

Acceptance and interpretation of Dharmakīrti's theory of *nigrahasthāna* in the *Nyāyamañjarī* (SASAKI Ryō)

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SASAKI Ryō

1. Introduction

The *Nyāyasūtra* (NS) systematically arranged the theory of debate – including “the condition of defeat” (*nigrahasthāna*)¹, which is the rule to determine victory or defeat in a debate – for the first time in the history of Indian thought.² The *Nyāyabhāṣya* (NBh), Vātsyāyana's commentary on NS, and the *Nyāyavārttika* (NV), Uddyotakara's commentary on NBh, cultivated the thought of debate.

On the other hand, the *Vādanyāya* (VN), a philosophical work by Dharmakīrti, criticized the definition of “the condition of defeat” presented in the Nyāya school (NS, NBh, NV) and uniquely redefined the term from the position of the theory of Buddhist logic.³

VN was translated and critically edited by M. T. Much in 1991 (Much [1991]); he presented the comprehensive results of VN research up until that point, marking a significant contribution to research on the text. However, very few attempts have been made to examine the Nyāya school's criticism or acceptance of the theory in VN. In this paper, I will consider the way of accepting Dharmakīrti's theory found in the *Nyāyamañjarī* (NM), which is Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's commentary on NS.

2. The Theory of *Nigrahasthāna* in the *Vādanyāya*

2.1. The Definition of *Nigrahasthāna*

Dharmakīrti defined “the condition of defeat” at the beginning of VN as follows:

VN 1,4–5: asāadhanāṅgavacanam adošodbhāvanam dvayoḥ /
nigrahasthānam anyat tu na yuktam iti neṣyate //1//

* This paper was partly read at the 17th Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies (IABS), August, 18–23, 2014, University of Vienna, Austria.

¹ See Ono [2006], Todeschini [2010] etc..

² See Kajiyama [1984], Katsura [2000], Preisendanz [2000] etc..

³ See Much [1986, 1991], Chinchore [1988], Gokhale [1993], Sasaki [2012a, 2012b, 2013a, 2013b, 2014] etc..

Asāadhanāṅgavacana and *adoṣodbhāvana*⁴ are the conditions of defeat (*nigrahassthāna*) for the two (debaters, i.e., a proponent and an opponent, respectively)⁵. However, other [conditions of defeat that the Nyāya school and the like explain]⁶ are not correct, hence [they are] not accepted⁷.

Here Dharmakīrti presents his original idea of dividing “the condition of defeat” into *asāadhanāṅgavacana* (the condition of defeat for a proponent) and *adoṣodbhāvana* (the condition of defeat for an opponent). These two terms are core concepts in the theory of debate constructed in VN.

In the first half of VN (pp. 1–24), many issues related to the interpretations of these two concepts are considered. Ultimately, the former is shown to have five types of interpretations and the latter two types of interpretations. On the other hand, the twenty-two types of “the condition of defeat” established by the Nyāya school are criticized individually in the latter half of VN (pp. 25–68), with consideration given to the interpretations presented earlier in the first half.

2.2. *Nigrahassthāna* by Dharmakīrti in the First Half of VN

First, Dharmakīrti provided five interpretations of *asāadhanāṅgavacana* in the first half of VN. These five interpretations are arranged in Table 1 below. See Sasaki [2012b] for more details.

⁴ It is difficult to accurately translate the technical terms “*asāadhanāṅgavacana*” and “*adoṣodbhāvana*” without a certain context because Dharmakīrti intended to present grammatically and semantically diverse interpretations of these two compound words in order to define the condition of defeat from diversified perspectives. In this paper, I will provide a suitable translation of these words when the meaning of them can be determined by their actual use in a sentence. However, if their meaning is difficult to determine, I will use the original Sanskrit word as it is.

⁵ See VA 3,5–6: **asāadhanāṅgavacanam adoṣodbhāvanam ca dvayor vādiप्रतिवādinor yathākramam nigrahassthānam** parājayādhikaraṇam. (*Asāadhanāṅgavacana* and *adoṣodbhāvana* are the conditions of defeat, namely the grounds for defeat for the two [debaters,] i.e., a proponent and an opponent, respectively.)

⁶ See VA 3,6–8: **anyat tv** ity etaddvayavyatiriktam⁽¹⁾ akṣapādaparikalpitaṃ pratijñāsamnyāsādikaṃ vakṣyamāṇam nigrahassthānam **na yuktam iti** kṛtvā **neṣyate**. nigrahassthānam iti vartate⁽¹⁾ etaddvaya° VA_{MS}. em. [P₁ 23a8, P₂ 73a1, D 52b4: gnyis po de dag las] : etaddheya° VA.) (“However, other ...” is [annotated as below]. The conditions of defeat – which are distinct from these two [*asāadhanāṅgavacana* and *adoṣodbhāvana*], are made by Akṣapāda, are [constituted by] “abandonment of a thesis” and the like, and are to be mentioned [in the latter half of VN] – are not accepted because they are considered not to be correct. [Thus] “conditions of defeat” are supplemented.)

⁷ At the beginning of the latter half of VN (VN 25,1), after mentioning line c and d of this verse, it is stated as below. VN 25,2–3: yatredaṃ yathoktaṃ nigrahassthānalakṣaṇam nāsti, tasya nigrahassthānatvam ayuktam iti noktam asmābhiḥ. (When something does not have this definition of the condition of defeat mentioned above, we do not mention [the thing] because it is not correct that it is the condition of defeat.)

Table 1

Dharmakīrti's interpretations of <i>asāadhanāṅgavacana</i>		
Resolution	Interpretation	Translation and Definition
<i>sāadhanāṅgasya avacanam</i>	1st interpretation	tr. : not stating the factor of proof def. : (1) not stating any logical reasons (2) not stating a justified logical reason (<i>svabhāvahetu</i> , <i>kāryahetu</i> , <i>anupalabdhihetu</i>)
	2nd interpretation	tr. : not stating the element of the means of proof def. : (1) in regard to the three conditions of the logical reason, not stating either the first or second conditions (2) not stating either the first or third conditions
<i>asāadhanāṅgasya vacanam</i>	3rd interpretation	tr. : stating what is not the element of the means of proof def. : (1) stating a thesis, an application, or a conclusion (2) stating a second positive concomitance or a second negative concomitance
	4th interpretation	tr. : stating what is not the factor of proof def. : (1) stating a fallacious logical reason (2) stating a fallacious example
	5th interpretation	tr. : stating what does not have proof as the factor def. : stating what is not the topic

Secondly, Dharmakīrti showed two interpretations of *adoṣodbhāvana*. These two interpretations are arranged in Table 2 below. See Sasaki [2013a] for more details.

