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**THE TREATMENT OF INFANTS IN CLASSICAL
AND HELLENISTIC GREECE**

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**Thesis presented for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Classics
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CONTENTS

Acknowledgements	Page	4
Summary		5
Abbreviations		7
Introduction		8
Notes to Introduction		14
Chapter One	The Care of Infants	15
<u>Part One</u>	<u>The newborn infant: immediate post-natal care</u>	
	Midwives and mothers	16
	Age of viability	21
	Other signs indicating non-viability;	
	superfecundation and viability	32
	Respiration	36
	Other medical observations	44
<u>Part Two</u>	<u>Swaddling</u>	47
<u>Part Three</u>	<u>Feeding</u>	60
	Initial feeding	
	- An excursus on theories of fetal nutrition -	62-66
	Feeding of babies with human milk	71
	Non-breast-feeding of infants; weaning	85
	Feeding of older infants	95
Notes to Chapter One		98
Chapter Two	Exposure and Infanticide	138
<u>Part One</u>	<u>Infanticide in Sparta</u>	139
	Unwanted children	140
	Granting of lots to infants reared	144
<u>Part Two</u>	<u>Exposure in Athens and elsewhere</u>	153
	To rear or not to rear?	

Evidence from New Comedy	159
- An excursus on related aspects of the treatment of infants in Comedy	
A: Recognition of exposed children	172 - 173
B: Suppositious children -	173 - 176
The law: Athens	176
The law: Gortyn	178
The law: Thebes	180
The law: Ephesos	
Exposure in a political and moral context	181
The exposure debate	197
<u>Part Three</u>	
<u>Exposure in myth and legend</u>	209
Some aspects of exposure-myths	210
The significance of exposure in myth	212
The exposure of Cyrus	214
Greek mythical exposure and initiation ritual	218
Characters in Greek history said to have been exposed	220
Notes to Chapter Two	230
Chapter Three	Ceremonies Performed for Infants 246
<u>Part One</u>	<u>Amphidromia</u> 247
Evidence for the amphidromia	
The date of the amphidromia	250
Women's role in the amphidromia	251
The significance of the amphidromia	252
<u>Part Two</u>	<u>Naming</u> 256
The δεκάτη	
The date of naming	257
The significance of the naming ceremony	259

<u>Part Three</u>	<u>Registration in the phratry</u>	264
	The age of admission	265
	A second presentation	268
	The introduction of girls	271
	The procedure	273
	Admission to other bodies	275
	The significance of phratry membership for legitimacy	277
	The significance of phratry membership for citizenship	279
Notes to Chapter Three		282
Chapter Four	Orphans	297
	Appointment of guardians	
	Duties of a guardian towards his ward's person	304
	The property of orphans	310
	Maltreatment of orphans by their guardians	315
	The εἰσαγγελία κακώσεως ὀρφανῶν	320
	The δίκη ἐπιτροπῆς	322
	Female orphans	324
	State maintenance of orphans	328
Notes to Chapter Four		337
Conclusions		352
Notes to Conclusions		364
Bibliography		365
Tables and Figures	Table 1: Chart showing age of viability according to Hipp. <i>Oct.</i>	following p. 46
	Table 2: Exposure of mythical persons	" 229
	Table 3: Inverted exposure in myth	
	Figure 1: Ancient feeding bottles	" 97

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Summary

This thesis examines the treatment of infants in the classical and Hellenistic ages of Greece. In the Introduction the scope and aims are described, and my use of ancient literary sources explained. Chapter One deals with the Care of Infants and examines the evidence for the treatment of newborn infants by women carers and medical men, looking in detail at the criteria by which the question of a newborn infant's viability might have been decided, and what this might mean for the decisions whether to treat a sickly baby and whether to rear or expose the child. Swaddling and Feeding are also studied in this Chapter: the evidence for the practices in the period under study is collected and discussed. In Chapter Two the subject of the decision not to rear is examined. The practice of killing unwanted infants in Sparta was subject to special rules, and the related subject of the provision of land to infants who were reared is unique to Sparta, and they form the first part of this Chapter. The second deals with the practice of exposure everywhere else: most of the evidence is from Athens, including evidence from New Comedy, which has been largely dismissed in modern scholarship and is here surveyed for what it can tell us about contemporary attitudes to exposure and motives for the practice. The laws and political and moral attitudes to exposure are next looked at, with reference especially to Athens, but also in the wider classical and Hellenistic world. The final section of this part surveys and comments on the "exposure debate" in modern scholarship. Part Three discusses the context to which most of the ancient accounts of exposure belong, that of myth and legend. It has been maintained that these tales directly reflect a practice and prevalence once found in real life, but other theories for their existence have recently been put forward which see them as the mythical expression of a ritual connected with

puberty initiation and a primitive form of education in the wilderness. The exposure of Cyrus is an important key to the understanding of this connection between myth and ritual in Greek myths and legends, and the same motives for ascribing exposure to Cyrus's early life apply to the exposure stories told of certain Greek historical characters. Chapter Three deals with the ceremonies performed for infants which admitted them to the family and phratry respectively, and with the significance of the performance of the ceremonies for the legitimacy and citizenship of the child. Orphans are the subject of Chapter Four, and their treatment under Athenian law is reviewed. The state of orphanhood applied to older children as well as infants: it is included here for its value in showing the degree of protection awarded to the most vulnerable class of citizen-children, and the motives which prompted the Athenians to accord them this protection.

The concluding chapter of this thesis draws together the implications of some of the evidence collected, in particular regarding the significance of the high neonatal death rate. It is suggested that the subject of exposure and infanticide be looked at in this context (as an alternative, for example, to the more usual context of birth-control and population limitation). An attempt is made to understand the prevalent attitude of parents in ancient Greece to their youngest offspring and the state of infancy. Some of the child-care practices are assessed, as far as this is possible, for their repressive and indulgent tendencies. Conclusions of a general nature about the treatment of orphans are put forward.

Abbreviations

Most of the abbreviations for Greek authors and texts are the same as those used in Liddell and Scott's *Greek-English Lexicon*. Those that differ slightly from theirs should still be easy to understand. In the Notes I have generally not resorted to abbreviations of modern publications, except for certain very well-known ones, set out below. In citing modern works, I have given the full citation the first time each is mentioned in the Notes to each Chapter, and thereafter I have referred to them by author's name and date of publication. The Bibliography, which lists alphabetically by author all works referred to, will provide elucidation where necessary.

<i>BICS</i>	<i>Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies</i>
<i>BGU</i>	<i>Berliner griechische Urkunde</i>
<i>CMG</i>	<i>Corpus Medicorum Graecorum</i>
<i>CP</i>	<i>Classical Philology</i>
<i>CQ</i>	<i>Classical Quarterly</i>
<i>CR</i>	<i>Classical Review</i>
<i>FGrH</i>	F. Jacoby, <i>Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker</i> Berlin 1923 - 1958
<i>IG</i>	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae</i>
<i>JHS</i>	<i>Journal of Hellenic Studies</i>
<i>PA</i>	J. Kirchner, <i>Prosopographia Attica</i> , Berlin 1901, 1903
<i>PCPS</i>	<i>Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society</i>
<i>RE</i>	Pauly-Wissowa, <i>Realencyclopädie</i>
<i>REA</i>	<i>Revue des Études Anciennes</i>
<i>VS</i>	H. Diels and W. Kranz, <i>Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker</i> , 6th edition 1951 - 1952

Introduction

The treatment of children in ancient Greece is a subject which has received little scholarly attention, and most of it has been devoted to the subject of education. The lives of children in their pre-school years have been largely ignored. The great exception to this neglect has been the subject of exposure and infanticide, the area in which we find the infants of antiquity suddenly illuminated by the glare of the scholarly spotlight. But other aspects of their lives have generally been left in darkness or semi-gloom. Yet the treatment of infants is a subject worth examining, and the practices of infanticide and exposure are worth bringing out of isolation and setting in the context of general treatment. Infants are worth studying in their own right, as inhabitants of ancient Greece and its households, and also for the sake of a complete understanding of their parents, the men and women of the Greek world who expounded the theories, made the rules and carried out the practice of their treatment.

This thesis therefore aims to present a collection of the ancient evidence about the treatment of infants, as much, that is, as can be gleaned from the written sources. The evidence is patchy, because no ancient author saw the need to describe details of everyday life that were familiar, and not particularly interesting, to his contemporaries. The study of such evidence as exists will shed a little light on certain questions: what were the experiences of infancy in antiquity; which were the areas of the treatment of children thought to require regulation by rules and standards; by what ideas or ideals was treatment of infants regulated; how should we interpret the attitude of adults towards their offspring, in the light of the evidence about their treatment?

The thesis is limited in scope to the classical and Hellenistic ages. This is made desirable by the nature of the evidence, which is more plentiful for this period of Greek history than any other. By concentrating

on this period it is possible to build up a picture of the treatment of infants which, although not complete, is not too sketchy to be of any use, and which is able to be set in the context of a society and culture about which a considerable amount is known. I have left out of the picture Hellenistic Egypt, because in spite of its importance for Greek culture, in its social conventions it was in many important ways a world apart. It is not generally safe to apply evidence for practices in Hellenistic Egypt to the rest of the Greek world, and the treatment of children in that society perhaps deserves a separate study.

I define "infants" for the purposes of this study as children from birth to the age of about six or seven, but most of what I have to say applies particularly to children in the first few days, weeks and months of their lives. Greek authors referring to babies use the terms βρέφος, νήπιος, παιδάριον and παιδίον, the first of which usually refers to a young baby, while the others do not refer to any specific age-range within babyhood or early infancy. In addition, παῖς and τέκνον are sometimes used of an infant, where the context makes it clear that a very young child is meant. (I refer to infants of unknown sex by the neuter pronoun, purely as a matter of grammatical convention, and without any implication that babies are less than fully human.)

It remains to outline my approach to the available sources for the period under study. I have confined myself almost totally to written sources, referring where appropriate to the excellent recently-published work of Hilde Rühfel on children in Greek art.¹

Tragedy does not have much to tell us about Greek infants, and I have thought it best not to rely on it as a source, as the authors' dramatic and lyric purpose make it not, generally, good evidence for everyday life: it is not always possible to distinguish references to fifth-century practices from allusions to pre-historical culture. Comedy, on the other hand, is a good source. In Old Comedy many jokes are based on the incongruity of a

reference to contemporary life set in a fantastical or mythical context, and such contemporary references are easily recognised. The characters and households portrayed in the plays of Aristophanes are those of late fifth-century and early fourth-century Athens, with the addition of farcical elements and exaggeration of idiosyncrasies. New Comedy is likewise set in contemporary Athens, and the world of the household, rather than that of the city, is its sphere of operation. Not all aspects of household life are seen in New Comedy (for example, there are few older children), but romantic love between a man and a woman is often at the centre of the plot, and babies are sometimes the product of these affairs. The baby often figures as an inconvenience, and later has its significance reversed to become, directly or indirectly, a means of bringing the lovers together, cementing a marriage already contracted or providing a compelling reason for a wedding. Incidentally we are told quite a bit about attitudes to unwanted infants and about contemporary Athenian law and custom.

The prose writings of orators, historians and philosophers occasionally refer to children. In law-court speeches children generally only merit a mention when they are of significance in disputes about inheritance, property, or citizenship. The class of children most frequently involved in these affairs is orphans, and the speeches, together with the occasional piece of legislation quoted in them, provide most of our evidence for the treatment of this category of children, which would have included infants. Philosophers and moralists, unlike historians, rarely make completely factual and neutral statements about children. But what they say may well reveal indirectly information about contemporary practices and attitudes, which they approve, or, more often, condemn. Of all philosophers, Plato was the one most interested in education and in influences upon the young. It seems to have been Plato who first expressed the idea that there was such a thing as ὀρθὴ τροφή (*Laws* 788

c), the correct way to bring up a child. Parents had probably always given at least some reasoned consideration to their children's upbringing, even without the benefit of Plato's thoughts on the matter. But Plato wished to make children's upbringing less a matter of an unscientific mixture of parental decisions and child-care traditions, and more a kind of τέχνη, an art or science based on a rational footing. And so he gave considerable attention to the specific effects to be produced on children and the precise means by which they were to be achieved. Even infants, otherwise ignored by ancient education, come into the scope of this τροφή, though in practice Plato has relatively little to say about this stage of childhood.

Aristotle in his scientific treatises sometimes makes observations about the physiology and pathology of the young of the human species, and he is a valuable source for the ideas of earlier scientists. Book 7 of his *Historia Animalium*, this book perhaps being a compilation of Aristotelian and Peripatetic knowledge and views, is about conception and the perinatal period, and contains much of the little extant information about the treatment of newborn infants for our period. Aristotle either wrote or intended to write a work on the Management of Children, *περὶ τῆς παιδονομίας* (*Pol* 1335 B 5). But his extant works contain only a few paragraphs on the subject of the upbringing of infants (especially at *Pol*.7. 15).

In fact, the great preoccupation of parents in the ancient world was not so much how to bring up their young children as how to keep them alive and healthy. Infant mortality must have been, by modern standards, very high indeed, with perhaps half or more of all children born not reaching their fifth birthday. This perhaps helps to explain how it came about that in the Roman Imperial age the public, both lay and professional, took as its guide to infant τροφή the product of a quite different intellectual tradition to that begun by Plato. It was medicine, in the end, which was to produce the authoritative voice on the subject.

Greek medicine in the early days had little to say about practical child-care. This was at that time largely in the hands of women, some of them professionals (in the sense that they pursued it as a kind of career for pay and professed an expertise, not that they necessarily had professional training or qualifications). Nevertheless the Hippocratic Corpus does provide quite a bit of useful evidence for the study of infants. In the first place, scientists and doctors investigated reproduction, pregnancy and embryology. In their writings on these subjects they sometimes touch on the subjects of neonatal care and nutrition, for example. What they say - and sometimes what they omit to say - repays detailed study and comparison with the other, meagre or later, evidence. Secondly, doctors sometimes worked alongside female healers and midwives, especially when treating gynaecological cases, and they were aware of the women's beliefs and practices, which they occasionally mention in their writing (and they were capable of being influenced by them too, as we shall see).

We have to wait until the second century AD before the body of knowledge collected by Greek doctors and midwives on infant care appears in an extant text. Soranus's *Gynaecology* is much more than that, of course. Soranus's thorough expertise in theoretical and practical medicine, his rationality and his common sense, his clear and confident advice, and his refusal to present his readers with advice that was dogmatic or socially unacceptable, won him great respect and admiration. The use of Soranus as a source for a period several centuries before him is not without its problems. His influence in matters of child-care is not only to be seen in the fact that his advice largely dominated the nurseries of Europe until the eighteenth century. It has also cast its shadow backwards over the preceding centuries, where the lack of any such authoritative voice on practical infant care has tempted students of the subject to ignore or treat superficially such evidence as exists for the

earlier period, and sometimes to be too ready to flesh it out with excerpts from Soranus.² A discriminating use of Soranus is, however, an appropriate means of illuminating and setting in context certain practices which are known to have existed in the classical and Hellenistic Greek world, particularly since it was his habit to observe and comment upon the practices of women child-carers which he found in currency. In a society where older women, who had already given birth to and brought up families of their own, were the helpers to whom women in childbirth and younger mothers normally turned, traditions in child-care must have died hard. It is not unreasonable to assume that many customs survived virtually unchanged for generations. But in Soranus's detailed advice to midwives and wet-nurses (and, less often, to parents) there is less that is relevant to the study of earlier centuries. Even for his own day, it is hard to believe that many midwives and wet-nurses measured up to the high professionalism of his ideals; those who did must have been an élite group indeed. The assumption that all the practices advised by Soranus were employed in classical and Hellenistic Greece must be resisted.

One group of witnesses who might have told us much about the treatment of infants has remained silent: the women of the ancient world. Even after men began to take an interest in infant care (in the theory of it, at least), it was largely administered by women. This fact may also have significance for the restricted contribution of philosophy to matters of infant care, with its lofty contempt of the abilities of women. Medicine, which in the classical period neglected the subject but which, significantly, always remained in touch with women's ways of doing things (even if it sometimes disagreed with them), had the last word on the practical treatment of infants.

Notes to Introduction

1 Hilde Rühfel, *Das Kind in der griechischen Kunst: Von der minoisch-mykenischen Zeit bis zum Hellenismus*, Mainz am Rhein 1984; *Kinderleben im klassischen Athen: Bilder auf klassischen Vasen*, Mainz am Rhein 1984.

2 These tendencies are present, to varying extents, in the following treatments of the subject: M. Moïssides, "La puériculture et l'eugénique dans l'antiquité grecque" *Janus* 19, 1914, pp. 289 - 311; Wolfgang Lehmann, *Die Ernährung des Säuglings im Laufe der Jahrtausende*, Belp 1954; Pierre Boulan, *Quelques Notes sur l'Histoire de l'Allaitement*, Paris 1911 (Thesis for Doctorate in Medicine, Imprimerie de la Faculté de Médecine); W. Braams, *Zur Geschichte des Ammenwesens im klassischen Altertum*, *Jenaer medizin-historische Beiträge* Heft 5, 1913.

Chapter One

The Care of Infants

Part One

The newborn infant: immediate post-natal care

The care of the newborn infant was in ancient times the province of the midwife and the women of the household, but the medical writers of classical and later times gave some attention to the subject of bringing babies safely into the world. Among the writers of the Hippocratic corpus were those interested in embryology and in the newborn infant as a phenomenon to be observed. There was also much interest in the condition of women in pregnancy and the post-natal period. But very few prescriptions for the treatment of the newborn are made, in contrast with the hundreds of suggestions for treating pre- and post-natal conditions in women. Part of the explanation for this contrast probably lies in the obvious fact that adults are far easier to treat and more able to withstand the effects of treatment than are newborn infants. It was probably also accepted that many newborn infants would not live, and that very little could be done about it. This section will investigate to what extent and for what particular reasons doctors acquiesced in this attitude, and how medical knowledge may have affected the lives of newborn infants if at all. But first we must return to our original distinction between what midwives knew and did about the care of the newborn infant, and what medical men knew and were able to offer.

