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## OPERATION MARKET GARDEN

### STRATEGIC MASTERSTROKE OR BATTLE OF THE EGOS?

by

Dr. Martin Watts, BA (Hons.) PhD, Sessional Lecturer, Canterbury Christ Church University. June 2012.

In September 1944, the allies undertook the largest ever airborne operation, apparently in an effort to capitalise on the German withdrawal from France and Belgium and end the war in the west by encircling the Ruhr. But what really lay behind this most audacious and daring attempt to finish the war in 1944? Inter allied rivalry, at the highest levels of military command, and the pursuit of personal ambition, will be discussed to reveal some of the reasons for failure and the post war bitterness it engendered.

By 1944, the Anglo – American alliance against Germany was firmly focussed on the invasion of France. The subsequent success of the landings in Normandy was recognised by Eisenhower, Bradley and Patton as owing much to Montgomery, and the allies succeeded in reaching all of their objectives within the 90 days of the Overlord plan. The victory in Normandy, which inflicted more casualties upon German forces than in North Africa and Stalingrad, might be viewed as the pinnacle of Montgomery's achievements in the Second World War. Nevertheless, the failure to take Caen within 24 hours of the landings, as originally planned, and the consequent slowness of the advance in the eastern sector – which created the time and space for the American advance from the west - began to sow the seeds of allied ill-feeling relatively early in the campaign. This was an unnecessary situation, borne out of Montgomery's success in maintaining the siege of Caen, thus deliberately attracting German reserves towards the British and Canadian forces. In response to press criticism of the British 'stickiness' around the city,

Montgomery, who can hardly have been expected to reveal the truth about this strategy to create the conditions for an American breakout from the west, nevertheless overemphasised the importance of the attacks on Caen. This, rather unfortunately, created an impression of failure rather than success, effectively reinforcing the unfair national stereotypes that became associated with the 'defensive' attributes of the British and the 'offensive' qualities of the Americans. Montgomery's own reputation had been built upon the careful preparation of his forces in readiness for the execution of a meticulously planned operation. At Caen, this helped to obscure the flexibility he demonstrated upon realising that the swift taking of the city would actually undermine his overall strategy for the battle of Normandy. By insisting that everything always went according to plan, and concentrating on the importance of Caen as an objective, Montgomery, to some extent, came close to being hoisted by his own petard. As indicated above, the result of this episode, as far as the allies were concerned, was to lay the foundations of a certain amount of ill feeling between senior commanders. In the words of Omar Bradley, the commander of the US 12<sup>th</sup> Army Group:

... the frustration they (*the British*) experienced here at Caen produced an extreme sensitivity to Patton's speedy advance across France. In setting the stage for our breakout the British were forced to endure the barbs of critics who shamed them for failing to push out as vigorously as the Americans did. The intense rivalry that afterward strained relations between the British and American commands might be said to have sunk its psychological roots into that passive mission of the British on the beachhead. <sup>i</sup>

With the breakout from Normandy complete, the Allied armies in France now found themselves in a similar situation to the German forces who had reached Abbeville in 1940, where the lack of an immediate follow up plan prevented them from making the most, in

strategic terms, of this success. Given the scale and increasing speed of the German retreat this is hardly surprising. Three significant problems now presented themselves to the allied direction of the war in the west, whilst Bradley's and Montgomery's troops were racing through eastern France. Firstly, the question of command of the land forces, secondly, the determination of strategy and thirdly, the problem of logistics and supply.

The selection of Montgomery tasked, as land force commander under Eisenhower, with the ultimate planning and execution of Overlord, in addition to commanding the British and Canadian 21<sup>st</sup> Army Group, was a sound acknowledgment of his ability and experience. As mentioned earlier, all of the American commanders, including Eisenhower, attributed the success of this massive undertaking to Montgomery. His appointment as land force commander, however, was only ever meant to be of a temporary nature, lasting until Eisenhower's SHAEF was firmly established in France, concomitant with the activation of the US 12<sup>th</sup> Army Group as the equivalent of the 21<sup>st</sup> Army Group. The basis of this command structure lay in a meeting between Churchill and Roosevelt at Casablanca in 1943, where they had agreed the principle that command would lie with the nation that contributed the majority of forces. The forthcoming arrival of further American armies into France, the combat and command experience gained by the Americans during and after Overlord, ensured that, on the 1 September 1944, when Eisenhower himself added this field command to his overall responsibilities as Supreme Commander, Montgomery stepped down. To Montgomery, this decision was militarily unsound. In common with his British superior, Alanbrooke, Montgomery had a poor opinion of American generalship and military doctrine, and particularly decried Eisenhower's lack of command experience. For example, Alanbrooke's diary entry of 27 July 1944 contains the following passage:

There is no doubt that Ike is all out to do all he can to maintain the best of relations between British and Americans, but it is equally clear that Ike knows nothing about strategy and is quite unsuited to the post of Supreme

Commander as far as running the strategy of the war is concerned!<sup>ii</sup>

Alanbrooke and Montgomery may, militarily speaking, have had a point, but Montgomery in particular failed to appreciate the bigger political picture, and the realities of running an allied coalition made up of forces subject to the control of two independent democracies. For as much as Montgomery was championed by Alanbrooke, so was Eisenhower by Marshall, and it is of interest to note that both Alanbrooke and Marshall believed that the command of the invasion should have been theirs, but neither Churchill nor Roosevelt would let go of their chief military advisers. Alanbrooke and Marshall had clashed over strategy, and Alanbrooke had won the initial arguments by insisting on putting the Mediterranean first but, by the end of August 1944, the preponderance of American forces had begun to weaken British influence. The truth was Britain and the Empire were running out of resources, especially manpower, just as the millions of US soldiers recruited and trained under Marshall were being brought to bear. The American public (not forgetting that it was also an election year) would not accept the continuation of Montgomery's command of their armies in North West Europe.

As interesting as the management of senior personalities may be, the lives of the soldiers serving at the front would be ultimately dependent on the strategy decided upon by these personalities. Without a post Overlord plan, the development of strategy revolved around the progress of Montgomery's and Bradley's army groups, in the north and centre respectively, and the military doctrines of the American and British leadership. Unfortunately, the two doctrines concerned were diametrically opposed and, with command and the majority of forces employed, it was inevitable that Eisenhower would choose a broad front strategy that essentially entailed attacking along the whole length of his front, from the coast to Switzerland, taking the Siegfried Line head on and probing for weaknesses before committing forces to a decisive crossing of the Rhine. Such a notion appalled Montgomery, as he felt sure that this would guarantee that the war could not be finished in 1944, and would result in greater casualties. His view, based on the principle of

concentration of forces, was that a thrust be made into Germany from North of the Ardennes, securing Antwerp, outflanking the Siegfried Line and be strong enough to bounce a crossing of the Rhine before enveloping the Ruhr and destroying German industry. This is often referred to as a narrow thrust, with the obvious disadvantage that its flanks would be exposed to superior German forces, but what Montgomery initially argued for was a combined effort of both his and Bradley's army groups advancing north of the Ardennes. It is difficult to describe a combined force of this size, effectively four armies, as 'a narrow thrust', but Eisenhower's fears of flank exposure are not to be dismissed. In their book, *'A War to be Won'*, Murray and Millett convincingly argue that, had Hitler deployed his final reserves after the allies had crossed the Rhine in a concentrated thrust, then this could have been decisively beaten.<sup>iii</sup> The Supreme Commander, therefore, was faced with weighing the risks of making an immediate drive in the north and attempting to end the war in 1944, against the more cautious, and prudent, strategy of the broad front. For his own part, Montgomery thought the Saar, to the south, could be left to the US forces advancing north from the landings in the south of France, thus permitting more resources to be allocated to his northern drive.

Montgomery first argued his proposals with Bradley in a meeting on the 17 August and thought the latter agreed but, by the time he met with both Bradley and Eisenhower, six days later, two things had become clear. Eisenhower was going to assume direct command of the land campaign from the 1 September, and was prepared to order the execution of the broad front strategy, directing the 21<sup>st</sup> Army Group to Antwerp and on to Germany through the coastal plain, whilst the US 12<sup>th</sup> Army Group were directed to the centre towards Metz and the Saar. Montgomery then spoke to Eisenhower alone and, in the words of Eisenhower's biographer, Ambrose, proceeded 'to deliver a patronizing lecture on elementary strategy that a Sandhurst or West Point cadet would have found insulting.'<sup>iv</sup>

