Chapter One

Introduction

Daniel G. Zirker

The "Third Wave of Democracy" has had a decidedly mixed impact on the world's military establishments. An increasing appearance of "tribal behavior" and social isolation of military institutions in a post-conscription era, wars of attrition fought conservatively by volunteer forces against ethnic armies, religious tradition versus various versions of modernity, these patterns are rapidly becoming the hallmarks of our age. The end of the Cold War, and of ideology as a driving force of conflict has had profound impacts upon our understanding of socio-political development in virtually all parts of the world. In an important sense, identities—ethnic, religious, linguistic and even historic—have replaced the dichotomous ideological divide that characterized the Cold War. Social science axioms of that now almost-forgotten period have collapsed, along with the major "East Bloc" political systems, while pre-WWI obsessions with conceptualizations of culture, identity, religion and ethnicity have increasingly come to dominate political behavior.

These, in turn, are extraordinarily complex and slippery concepts[1] and are all part of a new period of nationalism and national secession[2] that has overtaken international politics. "Ethno-politics," with its dynamics and "rules," have increasingly dominated the politics of democratizing nations. National identities are challenged, secession has become the norm, and most governmental institutions now routinely struggle for fiscal and political autonomy as part of their survival strategies in an increasingly privatized world.

Military establishments are inevitably drawn into this struggle for institutional autonomy and, in culturally plural societies, into ethno-politics. The resultant growing insularity and advanced competencies naturally combine with their uniformly central mission to protect and preserve the nation, even

when that nation, because of profound ethnic pluralism, is difficult to identify as a single entity. The military must, in a sense, *become* the nation in order to preserve it, even if it does not, or cannot, reflect it accurately from a demographic perspective. As Alfred de Vigny observed in his nineteenth-century classic *Servitude et grandeur militaires*, "An army is a nation within a nation."[3] Morris Janowitz made the same point in more technical terms: "The military profession is more than an occupation; it is a complete style of life. The officer is a member of a community whose claims over his daily existence extend well beyond his official duties."[4] Those claims begin and end with the preservation of the nation . . . in one form or another.

Culture and its frozen counterpart, ethnicity, are profoundly enigmatic: They are at one and the same time difficult to define precisely in most cases, and yet all too static to those who must struggle against them in others. In attempting to understand the complex nexus of explanatory variables in general ethno-political terms, many observers have argued that *ethnicity* is either a *primordial sentiment*, a fundamental and irreducible cause of behavior, or, conversely, that it is yet another, albeit very effective, *instrument* to be manipulated in the interests of power. Conceptually, *primordialism* and *instrumentalism* represent mutually exclusive perspectives, or approaches, although in application they are typically indistinguishable and virtually always *combined* to some extent. That ethnicity is a significant—indeed, increasingly significant—explanatory variable in world politics is, at any rate, beyond dispute.

Decades ago Anthony D. Smith argued that the world was being engulfed by a growing emphasis upon ethnicity, that the ideological divide was fading, and that "nationalism . . . endows [this] ethnic revival with a scope and intensity which have no parallel in previous ages."[5] Developing countries have manifested particularly intense forms of ethnically based politics. The late Clifford Geertz, one of the best known "primordialists," observed that "a primordially based 'corporate feeling of oneness' remains for many . . . the meaning of the term 'self' in 'self-rule' . . . [and] is not easily . . . insulated from the web of primordial attachments."[6]

It appears to be increasingly relevant and useful to apply our growing understanding of the dynamics of ethnic politics, their tendency to relate back to close (perhaps primordial) personal attachments, to at least one institution—one of the most enigmatic—that exists within most democratizing countries: the *military*. Military institutions, particularly in new or newly revitalized democracies after the end of the Cold War, have just begun in some cases to evince their own, autonomous ethnic, or quasi-ethnic, identities. These involve a distinctive and separate ethos, often a separate or distinctive (frequently a colonial) language, and a separate technical terminology; a distinctive, if revisionist, "social" history, a separate mythology, a distinctive interpretation of nationalism, clear (and, for officers, often *ascrip-*

tive, that is, based on parental lineage, relatively unchangeable, or even almost compulsory) membership boundaries, and so on. We might even argue that this kind of autonomous institutional development will be necessary in the future to compete effectively for political power and resources in a new world of privatized budgets, declining "orthodox military missions"[7] and ethno-politics.

