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# The 2000 S.C. Lottery Vote: Shadows of the Past and Projections of the Future

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*The successful passage of the South Carolina "education lottery" referendum in 2000 is explained in terms of regional differences that reflect differences in religion, racial and ethnic composition, partisan identifications, and political culture. A key variable in understanding the outcome is the changing political culture of the state. The dominant traditionalistic and morally conservative cultural mix has sometimes been challenged by individualistic rejection of government regulation, including regulations on gambling, which has a long history in the state. Though the regional differences in culture from historical settlement patterns can still be seen, the balance of power has begun to shift as less morally conservative outsiders move into the state and as citizens recognize the importance of public education. Many anti-government traditionalists hoped the lottery would provide better education and lower taxes at the same time.*

## INTRODUCTION

In 2000 the voters of South Carolina passed a statewide referendum to amend the state constitution so as to allow an "education lottery" for the state. The purpose of this paper is to explain the outcome in terms of key variables that both reflect the past of the Palmetto State and project changes into its future: region, religion, race, partisanship, and culture.

South Carolina is still a morally conservative and a politically traditionalistic state that is characterized by low levels of political participation, social and political deference to the elite, and government actions that focus more on preserving the status quo than promoting the general welfare (Elazar, xxix-xxx). Another aspect of the state's southern culture is an exaggerated sense of individualism that rejects most government regulation and demands that each person look out for him or herself (Botsch). This tendency to reject government regulations sometimes comes into conflict with the long-standing role of government in preserving standards of conservative morality in the Bible Belt. A growing recognition by most residents that the state needs more resources for public education adds to the conflict over the proper role of government in contemporary South Carolina. This recognition could be seen in the heavy emphasis both gubernatorial candidates placed on improving education in the 2002 election.

The population of South Carolina grew by 15.1% in the 1990s, in part because of in-migration as people moved from colder northern climates to the South. In the year 2000 alone, the state was seventh in the country among the shipments of household goods handled by the country's largest mover.<sup>1</sup> Based on an analysis of census data long forms, during the last half of the 1990s, from 1995 through 2000, more than 132,000 more people moved to the state than left the state, and they came most frequently from New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey, in that order. In comparing states, this represented the ninth largest net gain in the nation.<sup>2</sup> The new South Carolinians arrived with their own political cultures, which, as we shall see, helped shift the balance of power in the outcome of the 2000 lottery referendum.

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<sup>1</sup> Tim Flach, "Migration boosts S.C. population," *The State*, 22 January 2002, B-1.

<sup>2</sup> Chris Roberts, "Migration to S.C. on the Rise," *The State*, 6 August 2003, A-3.

## A LOTTERY FOR SOUTH CAROLINA

Although various forms of gambling were popular in early South Carolina, by the late 1800s lotteries had fallen out of favor. The delegates to the 1895 constitutional convention outlawed the practice. However, some eighty years later, bingo became legal as a means to raise money for charities. Video poker was legal through much of the 1980s and 1990s, becoming part of a political battle that foreshadowed the battle over a lottery and playing a role in Governor David Beasley's 1998 defeat in his re-election bid by Democrat Jim Hodges. Hodges favored holding a referendum on video poker and made an education lottery a key plank in his platform.<sup>3</sup> But in October of 1999 the State Supreme Court ruled that a proposed referendum on video poker was unconstitutional, while upholding a portion of the same law that banned video poker as of July of 2000.<sup>4</sup> After his election, Hodges pushed for a referendum on the lottery. Much of the rhetoric during the lottery battle focused on morality and on the need to improve education. Speaking to a group of educators, Hodges argued "there is no greater crisis in our state than the education crisis." Kathy Bigham, chair of "No Lottery 2000," an anti-lottery group, responded by stating "I do believe that if we fund education with gambling that we will create a moral crisis for all South Carolinians."<sup>5</sup> Blacks, a key group of Democ-

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<sup>3</sup> Chuck Carroll and Douglas Pardue, "Kings & Jokers," *The State*, 1 August 1999, A-1, A-9-12; Melissa Manware, "Lancaster group mobilizes against gambling," *The State*, 7 September 1999, B-3; "Video Gambling Chronology," *The Augusta Chronicle*, 24 June 2000, Available on the internet: [http://www.augustachronicle.com/stories/062500/met\\_pokertime.shtml](http://www.augustachronicle.com/stories/062500/met_pokertime.shtml).

