

# LoGoSO

中德 Germany China

Models of Co-operation  
between Local  
Governments and Social  
Organizations –  
Migration: Challenges  
and Solutions

## LoGoSO Research Papers Nr. 23

# Models of Co-operation in Germany's Migrant Services

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#### The Publication Series

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#### The Research Project

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Models of Co-operation between Local Governments and Social Organizations in Germany and China– Migration: Challenges and Solutions (LoGoSO Germany China) is a comparative research project of the Freie Universität Berlin, the Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster and the Chinese Academy of Governance, funded by Stiftung Mercator.

This comparative research project looks at the co-operation between state and social organizations (SOs) in China and Germany. It focusses on social service delivery in the area of integration of migrating populations with special attention to the fields of education, employment, vulnerable groups and social assistance (incl. legal aid) as a crosscutting issue to all of the fields. Within this subject area, the project wants to identify different models of state-SO co-operation and analyze which models are successful and why and where this co-operation is problematic. It aims to capture the different models of co-operation in Germany and China, to analyze and compare the underlying structures and to show potentialities for development.

**Contents**

- 1 Introduction..... 1
- 2 Theoretical Framework of Government/NPO Co-operation..... 1
  - 2.1 Co-operation and Public Administration..... 1
  - 2.2 Third-Party Government and Network Governance ..... 2
  - 2.3 Coston’s Model of Government-NPO Relationships ..... 3
- 3 Overview of Cases ..... 4
  - 3.1 Methods ..... 4
  - 3.2 Summary of Cases ..... 5
- 4 Representative Cases ..... 1
  - 4.1 Kein Abseits!..... 1
    - 4.1.1 Organisation Description..... 1
    - 4.1.2 Interest in Co-operation ..... 2
    - 4.1.3 Project Co-operation – Third-Party Government..... 3
  - 4.2 Chance+ Network for Refugees and Employment ..... 4
    - 4.2.1 Organisation Descriptions ..... 4
    - 4.2.2 Interest in Co-operation ..... 5
    - 4.2.3 Project Co-operation – Network Governance ..... 5
- 5 Conclusion ..... 8
- 6 References..... 9

## 1 Introduction

This paper investigates models of co-operation between government and nonprofit organisations (NPOs) in the policy field of migration in Germany as part of the LoGoSO project<sup>1</sup>. The co-operative relationships between local government and nonprofits in Berlin and Cologne are evaluated from a new public governance perspective and considering the theories of third-party government and network governance. The specific instances of co-operation are compared using Coston's (1998) model of government-NPO relationships, which considers both formal and informal forms of co-operation. For the nine German case studies, we provide a summary of the relationship models found in migrant service provision in the cities of Berlin and Cologne. We then present two case studies that represent the most formal examples of third-party government and network governance.

## 2 Theoretical Framework of Government/NPO Co-operation

### 2.1 Co-operation and Public Administration

Research shows that co-operation between the state and the nonprofit sector is not a recent phenomenon (Bode & Brandsen, 2014; Howlett, Kekez, & Poocharoen, 2017). This is especially true in Germany, where local government began co-operating with NPOs at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, in order to address challenges caused by urbanization and industrialization (Szeili & Zimmer, 2017; Zimmer & Grabbe, in press). The principle of subsidiarity, along with the German constitutional designation of municipalities as the lowest administrative unit in the federal system, responsible for all community social issues, has led to increased co-operation between local government and nonprofits in the wake of the Second World War (Szeili & Zimmer, 2017). For decades, local government has looked to the German Welfare Associations as the main provider of services, and currently Welfare Associations represent over 100,000 entities that employ 1.7 million workers and 2.5 million volunteers (Szeili & Zimmer, 2017; Zimmer & Grabbe, in press).

It is no surprise, then, based upon this history of co-operation, that nonprofit organisations play a key role in providing migrant service in Germany. Migration policy is a new field for local government and has very little regulation. Further, the recent arrival of large numbers of refugees has underscored the fact that municipalities are highly dependent on NPOs to deliver critical services (Szeili & Zimmer, 2017). While we are aware of this significant co-operation, there is little known about the nature of these co-operative relationships. Further, these relationships and the tools government utilizes to engage with NPOs have likely been influenced by changes in prevailing public administration practices over the past several decades.

Public administration research lacks its own analytical concepts and, thus, employs those of other disciplines like systems theory or neo-institutionalism (Schnapp, 2006). One of these concepts utilized in this paper is the creation of administrative paradigms. The paradigms can be seen as ideas and models of administrative reform that have been repeatedly voiced in a certain time period (Polzer, 2016). They describe "the organizing principles to guide reforms and practices, focus attention, give meaning to activities and specify what goals or values are to be pursued" (Meyer & Hammerschmid, 2006). Hartley (Hartley, 2005) identified three paradigms through which the public sector has passed

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since the post–World War II period. These are the bureaucracy - or simply called (traditional) public administration (PA), new public management (NPM), and new public governance (NPG).