The following chapters explore military establishments as competitive institutions in seven democratizing countries. Some of these have, of necessity, begun to model themselves, either consciously or unconsciously, as "quasi-ethnic" entities, in some senses "nations within nations," in order to establish institutional autonomy and competitiveness, secure budgets, achieve and retain political power, or, in at least one case, to serve as a vanguard nationalizing example. We have chosen to use the thoughts of several classic writers of the 1950s and 1960s on ethnicity (e.g., Clifford Geertz, Paul Brass and Cynthia Enloe) and on the military and politics (e.g., Ruth First, Cynthia Enloe, Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz) to draw some of our conclusions regarding military behavior in this largely uncharted area. Understanding the ethnic tendencies of military institutions in deeply divided, multi-ethnic societies may well shed light on future patterns of civil-military relations in democratizing countries.

Ethnicity

Why begin to examine military institutions in the context of ethnic behavior? The central thesis of this study is that the fundamental behavior patterns associated with ethnicity in the post-Cold War era may well relate directly to the problems—and promise—of military establishments in their inevitable competition for power and resources in new, and newly revitalized, democracies. The dynamics and "rules" of ethno-politics increasingly predominate in multi-ethnic democratizing countries in the post-Cold War era. Military institutional identity, reinforced by technical and technological competency, along with the narrow code of military discipline, and with uniforms and guns, easily becomes pervasive and fixed. Legitimacy, often based on tradition, is obviously enhanced when traditions have quickly and efficiently been fit to purpose, "invented"[8] as it were.

By *ethnicity* we mean *a sense of shared common descent and/or history*,[9] largely a perception. While ethnicity, then, may seem less than concrete in this interpretation, it is important to reiterate that ethnic identity, indeed, all identity, is first and foremost a *perception*, and as Professor Paul Brass has observed, it invariably involves a *claim* to status.[10] Another observer has stressed that identity has been a "fundamental source of meaning and recognition throughout human history . . . . a founding structure of social differen-

tiation, and social recognition, as well as of discrimination, in many contemporary societies, from the United States to Sub-Saharan Africa."[11]

There is one relevant aspect to identity that must be added to an understanding of ethnicity in the context of this study, and that is *territory*. Linda Bishai noted in this regard that while "the boundaries of identity can be constituted through language, religion, race, and culture, the modern state has confirmed territory as the key boundary."[12] It was the state, then, that came to define the security perspective, the borders, of national, and all-too-often *ethnic*, identity. This emphasis upon territory guaranteed, and continues to guarantee, the role of the state as a gatekeeper—or even progenitor[13]—of the ethnic identity or identities of the "nation," broadly defined.[14] The "orthodox" role of the military, protecting the nationals within their borders from invasion by a foreign country, is easily confused with another, very different "national" mission, *irredentism*, invading neighboring territory containing one's own nationals (ostensibly to "re-unite" them), as Hitler and the *Wehrmacht* graphically demonstrated at the outbreak of WWII. Moreover, national military establishments, as the monopolies within their societies over the legitimate use of force, are implicitly involved in these elements of state politics.

The primordial nature of ethnicity as a causal variable is at the heart of these observations. *Primordialism* is the condition in which ethnic identity is a taken as a necessary and sufficient causal variable in social and political interactions, a complete cause.[15] Moreover it can be, and often is,[16] a corrosive and destructive force as regards civil society: "It . . . gives to the problem variously called tribalism, parochialism, communalism, and so on, a more ominous and deeply threatening quality than most of the other, also very serious and intractable problems the new states face."[17] Primordialists argue that ethnic identity simply *is*, that its practical and pernicious ramifications are basic to the human psyche, as pernicious and destructive as they may be.

