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# Strategic Lobbying: The Nature of Legislator/Lobbyist Relations

Adam J. Newmark  
Appalachian State University

*This paper explores lobbying roles based on a survey of lobbyists in ten states. Lobbyists employ a variety of tactics in their interactions with legislators that can be characterized along two dimensions, one based on how personal the relationship is, and the other based on the extent that information is exchanged between these actors. The findings suggest that there are only a few good ole boy lobbyists, who rely solely on personal appeal strategies. Instead, there is a mix of those who are amateurs, those that use information based appeal strategies, and those that appear to use both personal relationships and information-based appeals in their interactions with legislators. This allows us to examine the specific activities that lobbyists use in their dealings with legislators, as well as the general appeal strategies that they use.*

## DIMENSIONALITY OF LEGISLATOR/LOBBYIST INTERACTIONS

Political scientists have long recognized that relationships between legislators and lobbyists are critical to achieving objectives (Heinz *et al.* 1993). The *good ole boy* style of lobbying best epitomized the use of relationships in these exchanges (Rosenthal 2001). Though there has been wide discussion of the decline in the *good ole boy* style of lobbying, little empirical work has examined this decline and what has replaced it. To what extent has there been a decline in lobbying strategies that are primarily based on personal appeals? Additionally, as many scholars have noted, lobbyists are important suppliers of information to legislators who lack the time, money, and perhaps

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inclination, to research every issue (Kingdon 1973, Matthews and Stimson 1975). Thus, information is an important commodity for lobbyists to convey to legislators.

Lobbyists are of particular interest to political scientists, the media, politicians, and other actors given the recent string of good government reforms in the states (term limits, lobbying and ethics regulations). In an effort to curb unethical or illegal political behaviors, many states have reformed their lobbying laws following scandals involving lobbyists and members of the legislature. Another reason to further explore relationships between lobbyists and legislatures is that much of the literature on interest group and PAC influence on decision-making is inconclusive in finding such a linkage (Smith 1995; Baumgartner and Leech 1998). The conflicting findings in this literature may result from an inadequate understanding of the core relationships between these political actors.

This paper assesses whether state lobbying tactics are primarily based on personal appeals, information, or a combination of the two. Scholars owe much to Zeigler and Baer's (1969) work on amateur and professional lobbying, yet little research has addressed the nature of the profession beyond classifying lobbyists by type (contract lobbyist, legislative liaison, or in-house).<sup>1</sup> These classifications are important, but how these lobbying types use certain appeal strategies and how this fits into our schema of professionalization needs further attention. The first portion of the analysis explores the nature and dimensionality of lobbying relationships. That is, what are the defining components of relationships? Next, based on these dimensions, lobbyists are classified according to the kinds of behaviors typical of the underlying dimensions identified. Finally, I examine

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<sup>1</sup> For exceptions, see Schlozman and Tierney (1986), Nownes and Freeman (1998a; 1998b), and Thomas and Hrebener (2004).

the differences in the typical lobbying strategies employed by each of these types of lobbyist.

### **Information Provision and Personal Relationships**

Many studies have examined how lobbyists attempt to persuade legislators through information provision (Milbrath 1963; Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1963; Austen-Smith 1993; Wright 1996; Ainsworth 2002). Early research on lobbying viewed interest groups as having little influence on legislators, and access to lawmakers and the policy process was usually limited to those organizations that had similar views as legislators in the first place. Bauer, Pool, and Dexter (1963), for example, viewed interests as relatively innocuous "service bureaus" with limited funds and marginal influence. Milbrath's (1963) examination of contract lobbyists sought to uncover how these actors perceived the effectiveness of various lobbying tactics. More recently, interest group scholars have pushed the focus on tactics to better understand the approaches used in dealing with legislators (Berry 1977; Walker 1991; Nownes and Freeman 1998a). Rosenthal (2001) and Browne (1985) note the importance of access and interaction in the relationship between lobbyists and legislators. Termed the "contact game," lobbyists employ a multitude of strategies to achieve their objectives and facilitate deal-making (1985).

Schlozman and Tierney (1986), Walker (1991), Kollman (1998), and Nownes and Freeman (1998a) have also furthered our understanding of lobbying tactics. Baumgartner and Leech (1998) summarize these extant findings on interest group and lobbying tactics suggesting that lobbyists engage in a variety of activities like giving testimony at hearings, having person-to-person contact, utilizing informal contacts (Schlozman and Tierney 1986; Heinz *et al.* 1993), presenting research (Schlozman and Tierney 1986; Berry 1977), forming coalitions with other

groups (Hojnacki 1997; Gray and Lowery 1998), serving on advisory boards, and 'contacting agency personnel' (Kollman 1998).<sup>2</sup> Nownes and Freeman find that many techniques are used in lobbying, and they often involve direct contact with legislators, helping to draft legislation, and they "[alert] state legislators to the effects of a bill on their districts" (1998b, 1190).

The importance of information is also stressed in the voting cue literature, as we know that lobbyists and interest groups are critical sources of information for legislators at both the national (Kingdon 1973; Matthews and Stimson 1975) and state levels (Ray 1982; Songer *et al.* 1985; Gray and Lowery 2000). Esterling (2001) found that members of Congress seek out lobbyists with specialized information, which indicates the importance of expertise in information provision. Even when the lobbyists are not the experts, they can provide specialists who may deal directly with legislators or testify before legislative committees (Rosenthal 2001). Lobbyists also possess information on how a policy or piece of legislation will affect the member's district and how constituents view such matters (Kingdon 1973; Kollman 1998).

