

# The History of Globalization, and the Globalization of History<sup>1</sup>

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## Introduction

This paper aims at constructing a simple framework for discussing some issues of globalization from an historical point of view. In taking this approach I should like to acknowledge my indebtedness to the work of Professor Yoda Yoshiie who successfully combines a rigid academic approach towards issues of historical periodization with the comparative study of civilizations, in particular Japanese and Chinese civilizations.<sup>2</sup>

China, India, Indonesia, Japan and Korea constitute more than two fifths of the world's population, but the voice of their citizens remains muted in the "international community". As a result of globalization, their civilizations may survive at the regional level at best, if not destined to be relegated to folklore. More importantly, the attempt by the Chinese Communist Party to maintain leadership into the future is seen by some as a challenge to globalization. It is a question of vital importance whether Asia can avoid a replay of the kind of polarization that triggered major wars during the past one hundred and thirty years all over the globe. An historic perspective may aid us to understand the tectonic shifts that produce major quakes such as wars.<sup>3</sup>

As one of the many reactions to Western colonialism, and Western-led globalization, scholars from many different parts of the globe presented attempts to introduce paradigms of Western history to the study of non-Western history, including the application of Western-derived paradigms such as "civilization" and "religion". In recent years concepts such as "civil society" have been applied to the history or urbanization of Ming China, and the popular literature of the preceding Mongol Yuan dynasty has been given the label "citizen's literature". The application of paradigms of globalising societies to the distant past of Chinese civilization is no more and no less than subordinating Chinese history to the demands of globalising history, or else the integration and subordination of Chinese history into the genealogy of the globalization paradigm.

Usually, colonialism and globalization are seen as threatening to the survival of non-Western civilizations. The rise of a new discipline in Japan, "the study of civilization" (*bunmeigaku*) may in part be explained as an attempt to establish the authenticity and autonomy of the study of Japanese civilization.<sup>4</sup> Such an approach must not be interpreted as, and confused with narrow-minded "nationalism"—a label that is all too often (and not always unthinkingly) applied to opponents, by those who regard themselves as representing a "universal" approach. Recently, demands have been made to incorporate non-Western traditions into debates on International Relations theory, and studies on defense.<sup>5</sup> Any scholarly discussion of the globalization of social science

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disciplines requires grasp of scholarly debates of sheer unlimited size at a stage when discussions even in any one limited field of a discipline have become so complex that their complexity threatens to undermine our capability to communicate meaningfully altogether.<sup>6</sup> All too often concepts are used without referring to underlying assumptions which may or may not be shared by other participants in discussions. To give but one example, terms such as Christian civilization, or Islamic civilization presume the existence of a community of believers (*umma*) united in their belief of being bound to one ultimate being (G'd), while such an assumption cannot apply to civilizations in India, China (at least not to the non-Islamic civilizations in both countries), or Japan. Definitions of civilizations are encumbered by the fact that the phenomenon "civilization" has a chameleon-like quality—apparently able to change not just its appearance, but also its quality in unpredictable fashions. At the same time, this has been a major reason for widespread attempts to pin down the quasi-eternal, permanent "essentials" of civilizations.<sup>7</sup>

The age of globalization is crowded with references to an (international) civil society, or the international/global community, yet there is little global agreement on its nature. Should the inhabitants of China, India, Indonesia, Brasil, Nigeria and Japan agree on how to deal with a major issue, this implies the support of the majority of the global population—it needs no comment that the major global media have a different concept of the international, or global community. If nothing else, it seems that global cooperation against terrorism seems to unite states and citizens against a common enemy, at least for the time being.<sup>8</sup>

The collapse of the Soviet Union has speeded up processes of globalization, prominently driven by the leader of Western alliances, the United States. Globalization processes are commonly identified with concepts such as *market democracy* (short for market economics plus parliamentary democracy), the strengthening of *civil society*, and specific values such as *human rights*. True to the character of an historic development enveloping the globe, globalization is portrayed as having a universal character applicable to all major civilizations of the twentieth and twenty-first century. Presented as an irreversible phenomenon it appears to transcend borders that separate nations, states and civilizations, if not subverting civilizations around the globe. Rather than building on self-descriptions and definitions provided by the actors this paper presents globalization as just one stage in a development that on the one hand separates states and regions into zones with an efficient social, economic and political order carried by core leaders such as the US and some member states of the EU, while the remainder of the globe attracts attention of global leaders mainly when that core order is threatened.<sup>9</sup>

The history of the twenty-first century tends to be seen as the history of globalization that relegates the history of geographical regions and disparate civilizations to the realm of local history.<sup>10</sup> Its major achievement is the creation of sets of orders that regulate relations between the individual, society and the state (*civil society*), the behavior of companies (*governance*), and set the standards for a global economic order (symbolized in institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO). Lest there be no misunderstanding: the order thus created rests on the shared acceptance of institutionalized forms of rivalry and conflict that still require the exercise of military, economic and political power.<sup>11</sup> US alliances with European states (NATO) and alliances

such as the US-Japan alliance are core elements to guarantee a global security order, while ad hoc coalitions such as in the Gulf War, or the recent Afghanistan war are merely temporary arrangements. Core alliances by far transcend tasks and functions described in balance of power theories, and link member states in a semi-permanent fashion that recalls the organization of a *franchise enterprise*. Its common product is the spread of “globalization”, a project covering the economic, political, military and social order.<sup>12</sup> Tendencies towards *hierarchical patterns of order* are strengthened by advances in information technology which require instant decisions on the basis of well-guarded information both at the levels of state and companies which obviate traditional forms of participatory decision-making. Such phenomena are indications that labels of self-descriptions such as “democracy” and “transparency” may conceal more than they reveal. The essence of democracy is self-determination, but globalization appears to narrow considerably the framework within which the individual may exercise his (political) preferences. To some, globalization appears as an inevitable historical phenomenon, to others the result of a Western conspiracy for world domination. To the contemporary historian globalization presents the chance of a lifetime to grapple with the question whether history has meaning at all. The collapse of the Soviet Union has stimulated debates by historians on “globalization”, leading the American Francis Fukuyama to hail the end of history,<sup>13</sup> while Frenchman Jean-Marie Guehenno announced the beginning of a new age, the “imperial age”.<sup>14</sup> To some Chinese writers globalization is just another phase of Western colonialism.<sup>15</sup>