Midwives and mothers

Babies had of course been brought safely into the Greek world for centuries before the existence of the art of medicine. The art of the midwife was one of the oldest known, and upon it continued to depend the well-being of mothers and babies throughout ancient times (and well into modern). The usual Greek word for midwife was *μαῖα*, but the designation *ὀμφαλητόμος* is also found, in honour of the midwife's main duty toward the newborn (Hipp. *Mul* 1. 46, VIII 106. 7 Li., Hipponax 12. 2D = 19 West).¹ In the Hippocratic treatise *On Flesh* the term *ἄκεστρίς*, the feminine form of *ἄκεστήρ*, healer, is found in the context of childbirth: the author refers to "the female healers who attend women in childbirth" (*Carn.* 19, VIII 614. 11 Li.). The importance of the midwife for the safe delivery of babies is acknowledged in the Aristotelian *Historia Animalium*, in a passage on the birth of infants (7. 10, 587 A 9 - 25).² Here *ὀμφαλοτομία*, the cutting of the umbilical cord, is said to be the skill of the midwife which particularly requires intelligence. When the placenta came out in the normal way, the midwife would place a ligature of wool at some point on the cord (presumably near the umbilicus) and cut the cord above this point. When the cord healed up at the point of ligation, the remainder was left to fall off naturally.³ Care had to be taken that the ligature did not become detached before this happened, for the infant might then die through haemorrhage. When the placenta did not emerge at the time of birth, two ligatures were put on the cord and it was cut between them.⁴ If the infant appeared lifeless, before the tying and cutting of the cord, the experienced midwife knew how to "force the blood back inside by pressing the cord", and thus revive the infant. It is perhaps likely that in such circumstances an intelligent midwife also knew how to let the infant receive a transfusion of placental blood by holding the infant below the level of the placenta.

The passage does not say what the midwife would use to cut the cord. Soranus (*Gyn.* 1. 27. 80, 250. 4 ff. Rose) recommends an iron implement and ridicules αἱ πολλὰὶ τῶν μαιουμένων who refuse to cut with iron because they consider it ill-omened for the first days of life, and use instead glass, a reed, a potsherd, or a crust of bread. Presumably any of these or any other sharp object might have been used by midwives throughout ancient times.⁵ The risk of neonatal tetanus was of course not understood, and it must have accounted for many infant casualties.⁶

This passage in *HA* contains all that the work has to say about the immediate after-birth care given to infants, and the rest of classical and Hellenistic literature has only scattered references to the subject. The Hippocratic writings are for the most part silent on the subject of midwifery. Their authors were evidently content to let the midwives exercise their traditional skills without interference, and would generally only have involved themselves in the practice of obstetrics when they were called in to help with a pregnancy or birth that was going wrong. In such cases, as well as in the practice of gynaecology in general, they probably sometimes worked side by side with the midwife or employed her as assistant.⁷ By contrast the Greek doctor Soranus, born in Ephesus and practising in Rome in the early 2nd century AD, gave full instructions to midwives in his *Gynaecology*. But caution must be exercised in using Soranus as a source for the practices of midwives in his own day, since many may not have followed or even read his advice, and even more for midwifery in the Greek world several centuries before. Even the traditional skills of midwifery may vary from time to time and in different localities. Soranus, when he appears to refer to widespread traditional practices of midwives, may be used with caution to expand upon practices attested by classical writers for their own day (see pp. 12 - 13 above).

One such practice is that of examining the newborn to see whether it was worth rearing. Sokrates in Plato's *Theaitetos* makes repeated

references to his role as a philosophical midwife, the point of the metaphor being that he has the ability to draw out ideas from his interlocutors and distinguish the real argument from the spurious. There can be no doubt that the art of discrimination, not of course between real and imaginary babies (cf. *Theaet* 150 B), but between that which was worth rearing and that which was not, was one of the skills of midwives in Sokrates's day :

προσφέρου οὖν πρὸς με ὡς πρὸς μαιίας ὑὸν καὶ αὐτὸν
μαιευτικόν, καὶ ἅ ἂν ἐρωτῶ προθυμοῦ ἕπως οἶός τ'εἶ
οὕτως ἀποκρίνασθαι· καὶ ἐὰν ἄρα σκοπούμενός τι ὦν ἂν
λέγῃς ἠγήσωμαι εἶδωλον καὶ μὴ ἀληθές, εἶτα
ὑπεξαίρωμαι καὶ ἀποβάλλω, μὴ ἀγρίαινε ὡσπερ αἱ
πρωτοτόκοι περὶ τὰ παιδία (151 B 9 - C 5).⁸

It is interesting that Sokrates presents the rejection, the "throwing away", of the baby as an act of the midwife herself. One would have expected that, at least in classical Athens, the midwife herself had no right to decide not to rear a substandard baby, and that it was up to the head of the household whether he took her advice. Factors other than physical fitness must often have affected the father's wishes in the matter (see Chapter 2 Part 2 below). The *Theaitetos* passage certainly shows that professional judgement on fitness to be reared was one of the traditional skills of midwifery.⁹ Soranus, five centuries later, instructed midwives to make the judgement according to specific criteria: whether the mother has had a healthy pregnancy, the baby has been born at term (seven, nine or ten months according to ancient belief – see pp. 21 - 32 below), the baby cries lustily when placed on the ground, and is physically perfect with respect to the shape, size, function and sensitivity of all its parts. To ascertain this, the midwife will examine all the newborn infant's orifices to make sure that they are free from obstruction, bend and stretch the joints, and press the body with her fingers to see if the child has sensation in every part of

its body. From the opposites of these things one may recognise that which is not suitable for rearing (ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων τοῖς εἰρημένοις τὸ πρὸς ἀνατροφὴν ἀνεπιτήδειον) says Soranus (*Gyn.* 1. 26. 79, 248. 14 - 249. 17 Rose). Soranus would have midwives perform this examination before cutting the umbilical cord, having first put the infant on the ground, and announced by a traditional sign whether the baby was male or female. Aline Rousselle has argued that the reason midwives of Roman Imperial times cut the cord only after performing the examination was that they tied the cord properly only if they considered the baby worth rearing; if it was not worth rearing, they let it die through haemorrhage (1988, pp. 50 - 51). It is difficult to tell whether midwives of classical and Hellenistic Greece took it upon themselves to do this. In classical times, some infants with congenital deformities are known to have lived and been treated by doctors (see below, pp. 155 - 157), and doctors were also able to make observations about the course of illness in newborn babies (see pp. 44 - 45 below). So either the requirements of contemporary midwives were less stringent than those recorded by Soranus, or midwives tended to refer the decision about rearing to the father, who would sometimes be willing to attempt to rear a weak, ill or otherwise defective child.

Having delivered the baby, examined it, and cut and ligated the cord, what else did the midwife do for the newborn infant? She must surely have removed the mucus from the baby's nose and mouth. Soranus mentions the clearing out of mucus in his section on cleansing (*Gyn.* 1. 28. 82, 252. 23 - 25 Rose). She would also have wiped the baby to remove blood and the vernix caesosa, and bathed it thoroughly. A fragment of Hipponax's iambic trimeters reads :

τίς ὀμφαλητόμος σε τὸν διοπλήγα

ἔψησε κάπέλουσεν ἀσκαρίζοντα; (Hipponax 12 Diehl = 19 West).

Washing with water is almost certainly meant by ἀπέλουσεν. The verb ψάω

usually means to rub or smoothe, and here may refer simply to wiping the baby clean, but more likely to a vigorous rubbing of the newborn's body. Soranus recommends using salt and honey or olive oil (*Gyn.* 1. 28. 82, 252. 9 - 23 Rose). A remark in the Hippocratic treatise *On Regimen* gives a vivid sketch of the treatment endured by infants, probably newborn infants on their emergence from the womb:

νακοδέψαι τείνουσι, τρίβουσι, κτενίζουσι, πλύνουσι· ταῦτα
παιδίων θεραπείη (*Vict.* 1. 19, VI. 492. 23 - 24 Li.)

(reading the ταῦτα of Joly [Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1967] instead of Littré's ταῦτα): "Leather-workers stretch, rub, comb, wash; the care of infants is the same" (cf. p. 56 below).

The purpose of cleansing the infant by rubbing and washing overlaps with another motive for carrying out these procedures, namely to toughen the infant and test its strength.¹⁰ Aristotle (*Pol.* 1336 A 12 - 18) records that many non-Greek peoples dip babies in a cold river at birth, and he himself recommends accustoming babies to cold gradually from a very early stage. It appears from this that washing newborn babies with very cold water, or dipping them in it, was not a popular Greek practice in Aristotle's time, but during the centuries that followed it seems to have gained some Greek adherents, for Soranus remarks that "most of the barbarians, such as the Germans and Skythians, and even some of the Greeks, put the newborn infant into cold water for the sake of its firming quality, and to destroy as not worth rearing the infant that cannot bear the chilling. . ." (*Gyn.* 1. 28. 81, 251. 8 - 12 Rose). Plutarch records (*Lyk.* 16. 3) that the Spartans used to bathe babies with wine, as a test of strength: he does not specify newborn infants, but these are probably meant. Soranus records as traditional practices of unspecified people, bathing the newborn in wine mixed with brine, pure wine, the urine of an "uncorrupt" child, and wine finely sprinkled with myrtle or oak gall, but himself gives a warning

against the cold dip and all of these methods as likely to harm a child that could otherwise live a perfectly healthy life (1. 28. 81, 251. 12 - 252. 4 Rose).

According to the author of the Hippocratic *Diseases* 4, women fed newborn babies small quantities of purgatives to expel their first faeces after birth : . . . ἐπὴν τὰ παιδία γένηται, ψωμίζουσιν αὐτὰ αἱ γυναῖκες τὰ αὐτὰ φάρμακα (54. 2 Joly, VII 596. 5 - 6 Li.). "The same medicines" is not explained in the passage, but must refer to the purgatives that are implied in a sentence a few lines above: ἀποπατεῖ γὰρ αἰεὶ τὴν ἔωλον κόπρον ἀνὰ πάσας ἡμέρας, ἣν μέλλη ὑγιαίνειν ὁ ἄνθρωπος (54. 1 Joly, VII 594. 22 - 23 Li.). He introduces this information as part of his demonstration that flat worms are formed in the fetus's intestine while it is still in the womb, holding as he does the erroneous belief that flat worms are found in the first faeces. The author's theory about worms is a scientific one, based on spontaneous generation, and he uses the example of a common practice among women as an indication (σημῆιον) that he is right. The women themselves, in finding it necessary to administer purgatives to their newborn children, may have been influenced by primitive medical opinion or by superstition about the necessity for this post-natal evacuation of stool.

Age of viability

Further investigation into the care of the newborn child takes us deeper into the realm of the medical and scientific writers. Ancient interest in reproduction and embryology goes back to the earliest philosophers, and the medical and scientific observations about the newborn infant found in writings of the fifth century onwards are inseparable from the context of current ideas and accepted methods of

inquiry in natural philosophy. At the same time, there was no strict demarcation between professional and layman, and popular ideas influenced scientific theories, while the latter further extended lay knowledge. This is exemplified by ancient theories about the ages at which the fetus was viable and non-viable as a newborn infant.

The author of a late fifth-century treatise belonging to the Hippocratic corpus, *On Eight Months' Children*, appeals to the experience of women themselves to confirm what he has to say about the non-viability of the infant born in the eighth month of pregnancy :

τοῖσι δὲ βουλομένοισιν ἄλλο τι λέγειν ἔξεστιν. αἱ δὲ κρίνουσαι καὶ τὰ νικητήρια διδοῦσαι περὶ τούτου τοῦ λόγου αἰεὶ ἐρέουσι καὶ φήσουσι τίκτειν καὶ ἐπτάμηνα καὶ ὀκτάμηνα καὶ ἐνάμηνα καὶ δεκάμηνα καὶ ἐνδεκάμηνα, καὶ τούτων τὰ ὀκτάμηνα οὐ περιγίνεσθαι, τὰ δ' ἄλλα περιγίνεσθαι (*Ost.* 7. 2 Gr., VII 442. 1 - 4 Li.).¹¹

Herodotos puts into the mouth of the mother of Demaratos of Sparta an account of the various possible lengths of pregnancy. Her husband Ariston had refused to believe that Demaratos was his son, saying that the ten months had not elapsed, but she refuted this by saying τίκτουσι γὰρ γυναῖκες καὶ ἐννεάμηνα καὶ ἐπτάμηνα, καὶ οὐ πᾶσαι δέκα μῆνας ἐκτελέσασαι, and adds that her son was a seven months' child, and that Ariston later accepted her explanation (*Hdt.* 6. 69). Although Herodotos may well have heard the theory discussed and rationalised by doctors and scientists, he would hardly have put it into such a context had it not also been a traditional belief among women. So the non-viability of an eight months' child was probably a theory current among midwives and mothers long before it was taken up by scientists and doctors.¹²

Whatever the origins of the belief in the viability of a child born

after seven, nine or ten months' gestation, and the non-viability of the eight months' child,¹³ it found many adherents among philosophers, scientists and doctors. The Pythagoreans pointed to the possibility of birth in the seventh month as exemplifying one of the special properties of the number seven.¹⁴ Censorinus (*De die nat.* 7. 2 - 7, p. 12 Hultsch) records that the fifth-century natural philosopher Hippon considered that birth was possible from the seventh till the tenth month, adducing various phenomena in human physiology said to depend on the significance of the number seven as analogues for viability in the seventh month. Censorinus mentions others who affirmed the possibility of birth in the seventh month, including Aristotle, the doctor Diokles of Karystos, Straton the Peripatetic philosopher, and Empedokles. Euryphon of Knidos (a medical contemporary of Hippokrates) denied it, but held that birth was possible in the eighth month; with the latter opinion almost everyone except Aristotle and Diokles disagreed.¹⁵

Empedokles's explanation for the ages of viability was based on cosmogonical analogy and number-symbolism. The first race of men to appear on earth was produced in a night and a day that lasted as long as ten months do in our age; later another generation grew up in a seven-month-long night and day (*VS* 31 A 75 Diels-Kranz). Proclus records that Empedokles said that women were διγόννοι, meaning that two lengths of gestation were possible (which Proclus says are seven and nine months), and that eight months' children were not viable (*VS* 31 B 69).

A hebdomadic scheme for human life, similar to that attributed to Hippon, is given in a passage in the Hippokratic treatise *On Flesh*: here children are said to be born viable at seven and nine months, but not at eight. The seven months' child is born after three tens of weeks, that is 210 days, and is viable because it has spent an exact number of tens of hebdomads in the womb; at eight months none ever survives; but at nine months and ten days it again has an exact number of tens of weeks to make

it viable, namely four tens of weeks or 280 days (*Carn.* 19, VIII 612. 1 ff. Li.). The writer backs up his claim with evidence from his experience, saying of birth at seven months "I myself have often seen it", and refers the reader who wishes further proof to the midwives. This is adduced as merely one of a number of examples of the significance of the number seven in human development.

The hebdomadic development of the fetus was the keystone of the embryology of Diokles of Karystos and Straton, as recorded by Nikomachos of Gerasa (*apud* [Iamblichus] *Theologoumena Arithmeticae* 61. 5 ff. de Falco) and Macrobius (*In somn. Scip.* 1. 6. 63. ff.).¹⁶ They too said that the fetus was viable in seven months. Diokles, as we have seen above, was also said by Censorinus to have held, along with Aristotle, that birth was also possible in the eighth month, and we find this attribution to Diokles also in Aëtius (5. 18. 3), who records that Polybos, Diokles and the Empiricists said that the eighth month is also capable of producing children, but ἀτονώτερον and that many eight months' children died διὰ τὴν ἀτονίαν.¹⁷

In the Hippocratic collection of aphorisms known as *Περὶ Τροφῆς* (*Alim.*), probably compiled in Hellenistic times,¹⁸ we again find the seven months' child and a hebdomadic development of the embryo linked together, in Aphorism 42 (IX 112 - 116 Li.): "for formation 35 days, for movement 70, for completion 210". An alternative set of figures based on the number nine follows: "others, for form 45, for movement 90, for delivery 270", referring to the fetal development of the nine months' child. Then follows a set of figures for the ten months' child: "others, 50 for form, for the first leap 100, for completion 300", a sentence missing in one of the MSS. A fourth scheme follows: "40 for distinction [i.e. of limbs], 80 for changing position (μετάβασις), 240 for expulsion (ἐκπτώσις)". This obviously refers to the eight months' child, and the word ἐκπτώσις cannot refer to live birth of an infant.¹⁹ After this the MSS. have the elliptical sentence οὐκ ἔστι καὶ

ἔστι. Aulus Gellius, in writing his discussion of lengths of gestation in humans, apparently had the text ἔστιν καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν τὰ ὀκτᾶμηνᾶ before him, for which he quotes Sabinus's explanation that the eight months' child appears but does not live, therefore is and is not (Gell. 3. 16. 7).

