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NO. 16

THE PROBLEM OF
UNITY OF WORLD COMMUNISM

BY

DINKO A. TOMASIC



"The Pursuit of Truth to Make Men Free"

MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY
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THE PROBLEM OF UNITY OF WORLD COMMUNISM

THE Communist party was conceived by Lenin as a highly centralized organization of full-time professional conspirators, "no less professionally trained than the police," but more militant, completely dedicated to the objectives of the Party, as well as highly specialized in a variety of revolutionary activities.¹ The apex of the Party's organizational structure was to consist of a "dozen" tried and talented leaders "working in perfect harmony . . ." who would "appoint bodies of leaders for each town district, for each factory district, and for each educational institution."² Lenin expected that such a monolithic system would provide solidarity, stability, and continuity of leadership, would enjoy the confidence of the masses, and would enable him to overthrow Czardom and to seize power. He said:

The fundamental question of revolution is the question of power⁴ [and] a Communist party will be able to perform its duty only if it is organized in the most centralized manner, only if iron discipline prevails in it, and if its Party center is a powerful and authoritative organ, wielding wide powers . . .⁵

When the Bolsheviks did seize power, they organized the new regime according to the same authoritarian and monolithic

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works* (New York: 1929), IV, 201.

² *Ibid.*, p. 194, 196.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 200.

⁴ Quoted by Joseph Stalin, *Foundations of Leninism* (New York: 1939), p. 48.

⁵ V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works*, X, 204.

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principles which prevailed in the Party. Lenin also stated at that time that if Czarist Russia was ruled by 200,000 members of the nobility there was no reason why the Soviet Russia could not be ruled by 200,000 Bolsheviks.

In 1919, Lenin conceived an organization of the world Communist movement along the same principles and with headquarters in Moscow. The objective of this organization was the establishment of a monolithic Communist dictatorship on a world scale. Accordingly, each local Communist party, in order to be a member of the Communist International, had to lose its autonomy and submit to the dictates received from the headquarters in Moscow where the Comintern had constituted itself as the "general staff" of the world revolution. Various sections of the International (local parties), themselves monolithically organized, were bound by the strictest discipline, forming a world-wide front, directed from one center, in a life and death struggle against the non-Communist world.⁶ The base of this world revolution was the Soviet Union, and the members of the Communist Parties, as well as the working class of the whole world, were to look at the Soviet Union as their only fatherland. The Soviet Union, to whom they owed their primary loyalty, was to be defended by these world-wide masses against any attack, including attack on the part of one's own country.⁷

Soviet control of the Communist International found its clearest expression in the organization and powers of the Executive Committee of the International which elected a smaller

⁶ See *The Theses and Statutes of the Communist International*, Second World Congress, July 17-August 7, 1920, Moscow; particularly "Conditions of Admission to the Communist International." See also *Program of the Communist International*, adopted by the Sixth World Congress, September 1st, 1928, Moscow, particularly "The Fundamental Tasks of Communist Strategy and Tactics."

⁷ *Ibid.*, particularly "The Significance of U.S.S.R. and Her World Revolutionary Duties."

body known as the Presidium of the Executive Committee. The Presidium in turn elected from among its members the Political Committee. And it was the Political Committee (which was composed of Moscow-oriented members) that had concentrated in its hands all the power of the International.⁸ In this manner, the International Communist movement became a tool in the hands of the Kremlin which used the Communist International to promote the interests of the Soviet Union.

Lenin was not without precedent in his image of Moscow as the ideological and political headquarters of a universal state. The ideology of Slavophilism which conceived Moscow as the Third Rome, as the center of a universal religion and of a world-wide state should not have been alien to him. It was, however, Stalin, a Georgian, who for reasons of personal power, as well as for reasons of promoting and strengthening a world-wide Communist movement, that had elaborated a theoretical justification of a world Communist monolith of charismatic character, centered in Moscow. Stalin stated that the intensity of internal contradictions in Czarist Russia, the ability and the revolutionary attitude of the Russian people (said to be "the most revolutionary in the world"), gave birth to Leninism, which in turn was responsible for the first proletarian revolution and for the formation of the "Fatherland of Socialism." Lenin thus became the leader not only of the Russian but of the international proletariat, according to Stalin.⁹

Considering himself as Lenin's rightful successor, Stalin undertook to Stalinize the Communist parties the world over. Stalin had realized that it was the intellectuals in the leaderships of various Communist parties who tended to identify

⁸ *Ibid.*, "Constitution and Rules of the Communist International, The Executive Committee," points 14, 15, 19, 22, 25.

⁹ Joseph Stalin, *Foundations of Leninism*, *op. cit.*, pp. 10, 15-19. Concerning the background of the ideology of a Moscow-centered world-wide state, see D. Tomasic, *The Impact of Russian Culture on Soviet Communism* (Glencoe: 1953).

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themselves with the national interests of their own countries rather than with those of the Soviet Union. Hence, in search for more compliant leadership, Stalin undertook to substitute the intellectuals in Party leadership by people of working class origin, without formal education, but outstanding for their ability, militancy, discipline, fanatic dedication to the Communist cause, and personal loyalty to Stalin. And it was such a thoroughly indoctrinated and Moscow-oriented group of leaders in the world Communist movement—people who were able to follow Kremlin orders unquestioningly and with deep conviction in the rightfulness of Stalin's policies—that were of considerable help to the Soviet Union in promoting its global interests before and after World War II. The territorial expansion of the Soviet Union and the formation of its satellite empire during this period would have been inconceivable without such a system of monolithism which Stalin had characterized as “complete and absolute unity of will and action.”¹⁰

The claim to lead all newly formed Communist states and the whole world Communist movement was now justified by the Kremlin not only on the basis of Russia's unique revolutionary experience, but also on the basis of the Soviet Union's achievement in expanding proletarian revolution, in building Socialism, and in developing it toward Communism. The Soviet Union was said to be an advanced Socialist country while other Communist ruled countries—the “People's Democracies”—were said to be on a lower stage of Socialist development.

