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Tocqueville's Typology and the Causes of the Cuban Revolution

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I. INTRODUCTION

The France in which Tocqueville lived was one of extreme political instability. The Revolution had ended the *Ancien Regime*, but neither it nor any of the subsequent revolutions of the 19th Century were able to bring order to the political life of the country. To Tocqueville it was only one continuous process which manifested itself in periods of intense activity broken by intervals of relative calm. He believed it to be the efforts of the French Nation in producing a democratic political system.

This process of democratization was not only to be found in France; Tocqueville believed that it could be discerned all across the continent. Revolutionary activities and events were evidence of the process; as the old institutions were destroyed to make way for the new, Europe was moving toward an era of democracy.

In order to acquaint man with the nature of revolution, Tocqueville began to reflect and write upon the subject, especially as it pertained to the French situation. His major effort was to be an analysis of the French Revolution from its inception to his then contemporary period. He was able to finish one volume in this series before his health failed him; he died shortly thereafter, never completing the work.

The one volume on the Revolution of 1789 which he did finish has been given various titles by the translators; it will be referred to in this paper as the *Ancien Regime*. This book concerned itself with the nature of French institutions prior to 1789 and the beginning of the French Revolution. In addition to this book, Tocqueville's *Recollections* also deals with revolution; here the subject is the Revolution of 1848. From these two books can be drawn Tocqueville's theories or ideas as to how and why a revolution occurs, the only result of his study which he was able to present to the people.

He ordered his ideas as to the causes of revolution in a typology which he presented in his *Recollections*.¹ It is never really mentioned in

¹ Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Recollections of Alexis de Tocqueville*, translated by Alexander Terxeriz de Maltos (Morningside Heights, New York: Columbia University Press, 1949), p. 64.

the *Ancien Regime*, but his approach is one which utilizes the typology presented in his earlier work. This framework set forth five major factors which were important in producing a revolution: the nature of a country's institutions (political, social, and economic), the nature of a country's *mouers* (its cultural essence), antecedent facts, the state of mind of a people, and chance. If social conditions were chaotic or "out of balance" when one considered the nation's institutions, *mouers*, or state of mind, then revolution would be a probable eventuality. Chance and antecedent fact were supplementary in that they added to but did not cause a revolutionary setting.

Tocqueville applied this framework to the French Revolution of 1789 and brought some understanding as to how and why this revolution came about. The purpose of this paper is to test Tocqueville's typology as a revolutionary frame of reference by using it to study the recent Cuban experience. Each of the five factors will be explained and then applied to the Cuban Revolution. An evaluation will then be attempted to determine if Tocqueville's typology is applicable and useful in explaining the Cuban Revolution.

II. THE NATURE OF CUBA'S INSTITUTIONS

Tocqueville viewed the nature of a country's institutions—political, social, and economic—as the foremost determinant of revolutions.² He believed that a close relationship normally existed between the social and political institutions. This relationship was a kind of balance in which an elite occupied the top strata of both the political and social hierarchies. This was an aristocratic notion in that he regarded this class as an elite, but it was not to be an aristocracy based upon tradition or birth. It was to be composed of those who qualified according to power, ability, and the predisposition to use these two qualities in leading the people. This elite enjoyed social privileges commensurate with its social rank, but it paid for these privileges by serving the people as their political head. The enjoyment of privilege was intolerable if those who were privileged served no useful social or political functions, and a new and cross-referenceable elite would be created through revolution if it could not be created peacefully.

Batista's government was characterized not by the fact that the social elite participated in it, but by the fact that the government was Batista. This condition was the product not only of the coup in 1952, but also of the very nature of Cuban political history. Federico Gil has

² Melvin Richter, "Tocqueville's Contributions To the Theory of Revolution", *Revolution: Nomos VIII*, edited by Carl J. Friedrich (New York: Atherton Press, 1966), p. 77.

said that the condition of government in Cuba was the product of her political heritage, the temperament of her people, the lack of civic training, and the apathy and absenteeism of the most capable and best qualified of the citizenry; as a result politics went by default to the corrupt and inept.³ The social elite had abdicated its political position, and ambitious politicians had filled the void with themselves. Batista would be included in this list of ambitious men.

