Collective Memory," *International Studies Review* 7, no. 1 (2005): 117–21.
[191] Edkins, *Trauma and the Memory of Politics*, 3–9.
[192] Kate Schick, "Acting out and Working through: Trauma and (in)Security," *Review of International Studies* 37, no. 4 (2011): 1842.

By analogizing from the insights of ontologically-individualistic approaches to macro-social scenarios, these scholars tend to downplay the added complexity posed by the repeated politically-mediated narrations and interpretations necessary for individuals' traumatic experiences to spread socially as influential identity narratives. When applied empirically, such an approach can veer towards the psychological reductionism sociologist Neil Smelser has argued makes the level of culture (and, I would add, politics) begin to disappear.[193] Further, when such analysis overstates the applicability of Freudian theory and analogies directly to complex, large-group scenarios it can verge upon what Robert Jay Lifton has called a "*pre*historical" or "mythical" approach to analysis, which implicitly and fallaciously assumes that all of global history is simply a stage upon which scientifically-suspect Freudian theories play out across time and space.[194] This approach neglects the extent to which issues in controversial Freudian theories may be compounded and magnified as these theories are scaled up to the realm of international politics. Finally, just as Olick notes of individualistic ontologies of collective memory, when such scholarship grants primacy to the psychic processing of trauma over its sociocultural reproductions and reifications, it neglects important repositories of memory "other than the brain," which can cause traumas to resurface in diverse ways over time.[195] As I will argue later in this chapter, material conditions can constitute a repository for trauma which can be resurfaced and narrated into identities long after the immediate traumatic encounter ends.

3.2b The 'Collective/Cultural Trauma' Tradition

The second culture of scholarship on collective trauma identified by Olick—the Durkheimian ('collective') tradition—oftentimes uses the alternative term 'cultural trauma' and tends to define collective trauma as akin to Durkheim's conception of "religious imagination" or "collective consciousness."[196] This vision views collective trauma as a socially emergent phenomenon, irreducible to individuals, that becomes a form of social knowledge due to trauma's continued rehearsal, reproduction and commemoration in social spheres.[197] According to Jeffrey

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[193] Neil Smelser, "Psychological and Cultural Trauma," in *Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity*, ed. Jeffrey C. Alexander (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004), 32.

[194] Robert Jay Lifton, "On Psychohistory," in *Explorations in Psychohistory: The Wellfleet Papers*, ed. Robert Jay Lifton and Eric Olson (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1975), 24–25.

[195] Olick, "Collective Memory: The Two Cultures," 333.

[196] Émile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, ed. Mark Sydney Cladis, trans. Carol Cosman, Oxford World's Classics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, [1912] 2008).

[197] See Alexander, *Trauma*; Jeffrey C. Alexander et al., eds., *Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004); Smelser, "Psychological and Cultural Trauma"; Neil Smelser, "Epilogue: September 11, 2001

Alexander, perhaps the leading contemporary theorist in this tradition, the key variable determining whether an event will be narrated into influential socialized collective trauma is not the empirical accuracy of narrations of underlying traumatic experiences in individuals, but rather these narrations' symbolic power. Despite psychological evidence on their intertwining, this vision views episodic memories formed from actual traumatic experiences and the social knowledge formed from public narrations of trauma as utterly distinct from the standpoint of analysis. Alexander dismisses scholarship that connects collective trauma as social knowledge to physically or psychologically traumatic experiences in individuals "lay trauma theory" and refers to the conflation of psychic trauma and cultural trauma as a "naturalistic fallacy."[198] Instead, his vision of collective trauma narratives depends predominantly on shared social knowledge (veering towards the category end of the spectrum) and he focuses empirically on carrier groups and their politicized narrations' social spread. IR theorists, in turn, can apply this theoretical model by focusing solely on narrations as common social knowledge, especially as they spread through political culture, shaping identity and policymaking discourses.

Because this tradition largely eschews analysis of collective trauma as a complex psychological wound present in many individuals' psyches, it makes intuitive sense for easy application to macro-contexts. The IR discipline, in particular, has traditionally avoided so-called 'great man' theories of individuals' unique psychological idiosyncrasies as determinative of international events.[199] Further, since this tradition focuses largely on trauma's publicly-available representations in social arenas rather than its more intangible psychic effects, which psychoanalysis and psychology emphasize can involve unconscious or pre-linguistic elements, it has a far clearer methodological application. IR scholars can focus the bulk of their analysis on publicly available narrations of trauma in mass media, political speech and even artistic reproductions and track these manifestations' impact on collective identity and policymaking, rather than trying to psychoanalyze individuals via such imperfect and limited sources, clinical evidence or surveys. Notable examples of literature in this tradition include, on a sub-national level, Ron Eyerman's work on the emergence of African-American political identity in literature of the Harlem Renaissance and activism during the Civil Rights movement, and, on a transnational level, Dovile Budryte's work on the Lithuanian

as Cultural Trauma," in *Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity*, ed. Jeffrey C. Alexander (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004); Piotr Sztompka, "Cultural Trauma," *European Journal of Social Theory* 3, no. 4 (2000): 449–66.
[198] Alexander, *Trauma*.
[199] For more on this, see Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, "Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In," *International Security* 25, no. 4 (2001): 107–46.

diaspora's commemoration of its collective trauma under both Nazism and Stalinism (approximately 1940-1953) via analysis of memory carriers and mnemonic entrepreneurs, as evidenced by interviews, popular novels and histories, and public commemorations.[200]

Yet, as Hans Joas has written in a noteworthy critique of Alexander, while this scholarship is right to highlight how collective trauma can become identified as a form of social knowledge, it oftentimes omits or under-emphasizes discussion of how individuals' experiences of psychic suffering influences collective representations of trauma and their interpretation. "Nobody should dispute the constructedness of propositions about traumatization," Joas writes "but the question remains whether these constructions do refer to something that has its own qualities that exert some resistance in the process of construction, whether traumas are therefore 'nothing but' construction."[201] Indeed, the tension that Joas identifies resonates deeply with the agent-structure problem in IR and the previous chapter's discussion of the deep intertwining of semantic and episodic memory (experience and knowledge), both of which cannot truly be conceived of independently. When applied to IR theory, dismissal of individuals' psychic experiences of trauma and resistance to common knowledge socially-constructed narratives has the potential to descend into foolhardy determinism that negates agency. Cultural trauma scholarship oftentimes proves entirely unable to account for the social *salience* of the trauma narratives it describes beyond pure instrumentalism, succumbing to the problems associated with purely instrumentalist approaches discussed in the previous chapter. Take, for instance, the recently-formed Black Lives Matter movement in the US, which has emerged as a powerful national and, at times, transnational voice against racial injustice in policing and the overreaches of the American criminal justice system. Activists within the movement did not, by any means, imagine into being wholly new narratives about police brutality or racial inequality. Likewise, these narratives' spread cannot be adequately explained through pure instrumentalism, since identifying with the movement hardly reaps immediate material or strategic benefits for many advocates. Rather, part of the reason the Black

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[200] Ron Eyerman, *Cultural Trauma: Slavery and the Formation of African American Identity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).; Dovile Budryte, "Travelling Trauma: Lithuanian Transnational Memory after World War II.," in *Memory and Trauma in International Relations: Theories, Cases, and Debates*, ed. Erica Simone Almeida Resende and Dovile Budryte, Interventions (London: Routledge, 2014); Dovile Budryte, "'We Call It Genocide': Soviet Deportations and Repression in the Memory of Lithuanians," in *The Genocidal Temptation: Auschwitz, Hiroshima, Rwanda, and beyond*, ed. Robert Seitz Frey (Dallas, TX: University Press of America, 2004); Dovilė Budrytė, "Experiences of Collective Trauma and Political Activism: A Study of Women 'Agents of Memory' in Post-Soviet Lithuania," *Journal of Baltic Studies* 41, no. 3 (2010): 331–50.

[201] Hans Joas, "Book Review: Cultural Trauma?: On the Most Recent Turn in Jeffrey Alexander's Cultural Sociology," *European Journal of Social Theory* 8, no. 3 (August 1, 2005): 368.

Lives Matter movement has been successful in crafting political narratives constitutive of identity is that these narratives *resonate* with individuals' experiences. While videos of police brutality against people of color, shared via social and conventional media, certainly constitute reproductions of collective trauma that become social knowledge, they also reveal the importance of authenticity and resonance with individual experience in enhancing narratives' cultural power.[202]

3.3 Addressing Trauma Studies' Western Bias through Materiality: Towards a Unified Approach

In her recent book, *Affective Communities in World Politics*, Emma Hutchison offers an excellent alternative theoretical framework that attempts to bridge the gaps between these two cultures and conceptualize collective trauma in an interdisciplinary, holistic manner. In so doing, she emphasizes the role of both representation and interpretation in understanding trauma's impact on identity constructions. This viewpoint allows simultaneously for consideration of both the bottom-up of identity's narration from experiential memory and the top-down political imposition of widespread narrations as social knowledge. Thus, Hutchison's outlook resonates with not only the narrative identity approach of Ricœur and Somers, but also the prior chapter's emphasis on how meaning-making narratives collate different types of memory to bridge the divide between individual and society in constituting identities. After outlining Hutchison's insight, in this section I add to her conceptualization in three overlapping ways to highlight how narratives grapple with both the material and non-material impacts of trauma across time and space. First, I emphasize how narratives constructed by some on behalf of others complicate the process of bridging between individuals and society she alludes to—especially when elites offer these narrations on behalf of subalterns. Second, I problematize her account of the state, by discussing an alternative bottom-up picture of how post-traumatic narratives, especially when expressed by nationalist movements, can challenge elite political discourse and fundamentally reshape state institutions. This addition builds on the final section of the previous chapter and proves especially important in this thesis' analysis of nationalist movements assuming control of state apparatuses in India and Israel. Third and finally, I complicate the temporality of her account by discussing how material (specifically economic) conditions can serve as reservoirs of trauma, prolonging and complicating traumatic encounters' impacts and re-shaping their legacy across time and space. Together these additions help connect her

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[202] Dottie Lebron et al., "Facts Matter! Black Lives Matter! The Trauma of Racism" (New York, NY: McSilver Institute for Poverty Policy and Research, New York University Silver School of Social Work, May 25, 2015).

and other trauma theorists' work on sociocultural representations of trauma in international politics with a broader understanding of trauma's embedding in political culture over time.

Hutchison begins by defining collective trauma as an inherently paradoxical phenomenon; she argues that trauma suppresses representation in language and incorporation into mnemonic schema in the psyche, yet is dependent on representation and narration to be socialized and to impact politics. "[T]rauma isolates individuals, yet it can also seep out, affecting those who surround and bear witness and, in doing so, shape political communities."[203] Psychiatrist Judith Herman has similarly observed that despite a clear tendency among many individuals to repress traumatic experiences, trauma also leads to a powerful desire to bear witness and narrate one's experience for social consumption. "Equally as powerful as the desire to deny atrocities is the conviction that denial does not work. Remembering and telling the truth about terrible events are prerequisites both for the restoration of the social order and for the healing of individual victims."[204] This paradoxical dual-aspect of trauma leads Hutchison to focus on the emotions that necessarily accompany trauma's representation and socialization. Emphasizing trauma's inherent emotional resonance in individuals, Hutchison theorizes that when traumatic events are represented and spread socially—a process I refer to as *narration* rather than simply representation to emphasize how diachronic emplotment promotes meaning-making out of traumatic disruption—they can catalyze the formation of "affective communities," bound by both a shared identity and shared emotions that stem from this identification and trauma's socialization.[205] By emphasizing how these emotions are not simply ephemeral, but rather strong, lasting motivations for the communities that share them, she unravels a key aspect of the complex role of trauma in shaping international politics.[206]

Hutchison's most notable contribution is to emphasize the way in which these representations (what I term narratives) of trauma, both linguistic and aesthetic, simultaneously distort underlying traumatic experiences and mobilize groups around them. Though emotionally potent, according to much previously mentioned psychoanalytic and psychological research, traumatic experiences are, at their core, somewhat ineffable and pre-linguistic. In this sense, trauma's impacts on the psyche complicate the already impossible notion of expressing pure, pre-linguistic

[203] Hutchison, *Affective Communities in World Politics*, 3.
[204] Herman, *Trauma and Recovery: The Aftermath of Violence--from Domestic Abuse to Political Terror*, 1.
[205] Hutchison, *Affective Communities in World Politics*, 4.
[206] For another argument problematizing dismissals of emotions in IR due to their ephemerality, see Crawford, "The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships."

experiences (pure episodic memory) generally. Still, though the translation from traumatic experience to language can be problematic, narratives serve the vital purpose of "locat[ing] trauma within particular historically embedded ways of understanding; they frame, provide a lens to interpret, and constitute 'trauma' by appealing to established discourses concerning what it means to experience extreme events."[207] In this sense, these narratives draw on common knowledge to articulate otherwise ineffable traumatic encounters. Further, narrative representations—via their emplotment, selective appropriation of facts, temporality and sequencing—fit otherwise unspeakably jarring traumatic encounters into identities that provide continuity to destabilized senses of self, endowing traumatic experiences with meaning across time and space that can shape the logics of policymaking.[208] Due to the difficulty inherent in narrating traumatic memory—which Edkins argues cannot truly be transformed into language but rather simply "encircle[d]" by representation[209]—Hutchison's framework foregrounds how the tensions inherent in *any* narration of trauma imply that *politicized* narrations will face intense contestation as they are incorporated into group identities. Such contestation will prove especially acute as the logics of these identity narratives inform policymaking decisions with distributional and security consequences.

The Holocaust's impact on post-independence Israeli national identity, which I discuss in a subsequent chapter in further detail, provides a notable example for Hutchison's framework's applicability. While Holocaust victims and survivors' immense suffering defies facile linguistic or artistic representation, the aggregate effect of this trauma helped shape the Israeli state's 'existential anxiety' and has played a profound role in shaping Israeli foreign policy in the decades since independence.[210] And yet, any simplistic assumption that political leaders can easily essentialize, narrate and transform collective trauma and existential anxiety into collective social knowledge and grounds for policymaking is foolhardy. Collective trauma implies contestation and tension, especially considering the problematic social relationships between traumatized people and the social categories of bystanders and perpetrators, both of which are often included in the audiences for trauma narratives. This helps explain why efforts to adapt narratives of the Holocaust into

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[207] Hutchison, *Affective Communities in World Politics*, 112.

[208] Somers, "The Narrative Constitution of Identity: A Relational and Network Approach."

[209] Edkins, *Trauma and the Memory of Politics*, 15.

[210] Gad Yair, "Israeli Existential Anxiety: Cultural Trauma and the Constitution of National Character," *Social Identities* 20, no. 4–5 (2014): 346–62.; Gad Yair and Behzad Akbari, "From Cultural Trauma to Nuclear War? Interpreting the Iranian-Israeli Conflict," *Human Figurations* 3, no. 2 (2014); Brent E Sasley, "Affective Attachments and Foreign Policy: Israel and the 1993 Oslo Accords," *European Journal of International Relations*, 2010; Tom Segev, *The Seventh Million: The Israelis and the Holocaust* (New York, NY: Henry Holt, 2000).

justifications for policies like the 1952 Luxembourg Reparations agreement between David Ben-Gurion's Israeli government and the post-war West German government met fierce opposition from some in Israeli society, who believed the agreement could be interpreted as a partial absolution of Germany's incalculable national guilt.[211] Hutchison's emphasis on the tension inherent in narrations of collective trauma helps explain why Ben-Gurion's political opponents, including his right-leaning rival Menachem Begin and even detractors from his left, would resist Ben-Gurion's policy justification, despite the agreement's clear financial benefit for Israel.[212] In my later chapter, I examine how this 1952 debate formed the backdrop for the national identity narratives that emerged during the 1961 trial of Adolf Eichmann.

Despite its innovations, Hutchison's framework exhibits what I consider three limitations which must be addressed to provide a more complete account of trauma's impact on identity, especially in new, non-Western states emerging from profound existential traumas. First, though Hutchison mentions the tension inherent to representing traumatic events and socializing these representations, she neglects the extent to which political dynamics that emphasize elite voices and representations can exacerbate this tension.[213] Although she does note that, in many cases, elites "struggle to reinstate their social control" and "fill the void" left by trauma[214], this instrumentalist outlook downplays the way in which elites—particularly political elites—do sometimes seek to authentically represent underlying trauma on behalf of those who experienced it, as well as how their instrumentalized narrations of trauma must necessarily attempt to resonate with genuine traumatic experience for them to be politically successful. I argue that the crisis in representation inherent to creating problematic linguistic representations out of fragmented, jarring traumatic memories[215] is exacerbated by the distance inherent in elite representation of subalterns. In many ways, this distance is an unavoidable outcome of politics generally and representative politics more specifically. In any political system in which the few act on behalf of the many, these few actors will have a privileged status relative to those they represent; frequently they draw on their privileged status to achieve

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[211] Yossi Sarid, "Israel's Great Debate," *Haaretz*, September 17, 2007, http://www.haaretz.com/israel-s-great-debate-1.229479; Avraham Avi-Hai, "Menachem Begin: Moments of Greatness, Moments of Error," *The Jerusalem Post*, November 27, 2014, http://www.jpost.com/printarticle.aspx?id=383064.

[212] For a more complete account of the debate over the agreement, see Segev, *The Seventh Million*, part IV.

[213] See Jennifer Todd, "The Politics of Identity Change and Conflict: An Agenda for Research," *Politics* 38, no. 1 (February 2018): 84–93.

[214] Hutchison, *Affective Communities in World Politics*, 49.

[215] For more on these issues with representation, see Emma Hutchison, "Trauma and the Politics of Emotions: Constituting Identity, Security and Community after the Bali Bombing," *International Relations* 24, no. 1 (March 2010): 69–73.

these positions and the positions afford them a distance that insulates them from masses' experiences of suffering. But in societies emerging from mass traumatic encounters, oftentimes this distance is even greater, worsened by the way traumatic encounters—through death, impoverishment and destruction—can further silence the voices of those who experience them most directly. This silence oftentimes renders already elite voices relatively more powerful in articulating the enormous needs—psychological and material—of post-traumatic societies in the international arena. Indeed, this dynamic proved pivotal in nationalist movements in Israel and India, in which numerous privileged figures that did not suffer directly in the Holocaust or famines and communal violence rampant under colonialism served as spokespeople for many who either died or became destitute. These elites were tasked with narrating their traumas as motivations for policy responses, but were left with an enormous chasm between their experiences and those they sought to address. In some cases, elites like MK Gandhi and Nehru sought to combat this distance by symbolically connecting with masses' suffering via dramatic fasts or deliberately seeking extended prison sentences for political protest.[216]

This downplaying of the dynamics inherent in elite representation alludes to a second shortcoming in Hutchison's work's potential application to this thesis' case studies. Mirroring what I have identified as Edkins' tendency to essentialize the state in her analogizing from individual to social, Hutchison's conceptualization of the nation-state as a hegemonic synecdoche for the Foucauldian "powers that be" or "status quo" neglects the extent to which contestation over narratives of collective trauma can in fact *constitute* nations and states' identities and shape their actions in international politics.[217] This constitution is especially apparent in new states, where power dynamics have not yet been fully institutionalized, as well as in traumatized nations, where mass suffering has undermined mass acceptance of the status quo. As evidenced by Ayoob's comments on Third World nation-states' exhibition of a "feeling of deprivation," when traumas are narrated throughout a political culture, they often reshape identities and these new identities can shape state actions on the international stage. The ability of trauma to alter the state may be less pronounced in societies with developed, long-institutionalized state apparatuses, but in new states emerging out of nationalist movements this trauma can prove far more impactful. This is a key reason why Manjari Chatterji Miller argues that India and China's traumatic experiences with empire played a profound

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[216] See, for example, Adam B. Lerner, "Collective Trauma and the Evolution of Nehru's Worldview: Uncovering the Roots of Nehruvian Non-Alignment," *The International History Review*, 2018, online first.

[217] Hutchison, *Affective Communities in World Politics*, 132–33.

role in shaping their post-independence regimes' foreign policies, infusing them with what she labels "post-imperial ideology."[218] Though, to be sure, states typically better reflect the opinions of elites than subalterns, through various mechanisms they often incorporate the voices of those traumatized. This dynamic is especially vital for examining the cases of India and Israel; though elites that escaped the bulk of their traumas led both post-independence states, they also both began as liberal democracies with universal adult franchise and relatively free presses, making them more responsive to swings in political identities and opinions.

My third and final problematization of Hutchison's framework relates to her invocation of representations of trauma that are limited to "linguistic, bodily or aesthetic forms of expression or depiction," which neglects the impact of other instantiations of trauma that are not primarily emotional.[219] While Hutchison's case studies brilliantly dissect the way political discourse, photographs and monuments can problematically represent trauma and its associated emotions, she neglects the way in which material conditions (including poverty, destruction, disease, etc.) can also instantiate and even reinforce this trauma. Though these material manifestations of trauma's impact are not *primarily* emotive like artistic representations, political speech or monuments, material conditions can serve as repositories for traumatic memory outside the brain to the extent that they reify and aggravate existing traumas. Though inert pure experience when they are not incorporated into narratives, these repositories can linger and even fester over time, changing trauma's narrative logics and impact on policymaking. Consideration of trauma's embedding in material conditions over time, as this thesis will demonstrate, helps explain not only the array of trauma's more immediate impacts on survivors' psyches, the political culture in which they participate, and the politics of their representation, but also why historical traumas prove so socially potent even generations after survivors have passed. When material conditions are not repaired, they can reinforce or even exacerbate trauma's shorter-term impacts in numerous ways.

Thus, as I turn to a holistic analysis of collective trauma in new states, emerging from colonialism, poverty and mass suffering, I argue for a conceptualization of collective trauma that expands on Hutchison's notion of paradox and narrative to incorporate both the material and non-material. This definition emphasizes that though collective trauma is dependent on narrative for its

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[218] Manjari Chatterjee Miller, *Wronged by Empire: Post-Imperial Ideology and Foreign Policy in India and China* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014).

[219] Hutchison, *Affective Communities in World Politics*, 114.

spread through a political culture and incorporation into identity, it is also instantiated in and persists in pre-linguistic psychological experiences and material circumstances that resist the linear time and causal emplotment implicit in narration. Because of the innate desire of trauma survivors to bear witness, as well as the clear political instrumentality of narratives that appeal to post-traumatic emotions, mnemonic entrepreneurs[220] of varying stripes (both trauma victims and those speaking on their behalf) do often seek to narrate traumas for collective consumption, using social knowledge to endow otherwise inchoate and variegated experience with meaning. But the production of these public narratives implies contestation over which narratives become hegemonic and constitutive of identities. Like any political contestation, existing power dynamics mediate this memory competition and shape its outcomes. But when a particular narrative is sufficiently embraced by a population or elite political influencers within it that it becomes common knowledge, it can imbue a nation, a state, on another international actor's identity, shaping its action on the international stage.

I conceptualize the emerging phenomenon of collective trauma—the product of explicitly political mnemonic competition—via the metaphor of a mosaic. Much like a mosaic artwork, the sum is an emergent effect greater than its individual parts. But, because the parts retain their individual integrity, this emergent sum (or overall effect) is also necessarily a partial abstraction and artificial fabrication. Further, the metaphor of a mosaic—an aesthetic, artistic product constructed out of individual pieces (oftentimes plain tiles) that are not necessarily independently aesthetic or overtly representational—emphasizes the extent to which public narratives of trauma are necessarily stylized abstractions that exist in tension with underlying traumatic experience in the psyche, as well as its unarticulated material instantiations. At times, these narratives seek to approximate or encircle experiences that by definition defy facile narration and incorporate these narratives into larger identities. At other times, these narratives deliberately mischaracterize or exploit traumas for political gain. Of course, this conceptualization does not seek to *resolve* the paradox inherent in collective trauma, but, as this article demonstrates, it does offer a framework for grappling with collective trauma's complex consequences in international politics.

3.4 Recovering Latent Trauma in New States

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[220] For a useful explanation and typology of mnemonic entrepreneurship of this sort see Jan Kubik and Michael Bernhard, "A Theory of the Politics of Memory," in *Twenty Years After Communism*, ed. Michael Bernhard and Jan Kubik (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 7–34.

Though the conceptualization of collective trauma developed in the previous section endeavors to explain how the phenomenon bridges the divide between individual and society, persisting simultaneously in intangible sociocultural, psychological and material instantiations, it alone does not provide sufficient direction for research interested in unraveling collective trauma's impact on new states. Collective trauma, as it is invoked in this thesis, is a broad term, used to group together group responses to an array of physical and psychological suffering of varying levels of severity. To better understand its unique impacts in context, in this section I refine this theorization with more concrete direction on trauma's manifestations in new states like India and Israel, both of which were emerging from historical traumas, yet mired in poverty, continued division and social mistrust. Continuing with this chapter's theorization's theme of unifying the material and non-material aspects of collective trauma in analysis, in this section I outline three empirically-minded applications of this larger framework that guide my subsequent chapters' examination of two impoverished post-traumatic new states. Each of these frameworks jointly considers collective trauma's material and non-material consequences, as well as the interplay between these factors and how narration is impacted by existing power relations. First, scholarship can consider a notion of the trauma *of* poverty, especially as it is caused, perpetuated and reinforced by traumatic historical encounters. Second, it can analyze the loss of economic opportunity that trauma entails as an anxiety akin to the structural trauma of absence, according to a concept adapted from the work of Dominick LaCapra. Finally, considering the insight of more conservative Wendtian systemic constructivism, scholarship can consider how narratives of collective trauma erode trust in institutions that are vital to international economic relations.

3.4a The Trauma of Poverty

While scholarship on collective trauma has often considered the psychological and sociological consequences of the massacres, forced evacuations, famine, disease and the like that have so often accompanied independence or civil wars in the developing world as forms of collective trauma[221], it has scarcely considered the way in which the continued experience of poverty *itself* after their occurrence can entail vulnerability to trauma. This notion can be interpreted in two potential overlapping ways. First, as scholarship considers the day-to-day lives of people living in

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[221] See, for example, Jeffrey C. Alexander, "Partition and Trauma: Repairing India and Pakistan," in *Trauma: A Social Theory* (Cambridge: Polity, 2012), 136–54; Erica Caple James, "The Political Economy of 'Trauma' in Haiti in the Democratic Era of Insecurity," *Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry* 28, no. 2 (2004): 127–49.; Maria Joao Ferreira, "Trauma as a Technology of Power: Memory, Aid and Rule in Contemporary Haiti," in *Memory and Trauma in International Relations: Theories, Cases and Debates*, ed. Erica Resende and Dovile Budryte (New York, NY: Routledge, 2013).

impoverished conditions, it must necessarily address the way in which poverty serves as a reservoir of past collective traumatic encounters and how the continuous vulnerability to further traumatic experience poverty entails contributes to identity when narrated. Though impoverished subalterns are often represented on the international stage solely via the distortion of elites, to the extent that their narratives contribute to national identities, the trauma resulting from material poverty can have enormous consequences. Second, to the extent that wealthier, industrialized nations are held responsible for perpetrating immense suffering of many nations via histories of colonialism, the imposition of unequal or unjust economic arrangements or the use of coercive violence, the states that form in colonialism's wake and actors within them oftentimes narrate high levels of endemic poverty as a reification of historically traumatic events.[222] This dynamic can help elucidate the lingering resentments in identities that shape contemporary international politics.

Though it would be naïve to insist that *all* of the more than 1.5 billion people in the world that lived on less than US $1 per day in 2013[223] live in a perpetual state of trauma analogous to the experience of torture or war famine or mass violence, IR scholarship has scarcely considered the extent to which large numbers of people live in a state of perpetual structural vulnerability, as well as how this vulnerability can affect the identities of the nation-states in which they live. Scholarship from numerous fields has demonstrated that, on an individual level, poverty's material deprivation leaves people vulnerable to myriad emotionally taxing experiences. Nancie Hudson, for instance, writes in an auto-ethnography of her upbringing in poverty across the United States, that her family's lack of material resources constituted a form of social identity that shaped her daily life—as a child, she constantly worried about a lack of food in her home, was humiliated wearing the same pants every day to school, and lived in a state of perpetual fear that the generosity of charities, neighbors, and government institutions upon which her family depended would evaporate. Ultimately, she employs the language of trauma to characterize this experience due to the extent to which the social rejection and isolation shattered her "sense of well-being and cause[d] haunting memories."[224] Poverty, indeed, is a mechanism via which collective trauma spreads through generations. On a transgenerational scale, for example, Maria Yellow Horse Brave Heart likewise employs the language of historical collective trauma to describe the experiences of American Indian

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[222] David Lloyd, "Colonial Trauma/Postcolonial Recovery?," *Interventions* 2, no. 2 (2000): 212–28.
[223] The World Bank, "Poverty: Overview," The World Bank: Understanding Poverty, February 10, 2016, http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/overview.
[224] Nancie Hudson, "The Trauma of Poverty as Social Identity," *Journal of Loss and Trauma* 21, no. 2 (2016): 112.

populations recovering from genocide. Her work documents how this historical trauma has transformed into economic poverty and, in turn, fueled substance abuse issues, depression, and other self-destructive behaviors, which ultimately reinforce these economic conditions and exacerbate initial traumatization.[225]

These experiences of economic poverty across generations as traumatic are not unique to developed countries like the United States, where the juxtaposition of material hardship with relative material comfort can exacerbate feelings of exclusion and shame. In developing countries, where many individuals in poverty lack access to institutions like those that helped Hudson and her family survive, far greater numbers die from preventable diseases, are increasingly likely to be victimized by crime, and suffer in numerous other ways due to a lack of material resources. Indeed, for this reason psychologist Ibrahim Aref Kira classifies historical traumas like genocides or slavery alongside the social violence of extreme poverty as two different types of the same category of "collective cross-generational trauma," which unfortunately often goes unrecognized because "people [are] accustomed to see[ing] such traumatized others suffering from such structural traumas."[226] Psychological research has shown that this form of structural collective trauma can have numerous ancillary deleterious effects on individuals, including stunted emotional and intellectual development among children or even an unwillingness to take the economic risks and make the investments necessary to escape the intergenerational transmission of poverty.[227]

Consideration of poverty as a structural predisposition to trauma has multiple implications for IR scholarship, especially considering the extent to which inequality and poverty persist as vital forces in the international system, shaping interactions in numerous ways. First, nations with high numbers of impoverished citizens and reasonably representative governments[228] are likely to incorporate narratives of this trauma into their national identities and, in turn, convey these identities

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[225] See Maria Yellow Horse Brave Heart, "The Historical Trauma Response Among Natives and Its Relationship with Substance Abuse: A Lakota Illustration," *Journal of Psychoactive Drugs* 35, no. 1 (2003): 7–13.; Maria Yellow Horse Brave Heart, "Wakiksuyapi: Carrying the Historical Trauma of the Lakota," *Tulane Studies in Social Welfare* 21, no. 22 (2000): 245–66; Maria Yellow Horse Brave Heart, "The Return to the Sacred Path: Healing the Historical Trauma and Historical Unresolved Grief Response among the Lakota through a Psychoeducational Group Intervention," *Smith College Studies in Social Work* 68, no. 3 (1998): 287–305.

[226] Ibrahim Aref Kira, "Taxonomy of Trauma and Trauma Assessment," *Traumatology* 7, no. 2 (2001): 80–81.

[227] Ben Fell and Miles Hewstone, "Psychological Perspectives on Poverty" (York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation, June 2015); J. Haushofer and E. Fehr, "On the Psychology of Poverty," *Science* 344, no. 6186 (2014): 862–67.; V. C. McLoyd, "Socioeconomic Disadvantage and Child Development," *The American Psychologist* 53, no. 2 (1998): 185–204.

[228] By representative, here, I do not necessarily mean democratic, but rather governments that attempt to convey the experiences of their populations onto the international stage with minimized distortion.

on the international stage. Though any narrative of collective trauma rests on paradoxical foundations and the problems inherent in elite conveyance of subalterns' experiences only compounds the tension, nation-states' impoverishment has often contributed to identity constraints on foreign policymaking. For example, during the years before the Green Revolution, India became dependent on food aid from the United States to prevent famine, a scourge to Indian society during centuries of colonial rule. By the mid-1960s, as the United States began to use this food aid to exert more and more influence on India's domestic politics, Indira Gandhi reportedly felt "humiliation" at having to beg for aid from her U.S. counterparts, motivating her to more aggressively pursue Green Revolution policies that, in turn, allowed her to shift alignment to the Soviet Union in the late 1960s, contrary to the wishes of her former American benefactors.[229] Though representation of India's food shortages by Indira Gandhi, a quintessential Indian elite, was heavily contested by actors across the political spectrum, India's history of traumatic famines played a significant role in formulations of its identity expressed during aid negotiations throughout the 1950s and 1960s.[230] Likewise, as previously mentioned, though Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion advocated signing the Luxembourg Agreement with West Germany partially to alleviate his nation's poverty at the time, many impoverished Holocaust survivors and their allies protested the agreement, painting it as a pittance relative to the immense collective trauma the Jewish people experienced.[231]

Incorporating a notion of poverty itself as a reservoir of collective trauma also has profound implications for concepts of transitional justice after events like colonialism or apartheid. For example, Emma Hutchison compares China's post-revolution public narrations of its 'century of national humiliation,' with South Africa's efforts to "work through"—grieve and critically reflect upon—apartheid via the nation's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Ultimately, Hutchison concludes that the TRC was largely successful in that it "therapeutically managed" the trauma, allowing for the "'culture of silence'" around apartheid's trauma to be "broken" following the nation's political restructuring and the creation of narratives of reconciliation.[232] "[T]he TRC demonstrates that societal trauma…can be reframed so as to acknowledge the deep suffering

[229] Adam B. Lerner, "Political Neo-Malthusianism and the Progression of India's Green Revolution," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 48, no. 3 (2018): 485–507.

[230] Nick Cullather, *The Hungry World* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010).

[231] Segev, *The Seventh Million*, 211–26; Aviv Melamud and Mordechai Melamud, "'When Shall We Not Forgive?' The Israeli-German Reparations Agreement: The Interface Between Negotiation and Reconciliation," in *Negotiating Reconciliation in Peacemaking*, ed. Valerie Rosoux and Mark Anstey (London: Springer International Publishing, 2017), 257–75.

[232] Hutchison, *Affective Communities in World Politics*, 248–50.

endured while simultaneously dissolving divisions and steering the community away from further animosity toward the type of collective reckoning, reflection and mourning that characterizes political grieving."[233] This perspective parallels numerous scholarly accounts of the TRC as vital to South African nation-building and preventing ongoing violence.[234]

Yet, while the TRC might have had successes in providing a *symbolically* and *politically* unifying hegemonic narrative of grief in the wake of apartheid, Hutchison's sanguine assessment implies too neat a coda to South Africa's collective trauma, belying the way in which South Africa's continued economic injustice serves as a repository for traumatic memory that continues to undermine this 'working through'.[235] As Aletta Norval argues, the slow and inadequate dispersal of reparations payments, as well as the ongoing efforts of the Khulumani Support Group (KSG) to document apartheid's sufferings and seek redress, demonstrate that the TRC was "only the start of a process yet to be accomplished."[236] Sharlene Swartz goes further, highlighting the extent to which existing reparations have been far too limited and that large-scale economic and social restitution as vital for South Africa to fully grapple with the wounds of apartheid.[237] According to South Africa's 2011 census (taken more than a decade and a half after the end of apartheid), whites still earned on average more than six times their black counterparts, in addition to a variety of similar disparities in crime victimization, health outcomes, education and other development indicators.[238] Citing the

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[233] Hutchison, 261.

[234] See Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela, "Remorse, Forgiveness, and Rehumanization: Stories from South Africa," *Journal of Humanistic Psychology* 42, no. 1 (2002): 7–32.; E. Skaar, "Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Did the TRC Deliver? Ed. Audrey R. Chapman and Hugo van Der Merwe; Narrating Political Reconciliation: South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Claire Moon," *International Journal of Transitional Justice* 3, no. 1 (2008): 150–52.; Annelies Verdoolaege, "Dealing with a Traumatic Past: The Victim Hearings of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Their Reconciliation Discourse," *Critical Discourse Studies* 6, no. 4 (2009): 297–309.

[235] Multiple scholars have also criticized the TRC for distorting facts, for offering collective amnesty while individualizing victims, and for removing victims and their families' right to seek civil redress, among other reasons. See Anthea Jeffery, "The Truth About the Truth Commission," *Human Rights* 27, no. 2 (2000): 19–22; Mahmood Mamdani, "Amnesty or Impunity? A Preliminary Critique of the Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa (TRC)," *Diacritics* 32, no. 3/4 (2002): 33–59; David Mendeloff, "Truth-Seeking, Truth-Telling, and Postconflict Peacebuilding: Curb the Enthusiasm?," *International Studies Review* 6, no. 3 (2004): 355–80; Aletta J. Norval, "'No Reconciliation without Redress': Articulating Political Demands in Post-Transitional South Africa," *Critical Discourse Studies* 6, no. 4 (2009): 311–21; Clint van der Walt, Vijé Franchi, and Garth Stevens, "The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission: 'Race', Historical Compromise and Transitional Democracy," *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 27, no. 2 (2003): 251–67.; Scott Veitch, "The Legal Politics of Amnesty," in *Lethe's Law: Justice, Law and Ethics in Reconciliation*, ed. Emilios A. Christodoulidis and Scott Veitch (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001)..

[236] Norval, "'No Reconciliation without Redress,'" 312.

[237] Sharlene Swartz, *Another Country: Everyday Social Restitution* (Cape Town: BestRed, 2016).

[238] John Campbell, "Black and White Income Inequality in South Africa and the United States," *Council on Foreign Relations* (blog), September 12, 2014, https://www.cfr.org/blog/black-and-white-income-inequality-south-africa-and-united-states; "South Africa's Census: Racial Divide Continuing," *BBC News*, October 30, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-20138322.

extent to which white South Africans have *acknowledged* the severe inequalities of their society, but, to-date, have not exhibited much support for policies that would significantly redistribute material and political resources to blacks, Swartz suggests "[t]he response from individuals and civil society has yet to emerge in the way the TRC envisaged."[239] Indeed, I would argue that South Africa's persistent economic inequality along racial lines serves as a material instantiation of this trauma, inflicting diverse traumatic experiences over time, and that trauma's persistence has played a profound role in narratives shaping South Africa's post-apartheid identity.

Because the perpetrator of apartheid's traumas was largely an internal enemy, South Africa's expression of this post-traumatic identity on the international stage can largely be seen as indirect.[240] But historical collective traumas perpetrated across borders often have more direct impacts on international politics, particularly in how relations between the West and the Third World. For example, to date many former colonizers have not acknowledged or apologized for the myriad traumas they inflicted upon their former colonies[241] or these traumas' manifestation in persistent international and sub-national economic inequalities. Yet, just as inequalities persist between South Africa's white and black communities, so too do significant economic inequalities persist between formerly colonized nations and their former colonizers. In addition to uncovering the ongoing collective psychological and sociocultural impacts of colonialism, future scholarship must address how the inequalities between under-developed nation-states and their former colonizers reify and reinforce the collective trauma of the colonial encounter, oftentimes fueling narratives that justify persistent international grievances and frictions. In recent years, intellectuals across the Third World and their allies in former colonizers have begun advocating official apologies and even reparations payments to compensate for the historical trauma of colonialism and its transgenerational economic

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[239] Swartz, *Another Country*, xix.

[240] There were, however, numerous instances in which anti-apartheid activists internationalized their struggle and these dynamics had enormous international implications. For example, the divestment campaign, advocated for by South African anti-apartheid activists, played a significant role in stigmatizing the apartheid regime and generating sanctions. Likewise, after democratization, the KSG internationalized apartheid reparations claims by pursuing redress from American companies that cooperated with the South African apartheid regime in US courts; see Audie Klotz, "Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions against South Africa," *International Organization* 49, no. 3 (1995): 451.; Norval, "'No Reconciliation without Redress.'"

[241] For instance, on a trip to India in 2013, UK Prime Minister David Cameron refused to issue an official apology for the Amritsar massacre in which British soldiers killed at least 379 innocent protestors. That this event, which constituted a particularly acute trauma of more than two centuries of violence, injustice and plunder, could not inspire an official apology, demonstrates how unlikely the prospect of an official British apology or reconciliation commission are.; Nicholas Watt, "David Cameron Defends Lack of Apology for British Massacre at Amritsar," *The Guardian*, February 20, 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/feb/20/david-cameron-amritsar-massacre-india.

impact.[242] Though different nations' experiences of colonialism varied widely, and thus so too do their respective narratives of collective trauma and calls for reparations, in a diverse array of cases these collective traumas have been narrated into identities in ways that shaped post-colonial states behavior in the international arena. This chapter argues that 'working through' such collective trauma necessarily entails dealing with their economic consequences, as poverty can serve as a repository for traumatic memory.

