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Metropolitan Delegations in the U. S. House of Representatives

Erratum

The name of Professor Burton M. Atkins was inadvertently omitted from the . Table of Contents page of the original print issue of this journal, as confirmed in Erratum section on page iv of Volume 2, Number 2.

Metropolitan Delegations in the U. S. House of Representatives *

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Introduction

Social psychologists have long noted that the larger a group, the more complex are the patterns of interaction among its members¹ and that within these groups it is not unusual for informal subgroups to form which help to mediate and simplify these interactions. The United States House of Representatives is undeniably a large group (with a possible 94,395 dyadic relationships among its 435 members) which must act in certain formal patterns to accomplish its goals. It has been hypothesized that the structure of the House of Representatives is not a composite of the individual behavior of 435 isolated members, but rather that it is a network of many informal groups and relationships.² All that we know of group interaction and of state and federal legislatures would lead us to be certain of this.

The informal groups that form within the legislature serve many functions. Among these, information and communications services, norm setting, and protection in the form of security of numbers are probably the most important. It is well known that Congressmen have little time to research and make individual decisions on the many hundreds of pieces of legislation that come before their consideration each session. Thus the representative must rely upon some external source to offer

* This is a revised version of a paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, April 27-29, 1972.

The data utilized in this study were made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research. The data were supplied in partially proofed form and the Consortium bears no responsibility for either the analyses or interpretations presented here.

¹ John W. Thibaut and Harold H. Kelley, *The Social Psychology of Groups* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1959), pp. 191 ff.

² Alan Fiellin, "The Functions of Informal Groups in Legislative Institutions," *Journal of Politics*, 24 (February, 1962), pp. 90-91.

him cues as to how he should cast his votes.³ Informal groups may serve this purpose. In addition to his personal considerations of issues, another concern of most legislators is re-election.⁴ Thus the representative must constantly be aware of the reactions of his constituents.⁵ For this reason a legislator may feel safer voting with a group that he can trust and that his constituents are likely to consider an appropriate reference group. Stevens argued that such a group would be the Congressman's state party delegation.⁶ After all, Stevens argued, if the entire state party delegation voted one way on a bill, an individual congressman couldn't have been expected to reach a different decision. The notion of safety in numbers offers protection. A Congressman's constituents are less likely to fault him if he could indicate that he was not deviating from the pattern that a large and relevant group felt was the correct way to vote.

The structuring of a potentially disorganized world is a basic need for all men. Legislators, probably no more or less than other political decision-makers who are faced with a policy decision which might be implemented by several courses of action, must seek methods for coping with an environment which emits conflicting stimuli. Evidence suggests that legislators seek cues from appropriate reference groups which guide them throughout the often confusing maze of work.⁷ And, as we indicated above, the state party delegation seemingly is one of the most satisfactory reference groups.

The basis of the state party delegation as a source of decision-making cues stems from the perceived similarity between the individual congressman's policy preference and those of some other member or members. As a cue giving group, the state party delegation obviously satisfies a basic criterion in this regard. Since significant diversity exists within parties, the party label cannot always suffice as a source of cues. However, this diversity often disappears when the cue taking is reduced to the state level.

But so long as the cue theory is premised upon the perceived similarities between a congressman and some group to which he either aspires or belongs, there is reason to suspect that within delegations from states containing metropolitan areas, that the underlying similarity within the

³ Fiellin, pp. 72-91; Donald R. Matthews and James A. Stimson, "Decision Making by U. S. Representatives: A Preliminary Model," in S. Sidney Ulmer (ed.), *Political Decision-Making* (New York: Van Nostrand, 1970), pp. 14-43; Arthur G. Stevens, Jr., "The State Party Delegation and Decision-Making in the House of Representatives," mimeo, Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, 1969.

⁴ Stevens, p. 1.

⁵ Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," *American Political Science Review*; 57 (March, 1963), pp. 45-46.

⁶ Stevens, pp. 3-9.