### **The definition of Western civilization**

Like most other civilizations, Western civilization displays an extremely complex structure comprising quite contradictory paradigms. Its dynamism does not derive from consensus and homogeneity, but from incessant strife and battles. European and American societies<sup>16</sup> have always been deeply aware of the innate tension between moral values and political expediency, the tensions that exist between “might” and “right”. The penetration of continental Europe, the British Isles and Ireland by Christianity contributed its own share of disputes: major themes in European history are deep conflicts between claims to worldly political power by the Pope in Rome over Europe, contested by secular as well as “protestant” forces.<sup>17</sup>

For reasons laid out below Western civilization is here defined not in terms of “Western values”, but as the rigorous *application of mathematical models* not just in the natural sciences, but in all spheres of socialized human activities. The French Revolution signaled the advent of a modernizing state engaging in scientific management of its affairs, including large scale social engineering, and attempts to extend itself as a model for the creation of other states, supported by military conquest and the establishment of alliances to spread its model. The French-led “Confederation of the Rhine” (Rheinbund) may thus be seen as the first beginnings of the globalization process.<sup>18</sup> Globalization is a true heir to the same Western tradition that also produced Marxism and Communism, a Western tradition that believes that not only nature, but the outcome of human activities such as economics, politics and society as well can be rationally described in figures, numeral equations, and mathematically phrased laws—a daring feat no other civilization achieved.<sup>19</sup> Modern market economics has gone a step further. It has

applied the lessons of biological Darwinism to economic development. Market economics relies on a system, a set of rules designed to let only the fittest survive, and may therefore be termed economic Darwinism. Market economics is advocated as the best mechanism to select those companies most suited to promote progress, in a manner evoking Darwinian thinking on the evolution of species, a game simulating processes of natural evolution.<sup>20</sup> This writer holds that advocating the (quasi) scientific management of human affairs is a much more fundamental, and revolutionary concept than the concept "capitalism" itself.<sup>21</sup>

As yet, there is no *science of globalization* to link phenomena in disparate fields in one grand theory. Historians of the twenty-first century may feel a certain sense of nostalgia towards Marxism, since post-Marxian historians were reluctant, if not unable to develop theories that present the direction of historic change in terms of inevitable and irreversible historical laws. This contrasts with widespread feelings, or assumptions that globalization is the result of irresistible developments.

The separation of moral precepts from demands of science-based development is a hallmark of western style *modernization*, constantly challenging (and changing) received values both in Western and non-Western civilizations. This author argues that it is futile to look for absolute standards in deciding the question whether Western (or any other civilization) should be defined by reference to sets of basis of values, but up to the historian to judge which approach is more appropriate in dealing with major historical developments. From an early stage Japan appeared willing to go a long way to meet this demand for separating moral injunctions and constructing a new survivable society:

In this quest to emancipate thought from moral abstraction and to establish a more flexible foundation for action, no man in the late Tokugawa period was better prepared than Sakuma Shozan... This is an early announcement of Sakuma's disposition to separate morality from politics and history. ... "However important standards and laws have been in the past, they must be changed today", not just for the Tokugawa family, but "for the welfare of the imperial line whose hundred generations of unbroken succession are without comparison in the countries of the world."<sup>22</sup>

As if shocked by the consequences of wholesale transformation numerous modernizers attempted to re-introduce traditional moral values in one way or the other. Others, disappointed by broken promises of modern beliefs, seek refuge in the culture of their forefathers.<sup>23</sup> Yoda Yoshiie has repeatedly pointed out that Japan tends to deal with conflicting elements in its civilization by juxtaposing them in a kind of peaceful coexistence-whereas in China, the tendency is to choose one alternative and discard the other.<sup>24</sup> This may in fact be a major, deep reason why Japan has been able to achieve successful modernization: wholesale colonization is hardly likely to produce successful modernization. The link between introducing novel techniques at the same time as promoting a traditional community spirit is also evident among modernizing entrepreneurs.<sup>25</sup>

As mentioned above, this writer holds that the dynamism of Western civilization

that is producing globalization is basically due to the application of science based models in all spheres of human activity. Needless to add, the application of rational means and methods does not necessarily produce rational outcomes. Attempts by both advocates and opponents of globalization to portray globalization as the spread of “Western” values suffer from one-sided interpretations of Western civilization as it developed since the end of the seventeenth century. A case in point is the use of the term “civil society”, which is in fact a value-loaded concept, rather than being a neutral term for historic analysis.<sup>26</sup> Differing from traditional European, Scottish and English concepts that placed the role of the natural individual in society in a central position, modern “civil society” is highly *institutionalized*. Without access to institutions any one individual can hardly hope to play a significant role in non-government “civil society”.<sup>27</sup> Another, not unrelated feature is the rise of globalized elites, which are far more developed than attempts to construct an international space for domestic civil society. Globalized elites are members of an epistemic community that shares the experience of similar curricula of business and management schools world wide. In a way they resemble elites of the Chinese empire, which relied on a numerically fairly small number of elites that were systematically trained and socialized as supra-regional elites (“Confucianism”, “examination system”) to constitute an epistemic community engaged in the management of local and supra-local affairs. The Chinese empire did not impose one national language or uniform culture on the citizens of the empire, and adopted different forms of taxation according to the economic structure of regions. It accepted the widespread use of self-government both in the economy, moral education and even parts of the criminal law. In this sense, the organization of the Chinese empire may present an early paradigm of “globalized governance” that required only limited inputs to impose centralized political rule, but left precious little space for the development of “civil society”. Last, but not least, values currently valid in any given society cannot simply be derived from studies of the respective classics such as the Christian bible. US popular culture is dominated by images of monsters and unknown dangers that have to be overcome by brutal and unforgiving violence to achieve “infinite justice”:<sup>28</sup> invasions by aliens, poltergeists, Frankenstein like monsters, or even the frequent portrayal of violence in nature by symbols of threats such as sharks, crocodiles and dinosaurs belong to this category.<sup>29</sup> The interpretation of values inherent in popular culture is far from easy: as one example I should like to refer to the difficulties in interpreting the major (cartoon) film hit in Japan in 2001, *Sen to chihiro no kamikakushi* (“Spirited Away”) which is not only brilliantly made, but takes up the theme of Japan’s identity in a very sophisticated way.<sup>30</sup>