3.4b Economic Trauma as Absence

In his groundbreaking analysis of trauma's historiography, Dominick LaCapra theorizes a distinction between structural trauma and historical trauma stemming from the conceptual difference between absence and loss. Whereas structural trauma "is related to (even correlated with) transhistorical absence (absence of/at the origin)," historical trauma is "specific" and involves loss incurred via some event.[243] "Everyone is subject to structural trauma," LaCapra writes, but whereas historical traumas result from precipitating events, structural trauma is, by definition, not associated with an event and thus can only be understood problematically, fallaciously narrated by being "identified with loss," rather than the vague, transhistorical without-ness to which LaCapra refers.[244] Historical trauma, despite the limitations inherent in portraying traumatic experience, proves easier to narrate, both because it results from a precipitating event and because it entails "the distinction between victims, perpetrators, and bystanders." The notion of a victim, LaCapra adds, is "in variable ways, a social, political, and ethical category," which *necessitates* some form of narration for its logic to be comprehensible due to its inherent relationality.[245] By contrast, structural trauma—though a somewhat murky, widely-applicable concept—persists in a state of anxiety, "related to the potential for historical traumatization," but only narratable via fallacious association with some loss.[246] In this

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[242] See, for example, Daniel Butt, "Repairing Historical Wrongs and the End of Empire," *Social & Legal Studies* 21, no. 2 (2012): 227–42.; Jason Hickel, "Enough of Aid – Let's Talk Reparations," *The Guardian*, November 27, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2015/nov/27/enough-of-aid-lets-talk-reparations; Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann and Anthony P. Lombardo, "Framing Reparations Claims: Differences between the African and Jewish Social Movements for Reparations," *African Studies Review* 50, no. 1 (2007): 27–48; Rs Ratner, Andrew Woolford, and Andrew C Patterson, "Obstacles and Momentum on the Path to Post-Genocide and Mass Atrocity Reparations: A Comparative Analysis, 1945–2010," *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 55, no. 3 (2014): 229–59.; Shashi Tharoor, *Inglorious Empire : What the British Did to India* (London: Hurst, 2017); John Torpey, "'Making Whole What Has Been Smashed': Reflections on Reparations," *The Journal of Modern History* 73, no. 2 (2001): 333–58.

[243] Dominick LaCapra, *Writing History, Writing Trauma*, 76–78; Dominick LaCapra, "Trauma, Absence, Loss," *Critical Inquiry* 25, no. 4 (1999): 696–727.

[244] LaCapra, *Writing History, Writing Trauma*, 49, 82.

[245] LaCapra, 79.

[246] LaCapra, 82.

sense, all historical traumas are likewise entangled with structural traumas, as the suffering imposed by a precipitating event begs questions of absence and what could have been.

LaCapra's notion of structural trauma, which he explains partially via its mythic enactment as original sin or Freud's primal crime, is somewhat outside the scope of this thesis' empirical inquiry into collective trauma's impact on international politics. Still, I argue that an adapted notion of structural trauma or absence can effectively elucidate another dimension of collective trauma—the way its narrations necessarily entail an ineluctable sense of absence and an ineffable anxiety of possibility. As the previous section has demonstrated, historical traumas—the primary subject of this study—are often reified in material poverty, as precipitating traumatic events devastate a population's economic livelihoods and this devastation persist over time. LaCapra astutely observes the way in which the social, political and ethical relationships between victims, bystanders, and perpetrators shape narratives of these traumas, affecting the identities they help constitute and the policymaking logics these identities inspire. But, even after the traumatic event's immediate material damage is repaired, a notion of absence distinct from material loss persists that, in many ways, parallels LaCapra's more psychoanalytically-inspired definition of structural trauma. Defining structural trauma in this way, absence is best understood as an anxiety related to the material comforts and gains that could have been achieved had the trauma not taken place. Such amorphous structural trauma can only be narrated by alluding to some mythic, pseudo-utopian vision of what progress the collective would have achieved without the trauma. But, to the extent that these imperfect narratives are legitimized politically, the collective structural trauma following historically traumatic events *does* contain, however abstractly and imperfectly, a notion of perpetrators, bystanders and victims. In many ways, this sense of economic absence or 'what could have been' differs from LaCapra's more abstract transhistorical notion of structural trauma as present at the origin, but it has similarly amorphous ethical, social and political consequences and can often lead to a sense of victimhood and narratives that assign blame. This structural trauma persists as anxiety and is narrated via flawed comparisons, mythic abstraction, or decentered lamentation over economic injustice. These narrations can have profound multigenerational consequences for the societies they impact but also are often heavily contested, especially considering their lack of reference to specific historical events.

This dynamic is perhaps best illustrated via an example. Take, for instance, the Khmer Rouge's mass killings from 1975-1979, which scholarship often refers to as a genocide. More than

20 percent of the nation's population (over 1.5 million people) perished and the Khmer Rouge regime's radical program thoroughly undermined the nation's social life.[247] From any such superficial account, the genocide clearly constituted a quintessential example of collective trauma—individuals suffered tremendously and the trauma severely disrupted social, economic, and political life. Yet, even nearly two generations after the genocide, after most survivors have found some way of rebuilding their livelihoods and achieved some sort of stability, the anxiety of structural trauma persists. Because of the trauma, an unknowable amount of economic progress did not take place— countless businesses could not be created, cultural institutions could not be founded, and families could not grow to accommodate new lives. Decades later, this structural trauma is best described obliquely, via abstract data like Cambodia's low median age (22.1 years in 2009 compared to a world average of 28.4), long-term lack of skilled health care professionals (only an estimated 10% of the nation's doctors survived the genocide), high rates of child abuse and relatively low gross domestic product relative to neighboring nations that did not see their nations' economies and collective-psychologies similarly shattered.[248] In a more profound sense, though Cambodia has made tremendous progress in repairing the economic damage of the Khmer Rouge and overcoming its collective-psychological wounds, Cambodian society still grapples with the lingering effect of the Khmer Rouge's destruction, plagued by a notion of what progress—economic, cultural and institutional—could not be made due to the trauma continues to influence national identity. Though multiple scholars have written on collective memory in contemporary Cambodia indirectly by referring to the country's tragic history or vague lingering resentments, this difficult to articulate aspect of the collective trauma can play a profound role in national identity, however obliquely it must be expressed.[249]

Though this notion of structural trauma as absence has yet to find significant application to IR scholarship, it has significant potential to help uncover Ayoob's notion of a '*feeling* of deprivation'

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[247] David P. Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War, and Revolution since 1945* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991); Ashley Starr Kinseth, "Unspoken Trauma: Breaking the Silence to Heal Cambodia's Youth," in *Human Consequences of State Political Action* (International Studies Association West Annual Conference, San Francisco, CA, 2009).

[248] Thailand's GDP per capita was 4.3 times that of Cambodia's in the mid-2000s, compared to only 3.5 times higher in the genocide's immediate wake in 1979.; Kinseth, "Unspoken Trauma: Breaking the Silence to Heal Cambodia's Youth."; Tadeusz Kugler et al., "Demographic and Economic Consequences of Conflict," *International Studies Quarterly* 57, no. 1 (2013): 1–12.

[249] David Chandler, "Cambodia Deals with Its Past: Collective Memory, Demonisation and Induced Amnesia," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 9, no. 2–3 (2008): 355–69.; Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*; Milton Takei, "Collective Memory as the Key to National and Ethnic Identity: The Case of Cambodia," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 4, no. 3 (1998): 59–78.

as it manifests via intangible tension between the developing and developed worlds. Take, for instance, the popularity of recent calls for reparations by intellectuals from formerly colonized nations like Shashi Tharoor[250], which the previous section identified as partly explicable via a notion of the trauma *of* poverty. Considering the significant, wide-ranging scholarship on colonialism's long-term detrimental effects on development[251], trauma theorists must take seriously how colonialism's stunting of various nations' progress results in a nebulous collective anxiety experienced over the long term, especially in cases where little post-colonial material progress has occurred. In this sense, the collective trauma of colonialism entails not only the specific harms of repression, violence and racism, but also an incalculable amount of lost opportunity, compounded with each subsequent generation. Because knowing what trajectory colonized nations would have taken without colonialism is impossible, debates over these issues are almost entirely non-academic and often devolve into impossible-to-assess statistics about what growth might have yielded or comparisons with other nations. For example, Benjamin Hickel has calculated that, had African slaves been paid the US minimum wage for their labor and, had this money been invested with a moderate rate of interest over the years since, these wages would be worth US $97 trillion in 2015—a figure close to the entire world's current GDP.[252] Yet, the *existence* of these debates and their resonance in developing nations points to the importance of this amorphous form of structural trauma in international affairs. Interpreting this economic absence as a form of structural trauma with profound international consequences provides a new framework for scholarship to analyze underlying anxiety within these contested narratives of collective trauma and their clear impact on identities via a more robust theoretical lens.

3.4c Collective Trauma and Trust in Institutions

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[250] Shashi Tharoor, "'But What about the Railways …?' The Myth of Britain's Gifts to India," *The Guardian*, March 8, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/08/india-britain-empire-railways-myths-gifts; Shashi Tharoor, *Inglorious Empire: What the British Did to India* (London: Hurst, 2017).

[251] See, for example, Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," *The American Economic Review* 91, no. 5 (2001): 1369–1401; Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Kenneth L Sokoloff and Stanley L Engerman, "History Lessons: Institutions, Factor Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New World," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 14, no. 3 (2000): 217–32.

[252] Hickel, "Enough of Aid – Let's Talk Reparations."; See, also, alternatively commentary opposed to reparations including Dinesh D'Souza, "Two Cheers for Colonialism," *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, May 10, 2002, https://www.chronicle.com/article/Two-Cheers-for-Colonialism/10241; John MacKenzie, "Viewpoint: Why Britain Does Not Owe Reparations to India," *BBC News*, July 28, 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-33647422

The previous two frameworks largely adhere to a vision of the state as, ontologically speaking, a structure rather than an agent—a social institution through which identity is narrated, contested by various actors and projected onto the international arena. Despite its recognition of the distortion and instrumentalization of mass identities in their conveyance to the international arena, this vision largely stems from this thesis' emphasis on narratives of collective trauma's ability to constitute both national and state identities that, in turn, shape actions in the international arena. Christian Reus-Smit has labeled this approach "*holistic* constructivism" because of the way it investigates how both domestic and international social interaction impact national identity construction, how this national identity impacts state identity, and how the state conveys this identity in international politics.[253] But even constructivists following what Reus-Smit refers to as the "*systemic* constructivism" of Alexander Wendt[254]—bracketing domestic social construction and treating the state as an autonomous, sovereign agent or 'person' able to narrate its own identity, engaging in social interaction within an international system of sovereign states—can consider the way in which collective trauma impacts international politics.[255] This section argues that collective trauma is an important concept for constructivists operating in *both* the holistic tradition (as this thesis largely does) and the systemic tradition, as the sense of betrayed social trust narratives of collective trauma often foment and infuse into identities is applicable to the state as both a social structure and as an agent. A sense of betrayed trust at the state-level can diminish cooperation with international institutions which depend on tacit social trust to operate and, in turn, a lack of engagement with international institutions efficacy can profoundly shape a state's place in the international arena. These consequences, this section demonstrates, can oftentimes reify trauma by fostering more poverty or detrimental international stigma.

For decades, IR scholarship has vigorously debated international institutions, resulting in a variety of broad, contrasting rationalist and constructivist definitions. Some conceive of institutions as sets of rules, internalized social norms or even more narrowly as simply formal international organizations. John Duffield synthesizes these divergent schools of thought by defining institutions

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[253] Christian Reus-Smit, *The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 165–68.

[254] Alexander Wendt, "The State as Person in International Theory," *Review of International Studies* 30, no. 2 (April 2004).; Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

[255] Reus-Smit, *The Moral Purpose of the State*, 165–68; see also Emanuel Adler, "Constructivism in International Relations: Sources, Contributions, and Debates," in *Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse-Kappen, and Beth A. Simmons, Second edition (Los Angeles, CA: Sage, 2013), 133.

as, broadly speaking, "relatively stable sets of related constitutive, regulative, and procedural norms and rules that pertain to the international system, the actors in the system (including states as well as nonstate entities), and their activities."[256] This definition encompasses not only unspoken norms that constitute shared social knowledge, but also a variety of forms of international organizations and interstate agreements which seek to codify and regularize this knowledge. IR literature has likewise vigorously analyzed and debated the role institutions play in international politics. While neoliberal institutionalism and other rational choice schools tend to view institutions as social contracts and rules that regulate behavior and remedy the deficient outcomes of autonomous behavior as outlined in game theory[257], constructivist literature has alternatively emphasized the way in which institutions and states are co-constitutive—states shape international institutions just as these institutions shape state identities and preferences in international society.[258] Unifying all of these traditions, though, is the belief that institutions regularize the international arena, rendering it predictable and facilitating what can, in theory, be fruitful economic and social interaction. These predictable interactions can impact identities in multiple ways, oftentimes by reinforcing identity narratives' ostensible macro-level stability.

But whether one identifies the state as the agent undergoing an emergent phenomenon of collective trauma or merely a structure reflecting collective trauma within it, a variety of trauma studies scholarship has emphasized how traumatic experiences lead to a sense of betrayal[259], particularly at the hands of institutions that provide social life with regularity, order and security. Jenny Edkins, for instance, writes that, for an event to be considered truly traumatic, it must entail a sense of "betrayal," by "the very powers that we are convinced will protect us."[260] This work is

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[256] John Duffield, "What Are International Institutions?," *International Studies Review* 9, no. 1 (2007): 2.

[257] Douglass C. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Arthur A. Stein, "Neoliberal Institutionalism," in *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford Univerity Press, 2008), 201–21.

[258] In the field of political economy, Ha-Joon Chang has taken a similar position, arguing that international markets for goods, services, labor, and capital are themselves politically-constructed institutions that lead to migration and a variety of global governance issues.; Ha-Joon Chang, "Breaking the Mould: An Institutionalist Political Economy Alternative to the Neo-liberal Theory of the Market and the State," *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 26, no. 5 (2002): 539–59.; See also Marlene Wind, *Sovereignty and European Integration: Towards a Post-Hobbesian Order* (New York, NY: Palgrave, 2001), 56–77; Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics," *Annual Review of Political Science* 4, no. 1 (2001): 391–416.

[259] Jenny Edkins, *Trauma and the Memory of Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 4–7; Emma Hutchison, *Affective Communities in World Politics: Collective Emotions after Trauma* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 39; Eli Zaretsky, "Trauma and Dereification: September 11 and the Problem of Ontological Security," *Constellations* 9, no. 1 (2002): 98–105.

[260] Edkins, *Trauma and the Memory of Politics*, 4.

corroborated by ample social science surveys and psychological experiments, which find that, on an individual and group level, trauma can, for varying periods of time, deplete trust in the regularity of the social world and in institutions that provide this regularity.[261] Indeed, this is a key finding of Kai Erikson's landmark book *Everything in its Path*, which examines the breakdown of community in a West Virginia town following a horrific flood that left thousands homeless and killed over 100.[262] On top of the flood's immediate material damage, its impact lingered and festered as it broke down the institutional ties that formed the basis of narratives of self articulated within the community.

In the context of international politics, formal international institutions like the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or even the World Trade Organization (WTO) all endeavor to codify rules and norms that regularize the international arena and oftentimes seek to prevent states from committing disruptive violence or predatory behavior. Likewise, widely-accepted norms—for instance against piracy, targeting civilians in wartime, genocidal violence, or the use chemical weapons—can also be thought of as protective institutions, regulating behavior. But, to the extent that traumatic experiences reveal these institutions as fallible, hypocritical or even sometimes complicit in perpetrating traumas, states incorporating narratives of collective trauma into their identities can be expected to display decreased trust in these institutions and others seen as associated with them. For this reason, Eli Zaretsky refers to the "dereification" following the collective trauma of September 11, 2001 to refer to the revelation that "the very forces that had made progress possible—world trade, the world division of labor, technology—also made the world more vulnerable to destructiveness."[263] Zaretsky's argument points to international terrorism's disruption of a fundamental institution—the "public/private division" that shaped the distinction between soldiers and civilians that terrorism seeks to undermine—which legitimated a shift in previously unquestioned international norms regarding civil liberties and pre-emptive military intervention.[264] Though in the case of September 11, the US' collective trauma was narrated to legitimate the questioning and undermining of norms governing international security arrangements and civil liberties, other traumas can be narrated to sow distrust in various other types of previously

[261] Ronnie Janoff-Bulman, *Shattered Assumptions: Towards a New Psychology of Trauma* (New York, NY: Free Press, 1992); Alberto Alesina and Eliana La Ferrara, "The Determinants of Trust" (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, March 2000), http://www.nber.org/papers/w7621.pdf.

[262] Kai Erikson, *Everything in Its Path: Destruction of Community in the Buffalo Creek Flood* (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1976).

[263] Zaretsky, "Trauma and Dereification," 100.

[264] Zaretsky, 101.

unquestioned international institutions or norms, and this widespread distrust can lead to policy decisions with enormous consequences.

Indeed, outside of the West, this sense of betrayed trust in international institutions has proven quite common in numerous post-colonial states. These states have often narrated traumatic events and encounters as examples of why international institutions are unreliable, biased, or hypocritical and thus they have grown more suspicious of engaging with them. For example, following the 1949 communist revolution, Andrew Kennedy writes that Mao's foreign policy was characterized by a lack of "confidence in the diplomatic sphere" and an unwillingness to adhere to international norms.[265] Whether this stemmed from collective memory of the "one hundred years of national humiliation" from the mid-1800s to mid-1900s during which China suffered at the hands of multiple imperial powers, or simply from a sense of betrayal due to Western powers' support for the Guomindang during their civil war, Chinese foreign policy during the first two decades of the PRC was characterized by a lack of engagement in international negotiations and organizations.[266] For example, in 1966 the PRC was a member of only one intergovernmental organization, compared to more than 50 in 2000, nearly three decades after détente with the United States.[267] This had a profound effect on China's economy—the nation suffered a severe famine during the Great Leap Forward (approximately 1958-1961), but its leaders still rebuffed new offers of international aid, even after the USSR worsened matters by withdrawing its assistance in July 1960.[268] This decision compounded the Chinese people's material suffering and worsened the country's traumatic famines, both experiences which could potentially sow further international distrust. While many IR theorists might simply disregard Mao's dramatic isolationism during the period as characteristic of an idiosyncratic ideology or revisionist 'rogue state', a theory of collective trauma can help explain more robustly both the PRC's reluctance to partake in international institutions, as well as the profound political and economic consequences therein. Mao and his acolytes were able to successfully craft and proliferate (through force and conversion) an identity narrative about their nation's collective

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[265] Andrew Kennedy, *The International Ambitions of Mao and Nehru: National Efficacy Beliefs and the Making of Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 57.

[266] Kennedy, 43–67; Zheng Wang, "National Humiliation, History Education, and the Politics of Historical Memory: Patriotic Education Campaign in China," *International Studies Quarterly* 52, no. 4 (2008): 783–806.

[267] Ann Kent, "China's International Socialization: The Role of International Organizations," *Global Governance* 8, no. 3 (2002): 344–45.

[268] Basil Ashton et al., "Famine in China, 1958-61," *Population and Development Review* 10, no. 4 (1984): 613–45.; Manjari Chatterjee Miller, *Wronged by Empire: Post-Imperial Ideology and Foreign Policy in India and China* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014), 61–64; Nicholas Eberstadt, "The Great Leap Backward," *The New York Times*, February 16, 1997, http://www.nytimes.com/books/97/02/16/reviews/970216.16ebersta.html.

trauma that ultimately had profound consequences for China's foreign policy and ultimate place in the international political order.

3.5 Reading Trauma: Incorporating Trauma into Narrative Analysis

This chapter has conceptualized collective trauma as inherently paradoxical—a phenomenon that suppresses language and incorporation into mnemonic schema and yet oftentimes leads to a desire to bear witness and share one's experiences socially. Narratives, I argue, help to bridge this divide by endowing traumatic experiences with social meaning and incorporating or encircling them in with established common knowledge within existing political discourses. These narratives can also address reservoirs of trauma—especially as they persist in material conditions—inscribing them with meaning and reviving their potency over time. Yet, I have also emphasized how this vision of narratives implies enhanced contestation, due both to narratives' inability to fully capture underlying traumatic experiences and due to their intense emotional resonance, especially when instrumentalized politically. As this thesis progresses to its empirical analysis of meaning-making narratives of trauma in India and Israel, drawing on primary sources including speeches, court transcripts, diaries, books and official documents, it's worth reflecting on insight from literary theory and historiography into how to uncover this latent trauma as it expressed in narratives and the discourses they constitute. In this section, I emphasize how three specific tensions that emerge might affect interpretation and, drawing on literary theory and historiography, how scholarship can remain attuned to their appearance in political discourse.

First, because of the paradox inherent in narrating traumatic memory, whether experienced first-hand or vicariously, reading political discourse in the wake of collective trauma requires a certain literary eye for aporia—figurative uses of language to allude to experiences that cannot necessarily be fully articulated. For example, esteemed literary theorist Cathy Caruth refers to reading the "language of trauma" as necessarily uncovering "a literary dimension…beyond what we can know or theorize about [the text], [which] stubbornly persists in bearing witness to some forgotten wound."[269] Indeed, this insight is not limited to analysis of literature[270]—it has broad application for interpretivist work across the humanities and social sciences. For example, this approach characterizes historian Dominick LaCapra's psychoanalytic reading of the 1980s German

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[269] Caruth, *Unclaimed Experience*, 4, 5.

[270] Though, I would argue that literary analysis is particularly well-suited to this sort of analysis, as acclaimed literary critic Cleanth Brooks has argued that poetry is "the language of paradox." Cleanth Brooks, "The Language of Paradox," in *The Well Wrought Urn: Studies in the Structure of Poetry* (Orlando, FL: Harcourt, 2006).

historikerstreit debate on the country's Nazi past. Because of the trauma involved in the history LaCapra's subjects describe, he includes in his analysis the tensions inherent in psychoanalytic concepts like "transference, denial, acting-out and working-through" and argues for a critical eye towards its revelation via the tension displayed by even simple choices in terminology. "[T]here is an ineluctable difficulty in naming the events in question," he adds. Such analysis examines language as a "site for memory and mourning" of experience, a forum in which the crisis of representation inherent in trauma manifests through metaphor, tension and paradox.[271] Likewise, Emma Hutchison brilliantly analyzes representative practices—both linguistic and visual—in her work, drawing on ample interdisciplinary scholarship.[272] This thesis, which focuses primarily on narratives' meaning-making and identity-constituting capacity, pays particular attention to how figurative language furthers various logics when invoked in identity narratives and the discourses they constitute, conveying and instrumentalizing experiences that might be too difficult to formally name.

Second, whereas the crisis of representation referred to frequently in literary theory and historiography typically refers to the localized issues inherent to language's conveyance of traumatic experience, in the context of international politics scholarship must remain attuned to the parallel issue of trauma's representation (and representation generally) on the international stage. This requires not only building on the previous point of paying attention to efforts to use figurative language to express the otherwise "inexpressible"[273] aspects of pain and trauma, but also using interpretive analysis to investigate problematic invocations of traumatic experience by some actors on behalf of others (namely those who experienced it). Indeed, the issue of representation in IR is complex, relating to the discipline's longstanding divide between third-image approaches that tend to treat states as unitary intentional actors on the international stage and second- and first- image scholarship that investigates the domestic representative practices that contribute to state behavior.[274] But because of the emotions that trauma evokes, instrumentalizing narratives of trauma (as opposed to other narratives constitutive of identity) can add fuel to tensions already present in contentious representative politics. In analyzing discourses relating to post-traumatic identity, I pay

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[271] Dominick LaCapra, "Revisiting the Historians' Debate: Mourning and Genocide," *History and Memory* 9, no. 1/2 (1997): 88.
[272] Hutchison, "Trauma and the Politics of Emotions: Constituting Identity, Security and Community after the Bali Bombing"; Hutchison, *Affective Communities in World Politics*.
[273] Scarry, *The Body in Pain*, 3.
[274] This tripartite typology stems from Waltz and has become a mainstay in IR literature. See Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co, 1979).

close attention to the positions of various subjects, the roles they assume, whose experiences they claim to represent and contestation over these subject positions and roles.[275] Further, I draw on actors' biographical details and historical insight into their political reputations within discourses in question to try to reassemble how their speech and narratives might have been interpreted in the relevant context, especially by audiences that more directly experienced the trauma they narrate.

Third and finally, recognizing trauma's ability to inspire a sense of betrayed trust in institutions necessitates critical and interpretive analysis of trust's subjective and context-specific dimensions. As Dominick LaCapra has noted, "trust is a category that may not hold a sufficiently prominent place in certain forms of critical theory"; it is often dismissed as relating to a "polyanna view of existence," somewhat at odds with the realist and rationalist models of human behavior that dominate social science generally and IR more specifically.[276] Yet trust is not a binary impulse—it is a complex, subjective belief in another actor's good faith intentions[277] which can play diverse roles in congealing or unraveling the institutions that constitute the international system. In this sense, in order to truly uncover trust's importance in the macro-realm of international politics, narrative analysis must pay special attention to the subjective and context-specific dimensions of articulations of trust and distrust.[278] If scholarship is interested in a more nuanced account of trust than the *ad hoc* functionalist variant that dominates much social science, interpretivist lenses must remain attuned to how language reveals trust's scope and limitations, the emotions that bolster or tarnish trust, and the contextual, temporal or relational specificity of trust or mistrust's narration. This contextual specificity alludes to the key issue of trust's fungibility—political actors' ability to draw upon trust from one context in another arena for another goal. Similarly, a betrayal of trust in one context can lead to mistrust in another, unrelated one, creating potential spillover effects. This complications associated with such transfers allude to the impossibility of a purely transactional functionalist account of trust; because of the innumerable unfamiliar situations that may arise and necessitate

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[275] For more on analyzing subject positions in discourse analysis, see Charlotte Epstein, "Who Speaks? Discourse, the Subject and the Study of Identity in International Politics," *European Journal of International Relations* 17, no. 2 (2011): 327–50.

[276] LaCapra, "Trauma, Absence, Loss," 719.

[277] See, for example, Andrew H. Kydd, *Trust and Mistrust in International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007); Branislav L. Slantchev, "Review of Trust and Mistrust in International Relations by Andrew H. Kydd," *Perspectives on Politics* 4, no. 3 (2006): 632–33.

[278] For instance, sociologist Kai Erikson has written that "[t]he mortar bonding human communities together is made up, at least in part, of trust and respect and decency," and trauma can severely undermine faith in these bonds. Kai Erikson, "Notes on Trauma and Community," in *Trauma: Explorations in Memory*, ed. Cathy Caruth (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 193.

trust's fungibility, trust built in one arena can prove potent across many, while the betrayal of trust inspired by collective trauma can prove particularly destructive in a wide array of contexts.[279] Thus, in reading representative texts from political discourses in India and Israel before and after independence, I pay special attention to the language and emotional tenor of narrations that describe trust, as well as the fungibility of trust to which these narrations allude.

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter has made three fundamental contributions that will be coupled with the first chapters' arguments and carried forward to my two empirical case studies. First, it has argued for a new conceptualization of collective trauma in international politics as a phenomenon that, through narrative, brings together traumatic encounters' sociocultural, collective psychological, and material impacts. This definition, which understands collective trauma via the metaphor of a mosaic, also provides a framework for analyzing collective trauma's narration and interpretation in political discourse. Further, this emphasis on trauma as not only causing a psychic, social or emotional legacy, but also being reified in material or economic conditions, complicates the 'event-ness' of past approaches to traumatic encounters by emphasizing how traumas can persist and radiate outwards psychologically, socio-culturally, and material over time. This insight not only furthers IR theory, but also helps to deconstruct trauma studies' notable Western bias, assisting this thesis' empirical focus of state-building in the developing world.

Second, this chapter has outlined three frameworks for applying this theorization of collective trauma to new states wrestling with trauma's diverse impacts. These frameworks focus this chapter's conceptualization on prominent repositories of trauma that persist in international politics over time, demonstrating this conceptualization's utility for IR and guiding my subsequent chapters' historical analysis. Third and finally, I have concluded by reflecting on how historiographic and literary theory insights into narrative analysis of trauma can supplement this thesis' methodological framework. Drawing on a diverse array of literature, I have demonstrated how empirical analysis can orient attention to the ways that figurative language alludes to trauma, as well as the crisis in representation and multi-faceted sense of betrayed trust that trauma can foster. This emphasis on

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[279] Aaron M. Hoffman, "A Conceptualization of Trust in International Relations," *European Journal of International Relations* 8, no. 3 (2002): 377–78.

trauma's unique manifestations in language will help orient my analysis towards aspects of political discourse previously neglected by scholarship.

Part 2: Post-Independence India and Israel

Chapter 4: Collective Trauma in Indian Economic Nationalist Discourse: The Discursive Roots of Autarkic Development

4.1 Introduction

Upon gaining independence in August 1947, India's nationalist leadership faced a situation unprecedented among anti-colonial activists from across the globe. India achieved independence relatively early in the global timeline of decolonization—well before most of the Asian and African nations with which it would eventually join in the Non-Aligned Movement—and thus had few peers whose successful transition it could emulate. Though the Indian National Congress (INC) leadership that seized the reins of government accepted the subcontinent's partition and loss of 60 million potential citizens to the new state of Pakistan, it still governed approximately 320 million people, making India the world's second most populous country. Further, the new state retained control of most of the former colonial administration's residual military and bureaucracy. The nationalist leaders that assumed top positions in the new government had previously organized a relatively successful nationalist movement across broad swaths of colonial India, fomenting a broad, inclusive national identity narrative to bring together the subcontinent's diverse population. But though many had served in provincial administrations and official commissions, up until that point they had yet to truly wield a state apparatus charged with the duties of sovereignty in the international system.

Further complicating these issues was the fact that independent India was a deeply impoverished country emerging from centuries of colonial repression, culminating in perhaps the most traumatic decade of its history. Upon the beginning of hostilities in Europe in 1939, the British Government of India (GoI) declared war on India's behalf and enacted the highly repressive Defence of India Act, which allowed for preventive detention of thousands (including the INC's leadership), harsh economic controls, censorship of the Indian press, coercive recruitment into the British Indian Army and crackdowns on labor to prevent work stoppages.[280] Perhaps most horribly, though, the colonial regime used these powers to divert food shipments away from food insecure regions of India, namely Bengal, to Europe. Indeed, food shortages—the traditional bane of colonial India—proved an especially lethal issue during the wartime. As Mike Davis has argued, famines

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[280] Yasmin Khan points out that these powers accomplished the dual British goals of fighting an all-out, centrally-planned international war effort and continuing the divide and rule policies that allowed it to control a disgruntled colony whose nationalist movement had begun to achieve widespread support. Yasmin Khan, *India at War: The Subcontinent and the Second World War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 12.

should not be understood as isolated disasters, but rather as embedded in impoverished societies, "part of a continuum with the silent violence of malnutrition that precedes and conditions it, and with the mortality shadow of debilitation and disease that follows."[281] India had suffered dozens of famines under colonial rule and, during the early 1940s, its persistent food insecurity worsened in Bengal due to a cyclone and preventive measures to thwart Japanese advances, leading to the subcontinent's most devastating famine in recorded history in which approximately three million died.[282] Across India, the Bengal famine was readily interpreted as part of the subcontinent's long history of traumatization under colonial rule, leading to widespread outrage and various forms of political protest. Nonetheless, British repression ensured that such activism fell politically on deaf ears in the colonial government.

Even after India emerged from this traumatic war period, political protest and communal violence raged, creating instability in many areas that inhibited post-war recovery. As with India's food insecurity, the British GoI had stoked communal divides for decades to prevent solidarity around the nationalist movement's national identity, as well as to secure loyalty from favored factions; oftentimes, these divisions led to widespread communal violence. During the war effort, though, the British GoI used their repressive powers to fracture the INC's political base and quell its Quit India movement, while retaining the loyalty of the so-called martial races that served in its military and the Muslim League, which it viewed as a more pliable rival to the INC.[283] After the war, these identity divisions proved so engrained that the British leadership, the INC and the Muslim League agreed to a partition of the subcontinent upon the end of imperial rule in August 1947. Beginning that summer, millions of Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs abandoned their homes on the 'wrong' side of these newly created borders. The process displaced around 15 million people and resulted in the deaths of between one and two million due to violence caused by the chaos.[284] In India, many nationalist leaders accepted this partition as inevitable, but nonetheless interpreted it as yet another traumatic result of colonial rule. Though India's post-independence leaders initially suppressed news of partition's atrocities to preserve their vision of a unifying secular national

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[281] Mike Davis, *Late Victorian Holocausts: El Niño Famines and the Making of the Third World*, Reprinted (London: Verso, 2007), 21.
[282] See Janam Mukherjee, *Hungry Bengal: War, Famine and the End of Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
[283] See Khan, *India at War.*
[284] For an overview of this partition violence, see William Dalrymple, "The Bloody Legacy of Indian Partition," *The New Yorker*, June 29, 2015, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/06/29/the-great-divide-books-dalrymple; Yasmin Khan, *The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2017).

identity, the divorce created lingering resentments that manifested in diverse ways. Partition's mass displacement further entrenched colonialism's legacy in migrants' poverty and precarious social position, provoking yet another symbolic collectively traumatic episode—the assassination of the nationalist movement's spiritual leader, MK Gandhi, in 1948.[285] Indeed, India's leaders narrated Gandhi's death as a symbolic coda to a long historical trajectory of colonial trauma, linking famines, communal violence and repression together into a single nationalist narrative.

Given this backdrop, Corbridge and Harriss write that India's post-independence leadership sought a break from the past, endeavoring to build a new state whose identity was defined by being "everything that British India was not: a democratic, federal Republic of India committed to an ideology of development."[286] But what identity and related commitments exactly did this "ideology of development" entail in this post-traumatic context? Contrary to traditional historiography's relatively loose labelling of the INC as 'socialist', Baldev Raj Nayar has argued that prevailing notions of development in the subcontinent were based only secondarily in the international Marxist or even import-substitution economic theories that later influenced P.C. Mahalanobis, the statistician and Planning Commission member whose technical model formalized India's development regime in the Second Five-Year Plan. Rather, Nayar argues that the primary motivation for India's post-independence leaders' pursuit of autarkic heavy industries-led growth was a variant of economic nationalist identity, centered around the idea that only autarkic self-sufficiency would provide independent India with the security and sovereignty necessary to avoid imperialism's violence.[287] Indeed, though Nayar's specific thesis has perhaps not become dominant in historiography of Indian development planning, it finds implicit backing in much economic history and foreign policy scholarship on the period, which often refers in passing to intangible collective psychological identity-related factors and memory of colonialism shaping India's development regime. Arvind Panagariya, for example, has written that India's decades-long autarkic economic orientation partially stemmed from Nehru's belief that "India needed to be independent of the world markets…to maintain political independence."[288] Likewise, Srinivasan and Tendulkar

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[285] Mira Debs, "Using Cultural Trauma: Gandhi's Assassination, Partition and Secular Nationalism in Post-Independence India: Using Cultural Trauma," *Nations and Nationalism* 19, no. 4 (2013): 635–53.; Alexander, "Partition and Trauma: Repairing India and Pakistan."

[286] Stuart Corbridge and John Harriss, *Reinventing India: Liberalization, Hindu Nationalism, and Popular Democracy* (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), 5.

[287] Nayar, "Nationalist Planning for Autarky and State Hegemony : Development Strategy Under Nehru"; Nayar, "The Political Foundations of Economic Strategy."

[288] Arvind Panagariya, *India: The Emerging Giant* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 24.

alternatively have written of the widely-held suspicion that "free markets and free trade were…economic arrangements imposed on India by its colonial masters for their own benefit."[289] Literature more generally focused on India's foreign policy has similarly connected the young state's desire for political and economic self-sufficiency to "post-imperial ideology,"[290] ideas of "anti-imperialism and anti-racialism,"[291] and even "collective trauma."[292]

While these diverse literatures aptly point to the larger role of colonialism's memory in shaping India's post-independence economic planning regime, their invocations tend to be somewhat imprecise, lacking a theoretical framework to unravel this orientation's roots and potency. While economic nationalism is a useful, if perhaps overly broad term[293], scholarship's frequent instrumentalist definitions of it offer at best a static representation of predominant Indian identity narratives at the time of independence that do not help explain their emergence or resonance with various factions of the population. Similarly, though invocations of 'anti-imperialism', 'post-imperial ideology' or even Ayoob's "subaltern realism"[294] certainly group together a broad array of post-colonial states' behaviors, they are ill-suited to explaining the variation in different post-colonial states' behavior, as they overlook the complex, context-specific roots of the identity discourses that constitute them. After all, nearly every country across the globe outside the West emerged from colonialism at some point in its history, but these countries' behaviors varied substantially. Why did economic nationalism emerge in India as a justification for pursuing autarky and non-alignment, while, for example, South Korea emerged from Japanese imperialism a staunch ally of the U.S. that based its economic development on a protectionist, yet export-led growth model? More attention to the context-specific constitution of post-colonial identity and, indeed, renewed investigation of the collective trauma embedded in the colonial encounter are required for scholarship to adequately

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[289] T. N. Srinivasan and Suresh D. Tendulkar, *Reintegrating India with the World Economy* (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 2003), 6.

[290] Miller, *Wronged by Empire.*

[291] Jayantanuja Bandyopadhyaya, "The Non-Aligned Movement and International Relations," *India Quarterly* 33, no. 2 (1977): 139.

[292] Adam B. Lerner, "Collective Trauma and the Evolution of Nehru's Worldview: Uncovering the Roots of Nehruvian Non-Alignment," *The International History Review*, May 22, 2018, online first.

[293] For example, in recent years the term has been revived by U.S. President Donald Trump and his followers to describe anti-immigration and anti-trade policies with only weak overlaps to the situation in post-independence India.

[294] Mohammed Ayoob, "Inequality and Theorizing in International Relations: The Case for Subaltern Realism," *International Studies Review* 4, no. 3 (2002): 27–48; Mohammed Ayoob, "The Third World in the System of States: Acute Schizophrenia or Growing Pains?," *International Studies Quarterly* 33, no. 1 (1989): 67–79.

address this variation without foolishly dismissing or generalizing about the emotional potency and historical impact of anti-imperial discourse.

In this chapter, I unpack Indian economic nationalist discourse in the lead-up to independence. I argue that prominent narrations of the subcontinent's unique collective traumas shaped identity formation, linking together India's diverse traumatic experiences under colonialism to justify a policymaking logic painting autarkic self-sufficiency as vital to securing India and preventing further exploitation and violence. In this chapter's first section, I theorize economic nationalism as a form of identity discourse that both identifies the nation in economic terms and motivates policymaking. Next, I turn to the pre-history of this discourse in India, outlining how 19th century economic nationalist thought developed during the early 20th century *swadeshi* protests against the partition of Bengal. In the subsequent section, I turn to changes in this discourse in the decades before independence, as colonial rule became more oppressive. I divide this period's economic nationalist discourse into four prominent currents—Gandhians, Marxists, the business community, and the Nehruvian consensus—and outline how each narrated the traumatic experiences Indians faced under colonialism and settled on a different vision of identity that legitimated autarky. Though this typology is not comprehensive, it is sufficiently thorough to demonstrate the prominence of the idea that autarkic self-sufficiency was a vital response to colonial trauma among multiple powerful factions in post-independence India, despite their disagreement on numerous other issues. For this reason, I argue that India's traumatic experiences under colonialism proved foundational in shaping its post-colonial place in the international order. Once institutionalized by the Nehru and Mahalanobis-led Planning Commission in the 1950s, India's unique post-colonial economic nationalism influenced Indian economic policymaking for decades to come, motivating numerous policies that limited foreign economic engagement. In the conclusion, I reflect on how this chapter's insight speaks to the traumatic roots of what postcolonial scholars have identified as the paradox at the heart of the post-independence Indian state.

4.2: Economic Nationalism as Identity Discourse

In his aforementioned article on the emergence of the Nehruvian development strategy, Nayar equates economic nationalism with the policy goals of autarky and economic self-sufficiency.[295] Indeed, though literature on the subject of economic nationalism is vast, George

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[295] Nayar, "Nationalist Planning for Autarky and State Hegemony: Development Strategy Under Nehru," 13.