<sup>4</sup> John Allard, "The Supreme Court decision," *The State*, 15 October 1999, A-13, A-15; Sammy Fretwell, "The Supreme Court decision," *The State*, 15 October 1999, A-13, A-15.; Kenneth A Harris, "In the courtroom, the lobbyists couldn't help," *The State*, 15 October 1999, A14; Clif LeBlanc and Chuck Carroll, "Lawsuit seeks to undermine poker vote," *The State*, 4 September 1999, B-1, B-4.

<sup>5</sup> Aaron Sheinin, "Hodges says lottery can help solve education crisis," *The State*, 7 September 2000, B-3.



matic voters, were targeted during the campaign because they were likely to support the lottery as a means of improving education, despite the opposition of their own religious leaders. Thus, many of the pro-lottery advertisements focused on how a lottery could help improve education.<sup>6</sup>

Most major newspapers in the state also took editorial positions opposing the lottery, again using the rhetoric of morality. By and large, South Carolina's religious community opposed the lottery. In October of 2000, approximately four weeks prior to the referendum, more than 300 clergy and religious leaders from a variety of denominations stood outside of the State House to read a statement opposing the lottery. Among the opponents were representatives from the Black community, a key constituency for any southern state seeking passage of a lottery.<sup>7</sup> Although church leaders expressed support for education, they argued that the lottery was "immoral," would "diminish...good government," and was contrary to the teachings of the Bible.<sup>8</sup>

In the end, the lottery referendum passed with the support of 54% of the voters.<sup>9</sup> Blacks proved critical to its passage, with 75% voting in favor of the lottery. A modest majority of whites, 55%, voted against it.<sup>10</sup>

#### REGION, RELIGION, RACE AND POLITICAL CULTURE

While most states have a distinctive political culture, one can find cultural differences within any single state. South Carolina

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<sup>6</sup> John Monk, "Hodges put machine to work for lottery," *The State* 9 November 1999, B-1, B-2.

<sup>7</sup> Allison Askins, "Christian churches unite to oppose lottery," *The State* 3 October 2000, B-1, B-5.

<sup>8</sup> Askins, *supra*.

<sup>9</sup> Valerie Bauerlein and Aaron Sheinin, "Opponents stressing details," *The State*, 9 November 2000, B-1, B-3.

<sup>10</sup> Lee Bandy and Chris Roberts, "Black vote clinched lottery win," *The State*, 9 November 2000, B-1, B-7.

is no exception. Many observers divide the state into two or three different cultural sections (Wallace; Writers' Program; Moreland, Steed, and Baker). The upcountry or Piedmont plateau is the northwestern half of the state. The lowcountry or the coastal plain is the lower southeastern section. The dividing line is defined by the first set of rapids on rivers—the "fall line." Sometimes the "midlands" are distinguished from the upcountry and lowcountry, though their topological distinctiveness is less precise. For the purposes of this paper and simplicity, we shall restrict our distinction to only the upcountry and the lowcountry.

Geography and topography had a great impact on who settled in these regions and how they lived and prospered. With different people came different cultural baggage. Dissimilar lifestyles increased those differences. Moreover, the institution of slavery and later the economic stagnation following the Civil War prevented any great in-migration of outsiders to dilute those differences.

Anglican aristocrats and large numbers of enslaved Africans settled the lowcountry, where the economy centered around the plantation. They generally built their plantations below the fall line because large farming operations were less practical above the fall line. Topography and soil conditions were less favorable, and in addition, the rapids made impractical the transportation of large amounts of agricultural products to the coast for export. Even today one can find statistically significant differences in the percentage of Episcopalians, who are the religious descendents of Anglicans, among the regions of the state. More members of this small, relatively liberal religious group are found in the lowcountry. Moreover, despite generations of social upheaval and great migrations, the percentage of Blacks living in lowcountry and midlands counties is far higher than in the upcountry.