### **Creating borders-zones of order, intermediate zones, and areas of benign (?) neglect**

The establishment of systems of order is an uneven process that spreads order from core regions. This process is not equivalent to the simple extension of “national power”. Globalization is no exception. If the age of the French Revolution is indeed a major historical starting point of globalization we may regard the completion of systems of colonial rule before the outbreak of the First World War as the second step, followed by the qualitative acceleration of globalization processes towards the end of the twentieth century. Separated by roughly one century, each of these turning points marked

significant changes in the regions forming the object of penetration by core states. This was accompanied by major changes in the manner in which political “communities” were constructed within the core states.

The French revolution provoked the rapid build up of modernizing nation states in the rest of continental Europe.<sup>31</sup> Although British industrialization led the way, numerous British institutions, including the British legal system and its peculiar form of constitutionalism were too idiosyncratic to be considered transferable to the continent.

Colonialism took place in the context of rivalry among modernizing nation states. Since religious communities (Catholicism, Protestantism) could no longer provide the basic force for uniting societies, space was created for the growth of political creeds and ideologies; in the second half of the nineteenth century this led to the gradual rise of political parties as a mainstay in the political process of the European colonial powers. The rise of political ideologies and parties proved a two-edged affair: it did not only liberate the individual and gave him access to participation in the political process, it also fostered the rise of Western-style totalitarianism (see below).

The internal modernization of colonizing powers was accompanied by imposition of colonial rule in territories elsewhere. This resulted in drawing the borders for the vast majority of nation states existing by the sixties of the twentieth century. Colonialism did not normally spread modern patterns of order that would enable colonial territories to achieve self-sustained modernization in areas such as the economy, politics and society. By the same token, autonomous government, or the establishment of rival regional systems or order were systematically thwarted. Changes were sufficiently serious to raise the issue of survival for non-Western civilizations. It is no accident that the decades before the outbreak of the First World War saw the massive rise of debates on the chances of survival of Chinese and Japanese civilizations in terms of a *clash of civilization*<sup>32</sup> resembling current debates of the consequences of globalization. Both debates coincide with periods of systemic change not just of the global order, but internal domestic order as well. In the age of globalization social and economic change have made it difficult, if not impossible to employ traditional concepts of class structure and social status as organizational foundations for the participation of individuals in society. By the same token, “civil society” is becoming the preserve of professionals working in specialised organizations such as NGOs. NGOs and NPO'S are not necessarily “private” institutions in the traditional sense of the word.<sup>33</sup> The acceleration of globalization in recent decades is accompanied by the demise of political parties based on political convictions—new forms of institutionalized mediation of economic and military competition are judged to be more efficient and appropriate.<sup>34</sup>

Globalization has drawn clear lines between areas of stable order in the Triad—Europe, North America and Japan and the rest of the globe. Societies elsewhere have few choices left: they either voluntarily accept modernization and its concomitant separation of (traditional) values from the structure of modernizing states, or attempt to construct rival orders, such as symbolized in the ascent of the pre-war Japanese Empire, or the attempt to construct an autonomous regional order such as constituted by the People's Republic of China. Both Japan and China adopted core elements of Western style modernization, but both countries developed social systems that are not easily identified with some of the main tenets of globalization. Nevertheless, Japan did not

only succeed in modernizing materially, but also in introducing a stable political and economic institutional framework along the lines of European constitutional states, which was one of the conditions which made Western powers acknowledge Japan as one pole in the Triad.

The period of colonialism seldom concluded with the successful restructuring of the economic/social/political system of territories along the lines of Western powers. Towards the end of the colonial age—roughly the sixties of the twentieth century—the newly independent countries were basically judged along three criteria: their alignment in the global Soviet-US competition, importance as markets (both as suppliers of raw materials and buyers), and whether protracted instability might threaten strategic interests of the core states. The collapse of the Soviet Union has not basically affected the latter two considerations. A huge part of the global population lives in societies in Asia and Africa that usually achieve not much more than tenuous stability, marked from time to time by eruptions of violence—wars, civil war, and economic chaos causing damage that rivals or even exceeds the ravages of war. Active intervention in those parts of the world in order to impose some kind of “globalising order” exceeds by far the ability of core powers—how costly such undertakings are is shown by estimates for the reconstruction of former Yugoslavia, or Afghanistan. Rather than provoking active resistance towards Western intervention it seems to be judged wiser to deal with these regions with (benign) neglect, unless major strategic interests dictate otherwise.<sup>35</sup>

### **The Third Reich and the Soviet Empire as products of Western Civilization**

Both the rise of fascism and socialist totalitarianism in Europe are by now often perceived to be aberrations from a European—Western civilization that is essentially based on values such as innate human rights, or else Christian values. Mainstream historians tend to ascribe the rise of the German genocidal state in terms unrelated to Western civilization, citing unique features of the German people, if not a(n imagined) German race.<sup>36</sup> To do otherwise would raise fundamental questions about the assumption that the West’s civilization is founded in “Western values”. However, communism, modernizing fascism and capitalism display remarkable structural similarities which suggest that they are indeed rooted in one and the same civilization.<sup>37</sup> They all subscribe to the view that certain social-economic “core processes” are the key engines of historic progression and change: changes in the material bases engendering class struggle, or else market mechanisms causing increasing division of labor. Even though fascism stressed the god-like quality of its leadership rooted in traditions of the (racially) defined groups it presented, fascism too endeavored to reconstruct society along the material demands of modernization.

