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Structure of Phenomenally Intentional States

PhD Dissertation

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Introduction

Philosophy of mind has been concerned, one might even say dwell, with the mind – body problem since the ancient times. Although, present-day, we speak of the mind – brain problem, consciousness studies within philosophy are still mostly engaged within this debate. However, the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness does not yield and remains to be hard. On the other hand, it still is the problem our attention should be focused on. How does one reconcile this imbalance? Perhaps with a slight shift in methodology. Put the discussion of the structure of the relation between phenomenological and physical in the background and focus on the structure of phenomenology itself. This dissertation is precisely an attempt at that – it concerns the structure of phenomenally intentional mental states. These are mental states that exhibit, primarily, the phenomenal consciousness, the felt, subjective, or ‘what it is like’ (Nagel, 1974) aspect of mental life. They also exhibit the intentional directedness; they are directed or “of” something. Until recently these two features were for the most part unreconciled. Paradigmatically intentional mental states, such as beliefs and thoughts, were not considered to be phenomenal. *Vice versa* – paradigmatically phenomenal mental states, such as feeling and sensations, were not considered to be intentional (although perception is possibly the one exception, being a mental state that is traditionally seen as phenomenal and intentional), were not considered to be intentional. However, the debate has changed. Especially so with the emergence of Phenomenal Intentionality – a thesis which says that phenomenology and intentionality are inseparable¹. Hence, phenomenally intentional mental states share both characteristics. I advocate a view according to which all intentional mental states are phenomenal, or at least, partly depend on phenomenology.

It is not inconceivable that certain properties of our experiences have objective phenomenal structures. For example, irrespective of what type of phenomenal mental state is currently

¹ There are many roads one can take within Phenomenal Intentionality debate. The theories differ with respect to every proponent’s key concepts. I will not go into them in full detail during the course of this dissertation, unless it is pertinent to my argumentative strategy. In that case, I provide sufficient background for the reader within the scope of the debate.

occurring - perceptive, cognitive, conative etc., there seems to be an accompanying temporal dimension to it – it is present. Even if I was a brain in a vat, a sheer passage of thoughts would provide such temporal dimension. If, indeed, some experiential properties are objective, they can speak to us about the structure of phenomenal consciousness in general. And this approach might make the ‘hard problem’ slightly less hard. If we have an understanding of objective experiential properties, then we might use this understanding for answering some of the questions about the experience itself in a systematic and, perhaps, measurable manner. Instead of focusing on the question ‘What is consciousness?’, our focus should shift on the questions such as: ‘Are there levels of consciousness?’, ‘Are there some unique features that accompany every conscious episode?’, ‘Is consciousness reserved only for some creatures with specific characteristics, but not others?’, ‘Is experience necessarily conscious?’, ‘Is the unconscious to be understood only as the other end of the spectrum from the conscious?’, etc. At least such is my understanding and motivation for this research.

A few terminological remarks are due on the onset. Some philosophers hold the view that intentionality is the ‘mark of the mental’ (Brentano, 1874, 1995), others tend to speak of phenomenology in those terms. There are, naturally, other options, but these two tend to be the most fashionable. Then again, most use the terms consciousness, phenomenology and subjectivity to be synonymous. This practice, in my experience, causes a great deal of confusion. The issue tends to stir up even more when cognitive scientists and neuroscientists use the terms. Hence, I also reserve the right to use the terminology to my own understanding.

There are, I believe, *five marks of the mental* (in no particular order): consciousness, intentionality, phenomenology, subjectivity, and temporality. I discuss each of them in this dissertation. As is evident by now and which I aim to further clarify, I do not take these terms necessarily to refer to the same underlying phenomena. The ‘mark of the mental’ talk is, to sum up, the question of whether there is any distinctive feature unique to all mental states that all and only mental states have. As such, when one uses this terminology, one is usually interpreted as stating the necessary and sufficient conditions for the mental. I do not wish to challenge this interpretation. However, I must note that the term ‘mental’ itself is vague. Is mental to be interpreted as animal mentality, or human animal mentality or alien animal mentality? Or transcendental, without immersion in the physical world, mentality? None of these seems implausible, and these are only some of the (more)

probable ways of understanding the concept of mentality. As such, necessary and sufficient conditions might differ depending on the definition of mentality. I cannot provide one, unfortunately, since it is task worth a dissertation on its own. However, I can provide a hypothesis. Not a hypothesis about what is the mark of the 'core mentality', but rather a one that is carving up a core category of cases that are clearly mental². For instance, take a simple perceptual episode of hearing Peki, the dog, bark. I am conscious of my experience, it seems to have intentional content, there is definitely something it is like to have it, it is as subjective as it can be, and it lasts and shows temporal structure. I focus on these clear cases of mentality. As such, mentality is an ability or capacity for meaningful reasoning which often, but not always, results in relevant action, whether physical or through further mental inferences. As a result, the five aforementioned marks can be at most a symptom of the mental. And certain symptoms can be necessary conditions, other sufficient conditions. In order to see which mark is a necessary and which is a sufficient condition, I gloss over all of the five marks of mentality more explicitly.

Consciousness is, for me, simply awareness. Not all mental states are conscious and the ones which are not are the unconscious ones. I restrain myself from identifying consciousness with a sense of selfhood or some similar quality that constitutes one as the object of consciousness. Self-consciousness is an ability of reference of a subject to itself as a subject. Naturally, the mystery of self-consciousness is closely related to the mystery of consciousness in general, however, there are plausibly creatures which are conscious without being self-conscious. Here I have in mind creatures who are aware of the internal and external going-ons and respond to them accordingly without having awareness of a sense of self. I do not hold the view that there is no consciousness in the relevant sense without self-consciousness. This is a particularly hard position to take, as one needs to find some demarcation conditions as to what is conscious and what is not. I certainly do not wish to say that H₂O is conscious, however I am fairly confident in saying that insects are (even if they are not self-conscious). I am also happy to concede to the possibility of borderline cases, such as mollusks, fungi, one cellular organism, etc., as they do react to the external environment, but they seem to lack neural sophistication to be conscious. Such borderline cases question whether there are levels of consciousness. In other words, whether consciousness is a

² This is acceptable also for someone who does not think there are necessary and sufficient conditions for mentality - for instance because they take mentality to be a concept that works by family resemblance. Thanks to Giuliano Torrenzo for pushing me to be clearer on this.

binary quality of two opposing states – conscious and unconscious, respectively; or are there levels in between, e.g. vegetative state. I do not wish to go further into these questions, as they are not directly related to the topic of this dissertation, however, I believe it is important to note them in order to be clear on what I mean by saying ‘consciousness’. All this said, being conscious seems to be necessary, although not sufficient, condition for mentality.

Even if not all mental states are conscious that does not mean that they are necessarily lacking in phenomenology. In other words, a state can be unconscious or a subject unaware of it and phenomenal or a subject having a quality of it. Hence, these two terms are not synonyms. This is a controversial claim. To understand what I have in mind here, an explanation of *phenomenology* needs to be given. This, unfortunately, I cannot offer to full satisfaction. However, what-it-is-likeness (Nagel, 1974), direction of fit, experience, appearances etc., does not do the term full justice. The best characterization I can offer is meaning things, whether external or internal, have for us. By meaning I do not imply information, as usually conceived in linguistics, but rather content. And by content, I mean whatever is given to us in our mental lives. It is not implausible that mental representations with certain contents are bearers of phenomenal qualities even if the subject is not occurrently conscious of these qualities. In that sense, a mental state can have (possibly) intrinsic phenomenal qualities, hence meaning, without me being aware of it, i.e. being conscious of it. It is hard to find an uncontroversial example of this sort of phenomenology. However, a point of reference might be the sorites. When I look at the pointillist painting ‘Banks of Seine’ by Georges Seurat, I am certainly not aware of every dot on the canvas, but that does not exclude that I see it³. Another example is the driver driving on a familiar road who is not aware of the it, how the road twists and turns, the signs and other vehicles in traffic, yet she does not crash. Granted, unconscious phenomenology sounds counterintuitive. Even more, intrinsic meaning I am not aware of, especially for someone who thinks that meaning it attributive or context dependent. However, I do not find it to be contradictory. Phenomenology is the occurrence of the structures of phenomena, worldly or otherwise, as they present themselves to the some subject. Some of these occurrences are empirically measurable, others are subjectively felt (or such is my claim). However, I am not claiming that these occurrences of the structures of phenomena are occurrences of the structures of the entities themselves, such as a patch of red colour or a round shape, but

³ A similar point of reference is the speckled hen problem.

rather the occurrences of the structure of how the phenomena presents to us. As such, these structures are internal to the phenomenology itself, rather than to the underlying thing which brings them about. All this being said, I would say that phenomenology is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for mentality.

As for *intentionality*, I stick to the scholastic definition of directedness. The scholastic idea behind intentionality is that of mental directedness towards targets, whether actual objects in the world, or contents in the mind (which need not be existent). The upshot is that intentionality is not aboutness or reference. And it is not so because of the mental part of directedness. A state is intentional only if the directedness comes from a creature capable of mentality. A book may be about something or refer to something, as can a mirror reflection, but that does not mean that the book itself or the mirror is intentional. Thus, only directedness of mental states is genuine intentionality. As such, intentionality might be a sufficient and necessary condition for mentality.

Subjectivity, on the other hand, is a term with multiple designators. There is the, so called, global sense of subjectivity or me-ness, which designates a subject in substantial terms, as a subject of mental states. Secondly, there is a sense of subjectivity in terms of agency or mine-ness, which designates a subject ownership of mental states. Lastly, there is a sense of subjectivity in terms of perspective or for-me-ness, which designates a subject's point of view. These three senses of subjectivity need to be sharply distinguished. As for mine-ness I do not consider it to be either necessary or sufficient condition for mentality. Phenomena such as thought insertion, where the patient claims her thoughts do not belong to her but are rather someone else's, hence there is no sense of agency in an otherwise non-impaired mental functioning, point to such a conclusion. As for the case of for-me-ness it is perhaps a sufficient condition, but not necessary, as for-me-ness designates subjectivity of the experience as it is given to me, felt as it is for me to the exclusion of anyone else. Me-ness designates the subjectivity of the self, felt through the particular experiences as a subject of them. There is no experiencing without me-ness. This makes it perhaps a sufficient, but not a necessary condition for mentality.

Temporality is essential since it gives our mental lives a unified frame of reference, both synchronically and diachronically. It is all-accompanying regardless of what is given to us, again, either internally or externally. Hence, temporality is a sufficient, but perhaps not a necessary condition for mentality.

My aim in this dissertation is to touch upon each of the five ‘marks of the mental’. In the first part of the dissertation, *Structure of Conscious Mental States*, I am mostly preoccupied by intentionality and phenomenology as they appear to us in consciousness, that is, when we are aware of them. Second part of the dissertation, *Structure of Unconscious Mental States*, is exactly the opposite analysis of the same phenomena, i.e. when we are not aware of them. As such, both parts deal with consciousness, the first part more as a local state or content, the second part as a global state of mind, however with reference to contents. Last part of the dissertation, *Structure of Subjectivity and Temporality*, concerns the last two marks of the mental and suggests a strong relation between them.

The dissertation, formed as a collection of papers, starts by introducing a novel theory of modes or attitudes in ‘*Intentional Primitivism of Modes*’. Here I defend the idea that phenomenally intentional mental states, as defined above, are not individuated only by content, but also by mode. Both variables need to be fixed in order to fix the nature of a conscious mental state. My theory differs from other intentional primitivist theories of modes in that the modes are intrinsically differentiated, as opposed to relational (Crane, 2001; 2003) or simply qualitative (Block, 1978; 1994; 2007). That is to say, modes do not get their intentional character through relational properties to the intentional object, nor are they simply qualitatively defined as such mode as opposed to another. Rather modes are inherently intentional. I distinguish two ways of experiencing modes; a coarse-grained and a fine-grained, and put forward a new metaphysical model, the modifiers model, based on non-representational features of mental states that make a difference to how the occurrent mental state is given to us in experience. I explain the relation between mode and modifier as a genus – specie relation. For example, desperately desiring is composed of the property of desire, the mode, and an independent modifier of desperation. This, as a result, makes my theory adverbialist, however only at a single level, namely, at the level of modes or attitudes, and as such I avoid the main issues of adverbialism. Lastly, I give the metaphysical underpinning of modes in terms of trope theory of modes.

However, this is not to say that all modes or attitudes are *per se* intentional. Hence, in the second paper ‘*Composition of Phenomenally Intentional States*’, I analyze the relationship between modes and contents. Here, there are two outstanding questions. The first one is, after examining the explanandum metaphysically and positing certain modes as primitive, the taxonomy of modes or

attitudes, i.e., which are reducible to others. Furthermore, some modes are to be eliminated at modes and given a different classification. The second question is a more straightforward question of relation: once we individuate mode and content, how are they combined? Depending on the answer to the first question, I look more closely at possible metaphysical relations between modes and contents and give necessary conditions for the options, e.g. fusion, emergence, composition etc.

The second part of the dissertation deals with differentiating conditions when is a mental state rightly said to be conscious, as opposed to unconscious and what are the consequences for intentionality and phenomenology. Here, I turn, in the third paper ‘Pure Content View of the Unconscious’, on the structure of unconsciousness itself. I defend Intentional Realism about unconscious or the thesis that unconscious mental states are genuinely intentional. Simply put, mental states that are paradigmatically considered intentional whilst conscious are intentional as well whilst unconscious. I defend this view by putting forward a two-dimensional intentional model of unconscious states. The structure of intentionality is usually conceived in a three-dimensional manner - that of subject, content and attitude. Most argue that conscious states are indeterminate with respect to content (Quine, 1960; Davidson 1973; Putnam 1975, 1980; Searle 1991). I agree with the indeterminacy thesis, however not with content indeterminacy. My argument proceeds by unpacking the indeterminacy argument for conscious content, applying it to conscious attitude while arguing it is an equally plausible alternative that the indeterminacy is in the attitudinal component, rather than the content one when it comes to unconscious mental states. This is a view of the unconscious that calls into question the standard model in analytic philosophy. On such a view, only desires are determinate, while other mental attitudes are not. This is essentially a Freudian view of the unconscious (2005, first published 1915).

The fourth paper, ‘Against Unconscious Belief’ discusses propositional attitudes, such as beliefs, when unconscious. For example, I hold a belief ‘that J.J. Abrams is the worst thing that happened to Sci-Fi genre in the last 50 or so years’ unconsciously. Someone asks me, knowing I am a Sci-Fi fan, what do I think of contemporary genre. Without a second thought I express my unconscious belief of J.J. Abrams. We use the terminology of dispositional belief when it comes to the unconscious one and occurrent when it comes to conscious one. However, we have been taking for granted that beliefs are propositional attitudes, even while unconscious, while, at the same time,

remaining committed to certain asymmetry between the conscious and the unconscious. As a result, unconscious beliefs are on par with conscious ones as propositional attitudes, which is in tension to the presupposed asymmetry. The novelty of my account is that it vindicates the asymmetry thesis without positing a difference in intentional content, but rather saying that the difference is in intentional structure, as stated in the previous paper on the nature of the unconscious in general.

My dissertation ends with an analysis of temporal and subjective dimension of experiences in ‘The Subject of Temporal Experience’. This paper is written in collaboration with Giuliano Torrenco and I thank him for his kindness in allowing me to include it in the dissertation. Most, if not every, mental state we undergo has a subjective structure of being to me or me-ness. We do not undergo experiences of a subject (at least not in the substantial term) of being to me, but rather the mental state as being to me. I argue that the same structure holds with respect to the temporal dimension, i.e. being present to one now or presentness. In other words, most, if not every, mental state we undergo is being present to me now. We experience these features as simply accompanying our experiences of content and attitudes towards those contents. Arguably, these are the only features of our experiences that are of this nature. I argue that this is not a simple correlation but rather there is a stronger metaphysical relation between them. Next, I analyze this relation. Contents nor attitudes we are experiencing do not give us the temporal or subjective dimension. Rather, my suggestion is that me-ness and presentness arise from the same structural characteristic of experience.

There is much more to be said on the topic of the structure of phenomenally intentional states. This is another reason why I chose this research. Creatures are conscious in different manners. For example, me and my dog might share some features of experiences, e.g. we both have sensory-visual conscious experience; but differ in other, e.g. a belief that the sensory-visual conscious experience is of cats as opposed to undetached-cat-parts. Although our global conscious features differ, we do share some local similarities, e.g. we see the same shape. What differs is our subjective perspective on them and how we use such features to guide our action and cognition. Consequently, the question are there objective measurable structures of some elements of phenomenally intentional states is, in my opinion, a valuable direction of research in consciousness studies.

Part I
The Structure of Conscious Mental States

I.1. Introduction

The first section of the dissertation concerns conscious states and their phenomenally intentional character. The main purpose of both papers in this section is to provide an overall theory of phenomenally intentional conscious states not just with respect to their content, but also with respect to the mode or attitude under which the content is represented. By content I mean *what* is represented, whatever is given to one in experience. By mode I mean *how* something is experienced, manner of having the content (or *what*) of the mental state. My primary aim here is not to develop a new theory of content individuation of phenomenology nor a new theory how content contributes to phenomenology in a distinctive manner. Rather, I focus on the modes in this regard. Modes are, I argue, intentionally primitive in that they are representational in themselves regardless of the content representation they are co-instantiated with.

It is important to distinguish, in Chalmers terms, *phenomenal properties*, which characterize what it is like of a mental state, from *representational properties*, which characterize the directedness or intentionality of a mental state (Chalmers, 2004). Chalmers makes a further distinction between *pure representational property* which is a property of representing a certain intentional content, from an *impure representational property* which is a property in representing a certain intentional content in a certain manner of representation. The manner of representation is *the how* content is represented which roughly corresponds to the mode in my terminology⁴. Correspondingly, one can talk about a *pure representationalism view* which states that representation alone suffices for (or is identical to) phenomenal property. However, nobody, to my knowledge, holds this view as simply representing something does not suffice for having an accompanying phenomenal property. *Impure representationalism view* states that certain representational properties suffice for (or are identical to) phenomenal properties. As Chalmers notes, all representationalists are impure representationalists.

⁴ There is some disagreement in how to interpret Chalmers' manners of representation. However, Chalmers himself notes that by manners of representation he is aiming at the same phenomena as Crane is with intentional modes. And intentional modes are what I have in mind.

However, there is a further distinction that needs to be made. This is between strong representationalism (defended by Dretske, Tye and Lycan) and weak representationalism (defended by Block, Chalmers and Crane). *Strong representationalism* is the view that representation of a certain kinds suffices for phenomenal property. These representations are characterized in materialist terms (most usually functionalist terms). *Weak representationalism* is the view that phenomenal properties necessarily have representational properties. This is a fairly uncontroversial claim. Although what is meant by this claim is usually interpreted that phenomenal properties have representational content, Intentional Primitivism about Modes is compatible with weak representationalism. The same interpretation holds for modes of representation, although I will not use representational content to designate representational properties of modes to avoid misunderstanding with representational content in terms of pure representational properties.

I am *Intentional Realists about Consciousness* such as Dretske (1988) in that propositional attitudes (or modes in my terminology) such as beliefs, desires, fears, etc. are indispensable in providing a complete analysis of mental states. This view is directly opposed to the views of *Intentional Eliminativists about Consciousness* such as Churchland (1981), Dennett (1987) and Stich (1983). Intentional Eliminativists about Consciousness (and, for that matter, Unconsciousness, as well) hold that there are no such things as representational states, which are simply a result of folk psychology generalisations⁵. Presumably, they are *Intentional Eliminativist about Modes* as well in that modes are not themselves intentional (or representational, for that matter). However, one can be an Intentional Realist about Consciousness and Intentional Eliminativist about Modes as reductive representationalists such as Dretske (1986, 1988, 1993), Lycan (1987, 1996, 2001) and Tye (1995, 2003). This is the view that conscious mental states are intentional in that their content is intentional and, although modes are indispensable in the complete analysis of these mental states, they are not themselves intentional. I go further in being also an *Intentional Realist about Modes* in that modes are intentional themselves. Furthermore, I am *Intentional Primitivist about Modes* in the sense that the intentionality of modes is not to be reduced or explained away by something external to the mode itself (content being the prime candidate here) or by relation to something external to the mode (object of content being the prime

⁵ Representational states are not to be confused with mental representation which most eliminativist would not eliminate. The difference is that for eliminativist mental representation is a neurophysiological phenomenon, e.g. when a visual image hits the retina and moves to V4 area of the brain, and as such is open to naturalization.

candidate here). Furthermore, I am not just Intentional Realist about Consciousness, but also an *Intentional Realist about Unconsciousness*. This is to say that unconscious mental states are genuinely intentional. This view is opposed to the view of *Intentional Eliminativist about Unconsciousness*, which states that unconscious mental states are not intentional, and *Intentional Reductivism about Unconsciousness*, which states that unconscious mental states are not intentional in themselves but rather their intentionality is to be reduced to something external to the state which is genuinely intentional (conscious states being the prime candidate here).

It is of importance to mention the distinction between reductive and nonreductive representationalism here. *Reductive representationalism* holds that phenomenal properties are identical to representational properties (or representational content) and representational properties can be given a characterization in purely material terms, i.e. nonphenomenal terms. This is to naturalize intentionality in purely material terms. *Nonreductive representationalism*, on the other hand, holds that phenomenal properties are identical to representational properties (or representational content), however the representational properties cannot be given a characterization in purely material, i.e. nonphenomenal, terms. As Chalmers notes ‘nonreductive representationalism might be nonreductive about the manner of representation, or about the representational content, or both’ (ibid, p.30). I am not just nonreductive kind of representationalist but also, I a primitivist, both about representational content and manner of representation or mode of representation.

To sum up, I am Intentional Realist about Consciousness, but also an Intentional Realist about Unconsciousness as well. This is to say that both conscious and unconscious mental states alike are genuinely intentional in my view. Furthermore, I am an Intentional Realist about modes in that modes are genuinely intentional. Moreover, I am an Intentional Primitivist about Modes in that the intentionality of modes does not depend on anything external to the modes themselves or on a relation to anything external to the modes, but rather that modes are intentional in and of themselves. The view I advocate, when it comes to consciousness, is of weak and nonreductive representationalism of modes. The view I advocate, when it comes to unconsciousness, is of strong and nonreductive representationalism of content and eliminativism about modes. Next, in the remainder of §I, I turn to consciousness, while unconsciousness will be discussed in §II.

I.2. Intentional Primitivism of Modes

Abstract:

I catalogue the structure of intentionality with the help of a fundamental distinction between psychological modes or attitudes, on the one hand, and contents, on the other. While intentional contents pertain to *what* is represented, modes or attitudes are meant to capture *how* the content is represented, or, more precisely, the nature of the subject's directedness toward a particular content. If one accepts this informative nature of modes and is not an eliminativist or a reductionist about their phenomenal character, but rather a primitivist, then modes supply the mental state with a proprietary intentional contribution independent of content. Since both of these variables need to be fixed in order to fix the nature of a mental states, an intuitive question would be do we and, if we do, how do we experience psychological modes? Is phenomenology distinctive at the level of modes, and not just that of contents? If we accept that modes contribute to phenomenology of a mental state, then when I judge that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris or see a lemon blurrily, is my degree of confidence in the judgment or the blurriness of my visual experience due to the contribution of mode or content? In this paper I put forward a new metaphysical model of individuating phenomenology of modes, the trope model, based on phenomenal modifiers or non-representational features of mental states that make a difference how the occurrent mental state is given to us in experience. I also contrast my model with most intuitive counter-models, namely; the content model according to which the modifier is part of the content (e.g. I judge *that Paris is capital of France moderately high.*); and the degree model according to which the modifier is part of the mode, hence modes come in degree (e.g. *I judge moderately high that Paris is capital of France.*

Keywords: Intentionality, Phenomenology, Psychological Modes, Propositional Attitudes, Mental Content.

I.2.A. Set Up

Intentionality is originally, in Scholastic and, subsequently Brentanian terms, defined as directedness of many, if not all, mental states. A standard model of this directedness is three-dimensional: intentional subject, intentional mode and intentional content. In other words, a subject is directed towards an intentional content through an intentional mode. For example, I, as a subject, might be directed towards my dog barking as intentional content, through the intentional mode of hearing. Subsequently, I as a subject, might be directed towards an intentional content

that there is a cat nearby, through and intentional mode of belief. Putting subject aside for now, we catalogue the structure of our intentional mental states with the help of a fundamental distinction between modes, on the one hand, and contents, on the other. While intentional content pertains to *what* is represented, modes are meant to capture *how* the content is represented, or, more precisely, the nature of the subject's directedness toward a particular content. Representation is directedness a certain content in a certain manner or having certain content in a certain manner. An intentional state represents an object. Consequently, in representationalism as a theory of the mental, all intentional mental states share a characteristic of being directed towards some object that is, in turn, represented by them. In the context of the content, representationalism is to be distinguished from direct realism. Object is something external to the given mental state. While in representationalism the object is part of the content indirectly through the representational content, in direct realism it is the object itself that enters the mental state directly without the intermediate level of representation. The subject is in a certain relation to the external objects. The represented object is *what* the mental state is about. *How* the object is represented is to be captured by the intentional mode or psychological attitude⁶.

In order to evaluate modes with more rigor, one should indicate first what modes are not and how we should not employ them in our analysis. The first obvious candidate for dismissal is Fregean mode of presentation (1948). By mode of presentation, I refer to different ways that constitute how an agent might think about the object. Think Phosphorus and Hesperus. Having the relevant conditions of satisfaction embedded in them, modes of presentation, in this sense, are types of content. You and I can think about the same object (Venus) while entertaining different contents. More precisely, we think about the objects of our representation under different aspects. Precisely those aspects constitute the representations as different.

The second, related, however, more controversial, candidate we can dismiss is *aspectual shape*. This is a very mysterious term in my opinion. It originates from Searle, however Searle never defined it properly. In his own words: 'Thought and experience and hence intrinsic intentional states generally, have a certain sort of aspectual shape. They represent their conditions of satisfaction under aspects' (Searle, 1991, p.53). I read this as equivalent to the notion of Fregean

⁶ This is true of both representationalism and direct realism alike.

mode of presentation⁷. What is special about *aspectual shape* is that it makes a representational difference in terms of the subjective character regularly associated with it i.e. “...the way that the aspectual shape matters is that it is constitutive of the way the agent thinks about the subject matter...” (ibid). The difference between the Fregean modes of presentation and aspectual shape is that the former are ways in which the object of reference is presented, whereas the latter is a way in which something like an “internal description” of the object of reference (the condition of satisfaction) is presented. Hence, I see *aspectual shape* as somewhat analogue to the mode of presentation as both pertain to reference of content. For that reason, we can dismiss *aspectual shape* on the same criterion: both aspectual shape and mode of presentation are meant to convey the reference of the mental state to objects and their properties in a certain way and, accordingly, are parts of the content.

Turning on to how we should characterize modes. Modes are most commonly defined as *psychological modes* (Searle, 1983), *intentional modes* (Crane, 2003) or *manners of representation* (Chalmers, 2004). It is my hypothesis that this is merely a terminological difference, however I leave open the possibility that these terms do not refer to exactly the same underlying phenomena, but rather a multiple phenomenon with deep similarities⁸. The underlying phenomena is primarily a psychological property which characterizes a manner of having the subject matter of the mental state. My claim (which differs from Searle, Crane and Chalmers) is that the phenomenal experience will have not just be constituted by phenomenology provided by content, but also the phenomenology provided by the mode irrespective of that particular content. The question which I wish to raise is do modes in some manner contribute to the phenomenology of our experiences or are modes rather uninteresting in our prospective theory of conscious experience?

⁷ Frege’s position is certainly more sophisticated from this brute characterization, however, for my point here I do not need to go into the details about Fregean exegesis. No one has ever given a more complete study of Frege than Dummett (1973, 1991).

⁸ I agree with Tim Bayne, who pointed this out, that Chalmers' manners of representation might be different from Searle and Crane characterization. However, it is unclear to me what Chalmers has in mind. In his own words '...manner of representation...involves a mental characterization of the state of representing. There are many different manners of representation. For example, one can represent a content perceptually, and one can represent a content doxastically (in belief): these correspond to different manners of representation. At a more fine-grained level, one can represent a content visually or auditorily. Manners of representation may also involve functional characterizations of the representing state. For example, one can represent a certain content in such a way that the content either is or is not available for verbal report.' This seems to be in agreement with my characterization and, indeed, in a footnote to the same paragraph, Chalmers states that 'manners of representation are closely related to what Crane (2003) calls "intentional modes".'

Note that I use mode and attitude interchangeably. Since there is no fixed terminology in the literature, I opted for modes for two reasons. Firstly, attitudes, since Russell (1903, 1905), carry with it the inference of being solely propositional. This does not leave room for non-propositional or objectual attitudes (Forbes, 2000) which capture the subject's relation to the object itself. Secondly, while modes, in this context, should not be mistaken with 'modes of presentation' (Frege, 1948), differences in modes can be seen as indicating differences in types of phenomenology. In that sense, one can speak of types of sensory-perceptual phenomenology as there is something it is like to see a lemon, and taste a lemon, and smell a lemon. Similarly, a proponent of cognitive phenomenology speaks of types of cognitive attitudes such as the phenomenology of merely entertaining a thought about a lemon, or believing that there are lemons in the kitchen, or wondering whether there are lemons in the kitchen (see Kriegel, 2015 for more on these and similar cases)⁹.

As most philosophers do indeed acknowledge this distinction, it seems natural to assume that modes are extensively researched, as contents are for the most part. However, modes are the underdog in the discussion with respect to content as far as their phenomenal and intentional character is concerned. This is surprising for at least two pivotal reasons. Firstly, modes seem to be a pervasive feature of our phenomenology. It is plausible to assume that there is a phenomenal unity in the structure of content and modes. This unity holds with respect to experience itself¹⁰. We do not experience modes without being tokened with some particular content, i.e. there is, presumably, no such thing as pure phenomenology of imagining without imagining something. The mode of imagining is not found in the experience apart from its content, as added in some manner to contents as a distinct ingredient. The same holds *vice versa*: we do not experience contents without experiencing them in some particular manner. Although we can distinguish introspectively between various contents, e.g. lemons on the one hand and limes on the other, the

⁹ Kriegel, for example, does not consider merely entertaining a thought to be a cognitive phenomenology, while Pitt (2004), among others, considers it as such. Furthermore, Pitt does not make distinction between belief and having a hunch for instance, while Kriegel does. I am more inclined to Kriegel in making further distinctions *within* cognitive attitudes (such as believing and having a hunch) and not only *between* attitudes (such as believing and desiring). However, I am not inclined in considering merely entertaining a thought to be an attitude at all. I address this further in I.3.

¹⁰ By unity, I am implying a symmetric dependence here. In other words, when consciously having a content, one is necessarily having it through a certain mode or attitude. Same holds for *vice versa*. Exceptions in my theory are consciously simply entertaining a content (see I.3. 'Composition of Phenomenally Intentional States') and unconscious mental attitudes (see II.1. 'Pure Content View of the Unconscious').

ways of apprehending these contents, e.g. seeing lemons and imagining lemons, seem to be always present¹¹.

One may object, right from the start that this portrayal of modes is incompatible with the *Transparency Thesis* of experience. As I already noted, modes cannot be experienced as added to the content as a distinct experiential property in some manner. Hence, one may argue that they define the transparency thesis altogether. Hence, even if some properties of experiences can be experienced as a distinct experiential property, i.e. properties we focus on or attend to, modes cannot. I disagree and let me clarify further why.

Introspection is most commonly defined as an epistemic process of one's own mental states. This process has three main characteristics. Firstly, our self-knowledge, or, more precisely, knowledge of our own mental states, seems to be exclusive and privileged. Only you and you alone have access to your experience in the way you experience them. Secondly, such knowledge is of *a priori* nature. It does not require any empirical evidence, experimental methods, observation or any other empirical means of recognition. Thirdly, introspection seems to be a confident process or immune to skepticism. That does not mean you cannot be erroneous about your inner mental life. In other words, immunity to skepticism does not imply that one possesses infallible knowledge of one's second-order intentional states. Consider the judgment that *P*, where *P* stands for: I believe that it is raining. The judgment that *P* is erroneous if I make that judgment, and it is possible that *P* is false. As such, second-order mental states are sometimes mistaken. However, one cannot be mistaken about the first-order mental state. What I can't be wrong is things such as being in pain.

I believe there are in fact two readings introspection. The first reading is, as already mentioned, *epistemological*: knowing what-it-is-like of one's own mental states. This reading gives us the privileged, epistemic access. A mental state, and corresponding experience of it, is unlike that of other types of mental going-ons, most notably, neural states. The mental state is, in this sense,

¹¹ As noted previously, simply entertaining a content is an exception in my overall theory when it comes to conscious mental states. Simply entertaining a thought is not a term from ordinary English language. Brentano (1874, 1995) used this term to distinguish a difference from belief, which entails commitment to the truth of the propositional content from that of entertaining which does not entail such a commitment. Brentano's student Meinong used the same distinction in 'On assumption'. Broad in his commentary to Meinong's "On assumption" used the term of entertaining to distinguish the mode of assuming (which entails commitment to the truth of the propositional content) from entertaining which does not entail such a commitment. Thanks to Giuliano Torrengo for introducing me to Broad's use. I will come back to this.

given to someone; it is for someone, to the exclusion of anyone else. Moreover, through privileged attendance we get privileged epistemic access. The second one is the *phenomenal* reading, which amounts to *what-it-is-like* to be in a particular mental state, or simply attend to a mental state. What makes experiences special for its subject is the fact that, in living through it, the subject is somehow aware of herself having it. In phenomenally introspecting one has the feel of the experience, the what it is like of it, in epistemically introspecting one knows what the experience is of.

The *Transparency Thesis* of experience is usually defined in the following way. Introspection of what-it-is-like to have an experience does not amount to awareness of experiences themselves, but only of their mind-independent objects. Transparency tells us what happens when we introspect. Note that this is a negative definition¹². There are two readings of transparency thesis as well (Kind, 2003). *Strong Transparency Thesis* states that ‘we cannot attend to our experience except by attending to the objects represented by that experience’. The *Weak Transparency Thesis* states that ‘we can attend to our experience by attending to the objects represented by that experience’ (Kind, 2003, p.6). In other words, the Strong Transparency Thesis reading tells us that we never experience properties of our experiences, but only contents. For example, when it comes to modes of experience, there is no such thing as what it is like to simply see but rather what it is like to see something in some manner. However, the Weak Transparency Thesis, on the other hand, tells us that we attend to everything which is represented in our experiences. In other words, if modes are represented by the experience, we can attend to them. As such, if modes are representational, they are phenomenal. As a result, modes being a pervasive feature of our phenomenology in such a way that we never experience a content without it being accompanied by a certain mode, is compatible with the Weak Transparency Thesis.

