

University of Mississippi

eGrove

Eastland Correspondence: Eisenhower
Administration

James O. Eastland Executive Branch
Correspondence

10-22-1954

Gerald D. Morgan to Senator James O. Eastland, 22 October 1954

Gerald D. Morgan

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/joecorr_c



Part of the [American Politics Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Morgan, Gerald D., "Gerald D. Morgan to Senator James O. Eastland, 22 October 1954" (1954). *Eastland Correspondence: Eisenhower Administration*. 9.

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/joecorr_c/9

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the James O. Eastland Executive Branch Correspondence at eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in Eastland Correspondence: Eisenhower Administration by an authorized administrator of eGrove. For more information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.

THE *WHITE* *HOUSE*
THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Washington

Rice

October 22, 1954

Dear Senator Eastland:

This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter of October eighteenth to the President. You may expect a further reply shortly.

With kind regards,

Sincerely,

Gerald D. Morgan

Gerald D. Morgan
Administrative Assistant
to the President

The Honorable James O. Eastland
United States Senator
Ruleville, Mississippi

WILLIAM LANGER, N. DAK., CHAIRMAN

ALEXANDER WILEY, WIS. PAT MCCARRAN, NEV.
WILLIAM E. JENNER, IND. HARLEY M. KILGORE, W. VA.
ARTHUR V. WATKINS, UTAH JAMES O. EASTLAND, MISS.
ROBERT C. HENDRICKSON, N. J. ESTES KEFAUVER, TENN.
EVERETT MC KINLEY DIRKSEN, ILL. OLIN D. JOHNSTON, S. C.
HERMAN WELKER, IDAHO THOMAS C. HENNINGS, JR., MO.
JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, MD. JOHN L. MCCLELLAN, ARK.

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

Ruleville, Mississippi
October 18, 1954

Dear Mr. President:

The continued unrest in Asiatic areas, as you know, brings into sharp focus policy considerations for one of our major farm commodities, rice.

Unfortunately, the existing legislation requires that acreage allotments and marketing quotas be imposed upon rice production whenever the actual supply is 10 percent more than the normal supply. The definition of normal supply itself permits only a 10 percent carry-over above domestic requirements and anticipated export needs. The legislation does, however, provide authority for the Secretary of Agriculture to adjust the calculations of normal supply for current trends in consumption and for unusual conditions, as he may deem necessary.

It is recognized that you, the Secretary of Agriculture, and, in turn, the Congress are anxious to keep a balanced pattern in agricultural production while at the same time provide fully for eventualities involving any nation friendly to us in which food is an acute problem. Since a decision concerning rice allotments and marketing quotas must be dealt with before December 31, 1954, for the 1955 crop year, would it not be desirable for the National Security Council and others responsible for our policies and plans in the Far East to look at our potential needs for rice for the next two or three years? It would be most undesirable for us to use production controls for 1955 and find ourselves in the same position for critically needed food as was the case when marketing quotas were imposed on cotton in 1950. With the Korean conflict it became necessary to impose export quotas

in August 1950 and to bring cotton under price ceilings later in the year. As a result, world cotton supplies and prices became almost completely demoralized.

Actually, most of the difficulties which have been encountered in cotton since that time reflect the adverse effects of this untimely action upon the competitive position of American cottons.

Is it not logical since we have established set-asides for cotton and for wheat that we take whatever steps necessary to provide for reserve supplies of rice in view of the grave situation which appears to be growing more serious in practically all of the rice consuming areas? The gravity of the current situation and the fact that the Secretary of Agriculture could take remedial steps only if "unusual conditions" are found to exist prompt me to lay this matter before you so that a thoroughly adequate determination can be made while there is yet time to protect the nation's interests in our continuing series of crises in the Pacific area.

Since existing legislation involved was enacted long prior to the conditions we now are facing, it would appear most logical that our policy planners should review it with extreme care.

With personal regards and best wishes, I am

Yours sincerely,

U. S. S.

The Honorable Dwight D. Eisenhower
The President of the United States
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

The continued unrest in Asiatic areas, as you know, brings into sharp focus policy considerations for one of our major farm commodities, rice.

