

## Layered quantum key distribution

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We introduce a family of quantum key distribution protocols for distributing shared random keys within a network of  $n$  users. The advantage of these protocols is that any possible key structure needed within the network, including broadcast keys shared among subsets of users, can be implemented by using a particular multipartite high-dimensionally entangled quantum state. This approach is more efficient in the number of quantum channel uses than conventional quantum key distribution using bipartite links. Additionally, multipartite high-dimensional quantum states are becoming readily available in quantum photonic labs, making the proposed protocols implementable using current technology.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

The possibility of increasing the amount of shared random variables across spatially separated parties in an intrinsically secure fashion is one of the flagship applications of quantum entanglement [1]. Referred to as quantum key distribution (QKD), such schemes have matured to the point of commercial application today [2]. Bipartite entanglement of a sufficient quality for violating Bell's inequalities is enough to ensure complete device-independent security in two-party communication scenarios [3–5]. However, due to strict technical requirements such as extremely high detection and coupling efficiencies, such schemes are difficult to realize in practice [6].

While conventional entanglement-based QKD protocols employ two-party *qubit* states, it is well documented that the quantum state dimension has a large impact on the actual key rate [7–11] and can significantly improve the robustness of such protocols against noise or other potential security leaks [12,13]. Both of these properties make quantum key distribution with *qudits* a viable candidate for next-generation implementations. High-dimensional bipartite entanglement in the spatial and temporal degrees of freedom of a photon has been recently demonstrated in the laboratory [14–18] and experimental methods for measuring high-dimensional quantum states are fast reaching maturity [19–22].

In parallel, recent years have seen the experimental realization of high-dimensional *multipartite* entanglement [23–25], as well as the development of techniques for generating a vast array of such states [26]. These experimental advances signal that multipartite high-dimensional entanglement is fast becoming experimentally accessible, thus paving the way for quantum communication protocols that take advantage of the full information-carrying potential of a photon.

The usefulness of multipartite entanglement for quantum key distribution was recently demonstrated by designing QKD

protocols which allow  $n > 2$  users to produce a secret key shared among all of them [27,28]. Such a multipartite shared key can later be used, for example, for the secure broadcast of information. Both of these protocols use  $n$ -partite Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ)-type qubit states. In certain regimes, these protocols are more efficient than sharing a secret key among  $n$  parties via bipartite links followed by sharing of the broadcast key with the help of a one-time-pad cryptosystem. This advantage is especially pronounced in network architectures with bottlenecks (see [27]), making this protocol an interesting possibility for quantum network designs.

In this work, we go even further and generalize QKD schemes to protocols which use a general class of multipartite-entangled qudit states. Such states have an asymmetric entanglement structure, where the local dimension of each particle can have a different value [23,29,30]. The special structure of these states allows not only an increase in the information efficiency of the quantum key distribution protocol (either due to the dimension of the local states or the QKD network structure), but also adds an additional qualitative property—multiple keys between arbitrary subsets or “layers” of users can be shared simultaneously. Our generalization therefore shows a more complete picture of the advantages of multipartite qudit entangled states in QKD networks, which goes beyond the simple increase in key rates.

Let us now introduce the idea behind the proposed protocols with a simple motivating example. Consider a tripartite state,

$$|\Psi_{442}\rangle = \frac{1}{2}(|000\rangle + |111\rangle + |220\rangle + |331\rangle). \quad (1)$$

After measuring many copies of this state locally in the computational basis, the three users—Alice, Bob, and Carol—end up with data with interesting correlations. First of all, each of the four possible outcome combinations 000, 111, 220, 331 is distributed uniformly. Moreover, the outcomes of the first two users (00, 11, 22, and 33) are perfectly correlated and partially independent of the outcomes of the third user. Alice and Bob can postprocess their outcomes into two uniform random bit strings  $k_{ABC}$  and  $k_{AB}$  in the following way:

$$k_{ABC} = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{for outcomes 0 and 2} \\ 1 & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}$$

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and, simultaneously,

$$k_{AB} = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{for outcomes 0 and 1} \\ 1 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Note that  $k_{ABC}$  is perfectly correlated to Carol's measurement outcomes; therefore it constitutes a random string shared between all three users. On the other hand, string  $k_{AB}$  is completely independent of Carol's data—conditioned on either of Carol's two measurement outcomes, the value of  $k_{AB}$  is 0 or 1, each with probability  $\frac{1}{2}$ . A simplified argument can now be made—since this procedure uses copies of pure entangled states, it is also independent of any other external data, and therefore the strings  $k_{ABC}$  and  $k_{AB}$  are not only uniformly distributed, but also *secure*. It remains to show that this simple idea can be turned into a secure QKD protocol, in which a randomly chosen part of the rounds is used to assess the quality of the shared entanglement.

In Sec. II, we provide a protocol which can implement an arbitrary layered key structure of  $n$  users. In Sec. III, we compare our proposed implementation with the more conventional techniques of implementing key structures based on Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR)- and GHZ-type states and show that aside from allowing very specific layered key structures, our proposed protocol provides a significant advantage in terms of key rates. In Sec. IV, it is revealed that every layered key structure can be implemented with several different asymmetric multipartite high-dimensional states. Additionally, we study the relationship between local dimensions of the constructed states and the achievable key rates.

## II. LAYERED KEY STRUCTURES AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION WITH ASYMMETRIC MULTIPARTITE QUDIT STATES

Suppose there are  $n$  users of a quantum network. In order to achieve secure communication within this network, many types of shared keys are required. Apart from bipartite keys between pairs of users, which can be used for numerous cryptographic tasks such as encryption [31,32] or authentication, secret keys can be shared between larger groups of users. Also known as *conference keys*, such keys have interesting uses such as secure broadcasting. Let us therefore define a *layered key structure* as a set of keys required for secure communication in a given quantum network (see Fig. 1).

Formally, we define a layered key structure  $\mathcal{K}$  as a subset of the power set of users  $\mathcal{K} \subseteq P(\mathcal{U}_n)$ , where  $\mathcal{U}_n$  denotes a set of  $n$  users  $\{u_1, \dots, u_n\}$ . In order to conveniently talk about the layered key structures, let us define some of the parameters that describe them. First,  $K$  is the number of layers. Additionally, we will use the same labels for layers and keys shared in these layers. They are labeled by a natural number  $i \in \{1, \dots, K\}$ , and therefore  $i \in \mathcal{K}$  is a label for a single layer (key) of the layered structure. Last but not least, for each user  $u_j$ , let us define a parameter  $\ell_j$  as the number of layers that the user  $u_j$  belongs to, and therefore  $\ell_j := |\{i \in \mathcal{K} | u_j \in i\}|$ .