Before World War II, the monolithic control system centered in Moscow was not based only on the rules of the Comintern. At that time Moscow's hold had much deeper roots. Moscow's overlordship then was ingrained in the innermost feelings and yearnings of hundreds of thousands of idealistic and Utopia-seeking Communists the world over, in their quasi-

¹⁰ Joseph Stalin, *Foundations of Leninism*, *op. cit.*, pp. 119-20.

religious conviction that Russia was fighting for the salvation of all downtrodden, all humiliated and oppressed. Such an identification with Russia fostered endurance of hardships, dedication to the cause, sufferance of imprisonment and torture, and even acceptance of death resignedly. Such a faith in the Fatherland of Socialism strengthened discipline and made many Party members ready to accept dictates from Moscow, and its frequent shifting of the "Party Line" as well as expulsions and executions of one's leaders, associates, and close friends; even when such an action seemed to be unfair on the basis of known circumstances.¹¹

After World War II, however, such emotional ties to Moscow began to weaken. The Utopia-seeking Party members or sympathizers who had heretofore idealized the Communist system from a safe distance were now confronted with Communist reality which had a shocking effect on their feelings and attitudes. At the same time the power-oriented fanatics who rose to the Party leadership in the course of the Communist underground struggle soon realized that their vested interests—the acquired power and prestige—were not identical with those of the Kremlin leaders, particularly when Stalin began to enforce changes in the leadership of the local Parties and install in power those whom he considered to be the safest instruments of Moscow (the "Muscovites"). In such a situation the threatened Party leaders (the "homegrown" Communists) were quick to appeal to the general public, pointing out that the "national interests" of the country were at stake.

And it was in this dilemma of personal and national versus Soviet interests that the Kremlin leaders had lost the most binding ground of monolithism. It was due to this loss of emotional ties and of internationalist orientation that the Red Army had

¹¹ See, for instance, the official biography of Josif Broz Tito, as told by Tito in Vladimir Dedier, *Tito* (New York: 1953), p. 49.

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to be stationed in the Communist-ruled countries of Eastern Europe in order to support the governments headed by Moscow-appointed and Moscow-dependent Communists.¹²

For the same reason wherever the Soviet Union failed to maintain large contingents of Soviet armed forces, such as in Yugoslavia, Albania, and China, the local Communist leaders were enabled to consolidate their power internally as well as build a vested interest in their own brand of Communist revolution which eventually was to come into conflict with Soviet type Communism. The question arose to whom a good Communist owes his primary loyalty, to his own Party, its leaders and its vested interests, or to the Kremlin, to his own country, or to the Soviet Union. This dilemma was closely related to the problem of who was entitled to define and to interpret the interests of the world Communist movement and the sacred texts of Leninism, the Kremlin, or an assembly of all Communist parties in a common consensus based on equal vote. It was such a question and conflict of vested interests that struck at the heart of monolithism after World War II and brought about open rebellions against Moscow in Yugoslavia, Poland, and Hungary, and more recently in China and Albania.

II

For an analysis of the problem of conflict and unit in the Communist world, the case of Yugoslavia is particularly significant. That is, the history of Soviet-Yugoslav relations indicates that a rebellion against the Russian type of monolithism does not necessarily annul the imperative need for Communist unity in regard to the non-Communist world. When the Communist party of Yugoslavia was formed in 1920, it identified

¹² See on this point D. A. Tomasic, "The Rumanian Communist Leadership," *The Slavic Review*, (October, 1961); also by the same author, "The Political Leadership in Contemporary Poland," *Journal of Human Affairs*, (Winter, 1961); and "Direccion y Estructura del Poder en Hungaria," *Estudios Sobre el Comunismo*, (October-December, 1961), (January-March, 1962).

itself completely with the interests of the Soviet Union. It resolved that it "will always be ready to fight with all its forces for the Russian proletarian revolution and to give everything for the defense of that revolution regardless of sacrifices."¹³ However, after the Communist party of Yugoslavia had seized power and established its control in the country according to the Soviet model, it began to develop its own sphere of influence and vested interests and these were not always identical with those of the Soviet Union.

Thus, for instance, the Yugoslavs were planning to expand their power in the form of a Belgrade-centered Balkan Federation which was to include Bulgaria, Albania, and eventually Greece, or at least Greek Macedonia. They put forward claims on some parts of southern Austria, as well as on the city of Trieste. Tito made trips to other Communist-ruled countries of Eastern Europe where he was received with great enthusiasm by the local Communists. The Yugoslavs claimed that their experiences in building Communism were better suited for Eastern Europe than Russia's model. And the Communist leaders in these countries saw in Tito a counterweight to the increasing pressures from Moscow. All this was a threat to the heretofore unchallenged authority of the Kremlin and it was this conflict of Soviet and Yugoslav interests and ambitions that eventually brought about the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the community of the Communist nations (Cominform) in 1948.¹⁴

The break with Russia, however, affected adversely the situation within the Yugoslav Communist party whose members had been trained for years to regard Russia as the center of Slav power as well as the source of world Communist inspiration. Demoralization, factionalism, and ideological splits devel-

¹³ "Program Komunističke Partije Jugoslavije," *Istorijski Arhiv Komunističke Partije Jugoslavije*, Belgrade, 1947-1952, Vol. 2, pp. 41.

¹⁴ See on this point D. A. Tomašić, *National Communism and Soviet Strategy* (Washington, D. C.: 1957), Chap. VII.

oped within the Party ranks as well as within the top leadership. As a result, Western, anti-Communist influences were beginning to infiltrate the country to an extent that caused worries in the Party's power-holding circles. Cutting of the umbilical cord to the main source of Communist energy and morale not only affected adversely the discipline in the Party but gave rise to considerable opposition against the Party outside its ranks. The Party leadership saw in these events a possible prelude to complete disintegration of the Communist system in Yugoslavia and to loss of their power (and lives as well).¹⁵

Faced with such grim possibilities, the Yugoslav ruling clique looked for ways to patch up its differences with the Kremlin, to return to the fold and even to recognize Russia's leadership, at least formally. In the meantime, significant events were also taking place in the Soviet Union itself. Stalin was dead and in the ensuing struggle for power, Nikita Krushchev was in ascendancy, inaugurating a policy of relaxation in the rigidity of Kremlin-directed monolithism, as a means to save it from its ruins. He stated that there were different "national roads" to Communism and that a certain degree of autonomy of each Communist country will strengthen rather than weaken the cause of world Communism. As a result of such rapprochement in views and change in attitudes, declarations were signed in Belgrade (June 1955) and in Moscow (June 1956) in which Yugoslavia pledged to follow the Communist line and to support the Soviet Union in its international policy. Close economic and cultural cooperation between the two countries was decided upon and even the prospects of a military agreement were indicated. Said Tito, "In peace as in war, Yugoslavia must march shoulder-to-shoulder with the Soviet people toward the same goal, the goal of the victory of socialism."¹⁶

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Chaps. VIII and IX.

