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Solon Simmons

James R. Simmons

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Latent Classes within the American Electorate: A Reinterpretation of the Pew Center Typology

Solon Simmons
George Mason University

James R. Simmons
University of Wisconsin

In this paper we develop a new typology of the American electorate that takes the popularly recognized Pew Research Center typology as a point of departure. In place of the ad hoc clustering algorithms used to develop that typology, we use probability-based method often called Latent Class or Latent Profile Analysis to produce a new classification. This model-based approach improves on the existing clustering techniques and produces more reliable estimates of underlying group structures. We apply the technique to the Political Typology survey conducted by the Pew Center in 1999 and discover eight political types in that year. These eight types are projected into a two-dimension attitude space via multidimensional scaling techniques to reveal one issue dimension pitting domestic state power against military state power and the other pitting conservative cultural positions against system integrity positions.

There is a natural tension between concepts of quality and quantity. In the history of recent social science, this tension has played out in internecine squabbles between researchers dedicated to qualitative research and those dedicated to quantitative research. The key explanatory concept of the qualitative researcher has long been the type or category, while that for the quantitative researcher has long been the variable or trait. Reasons for this are partly sociological and partly logical. There is a verisimilitude, a natural and obvious descriptive utility, to a

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well-developed typology that is absent from a similarly competent estimation of a system of random variables. On the other hand a typology is often static and lacks the precision that one finds in statistical models of what the Sociologist Andrew Abbot following Herbert Blumer calls the "variables paradigm" (Abbott 1997).The advantages of ready interpretation has made a typological approach attractive to social theorists and has allowed typologies to capture the public imagination,[1] but the difficultly in quantifying types has made typology more of an exercise for the general intellectual than for the social scientist.

Over the past fifteen years, researchers at the Pew Center for the People and the Press have been developing a survey based political typology using a combination of factor analysis and clustering methods (Kohut 1999). This typology has been quite popular in various settings because it combines the natural appeal of a theory of types with the scientific authority of large-scale survey research and complicated statistical techniques. While the methods employed to produce the typology are competent and justified by the dominant approaches to multivariate statistics, such clustering methods are well known to produce unstable groupings with unknown theoretical status. Traditional clustering is as much art as science.

As early as 1950 (Lazarsfeld 1950; Lazarsfeld and Henry 1968), Paul Lazarsfeld introduced a way of thinking about types as latent classes that could be derived from manifest or observable survey items. Since then these methods have been developed and rendered practical for estimation by Goodman, Clogg, Hagenaars and others (Goodman 1974; Clogg 1981; Hagenaars and

[1] Think only of the Myers-Briggs personality classification. This system is currently used throughout industry in ways that the better studied "big five" system of latent traits probably will never be.

Halman 1989). Most recently, convenient and powerful estimation programs have been developed by Jeroen Vermunt and Bengt Muthen (Muthen 2002; Vermunt and Magidson 2002). In its current form, Lazarsfeld's Latent Structure analysis has evolved to incorporate many desirable specification options that make it a reasonable alternative to the clustering techniques employed in the Pew Political Typology. In particular, the Latent Class techniques make it possible to generate attitude profiles based on explicit models of the response items instead of relying on the somewhat ad hoc and unreliable features of traditional cluster methods, which employ similarities data and loosely justified algorithms, each of which is capable of producing a different agglomeration.

In this paper we first motivate the discussion by suggesting why an empirical social typology is desirable and then go on to develop a latent class/latent profile model of the Political Typology data collected by the center in its most recent thorough specification of the typology in 1999.[2] After developing the new typology we highlight some of the attractive properties of the latent class/latent profile solution as it is developed here and provide a theoretical interpretation of the findings. As part of this interpretation we project the classes into a two dimensional space via multidimensional scaling techniques which helps to imagine potential attitudinal coalitions of voters.

[2] The data for 1999 are attractive because this is the last major revision of the typology produced by the center and more items are offered for examination in 1999 than are in subsequent studies. In order to facilitate comparisons we have estimated a similar model for the political typology survey of 2000 as well. There are notable limitations for the 2000 data, which utilize a more restricted set of attitude items and do not contain demographic data for non-registered voters.

