



Young, G. (2019) Political decision-making and the decline of Canadian peacekeeping. *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, 25(2), pp. 152-171. (doi: 10.1080/11926422.2018.1543713).

There may be differences between this version and the published version. You are advised to consult the publisher's version if you wish to cite from it.

<http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/209399/>

Deposited on: 5 February 2020

Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow  
<http://eprints.gla.ac.uk>

## Political Decision-Making and the Decline of Canadian Peacekeeping\*

**Abstract:** This article explores the reasons behind Canada's declining participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations. It proposes a decision-making model that explains how politicians assess opportunities to commit personnel to peacekeeping missions by balancing their policy objectives with the pressures of electoral politics. Emphasizing the importance of voters in political decision-making processes, it argues that participation in peacekeeping is dependent on three key factors: a belief in the value of peacekeeping in principle; a belief in the value of a given peacekeeping operation; and risk aversion in response to the potential costs of peacekeeping. Tracing Canada's declining participation in peacekeeping operations since the 1990s, it particularly focuses on how this calculus has, in different ways, limited Canada's involvement in peacekeeping under Stephen Harper's Conservative government and Justin Trudeau's Liberal government, arguing that the former undervalued peacekeeping as a means of obtaining its foreign policy objectives and as a feature of national identity, minimizing the perceived benefits of participation, while the latter has focused on the inherent risks of peacekeeping despite a professed commitment to peacekeeping in principle, maximizing the perceived costs of further personnel commitments. The decisions of successive Canadian governments have led to a free-rider problem in which Canada is willing to enjoy the benefits of peacekeeping but unwilling to bear the costs.

**Keywords:** Peacekeeping; Canadian Foreign Policy; Free Riding; Stephen Harper; Justin Trudeau

Peacekeeping has long been seen as a central feature of Canadian foreign policy and national identity.<sup>1</sup> Rooted in the dominance of Pearsonian idealism over the country's approach to foreign affairs throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, Canada's history of engagement in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations reflects a broader commitment to multilateralism and liberal internationalism and has allowed it, as middle power with limited military capabilities, to exert an outsized influence on the global stage. While this history has been mythologized and the apparent altruism that it captures downplays the extent to which it has been fuelled by the pursuit of self-interest (Carroll 2016, and Wagner 2006/2007), peacekeeping nevertheless has a unique resonance in Canadian political life and has traditionally enjoyed a broad degree of popular support among the Canadian public (Anker 2005, and Martin and Fortmann 1995).

Yet Canadian participation in UN peacekeeping operations has long been in decline. According to data collected by the International Peace Institute (IPI), from a peak of 3,222 troops deployed in April 1993, Canada's commitment had fallen to 193 by the end of the century and just

---

\* The Version of Record of this manuscript has been published and is available in *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, November 2018, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/11926422.2018.1543713>.

14 in December 2017 (International Peace Institute, nd.).<sup>2</sup> Different datasets provided by the Department of National Defence and the UN suggest that total Canadian personnel contributions hit an all-time low in February 2018 (Brewster 2018c). While the Liberal government has vowed to re-engage in UN peacekeeping operations and restore Canada's support for multilateralism, its concrete commitments, as explored below, have been limited. Canada's turn away from UN peacekeeping reflects a broader trend among Western democracies, which increasingly favour more hybrid missions and operations outside of the UN's authority to traditional forms of peacekeeping (Bellamy and Williams 2009). This represents a significant shift in the historical evolution of UN peacekeeping operations that deserves further attention.

As a public good that is dependent on private provision by UN member states, peacekeeping is subject to a classic collective action problem (Olson 1965) as states have the incentive to free ride on others by enjoying its benefits without contributing to its costs. This results in unequal burden sharing and the sub-optimal supply of peacekeepers, both of which are rendered particularly acute as Western democracies scale back their commitments.<sup>3</sup> The idea that Canada is a free-rider in global affairs is not new. In September 2015, *The Economist* described Canada as “[s]trong, proud and free-riding”, contrasting the country's self-image as a responsible and generous global citizen with the reality of limited spending on foreign aid and defence. The issue of free riding on the security guarantees and military leadership of the United States has been one of the most central and contentious concerns of Canadian foreign policy throughout the country's modern history, and has recently returned to prominence due to the public statements of U.S. Presidents Donald Trump and Barack Obama.<sup>4</sup> Nevertheless, the notion that Canada is a free-rider in international peacekeeping efforts sharply contradicts traditional perceptions of Canadian foreign policy. But is it accurate? If so, how can the dramatic shift from global leadership to free riding be explained? And what barriers are in place to prevent a return to peacekeeping?

Answering these questions requires a fundamental understanding of the factors that influence states' participation in international peacekeeping operations. Because participation in peacekeeping is, at its core, an issue concerning the private supply of a public good, it is necessary to disaggregate state behaviour and focus on the supply-side constraints that influence key decision-makers over time. In Canada and other modern democracies, the decision of whether to participate in peacekeeping is made by elected officials who are subject to the incentives of electoral competition. The domestic political considerations that shape participation are therefore

considerable. This article explores the impact of these considerations and the ways in which they interact with and shape politicians' ideological commitments and foreign policy goals. In doing so, it seeks to restore domestic politics to the centre of the analysis of international peacekeeping operations, and, more broadly, international relations theory (Fearon 1998). By placing politicians and voters at the centre of its analysis, it also expands on the distinction between the apparent disposition of a state towards peacekeeping and the decisions that policymakers make about participating in peacekeeping operations (Bellamy and Williams 2013), highlighting the degree to which these can conflict and how and why the specific pressures and incentives politicians face are of paramount importance to understanding the historical evolution of national peacekeeping participation.

Politicians are not often forthcoming about their decision-making processes. As a result, these remain largely opaque to external observers. Still, political science theory offers valuable insights into the behaviour of elected officials and the unique demands imposed on them by democratic politics, making it possible to develop theories about political decision-making that can be used to explain available historical evidence. This article engages in such a task by proposing a decision-making model to explain Canada's declining involvement in UN peacekeeping operations. It argues that politicians' decisions to participate in peacekeeping are dependent on three key factors: a commitment to peacekeeping in general as a valuable public good in the international system; a commitment to a given peacekeeping mission in response to the potential specific benefits of participation; and risk aversion in the face of the potential costs participation entails. Focusing on the Conservative government of Stephen Harper and the Liberal government of Justin Trudeau, it explores how a combination of these factors can, in different ways, explain the failure of either to make meaningful participation commitments despite contrasting publicly articulated views on peacekeeping and foreign policy more generally. For the Harper government, it contends, the lack of participation can be explained by the absence of an ideological commitment to peacekeeping and electoral incentives to encourage participation; for the Liberal government, limited commitments are caused by a risk aversion that is fed by public opinion. As a result of the decisions of policymakers in successive governments, Canada has become a free-rider in UN peacekeeping operations that is willing to enjoy the benefits of peacekeeping but unwilling to bear the costs.

