

Telling domestic and international policy stories: The case of Russian Arctic policy

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Introduction

Governments have a broad variety of tools to communicate their aspirations and plans with domestic elites, as well as with governments abroad. In the policy process, in order to bring up a new or redefine an old issue on the agenda with the ultimate goal of changing policy, media conventionally becomes a venue where policy images and narratives are mobilised (Jones and Baumgartner 2005). Domestic policy communication usually aims at informing citizens of the existence of a certain policy and gaining their support in pursuing this policy, for instance, comply with the policy requirements, participate, approve of budgetary transfers and the like (Ahn 2012). In their international political communication, governments are aiming at foreign governments and publics to inform them regarding their policy goals, intentions and activities, as well as to build a certain image using public diplomacy and soft power tools (Nye 2004; Sherr 2013).

In Russia, the Arctic policy has witnessed a revival in the past 15 years. The Russian strategic documents present ambitious plans to make the Arctic a profitable part of the Russian state, energy powerhouse, and a source of increased geopolitical power. The realisation of Arctic policies is envisioned through state support in the sphere of resource development, transport and power infrastructure, as well as through tax arrangements and co-financing from budgets of various levels and off-budget sources (Arctic Strategy 2008). In other words, the state guarantees financial support to the numerous industrial developments in the High North. While the Russian government has been experiencing problems with maintaining the country's welfare system (Cook 2013), the government could be expected to enhance popular sentiment with regard to Arctic development through communicating its policy aspirations as a compelling narrative.

Internationally, the growing importance placed on the Arctic in contemporary Russian domestic political speech and international rhetoric posed the question regarding its ambitions and plans, as well as speculations about its readiness to use military strength (Cohen, Szaszi and Dolbow 2008). Some commentators concluded that Russia is being a 'troublemaker', pursuing aggressive and expansionist politics that will eventually lead to conflict (Kraska 2009; Aron 2013). Others regarded Russia as a 'status quo seeker' interested in maintaining the region as an area of international cooperation and in preserving its most important asset as the country's future economic engine – its stability (Overland 2010; Keil 2014; Heininen, Sergunin and Yarovoy 2014).

Previous research emphasised that the Western media tend to over-interpret the official Russian statements and called for a more nuanced scholarly understanding of Russian policy in the Arctic (Piskunova 2009; Lackenbauer 2010; Laruelle 2011a, 2011b, 2013; Johnston 2012). Wilson Rowe (2013) showed that Russian media coverage framing the Arctic as a zone for cooperation rather than conflict grew steadily during 2008–11, so that by 2011 articles with a conflict-oriented tone had almost disappeared. Gritsenko (2016) demonstrated that hydrocarbon energy development has dominated the Russian Arctic policy agenda mediated through the mainstream Russian media outlets during 2011–15. Khrushcheva and Poberezhskaya (2016) argued that Russian leaders use symbolic means to frame Russia's Arctic policy to the Russian public in order to justify Russia's claim to the Arctic region and the development of abundant Arctic resources.

Based on extensive empirical analysis of policy communication, this chapter investigates the difference between the Arctic narratives presented by the Russian government to the domestic and foreign audiences. We apply narrative policy analysis (Nye 2004; Jones and McBeth 2010) to demonstrate how the Russian government offers two separate, yet intersecting policy stories. For the domestic audience, it highlights the socio-economic significance of natural (hydrocarbon) resources to the development of the Arctic region and Russia as a whole, and demonstrates persistence in turning the Arctic into the primary resource base 'against

all odds’ (such as the Western economic sanctions and low price of oil). For the foreign publics, it presents the narrative of the Arctic as a territory of peace and stability, emphasising adherence to the norms and principles of the international law.