Second reason why modes are central to our theory of mind is that how something is experienced seems to carve joints of the nature of experience (or of type or kind of experience). In general, one can individuate phenomenally conscious mental states in types by two ways; with respect to content or with respect to mode. If we individuate mental states solely with respect to content either we have only one mode of representation, namely representing, or all the different content individuations are different manners of representing. The former option is in the spirit of classical

¹² A positive one can be made, e.g. of the form: Introspection of what-it-is-like to have an experience amounts to awareness of the objects of that experience; we ‘look right through it’, i.e. the experience, to the objects themselves.

representationalism (Dretske, 1986, 1983, 1995; Tye, 1995; Lycan 1987, 1998). Although this option is a plausible one, I find it counterintuitive simply since I am aware of the difference between imagining and desiring a gelato. This is not to say that they do not make this distinction. However, they account for it in terms of the difference of the overall representation. More precisely, representationslists account it in terms of propositional content. However, the resulting phenomenology of hearing somebody calling my name is not to be accounted for at the level of propositional attitudes, since they are not phenomenal in the representationalist picture, but rather the accompanying sensory experience. This is precisely what I argue against. There is no incoherence, quite the contrary, that propositional attitudes are phenomenal. This option is too sparse to capture our mental life adequately. On the other hand, the latter option, individuating modes solely in terms of modes or presentation, is too rich, since it does not capture the similarity relations between seeing and imagining the Eiffel tower. In addition, it seems an inelegant solution because of its complexity and ontological richness. As such, I do not find it a plausible one nor anyone, to my knowledge, holds such a view.

By introducing modes as types of mental states, we point out something substantial about the structure of consciousness. Modes are, firstly, phenomenally informative, so to speak; they tell us something about the structure of our inner life. The differentiation and similarity conditions between mental states of hearing, remembering, imagining, and loving a song by Fabrizio de Andre or believing that Ferengi ethics is not ethical according to your ethics, or wanting that Ferengi ethics is ethical or simply entertaining it, is to be accounted for at two levels of explanation; namely, content and mode. If we account for it *only* at the level of content, then the differentiation and similarity conditions between these mental states are to be explained at the level particular tokening of contents and propositional attitude. Moreover, types of mental states are ontologically more fundamental in our theory of mind than particular tokening of those types in connection to particular contents. They are open to classification or typology according to their characteristics or features. Hence, we can talk about cognitive phenomenally conscious states, conative phenomenally conscious states, affective phenomenally conscious states, etc¹³.

One can object to this kind of typology of metal states with respect to modes by building a case on perception. It is a substantive claim that sensory modalities mark out types of experience, since

¹³ More on this in I.3.

there are examples of multi-sensory phenomena that make it impossible to distinguish the types of sensory experience at play from one another such as speech perception which involves integration of visual and auditory information at an early stage. Moreover, phenomena such as synesthesia is simply not a single sensory experience. I agree that perception is tricky with respect to proposed typology according to phenomenology of modes. However, I address this in more detail and put forward a possible course of action, that applies to, at least some, cases of perception in §I.2.B.

In §I.2.B. I put forward, firstly, my theory of phenomenal intentionality of modes. I distinguish two ways of experiencing modes; a coarse-grained and a fine-grained one and put forward a new model of individuating phenomenology of modes, the modifiers model, based on non-representational features of mental states that make a difference how the occurrent mental state is given to us in experience in a more fine-grained manner. Furthermore, I explain the relation between mode and modifier as an adverbialist relation based on the genus – specie distinction. Secondly, I move on to giving a metaphysical model of modes. I argue for a trope theory of modes. Here, I also ask the pivotal question: if modes are intentionally primitive, what is their intentional object? In §I.2.C. I contrast my model with most intuitive counter-models, namely; the content model according to which the modifier is part of the content (e.g. I judge that Paris is capital of France moderately high.); and the degree model according to which the modifier is part of the mode, hence modes come in degree (e.g. I judge moderately high that Paris is capital of France), as well as give counter arguments against both of these views. In §I.2.D. I proceed by refining the challenge. My aim here is to explore the logical space and situate modes with respect to existing theories. In §I.2.E. I discuss in detail the existing primitivist theories and dismiss them after looking at them more closely. In §I.2.F. I conclude by noting some of the issues in answering some of the questions what psychological modes or attitudes are.

I.2.B. Intentional Primitivism of Modes¹⁴

I turn to, firstly, my phenomenal individuation theory of modes, and, secondly, my metaphysical theory of modes. I start by employing the coarse-grained/fine-grained distinction in the way modes are phenomenally given to us in our experience in §I.2.B.a. I utilize this distinction at the onset of developing a plausible metaphysical theory since I hold that, phenomenally speaking, the fine-grained modes, described by adverbs, are the ones we essentially experience. In §I.2.B.b. I tackle the description of fine-grained modes in themselves, i.e. the designation of adverbs. Here I introduce phenomenal modifiers, non-representational features of our experience and define adverbs in those terms. §I.2.B.c. asks about the connection between mode and modifier. Here I opt for adverbialisms as a theory and argue that my solution avoids all the usual issues of adverbialism while, at the same time, is explanatory when it comes to phenomenal individuation of modes. In §I.2.B.d. I make an Interlude where I recap what I have said in previous three subchapters on the phenomenal individuation of modes. Here I turn to the building blocks of metaphysics behind the phenomenology. In §I.2.B.e. I ask the crucial question – if modes are primitively intentional, what are their intentional objects? Here I discuss formal objects theory. §I.2.B.f. argues for the trope theory of mental states. As a result, we maintain the differentiating and similarity conditions between mental states with respect to their intentional modes, as well as intentional contents. However, we do not have phenomenal identity between two mental states, as when both you and I think ‘I have a headache’.

I.2.B.a. Coarse-grained and Fine-grained Mode

To begin with one may say that the fact that we are in one mode rather than another, makes it the case that we are in a certain relation to the content. By this I do not imply that modes are essentially defined as a relation to the content of the mental state, but rather the opposite; the mode defines the relation. For example, the overall representation of my mental state when I believe that

¹⁴ Thanks to Davide Bordini for useful discussions in the pre-natal version of this theory and for pushing me forward with it, as well as providing me with some useful examples.

hedgehogs are cute, is not just accounted for at the level of hedgehogs and them instantiating the property of cuteness, but rather because I also believe them to be cute, as opposite to, say, doubting whether they are cute.

How are phenomenal roles of intentional modes to be individuated? I think there are in fact two aspects to the theory at play. The first aspect is the *Coarse-Grained mode* of representing. For example, what is it like to judge (as opposed to doubt) that the Széchenyi baths are in Budapest with modest confidence? Or, what it is like to desire (as opposed to intend) to have a gelato for breakfast? This is the question which intentional mode I am instantiating; am I believing, doubting, desiring, intending or something else.

The second aspect is the *Fine-Grained mode* of representing. For example, what is it like to judge that the Széchenyi baths are in Budapest with modest confidence (as opposed to high degree of confidence)? Or, what it is like to desperately desire to have a gelato for breakfast as opposed to intend? Or, what it is like to see blurry as opposed to vividly a yellow lemon? Or what is it like to have a throbbing pain as opposed to piercing pain?

Why is this distinction important? Because the Coarse-grained level does not capture fully the phenomenal character of our mental states. It only tells us whether I judge, or I do not; I desire something, or I do not; I see it, or I do not. To put it intuitively, when I believe that the Széchenyi baths are in Budapest the question is whether the mode of believing is on or off, so to speak¹⁵. But it seems that there is more to our experiences, as they are not so cleanly felt. Whenever I believe something, I believe it with some confidence. When I am in pain, I am not just paining, the pain has a specific character to it; it can be throbbing or it can be sharp, it might change its sharpness to throbness¹⁶. I can desperately desire gelato, but only have a pleasant feeling towards macaron. There are *ways* one can have an experience. These are the fine-grained differences: the way something is given to us in our occurrent experience. The fine-grained differences capture the

¹⁵ Thanks to Tim Crane for putting it in such intuitive terms.

¹⁶ Thanks to Tim Bayne for pointing out that it is controversial whether the pain case is relevantly similar to the belief case. I do agree since pain is a bodily sensation with a paradoxical nature. On the one hand, we experience pain in a certain bodily location. Moreover, pain has features such as duration and intensity. In these two senses pain resembles ordinary physical objects. On the other hand, pain resembles other mental states in that it, nevertheless, remains subjective and I, and only I, have privileged phenomenal and epistemic access to it. Although there are convincing arguments that pain (and other bodily sensations for that matter) are physical objects, I am more inclined to believe them not to be. However, full discussion of this tension is out of the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, since both these views are equally plausible, it is legitimate to acknowledge the extent of the controversy.

actual phenomenal character of our mental state as it is felt or sensed. In other words, our experiences are complex; my visual experience can be affected by my mood, my mood can be affected by my beliefs, my desires often are indeed affected by my emotions. Simply instantiating a particular mode, or for that matter, multiple modes, i.e. desiring something sweet because I see sweets at the window of a bakery and I feel a bit down due to my belief that the writing did not go well today, and so on, at a single time *t*, does not capture all the richness of my actual experience as it is felt from the first-person perspective.

But note this. I can have a depressing fear, but I cannot have a blurry fear. I can see something blurry, but I cannot see something inconceivably. I can imagine something conceivable, but I cannot imagine something painfully (although it may be that imagining something is painful to me). I can have a throbbing pain, but I cannot accept something throbbing-ly, etc. These examples point that, at least some, of the *adverbs*, which I used to describe the fine-grained differences, are distinctive of the mode. They cannot move around at will. I am making the natural assumption that different descriptions generally capture genuine differences between fine-grainly distinguished modes. The ‘generally’ is important, adverbs do not need to do that systematically, but they do in many cases. I allow for there being differences that are not captured by English adverbs (and maybe no natural language whatsoever), and there being distinct English adverbs which capture the same fine-grain mode (they may be just two slightly different ways of describing it, depending on our communicative interest, or maybe register of the communication etc.)¹⁷.

This points to show at two interrelated questions:

- (i) How are the adverbs to be selected with respect to the particular mode?
- (ii) Are the fine-grained differences somehow dependent on the mode?

The first question is, essentially, the question of what mental features those adverbs capture. I call them phenomenal modifiers¹⁸. I clarify in § I.2.B.b. The second question is the question of relation between mode and modifier. I opt for adverbialism in §I.2.B.c.

¹⁷ Thanks to Giuliano Torrenco for pointing this out.

¹⁸See Torrenco (2017). From him I take on the idea of phenomenal modifiers. Torrenco cites Boghossian & Velleman (1989).

1.2.B.b. Phenomenal Modifiers

The determinable-determinate is a relation between properties – a property is a determinate respective to a determinable, e.g. being red is a determinate of being coloured. Can the same relation be used to capture the fine-grained and coarse-grained differences in the mode? We want to keep this division intact, as through it we gain the difference and similarity conditions between mental states as well as a prospective typology with respect to which mental states one is instantiating. However, the determinable-determinate relation is a bit too stern as determinates are at the same time of similar type, although mutually exclusive. For example, a piece of paper can be *either* red *or* blue all over, not red *and* blue all over at the same time. My desire can be satisfying and unsuitable at the same time. Furthermore, the determinable-determinate is a relation between properties not objects or abstract concepts. It is fine to use colour for being coloured (to express: being red is a determinate of being coloured), but confidence and belief are both substantive, do they refer to property? It does not seem so¹⁹.

Unlike the determinable-determinates relation where the determinate is not treated in conjunctive terms, genus-specie relation is, and this seems to be more accommodating with respect to our experiences. Modes are fixed by a range of specie which can be accounted for at the level of genus. Having a desperate desire can be understood as a conjunctive property of having a genus property of desire and the specie of desperateness as conjuncts. Moreover, the specie conjuncts correspond to the nature of mode. So, I can see blurrily or vividly, and desire something desperately or vilely. However, I cannot doubt surely or dreary, for example. If there is such a fixed relationship between the genus mode and the specie adverbs, then it seems there is a connection between, at least some, certain modes and certain adverbs. In other words, there is a specific way of having the modes. On the other hand, some modes can share certain features that are usually characterised through adverbs, e.g. reliably believing (it will rain tomorrow since I saw the weather forecast) and reliably assuming (it will rain tomorrow since it has rained for the past few days); or desperately expecting (that it will rain tomorrow since I promised by friend I will join her for a run and I do not care much for running) and desperately desiring (for it to rain tomorrow since I enjoy the nostalgia of rainy weather). If modes, as determinables, are fixed by the adverbs, as determinates, in a strict

¹⁹ Thanks to Giuliano Torrenzo for pointing this out.

sense, then the features the adverbs describe cannot be shared between various modes. But, they could if modes are conceived as a genus and adverbs are conceived as a specie. The resulting view, that the relation between the mode and the adverb is that of genus and species, keeps the typology of mental states according to modes of representing with respect to difference and similarity conditions. But, more importantly, it allows for the features that the adverbs describe to be shared between various modes without necessitation of relations between adverbs and modes²⁰.

The question imposes itself: what kind of properties are mental features that the adverbs describe? When I am reliably predicting or desperately desiring that it will rain tomorrow, is the mental feature that the adverb ‘reliably’ or ‘desperately’ describes structured in such a way that it comes as part of mode or content²¹? Do I actually see the blurry lemon or am I seeing a lemon in a blurry manner? We use adverb to describe the phenomenon, and those adverbs seem to somehow point at the presence of certain property.

I call these properties of modes *phenomenal modifiers* (Torrengo, 2017). Modifiers are best defined as non-representational features of experience. Paraphrasing Torrengo, since representationalism comes down to the claim that all phenomenal features of experience are reducible to representational content, and phenomenal modifiers are non-representational features of experience, these two claims seem to be in conflict with one another. Torrengo explicates phenomenal modifiers in terms of *worldly aspects of experience* and argues that ‘not all phenomenal aspects of experience are worldly’. They do not present to us anything in the world. His aim is to show that the feeling of the passage of time is a ‘modifier of the character and content of experience, just as the blurred, or vivid nature of a visual experience can be seen as modifying the way the experience feels to us’ (ibid, p.2). There are two claims here:

- (i) Phenomenal modifiers are not worldly phenomena, i.e. the modifier does not present us with features of the world.
- (ii) Since phenomenal modifiers do not present us with features of the world, they are not representational.

²⁰ Or contents for that matter. I come back to this and dismiss this view in §1.2.C.a. However, it is important to note that, so far, all I have said is compatible with the content view as well, i.e. the view that adverbs are part of the content as representational features.

²¹ I am not assuming that there has to be a single answer to this question across all cases. Thanks to Tim Bayne for pointing this out.

The second claim is non-problematic given the truth of the first one. However, the first claim needs some arguing for. Again, in Torrenco's words, the issue comes down to:

'Let me call worldly any phenomenal character E_F that corresponds to the "what it is like" to have a mental episode with a content that represents the world as having feature F. If what I have claimed in the previous section is on the right track, E_T is not worldly: it is neither a representation of a pure flow of time, nor a representation of movement, change, or the like. However, to treat E_T as a non-worldly element of how we experience our perceptions (and mental episodes in general) is to say too little. It leaves E_T as a somewhat mysterious phenomenon, and it becomes difficult to see how its characterization could be linked to empirical results or to working hypotheses underlying empirical work.' (ibid, p. 15).

Although Torrenco discusses the feeling of passage of time in this paragraph, the same issue applies to any use of phenomenal modifiers, hence to my use of phenomenal modifiers in modes, e.g. 'desperately' desiring a gelato. The difference between our views is, firstly, that Torrenco presupposes the use of modifiers I have in mind here when it comes to modes of experiencing and uses it further to characterize a different kind of phenomenology: feeling of passing of time. The second, more substantial difference, between our views is that Torrenco puts modifiers to use with respect to contents of our experience, i.e. they modify the way the content is felt or given to us.

'Having a blurred visual experience rather than a non-blurred one leads us to a certain kind of indeterminacy in the judgements based on the content of our representations.' (ibid, p.17).

For him the indeterminacy is in the attitude, judgment or belief, with respect to the content of our perceptual experience. Nevertheless, claim (i) is still under question, as, he rightfully notes, we end up with a 'somewhat mysterious phenomena'. I turn now to this claim: what precisely are phenomenal modifiers and how are they to be accounted for in our overall ontological picture of the representation when it comes to modes.

In the context of modes, they are the properties that make the mode as rich as we experience it in our conscious mental life. For example, desperately desiring, blurry vision, depressingly fearing, confidently believing, are modifiers in the sense that they make a difference to the way the

occurrent mental states is given to us. In other words, they are the fine-grained distinctions; not representational in themselves, but they do affect the overall representational state had by the subject of experience. Or, they do not themselves represent the world as being one way or another, i.e. we do not have a confident belief, but rather the confidence affects our representations of the world *as if* the world is in one way rather than another. Moreover, they are primitive features. Here I agree with Torrenco. The primitive nature of modifiers is so because ‘it cannot be identified or triggered by any (combination of) worldly representational phenomenal character’ (ibid, p.18). To put the point more intuitively, ‘*depressingly* desiring a gelato’ is not to be found in the gelato itself. There is nothing depressive about it, quite the contrary. Nor is there anything depressing about the desire itself. Even when these, or any other for that matter, representational elements are put together, the fact that my desire for gelato is depressing cannot be accounted by the representational features. It is simply not there to be found. However, modifiers do influence our attitudes toward a certain content or mode of experiencing the occurrent mental state in a distinctive manner. Modifiers are felt in the experience, but not reducible to any representational features of it. There is distinctive phenomenology, however, this phenomenology cannot be pinned down to any extension of representation.

To that extent, what is the relation between the phenomenal modifier and representational features of our experience? Or, in the context of modes, what is the relation between phenomenal modifiers and modes? I turn now to this, second, question.

I.2.B.c. Adverbialism

According to adverbialism experiences are changes of a subject that can be expressed by adverbs which specify how the experience ‘*appeared-to*’ one (Chisholm, 1957). For example, when one sees a yellow lemon, the lemon appears to one as yellow-ly and round-ly. These experienced qualities appear-to one as modifications of the experience itself. When one sees the lemon as yellow, one has an instantiated experience of yellowness. However, the yellowness is not to be found in the object, but rather in the experience itself²². The experience is *modified* in a way we

²² Adverbialism was initially developed as a response to sense-datum theory of perception. According to sense-datum we are directly aware in perception of the mind-dependent. For example, as opposed to adverbialism,

are seeing yellowy and roundly. Hence, the descriptions of experiences put to use the very same fine-grained adverbs as modifiers. As such, adverbialism is a perfect match for phenomenal modifiers.

When applied to intentional modes, the view comes down to building in the modifier aspect of the representational state into the mode itself. For example, when you intensely want to eat an apple, it is usually said that you are committed to the value of that proposition. On my view, this commitment to the value is not an aspect of the content but rather is built into the mode of desire itself, due to intentional primitivism of modes. Moreover, intensively wanting to eat an apple does not present the apple as true with intensive value, but rather taking to be intensely valuable that [apple is true]. In other words, the overall structure of our mental states consists of two representations; one of mode adverbialized with phenomenal modifier, one of content. More formally the structure can be expressed as following:

[S[M_(APm)(C)]] – A subject has representations of some Mode with adverbialized Phenomenal Modifier and of some content.

In other words, within the single level of mode (contents excluded) the more specific property can be understood as a conjunction of the less specific property of the mode and the phenomenal modifier which adverbializes it. As such, phenomenal modifiers are simply specie of modes, modes simply take different degrees of grain²³.

However, the kind of adverbialism I am proposing is of a partial sort. Only at the single level of phenomenal character, the level of mode, are phenomenal modifiers to be found. This excludes the level of the content. There is an advantage to a single level explanation. There are well known arguments against adverbialism, most notably Jackson's (1975) argument from discernibility, as I call it. The challenge Jackson puts forth to adverbialism is an intuitive one, but complex. The issue comes down to this: what happens when someone sees a yellow square and a red triangle simultaneously. Proponents of the adverbial theory have no choice but to describe this state as:

according to sense-data, when seeing a lemon, one forms an image or sense-datum of it in one's mind. The sense-datum is yellow and round. Sense-data theorists include Ayer, 1967; Broad, 1925; Moore, 1953; Robinson, 1994.

²³ This solves the issue of distinct modes being described by same adverbs or phenomenal modifiers modifying distinctive modes. Thanks to Giuliano Torrenco for pointing out that there seems to be a tension between this claim, that modifiers are extrinsic to the mode itself, and the non-moving around freely of the modifiers. I do agree with this. Thanks to Tim Bayne for suggesting the solution above.

‘seeing yellowy and squarely and redly and triangularly’. The issue is obvious. How can one discern, and describe, this mental state without mix-matching the components? What prevents this mental state in being a state of seeing a yellow triangle and a red square? The challenge for adverbialist is to provide a description, without the use of objects, in which the match is discernible, and no blending occurs.

The problem of adverbialism is that it applies to both levels (or both representations, in my picture): content and attitude. Within a single level of explanation, the level of modes and phenomenal modifiers, the problem does not occur. If I am instantiating mental states of (i) [depressively desiring (a gelato)], and (ii) [blurrily seeing (a lemon)]; the contents remain untouched, so to speak, within they respective representational features. I am not desiring gelately or seeing lemonly, I am simply desiring a gelato and seeing a lemon – object which corresponds to something in the world and makes up the contents of my representation. With respect to the mode, there are two reasons that make it the case that I am not depressively seeing and blurrily desiring. The first one is, that on the look of it, the phenomenal modifier depressively does not go with the mode of seeing. Same goes for the phenomenal modifier blurrily and desiring. They are simply incompatible. Firstly, it is not in the nature of our language use to describe our desires and vision as such. Secondly, it is simply not a phenomenal feel one has. I might see something that triggers an emotion of depression in me, such as a hedgehog run over by a car, but I am not thereby depressively seeing it. Same for desire; I might be unsure what my desire is due to conflicting reasoning or something similar, but that does not make my desire blurry. The second reason why I am not depressively seeing and blurrily desiring is because of the content. Modes may be adverbialized, but they do come hand in hand with contents. And content, in this case, are differentiating. There is no mix-match between the contents and the modes with their modifiers. Contents are in a relation with modes (and *vice versa*, naturally)²⁴. As I have noted, modes are not something simply added to the content as an external and distinct ingredient²⁵.

²⁴ More on this in I.3. 'Composition of Phenomenally Intentional States'.

²⁵ Thanks to Tim Crane and Howard Robinson for pushing me on adverbialism to clarify my position in detail.

1.2.B.e. Interlude

In the first three subchapters of my theory of intentional primitivism of modes I introduced the theory of how modes are phenomenally individuated and laid in the basics for developing a full metaphysical theory. The utilization of the coarse-grained/fine-grained distinction provided me with a more intuitive picture of how modes are felt or given to us in our experience. Unlike the coarse-grained modes which are a matter of which mode one is instantiating, i.e. whether I am desiring or believing in something, the fine-grained modes are the ones that point to how we actually have experiences: we describe it by means of adverbs. The first question that imposed itself was what these mental features that the adverbs describe are in nature. Here I introduced the notion of a Phenomenal Modifier, non-representational features of our experience which modify how the experience is given to us or felt, as-if the world is in one way, rather than another. The next question is the one about the connection between mode and modifier (and subsequently content). Here I opt for adverbialisms as a natural fit in my overall theory. The phenomenal modifiers are modifying adverbs to the mode, however not the content. This gives me a single level adverbialist explanation, and as such, it escapes the usual issues of adverbialism, most notably Jackson's discernibility objection.

Now I, firstly, turn, in §1.2.B.f., to a pressing question: if modes are primitively intentional, what are their intentional objects? Here I discuss formal objects theory. I take cue from the literature on emotions mostly but extend it to different modes. §1.2.B.e. concludes the theory with the metaphysical picture of trope theory of mental states.

1.2.B.f. Formal Objects

It is undisputable that intentional objects are what intentional states are directed at. It is simply a matter of definition. However, what are intentional objects? We usually conceive them as entities of a certain kind. My desire for gelato is directed towards a certain entity, a gelato. Not only entities are intentional objects. For example, events can be an intentional object, e.g. me getting the gelato from the gelateria causes jealousy in my supervisor, since he did not get one. Same goes for relations, properties etc.

Nevertheless, none of these seem to be a good candidate for an intentional object of modes. The reason for that is fairly simple: modes are not directed towards certain entities. My mental content has gelato, an entity, as an intentional object, but, if modes are intentionally primitive, what is my desire directed at? One has a dilemma at hand: either deny that modes are intentionally primitive or deny that only entities are intentional objects. I take my cue from discussion on intentional states about objects which do not exist²⁶ and take the second road: deny that only entities (existing or non-existing) may be intentional objects.

Kenny (1963) makes a distinction between material and formal objects. He argues that primarily emotions and other mental attitudes have formal objects, not material objects or entities. Particular objects or entities differ from formal objects in that all instances of mode type, i.e., desire, belief, fear, love, shame, remembering etc., have a single formal object, while particular objects are not shared among the mode types. For example, in the act of imagination the formal object is the *possibility* of the proposition that unicorns exist, as opposed to a unicorn as a material object. A unicorn can be a material object of many different modes of representing, I can imagine a unicorn, believe in unicorns, remember unicorns, want a unicorn, etc. Possibility, however, cannot be a formal object of remembering, for example, since if I remember something it has to be actual, not possible (even if unicorns do not exist, as I can remember reading about it in a children book).

In Kenny's words 'To assign a formal object to an action is to place restrictions on what may occur as the direct object of a verb describing the action.' (ibid, 1963). The standard interpretation of formal objects is that they are 'correlates that correspond to each kind of mental state' (Teroni, 2007; Mulligan, 2007). In that sense, all the modes have a corresponding formal object, as with the example of imagination and possibility. There is a metaphysical thesis to be developed about the formal objects, however, it is out of the scope of this paper. Thus, I conditionally accept that certain formal objects are intentional objects of certain types of mental states or modes, provided that formal object, as a thesis, is a plausible one. Take imagination, for example. The formal object of imagination, as was noted, is possibility. When I imagine unicorns, the unicorn will be the material object and possibility of it the formal object²⁷. Fear, on the other hand, might have riding

²⁶ See Crane 2001.

²⁷ Although unicorns do not actually exist. As was already noted, non-existing object can be intentional object of a mental state. I do not wish to enter this debate here but will simply treat unicorn as an intentional object in its fullness.

in the metro as a particular object, for example, and a future evil or danger as its formal object²⁸. The same goes for other mental attitudes or modes. Belief has as a formal object the truth, desire goodness, emotions value, imagination possibility, memory pastness etc. (Kriegel, 2015; Teroni & Deonna, 2012).

I believe formal objects are a good candidate for, firstly, the typology of kinds of mental states we are currently undergoing and, secondly, correctness conditions of modes. In this I agree with Teroni (ibid) and Mulligan (ibid). I also agree on the typology put forward by them of the formal objects of attitudes, mainly; cognitive-truth, conative-goodness and emotional-value. However, there is one issue in expanding this theory to all representational modes: perception. It is, at best, unclear what are the formal objects of perceptual modes. In the case of hearing, one can say sound. However, there are arguments in the literature that sound, as such, does not exist²⁹. Furthermore, one can argue that sound seems more like the category in which all the material objects of hearing fall³⁰. Naturally, this is under dispute. With respect to olfactory perception, there is good case to be made that odours are formal objects of olfaction and again, not all agree on this³¹. When it comes to tactile perception one can put forward a formal object of discernibility. However, this seems circular as discernibility seems to be a necessary condition for all perceptual modes. Another problem is that tactile perception necessarily includes bodily feelings, and these seem to be different in nature, i.e. feeling of pain or pleasure seems different than simply feeling the surface of the table. Perhaps a possible course of action is to argue that these two are distinct in some manner, however, this is out of the scope of this paper. Same problem applies to temperature modality, although temperature modality is relatively straightforward in eliciting coldness or hotness which might serve as formal objects. So far, all of the modalities could be, at least, argued for having formal objects and there is discussion in the literature which is promising. However, taste and vision seem to be especially ‘hard problems’ when it comes to formal objects. Taste is generated by three sensory feelings: gustatory, olfactory, and somatosensory. If what I have said so far is true, i.e. that all of these are modes with their respective formal objects, taste seems to have multiple formal objects. Moreover, it is constituted by composition of these formal objects.

²⁸ The received view is that the formal object of fear is danger, however, some argue that it is future evil, that is, anticipated evil, as fear need not be about something dangerous necessarily.

²⁹ See Young 2017, 2018.

³⁰ As Giuliano Torrenco did in conversation.

³¹ See Cavedon-Taylor D., 2018; Mendelovici (forthcoming); Millar, 2017.

In other words, there is no taste, under normal conditions, with one of the constituents missing. Vision, on the other hand, might have luminosity or reflectance as a formal object. However, luminosity or reflectance are a relation with objects in space, i.e. objects are illuminated in a certain manner. Even yet, this might be an empirical question as there are is no light in empty space.

To conclude, formal objects are, in my opinion, a promising way to account for typology of modes and correctness conditions of modes. However, the discussion is, at best, scattered around various disciplines within philosophy and empirical sciences. A more substantial approach to formal objects needs to be undertaken to give a fully satisfactory account. This is not just out of the scope of this paper, but another research project. However, what should we think about the intentionality of modes? For now, I leave perception out of the discussion for the reasons above: some perceptual modes have one formal object, others have two formal objects and still others might have three formal objects. If we keep the discussion solely on cognitive, conative and emotional modes, things seem easier, although not simple. Earlier, I said modes are representational. The subjects, in being in a mode, represent certain formal objects. For cognitive attitudes (such as belief, thought, assumption, prediction, etc.) the formal object is truth; for conative attitudes (such as desire, hope, want, expectation, etc.) the formal object is goodness; and for emotional attitudes (such as hate, ecstasies, irritation, joy, etc.) the formal object is value. The correctness conditions of modes are accounted through these formal objects. For example, a belief is correct if and only it is directed at truth. Same goes for other attitudes, a desire is correct if and only if it is directed at goodness and an emotion is correct if and only if it is directed at value. If a belief is directed at goodness, then it is not a belief, but rather a certain sort of conative attitude. Note that I am not making a strict normative claim here in the sense that, for example, all beliefs must be true. We can certainly believe something which is not true normatively (as when one believes that they are dead as in Cotard syndrome), but that belief still has truth as a formal object in the sense that it is directed at truth.

1.2.B.e. Tropes Theory of Modes

There is a shortcoming to my view. What kind of a mental state I am instantiating exactly? More precisely, what are these modes like and how do they behave? As, in my opinion, a weak representational theory of phenomenal mental states is the most promising one, I would like to subscribe to it. However, phenomenal modifiers are non-representational features of our phenomenal mental states. Although both the content and the mode are representational, we have one constituent un-accounted for. Consequently, I am forced into a view that representations are particulars. How am I to account for non-representational modifiers in such a view? I account for it by means of tropes or abstract as opposed to concrete particulars the pure representationalist is forced into.

The trope theory of modes accounts for non-representational phenomenal modifiers as non-fundamental tropes or non-fundamental abstract particulars, e.g. desperation. They are part of the coarse-grained mode, e.g. desiring, and together they form the specie, e.g. desperately desiring, directed at a certain content, e.g. gelato. In other words, desperately (to a degree n) desiring is the ultimate specie. We get various similarity and differentiating conditions with other tropes, however in a coarse-grained manner as *abstractions*, the structure of the mode is accounted for at the level of the trope of desperate-ness and the formal object of goodness of desiring.

Trope Theory of Modes: Fine-grained phenomenal modifier FG_{PM} is a non-fundamental trope to coarse-grained mode CG_M . CG_M forms an ultimate specie directed at a particular content C .

This might seem as a complex picture, but ultimately, it is a simple one. Intentional state of desperately desiring a gelato is a mental state consisting of (Ia) a trope phenomenal modifier of desperateness and (Ib) the intentional mode of desire with its formal object of goodness, directed to (II) the content of gelato. (I) and (II) are meant to capture the two representational features at play; one of mode and one of content. This is not to say that there are two representations here, as opposed to a single representation with two aspects/dimensions.

One may immediately argue that there is a serious issue to such a view, namely, rich ontology. I do not see it as such. I believe exactly the opposite: using tropes has more advantages. Although this amounts to a theory that when both you and I believe that hedgehogs are cute we are

instantiating a different belief, this seems to be intuitively more plausible. As with tropes in general the sameness and differentiating conditions are preserved, which gives us means to typologize them³². Furthermore, the intentional contribution of the mode is fully accounted for in an informative manner.

I.2.C. Counter-models

I.2.C.a. The Content Model

The first intuitive counter-metaphysics is the *Content Model*. Most subscribe to this model (Martin, 2002; Tye, 2003). On this view the fine-grained modifier is part of the content (as mode of presentation or aspectual shape). One might say, it is precisely when I desire a gelato desperately, that desperation tracks the actual occurrence in the world of my desire to be valuable. When one believes with high degree of confidence that Paris is in France, the degree n of confidence tracks the probability in the world of that proposition to be true. This is the tracking model: the modifiers track occurrences, represented in content, instantiated by objects in the world. They are ‘worldly’ phenomenal characters, in Torrenco’s words. Saying anything differently is counter representational.

However, the fact that the mode has a phenomenological presence when undergoing it does not mean that you are aware of the mode while undergoing it. We want to differentiate between cases in which we simply believe p and case in which we are aware that we believe p ³³. That being said, I do not see why it is implausible that we can be aware of non-representational features in addition to the representational ones. Make a simple experiment: squeeze your eyes and you will see this page blurry, open them wide, you will see it vividly again. Is this a mental state with further content (or mode, for that matter)? No, it is shift in experiential quality and a shift in experiential quality

³² See Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002) who gives an illuminating theory of resemblance nominalism according to which things have their properties in virtue of resembling other things.

³³ Thanks to Julien Deonna for helping me clarify this.

does not necessarily constitute a shift in intentional directedness. Intentional directedness is fixed by the content (this page) and mode (seeing)³⁴.

However, one can say that the content being fixed is precisely at stake here. Even more, the case of belief imposes itself as a particularly hard nut to crack in this picture. Beliefs, arguably, track the actual probabilities in the world, and, as such, they are a matter of degree³⁵. To that I give a Fregean response by analogy³⁶. Just as the two utterances of me saying 'Gelato is awesome' and me saying 'I am saying that gelato is awesome' have different contents, so do the two judgments 'Gelato is awesome' and 'I judge that gelato is awesome'. By analogy so does the mode. I am 100% confident 'that gelato is awesome' and 'I am 100 % confident that gelato is awesome' seem to differ.