Crane has argued that this tendency to define economic nationalism in "instrumentalist terms"—as an ideology that engenders certain policy programs—has long characterized realist, liberal and Marxist approaches.[296] For example, realist Robert Gilpin employs the term economic nationalism to group together historical labels as diverse as mercantilism, statism, protectionism, the German Historical School, and New Protectionism, arguing that they are all linked by the belief that economic policy should serve the purpose of state-building on behalf of the nation.[297] Liberal scholar Harry Johnson, likewise, generalizes about economic nationalism's irrational psychology leading to policies that "either do not make economic sense, or else would make economic sense only in certain specific and rather exceptional economic circumstances." Accordingly, he defines economic nationalism in new states as policies giving undue attention to industrialization over agriculture, preference for certain prestige heavy industries like automobile manufacturing at the expense of those with comparative advantage, and import-substituting policies that neglect economic efficiency.[298] Otto Hieronymi, similarly, has defined economic nationalism primarily as efforts at "(i) shielding the national economy against outside influences and (ii) aggressive and discriminatory policies against foreigners."[299]

Though certainly not an exhaustive list, these widely-cited political economy and IR scholars tend to define economic nationalism solely by the policies it engenders, neglecting the more fundamental question of what economic nationalism *is* and how it supports logics adapted to different contexts. Further, their tendency to group together such diverse traditions as mercantilism and Third World developmentalism threatens to dilute economic nationalism's unique, context-specific emergence. As Crane has argued, this work is premised on treating the nation and its identity as an *a priori* given and not something mutually constituted with the economy over which it seeks to exert political control.[300] Such a conceptualization is best suited to comparing contexts where nations' identities are negotiated primarily in sociocultural or political terms before the advent of the contemporary nation-state or the economic system it develops and secures. But conceptualizing the nation as entirely divorced from its economic roots is highly problematic,

[296] George T. Crane, "Economic Nationalism: Bringing the Nation Back In," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 27, no. 1 (1998): 64.
[297] Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 31–32.
[298] Harry G. Johnson, "A Theoretical Model of Economic Nationalism in New and Developing States," *Political Science Quarterly* 80, no. 2 (1965): 169–85.
[299] Otto Hieronymi, "The New Economic Nationalism," in *The New Economic Nationalism*, ed. Otto Hieronymi (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1980), 11–33.
[300] Crane, "Economic Nationalism."

especially in countries like India, where discourse about Indians' diverse experiences of economic exploitation and underdevelopment were so intimately interwoven with efforts to construct national identity in the anti-colonial nationalist movement. Even well into the period of British colonialism, the Indian subcontinent hosted numerous religious, caste, ethnic, linguistic and other identities that either could have or—in the case of Pakistan—*did* become 'nations' that aspired to organize states. For this reason, a primary goal of the Indian nationalist movement that emerged in the 19th century was to forge a new, unifying national identity that would gain primacy in the political arena over more particularistic alternatives. The economic realm—specifically, shared experiences of economic exploitation and traumatic poverty under British imperialism—provided a vital source of mnemonic content to construct such a universalistic identity.

To combat this disjuncture between modern nations and their roots in historical economic organization, Crane describes how economic historical memories, which provide "a rich realm of differences (livelihood, class, consumption habits, *etc.*)," can be made into what Renan labels the "glorious pasts that animate the national present."[301] As examples, he cites the Industrial Revolution's contribution to national identities based on 'civilized' or 'advanced' divisions of labor in certain Western contexts, Meiji reformers' emphasis on industrialization as a means of constructing a modern Japan, or even Gandhianism's nationalist pride in India's decentralized agrarian economic roots. This addition's analytical utility is twofold. First, it identifies economic nationalism as, like the more general concept of nationalism, an identity discourse that seeks to define the boundaries of a political unit in economic terms, justifying the construction of a state apparatus to pursue economic security for the nation. Second, it complicates definitions that equate economic nationalism with certain policy programs, as different contexts, shaped by different experiences and sociopolitical discourses, can produce alternative economic nationalist discourses that legitimate a variety of policy programs beyond autarky, protectionism, or import-substitution. [302] While these specific policy programs have certainly proven popular ways for states to 'defend' the economic nation in the 20th century, they by no means exhaust the phenomenon of economic nationalism.

In many ways, Crane's insight into national identities' economic constitution resonates deeply with the previous chapter's emphasis on trauma's material instantiations and their narration

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[301] Crane, 67, 69.

[302] For a different articulation of similar points, see also Andreas Pickel, "Explaining, and Explaining With, Economic Nationalism," *Nations and Nationalism* 9, no. 1 (2003): 105–27.

into identities. But this resemblance only serves to highlight the limitations of examining solely those economic historical memories narrated as "glorious pasts" in the constitution of national identity. I argue that, in many colonial and post-colonial contexts, the economic historical memories narrated into national identities were not glorious, but rather traumatic. This was especially the case in India, where British colonialism manifested primarily as an intricate system of economic exploitation spread across the subcontinent whose violence and repression helped maintain its extractive practices. This exploitative economic system, which intensified in the immediate pre-independence period to fuel the war effort, resulted in extensive and diverse traumatic experiences for Indians of varying backgrounds. Though the Indian subcontinent did not host a widely-shared national identity before the arrival of the British in the 17th century, key nationalist leaders narratively linked these traumatic experiences resulting from economic exploitation to construct an inclusive, post-independence national identities. Of course, this endeavor led to significant contestation, most notably by the Muslim League which claimed the INC represented a proverbial wolf in sheep's clothing that planned to replace British with Hindu exploitation. But, even given this contestation, economic nationalism served as a discourse within which traumatic experiences and their legacies could be narratively linked and endowed with meaning via shared social knowledge, providing a logic for economic policymaking when the nationalist movement finally seized the state apparatus from the British. In this sense, I demonstrate, economic nationalist identity discourse developed the logics that legitimated India's post-independence autarky.

4.3: The 19th Century Roots of Economic Nationalist Discourse in India

Economic nationalist discourses that narrated the colonial encounter's traumas can conceivably be traced back in Indian history as far back as the colonial encounter itself.[303] However, for the purposes of this chapter, which begins with the economic nationalism that influenced development planning around the time of independence, a natural starting point is the work of prominent 19th century leaders, including Dadhabhai Naoroji, G.K. Gokhale, R.C. Dutt, G.V. Joshi and M.G. Ranade. Some of these early Indian nationalists (e.g., Naoroji, Gokhale, and Joshi) were involved in the formation and development of the INC, which held its first session in 1885, while others remained outside the organization but provided other intellectual foundations for the independence movement it became. Despite the significant ideational overlap between these leaders

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[303] For example, on the antecedents of Naoroji's 'drain theory', see J. V. Naik, "Forerunners of Dadabhai Naoroji's Drain Theory," *Economic and Political Weekly* 36, no. 46/47 (2001): 4428–32.

and the generation of nationalist leaders that followed, a division is justified both temporally and due to the fact that they, unlike the INC and other nationalist leaders around the time of independence, were mostly reluctant to call for India's *complete* independence or home rule, especially in the period before the *Swadeshi* movement. Instead, they focused their narratives on contesting British policies to promote colonial good governance and challenging the lack of Indian participation in imperial rule.[304]

Yet, despite these leaders' general reluctance to envision India as an independent sovereign state, their work contributed substantially to a conceptualization of India as an economic nation with a unique identity based in collective trauma. As Manu Goswami has written, these thinkers' ideas "had [their] experiential basis in the lived contradictions of colonial socioeconomic practices"—an intimacy with the lived manifestations of inequalities perpetuated by the British empire.[305] Chief among their narrations' arguments about traumatic poverty was 'drain theory', which stoked skepticism's of empires coercive practices, including suspicion of liberal economic policies as tools of repression. But despite these thinkers' lucid articulation of these ideas and immense efforts to popularize them, they spread largely among the elite urban classes and had significant difficulty penetrating into poorer and rural areas, where literacy rates and macro-political consciousness were low. Though these leaders' professed concern for the dire poverty experienced by India's 'masses', during the pre-World War I period their articulations of Indian identity promoted rigid binaries ill-suited to a mass, pluralistic nationalist movement that could fundamentally destabilize imperialism's logic and stability. These limitations became most notable during the early 20th century *swadeshi* movement, which devolved due to divisions among participants stemming partially from the crisis in representation involved in well-to-do urban elites narrating experiences of traumatic poverty on behalf of India's rural and urban poor populations.

Originally popularized by Naoroji and later developed by others nationalist leaders, 'drain theory' conceived of India as a coherent territorial whole (defined frequently as a category-style identity dependent on elite academic knowledge), whose poverty and suffering stemmed from a persistent transfer of wealth to Britain. This transfer came in multiple forms, including unfair trade, the remittances of British officers, the cost of maintaining the Indian military, and the 'Home

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[304] Bipan Chandra, "Indian Nationalists and the Drain, 1880—1905," *The Indian Economic & Social History Review* 2, no. 2 (April 1965): 121.
[305] Manu Goswami, *Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space*, Chicago Studies in Practices of Meaning (Chicago ; London: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 209–10.

Charges' the British Government of India paid to London.[306] A professor and trader who served as the first non-white member of British parliament before returning to India to help found the INC, Naoroji so championed the idea among Indian nationalists that it became the INC's official position at its Calcutta Session in 1896.[307] His particular articulation of 'drain theory' brought together arguments about transfer to emphasize that India would not develop economically or alleviate its poverty until it escaped the coercive economic arrangements of empire. He frequently pointed out that, contrary to classical economic modeling prominent among the British administration, India's significant export surpluses coincided with a net outflow of capital—an amount he dissected at length and labeled an unreasonable 'tribute' to India's foreign rulers that prevented the accumulation of savings necessary for productive investment.[308] Beyond this transfer of money, Naoroji and other drain theorists accused the British of perpetrating a "moral drain," as European officials came to India to rule coercively over the local population, profited immensely, and then left abruptly, taking the expertise they had developed with them.[309]

While drain theory indicted numerous British policies, its chief contribution as an identity narrative over the long-term stemmed from its causal linkage of the 'liberal' economic arrangements of the British empire with the subcontinent's immense and diverse experiences of traumatic poverty. Indian nationalist intellectuals established this linkage in multiple ways. R.C. Dutt, for instance, linked the drain directly to rural poverty by pointing out that the largest source of public moneys for the colonial administration in India was land revenue. He thus argued that the British took their wealth from the "poorest of the poor," India's impoverished rural population.[310] In this sense, the drain was narrated as a cause of the famines that had plagued India's rural population throughout the colonial period and killed more than 30 million people from 1800-1900.[311] Naoroji, on the other hand, adapted anti-liberal economic arguments reminiscent of mercantilism to explain rural hardship. He attempted to calculate the drain economically by equating India's enormous export surplus with the immense transfer of wealth back to England in the form remittances, purchases of

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[306] Ajit Kumar Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Economic Thought*, Routledge History of Economic Thought Series (London ; New York: Routledge, 1993), 74–77.

[307] J. V. Naik, "Forerunners of Dadabhai Naoroji's Drain Theory," 4432.

[308] See B.N. Ganguli, "Dadabhai Naoroji and the Mechanism of 'External Drain,'" *The Indian Economic & Social History Review* 2, no. 2 (April 1965): 85–102.; Manu Goswami, *Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space*, Chicago Studies in Practices of Meaning (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 70.

[309] Dadabhai Naoroji, *Poverty and Un-British Rule in India* (London: Swan Sonnenschein and Co., 1901), 56, 203.

[310] Quoted in Chandra, "Indian Nationalists and the Drain, 1880—1905," 120.

[311] Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Economic Thought*, 57.

British manufactured goods, interest on India's debt and other charges.[312] According to this model, India's export surplus was "a symptom of structural imbalance"[313] between the colony and colonizer that Naoroji articulated via "metaphors of economic vampirism."[314] Naoroji's model argued that, under the auspices of British monopoly, exports and imports solely created wealth and employment abroad. He thus saw free trade within the British empire as a "leakage" that impoverished the entire subcontinent with the rural poor most vulnerable to abuse.[315] Though, of course, economic theory did not dictate that *all* foreign trade would lead to such poverty and drain, Indian economic nationalists' anti-trade arguments led to deep skepticism of trade's potential to drive growth over the long term.[316] This skepticism of trade proved influential and malleable for decades to come.

But despite Naoroji and his allies' clear interest in calculating India's poverty and the drain from its rural population to Britain, they made few attempts beyond Naoroji's vague references to India's balance of payments to rigorously model or quantify the 'drain,' instead frequently drawing on exaggerated figures with limited empirical backing to evoke outrage.[317] Yet, despite this politicization, they made few attempts to recount and incorporate the lived experiences of those Indians who suffered most—the rural poor—referring to them largely in passing via metaphor or as 'the masses'. In this sense, drain theory's resonance during the period stemmed from its ability to inspire emotional outrage among elites who felt discriminated against within the colonial system, but undoubtedly did not face the worst consequences of the economic logic it described. "As the years went by," Bipan Chandra writes, "[Naoroji's] passion and anger increased. Unrighteous, despotic, plundering, unnatural, destructive, were some of the adjectives he applied to the British policy which, in his opinion, was leading to the draining of the 'life-blood' of India."[318] Oftentimes Naoroji combined his analysis with acerbic figurative language to allude to trauma foreign to his actual elite experience. He wrote, for instance, that British claims that over-population caused India's poverty

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[312] Naoroji, *Poverty and Un-British Rule in India*.

[313] Ganguli, "Dadabhai Naoroji and the Mechanism of 'External Drain,'" 91.

[314] Goswami, *Producing India*, 226.

[315] Ganguli, "Dadabhai Naoroji and the Mechanism of 'External Drain,'" 94.

[316] A notable exception to this was potentially MG Ranade who, at times, articulated a vision of free trade as potentially beneficial for an underdeveloped nation like India. See Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Economic Thought*, 87–119.

[317] Indian nationalists throughout the late 19th and early 20th century offered rival figures that exaggerated the drain and stoked outrage. For instance, R.C. Dutt accused the British of draining half of India's net revenues, while Naoroji cited a figure of 1.5 billion pounds over less than a century. Dasgupta, 75; Chandra, "Indian Nationalists and the Drain, 1880—1905"; Ganguli, "Dadabhai Naoroji and the Mechanism of 'External Drain,'" 90–91.

[318] Bipan Chandra, *The Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in India* (New Delhi: Anamika Publishers & Distributors, 2004), 640.

added "distressful insult to agonizing injury" of the drain, equivalent to "cut[ting] off a man's hands, and then…taunt[ing] him that he was not able to maintain himself or move his hands."[319] This macabre metaphor reveals the emotional potency of notions of economic absence explored in the previous chapter theorizing collective trauma, but also the distance Naoroji had from the lived experiences he lumped figuratively lumped together.

Such emotive figurative language was not limited to Naoroji and, indeed, important rhetorical patterns emerged among these thinkers and other elite nationalists in their efforts to connect drain theory and its implicit vision of India as a territorially, culturally and economically-bound nation with a distinct identity that encompassed the diverse suffering experienced by the subcontinent's rural population. RC Dutt, for example, opened his *Economic History of India* by describing the drain in terms oriented to India's largely rural population, writing that "the moisture of India blesses and fertilises other lands" and that reflecting on this process was "painful" for him, as he had previously been employed in the British GoI's Indian Civil Service.[320] Ranade, likewise, articulated a vision of India as a "plantation," language that evoked the exploitation of feudal agrarian systems common across India, as well as the widely-condemned colonial slave trade and plantation system in the Americas that no doubt would have been common knowledge for educated, literate Indians.[321] The nationalist Bengali newspaper *Amrita Bazar Patrika* similarly described the 'drain' with a metaphor alluding to India's agrarian economy, writing in March 1896 that the drain "reduces…the people to the condition of a cattle."[322] These narrations of the drain exemplify frequent metaphors reflecting agrarian life and traditional fables in efforts to simplify the complexities of the drain's economics, portraying colonialism in sharply delineated terms of good and evil, a dynamic ultimately responsible for suffering widely-experienced across rural India. Yet, despite the clear efforts to bridge the gap between experiences of poverty and the intellectual, urbane knowledge that dominated the nationalist discourse best positioned to challenge British despotism, these narrations hardly included direct reference to the diverse lived experiences of those

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[319] Naoroji, *Poverty and Un-British Rule in India*, 217.
[320] Romesh Chunder Dutt, *The Economic History of India under Early British Rule: From the Rise of the British Power in 1757 to the Accession of Queen Victoria in 1837* (London: Routledge, 2013), viii.
[321] Mahadev Govind Ranade, "Present State of Indian Manufactures and Outlook of the Same," in *Essays on Indian Economics: A Collection of Essays and Speeches* (Madras: G. A. Natesan & Co., 1906).
[322] Quoted in Chandra, "Indian Nationalists and the Drain, 1880—1905," 106.

suffering from poverty and famine, neglecting the contours of their arduous working conditions or the scourge of malnutrition.

During the late 19th century, as the INC grew in membership and influence, the economic nationalism of drain theorists remained largely within educated, urban English-speaking circles and failed to spread into a larger, widespread skepticism of colonial rule among India's diverse, majority rural population. Though these economic nationalists employed *knowledge* of India's chronic poverty extensively in their narrations, their writings demonstrated little contact with *experiences* of poverty and their ideas reached mostly literate educated elites, failing to truly bridge this divide.[323] For the most part, India's poor had little contact with British officials and, indeed, they often typically blamed their difficulties on local feudal regimes, high-caste chauvinism, and predatory moneylenders. To be sure, in retrospect many of these middle-men and upper-caste chauvinists derived their local power from colonial systems of authority, but at the time such a connection was not broadly articulated within Indian nationalist politics in ways relevant to different areas conditions. The distance between India's diverse masses and these economic nationalist narratives also stemmed from these leaders' elitist political views. Unlike the mass politics of later leaders like Gandhi who used symbolic politics to sow distrust in elite colonial institutions *and* the Indians who supported them, Naoroji and Gokhale, for example, retained their belief in the overall wisdom of British liberalism and parliamentary democracy and did not attack other hierarchies embedded in Indian society. Indeed, they argued that India should only receive these institutions if they could be controlled by "men of status and wisdom"—in other words, educated urbane elites like themselves.[324]

The distance between these elite thinkers and India's masses' diverse experiences also manifested in a tendency to drift from drain theory's initial focus on extreme poverty and use it to narrate the more subtle discrimination experienced by Indian elites, who sought the devolution of the colonial administration's power largely to enhance their own standing. A prime example of this was their continued excoriation of the British-dominated Indian Civil Service (ICS), which many economic nationalists during the period argued was a key source of the drain. Instead of employing

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[323] P. K. (Panikkanparambil Kesavan) Gopalakrishnan, *Development of Economic Ideas in India (1880-1950)* (New Delhi: People's Publishing House, 1959), 186.

[324] Partha Chatterjee, *The Politics of the Governed: Reflections on Popular Politics in Most of the World* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2004), 48; Partha Chatterjee, "Modernity, Democracy and a Political Negotiation of Death," *South Asia Research* 19, no. 2 (1999): 103–19.

Indians who would keep their earnings in the subcontinent, these thinkers pointed out that the ICS' largely British workforce typically remitted much of their wealth to their home country and their presence prevented locals from receiving training in administration and other skilled professions. In 1897 testimony before the Welby Commission, for example, the INC leader and social reformer G.K. Gokhale criticized British domination in the subcontinent in clearly elitist terms. He labelled British domination of India a "moral evil" that results in "a kind of dwarfing or stunting of the Indian race," an "atmosphere of inferiority" that forces "the tallest of us [to] bend." He continued, "the upward impulses, if I may use such an expression, which every boy at Eton or Harrow may feel, that he may one day be a Gladstone, a Nelson, or a Wellington, and which may draw forth the best efforts of which he is capable, is denied to us [Indians]."[325] While Gokhale eloquently articulated in figurative language the economic absence felt by many elite Indian students barred from upwardly-mobile opportunities, his and other economic nationalists' frequent efforts to secure limited transfer of power from British elites to Indian ones notably lessened the potential mass appeal of such arguments. This contortion of drain theory to speak to Indian elites was made all the more ironic due to many drain theorists past involvement in the colonial administration, including in the Indian Civil Service, the GoI's courts, and even, in Naoroji's case, the British Parliament.

To be sure, British rules setting maximum ages for ICS entrants and requirements that they sit the exam in England did limit the number of Indian entrants to a trickle (only a dozen Indians joined the ICS between 1853-1883). These rules ultimately prevented many upper-middle class Indians from reaping the benefits of this lucrative form of employment.[326] But economic nationalist thinkers frequently overstated this case at the expense of other arguments with more mass appeal, neglecting the fact that poor, uneducated Indians likely could not even imagine entering an Indianized civil service, which would almost certainly be dominated by wealthier, upper-caste Indian elites. Naoroji even asserted at the first session of the INC that British-domination of the ICS was "the *sole cause* of this extreme poverty and wretchedness of the mass of the people is the inordinate employment of foreign agency in the government of the country and the consequent material loss."[327] Indeed, this focus on opening the ICS to more Indians reflected an instrumentalization of India's masses' suffering to secure the desires of the elites, exacerbating the crisis in representation between the elite-led nationalist movement and the masses they professed a desire to liberate. This

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[325] Quoted in Chandra, *The Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in India*, 130–31.
[326] Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Economic Thought*, 83.
[327] Quoted in Chandra, *The Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in India*, 110–11.

dynamic proved a powerful limitation on economic nationalism's potency in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

Efforts to translate these economic nationalist ideas into mass mobilization did not gain serious traction until the 20th century with the rise of the *Swadeshi* movement following the controversial partition of Bengal in 1905. Though originally focused on encouraging the masses to boycott British manufactured goods and instead purchase Indian ones[328], in this early 20th century context it quickly morphed into a call among some activists (endorsed by the INC in 1906) for *swadeshi swaraj* (national self-government).[329] To promote this idea, the movement spawned proliferating societies, journals, pamphlets, educational materials, and street plays that popularized drain theory's emotional appeals beyond the literate classes to the rural peasantry, incorporating their experiences far more directly.[330] The movement began in earnest in 1905, following Lord Curzon's announcement that he would partition Bengal into East and West, a move that threatened national solidarity by dividing the largely rural Muslim population of the East from the wealthier Hindu-dominated West.[331] On October 16 of that year, the day of the partition, former INC president Amvika Charan Mazumdar described "wild demonstrations unparalleled in the history of the country," in which "the people in their hundreds and thousands in every city, town and village marched in solemn processions bare-footed and bare-bodied chanting."[332] Indeed, historical and contemporaneous accounts have confirmed the extent to which the *Swadeshi* movement swept through Bengal and beyond, impacting even the illiterate rural population that had little prior knowledge of elite economic nationalist discourse.

Ultimately, though, the *Swadeshi* movement's success in motivating the annulment of Bengal's partition in 1911 did not significantly contribute to a unifying sense of national or even sub-national identity that fundamentally threatened the British hold on power. Part of the reason for this failure was economic—over the decade following 1903 European imports of multiple key categories

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[328] For more on early *swadeshi* calls in the 19th century, which many industrialists and nationalists opposed as an ineffective means of agitation, see Chandra, 126–28, 670.

[329] In *Hind Swaraj*, for example, Gandhi's 'editor' refers to the *Swadeshi* movement following the 1905 partition of Bengal as laying the seeds of home rule sentiment. Mohandas Gandhi, *Hind Swaraj*, ed. Anthony J. Parel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 19–22.

[330] Goswami, *Producing India*, 242–50; Sumit Sarkar, *The Swadeshi Movement in Bengal, 1903-1908*, 2nd ed (Bangalore: Permanent Black, 2010).

[331] Surendranath Banerjea, *A Nation in Making: Being the Reminiscences of Fifty Years of Public Life* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1925), 171; Goswami, *Producing India*, 242.

[332] Amvika Charan Mazumdar, *Indian National Evolution: A Brief Survey of the Origin and Progress of the Indian National Congress and the Growth of Indian Nationalism* (Kolakata: Frontpage, 2010), 224.

of goods increased substantially, benefitting the local Indian economy in spite of colonialism's continued coercive presence. But it also stemmed from the extremism of certain factions of the *Swadeshi* movement that hardened existing communal divisions. Upper caste Hindus oftentimes violently enforced boycotts on lower caste and Muslim Bengalis and, for this reason, many Muslims grew to favor the partition as a means of separating themselves from the dominance of oppressive Hindu landlords and upper caste elites. [333] As historian A.K. Biswas concludes, "victims of hatred and prejudice cannot swell the ranks of their tormentors in the hour of crisis of the latter. Neither Muslims nor low caste persecuted Hindus could join, in the stated circumstances, the [S]wadeshi agitation."[334] Even Rabindranath Tagore, the great Bengali poet and nationalist leader, lamented the communalism and left the *Swadeshi* movement after three months. Of the movement's ultimate failure to evoke widespread solidarity, Tagore wrote "A brother does, of course, suffer for the sake of another brother, but if somebody just turns up from nowhere and introduces himself as brother, he is not very likely to be straight away shown into his share of inheritance."[335] Tagore's words here reflect deeply on the impact of the crisis in representation engendered by the elite-domination of this early economic nationalist discourse, as well as the suffering inherent to the poverty so many Indians experienced.

The *Swadeshi* movement certainly helped spread knowledge of elite economic nationalist ideas like the drain and a skepticism of trade beyond the small circles within which they were developed. But still, the crisis of representation involved in elite invocations of lower classes' trauma without connecting with their lived experience remained an issue for the nationalist movement until independence. This distance was only exacerbated by much of India's feudal agricultural system, in which local elites were oftentimes more oppressive of their rural workforce on a day-to-day basis than the distant British colonial regime. During the *swadeshi* movement, these ideas spread most intensely in Bengal, where the colonial administration's partition of the province proved a focal point for mass organization, and thus the movement did not lead to a widespread uprising across the subcontinent. For this reason, Sumit Sarkar concludes that the movement fizzled out because it "never translated into concrete bread-and-butter terms for the masses…nor could the swadeshi leaders despite some sincere efforts develop like Gandhi an idiom or style of political activity which

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[333] A. K. Biswas, "Paradox of Anti-Partition Agitation and Swadeshi Movement in Bengal (1905)," *Social Scientist* 23, no. 4/6 (April 1995): 38–57.

[334] Ibid, 53.

[335] Quoted in Biswas, 52.

could effectively bridge the elite-mass gap."[336] Over time, the limitations this divide imposed on the nationalist movement contributed to a fracturing of the INC between those favoring extreme tactics and those moderates favoring reform within the system.

4.4: Economic Nationalism in the Independence Period

As World War I began in Europe and over a million Indians traveled abroad to fight, the British GoI's wartime economic policies led to a significant boost in Indian manufacturing. These reforms placated Indian business interests and lessened the resonance of economic nationalist arguments for independence like the drain among urban elites during the immediate post-war period. In the meantime, the INC and the larger Indian nationalist movement continued to disagree over tactics; a chief fault line had emerged during the *Swadeshi* movement between moderates and extremists and this led to a deep divide over whether to pursue reform via participation in elected provincial legislatures. These debates proved vital to the overall history of the Indian nationalist movement, but did not prove particularly influential in the later foreign economic policy debates that are the subject of this chapter. Regardless, the deaths of key moderates Pherozeshah Mehta and G.K. Gokhale in 1915, as well as the leader of the extremist wing, Bal Gangadhar Tilak in 1920, augured the rise of a new generation of Indian nationalist leaders, including many who shaped economic nationalist discourse around the time of independence. The first and arguably most important of this new generation of nationalist leaders was MK Gandhi, but it also included leftists like MN Roy and JP Narayan, business leaders like GD Birla, John Matthai and Purshottamdas Thakurdas, and key INC leaders like Subhas Chandra Bose, Vallabhbhai Patel, and Jawaharlal Nehru.

This section examines the contours of economic nationalist discourse during the period around independence, focusing on how narrations of colonial trauma proliferated, fueling a fairly durable consensus around the idea that autarky was vital to achieving security. In many ways, this discourse built upon the 19th century narrations discussed in the prior section of India as an economic nation suffering collectively under British rule. But the escalation of British repression during World War II, coupled with new efforts to proliferate nationalist political consciousness outside urban educated classes, led to economic nationalist discourse's increasing incorporation of diverse Indian experiences and interchange with new economic ideas. Still, despite some groups'

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[336] Sarkar, *The Swadeshi Movement in Bengal, 1903-1908*, 3.

clear attempts to instrumentalize trauma in support of their existing policy preferences, the mass politics of the time period exerted resistance to any advocacy of foreign economic engagement, which many believed threatened to re-introduce the oppressive dynamics of empire. Given the contours of this debate, autarky became the *de facto* goal of development planning.

In this section I outline what I argue were the four most influential strands of economic nationalist thought during the period, demonstrating how each interwove experience and knowledge to narrate colonial trauma and articulate a political response. I begin with Gandhianism, arguably the most important ideology in spreading economic nationalist discourse outside of urban, educated India during the decades before independence. Second, I examine the Marxist left flank of the nationalist movement, which included three notable sub-factions. In the third section, I turn to India's big business community, represented by the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), the authors of the Bombay Plan, and their allies among INC leadership. Finally, the chapter turns to what became the mainstream of the INC, represented by Jawaharlal Nehru and his allies, which promoted moderated non-Soviet socialism and sought compromise between the factions around autarkic economic nationalist principles. For the sake of simplicity, this typology deliberately omits multiple political factions during the time period marginal to economic nationalist discourse, including liberal groups that eventually formed the Swatantra Party, the Muslim League, Ambedkar's Scheduled Caste Federation, and the various Hindu nationalist groups that formed the Bharatiya Jana Sangh in 1951.[337] Ultimately, though, this chapter's typology encompasses a sufficiently diverse array of thinkers to capture the multifaceted impact of narrations of trauma in Indian economic nationalist discourse, as well as how the consensus that emerged from these debates contributed to autarky's institutionalization in the Second Five-Year Plan.

4.4a: Gandhianism's Logic: Decentralization to Preserve India's Birthright

MK Gandhi returned to India from South Africa in 1915, already a well-known figure in nationalist circles for having organized Indians against discrimination in the region via his activist doctrine of *satyagraha* (truth force). Under Gokhale's advice, Gandhi spent his first year back in India travelling the countryside and then proceeded to organize peasants and factory workers on a local

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[337] Further, none of these parties or their ideological allies exceeded approximately three percent of the vote in India's first parliamentary elections, indicating their marginality in national political debates. Election Commission of India, "Report on the First General Elections in India" 1951-1952" (Delhi: Government of India, 1955).

scale, learning of their lived experiences and immediate concerns.[338] Throughout the 1920s Gandhi rose in prominence in Indian nationalist politics, advocating a vision of non-cooperation and *swadeshi* that appealed broadly beyond the organized elites of the INC.[339] During his initial years of activism, Gandhian thought was not primarily oriented towards economics. But, over time, Gandhi developed an idiosyncratic vision of a decentralized, agricultural post-independence Indian economy almost entirely cut off from what he believed was the inherent violence of global markets and their modernizing impulses.[340] In this sense, Gandhianism took inspiration from drain theory, drawing on narratives of collective trauma to more directly link imperialism, international economic engagement and centralized power to the suffering experienced by impoverished rural Indians. And while ultimately policymakers like Nehru and Patel marginalized much of Gandhianism's emphasis on decentralized village-based production in post-independence planning debates, his narrations of economic self-sufficiency as a means of avoiding colonial violence and trauma—in many ways an extension of the logics of drain theory—played an important role in shaping economic nationalist discourse in the independence period. Though his passing in 1948 limited his influence on post-independence planning debates, his thought continued on through his glorified legacy and the work of figures like J.C. Kumarappa.[341]

Even before his return to India in 1915, Gandhi demonstrated an early interest in reaching out to rural India and building upon the intellectual tradition of early economic nationalists and extending their arguments' emotive appeal beyond elite discourse. In *Hind Swaraj*, the 1909 book Gandhi wrote reflecting on India's identity and a path to Indian home rule, he demonstrated an emotional connection with the work of key 19th century economic nationalist intellectuals that extended beyond their technical arguments. "When I read Mr. Dutt's *Economic History of India*, I wept; and, as I think of it again, my heart sickens," Gandhi wrote in the voice of his sagacious 'Editor.'[342] In this dialogue and his other early writings, Gandhi adopted drain theorists' criticisms and adapted

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[338] Hermann Kulke and Dietmar Rothermund, *A History of India*, Sixth edition (London ; New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2016), 292–93.

[339] For example, Gandhi gained popularity among many of India's Muslim community's by supporting the Khilafat movement that sought to preserve the Caliphate after the fall of the Ottoman Empire.

[340] Ashutosh Varshney, "Contested Meanings: India's National Identity, Hindu Nationalism, and the Politics of Anxiety," *Daedalus* 122, no. 3 (1993): 227–61.

[341] Gandhian economics also notably influenced the grassroots *Bhoodan* (land-gifts) movement of Acharya Vinoba Bhave, though this group had little national political presence. See Taylor C. Sherman, "A Gandhian Answer to the Threat of Communism? Sarvodaya and Postcolonial Nationalism in India," *The Indian Economic & Social History Review* 53, no. 2 (2016): 249–70.

[342] Gandhi, *Hind Swaraj*, 107.

them into a full scale criticism of European modernity as the locus of India's suffering. For example, he referred to the railways as a "disease," representative of the larger cultural disease of European "civilization."[343] Further, he wrote oftentimes in empathetic, vaguely spiritual terms, recognizing the trauma experienced by so many on the subcontinent and the difficulty inherent in narrating it. In *Hind Swaraj*, his 'Editor' prefaced his remarks on India's condition by recognizing his "grave doubts whether I shall be able sufficiently to explain what is in my heart,"[344] reflecting directly on the crisis in representation inherent to narrating the traumatic experiences of such a diverse impoverished population from afar.

But though Gandhi wrote extensively during this period on India's rural population's suffering and accepted the basic tenets of drain theory, he had little early interest in debating the economic dynamics of empire. Further, in his early work, he often demonstrated his distance from prevailing conditions on the subcontinent, presumably due to his elite background and decades spent in London and South Africa. Frequently, this outlook led him to blame impoverished Indians' suffering on their moral failings, rather than empathize with the coercive arrangements they faced within the complex power structures engendered by imperialism.[345] For example, Gandhi's editor frequently blamed India's woes on its infatuation with technology and modernity, downplaying the hardships of poverty by euphemizing famines as "pressures" and romanticizing rural populations' "sleeping fearlessly" outdoors without adequate shelter. [346] His editor even lionized "open air" agricultural labor, which he lamented that many Indians had abandoned in favor of more lucrative "work in factories and mines." This transition, he argued, demonstrated these populations "are enslaved by temptation of money and of the luxuries that money can buy," rather than simply following economic incentives created by continued structural economic insecurity. He even stigmatized these workers' decisions by saying this transition to industrial work led them to succumb "diseases of which people never dreamt before."[347] At another point in the text, Gandhi linked this blame to India's colonial domination. "Who assisted the [British East India] Company's officers? Who was tempted at the sight of their silver? Who bought their goods? History testifies that we did

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[343] Gandhi, 42, 40.
[344] Gandhi, 42.
[345] Gandhi was also known to refer to the laws of supply and demand as a "law of the devil."; Paraphrased in Kulke and Rothermund, *A History of India*, 304.
[346] Gandhi, *Hind Swaraj*, 44–45.
[347] Gandhi, 36.

all this."[348] This figurative language of India's colonial subordination as succumbing to temptation for foreign baubles painted foreign economic engagement as a form of surrender and, implicitly, autarky as a form of strength—a theme that would reappear differently in Gandhi's more empathic later work. Still, this narrative was utterly discordant with the daily experiences of the majority of India's rural population, who had little direct contact with European modernization but did suffer immensely from food insecurity, poverty and the harsh conditions imposed by landlords and moneylenders. Such moralistic language decried the general influence of empire, but also neglected to examine how it often created desperate economic circumstances, pushing impoverished Indians away from traditional agricultural practices toward new economic opportunities.

Over time, though, as Gandhi spent more time organizing in India's countryside and engaging with the nationalist movement, his interpretation of economic nationalism grew into a more coherent (if not altogether practical) field of thought, more in tune with the experiences of impoverished Indians within the larger British empire. Further, over time Gandhi gained credibility with large sections of India's population, garnering an aura of saintliness due to his asceticism, self-sacrifice, religious syncretism, and anti-elitism, demonstrated visually through his emaciated figure and simple traditional dress.[349] Through the 1920s and 1930s, Gandhi articulated a vision of post-independence Indian identity in which a decentralized system of production devolved its loci of both political and economic power to self-sufficient villages. In such an India, Gandhi believed the "miserable hovels of the poor laboring class" would naturally and non-violently see their livelihoods improved.[350] But though his vision was primarily local, its implications spread to the international. He argued that decentralization would allow these villages to be insulated from the violence and trauma inherent to both foreign powers' imperialism and the potential tyranny of centralized capitalist production, which he referred to as the "bloody way of the west."[351] For this reason, he wrote that a "[r]urally-organized India will run less risk of foreign invasion than urbanized India well-equipped with military, naval and air-forces."[352]

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[348] Gandhi, 40.

[349] See, for example, Kulke and Rothermund, *A History of India*, 303–5; On Gandhi's relationship with Birla, see Leah Renold, "Gandhi: Patron Saint of the Industrialist," *South Asia Graduate Research Journal, Introductory Issue* 1, no. 1 (1994).

[350] Gandhi, *Constructive Programme: Its Meaning and Place* (Ahmedabad, India: Navajivan Press, 2010), 20.

[351] Gopalakrishnan, *Development of Economic Ideas in India (1880-1950)*, 191.

[352] Quoted in Gopalakrishnan, 191–92.

Under a Gandhian economic vision, foreign trade would occur only in surpluses, as he believed an economy dependent on foreign trade implied traumatizing and impoverishing villagers by stripping them of their birthright to locally produced goods. Foreign capital, due to its coercive influence and tendency to promote industrialization, was to be avoided at all costs.[353] This logic, reminiscent of drain theory, connected the macro realms of foreign intervention and centralized imperial rule to the hardships faced by India's poor, facilitating Gandhi's connection of local events to international political dynamics. For example, Gandhi identified the devastating famine developing in Bengal a result of food export mediated by imperialism as early as 1942, just as much of India was learning of its details, years before the Famine Commission.[354] In the coming years, he repeated the phrase that the traumas of the Bengal Famine, like so many famines in Indian history, were "man-made and not God-made" and thus could be resolved via political freedom.[355]

Indeed, the traumas of the war period fueled Gandhian economic nationalism's logics and inspired his acolytes. Gandhi's economic thought formally entered debates on development planning in 1944 via economist SN Agarwal's publication of "The Gandhian Plan of Economic Development for India"—endorsed by Gandhi himself in a forward.[356] Agarwal began the pamphlet with a critique of existing trends in planning, which he saw as insufficiently nationalistic, "copying Western plans" in lieu of emphasizing the "special cultural and sociological foundations" on which Indian life is based: "Well-organized and powerful Village Communities."[357] The plan centered around the idea of village self-sufficiency[358]—minimal trade between villages agglomerated into an autarkic national unit, creating multiple layers of defenses against exploitative foreign economic intervention. The plan's narrative rationale for this system drew on the contemporaneous global traumas of World War II, recognizing that the world economic system in which "sordid poverty [existed] in the midst of untold plenty" led directly to "sanguinary wars and wholesale human slaughter," both on the

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[353] JC Kumarappa, *Gandhian Economic Thought* (Bombay: Vora & Co., 1951).

[354] Mukherjee, *Hungry Bengal: War, Famine and the End of Empire*, 67.

[355] Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, vol. LXXVII (New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1981), 439.

[356] SN Agarwal, *The Gandhian Plan of Economic Development for India* (Bombay: Padma Publications Ltd., 1944); SN Agarwal, *Gandhian Plan Reaffirmed* (Bombay: Padma Publications Ltd., 1948), 8.

[357] Agarwal, *The Gandhian Plan of Economic Development for India*, 2.

