

not necessarily "of the most promising genius," but mentally qualified to pursue successfully courses in the higher institutions, may have the advantages of such courses, loan funds should be readily available. The commission cannot conceive of a more democratic application of Jefferson's principles than that those students who can now share with the State the cost of higher education do so, and that those who cannot, return this cost to the State when their earnings make it possible. Limited loan funds, separately administered, are now available. The commission is informed that the losses on loans to needy students are almost negligible. A centralization of administration of all loan funds will insure uniform requirements and additional safety. Loans should be made only to such students who can produce satisfactory evidence of need, character and scholarship.

The commission recommends:

*That a revolving loan be established by the State, under the direction of the Governor, to be administered under regulations to be by him hereafter determined.*

#### Salaries

The commission is satisfied both from the report of the survey staff and its own observations that the salaries now paid in many of the institutions will not suffice either to retain or attract teaching personnel of high character and ability. While the commission does not approve a horizontal increase in all salaries, it unhesitatingly recommends:

*That the executive and boards of visitors of the several institutions make such increases in salaries as funds will permit and as will insure the maintenance of that high standard of scholarship for which Virginia institutions are so justly famed.*

#### FUTURE NEEDS OF THE HIGHER INSTITUTIONS

In the report of the survey staff will be found a listing of the present and future needs of Virginia's institutions of higher

learning. The commission believes that it would be unwarranted in recommending the meeting of these needs beyond the amounts contemplated in the Budget for the next biennium. Such needs are always in flux and change from time to time by reason of the development of modern methods and new ideas of educational service. The commission is unable to determine the priority of the many items which would greatly enhance the effectiveness of the several institutions. It can only call the list to the attention of the Governor of the State, the members of the General Assembly, and the executive officers of the institutions themselves, in the hope that together they may devise a cumulative program which will enable the tax-supported colleges and university to improve their situation as rapidly as funds can be made available.

#### WHY THE OBVIOUS FAILURES OF EDUCATION

**I**F we are to make of education a better vehicle of world citizenship, we must have some idea of the way in which education has failed in this field in the past.

One of the first conclusions we are obliged to come to in considering education and peace is that not too much reliance is to be placed upon a mere knowledge of other peoples, a contact at second hand as it were, as in itself a factor of friendliness and understanding. Sometimes the peoples that we know best are precisely those that we quarrel with most. If you look back at the bitterest conflicts of history, they have often been between people who live in the same street, between Catholic and heretic in the wars of religion, between Catholic and Protestant in Ireland, between Hindoo and Mohammedan in India, between white and Negro in this country: we know of numberless misunderstandings and conflicts between people who know each other by daily contact.

So mere knowledge of external facts



about other people will not suffice unless it is linked with certain other things as well. What are they? Again I think we shall get the clearest idea if we look at three outstanding failures of education in the international field.

I say failure of education advisedly. You know there is a movement now for ensuring that political candidates, statesmen, politicians, shall be drawn only from educated and technically trained people. It is one of the suggestions which is made in connection with what one might term the partial breakdown of democracy.

But has it ever occurred to you that where government statesmanship has failed most disastrously, in the management of international affairs, that it was in the hands of specially trained and highly educated people? The old type of European diplomat and the members of the government that employed him, were usually, nearly always, drawn from men of university training. Heaven knows the diplomat was a man having wide knowledge of other peoples; and yet the Europe which came to an end in 1914, the result which 1914 represented, was largely due to the policies pursued by these highly trained, educated people.

I think we shall have to say that here education failed. You may say: They were a people thinking merely of the selfish interests of their own order, or at best of their respective nations. To which I reply that judged by that standard, even, their education must have given them the most erroneous notions of the nature of their task; for if their object was to advance the interests of their respective countries they entirely missed their aim, were guilty of gross miscalculation and incompetence. They certainly did not protect the interests of their nations, because today it is difficult to say which has the worst prospect, the victor or the vanquished. They failed from their own point of view. If their object was to protect their class, equally did they fail because their order has all but disap-

peared, and through most of Europe the class for which they stood has suffered more even than the others, in the events which they precipitated.

