Future Citizenship

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Contents

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Future citizenship

The concept of citizenship embodies the ways in which people, collectively, relate to each other through the exercise of formal and informal rights, responsibilities, duties and entitlements. Citizenship is most often understood in relation to the nation: it defines how people within the same nation live and the common sense of identity they come to share.

Today, it can seem as if these shared assumptions about what it means to be a citizen of a nation are being called into question. The contested nature of citizenship lies at the heart of debates on immigration, the welfare state, policing, education and, of course, Brexit.

Some now deride citizenship as a narrowly nationalistic and exclusive preoccupation. The rights and entitlements associated with citizenship – freedom of speech, movement and association; the right to participate in elections, to seek police protection and legal redress, and to apply for state benefits or healthcare - are challenged for masking divisions rather than underpinning equality. Some feel that the division between citizen and non-citizen (for example with regard to citizens of other EU states working in the UK) is too rigid or lacks justification. The slogan 'no borders' calls into question not just the validity of the nation but also the possibility of national citizenship.

Shared assumptions about what it means to be a citizen of a nation are being called into question.

Different understandings of citizenship are made concrete in our values. Society appears increasingly divided between those who identify with the nation and their particular place within it and those who reject this identity - groups defined by David Goodhart as 'somewheres' and 'anywheres'. The response to the result of the Brexit referendum revealed that UK citizens do not share a common view of democracy or how they should be able to participate in it. In particular, the EU referendum pitted 'citizens of the world', mobile, relatively wealthy and adopting a cosmopolitan wordview, against 'citizens of somewhere', rooted, with loyalties to locality and nation.

In this collection of essays, **Jim Butcher** questions the moral authority granted to cosmopolitanism that is often counterposed unfavourably to being a citizen of a nation. He argues that national citizenship is vital to meaningful democracy and no barrier to internationalism. It is the nation state that today provides the source for a revived sense of citizenship and democratic involvement.

James Hodgson considers the rise of legalism, the turn towards handing powers that once lay with elected representatives over to unelected judges, specifically in relation to the recent trajectory of left-wing politics and attempts to thwart Brexit. He notes that it has

been a party of the left, ostensibly a party of 'people power', that has embraced legalism and diminished the capacity of citizens to exercise control over the destiny of their nation. He argues that Labour's disclaiming of the fundamental importance of democratic accountability meant it missed an historic opportunity in its approach to the vote to leave the EU.

Discussions of migration are central to citizenship today. **Vanessa Pupavac** examines the *United Nations Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration*, a document that speaks to current thinking on migration. It has been developed by the UN, and reflects the outsourcing of national responsibility for the question of migration. Pupavac examines the vision of global migration underpinning the compact. She questions whether free movement is an unmitigated good and considers the impact of immigration upon citizenship in both the generating and receiving nations.

> **National citizenship is vital to meaningful democracy and no barrier to internationalism.**

Citizenship is also about how we live together in local, as well as national, contexts. Where geographically close communities effectively live apart, can we talk about a common society in which we seek to live and act together? **Rakib Ehsan**'s essay sets out some important perspectives on the importance of integration as a part of shared citizenship. He explores how integration can mitigate extremism and cultivate shared values and asks how a recognition of these benefits could influence the UK's approach to immigration.

Education prepares people for citizenship through imparting a shared tradition of knowledge. Yet the role of schools in citizenship is contested. **Alex Standish** argues that there has been a hollowing out of the moral content of education *for its own sake*. He claims that the emphasis on various instrumental and extrinsic goals and the deprioritisation of knowledge at the centre of schools' curricula and mission, mark a failure to foster national citizenship.

This collection of essays sets out a range of challenging perspectives with citizenship the common thread. They should become points of reference in the important debates ahead on who we are, how we live and how we shape our future together.

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Whither national citizenship?   Jim Butcher

At the 2016 Conservative Party conference then Prime Minister Theresa May asserted, "if you believe you are a citizen of the world, you are a citizen of nowhere. You don't understand what citizenship means." Subsequently, some opponents of implementing the vote to leave the EU adopted the label 'citizen of nowhere' as an ironic rejection of British citizenship. They emphasise their status as 'citizens of the world', as well as bemoaning the loss of 'European citizenship', in order to differentiate themselves from a perceived narrowness and exclusive nationalism they consider characteristic of the Leave vote and national sovereignty.

There is no doubt that the vote to leave the European Union exposed divisions in people's orientation towards national citizenship. David Goodhart's book *The Road to Somewhere: The Populist Revolt and the Future of Politics* sets out this division in British politics in terms of citizens of *somewhere* (a nation) and citizens of *anywhere* (those who adopt a supra-national or global identity). The latter, he argues, are associated with a more cosmopolitan and liberal value set while the former show a rootedness and identification with place. These divisions have characterised the post-EU referendum debate and indicate a lack of shared values and points of reference that have been important in relation to citizenship in the past.

Citizenship is in crisis. But should we be looking towards supranational or national citizenship for answers?

National citizenship vs global citizenship

In essence, citizenship involves the relationship between an individual and a political community, historically and culturally defined, within which social organization is established and power legitimised and contested. The concept of citizenship originated in ancient Greece. Aristotle recognized man as a *zoon politicon* –a political animal. This feature of humanity was expressed through the *polis*, the ancient Greek city state. The Roman conceptualisation of citizenship established a legal relationship between citizen and state. The Italian City states of the Renaissance are also an important watershed in the development of citizenship, marking a shift away from people being considered subjects of a monarchy to citizens of a nation or city. In modern society, citizenship developed in the context of the nation state. Citizens have rights within the nation, sometimes inscribed in a constitution, as well as obligations under the law. This is encapsulated in the idea of a social contract.

The civic republican conception of citizenship, championed by political theorist Hannah Arendt, emphasises the individual as an active part of the political determinations that shape the society in which he or she lives: citizens were not simply granted rights by nation states. Demands for freedom, equality and suffrage comprise an intrinsic part of a nation's history and they were acheived only as the result of heroic struggle.

Global citizenship is a very different model. Here, identification with a wider community is emphasised above citizenship of a particular nation. Global citizenship transcends geographic and political borders and often presents rights and responsibilities as deriving from one's status as a 'citizen of the world'. It does not necessarily deny national citizenship, but the latter is often assumed to be more limited in a moral as well as spatial capacity. Arguments for European citizenship run along similar lines; it is deemed to be more inclusive and better able to co-ordinate policy in a global world of so called 'wicked' interconnected problems. It endorses 'free movement' whilst national citizenship has been associated with exclusive nationalism and hostility to non-citizens.

The limits of global citizenship

Supranational versions of citizenship are enacted in three ways: through an identification with transnational bodies such as the European Union; through an orientation towards non-governmental organisations or charities; and through consumption and lifestyle initiatives such as Fair Trade shopping or ethical travel. All three versions of supranational citizenship share in a detachment of citizenship from the nation state. On this basis, there are clear arguments to be made against global citizenship and all forms of supra-national citizenship.

Sociologist Bikhu Parekh has argued that: "If global citizenship means being a citizen of the world, it is neither practicable nor desirable" (2003, p. 12). Global citizenship is divorced from the institution of politics that matters most – national government. It is only in the context of the nation state that citizens can vote, or can strive for the vote, and through that alter the law, campaign for rights and re-negotiate a social contract between individual and state. The distant notion of a world state is, according to Parekh, "remote, bureaucratic, oppressive and culturally bland," (2003, p. 12).

In bypassing national citizenship, global citizenship bypasses politics too.

Geographer and education expert Alex Standish shares the view that global citizenship tends to bypass national politics in a world in which nations are the principal expressions of power and of democratic potential. He argues that cosmopolitan global citizenship seeks to shift authority from the national community to a world community, the latter a loose network of international organisations and subnational political actors outside of a clear democratic

constitutional framework (Standish, 2012). In bypassing national citizenship, global citizenship bypasses politics too.