If not in theory, then in actual practice these approaches produced “leading states” that present themselves as the advance force of inevitable change—mainly the Soviet Union and the United States. Propaganda preaches belief in the historical inevitability of the global spread of one’s system by voluntary or forcible conversion. The struggle between “communism” and “capitalism” was considered by both to be a global event representing the final stage of the evolution of global history<sup>38</sup>—there simply seemed to exist no credible alternative to forms of organization derived from other than Western civilization. The comparison between both systems may be carried further: coalitions

led by the United States resemble the Communist “United Front” approach, and the function of some institutions of “civil society” are not dissimilar to the role of “front organizations” in disseminating political and social values in society at large.

### **Guarantors of the new global order—the franchise system of Western alliances**

The structure of the international order since World War II, dominated by alliance systems, resembled the rivalry among two franchise enterprises: the Soviet one, and the project later to be known as market democracy led by the United States. We may liken the export of forms of organization in the political, cultural, social and economic sphere to the spread of a network of franchise enterprises, not “owned” by company headquarters, but bound to it in a complex set of relationships. Its relative stability is amongst others due to the fact that membership promises stable returns on investments. Withdrawal of participation from the chain usually results in heavy losses of accumulated investments. A franchise enterprise “thinks globally, and acts locally”. It markets its products in globally recognizable packages, but their contents are not always identical with those produced elsewhere. Debates on particular policy issues (“discours”) tend to be structured by the pattern of the franchise headquarters, whatever the specific local conditions. Scholars affiliated with the culture of franchise headquarters carry greater weight than those in the so-called “periphery”, if for no other reason than that they can actually influence decision making in Washington. Terms such as “good governance” reflect the codes set by franchise headquarters.

The strength of the United States is often taken as proof of the superiority of its “system”—as historians are well aware, mono-causal explanations are hardly ever sufficient, and what is appropriate to the physical environment of the United States may be highly unsuitable elsewhere. Becoming the world’s uncontested hegemon is presented as a consequence of adhering to “Western values”. In turn, the material superiority of the United States is easily linked to the claim that this also proves the superiority of Western Civilization in general.

“Globalization” has been called a political revolution brought about by business.<sup>39</sup> If so, it is a revolution or movement that cooperates with states and governments, rather than opposing them. Interpreting globalization as the spread of “market plus some democracy” seems an attractive proposition, since it is a form of democracy in which the selection of the fittest relies heavily on the market place, yet in which political activities are frequently regarded as improper interference in market mechanisms. “Globalization means homogenization. Prices, products, wages, wealth, and rates of interest and profit tend to become the same all over the world... Under the protection of American military power, globalization proceeds relentlessly.”<sup>40</sup> The United States often arrogates the title, or is credited with being the model of a “market democracy”. Serious analysis would first of all require an awareness of interaction and conflict between the concepts “market” and “democracy”;<sup>41</sup> once an analytical model is established, one needs to test the usefulness of this model by applying it to the actual situation of the US. Unless this is done, a term such as “market democracy” retains at most propaganda value.

### **Implications for the Theory of International Relations**

The core states underwriting a globalising order are more or less the same as the



Western “great powers” of the past, now including Japan in an (as yet) minor role. The core powers also pretend to represent the international community. When the globalising order is seen threatened, members of core alliances assume leadership to restore order, aided by more or less loose coalitions that include the largest possible number of countries.<sup>42</sup> In case the United Nations is unwilling to support policies of the core states, it is THEIR international community, and not the members of the United Nations, that seek to reestablish the threatened order.<sup>43</sup> Globalized order is based on a clear distribution of tasks, division of labor and leadership, rather than on global consensus. The hierarchical aspect is strengthened still further due to the need to speed up decision-making in all areas of military activities, as well as in the economy, visible in particular in financial markets. The question arises whether all these are inevitable historical developments—it usually is in the interest of authority to deny the possibility of alternatives, if for no other reason that the only alternative is “anarchy”.

In a sense, the “franchise” allegory resembles the phenomenon of “bandwagoning” described in balance of power theories, yet franchising also entails a more complex process of interaction in which states can no longer easily be conceptualized as independent actors.<sup>44</sup> Such systems of order tend to be hierarchically organized, rather than reflecting deepening “democratization”. A case in point is the implementation of plans for a National and/or Theatre Missile Defense. It creates new forms of collective risk management which need to be backed up by institutionalized intelligence sharing under US leadership. Due to the short lead time in the age of the information revolution, it is only the power at the center of the integrated system that can take decisions over whether or not to take action against a perceived threat, possibly including preventive strikes. The heavy emphasis on integration under US leadership in recently published US long-term defense planning confirms this tendency. This is also clearly expressed in the explicit and implied visions for a united command structure under US leadership in the document “Joint Vision 2020” recently issued by the US Department of Defense. One of the results is a further strengthening of the division of labor that already exists in the field of collective defense planning among the members of the Triad. It also makes for deep asymmetries in the international order which cannot be expressed in simple terms of balance of power among sovereign states. Indices of “comprehensive national power” measuring individual states separately, common in the defense thinking in many countries, and still prevalent in Chinese analyses (*zonghe guoli*), are ill suited to comprehend the combined cohesive strength of the franchise union.<sup>45</sup> It seems futile to attempt rescuing the axiom of the sovereign state as the basic actor unit as is done in some mainstream theories of international relations.