In the last decades, governance practices have shifted from PA, a classic concept of public administration that reflects a strong government which steers primarily through laws and regulations, toward NPM, which assumes that private-sector management techniques are superior to those of PA and focuses on improving the quality, efficiency and effectivity of public services (Bogumil, Jann, & Nullmeier, 2006; Osborn, 2006; Polzer, 2016). The increased importance of NPM in the early 1990s, marketized service provision in Germany and, consequently, social laws were changed so that nonprofit providers lost privileges in the system, allowing for-profit providers into the mix (Bode & Brandsen, 2014; Szeili & Zimmer, 2017; Zimmer & Grabbe, in press). However, while these changes created challenges for the social sector, nonprofits remain an integral part of the Germany welfare system and in service provision.

The more recent paradigm shift toward NPG is the focus of this article (Howlett et al., 2017; Zimmer & Grabbe, in press). Contrary to PA and NPM, NPG is not centred on internal administrative processes and structures. Instead, it focuses on partnerships, networks and contracts between public administration and other actors (Dossi, 2017). These can span a variety of public, nonprofit and commercial partners (Polzer, 2016).

In public administration research, “governance” is discussed not only as a research perspective but more as a normative concept categorized under various labels such as “citizen-centered governance, [...] networked governance” (Hartley, 2005) or “public governance” (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2017). NPG, coined by Osborne in 2006, is a concept of governance where public, nonprofit, and commercial partners are involved in both policy-implementation and policy-making.

For the government, non-public partners are a welcome addition to public management. Non-public partners help address ever-more complex social issues amidst increasingly constrained revenues (Bode & Brandsen, 2014; Pestoff, 2012). Under the NPG paradigm, NPOs are seen as key partners who bring the comparative advantages of additional resources (volunteers, donations) and close connections to specific user groups (Bode & Brandsen, 2014; Salamon, 1995). The resulting interaction between public administration and external actors under the NPG paradigm leads to various forms of governance, two of which are central to this study: third-party government and network governance.

## **2.2 Third-Party Government and Network Governance**

Salamon defines third-party government as a system “in which government shares a substantial degree of its discretion over the spending of public funds and the exercise of public authority with third-party implementers” (1987, p. 37). This concept is strongly supportive of German subsidiarity, in that it fulfils the government’s obligation to set priorities for how to spend social resources while, at the same time, ensuring services are provided by those organisations closest to the problems being addressed. As previously mentioned, NPOs are well suited to this form of co-operation.

Two parts of Salamon’s (1995) theory are key to understanding the occurrence of government/NPO co-operation. The first is the concept of ‘voluntary failure’, where NPOs provide services in response to market failures but lack the resources necessary to sufficiently respond to community need. The second is that government can solve problems more efficiently by co-operating with those already engaged in the work. Since NPOs are often first to respond to community need (due to market failure),

they already have programmes and structures in place so that once the community need exceeds available NPO resources (voluntary failure) and rises to the level of government attention, co-operating with these NPOs provides a cost-effective mechanism for government response. (Salamon, 1995)

The second model under the NPG paradigm closely tied to co-operative relationships in Germany is network governance. There is no commonly accepted theory to study the formation and function of networks (Torfing, 2014), but Torfing defines network governance as “networks of independent actors that contribute to the production of public governance” (2014, p. 99). Jones et al. is more exacting and defines network governance as a specific group of autonomous ‘firms’ (including NPOs) that work together in order to successfully produce complex, highly customized services amid environmental uncertainty. Jones et al. also posits that network governance offers “comparative advantages over markets and hierarchies” (1997, p. 923), which aligns well with the NPG paradigm.

Networks can be either initiated by network partners themselves or – as is often the case in the public sector – can be mandated or contracted (Provan & Kenis, 2007). The preferred form of network interaction is frequent exchanges of knowledge, ideas and information that foster stronger ties between network partners (Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997; Torfing, 2014). Network partners maintain their autonomy, and, contrary to hierarchical modes of governance, participation in the network is voluntary. Although the network organisations might have different resources and structural positions that create asymmetric power relations, these power relations are horizontal, meaning that no actor can single-handedly resolve conflicts that emerge in the network.

Provan and Kenis (2007) further categorize networks along two dimensions. On the one hand, networks can be completely governed by the organisations that comprise the network. This results in a situation in which all organisations densely interact with each other and share governance. At the other extreme, the network can be managed by a single organisation. This leaves few direct organisation-to-organisation interactions, except for the purposes of operational issues such as the transfer of clients or information on services.

### **2.3 Coston’s Model of Government-NPO Relationships**

Comparing forms of co-operation – even in the same policy field – is very complex; there is little uniformity in these relationships, and they can develop in a contradictory fashion (Bode & Brandsen, 2014; Szeili & Zimmer, 2017). Coston’s model of government-NPO relationships helps us classify these specific interactions by taking into account “government’s resistance or acceptance of institutional pluralism, government NPO linkage, relative power relationship, degree of formality, favourability of government policy vis-a-vis NPO, and other type-specific characteristics” (Coston, 1998, p. 360). We will primarily be concerned with the models on the right side of Coston’s relationship scale (as seen in Figure 1), as Germany’s history shows an acceptance of institutional pluralism or “welfare pluralism” as noted by Szeili & Zimmer (2017, p.19). On this side of the scale, the relationships are increasingly based upon competitive advantage and involve the sharing of resources ranging from grants/contracts to the coordination of voluntary labour (Coston, 1998). The different relationship models depend upon the government’s tolerance for the specific social organisation’s influence and autonomy, combined with that organisation’s willingness or ability to enter into formal relationships with government (Coston, 1998).