Obviously there was grave miscalculation in their management of things. I do not want to imply that I regard them as solely responsible. They were not. I am not one of those who think war is the result of the special wickedness of a small class. It is not. But they had a very special responsibility, and they did reveal astonishing misunderstanding of the forces which they were handling. Think of one aspect of that failure of education. You had in pre-war Germany a great state also governed by a specially educated order. Before the war, politics and statesmanship in Germany were confined pretty well to a highly educated order, which had passed through the university; and we know what the management of their state resulted in; and what happened to the class from which they were drawn.

In another respect, it seems to me, education has failed. Of all the single forces in Europe making for disruption and disintegration, the most insidious is an aggressive, acquisitive nationalism—the type of nationalism which divides Europe into thirty quarrelsome and warring states. That nationalism has been in an especial sense the work of education, as one of your own authorities, Professor Carlton Hayes of Columbia has very clearly shown; has been born and nurtured in the speeches of orators, the pages of historians, writers, journalists, editors. They have made the type of nationalism which very nearly destroyed Europe; may destroy it yet, and may mean the end of western civilization. These writers and politicians have come largely from the universities and the schools, from those who had culture. Nationalism has far fewer roots in the illiterate of the farm and factory.

I am not sure that this hasn't always been so; that often the net result of great



learning has been to worsen and render more permanent error and folly: perhaps I should say the first result rather than the net result, for we learn sometimes in order to unlearn. When we look back in history we find that the Inquisitor, for instance, who racked and tortured, was an extremely well educated man, and the difficulties into which Europe got from this religious problem, the conflicts of the religious groups, were not cleared up by learning and erudition. Much of the difficulty created by those conflicts was due to the attitude taken by highly educated people.

In spheres like these, in diplomacy, in the management of a state like pre-war Germany, in that Europe where nationalism of the more evil type has been kept alive, in fields where religious hatred thrives—education has failed to clear up the difficulties.

Why? The trouble has not been a lack of knowledge, in the sense in which we lack knowledge to cure cancer, but a failure to use the knowledge which we all possess. Europe did not go to pieces because it did not know the relevant facts. Europe had all the necessary facts under its nose. It failed because it didn't use, in the direction of its conduct, the facts which were of universal knowledge.

Indeed I would say that the commonest mistakes in politics—as the most disastrous—arise from a disregard of the self-evident facts which everyone knows.

The kind of failure I have in mind is illustrated by a story which I have sometimes told of a certain very successful parliamentary candidate, whose victory in election after election, was based on the fact that he had married a famous actress, had killed seven Germans with his own hand, and had kicked three goals in a famous football match.

Again and again twenty thousand people, many of them educated, voted for that man. They could not have been unaware of the fact that the capacity to marry actresses,

kill Germans, or kick goals was no qualification for dealing with problems of unemployment, trade, and government. You do not need a university education to see that. But I do not doubt that many a university graduate was included among the twenty thousand English men and women who, election after election, voted for that most popular and successful politician.

The motives upon which they acted are on a par with appeals about "native sons" and are the most successful electoral appeals that you can make. The minds which react to these appeals are not utilizing the knowledge they already possess.

Put certain of the phenomena of nationalism to this same test: do facts already known reveal the fallacy of ideas which we profess? An educated banker the other day, who had passed through one of your universities, asked me whether I supposed Germany had repented—because he knew very well, he added, that she had not.

I asked him what America thought about prohibition, and he didn't know. But although he, an American living his life among Americans, could not say what they thought on that outstanding question, he knew perfectly well what 60,000,000 people on the other side of the world were thinking, in their innermost hearts. I further asked him with what organ a Federative Republic repented. And further, whether he didn't loathe people who lived in odd numbered houses. To which he replied, of course that you could not make such a category, since all sorts of people live in odd numbered houses, tall, dark, short, fair; how could you like or dislike opposites?

I suggested that persons just as diverse lived within the area that we call Germany: That such a term geographical and political, indicating vast diversities of classes and creeds, of little children, old women, invalids, as well as the minority which is alone capable of a conscious part in national politics, could not more be referred to as



"repenting" than it could be referred to as having a cold in its head, or wearing side whiskers.

Yet the picture in his mind was of some personality, as definite as that. He had taken a symbol of speech, convenient and indispensable perhaps, and made of it in a very primitive and savage way, a grossly anthropomorphic reality in his mind.

