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## A Quagmire of Religion, Politics, and Violence : The Political Causes and Consequences of Militarized Religious Movements

Kara Skarda

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A Quagmire of Religion, Politics, and Violence

The Political Causes and Consequences of Militarized Religious Movements

Kara Skarda

Politics Honors Thesis

Dr. Curry

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

|   |           |
|---|-----------|
| TABLE OF CONTENTS .....                             | 2         |
| <b>LEBANESE FORCES PRAYER:</b> .....                | <b>3</b>  |
| <b>PART 1: THE LITERATURE REVIEW</b> .....          | <b>4</b>  |
| I. INTRODUCTION .....                               | 4         |
| II. DEFINITIONS AND TERMS .....                     | 7         |
| III. THE RESURGENCE OF RELIGION .....               | 13        |
| IV. THE HISTORY OF RELIGIOUS RESURGENCE.....        | 16        |
| <i>Israel's Gush Emunim</i> .....                   | 20        |
| <i>Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood</i> .....             | 23        |
| <i>Lebanon's "Lebanese Front"</i> .....             | 25        |
| V. PRIMARILY RELIGIOUS OR NATIONALIST? .....        | 28        |
| VI. SOCIAL CAUSES.....                              | 30        |
| VII. POLITICAL CAUSES .....                         | 33        |
| VIII. POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES.....                   | 36        |
| IX. CONCLUSION .....                                | 38        |
| <b>PART 2: THE CASE STUDIES</b> .....               | <b>40</b> |
| I. HISTORY OF LEBANON .....                         | 41        |
| II. HISTORY OF EGYPT.....                           | 48        |
| III. HISTORY OF ISRAEL .....                        | 54        |
| IV. CAUSES OF THE CASE STUDIES .....                | 61        |
| <i>LEBANON: Sense of Being Attacked</i> .....       | 61        |
| <i>EGYPT: Sense of Being Attacked</i> .....         | 61        |
| <i>ISRAEL: Sense of Being Attacked</i> .....        | 62        |
| <i>LEBANON: Failure of Secular Government</i> ..... | 63        |
| <i>EGYPT: Failure of Secular Government</i> .....   | 64        |
| <i>ISRAEL: Failure of Secular Government</i> .....  | 65        |
| <i>LEBANON: Language of Moralpolitik</i> .....      | 65        |
| <i>EGYPT: Language of Moralpolitik</i> .....        | 66        |
| <i>ISRAEL: Language of Moralpolitik</i> .....       | 66        |
| <i>LEBANON: Reaction to Turmoil</i> .....           | 67        |
| <i>EGYPT: Reaction to Turmoil</i> .....             | 68        |
| <i>ISRAEL: Reaction to Turmoil</i> .....            | 68        |
| <i>LEBANON: Population Mobility</i> .....           | 69        |
| <i>EGYPT: Population Mobility</i> .....             | 70        |
| <i>ISRAEL: Population Mobility</i> .....            | 71        |
| <i>Reaction to Education Policy</i> .....           | 72        |
| <i>LEBANON: Poor Economic Development</i> .....     | 73        |
| <i>EGYPT: Poor Economic Development</i> .....       | 74        |
| <i>ISRAEL: Poor Economic Development</i> .....      | 75        |
| V. CONSEQUENCES OF LEBANESE FORCES .....            | 76        |
| VI. CONSEQUENCES OF MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD .....        | 79        |
| VII. CONSEQUENCES OF GUSH EMUNIM.....               | 80        |
| VIII. COMPARISONS AND SUGGESTIONS.....              | 82        |
| WORKS CITED.....                                    | 86        |

**Lebanese Forces Prayer:**

*Dear Lord,*

*May Thy Name be glorified and Thy Will achieved.*

*Grant me the courage, the strength, and the knowledge to testify for the truth and walk on Thy path and deserve Thee*

*Stay in my heart, forgive my weaknesses, protect me from temptation, and if anger haunts me, overwhelm me with Thy love, so that hatred does not fill my heart.*

*Remind me Dear Lord of those who became martyrs after Thee and before me And Make their pure blood a light to guide me, or if I ever forget, a fire to burn me.*

*Keep me strong so that I love and commit myself to Thy love till martyrdom, and increase my confidence and faith so that I uphold the Cause and free Lebanon.*

*And let the cross be a sign standing on Lebanon's mountains forever,*

*Amen*

## PART 1: THE LITERATURE REVIEW

### I. INTRODUCTION

*“Men never do evil so completely and cheerfully as when they do it from religious conviction.”* –

Blaise Pascal

While sitting in the living room of my upper-middle class Muslim Egyptian host family, settling down for the evening, the mother of the family pulled out a shoebox and sat down next to me, clearly indicating it was time for me to put away the homework and learn an authentic lesson about Egyptian culture. Inside the shoebox were photos of her family over the decades, some dating even back to the 1930s. What appeared striking to my limited perspective was that in pictures all the way through the 1960s, the women were all wearing sleeveless dresses and attending what looked like cocktail parties. Also noticeable was the fact that the city was clean, and the traffic appeared orderly in every picture. In response to my surprise at the foreignness and beauty of the Cairo I saw in the pictures, she placed her hand on her heart and uttered the words that have inspired much of the research that follows: “Kara, my heart mourns the Cairo that uneducated fundamentalists have robbed me of.”

It would be nice to suggest that the rise of militant religion is unique to Egypt or Islam. The global rise of religion in general and the rise of militant religion specifically has been frequently studied and discussed in the last several decades. Religious movements become tied to nationalism and, once mixed with nationalism, become powerful fomenters of violent conflict—a reality that the Western world watches in fear. One reason for the plethora of writing that has sprung up on the subject of religion and politics is the fact that recent historical events, such as the Iranian Revolution, the conflict over Northern Ireland, and the events of 9/11, remind scholars that despite secularization hopes after the Cold War, religion remains an essential factor

in politics, with new extralegal, militarized movements attempting to exert their influence. While formal statistics about the number of deaths or conflicts every year originating from religious violence appear to be unavailable (and may in fact be difficult to distinguish between other forms of violence in a survey), some claim, “religious violence is among the most pressing and dangerous issues facing the world community” (Selengut 3). Examples of religious violence abound: the assassinations of President Sadat in Egypt and Prime Minister Rabin in Israel, the 9/11 attacks, the conflict between Christian Serbs and Muslims of Yugoslavia, the civil war in Ireland, the Oklahoma City bombing, etc. “Religion can tell us that it is ultimately right to love our neighbors, but it can also instruct us that it is our sacred duty to kill them” (Selengut 2-3). As the above examples demonstrate, where religion becomes militarized, it can have a highly destabilizing effect, especially on the host countries. When government leaders are assassinated because of their willingness to compromise with perceived enemies, it undermines chances of peace. In these cases, only a small minority of religious followers needs to militarize to wreak havoc. For this reason, it is essential that governments and scholars exert an effort to begin to understand how these extremist movements evolve and what their own role in the process is.

While the field of religion and politics has grown considerably in the last couple decades, this research will focus more narrowly on militarized religious movements (MRMs)—those religious movements that organize and take up arms, either independently or with state sanction. From this focus arise two basic questions dealing with both the causes and the consequences. First, what causal role have political factors taken in the formation of militarized religious movements? By “political factors,” I refer to both the structures and processes of government as well as people’s general understanding of their role in political processes. Most researchers have focused primarily on the non-political social causes, and while these factors are certainly

significant and possibly even primary, it is my goal to show political institutions and political climates can and do play a role in providing the impetus for and later exacerbating militarized movements. Religious movements do not take place in a politics-free vacuum; rather, political environments affect the methods a religious movement will use. Secondly, what have been the political consequences of the militarized religious movements? Clearly, in a democracy, constituents may dramatically shift the policy of their leaders based on grassroots trends. However, even in autocracies, governments must maintain some level of legitimacy among the population and therefore may be still swayed by popular movements. In short, how does politics influence the formation of MRMs, and how do MRMs influence politics?

For the purposes of this study, I will maintain a focus on the three dominant Abrahamic religions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. The choice of these three religions does not suggest religious violence or extremism is limited to the Abrahamic religions. Rather it is a practical choice: together these religions combine to account for over half of the world population, and the wealth of beliefs that they hold in common makes for easier comparisons in their interactions with their beliefs. Moreover, these three religions have tended to perpetuate the “chosen people” image, a view some scholars see as necessary to the formation of a religious nationalism (Smith, “Nations” 335). Additionally since so much of the violence that draws the world’s attention takes place in the Middle East, the need to understand the Abrahamic religions, all three of which reside within the Middle East, becomes all the more essential. To avoid the comparison of so-called ‘apples and oranges’ my focus will remain in the Middle East, specifically on the militarized Maronites of Lebanon, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and the Gush Emunim in Israel.

## II. DEFINITIONS AND TERMS

Before proceeding any further, a few definitions and terms need clarification. First and foremost, a functional understanding of religion is necessary. Unfortunately, focusing on the functional side of religion defines religion by its influence rather than by its actual essence. Religion is clearly more than just the function it serves within society, but in order to understand the role it plays in militarizing certain portions of the population, it must be looked at from a functional standpoint. Rieffer focuses on the summation of religion as a combination of a belief in the sacred and a code of conduct (217). However, this view prevents comparison with other social institutions that may meet many of the same functions. Peter Berger writes, "Whatever else religion may be, religion is a humanly constructed universe of meaning" (*The Sacred* 175). Similarly, religion can be described as that which gives basis for identity, influences behavior, is a primary source of legitimacy (even over law), and is generally associated with religious institutions (Fox and Sandler 294-295). I will assume this list, which gains importance when compared to the function of nationalism, thus hinting at how the two may become enmeshed in a militarized religious movement.

Secularization could be described oppositely as a cultural loss or dismissal of the role of religion in society. In my research, I will use Norris and Inglehart's definition of secularization as "a systematic erosion of religious practices, values, and beliefs" (5). It is worth noting, however, the awkward history of the word, where it has at times been used to mean, "to *take possession* of that which had traditionally been associated with the ecclesiastical" (Hurd 238). This connotation is problematic and remains especially strong in some Middle Eastern countries today, where secularism is seen both as an excuse to suppress minority feelings and a means to



take possession of the Middle East in the name of the West (238). This reality has made religious rebellion against secular forces all the more attractive.

In the West, part of the process of secularization was nationalism, seemingly rooting individuals in a new secular tradition as religious traditions diminished. While nationalism is now more clearly separate from secularism, both are rooted in Enlightenment thinking. Yet understanding nationalism has proven more difficult. Governments seek answers to the question of nations to determine responses to new people groups claiming nationhood within their state boundaries, provoking long and difficult ethical quandaries impacting the very legitimacy of the state. Smith expresses this dilemma, "Should we regard the nation as an immemorial and evolving community, rooted in a long history of shared ties and culture? Or are nations to be treated as recent social constructs or cultural artifacts, at once bounded and malleable, typical products of a certain stage of history and the special conditions of a modern epoch, and hence destined to pass away when that stage has been surpassed and its conditions no longer apply?" (*Nationalism* 8) The answers to these questions determine the legitimacy of a government's response to new nationalist movements, especially those based on religion, which may claim the most enduring existence. However, most contemporary thinking has accepted that nationalism, as it exists today, is a modern phenomenon.

Again it becomes necessary to define nationalism in terms of its function. From almost the onset of nationalism, however, scholars have produced multiple possible definitions. Marx saw nations primarily in terms of their function in bringing about his eventual utopian society. "Nations provided the forms and vessels, while class formations and their ideologies provided the content and ends to which the next stage of history aspired" (Smith, *Nationalism* 12). Clearly, this view remains heterodox, and most scholars see it as overly deterministic. Durkheim saw

nationalism primarily as a new (and uniquely modern) principle of cohesion and reintegration (Smith, *Nationalism* 16). The idea, supported by Freudian scholars, was that modernization, in which secularization played a major role, had caused a sensation of alienation in the individual, and that nationalism was the secular, modern solution (Smith, *Nationalism* 12). This classical understanding is most useful in its comparison to the function of religion: “Religion is not alone in offering individuals a worldview and providing structure to daily life. Nationalism also has the potential to provide individuals with a frame of reference by which they can navigate through an often confusing and complex world” (Rieffer 218).

Nationalism today is frequently defined as the actual movement for independence or recognition of a people that, regardless of the reasons, considers themselves deserving of self-determination (Rieffer 218). Smith describes it as, “An ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential ‘nation’” (“Ethnic” 333). This understanding can be frustrating if technically accurate. After all, “The ‘nation’ as conceived by nationalism, can be recognized prospectively; the real ‘nation’ can only be recognized *a posteriori*” (Hobsbawm 9). However, separating between the three uses of the word “nationalism”—the principle, the sentiment, and the movement—can be useful.

Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent.

Nationalism as a sentiment, or as a movement, can best be defined in terms of this principle. Nationalist *sentiment* is the feeling of anger aroused by the violation of the principle, or the feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfillment. A nationalist *movement* is one actuated by a sentiment of this kind. (Gellner 1).

This view of the actual working definition of nationalism as encompassing, in reality, three definitions and the more functional Durkheimian understanding will be the basis for the use of nationalism throughout the rest of this paper.

Generally, some concept of ethnicity plays a role in a nation's sense of distinction. Ethnicity is particularly difficult to define because of the difference between its commonly assumed meaning and the reality of what it describes. The difference is much contested. "In ordinary usage this [idea of ethnicity] is almost always connected in some unspecified way with common origin and descent" (Hobsbawm 63). However, Hobsbawm argues that an ethnic group often refers to a somewhat heterogeneous people with no realistic claim to a common ancestor or genetic link (63). Other scholars tend to use "ethnicity" and "nation" interchangeably, making little to no distinction between the words (Smith, *Nationalism* 45). Still another common view sees ethnicities more as a sub-category of modern nations, inasmuch as they exist within the boundaries of the modern nation, and yet are much older than any nation (Kellas 4). Generally, there remains a vague consensus that ethnic groups were somehow precursors to the modern nation, but even that reality is by no means inevitable.

To assume that a localised collection of people who speak similar dialects, observe the same customs and worship in the same liturgy, form an ethnic community and should therefore spawn a nationalism, if nationalism is to be regarded as 'strong', is to miss out vital stages of ethno-genesis, and bypass the search for factors that turn a loose ethnic category into an ethnic association and thence into an ethnic community, let alone a nation (Smith, *Nations* 45).

For this reason, 'nation' and 'ethnicity' simply cannot be used interchangeably. Instead of looking at an ethnicity in terms of the nationalism it might form, one must see the ethnic group in terms of what it actually is.

The definition used in this research is meant to include both the potentially changing objective characteristics and to recognize the role of culture in ethnic formation. For this purpose, Brass's definition is most useful: an ethnic category is "any group of people dissimilar from other peoples in terms of objective cultural criteria and containing within its membership, either in principle or in practice, the elements for a complete division of labor and for reproduction" (19). The first half of this definition refers to the externally visible factors separating people groups, and the second half refers to the unique cultural meanings assigned to life in distinct people groups. An ethnic group becomes a nation when it begins to demand "recognized group rights in the political system" and forms a "self-conscious political entity" (20).

In contemporary terms, nationalism is not always so neatly divorced from religion as secular nationalist movements sought. Religious nationalism is where religion meets modernity—where modernity exists in the absence of secularization. It is the attempt to "link religion and the nation-state" (Juergensmeyer 40). Religious nationalist movements define their existence as nations within a religious framework. Nationhood stems from a definite insider-outsider paradigm: members of a nation obsess with forming a nation precisely because they are outsiders to other nation-states, and others are inevitably outsiders to their unique culture. Moreover, members of nationalist movements see their collective identity in some way as superior to outsiders'. Religion can perform a similar function through "election myths"—myths of being a "chosen people" for a specific purpose, where one's very existence is essential to the cosmic order of the world (Smith, "Nations" 335, 337). If nationalism mixes successfully with a religious election myth, then one would expect the members of such a movement to stop short of nothing to win in battle, for the whole cosmic order may hang on their success. "The merger of

the absolutism of nationalism with the absolutism of religion might create a rule so vaunted and potent that it could destroy itself and its neighbors as well... An absolute power of the worst sort could claim its most evil deeds to be legitimate moral duties" (Juergensmeyer 41).