This critique further speaks to the enactment of citizenship through ethical consumption and activism via non-governmental organisations. No one, bar shareholders, votes for the directors of companies. Non-governmental organisations and non-profits are accountable to, at most, a self-selecting group of supporters. This may be entirely appropriate for such organisations but in no way represents a replacement for the rights of citizenship as previously understood.

Global citizenship-oriented campaigns from non-governmental organisations often focus on individual behaviour change around, for example, recycling or ethical consumption. This is in sharp contrast to national citizenship which cannot be bought or sold but involves a collective commitment to entering into political dialogue with fellow citizens. National citizenship, unlike global citizenship, has the potential to bring about fundamental change in the way a particular society is organised. It is a qualitatively different form of citizenship.

Is national citizenship too narrow?

Of course, empathy, sympathy and an aspiration for change are not bounded by national borders. Neither is a person's desire to make their mark on the world. For many people, greater mobility and wealth opens up new opportunities to live, work, holiday and campaign outside of the nation of their birth. This is to be celebrated.

> **Although it may seem counter-intuitive, a globally oriented politics may be better served by a reinvigoration of national citizenship.**

But it is wrong to counterpose this, as some do, to a limited and parochial national citizenship. Campaigns, from the anti-Corn Law League to agitation for a united Ireland in the nineteenth century, from anti-nuclear protests to anti-racist campaigns in the twentieth century, have confronted political power at home in relation to issues recognised as being international in nature or global in scale. The tradition of working class internationalism, borne out of the belief that workers are united globally by their position in relation to their employers and capitalism, has been national in form and international in content. Capitalism has also been justified with reference to its capacity to raise living standards and safeguard freedom around the world. An identification with national citizenship has never precluded global concerns.

Thomas Paine famously said in *The Rights of Man* (1781): "The world is my country, all mankind are my brethren, and to do good is my religion," yet spent his adult life agitating for republican citizenship in the USA, France and the UK, precisely so free citizens could shape their destiny and 'do good'. As Parekh argues, global politics may be better approached through a citizenship defined by a focus on political power and the national

institutions that wield it – a 'globally oriented citizen' (2003). Although it may seem counter-intuitive, a globally oriented politics may be better served by a reinvigoration of national citizenship.

The limits of caring through global citizenship

It is also notable that global citizenship tends to be couched in terms of care, awareness and responsibility of individuals with regard to the world's problems. These are all commendable virtues but tell us nothing about the *political* position an individual or society takes on a given issue. Private virtues, enacted through global citizenship, are limited in their capacity to address social and political problems. These require public scrutiny and debate in the light of different political perspectives and strategies.

Those who emphasise private virtues, cut adrift from politics, too often fail to treat the objects of their concern as political agents themselves. In doing so, global citizenship often regards people in other countries as objects of humanitarianism rather than potentially active subjects - political citizens within their own nations. A high-profile example of this is that of young western 'voluntourists' who enact their global social aspirations through individual acts of care. In doing so they may perpetuate a stereotype of active, caring western subjects in constrast to the more passive but grateful objects of their concern. Global citizenship *over here* often fails to treat its putative beneficiaries as citizens *over there*.

Criticising the claims made for a global civil society of non-governmental organisations, David Chandler insightfully refers to a "blurring [of] the distinction between the citizen with rights of formal democratic accountability," on the one hand, with the "merely moral claims of the non-citizen," on the other (2005: 194). Chandler is not criticizing moral approaches *per se*, but making a case for a politically engaged morality that acts democratically, in concert with others. This politically engaged morality requires a strong sense of national citizenship.

Hannah Arendt and the importance of the public sphere

Hannah Arendt's political philosophy sheds further light on the limitations of global citizenship. She argues that the full realisation of human freedom requires the development of a public realm that represents the extension of human freedom beyond the private sphere of the family, private interest and intimate life. It requires bringing together the diversity of private experience and interest in an agonistic public space. Whilst "everyone sees and hears from a different position," (Arendt, 1958: 57) this public space is the basis for striving for a "word in common" (ibid: 58).

In modern societies, the public realm corresponds to the nation state: newspapers, legal and democratic systems are national in origin and reach. Arendt's republican citizen is an active part of the political determinations of nation states, these being the principal institutions of power and authority. A citizen outside of a state can only ever exercise a limited form of citizenship and is unable to strive for a common world. Without the potential for politics to transcend or mediate differences, private experiences (by their very nature differential and varied) dominate.

Conclusion

Brexit involved a straightforward demand for national sovereignty to be strengthened through an end to the outsourcing of political authority to the supranational institutions of the EU. A new establishment and its supporters, grown used to decision making being shielded from national accountability, condemned Leave voters and politicians for rejecting liberal, cosmopolitanism values and, as they argued, embracing a narrow, atavistic nationalism. Some in this new establishment have adopted the 'citizen of the word' or 'citizen of nowhere' tag to differentiate themselves, politically and morally, from their fellow citizens. They have derided the political choice of Leave voters as, at best, representing the 'little Englander' parochialism of the uneducated and, at worst, a descent into fascism. The former is not borne out by evidence and the latter is fantastical ahistorical hyperbole.

There is a need to restate the importance of national citizenship and to put into context the lofty claims of global citizenship. The latter tends to abstract morality from the pre-eminent site of political power and democracy, the nation state, whereas the former assumes individual and national sovereignty and agency. Regardless of our views on Brexit and contemporary politics, national citizenship needs strengthening, not weakening. The alternative is to entrench divisions between those who have agency through their wealth, job and influence and those who must rely only on democracy and their vote to bring about change.

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Legalism and the Left   James Hodgson

Over the course of the twentieth century, the British left (which I leave undefined, but for ease of explanation we may regard as synonymous with the Labour Party) moved from scepticism about the power of the judiciary and the law in general to embrace an ideology which we might call legalism. Broadly speaking, legalism is a position which subordinates politics to law. This legalistic outlook has culminated in Labour's transmutation into a party dominated by advocates for the UK to remain in the European Union and in the efforts of the political establishment to thwart Brexit by judicial manoeuvrings. This move has been accompanied by an increasing distrust in the capacity of electoral politics to deliver social and economic reform and a gradual abandonment of Labour's working-class origins. The promise of Corbynism was to reverse this trend and to re-engage with popular politics, however imperfectly this promise was realised in practice. In the wake of its disastrous electoral defeat and with some form of Brexit imminent, the Labour Party will be tempted to return to the siren call of legalism. This, I shall argue, would be yet another catastrophic mistake.

Legalism as political ideology

What is legalism? Simply put, legalism is a political ideology (by which I simply mean here an organising worldview) and a style of political governance that sees politics as separate from and subordinate to law.

Rather than seeking to achieve social and economic reforms through democratic means, legalists pursue their ends through anti-majoritarian means, specifically the courts, treaties, and other legal avenues. Certain social issues are thus placed beyond political contestation. In this way, the legalist approach 'locks in' certain aspects of the political-economic system, such as individual rights and private ownership of the means of production. We might therefore classify legalism as a species of technocracy, which seeks to resolve social conflicts not through public deliberation and electoral contest, but by placing them in the hands of non-political legal experts. Legalism, like all forms of technocracy, stands opposed to populism, to majoritarianism and to democratic pluralism.

Legalism is a political ideology and a style of political governance that sees politics as separate from and subordinate to law.

Legalism, in the sense I use it here, must not be confused with constitutionalism or the rule of law.[1] All countries seek to 'lock in' certain features of their political systems by means of a constitution to organise political life. These are the 'rules of the game' which are a precondition for politics taking place at all; they specify, for example, the type of electoral system in use, the scope of the franchise, how legislation is passed, and so on. These procedural matters do not normally come within the scope of electoral contestation, except perhaps in matters of constitutional amendments decided by popular referendum (see, for example, the legalisation of same-sex marriage in the Republic of Ireland, 2015). Indeed, not only could normal politics not take place in the absence of such rules, but the virtues of political leadership could not be realised. Just as superior players of games, such as chess, master the rules and various strategies for exceling within the boundaries of those rules, so superior politicians will master the political system and finds ways to achieve their goals within it.

