

interlocutor with full human agency and dignity; (8) regrets his action or inaction “categorically,” that is, not merely as a bad consequence of an appropriate action (“I am sorry that I dropped an atomic bomb on your country but it was the best available option”), but as an action that he now thoroughly repudiates; (9) articulates (communicates) 1–2, 4–8 to the victim; 10) reforms his life so as not to offend again in the way apologized for, again and again demonstrates his commitment to reform, accepts appropriate sanctions for his wrongdoing, and redresses the injury as far as he reasonably can; (11) intends his apology to serve not merely his own interests, but the wellbeing of the victim and the vindication of relevant values; (12) feels appropriate emotions, for example, guilt about his delinquency and sympathy for the victim.

Much of the burden of Smith’s book is to show how far many (most) apologies fall short of being real apologies, by apologizing vaguely or about the wrong wrong, by not really taking responsibility, by expressing only sympathy or conditional regret, by only expressing agreement on the moral principles involved, or by not really intending to act differently in the future. Apologies are often deceitful, being efforts to convey “meaning” they do not actually have so as to avoid responsibility or the consequences of irresponsible behavior. Smith’s book aims to make this eventuality less likely in the reader’s case. Among non-categorical kinds of apologies, Smith discusses the Ambiguous Apology, Expression of Sympathy, the Value-Declaring Apology, the Conciliatory Apology, the Compensatory Apology, the Purely Instrumental Apology, the Coerced Apology, and the Proxy Apology.

*Free Will: Sourcehood and Its Alternatives*, by Kevin Timpe. London: Continuum, 2008. Pp. 155. \$130.00 (hardcover).

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The problem of free will is one of those philosophical problems—perhaps they are all like this—that rewards those who take the time to revisit the basics. It is for this reason that I am always glad to see books like Kevin Timpe’s *Free Will: Sourcehood and Its Alternatives*, which for the most part endeavors to furnish the last fifty years of debate over free will with a new and useful perspective. Timpe thus adds his own voice to the mix not only by arguing for a particular view about free will but also by simply telling its story.

Timpe’s book is very readable and he displays an impressive command of what has become an almost unmanageably large literature. Indeed, Timpe tells his story so that, for the most part, readers need not have any background in free will (though I would wager that newcomers to the issues will nevertheless occasionally get lost in the intricate thicket that the Frankfurt-style counterexamples have become). The book’s conclusion is

incompatibilist but theorists of all stripes will find much to like in Timpe's treatment even when they disagree with his ultimate conclusions.

Timpe's book is structured by a distinction between two dominant conceptions of free will. According to the first, "free will is primarily a function of being able to do otherwise than one in fact does," whereas according to the second, "free will is primarily a function of an agent being the ultimate source of her actions" (p. 10). After introducing this distinction and other relevant jargon in chapter 1, Timpe spends roughly equal time exploring each conception.

In chapter 2, Timpe points out that the first conception of free will plays a crucial role in one influential argument for incompatibilism, *The Basic Argument*: "(1) Free will requires the ability to do otherwise. (2) If causal determinism is true, then no agent has the ability to do otherwise. (3) Therefore, free will requires the falsity of causal determinism" (p. 21). Incompatibilism is the conclusion, but there are two ways to resist: accept *strong compatibilism*, the view that determinism is consistent with the ability to do otherwise (p. 23), or accept *weak compatibilism*, the view that the ability to do otherwise is not necessary for free will after all (p. 30). After rejecting various versions of strong compatibilism, Timpe focuses on Frankfurt-style counterexamples (FSCs), which constitute one salient way of challenging premise (1).

Roughly, an FSC is a story about someone who performs a morally reprehensible act for his own reasons but who is being monitored by an observer who is prepared to intervene if the protagonist were about to have an attack of conscience. Since the observer is ready but does not need to intervene, the wrongdoer allegedly acts of his own free will despite being unable to do otherwise. If such cases are coherent, free will does not require the ability to do otherwise after all. Timpe dedicates chapters 3 and 4 to the most recent rejoinders to FSCs.