¹⁶ In a speech in Stalingrad as reported by Radio Moscow, Soviet Home Service, June 11, 1956, and in *Borba*, Belgrade, June 12, 1956.

Nevertheless, relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia continued to be strained, mainly because of a high-handed attitude of the Russians which offended the pride-conscious Yugoslavs. Thus, the Declaration of the ruling Communist parties in Moscow, 1957, was not signed by Yugoslavia. Moreover, the Yugoslav Communists, who have often manifested an ambition to play the role of a "Great Power," were confident that they would be able to form a "third force" of "neutral" countries under Tito's leadership and thus become a leading factor in international politics and make an historical contribution of their own to the spread of Communism over the globe. Their long-range plans of such grandiose proportions included also the role of chief mediators between the East and the West during the period of peaceful coexistence.¹⁷ For such a role of worldwide significance, the Yugoslav Communists needed a platform which would appeal to the nonaligned, particularly the underdeveloped countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, as well as to Socialist parties and movements in the West. At the same time the Yugoslavs wanted to preserve the essential tenets of Marxism in order not to risk an irreparable break with Moscow. Accordingly, at the Seventh Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia which met at Ljubljana in 1958, they adopted a Party Program which was to serve these ends.

In underdeveloped countries private native capital tends to be rather limited compared to state capital. Therefore the state bureaucracy is particularly powerful in these countries and is in a key position to effect significant social changes. It is to these circles that the Ljubljana Program was intended to appeal. Thus the Program states that "state capitalism" was not necessarily a "stage" in the capitalist development but could be the function of a new type of state: a state which is not any

¹⁷ For a sociological explanation of such political ambitions of Yugoslav Communists see D. A. Tomasic, *National Communism, and Soviet Strategy op. cit.*, Chaps. IV and VII.

more an exclusive instrument of the bourgeoisie but has acquired an independent role and has placed itself "over and above society." The bureaucracy in such a state might become an independent social and political factor free from the pressures of the bourgeoisie. In such a situation, state capitalism, under certain conditions, might be the first step toward socialism.¹⁸ This could be achieved in a gradual way, merely by the political struggle of "the working class." And in order not to alienate the entrenched bureaucracies in these countries, the Ljubljana Program purposely minimizes the "leading role" of the working class "vanguard"—the Communist party, in the transformation of society toward socialism:

The conception that the Communist parties have a monopoly over every aspect of the movement of society toward socialism and that socialism can find its representatives only in them and move forward through them, is theoretically wrong and practically very harmful.¹⁹

At the same time, however, the Program of the Communist League of Yugoslavia supports Khrushchev's ideas of a "parliamentary road to Communism" and of "buying off" the revolution from capitalists. It supports also the present Soviet concept of "peaceful coexistence."²⁰ It is intended to be a link between the Communist Internationalism of the Soviet Union and local nationalisms of the bureaucracies in the underdeveloped countries.

Moreover, as an ideological conflict between Moscow and Peking began to take a distinct form, the Yugoslavs saw in this situation, too, a good chance for themselves to play a significant part on the world stage. Thus, in August, 1960, a series of articles appeared in Belgrade's *Borba*, the leading organ of the

¹⁸ *The Program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia* (Ljubljana: 1958), Chap. 1.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, Chap. II.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, Chaps. II and III.

Yugoslav Communists, in which Russia's position against that of China was strongly defended. The articles were written by Edward Kardelj, a ranking member of the Politburo (Executive Committee) and official "ideologist" of the Yugoslav party. Soon after that, during the meeting of the U.N. General Assembly in New York (1960), Tito and Khrushchev made a public declaration concerning the identity of their views on "basic issues." How close the two Parties have come to an even closer understanding is indicated in the new Program of the Communist party of the Soviet Union (1961) in which Yugoslavia is identified as a country that, like the countries which form the "Socialist camp," has "likewise taken the Socialist path."²¹

The ideological rapprochement between Belgrade and Moscow might reflect the similarity in the social structures of the two countries. Both are ruled by monolithic Communist parties, and both are governed by a new, well-paid class of privileged bureaucrats and technocrats. This new "technological intelligentsia" has developed a vested interest of its own in contrast to the rest of the population. And it is this class that has been growing in numbers and importance in all the Communist-ruled countries. This new class, therefore, is developing an *esprit de corps* not only on the local level but on an international level as well, identifying its interests with the survival of Communist unity on a world scale. Such a class would therefore tend to exert a concerted pressure on their respective Party leaderships to patch up the differences.

In addition, in the case of Yugoslavia, the internal situation is an important factor which works in the direction of a pro-Moscow orientation. National rivalries and conflicts in that

²¹ *Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, adopted at the 22nd Congress of the Party, Moscow, 1961, Part I, Chap. 3. The Central Committee of the Communist party, of Yugoslavia, at its session of Nov. 27, 1961, in appreciation for such Soviet treatment of Yugoslavia, had high praise for the 22nd Congress of the Soviet party as having made "a very significant contribution" to the progress of socialism and peace.

country have been intensified in recent years and even affected the Communist party's ranks and cadres. The existence of at least two rival views in the Party has recently been officially recognized: one demanding more centralization, in favor of Belgrade, the other more decentralization in favor of national republics.²² Moscow, from the point of view of its own interests and experiences is inclined to support a monolithic system in Yugoslavia centered in Belgrade which would disregard separate interests of various nationalities and would tend to strengthen Serbian hegemony in the country. The Western influences on the other hand tend to encourage claims of various nationalities for self-assertion against de-nationalizing and hegemonistic monolithism. Thus, the present Serb-dominated leadership of the Communist party of Yugoslavia is under intense pressure to come closer to Moscow. And in a recent communique issued in Belgrade jointly by the respective ministers of foreign affairs of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia they "re-affirmed the identity or similarity of views on fundamental international questions."²³

III

The struggle for power which took place in the Soviet Union after the death of Stalin and difficulties which developed between the Kremlin and the Communist states in Eastern Europe opened an opportunity for the Chinese Communist leaders to interfere in favor of one or the other Party. Thus, it is alleged that in the Soviet-Polish clash, the Chinese intervened in favor of Poland while in the Hungarian Revolution they prevailed on the Soviet leaders to crush the uprising by armed force.²⁴ The Chinese Communists have also developed a

²² See Tito's speech at the session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, November 27, 1961.