The two facets of the Russian Arctic policy

Russia has a long history of economic (including maritime, fisheries, and extractive industries) and scientific activity in the region located above the Arctic Circle and usually referred to as ‘Far North’ (Krayniy Sever) in Russian. The collapse of the Soviet Union caused significant disinvestment into the Russian Arctic region, which resulted in decreasing activity, deteriorating infrastructure, and massive outwards migration. During the 1990s, Russian Arctic policy was not a coherent set of activities, but rather a response to economic and social crises. This situation was unfavourable from the Russian point of view as it complicated access to the Arctic riches (in particular, mineral energy resources) and undermined potential benefits from the development of commercial maritime activities.

In 2001, the Russian Cabinet approved the draft of a document titled “Foundations of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic,” outlining the Russian national interests in the Arctic, which can be regarded as the beginning of the modern era of Russian Arctic policy. Table 12.1 shows that between 2008 and 2015, a series of new concepts, strategies, and doctrines were adopted to frame plans of the Russian government in the Arctic in the long term, as well as within specific policy sectors, such as energy, transport, and security. In order to improve administrative support for Arctic zone development, the State Commission for the Development of the Arctic was established in 2015 by the RF Government, institutionalising the preceding strategic communications.

Table 12.1 Russian Policy Instruments for Arctic Development, 2008–14

Year	Document	Priorities relevant to Arctic development
2008	Foundations of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic Up to and Beyond 2020	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - develop three strategic resource bases: oil and natural gas, fisheries, and minerals. - maintain the Arctic as a zone of peace and cooperation - environmental protection - promotion of the Northern Sea Route (NSR)
2008	Transport Strategy of the Russian Federation up to 2030	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - develop maritime activities in the Arctic; - refurbish the Northern Sea Route infrastructure (ice-class vessels, ice breakers, coastal infrastructure, functioning border control and rescue service); - maintain and enhance port infrastructure.
2009	Russian Energy Strategy up to 2030	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - develop the Arctic region as one of the key areas for future extraction of oil and gas
2009	Strategy for National Security of the Russian Federation until 2020	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - improve border protection and infrastructure related to possession of energy resources in the Arctic

2013	The Strategy for Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and National Security up to 2020	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - comprehensive socio-economic development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation; - develop science and technology; - create modern information and telecommunications infrastructure; - ensure ecological safety; - international cooperation in the Arctic; - military security, defense, protection of the state border.
2014	Russian Energy Strategy up to 2035	- increase energy production in the Arctic (5% of total oil and 10% of total gas extraction from Arctic offshore sources by 2035).
2014	State Programme “Socio-Economic Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation for the Period until 2020”	Includes a list of activities from other RF state programmes implemented in the Arctic zone.

Source: Pilli-Sihvola et al. 2016. Translated by the authors

Besides the orientation towards the Arctic in Russian domestic politics, another facet of the Russian Arctic policy is international cooperation on Arctic-related issues. From the very beginning, Russia was an active member of the intergovernmental Arctic fora, in particular the Arctic Council (Heininen 2013). In 1997, Russia ratified The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which has become the basic international regime governing the Arctic. Recently, Russia actively participated in Arctic cooperation by entering into bilateral and multilateral agreements with other Arctic states (Table 12.2, see also Konyshev and Sergunin, this volume).

Table 12.2 Key international Arctic events involving Russia 2010–2017

Year	International event
2010	Norwegian-Russian Treaty on the Delimitation of the Barents Sea
2013	The Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic
2013	The Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution, Preparedness and Response in the Arctic in 2013
2014	Economic sanctions imposed over the Ukrainian conflict (incl. restrictions on trade in certain types of energy technology, access to credit, and asset freezing) hit Arctic projects
2017	The International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code)

Source: Authors.

The escalation of the Ukrainian crisis, especially Russia’s intervention in the Ukraine in early 2014, has raised questions regarding the future of international cooperation in the Arctic (Klimenko 2014). In the light of the Ukrainian situation, increasing Arctic militarisation has been perceived as a sign of Russia’s readiness to use military force to achieve its geopolitical ambitions (Norris 2014). The sanctions imposed by the EU, the United States, and some other countries have created constraints for the implementation of Arctic energy projects previously envisaged as cooperation between Russian and Western companies (Aalto 2016). Generally, the

scholars provide reassurances that the Arctic is not the Ukraine and that Russia will 'play by the rules' in the Arctic as its material and political interests will come first: success in attaining sustainable economic growth and development in the Arctic depends upon its ability to align with other powers.