On a more prosaic level, we might say that legalism describes the attitude or outlook of the legal profession. As one lawyer put it: "A lawyer is bound to certain habits of belief... by which lawyers, however dissimilar otherwise, are more closely linked than they are separated… a man who has had legal training is never quite the same again… is never able to look at institutions or administrative practices or even social or political policies, free from his legal habits or beliefs… He is interested in relationships, in rights in something and against somebody, in relation to others… This is what is meant by the legalistic approach… [A lawyer] will fight to the death to defend legal rights against persuasive arguments based on expediency or the public interest or the social good… He distrusts them… He believes, as part of his mental habits, that they are dangerous and too easily used as cloaks for arbitrary action."[2]

Legalism represents a flight from democratic politics by an expansion of the role of judicial decision-making.

What is wrong with legalism? Aside from giving work to judges, legalism represents a flight from democratic politics by an expansion of the role of judicial decision-making. Social conflicts are removed from the realm of politics, where they can be mediated through democratic forms of political contestation and decided by the necessary building of parliamentary majorities and placed into the realm of law, where they are to be answered by judges applying their technical-legal knowledge to arrive at an impartial decision. In this way, questions of substance are thus turned into questions of procedure and interpretation. However, judicial decision-making, if it is to be successful, must rest upon a political consensus, for both sides of the dispute must accept the decision of the adjudicator as impartial and binding. But in many deeply contentious conflicts, of course, no such

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[1] In contrast to Shklar (1964) who defines legalism as "the ethical attitude that holds moral conduct to be a matter of rule following, and moral relationships to consist of duties and rights determined by rules". See J. Shklar (1964) *Legalism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), pp. 1-2.
[2] Griffith, quoted in Shklar (1964), p. 9.

consensus obtains. This is one reason why international politics is traditionally resistant to resolving disputes through legal mechanisms: there is no commonly accepted umpire or framework within which conflicts can be resolved.

Legalism is inherently depoliticising, as it seeks to ground policies in the intellectual authority of experts rather than the popular authority of the demos. Yet, at the same time, legalism as a strategy is deeply political, albeit one orientated towards politics in a purely negative way. The removal of controversial issues from public deliberation and decision and into the hands of experts is usually politically motivated, often by a scepticism about the ability of the demos to reach a just and wise decision. Politics does not evaporate from the decision-making process, however, as under legalism social conflicts become absorbed into the basic structure of the state. The law is no longer considered a malleable product of the political sphere; rather, it becomes an overtly politicised instrument, with the judiciary itself becoming a site of political contestation and begins to find its legitimacy drawn into question. In short, instead of turning politics into law, legalism ends up politicising the law itself. To borrow from the political theorist Glen Newey: "It's like squashing a ruck in the carpet: power simply shifts elsewhere. Whether or not judges enjoy a bigger share of practical wisdom than the next person, kicking political decisions upstairs from the bear pit to the bench will not somehow make them not political."[3]

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One only has to look to the United States and the fierce battles fought around the nominations to the Supreme Court to see how political conflicts reappear in different and often more vituperative forms. Many controversial social issues, such as abortion, which represent not merely claims by disputing litigants but fundamentally different worldviews, are never truly resolved by legalistic means. On the contrary, such issues become *less* amenable to public deliberation and discussion, not more. This is because when democracy takes the form of an open-ended contest, the losing side has an incentive to live with the result on the understanding they will have an opportunity to overturn the decision at the next election. In the legalistic mode, by contrast, the opportunity to influence the law on such issues becomes a rare event. In seeking to push such issues out of the political sphere, the legalist makes political instability and extremism more likely, as the losers to a judicial decision can justifiably claim they have been excluded from public life.

From radicalism to legalism

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[3] G. Newey (2009) "Ruck in the Carpet", *The London Review of Books*, Vol. 31, No. 13. Available online at: https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v31/n13/glen-newey/ruck-in-the-carpet

The British left's turn from politics to law is complex and spans much of the twentieth century, so the story I tell here is necessarily incomplete. It is safe to say, however, that the roots of the left's radical tradition are grounded in a scepticism about the power of the judiciary and the law in general. It is not hard to see why. The judiciary was and remains an elitist institution in terms of culture and social class.[4] The experience of the early labour movement was one of a hostile judiciary, with the legal arm of the state deployed to suppress trade union activity and 'seditious speech'. Infamous cases such as the conviction and transportation of the Tolpuddle Martyrs, who combined to form the Friendly Society of Agricultural Labourers to protest the gradual lowering of wages, are illustrative examples of the early encounters between the labour movement and the law courts. Such an attitude continued through the nineteenth and well into the early twentieth century and the inter-war years, with the courts seen as an obstacle to, rather than as a vehicle for, the advancement of the social and economic reforms desired by the left.

> **The experience of the early labour movement was one of a hostile judiciary, with the legal arm of the state deployed to suppress trade union activity and "seditious speech".**

This picture of judicial scepticism contrasts with the prevailing image of judicial power promulgated in today's public discourse; that of fair-minded judges acting as a bulwark against the tyranny of majority opinion and against governmental abuses of power. The fact that this (liberal) image of the judiciary has become part of the furniture of left-leaning public discourse suggests the extent to which the left has been colonised by liberals and by the professional legal class. Indeed, one might chart Labour's turn to legalism by its adoption of human rights legislation on both the domestic and international fronts. Members of the post-war Labour government (1945-51) were opposed to the creation of the European Court of Human Rights, rightly understanding the conservative intentions of such a body to act as a restraint on state interventions in national economies.[5] Throughout the mid-twentieth century, Labour's manifestos reflected this wisdom, protecting individual rights through parliamentary statute. Over time, however, Labour came to propose the enshrinement of constitutional rights, culminating in the Blair government's incorporation of the European Convention of Human Rights into British law as the Human Rights Act (1998) and enthusiasm for the European Union. Thus, Labour's embrace of legalism was consummated.

Why did this migration from judicial scepticism to full-blown legalism take place? One reason is economic. During the 1950s and 1960s Britain's Empire was dismantled and many of its former colonies pursued 'import substitution' policies – raising tariffs on imports in the hopes of encouraging their domestic economies. Hopes for privileged access the US market

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[4] See J. A. G. Griffith (1997) *The Politics of the Judiciary*, 5th Edition (London: Fontana Press).

[5] See M. Duranti (2017) *The Conservative Human Rights Revolution: European Identity, Transnational Politics, and the Origins of the European Convention* (Oxford: Oxford University Press). See also M. Evans (2003) *Constitution-Making and the Labour Party* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), p. 167.

faded in the face of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the global tariff-reduction regime.[6] The British political class therefore turned towards the European Economic Community (EEC) in the hopes of securing economic growth and re-establishing some of its waning international influence. A large part of the Labour party of the 1960s and 70s opposed membership on the grounds that the EEC would undermine the British left's ability to direct and intervene in the economy. In the campaign for the 1975 referendum, many figures on the left, such as Michael Foot and Tony Benn, raised these points eloquently in televised debates with leading Labour and Tory politicians. (These debates still resonate today and reveal how intellectually impoverished our public discourse, to say nothing of our political class, has become in the intervening years[7]). Yet the ending of this story is well-known. Britain voted to remain within the EEC and on the domestic front the rise of Margaret Thatcher's neoliberalism and initial enthusiasm for the Single Market ushered in an era of electoral defeats for the Labour Party. Jacques Delors' speech at the Trade Union Congress in 1988 was a watershed moment insofar as it convinced the Labour Party that the kind of social reforms they once attempted to secure by parliamentary majority might be advanced by European-level legislation. Out of electoral desperation they acceded, and a new political-economic strategy was inaugurated. Thus, the left's embrace of legalism marched to the drumbeat of its accommodation with neoliberalism as the hegemonic economic doctrine of our time.