[358] For a more thorough discussion of this Gandhian plan's concept of self-sufficiency, see Daya Shankar Nag, *A Study of Economic Plans for India* (Bombay: Hind Kitabs Limited, 1949), 55–70.

battlefield and in impoverished colonies.[359] Accordingly, it conceived of autarky as vital to avoiding this imperialistic cycle and preventing collective trauma due to imperialistic ventures. Agarwal decried British imperialism not solely for its oppressive use of power, but also for its introduction of mechanization and industrialization to the subcontinent—these forces led inevitably to a "frantic race for 'foreign markets,' which sooner or later ends in blood-thirsty wars and brutal massacre."[360] The thoroughly decentralized Gandhian model he envisioned as a response would stymie these dynamics by allowing for only minimal international trade, conducted solely in "surpluses of different countries in terms of mutual benefit."[361] Any further international economic engagement, the plan argued, was based on "greed and exploitation, setting in motion the forces of imperialism, which, ultimately, result in sanguinary wars."[362] In 1948, Aggarwal even extended the logic of his plan to partition violence in a pamphlet entitled the "Gandhian Plan Reaffirmed." He argued that the widespread communal violence of partition was a "passing phase" in India's history due to the continued influence of imperialism that would be eliminated in an independent India with a Gandhian economic planning regime.[363] Together, Aggarwal's Gandhian planning documents narrated a direct link between imperialism, international economic exchange, centralized power and the traumas experienced by India's "teeming millions," envisioning multiple layers of autarky as vital to avoiding this system.[364]

Though Agarwal's plans did not form the basis for government policy after independence, the legacy of Gandhian planning lived on after Gandhi's death in 1948 via multiple avenues—most notably in government via JC Kumarappa, a US-educated economist who served as Gandhi's interpreter in mainstream development planning debates. Kumarappa rose to prominence in national politics after Gandhi chose him in 1934 to run his All-India Village Industries Association (AIVIA). This position led to his inclusion as the sole Gandhian on the INC's pre-World War II National Planning Committee, an important precursor to the powerful post-independence Planning

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[359] In the pamphlet, Agarwal contrasted the Gandhian plan with the Nazi development agenda, the US 'New Deal' under Franklin Delano Roosevelt, British planning and the Soviet model, all of which contributed to World War II and suffering or imperialism. Agarwal, *The Gandhian Plan of Economic Development for India*, 8–15.

[360] Agarwal, 46.

[361] Agarwal, 96.

[362] Agarwal, 96–97.

[363] Agarwal, *Gandhian Plan Reaffirmed*, 12.

[364] Agarwal, 10.

Commission.[365] Gandhi wanted Kumarappa to be India's first Finance Minister and Nehru included him on the INC's 1947 Economic Programme Committee, but Gandhi's death in 1948 led to a gradual decline in Kumarappa's political influence. Ultimately, he was never made a permanent member of the Planning Commission and left government altogether shortly after independence.[366]

Despite this alienation, Kumarappa remained an outspoken voice for Gandhian economics in the 1950s, countering what he saw as the mistakes of pro-industrialization Nehruvians in government. In a 1952 speech, for example, Kumarappa drew on Gandhianism's logic to argue that India's continued post-independence traumatic poverty was due to the global production chains in which it was still embedded:

> [G]lobal conflicts are not isolated incidents. They are the culminations of innumerable small acts performed by simple people innocently. Though the responsibility for wars may immediately be placed on some leaders yet the real causes can be traced to our daily acts. For instance, city people buy milk without asking whether the calf had been fed or the children of the milkman had their quota. When the milk we buy is not a surplus but has been squeezed out of the mouths of calves and children with prior claims our acts are *Adharmic* and we create violence, which when accumulated breaks out into world catastrophe. Hence, we see the real remedy lies in the consumer being closely associated with the producer and the distributer. This means decentralization of production and a move towards self-sufficiency.[367]

This equation of trade with economic 'violence' implicated in 'small acts' shaping people's everyday experiences drew on the powerful metaphor of stealing milk from children, deeply evocative of traumatic rural poverty and famine. Furthering, his notion of "war in the economic field" connected the recent international trauma of World War II to the local traumas Indians experienced during the period, namely the Bengal Famine.[368] Working with groups like the Boycott America Committee to advocate further economic and diplomatic isolation, Kumarappa blamed excess trade for village

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[365] Mark Lindley, *JC Kumarappa: Mahatma Gandhi's Economist* (Mumbai: Popular Prakashan, 2007), 29–30; Bidyut Chakrabarty, "Jawaharlal Nehru and Planning, 1938–41: India at the Crossroads," *Modern Asian Studies* 26, no. 2 (1992): 282.

[366] Lindley, *JC Kumarappa: Mahatma Gandhi's Economist*, 47.

[367] JC Kumarappa, "The Gandhian Approach to World Peace," December 1952, 2–3, JC Kumarappa Papers: Speeches/Writings, Volume 5, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML).

[368] JC Kumarappa, "'World Peace', Inaugural Address, Conference for Peace and Asian Solidarity, Bangalore," January 29, 1955, 10, JC Kumarappa Papers: Speeches/Writings, Volume 5, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML).

children being "skin and bone." [369] Building on these metaphors alluding to the traumatic experience of rural hunger, Kumarappa even at one point argued that this logic implied that "villagers are actually selling their children and we are eating their children."[370] This shocking figurative language comparing international trade to cannibalism again vividly narrated a link between India's diverse collective traumas, imperialism and the pro-industrialization policies pursued by Nehru's Planning Commission.

Yet, despite Kumarappa's eloquent advocacy and Gandhian economics mass appeal, by the time of the formulation of India's first and second Five-Year Plans in the 1950s, Gandhian economics had already largely fallen out of the mainstream, overpowered by the logics of the Nehruvian planning regime, as well as the forces of Hindu nationalism, communism and resurgent sub-national political identities.[371] Still, Gandhi and his acolytes' decades of rhetoric narrating India's rural poverty and warning that a lack of self-sufficiency could lead to the horrific violence of foreign economic domination cast a shadow over these debates and profoundly furthered the logic of autarky. Indeed, on the question of autarky, Gandhian economics' vision of *swadeshi*[372] deeply influenced numerous figures in India's planning establishment, namely Jawaharlal Nehru.[373] And to the extent that Gandhi personally remained a revered figure among India's post-independence political elites, the Planning Commission frequently justified its policies by referencing their basis in Gandhian economic thought.[374] Even if these invocations were sometimes pure artifice, Gandhian economic nationalism's prominence and status as a doctrine in post-colonial India made it an ideology with which planners needed to contend.

4.4b: Indian Marxism's Turn to Economic Nationalism

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[369] JC Kumarappa, "Correspondence with the Boycott America Committee," undated, JC Kumarappa Papers: Correspondence, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML); Kumarappa, "'World Peace', Inaugural Address, Conference for Peace and Asian Solidarity, Bangalore"; JC Kumarappa, "Speech Delivered by Dr. JC Kumarappa in the Sri Rangacharlu Memorial Hall, Mysore," March 18, 1947, JC Kumarappa Papers: Speeches/Writings, Volume 5, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML).

[370] Kumarappa, "Speech Delivered by Dr. JC Kumarappa in the Sri Rangacharlu Memorial Hall, Mysore," 3.

[371] Benjamin Zachariah, *Developing India: An Intellectual and Social History, C. 1930-50* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2012); Benjamin Zachariah, "The Development of Professor Mahalanobis," *Economy and Society* 26, no. 3 (1997): 438.

[372] Satish Kumar, "Gandhi's Swadeshi: The Economics of Permanence," in *The Case Against the Global Economy: And for a Turn toward the Local* (San Francisco, CA: Sierra Club Books, 1996), 418–24.

[373] For example, this idea appears at numerous points in Nehru's seminal outline of his political thought, *The Discovery of India.* Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989 [1946]).

[374] Raghabendra Chattopadhyay, "The Idea of Planning in India, 1930-1951" (Australia National University, 1985), 20, http://hdl.handle.net/1885/109360.

John Patrick Haithcox has written that the term 'socialism' in pre-independence Indian reasonably applied to multiple distinct groups, among which Gandhians, Fabians and Marxists were the three most prominent.[375] Indeed, beyond any affiliation with international socialist thought or the Soviet Union, the term 'socialism' retained a broad appeal throughout the period in question across the Indian political spectrum as a vague, normative positive referring to social justice and economic uplift.[376] Among these groups, this section examines the Marxists, a label which itself contained multiple distinct overlapping factions. During the pre-independence period, the most prominent of these were the Congress Socialist Party (CSP), the Communist Party of India (CPI), and followers of M.N. Roy (Royists/Radical Humanists).

In this section I focus on a key tension which emerged in the adaptation of international Marxist thought to the Indian nationalist movement relating to the trauma experienced due to the colonial encounter. While Indian Marxists certainly adapted from their European counterparts, I argue that their relevance in mainstream Indian economic nationalist discourse depended on maintaining a distance from Soviet-dominated international Marxist discourse. Stemming in large part from the views of Gandhi, who believed that Soviet socialism depended on horrific violence to maintain control[377], international socialism and Stalinism more specifically developed an immense stigma among Indian nationalists by the time of independence. By the 1940s, as debates about economic planning raged in the subcontinent, most mainstream leaders of the nationalist movement had abandoned their previous admiration for Russia's revolutionary leaders and begun seeing Soviet socialism as having devolved into imperialistic tendencies, liable to reintroduce imperial traumatization if welcomed into the subcontinent. Though all three Marxist groups discussed in this section followed conventional Marxist thinking in supporting state control of industry and closed markets, their acceptance within mainstream Indian politics depended on their acceptance of autarky and rejection of solidarity or alignment with the Soviets. By the time of independence, pro-Soviet Marxism persisted in only a few isolated circles—the strand of Marxism most relevant in nationalist

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[375] John Patrick Haithcox, *Communism and Nationalism in India: M. N. Roy and Comintern Policy, 1920-1939* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1971), 219.; This categorization was also adopted by Girja Shankar in his history of socialism in the Indian national movement. Girja Shankar, *Socialist Trends in the Indian National Movement* (Meerut: Twenty-First Century Publishers, 1987).

[376] Haithcox describes socialism as "in vogue among young, educated Indians, but it more closely represented an ill-defined sentiment than a distinct ideology." Haithcox, *Communism and Nationalism in India*, 219.

[377] See, for example, Gandhi's interview with American journalist Louis Fischer in Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, *My Socialism* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1959), 49–51; Kazuya Ishii, "The Socioeconomic Thoughts of Mahatma Gandhi: As an Origin of Alternative Development," *Review of Social Economy* 59, no. 3 (September 2001): 297–312.

politics, embodied by the Socialist Party (later the Praja Socialist Party), accepted the prevailing logic of economic non-alignment and stigma of Soviet practices' violence.

Before proceeding to a discussion of the development of these groups' identity narratives, it's worth briefly outlining the tactical and policy debates between the three main Marxist factions (CSP, CPI and Royists) in the decades before independence, as these contours help to explain their relative success in integrating into the nationalist movement. The CPI was founded in 1924 by Indians in Europe, including MN Roy.[378] The group gained prominence in the subcontinent in the late 1920s[379], organizing notable strikes and agitations.[380] Roy, who had been involved in multiple congresses of the Communist International (Comintern) and famously debated Lenin on the wisdom of supporting so-called bourgeois anti-imperialist nationalist movements like the INC[381], became an early leader in the movement whose writings inspired numerous later Indian Marxists, including JP Narayan.[382] But in 1928 Roy broke away from the Comintern and CPI due to disagreements with Stalinism and he began his own Marxist faction in India known as Royists.[383] Still, during much of this pre-war period Roy hoped to reconcile with the CPI and reintegrate his followers into the international communist movement. Even without Roy, the CPI garnered a significant urban following via its work with trade unions, but the radicalism it espoused led to its prohibition by the British GoI in 1934.[384]

In that same year (1934), a variety of left-leaning INC members—including Narayan, Acharya Narendra Dev, Ram Manohar Lohia, and Minoo Masani—formed the CSP within the INC as a broad left-leaning bloc that included Marxists, Fabians and Gandhians. Initially, the group focused largely on opposing the influence of right-leaning factions of the INC. Relations between the then-underground CPI, Royists and the CSP were initially tepid and instead of creating Marxist

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[378] Shankar, *Socialist Trends in the Indian National Movement*, 22.

[379] See also Nirmala Joshi, *Foundations of Indo-Soviet Relations: A Study of Non-Official Attitudes and Contacts, 1917-1947* (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1975), 14–68.

[380] Shankar, *Socialist Trends in the Indian National Movement*, 23.

[381] John P. Haithcox, "The Roy-Lenin Debate on Colonial Policy: A New Interpretation," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 23, no. 1 (1963): 93.

[382] John Patrick Haithcox, "Left Wing Unity and the Indian Nationalist Movement: M. N. Roy and the Congress Socialist Party," *Modern Asian Studies* 3, no. 01 (1969): 25.

[383] In 1941, Roy launched the Radical Humanist movement, which denounced Marxism entirely. Ultimately, though, this movement proved less influential in the economic nationalist discourses of the period and thus it is largely outside the purview of this chapter. B. K. Mahakul, "Radical Humanism of M.N. Roy," *The Indian Journal of Political Science* 66, no. 3 (2005): 607–18.

[384] Shankar, *Socialist Trends in the Indian National Movement*, 23.; Myron Weiner, *Party Politics in India* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), 15.

solidarity, the CSP focused on courting leftist INC leaders of other socialist persuasions like Nehru, Gandhi and Subhas Chandra Bose, none of whom ended up joining.[385] Having failed to garner such mainstream approval, the CSP eventually expanded to include Royists and CPI-style communists, though their union was short-lived. The Royists resigned from the CSP in 1937[386], while the communists attempted to disrupt the CSP's functioning from within until they were purged 1940.[387] During World War II, the CSP and its leaders joined the INC's Quit India movement, while the communists supported the war effort after Hitler attacked the Soviet Union in 1941. Roy similarly declined to join the Quit India movement, severing connections with the INC to support the war effort. Following the war, the CPI re-emerged in a more radical and violent direction under BT Ranadive and the CSP split from the Congress to form the Socialist Party (later becoming the Praja Socialist Party).[388] Both the CPI and the Socialist Party remained prominent foils to the INC in the immediate post-independence period, while Roy ceased to play a major role in Indian national politics until his death in 1954.

In many ways, autarky was a natural position for all three factions of Indian Marxists due to international Marxism's longstanding critiques of liberal trade policies and open capital flows. Indeed, skepticism of capitalism even led the CPI to oppose the INC as too liberal; the CPI claimed its bourgeois leadership would inevitably compromise with dominion status in the British empire so that wealthy industrialists could continue to benefit from imperial economic dynamics. As an article in the CPI-mouthpiece newspaper stated in March 1923, the "capitalist offensive in Europe [would] naturally [be] followed by an offensive of the Indian capital against native labour."[389] The CPI viewed with suspicion any economic ties to the British empire. The CSP, similarly, included in its initial program an economic nationalist call for "state monopoly of foreign trade," which its leader Narayan wrote would eliminate profiteering and make it impossible for "enemies of the Nation, either within or without, to sabotage its economic schemes and activities."[390] The idea of a state monopoly on foreign trade persisted in the CSP's platform even after it became the Socialist Party—in its 1951 "Programme for National Revival" it again called for a state monopoly on foreign trade

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[385] Shankar, *Socialist Trends in the Indian National Movement*, 48–49, 61–67; John Patrick Haithcox, "Left Wing Unity and the Indian Nationalist Movement: M. N. Roy and the Congress Socialist Party," *Modern Asian Studies* 3, no. 1 (1969): 41.
[386] Haithcox, "Left Wing Unity and the Indian Nationalist Movement," 32–33.
[387] M. R. Masani, "The Communist Party in India," *Pacific Affairs* 24, no. 1 (1951): 22–23.
[388] Masani, 24–27.
[389] Gangadhar Adhikari, ed., "The Capitalist Offensive in India," in *Documents of the History of the Communist Party of India: 1923-1925*, vol. 2 (New Delhi: People's Publishing House, 1976), 79–80.
[390] Jayaprakash Narayan, *Why Socialism?* (Benares: The All India Congress Socialist Party, 1936), 28, 44.

and strict state controls over the introduction of foreign capital.[391] Even Roy, who led the most idiosyncratic of the factions, published a noteworthy criticism of the prominent industrialist-crafted Bombay Plan (discussed in the next section) as allegedly accepting export-led growth's logic. Such growth, Roy argued, would lead to a fascist desire to capture foreign markets and the violent exploitation of domestic workers.[392] Advocacy of strict state controls over all of economic life were *de rigueur* for Marxists throughout the period and thus it is no surprise that Indian Marxists were among the most vocal critics of liberal trade policies after independence.

But while these calls for stringent protectionism were standard Marxist doctrine, most Indian Marxists did split from their international peers in an important respect: denouncing the violence of the Soviet Union and rejecting potential alignment with the international communist bloc. Drift from Soviet socialism occurred slowly among the three Marxist factions, beginning in the 1930s when more moderate Indian socialists began to express their disillusionment with Stalinist violence and repression. Nehru, for example, who remained a respected figure among Indian Marxists during the pre-independence period despite later fitting more closely into the 'Fabian' category of Haithcox's typology, admitted as early as 1933 that the first Soviet five-year plan "brought much suffering, and difficulties, and dislocation." He added that even though some of this suffering was sacrifice paid in hopes of a better feature, much of it was also imposed harshly by the Soviet Government.[393] Over time, this skepticism of Soviet violence bled into the CSP and among Royists, most notably after the Soviet non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany in 1939 seemed to sanction Hitler's imperialist occupations of Czechoslovakia and Poland.[394] Narayan, for example, came to regard Stalin's USSR as an imperialist power, especially after Stalin's speech to the Supreme Soviet in 1944 advocating that peace-loving nations militarily and economically disarm their war-loving counterparts. "A socialist will shed tears over it—at least he will want to," Narayan wrote of the speech. "Stalin, the head of a professedly socialist state, talks like the imperialist and capitalist rulers of the world."[395] Indeed, Narayan and the CSP he led came to view international socialism,

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[391] *The Socialist Party's Programme for National Revival* (Hyderabad: Chetana Prakashan Ltd., 1951).

[392] M. N. Roy, "Planning & Planning," in *Alphabet of Fascist Economics*, ed. M. N. Roy and G. D. Parikh (Calcutta: Renaissance Publishers, 1944), 67–69.

[393] Joshi, *Foundations of Indo-Soviet Relations: A Study of Non-Official Attitudes and Contacts, 1917-1947*, 71.

[394] Quoted in Joshi, 120–37.

[395] Joshi, 137.

dominated by the USSR, as no better that British imperialism, liable to reintroduce such collective trauma to the subcontinent if it took hold.

By independence, this equation of Soviet totalitarianism with imperialist violence was shared by most CSP members and Royists, as well as Gandhians, Nehruvians and the big business community, becoming a relative point of consensus across much of the nationalist movement. Only the CPI remained approving of the Soviets by the mid-1940s and, for multiple reasons, this alignment began to fade after independence. During the war period, the CPI opposed the INC's "Quit India" movement, actively supporting the British war effort due to its approval of the British-Soviet alliance. This fueled criticism that the CPI put Soviet interests over that of independence and lessened their popularity among Indian nationalists. After independence, the Soviet-aligned Marxism of the CPI remained highly unpopular outside all but a few select areas of the country.[396] Though the CPI retained a vague affiliation with the Soviet Union, it too realized the stigma this affiliation created and it began to dampen its support for Stalinist expansionism. In its 1951 Draft Programme, for example, the CPI referred to the Soviet Union, Lenin and Stalin largely as spiritual leaders, advocating following instead the example of China and focusing policy on improving the impoverished conditions of agricultural peasants. Such an approach, the Programme added, would end India's continued "semi-colonial" status under the bourgeois INC government and prevent these peasants from being "left for the enslavers to rob and exploit."[397] Adrift during this period and largely irrelevant during major economic policy debates due to its exile from the INC and mainstream, the CPI garnered just over 3 percent of the total vote in the First Indian General Elections of 1951-1952.[398] The CPI's drift into irrelevance during this period reveals its failure to develop an economic *nationalist* identity that resonated with India's impoverished laboring classes' experiences, which did not fit easily into the sharp class identity divisions between proletariat and bourgeoisie that Soviet Marxism painted. By the post-independence period, Soviet economic

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[396] Later on, Maoist-inspired communism gained traction in a number of rural areas. Indian Maoism, though, remains outside the scope of this chapter. Joshi, 173.

[397] *Draft Programme of the Communist Party of India* (Bombay: Communist Party Publications, 1951), 1–16.

[398] Notably, though, due to this concentration of support in certain districts, the CPI ended up with 16 seats, second only to the INC's 364. The Socialist Party, having recently split from the INC, received nearly 11 percent of the vote but only 12 seats, due to these votes' dispersal around the country. Election Commission of India, "Report on the First General Elections in India" 1951-1952"; Irene Tinker and Mil Walker, "The First General Elections in India and Indonesia," *Far Eastern Survey* 25, no. 7 (1956): 97–110.

planning had become associated in the public eye with violent repression and famine—in an India still reeling from colonial trauma, the CPI could not defend its longtime support for Stalinism.

But while the CPI declined in popularity, other strands of Indian Marxism remained formidable forces after independence, represented in parliament not only by the Socialist Party (previously the CSP, renamed after splitting from the INC), but also Marxists remaining within the INC and smaller parties like the All India Forward Bloc, formed of previous supporters of Subhas Chandra Bose's breakaway Indian National Army. During the immediate post-independence period, the Socialist Party deployed the language of socialism as a vague palliative to India's suffering, rather than indicative of a foreign model worth following. Narayan, for instance, wrote after the war that "In Russia collectivisation was pushed through at great human cost and under a ruthless dictatorship. Estimates run up to as high a figure as twenty millions of those who had to be 'liquidated' in order to make collectivisation a success. I do not favour such a colossal repression of the toiling peasant masses."[399] Instead, Narayan advocated democratic and peaceful means of achieving socialist goals, opposing both British imperialism and Soviet totalitarianism as violent forces whose example India should avoid.[400]

The Socialist Party's abandonment of Soviet socialism became clear in its 1951 economic policy program, which largely avoided references to international Marxism. In this regard, the program revealed how the party had grown to accept the conventions of the mainstream of Indian economic nationalist discourse, eschewing any invocations of Marxist ideology that could be deemed foreign. It avoided Marxist tropes lionizing the industrial working class and instead focused on the "intense poverty" of India's *rural* populations. [401] In multiple illustrations, the "Programme" depicted scantily clad malnourished figures whose experiences words—especially the formal language of economic policy—could only problematically capture. And despite the party's roots in European economic ideas, it accused Nehru's INC-led government of reviving the British GoI's repressive economic system in post-independence India by failing to challenge entrenched landowners' coercive power.

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[399] Jayaprakash Narayan, "My Picture of Socialism," in *Socialism, Sarvodaya and Democracy: Selected Works of Jayaprakash Narayan*, ed. Bimla Prasad (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1964), 44.
[400] Jayaprakash Narayan, "The Transition to Socialism," in *Socialism, Sarvodaya and Democracy: Selected Works of Jayaprakash Narayan*, ed. Bimla Prasad (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1964), 49–56.
[401] *The Socialist Party's Programme for National Revival*, 5.

Figures 1 and 2: Images from the Socialist Party's 1951 Programme for National Revival. [402]

The Socialist Party and, to a lesser extent, the CPI's post-independence turn away from the Soviet Union and focus on appealing to the experiences of India's impoverished rural population reveal the widespread stigma around foreign ideas in post-independence India, especially those that could somehow be linked to imperialism's traumas. Though Roy's influence on such large-scale planning debates waned in the post-independence period, his Radical Humanism likewise emphasized a turn to individualism, away from traditional Marxist class divisions. Ultimately, the Soviet model and even, to a significant degree, the violent revolutionary Chinese model proved politically unpalatable for a country emerging from centuries of frequent famines and colonial oppression. No political leader could reasonably advocate policy that might lead to the same level of traumatic national sacrifice that Soviet socialism seemed to demand. Indeed, Indian Marxists' turn away from the Soviet Union, coupled with the dictates of non-alignment, helps explain India's relatively tepid relations with the USSR until the mid-1950s.[403] Even as the USSR ramped up its aid to India during the late 1950s, accounting for approximately 20 percent of public investment in the industrial sector during India's Second Five-Year Plan (1956-1961)[404], Indian political opinion at-

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[402] Illustrations from *The Socialist Party's Programme for National Revival*, 5, 6.

[403] Arthur Stein, "India and the USSR: The Post-Nehru Period," *Asian Survey* 7, no. 3 (1967): 165.

[404] Balwant Bhaneja, "Soviet Foreign Aid to India," *Asian Studies: Journal of Critical Perspectives on Asia* 8, no. 3 (1970): 334, http://www.asj.upd.edu.ph/mediabox/archive/ASJ-08-03-1970/bhaneja-soviet-foreign-aid-india.pdf.

large remained skeptical of Soviet political advances during the period as potentially auguring neo-imperial dynamics.

4.4c: The Capitalist Class: FICCI and the Bombay Plan

Despite its relatively small size and concentration in urban areas, India's capitalist class undoubtedly exerted an enormous influence on elite economic nationalist discourse during the immediate pre- and post-independence periods, represented in the INC by leading center-right figures such as Vallabhbhai Patel and Rajendra Prasad. In the early decades of the 20th century, the Indian business community largely cooperated with the British GoI and was reluctant to support the nationalist movement beyond isolated personal patronage.[405] Many Indian capitalists garnered windfall profits during World War I due to international competitors' incapacitation and thus were reluctant in war's wake to challenge the colonial regime that facilitated their access to European markets. But, over the course of the 1920s and 1930s, India's capitalist class increasingly came to see national self-government as a pre-requisite for industrialization and economic development. By the 1940s the most prominent mouthpiece for the Indian capitalist class—the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI)—began to speak openly about its desire for India's independence and a nationalist government to oversee economic planning.[406] In this context, a group of eight wealthy leaders in the Indian business community, including FICCI's two founders (G.D. Birla and Purshottamdas Thakurdas) and three other prominent FICCI members, gathered in Bombay in late 1942 to discuss post-war economic policymaking.[407] These leading voices of the Indian business community published their recommendations in two parts—together known as the "Bombay Plan"—outlining their vision for independent India as an economic nation.[408]

Much scholarship on the Bombay Plan has portrayed it as wealthy capitalists' effort, in the face of widespread leftist sentiment within the nationalist movement, to secure a place for private industry in post-independence Indian planning. Indeed, one of its principal authors, Thakurdas, wrote that the group intended to "examine how far socialist demands can be accommodated without

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[405] Kamal Mitra Chenoy, "Industrial Policy and Multinationals in India," *Social Scientist* 13, no. 3 (1985): 15–17.; Medha Kudaisya, "'The Promise of Partnership': Indian Business, the State, and the Bombay Plan of 1944," *Business History Review* 88, no. 01 (2014): 106–7.

[406] Aditya Mukherjee, "Indian Capitalist Class and the Public Sector, 1930-1947," *Economic and Political Weekly* 11, no. 3 (1976): 67–73.

[407] Kudaisya, "'The Promise of Partnership.'"

[408] Purshotamdas Thakurdas, J.R.D. Tata, A. D. Shroff, John Matthai, Ardeshir Dalal, G. D. Birla, Shri Ram, and Kasturbhai Lalbhai. *A Plan of Economic Development for India: Parts One and Two*, 2 vols. (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1944).

capitalism surrendering any of its essential features," as well as to "vindicate capitalism as an institution" in the face of socialist trends in the nationalist movement.[409] But this emphasis in scholarship has also tended to overlook how these wealthy industrialists carefully harnessed the tropes of anti-imperialist economic nationalist discourse to promote their favored policies[410]—most notably protection from foreign competition via import controls. To be sure, these business leaders, in both the Bombay Plan and their separate speeches and writings, did not focus as much on narrating the traumatic experiences of India's masses as Gandhians or other nationalist leaders. Their audience was largely other elites in the nationalist movement and even during the 1940s, when a post-war national government seemed likely, they still feared politically alienating British interests, both in the colonial government and private sector. But the Bombay Plan did notably accede to the conventions of mainstream economic nationalist discourse by drawing on then-common knowledge tropes about India's underdevelopment and traumatic poverty as justifications for its program. And the impact of this adherence to prevailing discursive norms was more than simply rhetorical. Despite the plan's authors' past profits from export trade and FICCI's clearly pro-export positions, they broke from these positions in the Bombay Plan and bowed to prevailing economic nationalist consensus on autarky, refraining from advocating export-led industries as a source of growth for post-independence India. Ultimately, recognizing the controversy surrounding export trade due to India's history of simultaneous agricultural export surpluses and traumatic famines, as well as the priority for domestic business of protection against imports, the Bombay Plan compromised export-friendly policies in favor of advocacy of a more closed model that would afford them domestic dominance. This compromise, I argue, helps explain the basis for what economic historians later referred to as 'export pessimism.'

In terms of international political economic orientation, big business' interests in colonial India had traditionally been mixed—neither liberal nor completely autarkic. Generally speaking, India's capitalist class tended to favor protectionist tariffs against cheap foreign imports, as well as pro-export policies that allowed them access to foreign markets. This often put their interests at odds with those of the Gandhian and socialist-dominated nationalist movement, as well as peasant classes who typically wanted less centralized ownership over India's agricultural goods and less focus

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[409] Purshotamdas Thakurdas, "Post-War Economic Development Committee," n.d., 265–66, File 291, Part II, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML).

[410] Benjamin Zachariah, "The Creativity of Destruction: Wartime Imaginings of Development and Social Policy, c. 1942–1946," in *The World in World Wars: Experiences, Perceptions and Perspectives from Africa and Asia*, ed. Heike Liebau et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 549.

on crops for export. Although certainly not a monolith, large capitalists (particularly millowners) had generally avoided participating in the early 20th century *Swadeshi* movement, instead remaining supportive of the British GoI.[411] Even into the 1920s, the business community's support for the nationalist movement was tepid and largely a matter of personal connections rather than institutional alignment.[412] But their skepticism began to change through the 1930s and 1940s, as business leaders came to see colonialism as detrimental to their interests, creating instability and underdevelopment on the subcontinent. FICCI began to invoke the INC's drain theory narrative as a means of justifying their support for illiberal protectionary tariffs to eliminate British imports' dominance in India. Further, both FICCI and the INC found common ground in opposing the colonial government's manipulations of the rupee to favor British producers over Indian ones.

Unlike the INC, however, during the early 1940s FICCI supported the British war effort, hoping it would lead to increased demand for Indian products as experienced during World War I.[413] Further, during this early period, FICCI actively tried to promote India's export trade. This position put them in opposition to many left-leaning factions within the INC (including the Gandhians and Marxists discussed above) who were skeptical of exports, believing that Indian goods should remain in Indian hands. At its 1940 annual meeting, FICCI President CS Ratnasabapathi Mudaliar called on the government to simultaneously enact protectionist measures for Indian industry, while also seeking to "preserve India's exports and find new ones in place of those lost in the enemy territory." Further, he asked the British GoI to help Indian industry "secure a fair share of the additional demand created by the war."[414] After fighting ceased, FICCI vigorously opposed the continuation of British GoI-imposed wartime economic controls. It argued in a lengthy communication to the government as soon as September 1945 that policy should shift to allow Indian firms to export and "recapture her markets to which commodities were exported before the war," as well as "retain and develop new markets."[415] Even after the INC-led national government seized control in 1947,

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[411] A. P. Kannangara, "Indian Millowners and Indian Nationalism Before 1914," *Past and Present* 40, no. 1 (1968): 147–64.

[412] Chenoy, "Industrial Policy and Multinationals in India," 15–16.

[413] FICCI's enthusiasm for the war effort did, however, wane over time, as business leaders grew frustrated with the colonial administration's imposition of high wartime taxes and general preference for British business interests over Indian ones. Kudaisya, "'The Promise of Partnership,'" 109–10.

[414] Quoted in Kudaisya, 108.

[415] Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, "Export Trade Controls: Copy of Communication No. F 1668/443, Dated 3rd September 1945, from the Federation to the Government of India, Department of Commerce, New Delhi," in *Correspondence and Relevant Documents Relating to Important Questions Dealt with by the Federation during the Year 1945*, vol. 2 (New Delhi, 1946), 17.

FICCI and other Indian capitalist organizations opposed anti-imperial policies that discriminated against foreign capital and lobbied to allow external finance's entrance into Indian markets.[416] Though the business community tended to support the INC around the time of independence, over time it became disillusioned and drifted towards Hindu nationalist groups or the more free-market Swatantra Party, formed in 1959.[417]

Given FICCI's relatively liberal policy preferences, the more autarkic, economic nationalist proposals of the Bombay Plan demonstrate the power of economic nationalist discourse brewing among various factions. I argue that the Bombay Plan's politically-savvy authors broke with FICCI on export policy out of deference to this economic nationalist mainstream—the authors understood that they would need to work within an autarkic vision and thus prioritized advocating other, less controversial policies. Indeed, the authors made clear their deference to the nationalist movement throughout the plan. Though all the Bombay Plan's signatories had served in colonial government planning committees in varying capacities[418], the authors wrote that the INC's NPC served as their inspiration and even stated that, because its proposals were more "comprehensive," the Bombay Plan should be read as a supplement to the NPC's prior published plan documents.[419] Further, though the British GoI had not yet accepted ceding power and counted many Bombay Plan authors as allies, the plan begins with "the assumption that on the termination of the war or shortly thereafter, a national government will come into existence at the centre which will be vested with full freedom in economic matters."[420] The plan's authors crafted it in secret partly due to this controversy and, once published, it proved an unwelcome surprise for the colonial administration.[421] Most notably, in line with prevailing economic nationalist skepticism of foreign economic intervention, the plan twice mentions the importance of lessening India's "dependence on foreign countries" for industrial production, as well as reducing India's "dependence on external finance."[422] Notably, these statements did not reference the salutary import-substitution effect of reducing

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[416] Chenoy, "Industrial Policy and Multinationals in India," 16.

[417] See Howard L Erdman, *The Swatantra Party and Indian Conservatism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

[418] Chattopadhyay, "The Idea of Planning in India, 1930-1951," 151.

[419] This fact is especially surprising as business leaders, including Thakurdas and Shroff, had disassociated from the NPC and pulled their financing in 1941, leading to its dissolution. See Chattopadhyay, 153.

[420] Thakurdas et al., *A Plan of Economic Development for India: Parts One and Two*, 7–8.

[421] Chattopadhyay, "The Idea of Planning in India, 1930-1951," 160.

[422] Thakurdas et al., *A Plan of Economic Development for India: Parts One and Two*, 9, 51, 60.

dependence, but rather framed this desire in economic nationalist terms—as increasing self-reliance and eliminating India's vulnerability to foreign powers.

Though tempered, economic nationalism permeated the Bombay Plan's proposals. Beyond these introductory passages, the plan went into detail on its vision for lessening both India's imports and exports, departing substantially from FICCI's longstanding anti-import but pro-export policies. The plan states unequivocally that, "in respect of agricultural commodities India should as far as possible aim at feeding her own population adequately and should not aspire in the initial years of planning to export to foreign markets."[423] Similarly, it calls for less focus on crops like tea, jute and cotton, which were primarily oriented toward export trade and thus added an "element of uncertainty in our economic life." Instead, it favored crops geared towards domestic consumption like food suitable for a "nutritive diet" for impoverished Indians.[424] Later on, the plan adds that this diminution in agricultural exports and shift to focus on "internal demand" entails that "our export trade is likely to diminish in the future," which would occur "side by side" with a "reduction in the volume of imports," lessening India's overall dependence on world markets.[425] These calls for reduced foreign trade are all the more surprising given many of the authors' past success in export-led agriculturally-based industries; Birla, for example, had made a fortune during World War I in jute trade, while Thakurdas had earned the nickname "King Cotton" due to his success trading the staple crop.[426] Overall, the plan bows to the premises of other strands of economic nationalist discourse during the period, which called for an emphasis on production for domestic consumption and food security.

The Bombay Plan authors' actions after publication only further signified their desire for the plan to appeal to a broad array of Indians and influence mainstream Indian economic nationalist discourse, rather than solely strike a favorable accommodation from the colonial government or shift the opinion of select future policymakers. In a follow-up meeting with plan authors, government officials tried to coax them into accepting a compromise on their plan's premise of a full national government, but they bluntly refused.[427] Likewise, in 1945 the authors published the plan's two volumes together with Penguin, a popular press, and they subsequently contracted Minoo

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[423] Thakurdas et al., 35.
[424] Thakurdas et al., 36.
[425] Thakurdas et al., 53.
[426] Kudaisya, "'The Promise of Partnership,'" 100–102.
[427] Chattopadhyay, "The Idea of Planning in India, 1930-1951," 160.

Masani, a former socialist prominent in the nationalist movement who had worked for Tata Sons as a publicist, to transform it into an illustrated book for mass consumption, geared toward shaping public opinion.[428] Masani's book, far more than the plan, demonstrated the rhetorical power of appealing to India's mass poverty, even for those interested in securing a place for capitalist wealth creation. Like the authors of the Socialist Plan, Masani understood that India's limited English-language literacy meant that economic policy required visualization to appeal to popular sentiment. For this reason, Masani adapted what British economist William Beveridge had termed the "five giants" of post-war poverty to the Indian context, dressing them in Indian garb, while making the figures sufficiently caricatured to prevent alienating readers.

Figures 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7, taken from Masani's Picture of a Plan *illustrating India's impoverished conditions*[429]

Much like the plan itself, Masani's text spent ample time dwelling on India's lack of food, poor healthcare and life expectancy, and even included pictures to illustrate the amount of food necessary for a balanced diet that the plan would secure for all Indians. This focus on issues germane to Indians' day-to-day experiences helped curb the plan's elite origins and Masani's language was notably empathetic with not only India's rural poor, but also the factions of the nationalist movement that many rural poor identified as their representatives and advocates. The book began by reflecting on the crisis in representation inherent in "well-to-do, well-educated and well-looked-after people" concerning themselves with policy to tackle the "poverty, hunger, disease, and ignorance in which the mass of [India's] people live," arguing they had unique insight from their worldly perspective on how India could overcome these challenges.[430] It went on to lament India's conditions, but departed from Gandhianism or other socialists' emphasis on sacrifice and moral purity to promote growth, writing "our people are already so poor and so starved that to ask them to

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[428] Kudaisya, "'The Promise of Partnership,'" 98.
[429] Minoo Masani, *Picture of a Plan* (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1945), 45–47.
[430] Masani, i.

'tighten their belts' further would be cruel."[431] It touched on the conditions in India's slums, calling them "shocking," adding that while "God made the World…the devil made the slum."[432] On India's poor education system and illiteracy, it quoted a proverb saying that instead of transmitting "life from the living," the Indian system "carr[ied] death from the dead, through the dead, to the dead."[433] Though, of course, this language could not help but be vague and figurative, especially considering its omission of direct accounts of traumatic experience, it framed the Bombay Plan as premised on addressing the problem of poverty, rather than the wellbeing of elite industrialists.

Much early economic history of the period has referred to views like those expressed in the Bombay Plan as 'export pessimism'[434]—a view prominent among development economists in the 1950s and onward that "developing countries did not benefit from primary exports and international trade, contrary to the earlier experience of countries like the United States, Australia, and Canada."[435] But as multiple authors have since argued, the economic theories substantiating export pessimism[436], which began primarily with the work of *Raúl* Prebisch and Hans Singer, were not popularized internationally until after the advent of planning in the 1950s, and thus they could not possibly explain the Bombay Plan's turn away from exports in the early 1940s. Indeed, FICCI's general bullishness at meetings and in exchanges with the British GoI indicates that many industrialists thought export-led growth could be a tremendous boon for post-independence India, as it had during the World War I period. Yet this vision was absent from the Bombay Plan. Alternatively, Bhagwati and Chakravarty, among others, have explained export pessimism in Indian planning by referencing its antecedents in the Soviet Union. But while it's true that Mahalanobis cultivated select contacts with Soviet planners, the Bombay Plan firmly rejected the Soviet model or its Marxist logics as inspiration. Indeed, in his children's book Masani wrote that the Soviets caused "hardship and misery" for the poor and thus would be unacceptable for a country already suffering as much as

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[431] Masani, 22.

[432] Masani, 7.

[433] Masani, 14–15.

[434] Nayar makes this point on trends in the historiography in Nayar, "Nationalist Planning for Autarky and State Hegemony : Development Strategy Under Nehru," 18–19; For examples of scholarship holding this view, see William A Byrd, "Planning in India: Lessons from Four Decades of Development Experience," *Journal of Comparative Economics* 14, no. 4 (1990): 713–35.

[435] Adam Szirmai, *The Dynamics of Socio-Economic Development: An Introduction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 283.

[436] Nayar, "Nationalist Planning for Autarky and State Hegemony: Development Strategy Under Nehru"; Jagdish N. Bhagwati and Sukhamoy Chakravarty, "Contributions to Indian Economic Analysis: A Survey," *The American Economic Review* 59, no. 4 (1969): 7; Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Economic Thought*, 165–66.

India.[437] Instead, I argue that prominent Indian industrialists eschewed calls for export promotion in their public planning proposals because of prevailing economic nationalist discourse's skepticism of trade during the period. The traumatic famines and food shortages of the war period, caused primarily by the expor of foodgrains to the war effort, left many Indians believing that domestic agricultural products should remain in India to feed Indians. The Bombay Plan authors knew that their promotion of aspects of capitalism would prove controversial in this context and thus eschewed aspects of free market ideology to moderate their proposals for mainstream consumption.

