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## Ambition Theory and Presidential Aspirations: How the Senators Vote\*

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"Ambition lies at the heart of politics," says Joseph A. Schlesinger<sup>1</sup> as he begins to describe his ambition theory of politics. His central assumption is that a politician's behavior is a complex of responses to his office goals. The politician's choices and decisions are made to enhance his chances to fulfill his office ambitions. If he wants to seek advancement in elective office "he must act today in terms of the electorate of the office which he hopes to win tomorrow."<sup>2</sup> We will not try to explain why politicians seek advancement. Schlesinger says, "The small band of governors in sizeable and competitive states and the conspicuous members of the Senate who together compose the presidential 'hopefuls' are hopeful as much because of the expectations of others as because of their own."<sup>3</sup>

The dust of electoral conflict had barely settled after the 1968 election when speculation began about who would be the Democratic presidential nominee in 1972. Despite the apparent availability and popularity of Edward Kennedy, the possibility of a relatively open contest for the Democratic nomination unconstrained by a Democrat in the White House was apparent to all. For most aspirants the chance to have a "good shot" at the presidency is likely to be small. This is particularly true for an aspirant in the majority party because an incumbent president may control the nomination of his successor, or it may pass through succession to the Vice President. Humphrey's defeat in 1968 could not help but whet the appetites of numerous Democrats for the highest political office in the land.

The institutional base for many presidential hopefuls in 1969 was the United States Senate. All presidential nominees of the 1960's had previously been Senators. The Senate obviously provides a potential candidate a forum for addressing the public, for proposing policy alternatives, and for keeping in

\*We wish to thank Charles O. Jones, Eric M. Uslander, and James W. Lindeen for their constructive remarks on an earlier version of this paper.

<sup>1</sup>*Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1966), p. 1. For the implications of candidates' ambitions on party organization, see Schlesinger, "Political Party Organization," in James G. March (ed.), *Handbook of Organizations* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1965), pp. 764-801.

<sup>2</sup>Schlesinger, *ibid.*, p. 6.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*

constant touch with the issues of the day. It also gives Senators ample opportunity to accommodate their senatorial behavior to their presidential ambitions. They can do this in a variety of ways: by public statements, bill introductions, investigative activities, challenging the President's nominees to the courts and administrative positions, and the like. One kind of behavior particularly amenable to comparative analysis is their roll call voting records. This is the data base to which we will direct our attention.

The matter of identifying Senators' ambitions for the Presidency is one of some difficulty. Perhaps it is true, as former Senator Everett Dirksen once noted on a TV talk show, that every Senator at one time or another harbors the notion that he or she could achieve the top political prize. Arbitrarily we have chosen to identify as our pool of aspirants the Senators of the 91st Congress (1969-70) who made conspicuous steps toward obtaining that nomination; namely, McGovern, Muskie, Kennedy, Hartke, Bayh, Jackson, McCarthy, Harris and Hughes. These put themselves forward, responded coyly to inquiries about their interest in the office, and, in some instances, formally declared for the Presidency. These we submit, can be expected to have accommodated their behavior, and, in particular, their roll call voting to the scrutiny of a national constituency during their concurrent service in the 91st Congress. It remains true, of course, that other Democratic hopefuls may similarly have adapted their voting to the same end but when opportunity came, they did not put themselves forward. On the other hand, the openness of the Democratic scramble and the array of men actually considered as active aspirants leads us to think that such surreptitious aspirants can be safely discounted.

Drawing upon Schlesinger's ambition theory, we expect that the Senators who are presidential aspirants will distinguish themselves from their colleagues who are content to serve their states and constituents on a continuing basis. The aspirants will have to look and act presidential. Some of this may seem only to be vain posturing, the kind of puffery that critics of the American political style righteously protest.<sup>4</sup> More than that, the aspirants must obtain the hue of a national figure, above the parochial identifications of a state or particular region. Interestingly, however, the aspirants will not be particularly different from one another *on the issues*. Particularly on the general issues of governmental management, social welfare, civil liberties and rights the candidates all seek moderate ground in the liberal-labor, northern urban majority of the Democratic Party. Differences from one another will basically be in style and rhetoric, not substance.