In what follows, given a particular key structure  $\mathcal{K}$ , we define a state that can be used for the implementation of  $\mathcal{K}$  in a multipartite protocol. The construction is based on implementations of correlations shared in a tensor product of

GHZ- and EPR-type states for every layer with the help of high-dimensional states.

*State preparation.* Given  $\mathcal{K}$ , find the state  $|\Psi_{\mathcal{K}}\rangle$ .

(1) For each layer  $i$  that the user  $u_j$  is part of, they hold a qubit labeled by  $u_j^i$ .

(2) For each layer  $i \in \mathcal{K}$ , we define a state

$$|\psi_i\rangle := \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \left( \bigotimes_j |0\rangle_{u_j} + \bigotimes_j |1\rangle_{u_j} \right).$$

(3) Define the state  $|\Psi_{\mathcal{K}}\rangle := \bigotimes_{i=1}^K |\psi_i\rangle$ .

(4) Each user  $j$  encodes their  $\ell_j$  qubits  $\{u_j^i\}$  into a qudit register  $u_j^i$  of dimension  $d_j = 2^{\ell_j}$  by rewriting binary string of qubits into digits.

(5) The resulting state  $|\Psi_{\mathcal{K}}\rangle$  is an equal superposition of  $2^K$  states of registers  $d_1, \dots, d_K$ .

Before describing the QKD protocol for the layered key structure  $\mathcal{K}$  implemented with the state  $|\Psi_{\mathcal{K}}\rangle$ , let us first discuss the measurements we will use in the protocol. As stated above, each user  $u_j$  holds a qudit state of dimension  $2^{\ell_j}$ . Our proposed protocol requires full projective measurements, and therefore each user needs to be able to implement a projective measurement with  $2^{\ell_j}$  outcomes. Additionally, since the state  $|\Psi_{\mathcal{K}}\rangle$  can essentially be seen as a tensor product of various qubit GHZ and EPR states, the proof of security will be done by the reduction to multiple instances of protocols for such qubit states implemented simultaneously in higher-dimensional systems. The protocols for qubit systems typically require only measurements in the three mutually unbiased qubit bases  $\sigma_x, \sigma_y$ , and  $\sigma_z$  (see [27] for GHZ-based protocols and [33] for an example of an EPR-based protocol). In order to use the analysis for a qubit state protocol for every layer, the user  $u_j$  needs to implement measurements with  $2^{\ell_j}$  outcomes that can be postprocessed into measurement outcomes on the respective “virtual” qubits belonging to these layers. What is more, in order to keep the analysis of each layer independent, all combinations of qubit measurements are required. Let us therefore label required measurements of user  $u_j$  as  $M_{b_1, b_2, \dots, b_{\ell_j}}^j$ , with  $\forall i, b_i \in \{x, y, z\}$ . Outcomes of such a measurement can be coarse grained into measurement outcomes of measurements  $\sigma_{b_i}$  on their respective qubits.

Let us now present the protocol:

*The Layered QKD protocol.* Protocol for implementing  $\mathcal{K}$  using  $|\Psi_{\mathcal{K}}\rangle$ .

(1) In each round, user  $u_j$  performs a randomly chosen projective measurement  $M_{b_1, \dots, b_{\ell_j}}^j$  and coarse grains its outcome into measurement results for each “virtual” qubit corresponding to their layers.

(2) The measurement choices are revealed to all users via a public channel.

(3) For each layer  $i$ , the rounds in which  $\sigma_z$  was measured by every user in this layer are the key rounds.

(4) For each layer  $i$ , the rounds with other  $\sigma_j$  measurement combinations are the test rounds.

(5) In every layer separately, the test rounds are used for parameter estimation.

(6) Based on the parameter estimation results, error correction and privacy amplification are performed separately for every layer.




FIG. 1. Examples of layered key structures. Left: Each of the two security agencies requires a secure communication channel with their respective agents, as well as an interagency channel secret even from their agents. Additionally, the agents require a secure channel shared only among themselves. Right: The central bank shares a key with each of its branches, while each branch shares a key with each of its automated teller machines (ATMs) and, additionally, all parties share a common secret key.

Note that this is truly a parallel implementation of the qubit protocols for all the layers using higher-dimensional qudit systems and it retains all the expected properties. First of all, a particular round can be a key round for some of the layers and a test round for others. Moreover, it is possible, depending on the quality of the state, to have different key rates for each layer, including the situations when some of the layers have a key rate equal to 0. And last but not least, the implementation and analysis of each layer  $i$  does not depend on users who are not the part of this layer. In fact, each layer can be used and treated independently of the other layers. This signifies that the key in every layer  $i$  is indeed secure even against other users and, additionally, it can be implemented even if the users of the network not in layer  $i$  stop communicating.

### III. COMPARISON TO OTHER IMPLEMENTATIONS OF KEY STRUCTURES

In this section, we compare the performance of our protocol for implementing a key structure  $\mathcal{K}$  with the performance of other possible implementations. The tools available for other implementations are the standard QKD protocols of two types:

(i) Bipartite QKD protocols (qubit or qudit) for sharing a key between a pair of users with the use of EPR states such as

$$|\phi_d^+\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{d}} \sum_{i=0}^{d-1} |ii\rangle.$$

The qubit case of  $d = 2$  can be seen as the standard solution and is sufficient to implement any layered key structure with current technology. However, for the sake of a fair comparison, we also allow for higher-dimensional protocols (see, e.g., [8]).

(ii) Recently, multiparty QKD protocols have been proposed that can implement a multipartite key with the use of GHZ-type states shared between  $n$  users,

$$|\text{GHZ}_d^n\rangle_{u_1, \dots, u_n} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{d}} \sum_{i=0}^{d-1} |ii \dots i\rangle_{u_1, \dots, u_n}.$$

Such protocols can be used to implement the key for each layer separately. Although so far only qubit ( $d = 2$ ) protocols are known [27,28], we also allow for protocols with higher-dimensional systems, which are, in principle, possible.

These existing protocols can be combined to implement the given layered key structure  $\mathcal{K}$  in multiple ways. Here we compare the performance of two specific implementations. The first one uses only bipartite QKD protocols of various dimensions between the selected pairs of users. These bipartite keys are subsequently used to distribute a locally generated multipartite key via one-time-pad encryption [31]. The second implementation uses the GHZ protocols of various dimensions to directly distribute the keys for each layer.

