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Policy Analysis: A Review and a Suggestion

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Policy analysis illuminates the comparative desirability of specific goals and the alternative ways of reaching them. It is generally viewed as a central tool for sound decisions—contributing to a better understanding of the relevant reality by comparing intentions with formal goals and images with actual constraints.

Policy analysis examines different combinations of substantive concepts and modes of implementation in order to estimate the possible contributions of different decisions toward the achievement of prescribed goals. Policy analysis involves (1) investigation of the causal relationships between policies and presumed consequences,¹ (2) prescription of ground rules for future policy making by elaboration of any explanation that may emerge as a result of the investigation.² When the identification of a possible linkage between an act and its impact generates a search of an explanation,³ i.e. a descriptive knowledge of policy making, prescription can be made about the better use of knowledge in policy making.⁴ Reflecting on this point Dror concludes that “when policy studies are oriented towards policy improvements . . . some basis must be provided for building bridges between the descriptive explanatory and the prescriptive worlds of discourse. . . . This implies that descriptive-explanatory studies should select concepts which fit the needs of prescriptive analysis, while prescriptive analysis should utilize concepts permitting relevant descriptive-explanatory investigations.”⁵

¹ Thomas R. Dye, *Understanding Public Policy* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1972), p. 6.

² Yehezkel, Dror, *Design for Policy Sciences* (New York: American Elsevier Publishing Co., Inc., 1971), pp. 55f and 24f.

³ Thomas R. Dye, “Policy Analysis and Political Science: Some Interface Problems.” *Policy Studies Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Winter 1972), pp. 103-107.

Yehezkel, Dror, “Some Diverse Approaches to Policy Analysis: A Partial Reply to Thomas Dye.” *Policy Studies Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Summer 1973), pp. 258-260. Yehezkel, Dror, “General Policy Science.” *Policy Studies Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Autumn 1972), pp. 4-5.

⁴ The difference between knowledge of policy making and knowledge in policy making was discussed in:

Harold D. Lasswell, *A Pre-View of Policy Sciences* (New York: Elsevier Publishing Co., Inc., 1971).

⁵ Yehezkel, Dror, “Some Features of a Meta-Model for Policy Studies,” *Policy Studies Journal*, Vol. 3 (Spring 1975), p. 248.

In sum, by generating knowledge of policy making and informing decision makers on the use of knowledge in policy making, policy analysis is expected to contribute to a better fulfillment of more needs.⁶

Current approaches to policy analysis tend to concentrate on the ways policies are made (or ought to be made) and on the character of their impact on reality. While these two foci of interest can not be dismissed as unimportant, they do not assure a continuous application of knowledge for improvement of policy making.⁷ Following a brief review of the literature, the paper suggests that a use of the methodological basis of evaluation research coupled with due considerations of the contextual factors is capable of leading a better policymaking, i.e. policymaking that brings both the policymaker and the polity closer to their

MODELS OF POLICY ANALYSIS

The taxonomy of models of policy analysis can be done in different ways and cannot be separated from the attempts to categorize public policies per se.⁸ One way is to categorize models according to the way they look at a policy's impact on reality. Such taxonomy makes it possible to compare the conceptual bases and methodological significance of models that view policies or their impacts (1) as differential values—e.g., the works of Lindblom,⁹ Dror,¹⁰ and other members of the economic rationality school; (2) as changes in the balance or allocation of benefits and cost within the policy—e.g., Mitchell,¹¹ Curry and Wade¹² and

⁶ Responsiveness to need i. e. "demands" constitutes an essential element in the analysis of political systems and especially in Easton's model of politics. When a system approach is used to analyze a political system, it is not necessary to differentiate between the needs of a particular actor and the needs of the system as a whole because both regulate its behavior as suggested by J. S. Sorzano. "David Easton and the Invisible Hand", *The American Political Science Review* 69 (March 1975), pp. 98f.