Analysing Arctic policy communication

Scholars have long recognised that there are differences between the domestic and foreign policy communication. Does such dualist communication apply to Russia's Arctic policy? Wilson Rowe and Blakkisrud (2014) argued that Russia's Arctic policy can be characterised by an open/close dichotomy: on the one hand, open to international cooperation, on the other hand, concerned with national economic and security interests. If this is the case, we are likely to observe differences in policy communication for international and domestic audiences. To test this hypothesis, we compared internal and external communication to find out how they differ.

Our data consisted of articles from Rossiiskaya Gazeta (Russian Gazette, RG), a federal level newspaper widely circulated in Russia and founded by the Government of the Russian Federation in 1990, and materials from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA). Using the keyword 'Arctic', we retrieved the full texts of the RG newspaper from Integrum database and the texts published on the MoFA official website (www.mid.ru) for the period 1 January 2011–31 December 2015. The final sample consists of 167 individual texts from the RG, ranging from daily news, special reports and interviews of government officials to expert commentaries on state documents and policies, and 136 texts from MoFA, including official speeches, interviews, statements, transcripts of meetings, and communiqués.

The method used in this study is qualitative content analysis and the software used is ATLAS.ti (Miles and Huberman 1994). The essence of the method is to proceed from individual data points (e.g. news articles) to information on the case through categorising the information by its thematic structure (inductive coding), aggregating the initial codes into larger categories (axial coding), and examining the patterns emerging from the analysis of these categories. In the final stage, we compare the structure of two communications by treating them as policy stories (Nye, 2004, p. 26) comprised of setting (basic assumptions), policy problems (villains), and policy solutions (heroes). Using these components, we map the overlaps and disagreements between domestic policy expectations and foreign policy aspirations. Of course, one cannot draw a direct line between the domestic and international communication, as domestic news can be reported abroad, whereas the MoFA statements are translated for the domestic audience, and all the materials can be freely accessed via the Internet. However, the difference between the newspaper of record and the foreign ministry statements is due to the different communicative goals and different primary target audience.

Domestic policy story

The scope of internal Arctic communication is quite broad, covering various aspects of Russian Arctic policy – economic, energy, social, environmental, security. The economy is at the center of the policy story told by the RG newspaper. The Arctic is depicted as a future resource base for a range of valuable natural resources and economic advantages. There are two distinct narratives pertaining to the Arctic future. One indicates multiple economic opportunities in the Arctic and their positive effect on regional development and well-being in the Arctic region. Another concentrates on the Arctic as a driving force of economic development for the whole country, and shows how the properties of the Arctic region, in particular resourcefulness and geographic location, could open up potential for international business and strengthen Russia's position in the global economy.

The two main aspects of Arctic economic potential are energy, in particular the offshore hydrocarbon resources, and commercial use of Arctic shipping via the Northern Sea Route (NSR). The two aspects are usually mentioned together and presented as two facets of the same process of unlocking the Arctic potential for the Russian economy. The growing importance of offshore reserves is motivated through both growing energy demand worldwide and a decline in conventional sources. In particular, gas is emphasised as the future of energy. When it comes to Arctic shipping, the argument of reduced distance and the NSR as a shortcut between Europe and Asia is primarily used. NSR maritime logistics is expected to pose viable competition to the Suez Canal route and strengthen Russia's economic cooperation with the Asian countries. In terms of both the energy and shipping sectors, active participation of international companies and the global potential of these sectors is central for the argument.