LATENT CLASS TYPOLOGIES

A latent class model is an explicit model of the data structure just as regression and factor analysis type models are. The model imposes a set of assumptions onto the distributions of the observable variables that be tested against the actual data. Rather than employing algorithms of unknowable conceptual status, the latent class models are estimated as are other statistical models. Parameters can be constrained manually which allows the researcher to control the definition of the type across groups and time. If the older definition does not fit the data well on the bases of probability theory, the older definition can be said to be invalid. In short the latent class approach allows for classification according to the legitimated approaches of statistical model building.

In Figure 1, a standard latent class model is represented. At the core of the latent class model is the insight of the classic factor model. The variable X in Figure 1 is a discrete an unobservable variable with an unknown number of nominal values. A set of observed indicators are related to one another through their association with the unobserved variable X, here called a latent class variable. As in the classic factor model, any association between the manifest variables is explained by this underlying discrete variable. While this takes the form of zero residual correlation between indicators in the factor model, it takes the form of conditional independence in the latent class model. In the standard latent class model the indicators A, B, C, D are understood to be observed and measured on a nominal or unordered scale.

Figure 1



What one actually observes in a data set are four manifest variables, A, B, C, D. The model is devised in such a way that the underlying unobserved variable is treated much the same way as are the observed variables. The basic justification of the method can be represented by considering the following probability statement of the process in Figure 1:

$$\pi_{IJKLT}^{ABCDX} = \pi(A_i \mid X_t)\pi(B_j \mid X_l)\pi(C_k \mid X_l)\pi(D_l \mid X_l)\pi X_t$$

In this representation the T classes of the discrete variable are not observed, but function as would any observed variable. However the X variable is unique in the model because, for example, $\pi(A_i \mid X_t) = \pi(A_i \mid B_j, X_t)$. This condition is called local independence and implies that A and B are independent conditional on X. In common English, this means that any association between the observed variables is "explained" by their common class membership much like observed correlations are explained by an underlying continuous trait in classic factor analysis.

From this basic insight many more complicated models have been formulated. Among the complications is the inclusion of ordered or continuous indicator variables. This version of the model is often called latent profile analysis. In addition, covariates can be added to the model that are understood as causes of group membership. This kind of specification follows the MIMC specification of latent trait models devised for the LISREL program. The resulting models provide a better fit for the data and help in the identification of the unobserved types.

DATA AND MODEL STRATEGY

Beginning in 1987, the Pew Center began its typology study, which continues to this day. The core questions used for the study have been fairly stable over time and appear in Appendix A below. In October 1999 there were 26 questions included that corresponded to 13 underlying concepts developed for the study. The original Pew study discovered eight underlying continuous traits lying behind these indicators and nine latent types plus one for those not registered lying behind these traits. They discovered these types using k-means cluster methods. After completing the process, the nine types were given names to capture the flavor of members who had been assigned to these categories. We propose to reclassify these respondents using a latent profile analysis with covariates.

The basic outline of the strategy is as follows. First we chose to examine only 24 of the 26 items of the question battery. The reason for this was that the last two questions, although important, were too timely or contextual to be considered stable features of an underlying type of person. A person may well run out of money, while not changing his or her attitude structure. In order to use the questions as variables a scaling strategy was necessary. For each question one of two opposing options was selected as preferred. Directly afterward the respondent was

asked if they felt strongly about this choice or not. The questions were rotated so that the default "Left" position was not always presented first and rotated too so that question order would not bias the results. For all 24 indicators, we have scored the strong "Right" position as a 5, the moderate-right position as a 4, the strong left position as a 1, and the moderate left position a 2. If neither or both was volunteered, this was scored as 3.[3] This procedure produced 24 five point scales.