The first is the Dilemma Defense, according to which FSCs founder on whether determinism is true in the examples. If it is, then the examples beg the question, since the incompatibilist will not have the intuition that the wrongdoer is acting of his own free will. If determinism is false, however, then the wrongdoer seems to retain the ability to do otherwise. Either way, there is a problem (p. 34).

Timpe inserts his own voice into the story at this point by offering his favored response, which is to redescribe the examples so that they employ *trumping* preemption rather than the traditional *cutting* preemption (pp. 44–47). Traditional descriptions of FSCs employ a prior sign that indicates whether the observer needs to intervene and preempt (by *cutting off*) the would-be wrongdoer's attack of conscience, and it is the prior sign that gives rise to the problematic dilemma in the first place. In Timpe's view, if we shift to a case that involves two complete causal chains one of which *trumps* the other (though little is said about *how*), then we can avoid prior signs altogether and hence sidestep the Dilemma Defense. Timpe's view here, despite its complexity, is interesting and worthy of consideration.

The second incompatibilist rejoinder to FSCs is the Flicker of Freedom strategy, of which there are two versions. Both strategies begin by noting that the only way to rid FSCs of all alternative possibilities is to assume determinism, which would be dialectically unfair. So, some alternatives will always be present in non-question-begging FSCs. Here the strategies diverge over which leftover alternatives count as *morally relevant* and thus capable of refuting (1) of the Basic Argument.

The Weak flicker strategy is satisfied with any old alternative since, as Timpe says, "If the falsity of determinism is relevant to free will . . . then any alternative possibilities are also morally relevant in that they are a necessary presupposition for the agent's being free" (pp. 55–56). The Strong flicker strategy, on the other hand, argues that alternatives can be found that are morally relevant in the stronger sense of helping to explain the agent's free will (p. 60). Timpe argues that although the Weak strategy succeeds, it is dialectically inert since compatibilists will reasonably insist on a stronger sense of "morally relevant." On the other hand, although the Strong strategy would be dialectically forceful, Timpe argues against one particularly salient version of it (though he attempts a novel—but, in my view, unsuccessful—defense of the Strong strategy in chapter 7).

The second part of the book begins with chapter 5, in which Timpe motivates the turn to sourcehood (alternative possibilities do not "get at the heart of the matter" (p. 72) since not all will help to ground free will) and presents two influential compatibilist accounts of it. I especially appreciate this chapter of the book because it makes clear that sourcehood is not an idea exclusively owned by incompatibilists, a point that often seems overlooked. Timpe finds compatibilist accounts of sourcehood untenable, however, for the familiar reason that they are subject to counterexamples involving external manipulation. Unfortunately, there is little more to Timpe's argument against compatibilist accounts of sourcehood than mere intuition clash. For instance, of the fact that Frankfurt must allow for the possibility of externally implanted sourcehood, Timpe says, "I think the size of this particular bullet gives us sufficient reason to look elsewhere for a satisfactory account of sourcehood" (p. 78). We all must choose which bullets to bite, of course, but Frankfurt must think this one is particularly tasty, and it would have been interesting to see Timpe try a bit harder to understand the compatibilist's taste buds.

In chapter 6, Timpe goes a bit further by presenting and defending Derk Pereboom's 4-case argument against compatibilist accounts of sourcehood and then defends incompatibilist accounts from two pressing objections, including the notorious Luck Objection. His presentation of the 4-case argument—according to which there is no relevant difference between responsibility-undermining manipulation and ordinary deterministic causation—is in my view one of the best parts of the book because he tells a compelling story of the motivations that generate the argument in the first place. His response to the Luck Objection, however, is underwhelming. According to the Luck Objection, "the failure of a choice,

volition, action, etc. to be determined by previous events and/or states [as the incompatibilist requires] means that the resulting choice, volition, action is somehow inexplicable or random or merely the result of luck" (p. 96). Timpe gives two responses: (1) not all indeterminism undermines free will, and (2) most compatibilists have a problem about luck, too. Although both points are correct, neither puts the Luck Objection to rest. At best, they show that (1) the proponent of the Luck Objection needs to be very specific about the sort of indeterminism that is thought problematic and (2) if the incompatibilist is in hot water, she is in good company.