The Left's embrace of legalism marched to the drumbeat of its accommodation with neoliberalism as the hegemonic economic doctrine of our time.

Another reason for the left's embrace of legalism, although more difficult to pin down, is sociological or class based. The Labour Party hosts a long tradition of Fabian democratic socialism, representing an alliance between the affluent middle-classes and the working-classes. Many of the party's greatest leaders, including Clement Attlee, were drawn from this upper-middle-class social stratum. In recent decades, however, it appears that an increasing number of the party's *caporegimes* have been of this social background, as well as being drawn from within the legal profession.[8] Both John Smith and Tony Blair trained as lawyers, as did several of their chief lieutenants. Without wanting to make too much of this association, it is not unreasonable to assume these Labour politicians held a worldview more comfortable with and congenial to an outlook of legalism than would otherwise have been the case. In many respects, Labour became a party colonised by the legal profession. This change in the leadership was reflected by a change in the culture and the composition

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[6] C. Bickerton (2016) *The European Union: A Citizen's Guide* (Penguin Books), p. 158.

[7] Several of these debates are available to watch online. For the debate between Michael Foot and Edward Heath: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CuZrzwm6CJs, and for the debate between Tony Benn and Roy Jenkins: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_zBFh6bpcMo.

[8] See M. Bovens and A. Wille (2017*) Diploma Democracy: The Rise of Political Meritocracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press). For an American perspective, see N. Carnes (2013) *White-Collar Government: The Hidden Role of Class in Economic Policy Making* (London: University of Chicago Press).

of the party more broadly. Though not a scientific observation, to an outsider the Labour Party of today appears less a working-class movement than a convention of public sector managers, academics, students, and young professionals, many of whom feel comfortable with a liberal, rights-based orientation in politics and do not see why constitutional matters should not be decided by the 'better educated' or those in possession of technical expertise.

This retreat into the judicial framework of the European Union and the valorisation of the law courts, and the change in Labour's cultural make-up, has been brought to a crescendo with the party's position on Brexit. Though not favouring the outcome of the referendum, most Labour Members of Parliament were committed to honouring the choice to leave the European Union, including the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. Despite this formal acceptance, the three and a half years following the referendum gave rise to a series of skirmishes designed to frustrate or overturn its result, several of which have been fought in the courts. This was to be expected. The Labour Party as an institution has become so wedded to the legalistic superstructure of the Single Market that it can scarcely imagine a future without it. Similarly, if there was to be a challenge to Brexit then it was likely to come through the courts. In the realm of electoral politics, attempts by Labour to fudge the issue, and by the Liberal Democrats to simply ignore the referendum decision, have been met with decisive rejection. Which brings us to the present.

What now?

Blair's 'New Labour' victory of 1997 may well have been the highpoint of the left's electoral fortunes and of its dalliance with legalism. Given Labour's disastrous outcome in the December 2019 election under Jeremy Corbyn, the party will naturally be tempted to return to the norms and habits that characterised Blair's time in office. However, this would be to draw the wrong lesson from the failures of the Corbyn project.

> **In many ways, Brexit is as much a backlash against the legalism of the British political class as against the EU itself.**

It was, in part, the foreclosure of radical politics – the sense among citizens that they could not change their common life very much through the ballot box – that produced the frustrations that led to the Brexit vote. In many ways, Brexit is as much a backlash against the legalism of the British political class as against the EU itself. It represents a desire for a more flexible (and, at the risk of parochialism, quintessentially British) constitutional order in which electoral majorities can implement transformative social and economic reforms. The elevation of Jeremy Corbyn to the Labour leadership in 2015 presaged the Brexit vote, as a sincerely held yearning for a kind of politics that is simply not possible within the EU and the rules governing the Single Market. This should not be discounted. Labour's increase of the vote share in the 2017 election suggests that while many voters believed the party would honour the decision to Brexit, it remained a viable political project. Contrast this with

the 2019 result, when it became clear that Labour's Brexit position was a Remain position in all but name, proposing a second referendum stacked in favour of remaining in the EU. This made a mockery not only of the power of voters to enact meaningful change through the ballot box, but also of Labour's ambitious manifesto commitments, many of which – notably its battery of nationalisation schemes – could only be accomplished outside the Single Market and jurisdiction of the ECJ.

Other factors were at work in both the 2017 and 2019 elections, not least the figure of Corbyn himself and the historically low levels of voter confidence he instilled.[9] However, the promise of Corbynism – far more than the details of policies and plans to increase public spending – was a re-engagement with the electorate and the building of the kind of mass political movements not seen for almost a century. This is not insignificant. At a time when social democracy is in retreat throughout Europe, the increase in the membership of the Labour Party was a real achievement, suggesting an appetite for a different kind of mass politics and democratic engagement. While the public were not inclined to trust Corbyn for several reasons – ranging from his past dalliances with unsavoury extremist figures to his poor handling of Labour's anti-Semitism crisis, as well as his equivocation over the party's Brexit policy – the democratic project which he inspired is not only worth salvaging but may contain the seeds for Labour's future renewal.

> **The arc of history will travel in whichever direction the people wish it to travel. That is the great promise and the great hazard of democracy.**

Corbyn's leadership of the Labour Party is now drawing to an end, and a new field of candidates is emerging. After the scale of their recent defeat, and amid calls that the manifesto was 'too left-wing' and made public spending promises that were simply not credible, the party may well be tempted to seek to return to something like the legalistic heyday of the Blair years. To such an end, a candidate like Keir Starmer (also, not coincidentally, trained as a barrister and a former head of the Crown Prosecution Service) would be the natural choice. But this would be a mistake. It may have become something of a comfort blanket among Labour's supporters but it is nevertheless true that many of Labour's economic policies did command widespread public support.[10] It is entirely plausible that a leader with left-leaning economic policies who had committed to honouring the referendum result (and who did not carry Corbyn's personal baggage) would have won the

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[9] See the Ipsos Mori polling data:
https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/jeremy-corbyn-has-lowest-leadership-satisfaction-rating-any-opposition-leader-1977
[10] See M. Goodwin (2 October 2019) ''Corbynomics' is More Popular than You Think', *Bloomberg Opinion*, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-10-02/jeremy-corbyn-s-labour-party-are-onto-something

2019 election handsomely. Indeed, it was the failure to do so that discredited Labour's manifesto, not its ambitions for public ownership. For these ambitions were at odds with membership of the Single Market and thus not worth the paper they were written on.

It would be an historical irony if the Conservatives – the party which has traditionally been the most enthusiastic about the European Union and the Single Market – were the party to deliver Brexit. But the Labour Party's failure to grasp the political opportunity with which it was presented – and indeed the purpose for which it was founded – has been nothing short of a historical tragedy. Despite Corbyn's manifold failings, one thing he did achieve was to offer a glimpse of the possibilities for British politics in the years ahead, and to remind us through his failures that the only secure basis for a genuinely transformative programme is a commanding democratic majority. Such a majority can never be taken for granted and needs to be renewed again and again and again. Such is the nature of democratic politics; there is no state of permanence, and the arc of history will travel in whichever direction the people wish it to travel. That is the great promise and the great hazard of democracy. Outside of the legal structures of the EU, this kind of radical democratic politics is once again possible. Whether the British left will take advantage of this remains to be seen.

