

# 国際政治におけるアジア太平洋のペリフェリー権力とバランスの研究

－米国及びグアムの関係を事例として－

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## **Powers of the Periphery: A Case Study of the U.S.-Guahan (Guam) Relationship with References to the Asia-Pacific Rebalance and the Political Status Issue**

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### **Abstract**

From the establishment and implementation of the United States' rebalancing strategy to China's modern-era economic and militaristic rise, there is undoubtedly a heightened sense of focus, substance, and weight directed on the peripheral entities that serve as quasi-gatekeepers of security for nation-states. Moreover, with the U.S. Asia-Pacific rebalance remaining relatively difficult to implement, as well as delicate Okinawa-Tokyo relations, it is critical to examine socio-political insights into the center-periphery relations focused on the periphery. As such, the main aim of this paper is to develop an analytical framework, based on the nature of center-periphery relations, to assess the extent of power peripheral entities have in negotiations with their centers in terms of autonomy and security. The framework is then applied to the case of inter-governmental negotiations between the U.S. and Guam with regards to the unincorporated territory's political status and U.S. military bases. Using Guam as the case study, the research design uses qualitative interview methods in Guam with the island-leadership, the in-betweens, and grassroots to draw out first-hand insights on the rebalance, political status, and identity, as related to the questions of roles and powers in the periphery. In the end, to the questions of role(s) and powers of the periphery the answer remains highly dependent on various factors, most notably, a) the nature of the periphery's relationship to the center, b) the subject matters at hand (the strategy, policy, or matter in correspondence), and c) the intents of the periphery/center. Despite-so, the paper does illustrate that the developing analytical framework indicates a need for the theoretical component behind center-periphery relations to be expanded for a fuller-picture. Likewise, the socio-political insights offered via original interviews indicate a necessity in policy adjustments by the United States (center) to her periphery (Guam) in order to achieve mutual-intents with the highest agreeable-terms on referenced issues such as the Asia-Pacific rebalance and political status.

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## 1. Introduction

*"Guam is a pawn. [Now] is the pawn going to be in rebellion, how important is the pawn in relations to other pawns, those are the further questions."*

- Robert A. Underwood  
(former Congressman & current University of Guam President)

From the establishment and implementation of the United States' rebalancing strategy<sup>1</sup> to China's modern-era economic and militaristic rise<sup>2</sup>, there is undoubtedly a heightened sense of focus, substance, and weight directed on the peripheral entities that serve as quasi-gatekeepers of security for nation-states.

As such, the main aim of this paper is to develop an analytical framework, based on the nature of peripheral relations, for assessing the extent of power peripheral entities have in negotiations with their centers in terms of autonomy and security<sup>3</sup>. The framework is then applied to the case of inter-governmental negotiations between the U.S. and Guam with regards to the unincorporated territory's political status and U.S. military bases. In addition, the scope is mostly confined to the period after October 2011<sup>4</sup> and to the internal peripheral dynamics, i.e. Guam and Okinawa, of selected democratic nations, i.e. the United States and Japan, in the Asia-Pacific.

Similar to the decision-making process in game theory<sup>5</sup>, the correct interpretation of subject and intent in both the periphery and center will play a strong role in determining the cooperation, sustainability, and development of the relationship. It is reasonable to argue that the role(s) and powers can be interchangeable at times, with neither one nor the other being able to dictate the terms for each other. Likewise, as intents and subject matters shift and change, neither role nor power is definite and everlasting in each situation.

Whether the periphery possesses power in negotiations or not, is relegated a lesser position or not, or if it is a part of the dialogue or apart from the dialogue, the paper asserts that only by understanding the nature of peripheral relations, that stem from and is well-rooted in certain facets such as *history, culture, governance, natural resources, and security*, can more concrete actions such as lawsuits to protect ancestral-lands, educational campaigns towards an island-wide plebiscite, or people-power for decolonization follow.

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<sup>1</sup> The White House Office of the Press Secretary, "Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament," November 17, 2011.

<sup>2</sup> Edward Wong and Chris Buckley, "China's Military Budget Increasing 10% for 2015, Official Says," *New York Times*, March 4, 2015.

<sup>3</sup> For more on author's usage of security and power, see works by E.H. Carr ("Realism and Idealism", in Betts, *Conflict After the Cold War*, 2008), Morgenthau (*Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 1948), Walt (*Theory of International Politics*, 1979), and Mearsheimer (*The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 2001).

<sup>4</sup> Hillary Clinton, "America's Pacific Century," *Foreign Policy*, October 11, 2011.

<sup>5</sup> Stephen L. Quackenbush and Frank C. Zagare, "Game Theory: Modeling Interstate Conflict," in *Making Sense of IR Theory*, (2006), 98-114; Quackenbush and Zagare, 14.

## 2. The 'Peripheral' Relationship - Overview

Defining the central concepts of the periphery, the center, and the 'peripheral relationship' itself is essential to more substantive readings into this paper; a paper that will use Guam as a case study in the attempt to reinterpret the peripheral relationship.