A similar point can be put forward with respect to perception, more precisely, visual experiences³⁷. When I see a lemon blurrily, I see all the properties of the lemon that I usually see: its colour, shape, boundaries, etc. The only difference is that I see a lemon indeterminately. Seeing something blurry does not consist in having an additional representational feature as part of the content. These experiences do not represent the object of being one way as opposed to other. A blurred visual experience does lead to a certain kind of indeterminacy in act of seeing. The same can be said of other mental states. When I judge that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris, I do not judge the proposition as having an additional content of being positively true, or as representing truly in addition to the Eiffel Tower being in Paris. Certainly, the content can be true or false, but the property of truth or falseness is not represented in the content, let alone my confidence in it. My low level of confidence in the judgment does not represent an indeterminate Eiffel Tower. As a result, this property cannot be part of the content itself.

³⁴ Thanks to Davide Bordini for help in clarifying this point. Also, as Tim Bayne rightly points out, the intentional content is surely much richer than just 'the page'.

³⁵ The degree point I put aside for now and discuss it in detail in §1.2.D.

³⁶ Thanks to Giuliano Torrenco for pushing me in this direction.

³⁷ Although, as I noted previously on several occasions, perceptual experiences need to be separated in this discussion from other experiences

1.2.C.b. The Degree Model

The second counter-model is the degree model according to which the phenomenal modifiers, such as blurriness or intensity for example, are not ways of experiencing, but rather a matter of degree of experience and as such so are the modes. The view that beliefs come in degree seems to be prevailing, most notably in formal epistemology. The discussion is mostly focused on which model should be used to measure the degree of one's confidence in belief, and, consequently, when a subject should rightfully hold his belief true. On the probabilistic model, a subject should accept the truth of her belief if there is higher probability of the truth than falsity. On the second view, the truth and falsity of belief may be defined in terms of some sort of arbitrary threshold, above which the subject should believe it to be true/false, i.e. 51%. The third option is to define belief as a binary state. I simply instantiate the mental state of belief and my level of confidence in the belief is something external to the belief itself. As is clear by now, I opt for the third option.

However, the same discussion can be extended to desires. For example, it seems natural to ask whether my desire for a macaron is of higher degree than my desire for a gelato, although we would not frame the sentence in this manner. We would simply ask: 'Would you prefer the macaron over the gelato?'. Still, it seems that the discussion can be extended to other mental attitudes outside the straightforward Humean belief-desire framework. I can also predict something with more or less certainty, or my anxiety can be more or less acute, or I can think a thought with more or less attention to it, or I can attend acoustically to a nearby conversation with more attention than to a mosquito buzzing around me.

Let us state the metaphysics more clearly. What sorts of things come in degree? Certainly, not concrete individuals. Rocks, plants and fountains in the Jardin du Luxembourg do not come in degree, nor does the Jardin itself. We can ask how many rocks are there in the Jardin du Luxembourg, but not of the degree of rock-ness of the Jardin³⁸. How about substances such as the water in the Medici Fountain in the Jardin³⁹? We most certainly cannot count water in the fountain as we can do with rocks. Although one can say that there is more water in the ocean than in the

³⁸ Note that intentional eliminativists might hold this view. If one holds that a belief (or any other mental attitude) is a neurophysiological phenomenon, then one presumably holds that it is a concrete entity as well. In that sense, beliefs do not come in degrees, since they are concrete individuals.

³⁹ Substance corresponds to natural kinds in this context, such as water, gold or quarks.

Medici fountain, it also seems counterintuitive to say that the ocean has a higher degree of water than the Medici fountain. Substances seem more natural to describe in terms of quantity rather than degree⁴⁰.

What does come in degrees are properties such as height or mass⁴¹. Two objects can instantiate the property of mass, e.g. me and my dog both have mass. However, I do not instantiate more mass than my dog, I simply have a higher degree of mass.

What kind of properties are beliefs, desires, and other mental attitudes? Is my belief that the Jardin du Luxembourg is the most beautiful park in Paris structured in such a way that it does not come in degree? Or if it does, which measure should we apply to it?

As I noted previously, what is distinctive of believing, as opposed to desiring, for example, is that there is a systemic connection of modes and certain formal objects. Belief corresponds to truth, while desire corresponds to goodness or value. But it seems that I can, nevertheless, have a belief with some degree of truthfulness or a desire with some degree of value, although truth or value themselves are not a matter of degree.

As a result, I suggest the following: modes, in themselves, are not a matter of degree. Our everyday language use and folk psychology suggests a degree dialectic. However, I suggest that the degrees are a non-specific case of modification of the mode. In other words, there is no genus of the specie or phenomenal modifier of degree. The genus properties constitute modes as specie in a rich phenomenal way that is felt or given to us in experience. The properties of truthfulness or value are a generalization of our everyday metaphysics that give us the degree model. In other words, a property of something can be a matter of degree, however that does not mean that the thing itself is a matter of degree. I have a certain degree of mass, but it is not the case that I myself come in degree. The same can be said for modes. Modes are a binary state, either my mental state instantiates a particular mode or it does not. For example, while beliefs can be unconscious or

⁴⁰ Note that this can cause confusion. Both quantity and degree are not a difference in quality, but rather in measure. However, we are referring to different kinds of measures. We can count the measures of quantity, but we cannot count the measure of degree. I can say that there are two macarons, but if one macaron is slightly larger than the other the appropriate way of expressing the difference would rather be in the units of quantity.

⁴¹ Again, note that not all properties come in degrees. For example, I can instantiate the property of pregnancy, but we would not say that my pregnancy is a matter of degree. Either I instantiate that property or I do not. We can most certainly ask how far along I am in being pregnant, but that does not make me more or less pregnant.

dispositional, e.g. I can believe that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris although I currently do not consciously entertain that belief, my conscious judgment while I look at the Eiffel Tower in Paris seems not to be a matter of degree. Same goes for other mental attitudes. Although I see a lemon on the table blurrily, it is not my visual experience that is of particular degree.

As noted, one can say that the belief is a matter of degree even if truth is not. Or the desire is a matter of degree even if value is not. I agree. But I do not see this as a counterexample to degrees being a non-specific case of modification and generalization of our everyday metaphysics. However, on this view I do indeed judge moderately high that gelato is awesome or see blurrily the lemon. The fine-grained distinctions are an integral part of the mode, not as separate and distinctive entity, but rather they are constitutive of modes themselves intrinsically contrary to phenomenal modifiers which are essentially extrinsic to the mode itself.

The standard response is that one can instantiate these fine-grained distinctions without instantiating the type of mental state. So, I can judge moderately high that gelato is awesome, without instantiating the judgment that gelato is awesome. Plausibly, this is a sufficiently good reply to such a counter-model. Nevertheless, I also want to provide another response based on the colours within a spectrum⁴². We divide the spectrum into different colours, somewhat arbitrary. But when one kind of colour gradually turns into another kind, say red to orange, we do not experience degrees of the same phenomenal character, e.g. red, but rather a wholly different phenomenal character, i.e. red or orange. Take the colour lime, for example. Lime can be reported as yellow *or* as green, not as 50% yellow *and* 50% green. In conclusion, we do not have metaphysics of degrees but rather of ways that arrange themselves in a way that they seem a matter of degree. I am generalizing the idea of degrees with the theory of phenomenal modifiers, which are, essentially, ways, not degrees of instantiating a mental state.

⁴² Thanks to Kristina Pucko for suggesting that I explore this line of reasoning.

I.2.D. Refining the Challenge

One can wonder whether the distinction between modes and contents is just a useful abstract, methodological tool that we employ in our analysis of mental states, while, phenomenologically speaking, there is just one representation in play. There are various options in the logical space one can take.

First is *Intentional Eliminativism* (Churchland, 1981; Dennett, 1987; Stich, 1983). On this view, propositional attitudes simply do not exist as entities, mental states and representations. I will not discuss this view further as it is uninteresting with respect to the issue at hand. The second view is functionalism which identifies modes with functional properties (Dretske, 1988). Functionalists are eliminativists about modes with respect to their phenomenology, however modes more neutrally described do exist, although as a neurophysiological feature. Another option in the logical space is reduction: either of mode to content or content to mode. Plausibly, pure representationalists reduce modes to content. The only relevant mode is mode of representing. No one, to my knowledge, holds this view. As for the reduction of content to mode, some versions of adverbialism are the prime candidate (Kriegel, 2011a, b). But this is not a reductionism with respect to the modes. Indeed, adverbialism is perfectly compatible with modes being primitive and non-reducible as adverbialism is the only view, so far, that accounts for attitudinal phenomenology or phenomenology of modes.

As usual in metaphysics, the third way to go is primitivism, or to claim that modes are primitive phenomenological features. For primitivism, a representational state consists of content and of mode, which jointly constitute the overall the representational state. This is primitivism not only with respect to the modes but also with respect to the content. This view is compatible with weak representationalism which says that phenomenal properties necessarily have representational content. As far as existing theories go, there are two prime candidates in the literature. The first one is *Strong Intentionalism* by Crane (2001, 2003). Crane does, in my opinion, take modes as primitive. Although modes are part of our phenomenal consciousness, their phenomenal contribution to overall phenomenology, while being distinctive, is not due to intrinsic phenomenal properties of the modes themselves. Rather modes are relational properties that tie the subject to

the object in the intentional state in a certain manner. The modes themselves do not possess qualitative properties, but their qualitative character is a result of that relation⁴³. Believing that the Eiffel tower is in Paris is a relation between me and the Eiffel tower in Paris, for example. However, this sort of relationalism emphasizes relations themselves as primitive, not the constituents, i.e. subject and mode, while objects of the intentional state are primitive. If my reading of Crane is correct, then there is nothing primitive about modes except that they exist. However, existence does not entail primitivism. Just acknowledging the phenomena does not entail that the phenomena is *per se* (unless Crane takes relations to be primitive, which I do not believe is the case).

The second candidate is *Anti-representationalism* by Ned Block (1978, 1994, 2007), or the qualia view. Block never explicitly said that qualia exhaust modes. In fact, he does not say much about modes at all. If we took anti-representationalism further, to apply to modes as well, my interpretation would be that modes have non-intentional conscious properties, namely qualia, which exhaust their nature, same as content. While I find this view appealing, as there are intrinsic phenomenal properties of modes that we are introspectively acquainted with, this is not a very informative view. What does me desiring a gelato amount to? The qualitative property of desire. What is the difference between the qualia of desire and the qualia of wanting? Or desire and hoping?

My primitivist view differs from the aforementioned options in that modes are intrinsically qualitative. That is to say that modes constitute phenomenal character in a *sui generis* kind of way. They possess intrinsic qualitative properties independent of content and contribute to intentionality of mental states in a compositional manner. In giving account of the state's intentional structure one need not just fix the content, but also fix the mode and the way the mode is fixed is by determining the qualitative property specific to that mode⁴⁴. Before I set off in discussing primitivism further and summing up my preferred account, let me first consider functionalism and

⁴³ This is not to say that the two ideas are inconsistent: the latter tells you what the mode is, the former tells you what the phenomenology of a mode involves. Thanks to Tim Bayne for pressing me on this point.

⁴⁴ In this paper, I will remain agnostic on the nature of content. If one accepts that the structure of intentionality is composed out of modes and contents (in addition to the subject experiencing them), then one can mix-and-match various accounts of content and mode. The scope of this paper is to inquire into the metaphysics of mode. I discuss the nature of content in II.1. 'Pure Content View' and I.3. 'Composition of Phenomenally Intentional States'.

reductionism and give reasons not to favour them, when it comes to phenomenology of modes, in more detail.

1.2.D.a. Functionalism about Modes

Functionalism defines mental states in terms of the primary functional roles those mental states play. Functions are best seen as causal processes performed by the physical systems. If one accounts for intentionality of modes in functional terms (as most theorists hold that modes are accounted for in functional terms but that contents are not), one defines it in terms of the function that it performs; namely, collecting and using information, by its causal relation to other mental states and interaction among each other, to insure the system's goals and needs are met and subsequent appropriate behaviour follows. Accordingly, when I believe there is a gelato on the table in front of me, what makes it a belief mental state rather than a desire is not dependent on any of the intrinsic properties of the state itself, even its content since functionalism does not hold content to be an intrinsic property of a mental state. Rather, that the state in question is a belief is dependent on the causal correspondence between the belief, produced either by sensory modalities or inferences from other beliefs, and the external state of affairs of the world. The mode, including the meaning we ascribe to it, is to be accounted for by the role it plays in the mental life of the subject. The functionalist will think of modes as operations on symbols, so that they can preserve some sort of content as mental symbols.

Let us fix the meanings we ascribe to modes in terms of the functional role they play in our mental life. For example, it is usually considered that in order for a state to be considered a belief, the subject regards the intentional object as being true or represents it as being the case. A functionalist would formulate this in terms of representing *p-as-true*. In other words, the truth bit is analysed in terms of the role played by the mode in the subject psychological negotiation with the environment. If I believe that there is coffee in the kitchen, I represent [that there is coffee in the kitchen-as-true].

There are several issues with this approach. Firstly, this content can be the content of many different mental states. If I remember, after a few minutes of craving, that there is coffee in the kitchen, I also represent [that there is coffee in the kitchen-as-true]. Alternatively, if I just sit in my

office and entertain a thought of getting a cup of coffee, I represent the same content. But here it is not more natural to say that the content is different, because it lacks the *as-true* part. Functional theories, do indeed, describe beliefs and desires as attitudes or relations that are directed towards some state of affairs or proposition. There is a similarity relation between the belief that there is coffee in the kitchen and the belief that there is gelato in the kitchen, as the same attitude toward two different propositions. However, these difference and similarity conditions are in the proposition itself (representing *p-as-true*). Although a functionalist description can be given, beliefs and desires are relations, according to functionalism. Hence, difference and similarity conditions of contents of beliefs and desires is constituted by difference and similarity conditions in the propositions to which beliefs and desires, as attitudes, are related. But, firstly, what makes a mental state a relation to (or attitude) some proposition P with, firstly, corresponding difference and similarity conditions and, secondly, corresponding satisfaction conditions? Can attitudes be captured solely by functional roles they play? Having a belief is not just a matter of being aware of its content. The subject must be aware of the attitudinal component as well. This is the role of belief in the overall mental life of a subject. On this, the functionalist and I agree.

However, on the face of it, it seems more plausible to assume that it is because of <I believe> component in me believing that P that the mental state has the functional role it has, not the other way around; that the mental state in question is a belief because of its functional role. A functionalist may insist that belief is exhausted by reference to truth, whereas memory, in addition to truth, entails something more, such as reference to past⁴⁵. But it is precisely the remembering or the believing attitude that makes a difference in the overall mental life of the subject⁴⁶. As such, the correct formulation to capture the difference and similarity conditions of belief attitudes would be *representing-as-true p*. This formulation does not hinge on satisfaction conditions of the proposition, while still preserving the difference and similarity conditions of contents. Furthermore, it captures the difference between various types of mental states and, ultimately, fixes the role of belief, as opposed to, desire⁴⁷.

⁴⁵ Thanks to Giuliano Torrenzo for pointing this out.

⁴⁶ Conceptual Role Semantics might be the answer; one might argue (Harman, 1973; Field, 1980; Loar, 1981). However, CRS adds further issues to be resolved, holism of functional causal relations being the most pressing one, in my opinion.

⁴⁷ I am thankful to Uriah Kriegel for making these formulations precise and clear to me in conversation and in his two talk on Attitudinal Phenomenology in Paris (March, 2017) and Milan (May, 2017).

In addition, functionalist approaches to mental states tend to conceive modes purely in dispositional terms. Inasmuch as it is plausible to assume that dispositional properties do not feature in phenomenology since phenomenology is occurrent, this makes modes rather uninteresting. On this picture, there would not be any phenomenological difference between wondering whether the Jardin du Luxembourg is in Paris and seeing that the Jardin du Luxembourg is in Paris that could be ascribed to the contribution of the mode, since modes do not manifest themselves in consciousness.

I.2.D.b. Reduction of Mode to Content

It seems plausible to apply the distinction between what and how something is represented. Still, *pure representationalists* have reduced this difference only to contents. All the phenomenologically salient features of our experience can be accounted for at the level of content. Furthermore, in this framework the use of qualitative properties is altogether avoided by simply tracking content to its external features in the world. Although functionalism tracks content to external features of the world as well, functionalists do not reduce the functional roles of modes to that of content. It has been suggested that pure representationalist framework cannot account for the difference between representing content in different sensory modalities⁴⁸. For example, I can have a visual experience of the river Seine directly in front of me, but I can also have an auditory experience of the Seine directly in front of me. Both experiences represent the same content: the river Seine in front of me; however, each experience carries a different phenomenal character. Pure representationalists locate the difference in these experiences in the intentional content itself as difference and similarity conditions are located in the proposition itself, and, furthermore, correspond to the difference and similarity conditions of contents. If we account for the difference and similarity solely at the level of content, then the mental state of hearing the Seine would be of the form representing *Seine-as-hearing* (or perhaps as-sound). Here we seem to be positing a new

⁴⁸ See Kriegel (forthcoming2) for an argument against reducing modes to contents in emotional phenomenology. However, the same argument can be extended to other varieties of phenomenology. There is such an argument in Teroni and Deonna 2012, 2015, too.

property of the objects of mental states, namely the property of sound-ness of Seine. However, it seems unclear what this property is⁴⁹.

Moreover, on this view, the issue arises can mental states share phenomenal character of content. Seeing Seine and hearing Seine are two different phenomenal states. You might confabulate when I say that the sight of Seine is marvelous, that I am actually refereeing to the Canal Saint Martin, since you visited Europe once and did a quick backpacking tour and simply forgot the difference, hence in order to fit together disparate pieces of information, you formed a false experience of remembering Canal Saint Martin as Seine⁵⁰. How are the functional relations between believing that the Seine is in Paris, wondering whether the Seine is in Paris or doubting whether it is in Paris, be understood if we do not assume that all these mental states have the same phenomenal character for both of us.

For these reasons, I believe there is a much simpler way to account for the difference and similarity conditions, not just in terms of *what* is represented, but also in terms of *how* that particular content is represented. Appeal to both mode and content in determining the nature of mental states is compatible with a weaker version of representationalism which accounts for the difference between what and how something is represented. According to the *impure representationalism*, phenomenal states are individuated not just in terms of contents but also in terms of attitudes, since impure representationalism involves *impure representations*. These are properties of representing ‘intentional content in a certain manner’ (Chalmers, 2004)⁵¹. As such, impure or weak representationalism escapes the problems of functionalism. But, more importantly, it opens up a gap in logical space for primitivism about modes, since it takes them to be distinctive representational features of experience. All that is given in one’s experience contributes to the phenomenal character.

⁴⁹ As Julien Deonna pointed out and I noted previously, perceptual cases differ from other modes such as belief and desire, hence the reductive claim may sound more plausible in the case of perception.

⁵⁰ The standard example is the Twin examples (Putnam, 1975). The example I gave has more in common with Byrne (2001). Byrne argued that two distinct experiences can have the same content (however, only with respect to visual experiences). The upshot is that phenomenal difference is accounted for at the level of the difference in how things seem, and difference in how things seem is, essentially, a difference in representational content. I do not find this view plausible (see Chalmers, 2004 for further analysis).

⁵¹ Chalmers (2004) has introduced the distinction between pure and impure representationalism, although different terms may be used. For example, Crane (2009) uses strong and weak intentionalism. The differences are, in my opinion, purely terminological.

I.2.E. Primitivism about Modes

Primitivism about modes is to subscribe to the view that properties of modes indeed do contribute to the phenomenology of the mental states independently of the properties of content. In other words, if states are typed in terms of their modes then the type-phenomenology is also fixed, not just the token-phenomenology. Moreover, unlike Crane's relationalism, it is fixed in terms of intrinsic phenomenal properties corresponding to that particular type-phenomenology.

Modes are a binary state. Either my mental state instantiates a particular mode or it does not. This is especially intuitive with respect to conscious occurrent states, e.g. I can consciously judge that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris while I look at the Eiffel Tower. Same goes for other mental attitudes. Although I consciously desire a gelato for breakfast, I am doomed to eggs, since I did not remember to buy it. One can put the same thought with respect to content. The fundamental essence of intentional primitivism about modes is the following:

Intentional Primitivism of Modes: A total mental state (content+mode) is satisfied in the way M dictated by its mode iff the content satisfaction condition of type M are met by the content.

In other words, it is because the content 'that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris' is judged, as opposed to desired, it is the case that a mental state is satisfied iff its content is true, as opposed to good. A mental state aims to capture how things are. When it does so the aim has been met: the mental state of belief is true, a perception is veridical, intention is fulfilled etc. The mental state is satisfied. There is a relation between the various *ways of satisfaction* (alethic [being true]) and various modes, or at least *classes of modes*, of judging, believing, desiring, etc. This link is not superficial, but it is of their essence. A mental state is satisfied in one way or another iff it instantiates a mode and content, and the content meets the satisfaction condition dictated by the mode.

There are two claims here to be distinguished here:

- (i) Modes are phenomenal in nature, and
- (ii) This phenomenology does not constitutively depend on anything extrinsic, most notably content.

At the core of (i) is the claim that there is something it is like to desire a gelato for breakfast, for example, which is phenomenally different for intending to have gelato for breakfast, or different from simply thinking about it. The task here is to show that different ways of intentional directedness cannot be accounted for solely at the level of content or reduced to it, but rather a level of modes needs to be added together with their contribution to the overall intentional character of the mental state and, subsequently, its phenomenal character. Simply put, the issue is can modes contribute to phenomenal character.

The task of claim (ii) is to show that the phenomenology of modes does not constitutively depend on anything outside of the modes themselves, most notably content. In other words, modes are intrinsically, non-relationally phenomenal. They can certainly be causally dependent on content, but not constitutively. In other words, this is the issue of what fixes modes.

Not all modes are phenomenal *per se*, not all modes have the properties that make them intrinsically, non-relationally intentional. Perhaps perception is a case of such modes. However, it is important to that at least some modes are phenomenal *per se*, such as belief, intention, desire etc. Intrinsically intentional modes are basic or primitive. But this does not mean that all modes are fundamental, since some modes may be derivative on others. Phenomenology of some modes can be, and in some cases, certainly is, derived from others. Some, which we usually take to be mode such as simply entertaining a thought, I believe not to be a mode at all. Thus, there is some hierarchical structure to them⁵².

To provide an argument for the first claim, that modes do contribute to phenomenology, is simply enough to apply an argument for the irreducible phenomenal character of content to attitudes. For example, Jorba (2016) used this strategy for Pitt/Goldman argument (Pitt, 2004; Goldman, 1993). The Pitt/Goldman line of reasoning is an epistemic one. They argue that we have first-person knowledge by acquaintance of our cognitive states in a similar way as we have knowledge of our phenomenally conscious sensory states. Since Jorba specifically used Pitt's formulation, I will focus on it. The argument goes as following:

(P1) I can introspectively and immediately distinguish whether I am representing P or Q.

⁵² In I.3. 'Composition of Phenomenally Intentional States' an attempt at the taxonomy of modes is undertaken.

(P2) I would not be able to do this unless there is a specific phenomenal character associated with P and Q.

(C) P and Q have specific phenomenal characters.

As a result, one can introspectively and immediately distinguish between different attitudes. By doing so, one secures the phenomenal nature of modes. I have discussed the second claim in I.2.B.

I.2.F. Finalizing what Modes are

If we want to account for overall intentional state and the satisfaction conditions of our representation, we must consider the mode of representing as well. Thus, I argued for an intentionally primitivist theory of modes. However, what we experience, what is given to us or felt are only fine-grained modes. Our phenomenology is complex and heterogeneous. It is not a simple case whether I am believing as opposed to anticipating, or desiring as opposed to hoping, or feeling pain as opposed to pleasure; it is also the case that these different modes are given to us in different ways in our experience. The coarse-grained modes talk is just a simplified everyday practice people are using when describing intentional modes. It is a simplified way of grouping experiences in a simplified model. But this simplified model does not correspond to our actual phenomenal experiences. In this paper I proposed a primitivist theory of modes based on this fine-grained/coarse-grained distinction. The theory does all the explanatory work as existing theories, even more, as it accounts for correctness conditions of not just the contents, but also the modes of our mental states. It also provides us with a useful similarity and differentiating conditions between various modes of representing, which, subsequently, gives us a useful typology of mental states.

I.2. Composition of Phenomenally Intentional States

Abstract: In contemporary analytic philosophy of mind, there is one distinction that is presupposed as fundamental: that of content and mode or attitude. I am an Intentional Primitivist about modes, meaning that, in my theory of mind, modes have distinctive phenomenology independent of content. However, if we accept distinctiveness at the level of modes as well, then a natural question imposes itself: what is the phenomenal connection between contents and modes? How is phenomenology structured not just at the level of contents, but also at the level of modes? In what follows I proceed by analysing the first principles for the relation between content phenomenology and mode phenomenology of mental states, firstly, aiming to provide a viable model of typology of modes and, secondly, to analyse the relation itself from the perspective of reductive and non-reductive views. My aim is to conceptualize the landscape of possible relations, and by doing so, answer questions about the composition of phenomenology. Much of what will be said can be applied to most kinds of phenomenology, e.g. sensory-perceptual, cognitive, conative, emotional, first-person agency etc., and these possible directions have bearing on a more general viewpoint one might take on the structure of consciousness.

Keywords: Phenomenology, Intentionality, Composition, Taxonomy of Modes, Reduction, Non-Reduction.

I.3.A. Relation between Intentionality and Phenomenology

There are two ways one can go about the relation between intentionality and phenomenology. On the one hand, one can be a *separatist* about the two. That is, one can hold that intentionality and phenomenology are mutually independent. On this account, standard cases of intentional states, such as judgments, beliefs and intentions are not phenomenal. Similarly, standard cases of phenomenal states, such as sensory-perceptual feels, algedonic experiences or bodily sensations, are not intentional. On the other hand, one can go opposite and claim that they are mutually dependent. This is the claim of *inseparatism*. As Horgan and Tienson (2002) noted, according to inseparatism, phenomenology and intentionality are necessarily interconnected in such a way that one does not feature in our mental life without the other.

The orthodox view in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind has been *representationalism*, which compatible with inseparatism. There are two representational theories, contingent on the direction of dependence. Firstly, there is reductive representationalism or intentionalism according to which phenomenal properties are dependent on intentional properties. Or, in other words, according to intentionalism; the fact that I see a red strawberry determines the what-is-it-like character to see a red strawberry or the experience of it. Recently, a group of heretics emerged arguing for exactly the opposite - the *phenomenal intentionality* (PI) thesis. Within PI framework, the intentional properties are dependent on the phenomenal ones. On this view the experiential what-is-it-like character of seeing a red strawberry determines that I see a red strawberry, or, that my mental state is intentionally directed at it. PI, the idea that intentionality is grounded in phenomenal character, has become increasingly influential in recent analytic philosophy of mind. While being at odds with intentionalism with respect of the dependence relation between intentionality and phenomenology, both views fall under the *inseparatis*, as well as representationalist picture.

Different proponents of PI have different conceptions on the *nature* of PI. For our purposes, we can specify two ways phenomenology could constitute representational content. The *Modest View* is that intentional contents and phenomenal experiences are at par and necessarily co-occur in a determining way, such that a change in intentional content involves a change in phenomenal content. The modest view is basically an identity claim. Phenomenal and intentional properties are just the same kind of properties. The *Rich View*, on the other hand, is the view that phenomenology plays a distinctive role in determining intentional content in a stronger grounding or in virtue of relation. One can say that intentional properties, at the very least, supervene on phenomenal properties⁵³. There are different ways one can cash out this dependence within PI, but I will not go further into this debate. However, I am going to presuppose a conditional claim of PI and, moreover, the rich view of PI in terms of the grounding or in virtue of relation.

The rich view of PI is meant to capture that what-it-is-like to think that *p* is different than what-it-is-like to think that *q* is distinctive due to the differences in content, i.e. *p* and *q*. In other words, what-it-is-like to think of red strawberries is different than what-it is-like to think of yellow lemons.

⁵³ I call the rich view rich because it is implied by it, due to the nature of metaphysical relations, that intentional states are distinct from phenomenal, hence we get a much richer inner life.

Since this characterization concerns the level of content, a natural question would be is PI distinctive at the level of modes or attitudes. I have argued in ‘Intentional Primitivism of Modes’ that modes are inherently distinctive in character. Hence, if we presuppose distinctiveness at the level of modes, then what is the metaphysical relation between contents and modes? How are our mental states structured not just at the level of contents, but also at the level of modes and their interconnection?

Some (Horgan & Graham, 2012; Horgan and Tienson, 2002; Smithies 2014; Kriegel, 2015; Jorba, 2016; Dorsch, 2016) characterize PI as being distinctive not just in terms of propositional contents, i.e. proposition p or proposition q , but also in terms of propositional attitudes associated with those contents, i.e. entertaining that p , judging that p , believing that p , etc. Horgan and Graham put it in these terms:

‘There are phenomenologically discernible aspects of ... cognitive phenomenology, notably (i) **the phenomenology of attitude type** and (ii) **the phenomenology of content**. The former is illustrated by the phenomenological difference between, for instance, occurrently hoping that Barak Obama will be re-elected U. S. President and occurrently wondering whether he will be – where the attitude-content remains the same while the attitude-type varies. The phenomenology of content is illustrated by the phenomenological difference between occurrently thinking that Obama will be re-elected and occurrently thinking that he will not be re-elected—where the attitude-type remains the same while the attitude-content varies.’ (Horgan and Graham 2012, p. 334)

Similarly, Shields puts it:

‘When I am curious about whether p is true, I am in an experiential state rather unlike the experiential state I am in when I doubt that p is true. What is it like to be curious? I might say that it is like being intrigued or that it is like having a mental itch; but already, then, I am characterizing the quality of curiosity, and assuming, as I do, that there is something which is ***what is it like to be curious***, or, less clumsily, that *curiosity is a certain way*. I am assuming, that is, that **curiosity has a qualitative feel.**’ (Shields, 2011, p. 2015)

And finally, Kriegel puts it:

‘How should we understand the idea of “mental commitment to truth”? I propose that we construe it as an *attitudinal feature, rather than a content feature*, of mental states. The truth of *p* is not part of what the belief that *p* represents, it is an aspect of *how the belief that p represents.*’ (Kriegel, 2015, p.43)

Similar claims have been advocated by most proponents of PI, with some exceptions (more on the exceptions in what follows). Although some has been said on how exactly attitude is phenomenally individuated and what is the role it plays in the overall phenomenal experience⁵⁴, not much has been said on the precise metaphysical relation between content and attitude, phenomenally speaking. This paper is concerned with this issue.

1.3.B. Why is Composition Important?

It is important to note that it seems plausible to assume that there is a phenomenal unity between contents and modes; we cannot experience mode without being tokened with some particular content, and *vice versa*, we cannot experience contents without being tokened with some particular mode⁵⁵. However, the question of what the relation between attitudinal phenomenology, as well as phenomenology of other intentional modes, and content phenomenology seems relevant.

We experience modes in sensory perceptual phenomenology. There is something it is like to see a lemon and there is something it is like to taste a lemon or smell a lemon. The same holds for algedonic phenomenology: there is something it is like to sense throbbing pain and there is something it is like to sense piercing pain. Or in conative phenomenology: my craving for a gelato seems quite different than me wanting to do some engaging philosophizing today. The example is most intuitive with respect to affective phenomenology: my feeling of anger towards Donald Trump trumps my joy over aforementioned gelato. I also believe there is such a thing as

⁵⁴ With the exception of Kriegel (2015), Jorba (2016), and Dorsch (2016).

⁵⁵ Here I understand modes both coarse-grained and fine-grained. For example, seeing a yellow lemon and thinking about a yellow lemon would be course-grained modes, while blurrily seeing a yellow lemon and desperately desiring a yellow lemon fall into the category of fine-grained modes. Similarly, when I use attitudes as terminology, I am meaning primarily cognitive attitudes, while by the use of modes terminology, I am meaning non-propositional and objectual attitudes as well.

phenomenology of agency or something phenomenologically distinctive of first-person agency⁵⁶. If there are ‘agentive experiences’ (Bayne, 2008), one can say there is something it is like for me to deliberate on getting a cup of coffee, something it is like for me to raise my arm to pick up the cup and something it is like for me to perform that action, etc. Issue aside whether I am rightfully a phenomenology inflationist (which I am), it sees modes or attitudes run deep within it.

To move on to a more straightforward example; compare two photographs of the Duomo in Milano. The content of both these photographs is the Duomo itself, the photographs represent the Duomo. *What* comes after the is-clause is *what* of the mental state, i.e. what is represented, the content. However, the Duomo might be represented in different ways in the photographs. For example, one might represent the Duomo in daylight, the other during the night. Or one might be a filtered selfie in the front of the Duomo, while the other might be black and white conceptual photography of the pinnacles on the roof of the Duomo illustrating the idea of hierarchy, for example. One can extend this talk of photographs to mental states. In the same words, *what* comes before the if-clause is *how* of the mental state, i.e. how it is represented, the mode.

If mental states are representational, as I believe them to be, then it seems a plausible course of action to apply this distinction between *what* and *how* of representing them. It seems intuitively manifest to me that seeing the Duomo is different than thinking of the Duomo. And these distinctions seem equally salient in individuating my mental state as the difference in content of say, wondering whether the Duomo is in Milano or wondering if it is the Notre Dame.

If that is the case, then if two thoughts do not differ with respect to content, i.e. both *t1* and *t2* have content *P* <the Duomo is in Milano>, but differ with respect to the attitude, i.e. *t1* is believing that *P*, while *t2* is doubting that *P*, it would be natural to assume that they differ with respect to overall phenomenal character. But then there seems to be a tension with the claim that PI is distinctive with respect to the content, unless we assume that, in addition, it is also distinctive with respect to the attitude. If both *t1* and *t2*, with their respective contents *P* <the Duomo is in Milano>, and *Q* <the Notre Dame is in Milano>, share the same attitude type, i.e. judging, there will be a common phenomenal aspect to those thoughts, although the content of *t1* is true, while the content of *t2* is not.

⁵⁶ See Bayne 2008 for an overview.

Hence, intentional modes or attitudes contribute to the intentionality of the mental state. They possess qualitative properties independent of content. This means that the type-phenomenology is also fixed, in my terminology, not just the tokened content phenomenology. In 'Intentional Primitivism of Modes' my aim was to show this; that modes are intrinsically phenomenal, and that this phenomenology is not based on relational properties. Here, in this paper, my aim is to analyse how the intentionality of modes and contents is related (since they necessarily co-occur).