Other scholars have stressed the importance of relationships and have examined the role of friendships in the legislative process (Patterson 1959; Matthews 1960; Baker 1980; Jewell and Patterson 1985; Caldiera and Patterson 1987). Baker (1960) discusses the inseparable nature of political and personal relationships in the U.S. Senate, and Matthews (1960) notes the importance of personal relationships on legislative outcomes. Social psychologists have also addressed personal relationships

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<sup>2</sup> See Milbrath (1963, 41) and Berry (1977, 212) for differences between tactics and strategies. Tactics refer to activities—meeting with legislators, testifying at hearings, or using litigation—undertaken by lobbyists (see Baumgartner and Leech 1998). Strategies involve the use of these tactics in conjunction with relevant issues and the interest environment within which activities take place.

in a number of contexts. According to Kelley and his colleagues, "a close relationship is one of strong, frequent, and diverse interdependence that lasts over a considerable period of time" (1983, 38). And the key to personal relationships is that they involve unique individuals who cannot be replaced if the relationship is to be sustained (Hinde 1979). Hinde (1979) notes that relationships involve repeated interactions, whereby past encounters influence existing interactions, which in turn affect future exchanges.

The *good ole boy* style of lobbying is an excellent example of a relationship that is personal in nature. Alan Rosenthal describes these *good ole boys*, "whose modus operandi is the three Bs—bourbon, broads, and beefsteaks. These lobbyists are known also as the 'old bulls;' their approach is that of the 'fixer.' They are also 'full service lobbyists' because they try to take care of the various needs of the legislators" (2001, 38). There is no doubt that this type of behavior has declined, and, in many states, likely no longer exists at all due to reforms. For example, a number of scholars have looked at efforts to regulate lobbyists in recent years (Hunter, Wilson, and Brunk 1991; Brinig, Holcombe, and Schwartzstein 1993; Lowery and Gray 1997; Rosenson 2005; Newmark 2005; 2008). Still, lobbyists attend social events with legislators, including a number of activities such as dining, sports games, or travel (Rosenthal 2001). Though these observations are often derived from survey research or interviews, much of these observations are anecdotal, and perhaps we do not fully understand the nature of these relationships.

#### UNDERSTANDING LOBBYING ROLES

Lobbyists engage in a number of activities in dealing with their legislative counterparts, and the above discussion suggests that many of these can be categorized as personal appeal strategies or information provision. For example, activities such as

dining or attending sporting events are clearly personal in nature. Although the *good ole boy* style of lobbying may be a thing of the past, personal relationships are still a necessary part of the lobbying profession. Conversely, writing legislation, serving on advisory boards, or providing information about policy implications are information-based tactics and are also common.

Thus, there are conceptually two constructs; but, how are these constructs related? The first conception is that there is a good deal of independence between these constructs. That is, we can conceive of relationships along two dimensions based on what the literature, lobbyists, and legislators tell us. The purpose here is to assess empirically whether there are two constructs. A long history of lobbying studies emphasizes the importance of cultivating relationships and the critical role of lobbyists providing information to legislators. Nonetheless, these constructs are not completely unrelated because of the enduring nature of relationships. Once a legislator accepts information from a lobbyist, and that information is not misleading or erroneous, a relationship is fostered. The legislator will more easily trust the lobbyist on the next exchange, which facilitates a more personal relationship and a greater degree of information acceptance in subsequent meetings. Trust is a crucial component in any personal relationship (Cialdini 1993), friend or otherwise. Trust in the individual will likely lead to trust in the information that that person provides or in advice that they give. Even the *good ole boy* style of lobbying required an element of trust, as a legislator is unlikely to accept gifts from someone with whom they have no confidence. Violations of this trust can also end a relationship.

Thus, the dimensions are not zero-sum, and in fact, having personal ties should increase the likelihood of information provision. It is also likely that a lobbyist who uses both personal and information-based appeal strategies is more likely to engage in a

greater variety of activities ranging from attending sporting events to helping to draft legislation. Thomas and Hrebenar (2004), for example, note the variability in tactics of lobbyists today indicating that they rely on a host of direct and indirect personal and information-based appeal strategies. Consider a personal appeal strategy like dining with legislators, which is clearly indicative of the *good ole boy* style of lobbying. It is probable that a lobbyist who can combine information based activities with personal tactics is more likely engage in any single personal behavior. They should also engage in a greater number of activities than someone who relies on only a personal or information based set of strategies. Similarly, drafting legislation or serving on advisory boards should more likely occur if the lobbyist can combine information based and personal appeal strategies, rather than relying on only the former.

So, how does this fit into our understanding of lobbying roles? Much of the early work on the profession viewed lobbyists as either amateurs or professionals. Zeigler and Baer (1969) examined professionalism of both lobbyists and legislators and noted that lobbying was deemed a "marginal occupation," which is evidenced by the fact that the U.S. Department of Labor did not even have a classification for the profession at the time. They did, however, argue that lobbying professionalism referred to skill in the profession, which was a function of lobbying experience; skill and experience increased the frequency of interaction between these actors.