Scotch-Irish and Germans migrated to the upcountry, and scratched out a living on small farms above the fall line. They

brought with them their religions, which contained many moral prohibitions, including a prohibition on gambling. They were more likely to be part of the great religious awakenings in early American history, taking their moral beliefs into the Baptist churches that were springing up like mushrooms across the South Carolina frontier. Moreover, they held the people and culture of the lowcountry in great disdain (Moreland, Steed, and Baker, 7). Even today one finds significantly more people who claim Irish heritage in the upcountry than in the lowcountry. The same is true of Scottish, though to a lesser extent. There is a large regional difference in those who claim adherence to the Southern Baptist church. In the average upcountry county, a full third of the population count themselves as Southern Baptists, as compared to a fifth of the population in lowcountry counties.

Every culture has some internal contradictions. So it is with the socially and morally conservative traditionalistic culture of South Carolina. It may well be the most traditionalistic of all states (Elazar, xxx). It does not have an individualistic culture because South Carolinians do not see politics as a competitive business in which government provides services in return for votes (Elazar, xxvii). But the state's political culture contains one strong element of the individualistic culture. South Carolinians have long seen the private realm as of greater importance than the public realm, even when they are in great need of public help. Historically, South Carolinians have rejected collective action in favor of individual attempts to survive, even when the collective efforts of common people were the only way to combat the power of those who ran mill towns and controlled the land in rural areas (Botsch). Individualism expressed through extreme notions of self-reliance, volunteerism, and of individual and family honor that can be defended through violent outbursts have all been noted by many observers of southern life, culture and politics (Cash, 349-40; Reed, 33, 43; Havard, 702-3).



Even the dominant religious institution of the white South, the Southern Baptist Church, reflects the individualistic element of southern culture. Until the 1990s, when conservative elements took over the reins of the organization, a prime belief of the church was the "priesthood of the believer." No leader was to tell members how to interpret scriptures or create any official doctrine of the church. That was all left to individuals and to individual churches. Although few took these freedoms outside the conservative moral consensus and although those who did were often socially ostracized, the right was cherished in principle, if not in practice.

In the context of the issue of central concern in this paper, the 2000 lottery vote, the individualistic ethic of South Carolinians presented an obstacle to religious leaders. While those most closely tied to formal religious organizations tended to call for government restrictions on the right of any person to throw his or her money to the winds of chance, those who were less closely tied to conservative religious groups were much more difficult to influence. Playing the lottery might be a sin, but that was between each person and his or her Maker, not something government should prohibit.


#### COUNTY AND REGIONAL LEVEL ANALYSIS

If we examine the lottery vote on a county-by-county basis, we can see several patterns in terms of region, religion, race, and partisanship, all of which illuminate these cultural differences and contradictions. Let us briefly examine each one.

The regional differences in the state had a dramatic impact on the lottery vote. In Figure 1, the darkened line running in a northeasterly direction across the middle of South Carolina divides the state into upcountry counties and lowcountry counties. The darker colors on the map correspond to greater support for the lottery. As one moves from the upcountry to the lowcountry,



**FIGURE 1**  
**UP AND LOWCOUNTRY AND PERCENTAGE FAVORING LOTTERY**  
**BY COUNTIES IN SOUTH CAROLINA, 2000**



Values	To	N
41.2	47.8	(9)
49.2	51.8	(9)
52.5	58.5	(9)
57.1	63.2	(9)
63.8	88.2	(10)
Missing		

support for the lottery grew. The average vote for the lottery in counties above the fall line was 49.3%, while the average "yes" vote in lowcountry counties was 61.4%.

One should note that even though upcountry counties rejected the lottery, the margin was extremely narrow. The overwhelming vote in the lowcountry was more than enough to turn the tide. This finding is consistent with regional patterns long observed in South Carolina political history. For example, the mini-bottle referendum of 1972 also fell along regional lines. Twelve of the fourteen counties that rejected the proposed constitutional change to allow the sale of liquor in mini-bottles were in the upcountry (Moreland, Steed, and Baker, 13).