While it can be said that the Batista government was absolutist in that one man held dictatorial power to which all others were subject, it was still a government which reacted to some pressures. Batista knew that it would be extremely difficult to hold power without some legitimizing support, and in order to provide this legitimacy, he created a political party called the Progressive Action Coalition shortly after his 1952 *cuartelazo*. In addition, he allied himself with such groups as the Church hierarchy, labor, and business, and he also maintained a *modus vivendi* with some groups which normally would have been highly opposed to his government, such as the Cuban Communist Party. His main source of support continued to be the army, however. In return for their support, these various groups received satisfaction of their separate interests, a situation which forced Batista to consider their wishes.⁴

While Batista's actions might have been based in part on popular pressures or the particular interests of his supporters, he was still a dictator; what he decreed was what the government enforced. Such a form of government violated the principle set forth by Tocqueville when he spoke of the need for an elite which paid for its privileges by using its superior ability to lead the people. The social elite, either because of Batista or its own unwillingness or incapacity, did not govern. This discrepancy demanded adjustment, but Batista's regime was one in which there could be no real inclusion of anyone else. The only access one could have to the decision-making process was indirect and subject to Batista's discretion. As Tocqueville believed it would, this led to resentments and revolutionary pressures. The social and political elites were not one, nor could there be any real movement toward this end while Batista remained in power.

Apart from the political aspects of Tocqueville's concept of an elite, one finds that the society and its structure offered little mobility, a necessary factor if the aristocracy was to be composed of only those who served useful social functions. The society was divided into an upper

³ Federico Gil, "Antecedents of the Cuban Revolution," *The Centennial Review*, VI (Summer, 1962), p. 373.

⁴ Rufo Lopez-Fresquet, *My Fourteen Months With Castro* (New York: World Publishing Company, 1966), pp. 14, 18 and 22.

and lower class whose boundaries were determined according to cultural and functional characteristics. Possibly the main social determinant was a consideration made as to one's economic function: those who performed menial tasks were members of the lower class and those who hired others to perform these tasks were members of the upper class.⁵ It was extremely difficult for a member of the lower class to reach a position where he no longer had to perform menial tasks, but even if he did, he had his aspirations blocked by cultural barriers such as education, tastes, birth, and other considerations.

There was a middle-class which could be determined on the basis of economic criteria, but it was almost non-existent as a social class. It had no real sense of self-identification except possibly in the form of deeply felt resentments produced by its frustrations. It was found almost exclusively in the urban areas, and it was composed of salaried and skilled workers with some education, and of small shop-owners and other small-scale self-employed individuals.⁶ It had moderate economic resources, but it aspired to be a part of the upper class, an aspiration that was usually thwarted.

Politically and socially, then, there were individuals who were frustrated in their attempts to secure greater political power or social prestige; this was done without regard to their qualities or abilities. These imbalances and frustrations produced, according to Tocqueville's typology, a revolutionary setting in Cuba.

The economy and its strengths or weaknesses is the last consideration found under the heading of the nature of a country's institutions. Tocqueville was a pioneer in hypothesizing that economics and politics were related.⁷ He believed that if an economy were not able to meet the needs of the people, then the people would seek change in the economic system; if peaceful change were not forthcoming, then they would turn to revolutionary change, and this meant political upheaval.

The economic needs of the people might range from subsistence to continued prosperity, depending on their aspirations. What the people determined as their needs did not matter so much as that these perceived needs be met.

The Cuban economy was based on a monoculture—the growing and processing of sugar. Cuba was self-sufficient neither agriculturally nor industrially. To pay for large amounts of imports, she depended on the sale of her sugar crop in the world market, and especially in the

⁵ Wyatt MacGaffey and Clifford R. Barnett, *Cuba: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture* (New Haven, Connecticut: Human Relations Area Files Press, 1962), p. 38.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

⁷ Melvin Richter, p. 120.

United States. Cuba's demand for imports rose, as did the prices paid for these imports, in the period from 1920 until 1959, but the income Cuba received from her sugar crop remained about the same (her share of the world sugar market dropped, but rising sugar prices prevented an absolute decline in income from sugar sales).⁸ This left Cuba with a balance of payments deficit and a seriously threatened economy.

Diversification was needed to enable the Cuban economy to approach self-sufficiency or at least a position from which it could pay for its imports. Approximately two-thirds of the Cuban economy was tied in some way to the sugar crop,⁹ however, and the Cuban sugar crop had a strangle-hold on the available capital needed to fund industrial diversification.¹⁰ The rate of foreign investment in Cuba was not sufficient to provide the funds necessary for diversification, and the need for domestic investment was made chronic. Since the sugar-growers opposed this, there was relatively little investment made in domestic industry, and the economy of Cuba stagnated.