In what follows I proceed by analysing the first principles and introspective evidence for the relation between content and attitude of mental states. My aim is to conceptualize the landscape of possible relations, and by doing so, answer questions about the composition of phenomenally intentional mental states and, at the same time, open some possible directions in research of the structure of phenomenology in general. Much what will be said equally holds for various types of phenomenology, and as such has bearing on a more general viewpoint one might take on the structure of consciousness and their respective theory of mind. Nevertheless, some cases defy my proposed structure, such as simply entertaining a thought. Hence, my second aim is to provide the basis for typology of intentional modes. Some are fundamental, other primitive, and some are reducible to others. Even yet, some, I argue, are not intentional modes at all, hence, they are to be eliminated. Thus, I first to focus on the issue of specifying the various types of phenomenology, or typology of modes, one can experience.

1.3.C. Taxonomy of Modes

Phenomenology is always complex. Just a simple act of grabbing a cup of coffee has so many various phenomenological aspects that it might even be impossible to account for them all. For example, there is sensory phenomenology of seeing the cup, smelling the coffee in it and tactile phenomenology of the surface of the cup. There is certainly conative phenomenology of my intention to grab the cup and my wish to drink the coffee in it, or even craving for it. There is even perhaps cognitive phenomenology of me believing there is coffee in the cup, or remembering it, or suspecting it, or simply thinking it, etc. There is the phenomenology of first-person agency of me deciding to grab it, moving my hand, the grabbing itself etc. There might also be some

phenomenology of emotion of joy involved, as well as bodily pleasure as I have a sip of coffee. Plausibly there is also phenomenology of that mental state being mine, or sense of ownership and being for me, to the exclusion of everyone else. However, say I finally, after being overwhelmed with all these experiences, grab the cup and taste the coffee. Here it all starts again, perhaps in even richer form, since there are further stimuli added, such as taste, which might trigger all other kinds of phenomenology. But I am also an embodied organism. I am situated in the world (with respect to the cup) and I have various assumptions and beliefs about the world.

A possible way to go about this is to make an analogy with examples from biology. In Philosophy of Biology (as well as biology in general as a discipline) one of the central questions is about species. Species is commonly described as the basic unit of classification and taxonomy of an organism. Giving the definition of species is not a simple task, as the definitions differ with respect to the methodology of research and the phenomena one is interested with respect to species. However, for our purposes, a tentative and general definition could be put forward in terms of defining species as the largest group of organisms in which any two individual organisms share morphological and phenological characteristics of the appropriate properties, which allows them to mate and produce fertile offspring and are adapted to a particular niche in the environment.

The morphological and phenological part of definition is of importance here. Morphology aims at typology of species to fixed properties or a type. Types of variations, or phenotypes in biological terms, within specific clusters of organisms, e.g. longer or shorter snout, number of legs, lack of vision, etc. differentiate the species. The fact is species carve nature at its joints. I believe the same can be applied to mental states in a heuristic method⁵⁷. Let me give it a try from the lowest type to the highest in a hierarchical manner:

- 1) Species – token intentional modes such as desperately desiring, wishfully thinking, excitingly fearing, etc. (naturally, in relation to some content).⁵⁸
- 2) Genus – type of intentional modes such as desire, thinking, fear, etc.
- 3) Family – kinds of intentional modes such as conative, cognitive, emotional, etc.
- 4) Order – intentional modes as such.

⁵⁷ Hence, I am not claiming that this is the optimal method, simply a sufficient guesstimate for the purpose of giving at least some sort of typology.

⁵⁸ As in 'Intentional Primitivism of Modes' these are tropes in my overall metaphysical theory.

One can go higher to consciousness itself, or even life as in biology, as the highest taxonomy rank, but, for my purposes, we can stop here. The question is how all those individual phenomenologies fit within this hierarchy.

I.3.D. Relations Between Content and Mode

I approach the possible relation between content and mode with respect to another term used in biology – reduction. In other words, I will landscape the conceptual space with respect to unification of mode and content and their reducibility or irreducibility, with respect to one another. It is important to note that I am interested in the structure of phenomenology, not physical features underlying it or anything else, for that matter.

I.3.D.a. Reduction

The first option one can hold is that one of the constituents, i.e. content or mode, is *a priori* more fundamental than the other. If one is more fundamental than the other, then the latter is to be accounted for in terms of the former, or the more fundamental one. Hence, one would be arguing for a reduction. The reasoning behind the reductionist move is that, while we do indeed talk about content and mode, and it might be helpful to talk about them in those dualist terms, there is, in the end, a single property of importance to the structure of consciousness and the relation between mode and content is just a simple tool. However, there are two kinds of reduction in this picture:

- 1) Reduction with Identity, and
- 2) Reduction without Identity.

Identity essentially is the claim that content and mode are a single monadic property. However, as we noted, phenomenology is always complex. Hence, the fact that there is single monadic property with complex features, does not imply that, for example, the aspect of seeing greenly is complex.

Seeing and greenly are not identical. They are phenomenologically discernible. As such, I believe it to be a clearer way to put to use the reduction terminology more in the terms of unification of content and mode, where one is more primitive than the other, rather than simple identity.

Standardly, there are two directions of reduction and depending on the direction we either hold that modes are nothing over and above than content, or, *vice versa*, that content is nothing over and above the mode. In other words, *how-p-is-like* is nothing more than *what-p-is-like* or *what-p-is-like* is nothing more than *how-p-is-like*, phenomenally speaking. With respect to the two kinds of reduction, (1) and (2), there are four types of direction of reduction:

- 1) Reduction with Identity:
 - (i) Reduction of Mode to Content,
 - (ii) Reduction of Content to Mode.
- 2) Reduction without Identity:
 - (iii) Reduction of Mode to Content,
 - (iv) Reduction of Content to Mode.

As for option (i), or saying that modes are identical to content, or, in other words, content is the only phenomenology we experience and we do not experience phenomenology of modes, the literature is, at best fuzzy. The best candidate is strong or pure (in Chalmers, 2004 terms) representationalism or the view that identifies consciousness with a functional representational state specified by a physical mechanism. However, I do not quite understand what pure representationalism has in mind with respect to modes. On the one hand, it seems that for pure representationalism modes are not part of the phenomenal character, which would correspond to (i), or reduction with identity. Only contents individuate phenomenology. On the other hand, sometimes it seems that pure representationalism is saying that modes are part of the phenomenal character, but as part of content, which would correspond to (iii) or reduction without identity. There seems to be a conflation between these two notions in the literature. On the first option the only relevant mode is the mode of representing, on the second option, the genus (desiring, thinking, emotions, etc.) is reduced to specie or particular tokenings of the genus (desiring gelato, thinking about Star Trek, feeling anger towards people who do not recycle, etc.) and the mode is to be found in the content – I am representing a desire for gelato. This second option I have dealt with in

'Intentional Primitivism of Modes'. As for the first option or saying that modes are not part of phenomenal character, a strong case against it can be made with respect to emotions⁵⁹. I honestly cannot comprehend, epistemically or phenomenologically, how my anger towards people who do not recycle is not part of my phenomenal character. Or my anxiety of the metro. Or my anxiety in general. I can be simply anxious, without that anxiety being directed at anything in particular.

As for (ii) or reduction of content to mode with identity, Chisholm's version of adverbialism (1957) may be the prime candidate. Adverbialism is best characterized as representing in a particular way, e.g. seeing transparently. The translation of the sentences describing it would be from what-it-is-like-to-see-transparent to what-it-is-like-to-see-transparently. As I read him, for Chisholm the content seeing-transparently-glass is identical to the content glass. I do not believe this to be a plausible option. Again, the fact that there is one property with complex features, i.e. seeing, transparently, glass; does not imply the aspect of seeing transparently glass is complex.

(iv) is, in my opinion, the most plausible way of reduction. A prime candidate is again adverbialism, but less strong. Kriegel holds such a theory (2009, 2011b, 2015a). Kriegel accounts for phenomenology of modes or 'attitudinal phenomenology' as he calls it, which is what the aim is. However, Kriegel's theory suffers from counterarguments against adverbialism in general, which, in my opinion are quite strong⁶⁰. I have discussed this previously, hence I do not wish to repeat myself, but there is one aspect of reduction I wish to discuss further. This is the option of reduction in phenomenal intentionality (PI).

Pitt's (2004) argument for cognitive phenomenology of conscious occurrent thoughts is of epistemic kind, more precisely it is based on self-knowledge. Occurrent conscious thought have proprietary, distinctive and individuated phenomenology. In a nutshell, one can immediately and introspectively distinguish between conscious thoughts and other mental states, occurrent conscious thoughts with distinct representational contents and identify that it is a thought that it is.

However, the argument itself is directed only towards the content of occurrent thoughts. It does not commit Pitt to specific phenomenal characters of modes, and indeed it seems that his view is in tension with cognitive phenomenology being distinctive with respect to modes as well. The only

⁵⁹ See Deonna & Teroni, 2011.

⁶⁰ See 'Intentional Primitivism of Modes' §1.2.C.

‘attitude’ Pitt considers is ‘entertaining a thought’. In this, he is rather similar to classical representationalist, for whom the only relevant mode is mode of representing.

But it is far from clear that merely entertaining content is an attitude at all. Certainly, Pitt would agree on this. Entertaining a thought is a Brentanian notion. For Brentano ‘entertaining of a cup of coffee in front of me’ is simply *presenting*. This is neutral with respect to truth or falsity, and as such does not seem to be a cognitive mental state. Kriegel (2015a) argues that entertaining is phenomenal *per se*.

‘The idea is that there is a phenomenology of doxastic commitment to the truth of something and a phenomenology of axiological commitment to the goodness of something, but in addition there is a phenomenology of non-commitment. When one entertains that p, one experiences a phenomenology as of p being in some (admittedly elusive) sense simply present before the mind, unaccompanied by either assent, dissent, approval, or disapproval.’ (ibid, p. 100).

While I do understand Pitt’s and Kriegel’s motivation and have indeed had thoughts just presented to me, I disagree with them that simply presenting constitutes phenomenology *per se*. Even yet, I disagree that this is mode of representing. What I do believe is going on here is simply content instantiated without any intentional mode. As such, I am an eliminativist with respect to simply entertaining a thought as a mode of presentation. There might be phenomenology associated with it, however the source of it is either the content or some other type of phenomenology to which entertaining is reducible, not the act of entertaining. Entertaining itself is not directed towards anything; it simply presents the content.

To conclude, the fact that content and mode are unified does not imply there is reduction. Reduction artificially focuses on only two parts of the experience. Content and mode might be unified, meaning that the components are brought together for a common purpose or action, but still discernible. Or they might be blended, meaning that the components are merged together so that they are not discernible. However, neither unification nor blending is reduction to one another.

I.3.D.b. Non-Reduction

When it comes to non-reduction, there are three possible options an intentional mental state might take the form of; namely, fusion, emergence and composition. I discuss each of them in turn and opt for composition.

I.3.D.b.1. Fusion

Fusion phenomenology is to say that the intentional mode's contribution to the overall phenomenal experience is inseparable from the content's contribution in such a manner that the mode and content correspond, as a whole, to a merged, indivisible property; hence, phenomenology resulting from it is merged and indivisible. The result is a single complex phenomenal property whose simple constituents are not discernible introspectively. Compare it to adding spices to a vegetable soup you are cooking. Certainly, the spices contribute to the overall taste of the soup; however, their individual contributions need not be salient in your phenomenology. In other words, even though we cannot immediately and introspectively pick apart content and mode, the mental state resulting from their fusion would be of a different type if one of the ingredients were missing.

This option is rather problematic, in my opinion, for three reasons. Firstly, this seems contrary to our introspection of phenomenal properties. Granted, there might be phenomenal properties that are indeed combined in a fusion-like manner, but content and attitude seem discernible in our phenomenology. Secondly, it seems plausible to suppose that content and attitude do make their own distinct contributions. If we supposed otherwise, all our conscious experiences would necessary be composite of content and attitude. In other words, there could not be simply entertaining a thought, which does not strike me as mode on its own standing. Or we could not simply have attitudinal phenomenology. For example, many have come to argue that moods are not intentional, however there is still something *how* it is like to feel them. While I acknowledge that this is a controversial suggestion open to debate, it does seem prudent to me to keep the option open of having simple attitudinal phenomenology and simple content phenomenology. Lastly, it is hard to see, according to this picture, how my phenomenal duplicate on Twin Earth and me could share the same phenomenal character when we're thinking the same thing with different

reference, e.g. water as H₂O and water as XYZ (Putnam, 1975b). When it comes to a distinction between a phenomenally constituted narrow content and a wide content determined, in turn, by narrow content and external factors of the environment, in fusion cases the resulting mental state would be of entirely different type, although the narrow content is the same, since the ingredients constituting the wide content are of different kind. Similarly, since the sameness of mode is not discernible, that could not provide us with a point of comparison.

However, there is a plausible point contained in the soup example. This is not a trivial example. What I suggest is that fusion is a plausible option when it comes to solely *contents*. Hearing a song by Dizzy Gillespie, or fearing the praying mantis, or drinking a lemonade is not blended. What may be blended is the citrus and water of the lemonade⁶¹. I cannot see the same holding for modes for the reason that, although the boundaries between intentional modes might be fuzzy, they are not constituted in such a manner that the overall phenomenology is such that I cannot discern that I think, or that I feel, or that I am experiencing a bodily sensation, or that I see, etc. (although I might have ambiguous truth, value or other commitments to it, since I am instantiating an ambiguous intentional mode⁶²). On the other hand, it is very hard for me, phenomenally, to discern color from the surface, or aesthetic appearance of the praying mantis's eyes from the aesthetic appearance of its body shape, or the taste of spices in my famous Indian lentil soup.

1.3.D.b.2. Emergence

Emergent entities or properties are usually defined as novel and irreducible. The novelty of such properties is realized in them not being mere aggregates of their parts, but rather properties with new, original intrinsic qualitative characteristics. Characteristics of emergent properties cannot be analysed independently of the context of the whole, which is greater than just the sum of parts. The irreducibility means that we cannot account for the characteristics of the whole from the characteristics of the parts. In our context, this would mean that the content and attitude are indeed

⁶¹ See Roelofs (2014) for a discussion on this. Roelofs, although concerned with the combination and the palette problem in panpsychism, discusses 'phenomenal blending' (his term) of qualities in a very insightful manner.

⁶² See 1.3. 'A Peculiar Case of Doubt' for a discussion of ambiguous mental attitudes.

distinct properties of mental states and are discernible. This is what emergence gets right, unlike fusion.

However, the usual arguments against emergence aside, I believe we can dismiss emergence for two reasons. First is parsimony. From ontological point of view, we are postulating an additional entity to explain the structure of content and mode in our phenomenology. This seems as an *ad hoc* move since it is not clear to me how this could be applicable to other uses of mode and content, outside just the structure of phenomenally intentional mental states. Here I firstly have in mind the distinction between semantics and pragmatics, but also the fact that content can be merely entertained. The other non-parsimonious element is that in emergence, the system of consciousness needs to be aware, phenomenally, of the constituents, the emergent property and the emergent process itself. Beside the fact that I personally have no such phenomenology, if someone did, there would be so much conscious processing in a single representation that the bottleneck of consciousness would be blocked.

The second reason for dismissing emergence, although not a decisive argument in itself, is meant to show that emergence is at least counter-intuitive or nonsensical on the basics of our introspection. The gist of it is, if we can argue from our introspection that the two composites of content and mode do not show up in our phenomenal character as emergent, then how can emergence be the ontological relation between them? It seems plausible to suppose that content and attitude do make their own distinct contributions rather than give rise to an overall novel unified experience. If we supposed otherwise, we would not introspect such an elegant division of labor between the two.

However, think of cognitive penetrability. Perception is a different kind of mode from cognition. Same goes for types; seeing is a different type of mode from believing. Cognitive penetrability is the controversial process of cognitive states affecting perception⁶³. One can, for example, see a photograph of the trees, realize it is trees one is seeing, then see the forest. It is phenomenally different to see the trees and realize it is trees, and, subsequently realize it is a forest. Moreover, one can still perceptually attend to the trees and not the forest. Even yet, one can attend to the thought or realization it is the trees one is seeing. One might object that this is simply matter of

⁶³ While the *vice versa*; perception affecting cognitive processes, is not controversial.

attention. However, attention does not explain the phenomena, as it is not a structural feature of phenomenology. Point being, there might be cases of emergent modes and emergent contents. Cognitive penetrability seems to fit the picture nicely.

1.3.D.b.3. Composition

The third option is compositional phenomenology of content and mode. The *whole*, i.e. the mental state, is a composite of properties of the *parts*, i.e. content and mode.

I think this is the most plausible option. Firstly, it does not oppose our introspection, quite the opposite. Secondly, we can compose and decompose the state and account for sameness and differentiating conditions of contents or modes. Thirdly, we can account for satisfaction condition for the content and correctness conditions of the mode. And lastly, the neat division of labor is kept. We are not postulating any novel entities to explain a phenomenon, as in emergence, and our phenomenology is not getting to complex, as in fusion.

Furthermore, composition gives us means to a typology of mental states as suggested in §3. It also allows for some modes to be reducible, some to be primitive. An argument for composition can be made:

- 1) It is manifest in our introspection that the phenomenal character of the content of train is the same in hearing the train and seeing the train.
- 2) It is manifest in our introspection that the phenomenal character of mode of hearing is the same in hearing trains and hearing dogs.
- 3) The phenomenal character of mode and the phenomenal character of content is discernible in our introspection.

A counterargument can be made. What about the case of fearing fear? It is a psychological fact that in general anxiety disorder and panic disorder the patient is not afraid of anything in particular, any content or object, but rather the fear itself. How can one discern the content and the mode if they are the same? However, same composites or parts can play different roles in our mental states. Token role is different from type role. Fear can play both the token role and the type role.

I.3.E. Taking stock

In this paper I had two objectives. Firstly, to give a plausible framework for the typology of intentional modes. I applied the hierarchy from biology starting from specie, a tokened mental state, further up. My second objective was to examine what is the relation between intentional modes and intentional contents. I analyzed the logical space with respect to another biological notion: reduction. I have dismissed both reduction of content to mode and *vice versa* with identity and reduction of mode to content without identity. As for non-reduction I have dismissed fusion and emergence. However, fusion may hold with respect to solely content, while emergence might hold with respect to contents and modes, respectively.

However, two options seem to be promising: adverbialism and composition. Both adverbialism and composition capture the intuition that Loar (2002) said very clearly: when I see a blurry lemon, it is not the case that I represent a blurry lemon, but rather a lemon in a blurry way. The difference is that adverbialism does not hold that there are two ontologically different representations combined.

I opted for composition as it has more advantages than adverbialism.

Part II
The Structure of Unconscious Mental
States

II.1. Introduction

Do you believe that 12345 is a smaller number than 54321? Are you positive that you opine that women are equally good philosophers, yet on conferences you attend only talks by men; and when confronted with your behavior you deny that bias, holding to your conscious belief? When looking at a Dalmatian dog do you perceive every spot on him, even though you cannot tell how many there are? When picking a movie on Netflix on Sunday night, are you certain you picked it only because of its content, or perhaps the color of the poster had some influence on it?

This part of the dissertation deals with unconscious mental states in general and asks whether they are intentional or not. All the above are unconscious mental states. However, there is a difference. The first two examples are propositional attitudes of belief states. The third and fourth example are subliminal perception states.

One might object with a valid distinction at this point: is the question of the unconsciousness of dispositional cognition, such as beliefs, e.g. “men are superior to women”, and the question of the unconsciousness of subliminal cognition, such as priming, e.g. “buy this hamburger in this chain fast food restaurant that you see on your YouTube advert because it is so colorful, hence must be juicy and tasty” the same question⁶⁴? In my opinion, the question can be rephrased as to whether subliminal mental states are dispositional as well. Dispositional mental state is not actually occurring at the time, but rather it is a state which is prone to occur, under certain conditions. This distinction rests on the distinction between occurrences and dispositions in general, e.g. a vase is prone to break because it has the property of fragility as a disposition. It is not until the vase actually breaks, that the disposition is effectuated, hence occurrent. It is not clear whether priming is propositional, as beliefs are. The literature is scarce on the matter, but I do find it to be a very interesting question. I believe there must be some sophistication to the process. If there was not some sophistication and the process is purely ‘low-stream’ in a sense that it does not utilize any of our background mental conditions (such as existing beliefs, memories, knowledge, etc.), you

⁶⁴ Thanks to Julien Deonna for pressing me on this point.

would not be primed towards that particular response, but rather another. This question is closely connected to the question of relation between perception and cognition. For example, Tacca (2011) argues ‘that the spatial structure underlying visual object representation displays systematicity – a property that is considered to be characteristic of propositional cognitive representations.’ Furthermore, he argues ‘that visual representations, that display systematicity, might count as an early type of conceptual representations.’ Thus, what you are primed to has a conceptual element to it, at the very least. A step further is to treat that conceptual element as a propositional concept. In that sense, even subliminal cognition and perception may be treated as being constituted by propositional content. Note that I am not a dispositionalist in a sense that the propositional content P is stored in some sort of ‘belief-box’ and retrieved when occurrent. I am even unsure of the use of disposition talk in the context of unconscious mental states. Dispositions are somewhat mysterious properties to me and, as such, I will argue against dispositionalism. since they only have to do with possibility. In paper II.1. I argue against such a view. Furthermore, paper II.1. deals with the nature of unconscious mental states in general, applying both to subliminal perception and cognitions, as well as propositional attitudes. Paper II.2. deals more closely with propositional attitudes, in particular the attitude of belief.

Both papers in this part of the dissertation deal with content indeterminacy. Therefore, I take the opportunity now to clarify what I mean by content indeterminacy and what significance it brings to the question of intentionality of unconscious mental states.

Since Quine (1960) philosophers have worried about content-determination and indeterminacy of translation of our language contents. Moreover, this indeterminacy does not only affect our language contents, but extends to our thought contents as well. To put it roughly, the issue is what makes it the case that one is thinking about *rabbits* rather than *undetached-rabbit-parts*. Davidson (1973) extended Quineian notion of language indeterminacy in his *radical interpretation* to intentional contents of beliefs and desires to the actions driven by them. Others famously had worries about content determination, such as Putnam (1975) and Kripke (1979). Dennett (1971, 1987) follows this line of thought in his theory of *interpretivism*; a theory of ascription of mental content. The ascription is based on predictions of meaning of the subject’s beliefs and desires in a necessarily derived manner, made by an Ideal Interpreter of a kind, and moreover, it is an a priori matter.

The overall worry with content determination is the so called ‘content grounding’ problem (Bayne, Montague 2011). Conscious mental states consist of certain property attributions. The fact that I desire a gelato as an object to which I attribute the qualities of being cold, liquidly and refreshing must be grounded in some features and yet none of the facts external to the mental state itself, whether they are causal, dispositional, functional, or purely neurophysiological, seem to be good candidates for such grounding. In other words, my attribution of these qualities to the gelato as an object of my desire, makes it precisely the object of my desire: I desire it (from a subjective viewpoint) as a cold, liquidly and refreshing object. One might say that the gelato, in general, may be held to ground those properties from an objective viewpoint. However, the fact of my desire being directed towards that particular object with precisely those particular qualities cannot be explained from an external viewpoint of the mental state itself, since determination of those precise qualities, hence object is what determines the content of my mental state of desire.

When speaking of unconscious thought, grounding content determination proves to be even more challenging. What makes it the case that the contents of my unconscious mental states are determined? If we take the Quineian route the problem seems straightforward and immediate; there is no unconscious interpretation at play⁶⁵. How do you interpret something you are not aware of? Similarly, the unconscious is, naturally, an issue for the representationalists, whether in the form of Phenomenal Intentionality⁶⁶, or in the form of naturalist representationalists theories. In the case of Phenomenal Intentionality, the question is how an unconscious mental state can be intentional, hence have determinate content, if there is no unconscious phenomenology and intentionality is grounded in phenomenology (or at least, depends on it). Since representations can occur unconsciously, it seems that simply having a representation does not suffice for qualitatively experiencing it⁶⁷. In case of naturalist representationalists theories we go back to the aforementioned example, but from a different perspective⁶⁸. In the context of intentionality; what

⁶⁵ Some theories of this sort have been put forward. Most notably, Searle’s (1991) theory of potentialism places the content grounding in positing potentially conscious contents as the basis for intentional unconscious contents. Kriegel (2011), on the other hand, has a variation of Dennettian theory. He grounds interpretations of unconscious content in conscious content, i.e. only by relation of the ideal interpreter to conscious phenomenal content does unconscious content get content determinacy. I do not find either of these theories to be successful (Vitasovic, 2016).

⁶⁶ Most notably Searle, 1991; Strawson, 2008, 2011; Kriegel, 2011; Horgan & Graham, 2012; Smithies, 2012; Coleman, manuscript; Pitt, manuscript.

⁶⁷ See Chalmers (2004) and Kriegel (2002).

⁶⁸ Dretske (1995), Milikan (1984), Tye (1995).

makes it the case that my mental state is intentionally directed to rabbits as opposed to undetached-rabbit-parts. Same holds for unconscious mental states.

I do accept that mental states are paradigmatically intentional. Moreover, it is, for the most part, undisputed that phenomenal character is individuated by its representational content and I accept this as well⁶⁹. So, when both you and I believe that ‘Harry Potter is one of the greatest achievements in children literature in the history’ we share the same belief, i.e. our belief is directed towards the same content. Although these two beliefs are numerically distinct states, they are tokenings of the same type of state, namely the type belief *that Harry Potter is one of the greatest achievements in children literature in the history*⁷⁰. However, what happens when this belief is occurrent in my consciousness and when the same belief is not occurrently entertained? You may ask me ‘What is, in your opinion, one of the greatest achievements in children literature?’ And I might respond to you ‘Harry Potter’, without previously holding that belief ever consciously in my mind. The question remains was the representational content there before the conscious content was prompted by your question and my explicit answer.

⁶⁹ By content I simply mean whatever is represented. These can be objects, non-existing objects, state of affairs, events, properties and so on. However, the issue is how mental representations come to have their contents and satisfaction conditions that obtain between external objects and internal contents.

⁷⁰ A proponent of Phenomenal Intentionality goes even further. Not only are they tokenings of the same type of state, they are, in addition, qualitatively the same. We essentially share the same phenomenal character.

II.2. Pure Content View of the Unconscious⁷¹

Abstract

Some hold that conscious intentionality such as perception, thought, emotions etc. is indeterminate. Same can be said for unconscious intentionality (if there even is one). This paper is concerned with the indeterminacy of unconscious intentionality. There are two ways to go about this and I dismiss them both. One can argue that unconscious mental states and processes are either non-intentional or are merely derivatively intentional upon the conscious ones. As far as the first claim goes, I defend *Intentional Realism about Unconsciousness* (INRU). I argue against the second, derivative strategy, on the basis that it subscribes us to dualism with respect to the property of intentionality. On the one hand, there is conscious non-derivative intentionality and, on the other, unconscious derivative intentionality. The distinction between derivative and non-derivative intentionality results, I argue, in positing either two different properties of intentionality or a single, unified property with different instantiations depending on the property of consciousness, which, in turn, makes intentionality dependent on consciousness. My solution proceeds by arguing that the difference is not in the property of intentionality itself, but rather in the structural difference between the intentionality of conscious and unconscious mental states and processes. The argument proceeds from the argument of indeterminacy of content of conscious mental states and claims that the same can be said for indeterminacy of attitudes of conscious mental states. By analogy, the same holds for unconscious ones. I argue that this is precisely the difference between the conscious and unconscious states.

Keywords: Intentionality, phenomenal consciousness, unconscious, mental content, mental attitude, indeterminacy.

II.2.A. Unconscious Intentionality – a yes-no question

Many philosophers subscribe to the view that unconscious mental states and, even more, unconscious mental processes, cannot be, nor are, intentional⁷². In other words, they subscribe to the view that genuine intentionality is reserved only for the conscious ones. By genuine

⁷¹ I would like to thank the editors of the special edition of the journal 'Phenomenology and Mind' on 'Consciousness and Cognition: The Cognitive Phenomenology Debate', No. 10, 2016, Elisabetta Sacchi and Alberto Voltolini, for giving me permission to use §3 of the paper published in it for discussion in §C of this paper. Although most of the content is the same, some changes have been made according to the argumentative strategy, which differs in this paper. As well, some stylistic changes have been made.

⁷² See Davidson (1973), Dennett (1972, 1987), Descartes (1641;1993), Strawson (2008).

intentionality I mean directedness of a mental state or process towards some object, or effect, in case of processes. By use of the wording effect, I do not make any implications on the causality of mental processes, nor do I wish to make a conclusive statement on the matter; whether they are necessarily causal, even yet results of determinate causal chains of interaction. Hereby I mean the bring about-ness of the processes, in that they, firstly, bring about some outcome and, secondly, are themselves a fundamental part of that outcome inasmuch as the process itself is necessary to the completeness of the outcome.

It is important to note from the beginning that I uphold inseparatism of intentionality with respect to phenomenology, as opposed to separatism. Where separatism holds that intentionality and phenomenology are mutually independent, hence separate, inseparatism claims exactly the opposite. Here, I am using Horgan & Tienson terminology. In their words:

‘We affirm the following theses, both of which are repudiated by separatism:

The Intentionality of Phenomenology: Mental states of the sort commonly cited as paradigmatically phenomenal (e.g., sensory-experiential states such as color-experiences, itches, and smells) have intentional content that is inseparable from their phenomenal character.

The Phenomenology of Intentionality: Mental states of the sort commonly cited as paradigmatically intentional (e.g., cognitive states such as beliefs, and conative states such as desires), when conscious, have phenomenal character that is inseparable from their intentional content.’ (Horgan & Tienson, 2002).

Hence, the issue whether unconscious intentionality is a plausible concept has consequences for phenomenology as well, both conscious and unconscious. It is widely accepted that phenomenal experience is necessarily conscious. Even yet, phenomenology is used synonymously to consciousness to designate our everyday experiences. As far as the conscious states go, Horgan & Tienson’s claim of inseparatism, although debatable, is intuitive. When I see consciously and occurrently that my dog is barking on a sandwich, my seeing it has a different ‘feel’ to it than when I see him barking at a cat. This change of ‘feel’ is due to the change of intentional content. The question is: can the same be said for the unconscious belief?

An immediate move that might cross one's mind is to implement Block's distinction between '*phenomenal consciousness*' and '*access consciousness*' (Block, 1995; 2007). Phenomenal consciousness or P-consciousness is a result from sensory experiences such as bodily sensations, feelings, perceptions, thoughts, desires and emotions. P-consciousness consists of subjective experience. On the other hand, access consciousness or A-consciousness is data or information available for use in reasoning, action and speech and. This information is accessible, reportable and memorized, even if not phenomenal. Thus, I have A-consciousness of the belief that my dog is barking at a sandwich, rather than a cat, although not P-consciousness, when we talk about unconscious states and events.

However, Block's distinction is of no use as explanatory tool in my picture, since, for Block, representational content in P-consciousness and A-consciousness is different. When we talk about P-consciousness we are simply talking about qualia, while representational content, and by thus intentionality, is reserved only for A-consciousness. Secondly, I do not believe this distinction to be complete and sufficiently broad to capture all the phenomena of consciousness, as there are other forms of consciousness that seem to escape the division, such as self-consciousness and temporal consciousness⁷³.

The issue comes down to the incompatibility of intentionality with the claim that there are genuinely intentional unconscious states. I disagree with such a view, and it is the aim of this paper to provide reasoning for the opposite.

There are two ways one can do this; using philosophical method or using empirical methods. Although I will make mention of some of the empirical findings, I will mostly put my trust in philosophical reasoning. Since my argument is based on the Argument for Indeterminacy of Conscious Mental States I start, in §II.2.B., by making clear what content indeterminacy is and what are the consequences for the unconscious.

The above thesis, that unconscious states are not genuinely intentional can be read in two different ways. The *Strong Reading* is that only conscious states are genuinely intentional and unconscious ones are simply not. The *Weak Reading* is that unconscious states are merely derivatively intentional upon conscious ones insomuch the intentionality of unconscious states is dependent on intentionality of conscious states. In my opinion, both these readings are problematic.

⁷³ There might be other types of consciousness that do not fit within Block's distinction; however, I will stick only to these three. The reason is that these are the type of consciousness I discuss in this dissertation.

In §II.2.C. I tackle the Strong Reading. I subscribe to the view of:

(INRU) Intentional Realism about Unconscious - Unconscious mental states and processes are genuinely intentional.

Not only is the Strong Reading counterintuitive, but I argue that, in addition, it poses a serious problem for naturalizing intentionality. One needs to commit to INRU in order to be in agreement with cognitive science and neuroscience. However, there are independent philosophical arguments for committing oneself to this view based on the distinction between meaning and information, a well-known and researched distinction within philosophy⁷⁴. On the contrary, empirical theories implemented in cognitive science and neuroscience methods have, at least, inconclusive understanding of the distinction at hand⁷⁵. Or, so I argue.

In §II.2.D. I move on to the Weaker Reading, the view that unconscious states are only derivatively intentional and, as such, dependent on conscious states which are non-derivatively intentional. The reasoning is that, for example, books can be about something, and that makes them derivatively intentional. A book containing the sentence ‘There are more than 7 500 varieties of apples grown across the globe’ can be *about* apples, however it is not *directed at* apples the way I am when I instantiate that belief, since books are not themselves (‘intrinsically’) intentional, but rather by me reading the sentence as an intentional agent the sentence derives its intentional character from my intrinsic intentional character, hence non-derivatively. I argue that this position is essentially dualism: we distinguish between two kinds of intentionality and derived intentionality depends upon non-derived intentionality for its existence. One can argue that this dualism results in positing either two different properties of intentionality or a single, unified property with different instantiations depending on the property of consciousness, which, in turn, makes intentionality dependent on consciousness.

In §II.2.E. I turn to my proposal; *The Pure Content View* of the unconscious. I start by analyzing the property of intentionality itself or, in other words, its intrinsic nature. The thesis I defend is that it is not the case that conscious and unconscious intentionality are different types of property or a single property with different types of instantiations, namely, derivative and underivative, as

⁷⁴ Dretske (1981), Shannon (1948).

⁷⁵ Bayne T., Hohwy J. & Owen A. M. (2016), Hohwy (2009), Overgaard M. & Overgaard R. (2010).

shown by previous argumentative strategies. Rather it is the case that the property of intentionality is the same in both conscious and unconscious states. Moreover, it remains uniform across the spectrum of mental states and processes. To put it more bluntly, the property of intentionality does not change according to the type of global state of consciousness instantiated. That being said, there is a difference in conscious and unconscious intentionality. I argue that the mental states themselves differ in structure. And the difference is to be found in the attitudinal component of the mental state. More precisely, the unconscious mental states lack it, as opposed to conscious ones. Unconscious intentionality is constituted only by content placed upon the subject and as such differs in structure from the conscious one which is constituted by both content and attitude placed upon the subject. Hence, the Pure Content View of the Unconscious.