The potential absolutism of religious nationalism leads up to a discussion of militarized religious movements (MRMs), the subject of this paper. As described previously, a militarized religious movement is a religious movement that takes up arms in the name of the religion. When used within this research, the term assumes a degree of extremism, but it is left for another discussion as to whether an MRM could potentially have a non-extremist variant. By extremism, however, I would like to clarify that I do not necessarily mean irrational—within their religious framework, the taking up of arms may be a very rational decision in response to the surrounding political environment. While there could be theoretical exceptions, it is the opinion of this author that the majority of MRMs are essentially violent forms of religious nationalisms. Unfortunately, these movements have not been studied extensively as a unique category unto themselves, and therefore there is not a body of literature with which to compare.

"Fundamentalism" is an alternative term used to describe many extremist religious movements, and it would seem that "violent fundamentalism" would cover the same subject matter as "militarized religious movements" without as much confusion or the cumbersomeness of the multi-syllabic phrase, "militarized religious movement." However, the history of "fundamentalism" as a term has left it with only a nebulous understanding outside of its existence in American Protestant history and void of any specifically political definition. "The fundamentalist label has undergone inflation in its sometimes indiscriminate application to broader zones of political movements and other ideologies, to the point where it runs a risk of spinning out of control and losing specificity and explanatory power" (Nagata 481). However,

Hunter makes the connection that in fact among all fundamentalisms, “a close relationship seems to exist between religious ideology and national identity” (65). Though my preference would be not to use “fundamentalism” at all, I will occasionally quote authors referring to fundamentalist movements, and when that is done I will use the terms “fundamentalism” and “religious nationalism” interchangeably. Violent forms of fundamentalism are those that I call militarized religious movements.

### III. THE RESURGENCE OF RELIGION

Fifty years ago, scholars were not predicting the current rise in religion. Instead, most prominent political scientists and sociologists adhered to the modernization theory (also referred to as the secularization theory by many sociologists). Scholars looked to the Western model and postulated that the process of secularization, as it touched each culture, would become completely irreversible (Sahliyah 3). “The demystification of religion inherent in the classic secularization paradigm posited a gradual, persistent, unbroken erosion of religious influence in urban industrial societies” (Shupe 19). Many (if not most) of the leading thinkers, including individuals such as Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer, Emile Durkheim, Karl Marx, and Sigmund Freud, adhered to this theory. This hope and idea was not unique to the modern era. “Ever since the Age of the Enlightenment, leading figures in philosophy, anthropology, and psychology have postulated that theological superstition, symbolic liturgical rituals, and sacred practices are the product of the past that will be outgrown in the modern era” (Norris 3). Many scholars did not even bother to hypothesize about religion’s future role in society; they rather ignored it in an implicit agreement that it was unimportant. “Even the futurist John Naisbitt in his popular 1982

book, *Megatrends*, devoted only a single page to religion, hardly allotting it much relevance for the educational, economic, and political changes he envisions now underway” (Schupe 18).

Yet decolonization and democratization efforts did not usher in a new era of secularization. Instead, with an increase in nationalism came a simultaneous increase in religion. The modernization theory was faltering. “For the social and political sciences, this worldwide parallel development of nationalism and religion has come as a surprise, challenging the received disciplinary frame theories and analytical orientations” (Spohn 67). There is a growing and sustained debate as to whether the 1970s and 1980s even went so far as to disprove the modernization theory. After the unprecedented growth of democracy and social services, which has not led to the predicted rejection of religion or at least a diminished reliance on religion, some scholars have declared that modernization has lost all relevance (Sahliyah 4). Others, however, such as Norris and Inglehart, argue that the modernization theory has not really been disproved so much as demographic factors, such as population growth among the most religious groups in society, push the world back a few decades in religious development. They argue overall, “Rich societies are becoming more secular but the world as a whole is becoming more religious,” primarily due to the birth of more individuals in the most religious sectors of society (217).

Norris and Inglehart’s reduction of the situation, however, does not fit with the majority view that the modernization theory has failed at some level. While demographic factors may have exacerbated the situation, most scholars also refuse to reduce the so-called resurgence of religion to merely a product of population growth among select sectors of society. Something more surprising has occurred in the world at large. In fact, certain portions of religious society, as so evident in photos of Cairo, appear to be intensifying their religious fervor. There are two

main approaches to viewing this resurgence. First, something in the very essence of globalization causes individuals to “yearn for a deeper meaning to life” (Ellingsen 306). Many psychologists, including Freud, have cited “the dislocating nature of modernity, its disorientation of the individual and its capacity for disrupting the stability of traditional sources of support” (Smith 13, *Nations*). This disorientation induces individuals to look beyond this world for identity and support, thus turning to religion. Alternatively, globalization, in its constant contact with multiple civilizations, produces multiple forms of modernity, with Western secular modernity being only one civilizational form (Spohn 70).

A look at either history or at the contemporary world reveals that what is rare is not the phenomenon [of passionate religious movements] itself but knowledge of it. The difficult-to-understand phenomenon is not Iranian mullahs but American university professors—it might be worth a multi-million dollar project to try to explain that! (Berger, *The Desecularization 2*)

In that sense, the secular modern form was never inevitable, and the religious forms conform most closely to the cultures from which they come. Both the views, of the resurgence as a reaction to modernity and as one of many forms of modernity, likely capture elements of the reality.

It is important to note that the electronic revolution in mass communications may have heavily influenced the timing of the religious resurgence. Just as individuals are disoriented by the reality surrounding them and as they seek a culturally relevant way to interact with the ever-changing world, preachers, pastors, sheikhs, imams, and rabbis can all publish, or even broadcast, their words to an enormous audience. These religious (and oftentimes political) leaders have access to wider audiences than ever before, and they offer the answers to the questions that modernization and globalization have asked. While those same audiences may also have access to alternative views that might lessen the exposure to radicalized views, in



reality, many people seek answers rather than more questions, and religious extremism gladly gives answers while discouraging questions. Moreover, the wealth of media options has allowed a degree of niche marketing that exacerbates interfaith differences and even paranoia. "The media, particularly television, encourages simplistic reductions of issues into black and white as well as into the archetypal scenario of villains and heroes... In such a medium, those groups adept at reductionist, absolutist, and simplified frameworks of reference will excite and mobilize news consumers" (Schupe 22). As stated previously, however, this resurgence of religion was unexpected, and understanding the history of its arrival is essential to understanding its future.

#### IV. THE HISTORY OF RELIGIOUS RESURGENCE

The Enlightenment of the eighteenth century transformed Europe's understanding of the world and most specifically its relationship to religion. Scholars reasserted the ancient Greek notion that reason was the measure of man, and the church found increasingly less space in the scholarly world. The Enlightenment may have begun with Newtonian science, but scholars soon attempted to apply the same scientific methods to find natural laws that also governed human interactions. There existed a sense of optimism that utopias were possible if only the correct method was found. The transformation, however, did not stop with academia. The movement from scholarly writing to everyday thinking may have occurred slowly, but the reality of Enlightenment thinking in everyday language can hardly be argued. As a result of the Enlightenment, medicine and the sciences have flourished, and the average Western citizen accepts their authority rather than looking to ancient texts to determine their legitimacy. Even within the social sciences, scholars might suggest that theories matter most, but those who argue for the necessity of empirical data have accrued a great deal of authority to contest this idea. The

Enlightenment did not, contrary to some predictions, end the role of religion, but it did transform people's relationship to religion. In many ways, it deinstitutionalized religion and made it a matter of private habit. While the institution of the church (and other religions) continued to exist and exert its influence, more individuals felt the ability to critique and disagree with the doctrine of the church leaders.

The process of modernization did not proceed easily for all religious groups. In 1882, Nietzsche, arguably the most influential nihilist, proclaimed without optimism that the acceptance of modernity had killed God, leaving humanity feeling lost and aimless (Armstrong 97). On this basis, groups of all the Abrahamic religions began consolidating power and beliefs to defend themselves against the ever-encroaching secular modernity. "Human beings find it almost impossible to live without a sense that, despite the distressing evidence to the contrary, life has ultimate meaning and value" (Armstrong 135).

For European Jews, responses to modernity varied between the embracive formation of secular nationalism (Zionism) and the fearful creation of extremely protective yeshivas (Armstrong 148). In time, Zionism and the creation of a Jewish state would become the motivation for every Jewish extremism, militarized or not (150). In Lebanon, Christian responses to modernity and secularism have greatest similarity to the European Jewish response before the opportunity of Zionism, being in a minority position and therefore more embracive of a secular government. Moreover, European powers specifically favored the Lebanese Christians, both in trade agreements and politically, fostering a love for the West and a distrust of Muslim neighbors (Makdisi). In Egypt, as leaders attempted to imitate increasingly the "progress" of the West through secular nationalism, a new Iranian leader, self-titled al-Afghani, arrived in Cairo, "acutely anxious about the ubiquity and power of the West, which, he was convinced, was about

to crush the Islamic world... He was determined to teach the Muslim world to unite under the banner of Islam and to use religion to counter the threat of Western imperialism” (Armstrong 156). Thus the Muslim reactions that did not embrace modernism were from the start connected to anti-Western sentiment. All of these religious responses tended to be *against* something, even if not explicitly modernity itself, though that was often also a part of their response. “The modernization and globalization process makes people feel more insecure and alienated, increasing the importance of traditional values as well as the level of hostility” (Ellingsen 319).

At the same time that the Enlightenment supposedly marked “the dusk of religious modes of thought” (Anderson 11), nationalism was birthed. In many ways, these two processes were inextricably linked. As shown through the various religious responses to modernization and the growing secularization, secularism brought its own sources of confusion and disintegration. Nationalism, however, answered these frustrations by providing identity and integration once again, only through a secular means. Certainly the decline of religion was not the only factor leading to nationalism, but it played a significant role that has relevance in religion’s later interactions with nationalism (12). It would be foolish however to presuppose complete secularism on the part of all Western nationalist movements. “This secular model of national identity neglects or underrates the continuing importance of the religious foundations and components of modern nationalism and national identity in Europe” (Spohn 72). Even focusing only on Western examples, it is not difficult to see the role of religion (or the cooption of religion) in nationalist movements—from the American reactions to 9/11 to the ongoing Irish nationalist clashes. However, the diminishing source of identity from religion played into people’s new attachment to nationalism—all the more when nationalism also became a means of reasserting religious identity, as in the above two examples.

It is difficult to pinpoint at what moment movements transition from being essentially secular-influenced nationalist movements with religious support to becoming religious nationalist movements. The Iranian Revolution might seemingly be an example of a religious nationalist movement, but where do movements like the first *Intifada*—a movement based primarily on political injustices and condoned and encouraged by both the Palestinian secular elite and the Muslim majority with both secular and religious reasoning—fit into the picture? Given this spectrum, it is likely in the majority of all cases that religious and secular nationalism coexist together to some degree in their attempts to achieve independence, but the extent of control of either form after independence determines the trajectory of the nation. Moreover, even if a secular state is established, it does not guarantee the cultivation of a secular form of nationalism. As the modern state, by nature, becomes embroiled in questions of destiny, meaning, and justice, it “well-nigh invites religious encroachment precisely because it is increasingly concerned with matters traditionally associated with the religious domain” (Schupe 23). The religious concern for the state’s governing may very well evolve into a specifically religious form of nationalism.

During the 1970s, an important religious resurgence occurred, shifting the way people all over the world viewed the role of religion in the state. The resurgence occurred simultaneously “from Cairo or Algiers to Prague, from the American Evangelicals to the zealots of Gush Emunim, from Islamic militants to Liberation [Christians]” (Kepel, *Revenge 2*). Importantly, this resurgence seeped into politics in a backlash against secular forms of nationalism. Religious movements worldwide began to rebel against secular answers to social problems, arguing that the precise reason for the problems was the abandonment of the sacred in public space. Religious scholars and leaders had already laid the groundwork for this global shift, and religious followers

began to look backwards to those earlier scholars who argued for specifically religious forms of nationalism.

In 1974, students of Rabbi Tzvi Yehuda Kook founded the Gush Emunim. For these radical supporters of the Jewish settler movement, writings of the mystic Rabbis Kook (alternative spelled "Kuk"), both father and son, became extraordinarily popular. During the same period, the Muslim Brotherhood began to look to Muslim thinkers like Sayyid Qutb, who had been one of the greatest Muslim Brotherhood intellectuals in the 1950s and 1960s before his execution by the Egyptian government in 1966. Simultaneously, the Maronite Bashir Gemayel was rising to power in Lebanon. While Gemayel was not a theologian per se, his memory was nearly deified following his death in 1982 (Hage 37).

### *Israel's Gush Emunim*

The Orthodox settlers and messianists, who for a time formed the Gush Emunim, believe that the end of history is at hand, and they participate in the revealing of God's will by populating and redeeming the Holy Land (Heilman 259). Not that long ago, however, such views about returning to the land of Israel before the coming of the Messiah would have been nothing short of heresy. Rabbi Kook Sr. may have not been the first, but he was the most influential theologian to formulate arguments for the Orthodox Jews to actively support the creation of a Jewish state. Previously common Orthodox theology suggested that returning to the historic place of Israel would not have any redemptive effects without the Messiah first arriving. Attempting to return before that moment would be wrong and an attempt to surpass God's will. Rabbi Kook, however, argued that so long as the impetus for returning was impoverishment or persecution, it would not endanger Judaism. In fact, Zionism might be the only means of fighting the pull of assimilation.

Kook viewed nationalism as divinely inspired (Weissbrod, “Gush Emunim” 268), because only as one people united in God’s promised land could they finally fulfill the call to be ambassadors of peace to the world, setting an example of a perfect society. Kook repeatedly emphasized the need for unity among all Zionists—even religious Zionists with secular Zionists, for even the secularists were unwittingly play a part in fulfilling God’s desire to repopulate the Holy Land with the Jewish people.

Might in abundance will come streaming from the vitalizing source, the land that is the center of our life, whose majestic splendor we feel as we return to it, confident in our hopes for redemption and eternal deliverance increasingly stirring in us...

Wake up, wake up, dear brother, and from the illumination of our souls, which we will draw from the source of might and light, flashes of light will shine on the world, and the righteous one of Eretz Yisrael and those of the diaspora will unite, to enhance the glory of our beautiful land and its majestic treasures, and they will no longer be of divided heart (Kook 351)

There exists a hint of irony in the methods many of Kook’s most dedicated followers would use to hold onto the opportunity to be ambassadors of “peace.”

Rabbi Tzvi Yehuda Kook took his father’s ideas and translated them into practical terms (Weissbrod, “Gush Emunim” 269). He firmly agreed with his father that however secular the Zionists might be, they were “the unwitting bearers of a messianic redemption, and that the state of Israel was the unconscious instrument of the divine will” (Kepel, *Revenge* 155). Their eschatological views, however, were given very little serious attention until after the territorial gains of the Six Day War. Kook provided an explanation for a victory against all odds that many began to regard as miraculous. However, Kook’s teaching required extraordinary dedication to the redemption of the land, potentially even martyrdom. Victory in the Six Day War gave evidence that faithful followers should not tolerate any opposition or any government that attempted to defile any piece of *Eretz Israel* by giving it away. “Those who demanded Israel’s

withdrawal from Judea and Samaria, and those who submitted this request (the government), would be cursed by God” (Weissbrod, “Gush Emunim” 269). Both Kook Senior and Junior attracted an extensive following, paving the way clearly for extralegal settlements and a militarized religious movement, which would eventually be expressed in the anti-Palestinian terrorist acts of the Gush Emunim underground in 1983, including car bombs and a plan to blow up the Dome of the Rock (Hoffman 278). It is difficult to tell how large the Gush Emunim movement was at this time, even less so the underground movement, due to a lack of formal membership, but a 1976 mass hike across “Samaria” with the general Gush Emunim included 20,000-30,000 participants (Sprinzak, “Gush Emunim”).