⁷ Matthews and Stimson.

Congressman's own party may not be the strongest. Thus the question becomes one of the level of cue taking. Matthews and Stimson suggest that there are few groups that may offer most cues; the state party seems to be the most relevant for most congressmen. However, when a congressman is elected from a substantial metropolitan area whose delegation itself may be as large as a state party delegation in some smaller state, a metropolitan delegation may serve the same function as the state delegation. In other words, just as the party in Congress is too amorphous a group from which a legislator could take reliable cues, so too may the state party delegation itself be too varied, especially when a metropolitan or metropolitan party delegation may exist whose members share similar electoral problems.⁸

There are numerous states where metropolitan delegations are large enough to have formed their own informal groups. Several factors are present which would facilitate the formation of these informal groups. First, many of the issues considered in Congress are of particular importance to metropolitan areas. Second, the homogeneity of shared norms and attitudes is likely to be greater among representatives from metropolitan areas.⁹ Third, within large state delegations, a subgroup of small size might improve communications and allow for considerably more mutual trust among the Congressmen. Finally, if an individual is looking for security in numbers to alleviate the psychological pressures of policy decisions, he might well regard other metropolitan representatives as a more logical reference group than an entire, and more diverse, state delegation. However, for protection of this nature, the metropolitan group must be large enough to give the legislator the security he desires.

Most writers that have examined informal groups within the House of Representatives have examined either the committee structure or party delegations, including party delegations within a state delegation.¹⁰ If, however, what we have hypothesized is correct, an examination of metro-

⁸ *Ibid.* These authors recognize this possibility. Their state party delegation in some cases are broken into smaller units, e.g., in New York City and Upstate New York.

⁹ Samuel C. Patterson, "Patterns of Interpersonal Relations in a State Legislative Group: The Wisconsin Assembly," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 23 (Spring 1959), pp. 101-109.

¹⁰ David B. Truman, "The State Delegations and the Structure of Party Voting in the United States House of Representatives," *American Political Science Review*, 50 (December 1956), pp. 1023-45; John H. Kessel, "The Washington Congressional Delegation," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 8 (February 1964), pp. 1-21; Matthews and Stimson; Barbara Deckard, "State Party Delegations in the U. S. House of Representatives—A Comparative Study of Group Cohesion," *Journal of Politics*, 34 (February 1972), pp. 199-222; Charles S. Bullock, III, "The Influence of State Party Delegations on House Committee Assignments," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 15 (August, 1971), pp. 525-546.

politan delegations should indicate that some characteristics of an informal group exists.

Though group characteristics are indicated in numerous ways, and possibly the best way of getting at group interaction would be through interviews or by unobtrusively following legislators around day after day to record their interactions and conversations, we are often limited to indirect measures of group interaction and cohesion. One such method is to examine voting data for clustering of votes. Fiellin indicated in his study of the New York State Democratic Party delegation that there was conscious bloc voting on occasion.¹¹ Logrolling has been discussed by numerous political scientists in other situations as well.¹²

While it is not necessarily true that similar voting patterns are certain to have developed through direct or indirect interaction, it is likely that interaction either aids the voting pattern or that individuals who vote similarly (and therefore think similarly, have similar constituency, or shared attitudes), are likely to eventually begin to interact.¹³ It is true that analysis of roll call votes provide only partial information that could positively identify a group. However, despite the numerous problems of using roll call votes for this purpose, Stevens has concluded that it is possible to identify informal groups through the utilization of the roll call.¹⁴

The Problem

Stevens has already established that state party delegations tend to bloc together at a level higher than might be expected by chance. We decided to inspect metropolitan delegations within these state delegations to the United States House of Representatives. There are only seven states that have a delegation from any single metropolitan area that exceeds five members. We felt, for the following reasons, that it was necessary to examine only metropolitan delegations of five members or more. First, a group must reach a certain size before it can perform any of the functions that make its being meaningful. Five members appeared to make some sense. The arbitrary selection of five as a cutoff point also meant that we were likely to be able to look at metropolitan *party* delegations as well as entire metropolitan delegations. Finally, for methodological reasons that will be discussed at a later point, when we were

¹¹ Fiellin, pp. 84-88.