While a primordial interpretation of ethnic attachments may predict behavior accurately, it should, in our view, be qualified by two other understandings of the causal, and therefore political, nature of ethnicity. As per the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, when one observes ethnic identity from *situational* and *instrumental* perspectives, it is difficult, perhaps even impossible, to regard it as the fundamental cause of behavior. A *situational ethnic identity* is perhaps best explained in the highly multi-ethnic environment of Africa. A person living in an African country is, at one and the same time, the member of a family, a clan, a dialect-speaking group, a specific religious group, a broader religious grouping, a larger language group, a citizen of a country, a person from a region of Africa (e.g., British West Africa), a specific "racial" and ethnic type (Ibo, for example, as opposed to Hausa-Fulani), a person from Nigeria, from Africa (e.g., when in Europe), a

"black," and so on. Each of these possible identities can be very strong, depending of course on the context. The "primordial" nature of each of these ties simply evaporates in an unfavorable situational context. Ethnic identity is simply not primordial in this example, except, perhaps, in very limited contexts.

The *instrumentalist* perspective is also fraught with inconsistencies. From an instrumentalist perspective, "ethnicity is a plastic, variegated, and originally ascriptive trait that, in certain historical and socioeconomic circumstances, is readily politicized." Natural ethnic attachments, seen in this light, "generate many political entrepreneurs with a conscious and realistic interest in mobilizing ethnicity . . . into political leverage for the purpose of altering or reinforcing such systems of structured inequality between and among ethnic categories."[18] Put simply, there is profit to be made when people make use of this natural weakness for ethnic attachments. The instrumental interpretations leave one key, unanswered question, however: Why, if ethnic identity is so malleable and easily manipulated, is it sufficiently compelling repeatedly to support selfish and blatantly instrumental purposes?

It is clear that ethnic identity "causes" political and social behavior, which in turn yields political outcomes. Furthermore, virtually all observers agree that ethnic identity is, to a large—but not exclusive—extent, *ascriptive* in nature.[19] It has deeply psychological elements, a tendency toward primordialism, and yet, in specific contexts can be seen to be primarily situational, and/or readily subject to instrumental manipulation. As American political scientist and communications theorist Harold Lasswell once wrote, politics is "who gets what, when and how." Ethnicity is easily politicized, and an ideal vehicle to determine who gets what, when and how.

The Military as a Potential Quasi-Ethnic Group

It is important to reemphasize that *culture* and *ethnicity* are extraordinarily slippery concepts[20] and are all too easily reified. In examining what we have chosen to call *quasi-ethnicity* for purposes of understanding the separate and frequently antagonistic worldviews of military establishments in new and newly revitalized democracies, qualified and flexible definitions would seem to be most appropriate. By *quasi-ethnicity*, we mean to say *behavior that mirrors* or *replicates* in some important ways *a sense of shared common descent and/or history*. Perceptions are extraordinarily important in this regard. Examples abound of groups of shared biological and historical descent who nonetheless regard themselves as alien and apart. Major ethno-religious groups in Bosnia would fit this category. On the other hand, there are cases of dozens of groups that evince very different cultural and historical backgrounds but, for recent historical or linguistic reasons, regard themselves as part of a single ethnic grouping. Tanzania would be a good example of this.

A sense of "otherness," so much a part of the human psyche, goes to the heart of forging the sense of "sameness" in ethnic and, I propose, quasi-ethnic identity. An ethnic group, it seems, almost has to feel embattled to forge its identity.[21]

Quasi-ethnicity, as we suggest the use of the term, represents a common identity that might be located on a relational continuum somewhere between culture, broadly construed, and fixed ethnicity. Brass argues that there are "three ways of defining ethnic groups—in terms of objective attributes, with reference to subjective feelings, and in relation to behavior."[22] A cursory view of military establishments in new democracies would point to some extent to the possible presence of all of these, at least in some cases. A sense of a shared and necessary worldview, common institutional and national cultures, a common enemy or enemies, a sanctified group mission, and even a special language along with a jargon verging on a *patois*, are all part of this.[23] Strict controls over entry and departure from group membership, the *ascriptive* element, reinforce the sense of separate identity, as do a sometimes revisionist or even invented institutional history, in some cases a common struggle, myths and preferred ideology or mindset. All of these elements are available to a military establishment.