In §II.2.F. I sum up; however, I do present some outstanding questions; namely, the mental state of desire. The reason for this is that conative attitudes, in my opinion, differ in their structure from cognitive and emotional ones insofar as conative mental states and processes are constituted by both the content and attitudinal component regardless of whether they are conscious or unconscious. In that sense, sometimes our conscious behavior can be explained by the conative aspect of our unconscious desires and drives, however not our beliefs and emotions.

II.2.B. Intentional Realism about Unconsciousness

Denying intentionality to unconscious states completely seems to be a rather counterintuitive move, empirically speaking, since it is widely accepted that we are subjects to subliminal perception and implicit cognition.

The thesis that unconscious states cannot be intentional is essentially a result of the Cartesian intuition. The Cartesian intuition rests on an idea that if there is thinking, there must be someone doing the thinking, or, if there is mental action, something or someone must be performing that action. This implies the substantial notion of the self or an 'I' as a fundamental thinking thing. The Cartesian self is in contradiction with the idea that there might be a group of things which

constitutes the self or a bundle theory of consciousness⁷⁶. However, it is important to note that the unconscious is not reserved for only some mental states, as opposed to the others. Consciousness is a feature of our mental lives that can accompany any of our mental states or processes. Yet, precisely in this fact lays the trickery, since, as Searle notes, ‘Our naïve, pre-theoretical notion of an *unconscious* mental state is the idea of a conscious mental state minus the consciousness.’ (Searle, 1991, p. 47).

Searle (1991), following Jackendoff (1987), claimed that the mind can be divided into the ‘computational mind’ and the ‘phenomenal mind’. Contemporary psychology and cognitive science endorse a tripartite division in the conscious, subconscious and unconscious mind (Kihlstrom, 1987; Epstein, 1994). The conscious mind is the one comprised of mental states we are occurrently aware of. Subconscious states are generally accessible to conscious awareness, even if they currently are not accessed. The unconscious mind is, on the one hand, constituted by automatic processes. These computational, information processing mental states, i.e. procedural knowledge, cannot ever become conscious regardless of possible enhancements, making them unconscious processes in the strict sense. These types of mental states are characterized by on-the-go actions, bodily movements, skills etc⁷⁷. While it is straightforward that the unconscious corresponds directly to the ‘computational mind’ and conscious to the ‘phenomenal mind’, as Searle and Jackendoff refer to it, it is an open question whether the subconscious one is phenomenal. The subconscious is constituted by types of mental states and processes that could be conscious, hence controlled and not automatic, such as thoughts, memories, and affects etc.⁷⁸. Implicit memory and subliminal perception fall under this category⁷⁹.

It is evident that the putative intentionality of automatic unconscious processes’ is quite different from the tentative intentionality of the potentially controlled unconscious ones. As for the latter, the subject can access these states by either switching attention to them or enhancing it

⁷⁶ Hume, 2000. As well as Buddhist picture of the self, see MacKenzie, 2009.

⁷⁷ Although these types of mental states may stem from wilful decisions, e.g. wanting to sip my coffee, hence moving my arm to grab the cup, the neural pathways from the brain to my arm and the actual movement of my muscles are not and cannot be conscious.

⁷⁸ This roughly corresponds to the Freudian unconscious, although the Freudian unconscious is merely conative, or desire driven.

⁷⁹ An analogy can be made with respect to action – some actions are performed with intention, while others are of more passive sort. Think again of the example of the cup of coffee. I may have moved my arm because I want a sip of coffee or because the waiter bumped into me and made me move it to avoid spilling it.

in a different manner, hence transforming the unconscious state to a conscious one. Those states can be intentionally grasped by the cognizer. It is not just the case that the subject can become aware of the objects of those states, as when I hear a tune in the background, and it happens to be Beethoven's Symphony No.5. but am not aware of it, in directing attention to it, as an enhancer, and recognizing the tune as Beethoven. The states themselves can become an object of awareness, as when one becomes aware of the underlying belief, e.g. 'The tune that is playing is Beethoven's Symphony No.5.'⁸⁰. The question here is: do unconscious states we are not aware of have intentionality in and on themselves, not do they become intentional once I attend to them?

Another way of formulating this idea is by distinguishing between informational content and intentional content. For example, in visual representations, the dorsal stream conveys informational content, while the ventral stream conveys intentional content. In case of the dorsal stream, it is not crucial for its functioning that the object I perceive is a tiger in a sprint in front of me. What is crucial is the positioning of the tiger in my overall visual field and the fact that it is moving in a certain direction and at a certain speed relative to my position. If this information is obtained, then functioning is not impaired. However, simply obtaining that information would not make me act upon it, as by just obtaining information of an objects position, direction and speed, I do not get any meaning I do not see the tiger as something dangerous that I need to run from. If, on the other hand, my ventral stream functioning was impaired, since it is responsible for object recognition, my overall description of the world would not be complete. I would fail to recognize that it is a tiger in front of me, fail to retrieve information stored in my memory that tigers are dangerous, fail to focus my attention only to that stimulus and disregard everything else in my visual field, fail to have the appropriate emotional reaction and, finally, fail to act accordingly. The same distinction could be invoked when one considers functioning of plants, bacteria, fungi and the like⁸¹. It is not the case that my cactus represents H₂O as water nor is there a fact of the matter whether it represents it as H₂O or as water. What matters is that it stores it for drought, that is, the cactus's reaction to the input. And the reaction would be the same in both cases plausibly.

⁸⁰ Note that this is not an example of directing attention, although it can be reformulated as such. Conscious awareness is not just a matter of attention. The question here is do unconscious states we are not aware of have intentionality in and on themselves, not do they become intentional once I attend to them.

⁸¹ Animals are a different matter. There is much disagreement on consciousness of animals. Although I personally do not have doubts in animal consciousness, I do not wish to enter this debate here, so I will use less controversial examples as above.

There are two ways one can argue against (INRU). The first is simply to deny the phenomena. If one adopts this strategy to unconscious states, such as Dennett (1971, 1987) and Strawson (2008, 2011), one, by abandoning the realism about unconscious intentionality, abandons realism about unconscious mental representations. Moreover, one simply abandons all hope in the project of naturalizing intentionality, as has been noted by others⁸². Firstly, there is no conclusive empirical or conceptual evidence, to my knowledge, which points to intentionality not being a natural phenomenon, evolved by natural selection. Secondly, if we stick only to naturalizing intentionality on a conscious level, we are omitting the other end of the spectrum of the phenomenon, and by doing so, omitting to have a conclusive theory. In case of Dennett and Strawson, either only conscious mental states or either creatures capable of consciousness are genuinely intentional. This ends up in dependence of intentionality on consciousness, a result, I believe, which should be avoided as we are speaking of two different kinds of mental properties. Granted, this is not contradictory. A mental property may be dependent on another. Same goes for natural phenomenon. However, if we are going to pursue the project of naturalizing intentionality, we should treat it independently of other phenomena⁸³.

The second way one can go about this is by inseparatism about intentionality and phenomenology. That is to say that intentionality and phenomenology are mutually dependent. One can argue that unconscious states do not exhibit genuinely intentional content since they suffer from content indeterminacy which is fixed by phenomenal properties⁸⁴. By accepting this view, one also accepts that:

- (i) Phenomenology is necessarily conscious.
- (ii) Intentionality is necessarily conscious.

However, in case of fungi or my cactus there is no fact of the matter whether they see water or H₂O, hence there is no fact of the matter about content meaning. Simply, it is not even content, it is pure information. Information I characterize in terms of Shannon. In his words, information can be defined as ‘the entropy, H, of a discrete random variable X is a measure of the amount of

⁸² Kriegel (2007b), Mendelovici (forthcoming).

⁸³ A side note: if there is dependence, and only if, then it more plausibly goes in the other direction; consciousness is dependent on intentionality. However, I will not go further in this, as it is a substantial claim.

⁸⁴ Strawson (2011) holds this view for all mental states.

uncertainty associated with the value of X' (Shannon 1948; Shannon & Weaver 1949). The more probable X is, the less information we get, the less probable X is the more information we get. Shannon's definition of information is probabilistic, and this is key to understanding the *no fact of the matter* about content meaning. Covariance is a measure of linear variability of two random variables (in our case, water and H₂O). Without going in mathematic values, both variables are equally probable. In case of content, there is a conceptual element which makes one variable more probable (even if still undetermined).

As for holding a belief as opposed to a desire, there is no question at all to be asked since they have, arguably, no such capability of holding an attitude towards a content (or even better, in this case, information). But humans have this capability. So, how does one, plausibly, act on an unconscious state if they neither exist in the relevant form, but simply as information processing by neural network, nor are phenomenal? It seems that humans are most certainly acting upon them.

To put it in more intuitive terms, consider an example. Say you unconsciously believe that men are better philosophers than women. Consciously, however, your behaviour does not correspond necessarily and always to this unconscious belief. When attending conferences, you attend women's talks, you have a female PhD student you are supervising, in seminars you give apt discussion time to your female students and do not dismiss their arguments immediately. Your behaviour on regular day-to-day basis does not reveal your unconscious belief. As it may be, you are organizing an important conference in near future with generous ERC funds you have just obtained after years of applications and job insecurity. Your head of department informs you that, in case everything goes well with the conference and the paper you just submitted to a top five journal, you are up for tenure. When devising the program of the conference you invite only male speakers. When confronted with it, you naturally deny the intention and simply call it a misfortune, however still you do not invite a female speaker. If your unconscious belief that men are better philosophers than women were not affecting your conscious deliberations, there would be no conflicting conscious decision making and your action would be straightforward – you would simply invite a female speaker without second thought⁸⁵.

⁸⁵ This example is a form of implicit belief or unconscious bias. The relevant arguments in the literature is beyond the scope of this paper, however few notes are due. Firstly, there is a question whether the cognizer is aware of the implicit belief's content. Most evidence support the claim that the cognizer has awareness of belief content, however no introspective awareness nor inference from external sources (e.g. while being confronted with his implicit belief)

We would simply be unable of action based on unconscious states or processes if we deny intentionality to them – a counterintuitive consequence, or that, since they are not phenomenal, they are neither intentional. However, one can remain inseparatist with respect to phenomenology and intentionality, and still hold that there are genuinely intentional unconscious states. One can argue that the mental states and processes are intrinsically and originally intentional⁸⁶. By ‘intrinsic’ I simply mean non-relational. On the same note, being extrinsic implies relational properties. That does not imply that all mental states that are relational are fully and only extrinsic. For example, thinking that the Eiffel tower is in Paris is a relational property since it entails a relation to the Eiffel tower which is itself an external entity. However, the content of the thought itself is an intrinsic property as it never extends beyond your mind⁸⁷. Similarly, a state has non-original intentionality if its intentionality depends on the intentionality of some other state; otherwise it has original intentionality. Thus, a genuinely intentional state, as I define it, is the one that has original and intrinsic intentionality, or, a genuinely intentional state has intentionality that does not depend on something external to the state itself and its intentionality is not a result of a relation to some other state, e.g. second-order thought, ascription of content, and similar. I next move on the distinction between ‘intrinsic’ and ‘original’ intentionality vs. ‘extrinsic’ and ‘derivative’ intentionality.

II.2.C. Derivative vs. Non-derivative Unconscious Intentionality

One can derive intentionality of the unconscious in two ways. One way is to derive intentionality from ascriptions of content or external observations of behavior. This is the so-called tracking

(Gawronski, & Bodenhausen, 2006). The most plausible way a subject can become aware is through behaviour, however behaviourism has little or no consequence for the epistemological status of the cognizer. Secondly, Gendler (2008a, b) develops a view according to which the intentional content of implicit attitudes in general is comprised of three interdependent components: representational (R), affective (A), and behavioural (B). The representation will automatically induce certain affective and behavioural responses. However, I am more convinced by counterarguments, where the cluster or R-A-B is not considered a cluster at all, but rather separate mental states (Amodio & Devine, 2006; Currie and Ichino 2012).

⁸⁶ The same holds for phenomenology. One can argue that mental states and processes are intrinsically and originally phenomenal. This would lead one to defend the view of unconscious qualitative character. Although at first approximation this might seem implausible, I have seen no convincing logic against it.

⁸⁷ In that sense my phenomenal duplicate and me, when we think that the Eiffel tower is in Paris, are thinking the same thought. This corresponds to the distinction between broad and narrow content (see Horgan & Tienson, 2002). However, I will not go further in this matter.

method, as it tracks actual events in the environment. For example, when a person behaves in a certain manner, say pets a dog, we tend to ascribe beliefs to that person, e.g. that they like animals. The second way is to derive intentionality from conscious mental states. This is to say that the only intentionality there is, is not to be found in anything outside of the mental state of the subject itself. On this view the only intentionality there is, is intrinsic.

The first option, deriving intentionality from ascriptions of content, rests on external observation and/or behaviorism⁸⁸. For example, one might see a piece of contemporary art with no straightforward depiction, however, ascribe content of a male nude to the art piece. Or when looking at my phone battery I ascribe a certain duration to it. On the other hand, while gazing in astonishment at my colleague in the office while she solves a logical problem at the whiteboard, I may ascribe focus, determination and gift for problem solving to her. The same applies for our utterances. When I say, 'I believe that crosswords are fun', my interlocutor would most likely take that I believe them to be fun, that is take my belief as true. When applied to unconscious mental states and processes, this move amounts to ascribing content to your unconscious states, i.e. as with our example of a philosopher who believes women are equally good philosophers consciously, but not unconsciously.

The second course of action one may take is to derive unconscious intentionality from conscious intentionality in some manner. I will discuss two examples. The first is Searle's *potentialism* (§3.1.) and the second is Kriegel's *interpretativism* (§3.2.). Both are proposals for deriving unconscious intentionality from conscious intentionality and both have traces of the two aforementioned options of derivation. While potentialism might be seen as more of an example of option two at first glance, since what is crucial for Searle is first-person perspective, the view is dependent on ascriptions of content and the distinction between derivative and non-derivative intentionality. On the other hand, Kriegel's interpretivism might be seen as a straightforward example of the first option, since the view is, in my opinion, essentially a Dennettian approach; however, Kriegel derives unconscious intentionality from conscious phenomenal intentionality. Hence, conscious phenomenology is basis for the unconscious one. Let me tackle them in turn,

⁸⁸ Dennett (1971, 1987), Schiffer (1992).

then, in §3.3. give my overall argument why these sorts of approaches do not suffice to solve the issue of unconscious intentionality with respect to inseparatism⁸⁹.

II.2.C.a. Potentialism

Searle's (1991) central notion, in discussing intentional states, is *aspectual shape*. "The link, then, between intentionality and consciousness lies in the notion of aspectual shape" (p.51). While he does not provide a clear-cut definition of aspectual shape, I read it as equivalent to the notion of mode of presentation⁹⁰. "Thought and experience and hence intrinsic intentional states generally, have a certain sort of aspectual shape. They represent their conditions of satisfaction under aspects" (p. 53). Different modes of presentation constitute different ways an agent might think about an object or a state of affairs in the world. As such, their referent and thus, conditions of satisfaction, remain the same.

The aspectual shape makes a difference in my representation in terms of the subjective character regularly associated with it, i.e. "...the way that the aspectual shape matters is that it is constitutive of the way the agent thinks about the subject matter..." (ibid). For Searle an aspectual shape is necessarily subjective, e.g. I love the taste of water, but I do not have any feelings associated with the taste of H₂O. Thus, in Searle's terms, the subjective nature of intentional states is crucial, since no third-personal perspective can convene the aspectual shape. For Searle, content determinacy stems from first person perspective (Searle, 1987).

While I agree with Searle on the crucial relevance of subjective consciousness, the problem arises when one tries to ascribe aspectual shape to unconscious states. Since intentionality necessarily involves an aspectual shape, and aspectual shape necessarily involves the first-person perspective, it is not clear how to account for the intentionality of unconscious states on Searle's account, since unconscious states have no subjective, first-personal perspective to them. On the contrary, he states that the ontology of unconscious states, while unconscious, is a "purely neurophysiological phenomen[on]" (p. 57). Furthermore, neurophysiological phenomena can be described only from the third-person point of view. Searle seems to end up in contradiction: one cannot ascribe

⁸⁹ Thanks to Davide Bordini for useful discussion on these positions when the original paper was being published.

⁹⁰ In this I agree with Coleman (*manuscript*, p. 5). Pitt, while puzzled as well on the notion of aspectual shape suggests that cognitive phenomenology 'plays the role Searle assigns to aspectual shape' (*forthcoming* p. 3).

aspectual shapes to unconscious states, since one does not undergo first-person experience of them but only third-person observation. Aspectual shapes which are central in regarding a state as intentional (and thus mental). Hence, unconscious mental states are not mental states at all.

Searle's solution to the contradiction is positing *potentially* conscious contents as the basis for genuinely intentional unconscious contents. "...any intentional state is either actually or potentially a conscious intentional state..." (p. 47). If unconscious states are to be regarded as "genuinely mental they must in some sense preserve their aspectual shape...but the only sense that we can give to the notion that they preserve their aspectual shape when unconscious is that they are possible contents of consciousness" (p. 57). The potentiality Searle has in mind is cashed out in terms of *causal capacity* of the unconscious intentional state to produce a subjectively intentional conscious state. The underlying brain state preserves its aspectual shape by having a causal capacity to produce a conscious state⁹¹. In effect, unconscious mental states derive their intentional content from conscious states, since, in principle, they are potentially conscious in virtue of their causal capacity to produce consciousness.

However, positing potentially conscious states as ground for intentionality does not solve the contradiction⁹². The relation between potentially conscious states and conscious states rests on two conditions: (i) the underlying neurophysiological processes must have a capacity to produce the relevant conscious experience, and (ii) this relation is causal. Both conditions evoke talk of dispositions, and the problem with dispositions is that they are not identical to the properties they cause. If the neurophysiological state R has the causal capacity to produce a vivid experience of red and it is causally relevant for the conscious phenomenology of redness that is subsequently experienced, one would still not attribute the redness to the underlying disposition of the neurophysiological state (Coleman *manuscript*, p.7; Pitt *forthcoming*, p.5).

While Coleman and Pitt stress the fact that the properties and the dispositions causing them are not identical, which makes it either the case that the unconscious states lack intentionality

⁹¹ Note that Searle holds that, while unconscious, there is no difference between my unconscious belief that e.g. water is H₂O and my underlying neuronal activity of that belief. He makes no difference between purely informational states and simply subconscious states, which seems inconsistent with empirical findings (Kihlstrom 1987). The question how strictly unconscious states, e.g. dorsal visual stream processes, can be potentially conscious remains unclear in Searle's writing.

⁹² See Pitt (*forthcoming*) who acknowledges same problems in Searle. Similar points were raised by Sam Coleman at "Yet Another Workshop on Phenomenal Intentionality" in his talk at CEU, Budapest and in his paper "Unconscious Qualitative Character as the Basis for Content" (*manuscript*, p. 7).

altogether, or that there is no bridge between unconscious and conscious intentionality anymore, I would add that they are also not contentful in the appropriate manner. Certainly, the unconscious state can cause the conscious one, however the former cannot, by doing so, derive its content from the latter. The gap remains. For example, if I throw an ill-proportioned stone in the pond and by doing so cause the waves to spread in even circles, that does not make the stone itself circular⁹³. In this sense, unconscious states do not have aspectual shapes that are in any way relevant to the aspectual shapes of the conscious states. At best, they have a different aspectual shape, which constitutes them as two distinct states with two distinct contents; one unconscious, the other conscious. If these two aspectual shapes are different, then there is no bridge over the gap between them and, thus, no way Searle can derive any content determinacy of unconscious states, since potentiality cannot bridge the gap between two actual aspects.

In addition, it is not enough simply to have a theoretical notion of an aspectual shape without subjectively determined intentional content. And if qualitative character is to fix the content of a state, and by doing so, it fixes the intentionality as well, then the aspectual shape of the unconscious state that Searle has in mind does not work. Either it is a different aspectual shape, in which case the bridge that narrows the gap between the two contents is missing, or unconscious states lack aspectual shape altogether since they do not have an inherently experiential, first-personal mode of presentation that fixes the content directly. If it is a different aspectual shape that constitutes contents of unconscious states, then those states are fully intentional on their own and there is no need to derive contents anymore. On the second option, Searle ends up denying intentionality altogether to unconscious states⁹⁴.

Simply suggesting a systemic causal correlation between a neural state and a mental state does not give the former the inherently mental character of the latter, even if the neural state could possibly be a mental state with similar content⁹⁵.

⁹³ Coleman (*manuscript*, p. 7) makes a relatively similar point.

⁹⁴ See Pitt (*forthcoming*) and Coleman (*manuscript*) who acknowledge the second problem as well.

⁹⁵ Similar, however not identical; since the states are numerically distinct.

II.2.C.b. Interpretativism⁹⁶

Kriegel (2011a) adopts a proposal somewhat similar to Dennett's. Dennett's Intentional Systems Theory (IST) (Dennett 1971) states that everything is intentional in virtue of a subject taking an intentional stance towards it. An intuitive objection to Dennett, which, in addition, holds for all cases of dualism of original/derivative intentionality, is that deriving intentionality necessarily ends up in infinite regress (Dennett 1987). Hence, one needs to postulate some privileged entities or processes that stop the regress. Dennett's solution is that, since regress cannot be negated, it should simply be stopped by dividing the "intentional system" into its constitutive subsystems that are slightly less intelligent, thus less intentional, and continuously repeat the process until we reach the level of individual neurons. The result is a "finite regress" that denies that a property such as intrinsic intentionality exists, since one cannot account for it at the level of individual neurons. All intentionality is ascribed; thus, there is no mystery involved in giving a naturalistic definition of it, as well as no controversy in regarding intentionality as an extrinsic, relational property. Every intentional state gets its intentional character by ascription; the way the system has intentional states is grounded in the way the observer interprets it as being such-and-such.

Kriegel (2011a) adopts Dennett's interpretivism as the first strategy of deriving intentionality, although with a substantial difference from Dennett's theory. He maintains, following Loar (2003), the actuality of intrinsic, un-derived intentionality; however, it is reserved for conscious phenomenal states from which unconscious states derive their intentional character. That is, "unconscious intentionality is grounded ultimately in a certain type of cognitive phenomenology, namely, the cognitive phenomenology of conscious interpretation" (Kriegel 2011a, p. 94). However, his theory ends up with the same result as Dennett's: tracking of the intentional content of the unconscious state externally to the state itself, and as such, is a motivation for rejecting the view.

'Interpretivism' appeals to the so called 'web of intentional concepts' which we employ in order to produce the best possible explanations of behaviour of intentional systems. The idea is that the 'intentional stance' of the interpreter, composed of his 'web of intentional concepts', ascribes a content based on the inference to the best possible explanation. This suggests that every intentional

⁹⁶ Thanks to Uriah Kriegel for useful discussions on his view during my visit to his research group in Institut Jean Nicod.

state derives its content from some other intentional state; hence infinite regress, an already familiar outcome.

Kriegel, to avoid this outcome, posits a class of ‘privileged intentional states’, in order to preserve original intentionality. These ‘privileged intentional states’, correspondingly, are conscious intentional states that are phenomenally constituted. What gives an unconscious intentional state the content it has is conscious intentionality, that is, the unconscious state is consciously cognitively interpreted in some manner. In other words, infinite regress ends in conscious cognitive intentional acts of interpretation which have their content underivative or “for any unconscious intentional state, there is some possible ideal interpreter who, under some conditions, produces an intentional interpretation of that state, and moreover does so consciously” (Kriegel 2011a, p. 84). However, as Pitt (*forthcoming*) points out, the problem is that a state can have many, if not an infinite number of interpretations, meaning just “as many intentional contents”. Similarly, and somewhat interconnected, this proposal, in my opinion, invokes the notions of an ideal interpreter and of indeterminacy. Since we are dealing with the ideal interpreters or “subjects who exercise the intentional stance perfectly under all conditions” (Kriegel 2011a, p. 84), they will not assign the interpretation if there are two equally applicable stances. Kriegel addresses this point, though he states that “this kind of content indeterminacy should be extremely infrequent, and to that extent harmless” (Kriegel 2011a, p. 88). Kriegel expects that in “standard cases” the best interpretation is always available, and the ideal interpreter should recognize it. However, I want to emphasize that there still is some room for indeterminacy, while in the case of intrinsic intentionality one cannot be erroneous, since how something appears is how something is⁹⁷. There is no stable interpretation and no limit to the variety of contents that the interpreter can yield, making those unconscious states, by definition, states with undetermined content, which, in return, makes them not genuinely intentional states. And if conscious intentionality is fundamental and grounds content based on its determinacy through phenomenology, then one cannot accommodate *semi* determinate content.

Pitt (*forthcoming*) points out, in addition, the fact that the interpretation does not, in any manner whatsoever, change ‘the intrinsic nature of the interpreted state’. Kriegel does not, by any means,

⁹⁷ However, note that this does not imply that one possesses “infallible knowledge about what one’s first-order intentional states are” (Horgan & Tienson 2002, p. 528). As Horgan & Tienson point out further “Beliefs about one’s own intentional states are second-order intentional states...” and “...such beliefs are sometimes mistaken” (2002, p. 528).

disguise this fact as he states that, when examining unconscious states, a state X has content C because the interpreter *assigns* to the state X the content C (Kriegel 2011a). However, the third-person, extrinsic perspective on an intentional state does not reveal anything of its intrinsic nature. On this picture, unconscious intentionality is, as Kriegel calls it, a kind of ‘response-dependent property’, which is characterized in terms of dispositions (Kriegel 2011a, p. 84). “...the unconscious item must have the disposition to elicit the right interpretation in the right interpreter, but not that the disposition must be manifested” (Kriegel 2011a, p. 88). The content-free unconscious states have a disposition to cause, under the right conditions for the ideal interpreter, determinate content by eliciting the best explanation in the interpreter. The unconscious states themselves do not constitutively determine content, since they are content free. It is the interpreter’s conscious tracking of intentionality and ascription of content that gives these states the determinate content they have. This tracking is external to the state in question, however, and in that sense analogue to the naturalized, externalist intentionality theories.

By defending such a view, Kriegel truly does accommodate unconscious content, however with shortcoming of not being parsimonious. And if one is in the business of multiplying intentionality, why stop there? Perhaps there are more kinds of intentionality. The fact remains, only the intrinsic, narrow kind is the genuine kind of intentionality, and other kinds, by being dependent on it, are simply not genuinely intentionality.

II.2.C.c. The Issue of Deriving Intentionality

Generally speaking, any framework of ascription of content to intentional states, whether it is in Searle’s or Kriegel’s terms, is as extrinsic as Dennett’s proposal; it presupposes that the derived intentional state gets its intentionality externally from the intrinsically intentional state (of a genuinely intentional agent).

One might argue that, since I am interested in the intentionality of our mental states, deriving unconscious intentionality from conscious one is really a trivial issue. Conscious intentionality is the fundamental kind of intentionality and every other kind is reducible to it, including unconscious one. Granted, one could not leave any room for indeterminacy in the fundamental kind of intentionality. However, states that are derivatively intentional do not have intentionality as their

intrinsic property: they receive it from somewhere else – i.e., genuinely intentional (conscious) states⁹⁸.

On this reading, one accepts that the intentionality of unconscious states is quite different from the intentionality of conscious ones. The claim is precisely that derived intentionality is not genuine intentionality. Assumption is that there is a difference between conscious and unconscious states, hence between conscious and unconscious intentionality.

However, a question is raised. The question is: if we subscribe to this dualist nature of intentionality, are we subscribing to the same property anymore or are we subscribing to two different properties? We are certainly not talking about intentionality in scholastic or Brentanian terms anymore. Why should we accept two kinds of intentionality considering the emphasis on the importance of the conscious kind? Especially, why should we accept a derived kind of intentionality that rests on third-personal, external ascriptions of content? An extrinsic ascription of any kind does not make the state causally or informationally different in any relevant sense. And by relevant sense, I simply mean the intrinsic nature of the state. If one derives intentional content from other consciously constituted contents, there is a gap in individuating the former in terms of the latter, since the latter is inefficacious in two senses. It is inefficacious causally since the interpretation is extrinsic to the relevant state⁹⁹; it is inefficacious informationally because what is represented on a conscious level and ascribed as content to the unconscious state need not be consistent with the intrinsic nature of the state¹⁰⁰.

One might say that informational inefficaciousness might hold for Kriegel's view, however not Searle's¹⁰¹. After all, Searle says himself that the unconscious mental state or, in his case, neural state, represents the same information as the conscious one. I concede to that. However, the causal link is still missing, and this is a substantial shortcoming to the view.

This issue is especially intuitive when we consider that it seems, at the very least, counterintuitive to say there is such thing as derivative consciousness; one dependent on some other, more fundamental kind of consciousness. If consciousness constitutes intentionality, as it does according to these views, then accepting two kinds of intentionality seems inconsistent. One kind, on this view, is the phenomenal one grounded in the *what-is-it-like* character, while the other is grounded

⁹⁸ Thanks to Davide Bordini for pointing this out.

⁹⁹ Coleman (*manuscript*, pp. 9-10) also recognizes this problem.

¹⁰⁰ Pitt (*forthcoming*, pp. 11-12) presents an analogues argument of this sort.

¹⁰¹ Thanks to Julien Deonna for pointing this out.

in the conscious interpretations of *what-is-it-like* character. The latter is simply treated *as-if* it is genuine intentionality. We would not consider plausible *as-if* conscious contents of a mental state; either I experience the bitterness of my coffee or I do not. There is no experience *as-if* of bitterness. Either occurrent experience is present or it is not. Some additional experience might be present, even some with similar feel to it as bitterness, however it is not bitterness. By accepting *as-if* intentionality, we are accepting *as-if* intentional contents; which are again indeterminate since, in order to be determinate content, there is no room for vagueness or indeterminacy of extension as intentionality is precisely determined by directedness¹⁰².

In other words, on this reading, one can accommodate unconscious intentional contents by deriving them from conscious intentional contents, but one does not intuitively call such derived contents intentionality. Certainly, one can always define intentionality* or intentionality₁ that pick up the relevant properties of unconscious states, however the notion of intentionality* is defined through intentionality and thus it cannot (non-circularly) be used to explain intentionality¹⁰³.

In what follows, I suggest a different approach. It is not the case that the difference is in the type of intentionality which stems from asymmetry of conscious and unconscious mental states and processes, but rather its structure. In other words, I preserve the unity of the property, but suggest that conscious and unconscious intentionality have different structures.

II.2.D. Pure Content View of the Unconscious¹⁰⁴

To recap, there are three ways one can cash out the mutual dependency between intentionality and phenomenology. First there is the separatists claim: phenomenology and intentionality are mutually independent. When it comes to unconscious mental states and processes, phenomenology does not point out the intentional content. This is essentially the view of representationalism. While

¹⁰² Although Kriegel does not use this term, I am not alone in thinking that unconscious states end up having *as-if* intentional contents under his view. Pitt and Coleman come to the same conclusion.

¹⁰³ Thanks to Giuliano Torrenco for clarity on this part.

¹⁰⁴ Thanks to David Pitt for years of discussion on the nature of unconscious. Most views I hold are the direct result of that. Thanks to Giuliano Torrenco for stepping on the brake and moulding them into a statue, instead of a lump of clay. Granted, not a masterpiece statue, however not due to Giuliano, but rather mine shortcomings. Also, thanks to Davide Bordini, Tim Crane, Kati Farkas, Philip Goff, Garrett Mindt and Howard Robison for useful discussions and clarifications.

representationalism is a viable position to hold, I believe there are persuasive arguments for inseparatism¹⁰⁵. Secondly, as we saw in §II.1.B., some philosophers argue that neither intentionality nor phenomenology play any role in unconscious states altogether. This is compatible with both separatism, as in Dennett's theory, and inseparatism, as in Strawson's theory, however only with respect to conscious mental states. I gave my reasons against these views already. The third way to cash out the dependence between intentionality and phenomenology when it comes to unconscious states is in terms of inseparatism: phenomenology and intentionality are mutually dependent even when it comes to unconscious states and processes. In §II.1.C. I discussed the derivative strategy: unconscious intentionality originating from the conscious one, and dismissed it. As I see it, the only course of action in the logical space, is to argue for genuine, intrinsic intentionality of unconscious mental states. By doing so, and subscribing to inseparatism, one needs to accommodate phenomenology in some manner as well. I set to do that next.

Contents are usually said to be the distinguishing features of our experience. Whether I am seeing a tiger as opposed to a cat in front of me, makes up for the resulting phenomenology of the mental state. In other words, phenomenology is individuated by content. However, psychological modes or attitudes are distinguishing features of our mental states, as well. Whether I am imagining a tiger or seeing it certainly contributes to the overall phenomenological nature of the mental state in question. The trouble with unconscious mental states and processes is that, most would agree, there is no accompanying phenomenology through which I have certain epistemic access to the content (and the mode) of my mental state.

Be that as it may, action often results from unconscious mental states and processes. Indeed, most of our internal mental going-on are unconscious. It is understandable that, if we were conscious of all the inputs, computations and processing of the resulting outputs, the outcome would be overwhelming. A simple and well-known analogy pictures it. Our mental life is comparable to a bottle – most of the content is within the bottle itself or unconscious, while the conscious traffic of stimuli, so to speak, goes through the bottleneck, a threshold of a sort whose main purpose is to discriminate the context relevant stimuli. This discrimination is crucial for our response dependent

¹⁰⁵ Although I did not provide arguments against separatism, hence representationalism, in this paper, since the focus here is to find whether inseparatism is compatible with the unconscious, I do discuss it in II.2. 'Against Unconscious Belief'.

action. If all the content were conscious, we would not be able to make the relevant discriminations at a timely manner. Hence, our responses would not be relevant or timely, even yet.

While this analogy is straightforward when it comes to actions and deliberations based on conscious states and processes, it is unclear how does one act based on unconscious ones, that is, the stimuli that did not advance over the threshold. Subscribing to (INRU), the thesis that (at least some) unconscious mental states are genuinely intentional, means to subscribe to the claim that (at least some) contents of unconscious mental states are determinate or meaningful. Actions are goal orientated, hence meaningful. However, this is incompatible with the informational or raw data nature of the unconscious mental states. Or in other words, (INRU) is incompatible with the indeterminacy of content of unconscious states advocacy. If we are to hold the thesis of (INRU), some determinacy needs to be present in the unconscious. Hence, some meaning needs to be preserved. The question is: how can (INRU) and determinacy be compatible, since it is evident that we do not only respond in action based on unconscious mental states, but also that these sorts of states affect our further conscious processing?

Here I offer an alternative explanation from indeterminacy of content. Note that my aim is to offer alternative explanation, not alternative metaphysical picture. However, the results of this explanation are compatible both with standard ontology and they may result in different ontology of the structure of the unconscious.