¹² See particularly James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, *The Calculus of Consent* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962), part III; also William C. Mitchell, *Public Choice in America* (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1971), pp. 123 ff. and p. 288 ff.

¹³ Thibaut and Kelley, Chapters 5 and 11; Patterson.

¹⁴ Stevens, p. 36.

examining the patterns of bloc voting, we wanted a large enough group so that we might be able to systematically exclude a certain percentage of each delegation. If our metropolitan delegations had been smaller than five, this would have been difficult to do. There were seven states that contained metropolitan delegations of at least five congressmen: California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania.¹⁵

The first proposition that interested us was whether or not the metropolitan delegations exhibited more cohesion than state delegations of which they were a part. Secondly, we were interested in whether the metropolitan *party* delegations had more cohesion than the state *party* delegations.

Method

In performing a roll call analysis one has several options in choosing a technique. We were interested in finding out whether a metropolitan delegation, within a state delegation, voted together more frequently than did the state delegation as a whole. Thus we sought a method that would allow us to process our data on a state by state basis, and within the state allow us to follow the patterns for forming (or dissolving) voting blocs. An hierarchial clustering scheme developed by Stephen Johnson appeared to be the most appropriate.¹⁶ This method of clustering begins from a matrix of proximities that (in this specific case) relate all legislators to each other. The first step, then, involved the construction of an Index of Agreement (IA) between each pair of legislators within a state delegation. The resulting IA matrix could then be subjected to a hierarchical cluster analysis. In a relatively small state delegation of 12 representatives there would be 66 different IA's. In a larger state delegation of 40 representatives, this would involve the calculation of 780 IA's. Each IA was calculated using the formula F/T where F is equal to the number of times the two legislators either both voted for or both voted against a bill and T is equal to the number of times that both legislators voted on a bill.¹⁷ All votes on which either one of the legislators was absent or was not recorded was excluded from consideration. The IA is thus a simple proportion of agreements between the two

¹⁵ California: Los Angeles and San Francisco; Illinois: Chicago; Massachusetts: Boston; Michigan: Detroit; New Jersey: New York City Metro area; New York: New York City; Pennsylvania: Philadelphia.

¹⁶ Stephen C. Johnson, "Hierarchical Clustering Schemes," *Psycho-metrika*, 32 (September, 1971), pp. 241-254.

¹⁷ See discussion of measures of interpersonal agreement in Lee F. Anderson, *et al.*, *Legislative Roll Call Analysis* (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 40 ff; By vote we also mean publically announced or paired.)

legislators. Once this IA matrix is obtained, one needs to begin clustering those individuals with high indices of agreement together in a systematic form.

The hierarchical clustering technique does just this. It begins by assuming that there are the same number of clusters as there are (in this case) legislators. If we are working with a delegation of 12 legislators and each legislator forms his own cluster, we have 12 clusters. An examination of the IA scores is then carried out in order to seek the point of highest inter-agreement where two (or more) legislators might be joined together. This conceivably could occur between more than a single pair of legislators simultaneously, though it usually does not. That is, Legislator A and Legislator D might agree 96.8% of the time, and Legislator C and Legislator G might also agree 96.8% of the time. If this occurs, at the next level the number of clusters might be reduced from an original 12 to 10 clusters. Each of eight legislators remain separate, i.e., they form an isolated cluster. Legislators A and D form the ninth cluster and Legislators C and G form the tenth cluster. One then again searches for the next highest level where either a new cluster might be formed between isolated legislators, or where an isolated legislator might be added to another group cluster. This process of continuing to seek the next lowest point of agreement where the clusters may be enlarged continues until the point is reached where the entire state delegation is in one cluster. This may be reached at 0.0% level of agreement, or in some cases at a positive level of agreement. Johnson's algorithm allows one to observe the exact pattern of blocking from isolated legislators through the clustering of the entire state delegation. One can easily observe who blocs with whom and in what order, as well as at exactly what level each cluster formation takes place. We have included a sample output cluster diagram from the OSIRIS program HICLSTR, which utilizes Johnson's algorithm.¹⁸ This example may make the process from beginning to end more simply understood.