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The Global Compact for Migration: political implications of global migration governance for citizens and migrants
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Vanessa Pupavac

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The United Nations (UN) Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) of 2018 has been welcomed by migrant advocacy groups globally as affirming universal solidarities and non-discrimination towards migrants. The drafting of an intergovernmental compact arose from a heads of state and government summit at UN General Assembly in September 2016. The initiative was galvanised by the crisis unfolding in Europe the previous year with the arrival of thousands of migrants to the continent wanting to escape from conflicts, state collapse or poverty, and trying to travel onward to EU countries, mainly in northern Europe. A text was agreed by the UN in July 2019, and formally adopted in December 2018. 152 government representatives voted for the GCM in December 2018. Five states voted against the GCM: the United States, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Israel and Poland.

Outline of the Global Compact for Migration

The GCM outlines a 'co-operative framework' of 23 objectives, alongside a *common understanding, shared responsibilities and unity of purpose*' (pp. 2-3). Migration is regarded as 'a defining feature of our globalized world, connecting societies within and across all regions, making us all countries of origin, transit and destination' (p. 2). Its rationale follows the idea that since migration is a transnational problem then transnational responses are required. Under the GCM, states are expected to co-ordinate their national border management, "promoting bilateral and regional cooperation, ensuring security for States, communities and migrants, and facilitating safe and regular cross-border movements of people while preventing irregular migration" and people trafficking (pp. 17-18).

The text's "common understanding" refers to developing a shared knowledge base from "diverse voices" in order to establish "multidimensional reality". This should then inform "evidence-based policy making" and challenge misinformation and misleading narratives that "generate negative perceptions of migrants" (pp. 2-4, p. 7). Its 'unity of purpose' implies a shared global political vision and shared political interests between "countries of origin, transit and destination" (p. 2). Under the umbrella of "shared responsibilities," the GCM aims to "facilitate safe, orderly and regular migration, while reducing the incidence and negative impact of irregular migration" and "the risks and vulnerabilities migrants face" (pp. 3-4). A UK House of Commons research briefing explains how, "Within each objective it sets out a range of actions that can be drawn from in order to implement the objective" (2018). The GCM looks to a "whole-of-government" and "whole-of-society" approach, in which the objectives and policy actions are adopted across all levels of government and public institutions in partnership with relevant stakeholders, from migration advocacy groups to the media (p. 5).

International political significance of the GCM

The GCM describes itself as "a non-legally binding, cooperative framework". It reaffirms the "sovereign right of states to determine their national migration policy and their prerogative to govern migration within their jurisdiction, in conformity with international law" (GCM 2018, p. 2). The GCM does however imply the incremental construction of a global enforceable migration framework over states through embedding and socialising states into processes that will solidify into global customary law and practice. The document is of international legal significance for signatory and non-signatory states, as the GCM may in the future potentially be invoked as customary international law or an interpretative document in legal proceedings.

The GMC joins other initiatives incrementally revising the UN's relation to states and shifting from an international order organised around national self-determination of *independent* states to a global order organised around

Indicatively the text refers to being based on "the principles of non-regression and non-discrimination" (p. 4). The non-regression principle is associated with the reinterpretation of international law as higher transnational codes rather than a looser intergovernmental treaty-based system of law. The non-regression principle implies that norms adopted in the fields of human rights and the environment should not be reversed (p. 4). In short, while formally being non-legally binding and affirming national sovereignty, the GMC joins other initiatives incrementally revising the UN's relation to states and shifting from an international order organised around national self-determination of *independent* states to a global order organised around transnational governance of *interdependent* states.

Role of the International Organisation for Migration

The GCM designates the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) with new global responsibility as "the coordinator and secretariat of the [global] network" on migration (p. 33). The IOM was established in Western Europe in 1951 in response to problems in postwar Europe (IOM website). For most of its existence, its role was largely confined to being a flexible, auxiliary, operational logistics agency favoured by Western governments. In the twenty-first century, the IOM has emerged as a flexible new tool of transnational migration governance and developing state compliance with the GCM. In this role it is displacing the centrality of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) whose mandate and institutional history is more closely tied to the UN system, and twentieth century international debates on labour, economic development and the international political economy.

Regular versus irregular migration

The GCM's understanding of the rule of law and due process gives paramountcy to human rights, and seeks non-discrimination policies leaning towards treating people equally "regardless of their migration status" (p. 4). In the determination of cases, the GCM implies interpreting laws or regulations in favour of the migrant, and the burden of evidence being on the receiving host society seeking to disqualify individual migrants from entry or access to assistance. Significantly, the term 'illegal' is not in the document at all. Instead the GCM's terminology turns on *regular* versus *irregular* migration, not legal versus illegal. The GCM is concerned to prevent discrimination between migrants and citizens, between regular and irregular migrants, and also to regularise the status of migrants without formal status (p. 4). So while the GCM allows states to distinguish between regular and irregular migrants and retains the objective of "preventing irregular migration," its overall impact is to open such decisions to potential legal challenge (p. 18).

Politics of the GCM

Advocates of the GCM have praised its framework for enhancing the position of regular and irregular migrants. Critics of the GCM have accused it of violating national sovereignty and undermining national immigration controls. These political controversies were generally confined to global social media spats and have been characterised as disputes between cosmopolitans and populists. There has been relatively little domestic debate or scrutiny in most signatory countries. Nevertheless, whilst it sometimes draws on and appeals to past ideals, the GCM's transnational migration advocacy involves a fundamentally different understanding of global politics, economics and political community than past immigration campaigns. Democratic citizens, refugees and immigrants should all be concerned with a global economic and political vision which endorses a migratory economy and the demise of sovereign states.

Globalisation and a migratory economy

The GCM outlines a global migration economy organised around countries of origin, transit countries and countries of destination. Its typology of countries in the migration process accords with the world of periphery, semi-periphery and core countries, a world of 'combined and uneven development' challenged by critical development studies. Yet the GCM's economic globalisation recipe tends to reinforce these international inequalities whereby periphery supply states export human resources and raw materials for the core demand economies, and the semi-periphery become borderlands tasked with managing the migratory flows while also exporting their own human resources.

Democratic citizens, refugees and immigrants should all be concerned with a global economic and political vision which endorses a migratory economy and the demise of sovereign states.

Ironically, global migration advocacy can unwittingly legitimise economic globalisation, turning citizens into ideal exploitable, flexible migrant workers freed from the ties and defences of country and community. Freedom of movement of labour and capital, that is, labour *to follow capital*, is in the interests of a globalised capitalist economy, but it is not necessarily in the interests of labour or their countries. Where global capital has freedom of movement and free unconditioned supplies of labour, then it is easier for transnational companies to avoid the economic costs or social impact of their relocations on communities and the insecure workers they employ. Brushed over, too, are the social and economic problems for communities of depopulation on the one hand, or agglomeration on the other.

Remittances as sustainable development?

The GCM links itself with the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and its objectives see migration as contributing to "positive development outcomes" as well as realising global goals of sustainable development (p. 4, p. 26). Previously sustainable development was associated with community development and sustaining communities. Now globalisation and globalised migration is being championed as sustainable development. Private remittances represent greater sums than international development aid for many countries. One of the objectives of the GCM is promoting "faster, safer and cheaper transfer of remittances" and fostering "financial inclusion of migrants" (p. 27). Financial inclusion essentially concerns people having access to formal banking facilities to facilitate the transfer of remittances, the traceability of loans and debts, and monetary assistance and expenditure.

Overall, do migration and remittances facilitate development in supply countries? The GCM assumes the positive benefits of migration but does not adequately address the problems of migration for the supply countries (Salt and Clout 1976, pp. 134-139). Foreign migration rises when there is not enough industrial development to absorb people moving from rural agricultural work to urban work. Temporary guest work has been seen as easing the pressures of population growth, budgetary crises or economic reform problems (Salt and Clout 1976). Remittances could help fuel economic development where there was a lack of capital investment in industries.

Freedom of movement of labour and capital is in the interests of a globalised capitalist economy but it is not necessarily in the interests of labour.