First, periphery in the context of this paper is used to describe the internal entities (i.e. territories, prefecture) on the outer edges (hence 'periphery') of nation-states. For the case study in question, the peripheral entities that are deemed as significantly strategic would therefore be Guam for the United States in the Asia-Pacific. Second, the center although commonly referred to as the capital or core, i.e. Washington or Tokyo, represents the ruling government at-large. And third, the peripheral relationship is the relations, be it cultural, historical, or further, between the center and the periphery.

Many possibilities in the peripheral relationship do exist. The type of security role(s) the periphery, as designated by the center, takes on could simply be that of a pawn to the nation-state, a largely inconsequential entity that can only move forward without the ability to take a step-back. Or, it could be closer to that of a queen where the powers are so concentrated that nearly all directions and all options may be open to movement. More realistically, however, the answer is likely to be a bit of both—a bishop or castle. One that can negotiate or have freedom of movement to a certain extent, but is still bounded to a 'secondary' position per se. Regardless of role, this designation by the center remains a powerful indicator of center-periphery relations.

Though slightly different from the Guam case study, as the island despite being a U.S. territory remains on the U.N.'s decolonization list, parts of Michael Hechter's work on internal colonialism, written before the Welsh and Scottish parliamentary devolutions (1997), paint a strikingly accurate picture that can be applied to the U.S. - Guam peripheral relationship. Hechter states that, "the obstacle to...development suggested by the internal colonial model analogy...relates not to a failure of peripheral integration with the core but to a malintegration [sic] established on terms increasingly regarded as unjust and illegitimate."<sup>6</sup> Moreover, "the dominated society is condemned to an instrumental role by the metropolis."<sup>7</sup> On Guam, for instance, this would refer to the island's designated security role and the disproportionately heavy military infrastructure and installments on island as opposed to adjusting for developmental integration on par with the center (the US mainland/Washington). With reference to power in autonomy and security, the rebalance and political status issue is a frequent reminder for Guam of her questionable status and role as a United States colony.

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<sup>6</sup> Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic fringe in British national development, 1536-1966*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 34.

<sup>7</sup> *ibid.*, 30.

In the end, while research derived from paper analyses and policy details will further refine the originality and literary contribution by offering a separate distinctive outlook into center-periphery relations<sup>8</sup>, the questions of role(s) and powers of a periphery the answer remains highly dependent on various factors, most notably, a) the nature of the periphery's *relationship to the center*, b) *the subject matters at hand (the strategy, policy, or matter in correspondence)*, and c) *the intents of the periphery/center*.

### 3. Research Design, Framework, & Methodology

Naturally, if the degree of power or type of role relegated to the peripheral entity is largely dependent on the peripheral relationship, the paper then asserts that the nature of the peripheral relationship, subject/intent, and the resulting roles/powers to be the independent, intervening, and dependent variables, respectively.

In terms of the aforementioned analytical framework, the specific aims are to a) develop a more complete understanding of center-periphery relations using the five facets in the nature of peripheral relations, b) to situate each facet as a primary (short-term) or secondary (mid-long term) concern of importance for policymakers to evaluate, and c) to assess the peripheral relationship given the facets and concerns. The framework is currently limited in the following ways: a) providing more breadth as opposed to depth, b) suggestive (filling in the picture) rather than exhaustive (painting the picture).

With that said, the framework is then applied in the following order: evaluating the nature of the peripheral relationship (stage 1), determining the importance of each facet based on immediate existential concerns (stage 2), and finally concluding the implications on the peripheral relationship as applied via the framework to individual cases (stage 3).

Using Guam as *the* case study, the research design uses qualitative interview methods in Guam with the island-leadership<sup>9</sup>, the in-betweens, and grassroots to draw out first-hand insights on the rebalance, political status, and identity, as related to the questions of roles and powers in the periphery.

Interviews were conducted from the periphery in a semi-structured fashion with each interview lasting from thirty-minutes to a little above an hour depending on individual schedules. Roughly half of the interviews were conducted during August-2014 while the other half done in July-2015.

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<sup>8</sup> For more on author's intent in center-periphery relations, see works by Immanuel Wallerstein (*The Essential Wallerstein*, 2000) on world-systems, Carlos Escude (*Foreign Policy Theory in Menem's Argentina*, 1997) on peripheral sovereignties, and Gearóid O' Tuathail (*A Geopolitics Reader*, 2006) on geopolitical influence.

<sup>9</sup> Amongst the leadership, the Guam-legislature is only comprised of fifteen senators.

#### 4. The Nature of the Peripheral Relationship - Expanded Framework

To better understand the natural relationship between the periphery and the center, it is necessary that five distinct yet encompassing facets be briefly examined and evaluated for the Guam-case study; facets that include the areas of *history*, *culture*, *governance*, *natural resources*, and last but not least *security (physical and conceptual)*.