The merit of interest is the *idealized key rate*  $r_i$  associated with every layer  $i$ . The idealized rate  $r_i$  is the expected number of key bits in the layer  $i$  per the time slot, under an assumption that only key round measurements (i.e., the computational basis) are used. Such a merit captures how efficiently the information-carrying potential of the photon is used in different implementations, neglecting the need for the test rounds used in the parameter-estimation part of the protocol.

In order to further specify what implementations of the layered key structure  $\mathcal{K}$  we are comparing to, we need to characterize two different properties of the quantum network we are using for comparison.

Since the achievable idealized rates depend on the architecture of the network (as illustrated in [27]), let us specify the network architecture first. Let us suppose that the  $n$  users  $\mathcal{U}_n$  form a network where each  $u_i$  is connected to a source of entanglement by a quantum channel, and each pair of users  $(u_i, u_j)$  shares an authenticated classical channel (see Fig. 2).

The second property of the network we need to specify is the local dimensions of the measurements allowed for each user. We restrict every user to the local dimension of  $|\Psi_{\mathcal{K}}\rangle$ —user  $u_i$  can perform projective measurements with, at most,  $2^{\ell_i}$  outcomes. This is a reasonable assumption since it is a statement about the complexity of the measurement apparatus of each user  $u_i$ . This choice of dimension is also meaningful since, in a certain sense, our protocol is a good benchmark implementation under these local dimension assumptions. It achieves the rates  $r_i = 1$  for all layers  $i$  and it is not difficult to see that this is impossible with lower local dimensions, since the logarithm of the local dimension  $d_i$  of the user  $u_i$  needs to be at least  $\ell_i$ —the number of shared bits in each round.

Note that the two aforementioned assumptions do not restrict the routing capabilities of the source. This means that




FIG. 2. Entanglement distribution model. Each user  $u_j$  is connected to the source of entanglement via a quantum channel. Additionally each pair of users shares a classical channel.

the source can send out entangled states to any subset of users on demand. Also, these assumptions allow for simultaneous distribution of entangled states to mutually exclusive sets of users. Therefore, for example, in networks of  $2n$  users,  $n$  EPR pairs can be sent simultaneously or, alternatively, two  $n$ -partite GHZ states can be sent simultaneously, and so on. The routing capabilities required of a source in order to be able to implement such approaches pose significant experimental challenges—for example, in access QKD networks [34–36], only a single pair of users can receive an EPR pair in a single time slot. However, for the sake of a fair comparison, we allow them anyway. Note that in this sense, our protocol is passive since the source produces the same state in every round of the protocol.

In order to familiarize the reader with our setup, we explicitly calculate the idealized rates for the simplest case of three users [Alice (1), Bob (2), and Carol (3)], with the layered key structure  $\{k_1 = \{1,2,3\}, k_2 = \{1,2\}\}$  [see Fig. 3(a)], before discussing the rates of different implementations more generally. First of all, for this layered key structure  $\mathcal{K}$ , the associated state is the one introduced in Sec. I,

$$|\Psi_{442}\rangle = \frac{1}{4}(|000\rangle + |111\rangle + |220\rangle + |331\rangle).$$

This fixes the local dimensions to 4 for Alice and Bob and 2 for Carol.

Furthermore, note that in a network of just three users, an EPR pair can be sent only to a single pair of users in each time slot. However, since Alice and Bob can perform ququart measurements, they can use any given time slot to share and run a ququart QKD protocol with the state  $|\psi_4^+\rangle = \frac{1}{4}(|00\rangle + |11\rangle + |22\rangle + |33\rangle)$ , achieving the idealized rate of 2.

Therefore, in order to implement the given key structure, the source will alternate between sending an EPR pair  $|\psi_4^+\rangle$  to Alice and Bob with probability  $p$ , and sending a standard qubit (since Carol can manipulate only qubits) EPR pair  $|\psi^+\rangle$  to Alice and Carol with probability  $(1 - p)$  [see Fig. 3(b)]. This results in an idealized rate  $r_{AB} = 2p$  for the bipartite key  $k_{AB}$  between Alice and Bob. The rate of the key  $k_{AC}$  between Alice and Carol in this setting is  $r_{AC} = (1 - p)$ . In order to get one bit of the desired key  $k_{ABC}$ , a bit of each key  $k_{AB}$  and  $k_{AC}$  needs to be used—Alice locally generates a secret string  $k_{ABC}$  and sends an encrypted copy to both Bob




FIG. 3. Simplest layered QKD (LQKD) example. (a) In this example, three users want to share keys in two layers  $k_1 = \{1,2,3\}$  and  $k_2 = \{1,2\}$ .  $p$  is the probability that users 1 and 2 share the state  $|\psi_4^+\rangle$ . (b) An EPR implementation results in the idealized rates  $[\{1,2,3\}; (1 - p)], [\{1,2\}; 3p - 1]$ . (c) A GHZ implementation results in the idealized rates  $[\{1,2,3\}; (1 - p)], [\{1,2\}; 2p]$ . (d) An implementation with the state  $|\Psi_{442}\rangle = \frac{1}{2}(|000\rangle + |111\rangle + |220\rangle + |331\rangle)$  results in the idealized rates  $[\{1,2,3\}; 1], [\{1,2\}; 1]$ .

and Carol. Therefore, exchanging *all* bits of key  $k_{AC}$  and an equivalent amount of key  $k_{AB}$  in this way results in the rates  $[\{1,2,3\}; (1 - p)], [\{1,2\}; 2p - (1 - p)]$ . Note also that values of  $p \leq \frac{1}{3}$  do not allow the users to exchange all keys  $k_{AC}$  into tripartite keys since the amount of the keys  $k_{AB}$  is too low. For comparison, note that our layered implementation results in the rate  $[\{1,2,3\}; 1], [\{1,2\}; 1]$ , while the previous analysis suggests that keeping the rate  $r_{AB} = 1$  ( $p = \frac{2}{3}$ ) results in  $r_{ABC} = \frac{1}{3}$ .

The analysis for the GHZ implementation is much simpler. Here, either the source sends a qubit GHZ state with probability  $(1 - p)$  or a ququart EPR state to Alice and Bob with probability  $p$  [see Fig. 3(c)]. This results in the rates  $[\{1,2,3\}; (1 - p)], [\{1,2\}; 2p]$ . For comparison, keeping the rate  $r_{AB} = 1$  ( $p = \frac{1}{2}$ ) results in  $r_{ABC} = \frac{1}{2}$ . Thus, while this implementation is more efficient than the EPR one, it still cannot achieve the rate of 1 for both layers obtained by the state  $|\Psi_{442}\rangle$  shown in Fig. 3(d).