Over the years, Gush Emunim has been quite successful in its original goal: the settlement of “Judea and Samaria” (otherwise known as the West Bank). Moreover, Gush Emunim (and now more broadly those that could be deemed Gush Emunim sympathizers) became a powerful instrument in bringing into power the conservative Likud Party in 1977 (Weissbrod, “Core Values”). However, even as they began more directly influencing the government, they also increased their illegal activities. In fact, Sprinzak describes the rise of vigilante behavior during the Likud’s government,

It was convenient for most of the parties concerned, including government ministers and officials, to ignore the ugly side of the settlement process, and to focus attention only on Arab violence and terrorism. This silence encouraged key people amongst the settlers to prepare for more violent counter actions. They stockpiled guns, ammunition and explosives and resorted to a number of operations. Since they never questioned the legitimacy of the Likud government, they did not consider themselves a declared underground, and rather than the term terrorists, they saw themselves as the “true” defenders of the settlements (“The Iceberg Model” 44).

Even more frightening have been the multiple attempts of the Gush Emunim members to destroy the Dome of the Rock between 1980 and 1984 (Halsell). Moreover, though most of its activities

ceased in the late 1980s, Israeli society never widely condemned Gush Emunim. In fact, in 1990 three Israeli terrorists, who had targeted Palestinian mayors of the towns Ramallah and Nablus in car bombing attacks, successfully killing three Arabs and maiming the two Palestinian mayors, received the fourth reduction of the term, allowing them to be released from prison. Instead of returning to their hometowns in shame, settlers waiting outside the prison carried the welcomed “heroes” away on their shoulders (“Three Israeli Terrorists”). In 1994, a survey cited in the Jerusalem Post furthermore showed that Gush Emunim had become more popular than the largest peace movement in the region, Peace Now (Keinon).

### ***Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood***

The Islamic Resurgence happened in multiple countries simultaneously. Samuel Huntington describes the phenomenon as an “acceptance of modernity, rejection of Western culture, and recommitment to Islam as the guide to life in the modern world” (110). Coming out of this global resurgence, Sayyid Qutb provides the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (and beyond) the same sort of intellectual theological foundation that the Kooks provide Gush Emunim. In actuality, the Muslim Brotherhood predates Sayyid Qutb, but so great was his influence that followers regard his writings nonetheless as essential to the foundation of the contemporary Muslim Brotherhood. Heavily influenced by Pakistani Abul Ala Mawdudi, who had been the first Muslim scholar to argue that jihad was “a revolutionary struggle to seize power for the good of all humanity” (Armstrong 238), Qutb became the founder of what many refer to as Sunni fundamentalism (239). After a disillusioning experience in America and more especially with torture in Nasser’s prisons, Qutb called for the violent overthrow of even those leaders like Nasser that professed Islam if their actions demonstrated otherwise (240). Moreover to maintain their purity in a sex-



saturated society, faithful Muslims needed to remove themselves from the larger society, creating true Muslim enclaves. "They could, and indeed should, be courteous to unbelievers and apostates in their society, but should keep contacts to a minimum and in general pursue a policy of noncooperation in such crucial matters as education" (242). What made Qutb unique was that he rejected any current even self-proclaimed Islamic society as truly Islamic. Executed before he could ever truly explain his meaning, Qutb argued a complete break from and destruction of society, allowing a truly Islamic society to be built from the ruins (Kepel, *Revenge* 20).

After Qutb's execution, the Muslim Brotherhood's older members renounced violence, leading many of the more aggressive younger members to splinter off into new, more violent groups that would continue Qutb's final mission. One such group, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, which splintered from the Muslim Brotherhood in 1970, has been responsible for the assassination of President Sadat in 1981 after Sadat's peace deal with Israel, the 1993 assassination attempts on Prime Minister Atef Sedky and Interior Minister Hassan al-Alfi, the bombing of the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad in 1995, and a 1995 assassination attempt on President Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (Fletcher, "Egyptian Islamic Jihad"). Another, Jamaat al-Islamiyya, which also splintered from the Muslim Brother in 1970, ran a terror campaign pointed more at tourists, including the September 1997 ambush near the Egyptian Museum in Cairo, which killed nine German tourists and their driver, and the more famous November 1997 shooting spree in Luxor that killed 58 tourists and four Egyptians (Fletcher, "Jamaat al-Islamiyya").

### *Lebanon's "Lebanese Front"*

Lebanon's own religious "revival," if it can be called such, is very distinctive from that which occurred in Israel and Egypt. Perhaps the first major difference is that while radical Muslims or Jews might have perceived themselves as members of a minority in their respective countries, the Lebanese Maronites truly are a minority—albeit a historically favored minority wielding tremendous political power. Thus much of the Maronites' fears concern the maintenance of political and cultural power. Secondly, while the theologians mentioned in Israel and Egypt may have spoken within the context of predominantly nationalist movements, their own words and thoughts were arguably primarily religious with political implications. However, the "religious" figures, such as Bashir Gemayel, that the Lebanese community appears to have turned to, were primarily politicians who spoke freely of religious conviction and duty, more similar to a George Bush than a Jerry Falwell in American terms. In fact, there really are few Lebanese theologians to look to as foundational to the Maronite militarized movement. Despite these differences, religion remains intrinsically a part of the conflict—both culturally and theologically.

Gemayel's religious impact rests primarily on the image imprinted in people's memories and the Lebanese Front's use of his words following his death—more than on his actual words. Importantly, Gemayel was not a theologian. In fact, Gemayel entered politics by violently "eliminating, or trying to eliminate, all rival forces in the Christian camp" (Aulus 21). Foundational to his image of Lebanon were the works of Youssef al-Sawda, who saw Lebanon as an eternal entity and the lone Christian beacon of "cultural radiation in an otherwise backward Middle East" (Hage 29). From this idea, the Christian nationalists formed an idea, rooted in Biblical imagery, of Lebanon holding a sacred mission to the region and to the world, which could only be fulfilled if the Lebanese culture remained protected by Christian political power.

Gemayel emphasized the survival of Christian culture and played on people's fears of the Palestinian refugees turning Lebanon into a Muslim-dominated state, as in the rest of the Middle East. In a speech after his election as president, Gemayel proclaimed:

Yasser Arafat has transformed the Church of Damour into a garage; but we shall rebuild the Church of Damour, even though he has dirtied it, desecrated and plundered it! But maybe if we were in Egypt or in Syria, we wouldn't have the right to rebuild or restore any church that might be falling into ruins! But we want to stay in this East, so that our churches' bells can keep ringing when we want them to... We want to be able to baptize as we please; we want to be able to practice our traditions and rites, our faith and our convictions, as we please; we want to practice our Christianity in this East (qtd. in Hage 34).

Theoretically Gemayel maintained his attachment to a pluralistic Lebanon, but he simultaneously mobilized young Christians and militias with phrases like "our Christian society,' 'our values,' and so on" (Phares 125). While these words appear more cultural or ethnic than religious, others words accrued more religious meaning. For example, Gemayel sharply criticized the West for not rushing to the help of the Christians in Lebanon, blaming their irresponsibility on moral degeneration. The world was in desperate need of a moral regeneration, and the Lebanese Christian Right was on the correct path. "Indeed, the two main ideological bases of fundamentalism are there: first, the assertion of an existence of 'a true morality' emanating from a specific religion, a mode of conduct that can be traced back to 'the roots' of the religion; and second, the claim to be practicing or advocating the practice of this mode of conduct" (Hage 35).

After his assassination in 1982 however, the religious fervor surrounding Gemayel increased immensely. Lebanese Christians referred to him as "the closest image of Jesus Christ possible on earth" and as "the savior" of Lebanon (Hage 37), a view reaffirmed by the Superior of the Maronite Order of Monks (Dalrymple 199). Even reporters frequently discussed this metaphorical connection. His death only further contributed to his religious messianic image and

inspired a renewal that his life never prompted. Various miracles were reported in relation to paintings of Gemayel, truly exacerbating the religious connection, and on the Lebanese Front's weekly journal's cover, they began to print a famous quote of Gemayel: "I have come to ask you to tell the truth no matter how hard it is" (qtd. in Hage 38). While the quote was actually taken from a visit to a national television network, the implication in the journal was that Gemayel had come for a specific moment in history to reawaken the Lebanese Christians. The Christian reawakening, however, while attached to the memory of Gemayel, took on non-political forms, never particularly articulated by Gemayel. For example, the women's bureau of the Lebanese Front transitioned to helping women understand and fulfill their duties as wives—not leaders in the movement (Hage 41). The so-called "mission" of the Lebanese Christians became enmeshed in recapturing a lost (and more traditional) Christian ideology. Even the political journals became increasingly overtly religious, with a complete blurring of the lines typically separating religion and politics.

The role of the Maronite clergy during this time demonstrates the religious overtones that had been inserted into the movement. Priests encouraged parishioners to donate money to buy arms, and many of the supposedly cloistered monks become involved in arms dealing (Dalrymple 199). Some monk orders went even further:

Certainly, as in Byzantine times, the monks involved themselves closely in politics, tending to support the more extreme ultranationalist Maronite militias. Most popular of all in the monasteries were the sinister Guardians of the Cedars, whose symbol was a sword-cum-cross amid flames, and whose particular specialty was cutting the ears off their dead Muslim opponents, then displaying them as trophies. The monastic support given to this group continued, despite the Guardians holding a press conference to applaud the Sabra and Chatila massacres and adopting the macabre slogan, 'It is the duty of every Lebanese to kill at least one Palestinian' (Dalrymple 199).

These monks completely undermined any theoretical aim of a secular society by their violent involvement.

The Sabra and Chatila massacres, which occurred September 16, 1982 and the Guardians so proudly applauded, are considered the worst attacks in the 15-year civil war, killing upwards of 800 Palestinian civilians in horrific, brutal manners, as will be described later (“Flashback”). However, on many occasions, Christian militias used brutal violence, which the clergy, at the very least, tacitly supported. Such examples include the massacre of 200 unarmed Muslims after the murder of four Christian youth in December 1975 (Hanf 210) and then in January 1976 the attacks on the Dbayeh camp, where hundreds died and the militiamen took no survivors (Hanf 211). It remains very difficult to determine which actions to classify as part of the MRM and what were merely the brutal actions of a civil war, but in the midst of the blurred lines, it becomes clear that religion played a role and thousands of deaths resulted.

## V. PRIMARILY RELIGIOUS OR NATIONALIST?

Naturally, when looking at MRMs, it is tempting to question whether these movements in the end are primarily nationalist movements with religious undertones or religious movements with nationalist undertones. One potential way of answering this question is to note the interplay of ethnicity with religion and nationalism. Ethnic distinction remains fundamental in most nationalist movements, and religion may provide one ethnic boundary on which to base their ethnicity. However, just because religion provides a dividing line by which ethnicities can form, from which nationalisms emerge, does not answer whether the actual underpinnings of the movements are primarily religious or nationalistic—whether the core arguments are theological or political. Religion can give sanction to already-existing nationalist movements, or conversely

politics can “confirm” the already assumed theological arguments of a society. Scholars and governments seek answers to these questions in order to understand how to effectively oppose an MRM. For example, if the movements are primarily religious, giving a platform to prominent religious leaders who oppose the actions of an MRM may be most effective. If, however, the movement is primarily nationalistic, then condemnation from respected religious figures may fail to fully reduce the impetus for violence and other issues must be addressed.

To the theologians mentioned in Egypt and Israel, they were arguably advocating for religious movements that mixed with politics. However, to their followers and to the leaders that led the militarized movements, it appears less clear. Research has shown that religious factors do not tend to show up in the absence of nationalism—that nationalism comes first, but religion remains a powerful exacerbating force (Fox, “Rise” 728). The difficulty lies in the fact that ambitious political activists may use religious language to inspire the religious majority (arguably the case of Gemayel). For the activists involved the movement may be primarily a political struggle, but for the religious majority it becomes simultaneously an intrinsically religious struggle between good and evil. “The language of cosmic struggle is easily exploited by political activists who want to give sacred legitimacy to worldly causes” (Juergensmeyer 163). Without the primarily politically motivated activists, the religious majority would likely never be mobilized, but once mobilized it becomes futile to determine the difference between primarily nationalist militarized movements or primarily religious militarized movements, for both mix indeterminably.

Charles Sennott, describing the Chatila and Sabra massacres, provides one such example among the Maronites of Southern Lebanon, who were arguably fighting to remove foreign influences and reestablish “secular” democracy,

The Christian militias wore oversized crosses and Nazi-style army helmets, and they taped icons of the Virgin Mary and of St. George the Dragonslayer to their Israeli-issued machine guns, ready for “cleansing” Palestinians from Lebanon (289).

Two days after the assassination of Gemayel, the Israeli-allied Lebanese Christian militias massacred upwards of 800 Palestinian refugees, including men, women, and children, in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps. (Palestinian witnesses placed the death toll above 2,000, but accurate numbers are unavailable.) There were reports of infants’ limbs having been hacked off and of crosses carved into the flesh of victims (292).

One of the ironies in these brutal attacks, supposedly part of a movement to reestablish secular democracy, is the clear Christian imagery used. Christian militias were religiously, ethnically, and politically motivated. It would be impossible to separate these threads woven into the reality of the MRM. Religion is often used to support nationalist movements (Fox 727, Rieffer 229), which are largely based on ethnicity, but the consequences of mixing religion into a nationalist effort is that they tend to take on a life of their own and exacerbate the violence in a way that secular nationalism does not inspire (Fox 727, Rieffer 234). It is this reality that makes the study of militarized religious movements so crucial.

## VI. SOCIAL CAUSES

As mentioned earlier, there is not a body of literature on “militarized religious movements.” As a subset of religious nationalisms or even “fundamentalisms,” one can assume that the factors that have led to these larger movements will also contribute to the formation of an MRM. However, no empirical data exists to support or contradict this theory due to the lack of studies on the militarization of religious movements. It remains only that—a theory, which

provides a framework of explanation. However, based on that theory, some commonly espoused social causes of religious nationalism and so-called fundamentalisms will be examined briefly before looking more closely at the potential political causes.

The view most commonly shared by sociologists again has to do with the very nature of globalization and secularization. Psychologists hypothesize that within all humans is the need to own a group identity (Seul 554). As globalization tears away at people's sense of being rooted in a community and place, reducing them to isolated individuals in a changing world, people will look elsewhere to fulfill their psychological need for a group identity. "Religion (especially in the form of religious fundamentalism) is a strong candidate in that regard, providing people a way to define, restore, and reinforce their personal and communal identity, which has been destroyed by modernist aspirations" (Ellingsen 307). Moreover, there is a strong sense that their societies have already tried secular ideologies, and these attempts have resulted in corruption, poverty, and general misery. "In the eyes of the natives, the moral and political decline of the West has depreciated the secular ideologies and valorized the nativist religions as an alternative ideological vehicle for resistance against both foreign powers and indigenous secular rulers" (Tehranian). The imperfections (often exacerbated by the egregious behavior of secular dictators) of secular society, combined with nostalgia over a perceived forgotten religious era, inspire people to look backwards and attempt to recreate a religious society, sometimes using force.

Likewise, a sense of being defeated or especially attacked, particularly when framed in an overarching sense of being a minority on the verge of extinction, can similarly propel individuals back to more traditional forms of religion and even violent, militarized religious expressions. If a society perceives its very existence to be at risk, militarily or culturally, they may feel particularly inclined to look to God for rescue. The Gush Emunim provides an excellent example



of this tendency. To many Zionists, the Holocaust demonstrated just how endangered European Jewish existence was. Moreover, placing the Jewish state in the historic *Eretz Israel* meant facing hostile Arab neighbors, and once again many Jews perceived their very existence as a Jewish people to be endangered. This fear led many to more militant and even violent expressions of religious devotion, as epitomized by Gush Emunim. Just as the Arab defeat in the Six Day War in 1967 was a rallying point for many Muslim religious leaders, the loss of territorial gains in 1973 led to a sense of “psychological defeat” and brought about “re-Judaization” efforts (Kepel, *Revenge* 157).

Similarly, the fear of losing one’s culture among the older generation can be combined with the confusion of living in multiple cultures at once among the younger generation.