It is because of errors as simple, as rudimentary, as elementary as that, that Europe, particularly the Europe that has passed through universities, strangles itself, and engages in these vast collective suicides.

Errors as elementary, misconceptions as crude, have permeated economics, even among the captains of industry. We think in Europe in terms of the competition, for instance, of Britain with Germany. We think that growth in the trade of Germany is bound to be disadvantageous to Great Britain, and the German thinks that growth in the trade of Britain is disadvantageous to Germany; although there is, in reality, no such thing as British or German trade in that sense at all.

It is not truer to speak of British trade in the international field than it would be to speak of "Illinois trade" among the forty-eight states. And it is no more and no less foolish to think of the development of Illinois being a threat to the prosperity of Wisconsin than it is to think of the trade of Germany being a threat for Britain, since the real process is a complex of operations going on across frontiers.

A Brazilian planter sells his coffee in Chicago, and with the money buys machinery in Germany, the money so received going to the purchase of food in the Argentine, the money there received going to purchase of cutlery in Sheffield, those proceeds going to buy currants in Greece, that operation making possible the purchase of a dress in Paris. Is that German, Argentine, French, British, or Greek trade?

When your export trade in pianos fell

off, it was resuscitated because Americans began to eat Eskimo Pies. What is the connection between Eskimo Pies and the trade in pianos? Why, simply that the consumption of Eskimo Pies stimulated the consumption of chocolate or cocoa produced in South America, and immediately furnished funds for the purchase of American pianos up north.

Again, was the development of the South American trade, the going abroad of your money to South America for chocolate, disastrous to "American" trade?

Mercantilism of the crudest kind dominated commercial policy in Europe for five hundred years—dominates it still. It is rooted in fallacies which ought to be self-evident. They would be self-evident to Zulus or primitive peoples who do not know money. Education in Europe has utterly failed to render these things clear. One may say, indeed, that the modern science of economics has succeeded in making truths which ought to be a universal possession, the exclusive possession of a tiny group.

We are dealing in part perhaps with a failure to understand the meaning of words of everyday use, or so loose a use of words, by educated as much as by uneducated, as grossly to confuse thought. Thus, when we speak of the competition of "Britain" and "Germany" in trade, or of Germany as a deceitful person who harbours evil designs and who is only pretending to repent, we have taken a convenient symbol of speech and made of it something quite other than a symbol. Thus ever since feudal times we have talked of a province "belonging" to a government, or being taken by one country from another, as though there were an actual transfer of property from one group of owners to another, (as there was under feudalism) when in fact in modern times there is only a change of administration, as when a city "annexes" an outlying suburb. It looks perhaps at first sight, an innocent enough extension of the meaning of words



like "owning," to say that France "owns" Alsace-Lorraine, or Britain Canada—but the confusion and distortion of thought involved is at the root of some of the most obstinate misconceptions out of which international conflicts arise.

Among the motives responsible for causing the nations to drift to conflict in 1914 was the idea that preponderant power would give a nation security and advantage. It was assumed that wealth, either in the form of trade, or territory, markets or sources of raw material, could, as the result of victory, be taken from the vanquished. The British freely attributed these motives to Germany before the war, and feared for their economic security. The Germans accused Britain of using her power to restrict German commercial activity. The notion that wealth or trade could be "captured" as the result of military victory was all but universal before the war, and set up, not necessarily a direct intention to attack others for the purposes of enrichment, but fears that others might be so actuated and a determination to prevent those others from possessing the superiority of power which would enable them to obey such motive. It suffices for each thus to fear the other and act upon those fears, to make war inevitable.

The Treaty of Versailles itself reflected that universal obsession: each power grabbed all it could in the way of territory, and did all it could to destroy the economic competition of the vanquished in the firm conviction that in so doing it would advantage itself.

Yet the assumption from which the whole thing starts, the "axiom" of statecraft so universally accepted, comes near to being a complete fallacy, "the great illusion" of political thinking. Wealth and trade in the modern world cannot be transferred as the result of victory, from vanquished to victor. There is no transfer of wealth when territory is annexed: there is a change of political administration. The delusion is partly due to using loose, inaccurate terms about

"ownership" when we are talking of political administration. When Germany or France annexes Alsace-Lorraine, the farms and houses and shops and their contents are not transferred from one set of owners to another; they remain in the hands of the same owners: for the owners are annexed with the goods.