Eisenhower, exhibiting a great deal of patience, tried to explain to Montgomery the bigger picture as he saw it, and emphasised the importance he placed on the early seizure of Antwerp. This had become a vital allied objective, with the American and British armies, in mid-late August, remaining almost completely dependent on supplies landed about 400 miles to their rear. Prodigious efforts were being made to supply the armies by road, a situation not helped by the allied air forces necessary destruction of the railway infrastructure in northern France. Montgomery now took the opportunity to explain that, as he considered he did not have sufficient forces to achieve his objectives, he required twelve American divisions, from Bradley's armies, to cover his right flank, so that he could concentrate his own resources on Antwerp. Because of the supply situation, he also required Eisenhower to stop supplies to Patton, operating in the south of Bradley's command, so that he had sufficient to guarantee success in the north. Eisenhower, of course, could not agree. Subjected to lobbying by Bradley and Patton, he realised that he could not have a situation where Bradley would have been left with one army under his command whilst Montgomery 'acquired' the other. But he was keen, under his own directives, to secure Antwerp and the other objectives he had set for 21<sup>st</sup> Army Group, and so he compromised, in a further directive issued on the 29 August. This compromise did not amount to much by way of concession to Montgomery, and may owe more to Eisenhower's balancing act than sound military judgment, but he did give Montgomery's advance priority and a degree of co-ordination over the left wing of Bradley's forces. One of the long standing criticisms of Eisenhower was his exercise of compromise and, in this instance, the use of the word 'co-ordination', as opposed to control, can be seen as providing a basis for ambiguity and further misunderstanding between his subordinate commanders. Eisenhower's biographer, who considered it missed the point, has succinctly addressed this charge:

Montgomery tended to hear what he wanted to hear, read what he wanted to read; Eisenhower tended to seek out words or phrases that would

appease. There was, consequently, a consistent misunderstanding between the two men. Nevertheless, Eisenhower never yielded on the two main points, command and single thrust, not in August and September 1944, nor again when they were raised in January and March 1945. <sup>v</sup>

Notwithstanding any misunderstanding, as far as this discussion is concerned, the most positive (for Montgomery) part of the compromise was the allocation of the First Allied Airborne Army (FAA) to 21<sup>st</sup> Army Group. Under Montgomery's direction, the FAAA began, almost immediately, to plan several of what became abortive missions to assist 21<sup>st</sup> Army Group's advance, before Market Garden itself was carried out. The significance of the FAAA being made available to Montgomery, is that it represented Eisenhower's sole strategic reserve, and can be said, therefore, to demonstrate both the importance given to Montgomery's objectives by the supreme commander, and the way in which the broad front strategy was using up most of the available troops. It consisted of two American airborne divisions, the 82<sup>nd</sup> and 101<sup>st</sup>, both of which had been in action during Overlord, and the British 1<sup>st</sup> airborne division, 1<sup>st</sup> Polish independent parachute brigade and the 52<sup>nd</sup> (Lowland) airportable division. All of these units, with the exception of the 52<sup>nd</sup>, were to take part in Market Garden.

In any event, Eisenhower duly took over the land forces on the 1<sup>st</sup> September, and Montgomery reverted to command the 21<sup>st</sup> Army Group consisting of British and Canadian forces. An attempt was made to assuage his feelings by promotion to Field Marshal, with effect from the date of his stepping down, but as this meant he now technically outranked Eisenhower, it merely added to his irritation and discomfort. As noted above, it was to take all of Eisenhower's man management skills to keep Montgomery in the allied team – quite a feat when he also had similar problems with Patton, who had previously outranked both



his immediate commander, Bradley, and Eisenhower and had extensive combat experience.

Meanwhile, Patton, following his own lobbying of Eisenhower had, under Bradley, pushed forward with his own army, thus putting pressure on the supreme commander to maintain his allocation of supplies, thereby threatening to derail the support that was being offered to Montgomery. Eisenhower, once again, was forced into a position where he had to reaffirm the priority given to Montgomery in the North, which order only had the effect of provoking Patton to use his supplies to continue to move east, fully prepared to allow his forward armour to operate until their fuel was exhausted.