The most immediate failure of the economy to meet the needs of the people lay not in the way in which income was produced, however, but in the manner in which it was distributed. The upper-class was wealthy, and it became wealthier year by year. The lower-class was poor, and it would seem that it became poorer year by year. The per capita income in Cuba was one of the highest in Latin America, but many were extremely poor.¹¹

The rural working-class in 1959 lived under abominable conditions. Their work was for the most part seasonal; the sugar crop utilized their services for about five months of each year. For this they were paid a per capita income of \$91.00 per year. This salary enabled them to live in an environment in which eleven percent drank milk, four percent ate meat, forty percent had tuberculosis or intestinal parasites, less than three percent had running water in their homes, and most lived in dirt-floored huts or shacks without electricity. These figures are made more startling when it is revealed that they represent not only the peasants, but all, including the rich, who lived in the rural areas.¹² The plight of the sugar-worker was one which could engender deep resentments regarding the economic system.

Those who left the rural areas to find work in the cities fared little better, if not worse. The *Condereracion de Trabajadores de Cuba* had

⁸ Wyatt MacGaffey, p. 11.

⁹ Nicolas Rivero, *Castro's Cuba, An American Dilemma* (Washington, D. C.: Luce, 1962), p. 74.

¹⁰ Hugh Thomas, "Origins of the Cuban Revolution," *The World Today*, XIX (October, 1963), p. 452.

¹¹ Lopez-Fresquet, p. 24.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 10.

worked for years to better the conditions of the *employed* laborer. Because of its political importance, it had been relatively successful. The interests of the employed were protected to the extent that their gains were not economically rational; this worked to retard economic development which would have provided more jobs for the unemployed.¹³ The unemployed were forgotten or ignored by the government. Estimates of the rate of unemployment in the 1950's range from one-sixth to one-fifth of the total labor force of the island.

It is obvious that the Cuban economy did not meet the needs of the Cuban people. Not only was the economy subject to dangerous fluctuations, but a large segment of the population was forced to either work at rural jobs which paid very little or run the risk of finding no employment at all if they migrated to the cities. Tocqueville's typology would clearly indicate that a major portion of the people were ready for revolution upon economic grounds.

From the discussion of the different facets of the nature of the Cuban institutions—political, social, and economic—Tocqueville's typology indicates that a revolution in Cuba was imminent during Batista's reign.

III. THE NATURE OF CUBA'S "MOUERS"

Tocqueville believed that any society had a body of opinions, emotions, beliefs, and premises which were a product of a culture and which in turn created that particular culture. He called this cultural philosophy or essence the *mouers* of a nation. They were not static qualities to be described, but instead were dynamic forces or grand designs which impelled a people forward (or conceivably backward). He believed that man needed these *mouers* in order to regulate his life and give it meaning within the social context.¹⁴

Since *mouers* were so basic to the ordered operation of the social system, there could be no conflict or competition between two or more differing sets. Such a situation within a country would produce two or more societies within its boundaries. This was incompatible, Tocqueville believed, with the concept of a nation under one political head. Revolution was inevitable because the nation had to heal its schisms, and this could be accomplished only with the disappearance of all but one set of *mouers*.

In applying Tocqueville's concept to the Cuban situation, it is seen that from the coup of Batista in 1952 until his departure from Cuba on New Year's Eve, 1959, the nature of Cuban *mouers* was one in which

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

¹⁴ Richter, pp. 80-94.

revolution was an eventuality. This can be said to be so on the basis of Cuban attitudes toward and acceptance of the Batista Regime.

At the time of the 1952 coup, "the greatest desire of the Cuban people was to have an honest government."¹⁵ There had been a long history of revolutionary struggle for the freedom and efficiency of the political system, and the administration of Carlos Prío Socorras has given hope to these pressures even though it had been somewhat corrupt and inefficient. The people had had their interests taken into consideration in the decision-making process, and elections had been relatively honest. This was realized and appreciated by them, and it became a part of their political culture in that they expected it to continue.¹⁶

"The sin of Batista was to thwart the high hopes of a new generation by a return, or rather a continuance without hope of reform, of a cynical and short-sided regime."¹⁷ He had imposed himself and his policies on a people who desired to be able to choose their leader and the policies which this leader would implement. It was not a question of two different sets *mouers* opposing one another; it was instead a question of one man imposing his will upon a populace which did not regard him as legitimate. Because of this, the nation's *mouers* (or at least their political content) called for public opposition to Batista. Since Batista would not surrender his power without a fight, a revolution, according to the typology, was the only recourse.