Britain was supposed to be "after the Transvaal gold mines" when she entered the Boer War. But Britain did not capture a shilling's worth of mining stock; it changed hands on the stock exchanges of the world in the same way after the British victory as before. And today Britain has not even political control over the Transvaal.

When some years before the war the suggestion was made that political thought had gone astray on this particular and that a nation in the position of Britain, for instance, would not be able to use victory for the purpose of "taking" foreign trade or economic advantage, the suggestion was derided as a piece of foolish paradox; the defiance of the obvious. Well, we are in a position now to judge of the validity of mal-suggestion, for it has been put to the test of the experiment. The past war situation enables us to judge whether a nation can in fact turn military power to economic advantage. Britain has had her victory over her great rival Germany. Has the former been able to use its predominance for economic advantage? Is the foreign trade of Britain greater as the result of her power over Germany? If victory can be used for commercial advantage why is Great Britain not using it? Why a million and a half unemployed? Why these articles in the British press asking whether Britain's day is done? Has German competition been disposed of? If the assumptions that preponderant power can be used for economic enrichment are sound why does the period of complete victory for a state like Britain synchronise with the period of greatest economic insecurity which she has known since



the industrial revolution? The suggestion made twenty years ago that military victory would in the modern world prove economically futile has been put to the test of the event, and the event has pronounced upon it in no uncertain terms.

But my point is that that proposition derided twenty years ago as a paradox was even then already self-evident, that in so far as the public mind went wrong on it, it was because there was no developed capacity in making use of knowledge already possessed. It calls, for its demonstration, upon no economic or political data that are not the possession of any ordinarily well educated man. It is not quite perhaps within the category of such propositions as that because a man can marry an actress, kill Germans, and kick goals he is therefore equipped to deal with problems of government, but not very much more difficult. And as educated men in their thousands vote in elections for just such reasons as those I have touched upon, it does not surprise me that educated men also support the proposition that if we beat the Germans we can "take" their trade; or that as Englishmen we "own" Canada. And it does not surprise me, therefore, that four hundred members of the House of Commons should demand of Mr. Lloyd George that he compel Germany to pay the whole cost of the war in "money, but not goods," and that she be prevented from increasing her foreign trade.

These are only types, instances. With them go other ideas of similar nature. Here is a British Minister telling us that the sure road to peace is to be so much stronger than your prospective enemy that he won't dare to attack you. He stated it as a self-evident proposition. That is to say if two nations or two groups are likely to quarrel the way for them to keep the peace is for each to be stronger than the other. And so on, and so on.

These confusions of thought, these shortcomings of the public mind are failures of

education which threaten western civilization.

Can one make a guess as to the cause of the failure—or reduce the complexity of the cause or causes to something capable of brief and simple statement?

I suggest that your great educational authorities are agreed as to the main fundamental defect of traditional education. All alike, in lesser or greater degree, have attacked what might be called the "informational," memoriter, theory of education, the theory that education consists in learning a number of facts and trying to remember them. The conviction that such a process is not and cannot be education; that not merely does it not promote, but that it inhibits, thought, is now all but universally agreed among those most eminent in pedagogical science and the laymen who interest themselves in the subject are for the most part at one with the professionals. H. G. Wells said recently that he doubted very much whether it was necessary that any fact subject should be part of a curriculum at all. "If you have the right mental habits, you can get your facts as you want them. If you haven't got the right mental habits, no fact which you happen to have acquired will be of any use to you." But I suggest also that while that agreement as to what education is not is pretty widespread, there is no similar agreement as to what education is; or how the new method or methods shall be carried into effect.

And the truth is that when one descends from educational theory as expounded by its masters, to textbooks actually used in schools and the methods there employed, one finds the older conception of education still predominant. It is not due to the teacher. The teacher is almost helpless. The continued momentum of that old "informational" conception is derived from sources that he finds it extremely difficult to reach. One is the parent's and the general public's view of what education is, and another is the college entrance examination,



or the examinations for professional diplomas.

