

following five meanings. The first meaning of *asādhānāṅgavacana* is *iṣṭasyārthasya siddheḥ kāraṇasyāvacanam*. The second meaning is *trirūpāhetuvacanasamudāyasya avayavyāvacanam*. The third meaning is *trirūpāhetuvacanasamudāyasya anavayavyasya vacanam*. The fourth meaning is *iṣṭasyārthasya siddher akāraṇasya vacanam*. The fifth meaning is *asādhānāṅgasyāprastutasya vacanam*. Furthermore, these five meanings are explained in more detail by use of logical concepts, for example, *trividham liṅgam*, *trirūpāhetu*, *hetvābhāsa* and so forth. In this way, Dharmakīrti gives his own original definition to "the condition of defeat".

## An Inquiry into Kamalāśīla's Influence on the Definition of *bodhicitta*

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This paper inquires into Kamalāśīla's influence on the definition of the mind that aspires to enlightenment (*bodhicitta*) in late Mahāyāna Buddhism. It consists of two parts. In the first part, I reconfirm Kamalāśīla's understanding of *bodhicitta* in his *First Bhāvanākrama* (BhKr I). Then, in the second part, I consider Jñānakīrti's understanding in his *Pāramitāyānabhāvanākramopadeśa* (PBhU).

Kamalāśīla (ca. 740–795), a scholar representative of the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka school, shows in his BhKr-I the course for Bodhisattvas to realize enlightenment. This course consists of three stages, namely, compassion (*karuṇā*), the mind for enlightenment (*bodhicitta*), and practice (*pratipatti*). He classifies *bodhicitta* into two types, namely, *prañidhicitta* and *prasthānacitta*. The first (*prañidhicitta*) is the practitioner's will to realize enlightenment for the salvation of all beings. This *prañidhicitta* is connected with *karuṇā*. The second (*prasthānacitta*) is the mental foundation for practitioners who strive for self-control (*saṃvaragrahaṇa*) and to collect supplies for entering into practice (*pratipatti*). This *prasthānacitta* is connected with *pratipatti*. Kamalāśīla seems to systematize the course for Bodhisattvas (i.e., *karuṇā* ⇒ *prañidhicitta* — *prasthānacitta* ⇒ *pratipatti*) by defining *bodhicitta* in this way.

Jñānakīrti (ca. 9c.), who is presumed to have been a scholar of the Vajrayāna, wrote the PBhU on the basis of the BhKr I. However, his understanding of *bodhicitta* differs from that in the BhKr I. Jñānakīrti classifies *bodhicitta* into 22 types (i.e., three types of *prañidhicitta* and 19 types of *prasthānacitta*). Further, these 22 types are distinguished according to the practitioner's mental stages, including the final stage (*buddhabhūmi*). In this understanding, we can regard the completion of meditation on *bodhicitta* as the cause of attainment of the final stage. But Jñānakīrti states that the cause

is two practices (i.e., knowledge (*prajñā*) and means (*upāya*)). Therefore, in the PBhU we can regard 1) meditation on *bodhicitta* or 2) knowledge and means as the cause of attainment of the final stage. How, then, does he associate these two ideas? Jñānakīrti defines *prasthānacitta* as the mental foundation for practitioners who strive to collect supplies (*saṃbhāra*) such as giving (*dānādi*) for entering into practice (*pratipatti*). This definition is based on Kamalaśīla's definition. In Jñānakīrti's definition, the important point is that *saṃbhāra* is defined as *dānādi*, which are connected with *upāya*. Therefore, we can consider that *prasthānacitta* is connected with *upāya*. And Jñānakīrti regards *prajñā* as the cause for ascertaining the right state of *upāya*.

Jñānakīrti's definition of *prasthānacitta* was based on Kamalaśīla's definition. In Jñānakīrti's understanding, *saṃbhāra* is limited to that which is relevant to *upāya*. From this point, we can understand that *prasthānacitta* is connected with *upāya* in Jñānakīrti's PBhU. This understanding is not found in Kamalaśīla's BhKr I.

## The Demonstration of Cognition as Being Self-luminous by Śrīharṣa

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Śrīharṣa (ca. 12<sup>th</sup>) argued that Brahman is self-luminous (*svaprakāśa*) in the *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍakhādyā* (Kh), which he wrote from the position of the Advaita Vedānta. In this case, he proved that Brahman is self-luminous by proving that cognition (*vijñāna*), which is the nature of Brahman, is self-luminous.

In the Kh, the demonstration of cognition as being self-luminous mainly consists of criticism of the Nyāya school, the opponent, and at the beginning he proves positively that cognition is self-luminous. He replaces the self-luminousness of cognition with its being self-proved. Further, he considers it to be established through a process of self-luminosity. It is proved as follows that cognition is established through a process of self-awareness.

Experientially, when knowledge arises, there is for no one who seeks to know the object any doubt (*saṃśaya*) or error (*viparyaya*) or the valid cognition that cognition does not exist (*vyatirekapramā*). This implies that the cognition which exists in them is known correctly. By converting this empirical fact into a logical relationship, it is concluded that the cognition is known correctly when there is neither doubt nor error nor the valid cognition that it does not exist regarding that which exists in those who seek to know the object that is wished to be known. Otherwise, there would be doubt or error or the valid cognition that the cognition does not exist for those without the