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African Americans in South Carolina Politics

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It's beginning to look a lot like 1895.

> George Tindall, Speech at the
> University of South Carolina Law
> School, 16 November 1995.

For the first time in its relatively long history (for an American state), race is no longer the focal point of (South Carolina's) politics.

> Daniel Elazar, "Series Introduction," in
> South Carolina Politics and Government, xviii.

Introduction

A first axiom of southern political history is that southern politics revolves around race. In a quote that is practically memorized by students of southern politics, Key states that "...whatever phase of the southern political process one seeks to understand, sooner or later, the trail of inquiry leads to the Negro."[1] Key saw South Carolina as an exaggeration of this fundamental fact and subtitled his chapter on South Carolina as "The Politics of Color."[2]

Not only did race politics serve the cause of white supremacy in South Carolina, it also helped maintain South Carolina's highly traditionalistic political culture. Race politics was an essential tool used by a relatively small group of locally based elites to maintain political and economic control of the state. Economic issues that might challenge the perogatives and advantages of the small group of privileged were overridden by the race issue.[3] Leaders who began their careers as

fire-eating populists rarely proposed any realistic programs of economic reform because that would raise class issues, split the white vote along class lines, and tempt each side to seek black votes.[4] Political participation that might have challenged the traditional culture of deference was suppressed by the mechanisms carefully laid out to eliminate African American suffrage in the 1895 Constitution.[5]

A hundred years after the fateful 1895 Constitutional Convention, is race still the defining principle of South Carolina politics? Has the civil rights revolution eroded the role of race in South Carolina? Is race merely one of many lesser issues as state politics grapples with the best way to attack long standing economic, educational, health, environmental, and cultural issues? What role have African Americans played in structuring the political system? These are the central questions of this article.

Alternative Interpretations

As can be seen in the epigrams that began this article, modern observers of South Carolina politics have differing points of view. Some see the state as preoccupied with economic development issues. They see traditional elites as accomodating the demands of civil rights activists and the federal government and spending their energy in building the technological version of the New South.[6] Some of this optimistic view is rooted in V.O. Key's hypothesis that if race could be removed as the central guiding force, class-based politics would emerge. Working class and rural whites combined with black voters would be a liberalizing force in promoting government actions to improve economic opportunities. Traditionalistic values of deference, low participation and minimal government would fade.[7] Following the relatively peaceful civil rights revolution in the state, these optimistic observers saw white Democratic incumbents pursuing moderately progressive policies and appealing to new black voters because they held the balance of political power.[8]

Others see race as continuing to define and divide the state. They see the 1990s as a strange reflection of the 1890s, in which

traditional white elites—this time as Republicans—exploit white fears and build power around a white backlash to the Federally-imposed civil rights revolution.[9] The progressivism of the previous decades was but a passing mirror reflection of the progressivism of the Reconstruction period[10] that took place a century before. The state is moving toward a new race-based party system in which white Republicans dominate a powerless Democratic Party composed of blacks and a few moderate and liberal whites.[11]

The key to this scenario of a new race-based politics is the white working class and the growing middle class. They are drawn to the Republican side because of their resentment of government actions that they see as giving unfair advantage to minorities.[12] Their economic conservatism is based on anger with social programs that they see as taking their hard earned money and giving it to those who are too lazy to work.[13] Many contemporary researchers see the invocation of the traditional negative "lazy black" stereotype as an important link between Republican anti-government ideology and white political support.[14]

Which view better fits South Carolina politics today? Let us begin our quest by examining the historical record.

The Long Road to Equality

The role that African American South Carolinians played in the civil rights drama is often left unsaid. Because they were relatively more moderate in demands and rhetoric and because they lived in a traditionalistic culture that devalued political activism, South Carolina African American contributions are often devalued by omission. Although space prohibits us from going beyond a few highlights, the point must be made that African Americans were "in" South Carolina politics long before they gained the right to vote. They pushed the envelope of possible political action about as far as they could within a traditionalistic culture. By observing for the most part these cultural values, they deserve as much, if not more, credit for bringing about peaceful change during the turbulent 1960s than the moderate white political and business leaders of the time.[15]

Focusing on the modern civil rights movement misses the foundation that made the movement possible. The modest African American middle class that provided civil rights leadership was the creation of generations of African Americans engaged in the tasks of self-help with little white help and much white interference. While many African Americans left the state, others stayed and quietly built the foundation for a movement most would never live to see. Shut out of public politics, these people engaged in private politics, building schools and churches and agricultural groups, all the while learning skills and building the modest means that would keep them going when they and their offspring would challenge discrimination. This long effort was a necessary prerequisite for the political movement that was to come.[16]

Let us look at areas where the struggle for progress has taken place.

The Right to Vote

During Reconstruction, African American males voted and were elected to many offices in South Carolina.[17] Nevertheless, whites employed violence and threats of violence to regain political control.[18] After seizing control in 1876, whites added legal barriers to minimize black participation. These included the elimination of some precincts in black areas and a requirement for separate ballot boxes for Federal and state elections, making voting more complicated.[19] Delegates to South Carolina's 1895 convention were so anxious to minimize and dilute African American political influence that they even considered suffrage for women who owned property.[20] However, the white male delegates came to their male senses and focused on such mechanisms as male property ownership and literacy to deny the vote to blacks.[21]

After the 1895 constitution was adopted, African American influence "sputtered to a halt."[22] Both blacks and whites had to reregister. Newby states that by 1896, about 50,000 whites and only 5,500 blacks were registered. Although African Americans comprised about 60 percent of the population, they were relegated to under five

percent of the registered voters. Electing African American politicians was impossible. No African American was elected to Congress from South Carolina after George Washington Murray's defeat in 1896 until the election of Jim Clyburn in 1992. After John Bolts left the state legislature in 1902, no African American was elected to that body until 1970.[23]

Efforts to keep African Americans out of the political process were successful until the 1940s, with less than ten percent of the potential African American voters registered to vote in all but two southern states.[24] In the 1940s the barriers began to fall. The white primary fell first.

South Carolina and seven other states each held a "white primary" which denied blacks any role in the Democratic Party's decision-making process.[25] Unable to participate in the Democratic primary, African Americans in South Carolina formed the Progressive Democrats and in 1944 ran Osceola McKaine for the U.S. Senate against incumbent Olin T. Johnston. Ossie McKaine, surely one of the most remarkable figures in South Carolina history, had a life that spanned the racial demagoguery of Ben Tillman until just after the landmark 1954 *Brown v. Board of Education* decision of the U.S. Supreme Court. Conversant in 15 languages, he was a decorated military hero in World War I, ran a successful nightclub in Belgium between the world wars, worked as a newspaperman and journalist, and was known for his oratory in helping to build the NAACP in South Carolina and in fighting for equal pay for African American school teachers.[26] Although the effort only won 4,500 votes, it did have important symbolic value, encouraging further efforts. That same year, in an eight to one decision, the Supreme Court declared in *Smith v. Allwright* (1944) that political parties were acting on behalf of the state when they held primaries. Therefore parties must allow all eligible voters to vote in their primaries. Reaction was swift. In South Carolina, Governor Olin Johnston called a special session of the legislature to repeal all the state laws regulating primaries in an attempt to sever the relationship between the state and the party.[27] But despite Governor Johnston's belief that "white supremacy will be maintained in our primaries,"[28] the end was in sight. The Progressive Democratic Party and the NAACP supported a legal challenge. George Elmore, an

African American who was not allowed to vote in a Richland County primary, sued the Democratic Party.[29] The state lost in a 1947 decision.[30] Of course, blacks still had to face antagonistic white officials if they attempted to register and vote.[31]

Without the right to vote African Americans had little political power. This was reflected in the inequities faced by African Americans in everyday life and in lost opportunities. African American colleges lacked adequate funding, the state provided a park system for whites but few facilities for blacks, and the state had no programs for retarded African American children during the pre-civil rights years.[32] Even a few votes could make a difference. In the Greenville city election of 1939, prior to the court decisions, several hundred African Americans voted despite threats made by the Klan. As a result, the city built several new playgrounds.[33] But that was the exception.