Bauer, Pool, and Dexter (1964) offer a description of professionalism in terms of the characteristics of certain corporations that facilitate their lobbying efforts. Asking who the professionals were compared to the non-professionals, one interviewee in their study reported, "You know, we are just amateurs at this game." The professionals, on the other hand, are "People like the Ford people. We just have a typewriter and a mimeograph ma-



chine, and they have all sorts of money and resources" (342). Thus, money and resources are critical for lobbying professionalism and information provision.

More recent research has further developed the concept of lobbying professionalism. Rosenthal (2001) reports that there has been an increase in full-time lobbying, the number of firms offering lobbying services, and an increase in specialization of firms. In some states, these firms conduct a large share of the lobbying activity in front of the state legislature (Gray and Lowery 1996). Contract lobbying has become more business-like, and many firms believe they are advantaged by specialized services that they can offer their clients. Wright (1996) notes that these "hired guns" may have better connections and greater access to legislators. This fits into classifications of lobbying types in Thomas and Hrebendar's (2004) on-going study of state lobbying. These authors suggest that contract lobbyists are hired for a fee, represent a multitude of clients, and often have experience in state government and in other lobbying activities. They also classify in-house lobbyists as those who serve as a lobbyist for a business, organization, or association; they typically have experience in the field they represent. Another type, the legislative liaison, represents local, state, and federal agencies before the legislature. Perhaps less professional are those lobbyists who Thomas and Hrebendar (2004) classify as citizen or cause lobbyists or those who are 'self-styled' or lobby for pet projects.

If lobbying appeal strategies are based on two dimensions, perhaps we should rethink our classifications of lobbyists' strategies. Then we can consider how the different types of lobbyists use different appeal strategies. From the perspective of the lobbyist, the best possible strategy is to use all available appeal strategies when interacting with legislators. These individuals, whom I have termed *multi-tactic* lobbyists, probably engage in a variety of social activities like doing favors for legislators, meet-

ing socially, or attending sporting events with them. They also engage in information-based activities like providing information on policy, helping to draft legislation, and serving on advisory boards. Thus, the *multi-tactic* lobbyist likely has worked as a lobbyist for a number of years, has had a long term relationship with legislators, has frequent contact with them, and a few may even have experience as a legislator. They are most likely ambitious and are ready to provide information for legislators who seek information from them. In addition to having experience in their profession, many of these lobbyists have established a network of contacts to help them achieve their objectives (Heinz *et al.* 1993). The multi-tactic approach should most likely be used by contract lobbyists or well-connected business executives because of the time they devote to the job and the resources that they possess. Incidentally, they are probably the most professional lobbyists.

A second type of lobbyist, the *good ole boy* is likely described by the same set of personal characteristics as the *multi-tactic* lobbyist. This person probably knows the legislators well and is often involved in social activities with them like dining together or attending sporting events. The *good ole boy* lobbyist may also have an extensive network of contacts both inside and outside of the legislature. However, this person may exhibit a slightly smaller set of behavioral characteristics than the *multi-tactic* lobbyists who has a greater variety of options at his or her disposal. These lobbyists should favor highly personal social activities.

A third type of lobbyist relies on information based appeal strategies rather than personal appeals. These are termed *technocrats*. *Technocrats* testify at hearings, help draft legislation, inform legislators of the effects of bills on their districts, and may even influence appointments. They do not develop friendships, probably because of state government reforms that have sought

to regulate the behavior of both lobbyists and lawmakers (Newmark 2005; 2009). The *technocrat* lobbyist is more likely an in-house lobbyist than contract lobbyists who may also have fostered personal relationships, or grass-roots lobbyist who uses fewer personal or information-based appeals. In-house lobbyists may not have developed a contact network in the legislature, but they do have a great deal of experience in their issue-area (Thomas and Hrebenar 2004).

Finally, the *amateurs* possess few of the characteristics discussed herein. These individuals do not engage in lobbying professionally or full-time, and they are most likely grass-roots lobbyists. They are likely weak lobbyists to whatever extent success depends on personal or information-based relationships with legislators. In other words, they may be less proficient at their jobs or may resemble the *amateurs* discussed by Zeigler and Baer (1969). They are also less likely in-house or contract lobbyists because, for these types, lobbying is the focus of their jobs.

#### EXAMINING THE NATURE OF LOBBYING RELATIONSHIPS

To examine the dimensionality and characteristics of lobbying, a survey was conducted of lobbyists in ten states. The ten states—Delaware, Georgia, Iowa, Maine, Mississippi, Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio, Wisconsin, and Wyoming—were selected as part of a larger study to obtain variation in size, region, and other factors likely to characterize interest systems. The states vary in the number of registered lobbyists and the extent to which the profession is regulated. Lobby registration lists were acquired from the relevant administrative agency in each state.<sup>3</sup> The over-

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<sup>3</sup> Some states were avoided because lobbyists in those states were surveyed by a number of scholars in recent years and their inclusion might limit the response rate. The number of registered lobbyists varied in the ten-state sample from 166 in Wyoming to 1,459 in Note continues

all response rate for the entire sample was 36% or 432 total surveys out of the 1,250 sent. The response rate is consistent with a number of other lobbying studies (Hrebenar and Thomas 1993; Gray and Lowery 1996), and the rates across states are slightly more consistent. The survey was designed to elicit information on lobbying activities, including strategies and relationships with key legislators with whom the lobbyist interacts. Since many lobbyists represent a multitude of clients or interact with a number of legislators, the survey asked questions regarding interaction with the key legislators necessary to achieve the lobbyist's goals.