Table 2

Dharmakīrti's interpretations of <i>adoṣodbhāvana</i>		
Resolution	Interpretation	Translation and Definition
<i>doṣasya anudbhāvanam</i>	1st interpretation	tr. : not pointing out the fault def. : (1) not pointing out “insufficient” (<i>nyūna</i>) (2) not pointing out an unproved reason, an inconclusive reason, a contradictory reason, and so forth
<i>adoṣasya udbhāvanam</i>	2nd interpretation	tr. : pointing out the non-fault def. : making an incorrect response (<i>jātyuttara</i>) and so forth

After the condition of defeat was defined as indicated by the tables in the first half of VN, Dharmakīrti critically considered the Nyāya school's twenty-two different conditions of defeat in the

latter half of VN. In the latter half of VN, although the majority of the Nyāya school's conditions of defeat were not accepted as correct conditions of defeat, some of their conditions of defeat were admitted to be correct.

It is expected that the conditions of defeat defined by Dharmakīrti in the first half of VN correspond with the Nyāya school's conditions of defeat that Dharmakīrti admitted to be correct in the latter half of VN. However, Dharmakīrti did not expressly explain the concrete content of the relationship between these two sets of conditions of defeat in VN. Therefore, we ourselves have to analyze the relationship in accordance with the context of VN.

2.3. Comparison between the First Half of VN and the Latter Half of VN

I compared the first half of VN with the latter half and demonstrated the correspondence relationship between Dharmakīrti's conditions of defeat and the Nyāya school's conditions of defeat in Sasaki [2013b, 2014].

First, the correspondence relationship between the conditions of defeat defined by Dharmakīrti himself and the Nyāya school's conditions of defeat that Dharmakīrti admitted to be correct are arranged in Table 3 below.⁸

Table 3

Dharmakīrti's interpretation of the Nyāya school's <i>nigrahasthāna</i> (1)	
Nyāya school's <i>nigrahasthāna</i> which Dharmakīrti admits to be correct	<i>Nigrahasthāna</i> defined by Dharmakīrti
《6》 Different affair (<i>arthāntara</i>)	5th interpretation of <i>asāadhanāṅgavacana</i> 2nd interpretation of <i>adoṣodbhāvana</i>
《11》 Insufficient (<i>nyūna</i>)	1st interpretation of <i>asāadhanāṅgavacana</i> 2nd interpretation of <i>asāadhanāṅgavacana</i>
《12》 Surplus (<i>adhika</i>)	3rd interpretation of <i>asāadhanāṅgavacana</i>
《16》 Lack of an idea (<i>apratibhā</i>)	1st interpretation of <i>adoṣodbhāvana</i>
《22》 Fallacious logical reason (<i>hetvābhāsa</i>)	4th interpretation of <i>asāadhanāṅgavacana</i>

⁸ The condition of defeat is established against a background of specific theories of logic; furthermore, Dharmakīrti and the Nyāya school depend on two different theories of logic. Therefore, even if the conditions of defeat accord for both of them, we cannot anticipate that their conditions of defeat are consistent with each other in every detail.

On the other hand, Dharmakīrti rejected the majority of the Nyāya school's conditions of defeat because he thought that most of them should not be classified as different types of conditions of defeat separate from other conditions of defeat. This is arranged below in Table 4.

Table 4

Dharmakīrti's interpretation of the Nyāya school's <i>nigrahasthāna</i> (2)	
Nyāya schools's <i>nigrahasthāna</i> which Dharmakīrti rejects	Nyāya school's <i>nigrahasthāna</i> which should not be classified as different types (according to a certain interpretation)
《1》 <i>pratijñāhāni</i>	《22》
《2》 <i>pratijñāntara</i>	《5》
《3》 <i>pratijñāvirodha</i>	《22》
《4》 <i>pratijñāsaṃnyāsa</i>	《22》
《5》 <i>hetvantara</i>	《22》
《7》 <i>nirarthaka</i>	《6》 《12》 《22》
《8》 <i>avijñātārtha</i>	《7》
《9》 <i>apārthaka</i>	《7》
《10》 <i>aprāptakāla</i>	《9》
《13》 <i>punarukta</i>	《12》
《14》 <i>ananubhāṣaṇa</i>	《16》
《15》 <i>ajñāna</i>	《16》
《17》 <i>vikṣepa</i>	《6》 《7》 《9》 《16》 《22》
《18》 <i>matānujñā</i>	《16》
《19》 <i>paryanuyojoyopekṣaṇa</i>	《16》
《20》 <i>niranuyojoyānuyoga</i>	《16》 《22》
《21》 <i>apasiddhānta</i>	《22》

3. Mutual Acceptance between Dharmakīrti and the Nyāya School

The question we have to ask here is how the Nyāya school responded to Dharmakīrti's opinion. I will confirm Dharmakīrti's way of accepting the Nyāya school's conditions of defeat and pick up Jayanta's response to Dharmakīrti's assertion as an example of the Nyāya school's answer.

3.1. Consideration of “Different Affair” (*arthāntara*)

The sixth condition of defeat defined in NS is “different affair” (*arthāntara*).

NS 5.2.7 (Cī'e VN 40,9): prakṛtād arthād apratisaṃbaddhārtham arthāntaram //

“Different affair” is an affair which is not related with the affair under discussion.