The remainder of this article is divided into four sections. The first reviews current literature on peacekeeping participation, focusing on work that emphasizes supply-side factors to explain when, why and how states choose to participate in international peacekeeping operations. The second proposes a model based on the interests and behaviours of politicians and voters that explains the decision-making process Canadian policymakers engage in when assessing participation in UN peacekeeping missions. This model is then employed in the third section to explain Canada's declining involvement in UN peacekeeping operations, with a focus on Stephen Harper's Conservative government and Justin Trudeau's Liberal government. Conclusions are then offered about Canada's future involvement in peacekeeping and the possibility for overcoming free riding.

### **Participation in International Peacekeeping Operations**

Current literature offers a wide variety of explanations for why states participate in international peacekeeping operations (for an overview, see: Bellamy and Williams 2012, and Bellamy and Williams eds. 2013). One of the most notable arguments that can be found in early work on the topic is that democratic states are more likely than their non-democratic counterparts to engage in peacekeeping (Andersson 2000, Andersson 2002, Daniel and Caraher 2006, and Lebovic 2004). The normative and institutionalist underpinnings of this claim reflect the emphasis on the shared values, interests and political decision-making processes of liberal democratic states by proponents of the democratic peace theory (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999, Dolye 2005, Maoz and Russett 1993, and Owen 1994). An explanation that focuses on regime type, however, fails to explain different levels of participation between democratic states and why participation by individual states can fluctuate over time, and fails to enquire into the extent to which participation by democratic states may be a function of historically contingent power relations, alliances and shared interests. Its value is therefore limited.

Perhaps the most obvious explanation for peacekeeping participation can be found in the changing demand for finite military and humanitarian resources. States must prioritize where and how their troops are deployed at any given time, and commitments to certain operations, and to certain theatres, can come at the expense of others. An increase in the demand for troop commitments to non-UN missions would therefore have a negative impact on UN peacekeeping participation. According to this reasoning, the involvement of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF)

in the War in Afghanistan is a fundamental cause of the decline of Canadian participation in UN peacekeeping missions (Badescu 2010). It is possible to view later participation in international coalitions in Libya and in Iraq and Syria in a similar way. While this demand-side focus usefully places peacekeeping participation within a broader international and security context, it nevertheless has two important shortcomings. First, establishing direct causality can be difficult. Canada's military commitments in Afghanistan, which were particularly significant from 2006 to 2011, did not precipitate a sudden disengagement from UN peacekeeping operations, nor did the end of the country's combat mission or the ultimate withdrawal of Canadian soldiers from Afghanistan return it to the forefront of UN peacekeeping participation. Second, and crucially, how politicians respond to competing troop demands is, fundamentally, a choice. It is precisely how and why these choices are made that merits further analysis.

More promising explanations for participation in peacekeeping can be found in the analysis of the institutional decision-making environments of specific states. The use of case study work is particularly illustrative. Exploring Canada's participation in international peacekeeping operations, Libben (2017) argues that decision-making is shaped by the prevailing national strategic culture that reflects dominant views of the purpose of the country's military. Conflicting and evolving views of Canada as an isolationist, as a Pearsonian internationalist and as a robust Western ally, he claims, are key to understanding fluctuations in the country's troop contributions. Karlsrud and Osland (2016) similarly focus on strategic culture to explain Norway's declining personnel commitments to peacekeeping operations and the institutional environment in which political decision-making occurs, highlighting the significance of the country's increasing involvement with NATO, the reduction of the size of the Norwegian Armed Forces, fewer interests in the UN's recent missions in Africa and the impact of past failures. The importance of prevailing security doctrines is also highlighted by Sotomayor Velázquez (2010) to explain varying degrees of participation by Latin American states, as is the degree of alignment between foreign and defence policies.

Understanding peacekeeping as a public good that relies on private provision usefully shifts the emphasis to exploring the potential benefits that peacekeeping participation entails. Several authors have placed self-interest at the centre of their supply-side explanations of peacekeeping participation, a focus that is particularly useful for considering the decision-making processes of elected officials. Bove and Elia (2011) find that at the domestic level participation is facilitated by

the number and remuneration of military personnel and constrained by casualty tolerance and other military commitments, while at the international level it is primarily influenced by the level of threat that the target conflict poses, a state's geographic proximity to the conflict and the number of persons that the conflict has displaced. Peacekeeping can also be used to pursue strategic foreign policy objectives. National interest is, of course, a primary determinant of foreign policy, and it has been argued that peacekeeping is no exception. Neack (1995) claims that peacekeeping has been dominated by states with an interest in preserving the *status quo* in the international system, while others offer the more critical view that peacekeeping represents a form of liberal imperialism that covers the flaws of the global political economy (Pugh 2004). States also participate in peacekeeping missions with their allies, illustrating the significance of shared foreign policy preferences (Ward and Dorussen 2016). Participation can also be driven by more basic concerns. Most obviously, contributing troops to a peacekeeping mission offers concrete financial rewards as governments are reimbursed at a rate of over US\$1,332 per soldier per month (United Nations Peacekeeping, nd.(a)), providing an incentive for some states—particularly those that are low-income—to contribute troops as a form of budgetary support (Gaibullov et al. 2015). These financial incentives can play an important role in combatting free riding, a problem that becomes increasingly acute, Passmore, Shannon and Hart (2018) argue, as the number of contributors increases.

While each of these strands of enquiry offers valuable insights into the forces that shape peacekeeping participation, several key questions remain unanswered. How does domestic politics—a force that is often at the heart of the democratic peace thesis—influence politicians' decision-making processes about participation? To what extent are changing levels of commitment to international peacekeeping operations driven by electoral politics and the interests and actions of voters? And what implications do the unique demands of democratic politics have for the supply of peacekeeping as a public good? The remainder of this paper explores these questions by examining Canada's gradual but marked turn away from UN peacekeeping under two governments that illustrate starkly different reasons for non-participation. To understand these reasons, it is first necessary to outline a model that captures the pressures and incentives of politicians' decision-making processes. It is to this task that the following section turns.

## Political Decision-Making and Peacekeeping Participation

In democratic states with civilian control of the military, decisions concerning the use of force are made directly by elected officials.<sup>5</sup> These decisions are subject to significant resource constraints that take two forms: first, personnel constraints arising from the limited size of armed forces; and second, financial constraints imposed by limited budgets.<sup>6</sup> A state can only engage in a finite number of military operations at any given time, and existing demands on personnel and finances can limit the size, number and nature of further deployments. Again, however, how and why these finite resources are used is not predetermined, but subject to political decision-making processes.

