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Economic Orientations and Social Stratification: Public Opinion in Contemporary America *

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A connection between social class and political behavior has been an important feature of American politics over the recent past. The New Deal coalition involved a political alignment partially based on social class, with the focus on the division between the working and middle classes. However, this old pattern of class polarization and political conflict may be breaking down. In the 1972 election there was very little difference between the white-collar and blue-collar strata in their presidential vote, and class differences in party identification and congressional voting, while greater than those for presidential voting, were still fairly modest by the standards of previous elections.¹

The low level of class-based voting in the 1972 election appears to many as more than an aberration resulting from short-term factors unique to that election. Rather, the 1972 election is viewed as an acceleration of a trend that has been occurring since 1948, a trend that represents a fundamental shift in the nature of American politics.² Three related explanations for this change have been put forth. One explanation focuses on the shift from industrial to post-industrial society as the source of these alterations in partisan alignments. Put simply, this view sees the shifts in social structure and educational attainment that accompany the coming of post-industrial society as producing a more volatile electorate, unconcerned with traditional economic issues and unresponsive to traditional class-related partisan appeals.³ A second view sees

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¹ Norval D. Glenn, "Class and Party Support in 1972," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXIX (Spring, 1975), pp. 117-122.

² For longitudinal data on the relationship between social class and partisan choice see Norval D. Glenn, "Class and Party Support in the United States: Recent and Emerging Trends," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXVII (Spring 1973), pp. 1-20; and John W. Books and JoAnn B. Reynolds, "A Note on Class Voting in Great Britain and the United States," *Comparative Political Studies*, VII (October, 1975), pp. 360-376.

³ Everett Carl Ladd, Jr., and Charles D. Hadley, *Transformations of the American Party System* (New York: Norton, 1975), pp. 181-344.

generational change as the source of the breakdown of class-based voting. Younger voters, lacking experience with the Depression and having grown up in an age of affluence, have different values and concerns than older voters and display less class polarization in their political behavior.⁴ Related to these arguments is the view that increased affluence has diminished class divisions and produced a society where the vast majority are properly characterized as middle-class.⁵ Although this phenomenon often is greatly exaggerated in the popular media, some blurring of the dividing line between manual and non-manual groups may have occurred over the past three decades, partially as a result of the expansion of the service sector and the increase in routine white-collar jobs.

All these arguments suggest that significant alterations in the structure of opinion on economic issues have taken place. The New Deal alignment was based, at least in part, on class-related economic issues, particularly the traditional economic issues of social welfare and income redistribution. Thus, a sharp decline in class-based voting implies one (or more) of the following possibilities: (a) traditional economic issues are much less important now, at least in relation to other issues; (b) traditional class differences in economic orientations are disappearing; (c) traditional partisan differences in economic orientation are no longer perceived by the electorate. This last possibility can be dismissed, for survey data show that the electorate's perception of partisan differences on economic issues has increased, not decreased, over the past two decades.⁶ Therefore, the decline in class-based voting should be a reflection of basic changes in the nature and/or distribution of economic issue orientations.

Although there has been considerable discussion, much of it journalistic, of the recent decline in class-based politics, there has been very little research into the current relationship between economic position and orientation on economic issues. The common assumption is that the better-off groups are more conservative, but we have little data on (a) how much difference there is (if any) between different strata and (b) which aspects of economic stratification tend to be the more important influences on economic attitudes. This study attempts to investigate these relationships. It also attempts to suggest some conceptual and methodological considerations that are relevant to the study of economic issue orientations. In general the aim of this study is to explore some

⁴ Paul R. Abramson, "Generational Change in American Electoral Behavior," *American Political Science Review*, LXVIII (March, 1974), pp. 93-105.

⁵ Kurt B. Mayer, "The Changing Shape of the American Class Structure," *Social Research*, XXX (Winter, 1963), pp. 462-468.

⁶ Gerald Pomper, *Voters' Choice* (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1975), pp. 170-173.

key questions in order to provide a foundation for future research in this area.