“Different affair” can be explained as follows⁹: One debater states, “Sound is permanent because it is not an object of a tactile organ. And the reason (*hetu*) is the word with the *kṛt*-suffix when the *tu*- is added to the root *hi*-. And the word (*pada*) is the noun, the verb, the prefix, and the copula. And the noun (*nāman*) is” Here the explanation of “the reason,” “the word,” and “the noun” is irrelevant to the affair under discussion. Therefore, the debater stating such an irrelevant affair is to be defeated because of the condition of “different affair,” the sixth condition of defeat.

In regard to this thought of the Nyāya school, Dharmakīrti wholly admitted the “different affair” to be a correct condition of defeat.

VN 40,16–41,4: nyāyān etan nigrāsthānam pūrvottarapakṣavādinoh, pratipādite doṣe prakṛtaṃ parityajyāsādhanaṅgavacanān adōṣodbhāvanā ca. sādhanavādinoh upanyastāsādhanasya samarthane kartavye tad akṛtvāparasya prasaṅgenāprasaṅgena vātannāntarīyakasyāpy abhidhānam parājayasthānam, uttaravādinoh 'pi doṣodbhāvanamātrād aparasyopakṣepa iti.

This (= “different affair”) is a correct condition of defeat for both a former debater (= a proponent) and a latter debater (= an opponent). [In this case, the correct condition of defeat is] “stating what doesn't have proof as the factor” (*asādhanaṅgavacana*) and “pointing out the non-fault” (*adoṣodbhāvana*)¹⁰ after leaving the affair under discussion¹¹ when a fault is [mutually] stated [by

⁹ See VN 40,9–15.

¹⁰ The interpretation of the meaning of this word is not found in VN and VA, but Much [1991: 78] translated *adoṣodbhāvana* into “Nichtaufzeigen eines (begangenen) Fehlers;” furthermore, VN 21, 9–23,6 is cited in the Much [1991: 78, Anm. 342]. That is to say, Much adopted the first interpretation of *adoṣodbhāvana*, namely “not pointing out the fault.” However, here it seems to be natural for me to consider the case that an opponent states something because Dharmakīrti showed the expression “to mention something which is different from the mere comment on a fault” (*doṣodbhāvanamātrād aparasyopakṣepaḥ*) for the explanation of *adoṣodbhāvana*. Therefore, I will adopt the second interpretation of *adoṣodbhāvana*, i.e., “pointing out the non-fault” in this paper.

¹¹ See VA 99,15: **prakṛtam** atra sādhyasādhanahetvabhidhānam. (Here the affair under discussion is the expression of the probandum and probans, namely the logical reason.) See Much [1991: 77, Anm. 338].

a proponent and an opponent]¹². The reason is that it is the condition of defeat [for a proponent] to state a different [affair from the affair under discussion], i.e., even [the affair which has] no inseparability with it whether [the affair] has a connection [with it] or not without doing so (= proving his proof), although the debater of proof (= the proponent) has to establish the proof suggested [by himself]. For the latter debater (= the opponent) too, [it is the condition of defeat] to mention something which is different from the mere comment on a fault.

“Different affair” is explained by Dharmakīrti as “stating a different affair.” Therefore, it is appropriate that *asāadhanāṅgavacana* in this case is resolved into *asāadhanāṅgasya vacanam* (the third, fourth, and fifth interpretation of *asāadhanāṅgavacana*). Based on the meaning of “different affair” for a proponent, we should conclude that it corresponds with the fifth interpretation of *asāadhanāṅgavacana*; namely, “stating what does not have proof as the factor,” i.e., “stating what is not the topic.”

In the same way, *adoṣodbhāvana* in this case should be resolved into *adoṣasya udbhāvanam*. Therefore, “different affair” for an opponent corresponds with the second interpretation of *adoṣodbhāvana*, which is “pointing out the non-fault,” i.e., “making an incorrect response (*jātyuttara*) and so forth.”

NM 2.693.4–8: tad etad arthāntaram nigrahassthānam asāadhanāṅgavacanam iti. kīrtināpy anumoditam dvayor api ca vādiativādinoḥ prakṛtānanuṅaṃ abhidadhatō bhavaty ado nigrahassthānam. yathākramam ekasya sādhanam anavadyam apaśyato dvitīyasya dūṣaṇam iti.

This “different affair” is the condition of defeat, namely *asāadhanāṅgavacana*. Dharmakīrti also welcomed that this condition of defeat occurs to both a proponent and an opponent who state what is not suitable to [the affair] under discussion. [“To both a proponent and an opponent”] means, respectively, “To one [debater] who does not offer an unblamable proof and the second [debater who does not offer any] refutation.”

Jayanta welcomed Dharmakīrti's acceptance of the Nyāya school's thought. In the same way as Dharmakīrti, Jayanta considered the “different affair” as *asāadhanāṅgavacana* and *adoṣodbhāvana*.¹³

¹² See VA 98,26–27: **pratipādite doṣe** sati vādiativādibhyām⁽¹⁾ anyonyam ⁽¹⁾ vādiativādi° VA. : vādiativādi° VAMS.) (when a fault is mutually stated by a proponent and an opponent,)

¹³ It seems that Jayanta considered *asāadhanāṅgavacana* and *adoṣodbhāvana* in the case of “different affair” as *sāadhanāṅgasya avacanam* and *doṣasya anudbhāvanam*. Therefore, to be accurate, Jayanta's comprehension is supposed to be inaccurate based on the above-mentioned analysis of Dharmakīrti's thought.

3.2. Consideration of “Insufficient” (*nyūna*)

The eleventh condition of defeat defined in NS is “insufficient” (*nyūna*).

NS 5.2.12 (Ci' VN 49,6): hīnam anyatamenāpy avayavena nyūnam //

“Insufficient” (*nyūna*) is [an inferential statement] which lacks even a single component [of the five component parts].

“Insufficient” can be explained as follows¹⁴: The Nyāya school defines “insufficient” as the lack of any one of the five following component parts that comprise an inferential statement: a thesis (*pratijñā*), a logical reason (*hetu*), an example (*udāharāṇa*), an application (*upanaya*), and a conclusion (*nigamana*). This definition is based on the perspective that all five parts are means of proof (*sādhana*) that are indispensable for establishing what is to be proven (*sādhya*)¹⁵. Therefore, if a proponent sets up an inferential statement without including even one of these components he will be defeated based on the condition of “insufficient,” the eleventh condition of defeat.