In the post-Cold War setting, developing countries have tended to respond to ethnic attachments with ethno-political competition, even among national institutions, as a central political *leitmotif*. Geertz noted in the 1960s that in developing countries "primordial attachments tend, as Nehru observed, to be repeatedly, in some cases almost continually, proposed and widely acclaimed as preferred bases for the demarcation of autonomous political units."[24] It is the invention, or creation, of separate identities of military institutions that is the nub of the argument in this volume. Military establishments, particularly in newly democratizing, multi-ethnic systems, increasingly compete for power and resources *via* specific strategies, sometimes conscious, sometimes apparently unconscious, reverting to an almost atavistic form of tribalism, establishing quasi-ethnic membership bases, and using that unity, institutional autonomy and renewed sense of purpose to compete effectively, calling on their discipline, technical competency and guns, for institutional power and resources.

Military institutions already manifest many of the characteristics of ethnic groups, although these factors are occasionally modified through "professionalism" in developed countries, hence the suggested designation of "quasi-ethnicity." The frankly ascriptive elements in military membership, including the common insistence in less developed countries upon family, clan and ethnic group background, along with seniority in promotion and assignment in the all-important officer corps, further reinforce this, while potentially alienating other status groups in civilian society.[25] In most new and newly revitalized democracies, the general characteristics of the military organiza-

tion stands out in stark contrast to civilian society.[26] This may be true in developed societies as well. As Janowitz noted in his study of the United States, "The military community is a relatively closed community where professional and residential life has been completely intermingled."[27] This separateness, even isolation, of military personnel, and particularly the military officers, can become an instrument of force modernization, but it comes at a cost.

Military establishments in new and revitalized democracies also tend to evince a monopoly of technical expertise in their countries, and their relative isolation includes the isolation of skills and competencies. They also evince separate symbols, not the least striking of which are *uniforms*, a distinctive ideological orthodoxy, or at least mindset, and, in many cases, remnants within the ranks of a distinctive military-associated customs, often a holdover from colonial times, such as the preference for a "martial race."[28] Technical expertise, the relative institutional stability of most military organizations, their likely history of foreign military training, and frequent contributions to civic action projects may tend to "justify" their feelings of superiority and separateness *vis-à-vis* civil society.

Separate military symbols can also be very powerful. Equipment, and continual use of even very basic equipment, such as military boots, if unavailable to average citizens, may temporarily "brand" soldiers, even soldiers in mufti.[29] Moreover, an ideological orthodoxy, which does not preclude the existence of strident—even bitter—ideological factions within the officer corps, stems largely from such factors as the army's relatively weak institutional *raison d'être* in the first place, the typically weak position of the newly democratizing nation within the global economic system, and an often embarrassing institutional dependence upon foreign military assistance.[30]

Military organizational patterns may also contribute to the quasi-ethnic character of military institutions, particularly in their emphasis upon *primary groups*. In Janowitz's interpretation, these have received, and should have received, the most attention as keys to organizational effectiveness.[31] Military establishments in new democracies must have, through actual history or myth, a special bond of danger and heroism that brings them together.[32] Moreover, the common background and environment of soldiers should only reinforce this.[33] While the instrumentality of such bonds may be transparent, their cultural or proto-cultural effects may be the same. Thus, under embattled circumstances, military establishments do achieve at least some of the characteristics of *ethnic movements*, creating an intensified separateness from their larger national political system and society. When coupled with their monopoly over the means of coercion, such circumstances would seem to lend themselves readily to military intervention, an ultimate form of military autonomy, at least in the short term.

What do we really know about identity formation and ethnic competition, however, and how might this relate to a greater understanding of civil-military relations if, indeed, military organizations in new and newly revitalized democracies can increasingly be seen as quasi-ethnic entities?

Quasi-Ethnicity and Civil-Military Relations in New Nations

The "New World Order" has emphasized a global departure from ideological identities and a return to many of the concerns and conditions of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Ideological struggles have thus given way to the establishment and assertion of ethnic and religious identities, renewing cultural and ethnic attachments. In discussing contemporary Europe, Bishai argues, moreover, that identity and security have become inextricably linked, adding that "it is essential to recognize the mutual impact that security and identity have on the nature of both states and societies."[34] Military establishments necessarily play a key role in both of these areas. In this rapid and transparent creation of tribal identities, use is made of "building materials from history, from geography, from biology, from productive and reproductive institutions, from collective memory and from personal fantasies, from power apparatuses and religious revelations." Nevertheless, "individuals, social groups, and societies process all these materials, and rearrange their meaning, according to social determinations and cultural projects that are rooted in their social structure, and in their space/time framework."[35]

The mixture of security and identity concerns, moreover, represents a potentially troubling formula. As Bishai observes, "When group identity and security [are] created by the state, the result is a system which privileges the identities which exert the most political power."[36] The electoral machinery of new democracies, in other words, must expect almost immediately to begin receiving challenges from military establishments. The struggle over missions and budgets typically initiates this political contestation.