From these scales we next created a simple sum of scores for the remaining 12 concepts, resulting in 12 basic indicators of core attitudes with values ranging from 2 to 10. This Sum-score method was necessary because we wished to exploit the distinctness of the 12 concepts by including them in the model as indicator variables. Including the 24 indicators separately was implausible given the nature of the model because there are strong correlations between the pairs of indicators that would not be explained away by the model; the local independence assumption would never fit the data well if we did not collapse each of the two cognate variables into a single indicator.[4] We have used the following names for the 12 attitudes used as indi-

[3] The "don't know"/"refusal" option has also been included as a 3. This does not substantially alter the model estimation and allows for scoring of the maximum number of respondents.

[4] It would also have been possible to draw factor score estimates from 12 distinct factor analyses for the 24 indicators. This would have been problematic because the factor model with two indicators is under-identified. This means that assumptions about the residual variances and loadings must be made that effectively limit the information one can draw from the model to that one can draw from a simple sum of scores. We also chose not to extract the eight factors from the 24 indicators that result from such an analysis of the indicators. Predicted values for these eight factors could have served as our indicators, but we would then lose the ready interpretations that were possible with the strategy pursued here. Such an analysis would be seen through a glass darkly twice over. A final option was suggested by Jeroen Vermunt. He suggested that we could perform the analysis with the 24 indictors while relaxing the local independence assumption between the similar pairs of indicators. This option will have to wait for another paper.

cators in the study: Federal Authority, Poverty, Racial Discrimination, World Community, Military, Power, Fair Opportunity, Corporate Power, Beltway Insiders, The Environment, National Optimism, Cultural Orthodoxy, Religion. These twelve indicators then serve as the elements of the profiles generated in this analysis. The types represent distinct combinations of these twelve stances and effectively constitute potential structures of feeling. Taking the model seriously, we must assume that the resulting profiles are stable states which demonstrate empirical systems of constraint among the basic attitudes measured here. In its strongest form, this means that a change in any one of the 12 attitudes implies corresponding changes in at least some of the remaining eleven.

The latent profile models were estimated using the program LatentGold 3.0. This program builds on the log-linear modeling framework and makes several features of estimation much more simple than was possible with earlier programs. Among the most important advances for purposes of this analysis were the inclusion of relevant background variables as covariates and the treatment of indicator variables as ordinal rather than as nominal or continuous. The background variables included in the estimation were party (3 category), race (2 category), Latino (2 category), gender (2 category), registered (2 category), south (2 category), urbanicity (4 category), income, education, and age (all continuous). The resulting models then incorporate information about how the types would differ in incidence across these background characteristics.[5]

[5] There is some debate about how to interpret the resulting models. While the implied structure suggests that the types are "regressed" on the background variables, the interpretation we take is that the background variables help in the estimation of the types. This may simply result from the advantages of over identification that the background variables provide (see Lubke and Muthen 2003).

RESULTS

Over the course of many estimations we have discovered that the best fit to the data is an eight class model that includes all of the background covariates described above. In each case, the model with fewer or more classes or without any of the background variables resulted in a poorer fit to the data. In order to make this claim we have relied on likelihood ratio tests as well as the Bayesian model selection indictor called BIC (Raftery 1995). This second method of model selection incorporates information about model uncertainty that is often ignored in standard statistical analysis. Effectively BIC helps to standardize the fit statistics that are drawn from the large number of models that a researcher is likely to produce in the course of testing many rival hypotheses on observational data. The model with the lowest BIC score is likely to fit the data better than all of the others with higher BIC scores. A sample of the test results are shown in Table 1.

Table 1

Model	Model 1 7-Cluster	Model 2 8-Cluster	Model 3 9-Cluster
LL	-85629.67	-85506.32	-85423.00
BIC(LL)	173442.10	173426.90	173491.80
Npar	264.	292.	320.
L^2	171003.5	170756.8	170590.2
Df	1.08E+15	1.08E+15	1.08E+15
p-value	1.	1.	1.
Class Error	0.26	0.29	0.29

As is clear in the table, the eight class model fits better than either the seven or nine class model. Adding a new class introduces 28 new parameters and improves the absolute fit of the model. The likelihood ratio test and BIC help to differentiate between a

model that fails to improve the fit of the model enough to justify the estimation of the extra parameters.