I will start by stating, what I believe to be, a standard reconstruction of the argument for indeterminacy of conscious content¹⁰⁶:

Argument for Indeterminacy of Conscious Content:

(P1) If the explanation for you Φ -ing is indeterminate between you having an attitude X towards content A or B, then it is indeterminate whether you are consciously having contents A or B.

(P2) Sometime, the explanation for you Φ -ing is indeterminate between you having attitude X towards contents A or B.

¹⁰⁶ Thanks to Giuliano Torrenco for guidance in putting my argument apart and back together in a more simplified and to the point manner, as well as reducing my ambition in making a stronger and less plausible claim.

(BP) If sometime there is indetermination with respect to conscious content, then there is indetermination with respect to unconscious content.

(C) Unconscious content is indeterminate.

In other words, the argument proceeds in the following manner: P1 states that if the explanation of your behaviour is indeterminate between you having an attitude with content A, say, seeing rabbits, or attitude with content B, say, seeing undetached-rabbit-parts, then it is indeterminate which of these contents, A or B, is consciously occurring. P2 states that it may be the case that the explanation for your behaviour is indeterminate between you having the attitude towards content A or content B. The Bridging Principle states simply that if P1 and P2 hold for conscious content as indeterminate, then they do so for the unconscious one, as well. Hence, unconscious content is indeterminate.

There are two issues with this argument in my opinion. The first concerns the Bridging Principle. If the bridging principle is not justified, as I believe it not to be, the resulting conclusion does not hold. The bridging principle, in sum, states that what holds for consciousness, holds for unconsciousness. This is, at best, a dubious assumption. It presupposes that consciousness and unconsciousness are on a par. There is no difference between conscious and unconscious mental states and processes, no asymmetry at play. At best, a counterintuitive conclusion.

The second issue concerns the premises. On the spot, I accept P1, but reject P2. That is, I accept the conditional that if the explanation for my behaviour is indeterminate between me having an attitude X towards content A or B, then it is indeterminate whether I am consciously having contents A or B. But I reject that the explanation for my behaviour is indeterminate between me having attitude X towards contents A or B. I deny the explanation by affirming the falsity of the antecedent, hence rule out the conclusion of the conditional by abduction. In other words, although the conditional is true, an alternative antecedent can be put forward, hence one can reach different conclusion with equal plausibility. I call this the argument for indeterminacy of conscious attitude:

Argument for Indeterminacy of Conscious Attitude:

(P1) If the explanation for you Φ -ing is indeterminate between you having attitude X or attitude Y towards content A, then it is indeterminate whether you are consciously having attitude X or Y.

(P2) Sometime, the explanation for you Φ -ing is indeterminate between you having attitude X or attitude Y towards content A.

(BP) If sometime there is indetermination with respect to conscious attitude, then there is indetermination with respect to unconscious attitude.

(C) Unconscious attitude is indeterminate.

This argument proceeds in exactly the same manner as the argument for indeterminacy of conscious content, except that instead of placing the indeterminacy in the content, it is now placed in the attitude. In other words, if the explanation for my behavior is indeterminate between me seeing or imagining that there is a rabbit in front of me consciously (as in the case of hallucinations), the same indetermination holds in the case when the mental state is instantiated unconsciously, according to the Bridging Principle.

However, I already rejected the plausibility of the bridging principle as unjustifiable and counterintuitive. Matters are not so clear cut when it comes to unconsciousness. And they are so since we do not have any epistemic access to the contents and attitudes of unconscious states¹⁰⁷. If one is inseparatist with respect to phenomenology and intentionality, then one holds that the two do not come apart. In the case of conscious mental states, I have epistemic access to the content and attitude, either through epistemic introspection, e.g. I see a rabbit rather than undetached-rabbit-parts when it comes to content, since I am occurrently aware of the rabbit, or I see a rabbit rather than imagine it when it comes to attitude, since I am occurrently seeing it. And I know which mental state I am occurrently instantiating precisely because of the phenomenology. The phenomenal component, experience itself, gives directedness of my occurrent conscious state, as how something seems, is how something is. On the other hand, when it comes to unconscious states, we cannot rely on phenomenology. Hence, some indeterminacy is bound to be in the unconscious.

The upshot is that, with respect to unconscious states, indeterminacy of content and indeterminacy of attitude are both *equally valid* explanations for my behaviour resulting from the mental state. They both result in indeterminacy, however, placed at a different component of the mental state. Since both components are necessary for a mental state to be considered an intentional mental

¹⁰⁷ Precisely because of asymmetry. However, I will say more on this in II.2. 'Against Unconscious Belief'.

state, we still have intentional indeterminacy. But we do not have a difference in kind of intentionality involved, simply difference in structure of the same, unified property of intentionality. Either it is content indeterminacy structure, or it is attitude indeterminacy structure.

One may say, if both content indeterminacy and attitude indeterminacy are equally good explanations, what makes it the case that one should subscribe to attitude indeterminacy, since most agree that the indeterminacy results from content? Fair point. I concede that with respect to consciousness, there seems to be little room for indeterminacy with respect to the attitude. Imagining and remembering are clearly and distinctly present. Or seeing and hearing. However, one cannot say with absolute certainty that the same holds for unconscious. The unconscious is indeterminate because the unconscious only concerns the content. It does not concern the mode or attitude of representing. This holds especially if one does not accept the traditional propositional attitude framework of belief-desire, but a more fine-grained framework or modes, in which not all modes are propositional attitudes¹⁰⁸. This is consistent with saying that all intentional mental states have intentional contents, even the unconscious ones. For every intentional state must have the component of content¹⁰⁹: one cannot want without wanting something, or hope without hoping for something, or remember without remembering something, or imagine without imagining something. Even unconsciously.

The novelty of this approach is that the content remains stable along all possible levels of conscious awareness of it¹¹⁰. Hence, the 'Pure Content View'. Advantages of such a view are both empirical; we get to keep the local representational contents of particular mental states a subject is instantiating, even if global states of consciousness differ¹¹¹, such as that particular mental state the subject is instantiating being unconscious, as opposed to conscious, and philosophical; firstly, we keep the asymmetry between consciousness and unconsciousness and, secondly, we keep

¹⁰⁸ As I argue in I.1. 'Intentional Primitivism of Modes', this is precisely the picture we should accept. And in II.2. 'Against Unconscious Belief' my arguments are directed against the view that unconscious cognitive states are propositional attitudes.

¹⁰⁹ Note that having content does not equal having object. There are intentional states which cannot be evaluated as propositional contents with satisfaction conditions. Some contents, such as that of emotions and moods, do not have satisfaction conditions (Crane, 2003). The same holds for attitudes – not all attitudes are propositional, some are objectual, meaning there is not a relation to a proposition about an object, but the object itself (Forbes, 2000). However, I will not go further into this matter as, for the nature of this paper, I accept both distinctions, which, I believe, only makes my point stronger.

¹¹⁰ Naturally, this does not equate content with pure information.

¹¹¹ See Bayne et al. 2016.

intentionality without positing new mysterious properties or dividing the existing property of intentionality.

II.2.E. Summing Up and An Outstanding Question

In this paper I argued for, firstly, *Intentional Realism about the Unconscious* (INRU), or the thesis that unconscious mental states are genuinely intentional. Secondly, I moved on to the distinction between derived and un-derived intentionality. I do not hold this distinction ontologically sound. It certainly may be useful in our everyday folk psychologizing, however, there seems no compelling reason to posit two kinds of intentional properties, when one is inherently contingent in its existence on the other. Lastly, I moved on to my proposal – excepting the indeterminacy when it comes to unconscious mental states but offering a different explanation for it. The explanation differs in two main modes. Firstly, unlike the derived intentionality proposals, there is no positing of a difference in the property of intentionality itself but rather its structure. Secondly, the explanation preserves the asymmetry between conscious and unconscious mental states by preserving the two-dimensional intentional indeterminacy, however, offers as an equally good alternative a second component of an intentional state: the attitudinal one.

There is one outstanding question with respect to the second differentiating modus – the attitude of desire. From Freud (1915, 2005), the idea of unconscious desire affecting our conscious actions is pervasive in psychology, cognitive science and philosophy. If unconscious mental attitudes are indeterminate, how can this be? Indeed, the idea seems counterintuitive. However, Freud has defended the view that only unconscious desires can affect our conscious actions and behavior. He did not believe this to be the case for any other mental attitude, not even belief. Certainly, we have suppressed beliefs and thoughts, however, these attitudes on their own do not affect the conscious, unless they are ‘paired’, so to speak, with corresponding desire. In other words, if I hold a suppressed belief that women are better philosophers than man, this will not affect my professional behavior unless I also have a suppressed desire to be so. Merely suppressed cognitive states are not sufficient for subsequent conscious action, there needs to be a corresponding conative impulse or drive.

If the Freudian picture is true, this makes desires an exception from the two-dimensional model. Desire is determinate or fixed in both components of the intentional state: content and attitude. What makes desires such a salient feature of our unconscious mental life? For Freud the answer is that desire is not a contingent, but rather necessary feature of our fundamental psyche. However, this only shifts the question. What makes a desire a necessary feature, as opposed to some other mental attitude, i.e. belief?

Putting aside Freudian psychoanalysis, desire does, indeed, seem to fail to fall in neatly within any theory of the unconscious that results in action. Perhaps this is where the key lies: what makes desire such a salient feature of the unconscious is not that the desire itself is a necessary feature, but rather that there is a stronger, not merely contingent relation between desire and action. Desires aim at fulfilment, while beliefs, on the other hand, need not be effectuated. Another way to cash out the determinacy of desires is to claim that, even though all unconscious states are indeterminate with respect to the attitude, desire may be something like the default unconscious attitude, a preselected (either by natural selection or psychological factors or conjointly) condition. This would be the Freudian view construed in pure content terms, thus more in line with my view¹¹². Nevertheless, I do note that I find this relation a plausible explanation considerably worth pertinent research in analytic philosophy of mind.

¹¹² Thanks to Giuliano Torrengo for this suggestion.

II.3. Against Unconscious Belief

Abstract:

In this paper I tackle the issue of asymmetry that holds between unconscious and conscious mental states. The Asymmetry Thesis states that the contents of conscious mental states are more determinate, hence less vague, than the contents of the unconscious mental states. However, most hold (or, at least take for granted) that both conscious and unconscious mental states are partly constituted by propositional content. This I call the Equivalence Thesis. The Equivalence Thesis, contrary to the Asymmetry Thesis, makes conscious and unconscious mental states *on a par* with one another. I argue that these two theses are, at least, in tension. I vindicate the Asymmetry Thesis without postulating a difference in the content, hence a difference in the property of intentionality.

Keywords: Belief, consciousness, unconsciousness, intentionality, mental content, propositional attitudes, indeterminacy.

II.3.A. How Many Beliefs Do We Have?

‘How many beliefs do we have?’ is an unusual question¹¹³. It is also of outmost significance. Are all our unconscious beliefs *de facto* beliefs? If they are, then you seem to have a lot of beliefs, perhaps indefinite number. When you are not thinking of pecan pie, do you nonetheless have the belief that pecan pie is crunchy; similarly, when you are thinking that $a^2 + b^2 = c^2$ do you have the belief that it is the Pythagorean Theorem; or do you have the belief that a puddle of rain in the street depicts the building next to it, or when thinking of the Star Trek Enterprise episode ‘Daedalus’ do you believe it is logically incoherent, etc. I’m quite certain, when reading this, you did not have ever before, at least, the last belief of the above mentioned. You may become curious and go watch the episode and so indeed find it logically incoherent, hence agree with me. Are you holding that belief now or was there some sort of impoverished belief type there whilst watching the episode that might have affected your judgment?

We tend to make a distinction between dispositional and occurrent beliefs. If this distinction is to the point, then the question of how many beliefs I have is a relevant one. Naturally, dispositions

¹¹³ Thanks to Tim Crane for asking me this question. And giving an answer to it in his 2016 paper.

need not be effectuated or may be effectuated in an entirely different manner than one would expect them to be, based on their dispositional basis. For example, it is usually said that the object's occurrent or actual behaviour need not be in any manner effectuated for it to have the disposition it has. For example, a cup has fragility, but until it is actually broken, the disposition stays potential. My answer is that we have as much beliefs as we are consciously occurrently aware of. Dispositional beliefs are not beliefs in the full sense. Although unconscious beliefs are not to be identified with the dispositional ones, hence beliefs not in the full sense, if this proposal put forward about unconscious beliefs has plausibility, then the consequences of such a theory are not only significant for how we think of beliefs, but also for dispositionalism as a theory. I will come back to this in detail further in the paper.

I take it that the main advantage of my view, that we have as much beliefs as we are consciously occurrently aware of, is this parsimony. The question how many beliefs we have, looks less daunting. We have as many beliefs as we are consciously occurrently aware of. The ones we are not, are not beliefs. So, when you go and watch 'Daedalus', you might be influenced by my opinion in forming yours, but it is not a belief you are instantiating. You have an unconscious belief about Daedalus, which you formed as a consequence of Daria telling you that Daedalus is incoherent. And this unconscious belief may influence the belief that you form about the episode while you watch it, even though it is not a full belief (one that deserves to be counted when answering the quantity question), because it is unconscious. You are free to disbelieve my belief but let me argue for it first. When you are not thinking occurrently of pecan pie, does your non-occurrent belief that the pecan pie is crunchy count as a belief when answering the quantity question?

But my claim about unconscious belief in general, is that beliefs are propositional entities since they are partly constituted by propositional content. This seems in tension with our feeling that conscious beliefs seem more determinate than unconscious ones. I argue that it is equally plausible that the difference is not in the content, but rather the attitude. If that is the case, both conscious and unconscious beliefs remain propositional entities, however, unconscious beliefs are simply not beliefs, since the indeterminacy is now placed in the attitudinal component. If unconscious beliefs are propositional entities partly constituted by propositional content, then the claim that conscious beliefs are more determinate is vindicated without positing a difference in the property of intentionality. Next I turn on discussing this in more detail.

II.3.B. Content Determinacy and Inconsistency of Intentionality

We usually report our mental states in form of propositional attitudes such as: “I desire a gelato.” It is widely held that such mental states take the form of propositional attitudes. As I noted in §II.1., indeterminacy can be formulated in terms of me desiring a gelato as cold, liquidly and refreshing object. *I attribute* the qualities of being cold, liquidly and refreshing to the to the gelato as an object of my desire. *I desire* it, subjectively, as a cold, liquidly and refreshing object. Yet none of the facts external (such as neurophysiological, causal, dispositional and similar) to that desire seem to be good candidates for attribution of these particular qualities to the gelato, as opposed to some other qualities. While thinking of conscious mental states as propositional seems more straightforward, it is not so when it comes to unconscious mental states.

Thinking of unconscious beliefs as propositional attitudes commits one to some form of equivalence between conscious and unconscious mental states or to the equivalence of format of their content. I call this the *Equivalence Thesis*. Conscious states are equivalent to unconscious ones in the sense that they share the same structural element; namely, they are both partly constituted by propositional content. To clarify, the claim is not that any conscious belief and its unconscious ‘counterpart’ share the same propositional content, but rather that they are both propositional in nature or propositional entities¹¹⁴. Furthermore, it seems that thinking consciously about water, and thinking consciously about H₂O are determinately distinct, and so for that thinking consciously about rabbits, and thinking consciously about undetached-rabbit-parts. Whereas an unconscious belief about water and one about H₂O, there is something intuitive about the view that there is no fact of the matter whether I am craving for water or H₂O unconsciously. I call this the *Asymmetry Thesis*¹¹⁵.

Equivalence – Both conscious and unconscious mental states are partly constituted by propositional content.

¹¹⁴ Thanks to Julien Deonna for pointing out to this necessary clarification. As he noted, whether content is propositional or not does not seem to be the issue, unless content is always propositional in form.

¹¹⁵ Thanks to Giuliano Torrengo for pressing me to make the Equivalence Thesis and the Asymmetry Thesis clearer.

Asymmetry – The contents of conscious mental states are more determinate, hence less vague, than the contents of the unconscious mental states.

If *P* is an unconscious proposition, e.g. that the pecan pie is crunchy, then the equivalence thesis states that *P* is partly constituted by propositional content. However, the asymmetry thesis states the contents of *P* are indeterminate, hence vague. As a result, we have two theses that cannot be instantiated together with respect to *P* being unconscious, where *P* is a proposition. It is often assumed that propositional content expresses the same meaning. For example, the sentence proposition in English language ‘The snow is white’ and the same sentence in the Croatian language ‘Snijeg je bijel’ express the same content, namely the same proposition. And they are both necessarily true in the same scenarios. If it is the case that there is content indeterminacy in unconscious states, then it is not clear how the conscious belief and its unconscious ‘counterpart’ (not conscious and unconscious in general) could be constituted by same contents, let alone propositional contents. In addition, vagueness with propositional contents holds with respect to, so called, ‘borderline cases’, e.g. ‘John is tall’, as John might be considered tall in one context, while in another of average height¹¹⁶. Cases such as water and H₂O are not borderline cases of propositional content – they are simply different contents¹¹⁷. The Asymmetry and the Equivalence Theses seem to be, at least, in tension and as a result may lead to full-fledged contradiction. In order to avoid this, one must be abandoned. But which one? Or, perhaps, both must go?

The puzzle at hand can be reformulated and in terms of a triad of inconsistency. First is the thesis of intentionality of mental states (INT), or the thesis that all mental states are intentional. The second thesis is of the type of intentionality involved in conscious and unconscious mental states (TYPEInt), which, in other words, states the question of Asymmetry between conscious and unconscious mental states. Lastly, we have the property of intentionality as normally conceived (PROPInt) which aims at structural features of mental states which I put in terms of Equivalence of propositional contents:

(INT) All mental states are intentional¹¹⁸.

¹¹⁶ See Rohrs, 2017.

¹¹⁷ Granted on Fregean reading, not the Russell/Kripke one. Thanks to Giuliano Torrenzo for pointing this out.

¹¹⁸ By this I do not imply that all types of mental states are necessarily intentional. For example, the intentionality of moods is under debate. What is meant here is simply that the conscious states which are considered paradigmatically intentional while unconscious are paradigmatically intentional while unconscious.

(TYPEInt) Unconscious intentionality is a different type of intentionality than conscious intentionality, i.e. unconscious intentionality is indeterminate, while conscious one is determinate.

(PROPInt) Unconscious intentionality is the same type of intentionality as conscious intentionality, i.e. both are propositional entities as they are partly constituted by propositional content.

If we reject (INT), we are likely to reject the intentionality of unconscious states. There are two ways to subscribe to such a view. The first one is to hold that intentionality is necessarily conscious and unconscious states simply lack it. One can make this case by arguing that, since phenomenology is essentially conscious and intentional properties are mutually dependent on phenomenal properties, intentionality is necessarily conscious¹¹⁹.

The second way is essentially the view that that unconscious intentionality is, generically, radically indeterminate. Proponents of such a view are mostly reductive representationists. Prompted by materialist aspirations to reduce phenomenology to intentionality, since intentionality is more externally tractable, reductive representationalism identifies intentionality to some underlying function effectuated by a physical mechanism. Phenomenal character is identical to representational content. The assumption is that lack of intentionality and radical indeterminacy of intentionality are basically one and the same, or, at least, that radical indeterminacy is a way of lacking intentionality. However, radical indeterminacy does not apply to all mental states. Putting conscious ones on the side and focusing on the unconscious, studies in cognitive science, e.g. priming, seem to contradict it (Tulving E. & Schacter D.L., 1990). When a subject is unconsciously primed by certain stimuli, he is more likely to respond according to the priming mechanism at play. For example, if every time I take the metro, I see the same commercial in it, I am more likely to purchase the product than someone who has seen the commercial once or twice. There are three options to view this change of action. Either I acquire a new dispositional unconscious belief with some content or when I make a judgment about which product to buy, I make an unconscious occurrent decision. Or both. I discuss this further in §II.3.B.a.

¹¹⁹ This argument rests upon commitment to representationalism as a theory of mind. One can state the same in as the main premise of Phenomenal Intentionality framework; intentional properties are grounded in phenomenal properties. Although this might seem contradictory, phenomenal intentionality is a representational theory.

As for (TYPEInt), it is equivalent to the Asymmetry Thesis. Most philosophers agree upon it. I examine it, firstly, on the basis of deriving unconscious intentionality from conscious one and what are the consequences of such a derivative strategy on the debate with respect to the Equivalence Thesis. However, Crane (2016) has recently argued otherwise based on the difference between two conceptions of the unconscious that historically rest on Leibnizian and Freudian unconscious. In §II.3.B.b. I argue against Crane's *worldview* notion of the unconscious on the terms that the worldview is not a strong enough constraint on the proposition, and, in addition to it, the unconscious nevertheless upholds indeterminacy with respect to propositional content.

I take my part from existing theories in §II.3.C. Conscious and unconscious mental states are precisely of the same kind of intentionality, that is, they are both propositional entities since they are partly constituted by propositional content. Hence, I uphold (PROPInt) which is counterpart to the Equivalent Thesis. Firstly, I examine higher-order thoughts (HOT) theory as the prime candidate as it upholds (PROPInt). However, I dismiss it as it seems, at the same time, being committed to both Asymmetry and Equivalence. Secondly, I turn to my own proposal: I vindicate Asymmetry Thesis without positing a difference in the property of intentionality. It is equally plausible that the difference is not in the content, but rather the attitude. If that is the case, both conscious and unconscious beliefs remain propositional entities, however, unconscious beliefs are simply not beliefs. The attitudinal component is indeterminate, rather than the content one. In this my theory differs from (HOT), while it upholds weak representationalism.

In §II.3.D. I conclude.

Let me proceed first by looking at the outcomes of denying (INT) in §II.3.B.a.: the first of the thesis, as it is relevant for making my case further in the paper. That is, let us examine the thesis that all mental states, conscious and unconscious, are intentional once again, however, from a different perspective than in paper §II.2.

II.3.B.a. (INT): Upholding vs. Denying

The question is, to take the previous example, if I see the same commercial in metro very often, am I more likely to purchase the product than someone who has seen the commercial once or

twice. Let us assume, as it is plausible, that the answer it is yes. The question is now what explain this fact. As I noted previously, there are three ways of explanation of this. Either I acquire a new dispositional unconscious belief with some content or when I make a judgment about which product to buy, I make an unconscious occurrent decision. Or both. I take it that I am prone to my decision by an unconscious disposition, but I do not believe that disposition to be belief. As I noted in II.1., such priming mechanisms include concepts. A step further is to treat that conceptual element as a propositional concept. There is some low-stream, early type of conceptual representations at play. In that sense, even subliminal cognition and perception may be treated as being constituted by propositional content. However, that does not make it the case that the propositional content is dispositional belief. The content may be part of memory or desire. Hence, I believe the solution is that I acquire a new unconscious disposition unconscious with some content when I repeatedly see the ad that I make a judgment to buy the product by making an unconscious occurrent decision. In order to argue for this, I need to eliminate, firstly, the option that there is no content at all at play in unconscious mental states (or at least, that it is indeterminate) nor any directedness towards it, except for its neurophysiological underpinnings.

The most straightforward way to deny (INT) is to deny the existence of the unconscious. Same can be done with consciousness, however, with little plausibility. As previously noted, denying unconscious states seems to be, at least to me, a rather counterintuitive move. The unconscious is not reserved for some mental states, and not for others. Unlike consciousness, which shows selectivity, so to speak, regarding which states it accompanies, the unconscious seems to have at least a possibility (perhaps even strong possibility)¹²⁰ to accompany any kind of mental state a normal human can instantiate. Putting aside strictly unconscious processes, such as motoric functions and processive knowledge, paradigmatically conscious states can, and often are, taken to be possibly unconscious. These include most notably beliefs and desires; however, I take all attitudinal phenomenology, as well as content, to be potentially unconscious¹²¹.

¹²⁰ By strong possibility it is meant here metaphysical or nomological possibility at the very least.

¹²¹ There are, to my mind, two problematic cases. The less problematic one is emotions. There are theories in the literature of unconscious emotions that, in principle, can affect our conscious life. It seems to me that there is no conceptual inconsistency in regarding, perhaps only certain, emotions potentially unconscious. More problematic is the case of moods. For one, moods seem to be a pervasive feature of our conscious phenomenology when occurrent. In other words, it seems that all other phenomenology that we experience at a time is perturbed by the mood we experience at the same time. Furthermore, it does not seem to be a plausible assumption that moods are instantiated unconsciously. Firstly, it seems incoherent in our language practice to say, 'My unconscious anxiety does

Since denying intentionality to conscious mental states and processes is the less plausible horn, the natural way, for proponents of such a view is to deny intentionality to unconscious states and to claim that all intentional states are conscious. In order to claim the latter, the representationalist can run the argument as follows:

(P1) It is necessary for all mental states that if they are phenomenal, they are conscious.

(P2) It is necessary for all mental states that if they are intentional, they are phenomenal.

(C) It is necessary for some mental state X that if it is intentional it is conscious.

In other words, (P1) necessarily, if a mental state is phenomenal it is conscious; (P2) necessarily, if a mental state is intentional it is phenomenal; (C) necessarily, if a mental state is intentional, it is conscious which is equivalent to [necessarily, if a mental state is unconscious, it is not intentional]¹²². I move to the second argument because (P2) can be denied by reductive representationalists, if they are separatists about intentionality and phenomenology.

(P1*) Approximately, an intentional mental state is approximately equal to being representational.

(P2*) If a mental state is not intentional then it is not representational.

(C*) Approximately, if a mental state is not intentional then they are not representational.

However, reductive representationalists would not deny that unconscious mental states are not representational, but they would accept that they are not intentional. Consequently, these two claims seem to be in tension. Denying intentional character to unconscious mental states is approximately equal to denying them representational character.

And representations, as noted earlier, might just be constituted by content with propositional concept. If a representation has some semantic properties, such as content, then it would be wrong to construe it in purely neurophysiological or informational terms. It is in a much broader sense

not let me board the plane.' Moreover, 'unconscious anxiety' seems to be not just an oxymoron, but, plausibly, is paradigmatically a non-reportable phenomenon. To my knowledge, no one ever, in empirical studies or everyday life, has reported such an experience. However, one can say, 'I was anxious, but I did not realize it until take off' and this would constitute a coherent report. But, to my mind, these are two different phenomena. The former is first-level phenomenal property which is subject to introspective method of disclosure, while the later involves a certain cognitive access necessary for a state to be reported.

¹²² Again, representationalists are committed to this argument.

that representation should be construed – as a mental object which exhibits directedness or intentionality. Denying that a representation may be unconscious is denying naturalization of the representation. Denying representation with semantic properties is denying intentionality. Denying unconscious representation with semantic properties is denying Intentional Realism about Unconscious (INT).

If we deny intentionality to unconscious states as for (C), the argument does not uphold that there is *Equivalence* between conscious and unconscious mental states, hence it does not uphold (PROPInt). In other words, unconscious mental states are not constituted by propositional content and unconscious intentionality is not of the same type as the conscious one. This is the view of *reductive representationalism* or *intentional eliminativists*. This is contrary to *non-reductive representationalism* or *intentional realism* according to which either intentionality grounds phenomenology, which in turn grounds consciousness, or intentionality grounds consciousness which in turn grounds phenomenology. For a proponent of Phenomenal Intentionality either phenomenology grounds intentionality, which in turn grounds consciousness or phenomenology grounds intentionality and consciousness as distinct properties but on *a par*. These are ways one may use to uphold the *Equivalence* Thesis and (PROPInt).

As for the *Asymmetry* Thesis, hence (TYPEInt), if one accepts it then one subscribes to the view that conscious mental states as more determinate (content wise) than the unconscious ones and this is the source of the asymmetry between unconscious and conscious intentionality, which are, as a result, different types of intentionality. *Non – reductive representationalists* can deny (C), thus accepting the *Asymmetry Thesis* and (TYPEInt) in the aforementioned ways equal to dealing with the *Equivalence Thesis* and (PROPInt). Again, either by grounding phenomenology in intentionality, which in turn grounds consciousness or by grounding consciousness in intentionality, which in turn grounds phenomenology. A proponent of Phenomenal Intentionality can either ground intentionality in phenomenology, which in turn grounds consciousness or phenomenology grounds intentionality and consciousness as distinct properties but on *a par*. The result of each of these four relations is an Asymmetry between unconscious and conscious mental states. Unconscious mental states suffer from vagueness because of content indeterminacy and, moreover, they are not propositional attitudes. These are the most usual courses of action in the literature.

On the other hand, most *reductive representationalists* deny the *Asymmetry Thesis* and (TYPEInt). I take it that reductive representationalism is a natural match for this the second way of putting the argument¹²³. For reductive representationalism, phenomenal character is identical to representational content, and representational content is grounded in, dependent on, supervenes on or similar, on some physical property of the relevant sort¹²⁴. Hence, as per argument, if a mental state is intentional and not conscious it is nevertheless representational. This upholds the *Equivalence Thesis*. Since representational content does not depend on consciousness and as a result, neither does propositional content. This is the view of *Intentional Realism about Consciousness*, however not *Intentional Realism about Unconsciousness*. Per (C1), a mental state being representational is approximately equal to it being intentional. International Realists about Consciousness, such as Dretske, uphold (C1). If (C1) holds when it comes to Intentional Realism about Consciousness, I see no reason why it would not hold when it comes to Intentional Realism about Unconsciousness considering the nature of representations. As (P1*) states if a mental state is representational and not conscious it is not determinate that it is intentional. Hence, per (C*), a mental state for which it is not determinate whether it is intentional is approximately equal to it not being representational. This is not something reductive representationalists such as Dretske would subscribe, but rather an *Intentional Eliminativist* altogether.

Reductive representationalism deny the *Asymmetry Thesis*, hence (TYPEInt), that is, that conscious and unconscious intentionality are different types of intentionality. On the other hand, reductive representationalism upholds *Equivalence Thesis* and (PROPInt), that is, that unconscious mental state is partly constituted by propositional content and that intentionality involved in unconscious is of the same type as conscious intentionality.

When put together, denying (INT) upholds the *Equivalence Thesis* in both cases of reductive and non-reductive representationalism. This is to be expected by the very framework itself, and the importance of representational content.

However, problem with denying (INT) as Intentional Eliminativist does, is that simply stating that conscious and unconscious mental states are different in nature with respect to intentionality is no

¹²³ Dretske (1995), Tye (1995), Shoemaker (2002).

¹²⁴ Grounding, metaphysical dependence, supervenience etc. all deserve a special treatment, since contingent on the relation is the theory one might hold. However, they are of no importance in this context, since the argument holds for all of them, regardless of the metaphysical relation utilized in the theory.

grounds for a viable theory on the nature of consciousness. This does put a constraint, but a very loose constraint on the theory of consciousness, and even looser on theory of unconsciousness. It is equivalent to basic assumption to any non-eliminativist theory of unconsciousness: unconsciousness is.

II.3.B.b. (TypeInt) Upholding vs. Denying

If one upholds (TYPEint) or the thesis that unconscious and conscious intentionality is a different type of intentionality, then one upholds the *Asymmetry Thesis* once again. This seems fairly straightforward. As is fairly clear that one is *Intentional Realist about Consciousness*, at the very least. It is not so clear that one is *Intentional Realist about Unconsciousness*.

There are two strategies one can take here and I will take them in turn. The first one is a derivative strategy, which I discussed in II.2. in detail.¹²⁵ By derivative intentionality I mean parasitic on intrinsic, original intentionality. There is no such thing as unconscious intentionality, unless it is, in some sense, grounded in the conscious one. Derivative strategy, among other things, is accepting precisely that there is a difference between conscious and unconscious states, hence between conscious and unconscious intentionality. Although proponents of this view use different argumentative strategies as per different effects, what they have in common is acceptance that the intentionality of unconscious states is in an asymmetry relation to intentionality of conscious ones. For example, for Kriegel the difference is to be accounted for in terms of phenomenal intentionality as the only genuine kind of intentionality, which provides the subject the means of interpretation of unconscious states in classical Dennettian terms. For Searle the difference is in terms of potentiality of intentionality, that is, unconscious states are potentially conscious, and this gives us the content grounding relation¹²⁶.

However, if one derives unconscious intentional content from conscious intentional content, there is a gap in individuating the former in terms of the latter, since the latter is inefficacious in two

¹²⁵ Kriegel (2011 a, b), McGinn (1991), Searle (1991), Horgan & Tienson (2002).

¹²⁶ See Kriegel (2011 a; b) and Searle (1991) for detailed arguments and Vitasovic, 2016; Pitt, manuscript; Coleman, manuscript, for arguments against such views.

senses. It is inefficacious causally since the interpretation is extrinsic to the relevant state; it is inefficacious informationally because what is represented on a conscious level and ascribed as content to the unconscious state need not be consistent with the intrinsic nature of the state (Vitasovic, 2016).

This position is essentially of the dualist sort. We are positing two kinds of intentionality and this does not seem to be a parsimonious solution. One is the original, intrinsic and monadic intentionality grounded in conscious what-it-is-like character, while the other amounts to as-if intentionality. As-if intentionality constitutes as-if contents, which are indeterminate. And as-if contents are indeterminate since there are multiple, perhaps even indefinite, meanings one can assign to the content at hand. This makes them contingent.

Moreover, even if one is willing to accept two kinds of intentionality on this basis, there seems to be a further issue with such a view. It seems that the proponents of derivative strategy also want to hold the *Equivalence thesis* – unconscious mental states are propositional attitudes (granting that they derive their intentional content from conscious contents) together with the *Asymmetry Thesis*. Unconscious mental states enter further into our mental processing as inferences and premises. They have consequences on our actions, as well as further belief formation. There is some aspect under which the content is represented. As such, they seem to be genuinely intentional. For example, whether a subject holds an unconscious belief that Paris is in France or a belief that Paris is in USA, both beliefs are partly constituted by propositional content. Once the subject effectuates potentiality of mental content (Searle) or interprets the mental content in conscious intentionality (Kriegel), the mental content acts as conscious propositional attitude. However, the issue is that there is no difference to be accounted for at the level of the concept of the proposition. Certainly, there is difference in content between the two propositions, but it nevertheless remains propositional content, as I could equally hold a belief with both contents. Moreover, if the belief remains unconscious, the proposition will act as a premise in my subsequent reasoning and action; book a flight to France or to USA. This is especially salient with respect to unconscious biases and

confabulations¹²⁷. Upshot being, holding both the Asymmetry and the Equivalence theses together seems contradictory.