4.4d: Nehruvian Consensus and the Birth of Indian Autarky

While each of the three aforementioned strands of economic nationalist discourse contributed substantially to India's post-independence development regime, much of their impact on policymaking was filtered through Jawaharlal Nehru, who was undoubtedly development planning's most prominent policymaker. Nehru emerged as a leading voice in the nationalist movement in the 1920s, eventually serving as India's prime minister from 1947-1964 and chairman of the Planning Commission from 1950-1964. Though Nehru's engagement with political economy dated back to his involvement in the Fabian Society while living in London, his most substantive involvement in planning debates began with his chairmanship of the INC's National Planning Committee (NPC), beginning in 1938.[438] During his service to this committee and extensions of it in subsequent years, Nehru pioneered a heavy-industries-lead autarkic vision that, in many ways, served as a compromise between the Gandhian, Marxist and big-business economic nationalist traditions outlined in the previous sections. This is not to say that Nehru served as a passive instrument for the most prominent strains for balancing between other strains of economic nationalist thought during the period; Nehru was an avowed economic nationalist and these three strains were also among the most prominent influences on his beliefs. Ultimately, Nehru's speeches and writings indicate substantial reflection on Indian economic nationalist thought's engagement with trauma that came to define not only planning discourses, but also infused broader conceptualizations of India's sovereignty and post-colonial identity.

Historians often trace Nehru's engagement with socialism and political economy back to his involvement with the Fabian Society in London after finishing his degree at Cambridge and follow it

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[437] Masani, *Picture of a Plan*, 21.
[438] Chattopadhyay, "The Idea of Planning in India, 1930-1951," 90–91.

through his visit to the Soviet Union in 1927.[439] Indeed, throughout these years Nehru self-identified as a socialist and absorbed political economic thought from an array of European leftists, including leaders of the Soviet Union, Fabians and British Labour leaders like Harold Laski.[440] By the 1930s, as he became more involved in INC economic nationalist debates, Nehru became a chief advocate in his many writing of what he termed "scientific" socialism—a technocratic reorientation of traditional anti-colonial nationalism to issues of economic injustice. He came to define independence as more than simply the end of foreign rule, but rather "economic freedom" from imperial subjugation for the "masses"—a deliberately vague approach that betrayed his elite background by grouping diverse populations across the subcontinent together based on a shared identity of poverty. Still, Nehru was successful in making this broad goal of socialism official INC policy by 1931, helping shape planning debates into the future.[441] Distilled from his deep knowledge of global anti-imperialist thought, Nehru in this period began to envision Indian socialism as an alternative to the imperialist exploitation earlier economic nationalists had identified as a chief source of India's poverty.

Yet, as mentioned previously, by the time Nehru assumed leadership of the NPC in 1938 he had become disillusioned with Soviet socialism's violence, famine and repression and he had begun to rethink his own socialist leanings, responding to greater reflection on the unique experiences of India's rural poor.[442] Further, through his involvement with the elites of the Indian nationalist movement, he had grown more comfortable compromising with India's big-business community, tempering any remaining advocacy of far-left ideas.[443] Though then-INC president Subhas Chandra Bose named Nehru chairman largely because of their shared leftist inclinations, as well as Nehru's past advocacy for economic planning and industrialization, neither of the two expected the NPC to espouse a vision for Soviet-style state-controlled planning. Nehru realized that, despite previous INC statements, the group at-large had "not in any way accepted socialism" and thus the NPC's plans

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[439] For Nehru's account of these intellectual roots, see Jawaharlal Nehru, *Jawaharlal Nehru: An Autobiography; with Musings on Recent Events in India*, (London: John Lane, The Bodley Head, 1936), 25.
[440] Brant Moscovitch, "Harold Laski's Indian Students and the Power of Education, 1920–1950," *Contemporary South Asia* 20, no. 1 (2012): 33–44.
[441] Sanjay Seth, "'Nehruvian Socialism' 1927–1937: Nationalism, Marxism, and the Pursuit of Modernity," *Alternatives* 18, no. 4 (1993): 454–55.
[442] B. R. Nanda, "Nehru and Socialism," in *Jawaharlal Nehru: Rebel and Statesman* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 192.
[443] Nanda, "Nehru and Socialism."

would need to forge compromise with both multiple factions.[444] The NPC's fifteen diverse members included eminent scientists, the Gandhian JC Kumarappa, later Bombay Plan authors Thakurdas and AD Shroff, and a labor advocate, NM Joshi.[445] Recognizing the limitations inherent in achieving consensus among this big-tent grouping, Nehru began by consolidating opinion around the more fundamental idea of a proactive state planning apparatus to combat poverty, in many ways forging the consensus that inspired draft plans from other groups.[446] Both Bose and Nehru began their work with the NPC by reiterating in multiple documents that planning's *primary* goal was addressing the larger "poverty and misery" of India's masses—a unifying agenda for economic nationalists across the ideological spectrum.[447] In this sense, Nehru treated socialism and related efforts to curtail the profit motive[448] as a secondary goal—an ideal "to be deferred to some time in the future."[449]

As World War II broke out in Europe, the British GoI jettisoned its work compromising with the INC on reform to focus on harnessing its imperial possessions for the war effort, obviating the NPC's potential efficacy as a pressure group. Nehru attempted to continue the NPC's work, but admitted that the traumatic experiences war engendered across the globe made the NPC's technocratic agenda "even more divorced from present conditions."[450] Ultimately, the group disbanded due to his and other INC leaders' wartime jailing, to be replaced after the war by temporary planning bodies, and, eventually, the powerful Nehru-chaired Planning Commission. But,

[444] Jawaharlal Nehru, "Chairman's Note on Congress Policy," in *National Planning Committee: Being an Abstract of Proceedings and Other Particulars Relating to the National Planning Committee*, ed. K.T. Shah (Bombay: National Planning Committee, 1940).

[445] K.T. Shah, ed., "Congress President's Nominations of the Members of the National Planning Committee," in *National Planning Committee: Being an Abstract of Proceedings and Other Particulars Relating to the National Planning Committee* (Bombay: National Planning Committee, 1940).

[446] Sarvepalli Gopal notes that, though the idea of planning eventually became *de rigeur* for post-colonial nations, at that point it was still a fairly vague idea, especially as it applied to democratic contexts. During the 1930s, planning was often associated with Soviet or Nazi totalitarianism. Sarvepalli Gopal, *Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography*, vol. 1 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1975), 245–46.

[447] K.T. Shah, ed., "Resolutions of the National Congress Relating to Planning, Industries and Fundamental Rights.," in *National Planning Committee: Being an Abstract of Proceedings and Other Particulars Relating to the National Planning Committee* (Bombay: National Planning Committee, 1940); Nehru, "Chairman's Note on Congress Policy"; Subhas Chandra Bose, *Selected Speeches of Subhas Chandra Bose* (New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1962), 98.

[448] For a broad description of Nehru's vision of socialism as pursuing social justice over the profit motive, see Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, Modern Classics (New Delhi: Penguin Books India, 2004), 396; Baldev Raj Nayar, *The Modernization Imperative and Indian Planning* (Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1972), 113–14.

[449] Benjamin Zachariah, *Nehru*, Routledge Historical Biographies (London: Routledge, 2004), 151.

[450] Its General Secretary, K.T. Shah, though, did publish the sub-committee reports and his own comprehensive vision of the NPC's outcome.; Jawaharlal Nehru, "Chairman's Opening Address on the First Day of the Third Sessions of the National Planning Committee, Beginning the 1st May, 1940," in *National Planning Committee: Being an Abstract of Proceedings and Other Particulars Relating to the National Planning Committee*, ed. K.T. Shah, vol. 2 (Bombay: National Planning Committee, 1940), 29.; Chattopadhyay, "The Idea of Planning in India, 1930-1951," 125–27.

despite the NPC's futility in exacting meaningful compromises from the British, during the war period Nehru's belief in national planning only strengthened; he increasingly saw national-level planning as not only a tool to combat poverty, but also a means of asserting Indian sovereignty in the face of the "present order in the world…[that] is all awry, and requires complete reshaping."[451] Nehru expanded the logic of earlier economic nationalists connecting imperialism and the drain, arguing that imperialism of various countries not only impoverished India, but also spread this violence and trauma across the globe through expansionary wars. Following this logic, Nehru would later remark, the "principal" cause of war was "the subjection of one country by another," deliberately conflating British imperialism with the horrors of the Nazi and Japanese regimes.[452]

Nehru's belief in the connection between India's poverty, imperialism and the war spreading across the globe only strengthened as he learned about the Bengal Famine while in prison. In his *Discovery of India*, which he wrote during an extended wartime prison stint, Nehru used bitter language and analogies to describe Bengalis' traumatic experiences, calling the famine, among other things, a "creeping thing of horror" that he compared unfavorably to death on the battlefield, as it was "slow," "miserable, hopeless" and "had no purpose."[453] Though the Bengal Famine Commission did not release its report until 1945, Nehru, like Gandhi, unambiguously referred to it in his book as the result of British wartime "official policy" and "a man-made famine which could have been foreseen and avoided."[454] He wrote that "rich England, and richer America, paid little heed to the hunger of the body that was killing millions in India," employing rhetoric that both related the famine to existing international dynamics of empire and promoted a unified vision of India as a collective undergoing traumatic suffering.[455] Accordingly, Nehru presented planning and the industrialization it would bring as an idealized process, a panacea to combat "the problems of poverty and unemployment, of national defence and of economic regeneration."[456]

Beyond connecting longstanding principles of Indian economic nationalism to the war's global horrors, the Nehruvian-led mainstream economic nationalist discourse that emerged after the

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[451] Jawaharlal Nehru, "Chairman's Statement to the Press (July 1, 1940)," in *National Planning Committee: Being an Abstract of Proceedings and Other Particulars Relating to the National Planning Committee*, ed. K.T. Shah, vol. 3 (Bombay: National Planning Committee, 1940), 37.
[452] Jawaharlal Nehru, *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, ed. Sarvepalli Gopal, vol. 15, 1 (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1972), 524.
[453] Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, 2004, 16, 467.
[454] Nehru, 414, 496.
[455] Nehru, 16–17.
[456] Nehru, 396.

war and built on the NPC's foundation, pioneered two further compromises that eventually characterized post-independence planning consensus. First, beginning with the NPC, Nehru-led official planning debates rejected Gandhianism's equation of industrialization with trauma and goal for a planned Indian economy to move towards decentralized village-level production.[457] "Violence and coercion there undoubtedly were in largescale industry today," Nehru said during a meeting of the NPC. "[B]ut that violence was the outcome of the social and economic structure and was certainly not inherent in large-scale industry."[458] In fact, Nehru inverted Gandhi's vision, arguing instead that "For a country to do away with industrialization would lead to that country falling prey, economically and otherwise, to other more industrialized countries, which would exploit it."[459] This allowed him to argue, counter to Gandhi's vision of multiple layers of defenses against foreign exploitation, that industrialization was vital to economic self-sufficiency. In 1942, he even rebutted his mentor by saying that Gandhi's economic ideas would lead to dependence on imports and, in the end, "economic bondage and political subjection."[460] In this sense, Nehru adapted the logic of Gandhi's narration, agreeing on the goal of self-sufficiency to prevent a re-introduction of colonial trauma but favoring industrialization as a means of achieving it.

Second, despite the influence of multiple FICCI members in the NPC, the planning discourse that it helped begin reflected mainstream Indian economic nationalism's general disregard for the potential benefits of trade. This disregarded was double-edged, drawing both on longstanding calls among Indian industrialists for protectionary tariffs[461] and from general pessimism about the prospects for export-led growth, due to the dependence on world markets it could bring. As Nehru wrote in his *Discovery of India*,

> The objective for the country as a whole was the attainment, as far as possible, of national
> self-sufficiency. International trade was certainly not excluded, but we were anxious to avoid
> being drawn into the whirlpool of economic imperialism. We neither wanted to be victims of
> an imperialist power nor to develop such tendencies ourselves. The first charge on the
> country's produce should be to meet the domestic needs of food, raw materials, and

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[457] Chattopadhyay, "The Idea of Planning in India, 1930-1951," 96–97.

[458] Chattopadhyay, 111.

[459] Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Essential Writings of Jawaharlal Nehru*, ed. Sarvepalli Gopal and Uma Iyengar (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003), 679–80.

[460] Jawaharlal Nehru, *Jawaharlal Nehru, an Anthology*, ed. Sarvepalli Gopal (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1980), 308.

[461] See Chandra, *The Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in India*; Kudaisya, "'The Promise of Partnership.'"

manufactured goods. Surplus production would not be dumped abroad but used in exchange for such commodities as we might require. To base our national economy on export markets might lead to conflicts with other nations and to sudden upsets when those markets were closed to us.[462]

Rhyming with viewpoints across the economic nationalist spectrum Nehru distrusted trade's potential benefits due to fears it would be a Trojan Horse, bringing renewed economic subjugation. This belief led him to advocate social control over limited trade in surpluses, relegating such potential economic activity to an ancillary role that should be approached with caution for political reasons.

Indeed, the adoption of this Nehruvian consensus among the diverse members of the NPC reflected the mainstreaming of economic nationalist notions on autarky as a solution to colonial trauma. Despite being chaired by the industrialist Kasturbhai Lalbhai, who had made fortunes exporting textiles abroad, the NPC sub-committee on trade's report exhibited this political vision of export pessimism. The report largely focused on internal trade, adding only two brief appendices on international trade and the balance of payments. Further, it recognized that "even if we are able to expand our markets in certain commodities, such a gain will be merely a temporary one. For, we must realise that if we have been losing our markets it has been partly due to commercial policies followed by different nations." Though the report did reflect on certain limited potential pro-export policies, it recognized that export-led growth ran counter to the "universal desire to have a more controlled economy with a view to minimise fluctuations." [463] The fact that even an eminent industrialist proved willing to reflect this ambivalence on international trade's potential salutary effects reflected not only liberalism's unpopularity in planning debates[464], but also how deeply ingrained economic nationalism's connection of international trade with trauma was across India's ideological divides. Nehru and the report's language reveal that this export pessimism did not primarily reflect technical economic analysis; rather, it was also deeply shaped by economic nationalist discourse's logics.[465]

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[462] Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India* (New Delhi: Penguin Books India, 2004 [1946]), 398.

[463] Kasturbhai Lalbhai, *Trade (Report of the Sub-Committee)*, ed. K.T. Shah, National Planning Committee Series (Bombay: Vora & Co., 1947), 181–82.

[464] C. A. Bayly, "The Ends of Liberalism and the Political Thought of Nehru's India," *Modern Intellectual History* 12, no. 03 (2015): 606–7.

[465] For more on this, see Nayar, "Nationalist Planning for Autarky and State Hegemony : Development Strategy Under Nehru," 22–25.

As the war ended and independence was on the horizon, INC planning debates grew more concrete and the basic outlines took shape for what eventually became the Nehruvian planning regime: an autarkic heavy industries-based development model intended. Reinforced by INC leaders' bitter experience of wartime repression[466], subsequent interim planning bodies leading to the creation of the Planning Commission in 1950 largely continued these broad goals. This conclusion rhymes with that of Baldev Raj Nayar, mentioned in this chapter's introduction; though Mahalanobis offered limited support to the NPC[467], these ideas coalesced broadly in economic nationalist discourse well before he joined the Planning Commission and crafted his famed model for India's Second Five-Year Plan. Of course, this consensus was somewhat fragile, as it created uneasy bedfellows of ideological opponents. For example, Liaquat Ali Khan's controversial left-leaning interim government budget, released in 1947, split the INC's left from its right, leaving Nehru in the uncomfortable position of originally siding with his left-leaning ideological allies before changing positions to align with rightward elements of the INC.[468] Likewise, the post-independence government's lifting of wartime controls in 1948 led to massive inflation, temporarily increased imports and forced the eventual reinstatement of controls.[469] But, in spite of the tumult following independence, this consensus on the goal of an autarkic heavy industries approach maintained broad support through India's first general elections, which endowed Nehru with a massive parliamentary majority sufficient to pursue his vision of planning. No party advocating liberal economic policies received any significant share of the vote.

Three further changes warrant consideration in understanding the durability of this Nehruvian consensus, especially in examining the impact of trauma on India's post-independence economic regime. First is Partition and the violence it caused, which both buoyed Nehruvian planning by amputating a top political rival in Muhammed Ali Jinnah's Muslim League and provided a renewed rationale for Nehru to use the state apparatus after independence to promote a unifying category-style secular national identity, based on self-sufficient development to combat future traumatization. Though press censorship of Partition's specific atrocities and triumphalist sentiment

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[466] Adam B. Lerner, "Collective Trauma and the Evolution of Nehru's Worldview: Uncovering the Roots of Nehruvian Non-Alignment," *The International History Review*, May 22, 2018, 1–25.; Chattopadhyay, "The Idea of Planning in India, 1930-1951," 258.

[467] K.T. Shah, ed., *National Planning Committee: Being an Abstract of Proceedings and Other Particulars Relating to the National Planning Committee*, vol. 2 (Bombay: National Planning Committee, 1940), 31.

[468] Raghabendra Chattopadhyay, "Liaquat Ali Khan's Budget of 1947-48: The Tryst with Destiny," *Social Scientist* 16, no. 6/7 (1988): 77–89.

[469] Chattopadhyay, "The Idea of Planning in India, 1930-1951," 288–94.

over independence in many ways delayed processing of the trauma at the national level[470], this violence in the abstract served as a representation of the folly of both Hindu and Muslim nationalisms, and further evidence of the wisdom of Nehru's "modern," secular nationalism, oriented around the Congress' vision of development.[471] Second and relatedly was the assassination of MK Gandhi in 1948 by a right-wing Hindu nationalist, which Nehru strategically narrated as a metonym for the horrors of communal division of any type. In a speech broadcast on All India Radio the day after Gandhi's assassination, Nehru described the event as representative of a "poison spread in this country during the past years and months" and called on all Indians to "face this poison" and "hold together."[472] Outside of its symbolic value, Gandhi's death also sidelined a popular rival to Nehru's economic vision and provided the young prime minister with justification for banning the RSS and Hindu Mahasabha, jailing tens of thousands of their members, and discrediting their particularistic identity which challenged his state's identity-building project.[473] Though these groups had not been central to the *economic* nationalist discourse in the pre-independence years, their anger over Partition and widespread support might have otherwise threatened the INC's vision for the state after independence by communalizing policy debates. Third and finally was the death in 1950 of Deputy Prime Minister Vallabhbhai Patel, the only remaining national-level figure with broad enough support to rival Nehru. Patel and Nehru had forged a working partnership and Patel had been central to consolidating the Indian state's power after Partition, but he was far more aligned than Nehru with the Hindu nationalist and big-business factions of the INC. Had he competed for power with Nehru, he might have threatened Nehruvian consensus' imposition of a secular developmental state identity and skewed policymaking toward more factionalist goals.

Nehru's unrivaled position atop India's government allowed him significant power in pursuing his vision for planning. In 1950, the Congress Working Committee established the Planning Commission with Nehru as its Chairman and no members of sufficient political stature to serve as rivals. Recognizing the power the new commission possessed over the rest of the

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[470] Debs, "Using Cultural Trauma"; Greenberg, "Generations of Memory: Remembering Partition in India/Pakistan and Israel/Palestine."

[471] Jawaharlal Nehru, *Glimpses of World History* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1961), 1129–30; For a deeper discussion of this point, see Gyanendra Pandey, *Remembering Partition: Violence, Nationalism, and History in India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 154–64.

[472] Reproduced in Debs, "Using Cultural Trauma," 641.

[473] Debs, 641.

government, John Matthai, a former Bombay Plan-author who was then serving as Finance Minister, resigned in protest.[474] Though the First Five-Year Plan, beginning in 1951, largely consisted of existing projects and extensions of wartime import and export controls, cobbled together into a more comprehensive document[475], during its implementation Nehru entrusted his ally, the statistician PC Mahalanobis, with crafting a framework for the more ambitious Second Five-Year Plan. Mahalnobis plan-frame overlaid a formal statistical model on top of the autarkic heavy industries-led Nehruvian consensus.[476] The model notably excluded foreign trade and balance of payments considerations, thus relegating external markets to an afterthought in Indian planning, a position Baldev Raj Nayar has labeled "attempted autarky."[477] While limited exports and imports continued through licensing and some limited foreign investment did flow into the Indian economy, the planning regime's orientation was clearly inward and Nehru retained his rhetoric on autarkic self-sufficiency as a policy goal. From 1951 to 1961, the period shaped by this Nehruvian consensus and, after 1956, the Mahalanobis-model, India's exports as a share of GDP dropped from 6.2 to 3.9 percent. The country only reached the same pre-planning levels of exports again after the 1991 crisis and subsequent liberalizing reforms.[478]

Baldev Raj Nayar has further written of how India's planning apparatus ultimately pursued industrial self-sufficiency as a means of pursuing long-term physical security, focusing on heavy industries for their importance in military production.[479] But while Nayar is correct to point to the emergence of a security discourse around ideas of industrialization and self-sufficiency, he overstates the extent to which equation of security and industrial self-sufficiency stemmed from industrialization's *military* importance. Instead, this chapter has argued that, for Nehru's government, this equation related far more to notions of *economic* security in the wake of colonial trauma.[480] During the decade after independence, Nehru's government generally favored a "low military

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[474] Chattopadhyay, "Liaquat Ali Khan's Budget of 1947-48: The Tryst with Destiny," 323.

[475] C. N. Vakil and P. R. Brahmananda, "Reflections on India's Five-Year Plan," *Pacific Affairs* 25, no. 3 (1952): 248–62.

[476] Nayar, "Nationalist Planning for Autarky and State Hegemony."; See also Mahalanobis' explication of his model in P. C. Mahalanobis, "The Approach of Operational Research to Planning in India," *Sankhyā: The Indian Journal of Statistics (1933-1960)* 16, no. 1/2 (1955): 3–130.

[477] Nayar, "Nationalist Planning for Autarky and State Hegemony," 18.

[478] Anne O. Krueger, "The Role of Trade and International Economic Policy in Indian Economic Performance," *Asian Economic Policy Review* 3, no. 2 (2008): 271.

[479] Baldev Raj Nayar, "Political Mainsprings of Economic Planning in the New Nations: The Modernization Imperative versus Social Mobilization," *Comparative Politics* 6, no. 3 (1974): 341–66.

[480] Nayar does recognize that the "humanitarian and welfare aspects" of this discourse are "taken for granted," though he neglects to elaborate on these aspects in greater detail.; Nayar, 113.

profile" that took a back seat to economic development. During India's first decade of independence, its government limited defense spending almost every year to between 1.7 and 1.9 percent of GDP, increasing this ratio to 2.4 percent only when the powerful VK Krishna Menon assumed control of the Defence Ministry in 1957.[481] Further, as this chapter has shown, Nehru and other Indian nationalist leaders argued for this development model well before Pakistan, India's chief military rival, ever existed. Even after independence, India possessed clear military superiority over Pakistan, obviating any need for an immediate military build-up. By contrast, this chapter has traced this linkage of security and self-sufficiency to pre-independence Indian economic nationalist discourses' narrations of trauma, including Nehru's interpretation of traumatic encounters as motivation for autarkic development.

4.5: Conclusion: The Paradoxical Birth of the 'License Raj'

This chapter has analyzed the roots of the Nehruvian consensus on autarkic development in economic nationalist discourse. Contrary to previous scholarship's vague references to Marxist influences or 'anti-imperial sentiment', this chapter has argued for understanding its emergence in economic nationalist identity negotiations over how to make sense of Indians' experiences of colonial trauma, how to constitute an Indian identity, and how to protect India and Indians in trauma's wake. As economic discourse evolved from the 19th century through independence, the mainstream of the nationalist movement came to understand the colonial encounter as unifying the subcontinent via shared experiences of exploitation. Indeed, rhetoric linking imperial power dynamics with the traumatic experiences of India's 'masses' began to shape this nationalist discourse, though it remained largely among elites, shaped by their distance from underlying trauma. By the period before independence, these ideas shaped those of multiple leading factions across the nationalist movement's ideological spectrum, including some who were chiefly concerned with expanding support for independence among the rural poor. Over time, the prominence of these ideas motivated a relative consensus across the nationalist movement that the pursuit of autarky was vital to protecting India from further foreign exploitation. Following independence, as Jawaharlal Nehru assumed the role of India's prime minister, he consolidated control of the state apparatus and implemented this vision through his developmental state. Despite continued disagreements on numerous other issues, the key groups within economic nationalist discourse acceded to the pursuit

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[481] Raju G. C. Thomas, "Security Relationships in Southern Asia: Differences in the Indian and American Perspectives," *Asian Survey* 21, no. 7 (1981): 280–82.

of autarky and ultimately none advocated liberal economic policies during this period that could have challenged this goal. *Laissez-faire* ideas were sufficiently stigmatized that they lacked a true champion in India until the founding of the Swatantra Party in 1959 and, for decades after, these ideas garnered only minimal support.[482] Though multiple scholars have commented on Nehru's "long shadow" in various aspects of post-independence India's policymaking, this chapter's analysis of economic nationalist identity discourse demonstrates how it shaped Nehru's ultimate developmental state and its place in the international arena.[483]

Beyond its more specific idiographic contributions to the intellectual history of Indian foreign economic policy, this chapter sheds light on multiple other aspects of post-colonial state-building, two of which stand out for the larger purposes of this study. First, by focusing on the role of traumatic experience in shaping India's post-independence statecraft, it provides a deeper understanding to what postcolonial scholars have identified as contradictions at the heart of the Indian state. For example, Sudipta Kaviraj has pointed to the "contradictory inheritance" of the post-independence Indian state, which "was a successor both to the British colonial state and to the movement of Indian nationalism."[484] Indeed, I argue that one aspect of this contradictory inheritance lay in the goals of the developmental state, which were, in many ways, motivated by Indians' diverse traumatic experiences under colonialism. Though Indian nationalist discourse drew on diverse narrations of trauma to counter the colonial administration's hegemonic imposition, paradoxically the vision for the post-independence state that emerged from it required much of the wartime economic regime's continuation—chiefly its export and import controls and strong centralized planning apparatus. As Kaviraj points out, many Indians rejoiced upon independence only to see the same colonial-era institutions—including the bureaucracy, police, military and educational system—continue to control their lives under the auspices of a new set of elites. This, in many ways, exacerbated the crisis in representation that had proven a key concern for the nationalist movement since the 19th century. Further, in order to secure sufficient investment in industry without resorting to foreign capital, this post-colonial state needed to rigidly control foreign exchange and secure massive amounts of domestic savings. Though India's nationalist leadership believed that long-term growth this would produce industrialization and alleviate poverty, in the

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[482] For more on this, see Howard L. Erdman, *The Swatantra Party and Indian Conservatism* (London: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

[483] See, for example, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, "Still Under Nehru's Shadow? The Absence of Foreign Policy Frameworks in India," *India Review* 8, no. 3 (August 13, 2009): 209–33.

[484] Kaviraj, *The Imaginary Institution of India*, 222.

short-term it required the imposition sacrifices—what India's elites often euphemized as "national discipline."[485] Already impoverished Indians were asked to substitute preferred foods and even "miss a meal," while foreign consumer goods virtually disappeared.[486] Indeed, it's no surprise that many came to regard the Indian state that replaced the colonial regime as a new incarnation of similar repressive tendencies—aptly termed the "License Raj" instead of the British Raj due to the reign of India's licensing bureaucracy. As the previous chapter has argued, collective trauma can produce multi-layered crises in representation and related lack of trust in institutions—this chapter provides ample insight into challenges for the Indian state in obtaining trust as the sovereign representative of the 'masses' on the international stage.

Second, this chapter has added to an expanding body of literature on the impact of colonialism as a form of collective trauma generally and in India more specifically.[487] By critically examining the discourses that shaped India's post-independence foreign economic policymaking and the difficulties political leaders faced in narrating traumatic experiences, this chapter has emphasized in one important case how colonialism can be interpreted as a collective trauma and how this interpretation can impact policymaking for generations. As much scholarship has emphasized, the Nehruvian planning regime, once institutionalized, proved enormously resilient, resisting efforts at substantive reform for at least four decades, even after the Asian Tigers more export-oriented growth model led to enormous growth rates.[488] Further, India's autarkic development model, coupled with its related security policy of non-alignment, profoundly shaped its position in international affairs through the Cold War and after. Though this chapter focuses largely on the discursive roots of this regime, its insights ultimately serve this thesis' larger argument about identity and trauma as analytical tools guiding intensive historical research into pivotal international political dynamics—imperialism chief among them. India's idiosyncratic behavior in the international arena

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[485] Zachariah, *Developing India*, 242–52.

[486] Taylor C. Sherman, "From 'Grow More Food' to 'Miss a Meal': Hunger, Development and the Limits of Post-Colonial Nationalism in India, 1947–1957," *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies* 36, no. 4 (2013): 571–88.; Benjamin Siegel, "'Self-Help Which Ennobles a Nation': Development, Citizenship, and the Obligations of Eating in India's Austerity Years," *Modern Asian Studies* 50, no. 03 (2016): 975–1018.

[487] Miller, *Wronged by Empire*; Lerner, "Collective Trauma and the Evolution of Nehru's Worldview"; Alexander, "Partition and Trauma: Repairing India and Pakistan"; Greenberg, "Generations of Memory: Remembering Partition in India/Pakistan and Israel/Palestine."

[488] See J. Bradford DeLong, "India since Independence: An Analytic Growth Narrative," in *In Search of Prosperity: Analytic Narratives on Economic Growth*, ed. Dani Rodrik, 2003, 184–204.

has long perplexed scholars and this chapter's research constitutes an important step into uncovering its roots.

Chapter 5: Victimhood Nationalism in Israel: The Eichmann Trial and the Holocaust in Israeli Foreign Policy Discourse

5.1: Introduction

The retreat of the British empire after World War II was not limited to India—it also led to Israel's declaration of independence less than a year after the birth of two new states in South Asia. Wartime had been difficult for the Zionist movement in Palestine, though for different reasons than the Indian nationalist movement. Formed primarily of European emigres arriving between the late 19th century and mid-20th, the Yishuv[489] was largely helpless in preventing the destruction of European Jewry throughout the conflict.[490] Many Jews living in Palestine during the period retained connections to Europe, primarily through friends and relatives, but also through international Zionist groups and other religious and community organizations. They learned slowly of the genocide of six million Jews taking place under Nazi rule but were unable to combat it by absorbing significant numbers of refugees. The British Mandate government's 1939 White Paper restricted immigration to 75,000 over five years[491]; ultimately, the British government allowed only 46,000 European Jews to immigrate legally during the entire Second World War and they were joined by only minimal numbers of illegal refugees.[492] Even as the war ended in 1945, the British still barred significant immigration of Holocaust survivors in Europe's displaced persons' camps until Israeli independence in 1948. These British post-war policies enraged Zionist leadership, who launched a global public relations campaign decrying these restrictions as a new rationale for statehood.[493] Indeed, upon gaining independence, Israel reversed these policies, welcoming over 710,000 Jewish

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[489] Yishuv, meaning settlement, is a Hebrew term used to describe the group of Zionists living in Palestine before Israeli independence that eventually formed the Israeli state.

[490] For more on the Yishuv leadership during World War II, see Tuvia Friling, *Arrows in the Dark: David Ben-Gurion, the Yishuv Leadership, and Rescue Attempts during the Holocaust* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2005); Tuvia Friling and Moshe Tlamin, "The New Historians and the Failure of Rescue Operations during the Holocaust," *Israel Studies* 8, no. 3 (2003): 25–64.

[491] The British White Paper of 1939 limited Jewish immigration to Palestine to 75,000 over five years, though these numbers were supplemented by the Zionists' 'Aliyah Bet'—illicit immigration attempts throughout the war. "British White Paper of 1939" (Yale Law School), The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, accessed February 17, 2019, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/brwh1939.asp.

[492] Judah Matras, "The Jewish Population: Growth, Expansion of Settlement, and Changing Composition," in *Integration and Development in Israel*, ed. S. N. Eisenstadt, Rivkah Bar Yosef, and Chaim Adler (New York, NY: Praeger, 1970), 314.

[493] For more on these efforts, specifically regarding the British barring of the *Exodus*' landing in Palestine, see Idith Zertal, *Israel's Holocaust and the Politics of Nationhood* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 48–51.

immigrants in five years, predominantly from Europe, but also from North Africa and the Middle East.[494]

Thus, on May 14, 1948, as David Ben-Gurion, the longtime leader of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, delivered Israel's declaration of independence, this recent collective trauma of genocide formed the undeniable backdrop. The United Nations (UN) clearly considered the trauma the Jewish people had recently faced during the war in its decision to award the Yishuv land for a state in late 1947, approving a plan partitioning Palestine into Arab and Jewish states, with independent international control of Jerusalem.[495] Yet, even with the UN's sanction, Israeli statehood was almost universally condemned by the new state's Arab neighbors and the Arabs living within the partitioned territory. Fighting broke out across Palestine almost immediately in the wake of the UN vote in November 1947 and, after the British departure and Ben-Gurion's declaration of independence in May 1948, multiple Arab League states formally declared war, leading to a massive invading force including Egyptian, Syrian, Jordanian, Iraqi, Lebanese, Saudi and Yemeni soldiers, joined by local irregulars. Though Israel lost more than 6,000 of its citizens (approximately 1 percent) in the nine-month conflict, it defeated the invading armies decisively and expanded its territory significantly. Indeed, by the time the warring parties signed an armistice codifying Israel's borders in what became known as the Green Line, Israeli leaders felt emboldened by their newly gained territory and many even proposed potentially extending their borders further to the Jordan River.[496]

Despite its victory, Israel's immense poverty and continued insecurity demanded a militarized developmental state whose identity centered around resilience and strength. In many ways, these immediate concerns precluded a period of collective mourning over the immense well of traumatic experiences the Jewish people had faced in Europe. Yet, this traumatic memory and grief did not simply evaporate from Israeli society. Throughout the 1950s, Holocaust memory remained a flash point in Israeli politics, liable to resurface over key symbolic issues, but invoked only sporadically in *official* (government-sponsored) discourse. In this chapter, I investigate how this latency period in official narratives changed with the highly-publicized 1960-1962 capture and trial

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[494] "Total Immigration to Israel by Year," Jewish Virtual Library, accessed February 17, 2019, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/total-immigration-to-israel-by-year.

[495] "Resolution 181 (II). Future Government of Palestine" (United Nations General Assembly, November 29, 1947), A/RES/181 (II), UNISPAL, https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/7F0AF2BD897689B785256C330061D253.

[496] Anita Shapira, *Ben-Gurion: Father of Modern Israel*, trans. Anthony Berris (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 171–73.

of Adolf Eichmann, a Nazi Colonel and key figure in organizing the genocide of European Jewry. Much scholarship on Israeli history has discussed the trial's pivotal role in reshaping Israeli public discourse about the Holocaust.[497] But, in this chapter I examine how the forum it provided for narrating traumatic experience augured a shift in Israeli identity and foreign policy discourses. I argue that Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion and his government harnessed the trial as a forum for rearticulating the genocide of European Jewry according to their strategic priorities, harnessing collective trauma to further a foreign policy agenda. To conceptualize this shift, I coin the term 'victimhood nationalism' to describe how this identity strategically narrated Holocaust trauma to unify Jews of all backgrounds and project grievances away from genocide's past perpetrators in Europe to present enemies in the Arab world. Whereas Holocaust trauma in Israeli political discourse before the trial had served the counter-hegemonic priorities of the government's opposition, the trial afforded Ben-Gurion's government a controlled arena to harness this trauma's emotional appeal for his agenda and re-narrate the Holocaust as a unifying foundational trauma for all Israelis that served his strategic policy objectives.

This chapter proceeds in four sections. First, I outline the concept of victimhood nationalism, which I define as a type of identity narrative that harnesses the emotional resonance of traumatic experience and deconstructs the archetypal victim-perpetrator relationship to project grievances onto parties uninvolved in the precipitating trauma. Though Ben-Gurion's victimhood nationalist narrative certainly served various strategic interests of his governing coalition, I argue that it cannot be explained fully via rationalist expectations and, indeed, analysis requires an understanding of the role of traumatic memory in Israeli society. In the next section, I outline the broad contours of Holocaust discourse in Israel during the decade plus before Eichmann's capture—the period from 1948-1960—focusing on two instructive controversies over the 1952 Reparations Agreement with Germany and the 1954-1955 Kastner trial. I nuance existing scholarship's account of this period by arguing that, though the Holocaust appeared in Israeli political debate during this period as an emotionally potent wellspring and even, at times, threatened Ben-Gurion's coalition's legitimacy, its memory did not constitute a major determinant of official identity or policymaking discourse. This dynamic, I argue in the subsequent section, changed with the Eichmann trial. Because the Eichmann trial was so widely followed both in Israel and abroad, it

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[497] See, for example, Segev, *The Seventh Million*; Hanna Yablonka, *The State of Israel vs. Adolf Eichmann*, trans. Ora Cummings (New York: Schocken Books, 2004); Zertal, *Israel's Holocaust and the Politics of Nationhood.*

served as an ideal discursive site for Ben-Gurion's government to narrate Holocaust trauma as victimhood nationalism that served the government's foreign policy goals both at home and abroad. I conclude the chapter by reflecting on the utility of victimhood nationalism for Ben-Gurion and his allies moving forward, including in unifying Israel's diverse immigrant populations and in shaping Israel's attitude towards the Arab nationalism promoted by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser.

5.2: Victimhood Nationalism as an Identity Discourse

This thesis' first two chapters focused on theorizing identity and how traumatic encounters can inspire new identity narratives. Further, the previous chapter on India's post-independence foreign economic policy has examined economic nationalism as one important variant of identity discourse within which narratives seek to define the economic nation and motivate the logics of policymaking to secure it from outside threats. Indeed, understanding this relationality between the nation and other is vital for grasping how identity narratives create logics of policymaking.[498] For this reason Jie-Hyun Lim has written that "the nationalist imagination can be fed only in transnational space"—national identities necessarily implicate an ontological other in the form of other nations and no nation can identify itself through pure political solipsism.[499] In the case of traumatic encounters' narration as constitutive of identity, a key self-other distinction comes via the victim-perpetrator relationship, a notion which appeared obliquely in the previous chapter via Indian nationalists references to British imperialism and other imperialistic states. This relationship not only helps to define the self, congealing a group around its shared history of victimization, but also can direct blame and legitimize grievances against others deemed responsible, complicit, or negligent. And because nationalisms are defined in the modern era by their aspirations to exert exclusive control over the state apparatus, when the victim-perpetrator relationship characterizes a *national* identity narrative, these grievances can often inspire state policies.

To be sure, not all collective traumas constitutive of national identity lend themselves to narration via the traditional victim-perpetrator relationship's framing. Some traumas, like natural disasters, are more readily blamed on the vagaries of the gods or poor preparations undertaken by oneself or co-nationals. Other traumas do not perpetuate notions of perpetrators because they are largely repressed, appearing in national identity discourses only indirectly or sporadically. And

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[498] Iver B. Neumann, "Self and Other in International Relations," *European Journal of International Relations* 2, no. 2 (1996): 139–74.

[499] Jie-Hyun Lim, "Victimhood Nationalism in Contested Memories: National Mourning and Global Accountability," in *Memory in a Global Age*, ed. Aleida Assmann and Sebastian Conrad (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 138.

among those that do draw on the victim-perpetrator relationship, many do so in a relatively narrow fashions, narrating collective traumas to articulate limited, specific grievances that can be repaired via revenge, reparations, apologies, or bringing specific perpetrators to justice. For example, in the immediate wake of the 1984 Bhopal disaster, many victims' groups narrated their trauma as an offense to the Indian nation, but largely focused their advocacy on seeking criminal prosecution of the CEO of the American company responsible for leaking toxic gas and a large financial settlement.[500] Though the gas surely created victims and became a source of national outrage, the disaster's victims and their advocates did not frequently advocate the Indian nation's assumption of victimhood identity or the Indian state acting as such.

Yet, the grievances the victim-perpetrator relationship foments are part of what makes narratives of trauma politically useful, allowing them to be harnessed instrumentally. As traumatic experiences are narrated with more shared public knowledge, implicating the entirety of the nation and portraying trauma as constitutive of a national identity, oftentimes their notions of perpetrators are similarly broadened beyond the limited group responsible for initial traumatization. Indeed, as these narrations break down the initial victim-perpetrator relationship, they often project grievances beyond original perpetrators to otherwise uninvolved nations or younger generations within perpetrating nations. To describe this phenomenon of expanding, malleable grievances, this chapter employs the notion of victimhood identity and, when narrated into national identity, the notion of *victimhood nationalism*.[501] The term victimhood, here, is intended to draw a distinction with the simple status of being a victim, which limits grievances to the confines of the victim-perpetrator relationship. Whereas one must be a victim *of* something or someone, victim*hood* has no specific object and thus persists so long as it is continually narrated as constitutive national identity. In this sense, this distinction between the status of being a victim and the larger notion of victimhood builds on the philosopher Garrath Williams' distinction between revenge and victimhood. Unlike revenge, which retains a closer link to experience as it must "be served at the right person's cost [the perpetrator] and by the correct hand [the victim]," victimhood's grievances are malleable and can

[500] Adam B. Lerner, "Manufactured Silence: Political Economy and Management Of The Bhopal Disaster," *Economic and Political Weekly* 52, no. 30 (July 29, 2017).