Transmission of power has become a mediated, socialized, institutionalized process led by core states, in which the exercise of power often becomes opaque. The high degree of institutionalization has deeply affected processes of decision making. As anybody who participated in decision making in committees is aware, the results of such collective decision making frequently differ from the intent of individual committee members. Neither does (rational) bargaining necessarily lead to rational decisions. The qualitative increase of institutionalized cooperation among members of the Triad, especially in defense and security matters, makes it highly questionable to apply the human simile to state actors, as if the behavior of states followed the mechanisms of

decision making by human individuals.

States excluded from this institutionalized process may find that the only alternative to joining the process is by undermining it. Those powers tend to be categorized as “rogue states”, outcasts, countries to whom the courtesies of international rules need not apply.<sup>46</sup> This may also be due to deep doubts especially in the US whether non-Western countries such as North Korea, Pakistan, Iran and others might not consider suicidal attacks against the US, thus rendering the logic of mutual assured destruction useless in the post-Cold War period.

### **Asian geopolitics**

Regionalization in Europe and (Latin) America is proceeding steadily, even if the Argentinean crisis has thrown a dark shadow over attempts to achieve autonomous regionalization in South America that avoids US leadership. Different from Europe, countries with a history of colonization-and that includes the United States (!)-are clearly averse to conceding part of their sovereignty. This partially explains the fact that building a NATO-like structure in Asia seems virtually impossible. The US-Japan and US-Korean alliances date from an era where Japan as the defeated aggressor nation was not in a position to take sovereign decisions on the alliance, while the RoK had little choice but to join hands with the US if it wanted to survive the attack by North Korea. These alliances make it highly unlikely that Asia’s giant countries-India, Russia and China-will join hands to form a Eurasian triumvirate, since doing so would present an essential challenge to the Triad, all the more so at a time when each of the three Eurasian giants relies heavily on economic cooperation with Triad members. Moreover, competition among Asian countries is strong. The recent accession of China and Taiwan as members of the WTO is likely to increase competition not only within China, but also among Asian nations as a whole.

East, Southeast, and South Asia belong to an intermediate zone that is in no position to establish a regional order rivaling that of the Triad. On the other hand, the Triad is deeply interested in preventing the loss of stability in that huge area which may directly affect the well-being not only of Japan, but also the United States. The same is also true for the continental Asian giants, binding them loosely in a mechanism that I termed Mutual Assured Instability (MAI). While engaged in mutual competition members are aware that any major destabilization of one of its members would seriously threaten their own welfare, if not stability.<sup>47</sup> Having said that it would be an illusion to regard Asia as an integral part of a globalising system.<sup>48</sup>

It is important to note that policy debates within Japan, South Korea, or debates in Taiwan and Southeast Asia do not necessarily follow the frameworks set in Washington, nor do countries and societies in modern East Asia share a similar system of values that would make Chinese, Indian, Korean, or Japanese leadership acceptable to their partners in Asia. A similar system of values is essential in persuading cooperating partners that the country exercising leadership will take decisions on their behalf compatible with their own long term strategies. In fact, there is little agreement both within Asia or among observers from the US or the EU about the character of domestic political and economic systems in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and other parts of Asia.

Japan’s economy is said to deviate from a “genuine” market economy, South Korea,

Indonesia and other countries are accused of “crony capitalism”. Few non-Asian scholars seem convinced that any Asian country (including India) is a “genuine” democracy (no matter how that term is defined). Foreign and military security policies of Asian actors are habitually analyzed in terms linking them to systemic, European derived categories of “democracy”, “totalitarian dictatorships”, and “communism”. Opposition to policies of the Triad is quickly labeled “nationalism” as a means to delegitimize such opposition. Especially among members of the Republican Party in the US the tendency is strong to transfer images of the Communist Soviet Union to the People’s Republic of China, using concepts ill suited to account for changes since 1980. The United States and, to a lesser extent, Europe, export political models to Asia, but hesitate to grant the necessary certificates of acknowledgement to their Asian franchise takers.

Scholars and politicians in the Triad share serious doubts whether China’s transition to a “socialist market economy” signifies a break with communist one-party dictatorship, despite the imposition of international “regimes” such as those represented by the WTO. Since rules of international regimes are likely to be determined by the stronger parties this has caused quite a few scholars and politicians in non-Western countries to view globalization processes in terms of “new colonialism”.<sup>49</sup> With tongue in cheek we might call globalization “high-tech colonialism”, or “the highest stage in the development of market democracy”. Chinese government officials have expressed hopes that China’s accession to the WTO will also allow China to have a greater say in the construction of a global order. Needless to add, the inclusion of China will also contribute to greater competition among countries of the “third world” whose interests do not automatically converge.

Asian divergence from Western models is not due to the existence of a common Asian civilization. Above I posited that the core of Western civilization is a strong emphasis on the systematic application of mathematical forms of management throughout society. Just as countries in Europe and the Americas respond differently to these exigencies, so we notice that countries throughout Asia develop their own “version” of these models.

In an ironic twist of history, Miyazawa and Koosaka argued that Japanese foreign policy until 1970 did not follow moral guidelines, but that from 1979 Japan stressed the importance of shared values with the United States.<sup>50</sup> Rather than expressing a genuine qualitative change in independent Japanese policy making it rather points to a strengthening of the links with the United States in terms of the franchise alliance model referred to above. Others, such as Takasaki Tatsunosuke, would emphasize a commonality of values in East Asia (*tooyoo dootoku*).<sup>51</sup> More recently, Masato Kimura and David Welch have addressed the issue of reconciling theories about national interest with observable behaviour of Japanese foreign policy which does not seem to conform to common wisdom.<sup>52</sup>

At the present stage the US does not have an overall strategy which would enable it to impose leadership on integration processes in Asia—one might even suspect that it may not be in the US interest to support such a development.<sup>53</sup>

Although this paper maintains that the alliances linking the Triad under US leadership are extremely stable this does not necessarily imply congruence of global interests of its partners. The US has never been willing to accept the EU, or individual

European states as genuine partners in constructing a system of (co-operative) security in the Middle East.<sup>54</sup> This may be compared to the unwillingness of the US to grant Japan a genuine role in deliberations on the Korean issue. Japan was not represented in the Four Party Talks—it was strong Japanese reactions towards the firing of the Taepo-dong rocket that forced the US to grant Japan limited involvement by establishing the US-ROK-Japan Trilateral Co-ordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) in 1999.