Specifically, we will use six of Coston’s relationship models as presented in Figure 1. On the side of the scale where less institutional pluralism is accepted, the relationship types are competition, contracting,

and third-party government, which operate on a scale from informal to formal. Competition is related to government resistance to institutional pluralism, such that social organisations are critical of government and are seen as competitors for local power. Regarding contracting, social organisations deliver services on behalf of government, but they are allowed little input into the design of those services. The most formal of the three, third-party government, is similar to contracting, but in this relationship type social organisations have more autonomy in the use of public funds and public authority (Coston, 1998).




Figure 1: Coston's Model of Government-NPO Relationships (Coston, 1998)

On the side where more institutional pluralism is accepted, the relationships feature co-operation, complementarity, and collaboration, again with each having a different level of formality. Co-operation involves a more informal relationship defined by an unconstrained coexistence between the social organisation and government, with possible duplication of services and free flow of information. Complementarity is based upon mutual respect between government and social organisations, where the competitive advantages in service delivery offered by organisations are combined with "government's advantages in resource generation and democratic priority setting." (Coston, 1998, p. 371). Collaboration is more formalized, in which government and social organisations share the responsibility and operation of services; collaboration often results in the formation of service networks that include multiple actors.

### 3 Overview of Cases

In the following, we will present the case studies conducted as part of the LoGoSO project using the aforementioned theoretical framework. After describing the selection criteria for the cases and data collection method, we will give an overview of the cases and highlight the project-specific relationship models present in the study. Afterwards, two case studies will be presented in detail.

#### 3.1 Methods

The paper draws on nine case studies that were conducted as part of the LoGoSO-project (2016-2019). The case studies were undertaken in the cities of Berlin and Cologne in summer 2018. Eight of the case studies present NPOs engaged in successful co-operation with local governments in the field of social services for refugees. Co-operation was considered successful if the NPO had existed for several years, engaged in diverse networks, and had stable funding and staff. A ninth case was chosen as an example

of an ‘unsuccessful case’. Furthermore, in line with the project’s research interest, NPOs were identified that meet the following criteria:

- I. They all provide social services but operate in different policy fields, namely housing, education, employment and social assistance;
- II. At least one organisation was a newly established grassroots organisation, while at least one other was a member of a traditional German Welfare Association;
- III. At least one organisation was involved in policy-making; and
- IV. At least one organisation emerged in response to an increase in migration with a focus on service delivery.

Data for these case studies was collected by a review of local media reports and policy documents as well as qualitative expert interviews. All in all, 48 interviews were conducted with 22 government officials, 22 NPO representatives and 4 beneficiaries of services. The interviews were transcribed and, together with all collected materials, were examined through qualitative content analysis, filtering information according to ex-ante fixed analytical categories (Gläser & Laudel, 2010). If necessary, the ex-ante fixed analytical categories were supplemented by inductive categories (Gläser & Laudel, 2010; Kaiser, 2014). The analysis was supported by MAXQDA software.

The analysis focuses on the relationships between the NPOs and actors from the public sphere in the field of refugee integration. We take a public administration perspective and refer to the aforementioned third-party government, network governance and relationship models to analyse the types of co-operation occurring in these two cities in Germany.

### 3.2 Summary of Cases

NPOs play a critical role in local refugee and integration policy in Germany (Szeili & Zimmer, 2017; Zimmer & Grabbe, in press). The data in this study shows that NPOs are key players in each of the following policy areas: education, housing, vulnerable groups, and employment. Further, each of the case studies reveal elements of third-party government and network governance to varying degrees.

Aspects of third-party government are visible as all organisations provide services to refugees – a target group which is not sufficiently covered by the market or public programmes so far. For this reason, several of the NPOs under study were newly established or were extending their existing service portfolio in reaction to the arrival of refugees in recent years. In the majority of cases (with the exception of *Be an Angel*) the government had begun to acknowledge the work of the NPOs and entered into contractual relationships or provide other support measures. At the same time, all cases show elements of network governance. The models range from formal networks established exclusively to provide housing or labour market access for refugees to more informal networks like working groups and round tables that allow the NPOs to bring their policy ideas directly to local government. Finally, all organisations were involved in networks with other NPOs or profit-oriented actors, be it the Free Welfare Associations or business associations.

Table 1 presents a summary comparison of all nine cases in the study. The cases are in order of how they align with Coston’s (1998) government-NPO relationship model. Figure 2 shows where each case falls along the continuum.



Table 1 highlights a couple of interesting points in comparing these cases. Overall, 18 organisations are represented by these nine case studies. Only half of these organisations are members of larger established Welfare Associations. This is surprising considering the long prominence of Germany's Welfare Associations in all areas of service provision (Zimmer & Grabbe, in press) .

