

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIRECT SPEECH AND INDIRECT SPEECH

Etsuo Kozawa

0. INTRODUCTION

There have been extensive arguments concerning the relationship between direct speech and indirect speech. This is quite natural, since the discussion of this topic involves such major areas of English grammar as the study of narrative style and the relation between grammatical category (tense) and (actual) time as well as various types of deixis shift which include 'person shift', 'time/place adverbial shift' and 'tense shift' (commonly called 'backshift' or 'sequence of tenses').

In this paper I would like to approach this topic from the viewpoint of the interactions between syntax and discourse. I am interested in explicating how far the phenomena of English can and should be explained by the syntactic rules, and where and how the discourse principles come into play. I hope to consider some aspects of the relationships between direct speech and indirect speech, though none of which, I am afraid, will be fully elucidated or given entirely new insights. I just want to take part in considering this extremely interesting area as a student of

English grammar who should know something about this phenomenon.

Those issues which I am going to discuss are (1) aspects of correspondence between direct speech and indirect speech, and (2) deixis shift ('sequence of tenses' in particular)

1. CORRESPONDENCE RELATIONS BETWEEN DIRECT SPEECH AND INDIRECT SPEECH

I start from the basic assumption that direct speech is the basic form and that indirect speech is derived from direct speech. This assumption seems intuitively and logically natural, since indirect speech is a kind of quotation which employs verbs of reporting. Quotation might be divided into 'Direct Quotation' and 'Indirect Quotation'. The former can be further divided into 'total quotation', which ranges from a whole discourse (a set of utterances) to interjections and some related expressions, and 'partial quotation', which conveys part of the original utterance (such as "He said 'increase', not 'decrease'."). The latter is not conveyed in a word-for-word quotation style but in a paraphrase or summary fashion, and it is to this type of indirect quotation that indirect speech belongs. Direct speech corresponds to, needless to say, direct quotation.

Direct quotation has to be as precise as possible to the original discourse whether it is conveyed in written form or in spoken form. This is why people say "quote" and "unquote" in speech when they try to be precise. Indirect quotation, on the other hand, is not always expected to be precise in informal, everyday situations. It is often the case that what counts is the content to be conveyed and that the original surface form is not so rigorously maintained. It is possible that this is a matter of degree and that the degree of precision depends on the purpose and occasion of the indirect speech form.

In connection with this, observe the following pair of sentences discussed by Partee (1973):

- (1) The other day Tom said to me, "My grandfather was killed with a knife by a bachelor."
- (2) a. The other day Tom said to me, "A bachelor killed my grandfather with a knife."
 b. The other day Tom said to me, "An unmarried man used a knife to cause the father of one of my parents to die."

Partee (1973) claims that (1) is not synonymous with (2a), and certainly not synonymous with (2b). She goes on to conclude that it is not the meaning of the quoted sentence that is contributing to the meaning of the whole, but rather its surface form (we should interpret "it is not the meaning" as "it is not *only* the meaning", as Wierzbicka (1974) points out). The truth value of (1) and that of (2a) are the same, but as a precise quotation, (2a) fails. The truth value of (2b) is different from that of (1), and it is no wonder that (1) and (2b) are not taken to be synonymous.

But if we convert (1), (2a) and (2b) into indirect speech forms, the judgment seems to become a little uncertain:

- (3) a. The other day Tom told me that his grandfather had been killed with a knife by a bachelor.
 b. The other day Tom told me that a bachelor had killed his grandfather with a knife.
 c. The other day Tom told me that an unmarried man had used a knife to cause the father of one of his parents to die.

No doubt every speaker of English would agree that (3a) is a legitimate indirect form of (1). As for (3b), not all speakers would agree that it is a perfectly legitimate indirect form of (1); although it conveys virtually the same information. Even less people would agree that (3c) is a perfectly acceptable indirect speech form of (1).

It seems clear that the quoted sentence in direct speech has to be represented as precisely as possible in terms of meaning and syntactic form. It also seems fairly obvious that the indirect speech form has to reflect the meaning and surface form of the original utterance as much as possible for successful communication to be guaranteed. Lack of correspondence between the two speech forms in terms of lexical items, grammatical constructions, deixis shift and possibly some other factors can result in miscommunications of varying degrees¹⁾.

As for the assumption that direct speech is the basic form, we should remember that it can stand on its own, whereas indirect speech could not exist if the direct speech form had not been uttered in the first place. To be more exact, that part which can stand on its own is the original utterance. For example, it is "My grandfather was killed with a knife by a bachelor" that can stand on its own in (1), and "The other day Tom said to me" is added by the reporter.

Take the following pair of sentences for an instance of the correspondence between the two speech forms:

- (4) Alex said that he was making a plan for the excavation.
- (5) Alex said, "I am making a plan for the excavation."

It would be totally meaningless and contrary to the fact, in the first place, to utter

(4) if Alex, in reality, did not say, "I am making a plan for the excavation" unless, of course, it were uttered on purpose as a lie or based on some misinformation (I disregard this case here). It also seems perfectly correct to assume that sentence (4) and sentence (5) are closely related both syntactically and semantically. In other words, both sentences mean virtually the same, and the latter is more basic than the former.

If the relationship between direct speech and indirect speech were always as straightforward as this and there were rigorous correspondence rules that would produce the same results any time, no complicated problems would arise. As it is, there are only a few traditionally held rules of deixis shift such as 'person shift', 'time/place adverbial shift' and 'backshift or sequence of tenses', which are not enough to guarantee exact correspondences between the two speech forms. Besides, the problems are rendered doubly difficult because of the two-way correspondences between the two: we have to convert a direct speech form into an appropriate indirect speech form and we also have to reconstruct an appropriate direct speech form from its indirect counterpart to interpret the reported utterance.

To see some of the difficulties, let us observe the following examples:

- (6) a. John said that he was unmarried.
 b. John said that he was a bachelor.
 c. John said that he was single.
 d. John said that he had no wife.
- (7) a. John said, "I am unmarried."
 b. John said, "I am a bachelor."
 c. John said, "I am single."

d. John said, "I have no wife."

It is possible to reconstruct the direct versions from the indirect versions uniquely: (7a) is reconstructed from (6a), (7b) from (6b), and so on. It is also possible to convert the direct speech forms in (7) into the corresponding indirect speech forms in (6) uniquely. These operations are made possible with the employment of the traditional "deixis shift rules" (See §2 for more details). These examples are clear-cut and apparently pose no problem.

Suppose, however, that John said the following:

(8) a. I am not married.

b. I am celibate.

Is it possible to regard (6a) - (6b) as appropriate indirect speech forms of (8a) and (8b)? It seems to me that the most 'legitimate' indirect form of (8a) is (9a), and that of (8b) is (9b):

(9) a. John said that he was not married.

b. John said that he was celibate.

And it would be quite awkward to report (8a) - (8b) as (6a) - (6d)²⁾. (8b) poses a rather subtle problem, since 'celibate' is used especially of a priest and means 'to be unmarried, especially as the result of a religious promise' (LDCE). It is expected that people who regard this religious aspect of the meaning as significant would consider (9b) as the only legitimate indirect speech form and feel that (6a) - (6d) are not appropriate indirect speech versions, and very few people will consider (6a) - (6d) as appropriate indirect forms of (8b).

As another example, suppose that Mary said the following:

(10) I am not married.

and the person who heard her say (10) reported her remark with the following indirect speech:

(11) Mary said that she was a spinster.

This would be disastrous if the reporter did not mean ill. Needless to say, the idiosyncracies of 'celibate', 'spinster' and the like do not belong to grammar in a narrow sense, but it would be necessary to take into account extragrammatical factors such as these and others to fully explain the phenomena in question.

It seems to me that there are degrees of appropriateness in the indirect speech forms that are supposed to be the reflections of their direct speech counterparts. I speculate further that the judgments on the degrees of appropriateness vary from person to person and that this is because each person has his/her system of beliefs and frame of mind (personality). In other words, the reporter modifies his/her indirect speech forms according to his/her system of beliefs and frame of mind (personality). Needless to say, the reporter's linguistic skills play a significant part. I also suspect that 'imagination' is involved in this process as Wierzbicka (1974) points out³.

I would like to elaborate on these observations. As a concrete example, let us observe the following:

(12) "This is what the girl says, sir. That on Sunday afternoon she saw

Gudgeon, the butler, walking across the hall with a revolver in his hand."⁽¹⁾

"Gudgeon?"

"Yes, sir." Combes referred to a notebook.

"These are her own words. 'I don't know what to do, but I ought to say what I saw that day. I saw Mr. Gudgeon; he was standing in the hall with a revolver in his hand.⁽²⁾ Mr. Gudgeon looked very peculiar indeed.'" (A. Christie: *The Hollow*)

This is a fairly typical example of the direct speech-indirect speech conversion; underlined part (1) corresponds to underlined part (2). Three modifications have been made in the indirect speech version. For one thing, the reporter, a police officer, changes 'that day' to 'on Sunday afternoon'—an example of time deixis shift. For another, he adds 'the butler' to 'Mr. Gudgeon', thereby making the report as precise and intelligible as possible to his superior. What is to be noted here is that the reporter is making the modifications on the basis of his interpretation about what the addressee might know of the topic in question. If this police officer had assumed that his superior had known exactly when 'that day' had been and what Gudgeon was, he might, with good reason, have said thus:

- (13) That day she saw Gudgeon walking across the hall with a revolver in his hand.