On the other hand, nonaspirants will vary from one another. Their future constituency remains their states. Although, as Matthews pointed out,

<sup>4</sup>For example, see Michael Parenti, *Democracy for the Few* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1974), pp. 141-155 and *passim*.



Senators have some discretion in defining the constituency they will serve, constituency characteristics are associated with senatorial voting.<sup>5</sup> Men who wish to remain in the Senate will have particularistic concerns about federal assistance programs, school desegregation plans, tax credits for certain industries, agricultural support levels, and the like. Presidential aspirants will be anticipating the same national constituency. They will respond to and vote for the policy proposals in relation to preferences in their national political party of the electorate at large. We do *not* expect candidates to distinguish themselves from one another sharply. It is unlikely that an aspirant will be nominated because of his record on the issues — the issues alone are not of first importance — rather, one may be disqualified for having an “unacceptable” record on one or more salient national issues.

Our hypothesis can be disconfirmed by two kinds of senatorial voting behavior. Aspirants may not vote similarly on particular issue positions. They may choose contrasting positions because they act out of different perceptions of what is right, popular, workable or reasonable. Perhaps the aspirants do not feel constrained to behave similarly in anticipation of the national constituency. Such a finding would suggest that candidates perceive the electorate and/or their party's supporters as a diverse constituency for which numerous viable strategies might be devised to put together a winning coalition. Candidates would then be likely to communicate specific appeals for support to distinct interests — Southerners, blacks, labor, youth, the doves, and the like. Substantial disagreement among the candidates on the dimensions of policy would disconfirm our hypothesis.

The hypothesis would be disconfirmed if all Democratic Senators vote similarly. If there is little variance among aspirants, but likewise little among nonaspirants, our theory is meaningless. However, party unity is hardly a hallmark of Senate Democrats.<sup>6</sup> It is true, of course, that much of the disunity in the voting of Senate Democrats reflects the traditional cleavage between the South and the rest of the country's Democrats. For ambition theory to be at all persuasive we need to show that the aspirants, who are all non-southern Democrats, vote more homogeneously than their nonaspirant colleagues from outside the South.<sup>7</sup>

Having noted the Democrats' regional cleavage, it is worth suggesting that ambition theory has some explanatory and possibly predictive relevance to the voting of Southern members of Congress. George C. Wallace not withstand-

<sup>5</sup>Donald R. Matthews, *U.S. Senators and Their World* (New York: Random House, 1960), pp. 230-239. Clausen, with greater precision, indicates that constituency is more significant than party on senatorial voting on civil liberties and international involvement issues. See Aage R. Clausen, *How Congressmen Decide: A Policy Focus* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1974), pp. 140-149.

<sup>6</sup>See, for example, David B. Truman, *The Congressional Party: A Case Study* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1959), especially pp. 51-63.

<sup>7</sup>See Malcolm E. Jewell and Samuel C. Patterson, *The Legislative Process in the United States*, 2d ed. (New York: Random House, 1973), pp. 454-455.

ing, Southern politicians have had little realistic basis for pursuing presidential aspirations in the Democratic party. Most political commentators would agree that, except for their loyalty to traditional, southern lifestyle and values, Senators such as Russell of Georgia and Fulbright of Arkansas would have been considered promising presidential timber. Because they maintained positions on race related issues which were at variance with what was acceptable to the national constituency, especially the national Democratic constituency, efforts to pursue such aspirations were bound to fail. Of course, southern Democratic Senators have been shown to be "different" on issues besides race related ones,<sup>8</sup> but chances are that their issue positions would have been more tractable if the presidency constituted a real career opportunity. Because the presidency is not available, southern Democrats can be conservative or moderate on many social reform issues or exact a price from the party or President who needs their vote — military bases, defense contracts, agricultural subsidies, favorable consideration on bureaucratic decisions affecting local interests, pork, and other tangible benefits. Until there is a convergence of values between the North and South on attitudes toward race, or until the salience of this issue recedes, or until a southern aspirant forswears traditional racial values of his region, a Southerner cannot be a viable presidential candidate. In the absence of this office opportunity, presidential ambitions will not constrain southern Democratic Senators to accommodate themselves to national values and interests.