⁷ The discussions about the utilization of knowledge for better decision making cannot be separated from the discussions about the role of the scientist (or the policy analyst) as the broker of knowledge, cf Irving L. Horowitz. "Social Science Mandarins: Policymaking as a Political Formula," *Policy Sciences*, Vol. 1 (Fall 1970), pp. 330-360.

Irving L. Horowitz (ed.) *The Use and Abuse of Social Science* (New Brunswick: Transaction Inc., 1971).

⁸ An important attempt to suggest such categorization of policies is offered in Lewis A. Froman, Jr. "The Categorization of Policy Contents" in Austin Ranney (ed.) *Political Science and Public Policy* (Chicago: Markham, 1968) pp. 41-52.

⁹ Charles E. Lindblom, *The Intelligence of Democracy* (New York: The Free Press, 1965).

¹⁰ Yehezkel, Dror, *Public Policymaking Reexamined* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1968).

¹¹ William C. Mitchell, "The Shape of Political Theory to Come." *The American Behavioral Scientist*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Nov.-Dec. 1967), pp. 8-38.

Joyce M. Mitchell and William C. Mitchell, *Political Analysis and Public Policy: An Introduction to Political Science* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1969).

¹² Robert L. Curry and Larry L. Wade, *A Theory of Political Exchange* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1968).

Ilchman¹³ or (3) as micro or macro results—e.g., Froman's early proposal to differentiate between segmental and areal impact.¹⁴

Another way to classify models of policy analysis is by looking at the way they follow Salisbury and Heinz's differentiation between allocative policies and structural policies—i.e., "decisions which confer direct benefits . . . upon individuals and groups" and decisions "which establish authority structure or rules to guide future allocations."¹⁵ By a careful reference to this dichotomy it becomes possible to classify the work of Bauer, Pool and Dexter, on tariff policies in the first group¹⁶ of policy analysis that deals with allocation of benefits. Normative models that shed light on the appropriate way to allocate resources, e.g., the works of Hitch-McKean, or Trinkl¹⁷ may then be classified in the second group of policy analysis efforts that deal with guidelines for decision making.

The dichotomy that is suggested by Salisbury and Heinz summarizes the attempts of Lowi and others to group policies not only by their impact on reality but also by the attributes of the process by which they are reached.¹⁸

Recently, it has become possible to identify two general views policy analysis. One view can best be characterized by the controversy over the desired, the possible, and the appropriate orientation of policy analysis as prescriptive or descriptive.¹⁹ The other view advocates the

¹³ Warren F. Ilchman, Norman T. Uphaff, *The Political Economy of Change* (Berkeley; University of California Press, 1969).

¹⁴ Lewis A. Froman, "An Analysis of Public Policies in Cities," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Feb. 1967), pp. 94-109.

¹⁵ Robert Salisbury & John Heinz, "A Theory of Policy Analysis and Some Preliminary Applications," in Ira Sharkansky (ed.), *Policy Analysis in Political Science* (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1970) p. 40.

¹⁶ Raymond A. Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewish A. Dexter, *American Business and Public Policy: The Politics of Foreign Trade* (New York: Atherton, 1963).

¹⁷ Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean: *The Economic of Defense in the Nuclear Age* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963).

Frank H. Trinkl, "Allocation Among Programs Having Counteractive Outcomes" *Policy Sciences*, Vol. 3 (July 1972), pp. 163-176.

..... Hierarchical Resource Allocation Decisions *Policy Sciences* 4 (June 1973) pp. 211-221.

¹⁸ Theodore Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies and Political Theory," *World Politics* 16 (July 1964), pp. 677-715. In this review Lowi suggests to differentiate between distributive, redistributive and regulatory policies. This suggestion was criticized and elaborated by Salisbury who suggested the addition of a fourth category—self-regulatory policies. See: Robert H. Salisbury, "The Analysis of Public Policy: A Search for Theories and Roles" in Austin Ranney (ed.) op. cit. pp. 151f.