The purpose is to create two indexes relating to personal relationships and information if the data support these theoretical assumptions. The first dimension is an index derived from eight of the survey questions pertaining to personal relationships. These questions focus on characteristics of relationships, including activities that take place when individuals meet. Two of the questions, "*How friendly are your relationships with key legislators?*" and "*How often do you meet with key legislators at social gatherings?*," are measured on a five-point scale ranging from "never" to "extremely often." The remaining six questions are similar to Schlozman and Tierney's (1986) questions pertaining to lobbying tactics, where respondents were asked whether they engaged in a variety of activities. The difference is that respondents were asked to indicate whether they engage in the activity

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Ohio. The mean number of lobbyists was 643 (with a standard deviation of 381.36). Approximately 125 lobbyists were randomly selected from each of the ten states. The sampled lobbyists were typical of the lobbying population's characteristics in each state even in the states with a greater number of lobbyists. The response rates by state were as follows: 36% in Delaware, 38% in Georgia, 35% in Iowa, 43% in Maine, 37% in Mississippi, 38% in Nevada, 32% in New Mexico, 33% in Ohio, 31% in Wisconsin, and 34% in Wyoming. Thirty-four surveys were subtracted from the total because they were returned undeliverable (some of these lobbyists were confirmed to have left the state).

"often," "sometimes," or "not at all,"<sup>4</sup> in order to differentiate between the occasional lobbying behavior and activities that are done more frequently. The six activities are (1) doing favors for officials who need assistance, (2) engaging in informal contacts with officials, (3) attending social events with legislators, (4) dining with legislators, (5) attending entertainment such as sporting events or theater with legislators, and (6) attending the same civic organizations such as Rotary, Lions Club, or Kiwanis Clubs as legislators. The index ranges from 9 to 27 with a mean of 17.24 and standard deviation of 3.55. The Chronbach's alpha of 0.82 indicates a reliable measure.

The second dimension is another index constructed from eleven survey questions pertaining to information-related activities. The first three questions are measured on a five-point scale and ask (1) *How frequently do you give technical information to legislators about the issues before them?*; (2) *How frequently do you give information to legislators on how the public views issues before them?*; and (3) *How frequently do you give information to legislators on how other legislators view the issues before them?*<sup>5</sup> A number of the Schlozman and Tierney (1986; cf. Kollman 1998) style questions are also included, and again, respondents were asked whether they engaged in an activity "often," "sometimes," or "not at all." The activities are (1) testifying at legislative hearings, (2) contacting government officials directly to present point of view, (3) helping to draft legislation, (4) alerting state legislators to the effect of a bill on their district, (5) consulting with governmental officials to plan legislative

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<sup>4</sup> Since the first two questions are coded on a 5-point scale, they have additional weight compared to the six remaining questions. This is intentional because the first two questions focus on the core personal relationship, while the remaining six are more specific personal activities.

<sup>5</sup> Again, additional weight is given to these questions because they are central to the information concept.

strategy, (6) helping to draft agency regulations, rules, or guideline, (7) serving on advisory commissions or boards, and (8) attempting to influence appointments to public office. The index ranges from 15 to 36, has a mean of 25.99, and has a standard deviation of 4.07. The Chronbach's alpha of 0.74 indicates a reliable measure.

The survey also asked respondents how they would best characterize themselves as a lobbyist. A slight variant of the Thomas and Hrebenar (2004) categories was used because academics and survey respondents sometimes use different vernacular. The lobbyists were asked whether they were senior executives of their organizations, in-house lobbyists, contract lobbyists, grass-roots lobbyists, or some other type of lobbyist. Thirty-nine percent indicated that they were senior executives ( $n = 165$ ), 25% were in-house ( $n = 106$ ), 15% ( $n = 62$ ) were contract lobbyists, and 14% were grass-roots lobbyists ( $n = 60$ ).<sup>6</sup>

### Personal Relationships and Information-based Constructs

In order to determine whether there are two factors affecting relationships between lobbyists and legislators, questions were chosen based on their theoretical relevance for each of the constructs. Confirmatory factor analysis, which is often applied in studies of scale measures (Kelloway, Catano, and Southwell 1992), is used to determine how well 19 indicators load on the two factors. The loadings are found in Table 1.<sup>7</sup> Half of the indicators have loadings above 0.80, and all are at least 0.42: (P5)

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<sup>6</sup> This is consistent with other studies (Gray and Lowery 1996; Thomas and Hrebenar 2004).

<sup>7</sup> The following eight indicators reflect the personal construct: (P1) *how friendly are your relationships with key legislators?*; (P2) *how often do you meet with key legislators at social gatherings?*; and whether the lobbyist (P3) *does favors for officials*, (P4) *engages in informal contacts*, (P5) *attends social events*, (P6) *dines with legislators*, (P7) *engages in entertainment such as sporting events*, and (P8) *attends the same civic organizations*.

*Attending social events* loads at 0.93, the (P2) *frequency of social meetings* loads at 0.86, (P6) *dining with legislators* has a 0.86 loading, and (P7) *attending entertainment/sporting events* loads at 0.80. The loading for (P4) *having informal contacts* is 0.63, and (P3) *doing favors for officials* has a loading of 0.59. Apparently, these are the driving force behind *what* constitutes personal relationships, though all of the indicators are important. Two of the indicators—(P1) *how friendly are relationships?* and (P8) *attends the same civic organization*—have relatively low loadings (0.44 and 0.42). But they are theoretically relevant to the personal construct, and not so small that they should be excluded.