The Republican connection to this struggle is critical to understanding modern South Carolina politics. The foundation of the modern Republican Party in South Carolina (and elsewhere in the South) was white resistance to the civil rights movement. The first breaks with solid white Democratic voting came on national level offices. Gradually the shift has moved down to local offices.

Strom Thurmond first broke with the national Democratic Party in 1948 over the civil rights plank in the party platform. He walked out and carried the state as the Dixiecrat nominee for president. Thus began the crumble of what had once been "the most Democratic state."[34] In 1952, 1956 and 1960, the Democratic national ticket barely won in the state with a narrow majority of 51 percent.[35] Many whites crossed over and voted for Eisenhower, especially in some counties with large black populations. Of course, few blacks were registered to vote.[36] In the minds of many whites, the national Democratic party was becoming associated with support for civil rights.

But the lines were not completely clear yet. The Republicans also gained support from those few blacks who were voting between 1952 and 1956, perhaps because of Eisenhower's support of civil rights.[37] In 1957 Congress passed a civil rights act for the first time since 1875—over Strom Thurmond's vigorous filibuster in the Senate. A second civil rights bill was passed in 1960.[38] Even as late as 1960, with Richard Nixon himself a member of the NAACP, the Republicans

were not the party of white resistance.[39]

The next watershed year was 1964. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 resulted in significant increases in African American voter registration in the South.[40] In South Carolina the percentage of African Americans registered to vote increased from 15.6 percent in 1960 to 38.7 percent in 1964.[41] Attitudes of some white Democratic political leaders were beginning to shift as well. As former governor and Senator, Olin Johnston quipped about new African American voters, "Their vote counts just as much as anybody else's."[42]

Resistance formed on the Republican side. Strom Thurmond switched to the Republican Party and supported Barry Goldwater for President.[43] With Thurmond's critical help, Goldwater carried the state, the first presidential victory for the Republicans in South Carolina in nearly one hundred years. Goldwater's southern strategy can be summarized in the famous quote from a 1961 speech: "We're not going to get the Negro vote as a bloc in 1964 and 1968 so we ought to go hunting where the ducks are."[44] The ducks, of course, were white Southerners.

With the passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965, African American voter registration increased in South Carolina and throughout the South. Over 220,000 African Americans registered in South Carolina alone.[45] By 1970, 57.3 percent of voting age blacks and 73.3 percent of voting age whites were registered.[46] The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights estimated that by the time of the 1974 elections, the registration rates of blacks and whites in South Carolina were almost identical.[47] Since then rates have fluctuated with white rates running a few points ahead of those for blacks. Differences seem to have increased slightly in recent years as a new generation takes voting rights for granted.[48]

As many white Democrats in South Carolina moved to discover social and economic problems that needed to be addressed in the late 1960s, Thurmond and many Republicans refused to see the hunger and needs that government could address. Instead, they saw political advantage. They appealed to traditional southern values of rugged individualism in terms that invoked negative racial stereotypes. Rev. Isaiah DeQuincey Newman had taken Senator Hollings on tours of poor areas of the state after his 1968 U.S. Senate election. Hollings

was moved and spoke candidly in the Senate of the need for programs to address problems of hunger and abject poverty. Thurmond reacted by dismissing Hollings' observations as a tactic to gain the votes of African Americans and said that he had heard from "friends" that the only problem was that some people didn't want to work.[49]

Many political observers view the 1970 gubernatorial election as another turning point in South Carolina politics. The importance of the African American vote was demonstrated when a moderate Democrat, John West, defeated Republican Albert Watson, who ran an openly racist campaign.[50] African Americans had the potential to "swing the election."[51] The support of black voters and of enough whites disturbed by the viciousness of the Watson campaign helped West win with 51.7 percent of the vote. Watson did carry about 58 percent of the white vote, but that was not enough.[52]

Seeing the handwriting on the wall, Strom Thurmond's advisor Harry Dent told him he needed to get "in a position where he can't be attacked like Watson by liberals as a racist."[53] Thurmond subsequently began to give himself cover against the racist charge. He hired an African American staffer. In 1975 Thurmond supported the extension of the Voting Rights Act, his first pro-civil rights vote.[54] He sponsored Matthew J. Perry's appointment to the federal district court in 1976. Manipulation of negative stereotypes would now become more subtle, especially in South Carolina where the veneer of civility was so important.[55] In many cases opposition to wasteful Washington liberal programs would be enough to evoke negative racial images.[56]

By 1978 African Americans in the state comprised 27 percent of those registered to vote. Republican gubernatorial candidate Ed Young observed in his 1978 campaign that all he needed was 20 percent of the black vote to win along with his white base. He tried a different tactic, going all-out to win African American votes. But he did not do as well as Watson did in his openly racist campaign. Dick Riley beat Young by ten percentage points more than John West had received in defeating Watson eight years earlier.[57] Carroll Campbell candidly explained the lesson in a 1979 interview. Young's problem was that his effort to win black votes "backlashed on him. He overdid it in my estimation ... It turned off all the conservative George Wallace voters in the state." In Campbell's analysis, efforts to win black

voters in South Carolina should be limited to winning middle class black voters who are less concerned with government programs and more supportive of middle class values like the free enterprise system.[58] Campbell made this formula work in his own gubernatorial campaigns in 1984 and 1988.

Perhaps one way Republicans could attract some African American voters is through shared moral values. Many African Americans are quite active in fundamentalist religious organizations and share some of the same moral positions as the Christian Coalition, an important part of the Republican base. Indeed, at the national level, conservative Christian leaders are frequently quoted as hoping to attract African American voters on the basis of morality issues. We asked five African American legislators if they could work with the Christian Coalition on any issues. They gave a unanimous "no."[59]

Focusing on support from the slowly growing group of middle to upper income African Americans, as Carroll Campbell sugggested, may be a better strategy, though also a very limited one. Charleston County Council member Tim Scott, elected in a special election in February 1995, is the only African American who has won public office in South Carolina as a Republican in modern times. Scott campaigned on themes that were consistent with Campbell's strategy in appealing to middle class African Americans, individual responsibility, reducing taxes and being pro-business, but he also stressed conservative social values in his "pro-family" position.[60] He plans to challenge Legislative Black Caucus member Robert Ford for his state Senate seat in November 1996.[61]

Republican gubernatorial candidate David Beasley attempted to gain some African American support in his 1994 campaign when he hired African American political organizer Wilma Neal to help identify and activate African Americans who might be inclined to support him. Neal had worked in the primary for Democratic Charleston Mayor Joe Riley. While the effort did not win a significant number of African American votes for Beasley, Theodore's reaction angered African Americans who would normally be enthusiastic about his campaign. Theodore's camp dug up a 20 year old criminal charge against Neal and leaked it to the press. Beasley indignantly demanded an apology for attempted character assassination.[62] Most observers regarded the

incident as damaging to Theodore.[63] Neal's political marriage of convenience with Beasley did not last. Her advisory position within the Beasley administration ended before his first year in office was over. She resigned amid charges that she had no access to the governor and that the administration was not really sensitive to the problems of African Americans.