The youth from a rural or newly-urban family background is thus typically exposed to at least three sets of conflicting values at home, school, and society at large. The traditional, often religious, values of the family demand modesty, frugality, and obedience to authority. The secular schools, on the other hand, impart a mix of religious and secular nationalist values primarily calling for loyalty to the national symbols of authority and the application of the scientific method to personal and social problem solving. Finally, the urban society exposes the youth to a complex range of values reflected in the exhilarating license of the modern life styles portrayed in *Dallas*, *Dynasty*, *Bay Watch*, and *Melrose Place* as well as in the repression and fear of living under authoritarian regimes. The response to these conflicting messages is initially one of confusion but subsequently a search for meaning and certainty prone to ideological extremism and syncretism (Tehrani).

The ideological extremism that comes out of these youthful searches may or may not result in religious extremism. Marxist or even democratic extremism are equally possible, and some may even develop syncretistic alternatives, such as Islamic Marxism (Tehrani). However, where

youth feel most resentful towards the culture that threatens their family's way of life, religious extremism may be the most promising choice.

## VII. POLITICAL CAUSES

Political causes often overlap with social causes and the underlying issues may even be the same at some level, but inasmuch as political scientists need to look at the way in which political structures influence the form of religious resurgence that occurs, the distinction still needs to be made between those causes more clearly associated with political factors and those not. However, there is often no simple line between the fields of sociology and political science, especially when looking at the impact of religion on either. In fact, the first political factor has everything to do with the more general sense of the failure of secularism: the failure of a secular government. While the failure of secularism can be seen as a broader social phenomenon, the failure of a secular government is a related, but specifically political, factor.

More often than not, when a population feels that secular ideologies have failed them, it has everything to do with the very real failure of their secular government to provide a basic sense of security (Tehranian). Moreover, the secular governments often exacerbate the crisis of a lost communal identity (Appleby 49). The decolonization era led to the creation of many new nation-states. As many of the secular governments established either broke down or followed corrupt totalitarian paths, religion, especially where it mixed with politics, presented itself as a legitimate means of rebelling against disastrous secular governments. In fact, the neocolonial stigma of secular governments is often a very strong impetus to seek religious alternatives (Almond 132). Clearly, the form of government plays a considerable role in this process, too.

Religious nationalism can form under both autocracies and democracies, but they are more likely to take up arms where they have no voice.

Ironically, the language of post-WWII *Moralpolitik*—“the political expression of the drive for an international order based on a universal code of human rights and the principal of state sovereignty” (Appleby 63)—has also contributed to the militarization of religious nationalisms. Instead of reading into universal human rights a condemnation of ethno-religious violence, leaders have formulated their own set of universal rights, most specifically the idea that “every ‘people’ or ‘nation’ has a right to political autonomy and to establish its own state” (63). Moreover, basing their ideas on the internationalism of *Moralpolitik*, they expect the rest of the world to support their right to self-determination (63), even when their chosen form of self-determination is, in fact, no form of democracy that will promote further self-determination.

For reasons that may be apparent, MRMs often come out of situations of turmoil. Even under normal conditions, socio-economic, religious, and political lines divide a society, but “typically it takes some precipitant, shock, or trigger to turn these inert potentialities into ‘live’ ones” (Almond 133). A government transition of power may be enough to energize groups that perceive themselves to be the losers (Almond 132). More shocking events such as civil wars, famines, or even judicial decisions are all the more mobilizing. Armed conflict, especially civil wars, particularly coexists with the failure of states to find “enduring solutions” (Appleby 59). As a result, religion and ethnicity provide “the social matrix within which political interests were defined” (59). A sense of defeat in battle may especially trigger militarization of religious movements.

Population mobility can also exacerbate the propensity to create an MRM. One frequent reason for cultural confusion of the youth, mentioned earlier, is the movement to the urban

centers for employment. "As large numbers of people are uprooted from their traditional life but do not benefit from development, they face a crisis of identity. The result is relative deprivation, which generates feelings of frustration and hence aggression." (Ellingsen 307). Governments continue to struggle (or even fail) to push economic development in the rural regions. Similarly, immigration into completely new cultures causes similar, often even more profound, identity crises and feelings of aggression. Thus population movements have been particularly formative in the development of religious nationalisms (Almond 128). While not completely controlled by the government in most cases, clearly governments play a significant role in the existence of population mobility through the economic and immigration policies executed.

Policies dealing with the indoctrination of the new generation, namely education policy, tend to have an especially exacerbating force on religious aggravation. Secular schools and universities are seen as the catalysts of skills and beliefs that erode religious dedication. "Generally speaking, the most educated strata of populations are least susceptible to fundamentalism; the elite colleges and universities are less susceptible than the marginal ones" (Almond 124). A sudden change in laws surrounding education can become a rallying force for religious nationalists.

Economic development has a visible impact on all of the above factors, with the only possible exception being the reaction to international *Moralpolitik*. Governments, secular or otherwise, are more likely to fail to meet their constituents' basic needs for security and social services in the absence of economic development. Domestic turmoil often occurs concurrently with economic downfalls, precisely because domestic turmoil leads to economic difficulties, which in turn exacerbate conflict. As economic difficulties increase, often the rural poor suffer the most and find their way to cities to seek employment. Finally, an increase in income allows

families to provide for a better education for their children, thus reducing the likelihood of them joining in uneducated, mass MRMs.

Obviously the economic decisions of a government and the influential outside forces have a profound effect on the other factors that may affect the propensity to develop into an MRM. Moreover, "rank-and-file fundamentalists tend to be recruited from the less-developed, less 'modern' parts of societies, from the rural population, from the poorer parts of the cities, from the less well educated, from social strata relatively deprived in economic and social development and improvement, and the like" (Almond 130). Accordingly, one would expect to see low GDPs, high inequality, and economic crises all contributing to the rise in MRMs. Specifically, the disappointment of high inequality in capitalism (alongside the failure of socialism) is frequently cited as an impetus for Islamic extremism (Regan 262). However, one should note, "social movements occur when the economy is doing well, doing poorly, or stagnant" (Williams 803).

## VIII. POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES

There are many visible consequences to a militarized religious movement, not the least of which being the actual loss of life resulting from the conflict caused by the militarization of religion. This life-threatening reality frightens most Westerners to the point that they are mesmerized by stories of MRMs on the other side of the world. Moreover, violence in general, but especially political violence and assassinations, produces an incredibly destabilizing force. Countries wracked by frequent religious violence would likely struggle with both economic and democratic development.

Even more fundamentally, MRMs tend to promote very hierarchical religious forms that discourage rationality and critical thinking, which are seen as part of the secular erosion of religion. Similarly, the violence associated with an MRM counters the construction of social trust. Robert Putnam, in working in the various regions of Italy found that the more hierarchical one's religious associations are, the less likely that person will be civically engaged. On a macro level, the more hierarchical a society's associations, the less social capital there is and the more difficult it becomes for a democracy to succeed (Putnam 107). A lack of social capital might make a community more likely to seek connections within an MRM as well; thus the two may become intertwined in a vicious cycle. Regardless, one would expect to find where MRMs have been most prevalent, social capital (and therefore democracy) also flounders most. "Religious nationalism appears to be an obstacle to democracy and may ultimately hinder the consolidation process in most cases because there is no room for compromise and little belief in democratic dispositions or beliefs" (Rieffer 235)

Correspondingly, the nature of religiosity in a revolution has a profound impact on the sort of resulting government if successful (Rieffer 233). In the majority of cases, religious nationalism has led to non-democratic forms of government (235). There are several explanations for this reality, beyond only the social capital explanation of Putnam. Additionally, religious nationalist movements tend to be based on exclusion, and discrimination is often practiced against those who are not members of the religious group. Such discriminatory practices do not pave the way for a democratic government that represents all members of society and often lead to violence (234).

If co-opted by the government (or merely a more secular nationalist movement), an MRM puts considerable pressure on the leaders to cater to their religious stances. The leader of such a

movement may believe compromise would be best for the larger community but, due to religious considerations, must maintain hard-line stances. Palestinian and Israeli leaders when considering the future of Jerusalem remain perpetually confronted with this reality. Rieffer gives the example of how Yasser Arafat, if he had ever so desired, would have had a particularly difficult time relinquishing the rights of Palestinians to Jerusalem for the larger goal of peace (236). The same remains true for current leaders on both the Israeli and Palestinian sides. Arafat might never have desired such a compromise, but if a leader otherwise inclined to compromise should find him/herself in a position of leading an MRM, s/he might use compromise only as a last resort, rather than a first. In this scenario, peace appears unlikely. Correspondingly, in an already existing conflict, an MRM exacerbates the tension (Fox, "The Rise" 728)—making the conflict both more violent and longer sustained.

## IX. CONCLUSION

Without a doubt, religious nationalisms have changed the face of communities all over the world in the last three decades. Militarized religious movements, in the constant threat of terror that they carry, are particularly manipulative of their societies. Unfortunately, there is not a wealth of research on the subject. In reality, much of the Western world is only just realizing that religious violence affects them too, and one would expect funding for research to slowly follow this realization. However, one can make a few postulations, based on the research available on religious nationalisms and fundamentalisms, that show that political factors have a significant impact on MRMs and that MRMs conversely have a significant impact on politics.

The most important political cause is the failure of a government to bring stability, decrease inequality, and promote economic prosperity. Both the actual perception of a failed

secular government and the real side effects of the failure provide an impetus to revert to violence. Contentious policies on immigration and education exacerbate the situation, and the language of *Moralpolitik* gives the moral justification for an MRM's demands. These findings indicate that governments need to make a priority of stabilizing countries with radicalizing populations. Unfortunately, the research suggests that the consequences of an MRM only lead to more of the very same factors that drove individuals to the MRM in the first place: failed governments and economic stagnation.

Not only do militarized religious movements produce politically horrible vicious cycles, they violently rob individuals, as my Egyptian host mom so aptly reminded me, of the lives and cultures that were once so dear to them. Understanding how governments may or may not influence this process is essential to lessening the damage that might otherwise be done. To begin that process, it is beneficial to start with a closer examination of the places and organizations that have made up MRMs, as will be continued in Part Two.



## PART 2: THE CASE STUDIES

*In the orient there is either one country too few or one people too many.*” –George Malek (Hanf

1)

Too many people, and too few chairs; too many interests and too few resources--in America we call this commonplace children’s game “Musical Chairs,” but in Germany it is better referred to as *Reise nach Jerusalem* or “Journey to Jerusalem.” The irony in this title reflects the reality in the Middle Eastern countries surrounding Jerusalem. Each group, whether grouped primarily on religion or ethnicity, perceives that their claim to the land cannot coexist with all the multiple competing claims—somebody must inevitably lose his/her chair in this game. “When the diplomatic music stops the struggle for the chairs is fought with guns... For, in reality, the loss of one’s chair means subjugation, expulsion, life in refugee camps or emigration—if not physical annihilation. The fear of being the ultimate loser is the supreme force in politics in the countries along the roads to Jerusalem” (Hanf 1-2).

Clearly, this reality of Middle Eastern life does not emerge in a vacuum. The history used to validate political stances often begins centuries, even millennia, ago. For the Gush Emunim, one must, at least, understand their claim to the land—a claim that is four millennia old; for the Muslim Brotherhood, one must vaguely comprehend the impact of colonization on a culture that prides itself as having been one of the first great civilizations; and in Lebanon, one must see how so many Christians, who are a small minority in the rest of the Middle East, ended up in Lebanon, well over a millennium ago. Without understanding the contexts of the groups that would eventually become militarized along religious lines, it is impossible to understand the causes of their militarization. In the Middle East, memories of the past run deep, and what

happened ten years, one century, or even two millenia ago are all relevant to the political culture of contemporary times.

## I. HISTORY OF LEBANON

*“Lebanon is the history of religions with all their heresies and schisms” (Hanf 48).*

In a sense religious violence created Lebanon—not in the usual sense of battles and military feats giving one Lebanese religious group dominance over another (though such battles would come later), but in that religious violence drove minorities to seek refuge in the mountains of Lebanon (Hanf 53). In fact, the roots of every confessional group in Lebanon begin in neighboring countries (Khashan 4). The Maronites, followers of St. Maron in northeast Syria, were persecuted under the Byzantine Empire in the seventh century for their unorthodox view that Christ possessed only one nature with two parts, human and divine, rather than two natures (Hiro 1). Driven to Mount Lebanon to seek refuge, within a few centuries the Maronites were followed by the Druze, a secretive and heavily persecuted Muslim sect who believed in reincarnation and the transmigration of the soul and did not fast during Ramadan (Khashan 5).

Given that both groups splintered off from two warring religions, it is no surprise that eventually even the two refuge-seeking groups' relations would be problematic. In the hopes of preventing neighboring Muslim rulers from encroaching on their independence, the Maronites began a habit of forming ill-conceived foreign alliances (or at least alliances that conferred to them no favorable standing in the eyes of their neighbors), by actively endorsing the Crusaders, even coming to their military defense on occasion. Predictably, acting as the sole Arab supporters of the Crusaders (Haddad 30) backfired on their plan to maintain autonomy and hindered relations with both the Sunni rulers and their Druze neighbors. When the Crusaders left,

the Mamluk regime “brought instant punitive campaigns against the defiant Maronites” (Khashan 5). Yet, Khashan argues, the painful encounters with the Mamluk authorities only sealed the “Maronite impassioned fixation of their outlook and identification towards the West” (5).

Simultaneously the persecuted Druze made a similar ill-fated alliance, attempting to “prove their loyalty to Islam by participating zealously in the battles against Christian [Crusader] forces” (Hiro 2). By the turn of the thirteenth century, Druze occupied relatively high positions for a ‘heretical’ sect in the Mamluk empire, acting as both cavalry officers and administrators (Hiro 2). Clearly, this position pitted them against the Maronites who fought for the Crusaders. However, following the Crusaders’ defeat, the Mamluk dynasty had less use for the Druze. As both, once again, persecuted minorities, “the Maronites and the Druze forged a potent alliance that did not seem to falter until the beginning of the nineteenth century” (Khashan 5). Haddad writes of the Maronites, “Accustomed to independence, the mountain-dwellers were willing to use any ally to weaken their Sunni ruler” (30). These allies included at various times the Crusaders and the Druze and would later lead to alliances with the French and eventually even Israel, what many in the surrounding Arab region would consider the greatest betrayal.

Meanwhile, following the Crusades in the middle of the thirteenth century, the Shi’is, who believed authority could only be traced through the descendants of Ali and therefore not given to the caliphate, began to move towards the mountains, fleeing Sunni raids along the coast (Khashan 6). While Maronites actively opposed the Sunnis during the Crusades, Shi’is did not actively support the Sunni’s jihad against the Crusaders either. This reaction (or lack thereof) meant that the Shi’is, along with the Maronites, equally bore the brunt of Sunni retribution following the Crusades (Khashan 6). Moreover, while the Ottoman empire recognized Maronites

and Druze's religious status, the Shi'is were not recognized, leading to still greater persecution and political weakness (Khashan 7). This established weakness of the Shi'is remains through contemporary times.

For a time, the various confessional groups of Lebanon struck a certain balance, lasting into the sixteenth century, with the minority mountain-dwellers maintaining a degree of independence from the Ottoman empire. However, inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflict in the sixteenth century attracted European attention as an opportune moment to increase their influence in the region. "France took the lead, and in 1535 Francis I and Sulaiman II signed an agreement in which the French gained important concessions entitling them (among other things) to attend to the religious and cultural interests of the Maronties of Mount Lebanon" (Khashan 8). This action has developed extraordinary importance, because France established its long-term interest in the Lebanese "Catholics," which did not extend to other confessional groups in Lebanon. Meanwhile, Rome sent its own Franciscans and Jesuits to Lebanon while receiving Maronite clergy that wanted to study. European ties increased educational opportunities for Maronites quickly, so that by 1736 every parish maintained a school (Hanf 56). This trend increased only more when in 1740 the Ottoman Empire gave France still greater authority in relation to Catholic subjects in the empire. Under French influence, Christian orders opened what scholars today consider the first modern schools in Lebanon, thereby further advantaging the Maronite communities (Hanf 57). Interestingly, the Emir of Mount Lebanon, Yusuf Shehabi, "abandoned Islam and joined the Maronite Church, much invigorated by the formal links it had forged with the Roman Catholic Church in 1736... followed by his son Bashir" (Hiro 2-3). The Maronites continued to gain considerable educational and political power during this time.