The quasi-ethnic identity of a military establishment might well feed upon class interests. Military officers (and even recruits) in new democracies have come in the past from middle and lower-middle class backgrounds, from rural areas, and from geographically remote regions.[37] There are numerous social and economic reasons for this. One result relates directly to the use of the military as a political force: it establishes a separateness that is openly conducive to social control. An alternative explanation is that the adoption of a quasi-ethnic identity within an army should directly address a significant institutional vulnerability: the development of ethnic divisions among military ranks. If an organization comes to be dominated by such schisms, its ability to function effectively and within unified policy objectives would seem to be compromised. The struggle for power and resources in newly democratizing multi-ethnic countries, and those engaged in demo-

cratic renewal, is usually intense. The trump cards in most instances of ethno-politics are unity and commitment. Military establishments manifest these traits in spades.

Cases

West Africa represents a study in contrasts. West African countries have a multitude of ethnic groups, and military establishments have typically fought bloody civil wars with ethnic bases. This was the case in Nigeria, where the secession of Biafra led to a bloody, multi-year conflict and the deaths of millions of people. The Nigerian military today struggles to defend the country against Boko Haram, a northern Islamist extremist group, in part because of a preponderance of ethnic northerners in its officer corps and enlisted ranks. It has obviously been unable to develop a separate military identity, although Ibikunle Adeakin argues in his chapter that it seems to be approaching the point of developing one. Guinea, as Mamadou Diouma Bah's chapter explains, while dominated by traditional ethnic groups and a tradition of inter-ethnic violence, has apparently successfully established a separate military identity. Unlike virtually all of its West African neighbors, it has not had a civil war, has maintained a high level of military effectiveness, and although not noted for its respect for human rights, has had, relatively speaking, a degree of civil peace, mostly under a unified military dictatorship.

East Africa presents the most varied and interesting cases of post-independence military adaptation regarding quasi-ethnicity and the challenges of civil-military relations. Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania experienced simultaneously the East African military mutiny of 1964, mostly over pay disputes and rumors that British officers would be retained indefinitely in what was then a single (albeit, lightly partitioned) unit, the East African Rifles. Although the mutiny was quickly settled in three different ways, over the next thirty years each of the three new military establishments responded very differently, as chapters in this volume illustrate. In Tanzania, where the mutiny was arguably the worst, and students and workers threatened to join in a revolt to overthrow the young Tanganyikan government, the Tanganyikan Rifles were completely disestablished once British troops were brought in to quell the revolt. The colonial military was replaced with a wholly new institution, the Tanzanian People's Defence Force (TPDF), comprised entirely of highly ideological and nationalistic officers and enlisted men, all of whom were recruited exclusively from the Tanganyika African National Union, the revolutionary party founded by the nation's first leader, Julius Nyerere, who had been deeply embarrassed by the mutiny. Kiswahili was established as the sole institutional language of the TPDF, national and technological development through education became its primary institutional focus, and the export of these values to the nation became its long-term strategy. Thus, al-

though the TPDF had adopted by invention a quasi-ethnic identity, it was not adopted for purposes of creating institutional autonomy for the military. Rather, as the chapter explains, the military was conceived as a vanguard agency focused on creating a culture and identity that could, and ultimately was, spread to and adopted by all Tanzanians. The TPDF apparently used its quasi-ethnic identity as a *vanguard force* for change.