Despite these problems, African American voter participation began to pay dividends in non-elected positions, though it came slowly. Legislators had appointed one African American to the state supreme court, one to the state court of appeals, and two to the circuit courts by 1992.[64] Justice Ernest Finney became South Carolina's first African American chief justice. While still underrepresented, African Americans were beginning to occupy real positions of power that could make a difference.

Winning Political Office

As more African Americans registered and voted, they gradually began to win elective office. By 1968 three African Americans had been elected to county councils, two to law enforcement positions, one to a city council and five to other local-level positions. In 1970 three African Americans were elected to the state legislature (James Felder, Herbert Fielding, and I.S. Leevy Johnson), the first African Americans since 1902. Events such as the 1968 Orangeburg Massacre, where three African American students died, may have stimulated interest and participation in state politics by African Americans.[65]

In 1974 reapportionment into single member districts removed another barrier. The system of countywide election of legislators had made winning office difficult for minorities.[66] The number of African American legislators increased, with thirteen elected to the state House that year.[67] In 1983 the Rev. I. DeQuincey Newman became the first African American elected to the state Senate since 1887.[68] At the local level where many offices were also moving to single member districts, 255 African Americans were elected to local offices by 1992.[69]

Public Service

African Americans have had a slow climb up the ladder to the top in South Carolina state government. In a 1993 newspaper interview, Human Affairs Deputy Commissioner Bobby Gist summarized the status of African Americans in South Carolina state government: "White males dominate state government... Black women don't even show up in the higher (classification) grades." The seven black women who held higher paying jobs, according to Gist, were PhDs or doctors.[70] A report issued by the state Human Affairs Commission in 1993 noted that 78 percent of the state employees earning $50,000 a year or more were white males, although white males make up less than one-third of all state government employees.[71] Three of 72 agency heads were African American, and two of those held what were considered "traditionally-black dominated jobs" as the head of the state Human Affairs Commission and as the president of a traditionally black college.[72] Black men and women along with white women held nearly 70 percent of the lowest level jobs, those paying under $32,000 year, with 41 percent of black men in the lowest level jobs. White males also dominated colleges and universities in both academic and non-academic positions.

The lateral entry pattern typical of many government agencies explains some of this disparity. After an individual is hired at an entry level position, a number of years must pass before she works her way up to higher-paying policy-making positions. Only within the past generation have African-Americans had the opportunity to gain entry on to the first step of the ladder. They may now just be working their way up. A second factor may be the educational disparity. Fewer African Americans have had the education to qualify for the better jobs. A third factor may be the attraction of opportunities in the private sector, where salary levels are significantly higher than those paid by state government. Despite all this, according to Paul Beazley of the state Human Affairs Commission, "The remaining disparity is hard to explain by accident... "[73]

Education

The road to educational equality in South Carolina has been a long one, going back all the way to passage of a law in 1740 making it illegal to teach an enslaved person how to write.[74] The few who were free took advantage of limited educational opportunities during the 1700s and early 1800s, founding their own schools and educating their children. A few enslaved people learned to read despite legal prohibitions. During and after the Civil War, some African American schools were founded with the support of northern abolitionists and later the Freedmen's Bureau. The 1868 constitution, written at the beginning of Reconstruction by a convention with African Americans in the majority, required public schools to be open to all races, but leaders made little effort to force real integration. With what little money was available, both races developed their own schools. After Reconstruction ended in 1876, the state was well on the road to two separate school systems, although school segregation was not written into law until the 1895 constitution.[75]

As late as 1880, less than a quarter of all blacks in South Carolina could read and write, compared to over three-quarters of all whites. The schools relegated to African Americans provided little more than a vocational education.[76] Supplies and books were non-existent or minimal. A white administrator wrote in 1919: "It is not unusual—in fact, it is almost always the case—to find practically no blackboard, if any. If any is found, it is the kind we used to find in the white school 25 years ago... It is not a wonder that [pupils] do not learn more, but the real wonder is that they learn as much as they do."[77]

The gross inequality began to change in the 1950s, when white politicians saw the upgrading of black schools as a way to avoid integration.[78] In 1951 a task force headed by then-state representative Ernest Hollings recommended a three-cent sales tax for education. Along with Governor James Byrnes, Hollings pushed what became known as "Jimmie's tax" through the state legislature. Between 1951 and 1954, South Carolina spent over $100 million dollars to build and upgrade separate schools for blacks and whites. A new school bus system provided black students with transportation for the first time.[79]

In contrast to earlier education spending, the state spent around 70 percent of the funds on African American schools.[80]

These frantic efforts to avoid desegregation failed. Harry Briggs' efforts to obtain school bus transportation for his children blossomed into a lawsuit that the courts combined with four other cases into the landmark *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954). White resistance prevented any school integration in the state until 1963.[81] The state resisted by repealing the compulsory attendance law and passing state tuition grants to help whites attend private "segregation academies." African American parents continued to file lawsuits, and courts struck the measures down.

The greatest success came first at the college level. In 1963 the all-white colleges were desegregated. Full scale integration of South Carolina's elementary and secondary schools finally arrived in 1970,[82] and with it, boycotts and some violence. Many whites continued to resist through flight to private schools. But as the public schools improved in the late 1970s and early 1980s, many whites came back.[83]

Put within this historical perspective, South Carolina has come a long way along the road toward providing an equal education. However, the gap has not yet closed. Nearly three-quarters of all of South Carolina's whites now have a high school degree compared to only a little over half of all African Americans. Similarly, nearly 20 percent of whites, but less than eight percent of blacks have completed college.[84] The number of black superintendents has nearly tripled since the early 1980s, but at 18 percent,[85] it is still far below the roughly 30 percent of the population that is African American. A number of districts, including Clarendon One, where the *Briggs v. Elliott* desegregation case began, have resegregated.[86]

Income

While some African Americans have moved into the middle-class, change has taken place slowly. According to the 1990 Census, 5.9 percent of white and 28.5 percent of South Carolina's black families fell below the poverty level.[87] If we look at the upper and lower end of the income scales, we can see the extent of the disparity.

At the lower end, 13.6 percent of white and 32.5 percent of black households had incomes of less than $10,000 a year. At the upper end, 7.1 percent of white and 1.4 percent of black households had incomes of $75,000 a year or above.[88]

Why has movement into the middle classes been so difficult for African Americans in recent decades? As African Americans began returning south in the 1970s, more women were also entering the labor force. Competition for jobs increased. At the same time, fewer African Americans were attending and finishing college, so fewer were able to move into higher-paying managerial and professional jobs. In 1980, 10.6 percent of South Carolina's African American workers were managers and professionals. By 1986, this had dropped to 7.7 percent. The percentage of African Americans holding skilled craft positions also dropped. In addition, African Americans often needed more education than whites to get middle-class jobs.[89]

Education is supposed to be the great equalizer in America. Yet whites earned significantly more than blacks at every educational level. Whites with doctorates earned about twice as much as blacks. Although education improves incomes for both races, reality falls far short of the promise for African Americans.