²³ United Press International's dispatch from Belgrade, April 21, 1962.

²⁴ See on this point G. F. Hudson (ed.), *The Sino-Soviet Dispute* (New York: 1961).

great pride in their revolution, which they achieved without Russia's help, and in a way which was contrary to the advice and directives received from the Kremlin. Hence, considering themselves at least equal and possibly even superior to the Russians, the Chinese Communist leaders felt free to criticize the policies of the Kremlin. They also began to compete with the Russians in their propaganda endeavors, and even with economic aid, in various parts of the world, particularly Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Conflicts have existed between the two Parties from the very beginning of the Chinese Communist movement. As early as the late 1920's disagreements arose between Mao Tse-tung and Stalin on the question of strategy and tactics of the Communist revolution in China. While Stalin wanted the revolution to be centered in the urban proletariat, Mao's tactic was to rely on the peasants. At first Mao Tse-tung was demoted but by the early 1930's Mao was back in control of the Chinese Communist party.²⁵ He led the Party and the peasant army to victory in the late forties without Russia's help and against seemingly insurmountable obstacles.

An important circumstance in the present Sino-Soviet conflict is that the very same people who had led the Chinese revolution and had conquered power in China are still ruling in China today. And they differ considerably from the Russian leaders in terms of background and psychological make-up. The Chinese leaders come mostly from middle class families and on the whole have had a rather broad education and tend to be of an intellectual bent. A large part of Chinese top leaders come from the interior provinces of middle China (particularly Hunan and Szechuan), from regions which were almost unaffected by the influences of Western civilization and where

²⁵ See on this point B. I. Schwartz, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao* (Cambridge: 1951).

rebellious, warlike activities and military vocations have been a part of the local tradition.²⁶ As young men these people had revolted against their elders and against some of the old Chinese traditions and practices in their family and in the community.²⁷ But as students in high school and at the university they have been indoctrinated in the ideas of the greatness of China's history and civilization, which was said to be "older and more glorious than that of any other country." They have accepted the nationalistic traditions of the Middle Kingdom which had expanded over Manchuria, Turkestan, Mongolia, Korea, Formosa, and Tibet, had penetrated Burma, Nepal, and Annam, and had looked at the rest of Asia as its own sphere of interest. Said Mao:

Our nation has a history of several thousand years, a history which has its own characteristics and is full of treasures . . . The China today has developed from the China in history; as we are believers in the Marxist approach to history, we must not cut off our whole historical past. We must make a summing-up from Confucius down to Sun Yat-sen and inherit this precious legacy. This will help us much in directing the great movement of today.²⁸

At the same time, however, impressed by the achievements of Bolshevik Russia they adopted Marxism-Leninism in its Stalinist form, its ideology as well as its practices, as the best available psychological and organizational instrument to seize power and to expand it. Accordingly, the Chinese leaders became professional revolutionaries and conspirators, fanatically dedicated to the seizure of power and fanatically determined to

²⁶ According to a personal communication from S. Y. Teng, Professor of Chinese History, Indiana University. See also Chao Kuo-chun, "Leadership in the Chinese Communist Party," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, (January, 1959), pp. 40-50.

²⁷ See a sample of biographies of Chinese Communist leaders in Nym Wales, *Red Dust* (Stanford: 1952).

²⁸ Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works* (London: 1954), II, 259-60. See also Shen-yu Dai, "Peking's International Position and the Cold War," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, *op. cit.*, pp. 112-121.

further develop China's greatness. And it was their unshakable belief in China's great destiny and in the inevitability of their victory that explains, at least partly, their success in overcoming seemingly insurmountable difficulties in their road to power.

The present top Party leadership in the Soviet Union, on the other hand, is composed overwhelmingly of leaders of Russian nationality who had risen to prominence only after the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks.²⁹ They are "post-revolution" leaders whose education has been geared by the Party in the direction of technical specialization and administrative versatility rather than broad general knowledge. Thus they have gone through a rather specialized polytechnical training which has been generally below university level. They were picked up by the Party for their ability and versatility, for activism and sense of dedication from among the young men of working class (industrial labor and peasantry) background.³⁰ Hence, being raised and trained as members of a ruling nation and of an established class, they tend to be calculating technocrats rather than fanatic revolutionaries.

This difference in the social background, training, and psychology of the two leaderships might explain, at least partially, the differences in their "strategy and tactics." Thus, the Chinese leaders tend to believe in the inevitability of war with the capitalist world and in the necessity of war to spread Communism. They therefore tend to emphasize revolutionary methods throughout the world regardless of sacrifice in human life and suffering and believe in the necessity of constant internal tension to spur action and revolutionary enthusiasm in building Communism. The Chinese also sponsor the idea that the Soviet Union should in the first place help the economic and military growth of other Communist-ruled countries, including the devel-

²⁹ *Biographies of Soviet Leaders*, materials collected by Alan Lichtenstein, Indiana University.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

opment of nuclear weapons, and thus promote Communist revolution in the rest of the world.