[501] For a more complete articulation of my theorization of victimhood nationalism, see Adam B. Lerner, "The Uses and Abuses of Victimhood Nationalism in International Politics," *European Journal of International Relations*, online first, May 17, 2019.

reasonably apply to any 'other' narrated as complicit, negligent or even simply insensitive.[502] Oftentimes, political entrepreneurs have strategic reasons to narrate the break-down of the victim-perpetrator relationship and they draw on victimhood identities both to mobilize their in-group against a new enemy, as well as to garner sympathy from out-groups.[503]

Beyond the utility of victimhood identity across contexts, victimhood *nationalism* is a particularly common and potent phenomenon in international politics for two key reasons. First, because of the "complex processes of mutual identification" between disparate and diverse people of multiple generations inherent in narrating large-scale national identities as opposed to smaller group ones, limiting the scope of grievances these narrations inspire proves particularly difficult. Indeed, for this reason Williams argues that actual instances of revenge, which retain the initial victim-perpetrator relationship, are quite rare in the international arena.[504] When nations narrate traumas as shared public knowledge and create solidarity through generations around events only directly experienced by a small portion of their population, they are prone to likewise over-applying the label of perpetrator to other groups, expanding grievances beyond the agents involved in inflicting harm. Second, in contrast to the domestic political arena, which takes place under the auspices of a state apparatus that aspires to monopolize the administration of justice, the international arena lacks any clear power structure that can ensure grievances redress. Without such an arbiter, victims on the international stage often project their grievances beyond original perpetrators and seek sympathy and reparations from third parties narrated into the conflict.

Nearly all nations have latent in their identities some mythologized historical trauma that can potentially be activated by identity narratives and transformed into victimhood nationalism. For this reason, it's unsurprising that notions of victimhood have appeared in such diverse places as Turkey over the past imposition of secularism[505], on both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict[506], or the

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[502] Garrath Williams, "Dangerous Victims: On Some Political Dangers of Vicarious Claims to Victimhood," *Distinktion: Journal of Social Theory* 9, no. 2 (2008): 81.
[503] For more on victimhood's instrumentality, see Diane Enns, *The Violence of Victimhood* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2012).
[504] Williams cites ethnic Serbs' expulsion from Kosovo as reprisal during the late 1990s Kosovo War as one possible example.; Williams, "Dangerous Victims: On Some Political Dangers of Vicarious Claims to Victimhood," 80.
[505] Zafer Yilmaz, "The AKP and the Spirit of the 'New' Turkey: Imagined Victim, Reactionary Mood, and Resentful Sovereign," *Turkish Studies* 18, no. 3 (2017): 482–513.
[506] Neil Caplan, "Victimhood in Israeli and Palestinian National Narratives," *Bustan: The Middle East Book Review* 3, no. 1 (2012): 1–19.

US prior to the election of President Donald Trump.[507] But while these narratives are quite common responses to trauma, much of the time they are not sufficiently compelling relative to other narratives within a national identity discourse to prove determinative of state action. Indeed, oftentimes these narratives' exaggeration or fabrication of traumatic experiences can undermine their salience. In this chapter, though, I turn to the foundational trauma of Israeli national identity—the Holocaust—which involved such a large array of horrific unspeakable experiences beyond immediate material or psychological repair that it proved potent for victimhood nationalist narratives across generations. I trace the initial official repression of Holocaust trauma and the emergence of victimhood nationalism as a more hegemonic category style identity narrative that neglected much particularistic nuance in survivors' stories. This victimhood nationalism, championed by Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion around the time of the Eichmann trial, mobilized Israelis of all backgrounds and projected grievances away from Germany to Israel's neighboring Arab states. Indeed, in this sense it proved an important tool of Ben-Gurion's statecraft. Still, even given this victimhood nationalism's instrumental utility, it cannot be dismissed as *purely* instrumental—its success depended on resonance with Israelis' underlying experiences and it gained traction largely because of a longstanding desire in Israeli society to bear witness and account for the enormous trauma imposed by the Nazi genocide.

5.3: The Birth of Israeli Holocaust Discourse: Official Repression with the Luxembourg Agreement and Kastner Trial

Israel's war for independence lasted nearly a year and armistice agreements did not codify the new state's borders until 1950. During the interim period of 1948-1950, existential fear remained in the center of Israeli political life. But even after victory became clear and the new country rejoiced in temporarily defeating its Arab neighbors, Israeli society was far from physically secure from either the domestic or international vantagepoint. Israel's population exploded by over 130 percent in its first decade of existence, primarily due to immigration, and this demographic boom challenged the new state's economic security. To promote resilience during the war and in the face of economic crisis, the Mapai-led government leadership largely promoted its agenda by institutionalizing a rigid

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[507] Francis Fukuyama, "US against the World? Trump's America and the New Global Order," Financial Times, November 11, 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/6a43cf54-a75d-11e6-8b69-02899e8bd9d1; Mireya Solis, "A New Meaning for TPP -- Restrain Trump-Era Protectionism," Nikkei Asian Review, January 28, 2017, https://asia.nikkei.com/Viewpoints/Mireya-Solis/A-new-meaning-for-TPP-Restrain-Trump-era-protectionism.

category-style Zionist *halutz* (pioneer) identity.[508] This mentality, emphasizing "security, defence and heroism" as national principles for *all* Israelis regardless of their background coupled with popular collectivist and socialist ideas to legitimize austerity policies that impacted all aspects of daily life.[509] Though some scholarship has written of this period as one of repression of Holocaust memory[510], in this section I argue a more accurate description would be that the Holocaust did not play a prominent role in *official* (government sponsored) hegemonic identity narratives. Still, survivors' experiences did impact Israeli political culture. Two key public events—the 1952 reparations agreement with West Germany and the 1954-1955 Kastner trial—demonstrated clearly the potency of traumatic memory in Israeli society and the threat it could post to the Mapai-led state-building enterprise.[511]

Before turning to these two pivotal events, though, it's worth examining how and why Holocaust memory developed its muted role in official discourse during the early years of the Israeli state, despite the genocide's importance in legitimizing Zionism internationally and providing the impetus for Israeli statehood. Historian Dina Porat has described the progression of Yishuv attitudes to the Holocaust in three stages, culminating in the genocide's relative repression in the 1950s and stigma surrounding survivors' experiences. When Zionist leaders in Palestine first learned about the Nazi genocide around 1942, many treated it as confirmation of the "Zionists' image of helpless diaspora Jews succumbing to their fate passively."[512] Still, most understood that the cruel fate facing European Jews could just as easily be shared by those who found refuge in Palestine and thus treated the outbreak of antisemitic violence across Europe as a threat to their goal of Jewish self-determination and statehood. This commiseration largely faded in the second stage, beginning around the time of the Allies' victory in 1945, as many Zionist leaders began to wonder whether those surviving European Jews were undesirable candidates for immigration to their new state. The head of the Jewish Agency's Immigration Department Eliyahu Dobkin, for example, opined that many Holocaust survivors had been "broken in spirit" by their experiences and thus would not

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[508] Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt, *The Transformation of Israeli Society: An Essay in Interpretation* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1985), 149–59.

[509] Eisenstadt, 163.

[510] For a prominent example, see Segev, *The Seventh Million*, 361.

[511] Anita Shapira, *Israel: A History*, The Schusterman Series in Israel Studies (Waltham, MA: Brandeis University Press, 2012), 260–70.

[512] Dina Porat, "Attitudes of the Young State of Israel toward the Holocaust and Its Survivors: A Debate over Identity and Values," in *New Perspectives on Israeli History*, ed. Laurence J. Silberstein (New York, NY: New York University Press, 1991), 171.

make suitable Zionists "[a]ccording to past criteria." Others were even more suspicious, wondering whether only the most selfish of European Jewry had survived. This stigma of survivors and their memories continued into the early years of the state. In a closed 1949 meeting of his party, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion reflected on this outlook, stating that "Among the survivors of the German camps were people who would not have been alive were they not what they were—hard, mean and selfish—and what they have been through erased every remaining good quality from them."[513]

Ultimately, though, this hesitancy gave way to a third and final stage, beginning slowly after independence in 1948, characterized by acceptance of survivors as immigrants and official repression of their experiences to meet the state's rigid vision of Zionism. As Ben-Gurion and his allies visited the displaced persons camps in Europe and found widespread desire to emigrate to Palestine and accepted these new Jews as a potential demographic boon, in spite of their issues. In his 1948 declaration of independence, Ben-Gurion referred to the Holocaust in vague terms as providing evidence of the Zionist state's rationale: "[t]he catastrophe which recently befell the Jewish people — the massacre of millions of Jews in Europe — was another clear demonstration of the urgency of solving the problem of its homelessness by re-establishing in Eretz-Israel the Jewish State, which would open the gates of the homeland wide to every Jew and confer upon the Jewish people the status of a fully privileged member of the community of nations."[514] Yet, even as the Yishuv welcomed two-thirds of all Holocaust survivors (approximately 400,000) in its first years of statehood, it expected this beleaguered population to suppress public grieving over their experiences to meet the nation's Zionist identity of resilience and strength.[515] In 1951, for example, the Israeli government scheduled Yom HaShoah, which it labelled "Holocaust Martyrs' and Heroes' Remembrance Day," on the anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, choosing to highlight solely the small number of Holocaust victims who had undertaken violent rebellion. Decades later, most other countries and the United Nations would decide to commemorate the Holocaust on January 27, the day of the liberation of Auschwitz.[516]

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[513] Reproduced in Porat, 174.; For more on the Yishuv's conflicted attitudes towards survivors, see Segev, *The Seventh Million*, 113–22.

[514] David Ben-Gurion, "The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel," Jewish Virtual Library, May 14, 1948, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-declaration-of-the-establishment-of-the-state-of-israel.

[515] Shapira, *Israel*, 261.

[516] Yael Shahar, "Why International Holocaust Remembrance Day Isn't Marked in Israel," *Haaretz* (blog), January 27, 2015, https://www.haaretz.com/jewish/the-jewish-thinker/.premium-1.639209.

By 1951, one out of every four Israelis was a Holocaust survivor and a large majority of the population—including the majority of ruling elites—had European roots, meaning they likely also lost family and friends in the Nazi genocide.[517] Yet, despite trauma's continued reverberation through poverty, these dire economic conditions and associated post-independence insecurity made a unifying identity oriented towards collective action even more vital for the young state. Poverty touched nearly all incoming Israelis—in addition to Holocaust survivors from Europe, Israel welcomed another approximately 400,000 immigrants from North Africa and Asia between 1948-1951, most of whom also arrived with scarcely any economic resources. Further, Israel had lost much of its agricultural supply due to the departure of so many Arab farmers during the 1948 war and boycotts from Arab neighbors, leading to desperate food insecurity. Most of Israel's immigrants, both from the Muslim world and Europe, arrived without the necessary agricultural skills for developing the young state's economic base or knowledge of the Hebrew to facilitate integration. In this "atmosphere of half-war, half-peace,"[518] the state invested heavily in defense, forcing most immigrants living in *Maabarot* (transit camps) to persist on meagre food rations. Given these immediate economic concerns, historian and journalist Tom Segev has written that, in the immediate post-independence period, many survivors felt "imprisoned … behind a wall of silence,"[519] unable to convey their experiences. The little public dialogue on the Holocaust that existed either valorized the few who had partaken in uprisings and met the state's image of Zionism or referred in passing to abstract facts about the millions who had died, neglecting the diversity of traumatic experiences these figures represented. As many survivors Hebraized their names and assumed new identities, they often elected not to even attempt what Elie Wiesel referred to as "'tell[ing] a story that cannot be told…deliver[ing] a message that cannot be delivered'."[520]

But while this attitude might have served the state's short-term needs, it left an enormous repository of emotionally potent memory of traumatic experiences. This repository was revealed explicitly in the conflict over the 1952 Luxembourg Reparations Agreement which, in many ways,

[517] Porat, "Attitudes of the Young State of Israel toward the Holocaust and Its Survivors: A Debate over Identity and Values," 179.

[518] Nicholas Balabkins, *West German Reparations to Israel* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1971), 98.; See also Gardner Patterson, "Israel's Economic Problems," *Foreign Affairs* 32, no. 2 (1954): 310.; Nachum T. Gross, "Israeli Economic Policies, 1948-1951: Problems of Evaluation," *The Journal of Economic History* 50, no. 1 (1990): 67–83.

[519] Segev, *The Seventh Million*, 327.

[520] Quote from Elie Wiesel reproduced in Segev, 158.

pitted the policy goals and associated identities of mourning and resilience against one another.[521] Negotiations over the agreement began between 1949-1950, as Israel's physical and economic insecurity pushed Ben-Gurion and his government to consider reparations from West Germany.[522] Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, whose government in Bonn oversaw rapid economic growth into the early 1950s, had already expressed a desire publicly to use this newfound wealth to repent for the sins of their Nazi predecessors and reenter the good graces of the international community. Initially, understanding the sensitivity of the issues involved, Israeli leaders attempted to negotiate solely through intermediary Allied states that still occupied Germany, but the Allies recommended direct negotiations, having already devolved most state powers to Adenauer's government.[523] After more than a year of furtive courtship, the two countries outlined the 1952 Luxembourg Reparations Agreement in a secretive process that precluded survivors' input. The agreement bound the West German government to transfer 3.5 billion marks (approximately 845 million USD) in goods and services to Israel and other Jewish organizations above and beyond the individual reparations to survivors already underway via the Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany. In January 1952 the Mapai-led government presented a draft agreement for a vote to the Knesset, where it controlled a sizeable majority coalition. Yet, despite the government's efforts to control the negotiation process, once announced the deal was immediately enormously unpopular across Israeli society—according to a poll conducted by the Israeli newspaper *Ma'ariv*, 80 percent of Israelis opposed even the idea of direct negotiations.[524]

Fearing coalition members' defection and public outrage, Ben-Gurion and his Mapai allies sought to carefully navigate multiple constraints in narrating the agreement's justification, preventing traumatic experiences from fueling public backlash. Though they hoped to portray the deal as

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[521] For a few key examples of scholarship on the politics and history of the agreement, see Michael Brecher, "Images, Process and Feedback in Foreign Policy: Israel's Decisions on German Reparations," *American Political Science Review* 67, no. 01 (1973): 73–102.; Balabkins, *West German Reparations to Israel*; Aviv Melamud and Mordechai Melamud, "'When Shall We Not Forgive?' The Israeli-German Reparations Agreement: The Interface Between Negotiation and Reconciliation," in *Negotiating Reconciliation in Peacemaking*, ed. Valerie Rosoux and Mark Anstey (London: Springer International Publishing, 2017), 257–75.; Lily Gardner Feldman, *The Special Relationship between West Germany and Israel* (Boston, MA: Allen & Unwin, 1984); George Lavy, *Germany and Israel: Moral Debt and National Interest* (London: Routledge, 2014).

[522] Yaakov Sharett, ed., "The Reparations Agreement with Germany General Debate and Decision Knesset Sessions 38-401, 7-9.1.1952," in *The Reparations Controversy* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2011), 5–6..

[523] Israel's objections to negotiating directly with West Germany rather than occupation authorities continued into 1951. Sharett, 13–19.; "Document 3: Israel Note of 16 January, 1951, to the United States, United Kingdom and France Concerning Restitution and Indemnification," in *Documents Relating to the Agreement between the Government of Israel and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany* (Jerusalem: Government Printer, 1953), 3.

[524] Hannah Starman, *Trauma and the Making of Israel's Security*, PhD thesis (University of Wales, Aberystwyth, 2001), 123.

limited, securing purely financial compensation for impoverished survivors in the young state, its circumstances also made it problematically appear a symbolic victory for West Germany. West German Chancellor Adenauer, for instance, demonstrated a clear interest in capitalizing on the agreement's symbolism to further his state's international standing. Even though Israeli leaders notably offered feedback on drafts of Adenauer's pivotal September 1951 speech to the Bundestag in support of reparations[525], the West German leader's language undermined Ben-Gurion's later narration to the Knesset by hyperbolically describing his government as acting to see that "the spirit of true humanity must once more become alive and bear fruit."[526] The language of the agreement itself more closely reflected the Israeli government's goals, referring to West Germans' intentions "within the limits of their capacity, to make good the *material* damage." But it also referred broadly to the Nazi "regime of terror" as its rationale, rather than limiting its scope to the confiscation of property or the inability of the deceased to reclaim it.[527] Adding to these complexities, the Israeli government's efforts to limit the agreement's scope were at odds with the immense political, legal and moral issues involved in both treating the West German government as a natural successor to the Nazi regime, well-suited to pay for its predecessor's sins, and yet sufficiently different from its predecessor to warrant the Jewish state's establishing channels of communication. Relatedly, though the deal did not mention future diplomatic relations between Israel and West Germany, its delayed payment structure and the requirement that Israel use funds to purchase West German goods in many ways *necessitated* future engagement between the two states, paving a path for eventual close diplomatic ties.

Despite the financial windfall the deal offered Israel and its international political dimensions, during Knesset debate Ben-Gurion and his allies downplayed its significance beyond limited remuneration, maintaining the Israeli government's general abhorrence of West Germany as a successor to the Nazi regime. Through multiple speeches, government figures narrated the agreement in a careful, limited manner, omitting any reference to a new generation of German leadership or 'working through' traumatic experiences. In his opening speech, for example, Ben-Gurion argued that the Nazi crimes were "of such magnitude [that they] cannot be forgiven by

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[525] Segev, *The Seventh Million*, 203–4.

[526] "Adenauer Statement on Jews," *The New York Times*, September 28, 1951.

[527] Emphasis added. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Documents Relating to the Agreement between the Government of Israel and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany : (Signed on 10 September 1952 at Luxembourg).* (Jerusalem: Government Printer, 1953), 125.

means of any material compensation"[528], while Minister of Foreign Affairs Moshe Sharrett stated in his report to the Knesset that "Nothing will be forgiven. Nothing will be forgotten for generations to come, perhaps for eternity."[529] These statements attempted to justify the agreement while side-stepping the underlying traumatic experiences it implicated. Further, by dismissing any notion of forgiveness or reconciliation, Mapai's leaders obviated any nuanced debates over distinguishing between perpetrators, bystanders and the innocent within Germany. Indeed, Ben-Gurion even stated that the "entire German people…[are] equally responsible."[530] In essence, his narrative rationale for the agreement depended on a singular logic of remuneration, maintaining sharp, category-style distinctions between self and other. This vision was epitomized by Ben-Gurion's slogan: "Let not the murderers of our people also be their inheritors!"[531]

While Ben-Gurion's narrative portrayed the agreement as simply the repatriation of Jewish property, rather than indicative of any meaningful change in foreign policy or evolution in identity, Minister of Labor and future Prime Minister Golda Meir addressed trauma more directly, attempting to mold it into a rationale for signing the agreement in protection of Israel's security.

> We must be strong not only because by that very fact we are honoring the memory of those who were murdered, but also in order to prevent a repeat of that calamity. I believe that this was the last testament of our martyrs. We were slaughtered and burnt because we were weak, and only if we are truly strong can we prevent that from happening again.[532]

Here, Meir's rhetoric struck a balance between recognizing how the money could address the Jewish people's collective trauma's instantiation in Israeli poverty and structural absence, without referring to the horrors of the underlying traumatic experience that led to it. Indeed, the Mapai's general approach was to justify the agreement in financial terms that fit its vision of Zionist identity without including any discussion of trauma's symbolic or emotional resonance, which it bracketed as too immense to address in the context of the debate.

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[528] Sharett, "The Reparations Agreement with Germany General Debate and Decision Knesset Sessions 38-401, 7-9.1.1952," 162.
[529] Yaakov Sharett, ed., "The Foreign Minister Reports to the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee Before the Knesset General Debate Regarding Direct Negotiations Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee Meeting, 7.1.1952," in *The Reparations Controversy* (Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2011), 158, http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvbkjzj1.
[530] Sharett, "The Reparations Agreement with Germany General Debate and Decision Knesset Sessions 38-401, 7-9.1.1952," 162.
[531] Sharett, 166.
[532] Sharett, 225.

The fragility of the government's position was not lost on its chief political opponents on both the right and the left, who drew precisely on this traumatic memory's symbolic and emotional appeal to shame the prime minister and his allies. The first party to speak out against the agreement was the center-right General Zionists (GZ), who in 1951 became the largest opposition party in the Knesset. The GZ opposed the agreement both because of its symbolic potency and because of a lack of trust in their West German interlocutors. The party's most prominent voice in the debate on the agreement was the Austrian-born Member of the Knesset (MK) Elimelech Rimalt, who dissented directly after Ben-Gurion's speech on the first day of debate. He began by turning Ben-Gurion's statement indicting all Germans on its head, arguing that Israel should not sign the agreement *precisely* because "the Germans in the East and the West are one and the same" with their Nazi predecessors. "A people, the majority of whom were murderers—and the few who were not either fled the country, or were detained in concentration camps—a people such as this does not change so quickly," Rimalt said.[533] This interpretation of Ben-Gurion's argument also continued with another Israeli political party that opposed the agreement—the communist Mapam—which notably extended Rimalt's logic to sow distrust in the entire Western alliance that backed Adenauer's government. Mapam MK Yaakov Chazan argued that the Western powers deliberately excluded Jews from initial post-war reconstruction and that "Nazism in Germany is on the rise again," with the Western powers "nurturing" it.[534] "How can we be caught so appallingly in that same web of deceit that makes us, the victims of Nazi murder, the sponsor of the Nazi return to the international arena?"[535]

Underlying Rimalt's arguments about West Germany as a continuation of the Nazi regime was his assault on Ben-Gurion's narration as a distortion of underlying traumatic experience. Rimalt pointed out Ben-Gurion's limited framing served to silence the experiences of deceased victims on whose behalf the government negotiated. "[W]e cannot avoid calling witnesses to this debate," Rimalt remarked, "silent ones, invisible ones, witnesses whose very appearance chills our blood." Here, his figurative language served to allude to the crisis in representation inherent in the absence the genocide created. He further undermined the government's narrative by arguing that the "rational logic" it employed would not suffice when "the background to the debate is an unprecedented, horrific historic event," again alluding to suffering that purely denotative rhetoric

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[533] Sharett, 170.
[534] Sharett, 173.
[535] Sharett, 174.

could not directly capture.[536] Most poignantly, he turned to his own personal experiences to further his argument's emotional appeal. "My young son asked me: 'How much will we get for Grandpa and Grandma?', for both of my parents were murdered. This is too grave and too painful for us."[537] By drawing on the dark irony implicit in his son's comments and his family's experiences, he belittled Meir and Ben-Gurion's invocations of financial concerns relative to the immensity of the trauma involved.

Ultimately, though, Mapam and the GZ would not be the primary political beneficiaries of the reparation's agreement's controversy. During Chazan's speech, an MK from the far-right Herut party unnamed in the transcript stormed into the Knesset from the protest then taking place outside the building. Police had used tear gas to dispel the rowdy protesters and, in response, the Herut MK cunningly alluded to Holocaust trauma by shouting "Gas against Jews! That's it. That's how you'll win."[538] This macabre *double entendre*, referring both to the police tear gas and Nazi gas chambers, invoked the trauma underlying the debate and reflected the controversial tactics of Herut, the third major party opposed to the agreement, and its firebrand leader, Menachem Begin. At the time of the debate, Herut had only 14 seats in the Knesset, so Begin and his allies knew that even with the support of all other opposition parties they were unlikely to block the deal's passage. But he also recognized the symbolism of the controversy—indeed, according to historian Avi Shilon, his Herut ally Yochanan Bader convinced Begin to end his temporary retirement by telling him participation in the debate was a "moral obligation to your family, your duty toward your murdered mother," who had died in the Nazi genocide.[539] Begin understood the anger and trauma the idea of *any* Jewish contact with Germany evoked in Israelis across the political spectrum and thus saw the deal as an opportunity to expand his party beyond its traditional base of immigrants from Arab countries to those of European extraction. In the days leading up to the all-important debate of January 1952, he spoke at multiple Herut rallies openly advocating rebellion against Ben-Gurion's government. To heighten the drama, he suggested that those protesting on the day of the Knesset debate wear yellow stars to "[r]emember what Amalek did to you," drawing allegorically on both the experiences of Jews living under Nazi rule and the biblical narrative of the Amalek people who were sworn enemies of the Israelites. Both references sought to portray the deal as a new iteration of a transcendental

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[536] Sharett, 167.
[537] Sharett, 171.
[538] Sharett, 174–75.
[539] Avi Shilon, *Menachem Begin: A Life* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012), 168.

existential threat to the entirety of the Jewish people across the globe—a unifying vision for all Israeli Jews that countered the Mapai party's hegemonic official account. [540] On January 7, the first day of the Knesset debate, he joined over 15,000 protestors in Jerusalem before entering parliament.

Begin began the day of the debate narrating the agreement as an offense to national honor in Jerusalem's Zion Square. In this public speech, he referred to Ben-Gurion a "small tyrant and great maniac" who viewed the Germans as "a nation and not what it actually is: a herd of wolves who devoured our people as prey."[541] This sort of metaphor dehumanized the Nazis' successors in West Germany and portrayed the Mapai-led Israeli government as an internal 'other' who did not put the Jewish people's interests first. As he spoke, outraged members of the crowd began throwing stones, leading the police to respond with tear gas. Begin capitalized on this turmoil to again stoke outrage and further 'other' his political opponent, falsely stating that "Mr. Ben Gurion has deployed police officers carrying grenades and tear gas made in Germany, the same gases that asphyxiated our ancestors, and he has prisons and concentration camps."[542] These provocative accusations and their reception reveal not only Begin's savvy as a political rabble-rouser, but also the depth of public anger collective trauma elicited across Israeli society. Any reference to German gas, true or not, undoubtedly elicited deep emotions from the crowd and endowed protestors' discomfort facing tear gas with symbolic meaning.

Though he refrained from such outlandish claims in his Knesset speech the next day, Begin did continue his othering of Ben-Gurion, portraying him as collaborating with Nazis by conducting the negotiations. He referred to his "emotional shock" at learning of the deal, specifically citing his revulsion at Ben-Gurion's legitimization of Adenauer after the German leader had stated to the Bundestag that "the vast majority of the German people were revolted by these crimes…[and] did not take part in these crimes." "[Y]ou sat at the same table with the murderers of your people," Begin told the Knesset, referring to the prime minister.[543] This rhetoric notably represented what became a longstanding tactic for the Herut of accusing Mapai's leadership of collaboration and complicity with the Nazis during the genocide. The speech turned Begin's previous identity discourse from implicit to explicit, as he deliberately rejected Ben-Gurion's attempts to frame the

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[540] Shilon, 166–69.
[541] Cited in Shilon, 169.
[542] Cited in Shilon, 170.
[543] Sharett, "The Reparations Agreement with Germany General Debate and Decision Knesset Sessions 38-401, 7-9.1.1952," 178, 180.

agreement as an isolated matter of financial compensation and offered to symbolically recognize their shared identity, albeit on Begin's terms.

> I appeal to you at the last moment as Jew to Jew, as a son of an orphaned people, as a son of a bereaved people: do not do this! It is the blasphemy of all blasphemies in Israel; it is unparalleled since we became a nation. I am trying to give you a way out. As a rival I would not have given it to you, but as a Jew I will: go to the people; hold a referendum.[544]

Appealing to the prime minister for a referendum that would likely have resulted in the deal's rejection allowed Begin to portray himself as the Jewish people's champion, countering Ben-Gurion's subordination of the national will. Further, he called on the three Israeli Arab parties represented in the Knesset to abstain from voting on the agreement, again undermining Ben-Gurion's narration of the deal as a financial boon for a unifying state identity by portraying it as a matter to be dealt with solely by the dominant Zionist nation within the state and not by what he saw as the prime minister's interloper allies.

Ultimately, the opposition's arguments proved unable to stop the agreement from passing by a vote of 61-50 and, over the next 14 years, the import of German goods brought by the deal helped spur Israeli economic development.[545] Yet, even though the debate faded and did not threaten Mapai's hold on power, the demonstrations and widespread public disproval of the agreement revealed collective trauma's potency in sowing divisions and countering official narratives. The Herut party, perhaps more so than any other, desired to seize upon this potency and found a perfect opportunity with 1954-1955 Kastner trial, which again placed weighty issues of memory and ethics into the public sphere.[546] Unlike during the reparations agreement debate, the trial centered around a few key players and thus did not explicitly unify divergent parties across Israel's opposition. Yet, it again revealed the depths of collective trauma in Israeli society, as well as the potential vulnerability this trauma continued to pose for the Mapai-led government. Many of the arguments and characters involved appeared again in the pivotal 1961 trial of Adolf Eichmann.

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[544] Sharett, 182.

[545] For a polemical view of Germany's role in developing the Israeli economy, see Kenneth M. Lewan, "How West Germany Helped to Build Israel," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 4, no. 4 (1975): 41–64.

[546] For an extensive overview of the trial and its reawakening of Holocaust memory, see Segev, *The Seventh Million*, 255–95.; Leora Bilsky, *Transformative Justice: Israeli Identity on Trial* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2004), 19–82.

Rudolf (Rejo) Kastner, the spokesman for the Ministry of Trade and Industry and former failed Knesset candidate, initiated the trial that now bears his name in popular discourse. During the Holocaust, Kastner had led a Zionist rescue committee in Hungary aligned with the dominant Mapai leadership of the Jewish Agency. He had used this position to negotiate for the lives of Hungarian Jews with leading SS officers in Budapest like Adolf Eichmann and Kurt Becher. He'd famously forged an ultimately unsuccessful agreement to trade 10,000 trucks to the German army in exchange for the Nazis' sparing 1 million Jews' lives. But while this broader deal was stymied by British imprisonment of Kastner's messenger, he was able to organize a separate rescue train saving over 1,600 friends, family, and acquaintances. Still, Kastner was unable to prevent the deportation of approximately 500,000 Hungarian Jews in 1944 alone and his personal success in the face of this genocide led many critics to accuse him of acting selfishly or duplicitously during negotiations. After the war, Kastner first faced accusations of collaboration at the 1946 Zionist Congress, but the panel adjudicating the case decided it didn't have enough evidence to make a decision. Kastner then emigrated to Israel, where he rose the ranks of Mapai politics, even finding his way onto the party's list of candidates in the first and second Knesset elections.[547]

The issues of Kastner's wartime activity remained dormant until 1952, when Malchiel Gruenwald, a Jerusalem hotel-owner and survivor of the Holocaust in Hungary, self-published a newsletter accusing him of collaboration. Gruenwald claimed Kastner negotiated deceitfully with Adolf Eichmann and other key Nazi figures in Hungary, securing the escape of his friends and family in exchange for keeping quiet about the overall fate of Hungarian Jewry. He even accused Kastner of stealing Jewish money and helping save Kurt Becher's life by providing laudatory testimony to the Nuremberg trials. For these reasons, Gruenwald wrote that Kastner was "implicated in the murder of our beloved brothers" and even employed a macabre Nazi trope by calling for him "to be liquidated."[548] Initially, Gruenwald's newsletter was sent to members of the Ha-Mizrahi religious movement and received little press coverage outside the Herut party newspaper, which seized on the accusation as yet another opportunity to portray Mapai as collaborators and challenge its hold on power.[549] But, recognizing the government's vulnerability

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[547] Bilsky, *Transformative Justice*, 20–21.

[548] Cited in Segev, *The Seventh Million*, 257.

[549] Bilsky, *Transformative Justice*, 23.

following the reparations debate, Attorney General Haim Cohen, a leading Ben-Gurion ally[550], told Kastner he would have to either resign his position or sue for libel. Kastner begrudgingly chose the latter, hoping the trial would provide him an opportunity to rebuff Gruenwald's attacks and force him to recant.[551]

From its outset, Gruenwald was keen to politicize the trial, viewing it as an opportunity to relitigate Kastner and his organization's wartime activities, which had failed to save so many of his family and friends during the genocide of Hungarian Jewry. He hired as his attorney Shmuel Tamir, a Herut party cofounder and former Irgun fighter, who similarly recognized the trial as a vital forum for again drawing on traumatic Holocaust experiences' emotional resonance to challenge Ben-Gurion's Mapai party in the public sphere. Ben-Gurion and his allies had led the Jewish Agency throughout the war and, like all international Jewish organizations, theirs mostly failed in its rescue efforts. As Leora Bilsky has argued, Tamir strategically neglected to comment on the facts of the pamphlet's publication in his defense of Gruenwald, instead transforming the trial into an indictment of Kastner and the larger Mapai-dominated Zionist movement's wartime activity. In so doing, he narrated the Yishuv members' dilemma during the war as a binary choice between resistance and collaboration, a particularistic division of the larger category-style identity of Zionist; according to this logic, the revisionist Zionist Irgun paramilitary group that later helped found Herut chose the noble path of resistance, emblematic of true Zionist identity, while Mapai and its predecessors, by attempting to negotiate with the British colonial power and even the Nazis themselves, had chosen to collaborate in the Jewish people's destruction. This narrative both drew on the unaddressed cache of collective trauma in Israeli society and flipped Ben-Gurion's efforts to champion a unifying Zionest identity of strength and resilience. Of course, the historical details regarding different factions' collaboration and resistance is far more complicated than Tamir's simple binary logic. But while arguments in the courtroom necessarily focused on solely Kastner's role as an individual, partisan press coverage in Israel amplified these underlying identity narratives, resurfacing wells of collective traumatic experience typically kept dormant in Israeli political discourse. By portraying Kastner as representative of Ben-Gurion's Mapai establishment's diaspora

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[550] Cohen later defended his pressuring Kastner on television by saying that "I simply could not conceive that somebody tainted by the grave suspicion of 'Nazi collaborator' could serve in a senior position in our new, pure, ideal state."; Cited in Zertal, *Israel's Holocaust and the Politics of Nationhood*, 82.

[551] Hanna Yablonka and Moshe Tlamim, "The Development of Holocaust Consciousness in Israel: The Nuremberg, Kapos, Kastner, and Eichmann Trials," *Israel Studies* 8, no. 3 (2003): 1–24.

passivity, Tamir painted Herut as the honorable successor to valiant resistance fighters, seeking justice for survivors in numerous contexts.[552]

Indeed, the narratives emerging from the trial proved so compelling for Israel's partisan press outlets that the trial had to be moved to a larger auditorium.[553] Following arguments, the judge ruled in favor of Gruenwald and Tamir, remarking in his decision that Kastner had "sold his soul to the devil" in his negotiations with the Nazis.[554] This outcome proved a tremendous boon for Herut's narrative when rendered in 1955, coinciding with the party's gaining seven seats in the Knesset elections the next month as Mapai lost five. Though the Supreme Court eventually reversed the lower court's decision and Mapai retained its majority, Kastner's public image had been thoroughly tarnished; he was assassinated by three right-wing former paramilitary soldiers in 1957. Ultimately, the trial served as a symbolic victory for Herut and, again, revealed the vulnerability of the Mapai party's official Zionist vision and official repression of collective trauma. Though Mapai retained Israel's premiership throughout the period and tried to focus Israeli identity on security issues relating to the country's hostile Arab neighbors, its popularity fluctuated widely and Herut gained ground steadily. By 1960, Mapai's popularity was at a historic low, undermined by the controversial failure of a false flag operation in Cairo known as the Lavon Affair.[555] Mapai was able to assemble majority coalitions in parliament after each election throughout the 1950s, but the party's leadership realized the potency of Holocaust memory and how it had helped fuel the rise of Herut, which by the 1960s had emerged as the party's chief rival.

5.5: The Eichmann Trial: A Strategic Shift to Victimhood Nationalism

During the initial years of Israel's state-building, Ben-Gurion's government did not have the time, resources or political interest necessary to hunt down Nazi criminals or prosecute Nazism's enduring legacy, preoccupied as it was with more immediate issues of security and state-building.[556] But, by the late 1950s and early 1960s, as the Israeli state achieved greater stability and economic success and Mapai's leadership realized the vulnerability Holocaust trauma posed for the party's hold on power, this hesitance faded. An unsolicited tip in the late 1950s to Israel's intelligence agency led

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[552] Bilsky, *Transformative Justice*, 24–28.

[553] Bilsky, 23.

[554] Cited in Yablonka and Tlamim, "The Development of Holocaust Consciousness in Israel: The Nuremberg, Kapos, Kastner, and Eichmann Trials," 14.

[555] Idith Zertal, "A State on Trial: Hannah Arendt vs. the State of Israel," *Social Research: An International Quarterly* 74, no. 4 (2007): 1127–58.

[556] Andrew Nagorski, *The Nazi Hunters* (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2016), 136.

to actionable intelligence on Adolf Eichmann, a chief Nazi architect of the Holocaust hiding in Argentina. In 1960 Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion ordered a small team to extract him from Buenos Aires and transport him, drugged and disguised, to Israel. Despite the risks and clear violation of international law, the plan succeeded in bringing Eichmann to Israel and garnered significant international praise.[557] As debate swirled over how to handle Eichmann's prosecution, Ben-Gurion recognized the opportunity such a trial would pose for his government to seize control of the memory of Israel's foundational collective trauma, promoting a unifying victimhood nationalist identity that both challenged Herut's previous criticisms and served the state's foreign policy goals. He and his allies thus transformed Eichmann's trial into a must-see event across the globe, widely-consumed on television, radio and via secondary press accounts. In Israel, where television was not yet available, radio beamed the trial across the country[558]; according to a survey from Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics, approximately 60 percent of Israel's Jewish population listened on the opening day, including approximately 44 percent of those born in Asia or Africa (predominantly Mizrahi and Sephardi) who likely had no direct familial connections to the Holocaust.[559] Because the trial served such a pivotal public role in Israeli political discourse, in this section I argue it served as a key discursive forum for the production of identity, molding memories of traumatic experience into a strategic narrative framework. I argue that the Mapai-led Israeli government used the forum to narrate victimhood nationalism, which sought to unify Israelis around the state and shift grievances away from Adenauer's 'other Germany' and European collaborators to Israel's Arab neighbors, whom it portrayed as contemporary incarnations of neo-Nazi antisemitism.

The government's strategic intentions regarding the trial became apparent as early as Ben-Gurion's first announcement of Eichmann's capture to the Knesset on May 23, 1960. Though the

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[557] Israel's Ministry for Foreign Affairs even released a booklet that year reproducing numerous editorials praising Israel and its intelligence services for tracking down Eichmann and bringing him to justice, in spite of the potential violation such a kidnapping posed to Argentina's sovereignty. See *Eichmann in the World Press* (Jerusalem: Israel Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Information Division, 1960).

[558] In his memoir reflecting on his role in prosecuting the trial, Attorney General Gideon Hausner reflected on its mass consumption via radio. At the time, 82.6% of Jewish Israeli families owned at least one radio, compared to only half that owned an electric refrigerator. Hausner wrote that listenership extended beyond those who owned radios, as "[p]eople would often close their shops to listen; bus and taxi drivers were reported to have stopped their vehicles when the proceedings grew too moving. School children brought transistor radios to school, and the teachers had to stop work from time to time to allow group listening. The proceedings could be heard in the public streets, for the radio voices emerged from every open window." Gideon Hausner, *Justice in Jerusalem* (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1966), 309.

[559] Amit Pinchevski, Tamar Liebes, and Ora Herman, "Eichmann on the Air: Radio and the Making of an Historic Trial," *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television* 27, no. 1 (2007): 16.

prime minister frequently boasted of his young state's liberal democratic credentials and independent judiciary internationally, his statement violated the norms of *sub judice*[560] by assuming Eichmann's guilt, referring to him unequivocally as "one of the greatest Nazi criminals…who was responsible, together with the Nazi leaders, for what they called 'The Final Solution of the Jewish Problem'." This characterization added to the triumphalism felt initially across the Israeli political spectrum, where, since the Nuremberg trials, most politicians had heard Eichmann's name uttered alongside those of chief Nazi villains like Hitler, Himmler and Heydrich. Thus, the Knesset debate following Ben-Gurion's announcement largely accepted this characterization, focusing solely on logistics and other technical matters rather than issues germane to assessing Eichmann's guilt.[561] Further, the prime minister emphasized the political significance of Eichmann's prosecution, stating to the Knesset and reiterating in multiple subsequent interviews that, no matter what international pressure might arise calling for Eichmann to be tried abroad, the trial would be held in Israel.[562] In the coming weeks, various international figures—including World Jewish Congress President Nahum Goldmann, an architect of the 1952 reparations agreement[563]—either called for an international tribunal to try Eichmann or his transfer to West Germany.[564] But the position of Ben-Gurion's government remained firm, defending Israel's right to hold the trial in front of Israeli and foreign press as a vital symbol of the state's sovereignty and legitimacy.[565] In his responses to these calls, Ben-Gurion attempted to avoid accusations from domestic opponents that he was manipulating the trial for Mapai's benefit by characterizing it as inherent to the unifying Zionist idea of the Jewish people's historical right to self-determination.