Table 1: Equal Education Does Not Result in Equal Income In South Carolina (1990)

Race	< 9th grade	9-12 grades	High School	Some College	Assoc. Degree	B.A. Degree	M.A. Degree	Ph.D. Degree
white	$14,240	$15,88 1	$18,90 6	$21,80 2	$23,16 5	$30,90 5	$32,69 8	$54,54 0
black	$10,188	$11,62 6	$13,63 5	$15,63 6	$18,43 8	$20,87 7	$26,09 7	$28,45 0
diff.	$ 4,052	$ 4,255	$ 5,271	$ 6,166	$ 4,727	$10,02 8	$ 6,601	$26,09 0

Source: *South Carolina Statistical Abstract*, 1994, p.287, based on 1990 Census figures

Health and Social Relations

Infant mortality is considered an excellent indicator of health and social welfare. In South Carolina, a higher percentage of black than of white infants continue to die. In 1992 the infant mortality rate for whites was 7.2 per 1000 live births, while for blacks it was 15.5.[90]

In the pre-civil rights South, whites and blacks lived in two almost totally separate societies. An etiquette of race, with certain practices and conventions, governed behavior and helped maintain white domination. During his visit to a small southern town in the 1930s, sociologist Gunnar Myrdal remembered asking for a "Mr. Jim Smith," a black high school principal. Whites claimed not to know him. When Myrdal finally found Mr. Smith, the principal told Myrdal that he was well-known in the community. Myrdal should have asked for just plain "Jim." Regardless of achievement, whites addressed and knew blacks by first name only.[91] Racial etiquette promoted stereotyping African Americans as inferior and childlike, as a people who could not be expected to take responsibility for their actions or assume the role of mature adults.[92] The system forced blacks to assume a role that only reinforced such white stereotyping while internalizing their own frustration. Many left, in a sense "voting with their feet." Some, unable to handle living without dignity or respect in a white society, turned to alcohol or violence—usually against other blacks.[93] Others struggled to get an education and to assume a leadership role in the community, the church, and the professions despite overwhelming odds. Successful African Americans established two NAACP chapters in Charleston and Columbia in 1917.[94]

Thirty years after the passage of the Civil Rights act, no legal prohibitions exist to prevent social equality. Yet in many ways the state remains two separate societies with different world views. A November 1995 survey of South Carolina citizens found a wide gulf between the races. While a majority of whites and blacks reported working in employment situations with people of another race and a majority of whites reported having some members of another race living in their neighborhoods, in most other areas (employing professional services, attending church, watching movies about another race, club and civic group involvement) separation was the rule. The only exception was a

bare majority of whites who report frequently "enjoy listening to music generally associated with persons of another race."[95] In 1996 African American columnist Armstrong Williams wrote: "The legacy of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. is being threatened. His hope of 'judging people by the content of their character and not the color of their skin' appears more fiction than promise."[96]

White Anger and Partisanship

In our discussion of the struggle for voting rights, we observed that the Republican Party grew as whites resisted integration. Have the Republicans moved beyond this? Does any empirical basis exist for that relationship today? Available statewide polling data only gives some indirect evidence. A November 1994 survey showed that each race sees a different world when they look at their economic opportunities. Three-fourths of the whites feel that job opportunities are now equal while nearly three in every five black citizens feel that they are still at a disadvantage.[97] If most whites feel that job opportunities are equal, they might well oppose any programs that would give minorities additional help. Moreover, nearly three-fourths of the whites felt that black leaders are guilty of seeing "racism where it does not exist."[98] Are these feelings causally linked to Republican votes? While the data are certainly suggestive, the relationship is not certain.

Some local polling data, a 1994 exit survey of over 600 Aiken County voters, provides stronger evidence. Aiken County is more Republican than the state as a whole but it has about the same racial breakdown as the state as a whole. Lower to lower middle income whites (family incomes < $40,000) comprised just over half the voters. The feeling that "we have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country" was positively associated with Republican self-identification ($p < .03$). These "angry whites" comprised nearly 80 percent of all voters with a Republican identification in the county. If we look at those whites with the same income who felt no anger as measured by the "gone too far" question, the proportion of Democratic identifiers nearly doubles (from 22 to 38 percent). If all lower to lower middle income whites fit this profile—a big if—the Democrats would

again be competitive after taking African American votes into account. Of course, this simple analysis is only suggestive for the state as a whole, and many other issues unrelated to what some observers call "symbolic racism"[99] are also associated with a Republican identification.

Symbolic Politics—The Flag Issue

The most emotional and hotly-contested symbolic issue that divides the races in recent years in South Carolina has been the question of whether to continue flying the Confederate battle flag over the state capitol building. The flag was raised in 1962 by a legislative resolution—by an all-white legislature—in order to commemorate the hundredth anniversary of the Confederate secession. It remained flying after the centennial was over, in the view of many, as a symbol of state defiance aimed at forced integration.[100] However, a strong majority of white South Carolinians see the flag as a symbol of pride in heritage and a way of honoring their ancestors who gave their lives and fortunes in lost defense of states' rights. Most African Americans see the flag as a symbol of the Ku Klux Klan that honors the state's right to continue the reprehensible practice of enslavement that created white fortunes out of black suffering.

In the 1994 exit survey of Aiken County voters, we found a very strong relationship ($p < .001$) between anger over civil rights (agreeing that equal rights has "gone too far") and defending the flying of the flag. Looking at just white voters, 80 percent of those who felt anger wanted to keep the flag where it was. Those who felt no anger over the push for equal rights were about evenly split with 48 percent wanting to keep the flag flying over the dome and the remaining majority taking softer positions of having some compromise (31 percent), removing it (17 percent), or having no opinion (4 percent). The flag issue was strongly related to voting choice among Aiken County whites in the governor's race ($p < .001$). Those who wanted to keep it over the dome voted for Beasley by nearly a five to one ratio. Those who favored a compromise supported Beasley six to four. Theodore narrowly won among those whites who wanted to take the

flag down.

A number of white economic leaders, fearing that the flag projects a negative image to the rest of the nation and has an adverse effect on industrial recruitment, sought compromise. In 1994 a compromise seemed near. The formula would have involved removing the flag from the top of the capitol and placing it on the capital grounds in a memorial setting and adding a separate memorial to the civil rights movement. A few members of the Legislative Black Caucus delayed the compromise with demands for a better deal.[101] The delay gave time for Republican leaders to exploit the issue by adding it to their primary ballot as one of three straw poll questions. (The other two involved eliminating property taxes and enacting term limits.) The wording made no mention of a compromise and simply asked: "Should the Confederate flag be taken down from the State House Dome?"[102] Voters had to choose between "yes" and "no."

Although determining precisely why people voted in the Republican primary is difficult, anecdotal evidence strongly suggests that the ploy worked. Turnout set a record when it matched that of the Democratic primary held on the same day.[103] Many relatively conservative to moderate whites who may have normally voted in the Democratic primary opted to vote in the Republican primary. Some moderate to conservative Democratic candidates did not do as well as they had expected, including gubernatorial candidate Nick Theodore, who was forced into a very damaging run-off with the relatively more liberal Mayor Joe Riley of Charleston.[104]

The "no" side on the flag removal question won an overwhelming victory by about four to one.[105] Although it had absolutely no legal binding value, the vote made Republicans in the legislature less likely to accept any compromise. Compromise would then violate the strong wishes of their political base. Political advantage won out over any concern for better race relations.