In regard to this thought of the Nyāya school, Dharmakīrti constructed partial criticism as presented in the following text.

VN 49,9–14: na pratijñānyūnaṃ hīnam, tadabhāve pratītibhāvād iti pratipāditam. hīnam eva tat, nyūnatāyām api nigrahād ity aparāḥ. yaḥ pratīyamānārtham anarthakaṃ śabdaṃ prayukte, sa nigraham arhet, nārthopasaṃhitasyābhidhātety asamīkṣitābhidhānam etat. ata eva ca pratijñāyā na sādhanāṅgabhāva iti.

It has been already explained¹⁶ that [an inferential statement for which] a thesis¹⁷ is insufficient is not lacking [in a means of proof] because apprehension takes place [even] when it (= a thesis) does not exist [in an inferential statement]. [On the other hand], another person (Uddyotakara)¹⁸ [insists that] it (= an inferential statement for which a thesis is insufficient) is certainly lacking [in a means

¹⁴ See VN 49,6–8.

¹⁵ See NV 1185, 6–7 (Ci'e VN 49, 6–8).

¹⁶ See VN 17,9–11; 17,16–18,7.

¹⁷ See VA 109,16: **pratijñā**grahaṇam upalakṣaṇārtham tenopanayanīgamanayor api pariagrahaḥ. (the expression of the “thesis” is [used] for the purpose of synecdoche. Even the “application” and the “conclusion” are also included by this (= the “thesis”).)

¹⁸ As to who is the “another person” (*apara*), suggesting the possibility of Uddyotakara, Much [1991: 89, Anm. 382] does not abandon other possibilities and avoided affirmation. It is difficult to decide who is he but I will temporarily regard him as Uddyotakara in this paper.

of proof] because defeat takes place even when [a thesis] is insufficient¹⁹. A person who makes a useless speech which is already known is to be defeated²⁰ and is not a speaker of meaningful things. Therefore, this is a thoughtless remark [by Uddyotakara]²¹. From this very reason, the thesis is not the element of the means of proof.

Dharmakīrti did not admit a thesis (*pratijñā*), an application (*upanaya*), and a conclusion (*nigamana*) to be the element of the means of proof. Therefore, even if an inferential statement lacks these three component parts, it is not insufficient in essential component parts according to his Buddhist logic.²²

However, Dharmakīrti's logic also considers a logical reason (*hetu*) and an example (*udāharaṇa* / *dr̥ṣṭānta*) to be means of proof, which accords with the Nyāya school's logic. Actually, according to the first and second interpretation of *asādhanāṅgavacana*, i.e., *sādhanāṅgasya avacanam*, “not stating any logical reasons or three conditions of the logical reason”²³ is defined as the condition of defeat. Additionally, the “example” is included in the “logical reason” concept in Dharmakīrti's logic.²⁴

¹⁹ See VA 109,16–18 udyotakarasya matam upanyasyati, **hīnam eva tat** pratijñānyūnam, tasyāḥ pratijñāyā **nyūnatāyām api nigrahād** iti. (The [following] opinion of Uddyotakara is mentioned; the [inferential statement for which] a thesis is insufficient is certainly lacking [in a means of proof] because defeat takes place even when the thesis is insufficient.)

²⁰ See VA 109,18–19: **yaḥ** sādhanasāmāthyāt **pratiyamānārtham anarthakaṃ śabdaṃ** sādhyā-bhidhāyinaṃ sādhanē **prayuṅkte, sa nigrahaṃ arhet**. (In [the statement of] proof, a person who makes a useless speech which is expressing what should be proven (= a thesis) and is already known through indirect implication of the proof is to be defeated.) Furthermore, See the following explanation in HB. HB 5*,23f.: atra sāmāthyād eva pratijñārthasya pratīter na pratijñāyāḥ prayogaḥ. (Here (= in the logical formulation of similarity and dissimilarity), the meaning of a thesis is [fully] comprehended only through indirect implication. Therefore, the thesis [needs] not be used.) As to the translation of HB, See Steinkellner [1967: 40], Gokhale [1997: 17], Harada [1999: 2].

²¹ See VA 109,21–23: **nārthopasaṃhitasyayuktyuktasya pakṣadharmasambandhamātrasyābhidhāte-ty**⁽¹⁾ **asamīkṣitābhidhānam etad** vārtikakārasya. (⁽¹⁾ °ābhidhātey em. : °ābhidhānety VA; °ābhidhā-bhidhānety VAMS.) ([The person] is not a speaker of meaningful, i.e., reasonable things which is just “the property of the subject [as the logical reason]” and “the connection [between the probans and the probandum]” (= the logical concomitance). Therefore, this is a thoughtless remark by the author of *Nyāyavārttika* (=Uddyotakara).)

²² Not only that, Dharmakīrti thought that if a proponent states a thesis, an application, or a conclusion, he is to be defeated. See the third interpretation of *asādhanāṅgavacana*.

²³ Dharmakīrti mentioned that “not stating three conditions of the logical reason” is the definition of “insufficiency” (*nyūnatā*) in *Pramāṇavārttika*. PV IV 23: anuktāv api pakṣasya siddher aprati-bandhataḥ / triṣv anyatamarūpasyaivānuktir nyūnatoditā // (Even if a thesis is not stated, establishment [of probandum] is not prevented. Therefore, it is said that “not speaking of any one condition of three [conditions of the logical reason]” is “insufficiency” (*nyūnatā*).) See Much [1991: 89, Anm. 383].

²⁴ See NB III 121: trirūpo hetur uktaḥ / tāvatā cārthapratītir iti na pṛthag dr̥ṣṭānto nāma sādhanāvayavaḥ kaścit / tena nāsyā lakṣaṇaṃ pṛthag ucyaṭe gatārthatvāt // (The logical reason which has three conditions

Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that “insufficient” in the case of the logical reason and the example corresponds with the first and second interpretation of *asāadhanāṅgavacana*.