Dean Schooler, *Science, Scientists and Public Policy* (N. Y. Free Press 1971) pp. 35f.

¹⁹ The debate on the desirability of a prescriptive or a descriptive approach to policy analysis was made explicit in the exchange between Dror and Dye on the pages of *Policy Studies Journal* 1973. See: Ira Sharkansky, (ed.) *Policy Analysis in*

elaboration and application of a system approach for purposes of policy analysis. While some writers stick to the basic notion of general system theory like Quide,²⁰ other writers—as Salisbury and Heinz observe—deal after Easton with demand and support as input to the policy making process and its transformation into output, i.e., public policies.²¹ Still other writers like Kaplan or Martin²² deal with different groups as components of the political system by the use of functional analysis—paying no attention to the criticism of functionalism.²³

The use of system approach and functional analysis proved to be an important tool for developing a knowledge of policy making as evident in the recent works of Allison, Halberstram, Alexander George, Evans, Moynihan, Donovan and others.²⁴ However, their potential for

Political Decisions (Chicago, Markham Publishing Co., 1970), p. 2.

Michael Mont Harmon, "Administrative Policy Formulation and the Public Interest," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 29, No. 5 (Sept.-Oct. 1969), pp. 483-491.

Thomas R. Dye 'A Model for the Analysis of Policy Outcomes' in Sharkansky (ed.) op. cit. p. 21.

....., *Understanding Public Policy* op. cit. p. 6.

....., "Policy Analysis and Political Science . . ." op. cit. pp. 103f.

Yehezkel Dror, "The Challenges of Policy Sciences" *Policy Studies Journal*, (Aut. 1972) pp. 4f.

....., "Some Diverse Approaches to Policy Analysis: A Partial Reply to Thomas Dye" *Policy Studies Journal*, (Summer 1973) pp. 258-260.

²⁰ E. S. Quade, "Methods and Procedures" in E. S. Quade (ed.), *Analysis for Military Decisions* (Chicago: Rand McNally Co., 1964), pp. 149-178.

....., "Principles and Procedures of System Analysis" in E. S. Quade and W. I. Baucher (eds.), *System Analysis and Policy Planning* (New York: American Elsevier Publishing Co., Inc., 1968) pp. 30-53.

²¹ Robert Salisbury and John Heinz op. cit. p. 39. See also Douglas Rae and Michael Taylor, "Decision Rules and Policy Outcome" *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 1, (Jan. 1971) pp. 71-91.

Stuart H. Rokoff and Guenther F. Schaefer, "Politics, Policy and Political Science: Theoretical Alternatives," *Politics and Society*, Vol. 1 (Nov. 1970), pp. 51-78.

²² Harold Kaplan, *Urban Political Systems: A Functional Analysis of Metro Toronto* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1967). Roscoe C. Martin et al., *Decision in Syracuse* (Westport Ct.: Greenwood, 1961).

²³ Stanley Rothman, "Functionalism and Its Critiques: An Analysis of the Writings of Gabriel Almond," *The Political Science Reviewer*, Vol. 1 (Fall 1971), pp. 236-277.

²⁴ Graham T. Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 63, No. 3 (Sept. 1969), pp. 689-718.

David Halberstram, *The Best and the Brightest* (New York: Random House, 1972).

Alexander George, "Making Foreign Policy," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 61, No. 3 (Sept. 1972), pp. 791-798.

John W. Evans and Walter Williams, "The Politics of Evaluation: The Case of Head Start" in Peter H. Rossi and Walter Williams (eds.), *Evaluating Social Programs* (New York: Seminar Press, 1971), pp. 247-264.

Daniel P. Moynihan, *The Politics of a Guaranteed Income* (New York: Random House, 1973).

John C. Donovan, *The Policy Makers* (New York: Pegasus, 1970).