Race, Republicans, and Reapportionment

The relationship between race and partisanship not only has issue dimensions, but also a tactical dimension—the on-going battle

over reapportionment. One of the most important tools for gaining and maintaining political power in a representational system of government is the drawing of political district lines. For decades the incumbent Democrats in the legislature slowed the advance of Republican power by drawing lines that protected Democratic incumbents. Protection of white incumbents also limited the number of opportunities for blacks to win legislative office. Having a black population of at least 25 percent in a district greatly helped the prospects of white Democrats. But spreading African American voters meant that only a few districts had sufficient African American majorities to elect an African American to office. Of course, were more whites more willing to vote for black candidates, this would not be an issue. But they are not, and understandably, African American politicians felt bitterness.

With each reapportionment African American legislators pressed for more majority-minority districts, aided by pressure from the Federal Justice Department and the courts using an interpretation of the Voting Rights Act that favored more such districts. Republicans helped as a matter of self-interest. By 1994 enough Republicans sat in the state house so that African American legislators held the balance of power. In May of 1994 they temporarily joined forces and redrew the lines again to create more majority-minority districts. That redrawing "whitened" the surrounding districts and set the stage for electing more Republicans.[106]

Table 2 shows the impact of redistricting on the partisan balance of power. With each reapportionment, Republican districts became "whiter." As redistricting created more low percentage black districts and majority minority districts, the number of Republican seats rose, as did the number of African American Democratic seats.

The reapportionment battle is not just a matter of partisan tactics. It also raises a fundamental philosophical issue—the problem of duality—that has not yet been resolved by the African American community.[107] This problem is seen in many forms: integration versus separation, inclusion versus communal obligation, and as we can see in the reapportionment battle, direct representation by blacks versus black influence over mostly white officeholders. Strong arguments can be made on both sides.

local matters. Under the county delegation system, all legislators who have part of their district in a county sit together and have a great deal of control over local governmental decisions in that county. Creating majority African American districts has created many districts that cross county lines thereby allowing their African American representatives to sit on relatively more county delegations than white legislators.[111]

On the other side of the question are not only self-interested Democrats, but also many people—including some of both races—who see negative impacts. Drawing districts—whether they be school districts, city or county council districts, legislative districts, or U.S. House districts—with a first priority of maximizing the number of majority minority districts resegregates communities, causes representatives to see issues mainly in terms of black and white, divides communities into multiple districts so that they lose a clear single voice devoted to them and has a general negative impact on race relations. They argue that creating majority African American districts tends to pack districts with African American voters so that representatives from neighboring nearly all-white districts pay little attention to the needs of blacks.[112]

Ironically, the historical parallel for this goes back to 1882 when white Democrats packed a fourth of the African Americans in the state into a single congressional district, the seventh district, known then as the "black district." The idea was to minimize the political impact of those blacks who were still voting in the six other districts so that whites could be elected. The practice continued until the 1890s.[113]

After carefully weighing the many arguments concerning these issues, law professor James Underwood concludes that successful governance requires "the building of a consensus if anything is to be accomplished beyond the temporary victory of one group over another." This is best accomplished by a system "in which each legislator represents approximately equal numbers of people, without regard to the racial, ethnic, economic, or other characteristics" so that the system "does not tend to preordain election results or freeze into constitutional form certain issues as forever being the important ones."[114]

Table 2: Redistricting and Partisan Balance: Percentage Black Population (Number of Representatives)

% Black Population	1988 House Election	1992 House Election	1994 House Election
Republican Districts	16.5% (37)	13.9% (50)	10.3% (63)
White Dem. Districts	31.2% (71)	33.4% (55)	28.8% (33)
Black Dem. Districts	61.9% (16)	62.4% (18)*	60.2% (24)*

* Note: Total is not 124 because of districts with representatives claiming independent status.

Many African American political leaders, including many members of the Legislative Black Caucus, feel that having direct representation is important enough to sacrifice white Democratic seats. They bitterly feel that white Democrats took them for granted when in power, so that which party was in control made little difference.[108] In a newspaper interview, Representative Gilda Cobb-Hunter sarcastically took issue with those who wanted to protect the seats of white Democrats: "Spare me from all the good intentions of all these people who are just so concerned about the representation of people of color. I just don't understand why we're in the shape we're in when we've had all these people looking after us all these years."[109] Although the merits of this argument can be questioned, one clear effect of an environment where African Americans can be elected is stimulating political participation. If we examine county level data and registration rates, those counties with a high percentage of African American population tend to be the counties with the highest African American registration rates. All of the 11 counties with black majorities in their voting age population are among the 15 counties with a black registration rate of over 50 percent of the potentially eligible population.[110] In addition, South Carolina's tradition of county legislative delegation rule has increased African American power in

In recent years the U.S. Supreme Court has begun to make a correction. It questioned bizzare looking districts drawn to help elect minorities (*Shaw v. Reno, 1993*). In the summer of 1995 the court ruled in *Miller v. Johnson* that race could not be the predominant factor in creating election districts at any level. This ruling has stimulated two separate legal challenges to the house and senate districts for the state legislature.[115]

The outcomes of these cases will have a profound effect on future district lines. The cases may be the only hope that Democrats will have in South Carolina of not becoming a permanent minority party composed of mainly minority voters. If representation is based primarily on race, politics will continue to be mainly based on race. Other political issues that could challenge the rule by conservative white elites will tend to be ignored and the long-standing traditionalistic political system will continue.

The Legislative Black Caucus

The most obvious result of reapportionment into single member districts has been the increase in the number of African Americans who sit in the legislature and in local government councils across the state. The most visible and best organized African American politicians in the state have been the members of the Legislative Black Caucus. They played a deciding role in the reapportionment battle. They also have been active participants in other legislative battles.

The Legislative Black Caucus was formed in 1975 when the number of African Americans in the legislature increased from three to thirteen.[116] The first chair of the caucus was Ernest Finney, who persuaded the white Democratic leadership to name caucus members to all committees. The group pooled money to hire administrative support, held regional meetings to obtain input from African American political activists across the state, and coordinated efforts with the Congressional Black Caucus to persuade all of the state's Democratic members of Congress to extend the Voting Rights Act in 1975. They also won symbolic victories. The portrait of civil rights pioneer Mary McLeod Bethune was hung in the state house and the state gave official

recognition to Martin Luther King's birthday. They played a key role in expanding the state kindergarten system, over the opposition of Republican Governor James Edwards.[117] By the mid 1980s the caucus, which had grown to 21 members (17 in the House and four in the Senate), was given credit for several additional measures: a procurement statute that required consideration of minority business in state contracts, a governor's office for small and minority business, and the creation of a State Human Affairs Commission.[118] Their ranks were temporarily reduced and they lost seniority when the "Lost Trust" FBI sting operation that began in 1990 snared several members. But by 1994 their numbers had increased to 25 and they were beginning to grow independent of white Democrats in their push for more majority minority districts. Maggie Glover argued that working with Republicans would make little difference because "It's hard for black folks to tell the difference between Republicans and Democrats" because "it's just become them and us, white folks and us." The caucus had other victories to add to its accomplishments, including the election of African American judges, more money for traditionally black colleges, programs to recruit minority teachers, and the building of rural health centers.[119]