Yet historically, while migration may relieve unemployment or underemployment, it is not necessarily the unemployed, but the employed with skills, who get work and migrate (Salt and Clout 1976, p. 130). Many do not really learn new skills abroad, and have rather narrow work roles (Salt and Clout 1976, p. 139). Thus the supply country loses skilled workers whose education or training it has invested in, diluting the skills level of the home workforce and even creating labour shortages in some sectors (Salt and Clout 1976, p. 139). The returning workers tend to be the less skilled rather than the highly skilled. Furthermore, the mass of remittances do not go into investment in industries and have little macro-economic impact (Salt and Clout 1976, p. 139). Instead remittances go into private family businesses or expenditure on housing or (foreign) consumer goods (Salt and Clout 1976, p. 138). Remittances may therefore enhance private security but foster social divisions within communities rather solidarities and further encourage migration rather than community change.

A crisis of international development and humanitarianism

The new attention given to migration appears to be an expansion of global and social justice. However migration has come to the fore in global institutions as belief in the possibilities of transforming societies has contracted. The background to the GCM is the crisis of international development and humanitarianism. The field of international development has been incrementally retreating from its original ideals of national development universalising material prosperity. Humanitarianism expanded in the 1990s into humanitarian military interventions and international statebuilding but it too is in crisis with the spectacular failures of Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. The previous international development and humanitarian models were about developing or restoring communities, and reversing ethnic cleansing and returning refugees. Instead what is left of both fields is resilience governance, managing the responses of populations to insecurity and disaster.

> **Migration has come to the fore in global institutions as belief in the possibilities of transforming societies has contracted.**

Patterns of migration reflect how individuals have given up changing the character of their government and country and instead are resorting to changing the country they live in to improve their lives (Krastev, 2014, 2017). Global advocacy celebrating migration ironically legitimises the demise of political self-determination and national development of the supply countries, countries in which the politics of TINA ('there is no alternative') push migrants to adopt the individualised strategy of exit. So while the GCM wants migrants to be "empowered as agents of change" and their "independence, agency and leadership" (pp. 4-5) to be recognised, migration represents the hollowing out of supply countries as political communities, and the failures of global development and humanitarian strategies.

Political community and home in the world

Seventy years ago, the political theorist Hannah Arendt highlighted the problem of the stateless who lost their human rights when they lost their status as citizens of a country (Arendt 1968, [1950]). Global migration advocacy supporting a global compact on migration sees the primary guarantors of rights as international institutions rather than nation states. Their cosmopolitan ideals look to erode the distinctions between citizens and migrants (and between migrants and refugees) and expand global governance. Global codification of human rights addresses the problems Arendt raised at the formal level, but does not really address her insights on freedom and rights being substantially guaranteed through communal relations rather than higher legal appeal (Arendt 1968, [1950], p. 296). To erode the distinctions between citizens and migrants is to hollow out countries as political communities and citizens as self-determining subjects. Yet the patterns of migration

determining travel to specific countries suggest that migrants themselves want to ground their future security in political communities.

Migration represents the hollowing out of supply countries as political communities, and the failures of global development and humanitarian strategies.

Today's global migration advocacy takes place in the context of an erosion of trust in political community and citizens. The political community tends to be seen as a threat to global values and migrants. Unfortunately a 'no borders' approach legitimises the global forces weakening the political community and its capacity to offer protections to both citizens and newcomers. Yet democratically persuaded communities are safer places to be hosted as a stranger. Global human rights protections are thinner guarantees than those secured through democratic persuasion. Developing global frameworks at a distance from societies does not involve the same democratically accountable relations, commitments and responsibilities for making policies work, and living with, implementing and addressing the consequences of our collective decisions.

We need nationally based democratic immigration politics which takes seriously political community and the desire of citizens and newcomers to enjoy a home in the world.

Global advocacy, focused on securing protections at the global level and imposing them on the political community, ironically abdicates responsibility for winning over citizens, and imposes that challenge on individual migrants themselves within the host society. Conversely, an immigration politics model focused on national or local campaigns appealing to citizens fosters solidarity between citizens and immigrants. As such, the host country is renewed as a political community, both in engaging its citizens actively as democratic moral actors and in gaining new members. Without political community there is neither political equality nor communal safeguards of any freedoms or rights, as Hannah Arendt understood (1968, [1950], p. 296). We need nationally based democratic immigration politics which takes seriously political community and the desire of citizens and newcomers to enjoy a home in the world.

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Towards a responsible politics of cohesion   **Rakib Ehsan**

With the United Kingdom's departure from the European Union looming on the horizon, there is a golden opportunity for Brexit to be used as a project for social and democratic renewal.

One area of public policy where there must be a greater sense of purpose and urgency is social cohesion. The UK has been labelled as a 'plural state'. However, in recent times, multiculturalism – specifically the appreciation of cultural diversity – has increasingly attracted criticism. At a 2011 security conference in Munich, British PM David Cameron was of the view that 'state multiculturalism is dead'.[11] Similar statements were made back in 2010 by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who suggested that multiculturalism – *multikulti* – had failed in Germany.[12] In part seeking to neutralise the political threat of Geert Wilders' Party for Freedom, Dutch PM Mark Rutte publically decried the failure of multiculturalism in the Netherlands.[13] Current French President Emmanuel Macron, while labelling himself as a 'supporter of diversity', openly claimed that he has no belief in multiculturalism.[14] On the

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[11] BBC News, 'State Multiculturalism has failed, says David Cameron', 5 February 2011. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12371994.

[12] BBC News, 'Merkel says German multicultural society has failed', 17 October 2010. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11559451.

[13] Henley, J. 'Netherlands PM says those who don't respect customs should leave'. *The Guardian*, 23 January 2017. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/23/netherlands-pm-mark-rutte-dutch-citizens-open-letter-pvv.

[14] Ruthven, M. 'How Europe lost faith in multiculturalism', *Financial Times*, 24 August 2017. *Available at:* https://www.ft.com/content/dd122a8c-8720-11e7-8bb1-5ba57d47eff7.

European Political Left, Danish Social Democrat PM Metter Frederiksen has publically raised the divisive effects of multiculturalism in Denmark.[15]

In the British context, these debates are not new. A number of government-commissioned reports have expressed the view that more needs to be done to develop high-trust, cohesive communities in diverse parts of the UK. The 2001 Cantle and 2016 Casey reports on integration correctly identified social, residential, and economic segregation as a fundamental problem from a social cohesion perspective. Without sustained levels of intergroup contact, fewer opportunities for meaningful positive interactions between different ethnic groups are created. While social integration and interethnic contact can help to develop bonds of familiarity, understanding and mutual respect, social and occupational segregation can breed "suspicion of the unknown" and undermine trust.[16]

A 2001 report written by Professor Ted Cantle suggested that intergroup tensions could be addressed through greater cross-community contact: "In order to combat the fear and ignorance of different communities which stems from a lack of contact with each other, we propose that each area should prepare a local cohesion plan as a significant part of its Community Strategy. This should include the promotion of cross-cultural contact between different communities at all levels, foster understanding and respect, and break down barriers."[17]

The central view advanced in the Cantle report was similarly expressed in a 2016 report authored by Dame Louise Casey: "There is strong evidence around the benefits that can derive from high levels of meaningful contact between people of different backgrounds…social mixing can increase trust and understanding between groups…a lack of mixing can increase community tensions and risk of conflict."[18]

Without sustained levels of intergroup contact, fewer opportunities for meaningful positive interactions between different ethnic groups are created.