....., *The Cold Warriors: A Policy-Making Elite* (Lexington, D. C. Heath, 1974).

improving policy making was not available to policy makers because these studies were conducted before or after policies were made. These works were not intended—in formation or substance—to inform particular policymakers. Nevertheless, it does not follow that studies with a similar degree of excellence cannot be carried out in different formats to inform particular policy makers on specific decisions.

The growing demand for better policy analysis in recent years has been preceded by a spreading demand for social accountability and political responsibility.²⁵ This demand is a result of (1) the growing political awareness of citizens as subjects of public policies and (2) the realization that while available resources have remained the same (or declined) the critical nature and the complexity of current policy issues have grown.

The response of policy makers to these developments has not been limited to an attempt to improve policies through the introduction of sophisticated techniques for policy analysis, e.g., those that were used in PPBS.²⁶ In addition (and sometimes instead), policymakers tend to compensate for deficiencies in these techniques or their own limitations by smart political maneuvering.²⁷ Instead of concentrating on quality as means for substantive success, policy makers look for safeguards that reduce their vulnerability in case of failure. A case in point is the search for citizens' participation in the specification of goals, for planning etc. The attempt to substitute policy analysis with complicated procedures of citizen participation enabled some policy makers to get a better notion of the priorities among optional policies but not about the merit of their final results. It is not surprising, therefore, that a discussion on techniques of citizen participation starts with the observation that "the unmistakable message of much of the literature concerned with democratic decision making, and of the many practical examples of citizen participation programmes in the planning process is that the exercise is difficult and often traumatic for each participant."²⁸

²⁵ Raymond A. Bauer, *Social Indicators* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1967).

Bertram M. Gross, *State of the Nation: Social System Accounting* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1966).

²⁶ Fremont J. Lyden & Ernest G. Miller (eds.), *Planning Programming Budgeting* (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1972).

²⁷ Allen Schick, "From Analysis to Evaluation," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, Vol. 394 (March 1971), pp. 52-72.

Ida R. Hoos, *Systems Analysis in Public Policy: A Critique* (Berkeley: University of California Press, Ltd., 1972).

²⁸ Michael T. Fagence, "The Design and Use of Questionnaires for Participation Practices in Town Planning—Lessons from the United States and Britain," *Policy Sciences* 5 (1974), p. 297.

For a comprehensive bibliography of studies about citizen participation, see: Robert Yim *et al.*, *Citizen Organizations: Increasing Client Control Over Services* (The Rand Corp. No. 1196—HEW April 1973).

POLICY EVALUATION: CAN IT BE OF ANY HELP TO POLICY MAKERS?

Policy evaluation is concerned with effectiveness, efficiency and the trade-offs between them. For purposes of policy evaluation *effectiveness* has to do with the change in the environment that is attributed to the substantive impact of a particular activity. Once the impact of a policy or a program is identified, it is possible to refer to the economics (including the political economy) of its attainments, i.e., its *efficiency*. When the measures of effectiveness, i.e., the amount of change, and efficiency, i.e., its economics, are available, it is possible to define the trade-off rates between them. Therefore, the analysts may conclude whether a major change in one measure can be caused by a marginal modification of the other providing the policy maker with a basis on which to decide whether such changes are desired.

Policy evaluation precedes the choice among alternatives as it monitors implementation or as it assesses the results of previous decisions.²⁹ Before a choice is made policy evaluation attempts to establish whether an identified course of action is capable of bringing the intended results, i.e., its potential effectiveness and, what would be the optimal procedure of implementation, i.e., its efficiency. When a decision is carried out, policy evaluation provides the basis on which it is possible to find out whether the impact of the policy has nearly been achieved in the desired fashion and within the boundaries of an acceptance ratio of benefit to cost. Thus, policy evaluation, as an operation in real time, leads to modifications of decisions as they are carried out and enhances the attainment of the desired results.