The problem of finding the general form of achievable rates for an arbitrary key structure  $\mathcal{K}$  is too complex and would involve too many parameters. The reason for this is the fact that the probabilities (or, in fact, *ratios*) of EPR or GHZ states sent to the different subsets of users change the average rates  $r_i$  in different layers (see the previous example). Therefore, the goal of the following section is to argue that the rates  $r_i = 1$  for all  $i$  are achievable for only restricted classes of key structures  $\mathcal{K}$  with both EPR and GHZ implementations.

### Connected structures and partitions

Naturally, each layered structure  $\mathcal{K}$  defines a neighborhood graph  $G_{\mathcal{K}}$ . Users  $u_n$  are represented as the vertices in this graph






FIG. 4. A key structure with idealized rate 1 with EPR implementation. There are six two-user layers, which can be grouped into three partitions  $\{\{u_1, u_2\}, \{u_3, u_4\}\}, \{\{u_1, u_4\}, \{u_2, u_3\}\}, \{\{u_1, u_3\}, \{u_2, u_4\}\}$ . Eight-dimensional EPR pairs can be distributed to each partition in parallel. If each of these distribution rounds happens with probability  $\frac{1}{3}$ , the average rate for every layer is 1.

and two users  $u_i$  and  $u_j$  are connected by an edge, if they share a layer in the structure  $\mathcal{K}$ . We call a layered structure  $\mathcal{K}$  connected if the neighborhood graph  $G_{\mathcal{K}}$  associated to it is connected.

The connected components of each layered structure  $\mathcal{K}$  can be treated separately since the source can send states to them simultaneously and therefore their rates do not depend on the rates of the other connected components. In what follows, we therefore deal only with connected key structures  $\mathcal{K}$ .

Let us now introduce *partitions*  $\mathcal{P}_i$  of the key structure  $\mathcal{K}$ . These are subsets of layers that are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive—meaning that their union is equal to the set of all users  $\mathcal{U}_n$  and no pair of the layers in the partition contains the same user. Formally,

$$\mathcal{P}_j = \{i_1, \dots, i_m \in \mathcal{K} \mid \cup_a i_a = \mathcal{U}_n, \forall a, b : i_a \cap i_b = \emptyset\}.$$

Note that we maintain an index  $j$  for each partition since each connected layered structure might contain several partitions (see Fig. 4).

Let us now suppose that all the layers of a key structure  $\mathcal{K}$  can be grouped into exactly  $\ell$  partitions. In such a case, each user belongs to exactly  $\ell$  layers and, therefore,  $\forall i : \ell_i = \ell$ . We will show that for the GHZ implementation, all the partitions  $\mathcal{K}$  with this property can achieve the idealized rate  $r_i = 1$  for all layers. For the EPR implementation to achieve all rates equal to 1, an additional requirement is needed—all layers need to have exactly two users.

The crucial observation is that the source can send a GHZ state of dimension  $2^\ell$  to each layer in a partition  $\mathcal{P}_j$  simultaneously, resulting in rate  $\ell$  in each of these layers. It takes the source exactly  $\ell$  time slots to iterate over all the partitions  $\mathcal{P}_j$ , and therefore the average rate for each layer is 1. For the case of all the layers being of size 2, this simple distribution protocol reduces to one with EPR pairs.

It remains to be shown that key rates of 1 cannot be achieved in every layer, unless the key structures  $\mathcal{K}$  can be grouped into partitions of  $\mathcal{U}_n$  without leftover layers. To see this, it is enough to carefully count the number of key bits that are required to be produced in every time step. In order to achieve the rate 1 in each layer, each user needs to produce a total of  $\ell_i$  secret key bits in every round. This can only be achieved if every user measures a state of full dimension in every time step. However, this is not possible for connected key structures  $\mathcal{K}$  that cannot be fully decomposed into multiple partitions. To see this, consider a user  $u_i$ . In order to realize the full




FIG. 5. The number of channel uses needed in order to share a multipartite key with EPR pairs. Users  $u_1$  and  $u_m$  need to share only a single EPR pair with their neighbors. The rest of the users need to share two EPR pairs each. To share the multipartite key, user  $u_1$  generates a random string locally and sends it to the user  $u_2$  secretly via one-time-pad encryption. Then each user  $u_i$ , after receiving the key from the user  $u_{i-1}$ , sends it secretly to the user  $u_{i+1}$ , until all the users share the new secret key.

information-carrying potential, the user  $u_i$  needs to share a  $2^{\ell_i}$ -dimensional GHZ state in one of his layers in a single round. This implies that all the neighbors  $\{u_j\}$  of user  $u_i$  have  $\ell_j = \ell_i$  since otherwise they either will not be able to measure in  $2^{\ell_i}$  dimensions or they will not be able to generate enough key in the given round. This fact, together with the connectedness of the key structure, implies that  $\ell_j = \ell_i$  for all users. In the case of  $\ell_i = 1$ , the desired graph is not connected. Let us therefore discuss only key structures with  $\ell_i > 1$ . In each round, each user needs to share a key in one of his layers. This is possible only if each layer is a part of a partition. Additionally, since each user has  $\ell_j = \ell_i$ , to obtain the rate 1 in every layer, each user needs to iterate over all his layers in exactly  $\ell_i$  rounds. This implies that the key structure can be decomposed into  $\ell_i$  partitions.

An EPR implementation requires an additional restriction on the key structures implementable with rate 1. The reason for this fact is that in each layer of size  $m > 2$ , there is a user who needs to generate two bits of bipartite key in order to securely distribute the locally generated multipartite key (see Fig. 5). The number of required bits per round therefore exceeds  $\ell_i$  in some rounds for some of the users, whenever there is a key shared among a number of users larger than 2. This fact shows that even if the key structure can be grouped into partitions, with all users having the same local dimension  $\ell$  and generating  $\ell$  bits of bipartite randomness in each round, there are some users who need to generate more than  $\ell$  bipartite key bits in order to share  $\ell_i$  bits in their multipartite layers.

Although the conditions formulated in this section fully characterize when our construction *does not* give an advantage when compared to the “traditional” implementations, let us explicitly formulate a couple of simple corollaries, which showcase interesting key structures in which our construction *does* give an advantage. First notice that whenever a key structure of  $n$  users contains a layer of size  $n - 1$ , it cannot be decomposed exactly into partitions since keys of size 1 do not exist. Therefore, such key structures cannot be implemented with rates 1 in every layer by either the GHZ or the EPR implementation. A particularly interesting example of such a key structure is a key structure containing all the possible keys within a set of  $n$  users. Another simple corollary concerns

the EPR implementation—any key structure with an odd number of users  $n$  containing only bipartite keys cannot be exactly decomposed into partitions, and therefore its EPR implementations cannot achieve rate 1 in every layer.