In addition to the model fit statistics presented in Table 1, the latent class model provides a means for the estimation of the reliability of the latent classes. The justification for this procedure is simple. Class assignment in this model is based on model posterior probability. That is to say that each respondent is assigned to the class for which the estimated posterior probability (derived from the model estimates) is highest. In all cases these probabilities fall between zero and one and in some cases the largest posterior probability can be quite low in absolute terms. Reliability estimates can then be generated by taking the average of these posterior probabilities for members of each class or type. These data can be read off the trace of a proximity matrix created by crossing the average posterior probability with the estimated modal class membership. These estimates appear in Table 2. The latent class names have been included in the table, and will be justified later in the paper.

Table 2
Reliability Estimates

	Reliability
Right-Wing Populists	0.70
Great Society Liberals	0.74
Liberal Drifters	0.71
Opportunity Liberals	0.68
Business Class	0.71
Religious Right	0.72
Hard Right	0.79
Progressives	0.81

These probabilities seem to be quite high in general. While there is no way to compare them directly with the sort of reliability measures that accompany most scales, the results compare favorably with general standards of reliability in the current factor analysis and scaling literatures.[6]

[6] An example is Cronbach's alpha, in which values of 0.8 or over are considered to be excellent scales.

THE TYPES DESCRIBED

Once the models are estimated, it is a simple matter to produce graphical profiles of the characteristics of the discovered types. These profiles are the basis of substantive interpretation of the types and are the source of whatever names the researcher would like to apply to them. The dominant profile for such an interpretation is the attitude structure of the types. The types are, in essence, representations and simplifications of these structures of feeling. They are what is ultimately explained by the typology which becomes a stand-in or replacement for the attitudes. The attitude structure of the types is presented in Figure 2. On the Y axis is plotted the group deviation in the number of scale points for a particular attitude score. Higher numbers represent an orientation toward the political Right and lower numbers represent an orientation toward the political Left. From these spectra of attitudes, it is possible to begin to interpret the underlying sensibility of the group's members. The names in the figure capture the authors' interpretation of the group spirit of the members of each type. Specific reasons for these naming choices are left to the reader to imagine. Many other names could be appropriate. It is important to say that the most distinctive attitudes seem to fall into four classes, race and poverty, corporations and optimism, culture and religion, and military and the environment. Varying combinations of these attributes helped to define the groups.

The attitude profiles are by design the most important discriminators of group composition. Nevertheless, it is helpful to flesh out these political types by examining other aspects as well. Sensibilities are nurtured in social environments that are, in turn, functions of individual backgrounds. Among the background characteristics examined here are demography (including race, Latino heritage, gender, political registration, and marital status), status variables (income in thousands of dollars, education, and

Figure 2



age in years), party identification (Republican, Democrat, Independent), and geography (South, Urbanicity). In some cases, a full picture of the group cannot be developed without the aid of these background characteristics.

Also of interest is the group size. The groups are listed in rough order of group size. Weighted estimates of the size of the groups are presented in Figure 2. There are four larger groups and four smaller groups presented here. While these group size numbers are important, experience with the model estimates suggests that group size parameters are volatile and actual group sizes may be somewhat different than these estimates portray. We now know which groups are most alike, but what are the characteristics that impel them to similarity?

Right-wing Populists. The Right Wing populists are white, male, low-income and rural political independents. These Americans are doubtful about the international community, suspicious of the power of the federal government and of beltway insiders, interested in curbing the power of corporations, wary of race-based equality measures and comfortable with the military. In general, they see the economic order as somewhat unfair, but take no strong stand on cultural or religious matters.

Great Society Liberals. The Great Society Liberals are overwhelmingly black, low-income, female, urban Democrats. This group is the strongest critic of the supposed American meritocracy. They are strong proponents of race based policies as well as of anti poverty measures. They do not believe that opportunity is fairly distributed, are critical of corporate power and are among the most pessimistic of Americans. On cultural matters they tend toward the Right, but take no strong position on the military or the environment.