NM 2.699.6–15: atrāha pratijñādyavayavajātam asāadhanāṅgavacanam ity ataḥ tad anabhidhato na nigrahaḥ, pratyuta vadato nigraho yukta iti atrocyate anantaram evaitat pariḥṛtam, vistarataś cāvayavalakṣaṇe. tathā hi śrotur ākāṅkṣānivṛttaye 'numānavākyam prayujyata iti prathamam tadākāṅkṣāvīṣayaḥ sādhyadharmaviśiṣṭo dharmo pradarsyate. tataḥ kāraṇākāṅkṣāyām hetuvacanam abhidhīyate. kvāsya pratibandho dr̥ṣṭa iti bubhutsāyām udāharaṇam upapādyate. ittham eṣa siddhapratibandho hetuḥ dharmiṇi bhavet, na veti śāṅkāyām upanayavacanam uccāryate. tadanantaram sarvāvayavānām ekatropasamhārāya nigamanam prayujyata ity anyatamasyā-prayogāt nigrahārhatā bhavaty evety alam atraiva vastuni pade pade kalahaprastāvaneneti.

(Dharmakīrti's assertion:) Here [Dharmakīrti] said, “According to [the fact] that *asāadhanāṅgavacana* occurs from the component part, namely a thesis and the like, it is correct that [a debater] who does not state it (= a thesis and the like) is not defeated, and on the contrary [a debater] who states [it] is defeated.” (Jayanta's assertion:) This [Dharmakīrti's criticism] is answered [as follows]. This is abandoned immediately and [abandoned] in detail in the definition of the [five] component parts. That is to say, an inferential statement is used in order to stop the requirement of an audience. Therefore, to begin with, a property qualified by probandum that is an object of the [audience's] requirement is presented. Hence, when a ground is required, an expression of a logical reason (*hetu*) is stated. When [someone] desires to know what is empirically observed to have a relationship with this (= the logical reason), an example (*udāharaṇa*) is provided. When there is doubt as to whether this logical reason of which relationship [with probandum] is proven in this manner may exist in the subject or not, an expression of an application (*upanaya*) is given. Immediately after it (= an expression of an application), in order to put all component parts together into one place, a conclusion (*nigamana*) is used. Because any one of [all the component parts mentioned above] is not used [by the debater], [he] is to be worthy of defeat. Therefore, in regard to the above matter, stop starting controversy on every occasion!

Jayanta flatly objected to Dharmakīrti's assertion because all five component parts are essential to an inferential statement based on the Nyāya school's logic. However, as to the logical reason and the

was already stated. And the affair [which should be proven] is comprehended only by it (= the logical reason which has the definition mentioned above). Therefore, the example does not exist separately [from the logical reason] as a certain part of the means of proof. Hence, the definition of it (= the example) is not stated separately [from the definition of the logical reason] because the meaning [of the definition of the example] is obtained [from the definition of the logical reason].)

example, Dharmakīrti's comprehension is similar to Jayanta's opinion. Therefore, Jayanta's objection seems to be excessive.

3.3. Consideration of “Surplus” (*adhika*)

The twelfth condition of defeat defined in NS is “surplus” (*adhika*).

NS 5.2.13 (Cī' VN 49,15): hetūdāharaṇādhikam adhikam //

“Surplus” (*adhika*) is [an inferential statement] which has a surplus logical reason and example.

“Surplus” can be explained as follows²⁵: Even if a debater states an inferential statement which has a surplus logical reason and example, the surplus component parts are useless because proof of probandum can be established by only one logical reason and example. Therefore, the debater stating such an inferential statement is to be defeated because of “surplus,” the twelfth condition of defeat.

In regard to this assertion of the Nyāya school, Dharmakīrti conditionally admitted the “surplus” to be a correct condition of defeat.

VN 49,18–20: yatraikasāadhanavākyaprayogapūrvako vicāraḥ, tatrādhikābhīdhānam anarthakam iti nigrahasthānam. prapañcakathāyāṃ tu na kaścid doṣo niyamābhāvād iti.

When consideration postulates usage of an inferential statement, [“surplus” is] the condition of defeat because it is useless to state the surplus [component parts]. But there is not any fault because there is no restriction²⁶ in the expansive discussion (*prapañcakathā*).

“Surplus” (*adhika*) evidently should be identified with the condition of defeat for a proponent in VN. Furthermore, it is appropriate that *asāadhanāṅgavacana* in this case is resolved into *asāadhanāṅgasya vacanam* (the third, fourth, and fifth interpretation of *asāadhanāṅgavacana*) because “surplus” is explained as “stating the surplus logical reason and example.” Especially, “surplus” is not different from the third interpretation of *asāadhanāṅgavacana*, i.e., “stating a second positive concomitance or a second negative concomitance,” in the sense that both of these two mean “stating what is not the element of a means of proof.” Therefore, we should conclude that “surplus” corresponds

²⁵ See VN 49,15–17.

²⁶ The expansive discussion (*prapañcakathā*) has no restriction which makes the debater employ only one inferential statement.

with the third interpretation of *asādhanāṅgavacana*, except in the case of the expansive discussion (*prapañcakathā*).

NM 2.700.5: etac ca kīrtināpy evam eva kathitam prapañcakathāyāṃ tu na doṣaḥ iti.

And as to this (= “surplus”), Dharmakīrti also said “but there is no fault in the expansive discussion” in the same way.

Jayanta welcomed Dharmakīrti's acceptance of the Nyāya school's thought.

3.4. Consideration of “Lack of an Idea” (*apratibhā*)

The sixteenth condition of defeat defined in NS is “lack of an idea” (*apratibhā*).

NS 5.2.18 (Ci' VN 58,15): uttarasyāpratipattir apratibhā //

“Lack of an idea” means “not hitting on any idea of an answer.”

“Lack of an idea” can be explained as follows²⁷: When an opponent is unable to formulate an answer in response to the assertion of a proponent, he cannot negate the proponent's position. Therefore, such an opponent is to be defeated because of “lack of an idea,” the sixteenth condition of defeat.

In regard to this assertion of the Nyāya school, Dharmakīrti wholly admitted the “lack of an idea” to be a correct condition of defeat.