#### IV. DIMENSION-RATE TRADE-OFF

In this section, we show how to construct many different multipartite high-dimensional states that are useful for the implementation of a given key structure  $\mathcal{K}$ . These states differ from each other in their local dimensions as well as achievable idealized key rates—generally there is a trade-off between these two quantities.

As an example, consider the layered structure  $\mathcal{K} = \{\{1,2,3\},\{1,2\}\}$  depicted in Fig. 3. The solution discussed previously can be used to implement this layered structure with the  $|\Psi_{442}\rangle$  state [see Eq. (1)] of local dimensions 4 for the first two users and 2 for the third user. However, consider the following state:

$$|\Psi_{332}\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\left(|000\rangle + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|111\rangle + |221\rangle)\right), \quad (2)$$

which is very close to the first such asymmetric state that was recently realized in the laboratory [23]. Measuring the state in the computational basis produces data that can be postprocessed into two uniformly random and independent keys in the following way:

$$k_{123} = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{for outcome } 0 \\ 1 & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}$$

while, simultaneously,

$$k_{12} = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{for outcome } 1 \\ 1 & \text{for outcome } 2 \\ \perp & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}$$

where  $\perp$  denotes that no key was produced in this layer. The idealized rate associated with this state is  $[\{1,2,3\}; 1], [\{1,2\}; \frac{1}{2}]$ , as a bit for the key  $k_{12}$  gets produced only with probability  $\frac{1}{2}$ . Interestingly, a comparison with other implementations (see Fig. 3) reveals that even though the local dimensions of the  $|\Psi_{332}\rangle$  state are more restricted, it can nonetheless achieve rates that are unattainable by four-dimensional implementations for separate layers. In this section, we discuss under which conditions such local dimension-rate trade-off is possible and subsequently use this knowledge in order to construct a whole family of states which are useful for the implementation of a given layered key structure  $\mathcal{K}$ .

The main idea allowing for the dimension-rate trade-off is not to produce key bits in some of the layers for certain measurement outcomes, which results in a smaller local dimension. However, this idea is not usable in every situation since even the measurement outcome postprocessed to  $\perp$  can leak information about the key produced in different layers. In order to show this, consider two layers  $i$  and  $j$  with  $i \cap j \neq \emptyset$ . Additionally, label the user present in both layers as  $u$ . Without loss of generality, assume that user  $u$  interprets the measurement outcome  $a$  as  $\perp$  in layer  $i$  and as a key bit 0 in layer  $j$ . Since all the users in the layer  $j$  are fully correlated, the key shared in this layer can be interpreted as a string of symbols 0, 1, and  $\perp$ . It is important to notice that keys in layers

$i$  and  $j$  are not independent. While the users of layer  $i$  can infer only that no key was produced in layer  $j$  in rounds where a bit 0 was produced in  $i$  (which is not a security breach), users of  $j$  know that whenever the protocol produced no key symbol  $\perp$  in layer  $j$ , a bit 0 was produced in layer  $i$ . This is not a security breach if and only if all users of the layer  $j$  are authorized to also know the key  $i$ , in other words, if and only if  $j \subset i$ .

In order to explain how to use this observation in the construction of states for any layered structure  $\mathcal{K}$ , let us first revisit the state construction algorithm proposed in Sec. III and reformulate it recursively. Consider two layered key structures  $\mathcal{K}_1$  with users  $\mathcal{U}_1$  implementable with a state  $|\Psi_{\mathcal{K}_1}\rangle$  and  $\mathcal{K}_2$  with users  $\mathcal{U}_2$  implementable with a state  $|\Psi_{\mathcal{K}_2}\rangle$ . A new layered key structure  $\mathcal{K} := \mathcal{K}_1 \cup \mathcal{K}_2$  with users  $\mathcal{U} = \mathcal{U}_1 \cup \mathcal{U}_2$  can be implemented with a state  $|\Psi_{\mathcal{K}}\rangle$ , constructed as follows:

*Recursive state preparation, step 1.* Given  $|\Psi_{\mathcal{K}_1}\rangle$  and  $|\Psi_{\mathcal{K}_2}\rangle$ , find the state  $|\Psi_{\mathcal{K}}\rangle$

with  $\mathcal{K} = \mathcal{K}_1 \cup \mathcal{K}_2$ .

(1) Consider the state  $|\psi_{\mathcal{K}}\rangle := |\Psi_{\mathcal{K}_1}\rangle \otimes |\Psi_{\mathcal{K}_2}\rangle$ .

(2) Each user  $u_j \in \mathcal{K}_1 \cup \mathcal{K}_2$  holds two registers  $u_j^1$  and  $u_j^2$  of dimensions  $d_j^1$  and  $d_j^2$ , respectively.

(3) Let each user  $u_j \in \mathcal{K}_1 \cup \mathcal{K}_2$  encode their registers  $u_j^1$  and  $u_j^2$  in a register  $u_j'$  of dimension  $d_j' = d_j^1 d_j^2$ .

(4) The resulting state is the desired state  $|\Psi_{\mathcal{K}}\rangle$ .

The local dimensions of the resulting state are  $d_j' = d_j^1 d_j^2$  for each user  $u_j \in \mathcal{U}_1 \cap \mathcal{U}_2$  and remains unchanged (i.e.,  $d_j' = d_j$ ) for all users  $u_j \notin \mathcal{U}_1 \cap \mathcal{U}_2$ . Consider a layered key structure  $\mathcal{K}$  with  $|\mathcal{K}|$  layers. If we assign a qubit  $k$ -partite GHZ state to each of the layers of size  $k$ , we can recover the state for  $\mathcal{K}$  constructed in Sec. II by simply joining the GHZ states one by one with the recursive step 1 we just introduced.

In order to incorporate the dimension-rate trade-off into the state construction, let us present an alternative recursive step that takes two states  $|\Psi_{\mathcal{K}_1}\rangle$  and  $|\Psi_{\mathcal{K}_2}\rangle$  as an input. These two states implement key structures  $\mathcal{K}_1$  and  $\mathcal{K}_2$  with users  $\mathcal{U}_1$  and  $\mathcal{U}_2$ , respectively. The recursive step produces a state  $|\Psi_{\mathcal{K}}\rangle$ , which implements key structure  $\mathcal{K} = \mathcal{K}_1 \cup \mathcal{K}_2 \cup \{\mathcal{U}_1 \cup \mathcal{U}_2\}$ , where  $\{\mathcal{U}_1 \cup \mathcal{U}_2\}$  is a new layer containing all users in both  $\mathcal{U}_1$  and  $\mathcal{U}_2$ .

