Moreover, I clarify the role *abhāvapramā* plays in *svaprakāśa* of the Advaitavedānta school by examining Citsukha's (ca. 13th) *Tattvapradīpikā* (TP). Similar to the Kh, this work discusses *abhāvapramā* and *viparyaya* as evidence of *vijñāna svaprakāśatā*. By examining Kh and TP, it becomes clear that there are parallel arguments in both texts and that in this debate *viparyaya* and *abhāvapramā* (*vyatirekapramā*, *viparītapramā*) are consistent with each other. As a result, I conclude that the difference between *abhāvapramā* and *viparyaya* is as follows.

First, if cognition is present and if it is known correctly, then correct knowledge occurs. However, if *viparyaya* occurs when that cognition is not accurately known, then this *viparyaya* is knowledge that is incorrectly recognized as opposed to the content of cognition. On the other hand, when *abhāvapramā* occurs it is unrelated to the content of recognition and cognition that such cognition itself does not exist occurs. As described above, the difference between *abhāvapramā* and *viparyaya* is whether there is the recognition that the content of cognition is incorrect in regards to the cognition of the object, or whether it is incorrect knowledge about the presence or absence of cognition.

As a result of the above considerations, it becomes clear that *abhāvapramā* in the demonstration of *svaprakāśa* in the Advaitavedānta school is, unlike *viparyaya* that is related to the recognizing of content, the knowledge related to the presence or absence of cognition of the object. Then, *abhāvapramā* is the correct knowledge of the absence of the cognition of subject, but by saying that *abhāvapramā* does not exist, scholars of the Advaitavedānta school tried to claim that cognition that is the subject is always present.

Dharmakīrti's interpretation of *nigrahasthāna* (2): On *adoṣodbhāvana*

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Dharmakīrti (c. 600-660) defined "the condition of defeat" (*nigrahasthāna*) — a traditional concept in the art of debate — from a totally new viewpoint in his work *Vādanyāya* (VN). He divided it into *asādhanāṅgavacana*, the condition of defeat for proponents, and *adoṣodbhāvana*, the condition of defeat for opponents. This compels us then to conclude that a proponent is judged to be defeated when his behavior corresponds to *asādhanāṅgavacana* and an opponent is judged to be defeated when his behavior corresponds to *adoṣodbhāvana*, according to the terms of debate set up in the VN. However, based on the descriptions supplied in the VN, this conclusion must in fact be wrong.

The conditions of victory or defeat in debate in the VN should not be clarified only through an analysis of *asādhanāṅgavacana* and *adoṣodbhāvana*. We have to disentangle the relationship between

proponents and opponents in order to understand these conditions. However, there has been no study that has tried to abstract and arrange these conditions of victory or defeat. Therefore, this paper aims to clarify the entire picture of these conditions and discusses related issues, such as details of *adoṣodbhāvana* and the form of debate Dharmakīrti intended.

These conditions of victory and defeat are as follows. First, the proponent states a proof, and the proof is then divided into whether it is correct [1] or wrong [2] (i.e., *asādhanāṅgavacana*). When the proponent's proof is correct and the opponent does not point out any fault in it (the first interpretation of *adoṣodbhāvana*), then the proponent is judged to have won and the opponent is considered defeated [1-1]. Other conditions may prevail however: [1-2] when the proponent's proof is correct but the opponent points out a pseudo-fault in it (the second interpretation of *adoṣodbhāvana*); [1-2-1] when the proponent is successful in rebutting the pseudo-fault, so the proponent is judged to have won and the opponent is considered defeated; and conversely [1-2-2] when the proponent cannot rebut the pseudo-fault, so there is no victory or defeat for either party. We also have [2-1] when the proponent's proof has some faults and the opponent points out those faults adequately, and thus the opponent is judged to have won and the proponent is considered defeated. But for [2-2], even if the proponent's proof has some faults, if the opponent does not point out any faults (the first interpretation of *adoṣodbhāvana*), then neither party is victorious or defeated. Similarly for [2-3], if the proponent's proof has some faults and the opponent points out only a pseudo-fault (the second interpretation of *adoṣodbhāvana*), there is again no victory or defeat for either party.

In debating, even if the proponent's proof has a fault, the opponent may not necessarily recognize the truth, and if the opponent cannot point out the fault adequately, then the proponent is not necessarily presenting the correct proof. From the above-stated regulations for victory or defeat, we can see that Dharmakīrti's intention is to avoid a situation where if both the proponent and opponent fail to recognize the truth, they are judged victorious or defeated. From this intention, we can also comprehend Dharmakīrti's view that looking for the truth has priority over victory. Thus, we can conclude that this point of view — that the purpose of debate should be to benefit others, including not only the rivals in debate but also those in attendance — is reflected in the conditions of victory or defeat outlined in the VN.