Beginning with *history*, this facet looks at the past for answers to the present and future. Particularly in cases such as Okinawa, for instance, a controversial or shared history can make or break the peripheral relationship. Due to the unforgiving atrocities that occurred throughout Okinawa's historical memory<sup>10</sup>, citizens of Okinawa are much less likely to embrace militarization in the prefecture. In short, history as a facet is extremely straightforward – whether or not the periphery and her people hold historical animosities towards the center would result in policy impasse and vice-versa (alternatively, affirmative shared history would bring positive influences that likely ease the administration's development in negotiations and policy).

Consciously separate from history, *culture*, as a facet, is perhaps a bit more complex to evaluate in terms of the periphery and center. Certainly, history can be an obstacle to the relationship. However, if the modern-day culture has been assimilated to a point where reconciliation at-large has taken place and no longer affects short and long term affairs, then culture can be regarded as a redeeming factor to the peripheral relationship.

Here, Guam is an exemplary case study. Despite the island-territory being a largely Spanish overseas colony for hundreds of years<sup>11</sup>, as well as suffering through immense tragedy in World War II<sup>12</sup>, the incorporation of a Guam Guard (U.S. military)<sup>13</sup> and subsequent American-culturalization has ebbed the flow of animosity and created a largely patriotic and harmonious local-society in tune with the center.<sup>14</sup> That in it of itself has allowed for a much smoother transition in the push for security initiatives. Culture, in areas where history remains difficult, is an answer and alternative that allows future and present generations a sense of belonging despite troubled pasts.

One of the most critical factors to a peripheral relationship, *governance* or the type of government that the peripheral entity holds is key to what type of relationship and with what powers she can function on. Essentially, it can be seen as the hand that you're dealt with (in terms of cards). From an autonomous country in a Kingdom (i.e. Greenland) to an unincorporated territory (i.e. Guam), the various types of governance spells out the different

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<sup>10</sup> Saburo Ienaga, *The Pacific War, 1931-1945* (New York: Random House, 1978), 185.

<sup>11</sup> Patricia L.G. Taimanglo, "The Chamorro People of Guam," *American Psychological Association (Communiqué)*, August 2010.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Capt. Ken Ola, "Guam Guard's First Adjutant General Dies," *National Guard*, January 23, 2012.

<sup>14</sup> Hannah M.T. Gutierrez, "Guam's Future Political Status," *Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal* Vol. 4, issue no. 1 (Winter 2003): 138, 147.

types of leverage that a periphery has when in talks with the center regarding the management of her security situation.

Likewise, from the amount of dependency a periphery has to the center to the political associations attached, a peripheral relationship is largely based on the type of governance that it currently has. Equally important, however, is the possibility of movement within the types of governance.

For instance, whilst entities such as the territory of Guam may remain in political status quo due to current deadlocks between statehood, free association, or independence, others such as Greenland are making progress towards a self-sustainable economic and security-defense situation that may eventually lead to full-independence. As such, the future prospect of governance within the periphery impacts the well-being of the peripheral relationship as well. By and large, the influence of governing powers associated with or entrusted to the periphery can heavily sway the direction, weight, and even worth of a peripheral relationship.

*Natural resources* in the periphery, including minerals, gas, oil, and so forth, is another critical factor that influences the amount of leverage a peripheral entity has in negotiations between the center and periphery. Ultimately, the evaluation of this facet can be seen as a judgment on whether the peripheral entity is either self-sustaining<sup>15</sup> in present or could become self-sustainable in the future. If either possibility exists, then the peripheral relationship could be greatly influenced or broken (from the center). If not, then dependency on the center for survival becomes an inherent addiction forcing the periphery to adapt to the needs of the center rather than the other way around.

Beyond sustainability, natural resources may also be seen as a point of value. Whether or not the center's upkeep or maintenance of its periphery is on par with the natural (or established) value associated with the periphery should also be considered. Of course, distance, population, and other 'natural' aspects are areas within the facet that should also be highlighted if important. Thus, leading to our final and perhaps most significant facet.

*Security*, again arguably the most vital of all five facets, is similarly the most complex. Under the pretense of security, sometimes, the center is allowed incredible freedoms and powers in achieving its aims through rather creative or intelligent manners<sup>16</sup>—which is why security to be understood can be rather complex.

Here, security, from the center's perspective (although frequently in cohesion with the periphery), will be split into two distinguishable segments. Security that focuses on the psychological concerns in strategy and power, and security that is embodied in the physical

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<sup>15</sup> Here, self-sustaining refers to the ability of a peripheral entity in running a stand-alone economy based on available natural resources, aforementioned, rather than monetary subsidies from the center.