As noted above, regional differences are shorthand for racial and religious differences, as well as the partisan differences that correspond with race and religion. We cannot easily separate these things out using aggregate data. However, the expected patterns are clearly present. In terms of race, one sees the same pattern as one sees with the lottery vote. The correlation between percentage Black population and support for the lottery was +.63.

Religion was also clearly at work. Southern Baptists are the largest religious denomination in the state, and they are almost exclusively white. Where relatively many Southern Baptists lived, the lottery did badly. The correlation between percentage Southern Baptists and the pro lottery votes in counties is a -.54.

However, because so few Blacks are affiliated with the Southern Baptist denomination, one might suspect that this relationship is purely spurious. While that may explain part of what we see on this map, having a lot of white adherents among the Southern Baptists plays at least some role. We regressed percentage Baptist on percentage voting for the lottery and then added percentage black as another independent variable. While the standardized correlation coefficient for percentage Baptist did drop, it and percentage black both remained statistically significant predictors. While this evidence is less than totally conclusive, it does strongly suggest that the percentage of Southern Baptists in a county had an effect independent of race in reducing the pro-lottery vote.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Race and Southern Baptists are strongly negatively correlated ( $r = -.468, p < .01$ ), so multicollinearity is a significant problem in interpreting any regression. We controlled for race in another less formal way by pairing counties with similar racial compositions but different Southern Baptist compositions. We were able to identify eight pairs of counties in which the racial compositions were within two percentage points of each other while the percentage of the populations that were Southern Baptist adherents were quite different. When a third or fourth county had a similar percentage of Black residents, we chose the pair in which the differences in Southern Baptists were greatest. In the two pairs with

Note continues

Turning to partisanship, we can approximate the Democratic vote in each county by the percentage that Democratic candidate Jim Hodges received in the 1998 election. As noted earlier, Hodges had made creating an "education lottery" a major part of his campaign. The correlation between the 1998 vote for Hodges and the 2000 lottery vote was  $+0.67$ . However, we must be careful about drawing a firm conclusion, because Hodges did extremely well in counties with a large Black vote. So the relationship may be as much or even more the result of the voting behavior of Blacks, who are also the most loyal Democratic partisans in the state. When we regressed both percentage black and percentage for Hodges on the percentage for the lottery, percentage black dropped out as a significant predictor. Unlike the situation with Southern Baptists, we cannot separate out the influence of race from partisanship.<sup>12</sup>

#### INDIVIDUAL LEVEL ANALYSIS

One can only do so much analysis using aggregate data because aggregate data can only suggest how individuals behave. To analyze individual behavior we will turn to an exit poll per-

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the highest percentage Black population, the relationship is not as expected. The county with the higher percentage Southern Baptist reported a higher percentage of votes for the lottery than the counties with which they are paired. All four counties in these first two pairs are lowcountry counties with very high percentages of Blacks in the population (ranging from 54 to 63%). However, the other six pairs all have the hypothesized relationship. The county with the higher percentage Southern Baptist population reported a lower percentage of votes for the lottery. What seems to be happening is that when the percentage of Blacks is over 50%, the percentage of white Baptists in the county did not increase lottery opposition. However, when the percentage of Blacks falls below 50%, then the percentage of Southern Baptists in the county had a negative impact on votes for the lottery.

<sup>12</sup> Race and partisanship, as measured by the Hodges vote in 1998, are correlated with each other far more strongly ( $r = +0.875$ ,  $p < .01$ ) than race and the Southern Baptists ( $r = -.468$ ,  $p < .01$ ). Therefore, multicollinearity between race and partisanship is so great that it is impossible to sort out the separate influences of these two variables on the lottery vote.



formed on Aiken County voters.<sup>13</sup> Aiken County lies on the dividing line between the upcountry and the lowcountry. It matched the statewide results in that 54% of the voters in the county approved the lottery, the same percentage as for the entire state. Aiken is a county that has been greatly affected by the immigration of non-southerners associated with the defense industry at the Savannah River Site, where tritium was extracted as a component for nuclear weapons, and where today wastes are stored and processed. Like many places in the state, it has also developed a significant retirement population attracted by a warm climate, low taxes, and nearby amenities and services. Aiken has affluent golf communities, crumbling textile mill villages where generations of southerners have lived, and many small farms. While we cannot generalize to the state as a whole, we can certainly identify individual social and demographic factors that are associated with support of gambling that are at least suggestive of the factors at play in the rest of the state.