For an account of the age of viability that goes beyond mere arithmetical schemes we must return to the Hippocratic *Oct.*²⁰ wherein is found the most detailed and sophisticated of the ancient theories about viability. The main contention of the treatise is that the child born in the eighth month of pregnancy does not survive (2. 1 Gr. = VII 452. 4 - 6 Li., cf. 9. 4 Gr., VII 444. 12 - 15 Li.). The main elements in the author's reasoning are 1: the significance of definite crisis periods in human pathology, in particular the significance of the 40-day period (tetrakontad) for pregnancy and birth²¹ (1. 1 - 16 Gr. = VII 446. 12 - 450. 29 Li.), and 2: the inability of the fetus to survive two consecutive illnesses (κακοπαθείαι), one of which always occurs in the sixth tetrakontad of pregnancy and the other at birth itself (2. 1 - 2 Gr. = VII 452. 4 - 8 Li.). The κακοπαθείαι undergone in the womb during the sixth tetrakontad, which roughly coincides with the eighth lunar month, are caused by various changes (μεταβολαί) which womb and fetus experience in this period²² (5. 1 - 6. 3 Gr. = VII 436. 8 - 440. 4 Li.), and this fact is confirmed by women themselves, whose testimony about their experience is not to be doubted (6. 4 - 7. 3 Gr. = VII 440. 4 - 442. 4 Li., 9. 1 - 2 Gr. = VII 444. 1 - 8 Li.). The second κακοπαθείη, that of birth itself, is described in terms of its potentially dangerous effect on the newborn (2. 4 - 3. 8 Gr. = VII 452. 13 - 458. 10 Li.). A fetus which has left the sufferings of the eighth month behind it, or which has not yet reached them, may well survive those of birth, but no infant can survive both when experienced consecutively.

According to *Oct.* live birth of viable infants is possible from half a year, that is approximately 182 and a half days, from conception, onwards,

excluding the sixth tetrakontad (days 201 to 240). The chart (Table 1) shows the lunar months in which viable birth is possible, depending on the date of conception, which the author considers the most important date to fix correctly in order to predict the period of suffering in the womb and make a prognosis for the viability of the child at birth (4. 2 - 7 Gr. = VII 458. 13 - 460. 9 Li., 6. 5 - 6 Gr. = VII 440. 8 - 12 Li.). By putting the date of conception early in the first (lunar) month of pregnancy, we can see from the chart that birth is viable during part of the seventh lunar month, but not in the eighth or the first few days of the ninth; if conception occurs towards the end of the first (lunar) month, viable birth is in fact possible for the first part of the eighth month but not thereafter until nearly the end of the ninth (cf. 6. 3 Gr. = VII 438. 21 - 440. 4 Li.). The author prefers to put the date of conception for most women at the middle of the month or later²³; in the latter case, birth after 280 days' gestation will take place in the eleventh (lunar) month (4. 6 - 7 Gr. = VII 460. 4 - 9 Li.). He uses the terms "seventh month", "eighth month" and so on merely as terms of convenience (cf. 6. 6 Gr. = VII 440. 9 - 12 Li.); his argument depends on the more accurate terminology of the tetrakontad, or the half-year, counting the first day of the first tetrakontad or the beginning of the year from the exact date of conception (2. 3, 4. 1, 10. 4 Gr. = VII 452. 9 - 13, 458. 11 - 13, 446. 1 - 5 Li.): thus he can say the seven months' children are born after 182 days and-a-bit, or half a (solar) year (4. 8, 4.1 Gr. = VII 436. 1 - 2, 458. 11 - 13 Li.). When he speaks, loosely, of the eight months' child, he actually means a child born in the sixth tetrakontad.

There is a significant agreement with *Oct.* in the second book of the Hippocratic *Epidemics*,²⁴ where the sufferings in the womb at the eighth month are referred to in passing (2. 1. 7 = V 78. 13 Li., 2. 3. 17 = V 116. 10 ff. Li.). The approach to the problems of childbirth in the two brief passages is reminiscent of that of *Oct.* (cf. p. 31 below).

Aristotle, in his work *On the Generation of Animals*, shows no

interest in the power of significant numbers over the viability of infants, but attempts a purely physiological explanation. After explaining that the moistness and warmth of the body give rise to multiple births, and that body size dictates whether one or several children are born at any one birth, he goes on to say that this is also the reason why man is the only animal that has variable periods of gestation: "for both seven months' children and ten months' children are born, and children are born at intermediate periods, for indeed eight months' children do live, but less often" (*GA* 4. 4, 772 B 7 ff.). Aristotle does not elaborate on his explanation here, but promises to set out his arguments more fully in *Problems*; these arguments however are not to be found there or elsewhere. The author of the Hippocratic treatise *On Regimen* also bases his explanation of the fact that some children are born viable at seven months and others at nine months on the theory that fetuses develop at different rates according to the fire and nourishment available to each (ὅπως ἂν καὶ τοῦ πυρὸς τύχη ἕκαστα καὶ τῆς τροφῆς, *Vict.* 1. 26, VI 498. 17 - 23 Li.).

In the seventh book of the *Historia Animalium* a different explanation is given (7. 4, 584 A 34 - B 18).²⁵ Concerning the variable terms of gestation in humans, we find the statement that babies born before seven months' gestation are completely incapable of survival. Seven months' children are viable, but most of them are weak - and for this reason they are swaddled in wool²⁶; many have unformed passages such as ears and nostrils, but they develop as they grow and many survive.²⁷ Of eight months' children it is stated that in Egypt and places where women give birth easily and often, some such are capable of survival,²⁸ and there even eight months' children that are born deformed are reared, but in Greece very few eight months' children are saved and most die. And because of this assumption (διὰ τὴν ὑπόληψιν) even if one is saved, they consider it not to have been born at eight months, but that the women had conceived before they realised

it. The passage goes on to mention that the two periods of greatest distress to pregnant women are the fourth and the eighth months, and that when miscarriage occurs in these months the women themselves are frequently in danger of their lives, an explanation that has obviously been influenced by *Oct.* Likewise at 583 B 29 - 584 A 2 the statements that the womb opens in the eighth month to let the viable fetus progress down, and that the non-viable fetus does not make this journey, are reminiscent of *Oct.* 5. 1 - 6. 2 Gr. (= VII 436. 8 - 438. 21 Li.).²⁹

We now come to the question of whether there prevailed a deliberate popular policy not to rear an eight months' child, and how far the theories of doctors and scientists influenced parents and midwives in their decision whether to rear. The evidence of the *GA* and *HA* passages cited above appears to show that some attempts at least were made to rear eight months' children for it is admitted that some do survive. But from the information that seven months' children are swaddled in wool (rather than the harsher cocoon of linen) we may infer that eight months' children were not accorded this concession to their weakness and this earnest of faith in the possibility of their survival. If we are to believe that eight months' children in Egypt and other places "even if they are born deformed" were more often successfully reared than in Greece, does this not suggest that the low survival rate in Greece was influenced by a general preconception of their non-viability? There is one more piece of evidence which is relevant here. Aëtius records of Polybos, Diokles and the Empiricists that they say that the eighth month is capable of producing viable infants, though they are less vigorous and for this reason many die; furthermore καθολικώτερον δὲ μηδένα βούλεσθαι τὰ ὀκτάμηνα τρέφειν, γεγενῆσθαι δὲ πολλοὺς ὀκταμηνιαίους ἄνδρας (5. 18. 3 = Diokles fr. 174. 1 - 5 Wellmann). This confirms what can be inferred from the *HA* passage,³⁰ namely the reluctance on the part of people in general to attempt to rear an eight

months' child. But we must not overlook an important qualification to this conclusion: there is an assumption, according to *HA* 7, that they will not survive, so that any that do are denied to be eight months' children. Those who held the theory – and we must assume that the writer had in mind not only ordinary people, but in this medical context with its extensive borrowings from the Hippocratic corpus, doctors such as the author of *Oct.* – preferred to revise the previously determined date of conception than to modify the theory. Even where the theory was strongly held, babies born during what had been thought to be the eighth month of gestation, were at least sometimes allowed to survive, even if they were perhaps not given such encouragement as a soft swaddling in wool. The statement about the ὑπόληψις is also an important reminder that no very reliable means existed of calculating gestational age (cf. above, note 23). (It is not clear from the Aëtius reference whether Diokles *et al.*, in affirming that there were many men who had been born in the eighth month, considered that this was because mistakes about the date of conception were often made.) Furthermore, might it not also have been the case, even if neither source says so, that when a weakly baby died shortly after birth, or was stillborn or deformed, the explanation was sometimes made that it was an eight months' child? Thus the theory would have been strengthened.

As for the second part of our question, whether and how far the medical and scientific men influenced parents and midwives in their decision whether to rear an eight months' child, we have seen that popular opinion appeared to go hand in hand with medical on the subject of its non-viability. In particular, we should see the medical and scientific theories as attempts to rationalise a popular idea and incorporate it into embryological and perinatal theory. Probably medical opinion reinforced and perpetuated popular belief on this matter, just as the latter influenced the doctors (cf. *Oct.* 7. 1 – 2 Gr. = VII 440. 13 – 442. 4 Li., 9. 1 – 2 Gr. = VII 444. 1 – 8 Li., *Carn.* 19, VIII 614. 22 – 24 Li.). Centuries later Soranus, who when

he considered a popular belief contrary to common sense and medical knowledge was quick to pour scorn on it, instructs midwives, in his recommendations on how to recognise that which is not worth rearing, to note whether the baby is born κατὰ τὸν ὀφείλοντα καιρὸν . . . μάλιστα μὲν τὸν ἔννατον μῆνα καὶ εἰ τύχοι βράδιον, ἤδη δὲ καὶ τὸν ἑβδομον (1. 26. 79, 249. 2 - 4 Rose). This clearly implies advice not to rear those born in the eighth month, or at least to take an eight month pregnancy into consideration as one of the indications that the child was not worth rearing. There is no parallel for Soranus's injunctions to midwives in the Hippocratic corpus, and none of the writers, not even that of *Oct.*, says that an eight months' child, or indeed any kind of child, should not be reared. Such language indeed makes a brief appearance at *Oct.* 2. 3 Gr. (VII 452. 9 - 11 Li.), where the author introduces the subject of the effect of the κακοπαθείαι suffered in the womb during the sixth tetrakontad and at birth: "for even", he says, "the ten months' children, who I say are rather born in seven tetrakontads, are most suited to be reared and are most fully developed in their first forty days [i.e. after birth], yet when they are born many of them die." If it can be said of these full-term infants μάλιστα προσήκει ἐκτρέφεσθαι, presumably it was considered not worth rearing some of their less strong and fully developed fellows. However the author of *Oct.* does not go so far as to state this, and towards the end of the treatise, when a similar point is being made in conclusion, he simply says of the ten months' or seven tetrakontads' offspring μάλιστα ἐκτρέφεσθαι (10. 4 Gr., VII 446. 2 Li.).

The concern of the author of *Oct.* was to make a reliable prognosis as to the date when a viable child could be born,³¹ rather than a recommendation to the parents whether to rear. Of great importance too is the ability to predict the crisis in the sixth tetrakontad. His prognosis for the seven months' children is that "most of them perish . . . But there are some of these seven months' children that survive, a few out of many,

because the proportion of time during which they were nourished in the womb puts them in the position of sharing all that is possessed by the most fully developed fetuses, which are most likely to survive, and they leave their mother before suffering the illnesses of the eighth month" (5. 4 - 5 Gr. = VII 436. 15 - 438. 8 Li.). Of eight months' children he flatly states throughout that they do not or cannot survive (οὐ περιγίνεσθαι, ἀδύνατον περιγενέσθαι : 2. 1, 5. 6, 9. 4 Gr., VII 452. 6, 438. 9, 444. 13 Li.). Of those born in the ninth month he says they "survive no less than the seven months' children, but few even of them are reared . . . They have most chance of survival if they are born at the end of the ninth month, since they are then born stronger and have left the illnesses of the eighth month further behind them" (10. 1 - 3 Gr. = VII 444. 17. - 446. 1 Li.). Those born in the tenth month have most chance of survival (10. 4 Gr., VII 446. 2 Li.).³²

This prognostic approach is well exemplified in *Epid.* 2. 3. 17 (V 116. 10 ff. Li.), in a passage about pregnancy and childbirth which lists several of the considerations which must guide a doctor in his predictions. It starts: "the women to whom nothing happens inside the prescribed time give birth to viable offspring", and goes on to mention in brief elliptical sentences matters such as the months and periods in which difficulties arise, the relationship between the number of days in which a fetus moves and its length of completed gestation, "what one must know for the seven months' children", whether the nine months are to be counted from the menstrual periods or from conception, and whether the nine Greek months make 270 days, and more.

When a doctor who adhered to the school of thought exemplified in *Oct.* and *Epid.* 2 was called in to minister to a pregnant woman, his first concern would have been to ascertain the date of conception. According to the author of *Oct.* this would usually have been possible after menstruation had ended, and probably only a few days afterwards, so that he would

generally be inclined to put it about fifteen days after the onset of menstruation (*Oct.* 4. 2 - 7 Gr. = VII 458. 13 - 460. 9 Li.) It was a widely held belief that the woman herself, if sufficiently experienced, especially if she was a hetaira, would know exactly when she had conceived.³³ Then he would be able to give a prognosis as to the expected critical periods in the pregnancy for both mother and fetus, and predictions as to the earliest date at which a viable infant could be born and the period during which birth of a viable infant was to be discounted. Whether a positive decision not to rear an infant born alive at such a date was taken probably depended on the circumstances and varied from doctor to doctor and household to household. What is certain is that little attempt would be made to intervene medically to save the life of such an infant if it seemed weak. Prognosis was all that could be offered in such a case.

Other signs indicating non-viability; superfecundation and viability³⁴

There were signs other than length of gestation which indicated to doctors that a newborn infant was not likely to live, and some of them are mentioned in the Hippocratic work *On Superfetation*, a collection of observations and instructions, probably compiled in the middle of the 4th century,³⁵ of which most deal with pregnancy, conception and menstruation, between a fifth and a sixth with management of obstructed labour, and only one with superfetation or superfecundation. "When a child is born non-viable ³⁶ its flesh overlaps its nails, and the nails come short of the hands and feet" (*Superf.* 3, VIII 478. 1 - 3 Li.). Possibly underdeveloped nails were known to be a sign of immaturity, and it was this immaturity which signalled non-viability, rather than the lack of nail development in itself³⁷; in any case, an association between underdeveloped nails and non-viability had been established. *Superf.* mentions two other signs that a

baby will be born dead or non-viable, and both are signs in the mother herself: there is a danger of this if the woman in labour has a heavy, painless flow of blood before the child appears (11, VIII 482. 23 - 484. 2 Li.), or if shortly before the birth the woman is seen to have sunken eyes, somewhat swollen face and body, swollen feet, white phlegm, whiteness of the ears and tip of the nose, and livid lips (17, VIII 484. 21 - 486. 6 Li.). Such women, says the author, bring forth either dead children or children who, though alive, are weak and not viable and anaemic as though ill (reading νοσηλὰ ἔοντα with Lienau, for the MSS' νόθα ὄντα and νοσηλέοντα), or they have previously given birth to non-viable children. There follows a brief diagnosis of the women's problem - watery blood - and instruction how to treat them after the birth.³⁸ The words ἡ προέτερον οὐ γόνιμα, tacked on at the end of the sentence like an afterthought, are probably best taken to mean that a history of previous non-viable births is often an attendant circumstance in such cases. These medical observations have a prognostic value, in alerting the doctor to the fact that the baby is not to be expected to live, and to the need for particular care and treatment for the parturient woman.

The Hippocratic *Mul.* 1. 27 (VIII 70. 18 - 21 Li.) notes that when, around the seventh or eighth month of pregnancy, the fullness of the breasts and abdomen suddenly collapses, and the breasts become small and have no milk, the infant will be dead or, if alive, will be feeble (ἡπεδανόν).

There is one paragraph in *Superf.* which recommends medical intervention to save a child born after a difficult and obstructed labour: "In the case of a woman who has a difficult labour, if the baby is stuck in the birth canal and does not emerge easily, but only with trouble and the intervention of a doctor, these babies are just alive [or "short lived", ἀρτίζωα]. One must not cut the umbilical cord of these babies until they have urinated or sneezed or cried, but leave the cord. The mother must stay

as near as possible to the baby, and if she is thirsty, she may drink a mixture of honey and water. And if the cord is inflated like a stomach, the baby will move or sneeze and utter a cry, and then the cord must be cut, if the baby is breathing. But if the cord does not inflate and the child does not move after some time has passed, it will not live" (15, VIII 48.4 - 7 Li.). There is an interesting contrast here between the trouble that must be taken to save the lives of babies that are considered ἀρτίζωα, and the complete silence about any such efforts on behalf of those thought to be οὐ βιώσιμα.

When, in a multiple birth, the smallest of the babies died, the theory of superfecundation might be invoked to explain its non-viability.³⁹ This is suggested by the Hippocratic assumption that a superfetation, that is, a fetus conceived during an already established pregnancy, was non-viable.⁴⁰ *Superf.* 1 (VIII 476. 1 - 12 Li.) distinguishes two kinds of superfetation, and maintains that both are non-viable, and the non-viability of a superfetation is an assumption made elsewhere in the Hippocratic corpus.⁴¹ *Superf.* 1 says that a superfetation which shares the middle of the womb with the earlier fetus is aborted spontaneously early in the pregnancy, while one which occupies one of the two "horns" of the womb is delivered, dead or non-viable, after the birth of the first fetus. The latter example of superfecundation was probably often invoked to explain the death or stillbirth of what was really one of a pair of twins, for ancient authorities would in fact have had no real means of distinguishing between the birth of twins and the birth of two babies whose conception was due to the exceedingly rare phenomenon of superfecundation (even though Aristotle claims that such an occurrence has been observed: *GA* 4. 5, 773 B 11). A couple of examples in *HA* 7. 4 tend to confirm this suspicion (see below, next paragraph). The superfetation which remains in the womb after the birth of the first fetus may come away, if it has not yet developed limbs, in

the form of a piece of putrefied flesh, according to *Superf.* 1, and this is recorded as a case history in *Epid.* 5. 11 (V 210. 12 - 212. 4 Li.).