Policy evaluation assumes an 'experimenting society' in which the precautions taken during the making, implementation and completion of an action enable the analyst to use the accumulating experience to inform decision makers.³⁰ These attributes make policy evaluation different from other modes of policy analysis whose main influence on policy making occurs before a decision is made. An important support of this point can be concluded from Rothstein's observation that "the

²⁹ Lasswell uses the term "Constitutive appraisal" to describe the activities that are made "in order to discover any significant changes that have taken place in the power position of the individuals, groups, perspectives, or operations involved." This important element of policy evaluation was overlooked in many cases of evaluation. See Lasswell *op. cit.* p. 76.

³⁰ The term 'experimenting society' was coined by Donald T. Campbell in his paper "Methods for the Experimenting Society: delivered at the Eastern Psychological Association in 1971." However, in this experimentation is not taken to be restricted to the evaluation of micropolicies. See Henry Teune "Public Policy: Macroperspectives" in Gerald Zaltman (ed.) *Process and Phenomena of Social Change* (New York: Wiley, 1973), pp. 239-255.

RAND analogy is appealing because RAND's influence has tented to center on the period before an actual decision has to be made".³¹

Evaluation of various projects in recent years proves that good intentions cannot substitute for technical and substantive knowledge. However, in its current state of development policy evaluation that uses a simple experimental approach to policy making suffers from severe operational deficiencies.³² Heinz Eulau indicates that if a policy is a political unit's response to a challenge from the environment, experimentation in the true sense poses some questions that are not trivial at all.³³ Seldom can a pre-test and random assignments be made without evocating political consequences that may hamper the feasibility of the policy. The attempts of Eulau and others to develop a causal model in the spirit of Campbels' quasi-experimental approach³⁴ are still far from being of help to the policy maker.

The notion of evaluation as illuminated by Suchman, Rossi, Weiss or Moursund³⁵ is important in order to provide a valid knowledge for policy making. However, the notion that is suggested in these writings is not geared to define what aspects of the changes in a political environment should be evaluated and what is their relevancy to policy making. Therefore, an elaboration of policy evaluation as an approach to policy analysis is needed. It is suggested that such an elaboration is possible if some latent elements and implicit assumptions in current models of policy analysis are brought out.

³¹ Robert L. Rothstein, *Planning, Prediction and Policy making in Foreign Affairs* (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1972), p. 107.

³² Victor G. Nielson, "Why Evaluation Does Not Improve Program Effectiveness." *Policy Studies Journal*, Vol. 3, No. 4 (Summer 1975), pp. 385-401.

³³ Heinz Eulau, "Policy Making in American Cities: Comparison in Quasi-Longitudinal, Quasi-Experimental Design," (New York: General Learning Press, 1971).

³⁴ Donald T. Campbell and Julian C. Stanley, *Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Design for Research* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1963).

³⁵ Edmond A. Suchman, *Evaluation Research* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1967).

Peter H. Rossi, "Testing for Success and Failure in Social Action" in Peter H. Rossi and Walter Williams (eds.) *Evaluating Social Programs* (New York: Seminar Press, 1972).

Carol H. Weiss, *Evaluation Research* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962).

Janet P. Moursund, *Evaluation: An Introduction to Research Designs* (Monte-rey; Brooks, Cole Pub., 1973).

FROM A RATIONAL APPROACH TO A REALISTIC APPROACH

Current approaches to policy analysis are derived—directly or indirectly—from what was termed *the* rational model. The rational model of decision making, as described by many writers³⁶ suffers from all the deficiencies of its kin—Weber's pure bureaucratic model. We will not elaborate here on all of the various weaknesses of the rational model, but we would like to emphasize these points: (1) the rational model assumes the existence of a substantive goal a priorian assumption that is not necessarily valid, as has already been suggested by March;³⁷ and (2) the model does not deal with the possibility that the rationality of an individual's decisions may violate the rationality of the whole system, e.g., by introducing of inconsistencies among decisions that would hamper the system's equilibrium; (3) the model assumes that the problem, the array of solutions to it and their rank order remain constant even after a decision has been made.