Economic Stratification and Economic Attitudes

Most research into class-based political behavior has relied on occupation as the best measure of an individual's position in the social stratification system. The sharp decline in class-based voting raises the possibility that recent changes in the social structure have made occupation a less relevant indicator of economic position. The simple dichotomy between blue-collar and white-collar occupations, so widely used in social science, may not be as useful a distinction as it once was, and somewhat finer divisions of occupations into five or six categories may not be much better.

Whatever the changes in the occupational structure, the fact remains that there is considerable economic stratification when it comes to the distribution of income and wealth.⁷ Moreover, there has not been any drastic alteration in the inequality of the income distribution in recent decades.⁸ This suggests that income may be a better measure of economic stratification, at least for research into economic attitudes. Many of the traditional economic issues involve questions of government policy that have a different impact on the different income strata, but are unrelated to occupational strata, except insofar as they represent income levels.⁹

A third aspect of social stratification; education, also may influence economic issue orientations. The shift to a post-industrial society may be creating new economic cleavages, based on control of technical expertise, that are related to orientations on at least some economic issues.¹⁰

In order to examine the relationship of these various aspects of social stratification to orientations on economic issues, recent national survey data were analyzed. The data employed in this study are from the 1972 American National Election Study conducted by the Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan. In order to avoid confounding racial differences with stratification differences, all non-whites were dropped from the analysis.

⁷ Relevant data are contained in Gabriel Kolko, *Wealth and Power in America* (New York: Praeger, 1962); Herman P. Miller, *Income Distribution in the United States* (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Department of Commerce, 1966); and Richard F. Hamilton, *Class and Politics in the United States* (New York: Wiley, 1972), pp. 368-398.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ This is not to say that various occupational groups do not have their own specific economic interests, but broad categories, such as manual and non-manual, probably are of limited usefulness when it comes to determining economic interests, economic concerns, and economic issue orientations.

¹⁰ Daniel Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), pp. 212-242.

Four different economic issue orientations were used in the analysis, with each orientation measured by the respondent's self-placement on a seven-point scale. Specifically, respondents were asked to place themselves on scales indicating: (a) whether or not the government should see that every person has a job and a good standard of living;¹¹ (b) what the best tax rate would be;¹² (c) whether or not the government should do everything possible to combat the problem of inflation;¹³ and (d) whether or not the government should make every possible effort to improve the social and economic position of blacks and other minority groups.¹⁴

These four scales represent four different types of economic issues. The first is a traditional social welfare issue, involving governmental action to insure certain minimum standards of living. The second item, the desirable tax rate, does involve an issue of income redistribution, and in that sense is similar to the first issue. However, income redistribution through the tax structure does not call for the same amount of overt government activity as do most social welfare programs, and thus might be favored by those preferring a more egalitarian social structure but opposed to expansion of federal government activities. The third issue, government action against inflation, does not explicitly involve a question of income redistribution, making it different from the previous two issues. To some extent, this item taps feelings about governmental economic activism, although it does not differentiate between different types of governmental action against inflation, and there certainly is a difference between favoring fiscal or monetary action and favoring wage and price controls. Perhaps the question wording also makes this item a measure of the respondent's general concern over inflation. The final issue, government aid to minority groups, does involve issues of income redistribution and governmental economic activism. However, the government action in question would not directly benefit any of the respondent groups being analyzed (non-whites have been excluded) and presumably would involve some costs to these groups. In sum, these four issues involve in some way questions of governmental economic activism and/or income redistribution. Each item is a very general question that should be a good measure of attitudes on the more specific

¹¹ The seven-point scale ran from "having the government see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living" to "the government letting each person get ahead on his own."

¹² The seven-point scale ran from "increasing the tax rate for high incomes" to "having the same tax rate for everyone."

¹³ The seven-point scale ran from "total government action against inflation" to "no government action against inflation."