The Soviet leaders on the other hand tend to focus their interest in the first place on "building Communism in the Soviet Union" under Russian leadership and in expanding Russia's power and sphere of interest throughout the world by building a strong Soviet industrial base and military machine. Such a plan demands a prolonged period of peace, undisturbed by wars of international character, at least until such a time when the Soviet Union becomes economically and militarily so overpowering that it can blackmail the rest of the world with the threat of war and dictate peace on its own terms. The Russian Communists, therefore, say that this is the epoch of building Socialism and Communism, that the Socialist camp is already stronger than the capitalist camp and is therefore able to prevent war and to save humanity from nuclear destruction. Hence they stress the possibility of "peaceful transition from capitalism to Socialism" and claim that "peaceful coexistence" is the "highest form of class struggle."³¹ The two contrasting leaderships and opposite policies were therefore bound to come into conflict.

It appears, moreover, that the present Sino-Soviet dispute is also a continuation of the age-long rivalry between Holy Russia and the Celestial Empire. The Russian Czardom, taking advantage of China's weaknesses, has been expanding its power and conquests into Asia since early in its history. By the middle of the nineteenth century Russia was able to obtain all the Chinese territory north of the Amur river as well as the territory east of the Ussuri River where Russia eventually built the port of Vladivostok (the "Ruler of the East"). By the end of the nineteenth century Russia obtained permission to carry the

³¹ See the documents on ideological differences between Moscow and Peking in G. F. Hudson (ed.), *The Sino-Soviet Dispute*, *op. cit.*,

Trans-Siberian railway directly across Manchuria. Russia also extended its influence in Korea, occupied Port Arthur and Dairen, as well as a portion of the Liaotung peninsula, and claimed all the territory north of the Great Wall. In 1901 Russia dispatched large bodies of troops into Manchuria. Russia's further expansion was checked by Japan in the Russo-Japanese war of 1905 in which the Japanese captured Port Arthur and drove the Russians out of Manchuria and out of Sakhalin.

After the Communist seizure of power in Russia in 1917, the Communist rulers did not give up the traditions of Imperial Russia, but rather continued in the same footsteps. Thus, basing their claims on a secret treaty between Czarist Russia and Japan (1907) which empowered the Russian government to "lend Mongolia its assistance in order to . . . forbid entry to Chinese armies and colonization of her lands by the Chinese."³² The Russian Communists considered that Outer Mongolia fell within the Soviet sphere of interests. And in order to perpetuate its control of that country, the Kremlin incited dissension in it. And when violent anti-Russian revolts broke out (1930-32), the Red Army quelled them by tanks and planes. Finally a Communist party securely under a pro-Russian leadership was organized and has been used ever since as an instrument of Soviet control.³³

On the other hand, the Chinese Communist leaders who control Inner Mongolia (inhabited by a numerically larger number of Mongols than those in Outer Mongolia) and are motivated by the traditional Chinese claims on the whole of Asia, have shown a great deal of interest in the fate of their

³² E. B. Price, *The Russo-Japanese Treaties of 1907-1916 Concerning Manchuria and Mongolia* (Baltimore: 1933), p. 107.

³³ William B. Ballis, "Outer Mongolia: Case Study of Soviet Colonialism," *Studies of the Soviet Union*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1961, Institute for the Study of USSR, Munich, Germany.

“racial brothers” across the borders. Thus they have been promoting immigration of Chinese laborers to Outer Mongolia and have been helping Outer Mongolia with economic aid. They are well aware that Russian overlordship in that country as well as in other parts of the Soviet Union has provided a stimulus for Pan-Mongolian, Pan-Asian and pro-Chinese attitudes.

In addition, soon after the death of Stalin, while a struggle for power was being fought within the Soviet party, the Chinese Communists completed their first five-year plan which laid the basis for China's industrialization and for its future as one of the leading industrial and military powers in the world. The Chinese leadership also had an opportunity to assert its independence in the field of ideology as well as in the establishment of the Commune system in the rural parts of China. The commune was to be an institution which would combine agricultural and industrial production, trade, educational activities, and military preparedness. It was looked upon as a “great leap forward” toward Communism and as a proof that Communism in its pure form (“to each according to his needs from each according to his abilities”) might be established in China sooner than in the Soviet Union.

Moreover, Mao Tse-tung's ideas concerning the Chinese pattern of revolution (guerrilla warfare) based in peasantry and the Chinese Commune system in the rural areas were looked upon by the Chinese Communists as being better suited for underdeveloped peasant countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America than the Soviet pattern of revolution (through civil war or Parliament) and the Soviet agrarian system (Kolkhoz). And it was in the control of these vast areas of the world that the answer lay to the question of who is going to assume the overlordship of world Communism and of the globe, China or Russia. In a speech to the Chinese students at the University of Moscow, November 17, 1957, Mao Tse-tung stated the following:

The whole world has now a population of 2.7 billion of which the various socialist countries have nearly one billion; the independent, former colonial countries, more than 700 million; the countries now struggling for independence or for complete independence, 600 million; and the imperialist camp only about 400 million . . .³⁴

According to Mao, there are therefore at present 1.3 billion people (in Asia, Africa, and Latin America) who have not yet reached the full capitalist stage of development and are therefore open to infiltration and conquests by Communism, particularly through the instrument of Communist-led "national liberation movements" and using Chinese revolutionary experiences. In their written and spoken propaganda the Chinese Communists do not seem to leave much doubt that they believe these peoples should fall also under the Chinese overlordship. Thus, for instance, Chou-En-lai, a close associate of Mao, in a speech on August 20, 1958, said the following:

. . . the peoples of Latin American countries have something in common with the peoples of Asian and African countries. They have common aims: to oppose colonialism, to oppose imperialist aggression and intervention, to demand peace and oppose war, to press for independent development of the national economy and emergence from backwardness, in other words . . . the peoples of the countries in Latin America, Asia, and Africa have common aspirations and demands.³⁵

Moreover, there are indications that the Chinese Communists, being the greatest colored nation in the world expect to have a special appeal along racial lines among the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In Latin America their particular interest seems to be concentrated on Brazil, both because that country has a high percentage of people of colored and mixed racial traits and because Brazil is potentially the most powerful country in Latin America, economically, as well

³⁴ NCNA, Peking, November 18, 1957.

³⁵ SCMP, No. 1836, p. 40, August 20, 1958. See also Shen-yu Dai, "Peking's International Position and the Cold War," *op. cit.*

as militarily. Including a vast land area and abundant sources of raw materials, Brazil has all the potentialities for an autarchic economic system as well as for economic and military control of other Latin American countries if led by an aggressive Communist party, under China's guidance.