The eleven indicators for information provision are found in Table 1.<sup>8</sup> Seven of the eleven loadings are above 0.50, and (I13) *contacting officials directly*, (I16) *planning legislative strategy*, and (I14) *helping to draft legislation* have reasonably large path coefficients (0.79, 0.68, and 0.67, respectively). Other activities also appear to play an important role in information provision such as (I12) *testifying at legislative hearing* (0.56), (I15) *alerting of [legislators of the] effects of bills on districts* (0.51), and (I9) *giving technical information* (0.50).

Though the coefficient for (I10) *giving information about the public* is somewhat low (0.29), I have retained it in the index because there is some indication that lobbyists do provide information to state legislators about constituents (Kollman 1998). There is strong theoretical reason for including this in the

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<sup>8</sup> These include (I9) *give technical information*, (I10) *give information about public*, (I11) *give information about legislators*, (I12) *testify at legislative hearings*, (I13) *contact officials directly*, (I14) *help draft legislation*, (I15) *alert of effects of bill on district*, (I16) *plan legislative strategy*, (I17) *help draft agency regulations*, (I18) *serve on advisory boards*, and (I19) *influence appointments*.

model, and it is more desirable to leave it in because it is somewhat relevant rather than letting the data drive the specification.<sup>9</sup>

**Table 1**  
**A Two-factor Model of**  
**Personal Relationships and Information Provision**

Indicator	Description	Personal	Information
P1	How friendly are relationships?	0.44	
P2	How often meet socially?	0.86	
P3	Favors for officials	0.59	
P4	Informal contacts	0.63	
P5	Attend social events	0.93	
P6	Dining with legislators	0.86	
P7	Entertainment, sporting events	0.80	
P8	Same civic organizations	0.42	
I9	Give technical information		0.50
I10	Give information about public		0.29
I11	Give information about legislators		0.40
I12	Testify at legislative hearings		0.56
I13	Contact officials directly		0.79
I14	Help draft legislation		0.67
I15	Alert of effects of bill on district		0.51
I16	Plan legislative strategy		0.68
I17	Help draft agency regulations		0.52
I18	Serve on advisory boards		0.38
I19	Influence appointments		0.48
Chi <sup>2</sup> 923.57, df=151, p=0.000,		RMSEA	0.11
Completely standardized solutions			

<sup>9</sup> The Chronbach's alpha for the eleven indicators is 0.74, suggesting a reasonably reliable measure.




The assumption is that the two constructs are actually latent variables and that there is a causal structure linking these constructs to a number of observed variables (19 in this case). The model includes two factors, one representing the personal construct, and the other representing the information provision. LISREL was used to construct the structural diagram depicted in Figure 1. To estimate the model, polychoric correlations were obtained for the 19 indicators.<sup>10</sup> I use maximum likelihood estimation, and the model converges in 43 iterations. The Chi-square statistic is 923.57 with 151 degrees of freedom, and the p-value is 0.00 with a RMSEA of 0.11. This is better than the Chi-square statistic of 6,851.17, for the independence model with 171 degrees of freedom. The comparative fit index (Kelloway *et al.* 1992) is 0.88. Although slightly less than ideal, it does indicate that the model fits the data reasonably well. The standardized RMR is 0.096, which is also acceptable.

The two factors are correlated at 0.45, which is expected because personal relationships likely increase the probability of legislators accepting information (see Figure 1). Assuming that lobbyists pursue a variety of strategies when interacting with legislators, they will likely use both personal appeals and information based tactics to achieve their objectives. A Nevada lobbyist in this survey indicated this duality: "Our state has a citizen legislature and meets only 120 days every two years. We have ample time in the interim to work on issues, provide information, assist with constituent issues, and generally schmooze elected officials so we can be more effective."

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<sup>10</sup> For categorical data, polychoric correlations are better at assessing the underlying relationships among variables than Pearson product-moment correlations (Joreskog 1990).


**Figure 2**  
Single Factor Model of Relationships



have a common factor.)<sup>11</sup> These models did not fit the data better than the original model and the correlation between the two factors typically dropped by only 0.02, from 0.45 to 0.43. Thus, there is good support for the two-factor model.

<sup>11</sup> When paths were freed to allow cross-loading, the resulting coefficients were particularly small. None of the loadings justified altering the specification. Specifications with three factors fit poorly as well.

**Figure 1**  
**A Measurement Model:**  
**Personal Relationships and Information Provision\***



\*The comparative fit index (CFI) for this model was 0.88 compared to a 0.60 CFI for the single-factor model in Figure 2.