Our theory does not insist that aspirants must necessarily change their views on issues. It may be that their issue positions have been both consistent over time, and apt for a presidential candidacy. It does suggest that change might occur in some aspirants. Our empirical tests make no attempt to detect change over time. If the results of this study are persuasive, a longitudinal inquiry into senatorial voting behavior to ascertain change over time might be in order. It may well be that the decision to seek the presidency is the watershed for new voting patterns. This question goes beyond the scope of the inquiry which follows.

### METHODS OF INQUIRY

The data base for our inquiry consists of 40 cumulative scales or dimensions of Senate voting in the 91st Congress (1969-70). Beginning with 666 roll call votes, we eliminated 162 in which the minority did not exceed ten percent of those voting on roll call. Using techniques suggested by MacRae, we made pairwise comparisons of each roll call with every other as measured with Yules

<sup>8</sup>H. Douglas Price, "Are Southern Democrats Different? An Application of Scale Analysis to Senate Voting Patterns," in Nelson W. Polsby, Robert A. Dentler and Paul A. Smith (eds.), *Politics and Social Life* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1963), pp. 740-756.



Q coefficient.<sup>9</sup> We defined clusters of four or more roll calls in which each roll call included was related to every other with a coefficient  $\geq \pm .8$ .<sup>10</sup> We identified 40 clusters encompassing 408 roll calls, leaving 96 roll calls unclustered. The roll calls in each cluster were organized into cumulative scales and Senators were assigned scale scores on each dimension of voting.

The scaling technique is objective, but identifying the content of the scales is not. Instead of a prior prediction of relationships among issues being tested, we must account for roll calls that are empirically related. The labels and descriptions of the dimensions are based upon our interpretations of the public descriptions of the roll calls, especially those contained in the *Congressional Quarterly* and the *Congressional Record*, and occasionally supplemented by information and interpretations in news periodicals.<sup>11</sup> We note with caution the fact that the dimensions themselves are in some instances highly related and that the distinctions between them can be fine or ambiguous. However, each dimension constitutes a unique distribution of scale scores for the members of the Senate.

Although all members of the Senate were assigned scores, our interest centers upon the scores for Democrats. For purposes of our exploration the measures are treated as if they are interval scales of measurement. Our primary interest is in whether or not there is more homogeneity in the voting of the aspirant Senators than those who are not aspirants. Statistically then we simply want to compare the variance of the voting scores of the two groups. Previous research suggests that comparisons be made to "All Democrats" and nonsouthern Democrats. [Because our aspirant group is relatively small we will examine individual scores to indicate whether or not particular aspirants were deviating from the aspirant group means. Finally, because our scores measure direction of voting we will also compare the mean scores of the groups of Senators.]

## FINDINGS

The data in Table 1 indicate that on most of the dimensions of voting there is substantially more homogeneity in the scores of the presidential aspirant Senators than in those of the nonaspirant Senators. A comparison of aspirants with all nonaspirants shows that on 37 of 40 dimensions the coefficients of variance for aspirants are smaller than those of their counterparts. Even when

<sup>9</sup>Duncan MacRae, Jr., "A Method for Identifying Issues and Factions from Legislative Votes," *American Political Science Review* 59, No. 4 (December 1965), 909-926. The treatment of issues is elaborated in chapters 2 and 3 of MacRae's *Issues and Parties in Legislative Voting: Methods of Statistical Analysis* (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1970).

<sup>10</sup>This threshold level of .80 sets a minimum Q value which eliminates roll calls from the cluster which are only minimally related to the other roll calls in the cluster. Additionally, the .80 minimum Q value produced Guttman scales with little error and is comparable to the requirement of .90+ level of reproducibility. See Lee F. Anderson, Meredith W. Watts, Jr. and Allen R. Wilcox, *Legislative Roll-Call Analysis* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), p. 103.

<sup>11</sup>Coefficients of reproducibility and a description of the issues in the dimensions are reported in Appendix A.

aspirants are compared only with their nonsouthern counterparts their voting is more homogeneous on 33 of 40 voting dimensions.