Liberal Drifters. The Liberal Drifters are young, unmarried unregistered, suburban hard-core independents. They are drifters because they seem uncommitted to any of the society's major institutions. One imagines the liberal drifter reading Kurt Vonnegut and dismissing older bases of commitment as nothing more than "granfalloons." Nevertheless, Liberal Drifters feel strongly about culture, religion and the military on which they take a hard Left position. They are supportive of environmental controls and internationalism, but are center-right on race, poverty and federal authority issues. While they seem not be believe they are moderate in their skepticism and are not particularly distrustful of lawmakers or corporations and seem to have some faith in individual opportunity.

Opportunity Liberals. The Opportunity Liberals have more Latinos and women than one would expect, are of modest means and lean strongly Democratic. These Americans have faith in the

American system which extends to the establishment of a strong national government with active powers. In fact, it is only this strong commitment to federal authority and environmental regulation that qualifies them as liberal at all. An opportunity liberal has great trust in Washington lawmakers, a strong dose of religious piety, optimism and faith in the meritocracy and a distaste for race based policy. These citizens are moderate on issues regarding the military and corporations as well as on cultural issues in general.

Business Class. Members of the Business Class are extremely wealthy, white men, who are politically active Republicans. What most defines the business class is a fascination with power, whether it takes the form in the corporation or the military. Their optimism in the American system seems to match this lust for authority. The business class trusts the Washington establishment over which it has some control and is uncomfortable with minimal standards of human decency, which often prove to be expensive. While the group is more progressive in it cultural and religious values than other members of the Right, it demonstrates the strongest commitment to the international community of any group on the Right. This is probably commensurate with a vision of global opportunity shared by members of this group.

Religious Right. The Religious Right are older married folk from southern rural areas who tend to identify as Republican. If there is one issue that defines this group, it is tradition and group members see themselves as its defenders. Whether it is god or the family, members of this group are the farthest right of the eight. The Religious Right is somewhat pessimistic about America for what one supposes are concerns about "the culture" or "the liberal establishment," and the major institutions of that culture are held in generally low esteem. The Religious Right are mildly anti-government, anti-corporate, anti-World, and anti-Washington. They tend to side with the Right in their opposition

to programs concerned with Race, Poverty and the Environment as well.

Hard Right. The Hard Right are well-off, married men, who identify exclusively as Republicans, are registered in extreme numbers who tend not to live in cities. The hard right is one of the two clearly ideological groups in the electorate. On almost every issue they are in agreement with the strong right position. It is only on matters of religion and the international community that they take a moderate stand. The most extreme opposition is reserved for attitudes on the environment where this group is most out of step with the mainstream. If they ever side with the Left, it is in its critique of the Washington establishment of insulated and vested interests. One assumes that these are what they see as left-wing special interests.

Progressives. The counter-balance to the Hard Right are the Progressives. The Progressives are well-off, northern metro-area residents who marry in fewer numbers than average and who are committed Democrats. The profile of these Americans is very nearly the mirror image of the former group, but emphases differ. While the Hard Right stresses the environment, personal responsibility and abusive government, the Progressives stress the international community, and moral freedom. The progressives are quite moderate on the issue of corporate power and are fairly optimistic about America and its meritocracy. Progressives are even more committed to civil right and the war on poverty than are the Great Society Liberals and are the most anti-war and secular group of the bunch.

Even though the election of 2000 was over a year away from this survey, many respondents had developed voting intensions. Much of what appears here is obvious from the demographic descriptions, but there are a few surprises. The two groups that were most on the fence were the Right-wing Populists and the Liberal Drifters. The "Other" and "Don't Know" responses were

particularly high in those groups. Subsequent analysis of 2000 data suggests that these groups broke for Buchanan and Nader respectively in disproportionate numbers. Also of note is the fact proven reasonable by subsequent history that the four largest groups had the least well defined vote intentions in October 1999. While the heavily minority Great Society Liberals were leaning Democratic the rest were preparing to be erratic. The most certain of all of the groups were the progressives who most likely went on to combat the anti-corporate Nader movement in the last weeks of the campaign of 2000.