The third modification poses something of a problem. Gudgeon, who was seen to be standing in the hall, is walking across the hall in the officer's report. This may be because the officer forgot the exact words he had heard or because he imagined that walking across the hall was more natural than standing in the hall as the

behavior of a suspect person. What is more, he omitted mentioning that "Mr. Gudgeon looked very peculiar indeed." Perhaps this is because the officer thought that what was important was only the fact that the butler had a revolver in his hand, which fact might have a crucial bearing on the murder case the police were investigating. This assumption explains the fact that he uses exactly the same words concerning the revolver ("with a revolver in his hand"). This is another instance of interpretation on the reporter's side about the importance of elements constituting the direct speech version. For another matter, we should perhaps take into consideration the factor of 'memory', which varies from person to person and usually degenerates as time passes by.

Now, if we judge the precision of this officer's indirect speech report strictly, we could say that it is not totally acceptable. As a matter of fact, if we took this report as an official statement of a witness's testimony, it is unacceptable. In actuality, we regard this indirect speech version not as perfectly appropriate or totally inappropriate, but as basically correct and appropriate or correct in major points.

It seems to be generally the case that we are required to maintain the meaning and syntactic form of the direct speech in the indirect speech sufficiently for successful communication to be guaranteed. 'Person shift', 'time/place adverbial shift' and 'sequence of tenses' are major grammatical devices that guarantee this successful communication. Devices for guaranteeing semantic correspondence are not so easy to define, and it is in this area that such individual factors as imagination, personality and linguistic skills play a major role.

An interesting and relevant observation is made on this point in Quirk et al. (1985, p. 1025). They say: "... a reporter using indirect speech may paraphrase or summarize; changes may be made from the original wording without affecting

the essential truth of the report.” For, according to Quirk et al. (1985, p. 1021), “Indirect speech conveys in the words of a subsequent reporter what has been said or written by the original speaker or writer.” In other words, what they require of direct speech to be appropriate is “the essential truth of the report” “in the words of a subsequent reporter.” Let us see some examples they cite:

- (14) a. “My first task today,” said the teacher, “will be to examine current views on the motivations for armed conflict.”
- b. The teacher said that his first task that day was to examine current views on the motivations for armed conflict.
- (15) “What I want to do now,” said the teacher, “is to look at contemporary theories of the causes of wars.”
- (16) The teacher announced his intention of discussing the causes of wars.

Quirk et al. (1985, p. 1025) claim that (14b) approximates as closely as possible to the original wording, but that (14b) could also report the wording of (15) legitimately. They admit, however, that (16) has no clear correspondence with the reported clause in (14a). How should we interpret their statement?

It seems to me that their conception of indirect speech is a little too broad and permissive. We should distinguish examples like (14b) from examples like (16), which are, at best, summaries of the original wording. Their claim that (15) could be a legitimate origin of (14b) also seems to me too permissive. As Partee (1973) claims concerning examples (1) - (2a,b), (14a) and (15) are not synonymous, but an instance of ‘paraphrase’. Quirk et al. (1985) include ‘paraphrase’ and ‘summary’ in indirect speech, and they may be right in a very broad sense of the word, but this is clearly beyond the scope of *syntactic*

correspondence between direct speech and indirect speech, which is one of the conditions (the other being "meaning") imposed on the correspondence between the two speech forms. It is perhaps worthwhile to point out here that the examples they discuss concerning "backshift" and other changes in indirect speech are restricted to the type of correspondence between (14a) and (14b). I admit that 'paraphrase' and 'summary' are instances of indirect speech in a broad sense, but they are not easily susceptible to syntactic analysis and may even be beyond the scope of discourse grammar. It is my feeling that we need such vague concepts as 'imagination' and 'linguistic intuition/skills' to better understand this type of indirect speech. In short, there are several types of indirect speech. One of them can be largely a matter of syntactic analysis, and some of them are beyond the scope of syntactic analysis and require devices of discourse grammar and even some notions beyond discourse.

I have only considered direct-indirect *statements* so far. Before going on to the next stage of discussion, I would like to make a brief survey of other sentence types; questions, exclamations, and directives (imperatives). It is generally possible to convert various types of direct questions and some types of exclamations into their indirect speech counterparts, and reconstruct the direct speech forms from their indirect speech counterparts. The following examples are from Quirk et al. (1985, pp. 1029-30). Notice, by the way, that they assume this bi-unique correspondence basically holds between the two forms:

- (17) a. "Are you ready yet?" asked Joan. [Yes-No Question]
 b. Joan asked (me) whether I was ready yet.
- (18) a. "When will the plane leave?" I wondered. [WH-Question]
 b. I wondered when the plane would leave.

- (19) a. "Are you satisfied or not?" I asked her. [Alternative Question]
 b. I asked her whether nor not she was satisfied.
- (20) a. "What a brave boy you are!" Margaret told him. [Exclamation]
 b. Margaret told him what a brave boy he was.

It seems obvious that there is a clear correspondence between (17a-20a) and (17b-20b) in terms of syntactic form and meaning. But there are several problems involved here, too. One is a case involving deletion:

- (21) a. "You ready?" George asked Joan.
 b. *George asked Joan if she ready.
 c. George asked Joan if she was ready.
- (22) a. "What a cute baby!" Margaret told him.
 b. *Margaret told him what a cute baby.
 c. Margaret told him what a cute baby it was.
- (23) a. She said, "How beautiful!"
 b. *She said that how beautiful.
 c. ?She said how beautiful.
 d. ?She exclaimed how beautiful.
 e. She exclaimed how beautiful it was.
- (24) a. "So awful," she murmured. (A. Christie: *The Hollow*)
 b. *She murmured that so awful.
 c. She murmured that it was so awful.

(21a) and (22a) are perfectly acceptable, but (21b) is ungrammatical and unacceptable. (22b) is fairly awkward, though not as bad as (21b). The same is

true of (23a)-(23e), and (24a)-(24c). This seems to be another instance of interactions between syntax and discourse: A grammatical and acceptable indirect form would be obtained if the necessary conversion rules were applied to the original direct speech, but questionable indirect speech forms of variable degrees of awkwardness would be produced if their direct speech counterparts are grammatically incomplete. The conjunction *that* guarantees that the reported clause should be grammatically complete, since this conjunction only allows grammatically complete sentences in its conjunct.

This observation could be explained by Partee (1973) on a fairly principled basis: "... the quoted sentence is not syntactically or semantically a part of the sentence that contains it." In other words, the reporter is not responsible for the grammatical status of the reported clause, which is grammatically only a direct object of such verbs of reporting as *say*, whereas the reporter is wholly responsible for the meaning and syntactic form of the reported clause in indirect speech.

Another problem is concerned with interjections, which might be regarded as one type of exclamations:

(25) a. (Ema Carnaby gave a gasp.) She said: "Oh!" (A. Christie: *The Labors of Hercules*)

- b. *She said that oh!
- c. She said oh!
- d. She expressed surprise.

(26) a. She said, "Oh my God!"

- b. *She said that oy my God!
- c. ?She said oh my God!
- d. She exclaimed (with an incredulous look) that she could not believe it.

- (27) a. He said, "Shit!"
 b. *He said that shit! (cf. He said that it was shit.)
 c. ?He said shit!
 d. He expressed a feeling of anger/disgust/frustration/disbelief, ...

What is interesting about this pattern is that the (b) forms are all ungrammatical and unacceptable while the (c) forms are not as bad. This seems to be due to the fact that the original speech forms ("Oh!", "Oh my God!" and "Shit!") are grammatically incomplete and therefore rendered unacceptable when converted into indirect speech forms, which have to be grammatically complete. In short, exclamations are most effectively conveyed in direct speech.

The (c) forms are, so to speak, on the borderline between direct speech and indirect speech. They look like indirect speech forms in that they lack quotation marks, but they also look like direct speech forms in that they lack the conjunction *that* and retain an exclamation mark. But these distinctions are invisible in the situation of the utterance and the (c) forms sound more like direct speech. Addressees would certainly regard the (c) versions as direct speech forms when they are spoken.

Some other interjections and vocatives do not seem to fit well in the direct speech-indirect speech correspondence:

- (28) "Now look here, Sheila Grant," said Stoddart. "I'm a doctor and I know what I'm talking about..." (A. Christie: *ibid.*)
 (29) "Say buddy, do you have a quarter?" said a healthy-looking young man.

Phrases like "you see" and "say", which are used to attract the attention of the

addressee, are not easily converted into indirect speech forms. This type of interjections and vocatives virtually lose their function as soon as they have succeeded in attracting the attention of the addressee (though vocatives can contribute to establishing an interpersonal relationship in the ensuing dialogue as a device for various politeness expressions). Thus, they do not have much value in the reported clause of indirect speech itself, though they may be informative in terms of the 'manner of speaking' and the 'circumstances of the speech act.' (Quirk et al. 1985, p. 1020)

There are a few more constructions in which indirect speech form is difficult to get by. One is echo exclamations, which are characterized by a rise-fall tone :

(30) a. A: What a beautiful day!

B: What a beautiful $\widehat{\text{DAY}}$!

b. A: Open the door, please.

B: Open the $\widehat{\text{DOOR}}$! Do you take me for a doorman? (Quirk et al. 1985, p. 837)

Quirk et al. (1985, p. 1030) explicitly state that there are no indirect constructions for echo exclamations. It seems quite natural that this is the case, since intonation is an essential part of spoken language which expresses subjective feelings ("astonishment at what has been said" in this case) of the speaker. The only difference between echo exclamations and echo questions is intonation (a rising tone characterizes the latter). Obviously it is easier and more natural to report echo exclamations in direct speech.