A lack of contact between different groups in racially and religiously diverse parts of "Urban Britain" – including a number of post-industrial towns in Northern England - is certainly an

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15 Orange, R. 'Mette Frederiksen: the anti-immigration left leader set to win power in Denmark', *The Guardian*, 11 May 2019. Available at:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/11/denmark-election-matte-frederiksen-leftwing-immigration.
16 Ehsan, R. (2019), 'Discrimination, Social Relations and Trust: Civic Inclusion of British Ethnic Minorities – PhD Thesis', Egham (Surrey), Royal Holloway, University of London.
17 Cantle, T. (2001), 'Community Cohesion: A Report of the Independent Review Team'' [online], *Home Office.* Available at: http://tedcantle.co.uk/pdf/communitycohesion%20cantlereport.pdf.
18 Casey, L. (2016), 'The Casey Review: A review into opportunity and integration' [online], *Department for Communities and Local Government*. Available at:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/575973/The_Casey_Review_Report.pdf.

issue from a counter-extremism perspective. Experiences of positive interethnic contact through participation in cross-community projects – skills schemes, health awareness workshops, inter-institution sporting competitions – can help to foster meaningful intergroup relations which act as an effective "shield" from deliberately divisive narratives constructed by extremist forces.

The politics of cohesion needs to be rooted in realism and patience. As different ethnic and religious groups come into greater contact, there will be cultural misunderstandings, the offending of group-specific sensitivities, and hostile intergroup interactions. Unfortunately, a degree of conflict is inevitable. While 'self-segregation' may insulate one from such forms of negative intergroup contact, the drawbacks are hugely problematic. In the absence of positive social bonds beyond one's own ethnic or religious group, unfamiliarity can breed 'suspicion of the unknown' in diverse contexts. This in turn plays into the hands of extremists – both Islamist and far-right – who are presented with the social conditions which are ideal for their divisive narratives to gain traction.

The politics of cohesion also includes the prioritization of a well-managed, regimented immigration system for the UK. From a social cohesion perspective, the UK should adopt a more rational and hard-headed approach to immigration policy. This includes ending freedom of movement with the EU in the post-Brexit context. A reformed immigration system ought to prioritise migrants whose main skills are well-matched to the demands of the UK economy. One possibility would be to prioritise individuals who come from Commonwealth countries with similar political and legal systems to the UK.

The politics of cohesion needs to be rooted in realism and patience.

Prioritising migrants who have been socialised under similar prevailing social norms and legal arrangements better enables socio-political incorporation when relocating to the 'host country' – in this case, the UK. The importance of possessing a reasonable command of the English language should not be underestimated in this context – as it helps to facilitate both social and labour market integration, as well as engagement with mainstream political processes. Ensuring high quality and properly funded English language tuition for all migrants to the UK who do not have adequate English should be a priority.

Ambitious social-welfare schemes can only be sustained in high-trust, cohesive societies underpinned by a strong sense of collective membership. Bonds of social trust and mutual regard, along with the broader cultivation of a common identity, are critical in this context. In order to foster the level of cohesion required to sustain social-democratic endeavours – such as maintaining a robust welfare state – there has to be a degree of conditionality attached to the allocation of social rights. Reasonable boundaries must be maintained

around the membership of democratic political community, with the social, political, and economic integration of newcomers lying at the heart of a revamped community-oriented immigration system.

For the UK to become more internally cohesive, policymakers must adopt a more critical view on the politics of 'inclusion' and 'diversity'. These are concepts which have been overly prioritised in policy debates on integration and immigration. In order for the politics of social democracy to thrive in the UK, there has to be an acceptance of the drawbacks of cultural diversity, as well as an acknowledgement of the potential benefits of stronger exclusionary restrictions over immigration.

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Revisiting the Relationship between Education and Citizenship   Alex Standish

'*When the past no longer illuminates the future, the spirit walks in darkness.*'
Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (1835)

For the Greeks *scholè* meant "free time, rest, delay, study, discussion, class" (Massachelein and Simons, 2013). 'Rest' and 'delay' are a reference to the break *scholè* provided from contributing to society's work. Importantly, it was considered detached from society (*polis)* and household (*oikos*), such that external social demands did not interfere with learning. Similarly, Hannah Arendt discussed school as, "the institute that we interpose between the private domain of the home and the world in order to make the transition from family to the world possible at all" ([1968]2006). She adds, "educators here stand in relation to the young as representatives of a world for which they must assume responsibility although they themselves did not make it." Arendt notes that each generation grows, "into an old world" and that the teacher's task is "to mediate between the old and the new." Echoing Tocqueville's sentiment, Arendt's thesis was that "crisis in attitude towards the realm of the past" meant that American schools were not able to pass on society's religious traditions and moral standards.

In the twenty-first century, the 'intergenerational conversation' which mediates between "the old and the new" has become profoundly troublesome, leading to a hollowing out of the moral content of education and its capacity to prepare young people for their role as citizens. However, in England there has been some recognition of the problem, and both the Department for Education and Ofsted have sought to make amends with a new knowledge-led curriculum and a new inspection framework. In 2017, the newly appointed

chief of Ofsted proclaimed, "At the very heart of education sits the vast accumulated wealth of human knowledge and what we choose to impart to the next generation: the curriculum" (Amanda Spielman, 2017). While there has been something of knowledge-turn in English education, what this amounts to and how far it can establish a cultural shift in teaching remains to be seen.

In this essay I will briefly examine the nature of the relationship between education and citizenship, the form it has taken in modern society and why, over recent decades, there has been a parallel demoralization of both.

Democracy, liberalism and education

In *The Politics of Knowledge in Education*, Elizabeth Rata notes the parallel evolution of liberalism and capitalism: "the uneasy but workable settlement between liberalism and capitalism of the expansive industrial period was the condition for the extension of epistemic knowledge to the wider population" (Rata, 2012). This was an 'uneasy' settlement because it meant giving the demos a say in how society was governed, although women and all men did not gain voting rights until 1918 in England and 1920 in the USA. In both countries education was important for citizen formation and imparting ruling ideology. Especially in the USA, with a population lacking a common culture and history, schools were looked to for national identity formation. For example, in *The Making of Americans*, ED Hirsch quotes an extract from Governor Silas Wright's 1845 address to the legislature:

> On the careful cultivation in our schools, of the minds of the young, the entire success or the absolute failure of the great experiment of self-government is wholly dependent; and unless that cultivation is increased, and made more effective than has yet been, the conviction is solemnly impressed by the signs of the times, that the American Union….will ere long share the melancholy fate of every former attempt of self-government (cited in Hirsch 2009).

With citizenship in mind, a social studies curriculum was introduced in 1916, with a strong emphasis on American history and civics. In the 1920s, rituals such as the Pledge of Allegiance were introduced to schools.

Induction into the moral order and education were one and the same.

In England (if not the UK), the population shares a long history and common culture. Nevertheless, ruling elites made sure that schools were sites for the control and dissemination of their ideas. At the end of the nineteenth century, when Britain was enthralled in imperial rivalry, the geographer Halford Mackinder spoke of the importance of history and geography for teaching children to "think imperially" and come to see the world as a "theatre for British activity" (Mayhew 2000). At this time there was no clear dividing

line between epistemic knowledge and moral instruction; induction into the moral order and education were one and the same.

Things began to change as democracy spread and the movement for progressive education emphasised autonomy of the individual and freedom of conscience. Progressives such as John Dewey highlighted the role of the child as an active agent rather than a passive receiver of knowledge. As James Hunter notes, this led to a "new found emphasis on the independence of the child for the purposes of liberating children to develop socially, intellectually and morally" (Hunter 2001). The liberal education tradition was developed strongly through the Chicago school of thought led by Robert Hutchins, John Dewey and Richard McKeon, but also stretches back to Kant's notion of critical reason (Levine 2007). Liberal education is explicit in terms of the educational goals of developing autonomous individuals who are freed from the limits of their personal perspective. This necessitates "cultivation of critical thinking, an ability to judge the validity and reliability of knowledge claims, and an understanding of the merits and limitations of a particular mode of inquiry" (Deng, 2018). As Zongi Deng (2018) explains, liberal education involves "the cultivation of human powers, sensibility, self-awareness, liberty and freedom, responsibility and dignity" which are derived from "the methods or arts of inquiry embedded within the discipline" (2018: 374/6).