IV

Such aspirations, however, could not fail to arouse concern and anxieties in Moscow, heretofore the unchallenged seat of Communist world power and of Communist dogma. The communist leaders in the Kremlin could not take lightly Peking's plans for expanding their influence in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, particularly in view of the possibilities of China becoming economically and militarily one of the leading world powers in the next couple of decades, possessing atomic weapons. Moreover the attractive force of Pan-Mongolism and Pan-Asiatism in Outer Mongolia and among the Mongoloid and Turco-Mongol peoples in Siberia and Soviet Central Asia would certainly increase in such circumstances. The Kremlin, therefore, could not possibly fail to answer all these threats to its leadership in the Communist world, to its territorial gains, and to its aspirations to the status as the first and mightiest world power. The Kremlin had to act promptly, therefore, to forestall the Chinese challenge. The Kremlin's answer came in its new Party Program. Thus, in the first place, the Program emphasizes that the Soviet Union is the inspiration and leader of mankind and as its past as well as future savior, it states:

The gigantic revolutionary exploit accomplished by the Soviet people roused and inspired the masses in all countries and continents. A mighty purifying thunderstorm marking the springtime of mankind is raging over the earth . . . The Party regards Communist construction in the U.S.S.R. as the Soviet people's greatest internationalist task, in keeping with the interests of the international proletariat and all mankind . . .

The Soviet Union saved mankind from Fascist enslavement . . . As a result of the devoted labor of the Soviet people and the theoretical and practical activities of the Communist party of the Soviet Union, there exists in the world a Socialist society that is a reality and a science of Socialist construction . . . The high road to Socialism has been paved. Many peoples are already marching along it, and it will be taken sooner or later by all peoples.³⁶

Secondly, the Kremlin in its program emphasizes the necessity of all Communist countries to ally economically, politically, and militarily and to form a unified front against anti-Communist forces if Socialism is to survive.

The line of Socialist construction in isolation, detached from the world community of Socialist countries, is theoretically untenable because it conflicts with the objective laws governing the development of Socialist society. It is harmful economically because it causes waste of social labor, retards the rates of growth of production and makes the country dependent upon the capitalist world. It is reactionary and dangerous politically because it does not unite, but divides the peoples in face of the united front of imperialist forces, because it nourishes *bourgeois-nationalist* tendencies and may ultimately lead to the loss of the Socialist gains.³⁷

Moreover, in its plan to make "within two decades" the Soviet industry "technologically the best and the strongest in the world" the Kremlin has conceived a plan according to which in the Socialist Community of Nations there should develop a system of economy centered in the Soviet Union and based on an "international division of labor" and on "technical cooperation . . . coordination of economic plans, specialization, and combination of production."³⁸

Such a plan of economic division of labor, regardless of its merits in terms of economic efficiency, when centered in a monolithic political regime is likely to promote economic and

³⁶ *Program of the CPSU, op. cit.* Part I, Chap. 2.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, Part I, Chap. 3.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

political dependency. This kind of integration has already been in the process of development in the relations between the Soviet Union and its European satellites. Communist China, on the other hand, planning to develop its own system of economic and political integration in the area under its control, has refused to coordinate its economic development with that of Russia in order to avoid becoming its economic and political dependency.

Thirdly, the Soviet leaders leave no doubt that Communism will be constructed first of all in the Soviet Union. It will be built in other Socialist countries "more or less simultaneously, within the same historical epoch." But it will be the Soviet Union, "the first country to advance to Communism," that will "facilitate and accelerate the advance of the entire world Socialist system to Communism."³⁰ The Program also insists that the advance toward Communism could be achieved only by degrees; not as the Chinese would like to achieve it by skipping stages in its development.

In addition, according to the Program, particularly great attention will be paid to the development of the Asian parts of the Soviet Union, a development which will make the Soviet Union the greatest Asian power. Says the Program:

The following must be achieved within the next twenty years: in Siberia and Kazakhstan—the creation of large new power bases using deposits of cheap coal or the waterpower resources of the Angara and Yenisei Rivers; the organization of big centers of power-consuming industries and the completion, in Siberia, of the country's third metallurgical base; the development of new rich ore and coal deposits, and the construction of a number of new large machine-building centers; in Central Asia the rapid development of ore deposits. The Soviet people will be able to carry out daring plans to change the courses of some northern

³⁰ *Ibid.*, Part II, Chap. 6.

rivers and regulate their flow for the purpose of utilizing vast quantities of water for the irrigation of arid areas.⁴⁰

Moreover, in addition to exploiting the abundant natural resources of these regions, they will also be urbanized and Russified. The non-Russian peoples of this area and their native cultures are slated for extinction. That industrialization of these regions has been already used as an instrument of Russification is confirmed in the Program which states that the appearance of new industrial centers and the "virgin land" project "increased the mobility of the population" so much that the boundaries between the constituent republics of the USSR are "increasingly losing their former significance." The Program also claims that the full-scale Communist construction constitutes a new stage in the development of national relations in the USSR in which the nations will draw still closer together, until "complete unity is achieved" leading to eventual "effacement of national distinctions, and of language distinctions."⁴¹

That this unity in which national distinctions will be effaced will mean assimilation of the people of the USSR by the Russians, follows not only from the existing practices, but also from the new Party Program which has assigned to the Russian language a primary civilizing and unifying role.⁴² Expecting considerable resistance to this plan of Russification on the part of nationalities slated for genocide in the Soviet Union, as well as on the part of satellite nations scheduled for integration with the Soviet Union, the Program strongly condemns nationalism which is said to be one of the chief obstacles to

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, Part I, a.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, Part II, Chap. 4, Concerning the policy of Russification of Asiatic parts of the Soviet Union see *Studies on the Soviet Union, op. cit.*, particularly Anthony Adamovich, "Soviet Colonialism and the National Republics"; Baymirza Hayit, "Turkestan as an Example of Soviet Colonialism"; Andrij Bilinsky, "Colonialism or Genocide?"; see also Roman Smal-Stocki, *The Captive Nations* (New York: 1960).