In looking at the co-operative relationships by policy area, we see that, with the exception of employment, there is no consistency in type of co-operative relationship by policy area. As previously mentioned, migration is a new policy area for local government. Employment is regulated at the federal level, which provides consistency between cities. The other important refugee integration services, such as housing and counselling, represent local-level policies (Szeili & Zimmer, 2017), which explains why the type of relationships in the same policy areas differ between the cities. Housing is an example of this: *Auszugsmanagement* in Cologne is a formal network model that is publicly funded and has strong connections to government (Grabbe, in press c), whereas *Refugio* in Berlin is funded by the Berliner Stadtmission's general funds and is coordinated through informal case-by-case co-operation in response to the needs of individual refugees (Gluns, in press b). The situation is similar for education, only in this policy area the co-operation is more formal in Berlin than in Cologne. In Berlin, *Kein Abseits!* has a mix of public and private funding and has formal co-operative relationship with schools, refugee accommodations, and other government agencies (Schönert, in press). In Cologne, *HOPE* has mostly private funding, and the co-operative efforts are informal case by case co-operations (Grabbe, in press a).

Additionally, it might be expected that projects run by newer organisations would exist only at the lower end of Coston's 'acceptance of institutional pluralism scale', but this isn't strictly the case. *Kein Abseits!* is an example of an organisation, founded in the preceding decade, that maintains a large amount of autonomy and has developed strong connections with government (Schönert, in press). It is possible that the early engagement of *Kein Abseits!* with local networks and their interest in policy development at the local, regional, national and European levels may have contributed to their ability to successfully enter into the local welfare structures. It is interesting to consider and compare this case to *Be an Angel*, the 'unsuccessful case' in this study. *Be an Angel*, which was founded four years after *Kein Abseits!*, has not managed to make inroads into the local welfare structure. It is possible that their sole focus on service provision does not produce the strategies needed to become a networked part of the local service landscape. It was also observed that *Be An Angel* has been very critical of government refugee service provision in Berlin (Gluns, in press a). However, among these cases, *Be An Angel* is not the only organisation that advocates strongly for refugees, and, therefore, this quality in itself does not fully explain its lack of success in developing a co-operative relationship with local government. In fact, older organisations like the Refugee Counsel in Cologne started off in opposition to government but evolved into an autonomous organisation with high connectedness to local government; in fact, the *Auszugsmanagement* project is a collaboration in the form of a formal network that was initiated by *The Refugee Council* (Grabbe, in press c).

Project/Case Study	Organisation(s)	Policy Field	Welfare Assoc. Member	Project Relationship Type	Co-operation: Funding & Services
<b>Be an angel (Berlin)</b>	Be an angel e.V.	Varied	No	Competition	Only private funding Informal: case-by-case contact to address individual needs
<b>AWO Women's Counselling Center (Berlin)</b>	AWO Berlin District Association Southeast	Vulnerable Groups (women)	Yes	Contracting	Only public funding via contracts Informal: case-by-case contact to address individual needs
<b>Kein Abseits! (Berlin)</b>	Kein Abseits! e.V.	Education	No	Third-Party Government	Mix of private and public funding Formal: co-operation with schools and public agencies
<b>Refugio e.V. (Berlin)</b>	Berliner Stadtmission	Housing	Yes	Co-operation	Funded by Stadtmission general funds Informal: case-by-case contact to address individual needs
<b>HOPE (Cologne)</b>	Rheinflanke gGmbH (CG)	Education	Yes	Co-operation	Mostly private funding Informal: case-by-case contact to address individual needs
<b>Agisra e.V. (Cologne)</b>	Agisra e.V.	Vulnerable groups (women)	Yes	Complementarity	Public funding via administrative grants Informal: case-by-case contact to address individual needs
<b>Bridge e.V. (Berlin)</b>	1 agency and 5 organisations	Employment	1 of 5	Collaboration, initiated by government	Only public funding via contracts Formal: network model
<b>Auszugsmanagement (Cologne)</b>	1 agency and 3 organisations	Housing	2 of 3	Collaboration, initiated by social organisation	Only public funding via contracts Formal: network model
<b>Chance+ Network Refugees and Employment (Cologne)</b>	1 agency and 3 organisations	Employment	2 of 3	Collaboration, initiated by government	Only public funding via contracts Formal: network model

Table 1: Summary of German LoGoSO case studies




Figure 2: Adapted from Coston's Model of Government-NPO Relationships (Coston, 1998)

## 4 Representative Cases

To underscore the prevalence of third-party government and network governance models, we have selected two cases that represent the most formal examples of these models of co-operation found in this study. The selected cases also represent both cities:

- Integration by Education – *Kein Abseits! e.V.* in Berlin (Schönert, in press)
- Employment – *Chance+ Network Refugees and Employment* in Cologne (Grabbe, in press b)

### 4.1 Kein Abseits!

#### 4.1.1 Organisation Description

*Kein Abseits!* is an association founded in 2011 that promotes child and youth welfare, sports, and active citizenship mainly in the Reinickendorf District of Berlin. *Kein Abseits!* translates directly to 'no offside,' which is both a soccer reference and a nod to the organisation's mission to foster integration and not leave youth on the outskirts of society. The project is particularly focused on children and youth who have single parents, many siblings, parents with little education, few financial resources, or a migration/refugee background. Many children in Berlin are growing up with these risk factors, which impact their ability to succeed in the educational system and labour market and subsequently lead to poverty and social deprivation of whole neighbourhoods and quarters. *Kein Abseits!* is one of the few organisations offering measures to prevent this structural drop out. The mission of the organisation grew out of the lived experiences of the two co-founders, who are themselves children of migrant guest workers.