The caucus has always had critics, both from within and without, for not pushing hard enough.[120] It may be at its peak with 30 members in the 170 member General Assembly in 1996. The test of whether working with a Republican majority is no different than working with a white Democratic majority is in the near future.[121]

Paths To the Future

In December of 1995, Governor David Beasley addressed the issue of race in South Carolina by creating a 21 member Commission on Race Relations. The commission, which includes among its members state legislators, public officials and business leaders, was charged with advising the governor on ways to combat crime, improve educational opportunities, and increase economic opportunity.[122] While some leaders in the African American community have hailed this as a step forward, others have expressed doubt. The relationship

of the Beasley administration and African Americans was marked with friction during the early months of his administration. Five members of the legislative Black Caucus interviewed for this article characterized the relationship of the African American community with Governor Beasley as either poor or fair with reasonable hope for improvement. They were even more pessimistic about race relations, rating them mostly poor to fair with little hope for any change[123]

Many key issues remain to be resolved. Some are extremely divisive. At a race relations summit sponsored by the Palmetto Project in January of 1995, African Methodist Episcopal Church Bishop John Hurst Adams stated: "The Confederate flag is an obstruction to reconciliation."[124] Beasley responded that he thought the flag should remain in place.

As every student of government knows, special commissions often play no more than a symbolic role. A politician, faced with a controversial issue, may appear to move forward decisively to address the problem, when in reality, he is side-stepping the issue. The proof of seriousness will be in how Governor Beasley responds to the commission's recommendations and whether he actively supports substantive policy proposals.

South Carolina's preoccupation with economic development may be the best hope for those seeking to continue the long journey to equality. This is an area where white economic leaders share a significant common interest with black citizens. Good race relations and a good school system that produces a skilled work force—and coincidentally opportunity for African Americans—are prerequisites for economic development. This is also an area of potential friction between these development-oriented leaders and traditionalists who want minimal state government. But even traditionalists give some ground to the demands of development. In 1962 when Clemson was facing integration, Clemson President Robert Edwards warned Senator Marion Gressette, one of the oldest and most powerful traditionalists running the legislature, about what must happen to persuade a large company to relocate in the state. "Senator, if there's a ruckus at Clemson, those people won't even plant a scrub oak in Calhoun County." [125] No ruckus took place.

In 1968, a report by an outside investment securities firm, Moody's, pointed to education as South Carolina's most serious problem. As a result, Governor McNair supported establishment of a statewide kindergarten program. Governor Edwards, although he had opposed expansion of the kindergarten system, did support the Education Finance Act in 1977 to ensure a certain minimal level of services to all school districts. As governor, Dick Riley was determined to upgrade the school system. Finding little initial interest among either the business community or legislators when he proposed an Education Improvement Act in 1983, Riley sold it to businessmen as an economic development tool.[126] These efforts led to some improvement in the education system as measured by SAT scores and student attendance.[127]

The EIA was perhaps the high point for moderate development-oriented policies in the state. Those who created these policies were for the main part leaders who owed their electoral success to African Americans who held the political balance of power. Finding state resources for improving the opportunity structure has become more difficult as those moderate Democrats are replaced by conservative Republicans who see cutting taxes for their white middle class political base as a more important economic development tool than education. African American political leaders must appeal to more progressive development interests within the new Republican majority if they are to have any influence on future policies. Members of the Legislative Black Caucus seem to realize this. When asked about issues on which they could work with Governor Beasley and the Republicans, the only common theme among all five we interviewed was education.[128]

The movement of devolution of responsibilities to the state level will make significant improvements in education difficult. South Carolina, which received $1.23 back for every $1 its citizens paid in Federal taxes in 1993 alone, is one of a number of states that will certainly feel the pinch.[129] Republicans argue that if a state wants such programs, it should raise the money to pay for them. However, with the political emphasis in South Carolina on cutting taxes, this seems an unlikely scenario.[130] Lack of state financial support is an especially acute problem for African Americans seeking advanced degrees.[131] South Carolina is currently the only state that provides no

needs-based college scholarships.[132] During the past ten years, South Carolina increased its spending for its public colleges by less than one percent and is falling far behind other states in the region.[133]

Conclusion

Despite all the progress that has been made, race has reemerged as the great divide in South Carolina politics. Certainly the divide is not as clear as it once was. One can find anecdotal evidence that the state has moved beyond race politics. On January 1, 1996 African American Charlie Harts became mayor of Ninety Six, after being elected with 53 percent of the vote in a majority white community over two white opponents. A 90 year old resident of the mill village area remembered when blacks and whites "didn't associate at all." Considering the election, she would have thought "it could never happen." But "It's changed a lot. I am very proud."[134]

These kinds of stories give promise and hope for they way things might be. But a more careful analysis finds race-based politics not very far below the polite veneer of South Carolina politics. Too many people see partisanship in the same terms as an Alabama citizen interviewed on public radio as this article was being written. "The Republican Party today stands for what the Democratic party stood for a hundred years ago."[135]

A hundred years after the gains of the first reconstruction were lost, the gains of the second reconstruction are in jeopardy in South Carolina. Unless we come together, get to know each other, and constructively resolve our differences, we will be unable to resolve the vast array of problems facing the state for the last century and a half. Traditionalistic values will remain dominant.

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Endnotes

1. V.O. Key, *Southern Politics in the State and Nation* (New York: Vintage, 1949), p. 5.

2. *Ibid.* pp. 130-55. In the background research that was the basis for Myrdal's 1944 classic work on race relations, *An American Dilemma*, then professor and later Nobel Peace Prize winning African American diplomat Ralph Bunche argued that "The one-party system in the South is dictated by the presence of the Negro" and that "The non-voting Negro remains the greatest single political influence" in the South and is the "essential vehicle in southern politics." Ralph J. Bunche, in Dewey Grantham (ed.), *The Political Status of the Negro in the Age of FDR*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), p. xxvii. Bunche's work influenced the major premise of Key in his 1949 classic work. Hanes Walton, Jr., "Black Southern Politics: The Influences of Bunche, Martin, and Key," in Hanes Walton, Jr. (ed.) *Black Politics and Black Political Behavior* (Westport CT: Praeger, 1994), pp. 19-38.

3. Key, *Southern Politics*, 131.

4. *Ibid.*, 143-4.

5. James Lowell Underwood, *The Constitution of South Carolina, Volume IV: The Struggle for Political Equality* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1994), pp. 58-157.

6. Daniel Elazar, "Series Introduction," in Cole Blease Graham, Jr., and William V. Moore, *South Carolina Politics and Government* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), pp. xviii, xxiv, xxx.

7. Key, *Southern Politics*, pp. 655-71.

8. Jack Bass and Walter DeVries, *The Transformation of Southern Politics* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1976), pp. 249, 259-61, 273-4. Also see several general works on southern politics. Chandler Davidson, *Biracial Politics: Conflict and Coalition in the Metropolitan South* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1972); H. Brandt Ayres and Thomas Naylor (eds.), *You Can't Eat Magnolias* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1972). Some of this view is found in William V. Moore, "Parties and Electoral Politics in South Carolina," in Luther F. Carter and David S. Mann (eds.), *Government in the Palmetto State* (Columbia, SC: Bureau of Governmental Research and Service, University of South Carolina, 1983), pp. 48, 50. Also see Robert E. Botsch, "Interest Group Politics in South Carolina," in Carter and Mann, *Government in the Palmetto State*, pp. 75-6.