One way of comparing the variance in scale scores of the groups is to report the ratio between the variance of nonaspirants and that of aspirants for each scale. On scale 1, for example, the variance for all nonaspirants is 44.02 compared to 0.69 for aspirants. The ratio exceeds 63 to 1. Comparing nonaspirants outside the South (variance = 9.76) with the aspirants yields a ratio exceeding 14 to 1. Table 2 reports four categories of ratios. For category A ratios equal or exceed 10 to 1. In B the ratio equals or exceeds 2 to 1 but is less than 10 to 1. In C the ratio equals or exceeds 1 to 1 but is less than 2 to 1. In category D variance for the aspirants exceeds that for the nonaspirant group.

From Table 2 it is apparent that, as anticipated, the contrast in homogeneity of voting is sharper when all nonaspirant Senators are compared to the aspirants than when the comparison is between nonaspirants outside the South and the aspirants. Half the dimensions in category A for all nonaspirants appear in B for nonaspirants outside the South. Six dimensions in category B for all nonaspirants appear in C for nonaspirants outside the South. The results are similar for all categories. Referring back to Table 1, the reader can find that variances in column 4 exceed those in column 7 for all but nine dimensions and that in all of the nine the differences are modest.

There is remarkably little variance in the voting distributions of the aspirants on the 40 policy dimensions. On only five dimensions does the variance coefficient for the presidential candidates exceed 3.00. The variance is highest on dimension 11, the Anti-military Expansionism scale. Eight of the nine aspirants' scores are between 8.5 and 10.0, showing them to be opponents of military expansion. Senator Jackson, however, is sharply distinguished from the others with a score of 0.0, showing strong support for the military. Second most variance occurs on dimension 18, Taxpayers Savings and Congressional Budget Austerity. Votes in the dimension were to cut NASA spending, tighten spending and audit controls on defense contracts and reduce the total spending authorization for the Defense Department for fiscal year 1971. Seven of the eight Senators scored supported austerity with scores of six, seven or eight. Senator Jackson's score was one. Dimension 27 is called Tax Reform #2 and includes roll calls on amendments and passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1969. Most Senators supported reform with scores between 5.0 and 7.0, but McCarthy and Hartke had scores of 2.0. On dimension 32, Tax Subsidy Reform, the issues concerned reform of mineral depletion allowances and reduction of the maximum receivable by farmers for farm subsidies. High scorers favored subsidy reductions and low scorers opposed. The candidates were spread on this dimension; Harris had the lowest score of 0.0, Hartke and McCarthy had 1.0, McGovern and Muskie registered 3.0 and Hughes and Bayh were the strongest opponents of subsidies and depletion allowances with



TABLE 1. Means and Variances of Three Sets of Democratic Senators on the 40 Dimensions