Still, alternative specifications of the measurement model were tested. Figure 2 contains the LISREL estimates of a single factor model that has many small loadings and a generally poor comparative fit index of 0.60. The two-factor model is a better fit of the data, however. (In an analysis not shown, I tested specifications where paths were freed and indicators were allowed to

### Distribution of Personal Relationships and Information Provision


So, what do these findings tell us about lobbying relationships and the extent to which lobbying tactics are personally based or driven by information? Again, the mean personal score for the 432 respondents was 17.2 (3.55 std. dev.) and ranged from a low of 9 to a high of 27. The mean information provision score was 26 for the entire sample and ranged from 15 to 36, with a standard deviation of 4.07. Incidentally, no state varied significantly from the overall mean for either measure, which suggests similarity among the states.<sup>12</sup>

But what do relationships look like for the entire sample? Figure 3 is a scatterplot of the personal relationship and information provision indexes. The X-axis plots information provision, and the Y-axis plots the personalization score. Points on the lower left indicate low scores on each dimension, while the upper right corner shows those who had high scores on both. I have two general comments on the pattern illustrated in Figure 3. First, the pattern suggests that there is variance in the spatial locale of relationships such that the relationships are not predominantly located in one area of the diagram. In other words, the relationships vary to the degree that they are personal and the extent to which information is transferred between lobbyists and legislators. Second, the distribution of these relationships is relatively symmetrical along the diagonal, and there are very few outliers in the sample. However, nearly 37% of the respondents fell in either the upper left quadrant (*good ole boys*) or the lower right quadrant (*technocrats*).

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<sup>12</sup> The personal and information score are not meant for direct comparison to each other. They are not standardized for ease of presentation and to allow a visual depiction of where the data actually fall on the plot. Furthermore, state influences on lobbying are outside the scope of this manuscript and are examined in another paper (Newmark 2009).

Earlier, I developed a typology including four categories of lobbyists based on the amount of information they convey and the extent to which their relationships are personal. In order to construct the diagram, respondents were divided above and be-



low the means on each dimension.<sup>13</sup> Respondents who scored below the mean on both the personal and information dimen-

<sup>13</sup> The percentages listed in Figure 3 are partially driven by the decision regarding *where* to make the cut-offs. On both dimensions, the means and medians were nearly identical, so the means were chosen. Accordingly, those who scored above 17.23 were above the mean on the personal dimension, and those at 17 and below were below the mean. On the information dimension, those at 26 and above were above the mean of 25.99.

sions are deemed *amateurs* and are found in the lower left quadrant of the plot. One-third of the 432 lobbyists surveyed fall into this category. I suggested earlier that there has been a decline in the *good ole boy* style of lobbying, and according to the classifications above, only 12% of the sample are labeled as such.<sup>14</sup> These individuals scored above the mean on the personal dimension, but below the mean on the information dimension. They are located in the upper left corner of Figure 3. Nearly a fourth of the sample scored above the mean on the technical dimension but below the mean on the personal dimension. These individuals, labeled *technocrats*, are located in the lower right quadrant of the plot. The final type includes the 30% located in the upper right quadrant who scored above the mean on both dimensions. These individuals are labeled the *multi-tactic* lobbyist.

It is also likely that these types of lobbyists vary in their behaviors. Thus, I decompose the personal and information-based constructs to draw some conclusions about the specific types of behaviors in which these individuals engage. This allows an examination of the behavioral characteristics of lobbyists in absolute terms. Table 2 provides the deconstructed means for each dimension and its deconstructed components for all the lobbyists in the sample, as well as the means for each of the four lobbying types.<sup>15</sup>

The *multi-tactic* lobbyist's mean scores for the constituent parts of the personal dependent variable are presented in the table. This lobbyist had the highest mean for six out of the eight components, and was tied for the highest mean for an additional part of this construct. To name a few, the *multi-tactic* lobbyist

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<sup>14</sup> Unfortunately, given the nature of the cross-sectional data, it is not possible to draw specific conclusions about just how much the *good ole boys* have declined.

<sup>15</sup> By construction, we should expect higher means for certain lobbying types. The deconstructions do, however, allow us to examine the specific types of behaviors in which lobbyists engage.

**Table 2**  
**Variable Component Means by Lobbying Typologies**

Dependent Variables followed by deconstruction	Grand Mean	Amateur Mean	Good Ole Boy Mean	Technocrat Mean	Multi-tactic Mean
<b>Personal Dependent</b>	17.24 (3.54)	14.58 (2.08)	20.04 (1.95)	15.09 (1.78)	<b>20.89</b> (2.33)
How friendly are relationships†	3.44 (0.70)	3.13 (0.67)	3.67 (0.59)	3.24 (0.638)	<b>3.86</b> (0.59)
How often Meet socially†	2.88 (0.94)	2.36 (0.69)	3.55 (0.58)	2.37 (0.77)	<b>3.64</b> (0.77)
Favors for officials*	1.79 (0.63)	1.47 (0.54)	2.02 (0.52)	1.60 (0.53)	<b>2.26</b> (0.53)
Informal contacts*	2.29 (0.61)	1.96 (0.54)	2.47 (0.58)	2.17 (0.51)	<b>2.72</b> (0.47)
Attend social events*	2.16 (0.63)	1.78 (0.497)	2.59 (0.50)	1.86 (0.45)	2.67 (0.47)
Dining with legislators*	1.86 (0.64)	1.55 (0.51)	<b>2.33</b> (0.47)	1.50 (0.50)	<b>2.33</b> (0.51)
Entertainment, sporting events*	1.38 (0.54)	1.10 (0.31)	<b>1.80</b> (0.54)	1.10 (0.30)	1.79 (0.56)
Same civic organizations*	1.40 (0.55)	1.23 (0.42)	1.61 (0.61)	1.25 (0.44)	<b>1.63</b> (.62)
<b>Information Dependent</b>	25.99 (4.07)	22.10 (2.43)	23.06 (1.79)	28.49 (2.15)	<b>29.42</b> (2.42)
Give technical information†	3.52 (0.85)	3.12 (0.81)	2.96 (0.76)	<b>3.98</b> (0.70)	3.86 (0.68)
Give information about Public†	2.75 (0.91)	2.41 (0.88)	2.31 (0.68)	3.00 (0.88)	<b>3.11</b> (0.90)
Give information about legislators†	2.50 (0.89)	2.10 (0.75)	2.18 (0.64)	2.71 (0.90)	<b>2.93</b> (0.89)
Testify at legislative hearings*	2.29 (0.63)	1.96 (0.58)	2.00 (0.50)	2.58 (0.55)	2.55 (0.56)