As with the British leadership's view of Eisenhower's military capabilities, Patton was equally uncompromising in his self-confidence. In his diary, after being subordinated, in 1943, to Montgomery in Sicily, he wrote:

The U.S. is getting gypped... .. On a study of 'form', especially in the higher command, we are licked. Churchill runs this war... the thing I must do is retain my self-confidence. I have greater ability than these other people and it comes from, for lack of a better word, what we must call greatness of soul based on a belief-an unshakeable belief-in my destiny. The U.S. must win – not as an ally, but as a conqueror. If I can find my duty I can do it. I must. This is one of the bad days.<sup>vi</sup>

Regardless of Eisenhower's decisions and Montgomery's and Patton's behaviour, the critical factor limiting the scope of the allied advance was logistics. The speed of the breakout from Normandy left both armies dependent on overstretched lines of communication, leading to a virtual halt in the first week of September, with Montgomery up to the Belgian/Dutch border and Patton up to the River Meuse.

It was at this juncture, with Eisenhower's directive in mind and in possession of the First Allied Airborne Army, Montgomery stunned his allies with the plan for Market Garden, which Eisenhower approved at another fraught meeting on the 10<sup>th</sup> September. In the words of Bradley:

Had the pious teetotaling Montgomery wobbled into SHAEF with a hangover, I could not have been more astonished than I was by the daring adventure he proposed. For, in contrast to the conservative tactics Montgomery ordinarily chose, the Arnhem attack was to be made over a 60-mile carpet of airborne troops. Although I never reconciled myself to the venture, I freely concede that Monty's plan for Arnhem was one of the most imaginative of the war.<sup>vii</sup>

Eisenhower's approval of Market Garden was unequivocal. 'At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field Marshal Montgomery was authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the bridgehead I wanted.'<sup>viii</sup> Eisenhower's desire, in furtherance of the broad front, was to acquire a Rhine bridgehead in the Arnhem area, so as to provide an extension of the line providing security for Antwerp, and giving a base for the later outflanking of the Siegfried line in the north.

Once again, the approval of this plan meant that US forces would need to be halted and realigned and more supplies diverted to Montgomery; a situation that did not stop Patton, with Bradley's connivance, from pushing on himself. In his own words:

On the twelfth (*September*), we had a meeting at Twelfth Army Group Headquarters on the question of supply. As Colonel R.W. Wilson, G-4 of First Army, was there, I watched my step very carefully. He had been my G-4 in the II Corps. We learned that Montgomery had told Eisenhower

that the delay in the advance of the American VII Corps had been due to lack of gasoline. This was not the case; it was simply another instance of Monty trying to force everything to the north to attack the Low Countries and the Ruhr. If the High Command yielded to his blandishments, there would be nothing left for the Third Army but hold the west bank of the Moselle defensively... ..However, I felt that could we force a crossing, this unfortunate situation could be prevented, and Bradley gave me until the night of the fourteenth to do it.<sup>ix</sup>

Patton's troops made good his promise to Bradley then, on the 17<sup>th</sup>, the very day that Market Garden was launched, Patton later recorded that:

Bradley called to say that Monty wanted all the American troops to stop so that he, Monty, could make a "dagger thrust with the Twenty-First Army Group at the heart of Germany." Bradley said he thought it would be more like a "butter-knife thrust." In order to avoid such an eventuality, it was evident that the Third Army should get deeply involved at once, so I asked Bradley not to call me until after dark on the nineteenth. <sup>x</sup>

The Third Army did get across the Moselle but, by the 23<sup>rd</sup> September, with hardening German resistance and supply problems, Patton was forced to assume the defensive. Two days later, the remnants of the British First Airborne Division and the Polish Parachute Brigade were evacuated back across the Lower Rhine, heralding the failure of Market Garden. Both allied army groups were now faced with hard fighting in the Ardennes and through the Hurtgen and Reichswald forests, with heavy casualties, before a Rhine crossing could be attempted in March 1945.

When examining the aftermath of the victory in Normandy, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that both Montgomery and Patton were seeking to subvert Eisenhower's plans, by forcing him to choose, or at least reinforce, a single line of advance, relying on his apparent willingness to compromise. Later, and as recorded earlier, Eisenhower insisted that he wanted to proceed with Market Garden in order to get up to the Rhine before winter, and to secure Antwerp. As for Montgomery, he claimed that Market Garden was 'ninety per cent successful', but the defeat at Arnhem left a salient through to Nijmegen with dreadful consequences for the non-liberated Dutch to the west. The failure to take the northern bank of the Scheldt meant that the approaches to Antwerp remained in German hands until October and allowed much of the German Fifteenth Army to escape into the Netherlands. Ironically, it was these troops that were able to make frequent attacks across the airborne corridor, during the nine days of Market Garden, a factor that played a large part in the decision to evacuate the British and Polish troops stuck over the Lower Rhine at Oosterbeek, east of Arnhem.