Figure 1 is the result of processing the IA matrix presented in Table 1 in the fashion just described. There were 18 Congressional districts in Michigan during the 86th Congress. At the top of the plot each district forms its own cluster. Obviously, at this level there will always be 100% interagreement, as each legislator is isolated with only his own votes. The program then locates the legislators that clustered together at the highest level of interagreement. These were the Congressmen from Districts 16 and 17. They were connected in the plot.

¹⁸ Inter-University Consortium for Political Research, *OSIRIS II: OS USERS Manual* (Ann Arbor; 1971), pp. 409-414.

18	•	•	•	•	•	X	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
17	•	•	•	•	•	XXXXXX	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
16	•	•	XXXXXX	•	XXXXXX	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
15	•	XXXXXXXXXXXX	•	XXXXXX	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
14	•	XXXXXXXXXXXX	•	XXXXXX	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	XXXXXX	•	•	•	•	•	•
13	•	XXXXXXXXXXXX	•	XXXXXX	•	•	XXXXXX	•	•	•	•	XXXXXX	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
12	•	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXX	•	•	XXXXXX	•	•	•	•	•	XXXXXX	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
11	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXX	•	•	XXXXXX	•	•	•	•	•	•	XXXXXX	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
10	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	•	•	XXXXXX	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	XXXXXX	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
9	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	•	•	XXXXXXXXXXXX	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	XXXXXX	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
8	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXX	•	•	XXXXXX	•	•	•	•	•	XXXXXX	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
7	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	•	•	XXXXXX	•	•	•	•	•	XXXXXX	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
6	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXX	•	•	XXXXXX	XXXXXX	XXXXXX	•	•	•	XXXXXX	XXXXXX	•	•	•	•	•	•
5	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	•	•	XXXXXX	XXXXXX	XXXXXX	•	•	•	XXXXXX	XXXXXX	•	•	•	•	•	•
4	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXX	XXXXXX	•	•	XXXXXX	XXXXXX	•	•	•	XXXXXX	XXXXXX	•	•	•	•	•	•
3	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXX	XXXXXX	•	•	XXXXXX	XXXXXX	•	•	•	XXXXXX	XXXXXX	•	•	•	•	•	•
2	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	•	•	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	•	•	•	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	•	•	•	•	•	•
1	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	•	•	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	•	•	•	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	•	•	•	•	•	•

Dist. #	1	7	13	15	14	16	17	2	10	5	9	6	8	18	3	4	11	12
Party	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R
	M		M	M	M	M	M							M				

D = Democrat.
 R = Republican.
 M = Detroit Metropolitan Area.

The total number of clusters is reduced to seventeen. Sixteen clusters are still isolated legislators and one cluster now contains two legislators. In Table 2 we see that the level of interagreement for the cluster formed when there were seventeen clusters in 94.2%. The program then seeks another cluster. This time the Congressmen from Districts 13 and 15 are joined at the 92.9% interagreement level (see Table 2) which reduces the number of clusters to sixteen. The program then finds that the Congressman from District 7 is in agreement with both members of a previous cluster at 91.1% and thus he is added to the cluster of legislators 13 and 15. We may follow the formation of clusters through the entire state delegation, observing the order and level at which clusters form.