<sup>16</sup> National Security Act of 1947, Public Law 253, 80th Congress; Chapter 343, 1st Session; S. 758; Catherine Lutz, "US Military Bases on Guam in Global Perspective," *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 30 (2010): 3-10.

realizations of the military, such as bases or artillery, which serve from the periphery in question. Greenland, for instance, may be important geopolitically to the Arctic Circle, particularly to Denmark; however, the amount of foreign and domestic military stationed on the landmass itself is not equivalent to what it should be based on geographical size and strategic value (for instance, to Denmark or the U.S.)—as in a strong conceptualized security that may pale in comparison in actuality.

However unlikely, certain hypothetical events such as Russia or China acting assertively or aggressively in their respective regions, would, for instance, impel the United States or Japan to significantly alter the peripheral relationship so that the first points of contact can meet state (center) security needs. Quite frequently, the *raison d'être* of a periphery in a strategically significant location *is* to provide for the theoretical and actual security of the center and state at-large. As a result, in the decision-making process vis-à-vis the periphery, security concerns *are* sometimes the end-all-be-all.

Although situational and varying case-by-case, the five-distinct facets presented above illustrate the basics to the complexity behind the natural understandings of a peripheral relationship—an understanding that will subsequently shape the natural strategic blueprints to follow. Likewise, the intents/subject as perceived by either side in the peripheral relationship will likely affect the amount of power or type of role relegated to the periphery based on mutual or differing stances; the former offering more power and cooperation with the latter reversed.

## 5. Asia-Pacific Main Case Study: Guam (Guahan)<sup>17</sup>

At the end of the Spanish-American War in 1898, Guam was ceded to the United States as part of the Treaty of Paris.<sup>18</sup> In the modern-era, the island is an unincorporated territory of the latter by way of the Guam Organic Act of 1950<sup>19</sup>, with a brief yet brutal stint from 1941-1944 by the Japanese in WWII before being recaptured by the United States.<sup>20</sup> Roughly three times the size of Washington D.C. with a population of nearly 170,000<sup>21</sup>, of which the primary-ethnic group belongs to the indigenous Chamorros<sup>2223</sup>, and two strategically critical military bases (Anderson Air Force Base and Apra Naval Base)<sup>24</sup> Guam acts as a significant hub for security affairs to the United States in the Asia-Pacific.

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<sup>17</sup> Guahan is the proper-title for Guam in the Chamorro-language.

<sup>18</sup> Treaty of Peace Between the United States and Spain, U.S. Congress, 55th Cong. 3d sess., Senate Doc. No. 62, Part 1 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1899), 5-11.

<sup>19</sup> Organic Act of Guam, 64 Stat. 384, codified as 48 U.S.C. 1421, et seq (1950).

<sup>20</sup> Taimanglo, *Communiqué*, 1.

<sup>21</sup> Shirley A Kan, “Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments,” *Congressional Research Service* CRS Report for Congress (2014): 1.

<sup>22</sup> Taimanglo, *Communiqué*, 1.

<sup>23</sup> Chamorros are the indigenous-people of Guam.

<sup>24</sup> Kan, “Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments,” 1.

### ***5.1 The Nature of the Peripheral Relationship: Guam***

The nature of the peripheral relationship between Guam and the United States, as observed vis-à-vis the aforesaid facets, is as follows:

Historically, the island-territory has been a Spanish colony for over three hundred years since Ferdinand Magellan's first discovery in 1521. After relinquishing the islands to the United States following the loss of the Spanish-American War in 1898, Guam became a U.S. possession until the Guam Organic Act (GOA) of 1950 established the island as an unincorporated territory simultaneously granting U.S. citizenship to her people henceforth. Critically, however, as the civilian-structured rule of law was established through the GOA (U.S. Congress) instead of the U.S. Constitution, the island's U.S. citizens are unable to vote for the U.S. President and also do not have voting representation in Congress.<sup>25</sup>

As a facet, a little over a century's worth of *historical influence* and continued governance under the United States has vastly increased as well as consolidated the affinity between the island and the mainland: overcoming issues such as distance. Moreover, the facet is more stabilizing to the peripheral relationship rather than destabilizing; although, the occasional question of war reparations<sup>26</sup> still affects the relationship detrimentally. Overall, the nature of the peripheral relationship is held intact rather than hurt by historical understandings. Thus, the facet can be considered as a *secondary-concern* to the relationship.

Additionally, in terms of *culture* the island and her people do retain deeply rooted Spanish traditions as a result of centuries of Spanish colonialism. Be it by lineage, as many do have Spanish blood, or by tradition, in the form of fiestas, language, or even faith, overwhelmingly Catholic<sup>27</sup>, the Chamorros and Guamanians are immensely yet passively influenced by their once Spanish colonizers. Currently, however, the psychological political identification with the United States through education, citizenship, and the passing of time reflect a stronger conscious cultural connection with the United States as an affiliated American, Guamanian, or Chamorro.