**Table 2**  
**Variable Component Means by Lobbying Typologies**

Dependent Variables followed by deconstruction	Grand Mean	Amateur Mean	Good Ole Boy Mean	Technocrat Mean	Multi-tactic Mean
Contact officials directly*	2.63 (0.52)	2.24 (0.51)	2.51 (0.51)	2.87 (0.34)	<b>2.93</b> (0.25)
Help draft legislation*	2.23 (0.61)	1.88 (0.54)	2.10 (0.51)	2.45 (0.52)	<b>2.52</b> (0.533)
Alert of effects of bill on district*	2.40 (0.61)	2.07 (0.62)	2.20 (0.54)	<b>2.67</b> (0.514)	2.63 (0.52)
Plan legislative strategy*	2.12 (0.63)	1.74 (0.52)	1.96 (0.54)	2.34 (0.54)	<b>2.46</b> (0.56)
Help draft agency regulations*	1.98 (0.67)	1.71 (0.60)	1.67 (0.66)	2.19 (0.677)	<b>2.23</b> (0.60)
Serve on Advisory Boards*	1.89 (0.70)	1.60 (0.61)	1.61 (0.67)	2.05 (0.687)	<b>2.20</b> (0.65)
Influence appointments*	1.60 (0.62)	1.26 (0.46)	1.55 (0.58)	1.65 (0.592)	<b>1.98</b> (0.61)

\* = variable measured on a 1-3 scale.

† = variable measured on a 1-5 scale. The personal dependent variable ranges from 9-27; the information dependent variable ranges from 15-36. Number in parentheses is the standard deviation. High means in bold; low means are italicized

had the highest mean on survey questions dealing with how friendly their relationships were, how often they met socially, and whether they did favors for officials.

A similar pattern emerged for the *multi-tactic* lobbyist for the information-based components of the second construct. In all but three of the components of the information dimension, this lobbyist had the highest mean score. For example, the *multi-tactic* lobbyist typically had higher scores for giving information about constituents, giving information about the public, and serving on advisory boards. Moreover, the mean for influencing ap-



pointments was nearly a third of a point higher for the *multi-tactic* lobbyist than for any of the other categories of lobbyist. Summarily, the *multi-tactic* lobbyist engages in a variety of activities that are both social in nature, as well as, a host of activities designed to convey information to legislators. They are likely the most adaptive lobbyists and are able to tailor their lobbying strategies to the environment. Table 3 illustrates that 41% of these individuals were senior executives of their organizations, 27% were in-house lobbyists, 23% were contract lobbyists, and only 3% were grass-roots lobbyists. These first three categories typically have a great deal of experience in their professions or in government (Thomas and Hrebendar 2004) and likely have extensive networks to utilize in their lobbying efforts (Heinz *et al.* 1993). Grass roots lobbyists probably lack the resources to utilize the *multi-tactic* approach.

Looking at the components of the personal index, the *good ole boys* had the highest mean for attending entertainment or sporting events with legislators, and they tied for the highest mean for dining with lawmakers (see Table 2). It is interesting that these activities are among the most social of the personal construct, and they may resemble the *good ole boys* of the past. On the information-based construct, the *good ole boys* had the lowest means for three out of the eleven components (second only to the *amateurs*). Not surprising, the *good ole boys* were the least likely to give technical information about policy, give information about the public, and help draft agency regulations. Given our understanding of the behavior of these lobbyists (Rosenthal 2001), it would not be expected that they would provide detailed policy information or possess the technical skills necessary to draft legislation or regulations. Since only 12% of the lobbyists in the sample were considered *good ole boys*, it is likely that many lobbyists have recognized the importance of information in their relationships with legislators, and now attempt to

provide it. Still, the *good ole boy* lobbyists were most likely senior executives (37%), many were in-house lobbyists (31%), but only 8% represented grass-roots organizations (see Table 3). Notably, contract lobbyists represent only 16% of this type of lobbyist, providing some indication that they are not just selling their ability to facilitate personal relationships.

Table 2 suggests that the *technocrat* lobbyist likely provides technical information on policy and is apt to testify at hearings or alert legislators to the effects of bills on their districts. However, the *technocrat* is also the least likely to dine with legislators, and, along with the *amateur*, is equally unlikely to attend entertainment or sporting events with them. But again, this is expected because *technocrats* specialize in information provision, rather than using personal appeal strategies. These lobbyists were typically senior executives and in-house lobbyists, but less likely represented grass roots organizations (see Table 3).