Uganda's response to the 1964 mutiny was to concede completely to the pay demands of the mutineers, to retain the preexisting military structures, soldiers and officers, and in effect to set the stage for the 1971 military coup of General Idi Amin and his Nubian ethnic group. Britain, the colonial power, had staffed the enlisted ranks of the Ugandan Rifles with these Nilotes, or Nubians, a group of Nilotic and Sudanic peoples originally from the north, regarded in their relatively new tribal affinities as a "martial race," who had come from tribes in Sudan and Somalia and had reinvented their identities around a religion (Islam), distinctive dress and loose and relatively recent "tribal" customs. Most Ugandans were of sub-Saharan African, or Bantu, origins. The Nubians, Nilotic peoples, had been dominated after WWI in Uganda by the much larger and more powerful Bantu-origin Baganda and Banyankole ethnic groups, had been directed within the colonial military by Bantu non-commissioned officers, and only very gradually attained command positions. In 1971, when a key line commander, Chief of Staff Major General Idi Amin, overthrew the government of President Milton Obote, one of his first moves was to reinforce Kiswahili as the official language of the army, while especially rewarding speakers of Kinubi, and to begin a widespread purge on non-Nilotic officers and enlisted men. This rapid move to establish a distinctive military identity, however, was one of narrowing traditional enrollments until only those traditional groups absolutely loyal to him remained. While it was a move to achieve complete military autonomy and political domination of Uganda, it bore little relation to the invention of a new quasi-ethnic identity. When Yoweri Museveni finally came to power in 1986, stabilizing the system, he openly favored senior bureaucrats and military officers from *his tribe*, the Banyankole, hence perpetuating this pattern of traditional ethnic domination through the military. He has played a careful balancing game ever since while fighting a succession of ethnically based civil wars, mostly against dispossessed northerners.

Kenya's independence in December 1964 was concurrent with the East African mutiny, and thus left its first political leaders largely unscathed by the event. Jomo Kenyatta, the first post-independence leader of Kenya, and a Kikuyu, initiated and followed a careful manipulation of the ethnic balance of the Kenyan military that elevated Kikuyu officers to the top ranks. Subsequent leaders have followed suit, appointing their ethnic group to key military positions. Nevertheless, the military has been excluded from internal security duties. The result has been a largely professional military establish-

ment, albeit one that has been commanded by senior officers from the president's ethnic group, that has not intervened in politics. Rather, ethno-politics, with a good deal of inter-ethnic violence, has dominated the presidential political agenda, and continues to do so today, although *without* military participation.

Algeria is prototypical of several North African countries. Its revolution in the early 1960s created a military establishment that was unified, nominally ideological and secular. Nevertheless, as Yassine Belkamel argues, it was gradually co-opted by corrupt, foreign-trained officers who turned on the democratic processes in the late 1980s and early 1990s, at the cost of hundreds of thousands of deaths. The unique identity and autonomy of the Algerian military, in this case, served the military well, but dealt harsh and repeated blows to the multi-ethnic society in Algeria. The Berbers, in particular, a majority, were largely excluded from the political life of the country.

Paulo Gustavo Pellegrino Correa explores the dynamics of the military in tiny Suriname, the only non-African case in our study, and the most recent new nation. The retention of some elements of Dutch military culture, the resistance to dominant ethnic politics by the military in the new nation, and the desire to create a safe platform for nefarious and apparently criminal activities led to a bloody military coup and the charismatic and personalistic military dictatorship of Dési Bouterse, 1980–1987. Implicated in the murder of fifteen young critics of his dictatorship, and convicted in absentia by a Dutch court in 1999 of drug trafficking, Bouterse was elected president in 2010. The role of the military, set apart from the myriad of ethnic communities in Suriname in its unique cultural adaptation, is of central interest in this regard.

CONCLUSION

The increasingly "tribal" behavior of many military establishments is almost undeniable. The suggestion, however, that military establishments under certain circumstances may evince quasi-ethnic identities has preeminently political implications, and is thus inevitably provocative. As Abner Cohen has noted, "Contemporary ethnicity is the result of intensive interaction between ethnic groupings and not the result of complete separatism."[38] That interaction is inevitably political. While military identity-formation appears to be strengthened to some extent in an environment of relative isolation, its exercise is best appreciated in conditions of social conflict. Such interactions, often conflicts, among other ethnic entities have frequently involved xenophobia, hatred and, ultimately, violence. At the very least, this is a worrying feature of contemporary civil-military relations.