VN 58,17–20: sādhanavacanānantaraṃ prativīṣayam uttare vyarthaṃ tadajñānakramaghoṣaṇa-ślokapāṭhādīnā kālaṃ gamayan kartavyāpratipattiyā nigrahārha iti nyāyayaṃ nigrahasthānam iti.

Immediately after [a proponent] states a piece of proof²⁸, [an opponent] spending useless time [searching] for the answer to each topic through [actions] such as repeating [the whole assertion of the proponent] in [correct] sequence²⁹ or reciting verse without any idea for it (= an answer) is

²⁷ See VN 58,15–16.

²⁸ See VA 123,15: **sādhanavacanānantaraṃ**⁽¹⁾ prativādinā dūṣaṇaṃ vaktavyam. (⁽¹⁾ sādhanavacanā° *em.* : sādhanavacanā° VA.) (Immediately after [a proponent] states a piece of proof, an opponent has to state an objection.)

²⁹ See VA 123,15–16: sarvānukramānubhāṣaṇena. (by repeating the whole [assertion of a proponent] in correct sequence.) Dharmakīrti denied it to be necessary that the opponent repeats the whole assertion of the proponent in correct sequence when “lack of repetition” (*ananubhāṣaṇa*), i.e., the fourteenth condition of defeat defined by the Nyāya school, is considered at VN 53,17–18.

worthy of defeat because he does not perform that which he should (= refutation of the proponent's proof). Therefore, ["lack of an idea" is] the correct condition of defeat.

According to the system of debate in VN, "lack of an idea" is *adoṣodbhāvana*, i.e., the condition of defeat for an opponent. And the first interpretation of *adoṣodbhāvana*, "not pointing out the fault," is appropriate in this case because "lack of an idea" means "not hitting on any idea of an answer." That is to say, we should conclude that "lack of an idea" corresponds with the first interpretation of *adoṣodbhāvana*.³⁰

NM 2.707.13–14: kīrtir api caitad anumanyata eva nigrahasthānam.

And Dharmakīrti also indeed approves this (= "lack of an idea") as a condition of defeat.

Jayanta welcomed Dharmakīrti's acceptance of the Nyāya school's thought.

3.5. Consideration of "Fallacious Logical Reason" (*hetvābhāsa*)

The twenty-second condition of defeat defined in NS is "fallacious logical reason" (*hetvābhāsa*).

NS 5.2.24 (Ci' VN 68,1): hetvābhāsāś ca yathoktāḥ //

And "fallacious logical reasons" are [the same] as previously stated.

"Fallacious logical reason" is defined in the previous section of the *Nyāyasūtra*, i.e., NS 1.2.4–9. Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara, and Dharmakīrti also³¹ did not explain or examine this term in detail when considering the condition of defeat. However, according to the Nyāya school's definition, "fallacious logical reason" is regarded as a condition of defeat.

In regard to this assertion of the Nyāya school, Dharmakīrti admits that "fallacious logical reason" is a correct condition of defeat.

VN 68,6–9: atrāpi yathoktaṃ kṛtvā cintyam eva, kiṃ te yathālakṣitaḥ prabhedāś tathaiva, āhosvid

³⁰ Śāntaraṅkṣita also considered the "lack of an idea" to be *adoṣodbhāvana*. See VA 123,13–14: sādhy etan nigrahasthānam. ata evāsmābhir apīdam adoṣodbhāvanam ity atroktam ity etat matvā 'bhyanuḥjanāti. (This is a right condition of defeat. For this very reason, we also state that this is *adoṣodbhāvana*. After thinking thus, [we] approve [it].) See Much [1991: 99, Anm. 405].

³¹ Cf. VN 68,1–5.

anyatheti. tat tu cintyamānam ihātiprasajyata iti na pratanyate. hetvābhāsās ca yathānyāyaṃ nigrahasthānam ity etāvanmātram iṣṭam iti.

In this case also, according to the remark “as previously stated,” whether they (= “fallacious logical reasons”) are the same as divisions defined [by the Nyāya school] or not has to be considered. But if it is considered here, [we will] fall into the occasion of [making] too [detailed consideration]. Therefore, [we will] not amplify [this topic]. [Instead we] just mean that “fallacious logical reasons” are conditions of defeat in accordance with logic.

Without the need for consideration, we can conclude that “fallacious logical reason” corresponds with the fourth interpretation of *asāadhanāṅgavacana*, in which the meaning of “stating the fallacious logical reason” is included.

NM 2.717.12: eteṣāṃ dharmakīrter api ca na vimatiḥ nigrahasthānatāyām.

And Dharmakīrti also has no disagreement [with us] as to [the notion that] these (= “fallacious logical reasons”) are conditions of defeat.

Jayanta welcomed Dharmakīrti's acceptance of the Nyāya school's thought.

4. Jayanta's Comprehension of *Nigrahasthāna* put forth by Dharmakīrti

Overall, Jayanta interpreted Dharmakīrti's definition of the condition of defeat as stated below.

NM 2.680.17–2.681.9: doṣānubdhāvanam apratipattiḥ, viparītadoṣodbhāvanam vipratipattiḥ. evam asāadhanāṅgavacanam api vikalpanīyam. prasajyapratīṣedhavṛtṭyā sādhanāṅgasyāvacanam cet, seyam apratipattiḥ. paryudāsavṛtṭyā sādhanāṅgād anyac cet vacanam, seyaṃ vipratipattiḥ. ataḥ śabdāntareṇākṣapādapādebhya eva śīśikṣitvā, tad eva nigrahasthānavayam anena śloke dvayena nibaddham, na punar abhinavam alpam api kiṃcid utprekṣitam iti. na ca yathāsaṃkhyaniyamena dvayor dve nigrahasthāne varṇanīye, api tu yathāsaṃbhavam ubhayor api yathāvasaram tat tan nigrahasthānam ādeṣṭavyam. dvāvīṃśatibhedatvaṃ ca nigrahasthānānam asaṅkīrṇodāharaṇa-vivakṣayā kathyate, na niyamāyety uktam eva. parasparavisadr̥ṣaṃ ca lakṣaṇam eṣāṃ idānīm upadiśyata eva. tatraiva cāyuktatvaṃ eṣāṃ, bālīśapralāpakalpatvaṃ vā parākriyata evety alam atiprasaṅgena.