These points rule out the possibility that policy evaluation (or any other mode of policy analysis) can be based on a value-free analysis of a problem. Instead, it is suggested that in an attempt to define solutions that are Pareto optimum policy evaluation should concentrate on the illumination of needs versus constraints. An explicit identification of these is essential in order to find the feasible policy whose expected impact, i.e., effectiveness, can be reached with such a ratio of benefit to cost, that render it efficient by leaving every one better off.

In order to define constraints, one has to define a frame of reference by making a deliberate choice between (a) the needs of the policy maker—the consumer of the analysis—as an individual (e.g., his political survival); and (b) the needs of the polity.

This choice is not a simple one. Catering to the policy maker's own needs suggests a simple Machiavellian approach. However, the other choice heading the polity's needs—may underestimate the policy maker's aspirations for power and status. The answer to this dilemma lies in the fact that the sponsor of a policy analysis is not the polity, but the policy maker. The policy analyst must refer to the policy maker's needs as an individual—in order to have any impact on policy making. When an analyst realizes this truth he may discover already the fact that satisfying the policy maker's needs is coupled with satisfying the polity's needs by responding to its demands. The constraints on the policy-

³⁶ Yehezkel, Dror, *Public Policymaking Reexamined*, op. cit., p. 132.

Charles E. Lindblom, *The Policy Making Process* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1968), p. 13.

Ira Sharkonsky, *Public Administration, Policy Making in Government Agencies* (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1970), p. 37.

³⁷ James G. March, "Model Bias in Social Action," *Review of Educational Research*, Vol. 42 (Fall 1972), pp. 413-429.

maker's freedom of choice result from the "restricted set of opportunities, among which the individual, acting by himself or through a collectivity of some kind, must choose."³⁸ Therefore, policy analysis may be carried out under the assumption that the rational way for the policy maker to increase the opportunities that are open before him and to promote his own interests is by making the whole polity better off as means are committed to the achievement of goals.

By improving the state of his political system vis a vis other systems or in comparison to its own past, the policy maker becomes better off—provided that he maintains his relative status within it. Consequently, when a policy analyst considers the need to secure or promote the relative political status of the policy maker by probing into the possibilities for enhancing the polity, it makes no difference if the initial start was with the policymaker's needs considering the polity's needs as constraints on action or vice versa. Observing this point Sorzano concludes: "System analysis not only regards the actor as behaving in a maximizing fashion but it also characteristically distinguishes between the actor's intention and the objective consequences of his behavior for the system as a whole. At the outset, therefore, system theory distinguishes between two levels—the actor's or micro level and the systematic or macro level. These two levels must somehow be linked if the dynamic element at the micro level—the actor—is to be instrumental in propelling the system towards its preferred state."³⁹

Policy evaluation should therefore start with contextual definitions.⁴⁰ Such definitions may emerge from a careful examination of the elements that constitute the 'policy arena'—the environment in which needs and constraints are defined.⁴¹ This environment includes the main institutions, interest groups, procedures⁴² and individuals that exist within the physical surroundings of the policy maker. Graham states that "Knowledge linking institutional and constitutional structures with governmental behavior is necessary even in purely descriptive discussions of the policy process. At the same time such knowledge provides the basis upon which macro evaluation becomes possible. Macro analysis should be directed to the study of those characteristics of the

³⁸ Kenneth J. Arrow, *The Limits of Organization* (New York: Norton, 1974), p. 17.

³⁹ J. S. Sorzano, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

⁴⁰ For a possible approach to contextual definition and mapping see Lasswell, *op. cit.*, pp. 63f.