Castro served as a point upon which much of the opposition to Batista could find a basis for effective action. The question arises as to whether *fidélismo* constituted a separate body of *mouers* in opposition to that which was generally accepted to by the Cuban people. Apart from the contemporary personalism of Castro, much of the *fidélista* movement was based on concepts, ideas, or values which were traditional; they were and had been used by most Cuban politicians to gain popular support. Such things as "governmental and economic reform" were trite in that they were voiced by many, but they were adhered to by few. It would seem that Castro's central position in the opposition to Batista was due not to his ideology but to the fact that he was a major opposition figure who commanded respect for non-ideological reasons. As such, *fidélismo* could not really be termed an ideology or a body or *mouers*.

This view is not without opposition. George I. Blankston, for instance, says that *fidélismo* was a rural movement against an urban

¹⁵ Rivero, p. 65.

¹⁶ Thomas, p. 453; MacGaffey, p. 124; and Lopez-Fresquet, p. 9.

¹⁷ Thomas, p. 453.

Havana;¹⁸ his argument is based on his observation that Castro set up his revolutionary headquarters in rural Cuba where "the back country's enemies of Havana flocked to him in an indigenous nationalism."¹⁹ Others have also found *fidelismo* to encompass more than trite political slogans and Castro's personalism.

Whether or not Castro presented the people with a set of competing *mouers* is irrelevant in the sense that Batista's seizure of power was in opposition to the political *mouers* of the people. This fact is proof enough that the Cuban *mouers* were being frustrated. Since the *mouers* of a people are dynamic in that they guide the actions and reactions of society, there could be no solution to the problem until the conditions causing this frustration were destroyed.

IV. CHANCE AND ANTECEDENT FACT IN CUBA

Tocqueville believed that two supplementary factors of revolution were to be found in the events or conditions preceding this type of social action. These differed from his other classifications in that they encompassed all prior conditions not classifiable under the other three generalizations. These two causes were antecedent fact and chance.

Antecedent fact was the term used to describe those events or conditions which contributed to the revolutionary setting, but which were not causes for revolution in and of themselves. Antecedent fact made revolution a more likely eventuality by adding to the background which provided the people with their reasons for insurrection.

Chance was the term used to describe an event or condition which enabled a revolution to occur. It did nothing which had not been prepared beforehand, but it could provide the circumstances which would draw together those different pressures and frustrations that would lead to revolution.²⁰

In applying the concept of antecedent fact to the Cuban situation, three major considerations stand out. These are Batista's seizure of power, his suspension of civil liberties, and the disintegration of Batista's army.

When Batista seized power in 1952, he created perhaps the most basic antecedent fact. This can be said because his action did not add to a revolutionary setting, but instead created its *raison d'être*.

¹⁸ George I. Blankston, "Fidelism And Its Origin," *Latin American Politics*, edited by R. D. Tomasek (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1966), pp. 359-362.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 361.

²⁰ Tocqueville, p. 64.

Batista's suspension at various times of the civil and political liberties of the people also caused opposition. When Batista came to power, he suspended the Constitution and dissolved Congress. In the wake of public disorder after Castro's "History Will Absolve Me" speech, Batista was forced to suspend political and civil rights under a public order law which prohibited anti-government speech or actions. Later these acts were partially repealed. Elections were held and Congress reconvened, and the people had some of their civil and political rights restored. These moves, however, were designed to create support for Batista while still allowing him to control the opposition to his regime.

There were other suspensions of the civil and political rights of the Cuban people, and there were other "repeals" of these actions. Personal rights and constitutional safeguards were tenuous even while the people enjoyed the nominal restoration of these privileges. Arrests were made without regard to legality, and people were murdered and tortured by the authorities in defiance of all law, including that decreed publicly by Batista.²¹ Legality suffered most in Oriente Province and Santiago; it is interesting to note that it was here that the greatest opposition to Batista's regime was engendered.²²

The disintegration of Batista's army is also an example of antecedent fact. Following the failure of the general strike which Castro called against Batista, the Cuban Government announced that "the rebel movement was dying"; at the same time, the government ordered a massive army offensive to hasten this end. The offensive ended in failure; by Christmas, 1958, the rebels were in a position to move out of the mountains and march on the towns.²³