In making policy decisions, politicians behaving rationally weigh the potential benefits and costs of each option, responding, *ceteris paribus*, positively to the former and negatively to the latter. Politicians have two primary interests. First, they desire to implement a set of policy objectives and, more generally, work towards a conception of the collective good, however broadly or narrowly defined, that is informed by their ideology, background, beliefs, biases and socioeconomic position. Second, politicians aim to win re-election, both for themselves and for the political party to which they belong. These electoral interests suggest that voters can play a considerable role in decision-making processes, as voters should be able, in theory, to take advantage the electoral pressure they are able to exert to influence politicians to undertake desired policy actions. If politicians do not respond, voters can simply demonstrate their dissatisfaction at the ballot box by voting incumbents out of office and replacing them with more like-minded or amenable representatives. The degree to which a democratic country engages in peacekeeping, then, should depend a great deal on the degree to which its voters desire it to do so.

There are four reasons why this is not necessarily the case, each of which is well established in modern political science theory:

1. Voters have diverse preferences. Acting rationally on these preferences is unlikely to lead to a consensus of public opinion on foreign policy issues.
2. Voters often do not prioritize peacekeeping or foreign policy more generally in their electoral choices. Support for a particular political party and/or candidate may therefore not represent an endorsement of a stated foreign policy platform.<sup>7</sup>



3. Voters have significant informational constraints, a problem that is particularly acute in the realm of foreign policy as even the most ardent followers of national politics do not have access to classified diplomatic, military and intelligence information. This makes voters reliant on politicians for accurate and reliable information, creating a principal-agent problem with asymmetric information in which the interests of politicians diverge from the interests of voters.<sup>8</sup>
4. Voters do not always behave rationally. Rather than defining and acting upon consistent and informed preferences, voters often support political parties and candidates based on partisan affiliations or shared identities (Achen and Bartles 2016). In doing so, they fail to respond to the actions of politicians or act in a way that effectively communicates their interests.

What conclusions can therefore be drawn about the incentives and constraints that politicians face when deciding whether to participate in UN peacekeeping operations? First, if voters either have diverse preferences or do not communicate consistent preferences through their electoral choices, politicians are able to pursue their foreign policy objectives as long as they are able to rely on a supportive—or at least non-oppositional—electoral constituency. Second, voters are unlikely to reward politicians for participating in peacekeeping or, alternatively, punish them for failing to do so. Indeed, given their informational constraints and low prioritization of foreign policy, voters may be oblivious to changes in peacekeeping participation that are not subject to national debate or widespread media coverage. Third, when voters lack a strong collective commitment to peacekeeping, the potential benefits of participation are outweighed by the potential costs. While voters may not reward politicians for participating in peacekeeping, they may punish politicians if participation entails an unacceptable number of casualties. For politicians who must balance their policy and electoral interests, participation in peacekeeping is, in the context of domestic politics, therefore a high-risk, low-reward activity.

Taken together, these conclusions suggest that participation in peacekeeping is only rational when three conditions are met: when politicians hold a commitment to peacekeeping in general; when politicians hold a commitment to a given peacekeeping mission; and when politicians have a low risk aversion when faced with potential losses. Each of these conditions reflects a crucial factor in political decision-making surrounding peacekeeping participation:

### Factor 1: Commitment to Peacekeeping in General

The commitment to peacekeeping in general reflects a principled stance on the value of peacekeeping as a public good in the international system. Such a position stems from a broader ideological commitment to liberal internationalism and a belief that a country can best pursue its interests and exert its influence through engagement with multilateral institutions and the rules-based international order. It can also reflect a view of peacekeeping as central to national identity following real or imagined historical participation patterns, or, more prosaically, an assessment of the apparent successes of past UN peacekeeping missions.

### Factor 2: Commitment to a Given Peacekeeping Mission

The commitment to a specific peacekeeping mission is tied to judgements about the target conflict and the possible benefits of participation. It stems from both concrete concerns about national interest, geographic proximity and historical and cultural ties (Bove and Elia 2011, and Neack 1995) as well as an assessment of the marginal utility of participation based on whether committing troops would further ensure the success of the mission, particularly given the unique capabilities the state is able to contribute. The commitment to a given mission is also influenced by the actions of others as states can be induced to participate by allies (Ward and Dorussen 2016) or incentivized to free ride on other countries' commitments (Passmore, Shannon and Hart 2018).

### Factor 3: Risk Aversion


The significance of risk aversion in decision-making processes surrounding peacekeeping participation should not be underestimated. Indeed, the risk or reality of casualties has long been central to the supply of peacekeepers, particularly among wealthy democracies. The deaths of 18 American soldiers in Somalia in October 1993 tied to United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) led to a broader withdrawal of the United States from peacekeeping and, with Presidential Decision Directive 25, the policy that participation in peacekeeping operations should be aligned with national interests (The White House 1994). Similarly, Belgium withdrew from the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) following the deaths of ten of its soldiers in April 1994, precipitating a major reduction in the size of the UN mission and fatally undermining its capacity and ability to pursue its mandate. The failures of UNOSOM II greatly

influenced the decision by member states to effectively abandon UNAMIR (Lewis 1994). As missions become increasingly complex and centred on enforcing rather than merely maintaining peace, the impact of risk aversion on troop contributions is likely to continue to grow.<sup>9</sup>

The deaths of 159 Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014 may seem to suggest that risk aversion is not a significant factor in the decision-making processes of Canadian politicians. While the impact of casualties on public support for the War in Afghanistan is debated (Boucher 2010, and Massie 2008), there are reasons to resist applying apparent lessons from the conflict to peacekeeping operations. Although the casualty tolerance of voters in peacekeeping operations deserves further attention,<sup>10</sup> it has in other conflicts been shown to be influenced by the likelihood of success and initial support for the use of force (Gelpi, Reifler and Feaver 2007). For peacekeeping operations in which, for the public, vital interests are not at stake and objectives are unclear or unattainable, casualty tolerance is likely to be lower than it is in other military engagements. Furthermore, as explored below, peacekeeping can be a highly partisan issue, undermining popular support and increasing risk aversion as a result.

The probability of participation in international peacekeeping drops dramatically as the risk of casualties grows, as illustrated in Figure 1 below. This risk aversion, as shown in Figure 2, can lead to a shortfall in the aggregate supply of peacekeepers:


**Figures 1 and 2: Peacekeeping, Casualty Tolerance and Risk Aversion**



The probability of peacekeeping participation ( $PP$ ) declines sharply as the risk of casualties ( $R(C)$ ) increases, as illustrated in Figure 1 (above left). This risk aversion can, in the absence of greater participation incentives, lead to a shortfall (solid line) in the aggregate supply of peacekeepers ( $S(P)$ ) below optimal levels (dotted line), as illustrated in Figure 2 (above right).