VISUALIZING COALITIONS

While it is possible to imagine how these groups might be related one to another and how they might combine under certain ideological conditions to form coalitions of voters. In order to visualize potential coalitions we have projected the classes into a two dimensional space using the ALSCAL multidimensional scaling technique on a matrix of differences between the eight groups.

To produce such a solution, we first generated a matrix of distance measures between the eight groups, measured as the Euclidian distance between groups in a twelve dimensional attitude space. This simply means that the distance between groups is measured as a function of the square of the distance between average group ratings on each of the twelve attitudes. Groups with similar attitudes will be close on such a scale and those with different attitudes will be distant. For purposes of estimation, the measurement level was treated as ordinal to improve the representation and the solution was limited to two dimensions for purposes of reliable estimation. The solution for the attitude proximities is presented in a biplot in Figure 2.

Figure 2 projects the eight latent groups into space with coordinates equal to their values in the two-dimensional MDS solution. These are represented in capital letters in the figure. In addition, each of the twelve attitude vectors have been mapped into the space by calculating the projection of each vector along the two MDS dimensions. The length of each vector varies as a function of the multiple correlation of the attitude item with MDS dimensions.

In Figure 2 we can see that the two dimensions are quite different in content. The abscissa seems to embody the main left-right dimension. On the right extreme is the hard right and on the left are the progressives. All six of the other groups fall somewhere in between. One might imagine that all groups right of zero are a natural Republican constituency and those left of zero are the Democratic constituency. If this is a fair characterization then the challenge on the left at the time was to energize the lackadaisical liberal drifter group and to appeal to the opportunity liberals.

The ordinate dimension separates the privileged classes from the various lower status groups, the great society liberals, right wing populists and the religious right. Progressives are almost exactly moderate on this dimension, but both parties face a challenge in finding the right balance here. For example, the elites on the right are clearly low on this dimension which embraces opportunity, corporate power and optimism, but key constituencies, like the religious right are high on the dimension. On the left, the great society liberals are high on the dimension, progressives are moderate and the other two groups are leaning toward the Republican side of the issue.

By drawing separating lines through this space, one can envision a variety of possible attitude coalitions that could be generated. One example is to respect only the first dimension that separates the four groups on the left from the four groups on the

right. In this view a right coalition brings together two populist groups and one business group to form its center. The hard right stands outside for its inordinate opposition to the environment, federal authority and poverty programs. These four groups amount to less than 47% of the electorate. This leaves the remaining 53% to the left coalition of liberal drifters, opportunity liberals, great society liberals and progressives. Unfortunately for the left coalition, one of its member groups, liberal drifters, is completely unengaged from politics and is unlikely to vote and another, opportunity liberals, though mobilized are only weakly attached to the Democrats. The only comparable weak attachment on the right is among the right-wing populists whose tendency towards racism, national interests and jingoism probably left them susceptible to conversion with Bush's tough rhetoric and subsequently the events of September 11, 2001. It is not surprising that in this environment, the country faced one of its closest elections in 2000.

Another way to envision the natural coalitions in the above results is to separate those on the top of the graph from those on the bottom. Then Great society liberals, right-wing populists and the religious right square off on progressives, liberal drifters, opportunity liberals, the business class and the hard right. What unites these otherwise distinct groups is a populist appeal in view of their left leaning attitudes on corporate power, availability of opportunity, and beltway insiders. Certainly no stable coalition can be made of such groups, but one can imagine that some of the volatility in recent elections comes down to this cross cutting tension. An interesting wrinkle is to confine the opposition on this dimension to the business class, opportunity liberals and liberal drifters, while excluding the extremist progressives and hard right groups. This produces the divide between three lower status and geographically marginalized groups and three groups whose

status and geography are more middle class in nature. Many other possibilities are reasonable as well.

DISCUSSION

In the preceding paper, we have developed a new political typology of the American electorate in October 1999 using a model-based estimation procedure called latent class/latent profile analysis. This approach bears a strong resemblance to factor analysis and can be understood as the discrete alternative to that method designed for modeling continuous latent variables. The eight types that were discovered in these data have quite distinctive attitude profiles, which when combined with demographic, political, social status and geographic data paint an interesting and novel picture of the American public. Many of the findings presented here are largely anticipated, others are perhaps less so.