“Non-understanding” (*apratipatti*) is “not pointing out a fault,” [and] “misunderstanding”

(*vipratipatti*) is “pointing out a wrong fault.” *Asādhanāṅgavacana* also has to be sorted out in this way. If [*asādhanāṅgavacana* means] “not stating *sādhanāṅga*” by a function of direct negation (*prasajyapraṭiṣedha*), this [corresponds with] “non-understanding.” [On the other hand], if [*asādhanāṅgavacana* means] “stating a different thing from *sādhanāṅga*” by a function of indirect negation (*pariyudāsa*), this [corresponds with] “misunderstanding.” Therefore, in the hope of studying [them] through the expression which is different from Akṣapāda's lines, these very two conditions of defeat (= “non-understanding” and “misunderstanding”) are connected with these two [conditions of defeat] (= *asādhanāṅgavacana* and *adoṣodbhāvana*) in the verse. However, any new [information], even if it is a trifling matter, is not expected [in the verse about *asādhanāṅgavacana* and *adoṣodbhāvana*]. Furthermore, it is not needed to describe the two conditions of defeat (= *asādhanāṅgavacana* and *adoṣodbhāvana*) [corresponding] with the two [conditions of defeat] (= “non-understanding” and “misunderstanding”) on the basis of the restriction of numbers (= the first to the first and the second to the second). If anything, depending on the situation, this and that condition of defeat (= *asādhanāṅgavacana* and *adoṣodbhāvana*) should be [respectively] specified in accordance with the possibility as to both [“non-understanding” and “misunderstanding”]. And it was indeed stated that the conditions of defeat were conveyed as twenty-two kinds of divisions because of the desire to express examples without [mutual] confusion but were not [conveyed] in terms of the limitation [of numbers of twenty-two kinds]. At that moment it is necessarily instructed that the definitions of these [conditions of defeat] are mutually different. In that very case it is also necessarily rejected that these [conditions of defeat] are not correct or are foolish small talk. Therefore, stop falling into [saying] too much.

Jayanta's purpose here is to reinterpret *asādhanāṅgavacana* and *adoṣodbhāvana*, which are concepts established by Dharmakīrti, by a function of direct negation (*prasajyapraṭiṣedha*) and indirect negation (*pariyudāsa*).³² He intended to have these two concepts included into “non-understanding” (*apratipatti*) and “misunderstanding” (*vipratipatti*), which are defined in NS. The way of his

³² As for *adoṣodbhāvana*, *Prameyakalamārtaṇḍa* and *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* also interprets this term by a function of *prasajyapraṭiṣedha* and *pariyudāsa*. PKM 674,16–19 (= PM 82,18–20): yac cedam, adoṣodbhāvanam ity asya vyākhyānam. prasajyapraṭiṣedhe doṣodbhāvanābhāvamātram adoṣodbhāvanam, pariyudāse tu doṣābhāsānām anyadoṣāṅgāṃ cobdhāvanam prativādino nigrahasthānam iti (Furthermore, one says as follows: this [term], namely, *adoṣodbhāvana* is explained. [When this term is interpreted by] direct negation, merely “not pointing out the fault [of proponent's assertion]” is *adoṣodbhāvana*. On the other hand, [when this term is interpreted by] indirect negation, “pointing out the pseudo-faults and other faults” is [*adoṣodbhāvana*]. [Thus explained *adoṣodbhāvana* is] the condition of defeat of an opponent.)

interpretation is arranged below in Table 5.

Table 5

Jayanta's reinterpretation of <i>asādhanaṅgavacana</i> and <i>adoṣodbhāvana</i>	
Nyāya's <i>nigrahasthāna</i>	Dharmakīrti's <i>nigrahasthāna</i>
<i>apratipatti</i>	<i>sādhanaṅgasya avacanam</i> (<i>asādhanaṅgavacana</i> interpreted by means of <i>prasajyapraṭiṣedha</i>)
	<i>doṣasya anudbhāvanam</i> (<i>adoṣodbhāvana</i> interpreted by means of <i>prasajyapraṭiṣedha</i>)
<i>vipratipatti</i>	<i>asādhanaṅgasya vacanam</i> (<i>asādhanaṅgavacana</i> interpreted by means of <i>paryudāsa</i>)
	<i>adoṣasya udbhāvanam</i> (<i>adoṣodbhāvana</i> interpreted by means of <i>paryudāsa</i>)

According to Jayanta, *asādhanaṅgavacana* and *adoṣodbhāvana* are created not for the purpose of adding some new information to *apratipatti* and *vipratipatti*, but for the purpose of a different approach through putting *apratipatti* and *vipratipatti* in another way.

Dharmakīrti criticized the Nyāya school's “conditions of defeat” for mutual overlaps and rejected many conditions. However, Jayanta cleverly avoided this criticism by explaining that the twenty-two conditions of defeat defined in NS are not intended for the limitation of numbers but for expressing them clearly and without confusion.

5. Concluding Remarks

The main points from Tables 1 through 5 are collected and arranged in Table 6 on the next page. This table helps to show how Jayanta interpreted the correspondence relationship of “the conditions of defeat” (*nigrahasthāna*) between NS and VN.

In the position of VN, “insufficient” (*nyūna*) corresponds with the first and second interpretation of *asādhanaṅgavacana* (*sādhanaṅgasya avacanam*), and according to NM, *sādhanaṅgasya avacanam* corresponds with “non-understanding” (*apratipatti*). However, as long as the first and second interpretation of *asādhanaṅgavacana* are considered to correspond with “insufficient,” “insufficient” cannot be listed in this table because Jayanta flatly objected to Dharmakīrti's assertion regarding “insufficient”.