This came about because the army had disintegrated as a fighting force. The army had suffered heavy and demoralizing casualties in its massive offensive; these had come not in open fighting, but in ambushes and by sniper-fire. More important, however, was the fact that the army was a major tool of repressive force for Batista; this had caused a decline in military morale, for as the government increasingly relied on repressive and brutal tactics to stop the guerilla movement, the soldiers increasingly became dissatisfied with their part in implementing these policies.²⁴ In addition to the dissatisfaction with the policies which they were expected to implement, the army was further demoralized by rumors that some of their commanding officers were negotiating secretly

²¹ R. Hart Phillips, *Cuba: Island of Paradox* (New York: McDowell, Oblensky, 1959), p. 310.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 320.

²³ Rivero, pp. 42-43.

²⁴ MacGaffey, p. 136.

with Castro.²⁵ Other high army officials were arrested and imprisoned for plotting to overthrow Batista and institute a constitutional government, and this also hurt the morale of the army.²⁶ The result of these considerations was the collapse of the major basis of Batista's support.²⁷

The seizure of power by Batista, and the subsequent suspensions of constitutional rights, served to anger and frustrate the people. In this way they added to the revolutionary setting. The disintegration of the army, even though it did not contribute to revolutionary feeling, did have an effect on Batista's political survival. It was antecedent fact in the sense that the army's ability was destroyed by its demoralization, and this contributed to the revolutionary setting by removing a major obstacle to the revolutionaries.

While the flight of Batista might also be considered as antecedent fact, it is a good example of Tocqueville's concept of chance. It was the opportunity which enabled Castro to seize power. When Batista fled the country, he left a power vacuum which Castro filled as rapidly as he could.

Both antecedent fact and chance were then present in the revolutionary setting of Cuba in 1959.

V. THE STATE OF MIND OF THE CUBAN PEOPLE

According to Tocqueville, a revolution may come about when the institutions of a society do not fit its needs, or it may come about when the *mouers* of the people are in some degree of conflict. In either case, Tocqueville believed that the state of mind of the people must be of a nature which would allow the people to accept revolutionary actions as a means to promote or protect their interests. This feeling might be latent or overt, but it had to be present. In its absence, what otherwise might be a revolution became no more than a *coup d'état*.

Batista's reaction to the revolutionary activities of Castro in the last years of his regime was to institute a reign of terror; this served to unite the people against him. Castro presented the picture of a "a David challenging Goliath", and this so caught the imagination of the people that they rallied to his support.²⁸ This was especially so in the rural areas.

Castro's support in the cities came from the professional and white-collar workers, as well as from the students. Originally his support had come solely from the young people who had engineered and imple-

²⁵ Rivero, p. 43.

²⁶ MacGaffey, p. 244.

²⁷ Rivero, p. 29.

²⁸ Gary MacEoin, *Latin America, The Eleventh Hour* (New York: P. J. Kenedy and Sons, 1962), p. 99.

mented a terrorist campaign in his support after his return from Mexico.²⁹ Others had since been alienated by Batista to the point that they supported Castro. Castro had the backing of most teachers, writers, doctors, lawyers, engineers, and office-workers; these people formed what middle-class existed, and they also formed a part of the upper-class. In return for their support, Castro espoused goals which corresponded to how these people felt.³⁰ Political freedom, free elections, and social justice were synonymous with Castro and his movement.

Havana, however, had a large segment of its population which was pro-Batista. When Castro called a general strike in 1958, it failed in Havana because only a small part of the people supported the rebels. Havana was not like the rest of Cuba; "commerce and industry still clung to Batista" in the capital.³¹

By January 1, 1959, however, this had changed. Until that time there had been a great deal of political apathy, but now the people supported Castro or at least opposed Batista.³² This quick change in the sentiment of the people "could only be explained by the national feeling of revulsion for the existing political habits."³³

From apathy, the Cuban people developed openly anti-Batista attitudes. While not all people supported Castro, most were united in their opposition to Batista. The state of mind of the Cuban people in 1959 was one in which they were ready for revolution.

VI. CONCLUSION

Each of the five concepts in Tocqueville's typology prescribes revolution when it is applied to the Cuban situation. The nature of the country's institutions and *mouers* was such that change had to come. There were examples of antecedent fact and chance which added to the revolutionary setting. The state of mind of the people was one in which there was almost universal opposition to Batista.