¹⁴ The seven-point scale ran from "the government should make every possible effort to help minorities" to "the government should not make any special effort to help minorities."

issues that make up the issue area, and while there is some interrelationship among the four items, they are sufficiently distinct to be considered representative of a different issue area.

As a starting point, the relationship between occupational status and economic attitudes is examined. Figure 1 presents the mean score on each of the four scales for six different occupational groups: professional and technical workers, managers and proprietors, clerical and sales workers, skilled workers, unskilled workers, and service workers.¹⁵

These data do not indicate that those in higher status occupations are more conservative on economic issues in general. On two of the issue scales, the ones dealing with the tax rate and government job guarantees, there is no consistent relationship at all. There is a fairly clear relationship between occupational status and position on the minority aid scale, but it is the high status occupational groups that are more liberal here. Only on the question of government action against inflation do we find a consistent tendency for those in higher status occupations to be more conservative (or more anti-governmental-action), and even here the relationship is not that strong. If we simply divide the respondents into two categories, blue-collar and white-collar, the results are similar.¹⁶ There is virtually no difference between blue-collar and white-collar respondents on the tax rate and guaranteed job scales, while the blue-collar group is more conservative on the minority aid scale and the white-collar group more conservative on the inflation action scale.¹⁷

Occupational status does not appear to be strongly related to the economic issue orientations examined here. Perhaps other aspects of social stratification are more significant. In order to examine this possibility, we can compare income, education, and occupational status in terms of their impact on economic issue orientations. These three aspects of social stratification are interrelated, so in order to determine the separate and independent impact of each variable, the three variables were used as the independent variables in a multiple regression analysis of scores on each of the four economic issue scales.¹⁸ The results of the

¹⁵ The occupation of the family head was used to classify respondents. Cases where the family head's occupation did not fit into one of these 6 categories were eliminated from the analysis (*e.g.*, farmers, students).

¹⁶ The first 3 occupational categories were considered white-collar and the remaining three were classified as blue-collar.

¹⁷ The mean scores for each issue scale are:

	<i>guar. job scale</i>	<i>tax rate scale</i>	<i>infl. act. scale</i>	<i>min. aid. scale</i>
white-collar	4.58	4.03	2.57	4.21
blue-collar	4.52	4.07	2.36	4.68

¹⁸ For purposes of this analysis, yearly family income was treated as a seven-category variable, running from "under \$5000" up to "over \$20,000." Education was treated as a five-category variable, running from "primary education or less" to

analysis are presented in Table 1. One can see that income and education are the important aspects of stratification, in terms of explaining economic issue orientations, with the significant variable being income for the first two issue scales and education for the last two scales. The influence of occupational status is extremely modest, once income and education are taken into account.

Income and Economic Orientations

The impact of income on economic issue orientations warrants further investigation, as there are serious problems in using income as a measure of social stratification. Surveys commonly record only the total annual family income, but this can mean many different things. There are geographical variations in the cost of living, so a given income may imply a different standard of living in different locations. Also, a given family income may represent the earning of one, two, or even more individuals, and we would expect a single individual earning a specified income to have different economic interests, concerns, and orientations than a married couple earning the same income through full-time work on the part of both. It would seem, then, that the use of income in this analysis would require the application of various corrections or adjustments in order to obtain a valid measure of economic position.

An attempt to handle the above problems can be made by applying some controls and excluding some respondents. The following analysis excludes all respondents who were neither the family head nor the spouse of the head (e.g., adult children living with parents, retired parents living with children.). In such cases, total family income may not be a good guide to the respondent's economic situation. Also eliminated were married respondents who both were employed and had an employed spouse. Such respondents are better analyzed separately to control for the fact that the family income represents the joint earnings of two individuals.¹⁹ The following analysis thus involves white respondents who were either the head or the spouse of the head of a single-worker

"college graduate." Occupation was treated as the six-category variable described above. Strictly speaking, the assumptions for multiple regression are not fulfilled, as these data are ordinal rather than interval. But considering the nature of the data (the number of categories and the general distribution), the use of regression analysis should be acceptable. A check on the results of the multiple regression through the use of contingency tables does not indicate that any unwarranted conclusions are derived from the use of the more sophisticated methods.