With the historical facet being less contentious than say in Okinawa, for instance, sustaining a stable, intact, and well-maintained foundation between the island and the United States, *cultural integration*, in conjunction with considerations for preserving indigenous Chamorro culture, is a beneficial facet to inter-state negotiations while creating a mutual sense of identity, belonging, and purpose. A dual political identity between the island and the United States would not jeopardize a hypothetical situation just as having pride in being from the East Coast or the Deep South would not hurt negotiations as fellow

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<sup>25</sup> Michael Lujan Bevacqua, "The (Un)exceptional Life of a Non-Voting Delegate: Guam and the Production of American Sovereignty," *Pacific Asia Inquiry* Vol. 3, issue no. 1 (2012).

<sup>26</sup> Staff Reports, "The Fight for War Reparations," *Stars and Stripes* (Micronesia Area Research Center, 2010), 1.

<sup>27</sup> Congressional Record, V. 148, PT. 1, January 23, 2002 to February 13, 2002.



Americans. Perspectives may change, but core values do not. Again, a more *secondary-facet* than primary.

*Governance*, somewhat mentioned in the historical facet, is perhaps the most critical facet in the island's case study. Current Governor of Guam Eddie B. Calvo during his inaugural address has already indicated that "any status is better than unincorporated territory"<sup>28</sup> of the United States. In other words, the current status appropriated by the U.S. Congress to Guam is one that is minimal to say the least, behind the full powers of a state and even that of a commonwealth such as Puerto Rico. With neither the ability to vote for President nor the capacity to have full representation in Congress, the island is immediately relegated to 'second-class' status by default. U.S. citizenship, although internationally recognized, is no substitute to real political currency and sway that, for instance, swing states in the United States often have.

The lack of power that the island leadership has because of the appropriated governing structure translates to inefficient if not incapacitated talks between Hagatna<sup>29</sup> and Washington. Similarly, regardless of the cultural value, environmental urgency, or issues of human rights/decolonization surrounding certain negotiations such as the rebalance or political status, the heavily weakened or nonexistent power is not only clearly visible but would require drastic measures over time to correct.

As a facet, it is ironically one of the strongest weakening factors to the peripheral relationship from Hagatna's point of view. A *primary-concern* that would be increasingly difficult to resolve without a finished plebiscite, strong-leadership, and political will of the islanders in subjects such as the island's political status or rebalance build-up.

Economically speaking, beyond tourism and military installments, Guam holds very little in terms of *natural resources* such as minerals, oil, or gas. However, a lack of resources is not indicative of future roles or powers in terms of the peripheral relationship. Certainly, there would be sway had vast amounts of natural resources been well-hidden, discovered, and utilized for major industries, yet other nation-states or former colonies, despite not being in a peripheral relationship per se but existed very much in the periphery, such as Hong Kong<sup>30</sup> or Singapore<sup>31</sup> were able to adapt, in spite of their circumstances, to create major political, economic, and industrial hubs regardless of their lack of resources.

To be pragmatic, however, is to acknowledge that there are no readily available natural resources in the near to far future. Instead, focusing on developing current major industries, regardless of political positions, would be more practical as a tool in future inter-state

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<sup>28</sup> Gov. Eddie B. Calvo, "State of the Island Address," Office of the Governor of Guam, February 16, 2015.

<sup>29</sup> Formal-title for the island's capital.

<sup>30</sup> John Page, and E. Campos, "The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy," World Bank, Washington DC (1993).

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

negotiations of role and powers vis-à-vis Washington. Immediately, though, the facet is a *secondary-concern*.

Officially-speaking, Guam is a significantly strategic territory in the Asia-Pacific that allows the United States access to the nearby routes and waters, serves as a refueling station, hosts various military exercises, and a variety of other purposes that forwards the U.S. agenda. From thought to practice, the idea is very much true in reality as well. With two major military installments, Anderson Air Force Base and Apra Naval Base, nuclear-attack submarines, anti-missile defense, amongst others, the evidence points to a security and strategy effort that is not only being realized but is continually advancing with joint-government efforts, for instance, by the United States and Japan in terms of marine-deployments and costs associated with the rebalance strategy. Most recently, in “April 2014, President Obama issued a U.S.-Japan Joint Statement, reaffirming that ‘the United States and Japan are...making sustained progress towards...the development of Guam as a strategic hub.’”<sup>32</sup>

Without a doubt, the other principal *primary-concern* amongst the facets, *security*, both conceptual and in reality, has ‘secured’ the island’s near future so-to-speak as any shifts in the region, independently, and so forth would translate as drastic breaches to U.S. authority, public-image, and the internal-workings of the region. In the long-term, however, security may have indirectly doomed the island—or, as former Guam-Congressman Robert Underwood declares as the island's "birthmark curse"<sup>33</sup>—relegating her to a minor status without full powers for an extended period of time; until a point where a decision in political status by the islanders would not hinder nor hurt the original intentions and blueprint of the United States.