Scale (1)	Scale Score Range		NONASPIRANTS						ASPIRANTS	
	0 - (2)	N (3)	All Mean Score (4)	All		Non Southern		N (9)	Mean Score (10)	Variance S <sub>2</sub> (11)
				Variance S <sub>2</sub> (5)	N (6)	Mean Score (7)	Variance S <sub>2</sub> (8)			
1	17	47	10.51	44.02	31	14.79	9.76	9	16.50	0.69
2	20	48	15.39	13.95	32	17.47	5.11	9	18.78	1.63
3	21	48	12.625	73.52	32	17.38	27.68	9	20.06	2.72
4	7	42	2.94	6.66	28	3.93	6.16	7	5.86	3.14
5	10	43	6.26	12.54	29	8.48	1.42	8	9.50	0.36
6	16	45	12.17	15.18	30	14.28	4.17	8	15.56	0.53
7	11	46	7.50	12.19	30	9.52	2.35	9	10.39	0.61
8	11	44	5.32	17.06	28	7.64	10.72	9	10.17	1.56
9	8	40	6.68	1.51	25	7.10	0.90	6	7.42	0.44
10	4	31	2.50	1.35	17	2.09	1.82	6	1.50	1.00
11	10	45	5.73	11.73	30	7.07	9.44	9	8.50	10.50
12	9	47	4.98	8.68	31	3.10	2.44	9	1.89	2.36
13	11	46	1.89	3.79	31	1.07	0.96	9	1.17	0.88
14	6	38	2.45	3.34	25	3.20	3.10	4	4.00	2.67
15	6	41	5.06	0.58	27	4.96	0.71	8	5.44	0.17
16	7	45	2.98	6.69	30	3.55	7.06	9	5.89	1.05
17	7	46	4.66	6.31	31	6.02	1.41	8	6.06	0.89
18	8	33	3.74	10.27	20	5.05	8.37	8	6.75	5.93
19	4	37	2.27	1.77	24	2.81	1.43	7	3.21	0.41
20	4	38	1.99	1.22	26	2.42	0.67	7	3.14	0.81
21	5	48	3.60	2.33	32	4.38	0.61	9	4.61	0.49
22	4	33	2.11	1.62	20	1.73	1.88	3	1.00	1.00
23	6	43	1.38	2.02	29	0.78	0.73	9	0.33	0.25
24	5	43	2.98	3.13	28	2.18	2.62	8	0.75	0.71
25	9	43	4.97	9.42	29	3.31	4.62	6	1.08	1.64
26	6	44	3.16	2.74	29	3.88	2.17	8	4.94	1.03
27	7	43	4.36	4.65	29	5.24	2.32	9	5.39	4.24
28	5	36	4.22	0.84	21	4.24	0.72	6	4.50	0.70
29	5	41	2.10	3.19	28	1.30	1.60	8	0.63	1.13
30	5	44	3.24	2.69	29	3.57	2.53	6	4.83	0.17
31	4	41	1.28	0.88	26	1.33	1.20	6	1.42	0.64
32	9	39	2.18	4.02	23	2.78	4.75	7	2.57	3.95
33	4	41	1.33	1.73	28	1.71	1.77	8	1.50	1.71
34	4	41	0.55	1.29	27	0.70	1.58	7	1.50	2.58
35	4	34	1.77	2.94	20	2.60	2.41	5	3.70	0.20
36	4	34	1.47	1.00	21	1.79	1.19	5	2.20	1.33
37	3	42	1.83	0.87	26	1.54	0.89	7	1.00	1.00
38	4	30	2.07	1.69	19	1.74	1.40	4	2.00	1.17
39	4	26	2.80	2.22	15	1.93	2.03	5	0.50	0.75
40	3	39	2.49	0.97	27	2.72	0.64	5	2.60	0.80

TABLE 2. Comparison of Variance

Ratio	Ratio of Non Aspirant Variance to Variance for Aspirants	
	ALL Scale Numbers	NON SOUTH Scale Numbers
A 10-1+	1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 30, 35	1, 3, 30, 35
B <10-1	2, 4, 9, 12, 13, 15, 16,	2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 15, 16,
≥ 1-1	17, 19, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 39	19, 23, 24, 25, 26, 39
C <2-1	10, 11, 14, 18, 20, 22,	4, 10, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18,
≥ 1-1	27, 28, 31, 32, 33, 38, 40	21, 22, 28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 38
D >1-1	34, 36, 37	11, 20, 27, 34, 36, 37, 40



scores of 5.0. Finally, Dimension 4, Federal Spending #1, was concerned with salaries for political officials in all three branches, increases in spending for international development and also domestic programs including mass transit, medicare and welfare. Six Senators had scores of 6.0 and 7.0, McCarthy and Muskie were not scored, but Hartke gave least support for increased spending with a score of 2.0.

Summarizing then, Jackson contrasted with the other aspirants on support for defense, space and military. Hartke and McCarthy did not support tax reform, Harris joining them specifically on subsidy and depletion reforms. Hartke also opposed increased federal spending. These deviations noted, the aspirant Senators voted with substantial similarity.

Our theory offers no basis for predicting what direction aspirants will take on the issues in comparison with other Senators. Inspection of the mean scale scores for the three groups of Senators, all nonaspirants, nonaspirants outside the South, and aspirants, does indicate order in the responses. The most common pattern is the one that occurs on Dimension 1, States Rights. The mean for all nonaspirants is 10.51, the lowest mean reported on that dimension. Nonaspirants from outside the South have a mean score of 14.79. The mean for the aspirants is highest at 16.50. While the scores and the closeness of the means vary from scale to scale, the order of the means for each of the three groups is in this pattern on 25 of the 40 scales. The opposite pattern describes nine of the 40 scales. For example, on Dimension 10, Financial Conservatism, aspirants are the least conservative and have the lowest mean score with 1.50. All nonaspirants have the highest mean score with 2.50, and the man for aspirants from outside the South falls between those of the other groups with 2.09. On the remaining six dimensions the order of the category means is irregular.