While any typology drawn from data can be fertile ground for the imagination of pundits and scholars alike, imagination will be better served if the types are generated with the best and most reliable tools possible. Latent Class methods offer one of the best avenues toward the discrete classification of unobservable political states. The models presented here are merely an example of what could be done with them.

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APPENDIX A
PEW TYPOLOGY QUESTIONS

I'm going to read you some pairs of statements that will help us understand how you feel about a number of things. As I read each pair, tell me whether the FIRST statement or the SECOND statement comes closer to your own views—even if neither is exactly right. The first pair is...[READ AND ROTATE]. [AFTER CHOICE IS MADE, PROBE: Do you feel STRONGLY about that, or not?]

- Government is almost always wasteful and inefficient OR Government often does a better job than people give it credit for {6-97}
- Government regulation of business is necessary to protect the public interest OR Government regulation of business usually does more harm than good {10-96}
- Poor people today have it easy because they can get government benefits without doing anything in return OR Poor people have hard lives because government benefits don't go far enough to help them live decently {6-97}
- The government should do more to help needy Americans, even if it means going deeper into debt OR The government today can't afford to do much more to help the needy {10-96}
- The position of blacks in American society has improved in recent years OR There hasn't been much real progress for blacks in recent years {6-97}
- Racial discrimination is the main reason why many black people can't get ahead these days OR Blacks who can't get ahead in this country are mostly responsible for their own condition {10-97}
- Immigrants today strengthen our country because of their hard work and talents OR Immigrants today are a burden on our country because they take our jobs, housing and health care {10-97}

- Other countries generally treat the United States about as fairly as we treat them OR Other countries often take unfair advantage of the United States {7-94}
- The best way to ensure peace is through military strength OR Good diplomacy is the best way to ensure peace {10-96}
- We should all be willing to fight for our country, whether it is right or wrong OR It's acceptable to refuse to fight in a war you believe is morally wrong {10-96}
- Most people who want to get ahead can make it if they're willing to work hard OR Hard work and determination are no guarantee of success for most people {7-94}
- Success in life is pretty much determined by forces outside of our control OR Everyone has it in their own power to succeed {7-94}
- Too much power is concentrated in the hands of a few large companies OR The largest companies do NOT have too much power {10-96}
- Business corporations make too much profit OR Most corporations make a fair and reasonable amount of profit {6-97}
- Elected officials in Washington lose touch with the people pretty quickly OR Elected officials in Washington try hard to stay in touch with voters back home {10-96}
- Most elected officials care what people like me think OR Most elected officials don't care what people like me think {6-97}

Now I'm going to read you some more pairs of statements. As I read each pair, tell me whether the FIRST statement or the SECOND statement comes closer to your own views—even if neither is exactly right. The first pair is... (READ AND ROTATE) (AFTER CHOICE IS MADE, PROBE: Do you feel STRONGLY about that, or not?)

- This country should do whatever it takes to protect the environment OR This country has gone too far in its efforts to protect the environment {10-96}

- Stricter environmental laws and regulations cost too many jobs and hurt the economy OR Stricter environmental laws and regulations are worth the cost {10-96}
- There are no real limits to growth in this country today OR People in this country should learn to live with less {7-94}
- As Americans, we can always find ways to solve our problems and get what we want OR This country can't solve many of its important problems {7-94}
- Homosexuality is a way of life that should be accepted by society OR Homosexuality is a way of life that should be discouraged by society {10-97}
- Books that contain dangerous ideas should be banned from public school libraries OR Public school libraries should be allowed to carry any books they want {6-97}
- Religion is a very important part of my life OR Religion is not that important to me {new}
- We will all be called before God to answer for our sins OR I don't believe we will have to answer for our sins before God {6-97, modified}
- I'm generally satisfied with the way things are going for me financially OR I'm not very satisfied with my financial situation {10-96}
- I often don't have enough money to make ends meet OR Paying the bills is generally not a problem for me {7-94}