This is also the case with many instances of optative sentences :

- (31) a. She said, "May he rest in peace!"
 b. She prayed that he might rest in peace.
- (32) a. She said, "If only I had more money!"
 b. *She wished that if only she had more money.
 c. She wished that she had more money.
- (33) a. She said, "How I hate him!"
 b. *She said that how she hated him.
 c. ?She said how much she hated him.
 d. She said that she hated him very much.

Quirk et al. (1985, p. 1030) say that "there is no indirect speech construction for the optative subjunctive, but when it is used to express a wish the construction with *may* (with possible back-shift to *might*) is sometimes a near equivalent." (31) is an instance of the latter point, and (32) and (33) are instances of the former point.

It is basically possible to convert optative sentences like (31a) into indirect forms like (31b), but the same would not hold for the majority of cases. It seems to me that it is extremely difficult to report subjective feelings in indirect speech (Free indirect speech is a major device for doing this in a somewhat different but connected way). The majority of cases could be rendered in 'paraphrase' or 'summary' more easily, but such a process is an exercise in linguistic performance, which is well beyond the reach of syntactic rules, rather than direct speech-indirect speech conversions in a strict sense.

The last instance from which it is not possible to reconstruct the exact words of the direct speech is "directives of the summary type." (Quirk et al. 1985, p. 1030)

- (34) a. He told me the way.
 b. He said to me, "Take the second turning on the right, then cross a bridge and bear left until you reach the Public Library."

This type of indirect speech is another instance of paraphrase and summary, and needs a different approach from the one involving syntactic rules alone. Moreover, directives (imperatives) have a variety of illocutionary forces in the first place, and "illocutionary forces depend in most cases on the situational context." (Quirk et al. 1985, p. 831) In fact they give 15 illocutionary forces of imperatives ranging from ORDER and PROHIBITION to SUGGESTION and OFFER to INCREDULOUS REJECTION and SELF-DELIBERATION. It would be nearly impossible to incorporate and report these illocutionary forces in indirect speech. Hence 'paraphrase' and 'summary', or direct speech.

In this section I have observed that there are degrees of correspondence between direct speech and indirect speech and that this phenomenon could be discussed from the viewpoint of the interactions between syntactic rules and discourse factors. I have also shown that some constructions are harder to get by their indirect speech counterparts due to syntactic and discourse factors. We would need linguistic skills and imagination to report, paraphrase or summarize what other people have said or written. Rules of correspondence (= deixis shift rules) play a significant role in guaranteeing the correspondence between the speech forms, but clearly this is not enough. In the next section I would like to consider these correspondence rules from the above-mentioned viewpoint.

2. DEIXIS SHIFT RULES AS A DEVICE FOR GUARANTEEING THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN DIRECT SPEECH AND INDIRECT SPEECH

Rules of deixis shift include 'person shift,' 'time adverbial shift,' 'place adverbial shift' and 'sequence of tenses'. To see how these rules are applied to convert direct speech into indirect speech, let us review some typical examples.

2. 1 Pronoun Shift

First, when the identities of the speaker and the addressee are identical in the situations of the original and reported utterances, the personal pronouns remain unchanged; otherwise 'pronoun shift' requires the shift of 1st and 2nd person pronouns to 3rd person or to nouns, when the persons referred to in the original utterance are absent in the reported clause (Quirk et al. 1985, pp. 1028-29). (35) is an instance of the former case and (36) is an instance of the latter case:

(35) a. I said to you, "I like you so much that I want to marry you."

b. I told you that I liked you so much that I wanted to marry you.

(36) a. He said to her, "I like you so much that I want to marry you."

b. He told her that he liked her so much that he wanted to marry her.

What is to be noted here is that 1st and 2nd person pronouns are used relative to the situational context of reporting as illustrated in (37):

(37) a. "You should be ashamed of yourself," she said to me.

b. She told me that I should be ashamed of myself.

The following examples, which are statements about Margaret being reported to her, are also interesting (Quirk et al. 1985, p. 1024):

- (38) a. "Margaret is very clever," Tom said to me.
 b. Tom told me that you are very clever.
- (39) a. "Margaret is in my class," I said to him.
 b. I told him that you were in my class.

In fact, examples like (38) and (39) along with (40) and (41) below, present an apparently insurmountable difficulty when we try to explain the correspondence between direct and indirect speech:

- (40) John told Mary that *you* will meet *me here today*. (Kuno 1972)
 (41) Mary, told John, that I, like you, . (Wierzbicka 1974)

As for (40), (41) cannot be its direct speech version, because (42) would become (43) in indirect speech, as Kuno (1972) points out:

- (42) John said to Mary, "*You* will meet *me here today*."
 (43) John, told Mary, that *she*, would meet *him, there (here) that day (today)* .

On the other hand, (44a) - (44b) could be direct speech forms of (40). As Kuno (1972) makes clear, there can be infinitely many direct discourse representations for (40):

- (44) a. *Bill* will meet *Jane* at *Harvard Square tomorrow*.

- b. *My brother will meet your sister at the station on Sunday.*

The same holds for (41); "I" can be any speaker (except John and Mary), and "you" can be any addressee (except Mary and John), but "I" and "you" can never refer to Mary or John.

This pattern would be made more intelligible by the following paradigm:

- (45) a. Mary_i told John_j that I_k like you_l. ← "X likes Y."
 b. Mary_i told John_j that she_i likes him_j. ← "I like you."
 c. Mary_i told John_j that I_k like her_i/him_j. ← "X likes me/you."
 d. Mary_i told John_j that she_i/he_j likes me_k. ← "I/You like X."
 e. Mary_i told John_j that you_l like her_i/him_j. ← "Y likes me/you."
 f. Mary_i told John_j that she_i/he_j likes you_l. ← "I/You like X."⁴⁾

As we can see from this pattern, (45b) is a clear-cut case of syntactic pronoun shift: *Mary* is a female, so it is converted to "she", and *John* is a male, so it is converted to "him" both in agreement with number and case, thereby guaranteeing the syntactic and semantic coherence of the sentence in question. (45a) is a case of total indeterminacy (uncertainty) of pronoun reference in terms of syntax, and (45c)-(45f) are instances of partial indeterminacy (uncertainty)

In order to overcome this difficulty, Kuno (1972) proposed that (40) is derived from a "deep structure" that looks like (46):

- (46) [John said to Mary, "X will meet Y at time W in place Z"]_{s1} and [X is you and Y is I and W is today and Z is here]_{s2}

But there seem to be several problems with this analysis. First, (46) is *not a syntactic* deep structure; there is no way of syntactically deriving (40) from (46) without some ad hoc devices like deleting four occurrences of "is" and "and" after substituting the subjective complements of S_2 for the subject and object of S_1 .

Second, if (40) should be derived from (46), (47a) should be derived from (47b), and (48a) from (48b), as Wierzbicka (1974) points out:

- (47) a. John_i said that he_i and I_i are fools.
 b. [John said, "X and Y are fools"] and [X is John and Y is I]
- (48) a. John said that he was a fool.
 b. [John said, "X is a fool"] and [X is John]

Wierzbicka (1974) seems to be right when she says on the basis of Partee's (1973) remark that the meaning and the surface structure of the quote must be reflected in the deep structure of a quotative sentence, that "X is a fool" is not an English sentence and that consequently "John said, 'X is a fool'" is not a direct discourse version of (48a).⁵⁾ Wierzbicka herself tries to solve this difficulty by introducing the factor of "imagination", which, according to her, is necessary to understand an essential aspect of the meaning of the direct discourse and plays an important (and slightly different) role in indirect discourse as well. She suggests that (49a) should be represented as something like (49b), and (50a) as something like (50b):

- (49) a. Mary said to John, "I like you."=
 b. wanting to cause you to know what Mary said to John
 imagining that I am her saying it to him
 I say: I like you.

(50) a. John said to Mary that he, you and I are fools. =

b. wanting to cause you to know what John said to Mary

imagining that I want to say it to you now

I say : he, you and I are fools.⁶⁾

It seems to me that her insight represented in the second component of (49b) is basically correct and that it should be incorporated in the interpretation of direct discourse. The same, however, cannot seem to hold in (50b). What is going on in indirect speech is logical processing of the original utterance, and this is largely a matter of calculating the correspondence between the two speech forms. Imagination plays a minor role here.

For another, I am at a loss how to make out the difference between “wanting to cause you to know” in the second component of (49b) and (50b) and “wanting you to know”. Besides, the third component of (50b) explains nothing about the mystery in question. We would have to look somewhere else for an explanation.

I think that we should remember the most basic fact about communication here: The text (or message) that is communicated between the speaker and addressee has syntactic and semantic cohesion. It is this cohesion that makes the text (or message) communicable and meaningful (Halliday and Hasan 1976). The speaker and the addressee, on the other hand, exist externally to the text; they only exist in actual situations. It would be meaningless to talk of the speaker and addressee in terms of syntactic cohesion. Rather they should be conceived of in terms of (exophoric) reference.

It would be instructive to recall the distinction between ‘reference’ and ‘substitution’ as proposed by Halliday and Hasan (1976). They state that “... reference is a relation on the semantic level, whereas substitution is a relation on

the lexico-grammatical level." (p. 89) In other words "I" *refers to* "the speaker" and "you" *refers to* "the addressee", while 3rd person pronouns basically belong to "substitution", (cf. "... the substitute must be of the same grammatical class as the item for which it is substituted." (Halliday and Hasan 1977, p. 32) and they obey the syntactic rule of pronoun shift.

