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## Guest editor's presentation&

(Presentación del editor)

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Editing this special issue has been a rewarding experience. Every person involved was enthusiastic about the project. I wish to thank the authors of the papers for their excellent contributions and the anonymous reviewers for their efficiency and generosity. I also wish to thank Agustín Vicente, María José García Encinas, and Antonio Diéguez for their support, and my friend Alfonso Conde for his participation in the project during its early stages. María José contributed to the preparation of the issue during the whole editorial process, and for that I am especially grateful to her. My work on this issue was supported by the MEIC (Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad), Spanish Government, Excelencia programme project no. FFI2016-80636-P.

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I am glad to present to the readers of *Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History, and the Foundations of Science* this special issue devoted to the intellectual legacy of the American philosopher Jerry Alan Fodor (1935-2017).

Jerry Fodor was born and raised in New York City. In 1956, he earned his bachelor's degree at Columbia University and four years later he received his Ph.D. in Philosophy from Princeton University. He held teaching positions at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the City University of New York, and Rutgers University. Over the course of fifty-five years, he authored (or co-authored) thirteen books¹ and more than one hundred articles. Fodor's published work had a significant impact on cognitive psychology and the philosophy of mind. In his most influential writings, he defended substantive views about the nature and structure of the mind—views like the computational theory of mental processes and the modular theory of cognitive architecture—and criticized various theories and doctrines such as behaviorism, connectionism, inferencial role semantics, semantic holism, and Darwinism.²

The present issue of *Theoria* puts together five papers written by seven distinguished scholars. These papers discuss some of Fodor's major contributions to the philosophy of mind, including his language of thought hypothesis, his theoretical arguments for that hypothesis, his approach to concept acquisition, and his defense of the autonomy of psychology. There are, of course, other Fodorian topics that are not examined in this special issue. It is my hope that the issue will give its readers a motivation to keep thinking about the ideas that Fodor insightfully explored in his books and papers.

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I am excluding the books that collect previously published articles (Fodor, 1981, 1990, 1998b; Fodor and Lepore, 2002) and the books which Fodor co-edited (Fodor and Katz, 1964; Fodor and Lepore, 1994).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> For a list of Fodor's publications (up to the year 2000) and various interesting documents—including some obituaries and remembrances—see his personal website (https://ruccs.rutgers.edu/jerry) at the Rutgers University Center for Cognitive Science. To get a glimpse of the impact of Fodor's work in terms of number of citations, you can take a look at his Google Scholar profile (https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=HeKBobAAAAAJ).

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