In the final chapter Timpe turns to a discussion of two varieties of Source Incompatibilism. Those well-versed in the issues will recognize in the book's title a clever pun that reveals Timpe's own position, which is Wide Source Incompatibilism, according to which the appropriate conception of sourcehood is incompatibilist and entails an alternative possibilities condition as well. According to Narrow Source Incompatibilism, on the other hand, no alternative possibilities condition is needed. Timpe argues at length against Eleonore Stump's Narrow view and concludes quite generally that any incompatibilist is committed to an alternative possibilities condition (thus eliminating the need for Narrow Source Incompatibilism in a proper taxonomy, I suppose). His critique of Stump is nuanced and provocative, but I worry about the general conclusion and the taxonomy it generates.

The argument seems to run as follows: (1) All incompatibilists insist on indeterminacy at some point in the causal history of an action. (2) All indeterminacy entails alternative possibilities of some sort. So, (3) All incompatibilists must insist on alternative possibilities of some sort. Timpe says that these alternatives are "a verifying or indicating condition for the satisfaction of the sourcehood condition" (p. 114). Thus all source incompatibilists ought to be Wide Source Incompatibilists. This argument is fine as far as it goes, but what worries me is that it doesn't go all that far. I have a similar worry about the Weak Flicker Strategy: part of what is at issue is which alternative possibilities are morally relevant (and, indeed, what the relevant sense of "morally relevant" is) and thus it is an open question whether the alternative possibilities that all incompatibilists must insist upon are robust enough to underwrite a proper alternative possibilities condition on free will. Accordingly, the more interesting distinction would be between those incompatibilists who think there is some robust alternative possibilities condition and those who don't, rather than, as Timpe has it, between those who accept some "very 'weak' or 'flimsy'" (p. 114) alternative possibilities condition and those who don't (which, as Timpe convincingly argues, doesn't actually distinguish between any actual theorists).

In chapter 1, Timpe sets for himself three main goals: first, "to provide a fair and clear introduction to many of the central issues in contemporary debates about free will" (p. 4); second, to "elaborate and clarify" the basic idea that "what is most important for an agent's free will is the agent being

the source of her actions in a certain way" (p. 12); and third, to develop an argument "that agents have free will only if they are the sources of their choices in a certain way, and being the source of one's actions in this way requires the falsity of causal determinism" (p. 16). Despite the worries outlined above, I think it is clear that Timpe fulfills all three of his goals, and that's an impressive accomplishment for a mere 121 pages of text. I commend his book to you.

*The Recalcitrant Imago Dei: Human Persons and the Failure of Naturalism*, by J. P. Moreland. London: SCM Press, 2009. Pp. xiii + 180. £40.00 (paper).

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J. P. Moreland's *The Recalcitrant Imago Dei* (hereafter, *Imago Dei*) is a sustained critique of naturalistic views of the human person. Moreland argues that naturalism fails to explain (or provides inferior explanations for) consciousness, free will, rationality, the self, and moral value; theism offers a better explanation in every case. Given the number and complexity of the arguments in *Imago Dei*, the summary which follows is inevitably highly selective.

*Why does naturalism provide an inferior explanation of consciousness?* First, those naturalists who deny property dualism run up against strong arguments, since mental states plausibly have a number of features that physical states lack, including: (1) being directed toward an object, (2) being private, (3) being non-spatial (i.e., neither extended in nor located in space), and (4) having a felt-quality (e.g., what it feels like to be in pain). Second, those naturalists who accept property dualism have difficulty providing adequate explanations of mental states for such reasons as:

1. The "regular correlation between types of mental states and physical states seems radically contingent" (p. 25). Why is pain (rather than a feeling of joy) correlated with C-fiber firing? And how can naturalists explain the apparent possibility of "zombie" worlds and of "inverted qualia" worlds?
2. Given that naturalists accept the causal closure of the physical domain, and given the irreducibility of mental states, naturalists must accept epiphenomenalism; but epiphenomenalism is surely false since mental causation seems undeniable.
3. Evolutionary explanations of the mental don't work because "the functions organisms carry out consciously *could just as well have been done unconsciously*." And "it is the output [bodily movement], not what caused it, that bears on the struggle for reproductive advantage" (p. 26).