Perhaps most teachers would challenge the view that the public do not grasp the nature of real education. Living to some extent in his own circle, the teacher probably has the impression that things so familiar to him are familiar to the public and the parent. They are not. You still find most parents insisting that if Johnny or Mary does not know the list of Presidents of the United States or the names of those who signed the Declaration of Independence, Johnny or Mary cannot possibly know history. And that is not merely the test of education with the parents, but sometimes, if I am not too heretical, with those who hold the power of admittance to your universities.

We have still a long way to go in destroying this notion of education as a knowledge of isolated facts. And here perhaps those of us who are outside your profession and who, as journalists or publicists, get a little nearer to the public, can help to carry your message to them. We can go on insisting that, to be able to remember dates and occurrences is not to have a knowledge of history and that if what a boy or girl acquires in school does not help him to be wiser as a citizen, then it is not education. But those who deal with the public are aware how long it takes to get a new conception home, or an old one modified.

I once asked the most successful of all English newspaper proprietors, Lord Northcliffe, if there was any one principle which explained his success in reaching the public mind. (This was at a time when the most advertised thing in England was Pears Soap.) And he replied this: "Yes, there is. It is based on a fact which I think I have learned and which my competitors have not: The fact that most people have never heard of Pears Soap," which is like saying that most Americans have never seen a Ford car. Do not therefore suppose that

because the defects of the informational theory are familiar to you they are familiar to the public.

But this informational theory vitiates the adult education of the public quite as much as the education of children. The citizen as a voter has to make decisions in public policy which touch a vast number of subjects. How shall he be educated to come to sound judgment therein? At present we have only one answer: to get to know facts about them. It seems the only possible answer. And so poor Mr. Babbitt has to get facts about such trifles as the tariff, free trade, and protection, the Federal Reserve System, inflation, deflation, and the relation thereto of the farmer's interest and the cost of living; trust legislation; the payment of foreign debts; immigration; the League of Nations, world court, navy disarmament, the Monroe Doctrine, prohibition, evolution, the crime wave and capital punishment, the relations with Mexico, with Japan, with Russia, the Red menace, the Catholic menace, the Ku Klux Klan. . . .

Well, of course he cannot do it. And if, to come to sound decisions about those things, he has to know all the facts or many facts about them, then he can never come to wise decisions.

In other words we have not yet learned to make the distinction between what is the job of the layman in these things and what the job of the expert. Our education helps us very little to disentangle underlying general principles, gives us extremely little training in the interpretation and handling of evidence. In order to get some sort of guide in the way of general principles we catch at words and sometimes attach fierce emotions to them without even knowing what they mean. "I never said I did not believe in the Monroe Doctrine," said the patriotic citizen in the terms of the ancient jest. "I do believe in it. Of course I would go to war for it. I would lay down my life for it. What I did say was that I did not know what it meant."



For a century more or less the nations of the west have sworn by Liberty. Democracy was supposed to be its outcome and political expression; great political communities like the United States were founded upon that word; for generations the children in such communities have been taught to sing hymns to it, to recite orations, "give me Liberty or give me death"—and all the time nobody, speaking broadly, had the faintest belief in liberty (of discussion, that is, because without that freedom none other is of any worth) or regarded as anything but a dangerous and immoral fad. The word moved millions profoundly, but, except as it had some vague connotation of historical liberation from long-dead knights, that emotion had no relation to any understanding of what the principle of freedom of discussion implied, in the ascertainment of truth, in the maintenance of democracy, of government by discussion. And there was no understanding because there was no effort in education as it reaches the mass—never has been anywhere in the schools so far as I have been able to ascertain—to make freedom of discussion as an intellectual method, liberty as a principle of social action, understood by all. Probably not one in twenty thousand of those turned out by our schools could state the argument for free discussion as outlined by Mill. The assumption seems to have been that it is self-explanatory, and that there is no alternative or competing principle of political and social life. The truth being of course that liberty is only workable when we can reconcile it with the principle of authority, with the need for uniform action, and that there are a score of points where it becomes very challengeable indeed, and the case for its denial extremely plausible. We have taken great pains to excite a vague emotion—these songs about Liberty and the orations about giving me death are often compulsory law—but no trouble to get understanding. The intense emotions which words like "liberty," "democracy," "country," "de-

fense," "independence," "security," "Prussianism," "Socialism," excite, are undeniable. But they are the reaction to symbols of whose meaning we have apparently no clear notion.