## DISCUSSION

We hypothesized that the aspirations of Democratic Senators, desirous of the Presidency, would be reflected in their legislative voting. We expected that the single national constituency would attract candidates with similar policy positions to seek the presidency. Nonaspirants, on the other hand, presumably would be voting in behalf of more parochial interests; responding to regional, state or substate demands, specific groups or their personal values. There would be more variance in their scale scores. The findings fit the theory fairly well.

On most of the issue dimensions, aspirants voted more similarly on the issues than nonaspirants, even when Southern Senators are excluded from the comparison. Referring back to Table 2, we note that the ratios comparing variance for these two sets of Senators are highest on Dimensions 1, 3, 30 and 35. These were certainly among the very controversial issues of the day.

Twenty of the roll calls in Dimension 1 dealt with school integration and bussing. Others dealt with direct election of the president and changing the filibuster rule. Implicit in these issues is the struggle for nationalizing American politics at the expense of states rights. Clearly the Democrats choosing a presidential nominee had little choice among the aspirants from the Senate. The aspirants' mean score on the dimension was nearly the maximum possible, clearly favoring nationalization.

Dimension 3, the Humanitarian Dimension includes measures placing high value on human dignity in and out of the United States — nonproliferation treaty, Youth Corps, restricting deployment of ABM's, providing a federal legal service program, improving school lunch food services. Many of these proposals were opposed by President Nixon, and there was substantial variance in Democrat voting, but the candidates were very similar and consistently for extending human dignity, as our dimension measures it. Despite the fact that these roll calls constitute a significant dimension of conflict among fellow partisans, there was not much choice among the candidates' positions on this dimension. The same point can be made about the Drug Control Dimension (#30). All the aspirants were high scorers on the dimensions favoring the removal of "no knock" warrants from the Dangerous Substances Act, limiting the Attorney General's authority relative to enforcement and easing penalties from marijuana enforcement. On Dimension 35, National Expenditures, the aspirants favored increased federal spending for urban problems in Washington, D.C., but less for foreign aid than recommended by the administration — in short, supporting a change in priorities by spending more on domestic problems and less on foreign aid.

Without a belabored discussion of more dimensions, the point here is to suggest that the development of consensus on the issues, often described as a function carried out by the political party,<sup>12</sup> is on many substantive issues largely anticipated by the aspirants. It remains true, of course, that differences of style and emphasis may emerge in the campaign which are not foreshadowed in the policy dimensions of Senate voting. Likewise, similar candidates may encourage divergent types (such as Wallace) to enter the fray. Looking at our data what impresses us about the aspirants from the Senate is their similarity on the dimensions rather than their differences. As explained above, the most "different" of the aspirants was Senator Jackson, who was widely and correctly regarded as more hawkish than the others. The major contenders, Kennedy, Muskie and McGovern, and two darkhorses, Bayh and Hughes, voted nearly alike on almost all the dimensions of Senate voting.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>12</sup>Marion D. Irish and James W. Prothro, *The Politics of American Democracy*, 5th ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1971). "Looking first at latent functions of national conventions for the parties themselves, the most important is the creation or ratification of party consensus." p. 313.

<sup>13</sup>Our respondents are a universe of Democratic Senators for a given time and we have categorized them into groups. Statistics for evaluating differences between samples have no application here. To satisfy our own curiosity, however, we compared the means of non-southern aspirants and non-aspirants with an F test, finding the differences significant at the .05 level on scales 5, 8, 12, 16, 24, 25, and 39.