In the months that followed, the government tinkered in multiple ways with existing legal practices to ensure maximum political impact both in Israel and abroad. First, Ben-Gurion and his allies pressured the trial's three judges to allow the entire trial to be broadcast on Israel's main radio station Kol Yisrael and also brokered an agreement with an American film and television company

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[560] Hanna Yablonka, "Preparing the Eichmann Trial: Who Really Did the Job?," *Theoretical Inquiries in Law* 1, no. 2 (2001): 370–71.

[561] For the full Knesset debate following Ben-Gurion's announcement, see Netanel Lorch, ed., *Major Knesset Debates, 1948-1981*, vol. 4 (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 1991), 1141.

[562] For a few examples, see David Ben-Gurion, *Israel: A Personal History*, trans. Nechemia Meyers and Uzy Nystar (London: New English Library, 1972), 574–75.

[563] "World Tribunal Is Urged for Nazi," *The New York Times*, June 1, 1960.

[564] "Bonn Would Try Eichmann," *The New York Times*, May 25, 1960.

[565] See David Ben-Gurion, "The Eichmann Case as Seen by Ben-Gurion," *The New York Times*, December 18, 1960; David Ben-Gurion, "David Ben-Gurion: When I Listen to Nasser, It Seems That Hitler Is Talking (in Hebrew)," *Yediot Aharonoth*, June 6, 1960.

to record it for posterity and share footage abroad, ensuring its narrative's maximum international impact. Second, they selected as the site for the trial the newly-constructed Beit Ha'am auditorium, whose capacity was far larger than that of a typical courtroom, and welcomed over a thousand press correspondents into the hall and nearby accommodations to cover its multi-month duration.[566] Third, they pushed through the Knesset an "Eichmann law," according to which a defendant who pleaded guilty could still undergo a trial, rather than automatically progressing to the sentencing phase. This overhauled Israeli legal precedent, which was based on British tradition, but allowed the government to prepare for a massive public event no matter how Eichmann responded to his charges. A few years later this "Eichmann law" was removed from Israel's *Book of Laws*.[567]

Due to broad consensus across Israeli society on the state's right to hold the trial, the choice of prosecutor became a pivotal political question, as whomever was selected would both be forced to strategically narrate the Holocaust and coax testimony from a variety of witnesses that furthered the government's objective of victimhood nationalism. Press outlets speculated on which esteemed Israeli lawyer would emerge, while Shmuel Tamir, the prominent Herut-aligned lawyer that had antagonized the government in the Kastner trial, gave multiple interviews indicating his desire to contribute.[568] Ben-Gurion's government ignored these offers, recognizing that any opposition involvement might turn the trial into a forum for infighting over the past actions of various Yishuv leaders, rather than an opportunity to focus on a unifying narrative for all Israeli Jews. In a bid to maintain control, Ben-Gurion and his allies (chiefly Justice Minister Pinchas Rosen) selected Gideon Hausner, the newly appointed attorney general. This selection was strategic, as Hausner's relatively weak political stature and debt to the Mapai leadership for his appointment kept him from deviating from the government's narrative.[569] Though Ben-Gurion initially worried Hausner might be too inexperienced or lack the gravitas for the trial, Hausner ingratiated himself to his benefactors in forceful public statements denouncing the factionalism of the opposition, which wanted to relitigate issues of Jewish collaboration during the trial. Instead, he emphasized repeatedly that he would

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[566] Pinchevski, Liebes, and Herman, "Eichmann on the Air"; Moshe Pearlman, *The Capture And Trial of Adolf Eichmann* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1963), 89–92.

[567] Zertal, "A State on Trial: Hannah Arendt vs. the State of Israel," 1139–40, 1153–54.

[568] When his overtures were rejected, Tamir then unsuccessfully attempted to reopen the prior Gruenwald suit or join the Eichmann trial as a civil party to find an appropriate forum for continuing his prior narrative. Bilsky, *Transformative Justice*, 91.

[569] Hannah Arendt, who famously covered the trial for the *New Yorker* magazine, referred to Ben-Gurion as the "invisible stage manager of the proceedings", while Hausner did "his best, his very best, to obey his master." Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*, Rev. and enl. ed, Penguin Twentieth-Century Classics (New York, N.Y., U.S.A: Penguin Books, 1994), 8.

focus on Jewish collective *victimhood* rather than the actions of various victims in complex circumstances.[570] The 1950s challenges outlined in the previous section had demonstrated how invocations of traumatic Holocaust experiences could sow political rifts in Israeli society between survivors and non-survivors, young and old, Ashkenazi and Mizrahi, and religious and non-religious, as well as how these rifts could threaten the Mapai-dominated government's agenda and grip on power. The government's decision to combine mass publicity of the trial with careful influence over the prosecution was vital to securing its role as a forum for swiftly reshaping national identity.

Beyond the primary goal of using the trial to unify Israelis around his government's objectives, Ben-Gurion's victimhood nationalist identity hinged on two further logics. First, Ben-Gurion recognized that the trial's uncovering of Holocaust trauma might arouse anti-German sentiments counter to his nearly decades-long rapprochement with West Germany, so he promoted a narrative that contrasted with his rhetoric during the Luxembourg Agreement debate and painted a sharp contrast between Nazi Germany and West Germany's leadership. This served to legitimize his government's continued engagement with West Germany in the wake of the agreement, which remained controversial among many in Israeli society who believed Adenauer's government continued to employ former Nazis and was not doing enough to weed out Nazism dormant in German society. Public outrage had peaked during the 1952 debate described in the previous section, but it resurfaced at various points, including after Ben-Gurion and Adenauer held a widely-publicized 1960 meeting at the Waldorf Astoria in New York. Following the historic summit, press across Israel and internationally ran photographs of the two men glad-handing that heightened tensions in Israeli society. Ben-Gurion recognized that the trial could backfire against his government should it expose any links between contemporary West German leaders and the Nazi regime and thus sought to project grievances away from Israel's benefactor. Second, Ben-Gurion saw the trial as an ideal opportunity to project grievances onto contemporary Arab states by arguing that the ideology motivating them was reminiscent of that motivating Nazism's destruction of European Jewry.[571] Though this logic had arisen in Israeli political discourse previously, it had not become dominant across the Israeli political spectrum, as it existed in tension with consistent Israeli diplomatic overtures to Arab regimes and with the experiences of so many Mizrahi or Sephardi Jews

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[570] Yechiam Weitz, "In the Name of Six Million Accusers: Gideon Hausner as Attorney-General and His Place in the Eichmann Trial," *Israel Studies* 14, no. 2 (2009): 26–49.

[571] Idith Zertal, "From the People's Hall to the Wailing Wall: A Study in Memory, Fear, and War," *Representations*, no. 69 (2000): 106–9.

that had immigrated to Israel from the Arab world and retained connections to their home cultures. Internationally, equation of Arab regimes with Nazism found even less traction, as most Cold War powers retained hopes of wooing Arab states into their alignments.[572] Yet, Ben-Gurion recognized that Israel's Arab neighbors—chiefly the newly-aligned United Arab States of Egypt, Syria and Yemen—retained hopes of ending Israel's existence and thus understood that his government could benefit both domestically and internationally by stoking moral condemnation and stigma. Taken together, these two logics provided the basis for Ben-Gurion's government's victimhood nationalist narrative, facilitated by the trial's highly controlled public setting.

Figure 1: Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion and West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer meet at New York's Waldorf hotel.[573]

In multiple public statements after Eichmann's capture, Ben-Gurion sought to artfully promote this unifying victimhood nationalist identity in ways that would not alienate the domestic rivals he had excluded from the trial's planning. In articles published by two leading Israeli newspapers—*Davar* and *Yediot Aharonoth*—Ben-Gurion re-asserted Israel's sovereign right to try

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[572] For example, in May 1961, as the Eichmann trial was underway, US President John F. Kennedy began a correspondence with Nasser on the subject of strengthening bilateral relations. Michael Sharnoff, "Defining the Enemy as Israel, Zionist, Neo-Nazi, or Jewish: The Propaganda War in Nasser's Egypt, 1952–1967" (Jerusalem: Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism, Hebrew University, 2012), 5.

[573] "Adenauer Und David Ben Gurion," Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, accessed March 14, 2019, https://www.konrad-adenauer.de/stichworte/aussenpolitik/adenauer-und-david-ben-gurion.

Eichmann. He claimed that those Jews arguing for an international tribunal or for Eichmann to be sent to West Germany (where he might inadvertently reawaken controversies over Adenauer's government's links to the Nazi regime) were exhibiting an "inferiority complex." [574] This language directly combatted the Herut party's longstanding partisan charge that Mapai was emblematic of diaspora passivity—or even, since the Kastner trial, of reluctant collaborationism—and portrayed the government's orchestration of the trial as the epitome of the unifying Zionist ideal of Jewish self-determination. Ben-Gurion also reignited trauma's memory in nationalistic terms, stoking fear that could be used to project grievances. He stated in the article "when I listen to [Egyptian President] Nasser, it seems that Hitler is talking," drawing a linkage that justified his projection of Holocaust grievances onto the popular Arab nationalist leader who was then Israel's chief enemy.[575] The insinuation that Israel's southwestern neighbor might have genocidal intentions against Israel's entire population served to diminish the standing of opposition parties who wanted to use the trial to reawaken complex historical and moral issues that might divide the nation.

Understanding this identity's importance not only within Israel, but also among powers abroad, Ben-Gurion promoted these and similar claims in interviews with foreign reporters[576], including a full-page late-1960 feature interview with the *New York Times*, published nearly five months before the trial had begun.[577] The international ambitions of his identity narrative became especially clear in his interview with the *Times*.

> From what we hear on the Egyptian radio, some Egyptian propaganda is conducted on purely Nazi lines. The Egyptians charge that Jews—they usually say 'Zionists' but they mean 'Jews'—dominate the United States, Jews dominate England, Jews dominate France, and they must be fought. I have no doubt that the Egyptian dictatorship is being instructed by the large number of Nazis who are there.[578]

Though Ben-Gurion's claims of Nazi influence on Arab regimes are perhaps overstated, as the number of former Nazis known to be working for Arab regimes was minimal[579], his efforts in this

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[574] Ben-Gurion, "David Ben-Gurion: When I Listen to Nasser, It Seems That Hitler Is Talking (in Hebrew)."

[575] Ben-Gurion.

[576] Hugh Trevor-Roper, "Behind the Eichmann Trial," *The Times of London*, April 9, 1961.

[577] See, for example, Trevor-Roper; Zertal, *Israel's Holocaust and the Politics of Nationhood*, 100–101; Ben-Gurion, *Israel: A Personal History*, 574–75; Ben-Gurion, "The Eichmann Case as Seen by Ben-Gurion."

[578] Ben-Gurion, "The Eichmann Case as Seen by Ben-Gurion."

[579] Though only around 100-200 fugitive Nazis escaped to Syria and Egypt (far fewer than fled to Argentina) this number included several prominent Nazi villains who went on to work for Arab regimes. For example, Wehrmacht

interview to publicly link Nazism with Israel's Arab neighbors (rather than West and East Germany or Austria, all of which employed many former Nazis) served to implicate foreign powers into a global struggle against Israel's enemies. In this sense, contemporary Nazism could be interpreted as affecting all Israeli Jews—Mizrahi, Sephardi and Ashkenazi—as well as Israel's Western allies, who had already fought to defeat Nazism. Ben-Gurion had long sought to align Israel with the West in the Cold War and was in the process of pursuing a nuclear capability via the help of France. He understood that promotion of victimhood nationalism in Eichmann's internationally-publicized trial could help garner sympathy from foreign powers over past trauma and the state's continued existential threats, generating a desire among them to support Israel as an ally against supposed Arab neo-Nazism.

In the nearly eleven months between Ben-Gurion's announcement to the Knesset and the beginning of the trial, the prime minister's extensive public statements dominated international media coverage of Eichmann's capture. Yet, behind the scenes, members of Ben-Gurion's government pressured Gideon Hausner to reflect the themes of the government's victimhood nationalist narrative.[580] Historian Hannah Yablonka has uncovered in various archives the ample pressure government leaders—including Ben-Gurion himself and his Mapai-ally Foreign Minister (and future Prime Minister) Golda Mein—placed on Hausner, as well as documents demonstrating Hausner's awareness of the trial's immense political and historical significance beyond the more limited question of the accused's guilt or innocence.[581] In his correspondence with the attorney general, Ben-Gurion was a chief advocate of broadening the trial's scope to include the entire traumatic history of the Nazi crimes, heightening the trial's emotional resonance beyond the

Major Gerhard-Georg Mertins trained an Egyptian airborne unit and helped develop Egyptian guerrilla forces for use in the Suez Canal Zone, while former SS Lieutenant Colonel Otto Skorzeny, who had previously engaged in arms deals with the Egyptian government, joined former SS and Gestapo figures Franz Buensch, Joachim Deumling and Alois Anton Brunner in advising the Egyptian General Investigations Department in Cairo. Likewise, Johann von Leers, a leading Nazi propagandist, found refuge in Egypt in the 1950s and was hired by the Egyptian government to write anti-Zionist propaganda. He lived in Cairo until his death in 1965. These Nazi fugitives' overall influence on political culture in Arab countries is a subject of significant historical debate. See, for example, Joel Fishman, "The Postwar Career of Nazi Ideologue Johann von Leers, Aka Omar Amin, the 'First Ranking German' in Nasser's Egypt," Jerusalem Center For Public Affairs, July 10, 2016, http://jcpa.org/article/the-postwar-career-of-nazi-ideologue-johann-von-leers-aka-omar-amin-the-first-ranking-german-in-nassers-egypt/; Nicholas Kulish, "Old Nazis Never Die," *The New York Times*, January 10, 2015, sec. Sunday Review, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/11/sunday-review/old-nazis-never-die.html; Guy Walters, *Hunting Evil: How the Nazi War Criminals Escaped and the Hunt to Bring Them to Justice*, Bantam ed (London: Bantam Books, 2010); Owen L. Sirrs, *A History of the Egyptian Intelligence Service: A History of the Mukhabarat, 1910-2009*, Studies in Intelligence Series (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, [England] ; New York: Routledge, 2010).

[580] Weitz, "In the Name of Six Million Accusers: Gideon Hausner as Attorney-General and His Place in the Eichmann Trial."

[581] Yablonka, "Preparing the Eichmann Trial," 388.

bureaucratic actions of Eichmann's office. Ben-Gurion also argued for limiting any references to contemporary West Germany, convincing Hausner to refer to the perpetrating state as "*Nazi Germany*" rather than Germany throughout his opening statement and not to mention Hans Globke, a former high-ranking Nazi who had become a top adviser to Adenauer, intimately involved in negotiations with Israel. Meir, a senior Mapai ally of Ben-Gurion, intervened more heavy-handedly. She instructed Hausner to be "generous with praise for Good Gentiles and Friendly Nations," to further the contrast between the leaders of West Germany and other European countries that had hosted collaborators but since become allies of Israel. Likewise, Meir pressed Hausner to emphasize at length the wartime activities of the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Mohammed Amin el-Husseini. A spiritual leader among Palestinian Arabs, the Grand Mufti had collaborated with the Nazi regime during the war and found refuge afterwards in Nasser's Egypt despite international calls for his prosecution for war crimes. Avraham Zellinger, who led the investigative team that questioned Eichmann, wrote of this request that it was "politically important [for Meir and her Mapai allies] to include the ties of the Nazis with the Arab states in the prosecution's case."[582] Though the mufti's role in the Nazi's final solution has been hotly disputed by historians since the Eichmann trial[583], Israel's leaders had little evidence for concluding that he played a substantial role in the genocide or even interacted extensively with Eichmann, despite the Mufti's public support for the Nazis and virulent antisemitism. Yet, Hausner heeded Meir's request and afforded the mufti a prominent role in the trial, using him to symbolically further the government's goal of linking Nazi antisemitism with that of anti-Zionist leaders in the Arab world.[584]

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[582] Yablonka, 388–90.

[583] Husseini emerged as a top leader of Palestinian Muslims under the British Mandate, appointed Grand Mufti of Jerusalem in 1921 and leading the Arab Higher Committee upon its founding in 1936. He was an avid anti-Zionist, helping stoke multiple anti-Jewish riots including the 1936-1939 Arab Revolt before developing Nazi sympathies and organizing Axis-aligned forces in Iraq from 1939-1941. Ultimately, he fled Iraq to Berlin, where he remained throughout the war, developing relationships with top Nazi leaders and meeting with Eichmann, Heinrich Himmler and even Adolf Hitler himself. During this time, he propagandized Nazi ideology to Muslims on radio broadcasts and helped recruit Arab soldiers to fight alongside the Germans. For an array of perspectives on the Mufti's historical importance and role in the Nazi genocide, see Gilbert Achcar, *The Arabs and the Holocaust: The Arab-Israeli War of Narratives* (New York, NY: Henry Holt and Company, 2013).; Benny Morris, *Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001* (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 2001).; David Dalin and John F. Rothmann, *Icon of Evil: Hitler's Mufti and the Rise of Radical Islam.* (Somerset: Taylor and Francis, 2009).; Philip Mattar, "The Mufti of Jerusalem and the Politics of Palestine," *Middle East Journal* 42, no. 2 (1988): 227–40; Rafael Medoff, "The Mufti's Nazi Years Re-examined," *Journal of Israeli History* 17, no. 3 (1996): 317–33.; Sells, "Holocaust Abuse"; Moshe Pearlman, *Mufti of Jerusalem; the Story of Haj Amin El Husseini* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1947).

[584] Sells, "Holocaust Abuse."

Following initial technicalities, the trial began in April 1961 with Hausner's opening speech, which began by alluding to the immense collective trauma of the Holocaust, framing the otherwise sprawling testimony to come from more than 120 witnesses.[585] The speech's narrative framing was vital, as even though invocation of the witnesses' experiences was essential to victimhood nationalism's emotional resonance, they could hardly all be expected to articulate their memories in strict accordance with the government's narrative and, indeed, their unchecked accounts of traumatic experience might have lended themselves to interpretations that threatened the government's goals. Hausner's opening speech spanned three court sessions from April 17-18 and was the result of input from numerous deputies, extensive research by police and other government officials, and even the edits of Ben-Gurion himself.[586] Its opening lines were repeated in extensive press coverage: "When I stand before you here, Judges of Israel, to lead the prosecution of Adolf Eichmann, I am not standing alone. With me are six million accusers." This opening made clear his intention not to focus on Eichmann's specific role in organizing deportations to death camps, but rather to make the trial a larger, symbolic event for the State of Israel, which had passed legislation saying it considered all of those who perished in the genocide its 'commemorative citizens.' Hausner further suggested the transhistorical importance of the modern sovereign state via the double meaning of "Judges of Israel," which connected the three Israeli jurists presiding over the courtroom to the unifying figures for all Jews of the judges in the Hebrew Bible. Sacred texts arose again in Hausner's opening as he compared Eichmann and the Nazis' crimes unfavorably to historical villains of the Jewish people like Haman, Cain and Abel, and Pharoah. But he also broadened his points beyond the Hebrew bible, referencing secular historical villains relevant to the entire international community like Genghis Khan, Attila, and Ivan the Terrible. While Eichmann and his attorney, Robert Servatius, argued throughout the trial for limiting its scope and focusing on whether the accused should be held responsible for crimes he had been ordered to commit, Hausner's opening speech depicted the event as both a transhistorical and transnational referendum on the Nazis' evils, relevant to all Israeli Jews regardless of ethnic origins and even allies in the Western (Christian) world, which retained a biblical linkage to the ancient Israelites.

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[585] Stephan Landsman, "The Eichmann Case and the Invention of the Witness-Driven Atrocity Trial," *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* 51, no. 1 (n.d.).

[586] Weitz, "In the Name of Six Million Accusers: Gideon Hausner as Attorney-General and His Place in the Eichmann Trial."

The bulk of Hausner's speech referred to collective trauma, seamlessly weaving the specific experiences of Holocaust trauma into a narrative framed by abstract historical knowledge—a primary goal of the prosecution at the trial. Throughout, he focused on Eichmann's pivotal role as the puppet-master organizing innumerable instances of suffering on the ground, painting him as a cold and ruthless ideologue. Still, Hausner recognized the crisis of representation involved in his efforts, stating early in the speech that language could, at best, form a "pale and inadequate picture of the calamity, wide as the ocean, that overtook the House of Israel." To help convey the extent of the Nazis' crimes, Hausner broke outside the conventions of typical legal jargon, quoting historians, poets and philosophers, and employing numerous figurative tropes to describe the atrocities experienced in the ghettos, camps and extermination centers. Frequently, he invoked gruesome, shocking imagery of dismembered corpses ("bodies twitching on top of the motionless bodies that lay before them" in mass graves, "mounds of ashes, bones and human fat" discovered at extermination centers) or metaphors that alluded to the vast incomprehensibility of the Nazis' crimes ("the million Jewish children whose blood was spilt like water throughout Europe"). At one point, he painted a darkly ironic picture of Rudolf Hoess, the Commandant of Auschwitz, whose family lived a quiet life in a beautiful home while "just on the other side of the high-tension barbed-wire fence of the terrible extermination camp, in which each and every day, between five and ten thousand people were being put to death, and sometimes even more." [587] This language helped mute pre-trial external criticism over the rational merits of the Israeli government's legal framework and argument, as these considerations paled in comparison to the heightened moral stakes implicated by the trauma.

Yet, despite Hausner's speech's overwhelming emphasis on the horrific crimes perpetrated by the Nazis, he also made clear the parameters of the government's narrative framework. First, Hausner forwarded the idea of the trial as unifying for all Zionists by continually emphasizing the genocide as a crime against *all* Jews and the entirety of the *Jewish people,* rather than more generally against all of humanity or more specifically against European Ashkenazim or smaller communities or individuals. He even explicitly referenced Eichmann's decision to deport a small group of Dutch Sephardim (descendants of Spanish and Moroccan Jews) with the local Ashkenazim, heightening the trial's relevance to Israel's Jewish communities from outside Europe. Coupled with this were his

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[587] "Session 6-8," in *The Trial of Adolf Eichmann: Record of Proceedings in the District Court of Jerusalem*, vol. 1, 9 vols. (Jerusalem: State of Israel, Ministry of Justice, 1992).

overtures to those Israelis opposed to the Mapai government and efforts to stifle factionalism like that which appeared in the Kastner trial. He included in his description of the greatest achievements of European Jewry the work of Ze'ev Jabotinsky, Ben-Gurion's pre-independence rival and the intellectual founder of the Revisionist Zionist Herut party. Likewise, he dismissed potentially divisive inclusion of supposed Jewish collaboration by referring to such acts as the result of Nazi "trickery," even mentioning one Nazi lie that convinced Jews to accept deportation so that they could begin agricultural settlements in the East akin to those founded by Zionists in Palestine.[588] Together, these references portrayed the long-awaited Israeli state as a mythologized 'promised land' for all Jews, regardless of ethnic origin or political differences, heightening the trial's relevance to all Israelis (Ashkenazim, Sephardim and Mizrahim). Second, Hausner subtly furthered the projection away from West Germany to Arab states through multiple omissions and references. Though he discussed widespread antisemitism among Germans, he made sure to heed Ben-Gurion's instructions and not mention West Germany or members of his government. He did, however, allude frequently to the intellectual connections between Nazi antisemitism and antisemitism exhibited outside of Germany, describing the ideology as a chief "export" of the regime. Among the foreigners whom Hausner mentioned as ascribing to this ideology was the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, who in 1961 was still alive and politically active in Egypt. Hausner referred in detail to the Mufti's Nazi collaboration and antisemitism, even arguing based on limited evidence that Eichmann had special "obligations" to the Mufti "to frustrate emigration to Palestine." By conflating Nazism with a primary goal of Arab anti-Zionism from before Israel's independence to the post-independence era, Hausner heightened the contemporary relevance of the trial to Israel's security predicaments.

Following Hausner's speech, the trial proceeded geographically across Europe, blending survivor and expert testimony, Hausner's interpretations, discussion of documents and, eventually, an extended cross examination of Eichmann himself. Again, the overwhelming theme of the trial was weaving together the enormous diversity of traumatic Holocaust experiences into a tale of the Jewish people's miraculous survival in the state of Israel. Among the perspectives shared at the trial were direct accounts of starvation, violence and terror in the ghettos, mass shootings by *Einsatzgruppen* across Eastern Europe, and the horrors faced by inmates in concentration camps and death camps. A few heart-wrenching moments of testimony stood out in news reports and historical accounts. For example, Rivka Yoselewska, a young mother from what is now Belarus who had

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[588] "Session 6-8."

emigrated to Israel, recounted in Yiddish how hunger and deprivation had left her on the brink of death before German SS soldiers took her and her family to the woods, forced them to undress, and proceeded to murder her parents, sisters and daughter in front of her. She survived being shot in the head and managed to continue breathing underneath a pile of corpses long enough to escape.

> When I saw they were gone I dragged myself over to the grave and wanted to jump in. I thought the grave would open up and let me fall inside alive. I envied everyone for whom it was already over, while I was still alive. Where should I go? What should I do? Blood was spouting. Nowadays, when I pass a water fountain, I can still see the blood spouting from the grave. The earth rose and heaved. I sat there on the grave and tried to dig my way in with my hands. I continued digging as hard as I could. The earth didn't open up. I shouted to Mother and Father, why was I left alive? What did I do to deserve this?[589]

This testimony, along with that of so many others who had craved death after the persistent horrific and perilous conditions throughout the war, portrayed Holocaust trauma as an ongoing problem years later in Israeli society, plaguing survivors like Yoselewska who still could not use simple public amenities without recalling vividly their experiences. Further, this and other testimony's harrowing invocations of lived experience served as a powerful counterpoint to the "persistent leitmotif" in prior Israeli Holocaust discourse of European Jews' passivity and weakness in going like 'sheep to the slaughter'.[590]

Much to the surprise of many spectators, Attorney General Hausner interrogated this public 'leitmotif' directly, asking multiple witnesses describing Nazi cruelties the difficult question of why they did not resist or fight back. The response of Dr. Moshe Bejski, a prominent attorney and future Israeli Supreme Court Justice who had been saved by the German industrialist Oskar Schindler, stood out. Bejski described how he and approximately fifteen thousand other Jews watched as hundreds of SS guards publicly hung a young boy, despite the boy's tearful pleading for his life. Hausner asked Bejski directly why he and the thousands of others did not charge or attack. The witness, who had been standing, began to speak of how, despite the traumas of the prior years, he and so many other Jews had retained hope that they might be able to save their families. But this answer clearly struck him as inadequate, so he continued to speak, asking the judges if he could take

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[589] "Session 30," in *The Trial of Adolf Eichmann: Record of Proceedings in the District Court of Jerusalem*, vol. 1, 9 vols. (Jerusalem: State of Israel, Ministry of Justice, 1992).
[590] Deborah E. Lipstadt, *The Eichmann Trial* (New York: Nextbook/Schocken, 2011), 79.

a seat, indicating physical exhaustion from the very act of reflection. Ultimately, Bejski concluded that the conditions simply could not be conveyed to the courtroom. He instead relayed the dark paradoxes of the beloved engineer Greenberg, who continually asked to be shot to avoid his pain, but refused to commit suicide.[591] Indeed, Bejski's conclusion, mid-testimony, that he was simply unable to convey the extent of the trauma paralleled what became perhaps the most symbolic moment of the trial. The novelist Yehiel De-Nur, known across Israel solely by his pen name Ka-Tsetnik 135633, fainted as he began to describe what he referred to as the "planet of Auschwitz."[592] Despite the hundreds of hours of testimony solicited from survivors, language continually proved inadequate for conveying the trauma or responding to so many Israelis' prior stigmas.

Figure 2: Yehiel De-Nur (Ka-Tsetnik 135633) seated after fainting during his testimony at the Eichmann trial.[593]

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[591] "Session 21," in *The Trial of Adolf Eichmann: Record of Proceedings in the District Court of Jerusalem*, vol. 1 (Jerusalem: State of Israel, Ministry of Justice, 1992), 21.

[592] "Session 68," in *The Trial of Adolf Eichmann: Record of Proceedings in the District Court of Jerusalem*, vol. 3, 9 vols. (Jerusalem: State of Israel, Ministry of Justice, 1992).

[593] מאיה פולק, "הספרים האלה זה הדבר שהאנושות צריכה עכשיו", *מקור ראשון*, March 3, 2019, https://www.makorrishon.co.il/culture/118649/.

Yet, even as the testimony proceeded and numerous survivors struggled to describe their experiences on the stand, Hausner continued to sculpt their testimony to further the government's victimhood nationalist narrative's three primary logics: the benevolence and hope Zionism represented, the possibility of redemption for certain 'other' Germans, and the links between Nazi antisemitism and that of Arab states. The first emerged as numerous witnesses mentioned their desires to reach safety in Palestine, as well as the heroic efforts of the global Zionist movement's various factions and agencies to rescue Jews. The trial featured primarily those survivors who had emigrated to Israel and had successful careers and Hausner was sure to emphasize their stories as emblematic of a unifying vision of Zionist resilience. Though his experiences could not be tied to Eichmann's actions in Europe, Hausner concluded his questioning of Avraham Aviel, for example, who had fought with partisans after his family had been murdered by the *Einsatzgruppen* in Eastern Europe, by asking about his efforts to reach Palestine that ultimately left him awaiting Israeli independence in a refugee camp in Cyprus.[594] He asked Abba Kovner, the legendary leader of ghetto revolts and partisan fighter, about his underground movement, which united Zionist movements from the Jabotinsky-founded revisionist "Betar[595] to the Communists," linking the resistance to the entire spectrum of Zionist politics and the subsequent Israeli political parties formed from it.[596] Hausner even called as a witness Adolf Berman, a survivor from Poland who had gone on to represent left-wing opposition parties in the Knesset. Following Hausner's inclusive rhetoric hailing Jabotinsky in his opening speech, these witnesses all served to portray the prosecution as a united front that represented the entirety of Zionist politics and not simply a partisan operation of the Mapai-led government.

Hausner furthered the second logic of defraying guilt away from Germans generally and onto Nazis and their collaborators by evoking testimony highlighting what Meir had referred to as "Good Gentiles." This included probing questions to Abba Kovner on the work of Anton Schmidt, a German Wehrmacht officer who was put to death for assisting the Jewish underground, as well as questions about the hardship faced by gentiles who risked their lives to house Jews. Further, he called as a witness the Reverend Heinrich Gruber, a German Lutheran leader in Berlin who had

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[594] "Session 29," in *The Trial of Adolf Eichmann: Record of Proceedings in the District Court of Jerusalem*, vol. 1 (Jerusalem: State of Israel, Ministry of Justice, 1992).

[595] Betar is a Revisionist Zionist youth movement linked to the ideology and organizations that helped found the Herut Party after Israeli independence.

[596] "Session 27," in *The Trial of Adolf Eichmann: Record of Proceedings in the District Court of Jerusalem*, vol. 1 (Jerusalem: State of Israel, Ministry of Justice, 1992), 27.

negotiated with Eichmann and been sent to a concentration camp for attempting to assist the German Jewish community. Gruber mentioned numerous Christians throughout Germany that had secretly helped him in trying to save Jews, as well as a few SS officers that had, unlike Eichmann, sympathized with their efforts and fed them information. Notably, Gruber further fulfilled the role of 'Good Gentile' further by demonstrating his humility in refraining from describing his experiences at Sachsenhausen concentration camp, recognizing the crisis in representation inherent in mixing his experiences in with those of Jews who had suffered. "I had teeth knocked out and heart trouble, but I can only say that what I suffered was a trifle compared with the sufferings of my Jewish friends," he told the court.[597] This testimony, along with Gruber's restored position in West German society—he had been named dean of the Lutheran Evangelical Church in Berlin—helped project blame away from German society as a whole and instead focused it on Eichmann and other adherents of Nazi ideology.[598] Belying this depiction, of course, was West Germany's reluctance to prosecute all but a tiny number of the Holocaust's perpetrators, as well as later revelations that Adenauer's government knew of Eichmann's whereabouts as early as 1952. But the narrative emerging from Hausner's framing emphasized the possibility for rupture with the past and redemption for certain Germans.[599]

Though Nasser's Egypt and other contemporary Arab states did not appear directly in the trial itself, Hausner furthered the third subtle logic of linking Nazism and Arab anti-Zionism by following Meir's instructions and continually referring to the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem's pro-Nazi efforts throughout the trial. To buttress these claims, the prosecution submitted extensive documents from the Mufti's archive that portrayed him as a prominent and influential figure in Berlin from late 1941 until the end of the war, during which time he allegedly brokered deals with top Nazi leaders to prevent Jews from escaping the genocide by emigrating to Palestine.[600] For example, the prosecution cited a letter from the Mufti to the German Foreign Minister referring to a potential "liquidation of the Jewish National Home in Palestine" and another citing a "proposal for purging the Jews of Tripoli." Further documents included a telegram from Heinrich Himmler to the

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[597] "Session 41," in *The Trial of Adolf Eichmann: Record of Proceedings in the District Court of Jerusalem*, vol. 2 (Jerusalem: State of Israel, Ministry of Justice, 1992), 41.

[598] "German Church Leader Testifies Against Eichmann at Jerusalem Trial," *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, May 17, 1961, https://www.jta.org/1961/05/17/archive/german-church-leader-testifies-against-eichmann-at-jerusalem-trial.

[599] Helen Pidd, "Adolf Eichmann Wanted to Return to Germany, Historian Claims," *The Guardian*, April 11, 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/11/eichmann-sought-trial-germany-1956.

[600] "Session 50," in *The Trial of Adolf Eichmann: Record of Proceedings in the District Court of Jerusalem*, vol. 2 (Jerusalem: State of Israel, Ministry of Justice, 1992), 50.

Mufti referring to the "natural alliance between Greater National-Socialist Germany and the freedom-loving Moslems throughout the world" against world Jewry, and an unpublished joint German-Italian declaration the Mufti had drafted referring to "the right of Palestine and the other Arab countries to solve the problem of the Jewish elements in Palestine and in the Arab countries in accordance with the Arab national interest, and in the same way in which the question was solved in the Axis countries." Further, in multiple Holocaust-era letters presented to the court, the Mufti requested foreign leaders prevent Jews from emigrating to Palestine and instead send them to Poland, where they would be "under strict supervision," which Hausner argued was a euphemism for genocide.[601] In his closing statements, Hausner drew on this evidence to claim that the Mufti had a clear role in the genocide. "He had begun the spilling of Jewish blood in Palestine, his heart was wide open to an unclean partnership with the spiller of Jewish blood in the world."[602] These references indicated that the Mufti was both aware of the genocide of European Jewry and promoted it as a potential solution to his own anti-Zionist struggles. Further, his language and previous prominence as Palestinian Arabs' leader within the British Mandate indicated to Mizrahi Jews that they, too, should consider themselves potential survivors as they might have become targets of the Nazi genocide had the Allies not emerged victorious.

Ultimately, though, the resonance of the prosecution's arguments about the Mufti was slightly undermined by its limited ability to link him to Eichmann and his role in the final solution. The prosecution's main link stemmed from testimony given by Dieter Wisliceny, a top deputy of Eichmann, to the Nuremberg Trials. Wisliceny averred that the Mufti and Eichmann had substantial discussions about the genocide of European Jewry and that Eichmann and Herbert Hagen had even unsuccessfully attempted to meet with him during a brief 1937 visit to Palestine and Cairo.[603] Further, Wisliceny claimed that Eichmann had asked him to serve as an assistant on Jewish affairs for the Mufti, though he had declined the post.[604] Yet, the veracity of Wisliceny's testimony could not be proven by further documentation or witnesses and Eichmann himself denied it. When the accused finally took the stand, Eichmann framed his defense around the idea that he was "more

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[601] All quotes taken from submission of documents in "Session 63," in *The Trial of Adolf Eichmann: Record of Proceedings in the District Court of Jerusalem*, vol. 3, 9 vols. (Jerusalem: State of Israel, Ministry of Justice, 1992).

[602] "Session 113," in *The Trial of Adolf Eichmann: Record of Proceedings in the District Court of Jerusalem*, vol. 5, 9 vols. (Jerusalem: State of Israel, Ministry of Justice, 1992).

[603] "Session 16," in *The Trial of Adolf Eichmann: Record of Proceedings in the District Court of Jerusalem*, vol. 1, 9 vols. (Jerusalem: State of Israel, Ministry of Justice, 1992).

[604] "Session 50," 50.

Zionist than the Zionists"[605] and had tried to organize Jewish emigration to Palestine as an alternative to genocide before he was ordered to facilitate deportations to death camps. Eichmann claimed he had only met the Mufti once, though he did recognize the Foreign Ministry's policy against Jewish emigration to Palestine might have been related to the Mufti's requests.[606] The final judgment agreed with the prosecution that "the Mufti also aimed at the extermination of European Jewry" and a similar action in Palestine "after the victory of the Axis powers," but it did not reach conclusive findings on any deeper relationship between Eichmann and the Mufti that furthered the Nazi genocide.[607] This demurral regarding the Mufti's ultimate role demonstrated his inclusion in the trial's primarily political rather than legal utility. As historian Idith Zertal has written of the Mufti's wartime collaboration "[t]hese were acts of total evil, yet none of the documents proved that it was the Mufti's interference that prevented the rescue of the children, nor could they sustain the claim that he was a major contributor to the Final Solution."[608]

Ultimately, after months of arguments and testimony, the court's three judges convicted Eichmann. Though he and Servatius appealed the decision to Israel's Supreme Court and plead for clemency from the Israeli president, these efforts were unsuccessful and he was executed for his crimes in the spring of 1962. During these later post-trial developments, domestic interest waned, spiking briefly again only in response to further court decisions or the execution itself. But, as multiple historians have argued, the trial had a lasting impact on Israeli national identity's vision of the collective trauma and place in international community, as well as outsiders' visions of the Israeli state. Hanna Yablonka has written of two pivotal long-term effects of the trial that transcended divides between Ashkenazi, Sephardi and Mizrahi and helped foster a post-traumatic national identity that appealed to all Israel's Jewish citizens. "One was a new understanding of the importance of the existence of the State of Israel, and the other, perhaps even more significant, was the crystallization of a pessimistic outlook with regard to Israel's place in the world," she wrote. She further described this pessimism as "mixed feelings of deep isolation, of national destiny and an attendant existential anxiety, fostered, among other things, by the fact that Israel was surrounded by hostile Arab nations, who had been cohorts of the Nazis and now were about to 'rise up, in every

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[605] Pearlman, *The Capture and Trial of Adolf Eichmann*, 417.

[606] "Session 80," in *The Trial of Adolf Eichmann: Record of Proceedings in the District Court of Jerusalem*, vol. 4, 9 vols. (Jerusalem: State of Israel, Ministry of Justice, 1992).

[607] "Session 115-119," in *The Trial of Adolf Eichmann: Record of Proceedings in the District Court of Jerusalem*, vol. 5, 9 vols. (Jerusalem: State of Israel, Ministry of Justice, 1992).

[608] Zertal, *Israel's Holocaust and the Politics of Nationhood*, 102.

new generation, to annihilate us."[609] Indeed, the trial served immense pedagogic purposes in healing rifts between the Mizrahi and Sephardi immigrant communities that tended to live on the margins and the Ashkenazi community that continued to constitute Israel's political and social elite. As the next section will explore, this sense of national solidarity in the face of existential threat proved pivotal as Nasser's armies amassed strength through the 1960s and eventually attacked.