The average Japanese seems unwilling to see Japan become involved in a hot war against China, should the US and China clash over Taiwan. The governments of South Korea and Japan are said to have adopted a negative attitude when the US considered military attacks against North Korea during the crisis of 1994. Asian nations do not always appear overly enthusiastic in their support of other US led initiatives, and that includes the formal allies of the US. The Bush administration provides only lukewarm, if any, support to Kim Daejung's opening towards North Korea. In other words, in Asia the system of US-led alliances does not by itself create a coherent body politic.

### **China-US relations and Japan's function in Asia**

There are signs that the new Bush administration is considering an active "roll back" policy towards what they term the dictatorships in China and North Korea. The United States considers a China-supported "regionalization" of East Asia as a road towards regional autonomy that reduces the role of the US in the region. Increasing the strength of US led-alliance systems is seen as one way to ensure continued US involvement. Conceptualizing systemic order in terms of balance of power is likely to end in an arms race with an uncertain finish. Any attempt to bankrupt China along the lines of the Soviet collapse is likely to engender far greater instability in the whole of Eurasia than brought about by the ending of the Soviet empire. An awareness of mutual assured instability may induce common sense in the strategic thinking of all states concerned.

In this age of globalization, Japan finds itself in the position of a "frontier state", a stable member of the Triad, but itself not in a position to project Triadic order onto the Asian mainland. Japan prefers to use its still enormous economic power to contribute towards stability in Asia, without giving the appearance of acting in an unwelcome "leadership role". Japan's initiatives to achieve a swap agreement among the ASEAN-Ten plus China, the RoK and Japan are one part of this strategy. While cooperation among Asian countries exist, competition within the region remains strong, as evidenced by the competitive bidding of China and Japan for the establishment of Free Trade Zones with Southeast Asia. Globalization processes in Asia are most constructive when they contribute to the institutionalization of peaceful competition, rather than attempting to impose leadership. Such a "limited" role for globalization should not be evaluated negatively. Globalization and regionalism are not expressions of democratic ideals. Operating under the aegis of national treasuries, politically motivated manipulation of interest rates, and speculation by institutional and other investors against short and long term market flows are characterized by anything but openness. Neither the US Treasury, nor the IMF, World Bank and relevant European institutions are known for transparency or democratic decision making. The equal application of the same rules, whether those of the WTO or in other international regimes, is likely to favor the

stronger partner, rather than protecting the weaker ones. In the face of global or regional competition, and the need to survive economically, international cooperation is the only option for smaller economies or countries. It is highly unlikely that the ideals of regionalism would suffice to integrate the weaker members voluntarily without the leadership of the strongest nation states, Germany, France and Great Britain in Europe, and the US in the Americas. Security threats, and political and military interventions have all played significant roles in strengthening cohesion. Commonality of values was not the main motive power for regional integration, but mitigates the risks for weaker and small countries when accepting leadership of stronger states.

Since leadership by any one country is not an option in and for Asia, the evolving structure of the geopolitical order in Asia must necessarily differ from that of Europe and the Americas. Absence of “leadership” does not equal anarchy. Any attempt to impose one-sided leadership is likely to foster polarization, with little promise of increased stability.

Seen from this perspective, the history of globalization remains as open-ended as history has always been. Couching world history in terms of the slogans of globalization is unlikely to deliver a lasting analytical framework.

#### References

- 1 This paper is a summary of arguments on the topic of globalization in Asia which I published recently: Li Deji (=Kurt W. Radtke) “Shilun jianli guangfan youxiaode guoji guanxi lilun—dongya guoji guanxi fenxi” (An attempt to establish a comprehensive effective theory of international relations-an analysis of international relations in East Asia), in Mi Qingyu, Q.Y., Song Zhiyong, Z. Y. & Zang Peihong, P. H. (eds.), *Guoji guanxi yu dongya anquan* (International Relations and Security in East Asia), Tianjin, Tianjin Renmin Publishers, 2001, pp. 90–104. “Quanqiu hua zhi wai-20 shiji zhongguo de geren yu shehui (Beyond globalization-the individual and society in 20th century China), in *Jindai zhongguo-shehui, zhengzhi yu sichao*, Tianjin, Tianjin Renmin Publishers, 2000, pp. 151–166. “Quanqiu hua yu zhong, ri, ou, mei,” (Globalization in China, Japan, Europe and the US). in Zhang, Q., Fang, K. & Wang, J. (eds.), *Jingji quanqiu hua yu zhonghua wenhua zouxiang* (Economic Globalization and the Future of Chinese Culture), Beijing, Dongfanghong Shushe, 2001, pp. 857–871. See also my “East Asia: systematic stability through alliance politics?,” in *Ajia taiheiyo tookyuu* (Waseda University), 2002, No. 3, pp. 63–85. I do not claim originality for the concepts and ideas set forth in this paper-the massive amounts of information to which researchers are exposed make it often extremely difficult to distinguish between creative eclecticism and “originally” conceived ideas.
- 2 Prof. Yoda Yoshiie’s publications on the comparative study of Japanese and Chinese are included in the list of his publications elsewhere in this volume.
- 3 A collection of very critical Chinese views on globalization, and the prospects of global polarization, is the recent publication *Zhongguo zhi lu* (China’s Road) by Fang Ning, Wang Xiaodong and Song Qiang, Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, Beijing, 1999.
- 4 An excellent representative is the monumental research project led by Professor Umesao Tadao (Osaka, Museum of Ethnology Minpaku). For a recent Chinese approach, see Bai Zushi *Zhongguo wenming touxi* (Elucidating analysis of Chinese Civilization), Yunnan daxue Publishers, Kunming, 2000.
- 5 Makinda, Samuel M. “Reading and Writing International Relations,” in *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 54, No. 3 (2000), pp. 389–404, here p. 399. See also Oren, Ido “Is Culture Independent of National Security? How America’s National Security Concerns Shaped ‘Political Culture’ Research,” in *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 6, No. 4 (2000), pp. 543–573, and Beeson, Mark “Debating Defense: Time for a Paradigm Shift?,” in *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 54, No. 3 (2000), pp. 255–259.
- 6 As an example please refer to Morton A. Kaplan “My Post-Postmodern Objective Account of Theory