TABLE 2. Interagreement Level for Formation of Clusters
Michigan Delegation to the U. S. House of Representatives, 86th Congress

<i># of Clusters</i>	<i>Level of Agreement</i>
18	...
17	.942
16	.929
15	.911
14	.906
13	.901
12	.896
11	.882
10	.867
9	.858
8	.838
7	.797
6	.794
5	.763
4	.735
3	.628
2	.531
1	.229

The Analysis

In addition to spreading our analysis over a relatively broad geographical base, we also examined clusters for each of seven Congresses. The Congresses examined were the 84th through 90th. Thus, if we found that metropolitan delegations do form informal voting groups, we also would be able to see if these groups exist over time.

Our first and most basic question was whether metropolitan delegations tended to vote together more often than did entire state delegations. To ascertain this we compared the blocking levels of the metropolitan representatives within a state with those of the state delegation as a whole for each metropolitan area and each session of Congress. However, we were presented with one difficulty. It was impossible for

any subgroup of a total state delegation to bloc at a level lower than the entire delegation. The intergroup level of the metropolitan and the state delegation may, however, be equal. Thus we decided that though we did want to examine the blocking level for 100% of each group, we would also see at what point three quarters of each group agreed. By choosing to look at the level of agreement at which 75% of each group blocked, we were allowing at least one representative to be systematically discarded from most subgroups. Thus, it was now possible to have subgroups of a state delegation, e.g., metropolitan delegations, bloc at a lower level of agreement than the state delegation. Our procedure was to locate the point at which the entire state delegation blocked. We then compared that with the point at which the entire metropolitan delegation blocked. We also located the point at which three-quarters of the members of the state delegation blocked and compared that to the level where three-quarters of the metropolitan delegation blocked. If there were twenty representatives in the state delegation we would seek the level of agreement for all twenty, then for only fifteen. If within the delegation of twenty, there were eight metropolitan representatives, we would seek the level where all eight blocked, then we would seek the level where six of the eight blocked. Our results are exhibited in Table 3.

For each state and for each group there is a possibility of four entries in Table 3. For instance, if we examine New Jersey for a comparison of metropolitan republicans to the state republicans (with 75% of the delegates considered), we can see the four entries. The upper left portion of the cell indicates that in two cases the metropolitan delegation formed a bloc at a greater IA level than the corresponding state delegation. The lower left portion of the cell indicates that the metropolitan delegation formed a bloc one time at a lower level than the corresponding state delegation. The lower right portion of the cell indicates in three years the metropolitan delegation formed a bloc at the same IA level as the corresponding state delegation. Finally, the upper right portion of each cell indicates the number of years for which there was no metropolitan delegation large enough to analyze. Zero entries were omitted from the table.

When all cases are examined only in two of the eight metropolitan areas and in only one Congress each, did the metropolitan delegation bloc higher than the entire state delegation. However, when we examined levels of agreement for three quarters of the representatives, we found that in almost half of the cases the level of agreement for the metropolitan delegations was higher over the seven Congresses and eight

TABLE 3. Summary for the 84th Through the 90th Congress of the Number of Times a Metropolitan Subgroup Forms a Bloc at an IA Level That Is Greater Than, Equal To or Less Than Its Corresponding State Delegation

	Total	Calif. (L. A.)	Calif. (S. F.)	Ill.	Mass.	Mich.	N. J.	N. Y.	Penn.
<i>All Delegates in Group</i>									
metropolitan/state	2g — 54e	— — 7e	— — 7e	— — 7e	— — 7e	1g — 6e	— — 7e	— — 7e	1g — 6e
metro dems/state dems	15g — 41e	4g — 3e	4g — 3e	1g — 6e	— — 7e	— — 7e	2g — 5e	— — 7e	4g — 3e
metro reps/state reps	18g 13N — 25e	2g — 5e	3g — 4e	5g — 2e	2g 5N — —	— 7N — —	3g 1N — 3e	1g — 6e	2g — 5e
<i>75% Delegates in Group</i>									
metropolitan/state	23g 1L 32e	2g — 5e	— — 7e	5g — 2e	3g 1L 3e	7g — —	2g — 5e	2g — 5e	2g — 5e
metro dems/state dems	24g 7L 25e	3g — 4e	4g 1L 2e	4g — 3e	1g 2L 4e	1g 2L 4e	4g 2L 1e	3g — 4e	4g — 3e
metro reps/state reps	19G 13N 4L 20e	3g 1L 3e	4g 1L 2e	4g — 3e	2g 5N — —	— 7N — —	2g 1N 1L 3e	3g — 4e	1g 1L 5e