From a primordialist perspective, the military *qua* ethnic group suggests an intractable budgetary foe in the legislative process, an even more strident opponent of particular foreign and domestic policies, and even a self-righteous intervening force in the nation's political processes. From an instrumentalist perspective, a military establishment *qua* quasi-ethnicity may represent a trump card in the increasingly difficult game of ethno-politics. Neither of these alternatives is particularly attractive to the modern democratizing state. Each raises a key question: What do we know about ethno-politics? Rothschild has argued that "politicized ethnicity often erodes the legitimacy of a state and the effectiveness of the state's apparatus, and while it sometimes triggers and even spearheads anti-regime and anti-governmental violence, it ordinarily does not supply the follow-through conceptual model for major, historic, systemic social revolutions."[39] It tends, in other words, to be reactionary. Moreover, it also tends to be intensely changeable,[40] and hence unpredictable. Finally, it tends to be violent and, apparently, increasingly so. Anthony D. Smith noted in the 1980s, in a pattern that appears to be progressing today, that "interethnic conflict has become more intense and endemic in the twentieth century than at any time in history."[41]

Nationalism, the silent figure lurking behind this analysis, is perhaps its most important point. The era of the national security states in Latin America (and, to a lesser extent, in Asia) is apparently finished, although indications are that the military establishments in newly democratizing countries are experiencing a new wave of nationalistic fervor. Anti-globalism and economic collapse are increasingly feeding upon more intense "democratic" politics in many countries. The "Arab Spring" is but one such phenomenon. If, indeed, military establishments occasionally adopt quasi-ethnic identities, they also more frequently appear to assume the role of hyper-nationalists. This is threatening to democracy. More importantly, perhaps, while such behavior may resolve a local institutional dilemma, it ultimately threatens world peace.

NOTES

1. Raymond Williams noted, for example, that "culture is one of the two or three most complicated words in the English language." Williams, *Keywords* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 8.
2. Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Revival* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 18.
3. Vigny, Alfred de, *Servitude et grandeur militaires* (Gloucestershire, UK: Clarendon Press, 1907).
4. Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (New York: Free Press, 1971).
5. Smith, *The Ethnic Revival*, 19.
6. Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States," in *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa*, ed. Geertz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 120.

7. Meaning defense of the borders against invasion by a recognizable foreign country, increasingly a rarity in the twenty-first century.

8. See, in this regard: Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.). *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

9. We are indebted to Professor Emeritus Paul Brass, of the University of Washington, for this understanding of the complex concept of ethnicity.

10. "Ethnicity and ethnic identity . . . involves, in addition to subjective self-consciousness, a claim to status and recognition, either as a superior group or as a group at least equal to other groups. Ethnicity is to ethnic category what class consciousness is to class." Paul Brass, "Ethnic Groups and Ethnic Identity Formation," in *Ethnicity*, ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 86.

11. Manuel Castells, *The Power of Identity* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997), 53.

12. Linda S. Bishai, "Secession and Security: The Politics of Ethno-Cultural Identity," *Security and Identity in Europe: Exploring the New Agenda*, ed. Lisbeth Aggestam and Adrian Hyde-Price (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 158.

13. Geertz noted that "it is the very process of the formation of a sovereign civil state that, among other things, stimulates sentiments of parochialism, communalism, racialism, and so on, because it introduces into society a valuable new prize over which to fight and a frightening new force with which to contend." "The Integrative Revolution," 120.

14. Geertz maintained that "to an increasing degree national unity is maintained not by calls to blood and land but by a vague, intermittent, and routine allegiance to a civil state, supplemented to a greater or lesser extent by governmental use of police powers and ideological exhortation." "The Integrative Revolution," 110. The trend that Geertz described in the 1960s may well be in a process of reversal today, with appeals by states increasingly based upon such ethnic identifiers as religion, culture, and . . . a sense of shared common descent.

15. Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution," 109.

16. At least in the view of primordialist observers.

17. Geertz. "The Integrative Revolution," 111.

18. Joseph Rothschild, *Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), 1–2.

19. This premise can also be qualified. The Nubians of Uganda, for example, are often cited as an "invented" ethnic group. However, the "invention of ethnicity," like the invention of culture and of tradition, is common. The ascriptive elements quickly pertain. See, in this regard: Roy Wagner, *The Invention of Culture* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981); Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

20. I am using the term *culture* here as a broader construct that encompasses ethnicity.

21. In Bishai's estimate, "Identities are formed on many levels, but it is the ethno-cultural group which is most threatened by state politics." "Secession and Security" 160.