Aristotle distinguishes between the superfecundation in which the second act of intercourse has followed very soon (πάρεγγυς) after the first, in which case the superfetation is viable, and the other kind of superfecundation, which he says is much rarer, in which the superfetation is conceived when the first fetus is already well developed (ἤδη τοῦ κυήματος ηὐξημένου) - in this case the superfetation cannot proceed to completion and is always expelled, somewhat as in an ordinary miscarriage (*GA* 4. 5, 773 B 7 - 18). *HA* 7. 4, 585 A 4 - 23 begins by treating the subject in a similar way to *GA*: superfecundation is rare in humans; when a second fetus is conceived a long time after the first, it cannot reach completion, but, causing pain, destroys along with it the first fetus (this detail is not in *GA*, cf. above note 41); but when the second conception occurs soon (έγγυς) after the first, women have borne both children, like twins, as in the case of Iphikles and Herakles, and in the case of a certain woman who bore two children in the same birth, one begotten by her husband and the other by her lover. But then two more cases are cited which do not fit in with the theory set out a few lines above and in *GA*: a woman pregnant with twins conceived a third fetus, and gave birth to two well-developed infants and one five months' child, which died immediately, and another woman gave birth first to a seven months' child, then to two fully developed babies - the first died, and the other two lived. In neither of these cases did the so-called second conception take place "soon" after the first; but although they are examples of superfetations conceived "when the first fetus is already well developed" (*GA* 4. 5, 773 B 18) and "a long time after" (*HA* 7. 4, 585 A 9), it is not true of them that they could not remain in the womb and suffered a kind of miscarriage. The examples accord much more with the possibility allowed in *Superf.* 1 - that of a superfetation which occupies

a different "horn" of the womb from that occupied by the first fetus, or rather, in these examples, by the first twin fetuses. It is likely that whoever wrote this part of *HA* 7 was acquainted with the ideas expressed in *Superf.* 1,⁴² and thus with a theory of superfecundation that was sometimes used to deny the viability of a weakly or very small baby in a multiple birth and to explain its stillbirth or early death.

Respiration

Another interesting aspect of the attitude of some doctors to the non-survival of certain newborn infants is to be found in relation to the ancient scientific and medical views of perinatal respiration. The ancient views are to be divided into those which saw the infant as drawing its first breath after birth and those which held the fetus to respire *in utero*. In the latter case, some thought that the fetus breathed through the mouth while in the womb, and others held that intrauterine respiration took place through the umbilical cord. A further matter of interest is the lack of any reference to attempts to assist with the initiation of respiration.

Diogenes of Apollonia may have believed that the infant respired for the first time after it was born. Aëtius records him as saying that babies are born without life, but warm (γεννᾶσθαι μὲν τὰ βρέφη ἄψυχα, ἔνθερμα δέ, Diels), and that as soon as the child is born its innate heat draws the cold into the lung (*KS* 64 A 28). Empedokles is also said by Aëtius to have held that the fetus, though alive, did not respire, and that the first breath was taken at birth, when the moisture in the infant retreated and the outside air entered in to open the vessels and fill the vacuum (*Doxographi Graeci*, Diels, 425. 23 - 426. 4).⁴³ The Pythagorean Philolaos of Kroton is said to have described the first inhalation of air by an infant after birth, and in terms reminiscent of Pythagorean cosmogony. Philolaos said that our bodies are

composed of the hot: the sperm and the womb are warm, and so too is the creature which is created from sperm and in the womb; as for its creation, he said that immediately after its birth the creature draws in the breath outside which is cold, and then as if of necessity it exhales it again; this is so in order that the drawing in of the breath from outside may cool our bodies which are too warm.⁴⁴ However, without more detailed and dependable evidence of the beliefs of Diogenes, Empedokles and Philolaos on this subject, it is impossible to say much more about their theories.

In contrast to these, we find among the Hippokratic authors and in Aristotle and Diokles the belief that the fetus respired before its birth. For these writers the first post-natal breath was of course less significant than it would have been if the infant had not been thought to breathe pre-natally. The author of *Oct.*, it is true, does recognise that danger and difficulty may attend the first post-natal respiration. For him it is the change in the method of respiration and in the matter which is breathed in that involves danger: αἱ τε τροφαὶ καὶ αἱ ἀναπνοαὶ σφαλεραὶ μεταλλασσόμεναι (3. 1 Gr., VII 456. 4 Li.). He goes on to explain that if newborn infants absorb any diseased matter, they absorb it through the mouth and nose, and that instead of breath and humours suited to the child which have surrounded the fetus in its mother's womb with a beneficent environment, the newborn child takes in completely unaccustomed substances, which are rawer and drier and less suited to humans. As a result, he says, there are necessarily many illnesses and many deaths. He adds that even in adults changes in environment and diet often provoke disease (3. 1 - 3 Gr., VII 456. 5 - 17 Li.). As far as change in what is taken in to the body is concerned, then, the danger is not unique to the newborn infant. But the method of taking in air and food is, for the umbilicus had until birth been the sole passage into the body of the fetus, the other passages being closed until the moment of its emergence from the womb.

At this point the other passages open up and the umbilicus becomes thin, closes and dries up; the other passages now take in and let out all matter entering (τὰ ἐσιόντα) and leaving the body (3. 5 - 7 Gr., VII 456. 20 - 458. 9 Li.). This passage shows that the author of *Oct.* envisages fetal intrauterine respiration taking place only through the umbilicus, if τὰ ἐσιόντα (3. 5, 3. 7 Gr., VII 458. 1, 8 Li.) means breath as well as nutriment - as it surely must in this context of τροφαί and ἀναπνοαί, πνεῦμα and χυμοί.⁴⁵ The writer of *Oct.*, then, is of the opinion that the first breath through the mouth and nose was drawn after birth, and he is aware of some potential difficulty or danger in this connection. But he accounts for it entirely by the *change* in respiration, which is just one of several μεταβολαί which the infant undergoes in birth and immediately afterwards. The theory that it is changes which occasion the κακοπαθείαι to which fetuses and newborn infants sometimes succumb is an important element in his thesis (cf. p. 25 above), and is summarised in a sentence which introduces his discussion of the sufferings that are experienced by babies at birth: ἀναγκάζονται γὰρ πολλὰ μεταλαμβάνοντα ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ πολλὰ νοσεῖν (2. 3 Gr., VII 452. 12 - 13 Li.).

The author of *Nat. Puer.*, on the other hand, maintains that the fetus respire through the umbilicus only during the first stage of its development. When it develops a mouth and nose, during the course of its articulation, it starts to respire through the mouth and nostrils, and respiration through the umbilicus is cut off (17. 2 - 3 Jo., VII 498. 2 - 15 Li.). So according to this theory, the fetus has been breathing through the mouth and nose for many weeks before it is born. The author concerns himself very little with the condition of the newborn infant, but he evidently foresaw no difficulty particular to the first post-natal breaths. Respiration plays a very important role in his embryology, being responsible for the formation of the parts of the fetus from the very earliest stage.⁴⁶

The Hippocratic *Carn.* contends that the fetus in the womb draws in breath through its mouth: τὸ δὲ παιδίον ἐν τῇ γαστρὶ συνέχον τὰ χεῖλεα μύζει ἐκ τῶν μητρέων τῆς μητρὸς καὶ ἔλκει τὴν τε τροφήν καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τῇ καρδίῃ εἴσω (6, VIII 592. 11 - 13 Li.). The phrase ἔλκει . . . τῇ καρδίῃ εἴσω is difficult: Littré translates "tire . . . dans le dedans du coeur", and Joly "tire . . . en lui, pour son coeur". I prefer to follow Deichgräber ("zieht . . . auf dem Wege über das Herz nach innen ein") and translate "draws both the nutriment and the πνεῦμα in by means of its heart", since line 14 (Deich., = line 5 Li.) above tells us that πνεῦμα ἢ καρδίῃ ἔλκει (ἔλκει being a correction in the MS. for ἔχει, which Joly, however, preserves). But it is also the case that breath is drawn *into* the heart, since the heart contains πνεῦμα, according to the opening sentence of this chapter. The chapter has its difficulties, both textual and interpretational⁴⁷ (cf. Littré p. 592, Deichgräber pp. 39 - 41), but I think the author can be understood to mean the following: 1: πνεῦμα (in the body) is warm, warmth produces movement, and warmth is fuelled by cold - these are his three main premises; 2: since the heart and hollow veins move constantly they must have the most warmth and contain (warm) πνεῦμα, and the heart also draws in (cold) πνεῦμα (i.e. air from outside) which is fuel for heat (καὶ τροφή ἐστὶ τῷ θερμῷ τὸ ψυχρόν, 592. 11 Li.); 3: the fetus draws in πνεῦμα through its mouth and by means of its heart (and also into its heart, see 2); 4: "the πνεῦμα is warmest in the infant whenever the mother breathes in" (592. 13 - 14 Li.) - presumably because the cold (outside air breathed in) is fuel for the hot; 5: heat provides movement in the fetus, as well as in the mother's body and in everything else (592. 14 - 16 Li.).

Aristotle also believed that the fetus respired *in utero*, and, like *Nat. Puer*, he gave πνεῦμα the function of articulation. But for Aristotle πνεῦμα in the fetus precedes respiration. It is the πνεῦμα neither of the

mother nor of the fetus itself. This σύμφυτον - "connate" - πνεύμα is already contained in the semen and serves as the instrument which fashions the fetus. After the fetus has received its articulation, it respire in the womb by means of its lungs (*GA* 2. 6, 741 B 38 - 742 A 8).

In *HA* 7. 4 (583 B 31 - 584 A1) some fetuses are said to be, by the eighth month, not viable but ἀποπεπνιγμένα, and such fetuses, having become devoid of breath, will not be born alive. Those that lived were probably believed to have been breathing successfully through their lungs before birth. It is significant that *HA* 7 sees no difficulty in the first post-natal breaths in the account of the midwife's duties at chapter 10, where the intelligent midwife is not shown as being concerned with the infant's respiration at all: the problem with an apparently lifeless baby is seen as lack of blood (cf. p. 16 above). In fact in describing the infant's first cry (ἐξελθόντα δ' εὐθύς φθέγγεται, 7. 10, 587 A 27), *HA* does, perhaps unwittingly, describe the initiation of respiration in the newborn infant, and this is paralleled in Hipp. *Superf.* 15: τούτων οὐ χρὴ τὸν ὀμφαλὸν ἀποτάμνειν πρὶν οὐρήσῃ ἢ πτάρῃ ἢ φωνήσῃ. and καὶ ἦν ὁ ὀμφαλὸς ἐμφυσῆται ὡσπερ στόμαχος, καὶ κινηθήσεται ἢ παρεῖ τε τὸ παιδίον καὶ φωνὴν ῥήξει κτλ. (VIII 484. 11 -12, 14 - 15 Li.). In the *Epitome* of Aristotle's *HA* by Aristophanes of Byzantium (which also contains information on natural history culled from other works, Aristotelian and otherwise) we find a passage whose first few words appear to refer to *HA* 7. 10, 587 A 27 (quoted above): βοᾶν δὲ οἶεται εὐθέως τὰ τικτόμενα, but which then continues with an explanation derived from some other source. The passage says that newborns cry out "in accordance with a contraction of the vessels and in accordance with a spasm because of the coldness of the air surrounding them; for out of warmth they arrive in a completely cold environment, out of an accustomed environment into an unaccustomed one, and into a hard one out of a soft one" (l. 93, pp. 28 - 29 Lampros). It is difficult to say where Aristophanes got

this from. The reception of the newborn infant into cold air had a certain significance for Diogenes and Philolaos, as we have seen above, but for them the cold played its primary rôle in respiration itself, whereas in the Aristophanes passage inhalation of the air is not actually mentioned. The second half of the sentence reminds one very much of the first part of Hipp. *Oct.* 3. 3 Gr. (VII 456. 11 - 15 Li.).⁴⁸ The Aristophanes passage, whatever its derivation, points to the coldness (and unaccustomedness and hardness) of the environment as stimulating not respiration, but the infant's first cry. If it assumes that the first cry heralds the initiation of respiration, it does not say so, and in this respect it accords with *HA* 7. 10, 587 A 27, where no connection between first cry and first breath is made. A few lines further on in *HA* 7. 10 another remark also fails to connect the two: "before its emergence the infant utters no sound, even if the birth is difficult and the head is out while the rest of the body remains within" (587 A 34 - 35).

Part of the hebdomadic theory about human life, and the perinatal period in particular, held by Diokles was that a non-viable infant cannot breathe for more than seven hours after it is born (fr. 177 Wellmann).⁴⁹ He believed, like his contemporaries, that babies are born breathing. If an infant can be kept alive for more than seven hours, this is a sign that it is viable.

The belief that πνεῦμα was conveyed to the fetus *in utero* is taken for granted by Soranus. According to him material containing blood and πνεῦμα was conveyed to the fetus by the umbilicus.⁵⁰ Like his predecessors, Soranus ignores the initiation of respiration in the newborn infant, even though he deals with the care of the newborn infant more thoroughly than any of the authors mentioned above. Just as does *HA* 7. 10, he notes that the infant begins its life with crying (I. 27. 80, 250. 9 - 10 Rose), and he too fails to make any connection between this and healthy respiration. This is especially noticeable from the vagueness with which he accounts for a

failure to cry lustily soon after birth: the third sign which he advises midwives to look for as an indication that the child is worth rearing is that "when put on the ground it cries with appropriate vigour, for one that continues some length of time without crying or that only cries fitfully is to be suspected of being in this condition on account of some [*sc.* untoward] circumstance" (διὰ τινὰ περίστασιν, I. 26. 79, 249. 7 – 8 Rose).⁵¹

If Diogenes believed that newborn infants only after they were born took breath into their bodies, which he seems to equate with the entry of ψυχή (cf. Xenophanes's view that ἡ ψυχή πνεύμα, D.L. 9. 19), it is clear that Aristotle, *HA* 7, Diokles and the Hippocratic authors discussed above disagreed with him. They all saw the fetus as partaking, in some sense, of πνεύμα while in the womb.⁵² Respiration was therefore not so much initiated after birth, as continued. It was continued, according to *Oct.*, in a completely different manner, but in the view of those such as the authors of *Nat. Puer.*, *Carn.* and probably *HA* 7, Aristotle and probably Diokles, respiration through the mouth and nose (and, Aristotle says, the lungs) was already well established before birth.

For these authors πνεύμα was for different reasons an essential element in the fetus's formation, and it is not so very strange that some should have supposed it to be taken in through the mouth and lungs. These organs are, after all, seen to be ready to fulfil their function when the baby is born. It is in fact the case that fetal lung movements mimicking respiration, by drawing in and expelling amniotic fluid, are an essential part of fetal lung development, and those infants deprived of this by being born many weeks before they are due usually do not survive because of the immaturity of their lungs.⁵³

Does this neglect by doctors and scientists of the initiation of post-natal respiration tell us anything about the practices of midwives? We have seen that doctors did not theorise in a vacuum: they were aware of the

beliefs and practices of female patients and midwives, sometimes appealing to these to back up their theories, and sometimes incorporating popular beliefs, often rationalising them, into their theoretical schemes. They were also perfectly capable of ignoring both women's experiences and observable facts when it suited their theories to do so.⁵⁴ It may be significant that we find no mention of the initiation of respiration in either *HA's* description of a midwife's duties or Soranus's list of signs that told the midwife that an infant was not worth rearing, or his account of what the midwife must do for the newborn child. In fact, in most normal, healthy babies respiration is initiated a few seconds to two or three minutes after delivery, by means of various stimuli including change of temperature, a fall in the oxygen-level of the infant's blood, handling, and, perhaps, noise, and all that is usually required of the midwife is to extract any mucus that may have collected in the infant's mouth and air passages. But it is common midwifery practice to help to stimulate the initiation of respiration by such methods as slapping or massaging the infant's back, or moving its arms and legs, or tickling it, a tradition that persists today in many obstetrical units (despite the opinion of some experts that it is unnecessary). Perhaps this was not part of the ancient Greek midwife's repertoire of traditional skills.

As for the doctors, they were faced with a high perinatal mortality rate which they were for the most part powerless to do anything about. Anything which helped to explain or forecast individual neonatal deaths or stillbirths, such as the theory of the non-survival of the eight months' child, was to be welcomed. In respect of respiration, the attitude of the writer of chapter 15 of the Hippocratic *Supernat.* (see pp. 33 - 34 above) seems to be typical of ancient doctors. He advises the doctor called in to help with a difficult labour to watch the infant carefully, as it will probably be barely alive. If the baby shows various signs of life, including respiration, the cord may be cut. There is no reference to the baby's *starting* to breathe and no attempt is advised to do anything that might be thought to help it start

breathing. The writer obviously believed, in common with the others mentioned above, that the fetus respired in the womb, and that healthy babies are born breathing. The corollary to this is that babies that did not breathe after birth had ceased to respire some time before birth (cf. pp. 40 - 42 above and note 53). For such a child, nothing could be done.

Other medical observations

The attitude of Greek doctors of the classical and Hellenistic age to illness in newborn infants, in so far as it can be ascertained from the extant literature, had two areas of significance. Very little or no medical intervention seems to have been offered to a newborn infant that appeared to be weak or diseased, and doctors based their reputation in this area of medical practice on their ability to give a prognosis of survival. Secondly, they observed certain conditions in newborn infants and attempted to incorporate an explanation for them into their various theories of embryology and childbirth, using these examples, where they seemed appropriate, as indications that the theories were correct.⁵⁵

A few examples of the latter practice are worth looking at here. The theory found in *Oct.*, that changes in environment, diet and so on provoke diseases that may be fatal, could be made to account for many neonatal conditions. What change could be more radical than that made by the newborn infant from the safe, enclosed, totally supportive environment of the womb, to the outside world with its unaccustomed substances? There is the potentially traumatic event of the birth itself, when the baby may present itself feet-first, or get the umbilical cord wrapped around its neck: many such babies are born having within themselves the beginning of the illness from which some die while others survive but remain sickly (2. 4 - 7 Gr., VII 452. 13 - 454. 13 Li.).⁵⁶ Some babies that are born easily swell up

soon afterwards, and this may prove fatal: if it does not go down in less than three days neonatal oedema may be accounted for by the fact that they have suddenly been expelled from a confining space (2. 8 - 9 Gr., VII 454. 14 - 456. 3 Li.). We have seen above (pp. 37 - 38) what he has to say about the changes in feeding and breathing which accompany birth. The same applies to clothing: instead of being enveloped in flesh and liquids which are tepid and moist and congenial, babies after they are born are clothed in the same materials as men (3. 4 Gr., VII 456. 17 - 20 Li.). We have also noted his theory that infants born with deformities acquired them during the illnesses suffered in the womb during the sixth tetrakontad, by the ἀπόστασις, the settling down, of the disease into one part of the body (see note 21).