*Recursive state preparation, step 2.* Given  $|\Psi_{\mathcal{K}_1}\rangle$  and  $|\Psi_{\mathcal{K}_2}\rangle$ , find the state  $|\Psi_{\mathcal{K}}\rangle$

with  $\mathcal{K} = \mathcal{K}_1 \cup \mathcal{K}_2 \cup \{\mathcal{U}_1 \cup \mathcal{U}_2\}$ .

(1) Consider a state  $|\Psi'_{\mathcal{K}_2}\rangle$ , which is equal to  $|\Psi_{\mathcal{K}_2}\rangle$ , but with all labels of computational basis vectors primed.

(2) A state implementing  $\mathcal{K}$  can be written as

$$|\Psi_{\mathcal{K}}\rangle := \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|\Psi_{\mathcal{K}_1}\rangle_{\mathcal{U}_1} \otimes |\perp, \dots, \perp\rangle_{\mathcal{U}_2 \setminus \mathcal{U}_1}) + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|\Psi'_{\mathcal{K}_2}\rangle_{\mathcal{U}_2} \otimes |\perp, \dots, \perp\rangle_{\mathcal{U}_1 \setminus \mathcal{U}_2}),$$

where  $\perp$  is a new symbol.

The local dimensions of state  $|\Psi_{\mathcal{K}}\rangle$  are  $d_j^1 + d_j^2$  for users  $u_j \in \mathcal{U}_1 \cap \mathcal{U}_2$  and  $d_j + 1$  for users  $u_j \notin \mathcal{U}_1 \cap \mathcal{U}_2$ . The reason for this is that in the construction, we are using primed labels of the computational basis states of  $|\Psi_{\mathcal{K}_2}\rangle$  together with the original basis labels of the state  $|\Psi_{\mathcal{K}_1}\rangle$ . The resulting states of users  $u_j \in \mathcal{U}_1 \cap \mathcal{U}_2$  therefore effectively live in a Hilbert space obtained by a direct sum of their original Hilbert spaces. The

addition of one dimension for the remaining users comes from the fact that we enlarge their computational basis with a new symbol  $\perp$  in the construction.

Note that neither  $\mathcal{K}_1$  nor  $\mathcal{K}_2$  are necessarily nonempty in the construction. For this reason, let us define a state for  $\mathcal{K} = \emptyset$  with  $n$  users as  $|\Psi_\emptyset\rangle = |00\dots 0\rangle_{u_1,\dots,u_n}$ . This is especially important in order to be able to use the trade-off recursive step to construct a state for a union of two key structures  $\mathcal{K}_1$  and  $\mathcal{K}_2$ , such that  $\mathcal{U}_1 \subseteq \mathcal{U}_2$  and  $\mathcal{K}_2 = \mathcal{U}_2$ , i.e., the layered key structure  $\mathcal{K}_2$  contains only a single layer—the set of all of its users (see Fig. 3 for an example of such a key structure). In such a case, a state for the implementation of  $\mathcal{K} = \mathcal{K}_1 \cup \mathcal{U}_2$  can be constructed with the recursive step 2 applied to states  $|\Psi_{\mathcal{K}_1}\rangle_{\mathcal{U}_1}$  and  $|\Psi_\emptyset\rangle_{\mathcal{U}_2}$ .

Now we would like to discuss how to use the state  $|\Psi_{\mathcal{K}}\rangle$  to construct a QKD protocol producing a key in all the layers of the key structure  $\mathcal{K}$ . Our argument is again structured along the lines of a reduction to existing qubit QKD protocols for GHZ states of  $n$  users. The key observation for a state  $|\Psi_{\mathcal{K}}\rangle$  with user set  $\mathcal{U} = \mathcal{U}_1 \cup \mathcal{U}_2$  created with the recursive step 2 is that it is an equal superposition of two computational basis vectors, which are not only orthogonal, but also differ in every position. We call this property *local distinguishability*. Let us now divide the Hilbert spaces of the users in  $\mathcal{U}$  into two orthogonal components. Users  $u_j \in \mathcal{U}_1 \setminus \mathcal{U}_2$  can split their Hilbert space into two orthogonal subspaces spanned by  $\{|i\rangle\}_{i=1}^{d_j^1}, |\perp\rangle\} \in \mathcal{H}_{d_j^1} \oplus \mathcal{H}_1$ , where the set of orthogonal computational basis vectors  $\{|i\rangle\}_{i=1}^{d_j^1}$  is the computational basis of the Hilbert space of user  $u_j$  in the input state  $|\Psi_{\mathcal{K}_1}\rangle$ . Similarly, users  $u_j \in \mathcal{U}_2 \setminus \mathcal{U}_1$  can split their Hilbert spaces into two orthogonal subspaces spanned by  $\{|\perp\rangle, \{|i'\rangle\}_{i=1}^{d_j^2}\} \in \mathcal{H}_1 \oplus \mathcal{H}_{d_j^2}$ , where  $\{|i'\rangle\}_{i=1}^{d_j^2}$  is the orthogonal computational basis of the Hilbert space of user  $u_j$  in the input state  $|\Psi_{\mathcal{K}_2}\rangle$ . Finally, users  $u_j \in \mathcal{U}_1 \cap \mathcal{U}_2$  can split their Hilbert spaces into two orthogonal subspaces spanned by  $\{|i\rangle\}_{i=1}^{d_j^1}, \{|i'\rangle\}_{i=1}^{d_j^2}\} \in \mathcal{H}_{d_j^1} \oplus \mathcal{H}_{d_j^2}$ , where  $d_j^1$  and  $d_j^2$  are the dimensions of the Hilbert spaces of user  $u_j$  in the input states  $|\Psi_{\mathcal{K}_1}\rangle$  and  $|\Psi_{\mathcal{K}_2}\rangle$ , respectively. For each user, projectors onto these two subspaces define an incomplete set of positive operator-valued measurements (POVM), which can be used as analogues of  $\sigma_z$  measurements in the key rounds of the QKD protocol. Since these states are fully correlated in the respective subspaces, there are two kinds of possible classical global measurement outcomes, each occurring with probability  $\frac{1}{2}$ . Either the outcome is  $(i, i, \perp)$  or  $(\perp, i', i')$ . By a simple renaming, the first outcome can be seen as a 0 shared among all the users and the second one as 1, thus constituting a common shared binary key. However, since the measurements (depending on the dimensions of  $|\Psi_{\mathcal{K}_1}\rangle$  and  $|\Psi_{\mathcal{K}_2}\rangle$ ) do not have to be fully informative, they also lead to interesting post-measurement states. The postmeasurement states are, respectively,  $|\Psi_{\mathcal{K}_1}\rangle_{\mathcal{U}_1} \otimes |\perp\dots\perp\rangle_{\mathcal{U}_2 \setminus \mathcal{U}_1}$  and  $|\perp\dots\perp\rangle_{\mathcal{U}_1 \setminus \mathcal{U}_2} \otimes |\Psi_{\mathcal{K}_2}\rangle_{\mathcal{U}_2}$ . Clearly the postmeasurement states can be used to implement subkey structures  $\mathcal{K}_1$  and  $\mathcal{K}_2$  by their respective users.