22. Brass, "Ethnic Groups," 85.

23. The "modernization" of military establishments, and their acquisition of nuclear weapons, may actually exacerbate this tendency toward apartness. Janowitz, in describing the U.S. military, argues, "the boundaries of the military as a social organization are more than the mental definitions that its members create. The realities of military strategy, the admixture of weapons systems and politico-military rules for employing them, have served gradually since 1945 (and more decisively since 1960) to limit the trend toward civilianization. A national defense strategy which relies on nuclear weapons produces a military force with increasingly distinct boundaries." Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (New York: Free Press, 1971), xvi.

24. Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution," 110.

25. Janowitz and Little comment on the "vestiges of ascriptive status and authority in the form of seniority as a criterion of assignment and promotion [that] remain to complicate the incorporation of new skill groups. The dilemmas of authority based on ascription versus achievement exist in all organizations. But it is a recurrent civilian perspective that the military establishment underemphasizes achievement in order to maintain traditional forms and the

privileges of authority." Morris Janowitz and Roger Little. *Sociology and the Military Establishment* (New York: Sage, 1965), 31.

26. According to Janowitz, "Cohesion—the feeling of group solidarity and the capacity for collective action—is an essential aspect of the military profession's internal organization that conditions its political behavior." Janowitz, *Military Institutions and Coercion in Developing Nations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 143.

27. Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, 177–178.

28. E.g., in Uganda in the 1970s, the Nubians dominated the military ranks. There are many other cases like this. Cynthia Enloe notes that "almost every multi-ethnic society has one or two groups that have been stereotyped as being prone to, or adept at, soldiering." Enloe, "Ethnic Soldiers," in *Ethnicity*, ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 282. She concluded that these were often vulnerable ethnic groups, unable to resist "assignment" to this least favorable task, and not necessarily "warriors" by tradition.

29. In West Africa, for example, military deserters have been identified by the distinctive calluses left on their shins by military boots worn without socks.

30. Janowitz cautioned: "It is not possible to speak of an ideology among military officers in the new nations. Instead . . . because of diversity rooted in cultural and historical background, it is possible only to speak of some more or less common ideological themes . . . . at the core of these themes is a strong sense of nationalism and national identity, with pervasive overtones of xenophobia. In varying degree, this outlook adheres to the military as a profession. Profession and career seem to produce few experiences which work to counter this xenophobia." *Military Institutions and Coercion*, 139.

31. Janowitz and Little. *Sociology and the Military Establishment*, 77.

32. In Janowitz's estimate, "Social cohesion in primary groups is influenced by the proximity of danger and the importance of the mission which the group is assigned. Up to a point, as the threat of the danger increases and as the importance of the mission becomes apparent, the social cohesion of primary groups increases." *Sociology and the Military Establishment*, 85.

33. According to Janowitz, "Social cohesion in primary groups, military or other, is affected by two separate sets of factors: the social background and personality of group members and the immediate social situation. In the military establishment common social background assists the members in developing intimate personal relations; similarities in previous social experience such as social class, regional origin, or age supply a meaningful basis for responding to military life." *Sociology and the Military Establishment*, 80.

34. Bishai, "Secession and Security," 154. Bishai concludes: "Only by understanding how deeply intertwined are the manifestations of security and identity can we explain the existential cloud which hovers over Europe today."

35. Castells, *The Power of Identity*, 7.

36. Bishai, "Secession and Security," 160.

37. Janowitz noted in the 1970s that "in the new nations, the military establishment is recruited from the middle and lower-middle classes, drawn mainly from rural areas or hinterlands." *Military Institutions and Coercion*, 104.

38. Cohen, "Ethnicity and Politics," in *Ethnicity*, ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 83.

39. Rothschild, *Ethnopolitics*, 243.

40. Rothschild, *Ethnopolitics*, 229: "the political salience of ethnic cultures and the quality of allegiance to them change across historical time and across the spectrum of types of states."

41. Smith, *The Ethnic Revival*, 10.

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