9. George Tindall, "The Historical and Cultural Legacies of the Constitution of 1895," speech delivered at the University of South Carolina Law School, 16 November 1995; Michael Kelly, "Segregation Anxiety," *The New Yorker*, 20 November 1995, 44; Earl Black and Merle Black, *Politics and Society in the South* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press: 1987), pp. 167-70.

10. Thomas Holt, *Black Over White: Negro Political Leadership in South Carolina During Reconstruction* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1977); Carol Sears Botsch, Robert E. Botsch, James O. Farmer, W. Calvin Smith, *African Americans and the Palmetto State* (Columbia, SC: South Carolina State Department of Education, 1994), pp. 69-83.

11. Chester Bain, "South Carolina: Partisan Prelude," in William C. Havard, (ed.), *The Changing Politics of the South* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1972), p. 636; Neuman V. Bartley and Hugh D, Graham, *Southern Politics and the Second Reconstruction* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1975), p. 200; Walter B. Edgar, *South Carolina in the Modern Age* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1982), p. 124.

12. Botsch examined the possibility of a black/white populist coalition in the late 1970s, looking particularly at the issue of affirmative action and concluded that "it splits the races, rejuvenates functional racism, alienates workers against the central government, and does nothing to alter the distribution of wealth... ." Robert E. Botsch, *We Shall Not Overcome: Populism and Southern Blue Collar Workers* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), p. 161.

13. Steed, Moreland, and Baker note in their 1992 treatment of the party system in South Carolina that Republicans were winning the battle for the white working class vote. But they do not link this to racial issues because one party politics "depended on one overriding issue, the pursuit of white supremacy, and there is no comparably dominant issue at present," Robert P. Steed, Lawrence W. Moreland, and Todd A. Baker, "South Carolina Party System: Towards a Two-Party System," in Luther F. Carter and David S. Mann (eds.), *Government and the Palmetto State: Towards the 21st Century* (Columbia, SC: Institute of Public Affairs, The University of South Carolina, 1992), pp. 31, 39.

14. D.R. Kinder and D.O. Sears, "Prejudice and Politics: Symbolic Racism Versus Racial Threats to the Good Life," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 40 (1981), pp. 414-31; Susan E. Howell and Sylvia Warren, "Public Opinion and David Duke," in Douglas Rose, (ed.), *The Emergence of David Duke and the Politics of Race* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), pp. 80-93; Shickre A. Sabbagha, "Dynamics of A Specific Race: Ideology, Race, and Social Values in the 1990 North Carolina Senate Race," (an unpublished paper presented at the South Carolina Political Science Association Meeting at the Citadel, Charleston, South Carolina, March 1995); Martin Gilens, "Racial Attitudes and the Opposition to Welfare," *The Journal of Politics* 57, no. 4 (1995), pp. 1010-11.

15. Jan Collins Stucker, "Did You Know I.D. Newman Kept You Safe During Desegregation?" *The State Magazine*, March 25, 1984, 8-11; Archie Vernon Huff, Jr., *The History of South Carolina in the Building of the Nation* (Alester G. Furman III, 1991), pp. 421-4.

16. Botsch, Botsch, Farmer, and Smith, *African Americans and the Palmetto State*, pp. 85-104.

17. Underwood, *The Constitution of South Carolina*, 25; Holt, *Black Over White*.

18. Underwood, *The Constitution of South Carolina*, 28-9.

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 34-5.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 81.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 103.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 194.

23. *Ibid.*

24. Havard, *The Changing Politics of the South*, 18.

25. David Goldfield, *Black White, and Southern: Race Relations and Southern Culture, 1940 to the Present* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1990), p. 33.

26. Miles S. Richards, "The Eminent Lieutenant McKaine," *Proceedings*, South Carolina Historical Association (1992), pp. 46-54.

27. Goldfield, *Black White, and Southern*, pp. 37-8; Underwood, *The Constitution of South Carolina*, p. 173

28. Underwood, *The Constitution of South Carolina*, p. 172.

29. *Ibid.*, pp. 175-6.

30. Goldfield, *Black White, and Southern*, p. 38.

31. Underwood, *The Constitution of South Carolina*, p. 309.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 197.

33. Goldfield, *Black White, and Southern*, p. 46.

34. George C. Sherrill, "State Governmental Organization," in W.H. Calcott (ed.), *South Carolina: Economic and Social Conditions in 1944* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1945), p. 142.

35. Bass and DeVries, *The Transformation of Southern Politics*, p. 254.

36. Graham and Moore, *South Carolina Politics*, p. 80.

37. *Ibid.*

38. Havard, *The Changing Politics of the South*, p. 19.

39. Goldfield, *Black White, and Southern*, p. 195.

40. Havard, *The Changing Politics of the South*, p. 19.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 20.

42. Bass and DeVries, *The Transformation of Southern Politics*, p. 253.

43. *Ibid.*

44. Goldfield, *Black White, and Southern*, p. 195; Graham and Moore, *South Carolina Politics*, p. 82.

45. Edgar, *South Carolina in the Modern Age*, p. 152.

46. Havard, *The Changing Politics of the South*, p. 21.

47. Underwood, *The Constitution of South Carolina*, p. 249.

48. In 1992, 55 percent of the black population over 18 years of age were registered as compared to 61 percent of whites. South Carolina State Election Commission. Lower registration rates and lower turnout rates magnify differences at each stage of the election process. In 1992, 26.9 percent of the population 18 years or older were African American; 24.8 percent of those registered were African American; and23.2 percent of all those voting were African American. Calculations from Census data and South Carolina State Election Commission data.

49. Bass and DeVries, *The Transformation of Southern Politics*, p.261.

50. Alexander P. Lamis, *The Two-Party South* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 67.

51. William D. Workman, Jr., "Black Vote Still Belongs to the Democrats," *The State*, January 27, 1979, 16A.

52. William D. Workman, "Bloc Voting Not New in South Carolina," *The State*, January 28, 1979, 3B.

53. Lamis, *The Two-Party South*, p. 67; Bass and DeVries, *The Transformation of Southern Politics*, p. 272.

54. Goldfield, *Black White, and Southern*, p. 235.

55. Harvey Gantt, the first African American to enter Clemson, later reflected that "If you can't appeal to the morals of a South Carolinian, you can appeal to his manners." Bass and DeVries, *The Transformation of Southern Politics*, p. 258.

56. George Wallace effectively pioneered the development of this tactic as part of his overall strategy within the Democratic Party. The Nixon campaign employed it as part of their "southern strategy." Dan T. Carter, *The Politics of Rage* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995).

57. Graham and Moore, *South Carolina Politics*, p.93.

58. Lamis, *The Two Party South*, pp. 73,332, n. 28.59. Interviews with five members of the South Carolina Legislative Black Caucus, December 1995.

60. Nina Brook, :GOP Still Struggling to Attract Black Vote," *The State*, November 12, 1995, B1.

61. "S.C.'s Lone Black Elected Republican To Seek a new Seat," *The State*, January 15, 1996, B2.

62. Lee Bandy, "Beasley, Theodore Cross Swords," *The State*, November 6, 1994, A10.

63. Cindi Ross Scoppe, "Theodore: No Grudges, No Regrets," *The State*, November 11, 1994, A8.

64. Underwood, *The Constitution of South Carolina*, p. 255.

65. *Ibid.*, pp. 250-51.