So far, in assessing the *nature* of the island’s peripheral relationship, *security* and *governance* has been evaluated as primary concerns that affects Hagatna’s role and powers in inter-state negotiations with Washington immediately, permanently, and to a great extent, whilst history, culture, and natural resources are less significant secondary concerns that do influence the overall nature without the intensity as the aforementioned.

Instead of purely definite answers to which roles and what powers, at the end of the investigative process, it becomes apparent as to the key influencers that structure the inter-state negotiations and narratives.

In the Guam case study, to discover the proper roles/powers to the island, the subjects of security and governance must lead before the other facets can be addressed. Otherwise, it is an inefficient alternative that is moving away from the end-goal rather than towards it. Therefore, understanding the nature of peripheral relations thus serves to better clarify the

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<sup>32</sup> Kan, “Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments,” Summary.

<sup>33</sup> Robert Underwood, author-interview, Aug-2014.

underlying reasons behind which roles and what powers the island serves vis-à-vis the United States.

Alternatively, *however*, the investigation does allow separate takes on the relationship by opening possibilities of say, for instance, using the secondary concerns as motion to pressure primary concerns. Though judgment would lie in the interpretation of the facets and the strategy being implemented.

### ***5.2 Political Status: Guam (Intent/Subject)***

Shifting from the independent to intervening variable, understanding the nature of the peripheral relationship subsequently allows for the analysis or question of intent/subject to begin.

A case within the case, in reference to the political status issue, in 1982 the first self-determination plebiscite was held on Guam regarding her political status vis-à-vis the United States with the following five political options: Statehood, Commonwealth, Status Quo, Independence, and Free Association; in the end Commonwealth and Statehood were the top-two with Commonwealth prevailing but eventually collapsed at the executive branch.<sup>34</sup> In 1997, the Guam Decolonization Commission was established and revised the original plebiscite to one with three terminal options based on a mandate by the United Nations, namely: Statehood, Independence, and Free Association.<sup>35</sup>

As a reminder, while the Organic Act serves as a local constitution for Guam, the island does not retain the same powers that are reserved to American states, as the US Congress "retains plenary power (that is, authority) to amend the act or to enact any legislation it wishes for Guam without the consent of Guamanian US citizens"<sup>36</sup>—including political status.

Due to obstacles such as insufficient funding or low voter-registration as required by law, the political status of Guam has remained in question without too much advancement in any one direction.

We need to note that if Washington and Hagatna had a near identical understanding on the island's political status, whether in total concurrence or dissent, then the island would have already attained, for instance, the status of commonwealth. However, since there is a difference in intent on the subject matter, therefore plebiscites were held and negotiations did occur. To what extent did the role or powers of the periphery influence said negotiations is what is to be explored and assessed.

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34 LisaLinda Natividad, "U.N. Decolonization Statement - Statement by Representative of Guam," United Nations, PRS/2012/CRP.9 May 30 - June 1, 2012.

35 Ibid.

36 E. Robert Statham Jr., "Reformation of the Guam Legislature," *The Journal of Legislative Studies* Vol. 3, issue no. 4 (1997): 127.

With that said, referring to the nature of the relationship to explain the periphery vis-à-vis the center, governance and security has already been established previously as key natural facets that influence the scenario. Unfortunately for the island-periphery, the assessment of both facets translates to a removal of powers and an already designated or delegated role for the island.

To illustrate, just as the Guam Organic Act handed down by the U.S. Congress years before altered the island's political status, likewise the decision of the executive branch doomed negotiations (*Washington's intent*) despite the conclusive island-wide vote of a desired Commonwealth status (*Hagatna's intent*). And, as the rationale below insinuates, the island's role as a territory is seen as precisely the logic for why the center's interests is to dissolve the political status issue. Unless Hagatna can reassure Washington that any shift in her political status is a beneficial move for Washington, then save a whirlwind combination of outstanding leadership, political will, plebiscites, and copious lawsuits, the case is perhaps closed for the foreseeable future.

### ***5.2.1 Intent***

Taking a closer look into the political status issue, as legal-expert Hannah M.T. Gutierrez notes, "Guam has its own experience and historical relationship with the United States...[and] Indeed, U.S. citizenship—and the fifty-year quest to obtain that statues[sic]—has been an integral part of Guam's history and experience. [As such, it] can and should be a significant part of any future relationship with the United States."<sup>37</sup> In reference to the U.S. citizenship, as a part of the political status issue, Gutierrez echoes the intents of a vast-majority of Chamorros and Guamanians living on the island. Regardless of how the situation is resolved, U.S. citizenship is seen as an irrefutable component of the historical struggle in roles and powers.

While status has been and still is fought through political and legislative channels—[with the] United States thwarting attempts through inaction or amnesia<sup>38</sup>—a majority of local leaders strongly affirm their U.S. affiliation/citizenship while simultaneously seeking greater political autonomy, limits to federal power, and primacy for the island's indigenious.<sup>39</sup>

On Washington's end, however, Congressional think-tank expert Shirley Kan asserts that the rationale for the military build-up (rebalance) on Guam is precisely due to the territory's status. As it stands, "the United States is not required to negotiate with sovereign countries on force deployments or face the risks of losing bases or access"<sup>40</sup>—vis-à-vis the territorial-island.