The confusion concerning examples like (40) and (41) seems to derive from failure to fully recognize this fundamental distinction. (45a) is a case involving two occurrences of reference: (45b) is an instance of substitution: (45c) - (45f) are instances of mixed use of reference and substitution. I am not in a position to propose an integrated way of representing these two types (or levels) of 'pronoun shift', and I suspect that one reason of failing to recognize this distinction was due to the lack of an appropriate system of representing it. But this recognition should be the first step to explicating the intriguing problem at hand whatever form the representation may take.⁷⁾

2. 2 Time Adverbial Shift

It is well-known that time references are changed variously according to the time of the reported utterance (cf. Quirk et al. 1985, p. 1029; Kuno 1972; Comrie 1986). I would like to look over a few examples to see what kinds of shift are employed in actual situations:

(51) He said to her, "I visited Aunt Jane yesterday."

Suppose that 'yesterday' refers to 'February 9.' Then the following expressions would be possible candidates for the indirect speech version:

- (52) a. Time of Utterance (TOU): February 10
He told her that he had visited Aunt Jane yesterday.
- b. TOU: February 11
He told her that he had visited Aunt Jane the day before yesterday.
- c. TOU: February 16
He told her that he had visited Aunt Jane a week ago.
- d. TOU: August 10
He told her that he had visited Aunt Jane the day before/on the previous day.⁸⁾

Utterances involving a time adverbial like “next Monday” produce a little more subtle indirect speech forms (We assume that “next Monday” refers to “February 17”):

- (53) He said to her, “I’m going to Orlando next Monday”.
- (54) a. TOU: February 10–February 15 (Saturday)
He told her that he is/was going to Orlando next Monday.
- b. TOU: February 17
He told her that he is/was going to Orlando today.
- c. TOU: February 18 (Tuesday)
He told her that he was going to Orlando yesterday.
- d. TOU: February 18 (Wednesday)–February 23 (Sunday)
He told her that he was going to Orlando Monday.
- e. TOU: February 24 (Monday)
He told her that he was going to Orlando last Monday.
- f. TOU: February 25 (Tuesday)–March 2 (Sunday)

He told her that he was going to Orlando last Monday.

g. TOU: March 3 (Monday)

He told her that he was going to Orlando Monday two weeks ago.

h. TOU: August 10

He told her that he was going to Orlando the following/the next week.⁹⁾

I am not sure how many days of the week could be referred to by "last Monday" in each case, but it is evident that we have to make considerable changes to guarantee the correspondence of the two speech forms.

Indirect speech forms involving "now" are even more complicated.

(55) He said to her, "I'm going to Harvard Square now."

Suppose the original speaker uttered (55) at noon on February 10. The following sentences are possible candidaites of indirect speech versions for (55):

(56) a. TOU: 12:05, February 10

He told her (just a minute ago) that he is/was going to Harvard Square ? now/ *then.

b. TOU: 6:00, February 10

He told her (at noon today) that he was going to Harvard Square ?? now/ *? then.¹⁰⁾

c. TOU: February 11

He told her (at noon yesterday) that he was going to Harvard Square *now/? then.

d. TOU: February 17

He told her that he was going to Harvard Square then.

e. TOU: August 17

He said that he was going to Harvard Square then.

I am not sure of the judgment of these sentences, but time adverbial shift seems to be more complicated than a commonly held view of school grammar which just says “*now*” is converted into *then* in indirect speech.” In fact, such a ‘rule’ is not exactly a syntactic rule. In other words, time adverbial shift is not a matter of syntactic conversion but essentially a matter of (exophoric) reference which requires appropriate modifications of the original time adverbials relative to the time of utterance.

Lastly I will cite a few concrete examples just to show how time adverbial shift is actually employed:

(57) a. House Speaker Thomas Foley, Democrat of Washington, denied any political move. “I am not in the business of trying to use this for any partisan or electoral purpose,” he said. He said he hoped the investigation would yield at least preliminary results by *this* summer, well before Election Day in November. (*The Boston Globe*, February 15, 1992)

b. She admitted that she had a quarrel with him *on the previous morning* at breakfast time. (A. Christie: “The Thumbmark of St. Peter”) [He died *the next day*.]

c. ... I stopped at the door for a friendly word with Donoghue. Hadn’t seen him for a couple of weeks, so we made a date to go to the fights last night at the Garden... Well, anyway, I told Donoghue I’d stop in for him

last night after supper... (E. Queen: *Drury Lane's Last Case*) [TOU: today]

- d. Then, at 1 o'clock, Spano learned that Ozawa's physician had decreed that he should not conduct last night's (=December 10) performances of Stravinsky's "Apollo" and the Mozart "Requiem". (*The Boston Globe*, December 11, 1991)

(57d) is particularly interesting, since the addresser (writer) is making an elaborate modification to the time adverbial so that the reader can easily understand the situation relative to the time he/she reads the paper. In other words, at the time the addresser was writing this article, he knew that Ozawa could not conduct "tonight", but he deliberately changes "tonight" to "last night"; he is employing the perspective of the reader. This kind of time adverbial shift is not uncommon in indirect speech, and it is a clear indication that this shift is not syntactically motivated but pragmatically controlled so that the addressee may grasp the time relations in the reported discourse without any ambiguity.

2.3 Place Adverbial Shift

The process of place adverbial shift is essentially the same with that of time adverbial shift and the only place adverbials that might present difficulties are "here" and "there". If the places of the original and reported utterances are the same, "here" and "there" remain unchanged, but if they are different, place references are changed accordingly: "here" will be converted to "there" if the place of the original utterance is different from that of the reporting, and the reverse would be the case if the reference is to the place of the reporting utterance (cf. Quirk et al. 1985, p. 1029):

- (58) a. He said to her, "I'll pick you up here in an hour." [here:Harvard Square]
 b. He told her that he'd pick her up here in an hour. [place of utterance: H. S.]
- (59) a. He said to her, "I have to go there at once." [there: New York]
 b. He told her that he had to go there at once. [POU: Boston]
- (60) a. He said to her, "I'd rather stay here for a days." [here: Boston]
 b. He told her that he'd rather stay there for a few days. [POU: New York]
- (61) a. He said to her, "I want to study there some day." [there: Harvard]
 b. He told her that he wanted to study here some day. [POU: Harvard]

This is a typical example of place adverbial shift, which is one type of deixis. Deixis involves actual situations which include the relative position of the speaker and the addressee. It seems clear that only pragmatic correspondence (exophoric reference) exists between the (a) versions and the (b) versions in (58)-(61). This is all the more evident because any of the following utterances can be the direct speech version of, say, (60b), as Kuno (1972) points out, concerning (44):

- (62) a. He said to her, "I'd rather stay in Boston for a few days."
 b. He said to her, "I'd rather stay in this old city for a few days."
 c. He said to her, "I'd rather stay in this beautiful New England city for a few days."

The following is an example involving *here/now* and *there/then*:

- (63) *I read the account of the murder and later watched Detective Chief Inspector Morse make his appeal on television. I wish you to know that I almost telephoned there and then; in fact I waited outside a telephone-box in Southdown Road for several minutes that same evening. (C. Dexter: Last Bus to Woodstock)*

Demonstratives "this" and "these" are also changed to "that" and "those" if the relative distancing has changed, but the reverse would be the case if there is greater proximity at the time of the reporter's utterance. This is also a typical case of deixis shift (pragmatic correspondence). The following is one example:

- (64) Lewis told him exactly what happened that morning.
 [←This morning/report on the same day]
 (C. Dexter: *Last Bus to Woodstock*)

2. 4 Sequence of Tenses

We have seen so far that pronoun shift involves both syntactic substitution and (exophoric) reference and that time/place adverbial shift involves only pragmatic correspondence or (exophoric) reference. As for the 'sequence of tenses', however, a lot of conflicting arguments have been advanced. Some claim that the rule of 'sequence of tenses' is purely syntactic, some claim that the key notion is 'absolute deixis', still others claim that this process involves relative time reference. In this section I would like to treat this intriguing area of English grammar from the viewpoint of syntax-semantics-pragmatics trichotomy. In other words, I want to explicate how much the sequence of tenses could be explained in terms of syntax, semantics and pragmatics (external knowledge about the real

world) respectively.

2. 4. 1 Comrie (1986)

The case for the purely syntactic nature of the sequence of tenses has been made by Comrie (1986) in a straightforward way. The fundamental question concerning the sequence of tenses is why the verb *was* is in the past tense in the following sentence in English:

(65) Arthur said that he was sick.

The answer to this question that can be found in most of the arguments is one of the following:

(66) a. Because it has past time reference.

b. Because it follows a main clause verb in the past tense.

(66a) is a semantic explanation, and (66b) is a syntactic explanation employing the formal rule of 'sequence of tenses'. Comrie (1986) is an attempt at proving the validity of (66b).

As a groundwork for his arguments, he makes the following distinctions:

(67)

Reference	{	Fixed reference: <i>Nancy Reagan, 7 November 1917, ...</i>
	{	Deictic Reference
		{
		Absolute: <i>I, You, today, tomorrow, ...</i>
		{
		Relative: <i>the same person, the next day, ...</i>

Comrie's (1986) explanation is thus: An expression with fixed reference always has the same referent, irrespective of the speech situation in which it is used. The reference of deictic expressions is dependent on context. An absolute deictic expression has its referent determined by reference to the speech situation. Relative deictic expressions take as their deictic center not the here-and-now but some reference point which is given in the context.

It would not be entirely appropriate, as Comrie (1986) himself admits, to call "I, you, today" and "tomorrow" absolute deictic expressions. For one thing, these deictic expressions and phrases like "the next day" have a common characteristic; just as an absolute deictic expression has its referent determined by reference to the speech situation, such a relative deictic expression as "the next day" has its referent determined by reference to the speech situation as well. For another, it is questionable that "the same person" is a clear instance of reference.¹¹⁾

To return to the main topic concerning (65) and (66), Comrie (1986) gives (68) and restates the two hypotheses that could explain why "I am sick" is converted to "he was sick."