⁴² *Ibid.*, Part II, Chap. 4.

Socialism and Communism and therefore must be fought ruthlessly. When attacking nationalism the Kremlin has also in mind the tendency of some countries, such as China and Albania, to develop their own "national" or "racial" brand of Communism. Says the Program:

Nationalism is the chief political and ideological weapon used by international reaction and the remnants of the domestic reactionary forces against the unity of the socialist countries . . . Nationalist prejudice and survivals of former national strife are a province in which resistance to social progress may be most protracted and stubborn, bitter and insidious . . . The Marxist-Leninist internationalist policy and determined efforts to wipe out the survivals of bourgeois nationalism and chauvinism are an important condition for further consolidation of the Socialist Community.⁴³

V

At the 22nd Congress (1961) of the C.P.S.U. the Sino-Soviet conflict came to the fore in a dispute over Albania. And the Albanian question, too, like that of China and Yugoslavia, illustrates how the ideological differences between the Communist-ruled states are rooted in the vested interests of various Communist regimes, and in the struggle for power among them.

Albania was not occupied by the Soviet troops at the end of World War II. But, since 1941 and up to 1948, Albania's Communist party, as well as Albania's governmental, economic, and cultural development, were under the guidance of the Communist party of Yugoslavia.⁴⁴ The currency of the two countries was made interchangeable and a customs union was put into effect. In all Albanian schools, the study of Serh language was made obligatory, and plans were ready for incorporation of Albania into Yugoslavia as its seventh republic.⁴⁵

⁴³ *Ibid.*, Part I, Chap. 3.

⁴⁴ Stavro Skendi, *Albania* (New York: 1958), pp. 19 ff.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

This satellite position of Albania in relation to Yugoslavia came to an end in 1948 as a result of the break which occurred in that year between Moscow and Belgrade. The anti-Yugoslav faction in the Albanian Communist party, backed by the Soviet Union, rose to power, purged the pro-Tito faction, expelled Yugoslav experts, advisors, and representatives and brought in Russian agents instead. Thus Albania rose from its status of a dependency of Yugoslavia to that of a satellite of the Soviet Union. Albania also became a member of the Soviet bloc's Council for Mutual Economic Aid as well as a member of the Soviet bloc's Warsaw military treaty in its own right. Such an achievement enhanced considerably the anti-Yugoslav faction in the Albanian party led by Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu; they were credited for "liberation of Albania from the yoke of Yugoslavia."

However, regardless of Soviet support, deep distrust of Yugoslav Communists and fear of historical Serb aspirations in the direction of Albania were not removed from the thoughts and feelings of the Albanians. After World War I Yugoslavia incorporated a large section of Albania ethnic territory—now the autonomous province of Kosmet (Kosovo-Metohia)—where, according to Albanian sources, over 850,000 Albanians live, while the total population in Albania proper is only about 1,400,000.⁴⁶ During World War II, the Albanian part of Yugoslav territory became an integral part of Albania, but after the retreat of Italian and German armies, it was again reincorporated into Yugoslavia by the Yugoslav Communists. Since 1948, the anti-Yugoslav faction of the Albania Communist party has taken full advantage of this situation, stirring up irredentist aspirations among the Albania people. In this manner, the Albanian party, presenting itself as a champion of

⁴⁶ United Nations, *Demographic Yearbook*, 1955, p. 109. According to Rand McNally *World Atlas*, 1961, the population of Albania is 1,562,000.

Albanian nationalism, was able to strengthen its hold over the people.

These feelings of threat to national interests and to the national independence of Albania were intensified after Yugoslavia had concluded with Turkey and Greece the Balkan Pact. It was felt that this military collaboration between Yugoslavia and Greece might lead toward a renewed pressure on Albania on the part of Yugoslavia. Moreover there was the possibility that Greece too might demand an autonomous status for the Greek minority in southern Albania (northern Epirus) or to claim sovereignty over this part of Albanian territory. In such circumstances the Soviet submarine base in Albania was looked upon with great favor. The Albanians also saw in the widening Soviet-Yugoslav conflict (1948-1955) a ray of hope for eventual incorporation of Kosmet into Albania. And on the ideological plane Albania became one of the staunchest and most vociferous exponents of the Sino-Soviet bloc's concerted attack against "Titoism" and "Yugoslav revisionism."

Not unlike the Yugoslav and the Chinese party leaderships, the Albanian party core is still composed of the same people who took part in the formation of the Albanian Communist party in 1941, in the subsequent guerrilla warfare, and in the seizure of power in 1944. From the point of view of religious background the leading core of the Albanian party is predominantly Moslem. It could also be considered predominantly intellectual in terms of Albanian educational standards and predominantly of middle class origin in terms of Albania's social structure.⁴⁷ In the latter aspects, as well as in its revolutionary origin, and power-oriented fanaticism, the Albanian leadership is similar to the Chinese party leadership. Both have imbibed nationalistic attitudes in the course of their schooling

⁴⁷ See "Biographical Sketches" of Albanian Communist Leaders in Stavro Skendi, *op. cit.*, pp. 323-45.

and both tend to be orthodox Leninists in the sense that they believe that world tension, revolutionary activities, and warfare would enhance their internal and external objectives.

The ethnic origin of Albanian leadership is almost exclusively Tosk—the ethnic group inhabiting the southern Albanian regions. The northern Albanians—the Geg ethnic group which is still organized in the form of a tribal system—had provided Albanian leadership before the seizure of power by the southerners. The Geps therefore tend to resent the dominance of the Tosk people and the imposition of the Tosk dialect as the official language of the country.⁴³ The Geg tribes, however, are traditionally anti-Yugoslav, particularly anti-Serb, since it is the Geg Albanians who live across the borders in Yugoslavia under the Serb national hegemony. The animosity between the two national groups dates far back into history owing to an age-long contest over the same territory. Accordingly, the Albanian Communist leaders have used their anti-Yugoslav campaign since 1948 also as an instrument of national unification between the North and South, and as a means of weakening the opposition of the Geg population to Tosk leadership.