Besides energy and shipping, which are expected to form the backbone of Russian Arctic economy, fisheries, forestry, mining, tourism, and reindeer meat export are mentioned as potential sources of regional competitive advantage. Transport and logistics, as well as other matters of regional infrastructure development, are represented in direct connection to the overall plans for Arctic development. In particular, such projects as the Yamal LNG, Sabetta port, Murmansk port and railway link 'Severnyi Shirotnyi Khod' are identified as strategic infrastructures that will enable access to the Arctic region. The Murmansk and Arkhangelsk regions, as well as Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug (district) and Yakutia are the most frequently mentioned Arctic regions.

Social and environmental policies in the Arctic are among the significant topics discussed in RG. The welfare of people living in harsh Arctic conditions, human security related to the practice of Northern Deliveries (Severnyi Zavoz), as well as creating possibilities for the indigenous population to maintain a traditional lifestyle while benefiting from active economic development in the Arctic are addressed. Research and education are quite marginal topics. Much attention is paid to the environmental side of Arctic development, in particular, mitigating the legacies of the Soviet era through a large-scale Arctic clean up. Also, the need to take the fragile Arctic ecosystem into consideration when moving forward with large infrastructure projects is discussed. The creation of new national parks and nature protection areas is portrayed as one of the priorities for both federal and regional governments. Climate change is much less of an issue in comparison to nature protection – the topic of uncertainty regarding its causes and consequences is raised multiple times.

Russian energy policy is widely covered, including such controversies as energy poverty and insecurity in remote settlements and the global energy future in the face of climate change. The need for new solutions to provide energy security in off-the-grid settlements based on renewables is recognised. The uncertainties related to future oil markets are acknowledged, and much emphasis is placed on gas, as well as on the technological development that accompanies the plans for Arctic exploration. In fact, technology and innovation is a topic that receives a lot of attention. Although the need for new technology to develop oil and gas fields in harsh conditions, i.e. offshore, is recognised, this technology is regarded as a driver for innovation in other spheres.

Institutionalisation of Russian Arctic policy is a topic of its own. The lack of legal and institutional support is emphasised as an obstacle to building up the Arctic economy – and during the observation period new legislation is adopted (Arctic Zone law), and a new body established (Arctic Commission) to coordinate Arctic affairs. The highest state officials, in particular, Vladimir Putin in both his PM and presidential role, are quoted very often with regard to the necessity of Arctic development.

Foreign policy issues are covered very briefly, there are only few mentions of the Arctic Council; bilateral and diplomatic relations are mentioned only when directly linked to internal developments. Examples of international cooperation projects are scarce and very few remarks are made on other Arctic countries. In

fact, the AC countries are mentioned much more rarely than the potential for cooperation with Asian partners, and China in particular.

External policy story

The main concept that can be used to describe Russia's external communication narrative is 'Arctic cooperation'. Arctic cooperation is presented as the main tool for a safe and peaceful Arctic, which is one of the priorities of Russian Arctic policy. It is explicitly stated in the policy story presented by MoFA that Russia's national interests in the Arctic can only be realised in cooperation with other countries. Two types of 'Arctic cooperation' can be identified: bilateral and multilateral.

Bilateral cooperation can be divided into political dialogue with Arctic states and business partnerships with non-Arctic states. The Arctic states have different characteristics based on the strength of bilateral relations, ranging from very close (Norway and Finland), to good (Denmark, Iceland, Sweden), and limited (United States). Canada has shifted its position from good to limited/tense cooperation after the Ukrainian crisis. Very close cooperation means that there is on average more meetings, more bilateral agreements and reassurance about the deepening political dialogue, as well as specific types of cooperation, rather than generic (e.g. fisheries cooperation with Norway, bilateral trade and tourism with Finland). Good cooperation means regular meetings and no open contradictions. The United States is mentioned as a country with which Russia has most divergent positions.