Service provision by *Kein Abseits!* has a threefold approach: (1) sports and experiences that offer exercise; (2) social network building that is easily accessible to marginalized youth, and it involves 1-to-1 mentoring that pairs youth ages 9 to 13 with university students to engage in educational, cultural and social activities; and (3) occupational exploration offered by adult professionals to help children explore career paths, opportunities and interests. The success of this approach has been recognized with awards from the Alliance for Democracy and Tolerance, City of Berlin, Senate Department of the Interior and Sports, Trade Union Education and Science Berlin, and Robert-Bosch Foundation.

The sharp increase of refugees arriving in Berlin in 2015 led *Kein Abseits!* to develop specific programming to serve migrant children. The project “Heimspiel” (home play) was started in 2014 to serve girls living in refugee accommodations in Berlin-Reinickendorf. Since then, those services have been integrated into the regular offers in order to strengthen *Kein Abseits!*'s inclusive philosophy. However, migrants and refugees remain a central part of the service population.

*Kein Abseits!* is registered as a nonprofit association according to the German Fiscal Code (Abgabenordnung). Governance consists of a three-person executive board responsible for the association's activities, supervising the management, monitoring financial issues, protecting children and coordinating the members. There are four fields of operations: mentoring, pedagogical management, sports & adventure, and management. Management is focused on planning, strategy, finances, projects, human resources and public relations. Altogether, the association has around 20 members, most of which are engaged as executive board members, managers and supervisors, self-employed trainers or volunteers.

Like many newly formed independent associations, *Kein Abseits!* is highly dependent on private funding. In 2016, 85% of funding came from grants, donations and revenues and only 15% came from public sources. Additionally, the majority of funding is fixed-term (1 to 3 years) project funds, which makes long-term planning challenging. *Kein Abseits!* has been increasingly successful in securing public funds. In 2017, the proportion of revenue from public sources increased to 30%. This success has a lot to do with the association's skill in connecting to local welfare networks. (Schönert, in press)

#### 4.1.2 Interest in Co-operation

*Kein Abseits!* has had a clear interest in co-operating with government from the very beginning. This is exhibited by the association's efforts to build networks and impact policy beyond its specific project interactions at the district level in Berlin. This interest may be what led *Kein Abseits!* to swiftly become part of the established welfare structure in Berlin (even if they are still a small player).

In Germany, big welfare providers have the advantage of long engagement at the local level that leads to the largest share of public funding. They have the infrastructure to offer services on short notice and cope with complex and time-consuming administrative processes. Even without these advantages, *Kein Abseits!* became an established player at local level due to their strategic efforts to engage with government and other service providers. It is therefore notable that *Kein Abseits!* is not a member of one of Germany's Welfare Associations.

A representative of the youth office described *Kein Abseits!* as “innovative and research oriented in the development of their services” (Schönert, in press). From the start, staff regularly attended network meetings in the district and worked flexibly and effectively with other service providers. *Kein Abseits!* has also shown itself to be a catalyst for new initiatives that extend beyond their day-to-day service offerings. At the local level, they started the Working Group Refuge and Asylum (AG Asyl und Flucht) – a biannual meeting of field migration and integration professionals that now meets at the Refugee Coordination and the Youth Office of Reinickendorf.

*Kein Abseits!*'s initiatives extend beyond Reinickendorf. They co-founded the “Netzwerk Kinderpatenschaften” (network of child sponsorship) – a network of 36 social organisations who offer mentoring services in Berlin. The network exists to share knowledge, collectively advocate to impact the city's social agenda, and organize mentorship services across Berlin. They even coordinate efforts to apply for funding to increase the likelihood of success. The network is also engaged at the European

level. It initiated and co-led the European Mentoring & Befriending Exchange Program in 2014 and is often an organizer for the European Mentoring Summit and a member of the European Center of Evidence-Based Mentoring (ECEB). (Schönert, in press)

#### 4.1.3 Project Co-operation – Third-Party Government

The interests and ambitions of *Kein Abseits!* extend beyond the local level, as noted above, but their project-level co-operation with local government is at the centre of their service provision. Their co-operative engagement in the Reinickendorf district of Berlin is best described as third-party government. In this instance, government policy toward co-operative engagement is contingent on its specific relationship with the association. As a newer organisation, *Kein Abseits!* was able to become an important player in the established social welfare structure that is often monopolized by the established welfare organisations. For one, they engage in resource sharing in the way of tax-exempt status and public funding, but *Kein Abseits!* is also able to maintain autonomy when it comes to the use of funds and influence over the social agenda. This is partially related to its strategic positioning in the local welfare networks and the fact that it brings resources like volunteers and private funds into the service mix.