¹⁹ The analysis that follows also was carried out for these respondents. The overall pattern of results for this group generally is similar to the findings discussed in this paper. Some differences do exist, but it is not clear whether these represent true differences or fluctuations due to sampling error and other random factors. The data for these respondents are not reported because the relatively small number of respondents make the findings tentative.

family. Controls for region and community size were introduced in an attempt to control for differences in the cost of living. Of course, the above exclusions and controls still do not make family income a perfect measure of the respondent's economic position, but they probably improve its validity considerably.

Table 2 presents the relationship between income and each of the economic issue orientations for four respondent groups: urban Northerners, urban Southerners, rural Northerners, and rural Southerners.²⁰ For economy of presentation only the gamma for the association between income and the specified issue orientation is reported for each population group, with the partial gamma used as a summary measure. The data show that income is related to orientations on the first three issues and that the relationship is in the expected direction (i.e., the lower-income groups tend to be more liberal or pro-governmental-action). However, the relationship is weak in the case of the tax rate issue and only of modest strength for the first and third issues.

Although the relationships are not particularly strong, they are greater than the simple relationships between these economic issue orientations and family income without any of the exclusions or controls that were applied in the analysis for Table 2. This not only indicates the validity of such exclusions and controls, but also suggests that we might obtain stronger relationships between income and economic attitudes if we were able to apply a more precise and thorough set of corrections and adjustments.

It is interesting to note that the relationships are considerably stronger in the rural areas, as this is somewhat at odds with the view that class polarization is more a feature of urban life. Some explanations of electoral realignment in the South, for example, stress the connection between growing Republicanism, class polarization, and urbanization.²¹ Perhaps the relationship between occupation and partisan choice is greater in urban areas than in rural areas, but these data show that for economic attitudes there is more difference between upper and lower income groups in rural areas than there is in urban areas.

The impact of income on economic attitudes also may be examined for different age groups (see Table 3), a relevant analysis considering the

²⁰ See Hamilton, *op. cit.*, pp. 239-308, for information justifying these controls. Respondents were considered urban residents if they lived in an SMSA. The South was defined as the eleven states of the Confederacy plus Kentucky, Maryland, Oklahoma, West Virginia, and Washington.

²¹ See Donald S. Strong, "Further Reflections on Southern Politics," *Journal of Politics*, XXXIII (May, 1971), pp. 239-256; and Anthony M. Orum and Edward W. McCranie, "Class, Tradition, and Partisan Alignments in a Southern Urban Electorate," *Journal of Politics* XXXII (February, 1970), pp. 156-176.

generational differences in class-based voting that have been pointed out by others.²² Age group differences are not particularly pronounced for the first two issues, although one can see that on the question of government job and living standard guarantees there is a stronger connection between income and issue orientation among the older respondents. Clear age group differences are present for the issue of government action against inflation; the relationship of income to issue orientation ranges from nonexistent for the under-35 group to relatively strong for the over-54 group. These results are quite explicable when it is remembered that this item is more a measure of concern over inflation rather than orientation toward potential ways of combating inflation. Age group differences also exist for the final issue, where we find that a lower income is associated with a more liberal response among the young but the opposite is true for the older groups, but it is not clear what conclusions should be drawn from these findings. In general, the data in Table 3, while pointing out some interesting age group differences, do not indicate that the relationships between income and economic issue orientations are greatly weaker for the young.

Economic Satisfaction and Economic Orientations

The above data do not show objective economic position to be very strongly related to economic attitudes. At best, moderate connections are observed. Perhaps this reflects the fact that different individuals may react to the same economic situation in different ways. Instead of focusing only on an individual's objective economic situation, we might also consider the individual's subjective assessment of that situation. In order to do this, a measure of the respondent's satisfaction with his income level was introduced into the analysis.²³ As one might expect, satisfaction with income is related to actual income level. Although the relation is far from perfect (there are many dissatisfied high-income individuals and many satisfied low-income individuals), it is necessary to control for actual income level when examining the impact of satisfaction with income on economic attitudes.