- and Moral Analysis," in *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 62, No. 4 (Fall 2000), pp. 675–706. Kishimoto Mio (Tokyo University) has repeatedly stressed difficulties in communicating knowledge in the field of social sciences between adherents of different approaches, and among scholars from various parts of the world.
- 7 This is of course linked to the rise of *Nihonjinron* (theory of Japaneseness) in Japan, and also became a concern of a philosopher such as Maruyama Masao. See Joel Joos, *Questions of Modernity: sources and method in Maruyama Masao's Approach to Japanese history*, dissertation, Leuven University (Belgium), September 2001. Needless to say, there is a vast volume of publications in Chinese dealing with issues such as how to define Chinese civilization. Only a tiny part of these discussions reach the non-Chinese world. For a comprehensive recent collection of articles dealing with Chinese civilization in the age of globalization, see Zhang, Q., Fang, K. & Wang, J. (eds.), *Jingji quanqiuhua yu zhonghua wenhua zouxiang* (Economic Globalization and the Future of Chinese Culture), Beijing: Dongfanghong Shushe, 2001, 2 vols.
  - 8 A Chinese comprehensive overview of the terrorist threat published shortly before the September 2001 attack on New York is *Guoji kongbuzhuyi yu fan kongbu douzheng* (International terrorism and the anti-terrorist struggle), edited by Zhongguo xiandai guoji guanxi yanjiusuo and the Fankongbu yanjiu zhongxin, Shishi chubanshe, September 2001.
  - 9 My use of the term "core leaders" and "core states" does not imply that the "remainder" of the globe belongs to any kind of "periphery"—it is hardly appropriate to call the overwhelming part of the world's population "periphery".
  - 10 Serious attempts at writing world history should not evaluate past history on the basis of its impact on currently dominating themes in globalising civilization.
  - 11 WTO dispute settlement mechanisms illustrate the point: in case a member state is said to have breached WTO rules a decision is handed down that *legitimizes* punitive retaliation against the offender. The topic is dealt with in a number of contributions to K. Radtke and M. Wiesebron (eds.) *Competing for Integration*, M. E. Sharpe (NY) (2002, forthcoming).
  - 12 William Tow emphasized the potential for system building in Southeast Asia by using a multi-pronged approach in which the role of alliances goes beyond the traditional threat-oriented approach: "This paper . . . takes issue with those who insist that security alliances must be threat-oriented if they are to survive and be credible. Instead, it underscores the order-building characteristics of these alliances and their potential to link bilateral and multilateral security behavior in constructive ways . . . , the bilateral U.S. security alliances and the region's existing multilateral institutions, such as ASEAN and APEC are the only real instruments currently available for these allies to embrace common approaches to economic co-ordination and development." William T. Tow, *Assessing U.S. Bilateral Security Alliances in the Asia Pacific's Southern Rim*. October 1999, Stanford, APARC Paper, p. 7.
  - 13 Fukuyama, Francis *The end of history and the last man*, New York, Free Press, 1992.
  - 14 Guehenno, Jean-Marie *La Fin de la democratie*, Flammarion, 1995.
  - 15 Zhang Shunhong et al. *YingMei xin zhiminzhuyi*, Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, Beijing 1999. See also *Zhongguo zhi lu* cited above.
  - 16 In this paper the term "American" includes civilizations in both North and South America, while I use the term US to denote the United States of America.
  - 17 Following contemporary interpretations of the German victory over France in 1871 as the victory of protestant (Prussian) "rationality" over catholic (French) irrationality, if not corruption. Protestantism has repeatedly been accredited with superior "rationality", a belief also reflected in the works of the Prussian scholar Max Weber. The ferocity of attacks by a theocratic worldview on those portraying a non-Christian view of human beings is illustrated by the life of Elie Luzac; see Hans Bots and Jan Schillings (eds.) *Lettres d'Elie Luzac a Jean Henri Samuel Formey (1748-1770)*, Paris, Honore Champion, 2001. The battle between rational secularism drawing on "science", and attempts by various Christian churches to abide by theological accounts of global history is still continuing in countries like the United States or New Zealand, as evinced by disputes between Christian "creationists" and "evolutionists", the former constituting an important political force.
  - 18 The spread of a science-based model of governance distinguishes this from mere conquest or traditional-style colonization.