⁴¹ Theodore Lowi, *op. cit.*

⁴² It is assumed that the procedures are reflections of the values, norms of behavior, etc. Thus, the flexibility or rigidity of the procedures (or even their mere existence) indicate the existence and nature of some of the constraints.

policy outputs and eventual policy outcomes."⁴³ Such probing should be carried out regardless of the substance of the policy maker's decision to "establish the parameters and clarify the limitations which will invariably constrain and reduce available courses of public action."⁴⁴

Institutions, interest groups, procedures and individuals create the context for action, they generate the action and provide some input for it. By identifying and learning them it becomes possible (1) to find out what relations the policy maker needs to have with them in order to achieve certain results, (2) what ought to be changed in order to create these relations or (3) what should be done in order to compensate for their absence. Some writers tended to ignore the important intelligence that could become available by such probing. Giandomenico Majone, for instance, made a fundamental mistake that is expressed in his observation that "in public administration, however, the possibility of substituting one input for another, in order to take advantage of new opportunities and particular circumstances is severely limited by the requirements of fiscal accountability."⁴⁵ Assuming the environment resources of the policy maker to be fixed and tightly regulated, Majone ignores the difference between material and symbolic politics.⁴⁶ Thus, he excludes from the realm of feasibility analysis the ability of the policy maker to manipulate and to use symbolic values as political currency that has nothing to do with fiscal accountability.

The policy maker's relative position in an environment is modified by the means that are used in order to carry out a decision, the resources that are sought in order to carry out subsequent action, and those that are thought to exist at the discretion of the policy maker. When the context of policy making, the relative position of the policy maker in it, and what is needed to produce desired changes are identified, the policy maker is provided with rough but essential estimation of the exchange rates between the resources he lacks and those he can spare. Such an idea may help the policy maker reexamine existing priorities while taking into consideration both constraints and possible trade-offs between the effectiveness of policies and the marginal efficiency of the resources at his discretion.

⁴³ George J. Graham, Jr. and Scarlet G. Graham. "Macroevaluation: Framework for a Policy System," *Policy Studies Journal*, 3 (Spring 1975), p. 263.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ Giandomenico Majone, "The Feasibility of Social Policies," *Policy Sciences*, 6 (March 1975), p. 53.

⁴⁶ Murray Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1967). The use of symbols in a political exchange and its meaning in the struggle for power is also discussed in Abner Cohen *Two Dimensional Man* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974).

The validity and practical value of policy evaluation that considers the policy maker's environment and his relative position in it are supported by two basic observations: first, that policy making is a reaction of policy makers in their attempt to serve their own needs (including the psychological need to react) and, second, that there is a relation between the needs of a policy maker and the needs of his constituents a constraint on the policy maker's action.

A policy maker's interest to serve the interests of those elements in his constituency to whom he owes his position (especially in a representative system) has been dealt with in many places.⁴⁷ Such studies reveal that certain relations must exist between the needs of the polity and the needs of policy makers as individuals. The empirical findings of these studies rule out the Machiavellian possibility that there can be (for any significant period of time) a substantial discrepancy between the two sets of needs.

The use of the individual needs of a policy maker to identify the relevant aspects for policy evaluation may therefore prove to be not only in line with accepted norms of representation, but also highly realistic and instrumental from the policy maker's point of view. Thus policy evaluation that follows the conceptual and methodological specifications of evaluation research along with contextual consideration of the policy maker's (or the polity's) needs and constraints on action would make both the policy maker and the policy reach a higher rate of efficiency in the use of the available resources. This in turn would enable to satisfy more needs, leaving both the policy maker and policy better off.

⁴⁷ J. Whalke, "Public Policy and Representative Government: The Role of the Represent," a paper prepared for the Seventh World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Brussels, Sept. 1967. And John C. Whalke, "Policy Demands and System Support: The Role of the Represented," *British Journal of Political Science*. Vol. I (1971), pp. 271-290.

Also see Edmond N. Muller, "The Representative of Citizen by Political Authorities: Consequences for Regime Support." *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 64 (1970), pp. 1149-1166.

David Coputo, "Citizen Evaluations & Urban Public Policy Analysis: The Missing Link." Paper presented at the 1974 APSA meeting in Chicago.