We might predict several attitudinal characteristics for dissatisfied individuals (as compared to the more satisfied): (a) they should be more likely to cite economic problems as important political or governmental issues; (b) they should be more critical of or dissatisfied with existing economic policy; and (c) they should be more likely to favor governmental policies that would be of direct economic benefit to them.

²² Abramson, *op. cit.*

²³ Respondents were asked to place themselves on a seven-point scale running from extremely satisfied to extremely dissatisfied.

This follows from the simple idea that those who are dissatisfied with their economic situation are likely to respond in political terms, wanting government policies that ameliorate their economic condition. No doubt not all will respond this way, but some general tendencies should be evident.

Tables 4 and 5 show how concern over economic problems is related to income and satisfaction with income.²⁴ Table 4 contains, for each specified population group, the mean score on a scale measuring satisfaction with government economic policy.²⁵ Clearly, both a higher income and greater personal satisfaction with income have an impact on satisfaction with government economic policy. It also appears that satisfaction with government policy is more related to satisfaction with income than to actual income, thus indicating the relevance of including measures of subjective satisfaction with personal economic condition.

Table 5 contains, for each population group, the percentage indicating that the most important problem facing the government was an economic problem.²⁶ Contrary to expectations, these data indicate that satisfaction with income is unrelated to the importance placed on economic problems. The high income group is the most likely to name a non-economic problem as most important, but this is not due to higher levels of income satisfaction that characterize this group, and the middle income group is slightly more likely than the low income group to name an economic problem as most important. This pattern of responses seems surprising, particularly considering the clear relationships that were present in Table 4.

Table 6 contains scores on each of the four economic issue orientation scales by income and satisfaction with income. For economy of presentation, the mean scale score is presented for each group. These data indicate that for the first three issues those low in satisfaction are more likely to have a liberal or pro-government-action response. This is expected for most of the cases, but there are some places where this seems odd. For example, the high income group probably would not receive much direct benefit from any government program to insure a job and

²⁴ In order to reduce the number of cells in these two tables to a more readable number, both income and satisfaction with income were reduced from seven-point scales to trichotomous variables (with a roughly equal number of respondents in each variable category).

²⁵ This was a seven-point scale that respondents placed themselves on, with the scale extremes being highly satisfied and highly dissatisfied. A lower mean score indicates greater satisfaction with government economic policy.

²⁶ Respondents were asked to name the single most important problem that the country faced. Problems classified as economic included problems of inflation, social welfare policies, economic growth and prosperity, taxation and government spending, and other miscellaneous economic items.

good standard of living for everyone; in fact, such a program probably would involve some direct costs to this group. Therefore, one would expect that it would be the more satisfied members of the high income group who would be most supportive of such a program; those with lower levels of income satisfaction should be the most opposed to government programs to improve the economic condition of others. However reasonable these arguments are, the data clearly do not support this line of reasoning. The same arguments and contradictory findings also apply to the tax rate issue, except that the wording of the question may make these results explicable.²⁷

For the inflation issue, it makes sense to find that the dissatisfied at each income level are more in favor of government action against inflation. Their increased concern over inflation probably reflects one of the reasons for their dissatisfaction. One might also note that for any given level of satisfaction, the low income groups are more in favor of government action to stem inflation.

There is little relationship between satisfaction with income and orientation on the fourth issue (government aid to minorities). Following the line of reasoning advanced above, we might expect that those who were dissatisfied with their own economic situation would be the most opposed to the government providing aid to minorities, but the data again fail to support such an argument.