(68) Andrew said that he was sick (although he now claims to be better).

(69) a. The verb *was* is in the past tense because the reference is to a sickness that is located in the past relative to the here-and-now of the reporter.

[Absolute Deixis]

b. The past tense is used here because the main verb (the verb of reporting) is in the past tense. [Sequence of Tenses]

He formulates the sequence of tenses rule as follows:

- (70) **Sequence of tenses rule**: If the tense of the verb reporting is non-past, then the tense of the original utterance is retained; if the tense of the verb of reporting is past, then the tense of the original utterance is backshifted into the past, except that if the content of the indirect speech has continuing applicability, the backshifting is optional.

He gives five sets of data to verify this rule. The first three sets concern sentences whose verb of reporting is in the future.

(70) claims that the tense of the original utterance should be retained if the tense of the verb of reporting is non-past. It correctly predicts that the indirect speech form of (71a) is (71b), and this prediction is borne out:

- (71) a. Diana will say, "I am dancing."
 b. Diana will say that she is dancing.

On the absolute diexis hypothesis, however, the indirect speech form of (71a) should be (72a), since the time reference of 'dance' relative to the present moment is future. But (72a) corresponds to (72b), not to (71a):

- (72) a. Diana will say that she will be dancing.
 b. Diana will say, "I will be dancing".

The second set of data is concerned with examples where the main clause verb is future but the verb of the original utterance is past (We assume that both 2010 and 2000 are in the future):

- (73) a. In 2010, Ebenezer will say, "I got tenure in 2000."
 b. In 2010, Ebenezer will say that he got tenure in 2000.
 c. *In 2010, Ebenezer will say that he will get tenure in 2000.

According to Comrie (1986), the sequence of tenses rule predicts that the tense of the original utterance will be retained, and this prediction proves correct. The absolute tense hypothesis wrongly predicts that the indirect speech version should be (73c), since the year 2000 is in the future. It will also predict incorrectly that (73b) will be ungrammatical, since the past tense would have to receive past time reference.

The third evidence is exemplified by the following where a future report is of an event prior to that report. The result can be explained in the same way:

- (74) a. Tomorrow, Frances will say, "I was absent yesterday."
 b. Tomorrow, Frances will say that she was absent today.
 c. *Tomorrow, Frances will say that she is absent today.

The fourth set of data involves sentences with the main clause verb in the past and the verb of the original utterance in the future (We assume that 1970 and 1980 lie in the past):

- (75) a. In 1970, Graham said, "I will get tenure in 1980."
 b. In 1970, Graham said that he would get tenure in 1980.
 c. *In 1970, Graham said that he got tenure in 1970.

The sequence of tenses rule predicts the backshifting in (75b). Cormie (1986)

also claims that the absolute tense hypothesis incorrectly predicts that (75c) should also be an indirect speech form of (75a), since Graham's getting tenure is located prior to the moment at which the report is made. His claim on this point, however, seems to me unwarranted, since there is no way of deriving (75c) from (75a) in the first place. The direct speech counterpart of (75c) should be (76):

(76) In 1970, Graham said, "I get tenure in 1980."

The last set of data concerns examples where the future tense in the original utterance happens to have present time reference relative to the here-and-now of the reporter:

- (77) a. Yesterday, Henrietta said, "I will be absent tomorrow,"
 b. Yesterday, Henrietta said that she would be absent today.
 c. *Yesterday, Henrietta said that she is absent today.

Comrie (1986) claims again that his rule correctly predicts the grammaticality of (77b), but that the absolute deixis hypothesis would also predict the grammaticality of (77c) incorrectly. But his claim seems unwarranted again, since the direct speech form of (77c) is not (77a) but (78):

(78) Yesterday, Henrietta said, "I am absent tomorrow."

Comrie (1986) attacks the absolute deixis hypothesis, disregarding the existence of *will* in (75) and (77), but his argument seems beside the mark, since it is meaningless to talk of the status of an indirect speech form unless there exists (or

could exist) its direct speech counterpart, in the first place. But it should be admitted that the first three sets of data are crucial, and any reasonable hypothesis should be able to account for them.¹²⁾

As for the sequence of tenses rule of (70), the reason for the reservation can be shown by the following example:

- (79) a. Yesterday, Inigo said, "I will arrive the day after tomorrow."
 b. Yesterday, Inigo said that he would arrive tomorrow.
 c. Yesterday, Inigo said that he will arrive tomorrow.

The point of 'continuing applicability' is that it makes the sequence of tenses optional as seen in (79), and in (80) below, in which case universal truth is involved (Quirk et al. (1985, p. 1026) calls the same condition 'present validity'):

- (80) a. Many medieval scholars said, "The earth is flat."
 b. Many medieval scholars said that the earth was flat.
 c. Many medieval scholars said that the earth is flat.¹³⁾

This amendment is useful in accounting for the well-known differences of interpretation in the following:

- (81) a. Kit said, "I am sick."
 b. Kit said that he was sick.
 c. Kit said that he is sick.

In (81c) Kit has to be still sick, but he need not be sick now in (81b).

Comrie (1986) claims that the following examples demonstrate the validity of (70):

- (82) a. Yesterday, Linda said, "I will arrive the day after tomorrow," but she immediately changed her mind.
- b. Yesterday, Linda said that she would arrive tomorrow, but she immediately changed her mind.
- c. *Yesterday, Linda said that she will arrive tomorrow, but she immediately changed her mind.

The absolute deixis hypothesis cannot distinguish between grammatical sentences like (79c) and ungrammatical sentences like (82c), because the verb in the future tense has future time reference relative to the here-and-now of the reporter in both sentences. The sequence of tenses rule as formulated in (70) can explain the difference, since (79c) has continuing applicability while (82c) does not.

Comrie (1986) cites the following interesting example. Suppose today is Wednesday:

- (83) a. On Friday, Oswald will say, "I arrived on Thursday."
- b. On Friday, Oswald will say that he arrived on Thursday.
- c. ?On Friday, Oswald will say that he arrived tomorrow.

He says that (83c) is grammatical for many speakers including himself, but that it is completely out for some speakers. Notice that the sequence of tenses rule predicts that both are grammatical and the absolute deixis hypothesis predicts that both are ungrammatical. We see an apparent conflict involved here between the

past tense and a time adverbial whose meaning incorporates future time reference, but what is relevant seems to be, as Comrie (1986) suggests, that the adverbial (*tomorrow*) refers to time as part of its meaning, while *on Thursday* has future time reference only as part of its interpretation (in a situational context); it can refer to a Thursday in the past too. If what Comrie (1986) calls 'collocation restriction hypothesis' is correct, it means that we would need not only a syntactic rule of sequence of tenses but some other principle to account for examples like (83c).

Taken together, Comrie's (1986) explanation seems to me convincing as far as his data go. He stresses the point that the sequence of tenses rule is a purely formal operation insensitive to the meaning of verb forms. Even if this is correct, however, we would have to incorporate into an overall explanation such pragmatic and semantic notions as 'continuing applicability' and 'collocation restriction hypothesis'. This seems to me another instance of the interactions between syntax and discourse, which I find particularly interesting as an area of grammatical analysis.

This last point is demonstrated by the last set of examples Comrie (1986) cites concerning the alternation of the past and the pluperfect (past perfect) tense:

- (84) a. Yesterday, Wendy said, "I arrived yesterday."
 b. Yesterday, Wendy said that she arrived the day before yesterday.
 c. Yesterday, Wendy said that she had arrived the day before yesterday.

(84b) and (84c) are both possible perhaps with a subtle stylistic difference.¹⁴⁾ It would be natural to assume a discourse principle to the effect that time reference of events should be stated clearly (Comrie (1986) is also aware of this discourse requirement). This principle is also a matter of personal preference. For

instance, both tenses are possible in the following:

(85) After he ate/had eaten breakfast, Xenophon put on his armor.


Comrie (1986) resorts to a semantic explanation he calls 'pluperfect urle', which states that "In English, any event in the past can be referred to by the past. If that event is located prior to some contextually established reference point in the past, then the past may be replaced by the pluperfect." (This explanation is reminiscent of Declerck's theory treated in the next subsection.) This 'rule' is not incompatible with the discourse principle stated above. What is interesting is that a seemingly powerful syntactic rule of sequence of tenses is not powerful enough and that it needs some other pragmatic and semantic principles ('continuing applicability', 'collocation restriction hypothesis' and 'pluperfect rule') for a fuller explanation of this "grammatical" phenomenon.

2. 4. 2 Declerck (1990)

Declerck (1990) mentions three approaches to this problem. One is the "absolute deixis hypothesis", the other is the formal rule of "sequence of tenses", and the last is the "relative time hypothesis", which attributes the past tense in indirect speech to the fact that the subclause (reported clause) situation is simultaneous with the head clause situation, which lies in the past. His aim is to show that Comrie's (1986) sequence of tenses rule does not always make correct predictions and that the tense of the complement clause in indirect speech is best explained by a "relative time hypothesis" supplemented with the claim that the use of absolute tense is sometimes possible too.

According to Declerck (1990), English speakers conceive of time and tense as

schematized below :¹⁵⁾



Then he goes on to introduce the notion of 'temporal domain' to capture the fact that there are two possibilities when two situations are located within the same time-sphere: either both of them are represented as related to the time of speech ('absolute time'), or one situation is related to the time of speech while the second is related to the first ('absolute time' + 'relative time'):

(87) Temporal Domain: A (temporal) domain is a time interval taken up either by one situation or by a number of situations that are temporally related to each other by means of special tense forms.