66. *Ibid.*, pp. 251-6.

67. *Ibid.*, p. 254.

68. *Ibid.*

69. *South Carolina Statistical Abstract: 1994* (Columbia, SC: South Carolina State Budget and Control Board, 1994), p. 223.

70. Claudia Smith Brinson, "State Government's Blacks, Women Still Trail in Pay, Power," *The State*, June 10, 1993, 1A.

71. *ibid.*, 9A.

72. *ibid.*, 8A.

73. *ibid.*, 8A.

74. Levona Page, "Wanted: Good Teachers; Low Pay," in "Our Schools," *The State*, January 15, 1984, 13.

75. *ibid.*, 13.

76. Goldfield, *Black, White and Southern*, pp. 56-7.

77. I.A. Newby, *Black Carolinians: A History of Blacks in South Carolina from 1895 to 1968* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1973), p. 89.

78. John Norton, "Finally Money Flowed Into Schools," in "Our Schools," *The State*, January 15, 1984, 7.

79. *ibid.*

80. Levona Page, "Because It Is Right," in "Our Schools," *The State*, January 15, 1984, 15.

81. Levona Page, "Old Ways Were Changing," in "Our Schools," *The State*, January 15, 1984, 10.

82. Edgar, *South Carolina in the Modern Age*, p. 124.

83. By the 1990s the percentage in private schools was about seven percent. *Ibid.*, p. 129.

84. "Selected Characteristics of Persons By Race and Hispanic Origin: 1990." U.S. Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Administration, Bureau of the Census.

85. "Basic Educational Data System: 1983-4, 1992-3" and "Professional Certified Staff File: 1993-4, 1994-5," South Carolina Department of Education, Education Information Services, Staff Information.

86. Steve Smith, "Despite Gains in Education, Disparities Exist," *The State*, April 13, 1987, 6A.

87. "Selected Characteristics of Persons By Race and Hispanic Origin: 1990."

88. ibid.

89. Mike Livingston, "White-Black Job Ratio Unchanged Since 1940," *The State*, April 13, 1987, 6A.

90. "South Carolina Infant Mortality By Race By County: 1992," *South Carolina Statistical Abstract: 1994*, p. 384.

91. Goldfield, *Black White, and Southern*, p. 3.

92. *Ibid*.

93. *Ibid*., p. 8; Newby, *Black Carolinians*, pp. 23, 156.

94. Newby, *Black Carolinians*, p. 157.

95. Susan Hogan/Albach and Clif LeBlanc, "Poll: Race Gulf Wide," *The State*, December 4, 1995, A15.

96. Armstrong Williams, "America's Racial Divisions Beg For National Dialogue," *The State*, January 4, 1996, A11.

97. Hogan/Albach and LeBlanc, "Poll: Race Gulf Wide," A15.

98. ibid., A14.

99. Howell and Warren, "Public Opinion and David Duke."

100. Jim Auchmutey, "Confederacy's Symbols Still Stir Southern Battles," *The State*, March 21, 1993, D1.

101. "Glover's A Threat On the Road, A Disgrace Upon the Senate," *The State*, January 6, 1996, A8.

102. Nina Brook, "GOP Ballot Questions Seek Input From Voters," *The State*, August 1, 1994, B1.

103. Cindi Ross Scoppe, "Turnout Validating GOP Drawing Power," *The State*, August 10, 1994, B3.

104. Democratic State Senator Tom Moore of Aiken County qualified for a run-off for the congressional seat vacated by long-time incumbent Butler Derrick, but found that many of his potential supporters could not vote in the run-off because they had voted in the Republican Primary. Author discussions with Moore campaign staff.

105. Sammy Fretwell, "Republicans Take Opinions to the Polls," *The State*, August 10, 1994, B1.

106. Charles Pope, "South Carolina Stands Alone in Remap Dispute, *The State*, May 23, 1994, B1; Cindi Ross Scoppe, "Justice Oks Elections for House," *The State*, June 1, 1994, A1.

107. Ricky Hill, "The Study of Black Politics: Notes on Rethinking the Paradigm," in Walton, *Black Politics and Black Political Behavior*, pp. 12-13.

108. Interviews.

109. Cindi Ross Scoppe, "House Districts Challenged," *The State*, January 3, 1996, A1.

110. Calculations from figures in the South Carolina Statistical Abstract, 1994, p. 222. Bass observed this relationship in 1974. See Bass and DeVries, *The Transformation of Southern Politics*, p. 274. Notably, in each of these counties the registration rate for whites is above the state average for all whites (54.6 percent). This suggests that part of what Key observed in 1949 still holds true. The relative size of

the black population has an impact on white participation. But today it stimulates, rather than depresses, black participation.

111. Calculated by William V. Moore and related to author in a telephone conversation, January 1996.

112. Nina Brook, "Lawsuit To Contest Districts," *The State*, September 17, 1995, A1; "Race Based Districting Hurts Us Where We Live," *The State*, January 5, 1996, A10.

113. William E. Rone, Jr., "'Black District Drawn a Century Ago Aided Democrats," *The State*, May 15, 1991, A12.

114. Underwood, *The Constitution of South Carolina*, p. 376.

115. Scoppe, "House Districts Challenged;" Brook, "Lawsuit To Contest District."

116. Bass and DeVries, *The Transformation of Southern Politics*, p. 274.

117. *Ibid.*, pp. 274-5.

118. David Kern, "At Age 10, State's Black Caucus Shifts Focus," *The State*, April 21, 1985, D1.

119. Nina Brook and Cindi Ross Scoppe, "Black Caucus Coming of Age," *The State*, June 13, 1994, A1.

120. South Carolina State political scientist Ricky Hill has criticized the caucus for what he sees as a deferential attitude toward white Democratic legislative leaders. See Lee Bandy, "Black Caucus Tells Party to Listen Up," *The State*, March 6, 1994, 12B. One of the caucus's more outspoken members, Kay Patterson, a state representative from 1975 until his election to the senate in 1984, where he has served since, has often called for more aggressive leadership. See David Kern, "At Age 10."

121. Republicans had a majority in the house in 1995-6, while Democrats barely maintained a majority in the senate. Barring changes in districts mandated by Federal courts, the Republicans may control the senate after the 1996 election.

122. Lee Bandy, "Panel's Job: Demolish 'Walls' of Racism," *The State*, December 20, 1995, A1.

123. Interviews.

124. Dewanna Lofton and Clif LeBlanc, "Anger Fades, But Not Passions, In Race Summit," *The State*, January 7, 1996, B1.

125. Edgar, *South Carolina in the Modern Age*, p. 105.

126. *Ibid.*, p. 130.

127. *Ibid.*, p. 132.

128. Interviews.

129. "A Bargain for Federal Funds," *Aiken Standard*, January 13, 1996, 4A.

130. Nina Brooks, "Tax Relief Crusade Continues," *The State*, January 7, 1996, D1.

131. Scott Johnson, "Costs Keep Blacks Out of College," *The State*, April 13, 1987, 6A.

132. "Higher Education Increase Not Enough to Catch Us Up," *The State*, January 7, 1996, D2.

133. "Doctoral Program Rankings Trail Neighboring States," *The State*, December 26, 1995, D2.

134. Pat Butler, "Black Mayor Win Symbolizes Change," *The State*, January 24, 1995, B1.

135. "Morning Edition," National Public Radio, January 12, 1996.