If one denies (TYPEInt) and is an *Intentional Realist about Unconscious*, then one essentially holds that, when speaking of unconscious and conscious mental states, we are speaking of the same kind of states. This is to deny the *Asymmetry Thesis* and to uphold the *Equivalence Thesis*. The framework sits well with respect to some forms of *non-reductive representationslim*, most notably Crane's intentionalism (2009), however, as I argue, Crane's view, while on the other part of the stick from reductive representationalism, has issues to deal with as well¹²⁸. Crane has recently advanced a *worldview* view of unconscious states (2016). Crane's suggestion is that we should think of propositional attitude descriptions as models, where the model's main purpose is to 'draw attention to some features of the system under investigation' (Crane, *ibid*). In that sense 'a propositional model draws attention to features of your belief, and different kinds of propositions can be used to draw attention to different features' (Crane, *ibid*). Or, in other words, models point to structural features of propositions at play. The key is that the models are linked in a network. Unconscious mind links contents and these associative structures make up a 'network' which models contents, however, are not contents themselves. Crane gives an example of what he has in mind. He considers three people, namely, Alice, Bert and Carol, each of which is looking at the Houses of Parliament in London. They all instantiate the belief that what they are looking is the British parliament, however they instantiate it with different structures.

'Alice is an expert on the British constitution and has a full knowledge of how the parliamentary system works in the UK. Bert mistakenly thinks that the British parliament is the English parliament, perhaps because he has seen the Scottish Parliament building and because he was brought up in the USA he regularly uses the word 'British' to mean 'English'. Carol thinks that the British government is based in the Houses of Parliament, since she does not distinguish in her mind between government and parliament. These views are so different, the inferences they will draw from their various true and false beliefs

¹²⁷ There is more to be said on this topic, however, for the purposes of this paper I will not go into it. Nevertheless, note that the Equivalence and Asymmetry theses are particularly apt to explain these phenomena – a project I aim to undertake in the future.

¹²⁸ Thanks to Tim Crane for vivid discussions on his view. Also, thanks to Kati Farkas for giving me the initial nudge to argue against it.

are so different — and yet they all believe that this is the British parliament, as they stand on Westminster Bridge.’ (2016, pgs. 8 – 9)

According to Crane, all three of them instantiate the same belief, but how can this be since the beliefs are composed of different contents? I read Crane’s view in the following manner. The classical proposition is of the form *S is P*. Representation (*R*) consists of the subject entertaining or uttering this proposition. I take the propositional aspect to have the explanatory role in Crane’s model, while, on the other hand, the representational aspect simply models this model. The reason for this is the fact that there is some relation between the subject and the network, and the network has causal properties which tell us something about the network itself. In Crane’s example we have three models; Bert, Alice and Carol, respectively, each representing the proposition of the form ‘*S believes that P*’.

However, what all three models do is precisely modeling the same aspect of the network – the Houses of Parliament, not the whole system. Consider the following example:

- (I) Bert believes that this is not the English Parliament and that it is the British Parliament.

The first conjunct in the proposition is true, the second one false, but they relate to the same building and the same aspect in the network. Even if we allow background conditions of the model of associating contents into a coherent narrative of the subject to enter the picture, the proposition itself must be more than simply this. The role of propositions cannot be modelling the whole system or network. It is unclear what exactly do these propositions model – the model itself or what Crane intends them to model. As I noted, I take the propositional aspect to have the explanatory role in Crane’s model, while, the representational aspect models this model. If the role of propositions is to model the whole network, then they take the role of representational aspect and, more importantly, lose their explanatory roles.

There is another, interrelated, issue one can concede to Crane. It regards the distinction between structured and unstructured propositions. If the propositions in question are structured, then there seems to be content indeterminacy as a result, since the constituents of the propositions are in each

case different¹²⁹. Propositions ‘This is the British Parliament’ and ‘This is the English Parliament’ have different constituents, hence they are different models of the same aspect. There is a sense in which a constraint seems to be added such that the difference of constituents determines the model, which, in turn, seems to be more a model of a mental state than of its aspect. On the other hand, if Crane intends them to be unstructured propositions, then the resulting view is analogue when it comes to indeterminacy, although completely un-constrained. We now have multiple contents, hence again we have indeterminacy as a result. Either way the example, and, subsequently, the view itself, seems problematic. Both of these views share two issues. Firstly, what do these propositions exactly model and, secondly, how are they bind together with other models in our ‘worldview’.

II.3.C. (PROPInt) Upholding vs. Denying

Apart from representationalism, reductive and non – reductive alike, one needs to take into account the higher-order thoughts theory (HOT) as well (Rosenthal, 1986, 2005). Both HOT and non - reductive representationalism, in this context, come to the same outcome, only by taking different roads; or so I argue. HOT, like reductive and unlike non-reductive representationalism, does not uphold the Asymmetry thesis. Consider the following: certain property of experience, say a red patch, is of the same type in both conscious and unconscious mental state. For HOT theory, the most important distinction at play is the one between first-order mental states and second-order mental states¹³⁰. Coming back to our red patch, simply seeing it is the first-order state. The seeing instantiates an extrinsic relational property. The same relationalism holds for any intrinsic state I might form about the red patch, say an unconscious belief that ‘The patch I am seeing is colored red’. Me being conscious of this belief is the second-order property. HOT theories do not regard intentionality in general as an intrinsic property of mental states, however this does not affect their

¹²⁹ One can say that which is not different in each of these three beliefs is the binding of the constituents, that is, that they are instantiating the same belief. However, as I note in previous paragraph, that does not seem to be the case in this example.

¹³⁰ There are further ways for casting this distinction, however, for our purposes the simplest one will do. For more illuminating accounts and conceptual analysis of Rosenthal's distinctions see Rosenthal (1986, 2005) and Kriegel (2009).

representational content or phenomenal character. Intentionality and phenomenology of mental states are different properties and one can be instantiated without the other¹³¹. As a result, an unconscious state may instantiate certain intentionality (and mental quality or phenomenology) without instantiating consciousness since consciousness is necessarily a property of second-order mental states. In one sense, conscious and unconscious mental states are on par, since the relevant representational content, say our red patch, is in both instances present and, moreover, present with all the relevant phenomenal features. On the other hand, the content is indeterminate, since there is no intentionality instantiated at the first level. One can say I am simply unaware (by second-order state) that my experience is of a red patch as opposed reddish-dots-spatially-overlapping. However, this is precisely, indeterminate content.

HOT does seem to uphold the *Equivalence Thesis* but does not seem to uphold the *Asymmetry Thesis*, while being an *Intentional Realist theory about Unconscious*. On this I can agree. The second-order mental states are propositional attitudes, while the first-order ones are states with propositional (or sensory) content. However, HOT theories are perceptual, not cognitive. The nature of second-order states can simply be described as awareness. The nature of propositional attitudes, on the other hand, is far more complicated than that. Certainly, second-order states are discriminable and reportable, but I do not believe them to be propositions themselves, since HOT theories are perceptual not cognitive, and it seems reasonable to suppose that, in order to form a propositional attitude, one must employ cognitive machinery not perceptual one.

As a result, we have three kinds of Intentional Realist theories about Unconscious: non-reductive representationalism which wishes to uphold both Equivalence and Asymmetry, reductive representationalism which denies Asymmetry and upholds Equivalence, and HOT which denies Asymmetry and upholds Equivalence. First option seems contradictory, second counterintuitive, but the third is constrained to only perception. Naturally, this is not a sufficient reason to dismiss the theories, simply to note that there seem to be issues in need of attention if one accepts

¹³¹ This mainly holds in one direction: one can have a mental state which is non-conscious however instantiating mental quality. The other direction; conscious state without instantiation of relevant mental quality seems incoherent, as whether we tie consciousness to phenomenology as representationalism does, or we tie mental qualities with phenomenology as HOT does, it seems plausible that conscious states necessarily involve phenomenology we are aware of.

Intentional Realist theories about Unconscious and the plausibility of the two starting theses, Asymmetry and Equivalence.

II.3.C.a. Against Unconscious Belief

Let me now turn to my proposal. Simply put, uphold Intentional Realism about Unconscious (and (Int)), deny (TYPEInt) and Asymmetry Thesis, uphold (PROPInt) and Equivalence Thesis. In other words, all mental states, conscious and unconscious alike, are *genuinely intentional*. The difference between them is not in type of intentionality instantiated, but rather somewhere else¹³². However, both the conscious and the unconscious are partly constituted by propositional content. My proposal is compatible with non-reductive representationalism as well as HOT theories¹³³. It shares with reductive representationalism denial of Asymmetry and upholding Equivalence, however it does not, unlike reductive representationalism, deny intentionality to unconscious mental states. It does not deny it, precisely since unconscious states are partly constituted by content. Whether this content is determined is guaranteed by (Int) – if unconscious mental states are genuinely intentional then they are determined content-wise. And this is the difference with most non-reductive representationists.

My reading of Asymmetry Thesis is straightforward. There is something intuitive to the idea that conscious and unconscious mental states are, in some sense, asymmetrical. However, simply the tokening of Asymmetry is not equivalent to uphold (TYPEInt) or that there are different types of intentionality involved in conscious and unconscious mental states. The asymmetry relation is a direct result of thinking of both conscious and unconscious mental states as propositional attitudes. Conscious propositions are usually of the form (where S stands for subject, ATT for attitude and PC for propositional content):

CONSC S [ATT (PC)] = (I believe that [gelato is the best food in the world]).

Unconscious mental states, I suggest, are of the following form:

UNCONSC S [PC] = I [gelato is the best food in the world].

¹³² See II.2. 'Pure Content View of the Unconscious'.

¹³³ Nevertheless, I find myself to more prone to non-reductive representationslims, although HOT theories have my greatest intellectual sympathy.

In other words, the difference is not in the type or kind of intentionality involved. This approach also vindicates asymmetry thesis since the difference is not in the propositional content. This is pertinent since it provides us with novel methodology to investigate unconscious mental states and processes. They are still representational; hence we are in bed with cognitive science, but are not of different type, hence we do not need to posit additional theories of intentionality.

II.3. D. Conclusion

In this paper I argued against unconscious beliefs starting my reasoning with an unusual question of how many beliefs do I have. I concluded the paper by answering this question as many as you are occurrently consciously entertaining. I analysed the issue through the *Asymmetry Thesis*, or the thesis that when I have some content unconsciously and when I entertain it consciously, the latter is more determinate, hence less vague, than when I entertain them unconsciously; and the *Equivalence Thesis*, or the thesis that both conscious and unconscious mental states are partly constituted by propositional content. I argued that these two theses are in tension.

As far as the literature go, I examined it by recasting the formulation of Asymmetry and Equivalence in three interrelated claims: (INT), or the thesis that all mental states are genuinely intentional; (TYPEInt) or the thesis that the type of intentionality involved in conscious and unconscious mental states is of different type; and (PROPInt) or the thesis that the type of intentionality involved in conscious and unconscious mental states is of the same kind.

My conclusion is that one should uphold Intentional Realism not just about Consciousness but also about Unconscious (INT)), deny (TYPEInt) and Asymmetry Thesis, uphold (PROPInt) and Equivalence Thesis. This view, as a result, vindicates the *Asymmetry Thesis* by not positing a difference in the type of intentionality involved in conscious and unconscious mental states, namely beliefs. Simply subscribing to asymmetry metaphysically does not entail the difference in type of intentionality involved. Hence, the structural difference comes from the *Equivalence Thesis*. The property of intentionality remains monadic, but how it is instantiated in conscious and unconscious mental states differs in that the unconscious ones, although constituted by

propositional contents, are lacking in the instantiation of the relevant attitude. It is important to note that in this paper I focused mainly on belief as a paradigmatic example of propositional attitude. I do not believe the same holds for desires¹³⁴.

If the view I propose of unconscious beliefs has plausibility, it follows that dispositionalism may be false. If we subscribe to dispositionalism when it comes to unconscious beliefs, then to believe something means to have a particular dispositional structure of the content. Since this is not propositional content, then an occurrent judgment, resulting from it, does not belong to the category of beliefs. The reason for this is that the occurrent judgment with content C may be a manifestation of an *overall* dispositional structure of the belief that C, but it itself is not that structure. Hence, we have a choice here. Either the occurrent judgment that C is possible, or it is not. It seems fairly counterintuitive to deny it.

¹³⁴ See II.2. 'Pure Content View of the Unconscious'.

Part III
The Structure of Temporal and Subjective
Dimension

III.1. The Subject of Temporal Experience¹³⁵

Abstract: There are two features which accompany each and every of our conscious mental states. The first one is *being to-me* or *me-ness*. Any subject that has an experience reports of being aware of itself, whilst having it. The second feature is *being present* or *presentness*: we report our experiences as happening in the present. Those two features share a further commonality: they both are openly nonrepresentational. Although it is plausible that every report about the what-it-is-like to have a certain experience will contain at least implicit reference to the present as the time at which the experience is had, and the subject as the one to whom the experienced is presented, it is difficult to pin-down “where” we find these two features among the aspects of the phenomenal character of the experience. Plausibly, *me-ness* and *presentness* are the only features of our experiences that share those two characteristics: accompanying every experience and being openly non-representational. I argue that this is not a simple correlation but rather there is a more metaphysically substantive relation between being present and being to me. My suggestion is that *me-ness* and *presentness* arise from the same structural characteristic of experience.

Keywords: Phenomenology, Intentionality, Subjectivity, Temporality, Presentness, Me-ness, Forme-ness, Time.

III.1.A. Set Up

There seems to be, upon introspection, at least two features that always accompany each and every of our conscious mental states¹³⁶. The first one is *being to-me* or *me-ness*. Every occurring experience has a subjective character, in the sense that any subject that has an experience would report being aware of them self, whilst having it.¹³⁷ The second feature is *being present* or *presentness*: we report our experiences as happening in the present.¹³⁸ Regardless of the temporal

¹³⁵ This paper is a joint project with Giuliano Torrenco. I thank him for allowing me to include it in my dissertation.

¹³⁶ In this paper I focus solely on perceptual experiences. Perceptual experiences differ from other kind of experiences as one cannot perceive through inferences. Perception is immediate and direct. Whether the hypothesis I put forward here holds for other kinds of experiences such as cognitive, conative, action, bodily feelings, etc., is indeed an extremely interesting question. However, it is out of the scope of this paper, as substantial further research needs to be done.

¹³⁷ Having *any* phenomenal consciousness is a way to experience self-consciousness (Giullot, 2007).

¹³⁸ This claim is compatible with the claim that mental states can be extended through time. I will stay neutral here in the debate between (versions of) the specious present approach and (versions of) cinematic approach to perception of temporally extended features such as motion, duration, and change. On the retentionalist and extensionalist versions

location of what we are experiencing (we perceive present events, remember and expect past and future ones, respectively) — our experiences “tell” us that *they* are all happening *now*, in the present.

Besides accompanying every conscious mental state, these two features share a further commonality: they are, as I will say, *openly non-representational*. Although it is plausible that every report about the what is like to have a certain experience will contain at least implicit reference to the present as the time at which the experience is had, and the subject as the one to whom what is experienced is presented, it is difficult to pin-down “where” we find them among the aspects of the phenomenal character of the experience. In that sense they are openly non-representational: me-ness and presentness do not appear to have a *distinctive* character of what is like to have them, and yet we invariably report our experiences as being our present experiences. There is no “representational counterpart” of myself and the present time in the phenomenal character of an experience of mine, which, nonetheless, can usually be reported as *my present* experience of something — for instance my present experience of seeing a horse riding in a prairie.¹³⁹ Notice that the claim is not only that they are not *explicitly* represented in the content of our experiences, but also that neither are *implicitly* represented — for instance as “unarticulated constituents”. According to Perry’s theory of unarticulated constituents of beliefs, many beliefs represent the subject, the time they refer to only implicitly, as the result of the fact that the belief has a perspectival format and the “centre” of the (personal, temporal) perspective is determined by the actual context in which the belief occurs.¹⁴⁰ But even if such a theory of the way *beliefs* represent the subject who is having them and the time at which they occurs is correct, it does not

of the specious present theory see Dainton (2006), Lee (2014), Reaschbrook (2013). On the cinematic view see LePoidevin (2007) and Arstila (2016). It is also important to stress that the phenomenological aspect that I am focusing on here — presentness — is not obviously connected with the purported phenomenology of the passage or flow of time. The distinction between presentness and dynamicity is explicitly noted in Hestevold (1990), Paul (2010), and it is discussed in Torrenco (2018).

¹³⁹ On the absence of presentness among the phenomenal features of perceptual experience see, among others, Le Poidevin (2007), Paul (2010). Zahavi & Kriegel (2015) sense these two features are based on a common structural feature of experience, and how this fact can give rise to the reports, but do not provide a fully developed explanation.

¹⁴⁰ See Perry “Thoughts without representation”. We are relying on a particular interpretation of Perry’s theory of unarticulated constituents, which construe them as the result of the perspectival format of the belief. This is for ease of exposition and nothing substantive hinges on this. It is also immaterial whether this is a good exegesis of Perry (1986).

follow that *perceptual experiences* (which may be explanatorily connected to the beliefs in questions, for instance I come to believe that it rains because I look at the rain pouring down out of my window) have an analogous perspectival format and thus represent implicitly the self who is having them and the time at which they are occurring. Consider, for contrast, the spatial case—which according to Perry is also a case of unarticulated constituent of beliefs. It is not implausible to think that the “here” is implicitly represented at the perceptual level too. Visual experiences, for instance, do have a *spatial* perspectival element, and it is plausible to say that they implicitly represent the “here” as the point in space *from which* they represent what we see. But, indeed, there seems to be a *what is like* to have an experience from a certain spatial point of view. I can appreciate this, for instance, when we move around an object to observe it from different perspectives (Richardson, 2014). Thus, we can say that the “here” is represented in the perceptual content—although only implicitly, as the centre of the spatial perspective — since there is some phenomenal ingredient that correspond to it. The temporal case is different. Even if at the level of belief the “now” is an unarticulated constituent, there is no phenomenal element corresponding to it at the perceptual level: the present is neither explicitly nor implicitly represented at the perceptual level.¹⁴¹ The self is different in the very same way. Even if there is a personal perspective from which we have all our experiences, we cannot say that its centre is implicitly represented by our perceptual contents as the centre of our spatial perspective is in visual experience. We will say more on this point in III.1.C.a. For now, suffice to notice in the case of the self, there is no analogous situation to the change in phenomenal character of the spatial features of our experience that we experience when moving around an object.

Plausibly, me-ness and present-ness are the only two phenomenal features of our mental states that share these two characteristics, namely, accompanying every conscious mental state and being openly non-representational. The aim of this paper is to investigate the scope of this likeness: is it just a superficial connection, or is it a symptom of them being deeply akin?

To this effect, I will address the two following questions:

¹⁴¹ See Hoerl (2018), which we will discuss more in detail in what follows. But the point concerning the lack of phenomenal/representational counterpart of presentness in sensory experience is widespread, see Hestevold (1990) and Paul (2010).

- (I) Is sharing these two characteristics (accompanying every conscious mental state and being openly non-representational) a result of a mere contingent correlation, or is there a more metaphysically substantive relation between me-ness and presentness?
- (II) If there is a more metaphysically substantive relation, what is its nature of it, that is, what makes me-ness and presentness so close to one another?

This is how I am going to proceed in addressing these questions. I will start in §III.1.B. with investigating the connection between the thesis that those two features are openly non-representational and the so-called strong transparency thesis of introspection. Since me-ness and presentness are openly non-representational it is plausible to assume that they occur before introspection takes place. I argue that they it is impossible to attend directly to these phenomena, but only to representations in which these phenomena occur. This makes them compatible with the Strong Transparency reading of introspection. In §III.1.C. I focus on the relation between being openly non-representational and being ubiquitous for both me-ness and presentness. Finally, in §III.1.D. clarify in which sense those two features are based on a common structural feature of experience, and how this fact can give rise to the reports.

III.1.B. Introspection and the Transparency Thesis

Introspection is most commonly defined as an epistemic process directed towards one's own mental states. Me-ness and presentness are presumably in some sense available at the first-order level of mental states, before the introspection takes place. Both if I simply see a horse riding on a prairie, and if I introspect while I enjoy the visual experience, I can report that that experience of *mine* is happening *now*. Hence, one can argue that introspecting is also an experience that will have me-ness and presentness¹⁴². I do not dispute that. However, in case of introspection, me-ness is self-ascribed (Burge, 1988). To paraphrase Burge, the content of the second-order mental state of, for example, judgment is locked onto the first-order content of me who is doing the judging. In other words, the first level is self-referential, while the second level of judgment is self-ascribed.

¹⁴² Indeed, Julien Deonna pointed this out to me.

And self-ascription of a judgment that I am seeing a red ladybug ‘contains’ the first-order self-referential ‘I’ who is judging. In introspection we self-ascribe the experience, e.g. ‘I am seeing a red ladybug’. One might question further: this is a plausible answer with respect to me-ness, but what about presentness? Judgments (and any other second-order mental states) containing presentness would have to expire once the occurrent phenomenology has passed. Hence, these introspective judgments could not be used in later inferences without recreating the mental state Schwitzgebel (2002, 2016). As I show in §III.1.D. when reporting having an experience the subject does not represent their own personal and temporal location, the temporal and personal location cannot individuate the phenomenology of experience.

Schwitzgebel (2016), states six necessary conditions for introspection, of which I consider only the first three:

- 1) *The mentality condition*: Introspection is about mental events, not sensory perception.
- 2) *The first-person condition*: Introspection generates knowledge of our own mental states, which seems to be exclusive and privileged.
- 3) *The temporal proximity condition*: Introspection generates knowledge about occurrent mental states.

If this characterization of introspection is correct, it is tempting to conclude that we include me-ness and presentness in reporting about our experiences because they are phenomenally available to us when we introspect, thanks to the first-person condition and the temporal proximity condition respectively. However, this claim clashes with the claim that me-ness and presentness are *openly non-representational*, namely they do not appear to have a *distinctive* character of what is like to have them. In other words, there are no phenomenologically salient features that corresponds to presentness and me-ness and the two do no work in individuating particular mental states one might undergo (phenomenally speaking). Although it is plausible that every report about the what is like to have a certain experience will contain at least implicit reference to the present as the time at which the experience is had, and the subject as the one to whom what is experienced is presented, me-ness and presentness do not appear to have a what-it-is-like character. We could say that whatever our experiences present to us, they present it to us *simpliciter*, with respect to me-ness and presentness.

Moreover, claiming that me-ness and presentness are phenomenologically salient in introspection clashes with the widely held thesis that introspection, and indeed *experience* in general, is *transparent*.

There are two readings of the transparency thesis and I follow Kind (2003) in characterizing them:

- (a) *Strong Transparency Thesis*: ‘it is impossible to attend directly to our experience, i.e., we cannot attend to our experience except by attending to the objects represented by that experience’ (ibid.). In other words, there is no such thing as what it is like to simply see but rather what it is like to see something in some manner.
- (b) *Weak Transparency Thesis*: ‘it is difficult (but not impossible) to attend directly to our experience, i.e., we can most easily attend to our experience by attending to the objects represented by that experience’ (ibid.). In other words, there is only what it is like to see something in some manner.

In this paper, I explore the hypothesis that neither me-ness nor presentness are counterexample to the strong transparency thesis. Indeed, I will argue that if we assume the strong transparency thesis, the connection between me-ness and presentness can be explained in a more convincing way than by assuming that they are phenomenally accessible features of our experiences themselves.

There is an obvious obstacle to this project. While the claim that me-ness and presentness are accessible as properties of the mental events that we introspect is compatible with the weak transparency thesis, it is clearly at odds with the strong transparency thesis. More specifically, we can distinguish a *phenomenological* problem and an *epistemic* problem.

Phenomenological problem: According to the strong transparency thesis, we never experience the properties of the particular mental state *e* we are in. Rather, we experience the content of *e*. When we say that *e* has certain phenomenal character, we just mean that being in the mental state *e* is experiencing its content. For instance, when introspecting a visual experience of an object *O*, one is directly aware only of the qualities of the visual object *O*, and not of any further quality of the seeing itself. But we do not experience me-ness and presentness as property of *O*. This is a general pattern in experiencing. We describe our experiences as somehow giving access to us to the properties of me-ness (being self-conscious) and presentness (being located in the present), and yet me-ness and presentness are not experienced as the color or shape are in visual experience. If

the strong transparency thesis is true, it is difficult to see how me-ness and presentness could show up in reports of what is immediately and directly given in our experiences.

Epistemic problem: Our reports entails that we claim to *know* that we are self-conscious of our experiences and that they occur in the present. However, if the strong transparency thesis is correct and the phenomenological problem stands, it is difficult to see what the source of such knowledge would be. It is not of a perceptual (or more generally sensorial) nature, since we do not find those two features in the phenomenal character. But it does not appear to be of an inferential nature either, both because it is reported to be immediate rather than obtained upon reflection, and because there is no apparent convincing story about the premises from which we would derive this knowledge.

In what follows I will focus on the phenomenal problem. However, I will hint at the end of a possible solution to the epistemic problem too, assuming my solution to the phenomenal problem is on the right track.

III.1.C. Is There a Necessitation Relation Between Me-ness and Presentness?

III.1.C.a. Experience of Me-ness

Zahavi & Kriegel write (2015, p. 38):

‘Our view is not that in addition to the objects in one’s experiential field—the books, computer screen, half-empty cup of coffee, and so on—there is also a self-object. Rather the point is that each of these *objects, when experienced, is given to one in a distinctly first-personal way, and that this givenness is a pervasive dimension of phenomenal life. On our view, one does not grasp for-me-ness by introspecting a self-standing quale, in the same way one grasps the taste of lemon or smell of mint. [...]; one grasps such experiential elements as lemon-qualia and mint-qualia by appreciating what varies across such phenomenal characters, but grasps what for-me-ness is by appreciating what remains*

constant across them. We can put this by saying that the ‘*me*’ of *for-me-ness* is not in the first instance an aspect of *what is experienced* but of *how it is experienced*; not an object of experience, but a constitutive manner of experiencing. To deny that such a feature is present in our experiential life, *to deny the forme-ness or mineness of experience, is to fail to recognize the very subjectivity of experience.*’ (my emphasis).

There are three issues in this paragraph. On the first I agree; the second is ambiguous and potentially misleading, and the third seems to me wrong and based on a confusion. The one I agree with is the idea that ‘... one does not grasp *for-me-ness* by introspecting a self-standing quale...’. There is no distinctive phenomenological ingredient that we can individuate as *me-ness*. It is true that the object of our experiences are ‘given to one in a distinctly first-personal way and...this givenness is a pervasive dimension of phenomenal life’. But even if we can talk of the first-personal way or the phenomenally privileged perspective of the self from which the contents of our mental states are always experienced, being self-conscious is being aware of *being* in such a perspective, and not *of a way* our experience is given to us, or any other intrinsic feature of experience. Think again of the spatial case, and the example of someone observing an object from different spatial perspectives, by walking around it. We can take this as a case in which the spatial perspectival features of our experience vary (we have different visual experiences while walking around). However, if the *content* of the experience remains the same (we are aware of observing the same object all along), spatial perspectival features cannot be represented in the content, they must be structural, intrinsic features of our visual experiences of which we are in some way aware (and this is why we can say that the centre of the perspective, the here, *is represented* — albeit only implicitly). The first personal case, even if construed in terms of a personal perspective, is crucially dissimilar. There is no sense in which we are aware of what phenomenologically distinguish our privileged first-personal perspective, while being aware of being in such a perspective. If my reading of this passage is correct, Zahavi & Kriegel are here claiming that *me-ness* is openly nonrepresentational, and that *me-ness* is given to us in experience in a way that is compatible with the strong transparency thesis. It is the personal perspective *form* which the contents of our experiences are felt that allows us to pick up *me-ness*, and thus coming to know that our experiences are self-conscious.

As for the second issue, the claim that “the ‘*me*’ of *for-me-ness* is not in the first instance an aspect of *what is experienced* but of *how it is experienced*” is ambiguous. It may be read as just another way to make the point that I have just made, or it may be read as the claim that *me-ness* is a counterexample to the strong transparency thesis (although not necessarily to the weak transparency thesis). The claim that *me-ness* is given to us as the *way* contents are experienced may be read as the claim that it is encoded in a non-representational element of the phenomenal aspect of our experience.¹⁴³ If so, *me-ness* is given in our phenomenology, even though not as a representational feature (there is not an object, self-consciousness, that we are aware of by introspection). This hypothesis contradicts what we have just said about *me-ness* not being an intrinsic, structural feature of our experience, of which we can be directly or indirectly aware of (as spatial features are, according to some, see Richardson 2014). We will therefore put it aside. More generally, in this paper, I explore the option according to which *me-ness* is not a counterexample to the strong transparency thesis, and that is not given to us as a (representational or non-representational) feature of the phenomenal character.

As for the third issue, Zahavi & Kriegel seem to be missing a point when writing: ‘... , to deny the *for-me-ness* or *mineness* of experience, is to fail to recognize the very subjectivity of experience.’ The point they seem to be missing is the very point they are aiming at: *me-ness*. What Zahavi & Kriegel are missing is the distinction between three kinds or three ways of having subjective experience¹⁴⁴:

- (I) *Me-ness* – subjectivity of the self, felt through the particular experiences as a subject of them.
- (II) *For-me-ness* – subjectivity of the experience as it is given to me, felt as it is for me to the exclusion of anyone else.

¹⁴³ Torrenzo (2017) argues that the feeling of the passage of time should be understood as a non-representational element in this sense (a phenomenal modifier), and thus as a counter example (possibly the only one) to the strong transparency thesis. What is claimed in this paper about presentness (and *me-ness*) is compatible with this view on the experience of the passage of time.

¹⁴⁴ See Guillot (2007) for an extensive definition of these notions as well as successful analysis of the relations between them. Although, she is certainly not the only one defending this distinction, her paper is one of the most extensive in the literature.

- (III) Mineness – subjectivity of experiences belonging to me, felt as a sense of ownership of particular experiences.

These three kinds of subjectivity are not the same. For now, I put aside the sense of for-me-ness and mineness and focus on me-ness. Me-ness is essentially defined as self-awareness gained by having experiences. However, some define it as minimal self-awareness. As Gallagher points out:

‘Minimal self: Phenomenologically, that is, in terms of how one experiences it, a consciousness of oneself as an immediate subject of experience, unextended in time. The minimal self almost certainly depends on brain processes and an ecologically embedded body, but one does not have to know or be aware of this to have an experience that still counts as a self-experience.’ (2000, p.15)

As opposed to:

‘Narrative self: A more or less coherent self (or self-image) that is constituted with a past and a future in the various stories that we and others tell about ourselves.’ (ibid. p.15)

This minimal reading of self-awareness is the one I am aiming at in terms of me-ness¹⁴⁵. These considerations allow us to give a negative characterization of the experience of me-ness.

Experience of me-ness. We do not experience me-ness as something we encounter in the world, as it happens with ordinary representational features of experiences. We do not experience me-ness in a way contents are given to us in experience.

III.1.C.b. Experience of Presentness

Introspection is only possible of presently occurrent mental states and experiences. You cannot introspect now what it was like yesterday to listen to Tchaikovsky’s 1812 Overture or how it will be like to listen to Debussy’s Clair de Lune tomorrow. You can remember the introspected feeling

¹⁴⁵ This also solves the problem of depersonalization disorder and Cotard syndrome. They are not missing the sense of me-ness or self-awareness altogether as Guillot (ibid, p.41-42) suggests, but rather only the narrative self-awareness.

of anxiety, for example, while listening loudly to the cannons in Tchaikovsky's 1812 Overture yesterday or anticipate the relaxing feeling you might have tomorrow while listening to the gentle piano of Debussy. By so doing, you introspect the *presently occurring* memory and anticipation themselves.

How we move from the fact that our experiences occur always in the present to the fact that we report them as experienced in the present? As I noted, it is very unconvincing to claim that we perceive (or remember, or desire) *being present* as a feature of the world itself. Can presentness be a nonrepresentational *qualia*, which is in some sense accessible to introspection? One obvious thought is that our experience has a *tensed* format: we experience the world from a temporal perspective — one that is centered on the present — and this perspective itself is given in our experience as the way things are experienced¹⁴⁶. Thus, by introspecting on our experiences we can access presentness as the way things are experienced at the temporal centre of our experience. The analogy here is with experience of space in vision. We see things as located in different places *from us* in various directions and at various distances. Things are perceived as being “here” when they are perceived at (roughly) the centre of the spatial perspective.

I do not have a quick knock-down argument against this claim. However, notice that the claim that perceptual (and more generally sensorial) experience has a *perspectival temporal* (that is, tensed) format is not at all trivial, and indeed, dubious. Do we experience (see, hear) things as located at different temporal points at various distances from the moment of occurrence of the experience itself? It is certainly true that we can *think of* the events that we have perceptually encountered so far as located along the temporal dimension at various distances from the present moment. But from that it does not follow that the content of our sensory experience has a temporally oriented depth. First of all, any cinematic account of our experience denies that perceptual experience has any temporal depth at all, hence *a fortiori* a temporally oriented depth.¹⁴⁷ But even if we endorse a specious present view, in which perceptual contents have temporal depth, nothing forces us to maintain that temporally extended contents are tensed and represented as centred on the temporal location of the experience itself. As Christoph Hoerl has recently argued, reports of presentness

¹⁴⁶ By using the terminology of ‘the way things are’ I do not imply the mode of experiencing as suggested earlier in the dissertation. Modes are representational, while presentness is not. Here I am simply implying how something is given to us in experience: this perspective is given to us through the things we experience.

¹⁴⁷ LePoidevin (2007), Artsila (2016).

can be accounted for on the ground of a *lack* of represented temporal location both of what we experience and of our experiencing it:

“There is just no scope within a description of our experience of temporal properties for a distinction between those experienced properties themselves and a point in time from which they are experienced” (Hoerl, 2018, p. 143)

If we hold fixed the strong transparency thesis, it is easy to see how those considerations lead to a negative characterization of the experience of presentness which is strictly analogous to that of me-ness given above.

Experience of presentness. We do not experience presentness as something we encounter in the world, as happens with ordinary representational features of experiences. We do not experience presentness as a way contents are given to us in experience.

III.1.C.c. The Analogy Between Me-ness and Presentness

If the two characterizations of the experience of me-ness and of presentness given above are on the right track, it is clear that there is an analogy between those two features. There are two important points to be made here, in order not to misread the analogy.

Firstly, even if we can talk of a personal perspective in which our experience takes place, this is *not* in virtue of the content of our experience being experienced in a *perspectival way*. Thus, the analogy should not lead us to conclude that the content of our sensory experiences is experienced in a temporally perspectival way. We may, in thought, construct an “order” in which persons (or being capable of conscious experience) are located, and individuate our self as the centre at which a certain subset of all experiences happens.¹⁴⁸ But from the fact that we can think of our experiences as characterized by a personal perspective in this abstract sense does not follow that when the experiences occur, they are presented to us with a personal perspective format. To the contrary, our experiences seem simply to *happen*. We experience me-ness as the personal perspective of our experience in the sense that no distinction between the representation of

¹⁴⁸ See Prior & Fine (1977) and Fine (2005).

something as happening to a subject and the representation of a subject to whom something is happening can be made in reporting our experiences. Precisely this is analogous to what holds for presentness, as seen by commenting Hoerl's passage: it is the *lack* of any temporal location both in the experienced content and in the way in which the content is experienced that makes it impossible to report anything else than our experiences as located in the present. This is what I mean by saying that the experience of presentness *is* the experience of the temporal perspective in which we find ourselves.