As for multilateral cooperation, it can also be divided into several subtypes. The first and most emphasised is cooperation within the framework of the Arctic Council (AC). Russia endorses the AC, shows its full support, and is positive that the AC shall be the main body in the Arctic. Besides the AC, Russia endorses other regional programmes and cross-border initiatives, such as the Arctic Five, Barents Cooperation, Northern Dimension, Arctic Economic Council, and the like. The emphasis is more on intergovernmental rather than subregional or transnational dimensions. The multilateral format does not, however, mean global governance of the Arctic region. This policy story often emphasises that Arctic States shall bear responsibility for the region and decide on the 'rules of the game', whereas non-Arctic states can join in to contribute within these defined frameworks. The position with regard to AC observers is also rigid. Eventually, we can infer the principles according to which Russia constructs Arctic cooperation. First is the primacy of international law. Second, priority is given to intergovernmental forms of cooperation. Third, Arctic states shall be the driving force and the leaders, whereas other countries and organisations (such as the EU), shall fit into the frameworks defined by the nation states.


In terms of the substance of international Arctic cooperation, the following policy issues appear: environment, search and rescue (SAR), sustainable development, research, the human dimension. Climate change is treated as a source of opportunities and a driver for research cooperation, rather than an alarming threat. Recognition of the local impacts of climate change is limited. The Arctic emerges as a platform for international business cooperation through the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and the potential of Arctic logistics, while oil and gas development, infrastructure, and tourism are also mentioned as business development avenues. The NSR is highlighted as a much more important avenue for cooperation than energy projects. Tourism has a marginal position, and is only mentioned briefly.

The way MoFA's policy story is crafted points out the image the Russian government seeks to build in the international community. First, Russia is being a law-obedient state that sticks closely to international rules. This is, in particular, underlined in numerous communications regarding the UN CLOS shelf claims and how Russia closely follows all procedures and settled a dispute with Norway. In 2013, Greenpeace sailed its ship 'Arctic Sunrise' into the Kara Sea to protest against Arctic drilling at Prirazlomnaya platform. 'Arctic Sunrise'

is an interesting case – it is used in foreign policy communication to underline Russia’s commitment to international law, as well as to security in the Arctic (portraying the Greenpeace action as a security threat, also noted by Palosaari and Tynkkynen 2015), despite the fact that in the process Russia did not follow international law when arresting the Greenpeace protestors. Second, Russia is being a pro-active force. This is by driving forward agreements (such as SAR and oil spill response), and organising the Arctic Forum (Territory of Dialogue) and participating in all kinds of events and cooperation initiatives. Last, but not least, Russia emphasises its responsibility for the Arctic future – as one of the Arctic countries.

When it comes to the security dimension of the policy narrative, a peaceful and safe Arctic is a priority and international cooperation is the primary way to achieve this state of affairs, so security threats shall be addressed by the Arctic states both at the national and international levels. At the same time, it is reassuring that scrambling for resources is not possible in the Arctic – and all states are following the UN CLOS procedures in claiming their continental shelf and there is no space for unruly actions. In multiple cases, Russian diplomats insisted that the Arctic region shall remain outside the military agenda – and that there is no need for NATO in the Arctic. The call not to politicise and militarise the Arctic became more substantial as the Ukrainian crisis situation was unfolding. Figure 12.1 summarises the results of the coding and shows the distribution of code categories in domestic and external policy communication.

Figure 12.1 Appearance of main categories in domestic and external policy communication




Source: Authors

The 'external shock' hypothesis

One of the goals of our analysis was to understand the effect of an 'external shock' on crafting the policy stories for different audiences. The analysed material shows a pattern that the message sent to foreign audiences has changed relatively little during the period we observed, whereas the domestic communication on the Arctic has taken a significant turn after 2013 (Figures 12.2 and 12.3). We attribute this noticeable difference between domestic and foreign communication on the Arctic to the breakout of the war in the Ukraine.