These results suggest that dissatisfaction with personal economic situation leads to more liberal (or pro-governmental-action) orientations on economic issues. This tendency appears to be the case even when the more liberal position does not seem to be in the direct economic interest of the individual. Furthermore, the relationship seems too consistent to be explained away by such things as differences in the way respondents interpreted the questions or perceived their own economic interests. Further research certainly is necessary to confirm this unexpected finding, but the analysis results at least indicate an interesting area of research.

Conclusion


The extent of class-based voting may be disappearing and the nature of the social structure may be changing, but this study shows that social stratification differences still are related to economic issue orientations. Occupation, however, no longer is the most relevant aspect of social

²⁷ Those respondents classified as high-income who indicated that they favored increasing the tax rate on high incomes may not have felt that their own earnings fell into that category. Their own concept of high income might have been a very narrow one. Hence, raising taxes for the wealthy, which is what these respondents may have had in mind, would not imply higher taxes for most of the respondents classified as high-income (*i.e.*, greater than \$11,000) in this analysis.

stratification. Instead, income and education appear to be the important determinants of economic attitudes, and future research should concentrate on these two variables. However, income must be used in a more sophisticated fashion than it usually is, as various corrections and adjustments need to be applied in order to arrive at a true picture of the respondent's economic situation. In addition to objective measures of socio-economic position, it is worthwhile to include subjective assessments of personal economic situation. Such feelings may have an impact on both concern over economic issues and actual issue orientations. Bringing measures of subjective assessment of economic situation into the analysis does not make objective measures of economic position irrelevant, though, as the data also show that actual income is related to economic issue orientations even when satisfaction with income is taken into account.

The results of this study should be taken as suggestions for further research, not as definite conclusions. Further research into this area appears desirable and worthwhile. The aim of this study simply has been to examine some questions that are relevant for future research and to suggest some appropriate methodological and conceptual approaches for investigating the basis of contemporary public opinion on economic issues.

FIGURE 1. Mean Scores on Four Economic Attitude Scales for Different Occupational Groups*



* This chart indicates the mean score on each of the four economic issue orientation scales for six different occupational groups (defined by the occupation of the head of the household). Non-whites are excluded from the analysis. A lower scale score indicates a more liberal (or pro-governmental-action) response.

TABLE 1. Prediction of Economic Issue Orientation from Three Aspects of Stratification*

<i>Economic Issue:</i>	<i>Aspect of Stratification</i>		
	<i>Income</i>	<i>Education</i>	<i>Occupational Status</i>
1. Govt. guar. of jobs and living standard11	.01	.04
2. Desirable tax rate09	-.06	.01
3. Govt. action against inflation04	.12	-.02
4. Govt. aid to minorities02	-.17	.07

* The entries in each row represent the betas from a multiple regression prediction of the specified economic issue orientation using the three aspects of stratification as independent variables. The beta in each cell therefore indicates the individual impact of that aspect of stratification after taking into account the impact of the other two aspects of stratification. A positive beta indicates that increases in the independent variable are associated with a more conservative (or less pro-governmental-action) orientation on the economic issue. Non-whites are excluded from the analysis.

TABLE 2. Relationship Between Income and Economic Issue Orientations*

<i>Economic Issue:</i>	<i>urban</i>	<i>urban</i>	<i>rural</i>	<i>rural</i>	<i>partial gamma</i>
	<i>North</i>	<i>South</i>	<i>North</i>	<i>South</i>	
1. Govt. guar. of jobs and living standard12 (599)	.07 (188)	.20 (263)	.23 (194)	.13
2. Desirable tax rate06 (573)	.05 (190)	.13 (261)	.08 (181)	.07
3. Govt. action against inflation15 (609)	.09 (203)	.16 (249)	.13 (192)	.15
4. Govt. aid to minorities00 (569)	-.03 (183)	.03 (231)	.01 (178)	.00

* The cells in each row contain the gammas for the relationship between income and orientation on the particular economic issue, by the indicated geographical divisions. The final column contains the partial (second-order) gamma. The number of respondents is in parentheses. A positive gamma indicates that a lower income is associated with a more liberal or pro-governmental-action response. The data in the table are for whites who were either the head or the spouse of the head of a single-worker family.