The author of *Genit.* and *Nat. Puer.* attributes some of the deficiencies and illnesses in newborn infants to the conditions in the mother's womb: a child might become diseased in the womb if it was more open than normal, so that some of its nutriment escaped (*Genit.* 9. 1 Jo., VII 482. 3 - 9 Li.),⁵⁷ or if all the children born to a mother are weak, the cause is the constriction of the womb, which gave insufficient space for the fetus to grow (*Genit.* 9. 2 Jo., VII 482. 9 - 14 Li.). A deformed child may have received its deformity either as a result of a contusion, such as a blow to the mother in the region of the womb or a fall, or as a result of the constriction of the womb in the part where the fetus's deformed part was formed (*Genit.* 10. 1 - 2 Jo., VII 484. 1 - 14 Li.). Inadequate nutrition is also given as an explanation of the fetus's lack of growth or diseased state, for growth and health depend on what nutrition arrives from the mother into her womb: the health or disease of the child corresponds to that of the mother (*Nat. Puer.* 22. 1 Jo., VII 514. 6 - 8 Li.). The author's explanations of infant diseases reflect his preoccupation with intrauterine development and nutrition.⁵⁸

The limitations of ancient medicine in the field of therapy must

have been even more marked with regard to life-threatening conditions in infants, especially in the newborn, than for diseases in adults. The distinct absence of therapeutic prescriptions from *Genit., Nat. Puer.* and *Morb.* 4 accords with what is known of their author from his contribution to the gynaecological works in the *Corpus*. The parts of *Mul.* 1 written by him, identified by Grensemann as one of three distinct strata (labelled *Mul.* C), display a distinguishing characteristic of a complete absence of therapy.⁵⁹ Other authors do make suggestions for treating gynaecological conditions; the absence of any reference to the treatment of infants in this author's embryological treatise therefore is not evidence for the lack of therapeutic medicine for infants in general. Yet such an absence is in fact noticeable in the Hippocratic corpus as a whole, though there was no lack of interest in either the newborn infant or therapy. The ability to predict which child would live and which would die, on the other hand, and to a certain extent to describe the aetiology of infant diseases, was evidently considered to be of some value. Outside the Hippocratic corpus this tendency is confirmed. Diokles, as we have seen, affirmed the importance of the first seven hours in the life of an infant in deciding whether it lived or died. This approach is paralleled in *HA* 7. 12 (588 A 8), where it is stated that children are given their names only after seven days have passed, since it is likelier that having survived these they will live (cf. p. 257 below). To return to the Hippocratic corpus, infants born sickly are said in *Oct.* (1. 14 Gr., VII 450. 11 - 16 Li.) to be stronger and more mentally aware if they survive the first forty days after birth. Doctors were unable to prevent many of the neonatal deaths which occurred even among infants that were born fully mature, as *Oct.* 2. 3 reminds us (cf. p. 30 above). As for those born at what were calculated to be earlier dates, many of them were not expected to live at all. If it was a common practice among midwives of Sokrates's day to give advice not to attempt to rear certain infants (cf. pp. 17 - 19 above, p. 155 below), the medical men seem not to have challenged it.




TABLE I showing relationship of lunar months to dates of viability depending on the date of conception, according to Hipp. Oct.

Part Two

Swaddling

Swaddling of newborn babies appears to have been an almost universal custom in the classical and Hellenistic world. The many representations in Greek art of a neatly parcelled infant provide ample evidence of the practice, even if the few glimpses of it afforded by the literary sources make it rather more difficult to reconstruct a complete picture of it in its everyday, real-life, context.

Many of the literary references to swaddling bands, τὰ σπάργανα, and wrapping in swaddling bands, σπαργανοῦν, or σπαργανᾶν, come from mythological or legendary subjects. Pindar conceives of the infant Herakles attracting Hera's attention as he lay in his "saffron swaddling" (*Nem.* 1. 37 - 38), and nobly coloured swaddling clothes are also attributed by him to Jason, who was sent off to Cheiron "in purple swaddling bands" (*Pyth.* 4. 114). The Homeric *Hymn to Delian Apollo* tells how the goddesses washed the newborn god and swaddled him in a white cloth, fine and newly woven, and fastened a gold band around him (lines 120 -122), and in the *Hymn to Hermes* the infant Hermes, who was born at dawn, had invented the lyre by noon, and stole the cattle of Apollo in the evening, hides in his cradle "wrapping his swaddling bands about his shoulders, just like a little baby", snuggling down "in his fragrant swaddling bands" and curling up like a baby going to sleep, and later reveals himself by pushing the swaddling bands from his shoulders up round his ears (151, 237 - 241, 305 - 306); Apollo addresses him mockingly as σπαργανιῶτα (301). According to the account of Apollodorus, Rhea, when Zeus was born, wrapped a stone in swaddling bands and gave it to Kronos to swallow, as if it were the newborn child (1. 1. 7). These fanciful references to swaddling do not tell us much about its nature in real life,⁶⁰ but the words of Orestes's former nurse in Aischylos's

Choephoroi present a much more realistic picture: she reminisces about her care of her young charge, saying "a child still in swaddling bands does not say a word, if it is hungry or thirsty or wants to urinate⁶¹; the young bowels of infants act in an independent way. Of these things I was the forecaster, but often, I think, I was mistaken and had to wash the child's swaddling bands - I served as both launderess and nurse" (755 - 760). In the *Agamemnon* Aigisthos says that after the atrocious banquet Atreus drove out his father Thyestes along with himself "while I was still a nursling in swaddling bands" (1606). A similar reference to swaddling bands as the motif of the very young infant is made in Plutarch's essay *On the Fortune or Virtue of Alexander* (*Mor.* 337 D), in which Charillos, newly born heir to the Spartan kingship, is said to have been carried by Lykourgos in his swaddling bands into the mess-hall and proclaimed king. The connection between baby and swaddling was evidently so deeply rooted in the ancient mind that the phrase ἐκ πρώτων σπαργάνων could come to mean "from babyhood", much as we might say "from the cradle".⁶²

In Euripides's *Ion* there are a couple of references to the infant Ion's σπάργανα, which are far from being conventional swaddling bands. Hermes had been told by Apollo to take the exposed baby

αὐτῷ σὺν ἄγγει σπαργάνοισί θ' οἷς ἔχει (line 32).

These σπάργανα may naturally be taken to be Kreousa's χλιδὴ ("ornament") which she had attached to the baby when she abandoned him (line 26). Exactly what this consisted of is revealed later, in the scene in which the identities of mother and son are discovered by means of the contents of the ἄγγος (cf. line 1351 where the Pythia tells Ion ἐνθάδε κέκρυπται σπάργαν' οἷς ἐνήσθα σύ). There are three things: the robe which Kreousa had woven as a girl, and which she had wrapped round her baby (line 1417, cf. line 955: ... ἐν ὄρφνῃ σπαργανώσαντες πέπλοις); ornamental snakes, derived from the story of Erichthonios, which she used as a necklace for the baby (1427 -

1431); and a wreath of Athena's sacred olive tree (1433 - 1436). The woven robe does function as a wrapping for the baby, but the σπάργανα as a whole in this play are the tokens left with the abandoned baby. Menander in his *Perikeiromene*, in telling how the woman who reared a foundling baby girl later told her about her origins and gave her the σπάργανα with which she was found, probably also uses the word in a similar sense: birth tokens certainly play an important rôle in the later recognition scene (15, 352 ff. Koerte). Donatus in his Commentary on Terence's *Eunuchus* (753) tells us that the "monumenta" produced as birth tokens which identify an exposed child were called σπάργανα by the Greeks. In Sophokles's *Oedipus Tyrannos* Oedipus refers to his maiming as an abandoned baby as δεινόν . . . ὄνειδος σπαργάνων (1035), apparently using the word in the sense of a token or mark left with him on his exposure which would later contribute to his recognition. Later references (In Nikolaos of Damascus, *Fragments*, p. 15, 12 - 13 Dindorf, and Schol. Eur. *Phoin.* 26) to a legend in which tight swaddling bands were the cause of Oedipus's lameness have inclined A. D. Fitton Brown to believe that the version of accidental maiming by swaddling was the original one, and that Sophokles invented the story of the foot-piercing for his own dramatic purposes.⁶³ If this is the case, Sophokles's use of σπάργανα in *OT* 1035 may be a subtle exploitation of the ambiguity of the term, even though he chooses to ignore swaddling as the cause of maiming. But perhaps it was Sophokles's reference to σπάργανα and a too-literal understanding of it by commentators that gave rise to the alternative story of accidental crippling by swaddling. This may indeed be more likely, especially if we consider that a baby destined for exposure *and death* would not have been thought of originally as having been swaddled at all. In real life some exposed babies - those whom their parents hoped would be picked up and reared - would have been swaddled (and, indeed, the warmth provided by the bands would have prolonged their lives outdoors

perhaps for several days). This is the most likely explanation for the extension of the meaning of σπάργαννα into tokens left with an abandoned baby.

Leaving aside the infants of myth and legend, we read in Aristotle's *Historia Animalium* that seven months' babies are the first to be born viable but most are weak, "and for this reason they swaddle them in wool" (7. 4, 584 B 2 - 4). The inference to be drawn is that it was more common to swaddle healthy babies in something else - presumably in linen bands. Soranus recommends the use of woollen bands exclusively, "because of the softness of the material and because the linen ones shrink with sweat" (*Gyn.* 1. 29. 83, 254. 7 - 8 Rose). This suggests that babies were commonly too hot in their swaddling bands and sweated profusely. Diphilos wrote a comedy called *Συντρόφοι*, evidently about people who had been brought up together as children, probably foundlings, in which a character jokes: "There's the makings of a good dyer in the infant - he's produced for us his swaddling bands completely dyed!" (fr. 73 Kassel and Austin). This confirms what Orestes's Nurse tells us (above, pp. 47 - 48): that babies were swaddled in such a way that the faeces were caught in the swaddling bands, as in modern nappies. A. D. Fitton Brown ([1975] p. 17) says that "one reason for tight swaddling was to inhibit evacuation" and that the Nurse in *Choephoroi* was concerned to interpret Orestes's cry of discomfort correctly in order to avoid having to wash the bands. It is true that very tight swaddling might have such an effect⁶⁴; but on the whole I think the most that the Nurse hoped for was to employ guesswork, sharp observation and quickness to save herself some of the trouble of laundry work. Soranus says that the baby's nurse should be a cleanly person lest the stench of the swaddling bands upset the baby's stomach, or the irritation keep it awake or cause ulceration (1. 32. 88, 264. 9 - 11 Rose). No doubt some child-carers left babies in a state of filth and discomfort in swaddling bands much less

fragrant than those of the infant Hermes (above, p. 47) for considerable periods, but the lazy way out of frequent changes may just as often have been to leave the offending area unswaddled for much of the time. This is implied by Soranus's condemnation of the practice of leaving the lower part of the body uncovered in order to save trouble, and he mentions a method of swaddling in which a separate cloth is put around the loins in order to catch the faeces. But if the baby's skin becomes irritated while it is in swaddling bands, he advises replacing the bands with a small tunic (*Gyn.* 1. 29. 84, 256. 9 - 15 Rose; 39. 111, 286. 16 - 19 Rose).

Did swaddling cause damage more permanent than ulceration or skin irritation? There is no doubt that excessively tight bandaging could restrict blood circulation or cause deformity, and European writers on infant-care of the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries often allude to the latter.⁶⁵ There is an interesting allusion to deformity of the foot in infants in the Hippocratic treatise *On Joints* 62 (IV 262. 10 - 264. 10 Li.). The author has evidently observed many cases of club-foot in infants, which he takes to be congenital (ἐκ γενεῆς) deformities, caused by "the constant holding of the foot in a constrained position", by which he must mean, if he is using the term ἐκ γενεῆς strictly and consistently with his use of it elsewhere in this work,⁶⁶ the retention in a bad position of the fetus's foot *in the womb*. But intrauterine damage of this kind would be most unlikely, and the culprit would be much more likely to be bad swaddling. The doctor says that most of these cases are curable, if the dislocation at the foot is not very great and if the child has not grown much; he gives detailed instructions for treatment, including manipulation, bandaging and special footwear at a later stage, and rejecting incision and cautery. The references in Nikolaos of Damascus and the Scholiast on Eur. *Phoin.* (mentioned on p. 49 above), to Oedipus's lameness confirms what we must suspect: that some infants were crippled by inexpertly applied

swaddling bands.

In the Hippocratic treatise *On Fractures* there is a reference to the swaddling of infants in their beds, which implies that swaddled infants were strapped into their cradles. Describing a method of setting a broken leg, the doctor advises the use of a hollow splint which extends from thigh to foot, with a band loosely tied at the knee to include the splint, ὥσπερ τὰ παιδία ἐν τῆσι κούρησι σπαργανοῦται (22, III 492. 1 Li.). The infant thus treated, then, is swaddled and put into a cradle like a bandaged leg which is put into a hollow splint, and an extra band is tied round the cradle, presumably to prevent the baby falling out. The necessity for this is easy to understand if we think of the cradle as having a rounded base on which it rocks. A much more stringent form of swaddling is mentioned by Soranus, in which the infant is completely immobilised in a kind of cradle called "Thessalian". In this method, the baby is covered as far as the loins with bandages, and laid on a sack filled with straw or chaff and covered with a rag, which has been placed in a hollowed-out log; the baby is then tied fast with bands passed through notches in the sides of the log. Soranus disapproves of this as being cruel and hard to endure (*Gyn.* 1. 29. 83, 253. 16 - 23 Rose). Soranus also records that, after swaddling, the Thracians and Macedonians tie the baby down on a flat board, in order to flatten the back of the head and the part around the neck, a practice which he rejects because of the ulcerations and bruising that may be caused to the body and the unsuitable shape thus given to the head (1. 30. 85, 256. 17 - 25 Rose).

It was probably this kind of contraption that Aristotle had in mind five centuries earlier, when he alludes to the "mechanical devices used even now by some peoples" to keep the infant's body straight and prevent distortion of its soft limbs (*Pol.* 7. 15. 2, 1336 A 10 ff.). This comes in the context of the lawgiver's measures for ensuring good physical condition in children (1334 B 29 ff.): following a long discussion of marriage and

procreation, Aristotle makes a few recommendations about rearing newborn children. He touches on the subject of diet, and then says that it is beneficial to have them make as many movements as are possible for creatures of such an age. He continues:

πρὸς δὲ τὸ μὴ διαστρέφουσι τὰ μέλη δι' ἀπαλότητα
χρῶνται καὶ νῦν ἔνια τῶν ἐθνῶν ὀργάνοις τισὶ μηχανικοῖς
ἃ τὸ σῶμα ποιεῖ τῶν τοιούτων ἀστραβές,

and goes on to say "It is beneficial from the first also to accustom them to cold . . .". Some scholars have interpreted Aristotle's allusion to the mechanical devices as a recommendation to use them,⁶⁷ and others as a condemnation of the practice.⁶⁸ The practice certainly appears to be in conflict with his advice to encourage all possible movement in newborn infants, and Aristotle does not say how the two could be combined. In fact swaddling itself seriously restricted the movement of the newborn infant, and Aristotle does not recommend abandoning swaddling - which would indeed have been a very radical step. He neither explicitly condemns nor advises the use of body-straightening devices, but simply records it, as practised by some non-Greek peoples, and then seems to imply approval by following it with the words "it is also beneficial . . .". But Aristotle does not, when all is said and done, go into this subject in detail. A very general recommendation about encouraging movement, with no reasons put forward to justify it, followed by a passing reference to a custom in use in other cultures, does not indicate that Aristotle gave much thought to the subject. Perhaps he realised that traditional practices of women in relation to newborn infants were too deeply rooted to be successfully challenged.

Plato, in contrast, gave serious attention to the importance of swaddling, and was quite ready to encounter the hostility of women to his plans for infants in the state of the *Laws*. In this work the Athenian explains to his companions that creatures are exercised beneficially by being carried about or rocked, and suggests that in formulating the ideal

laws they must risk being laughed at and propose that "the newborn be moulded like wax, while it is soft, and be kept in swaddling bands until it is two years old". The law should also compel nurses to carry the children everywhere until they become able to stand, and even after that to keep carrying them until they reach the age of three, to prevent any twisting of the legs caused by pressure (789 E). That these requirements would meet with ridicule and obstinate disobedience from contemporary Greek nursesmaids "with their feminine and servile mentality" is readily acknowledged by the Athenian. Nevertheless it is to be hoped that the citizens will realise the importance of right management both of domestic and public affairs, and voluntarily adopt these things as customs (790 A - B).