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<sup>37</sup> Hannah M.T. Gutierrez, "Guam's Future Political Status," 148.

<sup>38</sup> Valerie Solar Woodward, "Reading American Empire in Guam," *The Contemporary Pacific* Vol. 25, issue no. 1 (2013): 72.

<sup>39</sup> Frank Quimby, "Fortress Guahan," *The Journal of Pacific History* Vol. 46, issue no. 3 (December 2011): 357.

<sup>40</sup> Kan, "Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments," 10.

In the end, proper alignments of intent within agreeable-terms would be a win-win of moral, ethical, and even *realpolitik* grounds, particularly in preventing an adverse power-struggle rising from differing end-points. For instance, the support and agreement of the Guam Governor's Office and Guam Legislature for the military build-up came only with the understanding that there would be enhancements to the local infrastructure, protection of ancestral-lands, and further negotiations on war reparations to the Chamorro-people.<sup>41</sup> Without clear understanding of details and to what extent, mutual-intents on agreeable-terms would clearly be difficult to accomplish.

### **5.2.2 Subject**

As a subject, political status should show mutual benefits to both the island and the United States if there is a desire to achieve concrete outcomes. Though, at the current stage of complacency on-island, it appears difficult to use human rights or political will to push the agenda with regards to the aforementioned grounds of morality and *realpolitik*.

As former Congressman "Underwood...[states] 'the desire for political fulfillment will always be a feature of Guam's ongoing relationship with the US. At times, this desire will appear dormant and then it will spring to life as it did in the 1930s and 1940s and again in the 1970s and 1980s.'" <sup>42</sup> Moreover, only by understanding the "surge of indigenous agitation"<sup>43</sup> can primary concerns be resolved. As a subject, however, even former Chamorro-delegate to the UN decolonization committee Senator Hope Cristobal acknowledges that political status is an almost dead-issue at the moment without the necessary plebiscites and an increasingly apathetic populace<sup>44</sup>; ironic as the role and powers are in part defined precisely because of a lack in political will for role and powers.

## **6. The Interviews (With References to the Rebalance)<sup>45</sup>**

As a collection of original sources, interviews regarding the paper's aforementioned aims were conducted with the intent to illuminate further insight into the peripheral relationship. Interview excerpts from selected individuals, as well as the data reflected in Tables 1-4, serve to highlight the prominence of roles/powers in peripheral discussions. Likewise, the excerpts showcase the respective voices of influential figures representing the leadership or grassroots on key-matters such as the rebalance or political status for a more diverse and encompassing outlook.

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<sup>41</sup> Kan, "Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments," 16-17.

<sup>42</sup> Quimby, "Fortress Guahan," 377.

<sup>43</sup> Lieutenant Colonel Robert A. Crisostomo, "Strategic Guam," USAWC Strategy Research Project (2013), 24.

<sup>44</sup> Hope Cristobal, recorded-interview by author, University of Guam, July 14, 2015.

<sup>45</sup> Each-interview part of a collection originally sourced by the author; individual profiles available on request; all quotes taken from interviews-directly.

**Table 1 Identity Composition**

<b>Identity</b>	<i>Chamorro</i>	<i>Guamanian</i>	<i>Amer./Guam.</i>	<i>Other.</i>
Interview-Members	81% (9)	0% (0)	9% (1)	9% (1)
<b>Total</b>	99% (11) <sup>46</sup>			

Source: Author's Compilation

**Table 2 Member Associations**

<b>Association</b>	<i>Leadership</i>	<i>In-Betweens</i>	<i>Grassroots</i>
Interview-Members	63% (7)	18% (2)	18% (2)
<b>Total</b>	99% (11)		

Source: Author's Compilation

**Table 3 Views of the Political Status Issue**

<b>Political Status Issue</b>	<i>Free Association</i>	<i>Independence</i>	<i>Statehood</i>	<i>N/A</i>
Interview-Members	63% (7)	9% (1)	9% (1)	18% (2)
<b>Total</b>	99% (11)			

Source: Author's Calculation

**Table 4 Views on Guam's Role in the Peripheral Relationship (w/ Washington)**

<b>Chess-Concept (Role of Periphery)</b>	<i>Pawn</i>	<i>Castle/Bishop</i>	<i>Potential Queen<sup>47</sup></i>
Interview-Members	72% (8)	27% (3)	[27% - 3]
<b>Total</b>	99% (11) & [27% - 3]		

Source: Author's Calculation

On the outlook of Guam's role and powers vis-à-vis the rebalance, *Speaker Won Pat* of the leadership states that, "Because we are a colony, because we are so small, there is really very little impact that we could have in terms of the relationship with the United States, being a powerful country." In addition, the U.S. uses the "Jones Act (*merchant marine act of 1920*), restrictions, to keep us where they can control us, to become dependent to the United States and dollar." Furthermore, while "Japan is at the table, [the] US is at the table, we're not at the table at all, Okinawa is not at the table, they're overburdened too" in reference to negotiations and security affairs vis-à-vis the military buildup. While the Speaker cites the

<sup>46</sup> Number in parenthesis represents total number of individuals interviewed, w/ selections (votes) tallied into percentages.

