

Kuwon: ResearchPapers Vol. 4, Young Buddhist Association of Waseda University, March 2013

On the Function of Name in the Preaching and Listening to the Teachings

TOBITA Yasuhiro

It is desirable as well as necessary for Buddhists that the newly discovered truth can be stated by the Buddha through preaching, and that the very truth can be understood by the followers through listening to the teachings. Therefore, the problem of how it is possible to realize the fulfillment of these purposes began to be discussed from a rather early stage of the development of Buddhism. Eventually the discussion was encapsulated into the relationship between Speech (sound), Name (abstract idea), and Matter (object).

The objective of this paper is to make explicit, from the viewpoint of the history of thought, the process in which the discussion of the relationship between Speech, Name, and Matter converged. The method for this study is threefold. Firstly, I examine the historical development of the discussion about “the basis of Speech” (**kathāvastu*), *i.e.*, the relationship between Speech and the basis of Speech. Secondly, I examine the development of the discussion about “gates to deliverance” (**vimuktyāyatana*), *i.e.*, the relationship between Speech, Name, and Matter. Finally, I compare these discussions. As a result of the examination of these discussions, I conclude the following process.

First of all, since the era of the *Āgama* (*ca.* 4c. B. C. - 2c. B. C.), the discussion about “the basis of Speech” considered this relationship from the viewpoint of those who make a speech; Matter, *i.e.*, the basis of Speech, can generate a Speech. [A] On the other hand, the discussion about “gates to deliverance” separately considered this relationship from the viewpoint of those who make a speech; Matter and Name can generate consciousness, and this consciousness can generate Speech by means of the Name. Moreover, from the viewpoint of those who listen to the speech, the heard Speech can affect the Name, and thereby the Name can manifest the Matter. [B]

However, around the time when the **Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣāśāstra* was compiled (*ca.* 2c. B. C. - 2c. A. D.), both of these discussions, [A] and [B], which deal with the relationship between Matter and Speech from the viewpoint of those who make a speech, was integrated. As a result, the discussion about the relationship between Speech and the basis of Speech in discussion [A] was incorporated into the discussion about the relationship between Speech, Name, and Matter in discussion [B]. Therefore, it can be conjectured that the relationship came to be interpreted that both Matter and Name are the basis of Speech, but, strictly speaking, Name should only be the basis of Speech, in the sense that Name is more directly the basis of Speech. [C]

Nevertheless, this integration [C] causes one difficult problem: although this new interpretation

[C] needs one more interpretation in order to dissolve the contradiction with the first old doctrine [A], the other old doctrine [B] shows nothing as to the relationship between Matter, Name, and Speech except that Matter and Name can indirectly generate their common result, Speech; namely, as to the relationship between Matter and Name, the two have no relationship. Hence, there is no dissolving the contradiction between the unrelated two. Fortunately, the latter doctrine [B] presents this relationship from the viewpoint of those who listen to a speech, which shows that Speech can affect Name, and thereby Name can manifest Matter.

Therefore, the discussion about “the basis of Speech” is primarily about the relationship between cause and effect from the viewpoint of those who make Speech; however, in order to dissolve contradiction, the relationship between what is based and what is the base (affecting and affected, or manifesting and manifested) from the viewpoint of those who listen to Speech is applicable to the discussion about “the basis of Speech,” and eventually the interpretation and explanation from the viewpoint of the listeners of the teachings came to be the mainstream.

Dharmottara's Theory of Cognition of the Object: Between the Conceptual and the Non-conceptual

MIYO Mai

The Buddhist logico-epistemological school accepts two kinds of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*), direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*), and direct perception as cognition free from conceptual construction. Therefore, direct perception is supposed to operate as valid cognition without any conceptual construction. However, Dharmottara, in his commentary on Dharmakīrti's opuses, defines valid cognition as the cognition that causes a person to make an act, and he is of the opinion that making an act presupposes judgment of some kind or another. Then, the question is how direct perception without conceptual cognition could be considered as valid cognition, if the judgment is conceptualistic.

In this article, I would like to examine how Dharmottara resolved this question referring to his *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, *Laghuprāmāṇyaparīkṣā* and *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā*, with previous studies by Dr. Oki Kazufumi and Dr. Helmut Krasser. I focus especially on cognition of the object (*arthādhigati*), which is presented as the result of valid cognition (*pramāṇaphala*) in the case of direct perception, and deal with the problems of the relation between cognition of the object and the judgment and whether the cognition of the object is conceptual or non-conceptual.

At first, I confirm Dharmottara's definition of valid cognition and its result. According to him,