In desiring children to be swaddled for two years and prevented from walking until they are three, Plato shows less awareness of the nature of infants than Aristotle, who at least knew that little children cannot be expected to keep still.⁶⁹ Yet in attaching importance to swaddling as a means of moulding the infant's body into a desirable shape Plato merely followed convention. This was undoubtedly the ancient rationale behind swaddling, and it can be seen in the assumption of the Hippocratic treatise *On Airs, Waters, Places* that one of the reasons that the Skythians have crooked and flaccid bodies is that they are not swaddled as infants.⁷⁰ It was known that the bones of infants were soft: in the Hippocratic treatise *On Wounds in the Head* we read that "the bones of infants are thinner and softer, because they contain more blood and are hollow and porous, and are neither dense nor hard" (18, III 250. 9 - 11 Li.); we have noted Plato's comparison of the newborn's body with wax (*Laws* 789 E), and Aristotle's observation of its softness (*Pol.* 7. 15. 2). Plato anticipated no arguments about the Athenian's statement that "the most beautiful bodies . . . must grow from earliest childhood as straight as possible" (*Laws* 788 D), and it was this idea above all that lay behind the practice of swaddling.⁷¹ Doctors,

such as the author of the Hippocratic *Nat. Puer*, in writing about deformities sustained by means of knocks and bad positions in the womb (cf. p. 45 above), must both have been influenced by the popular conception of the newborn infant as a fragile creature which required bandaging, and have helped to perpetuate the belief. The aesthetic and protective function of swaddling - the two aspects are not distinguished in the ancient sources - is confirmed by Soranus. He gives detailed instructions to midwives on how to swaddle, stating the principle that "one must mould each part according to its natural shape, and if any part has become distorted during the time of delivery, one must arrange it correctly and bring it back to its natural shape." He prescribes the material and exact size of the swaddling bands, and the precise manner in which each part of the infant is to be swaddled, paying careful attention to the effect each part of the swaddling will have on the body underneath (*Gyn.* 1. 29. 83 - 84, 253. 14 - 256. 15 Rose).

The originality of Plato's prescriptions lies in his desire to combine movement, which he considers absolutely necessary for the infant's development, with measures to protect the soft body and ensure its straightness. We have seen (above, p. 53) that Aristotle, while accepting that both of these were necessary, gave no attention to the means whereby they might be combined.⁷² Plato's thinking on the subject begins with a concern to make bodies and souls as beautiful and good as possible by means of "right upbringing" (ὀρθὴ τροφή), and the observation that the most beautiful bodies must grow as straight as possible from infancy. All bodies benefit from movement such as shaking and swinging, and therefore it is important that pregnant women walk to exercise the unborn child, and that infants be swaddled and carried about by their nurses. From the fact that children may be rocked to sleep we can see that external motion overpowers internal disturbance and quiets it; exercising children by motion will teach them courage and cheerfulness (*Laws* 788 c - 791 c).

The desire to form the bodies of infants into shapes that were thought pleasing seems to have been one of the preoccupations of ancient child-care, Greek and non-Greek, and swaddling was not the only means used. Plutarch records that nurses in Sparta had special diligence and skill (ἐπιμέλειά τις μετὰ τέχνης), so that they reared the babies without swaddling bands and left their limbs and forms free (*Lyk.* 16. 4). This may imply that the nurses substituted something else for swaddling, a certain technique which enabled them to do without it; we are not told what it was, though Plutarch does record their practice of bathing babies with wine to strengthen and harden their bodies. Like the other laws and institutions attributed to Lykourgos, this probably describes what was believed to have been the practice in earlier Sparta. After the fifth century the Spartans departed in many ways from observance of the old laws and customs, and Plutarch uses the past tense to record these practices. Nevertheless we should not rule out the possibility that the nursing practices mentioned by Plutarch lived on, and became traditions, as child-care practices often do long after the original reason for them has been forgotten.

"Leather-workers stretch, rub, comb, wash; the care of infants is the same": this Hippocratic remark shows that as early as the classical age (and probably much earlier) infants were thought to require vigorous manual attention (see p. 20 above). Soranus describes in great detail how the nurse should manually manipulate every part of the baby's body, including the head and face, to give it the desired shape and suppleness (*Gyn.* 1. 36. 101 - 103, 275. 26 - 278. 27 Rose).⁷³ Probably the Greeks of the classical and Hellenistic age employed practices similar to those described by Soranus. There was certainly an interest in the use of techniques of "moulding" and other methods as found in non-Greek nations. Head-moulding is attributed by the author of *On Airs, Waters, Places* to a tribe called the Makrokephaloi, who are said to find long heads the most distinguished in shape. As soon as a baby is born they start to model the still soft head with their hands, and

apply bandages and appropriate devices, to destroy the roundness of the head and increase its length. The author claims that eventually the members of the tribe came to be born with long heads, although long-headedness among them is less prevalent now than it once was, owing to mixture of races. He adduces this as an example of the influence of heredity (*Aer.* 14, II 58. 11 - 60. 8 Li.).⁷⁴ The same author says that the women of a Skythian tribe called the Sauromatai, who ride, shoot and kill before marrying, have no right breast, since their mothers perform cautery on this part of their baby daughter's anatomy, in order to prevent the breast from developing and thus channel all the strength and growth into the right arm and shoulder (17, II 66. 4 - 68. 2 Li., cf. *Hdt.* 4. 110 - 117). He also mentions the use of cauterisation in general among the Skythians to dry up the moistness of their bodies and give strength to the joints (20, II 72. 22 - 74. 8 Li.).⁷⁵ Among the customs of the Persian royal family recorded in Plato's *Alkibiades I* (121 D) is the upbringing of the royal child "not by a female nurse of little worth" but by the most highly commended eunuchs in the king's entourage, who are entrusted with the entire care of the newborn child, in particular with making (μηχανᾶσθαι) him as handsome as possible, by moulding (ἀναπλάττοντας) the child's limbs and straightening them (κατορθούντας); the passage does not indicate the actual methods used.

Swaddling seems to have been the method for shaping the bodies of infants that was most favoured by the Greeks. Its popularity probably rested on the tenacity of traditional usage as well as on the benefits which it was thought to confer on the bodies of children, and there were no doubt advantages in it for the child-carers themselves. A swaddled baby would be all but immobilised, and could be put down anywhere - on a hard floor, on the ground in a field - and ignored.⁷⁶ Special diligence would indeed be required to look after an unswaddled child, as Plutarch's words hint (above, p. 56). For the newborn infant it must also have provided the covering

necessary to prevent heat loss. It has been said that swaddling was useful as a means of preventing babies from rolling or crawling into danger,⁷⁷ but this would be true only if it was continued into the fifth to eighth months and later. Swaddling also produces a placid state in the great majority of babies so treated, and results in more sleeping, less crying, and lowered cardiac and respiratory rates: this was shown by Lipton, Steinschneider and Richmond (1965) in their laboratory tests.

On the question of the age at which swaddling was discontinued, lack of evidence compels us to resort to conjecture. Plato's two years would have made Greek women laugh; Soranus tells us that some release the infant about the fortieth day, and most about the sixtieth, but others even later (*Gyn.* 1. 29. 111, 285.16 - 18 Rose). Probably two months was about the usual duration in Plato's day too. In funerary reliefs, representations of tiny babies, evidently newly born to a mother who has died in childbirth, depict them in swaddling clothes, but babies who appear to be a few months old are naked, or clad in a thin tunic or lightly wrapped in the end of the cloak of the woman holding them.⁷⁸ Soranus advises discontinuation of swaddling whenever the infant's body seems sufficiently firm and in no danger of distortion, and recommends removing the bands gradually. Removal of swaddling bands one by one may have been usual in classical Greece: Plato reproves nurses and mothers for their ignorance and stupidity in bringing about the uselessness of the left hand - an entirely unnecessary circumstance since there is no difference between the capacities of the right and left feet and legs (*Laws* 794 D 8 ff.). Perhaps he had in mind the unswaddling process: Soranus assumes that freeing the right hand first, which he recommends, makes it stronger by giving it exercise earlier, and doing the opposite causes left-handedness (*Gyn.* 1. 39. 111, 286. 7 - 10 Rose). There is in fact evidence that some infants who are swaddled for more than the first two or three months are reluctant to give it up, and have to be weaned from their swaddling clothes gradually.⁷⁹

Considering the pacifying effect of swaddling upon most newborn babies, it is obvious that ancient Greek mothers and nurses who practised swaddling were not guilty of any conscious cruelty. Excessively tight swaddling, especially that which was continued beyond the first two or three months, and filthy swaddling bands that were seldom changed, would indeed have been uncomfortable and probably harmful to the child, and Soranus criticises the thoughtlessness and laziness of the nurses and parents who permitted this. We must not assume that the practice of swaddling excluded any possibility of play with the babies, or the evocation of responses from them, such as reaching out, waving their arms and so on. Lipton, Steinschneider and Richmond ([1965] pp. 563, 56) found that although babies when swaddled responded less frequently to external stimuli, newborn infants still had the *capacity* to respond viscerally in much the same way as when unrestrained. They warn against the assumption that people who swaddle their infants are concerned only to induce passivity, never playing with or stimulating their babies. These things would largely have depended on the length of time for which swaddling was continued, the extent of the swaddling itself (whether arms were sometimes left free, for example), and the habits and character of individual families.

Part Three

Feeding

Initial feeding

Soranus in his *Gynaecology* advises the withholding of all food from the newborn child for up to two days, because the child's internal organs are upset and its whole body still contains food ingested from the mother before birth which has to be digested. The mother's own milk is not to be used for the first twenty days,⁸⁰ and when after this period it is given, the first of the milk must be sucked out by an older child or expressed manually, since the first thick liquid is unsuitable for babies (1. 31. 86 - 87, 257. 19 - 259. 21 Rose).

When we look at the evidence for the classical and Hellenistic age, we find no reference to delay in feeding milk to infants or avoidance of the colostrum period.⁸¹ Aristotle's *HA* 7. 10 (587 A 28 - 33) says that the matter evacuated by infants soon after they are born, which women call μηκώγιον, is at first bloodstained and very dark, like pitch, but soon afterwards becomes milky in appearance, "for the infant sucks the breast immediately". This is confirmed elsewhere. The Hippocratic corpus contains no such advice on the care of the newborn infant as Soranus gives, but the theory of human milk production found in *Nat. Puer.* (21. 3 - 4 Jo., VII 512. 7 - 23 Li.) accords with Aristotle's account in *GA* 4. 8 (776 A 15 - B 3), where Aristotle says that human milk is χρήσιμον, fit for use, from the time of birth.⁸² Nature, he says, has supplied animals with milk for the purpose of external nourishment, in such a way that it is neither deficient nor superfluous at the time of birth. In humans, who have several possible gestation periods, milk is of necessity ready at the earliest gestation period: it is useless before seven months, after which it becomes fit to use.

Not only does its time of readiness serve a purpose, it also follows necessarily from the circumstances of its formation: in the earlier stages of pregnancy the nutriment is mostly used for the formation of the fetus, the sweetest and most concocted⁸³ part of it being drawn off for this purpose, so that what is left is salty and foul-tasting; as the fetus approaches completion, more residual nutriment is left over and this residue is sweeter and better concocted than formerly. For this reason it is fit to use when the baby is ready to be born.⁸⁴ *HA* 7. 5 (585 A 29 - 31) has a brief reference to the subject, which appears to have been drawn at least in part from the account in *GA* 4. 8: milk which is formed before seven months is useless, but as soon as the infants are viable the milk is also fit to use (χρήσιμον); but the first milk is also salty, just as in sheep. (What is said in *HA* 3. 20, 522 A 2 - 4, may appear at first sight to contradict this: "Milk is not produced in any animal, in general, until it becomes pregnant. When the animal is pregnant it is produced, but the first is not fit for use, nor is the later milk." But τὸ πρῶτον in this passage must mean the milk produced during pregnancy before the fetus is ready to be born; ὕστερον will refer to the milk produced at the end of the suckling period, when the young creature is ready to be completely weaned.)

It is evident then that the medical and scientific writers, drawing on their observations of animal life and of the feeding practices of women, accepted that, with the possible exception of very premature babies, mothers' milk was fit for consumption by newborn infants from the very first day, and that the colostrum secreted during the first few days after birth need not be avoided. In fact there were still, in Soranus's day, those who advised feeding by the mother from the first day, as Soranus himself tells us (1. 31. 87, 259. 9 - 14 Rose).⁸⁵ The use of colostrum would actually have increased the newborn infant's chance of survival, although there was probably no awareness of this in antiquity.

An excursus on theories of fetal nutrition

The medical and scientific writers held theories about fetal nutrition which are in accord with the idea that the infant was ready to suck the maternal breast as soon as it was born, and which may even in some cases partly stem from observation that all newborn infants in fact did so. Let us therefore take a look at these theories.

That the fetus is nourished in the womb appeared self-evident to all those who studied embryology. But while some believed that the unborn child derived all its intrauterine nourishment throughout gestation through the umbilical cord, there were several who thought that the fetus, at least in its later stages, sucked milk from "cotyledons", or teat-like suckers, just as it would suck milk at the breast when born.⁸⁶

The author of *On Eight Months' Children*, as we have seen, believed that the fetus derived breath only through the umbilical cord, and his theory about fetal nutrition (in so far as it can be known from what he writes in *Oct.*) accords with this in the way we should expect: the umbilical cord is the sole channel through which the fetus is fed in the womb, and all other orifices open only at birth (*Oct.* 3. 5 Gr., VII 456. 20 - 458. 2 Li.). Probably Empedokles thought so too: Soranus says that material consisting of blood and πνεῦμα is conveyed to the fetus for its nourishment through the vessels of the umbilical cord, and that Empedokles thought that these vessels were implanted in the liver (I. 17. 57, 225. 16 - 19 Rose = *VS* 31 A 79 Diels-Kranz). According to Censorinus, Anaxagoras also said that the fetus is fed through the umbilicus (*De die nat.* 6. 3 = *VS* 59 A 110 D-K).

The nutrient material itself is the mother's blood in Empedokles's theory (and probably all those who held nutrition to be umbilical agreed). This is clear both from Soranus's information (ὕλη αἱματική καὶ πνευματική) and from Aristotle's refutation (in *GA* 4. 8, 777 A 7 - 15) of Empedokles's statement that milk is putrefied blood (*VS* 31 B 68). The author of *Nat.*

Puer, who establishes an important part of his embryology on his theory of the fetus's nutrition, also ascribes the nutrition of the fetus to blood. The fetus depends for its growth and health entirely on the nutriment it gets from its mother (*Nat. Puer.* 22. 1 Jo., VII 514. 6 - 8 Li.), the nutrient material being blood, which coagulates to form flesh (*Nat. Puer.* 14. 1 - 2 Jo., 492. 8 - 21 Li.), and it is drawn into the fetus's body by its respiration (*Nat. Puer.* 13. 4 - 15 Jo., VIII 492. 7 - 494. 8 Li.). The blood that serves as nutriment for the developing fetus is the same as menstrual fluid, and it is this that is later concocted into milk, as Aristotle describes in detail (*GA* 4. 8, 776 A 15 - 777 A 27; Lonie (1981) pp. 204 - 206, gives a full account of this theory of lactation). The womb and breasts are connected by blood vessels, a point on which Aristotle and several Hippocratic authors agree, which when the milk has collected in the breasts (a process which begins when the fetus starts to move inside the womb, that is, at quickening), also serve as channels through which a little of the milk arrives in the womb, "and the fetus partakes of a little of it" (*Nat. Puer.* 21. 2 - 4 Jo., VII 510. 24 - 512. 23 Li.). The same words are used a little later in the treatise: the fetus "draws to itself the sweetest part of the blood, and at the same time also partakes of a little of the milk" (30. 5 Jo., VII 534. 14 - 15 Li.). Exactly how it takes the milk, the author does not say. Since he believed that nutriment in the form of blood is conveyed by the umbilical cord right up until the time of birth, he may have thought that the small amount of milk is absorbed by the fetus in the same way.⁸⁷ The way in which the combined nutrition of blood and milk are described in 21. 2 - 4 and 30. 5 perhaps suggests that this was so. But the author must have known of another possibility, advanced by Diogenes of Apollonia and others after him, that of the sucking by the fetus at so-called cotyledons in the womb.⁸⁸

Demokritos and Epikouros were said by Aëtius to have believed that the fetus is nourished in the womb by sucking "certain teats and mouths", and that this is why as soon as it is born it reaches for the breast with its

mouth (*VS* 68 A 144). Censorinus attributes the same belief to Diogenes of Apollonia and Hippon (*VS* 38 A 17, cf. 64 A 25), and Aristotle criticises "those who say that infants are nourished in the womb by sucking a bit of flesh" (σαρκίδιον τι, *GA* 2. 7, 746 A 19 - 20). Diokles described breast-like growths in the womb which he called "cotyledons" (κοτυληδόνας, the same word that is used of suckers on the arms of octopuses), "tentacles" (πλεκτόνας), and "horns" (κεραία), created by nature for the purpose of acquainting the fetus with the habit of sucking at the breast (Sor. *Gyn.* 1. 3. 14, 180. 20 - 181. 3 Rose = Diokles fr. 27, 10 ff. Wellmann). Werner Jaeger advanced the opinion that Aristotle's arguments against the function of cotyledons as feeding apparatus are directed principally, if tacitly, at Diokles, who was, according to Jaeger, his contemporary and pupil.⁸⁹ One of those with whom Aristotle disagrees at *GA* 2. 7 may well have been the author of the Hippocratic treatise *On Flesh*, who says that the infant in the womb "compressing its lips sucks from the mother's womb and draws the nutriment and breath into its heart". He gives two proofs of this: the infant is born with faeces in its intestine, which it evacuates as soon as it is born, and it would not have them if it did not suck in the womb; moreover, it would not know how to suck the breast as soon as it is born if it did not also suck in the womb (6, VIII 592. 11 - 594. 4 Li.).⁹⁰ One of his proofs had already been noted by Alkmaion of Kroton, who, according to Rufus (*apud* Oreibasios 3. 156, *CMG* VI 2. 2. 136) thought that the fecal matter found in the bowel of newborn creatures owed its existence to the fetus's eating with its mouth while in the womb (*VS* 24 A 17). Aëtius, on the other hand, attributes to Alkmaion the idea that embryos are fed through the whole body, and absorb nourishment like a sponge (*VS* *ibid.*). The two statements may be reconciled if Alkmaion in the latter case was thinking of the embryo in its early stages, before a mouth had developed, and he may have seen, or thought he had seen, early abortuses which confirmed him in this belief;

Alkmaion may have believed that once the fetus had developed a mouth and become recognisably humanoid, sponge-like absorption was replaced by feeding through the mouth.