The analogues of  $\sigma_y$  and  $\sigma_z$  needed to formulate the full GHZ protocol [27] require first projecting the state  $|\Psi_{\mathcal{K}}\rangle$  down to a qubit state by locally mapping all vectors in the left Hilbert space of each user onto a state  $|0\rangle$  and all vectors in the right Hilbert space onto a state  $|1\rangle$ , followed by qubit

measurements  $\sigma_x$  and  $\sigma_y$ . The down projection results in a loss of information about the exact position of the vectors in their respective subspaces. However, this happens only in the test rounds in which we cannot use the postmeasurement states to implement the keys in the substructures anyway. In other words, each layer is probed only probabilistically in the parameter-estimation rounds. However, since the parameter-estimation rounds are generically sublinear, this only leads to a constant increase of a sublinear number of rounds and does not impact the key rounds at all. Since only a small (logarithmic) portion of test rounds is required, most of the states will be measured in  $\sigma_z$  measurements. Postmeasurement states of these measurements will be useful for the implementation of  $\mathcal{K}_1$  half the time on average, and the other half will be useful for the implementation of  $\mathcal{K}_2$ . This probabilistic nature of obtaining the postmeasurement states is the source of the rate decrease in this construction. Repeating the reductions to binary QKD protocols for the substates leads to recovering a QKD protocol for the key structure  $\mathcal{K}$ .

A state for any layered key structure  $\mathcal{K}$  can be constructed by starting with an empty layered key structure and subsequent application of one of the previous recursive rules until all the layers of  $\mathcal{K}$  have been added. It is important to note that the exact form of the resulting state—i.e., the local dimensions and the idealized rates in every layer—depends on the types of recursive steps we use for each layer, but also on the order. This is because adding the layers of the structure  $\mathcal{K}$  in particular orders might result in the inability to use the trade-off rule.

The simplest example to consider is once again the key structure  $\mathcal{K} = \{\{1,2\}, \{1,2,3\}\}$ . Note that the recursive rule number 1 can only join two nonempty key structures into one state. In principle, this is not a problem since we know that for layered key structures with only a single layer of size  $n$ , there is only a single suitable state—the GHZ state of  $n$  users. Therefore, we can start by dividing  $\mathcal{K}$  into the single-layer sublayers  $\mathcal{K}_1 = \{1,2,3\}$  and  $\mathcal{K}_2 = \{1,2\}$  and assigning to them their respective binary GHZ and EPR states. After doing this, we can no longer use the recursive rule number 2. Therefore, the only option is to join the states together with the recursive rule number 1, resulting in the  $|\Psi_{442}\rangle$  state (1).

Another option is to assign an EPR pair to the layer  $\{1,2\}$  and subsequently use the second recursive rule with  $\mathcal{K}_1 = \{1,2\}$  and  $\mathcal{K}_2 = \{\emptyset\}$ , with user sets  $\mathcal{U}_1 = \mathcal{K}_1$  and  $\mathcal{U}_2 = \{1,2,3\}$  implemented with states  $|\Psi_{\mathcal{K}_1}\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|00\rangle + |11\rangle)$  and  $|\Psi_{\mathcal{K}_2}\rangle = |000\rangle$ , in order to obtain state

$$|\Psi_{\mathcal{K}}\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \left( \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|00\perp\rangle + |11\perp\rangle) + |0'0'0\rangle \right), \quad (3)$$

which is equivalent to the state  $|\Psi_{332}\rangle$  defined in Eq. (2).

Let us study the family of states for a fixed key structure  $\mathcal{K}$  in more detail. Recursive rule number 2 can be used to join two key substructures  $\mathcal{K}_1$  and  $\mathcal{K}_2$  only if the final key structure  $\mathcal{K}$  also contains a layer  $\mathcal{U}_1 \cup \mathcal{U}_2$ . For this reason, the central concept of this part of the section is ordering the layers of the key structure  $\mathcal{K}$  with respect to the set inclusion [see Fig. 6(a)].

The first step necessary to characterize different states that can be prepared for a given  $\mathcal{K}$  using the introduced recursive rules is to first order the layers  $k \in \mathcal{K}$  according to the inclusion. This ordering can be represented by an ordered graph  $\tilde{G}_{\mathcal{K}}$ ,




FIG. 6. Classification of different states for key structure  $\mathcal{K} = P(\{1, 2, 3, 4\}) \setminus \{\emptyset, \{1\}, \{2\}, \{3\}, \{4\}\}$ . (a) Key structure  $\mathcal{K}$  ordered with respect to inclusion. (b) Decomposition of ordered  $\mathcal{K}$  into binary trees. Note that union of two children vertices is always equal to their parent. Each tree can now be implemented using the trade-off recursive step multiple times. Joining the trees together can be done by the recursive step 1. This is illustrated by the dotted circle that joins three states together. (c)–(f) Different decompositions of ordered  $\mathcal{K}$  into a nonbinary tree. Using reductions to qudit protocols allows us to use the trade-off recursive step for all layers. Each decomposition leads to a different state.

where each layer is represented by a vertex and two vertices are connected if and only if one is a subset of the other [see Fig. 6(a)]. The next step is to find specific binary tree decompositions of  $\tilde{G}_{\mathcal{K}}$ .

A tree decomposition is a division of the graph into tree subgraphs, where all the vertices are used and the tree subgraphs are connected by edges from the edge set of graph  $\tilde{G}_{\mathcal{K}}$ . An additional condition for the decompositions suitable for our purposes is that the trees should correspond to key substructures which can be implemented with the help of recursive rule 2 only. This condition translates into the fact that the trees in the decomposition have to fulfill an additional constraint—the union of two children vertices has to be equal to their parent vertex [see Fig. 6(b)].