The exit poll strongly suggests that a number of cultural, demographic, and political factors were at play in explaining the lottery vote. Race played a powerful role. The vote was almost evenly split among whites, who divided 49% to 51% against the lottery in the sample, a margin that is too close to call for the general population. Among Blacks, however, the vote split 75% in favor to 25% against, a clear vote for the lottery. We could not

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<sup>13</sup> Professor Robert Botsch's Political Science Research Methods students performed the exit poll on 568 voters in ten precincts. These precincts represented the different geographical and demographic parts of the county that had in the past been representative of the county as a whole (such surveys have been performed since the early 1980s). The students performed a systematic sampling technique in two different time slots for each precinct. They chose males and females in approximately equal numbers. The voting results for the sample were well within the margin of sampling error for the actual votes for the presidential election and the lottery referendum. One may reasonably conclude that the sample approximates a random sample and is representative of the county voters in that particular election.

identify any subgroups of Blacks who opposed the lottery. Among Blacks, regardless of education, income, religious fundamentalism, or frequency of church attendance, strong majorities favored the lottery. The shifts were in the expected directions with support falling as education, income, and church attendance went up. Self-identified fundamentalists were less likely to support the lottery than non-fundamentalists, but a majority still supported the lottery over the objections of their religious leaders. Majorities of Blacks in every subgroup favored the lottery.

We thought that perhaps the explanation for Black support might be more a function of income than race. The group of whites most likely to support the lottery was low-income (less than \$25,000 family income) non-fundamentalists. But when we compared these whites to similar blacks, black support was still six percentage points higher (77% v. 71%, respectively). Just as we found in looking at aggregate county level data, individual data support the hypothesis that differences in racial subcultures played a major role in the outcome of the election.

Because Black voting behavior on the lottery question was so different than that of whites, we separated out whites to see what factors influenced their votes. Several subgroups of whites did give the lottery majority support: non-southerners, non-fundamentalists, those who do not attend church, those with family incomes of less than \$25,000 a year, those in two education groups (less than high school and with some college but less than four years), those who strongly agreed that more money needed to be spent on education in the state, and those who hoped that proceeds could be used to reduce taxes spent on education. Let us briefly discuss each of these factors, the impacts of which are summarized in Table 1.

As noted earlier, the in-migration of people who do not consider themselves Southerners and who bring with them the culture of other regions of the nation is slowly changing the culture

**TABLE 1**  
**FACTORS EXPLAINING**  
**WHITE VOTER SUPPORT FOR THE LOTTERY IN 2000**

Sub-Groups	Percent for Lottery	Significance of Difference
<b>Region</b>		
self-identified Southerners	48%	.06
self-identified non-Southerners	64%	
<b>Religious Fundamentalism</b>		
religious fundamentalists	39%	.00
non-religious fundamentalists	57%	
<b>Church attendance</b>		
none in last week	69%	.00
once in past week	48%	
several times in past week	21%	
<b>Family Income</b>		
less than \$25,000	62%	.06
more than \$25,000	48%	
<b>Education</b>		
less than high school or 1-3 years college	57%	.02
high school or college degree or more	46%	
<b>More Money for Education in SC</b>		
"strongly agree"	60%	.00
"agree" to "strongly disagree"	39%	
<b>Use Money to Reduce Taxes</b>		
"strongly agree" to mixed	55%	.02
"disagree" to "strongly disagree"	49%	
<b>Political Party</b>		
Democrats	70%	.00
Republicans	44%	

of South Carolina. According to U.S. Census figures, in 1990 just over 69% of all residents were native to the state. Between 1990 and 2000 the percentage of natives dropped ten percentage



points to 59% native. Many of these in-migrants come from states that already have lotteries. They are also less likely to bring with them socially conservative values associated with religious fundamentalism. In our sample of Aiken County voters, nearly half of all whites who considered themselves southerners also identified themselves as religious fundamentalists. Less than one in six non-southern whites were fundamentalists. These in-migrants seem to have voted differently on the lottery question than natives (the difference between self-identified southern whites and non-southern whites was right on the edge of statistical significance at  $p = .06$ ). As in-migrants grow in number their impact on the cultural mix will be felt more and more.