Tocqueville's typology does not, however, explain the Cuban Revolution. It can be used to order the study of the chaotic conditions in Cuba prior to 1959, but the real revolution came later, and the typology is not applicable in this later setting. The major factor in the Cuban Revolution is the personality of Fidel Castro, a factor which cannot be fitted into the typology.

²⁹ Phillips, p. 291.

³⁰ Rivero, p. 76.

³¹ Phillips, pp. 352-353.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 383.

³³ Gil, p. 385.

A re-evaluation of the state of mind of the people is important at this point for two reasons. First, the other conditions found revolutionary under Tocqueville's typology are conditions which can be duplicated in other countries. In these other countries, however, no revolution has occurred. In addition, those conditions were present in Cuba long before Batista was overthrown, but there was no revolution or ouster of Batista until the people were in opposition to him and were no longer apathetic. In other words, Batista was not overthrown until the state of mind of the people was one of open opposition, regardless of what other social, economic, or political problems existed. Second, the state of mind of the people was one which sought a democratic form of government, not a program of sweeping economic and social change. Castro took cognizance of this fact and initially presented moderate goals for his movement. These two considerations indicate that the state of mind of the people was the determining factor which enabled Batista to be overthrown, but that it called only for a political revolution and not the social and economic revolution for which the other concepts in Tocqueville's typology called.

The people received in 1959 what they sought in 1958; Batista was gone and a new government which promised democratic reform was instituted in his place. That even this was a revolution is questionable. Suarez says that if a revolution means a fundamental change in the institutions of a country, "then in January 1959 there was no revolutionary situation in Cuba."³⁴ At this time, Castro was simply a continuation of Batista and all the others who had controlled the island from time to time. He was just another military dictator in a nation whose history was characterized by political insurrection and military dictators.³⁵ That his support came from other sectors of society as well as from his Rebel Army does not alter this fact.

The Cuban Revolution was more than just a change of those in power, however, as can clearly be seen by the changed nature of the society and economy in Cuba today. The answer to the question of why or how did the Cuban Revolution come about lies in Fidel Castro, an aspect of revolution not observed by Tocqueville. Castro's control of the revolutionary movement was a product of his charismatic leadership rather than institutionalized relationships.³⁶ In order to protect this charismatic leadership, Castro opposed the "institutionalization" of his government or of his revolutionary movement. He sought to protect and

³⁴ Andres Suarez, *Cuba: Castroism and Communism, 1959-1966*. (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1967), p. 34.

³⁵ Blankston, pp. 352-354.

³⁶ Gil, p. 392.

strengthen his personal appeal to the masses. Suarez feels that after Castro became Prime-Minister in 1959, he either had to implement a return to the "democracy" before Batista or take a revolutionary path, a path that would justify holding on to revolutionary power.³⁷ Whether or not Castro was forced into it by conditions, he began unilaterally and incrementally to radicalize the revolutionary movement during 1959. In setting this process in motion, Castro used his personal power and appeal to initially obtain the program's acceptance by the people.

This radicalization prevented the institutionalization of the Cuban government in that Castro became the harbinger of a new social and economic order for the masses; elections were postponed, and rival power centers were rendered impotent. Through these actions, Castro not only maintained his personal power over and appeal to the Cuban people, but he may very well have increased them. This would be difficult to prove because he alienated much of the middle and upper classes whose support for him had been based on their desire to overthrow Batista and institute a democratic government rather than to embark on sweeping social and economic change. In any event, Castro maintained complete control over his revolution and his government by leading the nation into a program of social and economic change. The extent of this social and economic change was to form the Cuban Revolution.

As already stated, Tocqueville's typology does not explain why the revolution did not occur earlier (either before or immediately after Batista's overthrow), nor does it explain why one man was able to bring it into being. The French Revolution occurred in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, and the Cuban Revolution occurred in the Twentieth Century, but it would be foolish to expect their differences to end with that consideration. The result of Tocqueville's study of France is useful in that it provides general understanding about the social phenomena which are referred to as revolution, but it cannot, at least in the Cuban example, explain the "how" and the "why" of these occurrences. This is something that perhaps must be determined by a specific study of a specific revolutionary situation, the same approach which, it should be said, Tocqueville used in explaining the French experience.

³⁷ Suarez, p. 45.