The Maronites and Druze alliance broke down in 1845 over an argument over who had right to rule as governor (Moosa 285). It quickly became clear France would protect the Maronites, even dispatching its own forces (Hiro 3). In 1859, Maronite peasants and farm laborers revolted against Druze elites (Hanf 59). Druze peasants refused to join in the revolt, even if they too suffered under their notables, thus dividing what would have been a social revolution along religious lines: Sunnis and Shi'is joined the conflict on the side of the Druze, and the Melchites took the side of the Maronites (Hanf 60). Christians were losing and being slaughtered when France intervened, once again coming to the rescue of Maronites in the region. "The events of 1860 turned the cleavages between the religious communities into the preeminent factor of social and political life in Lebanon. Mistrust, fear, and hate coloured attitudes on both sides" (Hanf 60).

As a result of French and other European pressure, the Ottoman Empire declared Mount Lebanon an autonomous province, with the exclusion of port cities such as Beirut, Tripoli, and Sidon (Hiro 3), giving the new province a Christian governor (though not actually Lebanese). Moreover, as the province transitioned into a system of proportional representation (Hanf 61), the demographic dominance of the Maronites established that they would also be politically dominant (Hiro 3). This situation maintained itself essentially up until 1915, with France still asserting its influence, leading the business class and Christian bourgeoisie to adopt European customs and clothing (Hanf 63).

During World War I, the Ottomans reestablished direct rule over Mount Lebanon. When the Ottoman Empire then broke apart in 1918, the French gained a mandate over Lebanon and Syria (Hiro 3). By this time, it was clear that the French desired to see a strong Catholic (Maronite) presence in the Middle East and made sure that the shape and size of Greater

Lebanon, which added territory to the original Mount Lebanon, would be both economically viable and predominantly Christian (Hiro 4). Lebanese Christians saw the creation of Lebanon as their only protection against the surrounding Muslim world, while incorporated Muslims feared being forced into a Christian-dominant country, where they might live their lives as second-class citizens (Haddad 31). Importantly, however, Hanf emphasizes that even while accepting the French help in this process, Lebanese Christian leadership would have rather have independence in 1920 and were “self-assured enough to safeguard the peculiarities of the country and its institutions against French governors and officials” (67).

In June 1941, British and the Free French troops under De Gaulle’s command took control of the Lebanese mandate, and under British influence, De Gaulle’s representative declared Lebanon independent on November 26<sup>th</sup>, 1941 (Hanf 71). However, corresponding action to turn control over to Lebanese nationals did not follow this decree, frustrating Lebanese nationals. In postponing true Lebanese sovereignty, the French “unwittingly fostered among the Lebanese a degree of understanding and community that had not existed before” (Hanf 71). On November 8<sup>th</sup>, 1943, a parliament that consisted of Maronites, Druze, Sunnis, Shi’is, Greek Catholics, and Greek Orthodox unanimously passed several constitutional amendments, “including the repeal of all articles referring to the mandate, and reaffirmed the independence of the country” (Hanf 71). With the help of British and American pressure, the Lebanese succeeded in winning sovereignty.

However, the ecumenical harmony demonstrated in their quest for independence did not last indefinitely. The various factions within Lebanon formed the National Pact, comprised of an understanding of the identity of the country and compromises on power-sharing between the religious groups. “Christians renounced the protection of western powers, the Muslims

renounced union with Syria or other Arab states: Lebanon would be 'neither Eastern nor Western', but an independent country in its own right" (Hanf 72). Moreover, the pact gave the powerful roles in the country to religious groups according to their demographic significance: the president would be Maronite, the prime minister Sunni, and the speaker of parliament Shi'i. Additionally, in parliament, there would be six Christian seats to every five Muslim in recognition of the 1932 census that showed Christians made up 54% of the population (Hiro 5). Nonetheless, it is worth noting, some very prominent members of the Maronite Church advocated a more sectarian view of Lebanon as a Christian state. In fact, in 1945 Maronite patriarch, Arida, went before the United Nations to argue on behalf of the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine and a Christian state in Lebanon (Moosa 292). This view was not particularly unusual, even at the time that the nation's politicians were attempting to build a more pluralistic state.

In 1958, Lebanon barely avoided a prolonged civil war, though many would call the ensuing civil crisis a prologue to the war that would begin in 1975. At the time, the conflict was not over the demographic make-up of the government but over diplomatic relations with the rest of the Arab world. Muslims, as a whole, believed Lebanon ought to fully ally itself with (or even join) the United Arab Republic (the short-lived union of Egypt and Syria). Most Christians, especially the Maronites, however, believed more firmly in Lebanon's independence and connection to the West. Violence erupted, until eventually neither side felt capable of winning. Little was gained from the resulting violence except reaffirmation of the National Pact. "After 1958 extreme restraint was the keynote of Lebanese foreign policy" (Hanf 111).

With time it became clear that the Christians, especially the Maronites, as a privileged class in Lebanon were having fewer children and replacing themselves at a slower rate than their

Muslim counterparts. Yet even as this trend continued into the 1960s and 1970s, Maronites refused to give up any portion of the political control (Haddad 32). Moreover, in this same period, further polarization developed between Muslims and Christians over the plight of newly arrived Palestinian refugees and armed PLO fighters in Lebanon after the 1967 Six Day War, which threatened to disrupt the Christian demographic dominance even further (Haddad 32).

The situation regarding the Palestinian presence escalated when, following violent clashes with Jordanian authorities in 1970, the PLO moved its headquarters to Beirut. With the increase in anti-Israeli operations coming from the Lebanese-based Palestinians came an increase in Israel's reprisals against Palestinian targets (Hiro 13). After an Israeli assassination of three prominent Palestinian leaders in downtown Beirut on April 10, 1973, 250,000 individuals, nearly all Muslim, came together for the funeral procession, a staggering ten percent of the adult population in Lebanon. Hiro calls this gathering "an indirect warning to the authorities to refrain from succumbing to the Israeli pressure and suppressing the Palestinian resistance" (13-14). President Franjeh did not heed this warning, cooperating with Israeli authorities to reduce PLO operations in Lebanon. Both Christians and Muslims seemed to sense coming violence, and in the ensuing calm the various factions began to gather arms and prepare themselves for the impending war (14).

In 1975, civil war actually erupted. "The Palestinian organizations triggered off, and remained the prime object of, the conflict in Lebanon... They have always regarded Israel as the enemy absolute, and the Christian Lebanese nationalists as at best 'isolationists' who wished to remain aloof from the common struggle of all Arabs, at worst as collaborationists of Israel" (Hanf 184). It was in this backdrop that various Maronite factions militarized, supported by the church, and formed the Lebanese Forces.



## II. HISTORY OF EGYPT

While many scholars tout the Muslim Brotherhood as an example of a moderate Islamic force in the Middle East, and possibly accurately so, the Egyptian government at least has not taken for granted its acquiescence to secular rule. In fact, as part of the process of maintaining an image of control, the post-revolutionary government has publicly assassinated members of the Brotherhood on five occasions, in 1954, 1966, 1974, 1977, and 1981 (Kepel 27). It is important to note, however, that the Muslim Brotherhood at least officially condemns the use of violence (with some overseas exceptions), and authoritarian rulers often clamp down on politically powerful non-violent groups. However, certainly members of the Brotherhood have engaged in violence at times, even if the leadership chose not to claim the acts, and one of the greatest scholars of the Brotherhood, Sayyid Qutb, repeatedly advocated the use of extralegal, violent forces (Kepel 54-56). Moreover, multiple smaller splinter groups, such as Jamaat al-Islamiyya, have left the Muslim Brotherhood to commit violent acts. While those acts committed by Muslim Brotherhood individuals or splinter groups does not reflect necessarily poorly on the Brotherhood leadership, it does demonstrate that the teachings within the Muslim Brotherhood often foment into more violent expression outside the official auspices of the Brotherhood. Due to the lack of extensive research on any individual splinter group, my research will focus on the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood more generally but also highlight acts committed by those with only roots in the Muslim Brotherhood. One could legitimately question to what degree the Muslim Brotherhood is truly responsible for what more extremist members and former members do. However, the conditions leading to the growth of the Muslim Brotherhood, out of which these splinter groups formed, will be the same.

Before 1914, the British had quasi-ruled Egypt indirectly through its military presence and economic influence while allowing the country officially to remain a fairly autonomous member of the Ottoman Empire under the rule of the Muhammad Ali Dynasty. However, in light of the beginning of World War I, the British declared a protectorate over Egypt, releasing Egyptians of their "obligation" to Britain's enemy, the Ottoman Empire (Harris, Christina 82). However, many Egyptians viewed life under the British protectorate as humiliating and a submission to the Western colonization they had thus far avoided. Following the war, when the British and French jointly declared that the "liberated" Ottoman provinces should form free, independent states, many Egyptians hoped this declaration would apply to them as well (Harris, Christina 88). However, the British appeared in no hurry to let go of their newly acquired protectorate. Movements to gain independence peacefully, primarily through the Wafd party, following the signing of the armistice, led nowhere (Harris, Christina 90-91).

Following the British deportation of major Wafdist leaders in the beginning of 1919, widespread rebellion broke out. Harris writes of the united sense in the populations following the deportations, "So effective was Wafdist leadership that the fellahin joined the urban nationalists in anti-British action; Muslims and Copts stood solidly together; and even the women of Egypt, of all classes, joined in unprecedented public demonstrations" (92). At first, rebellious Egyptians focused on disrupting communications and isolating towns and cities in order to drive the technology-dependent Brits out. For a time, they even managed to cut off the bustling city of Cairo from the outside world. Later, however, the focus transitioned to general strikes by the lawyers, students, transport workers, and government workers (Harris, Christina 92). The British responded slowly with long phases of investigation, the writing of treaties, and various

negotiations, during which time the desperate rebellion escalated from strikes to serious riots with major losses of life on the part of foreign residents (Harris, Christina 95).

Finally in a strange compromise, on February 28<sup>th</sup> 1922, the British government declared Egypt independent, leaving, however, the security of communications, the defense of Egypt, the protection of foreigners and minorities, and the Sudan “to the discretion of His Majesty’s Government until such time as it may be possible by free discussion and friendly accommodation on both sides to conclude agreements in regard thereto between His Majesty’s Government and the Government of Egypt” (qtd. in Harris, Christina 96). While this agreement did quell the violence and allow Egyptians to begin the process of forming their own constitutional monarchy and representative institutions, clearly the British were refusing to leave the political picture entirely, dooming the Egyptian government from the start. Much of the population saw the remaining monarchy of King Farouk I during the 1923 to 1952 period as merely a puppet regime, failing to uphold the ideals of the 1919-1922 uprising by cleanly breaking with the British (Musallam 10).

Simultaneously during this time secularism concurrently with nationalism grew significantly and impacted society on all levels. Even as early as 1900 the Mufti of Egypt advocated a move away from strict interpretations of scripture (Abdo 48). In 1927, Taha Hussayn, a former student at the conservative al-Azhar University published a book in Arabic called *On Pre-Islamic Poetry* which cast doubt on both pre-Islamic poetry and on specific Qur’anic stories on Abraham and Ishmael. During the same period, Darwinism gained common use among Egyptian scholars, and the women’s emancipation movement took root, with significant legislation from 1923-1931 challenging the traditional Islamic view of marriage (Musallam 5-6). In both the West and Egypt, the modernization theory remained hardly

contested in academic societies. Yet even as liberal nationalists and secularists rejoiced in their successes, simultaneously a reactive force took root—one that was a violent polar opposite oriented around the Muslim religion (Musallam 1-2).

Hassan al-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood in 1929 (Rubin 10). The Brotherhood stemmed from the growing contrast in many writings between the so-called “‘spiritual’ East and the ‘materialist’ West, the ‘oppressed’ East and the ‘imperial’ West” (Musallam 8). The organization took off and grew rapidly during the 1930s, recruiting tens of thousands of members, including those in the army and police, and maintained a large arms cache. Immediately, it sensed that the society’s goals might juxtapose it against the government and therefore formed a secret sub-organization in charge of military training and terrorist activities (Rubin 11).

Meanwhile, the defeat in the 1948 War with newly formed Israel radicalized the general population. Nasser, later discussing the days leading to the 1948 War, openly declared that the very “existence of Israel itself is an aggression” (“Six Day War”). Speaking of the effect of the Israeli-Western partnership in the creation of Israel, Shahid Alam writes,

The Zionist partnership with the West was indispensable for the creation of a Jewish state. This partnership was also fateful. It produced a powerful new dialectic, which has encouraged Israel, both as the political center of the Jewish Diaspora and the chief outpost of the West in the heart of the Islamic world, to become more daring in its designs against the Islamic world and beyond. In turn, a wounded and humiliated Islamic world, more resentful and determined after every defeat, has been driven to embrace increasingly radical ideas and methods to recover its dignity and power--and to attain this recovery on the strength of Islamic ideas.

For many citizens, with the failure of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War came the gut response that the current Egyptian government had likewise failed the Arab world. There could be only two

potentially legitimate paths left to take: either the Marxist or that of the Muslim Brotherhood (Musallam 2).

These two forces made an unlikely alliance leading up to the 1952 revolution, temporarily strengthening both of their positions, and on July 23<sup>rd</sup> 1952, the nationalists toppled the existing monarchy, finally bringing about a truly independent state. Clearly, however, it was an unequal win for the two groups, with secular socialists in charge and Gamal Abdel Nasser at the head. With the heavy encouragement of Nasser, Arab nationalism (and thereby not Muslim nationalism) became the dominant vision in leading society (Rubin 11). Almost immediately, Nasser dissolved all political parties, but since the Muslim Brotherhood was not technically a political party, this did not immediately affect them (Kepel, *Muslim* 26). Initially Nasser made several conciliatory gestures towards the Brotherhood for their patriotism in fighting in the nationalist movement. He opened the investigation of the murder of Hassan al-Banna, arrested many enemies of the Brotherhood, and made friendly appointments within the government (Musallam 137-8). However, when it became clear that the Muslim Brotherhood would never accept a secular state, Nasser quickly purged the Brotherhood from the government (138). The Muslim Brotherhood felt betrayed, largely ignored by the government they had initially supported and helped bring to power, and small-scale conflict with the government began to escalate. For the time being, the government felt it could not fully suppress the Muslim Brotherhood immediately, given its still weak state and the vast popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood.

On October 26<sup>th</sup> 1954, however, the Muslim Brotherhood essentially handed the government an excuse to begin officially persecuting it, when a member of the Brotherhood attempted to assassinate Nasser during a speech in Alexandria. Though the assassination failed,

the entire country heard the interrupting gunshots on the radio (Kepel, *Muslim* 27). Consequently the state responded swiftly to the Muslim Brotherhood: “their headquarters were burned down, their leaders were arrested and tortured, and government agents inflamed the populace against their members” (27). While these actions did force a change upon the Brotherhood and for a time they became less popular, their story did not end there.

Originally an assistant of Nasser (Musallam 141), Sayyid Qutb found himself especially vocal in his criticism of Nasser and the secular regime. His writings, as already mentioned, would become the backbone of the Muslim Brotherhood. Qutb spent ten years in the Tura prison under appalling conditions, nearly always in the infirmary with consumption (Kepel, *Muslim* 27). The treatment that he received and witnessed in the concentration camp had a profound impact on him. Kepel notes one occasion that seems to have particularly inspired Qutb. Rumors in the camp circulated that several members of the Muslim Brotherhood would be killed when they reported to work, so in sheer terror they locked themselves in their cells, refusing to leave, until the camp soldiers broke in, massacring twenty-one of them (Kepel, *Muslim* 28). During this time, Qutb continued writing, but the nature of his writing began to change, having lost his “remaining illusion as to the Muslim character of the Nasser regime” (Kepel, *Muslim* 28). He now had the impetus to advocate more direct attacks on the government and an attempt to seize power (Rubin 12).