- 19 The pretense of mathematical models as an adequate reflection of the laws of nature sets it apart from the use of numbers as in the Cabala, or other numerically based systems of interpretation of the world around us.
- 20 It is of course open to debate whether the desires of individual or institutional consumers are the optimal guiding principles to establish a humane society.
- 21 There is no room here to argue that “capitalism”, rather than itself the outcome of objective, rational developments is in fact a value-loaded phenomenon. Adam Smith, for one, argued that his “system” would work only if moral values were respected.
- 22 Harootunian, H. D. *Toward restoration; the growth of political consciousness in Tokugawa Japan*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1970, pp. 135–6, 162, 167.
- 23 One may mention here Japanese students of foreign culture like Shiba Kookan (1733–1818), Hiraga Gennai (1726–79), or the Chinese scholar Wei Yuan. This writer was told an apocryphal story that Mao Zedong in the last days of his life concentrated on studying Buddhist scriptures—whether authentic or not, the existence of such a story attests to the strength of this phenomenon. In a sense, the reevaluation of Western civilization by Japanese right wing writers such as Nishio Kanji belongs to a similar tradition (Nishio Kanji, *Yooroppazoo no tenkan*, Shinchoosha, Tokyo, 1969.
- 24 *The foundations of Japan’s modernization : a comparison with China’s path towards modernization* by Yoda, Yoshiie, Leiden, New York, E. J. Brill, 1996.
- 25 See Kumakura, Hiroyasu “Inoue Yasusaburoo: chiiki ni okeru sangyoo shihonka no seiritsu,” in *Kindai gunma no shisoo gunzoo*, Takasaki keizai daigaku fuzoku sangyoo kenkyuujo comp., Bureen Shuppan, Tokyo, 2000, pp. 259–298.
- 26 For a recent critical evaluation of Gabriel Almond’s book *The Civil Culture* (1963) see Oren, Ido “Is Culture Independent of National Security? How America’s National Security Concerns Shaped ‘Political Culture’ Research,” *passim*.
- 27 An important criterion for the analysis of civil society institutions are their sources of income.
- 28 This was the original code name for the US intervention in Afghanistan, abandoned after protests that pointed out that to Moslems Allah can be the only source of infinite justice.
- 29 The sentimental effect of “ET” can only be understood against this background.
- 30 A simple introduction is Inoue, Shinichiro *Chihiro to fushigi no machi*, Kadokawa shoten, 2001.
- 31 It is important to note that this did not include all of Europe—in fact, as the collapse of the Soviet Empire demonstrated, even the formation of nation states in Europe is a process as yet far from complete.
- 32 Radtke, K. W. “Troubled Identity,” in *China’s Modernisation. Westernisation and Acculturation*, K.W. Radtke and Tony Saich eds., Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 1993, p. 18.
- 33 Volunteers tend to become professionals. Since active participation in civil society requires considerable leisure, participation is unlikely to reverse the decline in political participation.
- 34 These developments look *as if* they are actions by (hidden) actors, but this author does not wish to decide whether they are the result of inevitable historic developments or the outcome of free autonomous decisions.
- 35 There is a clear danger that repeated intervention in the huge areas populated by Moslems may produce polarization along religious lines. For a recent Chinese study of “Islam and international hot spots” see Jin Yijiu and Wu Yungui, *Isilan yu guoji redian*, Dongfang chubanshe, 2001.
- 36 It hardly needs to be pointed out that lying in the center of Europe, the population of modern Germany shares ethnic backgrounds with many peoples—from Scandinavia and Slavonic areas, including the Balkans, to Italy and France, Jews, Gypsies and others.
- 37 This phenomenon is different from the theory of conversion of both systems, once enjoying a certain popularity in the age of detente.
- 38 For a structural analysis of the last period of the Soviet Union, see Brooks, Stephen G. and William C. Wohlforth “Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War,” in *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Winter 2000/01), pp. 5–53.
- 39 Lester Thurow, in *Yomiuri Shinbun*, April 25, 2000.
- 40 Kenneth Waltz, “Globalization and governance,” in *Political Science and Politics*, Vol. XXXII, No. 4 (December 1999), pp. 693–700.

- 41 Since there is no clear and/or formal separation between the competence of market as an economic, and the parliamentary system as a political institution, decisions taken in the framework of economic and political institutions are likely to be in constant conflict.
- 42 Coalitions have a remarkable similarity to united front tactics as applied in the practice of communist parties.
- 43 This accounted for the refusal of the US to use the United Nations as a forum to prepare for, and legitimize its intervention in Afghanistan.
- 44 My forthcoming book on globalization will deal in detail with the issue of “autonomous” decision making by members of a franchise alliance. More specifically, what is required is a theoretical framework for describing the room for Japanese and RoK policy initiatives in the context of strategic and policy cooperation with the US. A more traditional approach is taken by Michael H. Armacost and Kenneth B. Pyle in their recent study “Japan and the Engagement of China: Challenges for U.S. Policy Coordination,” *NBR Analysis*, Vol. 12, No. 5 (December 2001).
- 45 A representative study is Huang Shuofeng’s *Zonghe guoli xinlun*, Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, Beijing, 1999.
- 46 The initial refusal of US to regard soldiers captured in Afghanistan as “prisoners of war” in the formal sense as applied in international law is a logical outcome of this approach.
- 47 On this concept, see Yoda Yoshiie, op.cit. This mechanism differs from the idea that it is in the interest of states to maintain an international system as such.
- 48 Here I exclude West Asia and the Gulf from my argument.
- 49 Zhang Shunhong et al., *Ying Mei xin zhiminzhuyi*, Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, Beijing, 1999. For a Japanese view critical of globalization, e.g. Takahashi Yasuo *Shin sekai chitujo* (New Global Order), Soogoo hoorei Publishers, 1999.
- 50 Miyazawa, Kiichi and Koosaka Masataka, Tokyo, Bungei shunjuu, 1991, p. 66.
- 51 Takemura *Nakasone Yasuhiro: booei o kataru*, p. 99.
- 52 “Specifying “Interests”: Japan’s Claim to the Northern Territories and Its Implications for International Relations Theory,” in *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 42 (1998), pp. 213–244.
- 53 Compare this with the statement by US politician Robert Zoellick: “... it is not clear whether most East Asian countries have internalized the fact that they will increasingly shape the international system, not just operate within it ... Also, the examples set by other principal regions have not been inspiring. The European Union (EU)’s preoccupation with its internal affairs has barely left any room for it to consider Europe’s periphery, much less the globe. The US, which did much to create the present order, still makes sacrifices, but without possessing an overarching strategy or considering the priority purposes of its still-considerable power. ... ” Zoellick, Robert “Economics and Security in the Changing Asia-Pacific,” in *Survival*, vol. 39, no. 4 Winter 1997/98, pp. 29–51, here p. 35–36.
- 54 Should Iran, Iraq, or a destabilized Egypt pose terrorist threats to Europe which is much closer to these countries than the US, the US has no choice but to intervene—the failure to do so would inevitably provoke a unilateral European response.