The decision of whether to participate in international peacekeeping operations involves two steps. The first is binary as officials can choose to either accept or decline to commit troops to a given peacekeeping mission. The second exists on a broad continuum as the decision to commit troops is followed by further decisions surrounding the size and nature of commitment. Politicians therefore have three options surrounding peacekeeping participation: to decline commitment and forego participation; to make a token commitment and provide limited and largely superficial support;<sup>11</sup> or to make a meaningful commitment that will have a qualitative impact on the capacity and likelihood of success of a mission. Each of these outcomes can be tied to the three factors that influence participation outlined above, as illustrated in the simplified model presented in Figure 3:

**Figure 3: Political Decision-making and Participation Outcomes**



If politicians do not view peacekeeping in general as valuable, they will likely decline commitment. Similarly, if they view peacekeeping in general as valuable but do not view a given mission as valuable, they will likely either decline or make a token commitment. A token

commitment also logically follows when politicians view both peacekeeping in general and a given mission as valuable but are reluctant to make a meaningful commitment due to the risk of incurring casualties. It is only when politicians are committed to peacekeeping in general, committed to a given peacekeeping mission and unaffected by risk aversion that they will make the rational decision to meaningfully commit to participation. These three conditions, as the following section shows, are not easily met.

### **Political Change and Peacekeeping Participation: From Stephen Harper to Justin Trudeau**

The political decision-making model presented above emphasizes the importance of the commitment to peacekeeping in general, the commitment to a given peacekeeping mission and risk aversion arising from casualty tolerance as central to determining peacekeeping participation. Each of these factors has, in different ways, limited participation in international peacekeeping operations under Stephen Harper and Justin Trudeau as the former undervalued peacekeeping as a public good while the latter has been constrained by the perceived costs of further peacekeeping commitments. Each is explored below.

#### *Stephen Harper and the Politics of Disengagement*

Stephen Harper's time as Prime Minister marked a historic shift in Canadian foreign policy. Abandoning the broad consensus around liberal internationalism that had defined Canada's place on the international stage for more than half a century, his Conservative government sought to reorient Canadian foreign policy around the promotion—at least ostensibly—of supposedly traditional national values, including democracy, open markets and human rights, and the co-operation with Western allies over multilateralism.<sup>12</sup> It was a Manichean foreign policy infused with ideologically conservative politics and mixed, at times, with domestic political considerations. Both, to varying degrees, can be recognized in the Harper government's signature foreign policy actions: the continued involvement in the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan and later involvement in largely Western coalitions undertaking military actions in Libya and Iraq and Syria; the vocal support for the governments of Israel and Ukraine and opposition to the government of Iran; the professed commitment to the protection of religious minorities; the promotion of the production and export of Canadian oil to the global market; the withdrawal from international agreements, most notably the Kyoto Protocol; and, beyond its failed bid for a Security

Council seat in 2010, the broad disengagement from the United Nations. As leader of the opposition in 2003, Harper also famously supported Canada's involvement in the Iraq War, writing with Stockwell Day in *The Wall Street Journal* that it was a mistake for Canada, a country "forged in large part by war", to abandon its traditional American and British allies and its historic willingness to use force "for freedom, for democracy, [and] for civilization itself."<sup>13</sup>

The Conservative Party's foreign policy principles were outlined in each of its election manifestos in 2006, 2008 and 2011. Its 2006 and 2008 platforms outlined a "Canada First" approach to national defence (2006, p. 45, and 2008, p. 29), with the former pledging that the party would "[a]rticulate Canada's core values of freedom, democracy, the rule of law, human rights, free markets, and free trade – and compassion for the less fortunate" (Conservative Party of Canada 2006, p. 45). Highlighting the intersection between its foreign policy priorities and its conception of national identity, the party's 2011 manifesto pledged to ensure Canada is prepared for present and future security challenges, to assert "national sovereignty" and to "promote our nation's history and foster Canadian patriotism." (p. 33). This is a version of Canadian history in which militarism looms large and peacekeeping is conspicuous in its absence.<sup>14</sup> The Conservative Party omitted any reference to peacekeeping in its 2006, 2008 and 2011 election platforms, and instead focused on promises to strengthen the CAF for combat missions, most notably in Afghanistan and more broadly in the context of the War on Terror, to assert territorial sovereignty and to promote Canada's values abroad (Conservative Party of Canada 2006, p. 44-45, 2008, p. 29-30, and 2011, p. 31-43).<sup>15</sup> The Liberal Party, in contrast, incorporated a commitment to peacekeeping in each of its platforms during the same period, declaring its intention to expand the CAF as a means of allowing Canada "to play a leading role in peace support operations" in 2006 (p. 73), highlighting its support for the joint UN-African Union (AU) peacekeeping mission in Darfur in 2008 (p. 58) and promising a return to peacekeeping and the deployment of troops "where it's clear that a mission is consistent with Canada's interests, values and capabilities" in 2011 (p. 82-83, quoted from p. 82).

The Conservative Party's three electoral victories from 2006 to 2011 allowed it to implement its desired foreign policy shift. When Stephen Harper was elected Prime Minister in February 2006, Canada had 198 troops participating in nine UN peacekeeping missions around the world; in October 2015, his last full month in office, it had 18 in five missions. Throughout his three terms as Prime Minister, monthly troop contributions only exceeded 26 for the period of

June-October 2013, peaking at 56 (International Peace Institute, nd.). While the Harper government was criticized for minimizing parliamentary and public input in foreign policy (Schmitz 2014), and it has been forcibly argued by Paris (2014) that, with some exceptions, Canadians maintained their commitment to liberal internationalism despite the Harper government's foreign policy changes, two facts are particularly pertinent. First, the foreign policy beliefs of Canadian voters are not monolithic, and those who identify as Conservative Party supporters hold demonstrably different views on a wide variety of topics tied to militarism and internationalism. Indeed, there was a strong correlation between these views and support for both the Conservative Party and Stephen Harper during his time as Prime Minister (Gravelle et al. 2014). It thus should not be concluded that the foreign policy actions and stated principles of the Harper government lacked a certain degree of popular support among the Conservative Party's successful electoral coalition.<sup>16</sup> Second, as acknowledged above, voters who do not prioritize foreign policy in their electoral decisions fail to incentivize politicians' behaviour by removing the potential electoral costs of unpopular foreign policy changes. Even if the Canadian public maintained a commitment to liberal internationalism throughout Stephen Harper's time as Prime Minister, the failure to translate that commitment into electoral incentives precluded greater involvement in UN peacekeeping.