By construction, each of the key substructures corresponding to a tree can be implemented using the recursive rule 2 only by assigning qubit GHZ states with the correct number of parties to the layers corresponding to leaves in the tree. Following this, the state is recursively constructed all the way up to the root of the tree by joining the states corresponding to the children vertices, while simultaneously implementing a layer corresponding to their parent. The states corresponding to the trees in the decomposition can subsequently be joined into a single state via recursive rule number 1. Every tree decomposition results in a different final state for the key structure  $\mathcal{K}$ .

Note that we allowed only binary trees in the tree decomposition of the graph  $\tilde{G}_{\mathcal{K}}$ . The reason for this is that in the recursive state preparation step 2, we join two states in such a way that we can implement a binary QKD protocol for the layer  $\mathcal{U}_1 \cup \mathcal{U}_2$ . However, in principle, we can define a more general recursive state preparation step, in which  $m$  states for substructures are

put into a uniform superposition in a Hilbert space which corresponds to a direct sum of the original Hilbert spaces. In this way, the resulting state is an equal superposition of  $m$  states living in subspaces, which are not only orthogonal but also locally distinguishable by every user. These can be used as  $m$ -dimensional GHZ states in order to generate a key in layer  $\bigcup_m \mathcal{U}_k$ . The drawback of this recursive rule, however, is that it uses a reduction to a QKD protocol based on  $m$ -dimensional GHZ states, which are not known yet. The advantage is a larger flexibility in tree decompositions of the graph  $\tilde{G}_{\mathcal{K}}$ ;  $m$ -ary trees are also allowed. This can lead to a situation where  $\tilde{G}_{\mathcal{K}}$  can be decomposed into a smaller number of trees than with binary trees only [see Figs. 6(c)–6(f)].

In what follows, we give an example of the fact that the dimension-rate trade-off can scale exponentially. Consider  $n$  users  $\mathcal{U}_n$  and a layered key structure  $\mathcal{K} = \{\{n, n-1\}, \{n, n-1, n-2\}, \dots, \{n, n-1, n-2, \dots, 1\}\}$ . Using only the recursive rule 1 to construct the corresponding state results in local dimension  $2^{n-1}$  for users  $u_n$  and  $u_{n-1}$  since both of them are present in each of the  $n-1$  layers. Additionally, this results in local dimension  $2^i$  for the other users  $u_i$  since each of them is present in exactly  $i$  layers. On the other hand, a state for this key structure can also be obtained by applying only the trade-off rule, by adding the layers together with an empty key structure, starting from the smallest to the largest. Such a state has a local dimension  $n$  for users  $u_n$  and  $u_{n-1}$ , and  $i+1$  for every other user  $u_i$ . The price to pay is the exponential decrease of the rates. While the first state achieves a rate 1 for every layer, the second state achieves a rate  $\frac{1}{2^{n-i}}$  for a layer of size  $i$ .

Note that even this implementation offers an advantage compared to the GHZ implementation explored in Sec. III. Noting that the local dimension of the user  $u_1$  is 2, it is clear that only a qubit  $n$ -partite system GHZ state can be distributed to the layer of size  $n$  in each time slot. Therefore, in order to achieve the rate equal to 1 in the layer  $\{u_1, \dots, u_n\}$ , all the time slots need to be devoted to the distribution of the GHZ state shared among all the users. This fact results in all the other rates being equal to 0. On the other hand, in the implementation using the full trade-off state, the sum of the remaining rates quickly approaches 1 as the number of users  $n$  approaches infinity.

Let us conclude this section by a short summary of the main ideas about distributing secure keys among users of a quantum network equipped with high-dimensional multipartite entanglement sources. We have presented three general ideas about encoding secure key structures in such states, each of which can be analyzed by a reduction to protocols using GHZ states. The first method can be seen as a standard solution and simply uses classical mixtures of GHZ states, where the mixture is known to the users. It uses a corresponding GHZ state for each key in the key structure. The second method utilizes the high-dimensional multipartite structure and uses a tensor product of the GHZ states, again one for every key in the structure, and encodes them simultaneously in high local dimensions. A protocol using this idea is presented in Sec. II. The third method uses the direct sum of Hilbert spaces in order to create locally distinguishable superpositions of states implementing substructures. As a byproduct, such superpositions can in some sense be used as a GHZ state for a



layer containing all users of the sublayers—this is a basis for the trade-off recursive rule presented in Sec. IV.

Each of these implementations has its pros and cons. The first one achieves the worst key rates, but unlike the other two it can be used with active routing of qubit entanglement sources. The second one achieves excellent rates; however, it requires very high local dimensions, i.e., scaling exponentially in the number of layers. The third one can be used to supplement the second method in order to reduce the local dimensions to a linear scaling in layers, albeit at the expense of decreased key rates.

## V. CONCLUSIONS

As quantum technologies develop, network architectures involving multiple users are becoming an increasing focus of quantum communication research [37,38]. For this purpose, it is vital to know the limitations and, more importantly, the potential of multipartite communication protocols. We contribute to this effort by providing a straightforward protocol that makes use of recent technological advances in quantum photonics [23,24]. Layered quantum communication makes full use of the entanglement structure and provides secure keys to different subsets of parties using only a single quantum state. If the production of such states becomes more reliable, this has the potential to greatly simplify network architectures as a single source will suffice for a variety of tasks. It is known that multipartite entanglement can be recovered through local distillation procedures, even if noise has rendered the distributed state almost fully separable [39]. Moreover, high-dimensional entanglement is known to be far more robust to noise than low-dimensional variants [40], indicating that even

under realistic noise, our protocols, augmented by distillation, could be applied in situations where all qubit-based protocols would become impossible. Our protocols and proofs are largely based on an extension of low-dimensional variants of key distribution through a separation into different subspaces. We have explicitly described the protocols in non-device-independent settings (i.e., trusting the measurement apparatuses, but not the source). This is mainly due to the practical limitations of fully device-independent entanglement tests, but in principle our proposed schemes could work just as well with device-independent variants of bipartite [3] and multipartite [28,41] key distribution schemes.

While the number of quantum channel uses and the noise resistance of entanglement scale favorably in the Hilbert space dimension, the current production rates of the proposed quantum states underlying the protocols are severely limited and exponentially decreasing in the number of parties. The central challenge in multipartite quantum communication thus still remains the identification of sources that reliably create multipartite entangled states in a controllable manner and at a decent rate. We hope that explicitly showcasing potential protocols will inspire further efforts into the production of multipartite entanglement in the laboratory.

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