In Coston's model, third-party government is the most formal of the relationships on the weaker side of the 'acceptance of institutional pluralism scale'. *Kein Abseits!* engages in formal co-operative engagement with government and did even before it had access to public funding. It began its co-operation with the local schools and later connected with refugee accommodations where they offered sports and mentoring services. From the start, they participated in "Kiez Runden" (Quarter-Meetings) to get involved in the local network. These meetings, the most important networks for local service provision, are part of the Sozialgesetzbuch (SGB; Social Code Book) and run by the Youth Office. Thanks to their consistent participation, *Kein Abseits!* became an officially recognized provider of children and youth welfare services (Träger der freien Kinder- und Jugendhilfe), making them eligible for public funds from the Youth Office (Schönert, in press).

As previously mentioned, *Kein Abseits!* has had some success securing public funding. They doubled the proportion of public funds in their budget from 2016 to 2017. However, securing this funding has been challenging and has not led to long-term financial sustainability. Combining efforts with other members of "Netzwerk Kinderpatenschaften", they received funding from Federal Ministry for Education and Research (BMBF) in 2012 and later in 2016 from the Senate Department of Education, Youth and Family for the project "1 zu 1 Flüchtlingspatenschaften" (1-to-1 refugee mentoring). When funding became available through Berlin's Master Plan for Integration and Security (Gluns, 2018b), representatives of the Youth Office immediately thought of *Kein Abseits!*, as they have "a portfolio that neither the Youth Office nor other providers in the district could offer and that is innovative and effective" (Schönert, in press). However, when it comes to funding, the opportunities are limited. Even though *Kein Abseits!* is an integrated member of the social welfare network and is trusted and respected by the Youth Office, the Youth Office has very little flexible funding that is not already allocated to more established organisations. The extra funds made available by the Master Plan enabled *Kein Abseits!* to get a foot in the door, but its year to year funding isn't guaranteed in the future. At the time that Schönert (in press) wrote the case, the association was at a crossroads of trying to figure out how to sustain services in the long run amidst these constraints.

## 4.2 Chance+ Network for Refugees and Employment

### 4.2.1 Organisation Descriptions

**Chance+ Network for Refugees and Employment** is a network that supports refugee labour market integration and includes one government agency and three social organisations in the city of Cologne. The government agency that staffs the network coordinator is the Job Center Cologne (Jobcenter Köln). The social organisations engaged in Cologne are IN VIA Catholic Association for Girls' and Women's Social Work (IN VIA Katholischer Verband für Mädchen- und Frauensozialarbeit), The Caritas Association of the City of Cologne (Cartiasverband für die Stadt Köln), and International Union (Internationaler Bund). Each of these network members are autonomous organisations that have long histories of service provision and engagement in workplace integration in Cologne. To give a clear picture of how this network functions, this section will first give a short description of each network member and then describe why the network was chosen as the preferred form of governance.

**The Job Center Cologne** is legislated by The Federal Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs (Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales/BMAS) and administered by the Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit) in co-operation with the city of Cologne (Gluns, 2018b). The Job Center manages long-term unemployment benefits (UBII) and provides labour market support in the form of education and training, counselling and placement, self-employed services, and counselling for specific target groups including refugees. The Job Center Cologne employs 1500 staff but no volunteers and is fully funded by the city and the federal government (Gluns, 2018b).

**IN VIA Catholic Association for Girls' and Women's Social Work** was founded in 1898 by wealthy Catholic women to help women and girls in need make a living. What started off as services to help women and girls from rural areas who came to Cologne for work expanded into assistance for female Spanish guest workers in the 1960s and later child and youth welfare for migrant children. Currently, IN VIA runs over 6 projects across Cologne that serve children and youth regardless of gender, origin, or belief. Specific services for refugees range from travel support and first orientation, accommodation for unaccompanied minors, and counselling. *Chance+* is not IN VIA's only co-operative effort to integrate refugees into the labour market; it also provides language tutoring and education to refugees as part of the federal programme "Quality is no coincidence – New Standards for Refugee Work" (Qualität ist kein Zufall – Neue Standards für die Flüchtlingsarbeit) and helps refugees get recognized for previously acquired qualifications through the Job Center programme "KompAS" (IN VIA 2017). IN VIA employs 616 staff, 162 volunteers and its budget is 59% public and 31% private funding.

**The Caritas Association of the City of Cologne** was founded in 1915 to unite Catholic social service organisations that were attempting to alleviate hardships caused by the First World War (Caritasverband für die Stadt Köln e.V., 2016). While Caritas only provided support to other organisations in its early years, it began providing services like childcare and retirement homes after the Second World War. Similar to IN VIA, Caritas began serving guest worker migrants in the 1960s. Today, Caritas provides a wide array of services to migrants, children, the disabled, and the elderly at over 80 facilities in Cologne. Services targeted to refugees include group accommodation and help finding housing, legal counselling, trauma care, and language education. In addition to *Chance+*, Caritas matches refugees with mentors to help them search for employment through the programme "Initiative New Neighbours" (Aktion Neue Nachbarn) and runs 6-week job market orientations and 6-week internships for refugees under 35 who are asylum seekers or tolerated persons. Caritas employs

1,765 staff and 1,630 volunteers, and the majority of its funding comes from service charges (76%), a small portion from public funds (11%), and the rest is provided by the Church.