The very last work of Qutb before his execution in 1966, *Signposts*, became his most controversial and shaped the future development of the next generation of the Islamic movement. At its most basic level, “Qutb presented his analysis of the regime and his recommendation of how to destroy it and replace it with an Islamic state” (Kepel, *Muslim* 37). Clearly life in Nasser’s concentration camps influenced the writing of *Signposts*, in which Qutb went far

beyond al-Banna's rhetoric by declaring the Nasser government *jahiliyya*, or "pre-Islamic" (Kepel, *Muslim* 46). In other words, if secular regime could not be considered Muslim, then the true Muslims had an obligation to forcefully remove it to bring about the true Islamic society. Qutb emphasizes the need to interpret Jihad as more than an inward or merely defensive battle (Kepel, *Muslim* 54).

The work holds significance in light of the generational conflict that arose in response to it. Older Brethren, who had experienced multiple arrests and were attempting to make peace with the Nasserist regime, could not fully embrace this piece of writing. Banna's successor, Hasan al-Hudaybi, suggested a concerted effort work within the government to bring about change (Rubin 12). On the other hand, youthful activists inspired by Qutb recommended the forceful overthrow of the regime. Older Brethren attempted warn Qutb and his followers "against the dangers of youthful enthusiasm" (Kepel, *Muslim* 31), but with no single uniting leader (as Banna had once been), the two groups were destined to split (Rubin 12). In light of the 1965 arrests and Qutb's execution, the older generation began adopting a reformist orientation, while the younger generation responded to the arrests and execution with still more vigor, leading to the aforementioned splinter groups (Kepel, *Muslim* 72).

### III. HISTORY OF ISRAEL

*"Let us say clearly and strongly: we are not occupying foreign territories in Judea and Samaria. This is our ancient home. And thank G-d that we have brought it back to life. Unfortunately, some of our ancient towns in YESHA are still illegally occupied by foreigners, interfering with the Divine process of redemption of Israel" (qtd. in Shahak xi)*

Studying Israeli-Jewish militarized religious movements presents a unique situation, inasmuch as the entire Israeli population is militarized through the draft. For many, religion

might play a role in the incentive to defend their country well, thus blurring the line between secular and religious militarized movements. To prevent this confusion, I will focus primarily on extralegal movements. Admittedly, however, strict adherence to this decision ignores the so-called hawks that use religion to promote greater military involvement and war. Often times, the theological basis for members of religious extralegal movements and religious war hawks in government are the same, and the categories may even overlap.

Before covering the modern history of Israel, especially MRMs, one must at least have a cursory understanding of more ancient Jewish history and certain Jewish movements that have been revered throughout the ages. One of the most notable examples would be that of the Maccabee revolt in 167 BCE against the Seleucid dynasty, who forbid Jewish religious practice. The success of the Maccabees in crushing their foes, according to Demant, became the prototype for politico-religious leaders claiming that redemption was at hand (“Jewish Fundamentalism” 3). Important to the story of the Maccabees’ success is the entanglement of politics and religion: “The lack of political freedom, so characteristic of most periods of Jewish history, sharply contrasted with the prophets’ grandiose visions of Redemption, when God would liberate the Children of Israel and chastise their oppressors. Worldly emancipation and spiritual rapture go hand in hand in the vision of Redemption, which linked up with belief in the coming of God’s Anointed, the Messiah” (Demant, “Jewish Fundamentalism” 3).

Equally important to the story is the hindsight now looking back, knowing that within two centuries the Jewish temple would be utterly destroyed by the Romans and Jews dispersed all over the empire in an attempt to destroy their society. When the Romans had gained control of Israel (which they would then rename, Philistine, commonly translated to Palestine in English, to mock the Jews by naming the land after their historical enemy), Jewish zealots felt that an



uprising was necessary to counter the spread of emperor worship and polytheism (Demant, “Jewish Fundamentalism” 3). These zealots used the memory of the Maccabee revolt, as many contemporary Israelis do today, for inspiration to fight the battle that eventually led to defeat, the diaspora, and a near genocide (Demant, “Jewish Fundamentalism” 4). Clearly, defeat is not a statement about the morality of fighting, but the defeat shaped how Jews would see their role as minorities under foreign ruling powers for generations to come.

In Europe, during the Middle Age especially, the anti-Messianic reaction took root. Most Jewish theologians felt that suffering and persecution was simply a part of their lot. The diaspora was a punishment from God, and accepting suffering and persecution was part of God’s plan of redemption. To make any movement to bring about the Messianic age and reverse the age-old suffering (such as by returning to Palestine) would be merely interfering with God’s will for His people (Weissbrod, “Gush Emunim” 267). For several centuries, religious Zionism (as the movement would eventually be called) not only did *not* exist but also would have been heretical.

Secular Zionism became an official movement under Theodore Herzl in the late nineteenth century and religious Zionism through the organization of the Mizrachi in 1902 (Sprinzak, *Ascendence* 30). Rabbi Reines, the founder, kept a very moderate view of the future state of Israel. He did not see it as redemptive, merely necessary for the survival and well-being of Jews worldwide that they have a homeland and that there existed Biblical precedence to make that in then-Palestine (Sprinzak, *Ascendence* 30). Though founded shortly after the growth of secular Zionism, religious Zionism continued to flounder for quite some time. However, the experiences of European Jews during the Holocaust seemed to confirm Reines’ views, and more religious Jews accepted the necessity of a place to call home—even if they actually disapproved

of making it a state. Clearly, Reines and his followers, though “religious Zionists,” hardly set the precedence for future MRMs.

The teachings of Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook, as mentioned previously, are today the foundation for future MRMs and most specifically Gush Emunim. In 1921, Rabbi Kook became the first Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi of the mandated Palestine (Demant, “Jewish Fundamentalism” 5). The Latvian-born rabbi emphasized a new understanding of Israel and the Jewish people. First Kook had to establish why the old view of waiting for the Messiah in order to return to the Land of Israel was wrong. Since Jews from all over the world were being forced to immigrate into Palestine for material reasons, not out of a desire to bring about on their own the age of the Messiah, he argued that it was beyond a human endeavor and could not be forbidden (Weissbrod, “Gush Emunim” 267). Clearly, Kook saw God’s hand at work, drawing His children back to their promised land. In fact, all Zionists, even secular Zionists, were part of the redemptive move of God, even if unbeknownst to themselves (Demant, “Jewish Fundamentalism” 5). Moreover, religious Jews needed to stand by their secular brothers and sisters in Israel, because only united could they be a witness of holiness to the rest of the world (Weissbrod, “Gush Emunim” 268). This gathering of the Jews in one place signified even greater importance as Kook became convinced that the greatest risk to the Jewish people (before the Holocaust anyhow) was assimilation. Only by heeding the call to return to the Land could Jews now fight this growing temptation (Weissbrod, “Gush Emunim” 268). Since such great emphasis was given to the awakening of holy desires and the beginning of redemption, even among secular Jews, through returning to their promised land, the movement that stemmed from Kook’s teachings “was totally hostile to the partition of Palestine” (Sprinzak, *Ascendence* 31).

After Independence and up until 1967, most Israelis viewed the religious Zionist movement, especially the followers of Rabbi Kook Sr., as a radical group on the fringes of society, but the Six Day War of June 1967 changed everything for Israel. During the month leading up to the war, many Israelis felt frightened and abandoned by their Western allies. War with their neighboring Arab countries was inevitable, and Israel would be vastly outnumbered (they did not yet comprehend the strength that came from Western military training and equipment). Sprinzak writes, “They could not but hate the political arrangement of 1949 that left them open to attack from all sides. *Israel was Masada*<sup>1</sup>, a small rock in the midst of a hostile wilderness” (*Ascendence* 38).

Victory against the combined armies of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan in six days alone would have caused shock beyond comprehension, but with the quick victory came, not only an affirmation of their long-term existence in the Middle East, but the control of the West Bank, Sinai, and the Golan Heights—all of great religious significance to Jews (Sprinzak, *Ascendence* 35). Suddenly, the words of Rabbi Kook, Sr. were given new credence, and his son, Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook, who had been interpreting his father’s words for decades, gave new life to his teachings. The younger Kook interpreted the command to emigrate to Israel to now mean all land won in the Six Day War, emphasizing that it may even require martyrdom on occasion (Weissbrod, “Gush Emunim” 269). Moreover, government was only legitimate if it represented the people’s interests, and, in this case, the redemption of the Jews (and through the Jews, the entire world) was the people’s interest. Therefore if the government forbid the settling of the new territories, which were necessary to God’s redemption, obeying the government would actually

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<sup>1</sup> Masada is the location of the legendary mass suicide of a splinter group of Jewish Zealots. According to the Jewish-Roman historian Josephus, the group chose death over enslavement and possible Roman cruelty. Many scholars question the historical accuracy of this story, but most Jews grow up familiar with the legend.

bring God's curse (Weissbrod, "Gush Emunim" 269). To succeed religious Jews must actively partner with secular Jews, hoping that in the process they might bring the secular Jews back into the fold (Weissbrod, "Gush Emunim" 270).

Given what appeared to be a miraculous victory for Israel, many Israelis took greater notice of the teachings of the Rabbis Kook. Religion seemed the only way to explain the need for a complete revolution in thought, starting with "an immense sense of national vulnerability, personal insecurity, memories of the Holocaust, and then, suddenly within a week, the destruction of all the threatening Arab armies and a return of the nation to much of its biblical territory" (Sprinzak, *Ascendence* 38). Moreover, the already-religious Orthodox populations, who had not previously perceived themselves as ultra-nationalist, saw in the Six Day War the fulfillment of Messianic expectations (Demant, "Jewish Fundamentalism" 6), leading to their own politicization. It is only in light of the incredibleness of the Six Day War that one can even imagine the sudden growth of Gush Emunim in the years to come.

The career of Gush Emunim... represents, in many ways, a mirror image of the career of Arab fundamentalism. Whereas the Arabs, as a result of the June 1967 war, experienced frustration and anomie, the Jews experienced elation. While the Arabs bewailed the loss of holy sites, Israelis rejoiced over the conquest of such religious sites as Jerusalem, the Temple mount, the Western Wall, and Hebron. Moreover, religious Zionists considered the Israeli victory to be a sign of divine deliverance and a portent of immanent redemption, while even some secular Israelis spoke of it in theological terms (Silberstein 16).

As Israelis struggled with what to do with newly acquired territory that was home to approximately 1.5 million Palestinians (Demant, "Jewish Fundamentalism" 6), Messianic visions shaped the answers of religious groups.

Immediately following the Six Day War, Hanan Porat started organizing followers to return to Kfar Etzion, the site of a significant Jewish massacre in 1948 and the kibbutz where

Porat had spent several years of his childhood before being evacuated. By 1968, Porat had successfully organized the settlement of Gush Etzion, a block of settlements in the immediate vicinity of Kfar Etzion, and a Jewish quarter in Hebron called Kiryat Arba (Weissbrod, "Gush Emunim" 266). Rabbi Levinger became the leader of Kiryat Arba, and together Porat and Levinger, along with the young settlers under them, formed the core of what would become Gush Emunim. Most of the young men on the settlements (and eventually in Gush Emunim) had graduated from Yeshivot Hesder, "the Talmudic college whose students serve in the army" (Weissbrod, "Gush Emunim" 272), combining military service with Torah studies, which contrasts with the average Yeshiva where students are granted military exemptions. Because of this combination, Hesder is well known for its nationalist tendencies.

Not until 1974, following the shock of the Yom Kippur War and the loss of territory, did the students formally organize to create Gush Emunim, under the auspices of their leader, the younger Rabbi Kook. Though created for the purpose of resisting the government, at the beginning Gush Emunim appeared almost apologetic about its extralegal activities (Sprinzak, *Ascendence* 18). At this time, the members focused primarily on extralegal settling of territory to prevent it from returning to Arab authorities (Weissbrod, "Gush Emunim" 266). At first, they had the support of key political figures, such as the Defense Minister Shimon Peres, and they were able to spread quickly (Shahak 55). However, the antagonistic side of their relationship to the government intensified dramatically after the Camp David Accords in 1978, which to the members of Gush Emunim felt like a betrayal from the nationalist right in parliament (Sprinzak, *Ascendence* 18).

#### IV. CAUSES OF THE CASE STUDIES

To view the Lebanese Forces, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Gush Emunim in the framework of the larger study, I will take each through the list of possible causes suggested earlier in the study and examine their presence (or lack thereof). Given that there are only three case studies, these findings are not meant to be viewed as decisive or over applied to other situations. However, the hope is that in looking closely at these three situations, patterns will become apparent.

##### ***LEBANON: Sense of Being Attacked***

In a part of the world where what happened a millennium ago still has relevance to contemporary politics, the fact that the Maronites first arrived in Lebanon as a persecuted minority sect matters. Moreover, as Islam took even greater root in the region and Christianity seemed to lose its grip, Maronites came to perceive their land as an island of hope in a Muslim world. Hanf writes, "Fear lies behind the policies of Lebanese Christians... As far as they are concerned, Lebanon is the only country in the Arab world in which Christians are not *de jure* or *de facto* second-class citizens, the only country in which people of all religious communities enjoy equal rights. Almost half a million mainly Muslim Palestinians would shift the delicate balance between Christians and Muslims to their disadvantage" (3).

##### ***EGYPT: Sense of Being Attacked***

As members of the Muslim Arab majority in both Egypt and the larger picture of the region, the Egyptians who became the backbone of the Muslim Brotherhood did not necessarily

have the same fear of annihilation that the Maronites in Lebanon had. Nonetheless, a sense of vulnerability and attack was relevant to their formation. First, their culture was threatened by British imperialism, against which they felt they had to fight if they were to maintain their Egyptian Muslim heritage. Secondly, their Islamic heritage came under attack from the liberal Westernizers who propagated ideas of historical criticism, feminism, and Darwinism—each of which threatened to destabilize Muslim traditional society. Lastly, the impact of the creation of Israel cannot be overstated in the effect it had on the Muslim Brotherhood and all Islamic extremist groups in the region. Wickham writes, “The regime’s stunning military defeat by Israel in the 1967 War opened a Pandora’s box of accumulated frustrations and disappointments. For the first time since the early years of the revolution, students and graduates took to the streets to hold the regime responsible for failing to deliver on its revolutionary promises” (Wickham 31). Though at first this reactionary movement tended to be primarily leftist in orientation, by the mid-1970s the Islamic movement became the dominant voice of opposition. The defeat in 1967 had awoken both the secular leftist and Islamic oppositions, similar to the Islamic awakening that had occurred before the 1952 revolution in reaction to the losses of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War.

### ***ISRAEL: Sense of Being Attacked***

The cultivation of a sense of being attacked in Israel hardly even requires any discussion. Israel remains surrounded by neighbors who either officially remain in a state of war with Israel or have been in the past. Israel has fought repeated wars with its neighbors, and various more distant neighbors, such as Iran, continue to make threats against Israel. Moreover, two *Intifadas* and a string of suicide bombers brings those fears to inside their own official borders, inspiring

the infamous wall that has been built, at least in theory, for security purposes. Clearly, Israel, though incredibly strong militarily and able to win repeated wars, has a very real fear of attack.

### ***LEBANON: Failure of Secular Government***

The idea of a failure of secular government or a lingering neo-colonial stigma contributing to the rise of the Lebanese Forces is an interesting one, because arguably the Maronites fared quite well under both the “secular” government and any lingering neo-colonialism. However, one could argue that the secular government failed to address the issues of inequality of Muslim populations, especially the Shi’i, or the wave of Palestinian immigration. These failures did not lead directly to Maronite uprisings, but they did lead to Muslim uprisings to which the Maronites reacted and over which they united. Moreover, as the country disintegrated into civil war, many, both Christian and Muslim, felt the government did too little too late to stem the violence. The Lebanese Forces came together directly to counter the effect of the government’s inaction. They formed on the basis of a relatively new idea: if the government will not do the job charged by its citizenry (who also pay the government), they must do it themselves (Snider 3-4).

Additionally, the confessional form of government, though democratic, did play a role in the deterioration of inter-confessional relations. Again, however, the Maronites held the privileged position within the government, receiving more parliamentary seats per capita than the other groups and the highest executive position. This unbalance led to Muslim uprisings demanding greater equality, to which Maronites reacted in various ways, some joining the Lebanese Forces.