The connection between disciplinary or epistemic knowledge and objective, critical reasoning, as a necessary component of liberal democracy, is elaborated further by Rata (2012). She reasons, "the objectivity and critical reasoning needed for scientific inquiry is also needed for democracy. Young people are prepared for citizenship, not by merely learning about being a citizen and what democracy is, but by being trained in the practices of objectivity and critical reasoning." Rata suggests that while objective thought is important for comprehending and participating in the contractual relations of capitalist society, there is also an important social dimension. She suggests that scientific objective thinking enables people to think beyond the person such that "non-kin associations" are possible. Leesa Wheelahan (2010) places a similar value on the introduction of "systems of meaning in disciplinary knowledge" in schools because "unless students have access to the generative principles of disciplinary knowledge, they are not able to transcend the particular context" (Wheelahan, 2010). Both Wheelehan and Rata draw on Durkheim's distinction between the sacred and profane, noting that deeper understanding and meaning can only be obtained by abstracting from everyday context and personal experience.

> **The very nature of education, gaining access to new knowledge and skills, is a social act.**

The very nature of education, gaining access to new knowledge and skills, is a social act. While individuals may have their own thoughts, the concepts and facts through which we reason are social. Returning to Arendt's notion of education as an inter-generational conversation, we can visualise education as induction into a social community. Below I will

say more about the curriculum and the content of education, but here it is important to note that while different types of school envisage 'community' differently (for example, religious school, progressive schools, international schools), in most countries schooling takes a national form with the state leading its organisation.

In liberal democracies, induction into a national community and identity remains important, with, as Rata suggests, "partial loyalty to the nation state" being a key function of education. She notes that in addition to epistemic knowledge, the curriculum includes "social knowledge" about the community and the nation. This would include historical, geographical and cultural narratives about the nation, traditions, festivals, customs, symbols, institutions, norms and significant people, such as great writers, artists or explorers. A school curriculum then comprises both disciplinary and social knowledge, which will tend to blend together in subjects like history and English. While disciplines have their own communities that transcend national boundaries, the curriculum – what knowledge we want to pass on to the next generation – is tied to "philosophical and political questions about who we are and what we value" (Young 2008). Through the study of sciences, humanities, arts, mathematics and languages, children are challenged to explore what is true, what is right and what is beautiful (Standish and Sehgal Cuthbert, 2017). So, while the curriculum is culturally-rooted, it introduces children to other cultures, other people, other environments and ways of living.

In recognising that citizenship is a broad category, we can note that education has several functions that contribute to the cultivation of citizens. Gert Biesta (2010) identifies three purposes for education: qualification, socialisation and subjectification. One of the functions of schools is to help children to obtain socially-sanctioned qualifications which will help them move into fruitful employment or access higher education. Most qualifications are nationally organised, sanctioned by the Department for Education and its regulating body – Ofqual (Office of Qualifications and Examinations Regulation). Passing qualifications gives a focus to study and provides *validation of learning* for students. As markers of achievement, qualifications have significance for life after school – both further study and employment. While knowledge gained in a qualification may or may not be directly applicable in the workplace, many employers view them as proxies of work habits, skills and dispositions, especially the ability to apply oneself to a given task and succeed (Wolf, 2002).

The selection of curriculum content is linked to who we are and what we value and hence will always reflect local and national culture.

Schools are also communities where children learn to socialise with peers and are inducted into societal norms and traditions by teachers and other staff. Through school, "we become part of particular social, cultural and political 'orders'," suggests Biesta (2010). We noted above that the selection of curriculum content is linked to 'who we are and what we value' and hence will always reflect the local and national culture, values and traditions. But, there

is also more to a school than a curriculum. There are extra-curricular activities such as performing in plays, musicals and sports, festivals, contributing to the local community, school trips and partner schools in other countries. Thus, the community reaches out beyond the school to make connections with people both near and far, providing opportunities for pupils to engage with people and society beyond the school gate. By providing children with such opportunities they can find different niches through which to develop talents, to learn to get along with other people, to talk with strangers, to learn how to conduct themselves in public and also to recognise the boundaries between public and private space. We could say that socialisation is preparation for adult life after school. Whether or not knowledge learnt in studying a subject is directly applicable outside of school, it develops maturity and often changes a person's perspective on life and values.

Biesta's third purpose, 'subjectification', means the process of becoming a subject or author of our own lives. Biesta suggests that educational experiences and knowledge can be viewed as "coming into presence" with the world. This is a gradual and relational process in which the pupils' experience of the world is mediated by the teacher. Biesta describes it as "a process through which we come into the world…and the world comes into us" (2012). And, as it comes into us, we learn to see the world anew – the pupil's eyes are opened to new horizons and questions they have never previously considered, let alone tried to answer.

While subjects introduce children to disciplinary-specific ways of enquiry and practice the aim is for the pupil to slowly take ownership of these ways of thinking and doing, as they learn to pursue questions for themselves. Biesta explains it thus: "The key educational challenge therefore, is not simply to tell the child or student which of their desires are desirable, but for this question to become a living question in the life of the child or student" (Biesta, 2017). In other words, it takes the skill of an impassioned teacher to draw a child into the intellectual mind set of the discipline and show them that there are potentially more interesting and profound ideas and practices to be concerned with than the everyday preoccupations of the average teenager. Through dedication to study pupils begin to internalise values associated with intellectual work including "devotion, respect, attention and passion" (Masschelein and Simons, 2015). As children begin to internalise knowledge and intellectual habits from the teacher "the self of the student takes form" (*Ibid*).

Here, we can envisage the dualistic quality of education: that as we learn more about the world we learn more about ourselves. As Hunter suggests, "Character is…the embodiment of the ideals of a moral order – it is formed in relation to the imperatives of that moral order that are embedded in the life of a community of moral discourse" (2001). While I have explored here the potential for education to prepare young people for citizenship, the problem today is that there is little in the way of a moral order to uphold.

The retreat from democracy and disciplinary knowledge

The fact that in this essay and elsewhere an argument for the value of disciplinary knowledge in education has to be made is indicative of the reality it no longer holds the cultural validity it once did. As Rata notes, in previous decades societies worked under the assumption that disciplinary knowledge would advance society culturally, economically and politically through its institutions (especially schools and universities) and individuals.

Leesa Wheelahan (2010) provides a helpful account of how, over recent decades, "knowledge was dethroned in society and displaced in curriculum," eroding social trust in its truthfulness, objectivity and specialised status. One cause, notes Wheelahan, is the blurring of the boundaries between different knowledge types (especially academic and vocational knowledge) combined with an instrumentalist approach to knowledge which replaces a performance-based curriculum with a competence-based one. She notes the shift in universities from universal epistemologies to context-dependent knowledge based on experience rather than abstraction, with the resulting tendency to conflate knowledge with experience. Biesta (2010) similarly laments the replacement of normative validity with technical validity, whereby schools have come to value what they measure rather than what is valuable (education). He describes the "learnification" of education, where questions of purpose and content are secondary to the process of learning.

In both schools and universities the curriculum has, over time, become deprioritised, with academic aims being overtaken by other concerns such as safeguarding, health and well-being, data and accountability, vocational skills, cultural sensitivity, consumer satisfaction and environmental sustainability (Whelan, 2007; Eccelstone and Hayes, 2009; Furedi, 2017). Since the 1970s, 'the democracy-capitalism settlement of the industrial era has weakened' reports (Rata, 2012). The same is true for the relationship between education and democracy, as the curriculum has become driven by instrumental aims tied to the neoliberal market, transnationalism, environmentalism and a superficial cultural tolerance. This remains an elite ideology, but now serves their global, neoliberal agenda in which citizens and the community are more objects to be acted upon rather than active subjects shaping their future (Standish, 2012; Runciman, 2016).

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