Comparison of the mean scale scores for each category of Senators indicates that the aspirant group mean is only occasionally between the mean score for all nonaspirant Democrats and the mean for nonaspirants from outside the South. Aspirant scores are either high or low on 35 of the 40 scales. In several instances, the *differences are substantial*. The scales on which mean differences were substantial are scales which contain two kinds of issues — civil rights and tax reform. Let us quickly say that the differences occur only on seven scales and that more dimensions have civil rights and tax reform roll calls than these seven. Yet it is noteworthy that the aspirants exceed the support of their non-southern colleagues on these issues. The aspirants tended to be out in front of their party in their voting to equalize opportunities. On economic dimensions they sought to close tax loopholes and provide family assistance. In a voter appeal sense, the aspirants were nearly uniformly liberal, responding to or anticipating the interests of racial minorities and the poor.

On only five scales could the aspirants' mean scores be thought of as expressing a mediating position between the scores for southerners and non-southerners (#12, 32, 33, 38, and 40). In each instance, the means were similar among all three groups. None constituted a matter of conspicuous regional cleavage within the party. Despite the order of means, there is nothing about the issues to suggest that the aspirants in fact played or attempted to achieve for themselves a position between the southern and non-southern Senators.

No aspirant consistently distinguished his position from the others in a direction attractive to the South. Jackson's voting on military spending was like that of a number of southern Senators, but obviously he was more liberal than Southerners on matters of social welfare, civil rights and tax issues. On a range of issues, Hartke was more moderate than the other aspirants, but evidenced no particular "Southern strategy" on his overall voting record. McCarthy (who could not be placed on several dimensions because of non-participations) was not as liberal as most aspirants on tax reform, but his positions on most issues would not be attractive to the South.

Aspirants' scale scores indicate no subtle or varying strategies by individuals to appeal to a unique coalition of interests to advance to the presidency. Instead it would appear that most placed themselves on the issues in a way that would be generally acceptable to the presidential wing of the Democratic Party.<sup>14</sup> Shades of distinction between the candidates were created more by the styles of their campaigns than their voting records. If McGovern was more attractive to the young than Muskie, it was not because of differences in their Senate voting. We think ambitions for the Presidency help explain the similar-

<sup>14</sup>See James MacGregor Burns, *The Deadlock of Democracy: Four-Party Politics in America* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963, 1967), especially pp. 249-264.



ity of candidates' voting. It implies that they seek to satisfy or reflect a consensus perceived in the national electorate or their own party. The development of such a consensus and how aspirants read it go beyond the limits of our inquiry.

#### PREDICTIONS: GOING BEYOND OUR DATA

At this writing, nominations for President for 1976 have not been settled. Obviously, however, presidential aspirants from the Senate have fared badly in the proceedings. In the denouements of Agnew and Nixon, the previously untried vice presidential appointment process brought a U.S. House member to the presidency. The candidacies of others whose careers did not include national offices proved to be robust. The most consistent losers were Senate aspirants. Kennedy refused to run, and one by one Senators and former Senators fell by the wayside: Mondale, Muskie, Bayh, Bentson, Harris, Jackson, and Humphrey. Senator Church remains a darkhorse possibility, along with U.S. House aspirant Morris Udall. No Republican challenger arose from the Senate.

Although it is possible that the public mood that nourished the campaigns of Carter, Reagan and Brown may persist, and that their very success will stimulate ambitions and support for candidacies by more governors, we expect the Senate to be the most fertile soil for nurturing the aspirations of future presidential candidates. Moreover, the impressive support achieved by Jimmy Carter on a nationwide basis confirms our view that Southern aspirants can be viable presidential candidates when they disclaim the traditional Southern racial values. We think this aspect of Carter's campaign is of greater future significance than the fact that he is not a Senator. Senators, including those from the South, can be viable presidential aspirants, especially in the Democratic party. We expect them to be Senators who have voted for nationalizing public policy rather than for defending states' rights, for spending relatively more on domestic social problems than on foreign aid or military budgets, and for extending civil rights and equalizing economic opportunities for minorities and the poor. Chances are we have not seen the withering away of presidential aspirations among Senators such as Bayh, Church and Kennedy. Meanwhile others, including Stevenson, Tunney, Bumpers and Chiles, will not lightly foreswear candidacies because of the events that shaped the presidential campaign of 1976.