Table 6

Jayanta's comprehension of the correspondence relationship of <i>nigrahasthāna</i> between NS and VN			
Jayanta's interpretation in NM		Dharmakīrti's interpretation in VN agreed by Jayanta	
NS's terms	VN's terms	VN's terms	NS's terms
<i>apratipatti</i>	<i>sādhanāṅgasya avacanam</i>	1st interpretation of <i>asādhanāṅgavacana</i>	«11» “Insufficient” (<i>nyūna</i>)
		2nd interpretation of <i>asādhanāṅgavacana</i>	
	<i>doṣasya anubhāvanam</i>	1st interpretation of <i>adoṣodbhāvana</i>	«16» “lack of an idea” (<i>apratibhā</i>)
<i>vipratipatti</i>	<i>asādhanāṅgasya vacanam</i>	3rd interpretation of <i>asādhanāṅgavacana</i>	«12» “surplus” (<i>adhika</i>)
		4th interpretation of <i>asādhanāṅgavacana</i>	«22» “fallacious logical reason” (<i>hetvābhāsa</i>)
		5th interpretation of <i>asādhanāṅgavacana</i>	«6» “different affair” (<i>arthāntara</i>) ³³
	<i>adoṣasya udbhāvanam</i>	2nd interpretation of <i>adoṣodbhāvana</i>	

Traditionally, the Nyāya school classified the twenty-two conditions of defeat into *apratipatti* and *vipratipatti* in its own way. However, isn't the traditional way of classification contrary to Table 6? We have to consider this problem through the following text.

NM 2.679.09–10 (Ce'e NBh 404,5–6)³⁴: atrānanubhāṣaṇam ajñānam apratibhā vikṣepaḥ paryanuyojoyopekṣaṇam iti apratipattiyā samgrhītāni; śeṣāni vipratipattiyā.

Among these [twenty-two conditions of defeat], “lack of repetition” (*ananubhāṣaṇa*), “lack of

³³ To be more accurate, when considering Jayanta's miscomprehension in NM 2.693.4–8, it is problematic to list the correspondence relationship between “different affair” and the 5th interpretation of *asādhanāṅgavacana* or the 2nd interpretation of *adoṣodbhāvana* in Table 6. See footnote 13 for details.

³⁴ NBh 404,5–6: tatrānanubhāṣaṇam ajñānam apratibhā vikṣepo matānujñā paryanuyojoyopekṣaṇam ity apratipattir nigrahasthānam, śeṣas tu vipratipattir iti. (Among these [twenty-two conditions of defeat], “lack of repetition” (*ananubhāṣaṇa*), “lack of comprehension” (*ajñāna*), “lack of an idea” (*apratibhā*), “throw-out” (*vikṣepa*), “Admitting the opinion” (*matānujñā*), and “overlooking what is blamable” (*paryanuyojoyopekṣaṇa*) are [collected into] “non-understanding” (*apratipatti*), which is the condition of defeat; on the other hand, the rest are [collected into] “misunderstanding” (*vipratipatti*)).

comprehension” (*ajñāna*), “lack of an idea” (*apratibhā*), “throw-out” (*vikṣepa*), and “overlooking what is blamable” (*paryanuyojoyopekṣaṇa*) are collected into “non-understanding” (*apratipatti*) and the rest are [collected into] “misunderstanding” (*vipratipatti*).

According to the explanation by NM which parallels NBh's sentence, among the conditions of defeat shown in Table 6, the sixteenth, “lack of an idea” (*apratibhā*), corresponds with “non-understanding” (*apratipatti*). The rest, namely the sixth, “different affair,” (*arthāntara*), the eleventh, “insufficient” (*nyūna*), the twelfth, “surplus” (*adhika*), and the twenty-second, “fallacious logical reason” (*hetvābhāsa*), correspond with “misunderstanding” (*vipratipatti*). The point to observe here is that this traditional way classifies “insufficient” into the “misunderstanding.” This classification, however, does not lead to an inconsistency in Table 6 because Jayanta objected to Dharmakīrti's interpretation of the “insufficient” as stated above, and hence Dharmakīrti's interpretation of the “insufficient” should not be listed in Table 6, which shows Jayanta's comprehension of the correspondence relationship of “the conditions of defeat” between NS and VN.

Therefore, the result clearly shows that Jayanta consistently reimported Dharmakīrti's interpretation of the Nyāya school's doctrine into the traditional Nyāya school's theory, except for the condition “insufficient.”

Jayanta resolved *asādhanāṅgavacana* and *adoṣodbhāvana*, which were concepts first devised by Dharmakīrti in VN, into “non-understanding” (*apratipatti*) and “misunderstanding” (*vipratipatti*), i.e., the traditional concepts in the doctrine of the Nyāya school. Furthermore, he welcomed and reimported Dharmakīrti's assertion in which some of the twenty-two conditions of defeat are admitted to be correct. By cleverly accepting Dharmakīrti's opinion, Jayanta showed the superiority of the Nyāya school's theory over Dharmakīrti's position in VN through the statement that the latter has no new point of view compared to the former.

Abbreviations and Bibliography

1. Sigla

- Ci'e** citatum in alio usus secundarii modo edendi / citation in another text used secondarily, that is, not marked by an author as being a citation, with redactional changes.
- Ci'** citatum in alio usus secundarii / citation in another text used secondarily, that is, a passage not marked by an author as being a citation.
- Ce'e** citatum ex alio usus secundarii modo edendi / citation from another text used secondarily, that is not marked by the author as being a citation, with redactional changes.

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- NBh** *Nyāyabhāṣya* (Vātsyāyana): See NV.
- NM** *Nyāyamañjarī* (Bhaṭṭa Jayanta): ed. K. S. Varadācārya, *Nyāyamañjarī of Jayantabhaṭṭa with Ṭippanī – Nyāyasaurabha*, 2 vols. Oriental Research Institute, Mysore, 1969, 1983.
- NS** *Nyāyasūtra* (Gautama): See NV.
- NV** *Nyāyavārttika* (Uddyotakara): eds. Tāranātha Nyāya-Tarkatīrtha and Amarendramohan Tarkatīrtha, *Nyāyadarśana with Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya, Uddyotakara's Vārttika, Vācaspati Miśra's Tātparyāṭīkā and Viṣvanātha's Vṛtti*, Calcutta Sanskrit Series Nos. 18 & 29, Calcutta, 1936–44, rep. Rinsen Book, Kyoto, 1982.
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