The decline of UN peacekeeping under Stephen Harper is therefore easy to explain. Within the decision-making model outlined above, his government's turn away from liberal internationalism and concerted efforts to reorient Canadian foreign policy around the use of force and co-operation with Western allies in the pursuit of narrowly defined values embodied a fundamental lack of commitment to peacekeeping as a public good in the international system. Voters did not punish or, to a certain degree, supported this shift, providing the Conservatives Party with little incentive to alter its course; in fact, to the extent that it mobilized certain members of the party's electoral coalition, it had an incentive to pursue its foreign policy objectives. The ideological commitments and electoral politics of the Conservative Party are not, however, the sole cause of Canada's declining involvement in UN peacekeeping operations. They may explain the specific reluctance of the Harper government to engage in peacekeeping, but they also reflect a broader set of pressures and incentives that define politicians' decision-making processes. A change in government may change the form(s) that these pressures and incentives take, but, as the

experiences of the Harper government's successor show, they remain an ever-present constraint on peacekeeping participation.

*Justin Trudeau and the Effects of Risk Aversion*

The election of Justin Trudeau's Liberal Party in October 2015 offered a symbolic return of liberal internationalism to Canadian foreign policy. Promising to restore Canada's place in the world and to re-embrace the commitment to multilateralism and international institutions that the Harper government had abandoned, the party's 2015 manifesto pledged to "recommit to supporting international peace operations with the United Nations", "not only because of the help they provide to millions of people affected by conflicts, but also because they serve Canada's interests." (p. 69). The Conservative Party platform again omitted any reference to peacekeeping, focusing instead on combatting 'jihadi terrorism' and the international campaign against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS),<sup>17</sup> protecting persecuted minorities, supporting Ukraine, asserting northern sovereignty and, more broadly, strengthening the military for the purposes of national security (p. 75-101). The Liberal Party's stance on peacekeeping enjoyed apparent popular support: an Angus Reid Institute (2015) poll conducted shortly before the election found that 74% of respondents believed that the Canadian military "should be focused on peacekeeping" rather than "combat preparedness" (at 26%), although support for peacekeeping over combat was notably higher among Liberal (82%) and New Democrat (84%) voters than their Conservative counterparts (53%). Again, however, foreign policy was not highly prioritized by voters in 2015. According to a poll conducted by the CBC during the campaign, voters ranked foreign policy last out of 13 issues in the election in terms of importance, with only two percent of respondents identifying it as their top priority. The economy, at 36%, was by far the most prominent concern (CBC News 2015) as the country dealt with the effects of a recent recession and a large drop in oil prices, a reality that was reflected by the major parties' campaign messaging.<sup>18</sup>

The new Liberal government maintained its rhetorical support for peacekeeping following its election victory. It also quickly declared that Canada would be seeking a seat on the UN Security Council, adding an extra imperative to demonstrate its apparent desire to re-engage in peacekeeping. In August 2016, the Liberal government announced a pledge to commit \$450 million and up to 600 troops and 150 police officers to international peace operations over the next three years (Brewster 2016). Trudeau reiterated this commitment to re-engage in UN peacekeeping



operations in his speech before the General Assembly the following month (Prime Minister of Canada 2016). These plans, however, lacked the popular support that peacekeeping enjoyed when considered in abstract. A Forum Research poll conducted in October 2016 revealed that 56% of voters, including 68% of Liberals, 56% of New Democrats and 41% of Conservatives, supported the plan to send 600 troops to Africa; when informed that Canadian peacekeepers could come under fire, however, support fell to 44%. In November 2017, the Liberal government announced it would be willing to provide Canadian transport and combat helicopters, cargo planes, military trainers and as many as 200 ground troops to the UN for future peacekeeping missions, apparently scaling back its promises from the previous year (Brewster 2017a).

The Liberal government delayed making concrete commitments despite repeated requests from the UN and key European allies, most notably for Canada to provide helicopters to support the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), to offer a senior officer to lead the Mali mission and to undertake military training and police reform in the country (Brewster 2017b). Similar requests to participate in operations in the Central African Republic (CAR), South Sudan and Haiti, and to fill important leadership positions in Afghanistan, the CAR and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, were also denied (Brewster 2017a, and Brewster 2017b). The demand for Canadian participation by the UN is unsurprising given that Canadian troops, many of whom speak French, are both well trained and well equipped, while Canada possesses advanced military hardware and lacks the colonial history in Africa of some European powers. Beyond its broader value of promoting regional stability and a wide range of human rights, MINUSMA offered Canada the opportunity to work with its close NATO allies, particularly France, on counter-terrorism operations in a region of growing strategic importance and to gain the support of African states in its bid for a Security Council seat. Nevertheless, the Trudeau government continued to resist firm participation commitments.

Canada's dwindling peacekeeping contributions began to receive media attention in early 2018 as the number of Canadian troops deployed in UN peacekeeping missions fell to a historic low point.<sup>19</sup> In March, the Liberal government announced that it would send six helicopters and up to 250 troops to Mali as part of MINUSMA (Brewster 2018a), and eventually pledged a further ten soldiers to serve at the mission's headquarters and 20 police officers to support both the UN and a European Union (EU) training mission (Brewster 2018b). With 15,425 personnel, including 11,684 contingent troops, deployed in April 2018, Canada's contribution would be relatively small

(United Nations Peacekeeping, nd.(b)), and the length of its engagement would be limited to one year (Dickson 2018). UN officials reportedly expressed concerns that the size of Canada's helicopter contingent would be inadequate for the demands of the mission, but the government's offer remained unchanged (Kent 2018). At the time the commitment was announced, none of the 162 fatalities experienced by MINUSMA had resulted from the use of helicopters in combat (Brewster 2018a). Some of Canada's allies reportedly expressed frustration that the Liberal government did not adequately explain to the Canadian public the necessity of the mission or that Canadian troops would be relatively safe compared to other participants (Berthiaume 2018b).

Senior opposition figures in the Conservative Party were quick to highlight the dangers posed by the ongoing conflict in Mali and to criticize the announcement as politically motivated (Brewster 2018a). The potential risks of the Mali mission have also been a major focus of coverage in the Canadian press, which has frequently stressed the possibility of Canadian casualties and the uncertainty of the mission's success.<sup>20</sup> Such concerns have had an impact on public opinion. In a poll conducted by the Angus Reid Institute (2018), 41% of respondents agreed with the statement that the Mali mission "is too risky and Canada shouldn't get involved". Again, respondents were split along party lines as 59% of Conservative supporters expressed agreement in contrast to only 29% of Liberal and 31% and New Democratic Party (NDP) voters. While 70% claimed to strongly agree or agree that Canadian peacekeeping is a personal source of pride, 54% agreed with the statement that "[u]ltimately, the situation in Mali is not Canada's problem".