Religious fundamentalism and frequency of church attendance had a strong impact on white voting. Combining these two factors had a powerful impact on the vote. A little over 80% of whites who were fundamentalists and who attended church several times each week voted against the lottery. But only a little more than 10% of the sample fit into this category (62 of 568). Religiously active fundamentalist whites are but a small portion of the electorate and will only make a difference when the larger and more secular part of the electorate is evenly split on some question or when voting turnout is low.

Whites in the lowest income groups (less than \$25,000 family income) seemed to be on the opposite side of the lottery question than those in higher income groups. The difference was right on the border of what is considered a statistically significant relationship. However, if we look at the full range of income groups, we see what appears to be a far more complex relationship, although the subgroups are far too small to produce anything close to statistical significance. Support falls below 50% when income of white families is between \$25,000 and \$40,000, but then it rises slightly above 50% again in the higher income groups up to \$100,000, but again falls below 50% in the over \$100,000 group.

This suggests that opposition was greatest within the white lower middle class. This is not a function of religious fundamentalism because a higher percentage of whites in the lowest income groups are fundamentalists than whites in lower middle or high income groups.

Education also has a complex relationship with the lottery vote among whites. The relationship is similar to what we saw in examining income. The greatest support comes from those with a less than high school education (72%), followed by those with one to three years of college (55%). The greatest opposition comes from those with education beyond a college degree (only 42% favored). Those with a high school degree and those with a college degree also opposed the lottery (46% and 48% favored respectively), but were more evenly split than those with the highest level of education.

One possible explanation could be differences in the understanding of the issue. Presumably education should work to increase citizen understanding of issues. The more one knows about the lottery the more one might question the value of the lottery to improve education and the more one should understand disparate impact on economic classes. We asked several factual questions about the lottery to see how well-informed voters were on the issue. Education had no relation to knowledge about the percentage impact the lottery would have on total education spending in the state (a less than 5% increase). All education groups grossly overestimated the impact. Nor did education have any relation to knowledge of how much of the lottery proceeds would go to education (about a third). Most again grossly overestimated the money for education. However, the highest education group (those with post college education) was significantly more likely to know that the lottery would take more money from the poor than from those who are better off. Two-thirds of this highest educated group gave the correct answer. Only about

a fourth of those with less than a high school education knew that it would cost the poor more. About half of those in the middle education groups gave the correct answer. So an altruistic concern for the poor among those who were most well educated—not knowledge about the impact of the lottery on education—may best explain their lack of support for the lottery. We have no explanation as to why those with some college may have been more supportive than those with just high school degrees, except that they were more likely to be non-Southerners.<sup>14</sup>

The political culture of South Carolina has long been one that opposed increased taxes or expanded government services. On the other hand, a long, slow process of public education may be awakening voters to the fact that the state can never make improvements without more resources devoted to education. Nearly 90% of the voters in our exit poll were on the “agree” side of the statement that “more money is needed for education in South Carolina” (54% “strongly” agreed). Nearly three-fourths agreed with the statement “public school teachers in South Carolina who meet national standards should have their salaries raised to the national average, even if that means raising taxes” (here the “strongly agrees” and “agrees” were about evenly split).