## APPENDIX A. The Forty Scalable Clusters

NAME	ISSUES	COEFFICIENT of REPRODUCIBILITY	NO. OF	
1.	States Rights	.972	34	Senate Rule 22, Direct election of President, civil rights, equal rights, busing, etc.
2.	Partisan Dimension	.972	39	Political contribution tax credit, equal time provision, fixing amount of money spent in electronic media in elections, minimum 5% income tax, etc.
3.	Humanitarian Dimension	.966	41	Nonproliferation treaty, ABM, Vietnam Policy, Youth Corp, Federal legal services, School Lunch Program, etc.
4.	Federal Spending #1	.971	9	Increase salaries for 3 branches of government, money for mass transit, medicaid and welfare spending, etc.
5.	Equal Rights	.969	14	Voting rights, manpower training, equal opportunities, etc.
6.	Economic & Welfare Spending	.964	22	Hill-Burton program, urban renewal, Head Start, Social Security, HEW health programs, etc.
7.	Human Rights	.967	24	Food stamps, OEO, local initiative program, child nutrition program, etc.
8.	Equal Rights or Equal Opportunities	.963	17	Philadelphia Plan, OEO appropriations, child Nutrition Act, etc.
9.	Federal Spending #2	.969	9	Urban renewal funds, health research spending, cost of John J. Kennedy Center, etc.
10.	Financial Conservatism	.977	4	Neighborhood Youth Corp., Social Security, UN building, etc.
11.	Anti-Military Expansionism	.968	16	Military spending and assistance, Cooper-Church Amendment, use of herbicides in Vietnam, etc.
12.	Civil Rights	.972	11	Voting rights, nomination of Haynesworth, Philadelphia Plan, School desegregation, etc.

13. Domestic Problems #1	.962	16	Consumer protection, postal reorganization, unemployment and manpower training, drug abuse, etc.
14. National Security	.976	6	Troop levels in Vietnam, military purchases, national security requirements, etc.
15. Domestic Problems #2	.965	6	Social Security Benefits, surtax extension, highway safety, etc.
16. Tax Reform	.955	8	Oil depletion allowance, minimum income tax, funding SST, etc.
17. National Security Spending	.967	10	Military procurement, Cooper-Church Amendment, etc.
18. Taxpayers Savings or Congressional Budget Austerity	.950	10	NASA Budget, space shuttle, military assistance, defense spending, etc.
19. Federal Salaries	.991	4	Salaries of federal employees and Vice President and certain members of Congress.
20. Human Needs	.980	4	OEO programs, Select Committee on Nutrition, etc.
21. Contemporary Reform	.979	6	Oil depletion, taxes, Social Security benefits, etc.
22. Protectionism	.970	5	Civil service, import restrictions, etc.
23. Reform #1	.956	6	Drug control, ecology, etc.
24. Reform #2	.973	6	Taxes, Family Assistance Plan, gun control, etc.
25. Civil Rights	.945	9	Equal employment opportunities, "Philadelphia Plan," desegregation of schools, etc.
26. Mass Society Problems	.958	8	Ecology, drug control, retirement benefits, etc.
27. Tax Reform #2	.954	7	Investment credit, tax loopholes, etc.
28. Public Health Problem	.970	5	Grants to medical schools, drug control, etc.
29. "Status Quo"	.962	5	Agricultural Price Supports, taxes, Vietnam war, etc.



30. Drug Control	.948	5	"Dangerous drugs," "no-knock" warrants, etc.
31. Public Reform	.990	4	Agricultural policy, taxes on cooperatives, Indian lands, etc.
32. Tax Subsidy Reform (gas & minerals)	.973	5	Oil, gas, precious metal, and mineral depletion allowance, etc.
33. Federal Spending & Retirement	.983	4	Appropriations, funding SST, and retirement for judges, etc.
34. Competitive Navy Repair Contracts	.988	5	Navy ship repair contracts.
35. National Expenditures (Foreign Aid & D.C.)	.959	4	Money for foreign aid and for D.C.
36. Rights and Privileges	.980	4	Protection of rights and privileges.
37. Newspaper Preservation	.988	4	Preservation of news- papers and anti-trust laws.
38. Reorganization Reform	.993	4	Postal reform, Con- gressional committee reform, etc.
39. Minority Rights	.965	4	Voting rights, unem- ployment compensation for migrant workers, etc.
40. Worker's Problems	.970	4	Railway strike, mine safety, etc.