There are thus few signs that the Trudeau government will restore Canada to a place of prominence in UN peacekeeping operations. Indeed, it has few reasons to do so. In contrast to their predecessors who declined commitment due to their foreign policy priorities and the absence of electoral incentives, politicians in the federal Liberal Party are constrained by risk aversion to the potential costs peacekeeping entails. This risk aversion arises from the disconnect among voters between the support for peacekeeping in general and the support for concrete peacekeeping missions, such as the mission in Mali, as the potential dangers of participation come to the fore. To limit risk and fulfill its campaign promise to re-engage in UN peacekeeping operations, the logical option for the Liberal government is to make a token commitment. This is the path that is has pursued by deploying a relatively small number of troops in limited roles for a short period of time in response to requests for greater engagement from the UN and its allies. According to the most recent figures from IPI, even if Canada fields its promised 250 troops and 10 mission

headquarters staff concurrently, it will only rise to 48<sup>th</sup> position on the list of troop contributing countries to UN peacekeeping missions, behind Western allies Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.<sup>21</sup> While a token commitment may fall short of international demand, it nevertheless allows the Liberal Party to placate its voters with a symbolic return to liberal internationalism while minimizing, as far as possible, the risk of incurring casualties as a result of participation. It is this domestic audience that decision-makers must satisfy, and thus for whom peacekeeping policy is ultimately crafted.

### **Conclusions: Overcoming Free Riding**

Canada's declining participation in UN peacekeeping operations has created a classic free-rider problem: while the country is willing to enjoy the benefits of UN peacekeeping as a public good, it is unwilling to bear the costs that the private supply of peacekeeping entails. The electoral incentives that politicians face make this problem particularly intractable. But can it be overcome? Canada has, of course, made large personnel commitments to UN peacekeeping missions in the past, suggesting that it might be possible for it to do so again. For this to happen, the incentives that elected officials face when deciding whether to participate in peacekeeping must change. Canadian voters, if they truly value peacekeeping as a source of national identity and a vehicle for their country to play a positive role on the global stage, must more effectively communicate these interests to politicians by rewarding those who make peacekeeping commitments and punishing those who do not. Peacekeeping is not a primary concern for most voters. If Canada is to again play a leading role in UN peacekeeping operations, it may need to become one.

There are, however, reasons to believe that Canadian politicians will be reluctant to meaningfully re-engage in UN peacekeeping operations for the foreseeable future. The modern Conservative Party's approach to foreign policy, while consciously breaking from the tradition of liberal internationalism, enjoys the support of a sizeable segment of the Canadian public that the party depends on for electoral support. The Liberal Party, conversely, maintains an official commitment to peacekeeping, but is reluctant to translate that commitment into concrete action. Its plans for future engagement will likely depend on the ultimate public response to the Mali mission, which will in turn depend on the mission's perceived success and costs. If the mission comes to enjoy public support—or at least fails to attract popular opposition—the Liberal government may be more open to the possibility of further commitments, but its ultimate risk

aversion is unlikely to disappear. Other political parties may see their approach to peacekeeping shaped by different combinations of ideological commitments and electoral constraints, but none have yet managed to break the Liberal/Conservative duopoly on political power.<sup>22</sup>

There is also the very real possibility that debates about Canada's role in the world will come to take on a greater urgency, if indeed they have not already done so. As the liberal international order that has historically been so central to Canadian foreign policy increasingly comes under threat from populist movements in Western democracies and the rise of powers that are less committed to the *status quo*, Canada may have to play a greater role in maintaining international institutions than it has in the recent past. There are few greater responses to free riding than changing the costs of inaction. The Canadian public will just need to communicate to its elected representatives that liberal internationalism is worth upholding.

---

<sup>1</sup> The significance of peacekeeping in Canadian politics and public opinion is explored throughout this article. For a recent survey of Canadians' views of their country's role in the world, including their perceptions of peacekeeping, see Environics Institute (2018).

<sup>2</sup> This article specifically analyzes troop commitments to UN peacekeeping operations. Troop numbers are used rather than total personnel numbers given the central role that troops play in peacekeeping operations and the unique demands and risks involved in their deployment. The long-term trend of Canada's declining participation also holds if total personnel numbers are used (International Peace Institute, nd.). UN peacekeeping operations are examined both because the UN remains the primary vehicle through which international peacekeeping operations take place and because multilateral missions outside the UN are often difficult to classify, even if they involve certain peacekeeping activities.

<sup>3</sup> For analyses of peacekeeping in the context of free riding and the private provision of public goods, see: Bove and Elia (2011), Gaibulloev et al. (2015), and Sandler (2017).

<sup>4</sup> While President Obama was measured in his criticism, he nevertheless expressed his frustration about allies' apparent free riding in a major foreign policy interview in *The Atlantic* as he approached the end of his time in office (Goldberg 2016). President Trump, in contrast, has made criticism of alleged free riders and the demand that allies increase defence spending a central pillar of his approach to foreign policy. See, for example: Davis (2018), and Tasker (2016).

<sup>5</sup> Crucial input is provided by the military and relevant government departments. Still, these decisions are ultimately made by politicians.

<sup>6</sup> For an exploration of military expenditures and Canadian foreign policy, see Leuprecht and Sokolsky (2015).

<sup>7</sup> The Almond-Lippmann consensus, which holds that public opinion is volatile, incoherent and largely irrelevant to foreign policy, has been extensively debated. See, for example, Holsti (1992).

<sup>8</sup> Principle-agent problems with asymmetric information are defining features of democratic elections. For classic treatments of principle-agent problems in political science literature, see: Banks (1990), and Barro (1973).

<sup>9</sup> The implications of the changing nature of UN missions, including the impact of peace enforcement mandates on troop commitments by Western states, is considered in Karlsrud (2015).

<sup>10</sup> Notable treatments of casualty tolerance in peacekeeping operations include: Bove and Elia (2011), and van der Meulen and Soeters (2005).

<sup>11</sup> Token commitment is an important yet often overlooked aspect of peacekeeping participation. See, for example, Coleman (2013).

<sup>12</sup> An excellent overview of Canadian foreign policy under Stephen Harper can be found in Carment and Landry eds. (2014).

---

<sup>13</sup> See Harper and Day (2003). At the time, Harper and Day were, respectively, the leader and shadow foreign minister of the Canadian Alliance, then in official opposition. The Canadian Alliance merged with the Progressive Conservative Party to form the Conservative Party of Canada later that year.

<sup>14</sup> For the Harper government's efforts to construct an alternative narrative of Canadian history that places militarism at the centre of national identity, see Frenette (2014).

<sup>15</sup> The sole reference to peacekeeping comes in the party's 2011 manifesto, which asserts that "no one can predict when our brave men and women in uniform may be called upon – whether to support our allies and defend our country's interests, to help keep the peace in troubled lands, or to rescue the victims of natural disasters at home and abroad." (32). The separation of peacekeeping from supporting allies and defending national interests is particularly illustrative.