Aristotle thought that birth is initiated by the exhaustion of the fetus's food-supply through the umbilical cord and the consequent collapse of the vessels of the cord, and that at the same time the milk becomes fit to use and collects in the breasts (*GA* 4. 8, 776 B 4 - 777 A 27). There is no possibility here of a milk-supply into the womb. It is through the blood-vessels of the umbilicus, which are rooted on to the uterus, that the fetus is nourished (*GA* 2. 4, 740 A 34 - 36; 2. 7, 745 B 23 ff.), on, of course, blood. The cotyledons were noted by Aristotle in his dissections of animals, and described by him as cavities in the wall of the uterus, the hollow side toward the fetus, in which the blood vessels of the umbilicus, extending all over the uterus, terminate.⁹¹ He assumed their existence in humans also. The Aristotelian cotyledons function as storehouses into which the sanguineous nutriment for the fetus is put "just as into breasts", and they gradually become crowded together during gestation and shrivel up and disappear by the end of the pregnancy. Aristotle emphatically denied that the fetus sucked at cotyledons, on the grounds that it was never observed to do so in dissections of non-human species, and because of the existence of a barrier in the form of the membranes and the chorion which contain the fetus within the uterus.

For ancient scientists and doctors who believed that milk was akin to, or a form of, blood, and who thought that veins ran between the womb and breasts, there was no reason to deny that the fetus was nourished on milk as well as blood while in the womb. Moreover to ancient observers, meconium, the thick green matter evacuated by newborn infants soon after birth, was evidence of intrauterine nutrition and proof that the fetus's nutriment passed through its digestive system. This was a reasonable assumption to make, and it is a fact that meconium is produced as a result

of the fetus's swallowing small amounts of *liquor amnii* and desquamated cells, though no actual nutrition is derived therefrom. Both of these ideas could be accepted by those who denied the existence of cotyledons that provide milk for intrauterine sucking. The impulse to believe in the latter may have come partly from observation of non-human fetuses and placentas. But perhaps it was observation of the behaviour of newborn humans that led Diogenes, Hippon and the others to conclude that human fetuses too had access to cotyledons from which to draw nutriment. The only part of its anatomy over which the newborn infant appears to have immediate mastery is its mouth. Babies are born fully equipped with the ability to suck (or, more accurately, to draw off liquid by compressing a teat between the tongue and the roof of the mouth) and swallow, and a newborn infant appears to be no stranger to the maternal breast. In observing the strong sucking and swallowing mechanisms of newborn infants, and inferring therefrom that the fetus had sucked and swallowed while in the womb, Diogenes and the others were essentially correct, for the fetus does swallow some amniotic fluid and this does help to develop the swallowing mechanism, and it may also suck its thumb, which helps to establish the strong sucking reflex present at birth. When they also noticed the newly born baby's rooting reflex, its unflinching tendency to open its mouth and seek the nipple when touched gently on the cheek, it is no surprise that they inferred that the infant appeared to know what the breast was for and that it had met with something similar in the womb. I think that these inferences would come naturally to persons who had the opportunity to observe newborn infants put to the breast immediately after birth, before they had a chance to lose the sucking reflex.

It is time to return to the main subject of this section, the initial feeding of infants. Another element in Soranus's advice on the feeding of the newly born infant is honey. Honey, alone or mixed with goats' milk, may be fed to the infant for the first three days (that is, presumably, the first three days of the feeding régime, not the first three after birth), followed, if no wet-nurse is available, by the mother's milk (1. 31. 87, 259. 14 ff. Rose). Honey, moderately boiled with water, is the only substance Soranus will permit the newborn infant to be given to lick after its two days' enforced abstinence (he rejects butter and various pungent substances) in order to prepare its digestive system for the reception of food (1. 31. 86, 258. 6 - 20 Rose). But, on the subject of giving honey as the first food to infants, evidence for the classical and Hellenistic period is lacking. There is, on the one hand, evidence that this was customary in later ages, and on the other there are many honey-fed newborns in the world of myth and legend, something which may well reflect a very ancient custom. In order to determine what, if anything, these allusions tell us about the period under study, it will be necessary to examine them in more detail.

The most famous of the divine infants to be fed on honey was Zeus. The first-century BC grammarian Didymos in his Commentary on Pindar is quoted by Lactantius (*Div. Inst.* 1. 22) as recording that Melisseus was a king of Crete who introduced new rites into religion, and his daughters Amalthea and Melissa ("Bee") fed the infant Zeus with goats' milk and honey, which is the origin of the poetic story that bees flew up and filled the infant's mouth with honey.⁹² One of the poetic versions is given in Kallimachos's *Hymn to Zeus* (47 - 53) in which the infant Zeus is said to have sucked the udder of the goat Amalthea and fed on sweet honeycomb. There must have been many versions of this tale. Diodorus Siculus tells how Rhea gave Zeus to the Kouretes, who carried him off to a cave, where they gave him to the Nymphs to tend. They fed him on a mixture of milk and honey and gave him the udder of the goat Amalthea to feed at (5. 70). In Apollodoros's version the Nymphs

who fed Zeus on the milk of Amalthea were again daughters of Melisseus, though here named Adrasteia and Ide (1. 1. 6 - 7). Dionysos was in infancy fed honey by Makris, daughter of Aristaeus (Apoll. Rhod. 4. 1129-1134).⁹³ Often the feeding of honey to an infant is seen to prefigure his later eloquence or gift of prophecy. Iamos, the son of Euadne who was abandoned by her where he was born, was, according to Pindar, fed honey by two snakes at the bidding of the gods (*O.* 6. 45 - 47), and he was destined to be a prophet and to be the founder of the prophetic Iamidai.⁹⁴ There are a number of references to the legend that Pindar himself was given honey by bees as an infant.⁹⁵ Plato's future skill with words was promised when as an infant bees settled on his lips (as was Virgil's).⁹⁶ In Hieron's case it was his future kingship that was indicated when bees fed him as an infant exposed by his father (Justin *Epit.* 23. 4. 7).⁹⁷ Throughout antiquity, then, legends circulated that honey was given to certain distinguished individuals when they were newborn or very young children.

But when we look for evidence for the practice outside the realm of myth and legend, we find the earliest authorities for it only in the early second century AD. Soranus is the more important of these. The other is the author of the Apocryphal *Epistle of Barnabas* which belongs to the early second century, probably to the first part of the reign of Hadrian.⁹⁸ Here we find an allusion to the custom in the exegesis of the phrase "a land flowing with milk and honey", which contains the words ὅτι πρῶτον τὸ παιδίον μέλιτι, εἶτα γάλακτι ζωοποιεῖται (6. 17). The reference was drawn to the attention of modern scholars by the seventeenth-century commentator Isaac Vossius, who rightly explains this as an ancient custom, and quotes the sixth- and seventh-century medical writers Paulus of Aigina and Aëtius of Amida in support of this.⁹⁹ A reference to the custom of giving honey to babies as their first food, found among the scholia to the *Ars Grammatica* of Dionysios of Thrace, probably also goes back to the second or third

centuries AD. Dionysios explains that letters (τὰ γράμματα) are so called because they are formed by lines (γραμμαίς) and scratchings (ξυσμαίς) (6 Uhlig, in *Grammatici Graeci*, Leipzig, 1883, I. 1); in the commentary recorded by the Scholiast Melampous or Diomedes the concept of letters being formed by a kind of scratching leads the commentator to the idea that Dionysios had in mind the writing of letters on wax tablets, "in order that, just as honey is the first food for babies, so also what is left over from the honey [that is, the wax] may be for the reception of the study and learning of language [or prose? (λογικῆς)] by the children".¹⁰⁰ The commentary variously attributed to both Melampous and Diomedes was probably ultimately derived by both commentators from an older, anonymous work, and the content of such chapters as that commenting on D. T. 6 has been attributed to a source not much later than the time of Apollonios Dyskolos and his son Herodianos, in the second or third century.¹⁰¹

The custom is also alluded to by the Scholiast on Aristophanes's *Thesmophoriazusai* 506. In the play Mnesilochos complains about the practices of women, like the one who had a baby smuggled in to her in order to pass it off as her own, its mouth stuffed with honeycomb to prevent it from crying:

τὸ δ' εἰσέφερε γραῦς ἐν χύτρῳ τὸ παιδίον

ἵνα μὴ βοῶη, κηρίῳ βεβυσμένον (505 - 506).

The Scholiast connects honeycomb with infant feeding, and reports that "they did not give babies milk at first, but honey to lick. Menander is wrong in making newborn babies need milk". In fact the Aristophanes lines are not about feeding at all, and cannot be used as evidence for the practice of feeding honey to babies in Aristophanes's day. Another scholion, on Ar. *Ach.* 463, makes use of the earlier scholion on *Thesm.* 506 to explain a reference to χυτρίδιον σπογγίῳ βεβυσμένον, with the conjecture that the pot contains a sponge filled with honey, "which they used to put into the mouth of babies

so that they might be quiet and not cry wanting food". The fact that both lines contain the word βεβυσμένον, and probably also the χύτρα of *Thesm.* 505 and χυτρίδιον of *Ach.* 463, no doubt explain why the information contained in the one scholion was incorporated into the other, the irrelevance to Aristophanes's text of the first being greatly surpassed by that of the second. The false information contained in the scholion on *Ach.* 463 was accepted as fact by Vossius (p. 311, cf. above, note 99), who connects the use of the honey-filled sponge with the feeding of infants with honey, rather than with a method of keeping babies quiet. It was transmitted thence to Schneider, whom Boeckh quotes on the subject in his Commentary on Pindar *Ol.* 6. 47.¹⁰² In fact the only element in all of this with any relevance to the actual practice of infant feeding, is the reference in the scholion on *Ar. Thesm.* 506 to giving babies honey before they were fed milk, which simply shows that the Scholiast knew of this practice but tells us nothing about its antiquity.

The feeding of honey to some infants of myth and legend may well indicate that it was a custom practised in remote antiquity in the Greek world. What its significance may have been is open to conjecture, and various opinions have been advanced on the subject.¹⁰³ It would not be at all surprising if Greeks throughout antiquity made use of this pre-digested food for children, including babies. But the giving of honey to newborn babies before letting milk pass their lips is a specialised use of honey, and a different matter from its simple inclusion in an infant's diet. If it was practised in classical and Hellenistic times - and there is no direct evidence that it was - nothing of certainty, or even of probability, can be said about its significance for Greeks of that time. It is necessary to make this negative point because it has sometimes been reported, without adequate evidence, that the custom was followed throughout antiquity, and unwarranted conclusions have been drawn about its significance.¹⁰⁴ It is

clear from Soranus that by his time the custom had arisen of giving any one of a number of special substances to a newborn infant to lick before it tasted milk. Giving honey to infants before any other food, as well as feeding with a mixture of animal-milk and honey, was a practice to which Soranus added the weight of his approval, on the ground of its benefit to the infant's health. It may have been an old established custom which he thus upheld, or it may have been a fairly new vogue in infant care which he now endorsed and which became popular and well known in the Roman Imperial era.¹⁰⁵

Feeding of babies with human milk

Aristotle says in the *Politics* that the kind of nurture given to children when they are born must be deemed to make a great difference to their bodily strength. He goes on to say that it is clear from looking at the other animals and from the peoples who are concerned to maintain a warlike way of life that the diet best suited to infants' bodies is one that is rich in milk, and which contains little wine because of the illnesses it causes (7. 15, 1336 A 3 ff.). Like several other aspects of infant care, feeding with milk was too obvious to require written testimony, and so it is difficult to determine from the ancient sources answers to such questions as how common suckling by the mother was relative to feeding by a wet-nurse, for how many months infants were usually suckled before being weaned, and how and to what extent human milk might have been replaced by the milk of animals. It is nevertheless worth looking at all of these questions in the light of such evidence as exists.

Lysias in his speech *On the Murder of Eratosthenes* (1. 9 - 10) presents us with a picture of normal domestic life as it was lived in an Athenian citizen household of moderate means. The speaker explains that he

lives in a small house with two floors, each of the same size, the upper floor housing the women's quarters and the lower the men's. "When the baby was born to us", he says, "its mother suckled it, and in order that she might not be at risk by descending the steps whenever it had to be washed, I took to living upstairs and the women below. And by this time we had got so used to the arrangement, that often my wife would leave me and sleep downstairs near the baby, in order that she might give it the breast and stop its crying." That it was common for mothers themselves to feed their babies in classical Athens is confirmed by the words that Xenophon gives Sokrates in *Mem.* 2. 2. Sokrates, having noticed that his eldest son Lamprokles was in a bad mood with his mother, gives him a lecture on the subject of ingratitude, involving a disquisition on the unselfishness of mothers, which it may be as well to quote at some length here. "The man maintains the woman who is to produce children with him", says Sokrates, "and for the children that are to come he provides all that he thinks will benefit their lives, and as much of it as he can. The woman receives the seed and carries it, and is weighed down with it and risks her life for it and shares with it the food with which she herself is fed. And when with much trouble she has borne it to the end and given birth to it, she then rears it and cares for it, not in return for any reward, and without the baby's being aware of the person who benefits it or able to communicate its wants to her. But the mother's instinct tells her what the baby needs and likes, and she tries to supply them, and she nurtures it for a long time, putting up with trouble day and night, not knowing what gratitude she will get in return" (2. 2. 5). There is no particular emphasis on breast-feeding, but that *τρέφει* signifies or at least includes this, is certain from the context. The weight of moral obligation in this speech lies on the child to show gratitude rather than on the mother to care for her child, but the words of course contain the strong implication that such a mother's behaviour is laudable and right. More than that, it is expected of her by her husband. But this is the nearest

approach of any classical author to a moralising stance on the subject of the caring for and feeding of a child by its own mother. It was left to later moralists to insist on a mother's duty to nurse her children at her own breast and not leave them to wet-nurses, a theme on which they could be dogmatic.¹⁰⁶

Soranus, in contrast, treats the subject unemotionally, giving equal consideration to the needs of mother and baby. He advocates feeding with the mother's milk, provided that the mother fitted his requirements as to age, health, body-size and temperament, since maternal feeding has certain advantages for the infant, being conducive to a more sympathetic attachment to the child on the part of the mother, and her milk being more suited to it. But if there was any reason why a particular mother should not suckle her child, Soranus welcomed the use of a wet-nurse as a way of freeing the mother from a task which he saw as exhausting and likely to age the woman and make her less fit for future child-bearing; feeding by a suitable wet-nurse, if the mother herself was prevented from feeding, could also have a certain benefit for the child, which, just as a vegetable grew more quickly if transplanted into a different soil from that in which it had sprouted, would grow stronger if fed by a woman other than its mother (1. 31. 87, 259. 21 ^{260.} - 21 Rose). As a doctor, Soranus would have been conscious of the state of physical weakness in which women were left by frequent pregnancies, and of the complications arising from childbirth which might prevent them nursing their offspring.

Feeding by a woman other than the infant's mother, a wet-nurse, was also common in the Greek world throughout antiquity. G. Herzog-Hauser's article "Nutrix" in Pauly's *RE* (17. 2, 1491 - 1499) collects the ancient evidence on the subject, and gives a useful comparison of the words τίτην, τιθήνη, and τροφός and their meanings. Τίτην, derived from τιτθός or τιτθίον, synonyms of μαστός, is a wet-nurse, and the form τιθήνη

(derived from θήσθαι, see LSJ) is also found. Although ἡ τροφός properly signifies the nurse who undertakes the care of a child that has been weaned (Eust. *Comm.* on *Il.* 6. 399), it is sometimes used synonymously with τίτη (see Herzog-Hauser for examples). In a grave-inscription from Egypt, reconstructed by Adolf Wilhelm,¹⁰⁷ enough of the inscription survives to enable us to see that the memorial is dedicated to a τροφός, jointly by her children and a former nursling whom she suckled (. . . <τ>ὰ τέκνα καὶ ὄν ἐθήλασας). Nursing by the mother and nursing by wet-nurses existed side by side and, until the strictures of certain moralists in Roman Imperial times, apparently without conflict. Both methods of feeding babies co-exist in Homer, where we read of Telemachos feeding at Penelope's breast and Hektor at Hekabe's, while Odysseus had been nursed at the breast of Eurykleia (whom he calls μάϊα) and Astyanax had a τιθήνη.¹⁰⁸

Whatever the practices in real life may have been in the early Greek world, it is evident that in the classical and Hellenistic ages both mothers and wet-nurses breast-fed babies. Evidence comes from the comic stage as well as from real-life sources. One of the women in Aristophanes's *Thesmophoriazousai* has her baby and its τίτη along with her (608 - 609). There are several inscriptions from fourth-century and later Attic grave-memorials to wet-nurses. One such, accompanying a relief of two female figures, is to a τίτη called Melitta, daughter of a metic ἰσοτελής, set up by her former charge Hippostrate: ". . . Here Earth covers over the good Nurse, the Nurse of Hippostrate. And now she mourns you. And I loved you while you lived, Nurse, and now I still honour you below the earth as you are, and I shall honour you as long as I live. I know that even below the earth, if there is glory for the good, honours are in store for you above all, Nurse, from Persephone and Plouton" (*IG* ii² 7873). Most of the memorials to τίται merely announced their name and their office, and sometimes also

a place of origin other than Athens. The popular epithet *χρηστή* is sometimes used of an esteemed nurse.¹⁰⁹ These nurses evidently retained the love and esteem of their former nurslings for the rest of their lives.