**International Union** was founded in 1945 to assist youth who were homeless and unemployed in Tübingen, many of whom lacked an education due to the Second World War. Since then, the organisation has significantly expanded its service offers, target populations, and geographic spread. Today, the Union provides education and training to help people of all ages who are living in difficult circumstances. It is active in 300 locations all over Germany. In Cologne, the Union works primarily in schools and training centres. Service offers include mobile social work, job counselling and training, general education, childcare, and housing for the disabled and homeless. In addition to *Chance+*, International Union funds the programme “Perspectives for Female Refugees” (Perspektiven für weibliche Flüchtlinge/PERF w), which provides language support and information about the German labour market to female asylum seekers and recognized refugees. Germany-wide, the organisation employs 14,000 staff, and the majority of funding is public (80%) with fees, insurance payments and donations making up the balance. (Grabbe, in press b)

#### 4.2.2 Interest in Co-operation

The institutional interest in co-operation of the three social organisations engaged in *Chance+ Cologne* are not all the same. Caritas has a long history of co-operation on both policy development and implementation, while the International Union and IN VIA have mostly been engaged in service provision and implementation. Caritas co-operates with multiple public authorities and private organisations. Additionally, it engages in public policy-making as a member of the Round Table of Refugee Issues Cologne (Runder Tisch für Flüchtlingsfragen Köln) and as part of a campaign and commission to grant refugees with exceptional leave permanent residency permits in Cologne.

The other two organisations do not engage directly in policy-making; instead, they have a significant history of co-operative service provision in conjunction with other public and private entities at the local, national and international levels. Both organisations are also a part of Quality Community Professional Education Cologne (Qualitätsgemeinschaft Berufliche Bildung Köln), which ensures quality service for organisations providing vocational training. IN VIA is also one of five Caritas members and, as such, is able to benefit from Caritas’s public policy work without having to directly engage in advocacy.

As a network, *Chance+* is focused on service provision to improve the lives of refugees with the legal status of exceptional leave to remain. It does not directly engage with policy-making; instead, it operates as a silent player. Since the Job Center is a member of the network and employs the coordinator, the network cannot advocate on behalf of refugees. (Grabbe, in press b)

#### 4.2.3 Project Co-operation – Network Governance

The *Chance+* network is a good illustration of networked governance and demonstrates why the network approach was chosen as the governance form of choice.

First of all, as expected in the public sector, the network was initiated from the top down. It was established by Germany’s national government with the goal to improve job market integration for targeted groups, among them asylum seekers, recognized refugees, and those with an exceptional leave to remain (‘tolerated’) who are served by the programme “Integration of Asylum Seekers and Refugees” (Integration von Asylsuchenden und Flüchtlingen/IvAF) (BMAS, 2017). This, however, does

not include refugees who are excluded from the labour market because they come from places that are considered 'safe countries of origin' (Gluns, 2018).

In order to participate, regions must put together a network of providers, one that preferably includes private partners like NPOs and businesses, to provide job counselling and placement, network building, and access to expert knowledge. These networks apply to the Federal Ministry for competitive funding, 50% of which is provided by the European Social Fund (ESF), 40% by the Federal Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs (Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales), and 10% from the network partners themselves (BMAS, 2017). *Chance+* is one of 41 IvAF networks across the country.

*Chance+* is based upon two previous employment networks that focused on persons without permanent residency permits who are therefore ineligible for regular offers at the job centers. The previous networks were the KNFA (Kölner Netzwerk Flüchtlinge und Arbeit/Cologne Network for Refugees and Labour) and Colourful into the Future (Bunt in die Zukunft). These 'tolerated persons' are a major focus of *Chance+*, and the network operates under the idea that employment offers the possibility of a guaranteed right to stay for refugees who lack residency. All three NPOs were engaged in one or both of these previous networks, and the KNFA was coordinated by a previous iteration of the Job Center. Therefore, the network partners have a long history of frequently exchanging knowledge, ideas, and information, which has fostered strong ties between them.

Second, relating to the different network forms identified by Provan and Kenis (2007, p. 233), it can be said that the governance of the network is not shared but executed by a lead organisation. The role of the lead organisation is conducted by the network coordinator, who is employed by the Job Center. The coordinator is responsible for performing administration related to the network, organising monthly meetings, and taking on a steering role when the network interacts with external partners. It is advantageous for the network that the coordinator is employed by the Job Center, as it creates a strong connection to local government; the Job Center is a joint facility of the Federal Employment Agency and the city of Cologne. Job Center employees see *Chance+* as a supplemental service that they are happy to utilize, and the Job Center provides *Chance+* with a technical infrastructure to draw upon. The network also participates in internal monthly meetings of the Job Center. Additionally, all network partners co-operate with public institutions outside the Job Center, in particular the immigration authority, housing authority, and the local integration centres. This includes knowledge sharing via trainings to other public and private entities including politicians, administration officials, and those from business and civil society.

Third, it is beneficial for the participant organisations to follow a network model because they all share a common goal: integrating refugees into the local labour market. However, as services for refugees are very specific and there is plenty of uncertainty created by a frequently changing legal environment (Bogumil et al., 2006), this goal is difficult to achieve. Thus, they have realized that they are likely to be more successful if they bundle their various areas of expertise and resources.