The amateur lobbyist lacks the personal and information-based appeal strategies discussed throughout this paper, but just how amateur are the *amateurs*? Table 2 shows that the amateurs had the lowest means on nearly all of the components of both the personal and information-based dimensions. With the exception of dining with legislators and attending entertainment or sporting events, the amateurs had lower means on the personal dimension components than the other types of lobbyists.

Looking at the information dimension, the *amateurs* had the lowest means for all of the components of that construct, with the exception of giving technical information, giving information about the public, and helping to draft agency regulations. Although the *amateur* lobbyists were often senior executives of organizations (39%) or grass-roots lobbyists (24%), of the four lobbying types, *amateurs* were less likely in-house lobbyists, (18%) or contract lobbyists (9%) (see Table 3). This is not surprising since contract lobbyists or in-house lobbyists who might

be classified as amateurs would not last long in their positions; contrarily, I suspect many grass-roots firms to have non-professional lobbyists. Some senior executives may lobby for a single issue (e.g. an anti-tax measure), and once the issue is addressed, they may have no further need to lobby.

Table 3  
Lobbyist Type by Lobbyist Characteristic\*

Characteristic	Amateur	Good Ole Boy	Technocrat	Multi-tactic
Senior Executive	39.0	36.7	39.0	41.0
In-house	18.4	30.6	32.0	27.0
Contract	8.8	16.3	11.0	23.0
Grass-roots	23.5	8.2	13.0	3.3
Other	10.3	8.2	5.0	5.7
N	136	49	100	122

Cramer's V = .18

\*Characteristics were derived from a survey question asking *Which best Characterizes you as a lobbyist?*

This analysis indicates that the *multi-tactic* lobbyists typically had the highest means on both dimensions. The *multi-tactic* lobbyist typically had a higher overall mean on the personal dimension than the *good ole boys* (20.9 v. 20), and a higher mean on the information dimension than the *technocrats* (29.4 v. 28.5). On the other hand, the *amateurs* also had a lower overall mean

on the personal dimension than the *technocrats* (14.6 v. 15.1), and a lower mean on the information dimension than the *good ole boys* (22.1 v. 23.1). This suggests that, from a strategic standpoint, there is not necessarily a finite set of tactics that lobbyists can use in their interactions, where employing a personal appeal diminishes the ability to use an information-based one. Rather, it is possible that lobbying tactics complement each other, such that the lobbyists who are able to do favors for officials or meet socially are also more likely to convey information by testifying at legislative hearings, planning legislative strategy, or drafting legislation. Or, once a legislator accepts information from a lobbyist, a relationship develops for future interactions, thereby facilitating a personal relationship. Conversely, the *amateurs*' inability to employ a given personal strategy seems to make conveying information even more unlikely, and their inability to disseminate information appears to make forging personal relationships with legislators more difficult.

So, what type of lobbying has replaced the use of gifts and expensive dinners as a means to gain access to state lawmakers? Unfortunately, it is difficult to compare the number of *good ole boys* today to their number in the past. However, the low percentage of *good ole boys* in this study suggests that they have indeed declined. Today, to do their jobs effectively, lobbyists appear to add information-based appeals to their network of personal contacts. Others focus solely on information provision. Despite the increased number of registered lobbyists in the states over the past few decades, many lobbyists are not effective in using personal appeals or conveying information. This is indicated by the fact that a third of the lobbyists in this study were deemed to be *amateurs*. Still, this may be encouraging for those concerned with democratic responsiveness, as it appears that a sizeable number of lobbying registrants are non-professionals. Whether

the average person can engage in lobbying and have an impact on policy is another story.

### CONCLUSION

What do these findings tell us about professional relationships? Perhaps a broader definition of professional relationships is needed. We know that lobbyists use a variety of tactics to achieve their objectives, ranging from going public (Kollman 1998) to testifying at legislative hearings (Schlozman and Tierney 1986; Nownes and Freeman 1998). If tactics or strategies are perceived as weapons in a lobbyist's arsenal, they will use whatever they have at their disposal to gain favor with legislators. A sizeable number of senior executives, in-house, and contract lobbyists use the multi-tactic approach. However, while the *good ole boy* lobbyist might not provide large amounts of information, he would have a highly personalized relationship with his legislative counterpart. Yet, this does not mean the relationship is not professional. Similarly, lobbyists who provide a great deal of information could be perceived as having professional relationships even if their relationships are not necessarily personal. So, professional relationships involve the effective use of one or more lobbying tactic(s) in order to achieve objectives. Professional lobbyists are more likely than amateurs to use direct contacts in their lobbying (Zeigler and Baer 1969). A third of the lobbyists who I have termed *amateurs*, likely do not have frequent, direct contact with legislators. Conversely, professional lobbyists are able to use direct contacts involving both personal and information-based appeals.

These relationship patterns may apply to other political actors as well. Thus, interactions between legislators and the governor or among law-makers and their constituents may involve a similar dimensionality of personal relationships and information provision. The successful use of these tactics probably plays an

important role in determining political influence. Accordingly, the obvious next step is to determine the effectiveness of various lobbying tactics in influencing legislators or at least policy outcomes. Of course, this has been somewhat difficult to do in a long line of research. These findings suggest that although there is reasonable support that there are personal and information based dimensions in lobbying, the ability to utilize one set of strategies will facilitate the ability use another set. There may be little additional time or monetary cost in pursuing multiple strategies, and even if there is an additional cost, it may be worth the added investment.

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