Internationally, the trial seemed to have Ben-Gurion's intended effect with multiple foreign powers, garnering significant praise from many Western states and renewed interest in the traumas of the Jewish people. American intelligence officials had collaborated extensively with the Israeli prosecution and American press largely reported favorably on the trial's outcome.[610] Likewise, satisfied with the trial's omission of content incriminating its contemporary political leaders, the West German government released a statement upon Eichmann's execution declaring "Justice has been done."[611] The next week, in a meeting with Deputy Defense Minister and future Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres, West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer conveyed his thanks to Ben-Gurion "for the way the Eichmann trial was conducted and brought to an end. It was outstanding. I will never forget it." Buoying Israel's victimhood nationalist narrative, less than three weeks later West Germany requested the extradition of former Eichmann assistant Alois Brunner from Syria, where he had helped train members of the Syrian secret services, confirming the salience of the trial's projection with a key European ally.[612] Two months later, Adenauer's government further improved relations by approving 240 million Deutschmarks of military aid for Israel.[613]

To be sure, the trial and its outcome did have a number of critics, primarily from intellectuals who disapproved of the death sentence or questioned the trial's propagandistic coaxing of traumatic experience into a Zionist framework. Martin Buber, the renowned Vienna-born Israeli

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[609] Yablonka, *The State of Israel vs. Adolf Eichmann*, 190–91.
[610] See Kevin Conley Ruffner, "Eagle and Swastika: CIA and Nazi War Criminals and Collaborators" (Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) History Staff, December 2003), 2196985, CIA Digital Library; "U.S. Press Says Eichmann Deserved Death; Endorses Outcome," *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, June 4, 1962, https://www.jta.org/1962/06/04/archive/u-s-press-says-eichmann-deserved-death-endorses-outcome.
[611] "West German Government Justifies Hanging of Eichmann," *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, June 4, 1962, https://www.jta.org/1962/06/04/archive/west-german-government-justifies-hanging-of-eichmann.
[612] "Bonn Bids Syria Extradite Ex-Eichmann Collaborator," *The New York Times*, June 19, 1962; Ronen Bergman, "Israel's Secret War against Hitler's Scientists," *Newsweek*, April 12, 2018, https://www.newsweek.com/2018/04/20/israel-secret-war-mossad-hitler-scientists-world-war-ii-egypt-nasser-883630.html.
[613] Klaus Wiegrefe, "The Holocaust in the Dock: West Germany's Efforts to Influence the Eichmann Trial," *Spiegel Online*, April 15, 2011 http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-holocaust-in-the-dock-west-germany-s-efforts-to-influence-the-eichmann-trial-a-756915.html.

philosopher, supported the trial's overall pedagogic purpose but criticized the death sentence, calling it a "mistake of historical dimension" that might inadvertently "expiate" the guilt of other Germans.[614] But the most notable criticism of the trial came from internationally-renowned political philosopher Hannah Arendt, whose 1963 series on the trial for the *New Yorker* magazine resulted in the acclaimed book *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*.[615] Even before traveling to Jerusalem, Arendt had become a critic of Zionism and she interpreted the trial as Zionist propaganda that chose to prosecute crimes against the Jewish people in lieu of a more universalistic approach to determining crimes against humanity. Yet, despite the widespread readership of Arendt's work, it did not inspire anything near consensus in the United States or Europe. Instead, her work sparked further debate on the nature of Nazi evil, which only heightened public recognition of the Nazis' crimes unprecedented nature and the special circumstances they warranted internationally. Her work was widely criticized in Israel, though it was not translated into Hebrew until decades later and did not prompt any official governmental response.[616] Even in Egypt, where the Nasser regime and its allies realized how the trial was being used to sow international outrage of their anti-Zionist policies, criticism largely refrained from questioning the historic nature of the Nazis' crimes or the trial's verdict on Eichmann.[617] Though Mapai lost five seats in the August 1961 Knesset elections, held just after the trial's conclusion, the trial became a signature achievement of Ben-Gurion's tenure as prime minister to which he devoted a full chapter of his memoir.[618]

5.6: Conclusion: The Legacy of Victimhood Nationalism in Israeli Foreign Policy Discourse

The Eichmann trial became an important moment in the development of Holocaust memory both in Israel and internationally. Alongside the late 1950s publication of key literary and historical works like Elie Wiesel's *Night* and Raul Hilberg's *The Destruction of the European Jews*, the trial helped codify the 'Holocaust'—the genocidal destruction of six million European Jew—as a politically salient concept across the globe. In Israel, where previously official government discourse had repressed survivors' experiences and opposition parties had seized upon their emotional salience for political gain, the Eichmann trial narrated Holocaust memory into a unifying victimhood

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[614] "Buber Calls Eichmann Execution Great 'Mistake'; Israeli Philosopher Foresees Ill Effects in Germany Says Expiation of Guilt May Retard Rise of Humanism," *The New York Times*, June 5, 1962.

[615] Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem*.

[616] Zertal, "A State on Trial: Hannah Arendt vs. the State of Israel."

[617] Gilbert Achcar, "Eichmann in Cairo: The Eichmann Affair in Nasser's Egypt," *The Arab Studies Journal* 20, no. 1 (2012): 74–103.

[618] Ben-Gurion, *Israel: A Personal History*.

nationalist identity. Indeed, this narration helped transform the Holocaust into a foundational trauma for all Israelis, regardless of ethnic background, with profound consequences both domestically and internationally. Rather than relegating the genocide to a past external to Zionism or limited to the confines of Israel's relationship with Germany, Ben-Gurion's government's victimhood nationalism harnessed the emotional potency of collective trauma to project grievances onto Israel's contemporary enemies, which it portrayed as the ideological successors to Nazism. Indeed, though this victimhood nationalism did not lead to a singular, otherwise inexplicable policy change, because of the trial's deep resonance within Israeli society and internationally, as well as the resilience of this narrative over time, it cannot be dismissed as epiphenomenal or the result of a 'show trial' seeking to justify pre-existing policy goals. The victimhood nationalism that the trial helped ideate proved remarkably resilient and malleable over time and across Israel's political spectrum, expanding to accommodate new international conflicts and new enemies beyond Nasser's Egypt and the Grand Mufti.

Following Eichmann's execution in 1962, Israel's largest security threat remained its Arab neighbors, chief among them Nasser's Egypt. Tensions escalated on both sides over the next few years, leading to border skirmishes in the spring of 1967, followed by Egypt's decision to blockade the Red Sea for Israeli ships. While world powers attempted to broker a negotiated solution, that June Israel launched an attack, sparking the pivotal Six-Day War, fought against Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq.[619] Though numerous scholars have dissected the miscalculations on both sides that contributed to the conflict[620], historian Idith Zertal has demonstrated how the rhetorical battle between opposing leaders during the "waiting period" leading up to the conflict furthered the victimhood nationalism crafted during the Eichmann trial by portraying Nasser's Egypt as posing a genocidal threat to Israeli Jewry. This narrative, she argues, only served to inflame tensions. Indeed, much scholarship has argued that this rhetorical battle was interwoven with the miscalculations in policymaking that helped provoke such a lopsided conflict.[621] In the lead-up to the war, Nasser and

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[619] William B. Quandt, "Lyndon Johnson and the June 1967 War: What Color Was the Light?," *Middle East Journal* 46, no. 2 (1992): 198–228.

[620] Richard Bordeaux Parker, *The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1993); William B. Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967*, 3rd ed (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005); Michael Brecher, *Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967 and 1973* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980).

[621] Nasser's aggressive rhetoric on 'liberating Palestine' and destroying Israel, for example, contributed to the idea in Israel that his blockade of the Red Sea posed an existential threat to the Zionist project, rather than a more limited one. See Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 302–11.

other Arab leaders frequently issued public threats to annihilate Israel. These threats contributed to a "collective anxiety" in Israel that led to widespread calls for a pre-emptive actions to prevent what it portrayed as another imminent Holocaust.[622] When Israel secured a decisive victory that greatly expanded its borders, again Israeli press linked the experience to Holocaust memory, claiming the vanquishing of its Arab foes and seizure of ancient Jewish territories was the culmination of a historical journey "from Auschwitz to Sinai."[623] And the impact of victimhood nationalism's projection of Holocaust grievances onto Arab states was not limited to Israel. As Michael Barnett has written, American Jewry similarly regarded the war as preventing a replay of Nazi genocide. "Just as before, murderous anti-Semitic forces were gathering and advertising their intentions, and the world was shrugging its collective shoulders."[624] During the approximately two-week period between Nasser's closing of the Gulf of Aqaba to Israel and the beginning of the war, American Jews gave over $100 million to Israel, compared to the $64 million they donated through the whole of 1966.[625] The support of American Jewry during this period contributed immensely to the strengthening bond between the U.S. and Israel that has persisted as a pivotal alliance into the 21st century.

Though the issues fought over during the Six-Day War were arguably relevant during the Eichmann Trial's development of victimhood nationalism, in the decades after it the trope of equating Israel's enemies with Nazis and portraying threats as existential for the Jewish people adapted to multiple new contexts. As Dan Porat writes, the existential anxiety felt during the 'waiting period' before the Six-Day War continued into the national devastation of the Yom Kippur War in 1973. Just as the trial's victimhood nationalism had instilled, the two subsequent wars "enabled Israelis to see themselves as part of what they perceived as a potential Holocaust," indicating a unifying identity that created a sense of continuity over time.[626] But whereas the triumphalism of Eichmann's capture and the 1967 war victory glorified the Israeli state's status as sovereign protector in the face of such danger, the 1973 war's massive losses adapted this narrative to feelings of isolation and vulnerability. Indeed, the 1973 war's devastation solidified the belief across the Israeli

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[622] Zertal, *Israel's Holocaust and the Politics of Nationhood*, 121–27.
[623] Zertal, 125.
[624] Michael N. Barnett, *The Star and the Stripes: A History of the Foreign Policies of American Jews* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 160.
[625] Arthur Hertzberg, "Israel and American Jewry," *Commentary* (blog), August 1967, https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/israel-and-american-jewry/; Barnett, *The Star and the Stripes*, 163.
[626] Dan A. Porat, "From the Scandal to the Holocaust in Israeli Education," *Journal of Contemporary History* 39, no. 4 (2004): 626.; See also Charles S. Liebman, "The Myth of Defeat: The Memory of the Yom Kippur War in Israeli Society," *Middle Eastern Studies* 29, no. 3 (1993): 399–418.

political spectrum that the country's enemies desired a second Holocaust and hardened the idea, especially among the right-wing, that, just as during the Holocaust, Israel could not depend on other states to protect it.[627] Projections of Holocaust grievances expanded further under the premiership of Menachem Begin, who portrayed not just neighboring Arab states, but also the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the United Kingdom and others as ideological heirs to Nazism.[628] In 1981, for example, Begin justified his decision to demolish an Iraqi nuclear facility by saying "We must protect our nation, a million and a half of whose children were murdered by the Nazis in the gas chambers." He frequently compared the PLO's leader Yassir Arafat to Hitler and even responded to international criticism of his 1982 decision to invade Lebanon by declaring to the Knesset, "No one, anywhere in the world, can preach morality to our people."[629] While the victimhood nationalist narratives Begin championed as prime minister were different than those of Ben-Gurion's, the intellectual roots of this discourse pass through his longtime rival's victimhood nationalism at the Eichmann trial.

Beyond demonstrating the utility of this thesis' analytical lens, this chapter has built on the extensive and wide-ranging interdisciplinary literature on the Holocaust trauma in Israeli society. While a significant portion of this work has focused on its representation in film, literature, and the press, far less has focused more substantively on its impact on Israeli *political* culture and national identity, especially as they impacted foreign policy. Those works that have wrestled with these subjects have oftentimes refrained from connecting political culture with policymaking, leaving open vital questions of scope and impact. Such hesitancy is understandable given the difficulty inherent in addressing causality with regards to such amorphous and multiply interpretable phenomena. But while perhaps impossible to distill pristine cause and effect from such a complex, nuanced discourse with such varied influences over time, this chapter has endeavored to emphasize how prominent, public narrations of the Holocaust fed logics that reinforced or undermined certain policymaking goals. During the Eichmann trial, Ben-Gurion's government shaped Holocaust memory into a narrative that unified Israel's diverse Jewish community and projected grievances away from Germans and onto Israel's neighboring Arabs. And because this narrative was widely consumed across Israel, drawing on the emotional resonance of survivors' experiences to reinforce its salience,

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[627] Eliezer Don-Yehiya, "Memory and Political Culture: Israeli Society and the Holocaust," in *Studies in Contemporary Jewry*, ed. Ezra Mendelsohn, vol. 9 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 152–53.

[628] Avi Shlaim, "The Likud in Power: The Historiography of Revisionist Zionism," *Israel Studies* 1, no. 2 (1996): 282.

[629] Quotes from Segev, *The Seventh Million*, 399.

it exerted a profound influence on policymaking debates. This identity narrative, which I label victimhood nationalism, proved remarkably resilient and malleable over time, employed by figures beyond Ben-Gurion, including his longtime rival Menachem Begin. Future work building upon this chapter might further examine these later iterations of victimhood nationalism and uncover how they built upon or contorted that which emerged from the Eichmann trial.

Chapter 6: Conclusion: A Trauma 'Turn' in IR Scholarship

6.1 Accounting for the International System's Traumatic Roots

While the rationalist mainstream of the IR discipline that I reference in this thesis' introduction may seem a convenient adversary, its neglect of the complexities involved in violence's aftermath makes sense given its distinctly Western 20th century roots. Though significant debate over IR's 'origin story' persists, the layman's version often begins with the first great debate between realists and idealists between the World Wars. As David Lake has written "[t]heir quest was, in part, driven by the destructiveness of World War I, but foundered on the inability of international institutions to prevent World War II."[630] With these goals and this failure in mind, it's understandable that scholars and policymakers under-appreciated how the international arena's mass violence manifested subtly over the longer-term as trauma. Their primary focus was the immediate concern of preventing future all-out wars and they shaped the discipline around the sorts of macro-strategic questions that were the primary concern of the elite, great power policymakers who had organized the war effort. Yet, even as the field has developed more theoretical pluralism and expanded its empirical focus in the decades since, the epistemologies, methodologies and grand theoretical concerns of the discipline's early practitioners and analysts oftentimes have prevented deepened engagement with the complexity of violence's legacy in trauma. Similarly, the discipline's recent turn towards hypothesis testing over theoretical refinement and innovation has grandfathered in problematic 20th century theoretical models—most notably rationalist or behaviorist ones with roots in economics or game theory—and tended to downplay non-systematic forces that cannot easily be modelled, quantified and explained via empirical regularities.[631] For both traditional theorists and this new generation of neopositivist hypothesis testers, the lens of discrete violent *events* with immediate, easily discernable impacts on the balance of power or economic relations provides a far more parsimonious alternative to inclusion of a labile sensitizing concept like trauma with diverse manifestations across time and space.

But, as this thesis has argued, IR scholarship's traditional focus on violent events—which has even subtly persisted in much new critical IR literature—has relegated a key force of international politics with long-term consequences to the margins of the discipline. For this reason, I

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[630] David A. Lake, "Theory Is Dead, Long Live Theory: The End of the Great Debates and the Rise of Eclecticism in International Relations," *European Journal of International Relations* 19, no. 3 (2013): 569.

[631] John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, "Leaving Theory Behind: Why Simplistic Hypothesis Testing Is Bad for International Relations," *European Journal of International Relations* 19, no. 3 (2013): 427–57.

began this dissertation by confronting this force head-on, asking "How and to what extent do foundational traumatic encounters impact new states and their actions in the international arena over the long-term?" To answer this question, I constructed ideal-typical theorizations of identity and trauma and used them to explore empirically in the cases of India and Israel how traumatic encounters have not only shaped national and state identities, but also, in so doing, inspired logics of policymaking that have proven durable over time. For many new states, foundational traumas are not simply 'events' to be overcome through independence or economic growth—their narration can endow the collective with a sense of self and purpose over time that shapes understandings of collective needs and security, motivating action.

Beyond deepening the IR discipline's understanding of a vital constitutive force, incorporating a notion of trauma into scholarship also has the salutary effect of combatting the field's pervasive Western bias. The artificial delineation between a violent event's immediate physical impacts and its intangible mnemonic legacy that prevails in much scholarship can have the effect of relativizing diverse traumatic experiences across time and space by failing to distinguish between those communities with resources to 'work through' trauma and those without. For this reason, I have begun this thesis by arguing for renewed theoretical attention to how the memory of violence, embedded over time both socio-culturally and materially, can inspire collective trauma narratives that shape identity and policymaking over the long-term. Building upon a diverse array of interdisciplinary insights, I have oriented this thesis' attention to trauma's unique manifestations in new, developing states, paying close attention to how discourses can endow traumatic experiences with social meanings that shape understandings of self and other across time and space. This orientation will help forge a new 'turn' in scholarship towards consideration of trauma as a pivotal, yet uneven force in the international system, paving the way for a more inclusive discipline with greater sensitivity to the perspectives of those outside the West.

To address the lacunae outlined in my introduction, I began this thesis' first part by framing my ideal-type theorizations of trauma and the identity discourses in which they are rendered meaningful. In the second chapter, I argued that identity narratives and the discourses they constitute are not solely a symbolic or representative practice, but also an ontological and epistemological condition of social life, shaping notions of self and other that constitute the international political arena and motivate its interactions. By weaving together episodic and semantic memory (experience and knowledge), identity narratives readily bridge the divide between the

individual and the social to create logics for collective action and policymaking. For this reason, I refer to identity narratives as ontologically fluid and I draw on psychologist Endel Tulving's seminal typology of memory to break down this fluidity. As identity narratives incorporate more episodic memory (experience), they become more particular, nuanced and *individualized*, appealing to those disillusioned with existing hegemonic accounts. Alternatively, as they incorporate more semantic memory (knowledge) they sharpen delineations between groups and create the semblance of rigid social *categories* useful for political mobilization. Yet, despite frequent politicized efforts to portray identity narratives as based either in pure individual experience or pure social knowledge, neither of these two types of memory can meaningfully exist independently and thus an understanding of their entanglement in the politicized process of narration proves vital in guiding interpretive analysis. This interpretive analysis can help uncover both these narratives instrumental utility and ideal appeal to groups seeking representation, overcoming frequent dismissals of identity in IR scholarship as epiphenomenal *post hoc* justification. In this chapter's final section, I apply this theorization to the conceptual relationship between nation and state that proves so vital to the process of state formation under study in my two empirical chapters. Without endeavoring to impose a singular, rigid theoretical model on my cases, I provide a suggestive account of how this theorization of identity can prove useful in dissecting the identity negotiations that take place between nationalist groups and the state as independence movements take control of state apparatuses. This account provides a backdrop for understanding the larger structural processes shaping the specific historical contexts under study in this thesis' empirical chapters.

In the next chapter—this thesis' third—I complicate my understanding of identity by theorizing the role of collective trauma. Recent trauma studies literature has helped synthesize diverse psychological, psychoanalytic and sociological perspectives to reveal how the very notion of collective trauma is based in paradox—while traumatic experiences in individuals can suppress language and memory formation, trauma also has inherently social dimensions. Trauma often stems from social conditions and frequently provokes in survivors and their advocates a desire to bear witness socially, implicating shared knowledge structures and representative practices. Further, I argue, traumatic encounters can become embedded in material conditions over time, distinguishing the traumas of those communities with the resources to 'work through' from those without. To help uncover trauma's unique material instantiations, especially as they manifest in developing states, I apply my theorization to three potential frameworks oriented towards uncovering trauma's

economic dimensions. I outline how trauma's effects can be exacerbated by poverty, how trauma can inspire a sense of economic absence over 'what could have been' and how trauma can provoke mistrust in institutions that can prevent economic development and further entrench an initial trauma's impact. Though these three frameworks are not exhaustive, they again prove useful in guiding my empirical analysis of trauma narratives in post-independence India and Israel.

To understand the tension inherent to collective trauma, I suggest the metaphor of a mosaic. Like the artwork, collective trauma is constructed out of stylized narrative representations of underlying experiences that, like the tiles, are not themselves inherently representational or aesthetic. Yet, as these narratives come together into discourses their overall effect can be more than the sum of their parts. As survivors and their advocates bear witness, they can shape identity discourses, including on the national and state level, motivating policies to prevent re-traumatization and regain security. Because of the centrality and prevalence of mass violence to international political history, I argue that collective trauma cannot be dismissed as a marginal phenomenon in international politics. Indeed, understanding them is vital to the IR discipline, especially for scholars interested in paying greater attention to the perspectives of the non-elites across the globe that it has traditionally ignored. To assist such future analysis and guide my own, I conclude this second theoretical chapter by drawing on literary theory and historiography's insight into 'reading' trauma in narrative analysis; though trauma narratives often depend on figurative language and subtle allusion to combat crises in representation inherent to socializing traumatic experiences, their emotional appeal, especially in nationalist discourses, helps explain how they frequently proliferate in identity discourses, especially in new, developing states.

Though these two chapters' theoretical arguments are extensive, their insight becomes clear in this thesis' second part, as they guide this thesis' two case studies from post-independence India and Israel. Both of these cases remain poorly understood by traditional rationalist IR scholarship and both remain highly relevant to this day. In India, I address the question of why post-independence India aspired to an autarkic economic orientation—a posture that persisted for decades until economic liberalization of the 1980s and early 1990s.[632] Early scholarship tended to

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[632] See, for example, J. Bradford DeLong, "India since Independence: An Analytic Growth Narrative," in *In Search of Prosperity: Analytic Narratives on Economic Growth*, ed. Dani Rodrik, 2003, 184–204; Dani Rodrik and Arvind Subramanian, "From 'Hindu Growth' to Productivity Surge: The Mystery of the Indian Growth Transition" (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, March 2004), http://www.nber.org/papers/w10376.pdf; Gurcharan Das, *India Unbound: From Independence to the Global Information Age*, (New Delhi, India: Penguin Books, 2002).

describe this goal as based on international socialist influences, but this view cannot easily account for Indian policymakers alienation from the Soviet Union or the diversity of economic nationalist voices that favored moving towards autarky. While some scholarship has referenced vague notions of anti-imperial sentiments or post-colonial grievances, in this chapter I demonstrate how this thesis' theory can contribute to a more nuanced understanding of this policy goal's discursive roots. By analyzing the origins of Indian economic nationalist thought and the main factions of the discourse around the time of independence, this chapter demonstrates how nationalist leaders narrated diverse experiences of famines, poverty, and communal violence as representative of a traumatic colonial encounter constitutive of India's identity. These narrations portrayed British economic exploitation as the source of ample suffering and motivated a consensus logic that the pursuit of economic self-sufficiency was vital to ensuring India's economic security and freedom from foreign exploitation.

The next chapter turns to the question of how Holocaust memory shaped Israel's security discourses after independence. While mainstream security studies and IR scholarship has traditionally neglected the role of collective trauma in shaping Israel's foreign policy calculus, those historians that have investigated Holocaust trauma's depiction in Israel have tended not to connect it to Israeli foreign policy discourses. In this chapter, I zoom in on the pivotal role of the 1961 trial of Adolf Eichmann, consumed on television, radio and in the press by a majority of Israelis and countless others abroad. Prior to the trial, Israel's governing Mapai party largely exerted official repression over survivors' traumatic experiences, favoring instead their assimilation into a category-style Zionist identity based on resilience and strength in the face of existential threats. But despite this posture, collective trauma remained a potent force in Israeli society. When narrations of underlying traumatic experience liable made their way into political discourse, oftentimes they threatened the government's agenda—a dynamic made clear during critical public debates over issues like the 1952 Luxembourg Agreement with West Germany or the 1954-5 Kastner trial. Recognizing the opportunity posed by the capture of Eichmann, a chief Nazi organizer of the genocide of European Jewry, Ben-Gurion organized the trial as a pivotal moment for the reformulation of Israeli national identity. Together with other Mapai leaders, Ben-Gurion used the trial to weave traumatic memories into an identity narrative I refer to as victimhood nationalism—an account of the Jewish people's traumatic history that sought to unify all Israeli Jews and legitimize the projection of grievances from Holocaust perpetrators to Israel's contemporary Arab enemies. This projection, I argue, proved durable in Israeli society. It helped shaped international reactions to

the 1967 Six-Day War between Israel and its neighbors, as well as Israelis' interpretations of the threat posed by Nasser's Egypt during the so-called waiting period before the war's outbreak. Even decades later, the victimhood nationalism pioneered at the trial mutated in Israeli nationalist discourse, legitimizing a variety of pre-emptive strikes and contributing to subsequent political figures condemnations of rival regimes.

6.2 Comparative Insights and Paths Forward

Because of my methodological orientation, which theorizes in the tradition of Weberian ideal-types that necessarily abstract from reality to serve as a tool of empirical analysis, I do not favor using a comparison of these two cases to help craft nomothetic generalizations about the role of trauma in international politics. Trauma, as I invoke it in this thesis, is best viewed as a broad sensitizing concept, used to bring together interdisciplinary insight into how violence's legacy reverberates at multiple levels in the international system. My theorizations of trauma and identity incorporate diverse insights to identify analytically general tendencies that provide suggestive insights useful for guiding rigorous historical investigation. The cases that follow this theory, in turn, can serve multiple possible purposes. First, these cases can each serve as 'deviant' and 'crucial', demonstrating how IR scholarship can benefit from drawing on notions of trauma and identity to further understanding of cases that, to date, remain poorly explained by prevailing academic accounts. Second, scholars interested in more specific debates in Indian and Israeli historiography can read these cases independently for the idiographic insight each offers. To assist in these efforts, I have framed my case chapters around outstanding questions in prevailing literature on Indian and Israeli foreign policy and concluded each by reflecting on how my thesis' theoretical insights further these debates. Third and finally, when juxtaposed, these two cases do benefit from certain similarities and begin to offer new insight into how future scholarship can similarly apply this thesis' theorizations to uncover how various traumatic encounters shape international politics.[633] In this section, I draw on these approaches and comparison of my cases to suggest three possible paths for future research to refine this thesis' ideal-type theory and enhance its analytical utility for new empirical investigations. Such expansions may stem from expanding the range of relevant traumas under consideration, expanding the range of political contexts included in analysis, or even

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[633] Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, *The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the Study of World Politics* (London: Routledge, 2011), 153.

considering new interdisciplinary insights that might help refine or expand this thesis' theory and its potential application to IR.

First, future scholarship interested in drawing on this thesis' theory to examine new cases can benefit from comparison of my cases' engagement with historically contingent and specific factors, particularly in reference to how the details of a traumatic encounter—including the experiences of survivors and the unique context-specific knowledge structures used to give meaning to them—alter its legacy in identity and policymaking discourses. Though I articulate a vision of trauma as a sensitizing concept that necessarily brings together a variety of different types of violence, the specific historical details of precipitating violent encounters and their aftermaths help distinguish how different historical traumas are narrated and the policymaking logics they inspire. In India, for example, nationalist leaders largely articulated famines, communal violence and poverty as the result of British *economic* exploitation—a drain of wealth that cruelly and impersonally imposed traumatic experiences across India, especially in rural areas. For this reason, identity discourses legitimated autarky and economic self-sufficiency as appropriate policy goals to prevent similar future foreign economic exploitation. On the other hand, Israel's chief foundational trauma—the genocide of European Jewry—stemmed from eliminationist antisemitism, mass indifference to the plight of world Jewry, and no sovereign state willing to intervene to stop the genocide or absorb large numbers of Jewish refugees. Using the forum of the Eichmann trial, Israeli leaders weaved testimony of survivors' experiences into victimhood nationalism, emphasizing the importance of their young state's sovereignty and projecting outstanding grievances onto contemporary enemies they portrayed as inheritors of Nazi-like eliminationist antisemitism. Both cases, of course, struggled with similar crises of representation inherent to narrating trauma, but the resultant narratives that shaped political discourse stemmed directly from the cases' particular roots.

Despite their small number and specific character, these two cases begin to reveal the extent of historical variation that falls within the concept of trauma and also alludes to new potential avenues for research. Regrettably, extractive and exploitative colonial rule and genocide against a transnational minority group have been all too common occurrences in international political history, making these cases potentially useful as road maps for analysis of a variety of others. But other types of violence, including all-out war, natural disasters, or ethnic cleansing, have also been central to international political history and thus warrant considerable scholarly attention. Scholarship interested in the legacy of these other forms of violence may seek to refine this thesis'

ideal-type theory for a particular sub-set of cases or may simply benefit from this thesis' theoretical breadth in their more nuanced historical investigations. Though I do not believe that further consideration of the variety of long-term responses to different types of historical violence should aspire to discover foolhardy 'laws' or even probabilistic 'regularities' regarding specific types of trauma's role in world politics, this additional breadth will attune scholarship to the subtle ways trauma can linger in international politics and, in turn, sensitize policymakers to the potential legacies of past violence and future action.

Beyond new empirical investigations into different types of violent encounters, this comparison may yield a second type of expansion that refines theory for cases with varying political factors or types of mnemonic entrepreneurs.[634] Both of this thesis' cases dealt with nationalist movements dominated by a small cadre of elite actors—the leadership of the Jewish Agency and World Zionist Organization in Israel and the Indian National Congress in India—that assumed control of a state apparatus after independence from British colonial rule. Further, in both cases these nationalist movements built *democratic* states that took seriously issues of representation central to this thesis' arguments. Yet, violence afflicts all types of states and non-state political units, including both new and old ones. Further, violence can be represented by a variety of actors beyond democratic national-level politicians. In many ways, this thesis' two empirical chapters are quintessential 'crucial cases' with extremely traumatic encounters, a limited number of dominant actors promoting hegemonic narratives, and relatively open democratic post-independence contexts in which independent media outlets and opposition politicians could promote trauma narratives to combat official repression. Future scholarship may ask how more authoritarian or pluralistic political contexts have dealt with the crises in representation inherent to collective trauma, as well as how trauma has afflicted more established states with entrenched institutions and political cultures. These extensions might also shed light on how various policymakers in different contexts have balanced the competing interests of instrumentalism and idealism with regards to representation. Jennifer Lind, for example, has begun such work with a paper challenging conventional wisdom that authoritarian regimes are less likely to pursue international reconciliation after historical violent encounters, theorizing that such reconciliation often serves instrumental purposes for authoritarian

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[634] For more on mnemonic entrepreneurship, see Jan Kubik and Michael Bernhard, "A Theory of the Politics of Memory," in *Twenty Years After Communism*, ed. Michael Bernhard and Jan Kubik (Oxford University Press, 2014), 7–34.

leaders who do not fear challenges from below as much as democratically-elected ones.[635] Similar explorations of trauma's narration and impact on different types of states and conflicts may help refine this thesis' theory and better address the array of potential cases offered by international political history.

Third and finally, in theorizing trauma and the identity discourses it impacts as sensitizing concepts that bring together interdisciplinary insight from the sciences, social sciences, and humanities, I recognize that new insights from these other fields may yield refinements or alterations in this thesis' theoretical models. This point is especially important to remember in relation to neurobiological and psychological insights into how memory and trauma operate in the brain and mind, shaping perceptions of traumatic experience and how social knowledge shapes their socialization. Perhaps more acutely than other fields of knowledge, psychology and neurobiology's knowledge of the mind and brain are provisional and ever-changing, responding to new tools and innovations at incredibly rapid clips.[636] Further, as I have consistently argued throughout this thesis, an ontologically individualistic notion of trauma and memory as purely the property of the individual brain or mind face difficulties in accounting for each's socially-mediated attributes. For this reason, new insight from psychology and neurobiology will inherently interact in new and exciting ways with both existing insight into social processes and new innovations in the social sciences and humanities. Though inclusion of these fields' diverse insights into IR has traditionally been slow, inconsistent and haphazard, scholarship interested in trauma's role in international politics would be wise to remain abreast of such changes and continue to innovate in tandem with other fields. In this sense, this thesis can serve as a model for how to increase interdisciplinary engagement without succumbing to foolhardy determinism in the face of unknown complexities.

Relatedly, as I've argued in this thesis' introduction, recent 'turns' in IR scholarship towards emotions, memory and postcolonialism are highly relevant for furthering consideration of trauma and thus new scholarship from each of these IR sub-literatures could prove of enormous importance for extensions of this thesis. Despite added attention over the last decade, each of these 'turns' remains inchoate and new theoretical and empirical applications continue to extend their

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[635] Jennifer M Lind, "Regime Type and National Remembrance," *EAI 펠로우즈 프로그램 연구보고서*, no. 22 (2009): 1–36.

[636] For an excellent recent examination of how American psychology and psychiatry's understandings of mental illness and mental processes have changed over time, see Anne Harrington, *Mind Fixers: Psychiatry's Troubled Search for the Biology of Mental Illness* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2019).

potential reach. Though this thesis has endeavored to begin a separate analytical 'turn' towards trauma's role in international politics, I recognize that each of these existing literatures remains highly relevant in considering trauma. For example, at multiple points in this thesis I have argued that trauma narratives must be emotionally resonant in order to spread within competitive political discourses and shape policymaking—future scholarship might ask what aspects of these narratives make them particularly emotionally resonant, which specific emotions they appeal to and why. Likewise, what aspects of these narratives might make them more or less likely to endure in collective memory or be forgotten? In asking these questions, I necessarily see these turns as working in tandem to uncover mainstream IR's enormous blind spots. Though too many turns over the long term may leave scholars dizzy, given critical IR scholarship's relative marginality these bold interventions can serve, for the time being, to help nudge the discipline away from its problematic tendencies.

6.3 A Trauma 'Turn' in IR Scholarship or an IR 'Turn' in Trauma Studies?

What, exactly, would it mean for the IR discipline to incorporate a trauma 'turn' into its mainstream? How would this reshape existing relationships between IR and other fields? To answer this question, it's helpful to examine a *longue durée* history of trauma as a sensitizing concept and how it has expanded over time to meet new demands posed by both world events and innovations in science and social science. Rather than diluting a specific concept, this history demonstrates how understandings of trauma have benefited from this interdisciplinarity and inclusive debate. Given this backdrop, I argue that expansion of notions of trauma to the international arena proves a natural and necessary route for scholars of both IR and other disciplines. Just as so many other disciplines have benefitted from consideration of the interdisciplinary insights offered under the category of trauma, so too can IR. And as IR scholars bring their expertise to the study of trauma's manifestations across the globe, the interdisciplinary field of trauma studies can symbiotically benefit by incorporating greater consideration of the international political dimensions of collective trauma.

The term 'trauma' stems from the Greek word for wound and for centuries it was applied primarily to shocks or injuries resulting from forces outside the individual's body.[637] To this day, similar usages remain common in medicine—for instance, hospitals house trauma wards for acute injuries and detectives refer to blunt force trauma as a cause of death—but the term's meaning

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[637] Allan V. Horwitz, *PTSD: A Short History* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2018), 4.

began to shift in during the 19th century, transitioning from being limited to physical wounds to eventually referring equally to mental, spiritual and social ones. As industrialization spread railroads across Europe, physicians began to see a peculiar delayed effect to railway accidents, as well as accidents incurred in other industrial settings. While some patients experienced brutal injuries, others with no obvious lesions after an accident reported pain or other symptoms days or even weeks after the precipitating accident. This delayed response became known as "railway spine" and lawyers interested in suits against railway companies quickly capitalized on its spread, leading to trauma's institutionalization in laws and legal precedents on negligence and liability. Medical opinions on the condition diverged widely; while the British surgeon John Erichsen[638] believed that a unique type of physical trauma compressing the spine caused this delayed reaction, others, including neurologist Russell Reynolds, suggested it may stem from the "morbid condition of idea, or of idea and emotion together." [639]

As historian Mark Micale writes, this lively 19th century debate over the origins of railway spine served to broaden the concept of trauma beyond the physical to the psychological. French neurologist Jean-Martin Charcot was perhaps the most important figure in this bridging. Reading on the symptoms of railway spine, he readily connected the condition to the "florid hysteria" he studied in women and eventually reimagined the latter diagnosis to include men. During the period between 1878 and his death in 1893, he posited that that external events served only to trigger an inherited biological predisposition to the affliction, and he pioneered the use of hypnosis to force patients to confront repressed traumatic memories. Charcot gained acclaim across Europe and his student, Pierre Janet, further psychologized Charcot's expanding notions of traumatic hysteria, suggesting that even the memory of events that did not actually happen could produce traumatic responses. Janet continued in Charcot's use of hypnosis, pressing patients to incorporate memories of traumatic experiences into their conscious minds well into the 20th century.[640]

The 1890s marked the emergence of Sigmund Freud as a leading voice in psychology and psychiatry generally, as well as on trauma more specifically. His views on trauma developed throughout his career, in many ways foreshadowing some of the changes that birthed the interdisciplinary field of trauma studies. Freud first encountered the subject during when training

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[638] See John Eric Erichsen, *On Railway and Other Injuries of the Nervous System* (Philadelphia, PA: Henry C. Lea, 1867).
[639] Hacking, *Rewriting the Soul*, 186.
[640] Horwitz, *PTSD*, 35–39.

under Charcot in Paris from 1885-1886. After returning to Vienna, during the 1890s he and his collaborator Josef Breuer experimented with talk therapy as a cure for hysterical patients. Unlike Charcot, Freud rejected notions of inherited predisposition to hysteria and instead theorized the condition as stemming from traumatic childhood sexual experiences whose memory was repressed into the unconscious—he even hypothesized that the vigorous physical motions of railway accidents reinvigorated repressed memories of childhood sexual experiences, causing railway spine's traumatic symptoms. After treating more patients and realizing that not all with hysterical symptoms had experienced childhood sexual, Freud began to alter these views and explain symptoms as the result of childhood sexual *fantasies* rather than memories of real experiences.[641] This view opened the study of trauma to interpretive analysis outside the remit of medicine and neurology and notably has persisted in much psychoanalytic literary theory.

World War I and the mass incidence of "shell shock," a similar ailment which afflicted millions of former soldiers across Europe and in the United States, forced Freud to reconsider his sexual explanation for traumatic hysteria. He began to see trauma as not solely the result of internal psychic conflict due to repression, but also a direct result of the stresses experienced during combat. Following this logic, traumatic symptoms could no longer be explained solely via unconscious fantasies or childhood sexual encounters but rather necessitated a public, social element—a breakdown in the orderly social world and the relationships through which individuals determine meaning.[642] This interpretation, which resonates deeply with the contemporary diagnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) added to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) in 1980, proved highly influential in the interwar period and even persisted in psychiatry after World War II. But during the two decades before his death in 1939 Freud continued to expand his ideas on trauma's inherently social and political dimensions, especially as he witnessed the rise of fascism across Europe. In his final published work, *Moses and Monotheism*, he offers an explanation of Jewish history via the repression of traumatic memory, analogizing directly from the individual's experience of trauma to that of an ethnoreligious group as a whole.[643] Just as individuals experience trauma from breakdowns in the social world, *Moses* implied that social groups could

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[641] Horwitz, 39–45.

[642] Horwitz, 57–59; Robert Jay Lifton, *The Broken Connection: On Death and the Continuity of Life* (Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Press, Inc., 1996), 163–77.

[643] For more on Freud's *Moses and Monotheism*'s invocation of trauma, see Cathy Caruth, "Unclaimed Experience: Trauma and the Possibility of History," in *Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History*, ed. Cathy Caruth (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

similarly undergo collective trauma which led to collective psychological symptoms similar to those in individuals.

This trajectory, especially as it developed in Freud's thought, effectively foreshadowed many of the divides in trauma studies scholarship that emerged in the 20th and 21st centuries that were discussed in the third chapter of this thesis. While neurologists and psychiatrists have continued to build upon early medical approaches to trauma and hunt for its roots in the brain and body, psychoanalysts have continued to investigate traumatic encounters' repression into the unconscious and impacts on the psyche. Meanwhile, Freud's later work, which expanded examinations of trauma to the social world that caused it, has inspired much work in the humanities and social sciences which has remained interested in the way traumatic encounters involve the breakdown in various social relations, are problematically represented in language and images, and subsequently shape sociopolitical action. As Micale and Lerner have written, in this more recent work trauma has emerged as a "metaphor for the struggles and challenges of late twentieth-century life"—a broad concept that seeks to account for the aftermath of impersonal mass violence enabled by new technologies and evolutions in social relations. Beginning with Freudian social theory, the concept of trauma has been adapted into the fields of sociology, anthropology, literary studies, and political theory. In recent years it has found its way into IR.

This adaptation into IR, I argue, is a vital next step for trauma studies. The encounters considered across the science, social science and humanities disciplines that deal with trauma are the quintessential subjects of IR. Encounters like the Holocaust, the September 11 attacks, and the partition of India have international political dimensions that are impossible to ignore—any purely localized examination of their impacts on individuals and small communities will inevitably neglect the larger systems within which they are embedded and thus will remain incomplete. In this thesis, I have endeavored to elucidate the reciprocal relationships between traumatic encounters and the international political dynamics that cause them—just as international political events can inflict psychic trauma on the individuals who experience them, their representation and legacy can shape international politics, including its potentially traumatic aspects. If, as literary theorist Cathy Caruth writes, "history is precisely the way we are implicated in each other's traumas," then this thesis has demonstrated that this history cannot be localized or contained. It is necessarily in the domain of the international and a vital subject for IR scholars moving forward.

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