Figure 12.2 Changes in internal communication – selected categories




Source: Authors

In the policy story presented by the RG, economy and energy are pushed aside as security topics strengthen after 2014. From zero mentions in 2011, news on military training in the Arctic and contracts for new weapons to strengthen the regional security began to rise, culminating in 2014–15. The establishment of the Arctic Military Okrug (district) and the adoption of the new Military Doctrine that specifically emphasised the need to provide the Arctic with defence capability is often mentioned in relation to the 'Arctic scramble.' The economic sanctions are mentioned only a few times, and identified as an obstacle. At the same time, the idea of cooperation with China and other Asian countries gained popularity – as it is acknowledged that Russia lacks the capital and technology for successful Arctic exploration. Also evident in the post-2014 newspaper is the sense of urgency to go offshore and to establish a presence in the Arctic economy.

Taking into account the overall change in the Russian media at the time, that is, how several issues were securitised in the aftermath of the escalating Russian-Ukrainian relationship, it is not surprising that discussion on the Arctic also experienced profound changes. The emphasis on assertive policies and militarisation of the Arctic is therefore understandable in the light of the general discursive change in the Russian public discourse after 2014. The Arctic, previously framed strongly via wide international economic cooperation and peace-promotion, did not manage to escape securitisation, meaning that Arctic development has been gradually transforming into an urgent security matter requiring extraordinary measures.

Figure 12.3 Changes in external communication – selected categories



Source: Authors

The external communication experienced relatively few changes, yet thematic emphases reveal some changes there, as well. First, it is the ‘coldness’ – or cooling down of relationships with other Arctic states, in particular, the United States and Canada. The change with Canada is most significant – from elaborate cooperation propositions to outspoken critique. After 2014 and after Western countries imposed sanctions on Russia, targeting its Arctic energy developments in particular, the call not to politicise and militarise the Arctic has become more substantial. Especially in 2015, when the crisis stagnated, MoFA started to reflect the crisis by increasingly marking the Arctic as a territory of peace and cooperation, i.e. calling for ‘Arctic exceptionalism’ (Young 1992). At the same time, the emphasis has been on Russian determination to continue with its Arctic development plans. More attention is also paid to ideas about cooperation with Asian countries and ideas about the Silk Road and Eurasia as alternatives to previous plans of cooperating with Western companies.

Comparison of domestic and international policy stories

The key terms in internal and external communication alike reflect the agenda set by the official Arctic Strategies: advancing international cooperation and harvesting the economic potential of energy and shipping. Moreover, both policy stories are in agreement about the basic assumptions that (1) the Arctic has huge commercial potential for Russia; and (2) Russia needs partners to unlock this commercial potential. Yet, while the point of departure is shared, policy problems and solutions are defined differently. Table 12.3 demonstrates the main differences between the policy stories.

Table 12.3 Comparing policy stories for domestic and foreign audiences

	Setting	Problems	Solutions
Internal	Broad range of issues from socio-economic development	Unlock the economic potential of the Arctic;	Commercial offshore exploration and maritime shipping via the NSR;

	<p>and culture to security and the natural environment;</p> <p>Scope – from the local to international levels, but with an emphasis on regional and local topics.</p> <p>2014: change of scene – securitisation of the Arctic.</p>	<p>Strengthen regional competitive advantage;</p> <p>Human security and welfare;</p> <p>Environmental pollution legacy;</p> <p>Lack of legal and institutional support;</p> <p>Keep the Arctic safe and secure;</p> <p>Accelerate offshore exploration.</p>	<p>Infrastructure development, industrialisation;</p> <p>Energy security, tech and digital innovation, protect the Arctic nature during the new rush;</p> <p>Clean up the environmental consequences of past;</p> <p>Establish new bodies and enact new national laws;</p> <p>Increase military presence and capacity;</p> <p>Seek potential partners in Asia.</p>
External	<p>Focus is mainly on the international level and covers nearly exclusively political and diplomatic issues.</p>	<p>Maintain the Arctic as a ‘territory of dialogue’;</p> <p>Strengthen Arctic governance;</p> <p>Peaceful and safe Arctic;</p> <p>Economic sanctions as an obstacle to furthering bilateral cooperation.</p>	<p>Russia as a ‘good international citizen’, primacy of international law;</p> <p>Priority of intergovernmental cooperation between the Arctic States;</p> <p>Diplomatic effort, no need for NATO;</p> <p>Building up cooperation with Asian partners.</p>