Caritas, IN VIA, and International Union offer the comparative advantages of long histories working in labour market integration, connection to migrant communities, and supplemental service offers that can improve overall outcomes for refugees. All organisations are currently involved in numerous labour market or educational programmes for refugees. So, with the exception of the work of the coordinator, the tasks accomplished by network partners overlap. Each organisation provides counselling, placement and trainings. However, this is balanced by each organisation's different



expertise and their offers of additional refugee-focused services. Caritas employs two *Chance+* staff who provide individual counselling, job placement and placement in training programmes offered by third parties. Caritas's refugee services that complement *Chance+* include social counselling for victims of trauma, mentoring, informational events, and counselling and training for employers working with labour market integration of refugees. As part of *Chance+*, IN VIA employs two staff and offers individual counselling, job placement, application trainings, referral to language courses, and contracts directly with businesses to provide work experience and job orientation to refugees. IN VIA also assists businesses with legal matters pertaining to refugee integration and guides refugees during the first few weeks of employment. International Union employs two *Chance+* staff and provides counselling and job placement like the other partner organisations, but its major strength is job orientation and in-house training opportunities.

A fourth aspect of the network approach is that, contrary to hierarchical forms of governance, network partners maintain their autonomy. This becomes clear when analysing the extent to which the network as a whole, and the individual organisations, advocate for the rights of refugees. While the network must maintain a more moderate role in advocacy efforts on behalf of 'tolerated' refugees, the individual social organisations maintain their autonomy in this area and are free to participate in political forums and round tables focused on these issues. As mentioned previously, Caritas is particularly engaged in public policy advocacy on behalf of refugees and it does not appear to have impacted their engagement as part of *Chance+* or their other co-operative arrangements. Further, as long as partners stay within contract guidelines, they are free to implement *Chance+* how they see fit and select the desired personnel. The coordinator of the network is characterized as very open to new ideas and thematic priorities of the network organisations.

By measure of number of participants integrated into the labour market, *Chance+* has been very successful. Since 2015, more than 50% of *Chance+* participants were integrated into the labour market. Measures of the overall IvAF-programme show a rate of 26% of participants provided with education, vocational training or work. It appears to be a particular strength of *Chance+* that the coordinator for the network is employed by the Job Center, which is not the case with other IvAF networks. This provides the network with particularly good connections to the Job Center and other local public authorities. Furthermore, the network's success rests in its ability to have services provided by social organisations that extend beyond legal and job counselling and include social counselling, mentoring and job market education. (Grabbe, in pressb)

While *Chance+* has grown into a network where the partners have great trust for one another and participant placements are above the national average, the project is not without its challenges. The highly bureaucratic nature of the federal programme creates the need for staff to manage time-consuming administrative processes, and partners feel that the provision of 1.5 full time-equivalent staff is not sufficient to comply with administrative requirements while also putting sufficient time into counselling participants. Further, the fact that this is a time-constrained project makes it difficult to retain staff who have the experience and personal connections that are important to the success of the network. Finally, *Chance+* is no longer seen as the primary expert on asylum and labour laws or the main provider of refugee labour market integration services in Cologne. (Gluns, 2018a). The

increase in other projects has created a complicated structure in Cologne that makes it difficult for refugees to navigate and has diluted the network's influence on policy. (Grabbe, in press b)

## 5 Conclusion

This paper investigates models of co-operation between government and nonprofit organisations in the policy field of migration in Germany from a public administration research perspective. The LoGoSO case studies in Cologne and Berlin present a range of co-operative models that exist between government and NPOs. Overall, third-party government and network governance are the preferred forms of interaction. Third-party government can be observed as the NPOs in this study either were founded in reaction to the arrival of a large number of migrants in recent years or have expanded their existing service portfolio. The local government sought to co-operate with these NPOs by providing contracts, support funding, and infrastructure instead of setting up its own programmes and services. At the same time, all cases show elements of network governance. These networks range from formal networks coordinated by local government actors to improve labour market access for refugees to more informal types of networks like round tables or working groups where NPOs have the opportunity to voice their ideas and concerns related to policy-makers.

In studying the factors that influence the co-operation, the LoGoSO case studies reveal that the co-operative relationships are not as dependent on the established German social welfare associations as might be expected. Half of the organisations represented in the study are not members of an association. There is also little alignment between the co-operative relationship and the policy field. Employment is the only field that has the same model in both cities, which makes sense as labour market integration is federal policy in Germany. In this field, the federal government initiated local networks to integrate refugees into the labour market. In contrast, the policy fields of housing, social assistance and education are local-level policies, and, therefore, co-operation models differ between the cities. They are influenced by local funding opportunities and traditions of co-operation. Further, the age of the organisation seems to have little influence on the degree of formality of the co-operation, as relatively young organisations were able to develop strong ties to the local administration while at the same time staying autonomous. The cases also demonstrate that early involvement into local networks and a great extent of advocacy work on the local, federal and European levels can help organisations to draw the attention of policy-makers to them and become integrated into the local infrastructure of service provision.

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