Unfortunately, the existing legislation requires that acreage allotments and marketing quotas be imposed upon rice production whenever the actual supply is 10 percent more than the normal supply. The definition of normal supply itself permits only a 10 percent carry-over above domestic requirements and anticipated export needs. The legislation does, however, provide authority for the Secretary of Agriculture to adjust the calculations of normal supply for current trends in consumption and for unusual conditions, as he may deem necessary.

It is recognized that you, the Secretary of Agriculture and, in turn, the Congress are anxious to keep a balanced pattern in agricultural production while at the same time provide fully for eventualities involving any nation friendly to us in which food is an acute problem. Since a decision concerning rice allotments and marketing quotas must be dealt with before December 31, 1954, for the 1955 crop year, would it not be desirable for the National Security Council and others responsible for our policies and plans in the Far East to look at our potential needs for rice for the next two or three years? It

would be most undesirable for us to use production controls for 1955 and find ourselves in the same position for critically needed food as was the case when marketing quotas were imposed on cotton in 1950. With the Korean conflict it became necessary to impose export quotas in August 1950 and to bring cotton under price ceilings later in the year. As a result, world cotton supplies and prices became almost completely demoralized.

Actually, most of the difficulties which have been encountered in cotton since that time reflect the adverse effects of this untimely action upon the competitive position of American cottons.

Is it not logical since we have established set-asides for cotton and for what that we take whatever steps necessary to provide for reserve supplies of rice in view of the grave situation which appears to be growing more serious in practically all of the rice consuming areas? The gravity of the current situation and the fact that the Secretary of Agriculture could take remedial steps only if "unusual conditions" are found to exist prompt me to lay this matter before you so that a thoroughly adequate determination can be made while there is yet time to protect the nation's interests in our continuing series of crises in the Pacific area.

Since existing legislation involved was enacted long prior to the conditions we now are facing, it would appear most logical that our policy planners should review it with extreme care.

Dear Mr. President:

The continued unrest in Asiatic areas, as you know, brings into sharp focus policy considerations for one of our major farm commodities, rice.

Unfortunately, the existing legislation requires that acreage allotments and marketing quotas be imposed upon rice production whenever the actual supply is 10 percent more than the normal supply. The definition of normal supply itself permits only a 10 percent carryover above domestic requirements and anticipated export needs. The legislation does, however, provide authority for the Secretary of Agriculture to adjust the calculations of normal supply for current trends in consumption and for unusual conditions, as he may deem necessary.

It is recognized that you, the Secretary of Agriculture and, in turn, the Congress are anxious to keep a balanced pattern in agricultural production while at the same time provide fully for eventualities involving any nation friendly to us in which food is an acute problem. Since a decision concerning rice allotments and marketing quotas must be dealt with before December 31, 1954, for the 1955 crop year, would it not be desirable for the National Security Council and others responsible for our policies and plans in the Far East to look at our potential needs for rice for the next two or three years? It would be most undesirable for us to use production controls for 1955 and find ourselves in the same position for critically needed food as was the case when marketing quotas were imposed on cotton in 1950. With the Korean conflict it became necessary to impose export quotas in August 1950 and to bring cotton under price ceilings later in the year. As a result, world cotton supplies and prices became almost completely demoralized.

Actually, most of the difficulties which have been encountered in cotton since that time reflect the adverse effects of this untimely action upon the competitive position of American cottons.

Is it

~~It is~~ not logical since we have established ~~set-~~asides for cotton and for wheat that we take whatever steps necessary to provide for reserve supplies of rice in view of the grave ~~s~~situation which appears to be growing more serious in practically all of the rice consuming areas? The gravity of the current situation and the fact that the Secretary of Agriculture could take remedial steps only if "unusual conditions" are found to exist prompt me to lay this matter before you so that a thoroughly adequate determination can be made while there is yet time to protect the nation's interests in our continuing series of crises in the Pacific area.

Since existing legislation involved was enacted long prior to the conditions we now are facing, it would appear most logical that our policy planners should review it with extreme care.