As an illustration, Declerck (1990) gives the following examples:

- (88) a. John said that he had worked all day, that he was tired and that he would go to bed early.
- b. John said he had felt very tired when he was working.

In (88a) the absolute tense form (*said*) locates a situation in the past time-sphere and creates a past time-sphere domain ('past domain' for short). The relative tense form in the second clause (*had worked*) relates the situation of working to

that of the first clause ; the second clause incorporates its situation into the already existing domain. In the third clause, *was tired* represents its situation as simultaneous with the central situation of the domain (*said*). In the fourth clause, the situation is represented as posterior to the central situation (*said*).

When a situation is introduced into a domain, it may be related to another situation which is directly or indirectly related to the central situation. In (88b) the three situations are located within a single domain. The third clause represents its situation as simultaneous with the situation of the second clause, while the latter is represented as anterior to the central situation in the first clause.

From these observations, Declerck (1990) concludes that "we always use the past tense for simultaneity, the past perfect for anteriority, and the conditional tense (*would* + present infinitive) for posteriority." In other words, the past tense can be used either as an absolute tense (establishing a past domain) or as a relative tense (expressing the domain-internal relation of simultaneity). He also claims that "situations which establish their own domains are not temporally related to each other by the tense system (since tenses that establish domains are absolute tenses)".

Declerck (1990) also introduces the possibility of 'shifting the temporal perspective', which is crucial to his explanation of the sequence of tenses. It means that "the time to which the situation is related is treated as if it belonged to an absolute sector that is different from the one to which it actually belongs, so that the relative tense used to relate another situation to it is a tense which is actually characteristic of another sector." Observe the following sentence for an illustration :

(89) Has the woman ever told you that she loved you ?

The head clause establishes a pre-present domain in (89), but the relative tense in the subclause used for being bound by the head clause is the one typical of a past domain. That is, once the domain is established, there is a shift of perspective from the pre-present to the past.

According to Declerck (1990), there is a similar shift of perspective in post-present domains: "The central situation of a post-present domain behaves as if it were a present situation when other situations are related to it."

- (90) a. (said when planning someone's murder) The police will think that he was killed by accident.
 b. His excuse next time will be that he has been ill all week.
 c. He will tell you that he doesn't know anything.

He explains the examples in (90) thus: "Since the speaker treats the time of utterance situation as if it were the moment of speech, he uses a 'pseudo-absolute' tense form in the subclause. That is, the tenses used to express relations in a post-present domain are the preterite or present perfect for anteriority, the present tense for simultaneity and the future tense for posteriority."

Declerck (1990) then proposes the following two principles to account for the uses of tense in indirect speech in English:

- (91) Principle A: In indirect speech the complement clause can in principle use either absolute or relative tense. That is, the complement clause situation can either shift the domain (i. e. establish a new domain) or be incorporated into the domain referred to in the head clause.

Principle B: If both clauses refer to the same time-sphere, the use of

relative tense in the complement clause is the unmarked choice. This means that, in such sentences, relative tense is always possible, whereas Grice's (1975) maxims of conversation allow the use of absolute tense only if the temporal order of the situations (which is not expressed by the absolute tense form) is clear from a temporal adverb, the context or from the hearer's pragmatic knowledge of the world.

Declerck (1990) claims that these two principles account for the following facts:

- (92) John said that he was ill.
- (93) John said that Bill was in London the day before.
- (94) He has always admitted that he had made a mistake.
- (95) a. John said that he will come.
 b. John said that New York is an interesting city.
 c. John said that he would come.
 d. John said that New York was an interesting city.

Canonical examples of the sequence of tenses rule such as (92) are predicted to be grammatical by (91), because the subclause uses relative tense to incorporate the situation into the domain established by the head clause. In (93), the subclause shifts the domain instead of incorporating its situation into the head clause domain, and the preterite is the only absolute tense that can establish a past domain. If the time adverbial were omitted, *was* should be changed to *had been* (Principle B).

Principle A correctly predicts that the head clause in the present perfect in (94) can be followed by a past time-sphere tense in the complement clause, since there has been a shift of temporal perspective to the past. (91) predicts the

grammaticality of (95a) and (95b), and states that they are marked, whereas (95c) and (95d) are predicted to be more natural since there is no restriction here which stipulates that the subclause situations should be valid at the moment of speech. Declerck (1990) agrees with Comrie (1986) that the absolute deixis hypothesis alone cannot explain (71) - (74), and that both Comrie (1986) and Declerck (1990) can account for these data.

One counterexample Declerck (1990) cites is (96a), whose indirect speech version is (96b), not (96c):

- (96) a. *They will report tomorrow that Harry is transmitting.*
 b. *They will report tomorrow: "Harry was transmitting."*
 c. *They will report tomorrow: "Harry is transmitting,"*

(96a) is only exceptionally possible, and this fact is explained by (91), which holds that the tense in indirect speech may be either a relative tense or an absolute tense and that the latter possibility is marked (in other words, shifting the domain is a marked possibility, and only admissible if it does not obscure the temporal relation).

Declerck (1990) also rejects Comrie's (1986) view that the past, present and future tenses can only be used as absolute tenses, citing the following sentences:

- (97) a. *Jennifer will be dancing when Ian is singing.*
 b. *Tomorrow you will say that you are sick.*

The present tense forms clearly express simultaneity here.

He then explains Comrie's (1986) 'continuing applicability' condition by

employing the notion of 'shift of domain', which he claims can handle examples like (82a-c). He says that his explanation is plausible because a shift of domain is a marked possibility and is therefore subject to restrictions. In this case the restriction is 'continuing applicability'. Declerck (1990) admits the existence of Comrie's (1986) 'collocation restriction hypothesis', too.

The following sentence is cited by Declerck (1990) to show that the formal rule of sequence of tenses has another defect:

(98) This is John's wife.—Yes, I THOUGHT he *was* married.

It is not possible to substitute *is married* for *was married* in (98), though the speaker takes the truth of the complement clause for granted. According to Declerck (1990), the restriction at work here is the fact that the verb of the head clause is a cognition verb (*thought*). He says: "Cognition verbs very seldom allow a shift of domain. The reason is that the report of a thought is not felt to be a faithful report if it involves a shift of domain, because the shift changes the structure of the thought."¹⁶

Declerck (1990) also argues against Comrie's (1986) 'pluperfect rule', which is intended to account for examples like (84) and (85), citing sentences such as the following:

- (99) a. I spent some time with John, who felt lonely.
 b. She said that she has spent some time with John, who felt/had felt lonely.
 c. *She said that she spent some time with John, who had felt lonely.
 (ungrammatical as a report of (99a))

(100) a. John said, "I told Betty that I was feeling ill."

b. John said that he had told Betty that he was/*had been feeling ill.

The point is why both past and past perfect tense forms are possible in (99b) but the past perfect tense form is impossible in (100b), and why (99c) is not allowed. According to Declerck (1990), (i) the past tense (*felt/was feeling*) is possible in the most deeply embedded subclause of (99b) and (100b) because these subclauses represent their situations as simultaneous with a past binding time; (ii) the fact that the past perfect is sometimes possible as in (99b) follows from the fact that in some types of subclause 'indirect binding' is allowed;¹⁷⁾ and (iii) the final clause of (99c) cannot be in the past perfect because this clause must be bound by its matrix clause and that the relation to be expressed is that of simultaneity (The domain has been shifted in the second clause because it is not bound by the matrix. The second and third clauses should belong to a different domain (past). The first clause cannot bind the third one).

Lastly, Declerck (1990) gives two sets of data which Comrie (1986) did not mention but he thinks refutes Comrie's claim. One is concerned with sentences with a head clause in the past tense and a complement clause in the present perfect tense:

(101) The Prime Minister stated in Parliament yesterday that Britain's economy has looked up considerably during the past two months.

He claims that the sequence of tenses rule would have to formulate still another ad hoc restriction to account for this kind of sentences but that his theory predicts the grammaticality of (101) because the subclause establishes a time shift triggered by

the semantic motivation, which is essentially that the embedded statement concerns a period which started in the past and reaches up to the present. But his argument is compatible with 'continuing applicability', since the basic meaning of the present perfect is 'past with present relevance' (Leech 1987², p. 36) and this notion of 'present relevance' prevents the backshifting.¹⁸⁾

The other set of evidence is illustrated by the following:

- (102) a. I have never said that you were stupid.
 b. (He has met her several times but) he has never told his wife that he had met her.
 c. (He has met her many times and) he has always promised her that he would not say anything to her husband.

The direct speech versions of the complement clauses in (102) would be the following:

- (103) a. You are stupid.
 b. I have met her.
 c. I will not say anything to your husband.

That is, backshifting has taken place after a verb in the present perfect. Declerck (1990) says that sentences like (102) constitute an insurmountable problem for Comrie's sequence of tenses rule, since he claims that his rule is a purely formal operation. Declerck (1990) claims, however, that the present perfect is non-past and that Comrie (1986) treats it this way. But what Comrie (1986) really says is that the morphological past tense equivalent of *has gone* is *had gone*. He does not

state explicitly that the present perfect does not refer to past time events. In fact, the present perfect tense can refer to past events (or non-events in negative past perfect sentences) (cf. Leech 1987², pp. 36-47); and Declerck says virtually as much in his two principles (91).¹⁹⁾ This reservation makes the sequence of tenses rule a less formal operation, but we have already seen that certain semantic and pragmatic factors play a role in this rule. It only shows that the process of the sequence of tenses is a little more complex than people had thought.²⁰⁾

2. 4. 3

Huddleston (1989) compares Comrie (1989) and Declerck (1990), and concludes that neither account on its own can cover the full range of data. The strongest evidence for a syntactic backshift rule can be seen in the following sentences, in which the past tense of the reporting verb has a modal meaning:

- (104) a. It is time you told her you were married.
 b. It is time you said to her: "I am married."
 (105) a. If I thought it was possible, I would try.
 b. If I thought: "It is possible", I would try.