An “education lottery” fits well with both the older anti-tax culture and the newer realization that improvements in public

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<sup>14</sup> In a countywide telephone survey performed in 1999, we found similar and even more striking results. In this survey we asked a series of eight political knowledge questions (such as the terms of U.S. House and Senate members and names of South Carolina’s two U.S. Senators) and also asked about whether they supported the lottery. We found that those who were more politically knowledgeable were significantly more likely to oppose the lottery ( $p = .03$  with whites only; the black subsample was too small to analyze by itself). This telephone survey of 200 Aiken County adult residents was performed by Professor Robert Botsch’s Political Science Research Methods students. The sample was selected using telephone numbers generated randomly. All numbers were called at least four times before replacement, and the individual respondent in each household interviewed was chosen using the “most recent birthday” method so that they were randomly chosen. The sampling error for this survey is plus or minus 7%.



education require more resources. Nevertheless, only those with the strongest level of support for more education spending were moved to support the lottery. Only among those who "strongly" agreed that more money is needed did the lottery garner majority support. The question about raising teacher pay even if it meant raising taxes had no bearing on the lottery vote. On the other hand, one could see the old anti-tax culture at work in the vote. We asked voters if they felt that lottery proceeds should be used to lower existing taxes that support education. About two-thirds of all the white voters agreed or had mixed feelings. As seen in the table above, a majority of these voters favored the lottery. Having at least mixed feelings about using proceeds to reduce existing taxes played a role in explaining why many white voters supported the lottery. Many apparently felt that a lottery would allow them to in effect have their cake and eat it too—the state could have more money for education and also lower taxes.

Partisanship played an important role in the outcome of the lottery. The GOP tried to stay out of the lottery fight, even though it officially opposed gambling in any form in its state party platform. The issue was too divisive for the party because many lowcountry Republicans were on the pro-lottery side. As lottery supporter Republican state Senator Arthur Ravenel Jr. of Charleston said, "We gamble, cuss, drink liquor and raise hell down here. But we're very conservative with our sins."<sup>15</sup> The white Democrats, on the other hand, voted to endorse the lottery as the centerpiece of Governor Jim Hodges' education program and spent money in its support.<sup>16</sup> The results, at least as seen in Aiken County, indicate that white Democrats were more united and far more likely to vote in favor, with 70% of all white De-

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<sup>15</sup> Lee Bandy, "Split on the lottery, GOP will stay out of the fight," *The State*, 10 September 2000, D-1.

<sup>16</sup> Bandy, *supra*.

mocratic identifiers supporting the lottery. Only 40% of the Republicans supported the lottery. The lottery was an issue that at least temporarily revived the state's Democratic Party. The lottery was a wedge issue that split the Republican Party, separating its social and moral conservatives who live primarily in the upcountry from its relatively more permissive and individualistic elements in the lowcountry.

### CONCLUSION

The lingering shadows of centuries old ethnic settlement patterns on current regional, racial, and religious dynamics in South Carolina contribute significantly to understanding the 2000 education lottery vote. Those historic patterns clearly help explain the differential support for the lottery, which was stronger in lowcountry counties and weaker in upcountry counties. Those patterns also help us explain related differences in support for the lottery among voters of different religious backgrounds, races, and partisan leanings.

Yet on-going changes in the state are also relevant to explaining the vote. As non-southerners move to the state, both the balance within each region and the political culture of the state as a whole appear to be shifting. The upcountry is still most conservative on issues such as gambling, but conservatives have at best a narrow majority. The state is still culturally conservative, but at the same time it contains a strong individualistic element that often rejects government prohibitions on gambling, just as it has in the past rejected mandatory requirements for wearing motorcycle helmets. At the same time, as the lottery vote indicates, the changing citizenry seems less willing than in the past to use government to enforce conservative standards of social morality. In addition, the vote indicates that while Blacks may share the religious fundamentalism label with many white citizens and may hear their religious leaders denounce the lottery as immoral,

theirs is a different flavor of fundamentalism, as least respecting an acceptance of games of chance. Most citizens of both races recognize the need for more resources for public education, and they have embraced the lottery as a kind of "voluntary tax" that will provide some of those resources. A notable proportion would even raise mandatory taxes. However, many still embrace the hope that lottery proceeds will lower mandatory taxes that the traditionalistic culture so detests.

The culture of South Carolina is slowly changing. The moral conservatism of the upcountry is now battling to maintain its dominance in that region, at least with respect to gambling. The battle has long been over in the lowcountry, which never fully embraced religious restrictions on individual morality. Regional differences still exist, but those differences are fading into ever more faint shadows as waves of in-migrants cast a new light on the political culture of the state.

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