After the war, many Generals and historians considered the failure to open Antwerp in September to be a major mistake in allied strategy. This widely held opinion would seem, therefore, to support the view that Market Garden was designed to ensure that Montgomery took the lead in the invasion of Germany. However, Bradley's remark about a 'butter-knife like thrust' rings true; the force that could have been put across the Lower Rhine, after the series of 'compromise' meetings Eisenhower held with his commanders in late August and early September, was not of the forty division scale originally proposed. Indeed, by the time that the final decision to launch Market Garden was taken, on the 10 September, Montgomery appreciated that there was no immediate prospect of pushing through to Berlin via the Ruhr. In a note of a conversation, in March 1946, with Chester Wilmot, the war correspondent, Montgomery said:

I knew now [the time of Eisenhower's visit on 10 September 1944]

that we could not hope to get much more than a bridgehead over

the Rhine before the winter, and be nicely poised for breaking out in the New Year. By the time Market Garden was undertaken...  
... its significance was more tactical than strategic.<sup>xi</sup>

In spite of this, and the earlier references to the 10 September meeting, Eisenhower later wrote that he took the opportunity, at this meeting, to explain that 'without railway bridges over the Rhine and ample stockages of supplies on hand, there was no possibility of maintaining a force in Germany capable of penetrating to its capital.'<sup>xii</sup> The implication is clear; Eisenhower considered Montgomery to be still insisting on the shutdown of all other operations to allow him the wherewithal to drive on to Berlin. This may certainly have been the intention of the British commander after Normandy but, by the time Market Garden was ordered, it was apparent that both commanders would have to settle for a bridgehead over the Lower Rhine at best.

Once again, the situation described in the previous paragraph only serves to show how the culture of inter-allied misunderstanding, bought about by the need for compromise, clouded the strategic picture. Significantly, the principal British personality responsible for smoothing over relations with the Americans, Montgomery's Chief of Staff, Major General de Guingand, was absent throughout much of this period, on sick leave in the United Kingdom. De Guingand, who managed through his own personal endeavours to keep his boss in the job after the worst of the latter's outbursts to Eisenhower, was very much respected by the Americans. The Supreme Commander later wrote of him, 'He lived the code of the Allies and his tremendous capacity, ability, and energy were devoted to the co-ordination of plan and detail that was absolutely essential to victory.'<sup>xiii</sup> As far as the concept of Market Garden was concerned, however, De Guingand was opposed to the venture, principally on the grounds of the time of year and the supply situation. With autumn mists due anytime in September he regarded this as too high a risk for an operation so dependent on the air element, and he understood, given logistics and the

political situation, that the broad thrust strategy, advocated by Eisenhower, made more sense at this time. Due to his absence, it will never be known what effect, if any, his counsel might have had on Montgomery's plans at the time, but their difference of opinion was to become a major factor in the post war battle of the memoirs.

Despite their long (since Montgomery's arrival in the Middle East in 1942) and successful association, Montgomery's failure to offer de Guingand a suitable position in the post war army, left the latter to pursue business interests and write one of the first memoirs of the second world war. De Guingand's book, *Operation Victory* was published in January 1947, thus making public his objections to Market Garden and views on what was to become the great controversy over 'broad front versus narrow thrust'. In defence of Montgomery, his erstwhile Chief of Administration, Major General Miles Graham, wrote to the *Times*, in February 1947, to take his former colleague to task, and dispute the need to give priority to the opening of the port at Antwerp. Such is the significance of this intervention that no apologies are offered for the reproduction of the majority of the text as follows:

General de Guingand bases his opposition to Field-Marshal Montgomery's plan broadly on: a) tactical and political objections; (b) administrative difficulties. As to the former I am not justified in expressing an opinion, although I can hardly believe that Field Marshal Montgomery would have been anxious to commit himself, when final victory was already in sight, to a course of action which was likely to lead to a tactical disaster. As to the latter, I was quite confident at the time (nor would Field Marshal Montgomery have pressed his views unless he had been assured on this point) that a deep thrust to the heart of Germany was administratively feasible. General de Guingand appears to forget that at the period at

which the advance would have taken place we were no longer based, as he suggests, on the Normandy beaches. The port of Dieppe was opened on September 5 and by the end of the month was dealing with over 6,000 tons per day. Ostend was captured on September 9 and opened on the 28<sup>th</sup> of the same month. Boulogne and Calais were captured on September 22 and 30 respectively. Meanwhile the depots on the Normandy beaches were being rapidly cleared by rail and road, and the new Advance Base established in central and northern Belgium. An additional 17 General Transport companies with a lift of some 8,000 tons and preloaded with petrol and supplies were borrowed from the War Office, and arrived in the latter half of September and early October. I personally have no doubt from a purely administrative point of view that, based as we were on the Channel ports, it would have been possible to carry out successfully the operation which Field Marshal Montgomery desired.<sup>xiv</sup>

Montgomery, to his credit, and after going into print with his own account in *Normandy to the Baltic*, and not labouring the point that his Chief Administrative Officer had advised him of the feasibility of the development of operations beyond Market Garden, then wrote to De Guingand advising:

I indulged in no controversy. You opened the controversy in your book; Miles replied; I remain silent and always will...' Interestingly, he then went on to state, Actually, if I were to disclose what took place between Ike and myself in my caravan at Tac HQ at GACE, when I forced from Ike the real

reasons for the broad front, I could shoot everyone sky high. We were alone

and no one else can ever know the true story of our talk. <sup>xv</sup>

The meeting with Eisenhower that Montgomery referred to in his letter was that of the 10 September, and it is understood that he believed the 'real reasons' to be more concerned with political rather than military matters, as previously discussed. Sadly, silence was not to remain the order of the day, and the broad thrust and narrow front controversy grew into an argument that, by focussing on whether or not the war had been needlessly prolonged, destroyed, in the 1950's, the relationship between the erstwhile Field Marshal and Supreme Commander, who by now had become the President of the United States.

The debate involving Operation Market Garden and the broad thrust, narrow front controversy continues to be discussed in the persistent stream of publications about this daring undertaking. It was, and remains, an operation that captures the imagination and focuses attention on the realities of democratic allied co-operation, and the priorities and qualities needed to fight a war under coalition conditions. Argument will, no doubt, continue, but the essential point is the priority that has to be given to maintaining a common cause in the face of a ruthless and efficient enemy. When the major partners of the coalition in a campaign, such as North West Europe in 1944-45, are democracies, with citizen armies and a free press, it is unrealistic to assume that public opinion can be discounted. Whereas Stalin used the competing egos of his two leading Generals to get results, the western, democratic, allies chose compromise in September 1944, for the sake of unity.



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- <sup>i</sup> Omar Bradley, *A Soldier's Story*, (New York: Rand, McNally & Company 1980), [hereafter Bradley, *A Soldier's Story*], p.326.
- <sup>ii</sup> Viscount Alanbrooke, *War Diaries 1939-1945*, Eds. Danchev & Todman, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2001), p.575.
- <sup>iii</sup> Williamson Murray & Allan R. Millett, *A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War, 1937-1945*, (Harvard University Press, 2000), pp. 456-57.
- <sup>iv</sup> Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower Soldier and President*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), p.155.
- <sup>v</sup> *ibid.*, p.157.
- <sup>vi</sup> As quoted in Carlo D'Este, *Patton A Genius for War*, (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), pps.494/5.
- <sup>vii</sup> Bradley, *A Soldier's Story*, p.416.
- <sup>viii</sup> Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, ( London: William Heinemann, 1948), [hereafter Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*], p. 336.
- <sup>ix</sup> George S. Patton Jnr., *War as I Knew it*, Ed.Beatrice Patton, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947), pps. 129/30.
- <sup>x</sup> *ibid.* p.133.
- <sup>xi</sup> As quoted in Hamilton, Nigel, *Monty The Field Marshal 1944 – 1976*, (London: Sceptre, 1987), p.49.
- <sup>xii</sup> Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, p.334.
- <sup>xiii</sup> *ibid.* p.314.
- <sup>xiv</sup> Miles Graham, letter to the *Times*, February 24<sup>th</sup> 1947.
- <sup>xv</sup> Letter Montgomery /De Guingand dated 8 April 1947, reproduced in Richardson, General Sir Charles, *Send for Freddie*, (London: William Kimber 1987), p.197.

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