***EGYPT: Failure of Secular Government***

At the time of the formation of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Egyptian monarchy still carried the image of being a puppet regime for the British. In this sense, the Muslim Brotherhood's rise to popularity was due in large part to the secular government's failure to rid itself of the neocolonial stigma. Moreover, many feel the current secular regime, now under Mubarak, has failed to reach the goals of the original reformers, continuing the strength of the Muslim Brotherhood and its more radical splinter groups. Written shortly after Nasser's death 1970, TIME Magazine encapsulates the original vision Egyptians cast on Nasser and the regime he represented, "Nasser overturned a rotting monarchy.. and brought visions of prosperity to his own country and hope for new unity to a diffuse and frustrated Arab world" ("Nasser's Legacy" 1). Yet the same article continues to explain the profound disappointment left by the reality of his policies, a disappointment to which even Nasser later admitted, "After nearly two decades of his rule, Egypt is something less than a monument to enlightened rule. By 1980, because of a scarcely controllable population explosion, there will be 50 million Egyptians; yet the country today lacks the industrial base to support half that population" ("Nasser's Legacy" 10). The failure of Nasser to achieve what so many Egyptians saw as his primary purpose (modernizing Egypt and uniting the Arab world) provides ample fuel to the argument that the very idea of secular government has failed. Moreover, the political repression of all potential opposition groups and the lack of a legal forum to express grievances gives credence to all extralegal attacks conducted by splinter groups of the Muslim Brotherhood. By providing martyrs and new abuses, it also inspires the anger necessary to take up arms.

### ***ISRAEL: Failure of Secular Government***

Israel represents yet again an exception for the development of an MRM. As a whole, the secular government has been very successful in providing for the needs of its Jewish citizens. Moreover, most followers of Kook maintain a deep respect for the State, even when choosing to rebel against it (Sprinzak, "Politics" 122). However, in one area the secular government has failed, and that is to provide a basic sense of security to all citizens of the state. The point is not that a religious government would be able to do better, merely that individuals of religious orientation can theorize that a religious government would do better under the blessing of God.

### ***LEBANON: Language of Moralpolitik***

Patriarch Arida demonstrates the beginning of the use of the language of *Moralpolitik* to defend the Maronite position. He spoke of the "right" of Lebanon to exist as a Christian nation, using the same language of *Moralpolitik* as the early Zionists, in fact also taking a Zionist position on the creation of a Jewish state. He, like many Lebanese Maronites to follow, argued wildly for the right of Middle Eastern Christians to have at least one place where they would be the self-determiners of their political future. Moreover, any historical analysis or even a quick survey of contemporary events quickly illuminates multiple examples where Maronites' basic human rights were denied by Muslim enemies. Few can disregard this reality, but Maronite extremists tout these examples while ignoring the plethora of occurrences where they were perpetrators of human rights violations. The Lebanese Forces website is written very strongly in the language of *Moralpolitik* with an entire page devoted to "human rights" officially dedicated to:

- *To those whose screams are not heard and whose agonies are not shared*

- *To those whose rights are violated and voices are muffled*
- *To those who endured and are enduring persecution*
- *To prisoners of conscience* (“Miscellaneous”).

Yet, this website does not make any attempt to be a human rights watch of sorts, for it only follows the violations of Christians’ rights. It uses the language of *Moralpolitik* to defend its existence, but it does not fully embrace the assumed intended spirit of the post-WWII language.

### ***EGYPT: Language of Moralpolitik***

Oppositely, the language of *Moralpolitik* does not appear to have had a profound effect on the formation of the Muslim Brotherhood. Perhaps, this can be explained because neither the occupying British nor the Egyptian majority doubted the existence of an Egyptian nationhood. While the Muslim Brotherhood does emphasize Arab nationalism, a concept associated with *Moralpolitik*, I can find little evidence of the typical language often present in other nationalist movements<sup>2</sup>. Instead, Arab nationalism, as the Muslim Brotherhood presents it, focuses on the unity of all Arabs, the “first Muslims,” in order to bring about a revival of Islam worldwide (Said Aly 352). It does not focus on arguing their right to existence or self-determination.

### ***ISRAEL: Language of Moralpolitik***

Israel was conceived based on the language of *moralpolitik* and the image of nation without a state, a people without a home. Western European guilt over the Holocaust formed

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<sup>2</sup> Limiting oneself to English automatically challenges the process of research. In this area, it might be especially useful to see their writings in Arabic.

simultaneously both the language of *moralpolitik* and the State of Israel—the two came together in one package. In many ways, most other nationalist movements that have adopted the language of *moralpolitik* have used Israel as an example, as in the case of Patriarch Arida in Lebanon. Religious groups continue this idea, claiming that Jews have been a “nation” for thousands of years and have a right to self-determination in their homeland (Vital 47). Importantly, they do not extend the right to self-determination to all peoples, as in the case of Palestinians.

### ***LEBANON: Reaction to Turmoil***

A valid question would be, when has there ever *not* been turmoil in the history of the Maronites? In that sense, every extremist branch could be traced back to a period of turmoil. However, in the case of the 1976 formation of the Lebanese Forces the second civil war between specifically Christians and Muslims is the backdrop. The Christian militias formed, with the support of Maronite clergy, largely in response to the increased Palestinian presence and ongoing support from the Muslim Lebanese. In the lead-up to the war, the PLO did much to escalate the crisis:

Since refugee camps dotted strategic locations and points of intersection along the urban sprawl, they could easily disrupt daily routines and become sources of fear, lawlessness, and public disorder. This they did, often with abandon and total disregard for the havoc they wreaked on the host country which had been very sympathetic and accommodating in nurturing the aspirations as well as the organizational and logistical demands of a revolutionary movement. Their violations were abusive and intimidating. They imposed roadblocks, detained, abducted, and kidnapped arbitrarily on the pretexts that suspects posed a threat to the ideals of the revolution. They occupied, seized, appropriated property, illegally levied impositions, and breached ordinary human rights of innocent citizens (Khalef 219).

The actions of the PLO provided ample turmoil against which to react.

***EGYPT: Reaction to Turmoil***

The creation of Israel, while radicalizing many Muslims, had an almost ameliorating effect on extremists' relationship to the Egyptian government for a time. The continued state of war with Israel from 1948-1977 actually lent support to the government, because undermining any Arab government that might have a chance at winning would actually be a blow against *Dar al-Islam*, the "house of Islam" (Kepel, *Muslim* 83). However as the existence of Israel continued to mobilize more extreme hate messages, the failures of the secular government to fight Israel, such as in 1967, became equally a rallying point against the government. Many saw the defeat in 1967, less than a year after the government publicly hung Sayyid Qutb and two of his senior colleagues, as a sign that the country had strayed too far from Islam (Abdo 53). Rubin attributes the 1967 defeat as causing an "ideological vacuum which pushed many people toward Islamic fundamentalism" (4). Ironically successfully finding a peaceful resolution with the enemy, Israel, also worked to mobilize the extremists seemingly as much as defeat had, culminating in the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981 (Abdo 14). In the end, it appears that military action rallied the emotions of the extremists against Israel, making both defeat and a "peaceful solution" unendurable so long as Israel continues to exist.

***ISRAEL: Reaction to Turmoil***

Israel's history is highly unusual, for though there were movements to return to Palestine before the Holocaust, few would have imagined either the speed of development or the massive Jewish migrations to new state before the Holocaust. The extraordinary "turmoil" of World War

It became the backdrop for Israel's formation, followed immediately by the reality of being completely surrounded by hostile Arab Muslim neighbors threatening to drive Israel into the sea. It was into this era of war that Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook spoke. However, in truth, it was the success in the midst turmoil, or at least military success, that truly gave rise to the teachings of an MRM. The 1967 Six Day War inspired extremism for both the victors and vanquished.

### ***LEBANON: Population Mobility***

Population movements were arguably the most destabilizing force in pre-civil war Lebanon, most notably in the immigration of Palestinian refugees and combatants. Hiro writes, "The single most important domestic factor which plunged the country into civil war was the perception shared by Maronite leadership that the presence of Palestinian commandos in Lebanon was a serious threat to Lebanese sovereignty" (Hiro 20). Here outsiders (the Palestinians) upset the demographic balance of power.

Additionally, as in much of the world, the productivity of the agro-business sector has actually reduced the viability of small farms, forcing many to choose between the humiliating role of hired hands or moving to the cities in search of new jobs and lives. In 1950, small farmers and sharecroppers constituted around 25% of the agricultural production; by 1970 this number had dropped to about 5%. The new workers who went towards Beirut often contributed to what is called the "misery belt" of the Beirut suburbs (Khalef 165). Simultaneously, other groups also joined the misery belt, especially after 1967, when the growing insecurity of the border villages sent many more migrants to the city. The sheer immensity of the portion of the rural population that migrated during this time period is staggering:

Results of the only national manpower survey (undertaken in 1970) revealed that nearly one-fifth

of Lebanon's rural population during the 1960s had migrated to towns or, more likely, to Beirut's suburban fringe. This exodus was particularly disruptive because it was largely a one-step jarring encounter rather than a two-step process observed in other instances of rural displacement. In other words villages were compelled to suffer the alienation of city without any intermediary and more accommodating interlude. Exodus from the south, as shown in table 6.1, was as high as one-third. During the early 1970s the magnitude increased sharply to envelop 65 percent of the rural population of the south and about 50 percent of the Biqa'a. Little wonder that by early 1970s such displaced and disgruntled groups became... easy fodder and accessible pools for any forms of political mobilization (Khalef 165).

Interestingly, these same workers often had to compete against Palestinian workers for jobs, contributing to fears of the Palestinians.

### ***EGYPT: Population Mobility***

Internal migration accounts for the redistribution of approximately 25% of Egypt's populations—particularly towards the cities of Cairo and Alexandria (Zohry 2). Many of the religious revival in Egypt began in a district in Giza called Imbaba, just outside Cairo. This particular district has been radically transformed by the multiple waves of immigration in the last several decades. Some of the new migrants have been from Upper Egypt and other rural areas where, as in Lebanon, farming became increasingly less productive. These individuals tend to be more superstitious and less westernized, and some have come during specifically violent confrontations with the Copts in the South, feeding hate-filled extremism. Simultaneously, guestworkers from the Persian Gulf region brought with them more severe versions of Islam. These newer populations quickly constituted the majority, creating fertile hotbed for extremism. From 1947 to 2000 alone, the population of Imbaba has increased incredibly from approximately

six thousand to one million (Abdo 26). With this extreme growth, however, development has not necessarily followed. There is very little electricity or telephone lines, and many continue to live as they did in the villages but with less space. Approximately 85% of Imbaba residents remain illiterate (27). As the UN and Egyptian authorities send more money and bureaucracy and still fail to provide for the adequate needs of local residents, more residents increasingly feel that answers simply cannot lie in secular governments but can only be found in religion (27).

Importantly, the impact of migration is not limited to Imbaba. These trends tend to hold up throughout Cairo (and to a lesser degree in Alexandria and all Egyptian cities) but are more visible within places like Imbaba, which have absorbed even more newcomers than normal. A similar area in Cairo, Bolaq al-Dakrur, had the highest proportion of members who were members of the organization responsible for Sadat's assassination, often referred to as *al-Tanzim* (literally "the organization") because of its conglomeration of multiple groups (Ansari 132). Yet, anywhere in Cairo, a person will find ample evidence of the shocking population growth and resulting overcrowding of the last several decades.

### ***ISRAEL: Population Mobility***

The majority of Jews now living in Israel either immigrated or are descendants of those that immigrated after World War II ("Centenary") The implication is that if population mobility, and immigration specifically, does indeed play a role in the development of an MRM, then the mass immigrations have played an exacerbating role. Unfortunately, I can find no evidence to either confirm or contradict this concept. There simply would not be a large enough of a case study to compare immigrants and children of immigrants vs. non-immigrants, given the relatively low numbers of Jews living in Israel without any immigrant parents, let alone grandparents.



However, another factor of population mobility might play an equally exacerbating role and that is the type of individual who now immigrates. Though Israel has been home to many political and economic refugees, Israel also attracts many American Jews and those from comfortable living situations. When examining what attracts these individuals to immigrate, religious ideology and/or a primary sense of Jewish identification, which often borders on religious nationalism, resonate strongly (Dashefsky 266). Clearly, bringing the West's ideologues into Israel would suggest an exacerbating effect on MRMs.

### ***Reaction to Education Policy***

Interestingly, I can find no research on the impact of state education policies on any of the three MRMs in Lebanon, Egypt, or Israel. While all three movements used the education of youth extensively, I can find no examples of a sudden change in government education policy influencing the development of the movements or any other scholars who have discussed education policy as potentially having an impact in these three countries. The closest scenario would be Nasser's ban of all independent student unions, which actually did in fact successfully quell much of the religious opposition on university campuses until the 1967 war with Israel and never appeared to have a true backlash (Wickham 29). Oppositely, his effort to train professionals, often training more engineers, lawyers, and doctors than the demand called for, caused many to be out of work or overqualified for the positions they chose in the end, thus possibly more susceptible to religious fanaticism (Wickham 25). Importantly, the increase of education under Nasser did not deter MRMs at all, as originally hypothesized. However, the fact that I cannot make any other connection between education policy and the development of these three movements does not necessarily mean there is not a correlation. It is equally likely that

either this area has not been researched or an ability to research in Arabic, Hebrew, and French would expand the possibilities significantly. In the end, nothing can be either confirmed or rejected.

### ***LEBANON: Poor Economic Development***

The Maronites of Lebanon make an interesting case study, because Lebanon appeared to be unusually strong economically before the start of the civil war in 1975. Though there had been small rises in inflation (Khalef 214), overall “among its distinguishing features were low rates of inflation, high economic growth rates, large balance of payment surpluses, small fiscal deficits, and a floating, stable, and fully convertible domestic currency” (Shahnawaz 6). Economists touted Lebanon as a positive example for the region.

However, economic inequality stood in the way of complete development. From the time Western European powers began favoring the Maronite community, Maronites had had more opportunities to develop economically than their Muslim or even other Christian neighbors. Hanf describes the division of the classes in 1960: At the bottom existed the foreign seasonal workers, often Palestinians, Kurds, Alawites, or Syrians; next came the rural agricultural workers, usually Shi’is; then the urban working class, mostly Sunnis; the middle class, mostly Christian; and finally the very small upper class, with the majority of landowners being Muslim and the majority of industrialists Christian (Hanf 99-100). Unfortunately, Shi’is have always remained at the bottom of the Lebanese socio-economic ladder. Naja asserts that “if you encounter 1000 vagrant children in the streets of Beirut, be sure that at least 900 of them are Shi’is” (qtd. in Khashan 14).

However, though Lebanon meets the criteria for high inequality, its role in the

development of a Maronite MRM is unclear, because the hypothesis is generally that the members of an MRM are at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder. However, the inequality may have militarized other Muslim movements, against which some Maronites reacted. In that sense, it may have played an indirect role.

### ***EGYPT: Poor Economic Development***

Egypt's current GDP per capita rests at about \$5400 when adjusted for the purchasing power parity ("Country Briefings"). As a whole, Egypt's economy has failed to develop thoroughly. Even during periods where certain sectors of society have enjoyed the advantages of Western-style life, the average Egyptian has continued to live under very harsh conditions. However, as in all economies, there have been times of growth and recession. Around 1965/66, the Egyptian economy entered a recession. From 1960 to 1965, the economy had grown per year an average of six percent, but that number shrunk to one percent from 1966 to 1970 (Wickham 31).

Additionally, as noted earlier, the 1967 Six Day War, though extraordinarily brief, had a profound impact on destabilizing Egypt. This impact expanded into the economic arena as well. "Not only did industrial expansion practically come to a standstill, but even the maintenance of the existing structure of industry was becoming increasingly more difficult" (Shukrallah 59).