Huddleston (1989) says that the past tense forms *were* and *was* do not express simultaneity within a past tense-sphere, because the time of telling and thinking is non-past and this past tense must be accounted for by reference to the syntactic fact that it occurs in the complement of a past tense verb of reporting.

On the other hand, a purely formal rule does not work in the following sentences:

- (106) a. He regrets not telling her he was married.
 b. He regrets not saying to her, "I am married."
- (107) a. I remember thinking it was impossible.
 b. I remember thinking: "It was impossible."

Huddleston (1989) is certainly right when he says that what is relevant here is the semantic fact that the telling and thinking are located in past time by virtue of properties of *regret* and *remember*. There is no past tense reporting verb to trigger backshift here.

He makes another significant suggestion that the first part of (70) is not necessary, since an independently motivated relative time hypothesis accounts for it anyway. So, he says, Declerck's counterexample like (96) and "One day John will regret that he is treating me like this"²¹⁾ do not bear on the 'backshift rule', although it poses a problem for Comrie's sequence of tenses rule as a whole.

Now I would like to review what we have observed so far and draw tentative conclusions.

The sequence of tenses rule as formulated by Comrie (1986) is inadequate on certain points, but some version of such a formal rule would be necessary to incorporate examples like (104) and (105) pointed out by Huddleston (1989). What is relevant is the backshift part of the sequence of tenses rule:

- (108) **Backshift Rule**: If the tense of the verb of reporting in the main clause is past, the tense of the original utterance is backshifted into the past in the reported clause.

This rule implies that (i) if the verb of the original utterance is in the past tense, it

is backshifted to the past perfect tense, and (ii) if the verb of reporting is in the present perfect tense which refers to a past event, it triggers backshift.

The backshift rule in (108) is supplemented by the following (semantic) conditions:

- (109) a. **Continuing Applicability** (Present Validity): If the content of the indirect speech (reported clause) has continuing applicability, the backshift is optional.
- b. **Collocation Restriction**: collocating the past tense with future time adverbials is restricted (for some speakers).
- c. **Pluperfect Rule**: In English, any event in the past can be referred to by the past. If that event is located prior to some contextually established reference point in the past, then the past may be replaced by the pluperfect. (This condition could perhaps be eliminated in favor of 'Relative Time Hypothesis')

(108) and (109) are supplemented by Declerck's principles of the 'relative time hypothesis', restated here as (110) in their essence:

- (110) **Relative Time Hypothesis**:
- a. **Principle A**: In indirect speech the complement clause can in principle use either absolute or relative time.
- b. **Principle B**: If both clauses refer to the same time-sphere, the use of relative tense in the complement clause is the unmarked choice.

It seems a pity that we have to employ such a long list of rules, conditions and principles to account for just a single phenomenon of 'sequence of tenses', but language seems a much more complex phenomenon than Comrie (1986) suggests, who says that "the beauty of the sequence of tenses rule is that it covers the whole range of data with just a single set of principles."

But there does seem to exist a single set of principles underlying the sequence of tenses and other related phenomena. I tentatively propose the following hypothesis:

- (111) **Sequence of Tenses Hypothesis**: The correspondence of temporal relations between direct speech and indirect speech has to be stated clearly.

(108), (109) and (110) are employed to guarantee (111).

3. CONCLUSION AND RESIDUAL PROBLEMS

3. 1

The Sequence of Tenses Hypothesis stated in (111) is, in reality, related to several types of deixis: 'pronoun shift', 'time adverbial shift' and 'place adverbial shift'. A more general hypothesis could be formulated thus:

- (112) **Direct-Indirect Speech Correspondence Hypothesis**: Conversion from direct speech to indirect speech has to be performed in such a way that the temporal and deictic relations in direct speech are clearly (unambiguously) retained in indirect speech.

I agree with Declerck (1990) that the role of Grice's (1975) maxims of

conversation is crucial here. His point is made in the latter part of his Principle B in (91), where he remarks that Grice's maxims of conversation allow the use of absolute tense only if the temporary order of the situations is clear from a temporal adverb, the context or from the hearer's knowledge of the world. As Declerck (1990) demonstrates, sentences like (113a) cannot be replaced by sentences like (113b) without violating the Maxim of Quantity:

- (113) a. John said he had been ill.
 b. John said he was ill.

The Maxim of Quantity also explains why both *ate* and *had eaten* are possible in (85) (repeated here as (114a)), but only *had eaten* is possible if *after* were replaced by *when*:

- (114) a. After he ate/had eaten breakfast, Xenophon put on his armor.
 b. When he had eaten breakfast, Xenophon put on his armor.
 c. *When he ate breakfast, Xenophon put on his armor.
 (out on the intended interpretation)

It seems, however, that both 'Maxim of Quantity' and 'Maxim of Manner' are relevant here:

- (115) a. **Maxim of Quantity:** Make your contribution as informative as is required.
 b. **Maxim of Manner:** Be perspicuous.
 1. Avoid obscurity of expression.

2. Avoid ambiguity.
3. Be brief.
4. Be orderly. (Grice 1975, pp. 45-46)

So we see that Grice's Maxims of Quantity and Manner underly the hypothesis (112), which in turn underlies (108), (109) and (110). I have also observed that pronoun shift involves both syntactic substitution and (exophoric) reference and that time/place adverbial shift involves only pragmatic correspondence or (exophoric/deictic) reference.

3. 2

We have still a lot of residual problems in this area. As for myself, I think I would have to consider the following problems:

(a) It is impossible, as Declerck (1990) suggests, to treat the whole range of data on the sequence of tenses without incorporating an overall theory of tense into the account. It would be necessary to examine the theoretical backgrounds of Comrie (1986) and Declerck (1990), i. e. Comrie (1985) and Declerck (1991), and some other important works.

(b) As Declerck (1990, p. 537) points out, some verbs (eg. *realize*, *regret*) can be followed by an indirect speech (or indirect thought) clause but not by a direct quote. It would be necessary to examine various types of reporting verbs and determine what characteristics each type has. Related to this problem is "Can speech and thought be conveyed in indirect speech in the same way? If different, how?"

(c) The structure and function of 'Free Indirect Speech'.

(d) The structure and function of 'Historical Present'.

(e) Comparison of English and Japanese speech forms.²²⁾

(f) Application of the observations made in this paper to narrative studies along the lines suggested by Banfield (1973) and Kuroda (1973), for instance.

(g) Female preference of direct speech. Tannen (1991, p. 262) writes thus: "Another aspect of Julia's story (=report of a fight she had with her father) that is typical of girls and women is that she creates the drama of what happened between people by acting out what they said, in dialogue. ... Because girls and women are concerned with conveying the emotional impact of what happened between people, they use dialogue to dramatize events more than boys and men do." An examination of this observation would make an interesting exercise in applied linguistic analysis.²³⁾

There would be a lot more problems related to our topic in this paper, but these problems alone would be a good indication that the topic I treated here can be interesting (if treated properly).

NOTES

※I wish to express my thanks to Susumu Kuno for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.

I am also grateful to Charles Cabell for providing me with his judgments on the example sentences in the paper. Needless to say, all the inadequacies that may be found in the paper are my own.

(1) It is sometimes the case that this correspondence is not retained as seen in the sentences below:

(i) a. Mary said, "John has cheated again."

b. Mary said that that son of a bitch has cheated/had cheated/cheated again.

It is obvious that the conversion of *John* into *that son of a bitch* is not a case of syntactic substitution but that of exophoric reference based on the fact that both speaker and addressee know who they are talking about. Without this mutual understanding, however, miscommunication will arise.

(2) In reality, people usually do not use *unmarried*, and *bachelor* sounds a little outdated, which usually means 'confirmed bachelor'. (6d) needs some special context to be used appropriately. These examples are cited here to just show the possible complexities of the correspondence between the two speech forms.

(3) Wierzbicka (1974) claims that earlier accounts have left one essential feature of direct discourse out of consideration: its "theatrical", playful, imaginary character. She says: "The person who reports another's words by quoting them, temporarily assumes the role of that other person, 'plays his part', that is to say, imagines himself as the other person and for a moment behaves in accordance with