It is therefore understandable that the rapprochement of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia since 1955, as well as the “peaceful coexistence” theme put forward at the 20th Congress of the CPSU in 1956, were looked upon by the Albanian Communist leaders as ill-omened events. Not only were these happenings considered to be a blow to the national aspirations of the Albanians, but they brought back the specter of the Yugoslav Communist party once again taking over the reins of Albanian political, economic, and cultural life, and purging all anti-Yugoslavs in the Albanian party. It was at this point, when both personal power and national survival were in question, that the

⁴³ A. R. V. Burks, *The Dynamics of Communism in Eastern Europe* (Princeton: 1961), pp. 144-48.

Albanian Communists began to look at Communist China as their ally and protector. Since Communist China was in the meantime organizing within the Communist camp resistance against the Soviet leadership and its "revisionism," the switch of Albanian allegiance was not only welcomed by the Chinese but they also supported and encouraged the anti-Kremlin stand of the Albanians. And when the Kremlin attempted to reverse this trend of development with the help of a few pro-Russian leaders in the Albanian party, these were promptly purged by the Hoxha-Shehu pro-Peking faction.

The Soviet leaders, on the other hand, not wanting to risk an open break with China over ideological and other issues, used Albania as a "whipping boy" to demonstrate their displeasure and their anger concerning the behavior of the Chinese Communists. This was done, as is well known, by Khrushchev in a dramatic way at the 22nd Congress of the Communist party in the Soviet Union in 1961, when he publicly castigated the Albanian leaders for their "dogmatism," "sectarianism," and "cult of personality," as a justification for expulsion of Albania from the Soviet bloc. The Chinese representative at the Congress, Chou En-lai, however, rose in defense of Albania and publicly denounced the way the Russians were treating a "fraternal Communist party" in contradiction to the 1957 Moscow Declaration of Ruling Communist Parties, according to which "the Socialist countries base their relations on principles of complete equality . . . and noninterference in one another's affairs," a principle which was stated again in the 1960 Moscow statement of 81 Communist parties, as well as in the new Program of the CPSU. Thus by defending the Albanians, the Chinese Communists emphasized publicly also their own right to challenge any one-sided decisions made in the Kremlin on the questions which are of direct concern to the rest of the Communist world.

VI

It seems clear from the preceding account of events in the Sino-Soviet orbit that the struggle for power and conflict of vested interests has brought about a certain degree of disintegration of Kremlin-centered monolithism. But will this trend of development necessarily lead toward a break in the Sino-Soviet alliance and eventually toward open hostilities between two Communist worlds, the Western and the Eastern?

It appears that the Communist global strategy as viewed from the Kremlin envisages several zones, centered in the Soviet Union and expanding to encompass the whole earth, each one of them having a special function to perform in a plan of world conquest. Thus the role of the satellite states, immediately adjoining the Soviet Union, is to strengthen "the base of world revolution" through an economic, cultural, and military integration with the Soviet Union. This bloc of closely united countries would form an impenetrable bastion of Communist ideological and material strength. The Communist-ruled countries which are outside of this inner core, such as Yugoslavia, China, and eventually Albania, would form a link between the Soviet bloc and that of the "neutral" and underdeveloped countries ("national democracies") in which "national liberation movements" and "popular front" tactics would be used to ease the Communist seizure of power, as it has been done earlier in Eastern Europe. In some cases this process might be of short duration, such as it has happened in Cuba; in others it might be rather slow, such as, for instance, in the Arab world.

In contrast to this view, the Communist global strategy, as seen from Peking, envisages an emphasis on immediate worldwide revolutionary activities, led by the Communist-oriented groups, primarily in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and backed by abundant military aid on the part of all the existing Communist-ruled countries particularly the Soviet Union. In

this view a speed-up of a violent seizure of power by means of guerrilla warfare or military intervention, is of paramount importance before the nascent anti-Communist bourgeoisies entrench themselves and perpetuate their rule. South Vietnam, for instance, is a case in point. At the same time the Chinese Communist leaders, as it was shown earlier, see China and its own ring of satellite states as the bastion of Communism and as a center of attraction and overlordship for a communized Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Thus looking at the Sino-Soviet relations from the point of view of expectations of the leaderships of the two major parties, the present dispute between them might seem insoluble and eventual open hostilities inevitable. Yet in addition to the ruling parties, there is another influential and growing class in contemporary Communist societies, as mentioned earlier. This is the class of government bureaucrats, technocrats, managers, and other experts who possess the know-how and are of paramount importance from the point of view of the survival of a complex totalitarian system. These technological intelligentsia have to be paid handsomely for their indispensable services. They have been already accumulating income and privileges, status and power. They have also been developing a vested interest of their own in the Communist system as well as a class consciousness and an *esprit de corps* on the international Communist level. Thus defending its common interests, this "new class" has become a unifying agent among Communist powers, exerting a counter-influence on disintegrating trends.

In addition, the Communist parties and pro-Communist groups outside the camp of Communist states, to which the growing strength of world Communism is a main source of inspiration, of energy, of morale, and of fanatical belief in the inevitability of the spread of Communist power over the globe, are exerting great pressure in the direction of unity, understanding, and common policies among the Communist powers.

Since these parties and groups are important to both the Soviet Union and China as arms of their foreign policies, their opinions and attitudes cannot be entirely neglected.

Moreover, there is a possibility that a new generation of youths will be growing up raised in the Chinese Communes and in the Soviet "boarding schools," away from the influences of parental homes. Could it be that these young people, devoid of human warmth of the family circle and exposed to constant drilling of Communist ideologists and coldness of Communist barracks, will grow as New Janissaries, fanatic and fierce, and eager to spread the Communist faith by sword and nuclear bomb against the infidel bourgeoisie of the non-Communist world? Or will they destroy themselves in a war of extermination between rival heresies?

Thus it should be remembered that while there are conflicts of interest between the parties of the Sino-Soviet orbit, they also have common aims, and the ideology of inevitability of Communist triumph on earth is imperative for the success of all. If this is so, then as long as there is "a world to win"⁴⁰ there is no reason to suppose that all the Communist powers should not continue to be united at least under formal Soviet leadership. And if they are split into Moscow-centered and Peking-centered blocs, they might still divide among themselves the "spheres of interests" and form a durable association for global conquest.

⁴⁰ Marx and Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, Chap. IV.

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