An even greater economic crisis occurred in 1982 due to the collapse of world oil prices. "Annual growth in GDP fell from an average of 9 percent in the decade between 1974 and 1984 to roughly 2.6 percent from 1986 to 1988, and beginning in 1986, per capita consumption growth turned negative" (Wickham 41). However, concurrently to these economic crises, as a part of Nasser's socialist movement, students could receive a university education free of charge and were then guaranteed a job after graduation. To fulfill this promise, the state began hiring new

graduates in droves: "Public employment grew by about 70 percent from 1962 to 1970, at a time when growth in national employment as a whole did not exceed 20 percent" (Wickham 27). The government employed thousands of workers that were under utilized and often unnecessary to the working of society, creating a huge financial burden on the government.

Though Nasser's program of free education and state employment continued under his successors, eventually the state simply could not keep up with the number of graduates, "forcing an increasing number of graduates to accept jobs they considered beneath their station or to join the ranks of the unemployed" (Wickham 36). The supply of highly educated individuals far surpassed the demand. A 1991 survey showed that the "domestic labor market was employing only 25 percent of new university and intermediate-level graduate that it was hiring 90 percent of those who were illiterate or in the next-to-last category of 'can read and write'" (Wickham 42). The educated unemployed created a new base from which the Muslim Brotherhood and other similar organizations could recruit.

Surprisingly Egypt does not suffer from extreme inequality however. While the country tends to have developed slower, there do not appear to be as extreme gaps between the wealthiest and poorest as in other countries. According to the United Nations, the richest 10 percent is only eight times richer than the poorest 10 percent, compared to in the USA where the richest 10 percent is 15.9 times richer than the poorest 10 percent (Watkins 231). This statistic indicates that huge inequality does not play an especially huge role in the formation of MRMs in Egypt.

### ***ISRAEL: Poor Economic Development***

Israel's economy appears almost audacious in the level of success it has experienced since 1948, while other newly formed states from the same period continue to flounder.

According to the CIA's World Factbook the GDP per capita (adjusted for the PPP) in 2008 was estimated to be \$28,200, clearly within the range of a developed economy. Moreover, the average member of Gush Emunim comes out of a middle-class Ashkenazi background. In fact, Gush Emunim has failed to take in the radical Sephardic populations, which often suffer from deeper inequality and poverty (Demant, "A People"). For these reasons, it appears that poor economic development has not played a significant role in the development of Gush Emunim.

## V. CONSEQUENCES OF LEBANESE FORCES

Clearly the civil wars and violence that have occurred in Lebanon cannot be merely traced to the Lebanese Forces or even the Maronites generally. Instead, multiple factions and MRMs, including those from the Shi'isi, Sunnis, Druze, Greek Orthodox, and Palestinians, have each played their role in the conflict. It remains unclear whether this conflict has truly been permanently settled. Most of the recent violence between the Lebanese Army and militant Islamic groups, as in 2007, or between militant Palestinian groups and Israel, as in 2006, has not included any suggestions of a new Christian MRM, but tensions remain high between the various confessional groups. A newly formed NGO called *Mémoire pour l'Avenir* or "Memory for the Future" states on its website the reason for its creation:

Since 2000, we were motivated by one thought: **the past remains present**. In fact, although the war that ravaged Lebanon between 1975 and 1990 has ended, it continues to stir divisions among the Lebanese. The end of the fighting could not erase its repercussions, which still influence political feuds and manipulate the people. The Lebanese were forced to close their eyes to the wounds of war, but at the same time, to look up to their warlords. Violence continued to haunt their minds and collective memory became the weapon of post-war disputes ("About Us").

According to *Mémoire pour l'Avenir*, altogether the war between 1975 and 1990 left “200,000 dead, 17,000 missing, and 400,000 wounded” (Mahdawi). Moreover, according to Hanf, there were an addition 1,460,000 refugees and IDPs (346).

Organizations like Memory for the Future attempt to insure that sectarian conflict does not continue to spiral into the recreation of new MRMs, who will launch new civil wars, but so long as Lebanon remains divided along confessional lines, it remains unclear what the future holds. The Lebanese Forces (or their faithful sympathizers) still operates two separate websites that, while not advocating the immediate taking up of arms again, certainly brag about past military achievements, mourn their existence as a “persecuted minority,” and show no signs of remorse (*The Lebanese Forces Official Website* and *LebaneseForces.com*). The prayer used at the very beginning of this work comes from one of these websites.

Whether or not the country’s civil society continues to flounder due to the presence of MRMs and hierarchical religious forms as predicted or due to the simple need to recover from the shocking violence of the past, there are many symptoms of a feeble civil society. Not surprisingly in 1992, so shortly after the war, political party affiliation was very low among students. Over sixty-five percent of Maronite students reported no party or militia affiliation (Khashan 88). The educated class, in the aftermath of the war, appeared to eschew direct political involvement (89). Moreover, voter turnout in elections remains relatively low, though it appears to be steadily climbing. In 1992 voter turnout was just 30.3% of registered voters versus in 2005 when 46.5% of registered voters actually voted (“Country View: Lebanon”). Perhaps most concerning has been the commonplace selling of votes for the upcoming parliamentary elections in June (Worth). Such actions intimate a civil society that has yet to recover.

As mentioned in Part One, another possible consequence is a resulting non-democratic regime. Lebanon has, however, remained a democracy, albeit one still divided along confessional lines with greater power accorded to the Christian population than demographically warranted. At the same time, the democratic quality of elections has deteriorated. In 1992 opposition campaigns were obstructed, election meetings blocked, and election results not immediately reported (Hanf 631). As already noted, in the current election, votes are being openly bought, and foreign governments are spending millions to guarantee their own victors (Worth).

Lastly, and perhaps more importantly, is whether Lebanon can successfully find lasting peace. Government positions continue to be divvied out based on inherited religious affiliation, which has become a controversial solution among many Lebanese (Sfeir). According to Alistair Harris, "Over half of all states emerging from civil war slip back into war within five years. Lebanon's post-civil war position was frozen until 2005 by the Syrian presence in Lebanon. Since the Syrian departure in 2005, the clock has started counting down again." Four years later, it appears Lebanon is surviving. More importantly, one must recognize the significance of the Syrian troops leaving. From 1978 until 2000 Israel maintained troops in southern Lebanon, while Syrian troops maintained a presence from 1976 until 2005. Finally, after nearly three decades of occupation, the Lebanese have the chance to decide their futures on their own. While foreign governments may be exerting influence through campaign spending, Lebanese individuals nonetheless will decide what happens next. Interestingly, when last May violence did break out again between the Shi'i and Sunni, the military refused to intervene for fear of the military breaking down along religious lines (Harris, Alistair). Unfortunately, if the military refuses to protect civilians, however, civilians may once again feel the need to form militias along

confessional lines—creating the backbone for future wars. As of right now, however, there have not been recent accounts of Maronites involved in these sorts of clashes.

## VI. CONSEQUENCES OF MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

While there are no numbers stating the overall deaths from religious terrorism in Egypt, one can look at recent headlines and realize that, though less than in times past, it would still be significant. As noted, Jamaat al-Islamiyya, one of the major splinter groups from the Muslim Brotherhood, ran a terrorism campaign from 1992-1997 that killed 1,200 individuals (Wright 258). Most terrorist organizations in Egypt if not traced directly to a splinter from the Muslim Brotherhood has, at a minimum, received significant inspiration from the writings of Qutb.

Civil society and the so-called democratic potential continue also to wither under the current regime. Amany Kandil, in a presentation on civil society organizations, cites several examples of a struggling civil society. For one thing, maintaining a centrist position leads to lower citizen participation in civil society organizations. Moreover, civil societies tend to contain twice as many men as women, even though involving both genders is important to civil development. Finally, there exists a very limited culture of voluntarism among the youth. While this reduction of civil society is a hypothesized consequence of an MRM, it could equally be a consequence of life under an autocracy. Similarly, there tends to be a very low voter turnout (28.1% of registered voters in 2005 [“Country View: Egypt”]), but without free and fair elections, such trends hardly appear surprising. Religious violence certain does not assist the positive development of civil society, but, given the circumstances, the weak civil society also cannot be attributed to the MRM.



It appears that the Muslim Brotherhood has played a greater role in the formation of an autocracy, but it remains equally difficult to draw causal relationship, especially considering how much the autocracy almost immediately disadvantaged them. In fact, the Muslim Brotherhood did help bring Nasser to power during the fall of the monarchy, and so an MRM legitimately may have played a role in the formation of the initial autocracy, though it was far from how they imagined it. If the religious renewal in 1970s-80s played any role, it would be in giving the already existing autocracy still another reason to fear democratic pressures. However, at that point, the autocracy already existed.

It is less clear what role the MRM has had on Egypt's diplomacy and ability to find lasting peace. Despite Sadat's assassination, Egypt has not returned to war with Israel since the 1978 Camp David Accords, and both countries continue to recognize the existence of the other. In fact, Egypt has taken on the role of arbiter between various Palestinian factions, which may prove crucial to a future Israeli-Palestinian peace deal (Lyons). Clearly Egyptian politicians must continuously walk a fine line between poor relations with Israel and risking assassination, but it appears Mubarak continues to successfully maintain this balance.

## VII. CONSEQUENCES OF GUSH EMUNIM

While there does not appear to be any source that records the number of deaths caused by Gush Emunim or more generally Jewish fundamentalism, it seems culture legitimately plays a role in this area. The truth is Gush Emunim attacks have not been notable for the number of deaths caused. While Islamic attacks often involve bombs that might kill hundreds at a time and the Lebanese Forces employed particularly egregious personal methods like dismembering their

living victims, Gush Emunim attacks tend to be very targeted without involving prolonged deaths or hundreds of innocent victims.

Likewise, inasmuch as a high voluntary voter turnout suggests an active civil society, it does not appear that Israeli social capital overall has suffered too terribly from hierarchical religious forms. Though, as apparently in democracies worldwide, the percentage of voter turnout has decreased from its 1949 peak of 86.9% of registered voters to 63.5% in 2006 (Country View: Israel), it remains quite high. Moreover, a survey assessing perceived levels of social capital among Israelis showed that 63.1% of respondents indicated a high level of social trust, though the level of trust in national and local authority was relatively lower, with only 32.6% indicating high trust (Baron-Epel 905). Having low trust of national authorities, however, hardly appears like a hypothesized result of hierarchical religious forms that encourage obedience and discourage critical thinking.

On the other hand, the government appears to have attempted on multiple occasions to co-opt the radical forces in Israel (Metz), making non-democratic or discriminatory forms of government more likely. One can contest the degree of legitimacy in Israel's current government, which does not extend the right to citizenship to the native Palestinians in the occupied territories. However, even more serious to Israel's democratic claims is the discriminatory way Arabs with Israeli citizenship are treated. Local and national government make it impossible for Arab minorities to move into certain towns (for the express purpose of keeping them homogenous), build walls to divide Arab-Israeli citizens from Jewish-Israeli citizens, enforce public school segregation, and exclude the majority of Arab-Israelis from the otherwise mandatory military service which unites Jewish-Israeli citizenry (Wilson).

On November 4, 1995, Yigal Amir shot and killed Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin. Amir later stated in court that his learning of Jewish law, Halacha, informed his decision to assassinate Rabin. He believed that Rabin's involvement in the peace process made Rabin an enemy, which Jewish law dictated he could kill ("Rabin's alleged"). Though no connection to Gush Emunim has been established, Amir represents the danger that Israeli politicians who choose to engage in the peace process risk from the religious extremists. Moreover, with the exception of the assassination, the government has not explicitly condemned Gush Emunim, suggesting that many members of the Israeli right might still attempt to court Gush Emunim sympathizers. By depending on their votes, politicians cannot easily pursue a peace process that includes evacuating Jewish settlements, necessary to any two-state solution. In fact, in what appears to be a highly successful political maneuver, the majority of Knesset members in 2004 stated they believed in attempting to keep all settlement founded by Gush Emunim (Shahak 78). Sprinzak writes, "The settlers of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza are also the one who maintain daily contact with over 1.5 million unhappy Palestinian... the settlers, who are armed and well organized, can turn the occupied territories into hell, if they only want to. Therefore, even cabinets hostile to the radical right cannot afford to ignore its attitudes and demands" (*Ascendence* 15). For these reasons and more, peace continues to flounder in Israel.

## VIII. COMPARISONS AND SUGGESTIONS

Not surprisingly, all three religious movements felt attacked by the outside and rose out of times of turmoil. What drives people to violence other than a perceived threat against themselves? Given this commonality between the three case studies, it brings up an interesting question: How do individuals *perceive* security? In other words, can state actors play a role in

diminishing the sense of being attacked? Clearly, first and foremost, to undermine the sense of being attacked, peaceful resolutions must be sought in situations where real battles rage. However, as the cases of Sadat and Rabin demonstrate, seeking peace may come at great personal cost to the leaders involved, and it is questionable how many leaders would voluntarily embark on a suicide mission, even if it might spare their countries significant strife. Moreover, physical “peace” may not be enough. Further research is needed to determine what educational methods or public programs help individuals to feel secure. In the end, the secular government may find its role limited by its lack of religious affiliation and lack of control over mass media. However, the government can, in various ways, provide a platform for religious leaders who promote peace with the “other” and run its own public relations campaign designed to highlight the security of the average citizen. Again, however, more detailed research is needed to determine the best strategies.

Likewise, in both Egypt and Lebanon the rural to urban migration shifts played significant roles in the radicalization of religious movements. The movements tend to be driven by economic factors, which often contribute to an individual’s lack of security. These trends suggest a need to emphasize rural economic development. Clearly, the governments must address the already-existing slums in their urban centers so as to prevent the further radicalization of these populations, but emphasizing new means of allowing rural individuals to stay in their villages comfortably would reduce the growth of extremist hotbeds like Imbaba. This topic has been the focus of a lot of development research in recent years (“Rural Development”) and should continue to be applied in areas particularly struggling with the growth of MRMs.

In both Lebanon and Israel, there exists a problem with how to integrate newcomers. In Lebanon, the newcomers (the Palestinian refugees) have been simply denied integration, confined to second-class lives in the deplorable conditions of a refugee camp. This creates a situation for Lebanese citizens in which it is relatively easy to blame the “other” that one never has to interact with. Likewise, it breeds hostility within the refugee camp that can spill into violence and against which (or in support of) the entire country has the potential to militarize. Lebanon needs to come to some sort of conclusion as to how to integrate the refugees, which will likely never have the option of returning to their homeland. Moreover, many of the refugees have been born in Lebanon and have no memories of another land. Spending generation after generation indefinitely in overcrowded refugee camps is simply not politically sustainable. It would be shocking to think that this situation would not result in further violence if not eventually addressed.

In Israel, the newcomers are not the “other” so much as they fear the Palestinian “other.” These newcomers especially include Westerners coming over for particularly ideological reasons. Israeli leaders may need to make some particularly difficult decisions about the long-term feasibility of catering to these ideologues. Laws that change the segregation of schools and neighborhoods could diminish the continuation of negative ideologies being passed down to the next generation and may discourage some ideologues from even immigrating. An even more extreme policy would be to require new immigrants to actually *study* the “other” through the study of Arabic and Palestinian culture. One could argue such changes are not likely to happen soon. Meanwhile, the prolonged conflict of the region continues to hinge on the inability of Israelis and Palestinians to make peace. Clearly something must change.

In all these efforts, the region desperately needs leaders who carry an overarching regional goal of moving past a “Musical Chairs” worldview. The outside world can attempt to arbitrate peace treaties, but change must come from within, which is why the development of a vibrant civil society is so fundamental. Unfortunately, history has yet to definitively determine how to change worldviews, and there is no easy answer as to how a leader might guide his/her country in a direction that sees each ethnic and religious group as having its own place in the rich tapestry of the Middle East. Yet so long as people continue to see the countries along the “journey to Jerusalem” as having one people too many, violence will continue – yesterday based on nationalism, today based on religion, tomorrow based on another grouping. With each new wave of violence, the extremists will continue to wreak havoc on the economies and social structures of their countries, robbing the next generation of the cultures they love so dearly, as my host-mom demonstrated to me. At the end of this research, I do not have an extensive list of suggestions for Western governments, only a foolish hope for the kind of Middle Eastern leaders, in both government and religious institutions, who will be willing to make tough decisions and risk all for the peace and security of their lands.

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