<sup>47</sup> No interviewee, outright, selected queen as a US designate-role for Guam. However, referencing the increase in military buildup and rebalance strategy, a few did refer to the expanded potential-role of the island to the United States as that of a possible shift for Guam from a pawn/castle/bishop to that of a queen.

Jones Act as well as 'not sitting at the table' in arguing Guam's particular reality in roles/powers vis-à-vis the United States. Her words are strikingly strong in resonating a sense of powerlessness at dealing with the central government-at-large from the periphery's perspective.

Offering institutional insight, a frequent guest to Guam and an in-between in this paper, former Minister of State for External Affairs (U.S. Virgin Islands) *Dr. Corbin* explains that, for instance, "[We're] not members of the United Nations. At a disadvantage, we could not negotiate. Just provided information. But, [we] did belong to other bodies (international)." As such, you could get "something tabled and adopted to move policy forward (at a higher level)" to "influence the process." Therefore, according to Dr. Corbin, as petitioners at the U.N. during the decolonization (political status) hearings, Guam may have been simply subjects being discussed, however, membership or participation in other forms and forums did allow the island to create its own role/power to influence subsequent actions; a different outlook globally versus the earlier domestic one.

Guam-academic and president of the Guahan Coalition for Peace & Justice, *Dr. Natividad* believes that while, "[Guam] do[esn't] sit at the table [being] absolutely a pawn. A piece of [inexpensive] real estate. [With the] lack of political power [in part] because of the political status issues", the "US absolutely hates to be shamed" internationally. Thus, despite a "One-sided and abusive relationship driven by what America needs and wants", Dr. Natividad asserts that Guam's roles/powers can be expanded and achieved through generating greater political will via global activism and awareness of the issues such as colonization or military buildup.

On a calmer-note, slightly differing from earlier critics, *President Underwood* states that "Guam's role and America's ability to project power into this environment, is not as a policeman but rather a stabilizing force" and that "the issues of Guam are not of intellectual stance but rather political will." As a former congressman as well, President Underwood presents a more diplomatic tone in discussing the aforesaid issues, asserting that in the right-time and right-place, negotiating roles/powers is not impossible nor improbable, but patience and readiness are key rather than "political theatre."

Our last influential excerpt, lawsuit lead attorney *Leevin Camacho* emphasizes that while "Change in numbers, or force posture, permanent to rotations, was between the politics of the governments and funding, something like live fire range areas or site, [he is] extremely confident was affected by lawsuit." Camacho asserts that the "power of the people and the power of the law was what prevailed."

Separately, on ways the periphery may influence the process, Camacho considers "political capital that you create with lawsuits is what you need" as a power of the periphery. Claiming the most-recent victorious lawsuit against the Department of Defense as

"symbolically, a water-shed moment" providing a practical/legal perspective outside of institutional/global awareness initiatives.

All in all, the interviews signify and illustrate in detail, from institutional insight to political and legal perspectives, the voice and outlook from the periphery adding to center-periphery discourse.

## **7. Closing/Conclusion**

In the end, it is absolutely clear that in the pursuit of which roles and what powers peripheral entities possess, key-influencers to narratives are discovered *via* evaluations on the nature of the peripheral relationship.

Essentially, the independent variable that is the nature of peripheral relations remains the single-largest factor in determining the peripheral relationship, followed by the intervening variables of subject and intent (possible game-changing indicators), that ultimately determine the outcome of the extent of power and type of role(s) (dependent variables) relegated to the periphery.

In addition, concise-versions of extended interviews with Guam's leadership, the in-betweens, and grassroots has indicated that there is an overwhelming Chamorro-majority that consider the periphery to need a role but not necessarily have the power for a meaningful one (being relegated to a pawn's position). The socio-political insights offered via original interviews indicate a necessity in policy adjustments by the United States (center) to her periphery (Guam) in order to achieve mutual-intents with the highest agreeable-terms on referenced issues such as the Asia-Pacific rebalance and political status. Moreover, the paper also illustrates that the developing analytical framework indicates a need for the theoretical component behind center-periphery relations to be expanded in breadth for a fuller-picture.

Regardless of the particular issue, as quasi-gatekeepers of security for nation-states, only through proper insights, perspectives, and understanding about the nature of the peripheral relationship, subject/intent, and related-issues (i.e. rebalance/political status), can the periphery seek to evolve and transition itself in negotiations and security affairs.

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