<sup>16</sup> Paris (2014) considers—and ultimately rejects—a version of this argument on p. 294-302.

<sup>17</sup> The name 'ISIS' is used here given its use in the Conservative Party platform and in Canadian politics more generally.

<sup>18</sup> The degree to which economic issues dominated party platforms is most evident in the Conservative Party's manifesto, entitled "Protect Our Economy: Our Conservative Plan to Protect the Economy". The word 'economy' appears on the cover six times alone. See Conservative Party of Canada (2015).

<sup>19</sup> See, for example: Berthiaume (2018a), Brewster (2018), and Keddie (2018).

<sup>20</sup> See, for example: Arsenault (2018), Chase (2018), Common (2018), Hansen (2018), Krayden (2018), and Smith (2018).

<sup>21</sup> Calculations by author based on figures for December 2017. See International Peace Institute (nd.).

<sup>22</sup> This duopoly includes the historic predecessors to the modern Conservative Party.

## References

- Achen, Christopher H. and Larry M. Bartles, 2016. *Democracy for Realists: Why Elections do not Produce Responsive Government*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Andersson, Andreas, 2000. Democracies and UN Peacekeeping Operations, 1990-1996. *International Peacekeeping*, 7 (2), 1-22.
- Andersson, Andreas, 2002. United Nations Interventions by United Democracies? State Commitment to UN Interventions, 1991-99. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 37 (4), 363-386.
- Angus Reid Institute, 2015. Elections 2015: Canadians Profess Decline In International Reputation in Last Decade by Margin of 2:1. September 28.
- Angus Reid Institute, 2018. Mali Peacekeeping: Politics Divides Canadian Support for Mission, But Majority Say Canada Should Help. July 24.
- Anker, Lane, 2005. Peacekeeping and Public Opinion. *Canadian Military Journal*, 6 (2), 23-32.
- Arsenault, Adrienne, 2018. Canadian Troops in Mali Prepare for Daunting, Dangerous Peacekeeping Mandate. CBC News, June 24.
- Badescu, Cristina G., 2010. Canada's Continuing Engagement with United Nations Peace Operations. *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, 16 (2), 45-60.
- Banks, Jeffrey S., 1990. A Model of Electoral Competition with Incomplete Information. *Journal of Economic Theory*, 50 (2), 309-325.
- Barro, Robert J., 1973. The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model. *Public Choice*, 14 (1), 19-42.
- Bellamy, Alex J. and Paul D. Williams, 2012. Broadening the Base of United Nations Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries. International Peacekeeping Institute, Providing for Peacekeeping No. 1.
- Bellamy, Alex J. Paul D. Williams, 2013. Explaining the National Politics of Peacekeeping Contributions. In Bellamy and Williams eds., 417-436.
- Bellamy, Alex J. Paul D. Williams eds., 2013. *Providing Peacekeepers: The Politics, Challenges, and Future of United Nations Peacekeeping Contributions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bellamy, Alex J. and Paul D. Williams, 2009. The West and Contemporary Peace Operations. *Journal of Peace Research*, 46 (1), 39-57.
- Berthiaume, Lee, 2018a. Canada's Peacekeeping Contribution Reaches New Low Despite Trudeau's Promises. *The Globe and Mail*, February 2.
- Berthiaume, Lee, 2018b. Some of Canada's Allies Frustrated with Liberals' Announced Mali Peacekeeping Mission. *National Post*, March 23.
- Boucher, Jean-Christophe, 2010. Evaluating the "Trenton Effect": Canadian Public Opinion and Military Casualties in Afghanistan (2006-2010). *American Review of Canadian Studies*, 40 (2), 237-258.
- Bove, Vincenzo and Leandro Elia, 2011. Supplying Peace: Participation in and Troop Contributions to Peacekeeping Missions. *Journal of Peace Research*, 48 (6), 699-714.
- Brewster, Murray, 2017b. Internal Documents Detail UN Peacekeeping Requests for Mali, Other Hotspots. CBC News, June 19.
- Brewster, Murray, 2016. Liberals Commit \$450M, up to 600 Troops to UN Peacekeeping Missions. CBC News, August 26.
- Brewster, Murray, 2018a. Canada Sending 6 Helicopters to Help UN Mission in Mali. CBC News, March 19.

- Brewster, Murray, 2018b. Canada Sending Police to Mali as Part of Peacekeeping Mission. CBC News, July 5.
- Brewster, Murray, 2018c. Number of Canadian Soldiers on UN Peacekeeping Missions Hits New Low. CBC News, March 15.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson and Alastair Smith, 1999. An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace. *American Political Science Review*, 93 (4), 791-807.
- Carment, David and Joe Landry eds., 2014. Transformation, Ambiguity, and Reversal: Harper's Foreign Policy Under the Microscope. *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, 20 (2), 107-240.
- Carroll, Michael K., 2016. Peacekeeping: Canada's Past, But Not its Present or Future? *International Journal*, 71 (1), 167-176.
- CBC News, 2015. Vote Compass: Economy and environment rate as top issues. September 10.
- Chase, Steven, 2018. Canadian Soldiers Well-Prepared for Risk of Injury or Death in Mali Mission, Official Says. *The Globe and Mail*, July 5.
- Coleman, Katharina P., 2013. Token Troop Contributions to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. In Bellamy and Williams eds., 47-67.
- Common, David, 2018. Canadians Head Into Fight that May be 'Unwinnable' in Mali. CBC News, June 26.
- Conservative Party of Canada, 2011. Here for Canada: Stephen Harper's Low-Tax Plan for Jobs and Economic Growth.
- Conservative Party of Canada, 2015. Protect Our Economy: Our Conservative Plan to Protect the Economy.
- Conservative Party of Canada, 2006. Stand Up for Canada: Conservative Party of Canada Federal Election Platform 2006.
- Conservative Party of Canada, 2008. The True North Strong and Free: Stephen Harper's Plan for Canadians.
- Daniel, D. C.F. and Leigh C. Caraher, 2006. Characteristics of Troop Contributors to Peace Operations and Implications for Global Capacity. *International Peacekeeping*, 13 (3), 297-315.
- Davis, Julie Hirschfeld, 2018. Trump Warns NATO Allies to Spend More on Defense, or Else. *The New York Times*, July 2.
- Dickson, Janice, 2018. Sajjan Brushes Off Suggestion Mali Mission is Too Short. iPolitics, March 20.
- Dolye, Michael W., 2005. Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace. *American Political Science Review*, 99 (3), 463-466.
- Enviroics Institute, 2018. Canada's World Survey 2018: Final Report. April.
- Fearon, James D., 1998. Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 1, 289-313.
- Forum Research, 2016. Canadians Satisfied, Happy with Liberal Government After One Year. October 13.
- Frenette, Yves, 2014. Conscripting Canada's Past: The Harper Government and the Politics of Memory. *Canadian Journal of History*, 49 (1), 49-65.
- Gaibullov, Khusrav, Justin George, Todd Sandler and Hirofumi Shimizu, 2015. Personnel Contributions to UN and Non-UN Peacekeeping Missions: A Public Goods Approach. *Journal of Peace Research*, 52 (6), 727-742.