Source: Authors

Russia’s interest towards the Arctic is strong and the recent policy communication illustrates this. Our analysis shows two clearly separated policy stories – but why would the state have different policy stories for the domestic and foreign audiences? We argue that the dualism in communication is first and foremost a sign that the Arctic is pivotal for the Russian government. Each narrative not only serves a specific audience, but also presents us with a different set of policy problems and solutions relevant in a given setting. This finding further underlines the idea that there is not one, but at least two Arctics – one is a region within a sovereign state, the other is a region within a globalised world (Heininen, this volume). The relationship between the two facets of Russian Arctic policy can be grasped through studying the relationship between the policy narratives. In the following, we identify three ways in which the two policy stories interact: they may support each other, contradict each other, or ignore each other.

Russia as a 'Great Arctic Power' is a powerful narrative for 'domestic use' that serves the goals of identity-building and justifies increased activity in the Arctic zone. Raising domestic awareness of the economic potential in the Arctic aims at strengthening political support among the domestic publics. Demonstrating how this potential can ensure the country's economic prosperity helps to justify public investment into expensive Arctic infrastructure projects. At the same time, this storyline has implications for the international cooperation on Arctic-related issues. In order to meet the ambitious goals set by Russian leaders, the country needs to rely on cooperation with foreign partners to ensure access to the technology and capital needed for extensive Arctic exploration. Russia's image as a 'good citizen' in the world community who plays by the rules is a precondition for successful cooperation with other countries that will enable Russia to reap the benefits of the Arctic resource base, while sustaining the fossil fuel-based economy chosen by the ruling regime (Gustafson 2012). This requires not only cooperative rhetoric in international fora, but a coherent set of international policy actions that strive at ensuring multilateralism and regional cooperation in the Arctic. The policy stories built around the problems of Arctic industrial development and maintaining international stability support each other, in particular through cooperation.

We observe a different relationship between the two communications when it comes to the arguments that favour Arctic energy development. Russia's geopolitical leverage via energy, i.e. the Energy Superpower position (e.g. Tynkkynen 2016), is an argument in support of Arctic energy development in the domestic story, while internationally energy trade is emphasised purely as a source of economic benefit. The dualist communication strategy used in relation to the Arctic is not exceptional and can be observed in relation to other issues, for example, climate change (e.g. Poberezhskaya 2014). Internationally, Russia argues that climate change is a serious threat, whereas domestically climate change is more and more defined via denial. All the nations and states surely have a tendency to communicate in a different manner internally than with the outside world. Our study shows that in the case of Russia this contradiction between the two stories also exists. Moreover, the internal communication is more vulnerable to changes in the international political situation, as exemplified by the time frames before and after the Ukrainian crisis.

Finally, an interesting difference between the external and internal communication can be found in the sphere of the environment. While domestic policy narrative is understandably broader than the external communication, the fact that the natural environment is discussed three times more often in the RG newspaper than in the MoFA documents may appear counterintuitive, as the environment is usually considered an ideal candidate for international cooperation. On the one hand, this demonstrates that environmental issues are important, at least rhetorically, for the RF government when it discusses the Arctic and its exploration. This emphasis can be explained as a central legitimising component in the otherwise economic-utilitarian discourse: by promising to clean up the environmental consequences of past Arctic exploitation and protect the Arctic nature during the new rush, the governing regime is 'buying hearts' behind its Arctic nation-building effort. The relative lack of attention to international environmental cooperation in the Arctic in the MoFA's documents can be attributed to the overall diplomatic orientation, focusing on procedures (such as international cooperation via international organisations and bilateral instruments) and international law. In the absence of an Arctic environmental convention and the overall downplaying of climate change on the Russian Arctic policy agenda, relative ignorance to the environment in the external communication can thus be understood.

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