TABLE 3. Relationship Between Income and Economic Issue Orientations by Age Group*

<i>Economic Issue:</i>	<i>Age Group</i>			<i>partial gamma</i>
	<35	35-54	>54	
1. Govt. guar. of jobs and living standard12 (401)	.08 (396)	.21 (443)	.14
2. Desirable tax rate08 (396)	.08 (388)	.06 (417)	.07
3. Govt. action against inflation02 (402)	.13 (413)	.24 (435)	.13
4. Govt. aid to minorities10 (374)	-.18 (383)	-.06 (400)	-.05

* The cells in each row contain the gammas for the relationship between income and orientation on the particular economic issue, by the indicated age divisions. The partial gamma is in the final column. The number of respondents is in parentheses. A positive gamma indicates that a lower income is associated with a more liberal or pro-governmental-action response. The data in the table are for whites who were either the head or the spouse of the head of a single-worker family.

TABLE 4. Satisfaction with Government Economic Policy by Income and Satisfaction with Income*

<i>Satisfaction with income</i>	<i>Income</i>		
	<\$7000	\$7000- \$11000	>\$11000
Low	4.59 (111)	4.93 (60)	4.92 (36)
Med.	4.32 (85)	4.27 (64)	4.12 (60)
High	4.20 (50)	4.20 (44)	4.01 (70)

* The entry in each cell is the mean score on the satisfaction with government economic policy scale, for respondents with the indicated income and level of satisfaction with income. A low score indicates greater satisfaction with government economic policy. The number of respondents is in parentheses. The data in the table are for whites who were either the head or the spouse of the head of a single-worker family.

TABLE 5. Importance of Economic Problems by Income and Satisfaction with Income*

<i>Satisfaction with income</i>	<i>Income</i>		
	<i><\$7000</i>	<i>\$7000- \$11000</i>	<i>>\$11000</i>
Low	30% (86)	40% (52)	22% (37)
Med.	44% (64)	42% (55)	27% (52)
High	40% (35)	29% (35)	30% (61)

* The entry in each cell is the percentage naming an economic problem as the most important national problem, for respondents with the indicated income and level of satisfaction with income. The number of respondents is in parentheses. The data in the table are for whites who were either the head or the spouse of the head of a single-worker family.

TABLE 6. Economic Issue Orientations by Income and Satisfaction with Income*

<i>Economic Issues:</i>	<\$7000			<i>Income</i> \$7000-\$11000			>\$11000		
	<i>High</i>	<i>Med.</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Satisfaction With Income</i>			<i>High</i>	<i>Med.</i>	<i>Low</i>
				<i>High</i>	<i>Med.</i>	<i>Low</i>			
1. Govt. guar. of jobs and living standard	4.64 (45)	4.64 (71)	3.99 (108)	4.79 (43)	4.58 (59)	4.22 (58)	4.95 (63)	4.88 (58)	4.43 (37)
2. Desirable tax rate	3.95 (44)	3.74 (73)	3.61 (102)	3.82 (50)	4.13 (62)	3.95 (59)	4.29 (66)	4.35 (60)	3.39 (38)
3. Govt. action against inflation.	2.20 (49)	2.37 (76)	1.94 (102)	2.50 (42)	2.40 (58)	2.30 (60)	2.94 (64)	2.69 (61)	2.65 (34)
4. Govt. aid to minorities	4.34 (47)	4.53 (72)	4.29 (107)	4.49 (41)	4.35 (60)	4.68 (57)	4.27 (67)	4.24 (55)	4.11 (37)

* The cells in each row contain the mean score on the particular issue orientation scale, for the respondents with the indicated income and level of satisfaction with income. A low score indicates a more liberal or pro-governmental-action orientation. The number of respondents is in parentheses. The data in the table are for whites who were either the head or the spouse of the head of a single-worker family.