- Gelpi, Christopher, Jason Reifler and Peter Feaver, 2007. Iraq the Vote: Retrospective and Prospective Foreign Policy Judgements on Candidate Choice and Casualty Tolerance. *Political Behavior*, 29 (2), 151-174.
- Goldberg, Jeffrey, 2016. The Obama Doctrine. *The Atlantic*, April.
- Gravelle, Timothy B., Thomas J. Scotto, Jason Reifler and Harold D. Clarke, 2014. Foreign policy beliefs and support for Stephen Harper and the Conservative Party. *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, 20 (2), 111-130.
- Hansen, Ken, 2018. Canada's Peacekeeping Mission to Mali Could Become a New Afghanistan. *Maclean's*, May 31.
- Harper, Stephen and Stockwell Day, 2003. Canadians Stand With You. *The Wall Street Journal*, March 28.
- Holsti, Ole R., 1992. Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond Lippmann Consensus. *International Studies Quarterly*, 36 (4), 439-466.
- International Peace Institute, nd. IPI Peacekeeping Database. Available at: <http://providingforpeacekeeping.org/contributions/>.
- Karlsrud, John, 2015. The UN at War: Examining the Consequences of Peace-Enforcement Mandates for the UN Peacekeeping Operations in the CAR, the DRC and Mali. *Third World Quarterly*, 36 (1), 40-54.
- Karlsrud, John and Kari M. Osland, 2016. Between Self-Interest and Solidarity: Norway's Return to UN Peacekeeping. *International Peacekeeping*, 23 (5), 784-803.
- Keddie, Ian J., 2018. On Peacekeeping, Canada is Failing the Global Community. *Maclean's*, March 1.
- Kent, Melissa, 2018. UN Says Canada Needs More Helicopters to Fully Meet its Peacekeeping Commitments in Mali. CBC News, April 24.
- Krayden, David, 2018. Canada's Peacekeeping Mission in Africa is Destined to Become the Folly in Mali. CBC News, March 21.
- Lebovic, James H., 2004. Uniting for Peace? Democracies and United Nations Peace Operations after the Cold War. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 48 (6), 910-936.
- Leuprecht, Christian and Joel J. Sokolsky, 2015. Defense Policy "Walmart Style": Canadian Lessons in "not-so-grand" Strategy. *Armed Forces & Society*, 41 (3), 541-562.
- Lewis, Paul, 1994. Security Council Votes to Cut Rwanda Peacekeeping Force. *The New York Times*, April 22.
- Libben, Joshua, 2017. Am I My Brother's Peacekeeper? Strategic Cultures and Change Among Major Troop Contributors to United Nations Peacekeeping. *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, 23 (3), 324-339.
- Liberal Party of Canada, 2015. Real Change: A New Plan for a Strong Middle Class.
- Liberal Party of Canada, 2008. Richer, Fairer, Greener: An Action Plan for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.
- Liberal Party of Canada, 2006. Securing Canada's Success.
- Liberal Party of Canada, 2011. Your Family. Your Future. Your Canada.
- Maoz, Zeev and Bruce Russett, 1993. Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986. *American Political Science Review*, 87 (3), 624-638.
- Martin, Pierre and Michel Fortmann, 1995. Canadian Public Opinion and Peacekeeping in a Turbulent World. *International Journal*, 50 (2), 370-400.
- Massie, Justin, 2008. Regional Strategic Subcultures: Canadians and the Use of Force in Afghanistan and Iraq. *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, 14 (2), 19-48.



- Neack, Laura, 1995. UN Peace-Keeping: In the Interest of Community or Self? *Journal of Peace Research*, 32 (2), 181-196.
- Olson, Mancur, 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Owen, John M., 1994. How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace. *International Security*, 19 (2) 87-125.
- Paris, Roland, 2014. Are Canadians Still Liberal Internationalists? Foreign Policy and Public Opinion in the Harper Era. *International Journal*, 69 (3), 274-307.
- Passmore, Timothy J.A., Megan Shannon and Andrew F. Hart, 2018. Rallying the Troops: Collective Action and Self-Interest in UN Peacekeeping Contributions. *Journal of Peace Research*, 55 (3), 366-379.
- Prime Minister of Canada, 2016. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau's Address to the 71<sup>st</sup> Session of the United Nations General Assembly. Available at: <https://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2016/09/20/prime-minister-justin-trudeaus-address-71st-session-united-nations-general-assembly>.
- Pugh, Michael, 2004. Peacekeeping and Critical Theory. *International Peacekeeping*, 11 (1), 39-58.
- Sandler, Todd, 2017. International Peacekeeping Operations: Burden Sharing and Effectiveness. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 61 (9), 1875-1897.
- Schmitz, Gerald J., 2014. The Harper Government and the De-Democratization of Canadian Foreign Policy. *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, 20 (2), 224-228.
- Smith, Marie-Danielle, 2018. Everything You Need to Know About the Violence in Mali and What Canada Will be Doing to Keep the Peace. *National Post*, May 30.
- Sotomayor Velázquez, Arturo C., 2010. Why Some States Participate in UN Peace Missions While Others Do Not: An Analysis of Civil-Military Relations and Its Effects on Latin America's Contributions to Peacekeeping Operations. *Security Studies*, 19 (1), 160-195.
- Tasker, John Paul, 2016. A Trump Presidency Could Add Pressure on Canada's Defence Spending. CBC News, April 27.
- The Economist*, 2015. Canada's Role in the World: Strong, Proud and Free-Riding. 12 September.
- The White House, 1994. Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-25. May 3.
- United Nations Peacekeeping, nd.(a). How We Are Funded. Available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/how-we-are-funded>.
- United Nations Peacekeeping, nd.(b). MINUSMA Fact Sheet. Available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusma>.
- van der Meulen, Jan and Joseph Soeters, 2005. Considering Casualties: Risk and Loss during Peacekeeping and Warmaking. *Armed Forces and Society*, 31 (4), 482-486.
- Wagner, Eric, 2006/2007. The Peaceable Kingdom? The National Myth of Canadian Peacekeeping and the Cold War. *Canadian Military Journal*, 7 (4), 45-54.
- Ward, Hugh and Han Dorussen, 2016. Standing Alongside Your Friends: Network Centrality and Providing Troops to UN Peacekeeping Operations. *Journal of Peace Research*, 53 (3), 392-408.