g = Metropolitan Delegation blocked at a greater IA level than corresponding state delegation.
 e = Metropolitan Delegation blocked at the same IA level as the corresponding state delegation.
 L = Metropolitan Delegation blocked at a lower IA level than the corresponding state delegation.
 N = Metropolitan Delegations large enough to analyze were non-existent.

metropolitan areas than for the state delegation. Not only did twenty-three metropolitan delegations bloc at a higher level than the state delegation, but only one metropolitan delegation had a lower level of agreement than the state delegation. For the remainder of the cases the level of agreement for the state and the metropolitan delegations was equal.

As we have previously noted, party is quite obviously a factor in achieving agreement. This was apparent in the cluster diagrams that we obtained. For most of our clusters, party was as clear a determinant as it is in the example in Figure 1. For this reason we compared each metropolitan *party* delegation with each state *party* delegation. There is an increase in the proportionate number of metropolitan groups that bloc at a higher level than the state party delegations. It should be noted that in only one case does any metropolitan delegation cluster at a level lower than the entire state delegation. Similarly, few metropolitan party delegations cluster lower than a state party delegation. Of course, where we are examining the level of agreement for 100% of the representatives of a group (first three rows in table 3) that would be impossible, but for the remainder of the cases there is nothing that would prevent or hamper a metropolitan delegation from having agreement levels lower than a state delegation. There appears to be little question that metropolitan delegations have some affinity. They do bloc together at levels higher than the entire delegation.

Since the linkage between a Congressman and the state party delegation stems from perceived similarities between the group and the individual so that reliable communicative and socialization cues can be taken, we investigated whether or not the metropolitan *party* delegation might serve a comparable function. Our findings indicate that when 75% of the delegation is examined, (1) there was higher inter-agreement rates among the metropolitan Congressman than among the state delegation; and (2) that when we control for party we find the same, that the metropolitan party delegations bloc at a higher level than the state party delegation.

These findings tentatively support our hypothesis concerning the significance of the metropolitan delegations. Yet, it is difficult to assess the importance of roll call vote analysis without other supportive evidence, although it should be pointed out that other studies have indicated that informal groups do tend to bloc vote.¹⁹ There are also logical reasons for expecting, especially in large state delegations, metropolitan delegations to form informal groups. The exhibition that the bloc voting

¹⁹ Feillin; Stevens.

does exist is certainly a strong indication that metropolitan grouping does exist. As our urban areas grow larger and larger and as more of the domestic problems that the American government faces directly concerns the metropolitan areas, it makes sense to seek out additional evidence of cooperation within state delegations of metropolitan Congressmen. One path of investigation that should aid us in ascertaining the strength of and motivation for metropolitan voting groups would be to study the voting activity of the metropolitan delegations on certain limited subject areas. For instance, one might expect a metropolitan delegation to bloc more closely on votes dealing with welfare or urban policy. However, if we were to discover that the metropolitan delegates bloc heavily on, for instance, foreign policy, this would give us some clues that the motivating factors were not necessarily issues that affected their constituency. It may be that this cooperation and informal grouping is not just for single metropolis' but from urban areas located throughout a state. There may also exist evidence of coalitions between metropolitan delegations across state lines. Evidence of bloc voting can provide only inferential evidence. To gather further proof will take extensive examination by scholars with knowledge of the varied state delegations. In addition, we also need evidence gathered in a manner that will allow examination of motivation, as well as action, such as survey instruments might afford.