Secondly, and relatedly, there is a sense in which what the two experiences share is an aspect of their structure. I will argue in what follows that this is true and is a crucial point to make in order to clarify the metaphysical connection between the two properties. However, we have to be careful in how the term "structural" is used here. As Hoerl notices few lines after (p.143-4):

"Features of the phenomenology of experience such as the particular way in which visual experience is spatially viewpointed are sometimes also referred to as *structural features* of experience,[...]. As Louise Richardson explains, these structural features of experience are "a matter not of which things we perceive, but of how we perceive those things"[...]. As such, structural features of experience should arguably be counted towards the properties of experience itself, rather than the things being experienced. The way visuo-spatial experience is spatially viewpointed, for instance, cannot simply be captured by talking about the spatial relationships that are being represented in the experience."¹⁴⁹

Maybe *spatial* experience has structural features that we can introspect and that are thus a counterexample to the strong transparency thesis (as we have assumed in the discussion above). This is possible insofar as we can experience the same object from different spatial perspectives (for instance, by keep on looking at something while moving around it), and if our spatial perspective can remain the same (and being experienced as remaining the same) while what we experience changes (for instance, by focusing on a distant location in which several distinct objects pass through). But the same does *not* hold in the temporal case. To the contrary, it is precisely because our sensorial experiences lack such structural (in this sense) features, and that we do not represent the temporal location of the content either, that we report our experiences invariably as

¹⁴⁹ The Richardson's passage is in (Richardson 2014: 493).

being present. If the analogy between presentness and me-ness holds, our experience lacks structural (in Richardson's sense) features also with respect to me-ness. We have already noticed that it is arguable that we report our experiences as being self-conscious on the ground of a feature of experience itself that we introspect: me-ness is not in the phenomenal character as a feature of experience itself. If the analogy with presentness holds, we report our experiences as being self-conscious because there is no structural (in Richardson's sense) feature of our experience that is given to us as the first-personal way we experiences things, and at the same time the content of our experience is not represented as "located" at a subject (that is, we do not represent what we experience as experienced by a subject). The conclusion is that if the connection between me-ness and presentness is structural, it must be "structural" in some different sense from Richardson's sense.

Those considerations lead us to a further important point. There is clearly a similarity between the idea of being openly non-representational, and the idea of lacking structural features (in Richardson's sense). If so, it seems that we can explain why a feature of experience invariably accompanies every experience on the ground of its being openly non-representational. This leads us to the question of how deep the analogy between me-ness and presentness is.

III.1.C.d. The Relation Between Me-ness and Presentness

We can now focus on question: is sharing these two characteristics (accompanying every conscious mental state and being openly non-representational) a result of a mere contingent correlation, or is there a more metaphysically substantive relation between me-ness and presentness?

I argue that there is a metaphysically substantive relation between me-ness and presentness. The argument for this conclusion is abductive.

(Asm) There is no counterexample to the correlation between me-ness and presentness. That is, there aren't cases of experiences that have one feature but not the other.

(ABP) – The connection between the features is not a mere correlation, but there is a more substantive metaphysical relation between the two explains why there are no counterexamples to the correlation.

(Conclusion) The connection between the features is not a mere correlation, but there is a more substantive metaphysical relation between the two¹⁵⁰.

The answer to the first question is given. However, the answer to the second one requires more metaphysical building: If there is a more metaphysically substantive relation, what is its nature, that is, what makes me-ness and presentness so close to one another? In order to give an answer to the second question, the first order of business is to look at the structure of experience in general, and see whether there is something in it that can explain both the connection between me-ness and presentness, and our reports about them.

III.1.D. Structure of Experience and the Relation Between Me-ness and Presentness

I see the general structure of experience as a three-dimensional model of subject, attitude and content. In other words, a subject is directed towards the content through an attitude. This is fairly uncontroversial and mainstream description. While content and attitude, on this standard account, have phenomenal features (representational and possibly non-representational ones), subjects are usually considered not to bear any phenomenal feature. More precisely, the phenomenal character of our experiences is necessarily fixed by the contents and the attitudes we might bear toward those contents. It is common to claim that we do not undergo experiences of experiences, and few would disagree with that. Nor do we undergo an experience of the self-experiencing, so to speak. If so, the *phenomenal features* of mental states are:

¹⁵⁰ One might object, as Julien Deonna did, that there is a premise missing that must relate exception-less co-instantiation with substantive metaphysical relation. However, this is intended to be an abductive argument with a probable conclusion. If such a premise was indeed inserted the argument, hence the conclusion, would be deductive.

Content: what is represented, i.e. the coffee in my Salvador Dali mug from The Met on the table that I see, smell, taste.

Attitude: how it is represented, i.e. my seeing, smelling, believing that there is coffee in my Salvador Dali mug from The Met on the table.

Both content and attitude bring into the mental state the phenomenal features one is currently experiencing. Both are distinguishing and individuating features of mental state, whether in terms of a state being a belief, or a memory, a mental image or state of wondering; or in terms the state being about coffee, tea, water or beer. In order to fix representation, one needs to fix both components. In other words, phenomenal experience is individuated in terms of those two constituents.

If me-ness and presentness are not phenomenological, then the phenomenal information we get from content and attitude cannot be responsible for our reports on the ever-accompanying felt experience of any mental state being both *present* and *self-conscious*. But how pointing out that the structure of experience has *three* components — subject, along with content and attitude — can help us account for the fact that we report our experiences as being self-conscious and present?

My suggestion is that the role of the subject in the general structure of experience can explain why both me-ness and presentness are reported as immediately given in our experience, as phenomenally salient features of experience usually are, even if they are openly non-representational. The phenomenal features of experience are silent with respect to who is the subject of the experience and when the experience takes place. That is, (i) no temporal location of the subject of experience, no subject having the experience is represented in the content, (ii) the attitude is not experienced as locating the occurring experience relative to a time or a subject. We can say that each occurrent experience represents a particular content *simpliciter*. But the experience of such a content is always an experience that a particular subject has at a particular time. When reporting having an experience, thus, there is no other temporal or personal location that can individuate the experience. The experience is reported to be of the subject having it (hence self-conscious) and to happen at the moment in which the subject has it (hence in the present) because this the only option a subject has if they experience the content *simpliciter* *and* they do not represent their own personal and temporal location. The fact that both features are based on the same structural feature — the lack of some individuating element in the phenomenology, both

with respect to the person who has the experience and with respect to the time when the experience is had — is what makes their connection closer than a mere correlation, and, at the same time, it is what explains why all our experiential reports potentially include self-awareness and presentness.

Now, one may ask why from the many lacks that experiences may present, these are lacks that must be filled, and why me and present must be the default fillings.¹⁵¹ The reason is that there is indeed nothing in the phenomenology that forces us to do so. As we have been stressing since the beginning, it is the *reports* concerning our experience that characterise it always as self-conscious and locate it always in the present. In order to elaborate (and express) such reports about our own sensorial experience we clearly need more complex cognitive capacities. In particular, we need some general narrative concerning ourselves as having a succession of experiences, with various relations between them (e.g., causal, motivational, along with temporal and spatial). We have not provided here any account of how such narrative forms, or on which mental processes is based. But if we assume that such a narrative is at our disposal, and indeed it is in the background of every experiential report, we can easily explain why even if our perceptual contents do not present us with a subject of experience and a time at which the experiences are happening, we tend to fill in those empty slots in our reports, and why the self and the present are the default “filling in” options. Every sensory experience can update of our own narrative. Thus, given that the narrative that gets updated is our own, it’s us who is self-conscious in the experience. And given that the narrative gets updated, it has to occur in the present.

III.1.E. Conclusion

In this paper I have argued that there is a similarity relation between Me-ness and Presentness in that they accompany each and every of our mental state. Moreover, the similarity relation in question is not a pure correlation but rather a substantive metaphysical relation. My suggestion is that both features are based on the same structural feature of our phenomenology — precisely the lack of some individuating element in the phenomenology. Given the transparency thesis of introspection presentness and me-ness are not themselves representational. As such, they are not

¹⁵¹As, again, Deonna did.

at the level of particular contents, but rather they give particular contents non-dynamic and non-representational features of the mental state being-for-me-now.

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Milan, November 2019

Daria Vitasovic

Doctoral Cycle XXXI (2015)

I. Final Report (October 2015 – November 2019)

I. a. Areas of Research

I started the first year by developing my PhD research project on Cognitive Phenomenology. In the first three months I rewrote my research proposal while keeping in mind the tentative structure of the dissertation. This further developed proposal, I submitted to my supervisor (Corrado Sinigaglia) and, following his comments, implemented them in the proposal. At the same time, I took on the project of mapping the debate, with special emphasis on pro and con arguments. It seemed fruitful to undertake this, since the arguments appeared to be overall inconclusive either way, hence a focused look on the structure of the debate seemed to be a good starting point.

In the second semester I started two larger projects. One was on Cognitive Phenomenology with respect to Unconscious Thought. This project resulted in a paper published in journal *Phenomenology and Mind: Special Issue on Cognitive Phenomenology*. Subsequently, I expanded on the paper, considering all the views in the literature, and made it into a dissertation paper with novel view of the structure of unconscious. The second project was on functions. Although function debate originates in Philosophy of Biology, my motivation for this project was to see the consequences of the views for Philosophy of Mind in general and functions of contents of phenomenal states in particular.

In addition, I tackled areas that might prove to be principal for developing my views on content of cognitive states; namely, definition of information with respect to mental and brain states, nature of the self, mereology, and complexity and holism versus hierarchical organization and reduction. I also developed a growing interest in Philosophy of Time.

At the end of my first year of PhD I changed the focus of my research project. I started to focus on broader issues, most notably, concerning the structure of consciousness. Hence, I opted to focus on these questions in my dissertation; are there objective structures of phenomenal consciousness, more specifically, phenomenally intentional consciousness?

In my second year, in the first semester I focused on the distinction between contents and attitudes of mental states. I primarily explored their interconnection, or, the question of composition, the way I named it. This led me to a broader research of how different phenomenal elements of mental states could be interconnected (e.g. reduction, identity, fusion, composition etc.) and do certain types of mental states follow particular rules. For example, some phenomenal states are made from 'simple qualities' which in composition bring about a complex phenomenology, while other are 'blended' in a complex phenomenology without discernibility of the elements constituting it.

In January 2017 I joined the Institut Jean Nicod (Paris, France) for 6 months (until July 2017) as a visiting PhD working as part of research group 'Consciousness and the Self' under the supervision of Uriah Kriegel. Here I started working on a different project; the nature of intentional modes or attitudes. I developed my metaphysical account of modes: The Modifiers Model, where I argue that intentional modes are more fine-grained in experience than the orthodox analytic philosophy of mind lets us believe and these fine-grained distinctions are to be accounted for in terms of non-representational modifiers of experience. This is a novel view of Intentional Primitivism. To this end, I also tackle the main counter-models. To this project a more specialized project was added on the nature of belief and doubt. The reason for this is twofold. Firstly, most mental attitudes are reduced to belief and desire framework, hence I consider it important to address this. Secondly, within philosophy of mind, the phenomenal nature of doubt has not been sufficiently cashed out and is a source of much confusion.

In September 2017 I joined Central European University in Budapest as a visiting PhD under the supervision of Tim Crane and Katalin Farkas. My original plan was to stay until December; however, the department extended an invitation to stay for another semester. In agreement with my supervisor Giuliano Torrengo I extended my visit until end of March. Here I developed my positive account of big part of my dissertation: the distinction between conscious and unconscious states. The distinction comes down to distinction in intentional structure. I have also developed a theory individuation of intentional attitudes in terms of formal object, e.g. belief-good. Beside these, I also developed an account which deals with unconscious cognitive attitudes. While at CEU, except for focusing on my area of research, i.e. philosophy of mind, I have undertaken more serious training in philosophy of language, epistemology and metaphysics.

In my third year of PhD, I became more interested in philosophy of time, in particular, perception of time and passage of time. I tackled the area of the interconnection between temporal and subjective dimension of all our mental states. This resulted in a paper as part of the dissertation. Unfortunately, due to health issues, I took time off my PhD from June 1 2018 to Dec 1 2018. I extended that period, due to family tragedy to Feb 15 2019. In both periods, I did not work. Upon my return in February 2019, I focused on my dissertation.

I. b Works

(i) List of the papers I wrote in the 1st year of PhD:

- **Unconscious Content: What Is It Like to Think that P When There Is Nothing It Is Like?**

Many have come to argue recently for the Phenomenal Intentionality Thesis (PIT). PIT can be best defined as a reduction of intentional properties to phenomenal properties. One of the challenges in construing intentionality in PIT terms is explaining unconscious thoughts. The issue comes down to the incompatibility of PIT with the claim of Unconscious Intentionality (UI), or more precisely, the claim that there are genuinely intentional unconscious states. There are two ways in which the proponents of PIT proceed. Most philosophers argue for some relation of derivation of unconscious intentional states from

conscious phenomenally intentional states. Firstly, I argue that this option is abandoning the program. Thus, the only way one can proceed, if one wishes to remain within the PIT framework, is to argue for genuine unconscious phenomenal intentionality. Secondly, I consider Pitt's proposal for unconscious phenomenal intentionality. I argue that, while Pitt stays within the PIT framework, his model does not take into account the necessity of the self for phenomenal (un)consciousness. Lastly, I suggest an outline of a third approach, based on Pitt's proposal, which takes into account the necessity of subject for intentionality or *what-is-it-like-for-me-ness*.

- **Holistic Approach to Functions**

In this paper, my ambition is to outline a different naturalistic perspective on function attribution debate within philosophy, one that does not rely solely on normative descriptions or reductionism; in particular, a holistic approach based on non-linear complexity.

Specifically, I propose a top-down approach in contrast to the bottom-up approach which regards biological organisms just as a sum of multiple autonomous sub-systems. In this holistic scheme, functions are such that their behavior, although constituted in particular sub-systems, cannot be analyzed independently of the context of the whole, i.e. organism, which is greater than just the sum of parts, i.e. systems. Such functions can be best defined:

(H) Functional holism necessitates the function to be **(1)** constituted in the particular sub-system (SS) of a complex system (S), however **(2)**, cannot be accounted for solely in the terms of the particular SS and its parts, thus **(3)** is a result of emergent behavior, therefore **(4)** grounded in S as a whole and interdependent with its other parts.

As long as the mechanisms internal structural organization, as well as its relations with interdependent mechanisms is maintained such that it is compatible with the activity it does, that mechanism is a functional one. Functions are seen primarily as relational and structural properties.

- **Book Review: 'Experiencing Time' by Simon Prosser**

Published in *International Studies in the Philosophy of Science*

(ii) List of the papers I wrote in the 2nd year of PhD:

- **Composition of Phenomenal Intentionality**

Phenomenal Intentionality (PI) or the view that intentional states exhibit phenomenal character is usually, among its proponents, characterized as distinctive. The distinctive character of PI is meant to capture that what-it-is-like-to-think that that p or feel that p is different than what-it-is-like-to-think that q or feel that q. The distinctiveness of PI concerns the level of content.

However, in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind, there is one distinction that is presupposed as fundamental: that of content and intentional mode or attitude. Hence, a natural question would be: is phenomenology distinctive at the level of modes as well? Most contributors to the debate presuppose that it is and, recently, there have been a number of arguments advanced for distinctive phenomenology of modes.

Nevertheless, if we accept distinctiveness at the level of modes, then another natural question imposes itself: what is the metaphysical connection between contents and modes? How is PI structured not just at the level of contents, but also at the level of modes? In what follows I proceed by analyzing the first principles for the relation between content and mode of mental states. My aim is to conceptualize the landscape of possible relations, and by doing so, answer questions about the composition of intentionality. At the same time, since much what will be said can be applied to different types of phenomenology, e.g. sensory-perceptual, cognitive, conative etc., these possible directions have bearing on a more general viewpoint one might take on the structure of consciousness.

- **Structure of Intentionality: Experiencing Intentional Modes**

We catalogue the structure of intentionality with the help of a fundamental distinction between psychological modes, on the one hand, and contents, on the other. While intentional contents pertain to what is represented, modes or attitudes are meant to capture how the content is represented, or, more precisely, the nature of the subject's directedness toward a particular content. If one accepts this informative nature of modes and is not an eliminativist or a reductionist about their character, but rather a primitivist, then modes supply the mental state with a proprietary intentional inject independent of content. Since both of these variables need to be fixed in order to fix the nature of conscious mental states, an intuitive question would be how do we experience psychological modes? Is phenomenology distinctive at the level of modes, and not just that of contents? If we accept that modes contribute to phenomenology of a mental state, then when I judge that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris or see a lemon blurrily, is my degree of confidence in the judgment or the blurriness of my visual experience matter of mode or content? In this talk I put forward a new metaphysical model of individuating phenomenology of modes, the modifiers model, based on non-representational features of mental states that make a difference how the occurrent mental state is given to us in experience. I also contrast my model with most intuitive counter-models, namely; the content model according to which the modifier is part of the content (e.g. I judge that Paris is capital of France moderately high.); and the degree model according to which the modifier is part of the mode, hence modes come in degree (e.g. I judge moderately high that Paris is capital of France).

- **Individuation of Intentional Modes**

If one is an intentional primitivist about modes or attitudes, then one holds that it is the case that because the content that the Jardin du Luxembourg is in Paris is judged as opposed, say, desired, that a mental

state is true, as opposed to good. This provides intentional modes a proprietary intentional role. Properties of modes enter into the correctness conditions of mental states without being represented, that is, being part of the content.

The natural question would be how do we account for these correctness conditions? Is there an object of modes? What kind of object it is? In other words, what is this systemic connection of the mode to some particular properties that makes judging distinctive, as opposed to desiring?

I propose a variation of the theory of formal objects.

- **From Consciousness to Unconsciousness without an Attitude**

When is a belief rightly said to be conscious, as opposed to unconscious? Do I believe that 1234 if a smaller number than 4321? And, if I do, then how many beliefs do I have? At which point does this belief, that you most likely never entertained before, becomes conscious? And, does it have content determination, as being a belief that it is, as well as being a belief at all, even when not occurrently entertained?

There are numerous explanations of the distinction between conscious and unconscious mental states. However, none of them seem satisfactory. I provide a novel explanation: difference between conscious and unconscious mental states is in their structure. Namely, we generally conceive mental states as paradigmatically intentional. My suggestion proceeds twofold. First, I argue that unconscious mental states are genuinely intentional. Secondly, I explain the difference between unconscious and conscious states as a difference in their structure of intentionality.

II. Track Record of Activities

II.a Courses Attended

(i) 1st year of PhD

- *Intellectualist Ethics: the Ancient Approach*. (November 2016) Thomas Bénatouil;
- *Academic Presentation*. (April 2016) Miriam Bait;
- *Philosophy of Motion*. (May 2016) Luca Guzzardi, Tzuchien Tho;
- *The Nature and Scope of Indeterminacy*. (June/July 2016) Elisa Paganini, Clotilde Calabi;
- *On the Nature of Time*. (October 2016) Jonathan Tallant, Giuliano Torrengo;
- *Introduction to Non-Classical Logic*. (February/June 2016) MA course by Hykel Hosni, Marcello D'Agostino. (Due to other responsibilities and frequent clashes with the activities of the Doctoral School, I was unable to finish all 3 modules of this course. I did Module 1: Non monotonic logics).

(ii) 2nd year of PhD

Courses Attended in Milan

- *On the Nature of Time*. (October 2016) Jonathan Tallant, Giuliano Torrenco;
- *Philosophy of Science*. (September 2016-December 2016) Corrado Sinigaglia;
- *Phenomenal Attitudes*. (April 2017) Uriah Kriegel (Institute Jean Nicod, Paris);
- *Structural Realism in Philosophy of Physics* (April 2017). James Ladyman (University of Bristol).

Courses Attended Abroad

- *Perceptual Inference*. Susanna Siegel (Harvard University). June 2017, Institut Jean Nicod, Paris.
- *Matters on Fact and Fiction*. Stacie Friend (Birkbeck College). May 2017, Institut Jean Nicod, Paris.
- *Four Talks on Assertion*. Manuel Garcia-Carpintero (University of Barcelona). April, 2017, Institut Jean Nicod, Paris.
- *Slurs*. Robin Jeshion (University of Southern California). June 2017, Institut Jean Nicod, Paris.
- *Ontology of the Mental*. (September-December 2017). Central European University. Lecturer: Tim Crane and Howard Robinson.
- *Epistemology*. (September-December 2017). Central European University. Lecturer: Katalin Farkas.
- *Philosophy of Language* (September-December 2017). Central European University. Lecturer: Hanoch Ben-Yami.
- *Belief and Knowledge*. (September-December 2017). Central European University. Lecturer: Katalin Farkas.
- *Doctoral Reading Seminar*. (September 2017-March 2018). Central European University.
- *Doctoral Work in Progress Seminar*. (September 2017- March 2018). Central European University. Lecturer: Tim Crane and Ferenc Huaronoski.
- *Existence*. (January 2018-March 2018). Central European University. Lecturer: Tim Crane.
- *Consciousness and the Physical World*. (January 2018-March 2018). Central European University. Lecturer: Phillip Goff.

II.b Seminars Attended

(i) 1st year of PhD

- *OMS: OntoForMat Metaphysical Seminar*. (October 2015/ March 2016) Organiser: Paolo Valore;
- *Neurophilosophy Research Group Seminars*: (December 2015/October 2016) Organizers: Corrado Sinigaglia, Sara Parmigiani
 - *PhilNeuro*
 - *LunchTime*
 - *Cognition in Action*;
- *The Seminars of Philosophy of Language and Mind*. (December 2015/June 2016) Organizer: Giuliano Torrenco

- *CPT Colloquia*, Spring Session 2016. (March/June 2016). Organizer: CPT.

(ii) 2nd year of Phd

Seminars Attended in Milan

- *NEURO-Nest Seminars*. (October 2016-December 2016) Organiser: Neuroscience Network at Statale;
- *Neurophilosophy Research Group Seminars*: (October 2016-December 2016) Organizers: Corrado Sinigaglia, Sara Parmigiani, Daria Vitasovic, Daniele Cassaghi
 - *PhilNeuro*
 - *LunchTime*
 - *Cognition in Action*;
- *The Seminars of Philosophy of Language and Mind*.
- *Centre for the study of Social Action*. Organizer: Anika Feibich
- *CPT Colloquia*, Fall/Winter Session 2016. Organizer: CPT.

Seminars Attended Abroad:

- Departmental Colloquium. Central European University. (September 2016-March 2017). <https://philosophy.ceu.edu/events/colloquium-talks>
- Institut Jean Nicod Colloquium. Paris. (January 2017-July 2017). <http://www.institutnicod.org/seminaires-colloques/seminaires/colloquium-1060/>
- Doc'in Nicod. Institut Jean Nicod, Paris. (January 2017-July 2017). <http://www.institutnicod.org/seminaires-colloques/seminaires/doc-in-nicod-1024/>
- Paris Consciousness/Self-Consciousness (PaCs) Group. Institut Jean Nicod, Paris. (January 2017-July 2017). <http://www.institutnicod.org/seminaires-colloques/seminaires/pacs-1023/>
- Language Seminar of the Linguae Group. Institut Jean Nicod, Paris. (January 2017-July 2017). <https://sites.google.com/site/linguae/paris/home>
- Reality and Representation. Institut Jean Nicod, Paris. (January 2017-July 2017). <http://www.institutnicod.org/seminaires-colloques/seminaires/reality-representation/>
- Aesthetics and Cognitive Science. Institut Jean Nicod, Paris. (January 2017-July 2017). <http://www.institutnicod.org/seminaires-colloques/seminaires/aecs-1025/>

II.c Reading Groups

(i) 1st year of PhD

➤ **Convened:**

- *Complex Systems, Brain and Consciousness*. Feb/Jun 2016.
- *Time, Experience, & Experiencing Time*. Co-convened with Dave Ingram, Oct/Nov 2016.

➤ **Attended:**

- *Composition as Identity*. November – February 2016. Organizer: Guglielmo Feis;

(ii) 2nd year of PhD

- *Social Cognition*. (October – December 2017). Milano. Convener: Anika Feibich.
- *Sense of the Self and De Se Thoughts*. (on Skype). Milano. Conveners: Davide Bordini, Valerio Buonomo.
- *Quine*. (January 2017-April 2017.). Paris. Convener: Geraldine Carrante.
- *Philosophy of Language*. (January 2017-June 2017). Paris. Conveners: Multiple.

II.d Colloquia and Conferences Attended

(i) 1st year of PhD

➤ **Colloquia and Conference organised by University of Milan and/or Doctoral School:**

- *Shame and Autonomy*. Carla Bagnoli, University of Modena & Reggio Emilia, Oct 20, 2015;
- *Evaluation day of Milan Doctoral School*, Dec 4/5, 2015;
- *Me, the Self and I. Multiple Approaches to the Unity of the Self*. PhD Graduate Conference, Jan 14/15, 2016;
- *Neuro-nest Mondays:*
 - Avoiding pain: brain responses to nociceptive stimuli and defensive movements. Giandomenico Iannetti (University College London), Mar 21, 2016;
 - Neural reuse in the evolution and development of the brain. Micheal L. Anderson (Franklin & Marshall College), Apr 4, 2016;
- *Seminar of Historical Epistemology:*
 - The Early Age of the Theory of Connections: At the Intersection of Geometry and Physics. Claudio Bartocci (Università di Genova), May 2, 2016;
 - The Controversial Polyp: The History of an Early Modern Disease Concept. Marco Bresadola (Università di Ferrara), May 17, 2016;
- *Distributed Responsibility in Networked Environments*. Luciano Floridi, May 4, 2016;

- *Explanation within and without Metaphysics*. International Workshop. CPT. May 12, 2016;
- *The role of mental imagery in our engagement with the visual arts*. Bence Nanay (University of Antwerp), Seminar of the Philosophy of Image, June 21, 2016;
- *Presentism*. International Meeting, Sep 12, 2016. Organizer: CPT;
- *Acting together: Coordination, Collective Goals, and Cooperation* - Warwick-Milan Workshop II, Sep 26/27, 2016. Organizer: CSSA;
- *The Philosophy Job Market*. Jonathan Tallant, Oct 14, 2016;
- *Constitution and Grounding in Philosophy of Science*. Ken Aizzawa, Oct 27, 2016;

➤ **External Colloquia and Conferences:**

- *Mind and Metaphysics*. International Conference, CEU, Budapest (Hungary), Jan 8/9, 2016;
- *The perception of transparency and the transparency of perception*. International conference, Turin, Italy, Apr 12/13, 2016;
- *Phenomenal Primitives*. Uriah Kriegel (Institut Jean Nicod, Paris). IUSS Pavia, May 6, 2016.

(ii) **2nd year of Phd**

➤ **Conferences and Workshops organised by University of Milan and/or Doctoral School:**

- *The Philosophy Job Market*. Jonathan Tallant, Oct 14, 2016;
- *Constitution and Grounding in Philosophy of Science*. Ken Aizzawa, Oct 27, 2016;
- Workshop '*Acting together: Coordination, Collective Goals, and Cooperation*' Warwick-Milan Workshop II. Centre for the Study of Social Action. Oct 9, 2017.

➤ **External Conferences and Workshops:**

- *Intentionality, Modality and Constitution*. Torino, Italy. Nov 10-11, 2017.
- *Phenomenal Intentionality*. Institut Jean Nicod, Paris France. March 13-14, 2017;
- Workshop '*Executive and Automatic Control of Skilled Action: how they Interface and Interact?*' Institut Jean Nicod, Paris France. May 11-12, 2017;
- *Workshop on Fiction*. Institut Jean Nicod, Paris France. May 22, 2017;
- *Philosophy of Moods*. Institut Jean Nicod, Paris France. June 21, 2017;
- *Fourth IAPT Meeting*. Gargnano del Garda, Italy, June 12/14, 2017;
- *Perceptual Awareness*. Institut Jean Nicod, Paris France. July 10-13, 2017.

(iii) **3rd year of PhD**

- *International Symposium 'Thinking In and About Time: A Dual Systems Perspective on Temporal Cognition'*. Milan, Italy. April 11-12, 2019

II.e Other Activities

- *CPT Brainstorming Sessions*. September 2016 - onwards.
- *'Pulse' Graduate Journal of History, Philosophy, and Sociology of Science*. Associate Editor for Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science. September 2016 - onwards.
- *Minorities and Philosophy Initiative*. Milano. November 2017- onwards.

III. Achievements

III.a Publications

- **'Unconscious Content: What is it like to think that P when there is nothing it is like'**, in *Phenomenology and Mind: Special Issue on Cognitive Phenomenology*, No.10. (2016). eds. A. Voltolini & E. Sacchi;
- Review of book **'Experiencing Time'**, by S. Prosser, in *International Studies in the Philosophy of Science* 30(4), 2016.

III.b Presentations on Conferences and Workshops

(i) 1st year of PhD

- *PSF 2016*, Dutch Academy for Philosophy of Science Triennial Meeting, Kaap Doorn, Utrecht, Netherlands. 'Holistic Approach to Functions'. May 19-21, 2016;
- *SIFA 2016*, Pistoia, Italy. 'Unconscious Content: What it is like to think that P when there is nothing it is like?' Sep 5-7, 2016;
- *II. International Conference on Philosophy of Mind: Thought & Perception*, Braga, Portugal. 'Unconscious Content: What it is like to think that P when there is nothing it is like?' Sep 21-22, 2016;

(ii) 2nd year of PhD

- *Evaluation Day of the Doctoral School in Philosophy and Human Sciences*. 'Unconscious Content: What is it like to think that P when there is nothing it is like'. Milan, Italy. Dec 12, 2017;
- *Consciousness and Introspection Seminar*. 'Composition of Phenomenal Intentionality'. Sorbonne, Paris, France. Mar 30, 2017;
- *Institut Jean Nicod*. 'Structure of Intentionality: Experiencing Psychological Modes'. Paris, France. June 27, 2017;
- Commentator on book symposium on "Humean Nature" with Neil Sinhababu (University of Singapore). Milan, Italy. Jul 19, 2017;

- *CEU Graduate Philosophy Conference*. 'Structure of Intentionality: Experiencing Psychological Modes'. Budapest, Hungary. Oct 13-14, 2017;
- *CEU WiP Seminar*. 'From Consciousness to Unconsciousness without an Attitude' Budapest, Hungary. Nov 24, 2017;
- *First Annual CUNY-Milan Interdisciplinary Workshop in Philosophy*. 'Against Unconscious Belief'. New York, US. Feb 14-15, 2018.

(iii) 3rd year of PhD

- 'The Subject of Temporal Experience'. *Philosophy of Time Society at the Pacific APA*, Vancouver, Canada, April 17-20, 2019.
- 'The Subject of Temporal Experience'. *Second CUNY-Milan Annual Interdisciplinary Workshop 'Tense'*, Milan, Italy, March 28-29, 2019;
- 'Structure of Intentionality: Experiencing Psychological Modes', *Rudolf-Carnap-Lectures*, Bochum, Germany, March 14-15, 2019;
- 'Subject of Temporal Experience and Introspection'. *Liege, Belgium*, March 11, 2019 (invited talk);
- 'The Subject of Experience'. *International Association for Philosophy of Time Annual conference 5*, June 2018, Seoul, Korea;

III.c Organisation

➤ **Seminars:**

(i) 1st year of PhD

- *Cognition in Action*. November 2015/May 2016. Co-organization with Corrado Sinigaglia and Sara Parmigiani. Talk(s) co-organized:
 - *Phenomenal Compositionality and Context Effects*. David Pitt (California State University), May 30, 2016;
- *Neurophilosophy LunchTime Seminar*. March/May 2016. Co-organization with Corrado Sinigaglia and Sara Parmigiani. Talk(s) co-organized:
 - *How Relevant is Neuroscience to Philosophy of Mind?* Işık Sarıhan (Central European University & University of Fribourg), March 23, 2016.
 - *The Problem with the 'Information' in Integrated Information Theory*. Garrett Mindt (Central European University), May 16, 2016;
- *Time-Methods Colloquia*. CPT. Talks(s) co-organized:
 - *Resolving Apparent and Theoretical Puzzles in Reflections on Time*. Apr22, 2016. Hanoch Ben-Yami (CEU, Budapest);
 - PhD course/talk '*Special Relativity: Some Central Ideas and Debates*'. Apr22, 2016. Hanoch Ben-Yami (CEU, Budapest);
- *Neurophilosophy LunchTime Seminar*. October 2016/January 2017. Co-organized with Daniele Cassaghi.

➤ **Workshops and conferences:**

- *Fregean Issues in Philosophy of Mathematics and Logics*. Oct 4, 2016. Co-organized with V. Buonomo and F. Baracco;

(ii) 2nd year of Phd

➤ **Seminars:**

- *Neurophilosophy LunchTime Seminar*. October 2016-January 2017. Co-organized with Daniele Cassaghi.

➤ **Workshops and conferences:**

- *Temporal Experience*. Nov 24-25, 2016. Co-organized with CPT;
- *First Annual CUNY-Milan Interdisciplinary Workshop in Philosophy*. Feb 14-15, 2018. CUNY, New York, US. Co-organized with Davide Bordini, Nick Young and CUNY Graduate Center.

(iii) 3rd year of PhD

- March 28-29, 2019. *Second CUNY-Milan Annual Interdisciplinary Workshop 'Tense'*, Milan, Italy. Co-organizer.
- June 2018. *International Association for Philosophy of Time Annual conference 5*, Seoul, Korea. Co-organizer.

III.d. Honors and Awards

- 2015 University of Milan and Italian Ministry of Education doctoral fellowship
- 2014 Full CEU MA Fellowship

III.e. Teaching Experience

- 2019, spring *Measuring Consciousness*, Undergrad and MA seminar

III.f. Professional Membership

- Dutch Society for Philosophy of Science
- Neurophilosophy Research Group, University of Milan
- Center for Philosophy of Time, University of Milan
- MAP – Minorities and Philosophy Chapter at Central European University member and founder of MAP Chapter at University of Milan
- Italian Society for Analytic Philosophy
- International Association for Philosophy of Time

III.e. Reviewer

- Dialectica
- International Studies in the Philosophy of Science
- Phenomenology and Mind
- 'Pulse' Graduate Journal of History, Philosophy, and Sociology of Science (Associate Editor for Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science, since September 2016)