- this counterfactual assumption." She also claims that the factor of imagination will enable us to explain the differences between direct and indirect speech. Her insight seems to be important and there seems no doubt that the factor of imagination plays an important part in this area, though her subsequent formulation seems to me somewhat unnatural. See §2.1 for some more discussion.
- (4) The quote on the right hand is intended to correspond to the reported part in the indirect speech on the left hand, and "X" and "Y" are supposed to represent the speaker and addressee respectively when the indirect speech forms are uttered. "X" and "Y" are, however, not intended to represent any deep structure or semantic structure. I use this representation for convenience sake only.
- (5) Since (46) is intended to represent the case of 'no identity', the counterargument concerning (48) is not warranted. However, (47) remains a problem for Kuno's analysis.
- (6) Maybe (49b) and (50b) should be interpreted as comprising three parts which correspond to (49a) and (50a) semantically. Or perhaps she would say that (49b) and (50b) are represented in terms of semantic primitives.
- (7) Comrie (1986) is apparently aware of this fact as can be seen in the following remark: "In order to work out the correct use of non-tense deictics in indirect speech in English, it is necessary to adopt the deictic center of the reporter and then use absolute deictics in accordance with this deictic center, i. e. in accord with semantics and pragmatics rather than any kind of formal transposition from direct speech." (p. 275)
- (8) We assume that in (52d) the speaker and the addressee know which day is involved. Notice also that it is always possible to say "on February 10."
- (9) According to my informant, (ia) refers to 'Monday (of) last week', and (ib) refers to 'Monday this week' if it were uttered, say, on Friday:
- (i) He went to Orlando (a) last Monday/ (b) Monday.
- (10) According to my informant, (56a) becomes O. K. if *now* is placed in sentence-initial position:
- (i) He told her that now he was going to Harvard Square.
Then in (56a) and (56b) is interpreted as 'and then' or 'after that', and is judged to be awkward.
- (11) The nature of *the same* is rather complex. Observe the following pair of sentences:
- (i) A: John sounded rather grateful.
 B: Yes, Mary sounded the same. (Halliday and Hasan 1976, p. 107)
- This *the same* is not a nominal substitute because (1) *sound* does not take NP for its complement and (2) there is no antecedent NP in the preceding context for *the same*. In other words, *the same* (in this use) is a kind of reference, but it is not exophoric reference as is usually the case with authentic reference. Rather it refers to the meaning in the preceding context. In short, it is an expression of reference with a characteristic of substitution.
- (12) Perhaps we should interpret the absolute deixis hypothesis in such a way that (75c) and (77c) are predicted by this hypothesis to be grammatical, since the reported clause refers to the past/present time whether *would* exists or not.
- (13) Comrie (1986) notes that continuing applicability should not be confused with truth. He says that the claim of the medieval scholars was wrong but their claim had universal validity, including applicability to our present. My informant, however, judged (80c) to be questionable.
- (14) Tregidgo (1979) compares (ia) and (ib)
- (i) Why was John late this morning?

- a. He told me he *fell* downstairs on his way to work.
- b. He told me he *had fallen* downstairs on his way to work.

and says that (ia) is likely to be interpreted as 'He fell downstairs: he told me so', but that (ib) is particularly likely if the speaker has now discovered John's story to be false ('... but actually he had overslept.'). since the falling is related solely to the telling.

- (15) Declerck (1990) explains thus: "The past time-sphere lies wholly before the moment of speech. To locate a situation in it the speaker uses the preterite. The present time-sphere is divided into three 'sectors' by the moment of speech: the portion of the present time-sphere that precedes the moment of speech is the 'pre-present sector'; the portion that is centered around the moment of speech is the 'present sector'; and the portion that follows the moment of speech is the 'post-present sector'. The tenses used to locate situations in these three sectors are the present perfect, the present tense and the future tense respectively."

He calls the four tenses 'absolute tenses' because the four timespans are defined in direct relation to the moment of speech.

- (16) Tregidgo (1979) says that 'Past-subordination' (=backshift) is particularly likely following verbs of believing, eg. *know* and *think*. According to him, we cannot change *was* to *is* in cases like 'I knew it was you' (said on opening the door to a visitor), the reason being that the present point of 'It is you' is here self-evident, taken for granted, presupposed, and the purpose of the sentence is simply to state that this fact was known earlier. The following sentences also illustrate this point:

- (i) a. So you're Irish! I \thought you *were* !
- b. So you've \passed! I \said you *would* !

The following cases are "not exactly obligatory, but are certainly expected."

- (ii) a. I got the job because I was a woman (i. e. that was the reason at the time).
- b. Why are you wearing your white coat?
- I put it on so that I would easily be seen.
- c. Why did they make you treasurer?
- Well, they wanted somebody who had studied accountancy.

Tregidgo (1979) explains that the past/past perfect in the subordinate clauses in (ii) takes the same viewpoint as that of the governing verb. It seems that these cases can be accounted for by Declerck's (1990) relative time hypothesis.

As another illustration, observe the following pair of sentences:

- (iii) a. They told me the road was under water.
- b. They told me the road is under water.

According to Tregidgo (1979), the tense of *was* in (iii) has the same viewpoint as that of *told*, i. e. the sentence means that the road was under water at the time of the telling, irrespective of whether it is under water or not. In (iii) b, on the other hand, the tense of *is* is not subordinate to that of *told*, so its viewpoint remains the present moment. In other words, although the speaker is reporting what someone else said about the road, he is at the same time making himself responsible for its present interest.

Incidentally, Wekker (1980) cites (i) in note (14) and says (ia) signifies that the present speaker confirms the validity of the original statement. It seems that this account is what made Quirk et al. (1985) choose the term 'present validity'. The last point made in the explanation of Tregidgo

(1979) concerning (iii) basically means the same thing.

Tregidgo (1979) states that the case of (ia) in note (14) and (iii) is the 'marked' case in English, though not necessarily an abnormal one. This is also Declerck's (1990) position. Comrie (1986) maintains, on the other hand, that (ib) in note (14) and (iii) are the marked choice.

Tregidgo (1979) says this 'marked' case is often found in newspapers, citing (iv) The motoring organizations reported last night that the road is under water. His explanation is that the newspaper is both reporting what somebody else said last night and at the same time taking responsibility for its new value now.

(17) 'Indirect binding' is a restricted option, which is possible only if it does not obscure the temporal relations. The past perfect version of (100b) 'would correspond not to (100a) but to the direct speech form: "I told Betty that I had been feeling ill."

(18) Tregidgo (1974), after citing Jespersen's (1933) view that the present perfect tense is a 'retrospective present', points out that the 'present perfect' functions like the ordinary 'present', and not like the 'past' as far as tense sequence is concerned. Observe the following:

- (i) a. I think he is sorry. He tells me he is, anyway.
- b. I think he is sorry. He's told me he is, anyway.
- c. I think he is sorry. He told me he was, anyway.

Tregidgo (1974) says that after *he told* (past), there is a strong tendency for *is* to change to *was*, but that this is not true after *he's told* (present perfect). It is obvious that the present perfect has an essentially present nature. He agrees with Allen (1966) that the present perfect is more aptly called 'pre-present'.

(19) According to Allen (1966), the 'present perfect' tense refers either to a period of time extending up to the present, or to a wholly past moment or period which is *undefined* for some reason. Leech (1987²) mentions four uses of the present perfect: STATE-UP-TO-THE-PRESENT, INDEFINITE PAST, HABIT-IN-A-PERIOD-LEADING-UP-TO-THE-PRESENT, and RESULTATIVE PAST. It is Allen's first half of the definition and Leech's first use that prevents the backshifting of (101), and Allen's latter part of the definition and Leech's second use that triggers the backshifting in (102).

(20) Declerck (1990) criticizes Comrie (1986) for treating the sequence of tenses in indirect speech complement clauses as an isolated phenomenon, and claims that his theory makes a much larger generalization because it accounts for the fact that 'tense harmony' takes place not only in complement clauses after verbs of saying or thinking but also in other types of noun clause as in (ia) - (ib) and in any kind of clause that allows temporal subordination as in (iia, b), including examples like (iiia-e):

- (i) a. It was clear that he was lying.
- b. The idea that she was perhaps dead had not occurred to me.
- (ii) a. Last week he made a promise which he would not keep.
- b. They needed someone who had studied languages.
- (iii) a. The man said he had heard a shot in the street.
- b. The man phoned the police. He had heard a shot in the street.
- c. The man, who had heard a shot in the street, phoned the police.
- d. The man phoned the police because he had heard a shot in the street.
- e. The man reported the fact that he had heard a shot in the street to the police.

Declerck's theory of the tense system in English is certainly exhaustive and convincing. I have not

considered the whole range of this system, but it seems possible to explain examples like (i)-(iii) if we took into account the meanings and uses of the various tenses. I leave this question open for now. For another, it is possible that we can find a better way of accounting for the sequence of tenses phenomenon in a principled way. See Kozawa (*forthcoming*) for a fuller treatment of this issue.

(21) The direct speech version of this sentence would be something like the following:

(i) One day John will say with regret: "I was treating him like that."

The verb *regret* does not take a direct quotation as an object.

(22) I just want to make two points here. One is that the sequence of tenses does not hold for indirect speech in Japanese as we can see in the following examples:

(i) a. Taroo wa "Boku wa kaze o hiite *iru*" to itta.

Taroo said, "I have a cold."

b. Taroo wa "Boku wa kaze o hiite *ita*" to itta.

Taroo said, "I had a cold."

(ii) a. Taroo wa kaze o hiite *iru* to itta.

Taroo said that he *had* a cold.

b. Taroo wa kaze o hiite *ita* to itta.

Taroo said that he *had had* a cold.

Another point is illustrated by the following pair of sentences:

(iii) a. Taroo ga utatte *iru* toki, Kazuko wa odotte *ita*.

When Taroo was singing, Kazuko was dancing.

b. Taroo ga utatte *ita* toki, Kazuko wa odotte *ita*.

When Taroo was singing, Kazuko was dancing.

(iiia) and (iiib) refer to the same situation, although the tense of the subordinate clause in (iiia) is in the present and that in (iiib) is in the past. We can explain this phenomenon neatly by Declerck's (1990) relative time hypothesis: In (iiia), the tense in the subordinate clause verb is incorporated into the tense of the matrix verb. This case is a relative tense, and it expresses simultaneity in the past. In (iiib), the tense in the subordinate clause verb establishes an independent domain. This case is an absolute tense, and it is defined in direct reference to the moment of speech.

(23) See also Wierzbicka's (1974) comment in note (1) on the role of imagination. Her following remark is also relevant here: "There would be several reasons why people prefer to quote rather than to paraphrase the speech of other people. One reason would be that the reporter may feel unable to separate the meaning from the form and to state it in his own words."

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