We urge our sons to die for democracy and liberty and then become utterly contemptuous of the very words we used in those appeals. Not a nationality but claims "independence or death"—and denies independence to its own minorities. We have deep fears about security, and in truth see every security of life deeply shaken; but are quite complacent about the forces which have produced that instability. We are ready to put everything in jeopardy again in order to satisfy some momentary prejudice or passion.

I do suggest that before it is much use attempting to educate the public by acquainting it with the number of nationalities that make up Poland, or the aspirations of the Czecho-Slovaks, we should try and induce it to make up its mind what it wants; what, that is, it regards as good and what as evil; what it regards as the meaning of the words which so profoundly move it; to make clear that, if it is to swear by liberty, then it should have some notion of how freedom works as a social method or principle; that if we demand "independence and sovereignty" as the guiding principles of international life we should be prepared to show how those things are to be made compatible with an organized society of nations; and if we don't want such a society just how we are to live in anarchy; whether, if each nation is to have the right to be its own judge of its rights, we are prepared to let our rival in some international dispute be its own judge. . . .

All very elementary, and all strangely confused in the mind of the average man. It is not easy perhaps to clear up those confusions; nor is it impossible. And in any case, while such confusions exist, the more facts we are asked to learn the more puzzling is the maze apt to become.



The facts are indispensable, even for Mr. Babbitt whose vote settles it all. But their place is a library where he can get at them when he wants them and knows how to use them. Dictionaries and those who can compile them are indispensable also. But the way to make the product of the lexicographer or the encyclopaedist of real use to the average busy citizen is not to ask him to "learn" the dictionary or encyclopaedia beginning with A, hoping that some day before he dies he may come to Z, but to let him go to it, when he wants it and it can give him help. His education consists in creating the want and then teaching him how so to use the tool as to satisfy the want.

A final word as to motive. I have heard people talk of teaching youngsters to like foreigners and love humanity. I doubt if it is possible or desirable to do one or the other. For myself I can't love humanity. There are too many of them and I have not been introduced.

But there are motives deep and strong in all youngsters to which we can appeal in these matters. One is the sense of fair play, of sportsmanship, a hatred of bullying. By the help of these we can reconcile patriotism and internationalism; make pride in our country a pride in the fineness of its behavior; in the fairness of its policy rather than the bigness of its size. "Our country is not the kind that brags and boasts and bullies, that behaves like a cad." Three-fourths of the imperialism and jingoism would be impossible if patriotism took the form of hating to see small and weak countries humiliated and coerced or bullied, and foreigners made the victims of smallness and meanness. As it is, much that masquerades as patriotism is the assertion, in the name of our country, of a savage egoism which we dare not so crudely assert as individuals. If I were to shout: "Myself first; myself alone; myself right or wrong," you would know me for a savage unfit for

civilization. If I shout "My country first; my country alone; my country right or wrong," you know me for a good patriot. The ultimate case for arbitration, for internationalism, is that unless we have it we shall always be asking other countries to take a position which we should not take if they asked it of us; always asking for predominance of power in order that we, a party to the cause, may be its judge. Unless we resort to third party judgment it must be judged by us or by the other fellow. If by us, we do the other fellow an injustice; if by him, he does us one.

That brings one to a second motive strong in young people: the artist's sense, pride in doing a job well, to say nothing of the artistic sense in the more limited meaning of the term—a sense for harmony, a distaste for the ugly. If one can make youngsters feel that life together is an art; that we all have to follow well or badly that art; that its big failures, like war, are due to stupidity and incompetence; that the old ways which produced war were due to philistine disharmonies of conduct and a crudity of thinking which sets on edge the teeth of those who have a finer sense of the art—why then there will be a certain pride, a vanity, but a useful vanity enlisted on the side of doing well one's bit, however small, of running the world and society.

If we could make the youngster see that the intelligent people of the world are now trying to get away from the older incompetent methods which were bound to fail, and are now engaged upon a great experiment, a great adventure which may fail if we cannot conquer dullness and stupidity, we shall then enlist also the sense of drama. If we can somehow manage to appeal to the sense of drama, of adventure, of sportsmanship, and of playing the game fairly, of pride in doing our bit well, I do not think we shall appeal in vain.

NORMAN ANGELL