A poetic testimony to such a relationship is provided by Kallimachos's *Epigram* 51, which he may have composed for a friend, a certain Mikkos, as an epitaph for Mikkos's old nurse: "Phrygian Aischre, the good milk-nurse [literally ἀγαθὸν γάλα] did Mikkos while she was alive care for in her old age with every good thing, and when she passed away he set [*sc.* this] up, for posterity to see, so that the old woman receives thanks for [*sc.* the milk of] her breasts". Perhaps Aischre was a slave in the household to which Mikkos belonged. In Athens too some wealthy households had a domestic slave who served as wet-nurse to the children of the family. Alkibiades had a Spartan τίτην called Amykla (Plut. *Alk.* 1. 2), who was probably a slave. Such women might be fortunate enough to obtain their freedom, and even to be supported in later life by their former nurslings, as in the case of the former τίτην of the speaker in a speech of Demosthenes (*Against Evergos and Mnesiboulos, on a charge of giving false testimony*, 47). The speaker describes how his opponents burst in on his wife, children and old nurse at home, seized the furniture, and attacked the nurse. "Moreover, . . . my wife happened to be having lunch with my young children in the courtyard, and with her was an elderly woman who had been my nurse, a good and faithful person, who had been given her freedom by my father. She lived with her husband after she had been set free, but when he died and she was an old woman with no one to look after her, she came back to me. It was impossible for me to let my nurse or my paidagogos live in poverty, and at that time I was about to set sail as trierarch, so that it was my wife's wish that I should leave such a companion to live with her" (47. 55 - 56). (The speaker claims that the nurse was so badly injured when she tried to prevent his opponents from taking away a cup, that she died six

days later, despite the attentions of a doctor.) This arrangement was evidently not unusual. It is reflected in the world of fiction, where Moschion's old τίτη in Menander's *Samia* was a household slave to whom Demeas had given her freedom, and she is apparently still in the household (237, 302, etc., cf. below, note 115). We come across two more freedwomen τίθαι in an inscription recording the names of those who dedicated a φιάλη on the occasion of their acquittal in a δίκη ἀποστασίου, a legal action brought against a freed slave by his or her former owner apparently for breach of certain duties. Lampris is simply described as τ[ί]τη, and Eupeithe is recorded as being παιδί(ον) τίτη(η). Both were acquitted in an action brought by the same man.¹¹⁰ But it is unclear whether τίτη refers to their office in their former master's household, or to the occupation they took up as freedwomen.

The majority of freeborn wet-nurses, like Melitta of IG ii² 7873, would have been metics who hired out their services. But there were also some citizen women who took employment as wet-nurses, according to a speech which Demosthenes wrote for a certain Euxitheos, appealing against the decision of his deme to exclude him from citizenship, and basing his plea on the citizenship of both his parents (*Against Euboulides* 57). One of the accusations against which Euxitheos is obliged to defend himself is that his mother was not a freeborn woman, since she had earned money as a wet-nurse. Euxitheos does not deny that she was a nurse, when at a time of national crisis, difficult circumstances afflicted many families, but he warns his hearers not to draw the wrong conclusion: "... for even today you will find many citizen women who are nurses, whom I will mention to you by name if you wish. If indeed we were rich, we should not be selling fillets, nor be in need of anything. But what connection is there between this and our birth? None, I think" (57. 35). He presents evidence that his mother is freeborn and a citizen, and explains the circumstances in which

she took up wet-nursing: "Some time later, when she had already borne two children, and while my father was away on campaign serving with Thrasyboulos, and she herself was in material difficulties, she was obliged to take Kleinias the son of Kleidikos to nurse. As regards the danger that has come upon me now, she did me no service, Heaven knows, for from this nursing has sprung all the slander against us, but as regards the poverty we were in, she did perhaps what was necessary and appropriate" (42). He points out that poverty is not cause for exclusion from citizenship, and that fortunes may fluctuate: "For, as I am told, many women have become nurses and wool-workers and vineyard-workers because of the hard times the city has suffered in their day - citizen women; and many have now become rich who were poor" (45). Wet-nursing was evidently one of those humble occupations which a respectable citizen woman might take up to save herself and her family from starvation, but wet-nurses of freedwoman and metic status must have greatly outnumbered those who were of citizen birth. It was unusual for a citizen woman to earn money by working for an employer at all.

Many of these non-slave wet-nurses, instead of living in the household of the baby's family, took the infant to live with them while it was being suckled. In Menander's *Samia* Chrysis, who is looking after the baby which Moschion has fathered, having recently given birth and lost her own baby, reassures Moschion that Demeas will get over his anger when he hears about the baby. But, in any case, she says, "I think I'd put up with anything rather than have some wet-nurse <bring up> the baby in a tenement" (84 - 85).¹¹¹ Such women were indeed likely to be poor and to live in poor accommodation. Moreover, not being under the everyday supervision of the child's parents, they perhaps could not be relied upon to care for the child properly.¹¹² These women may also have nursed several children simultaneously. In breast-feeding increased demand stimulates increased milk supply.¹¹³

We have seen above some evidence of the respect in which some nurses were held by their former charges, but in contrast to this we find in Attic comedy that nurses are often caricatured as greedy and self-indulgent. The nurse who puts eating and drinking, especially the latter,¹¹⁴ before everything else, is presented in several plays, including Roman adaptations of Greek originals. Phidippus says sarcastically to the nurse in Terence's *Hecyra* "but when you have eaten and drunk your fill, see that the boy is fed too" (769), and in Plautus's *Truculentus* the courtesan Phronesium demands money from Stratophanes, whose son she claims to have borne, saying "... the nurse has needs - in order that she may have milk, she must drink large quantities of vintage wine day and night" (903 - 904). A character in Menander's *Pseudherakles* makes a promise to the τίτην: "about wine, Nurse, say not a syllable. If you are blameless in other respects you shall celebrate always the sixteenth of Boedromion the whole day through" (fr. 454 Koerte). (Plutarch records that after the victory of the Athenians under Chabrias at Naxos in 376 BC Chabrias used to give the Athenians a wine-festival every year on the 16th of Boedromion.) In Menander's *Samia* the slave Parmenon, referring to the old τίτην, calls into the house, "Chrysis, give the cook everything he asks for. And keep the old woman away from the jars, for heaven's sake!" (301 - 303).¹¹⁵ In Euboulos's *Pamphilos* there is a τροφός who drinks: it seems that a young man attempts to get access to a girl by making her τροφός, who evidently is still her companion, drunk. It is not difficult to do: he simply has the innkeeper of a tavern nearby mix a χοῦς of wine for the nurse, and watches her drink it with astonishing speed.¹¹⁶

Does all this reflect an undue propensity on the part of real nurses to overindulge in wine? Aristotle expresses the opinion that wine is not good for infants nor for their nurses, and adds that it perhaps makes no difference whether it is the infants themselves or their nurses who drink it

(*Somn.* 3, 457 A 14 - 16), and he believed that it was one of the ways in which epilepsy might be caused in a young child (*ibid.* 457 A 7 ff.). It is quite likely that Aristotle had observed the fact that the effects of alcohol are passed on to an infant through the milk of the nurse who drinks a large quantity of wine. Soranus certainly knew about it: one of the reasons why the wet-nurse must not be given to drinking is that the consumption of an excessive amount of wine affects the milk and makes the baby sluggish and drowsy, and may even cause trembling, apoplexy and convulsions, just as sucking pigs become sluggish and stupefied when the sow has eaten the lees of wine (1. 32. 88, 263. 17 - 21 Rose). The comparison with the behaviour of pigs perhaps suggests that the phenomenon was more often to be observed in pigs than in humans. At 1. 34. 96 (272. 3 - 7 Rose) Soranus warns against thinking that because the wet-nurse is not harmed by wine the infant will not be harmed either; wine is too strong for the infant's constitution, and most of those fed carelessly will be seized with epileptic fits. In Muscio's Latin version of Soranus's *Gynaecology*, part of the remedy for watery milk is "let them wash less often and drink wine frequently" (99, 35. 21 Rose), but Soranus's actual advice for ameliorating this condition is, among other things, "a little wine" (οἰναρίῳ), if the baby whom the nurse is suckling is old enough (1. 35. 98, 274. 6 - 7 Rose). On choosing a wet-nurse, Soranus advises looking for the quality of self-control, both in sexual matters and in drinking (1. 32. 88, 263. 7 - 21 Rose). It is very unlikely that doctors prescribed large quantities of wine for nursing women (except in the case of Muscio just quoted), or that they considered wet-nurses specially bibulous. Nurses, like everyone else in ancient Greece, would have drunk wine, but the significance of the tippling old women in comedy, who often happen to be former τῖτθαί, is above all a comic significance. They were stock figures on the stage. We are not justified in concluding that this notoriety was earned by real-life nurses, any more than that of apoplectically angry

fathers or slaves who tried to orchestrate their masters' lives.

In a fragment of Antiphanes's *Misoponeiros* (159 Kock) we find wet-nurses mentioned in a comic catalogue of dislikes: "Then, aren't the Skythians extremely wise, who give their babies as soon as they are born the milk of horses and cows to drink? And, by God, they don't bring in those witches, wet-nurses, and paidagogoi in their turn, a greater <evil than whom does not exist, next to> midwives, Heaven knows. They surpass all, after mendicant priests, by God. For they are by far the most disgusting tribe of all, not to mention fishmongers . . .". Prejudice against nurses was not confined to the comic stage. In a passage by the third-century BC Cynic philosopher Teles, on how pleasure is not an end in itself, preserved by Stobaios in his *Florilegium* (4. 34. 72 Hense), we find the following reasons why early childhood is not enjoyable: "If the infant is hungry, the nurse puts it to bed. If it is thirsty, she washes it. If it wishes to go to sleep, she takes up a rattle and makes a noise". The nurse Teles is writing about is a τροφός, but in the next sentence he says, "If it makes its escape from the wet-nurse . . ." (εἰ δ' ἐκπέφυγε τὴν τιτθῆν), which shows that he is thinking of nurses in general, wet and dry. This is not merely a disparagement of nurses: it also implies the inability of the infant to make its wants clearly known, an idea we have already seen expressed by others (above, pp. 47 - 48 and 72). Moreover, when the child has escaped from the nurse, it falls into the hands of its teachers of gymnastic, reading and writing, music, and drawing, and so on, and Teles goes on to catalogue the other disagreeable experiences that await the individual on his journey through life. The account is entertaining, and the criticism of nurses should not be taken literally. It is interesting, however, as resembling the kind of low view of nurses and their habits with which comic dramatists liked to entertain their audiences, and as echoing the scornful attitude of Plato towards women child-carers, especially nurses. But even in comedy there are old

servants, former wet-nurses, who loyally stand by their mistresses, and such women are familiar from tragedy too. In both comedy and tragedy they are stock characters, close enough to their real-life counterparts to be believable, but with characteristics exaggerated and stereotyped for the purposes of stage convention. Affectionate illustrations of these nurses with infants in their arms are found in terracotta figurines, dating from the period when Menander wrote his comedies.^{116a}

The cheapest way to feed a baby was for the mother to breast-feed it herself, and it is therefore to be expected that most families of low or moderate incomes used this method, except when ill-health or difficulty in suckling on the part of the mother prevented it. (Though the fact that doctors sought to remedy cases of dried-up milk supply and other breast-feeding difficulties, suggests that some women preferred to try to overcome their difficulties rather than give in straight away, cf. Hipp. *Nat. Mul.* 93, VII 410. 10 ff. Li., *Mul.* 1. 44, VIII 102 Li., *Epid.* 4. 10, V 148. 24 Li.). It would also have been welcome, when breast-feeding continued, as it probably often did, for up to two years, as a convenient, if not entirely reliable, means of birth control - of helping to leave a gap of two to three years between children. (And breast-feeding on demand is a more effective contraceptive practice than feeding by a pre-determined schedule.) On the other hand, if another child was wanted as soon as possible, this would have been a reason for the mother not to breast-feed herself, or to give it up after a few weeks. There was, in the classical and Hellenistic periods, no apparent censure of women who preferred, and could afford, to give their babies to nurses to feed. From the abundant allusions to *τίτθαι*, we may infer that many of them did so.

Lactation, once successfully established, can continue, given continued stimulus from an infant's sucking, for several years, a fact which would have enabled a wet-nurse to stay in business for long periods between the births of her own children.¹¹⁷ An observation by the author of

HA 7. 11 (5... B 27 - 30) suggests that breast-feeding women did continue to suckle their children for a lengthy period, by modern European standards at least. "[Women] have milk until they again become pregnant". Soranus would have solid foods introduced from about six months onwards (see p. 93 below), but approves the continuation of breast-feeding until the infant has enough teeth to bite and chew properly, at the age of about eighteen months to two years (I. 41. 115 - 116, 287. 25 - 289. 17 Rose). Plutarch's little daughter still had a wet-nurse at the age of two, when she died (*Mor.* 608 D, 610 E). In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we should assume that, in previous centuries also, most children continued to be given the breast for over a year and often for two years, and that for much of this time breast-milk was supplemented by other foods.

We have seen above (pp. 62 - 66) that several philosophers and physicians taught that the fetus partook of its mother's milk while in the womb. We find in their writings occasional references to the subject of milk-feeding after birth, though no detailed ancient study of the subject exists, and the matter was evidently one which in this period men were content to leave for the most part in the hands of women. Later writers seem to have taken more interest in the subject, and we find in Soranus and in Aulus Gellius (quoting Favorinus) opinions about various aspects of the breast-feeding of infants. A couple of these merit brief attention here, and it seems to me that they are the kind of thing that might have originated as popular beliefs, which were current for centuries before they were written about. The belief that indulgence in sexual intercourse by a nursing woman spoils her milk is found in Soranus, who claims that the diversion of sexual pleasure cools affection towards the baby and spoils and diminishes the milk, or even dries it up completely by stimulating menstruation or bringing about conception (I. 32. 88, 263. 8 - 13 Rose).¹¹⁸ The earliest allusion to a belief of this kind appears to be in an Egyptian papyrus of 13 BC, where a contract with a wet-nurse for a female slave-child forbids her to spoil her

milk, sleep with a man, or become pregnant during the period of breast-feeding (*BGU* IV 1058, pp. 86 - 89). I can find no allusion in any author belonging to the period under study to a belief that it was better for a nursing woman to abstain from sexual intercourse in order to preserve her milk and not spoil it. Medical and scientific writers of the fourth century BC held that the recurrence of menstruation diminishes the milk,¹¹⁹ but evidence is lacking to show whether they thought that sexual intercourse stimulates menstruation or that the act of intercourse itself spoils the milk by disturbance. Another belief associated with the feeding of infants was that the infant takes in the qualities of its nurse with the milk. Aulus Gellius attributes this to the moralist Favorinus (*Noctes Atticae* 12. 1), as one of the arguments that a mother must breast-feed her children herself. Favorinus declares that, since milk is formed from blood, it is just as important as blood and semen in forming parental likeness of mind and body in the child; another's milk will harm the newborn's nobility of body and mind, especially if the wet-nurse is a slave or a barbarian, dishonest, ugly, unchaste and bibulous; the temperament and quality of milk of the nursing woman is important in forming character, as milk is imbued from the beginning with the material of the father's semen, and transmits as well mental and physical characteristics of the mother. His argument is based partly, it appears, on popular prejudice and superstition, and partly on a sort of pseudo-science, and, lest these should fail to convince, he quotes Homer, on the influence of the sea and hard rocks in begetting Achilles, and Virgil, on Dido's taunt to Aeneas: "fierce Hyrcanian tigresses suckled you". Soranus does not support this view of the influence of milk. He simply says that parents must choose a wet-nurse who is not bad-tempered, since the baby grows to be like the nurse in disposition (1.32. 88, 264. 1 - 3 Rose). But he probably does not mean that temperamental qualities are transmitted in the milk, but rather that the infant will tend to be influenced by and copy the nurse's temperamental habits. Soranus was probably aware of the belief we

have seen advanced by Favorinus, and, characteristically, he does not endorse an argument for which he could find no scientific basis, but he does not reject the, probably popular, view that the nurse's temperament does have some influence on the nursling's. For the period under study, the view seems to have found written expression only in poetry: Theokritos says of Eros that he is so cruel, he must have been suckled by a lioness (*Id.* 3. 15 - 16).

Let us look at one theory about the feeding of milk to infants that is found in classical authors, before we leave the subject of the feeding of human milk to babies. One of the functions of milk, according to two authorities, namely Demokritos and the author of the Hippokratic *On Flesh*, was to form teeth. Demokritos is known to have held the following views on the deciduous teeth from what Aristotle says in criticism (*GA* 5. 8, 788 B 10 ff.): animals shed their teeth because they are formed prematurely (*πρὸ ὥρατος*); according to nature creatures grow their teeth when they are mature; and the cause of their premature formation is suckling. It is intrauterine nutrition that is partly responsible for tooth-formation, according to *Carn.* (12, VIII 598. 11 - 17 L1.): the first teeth are formed from the diet in the womb, and after birth from the milk sucked by the infant. Demokritos, like the author of *Carn.*, was one of those who thought that the fetus took nourishment with its mouth (see above, pp. 63 - 64), and it is possible that he, like *Carn.*, held that the intrauterine nutriment also contributed to the formation of teeth. However that may be, Aristotle is vehement in his refutation of Demokritos, saying that nature does not provide what is not needed, and that teeth are only necessary for the creature to process its food after suckling has ceased, and he asserts that "suckling itself contributes nothing". But he does accept that the temperature of the milk has something to do with the growing of teeth, saying "the warmth of the milk makes the teeth appear sooner", adducing the "proof" that sucklings

that get warmer milk grow their teeth sooner, and explaining that heat is conducive to growth.¹²⁰ *HA* 7. 10 (587 B 16 - 18) echoes Aristotle's remark. "all those whose nurses have warmer milk grow [teeth] more quickly". It is interesting that *Carn.* connects healthy teeth with healthy eating, remarking that the teeth formed from the first nutriment (reading, with Deichgräber, <οὐ ἀπὸ > τῆς πρώτης τροφῆς) fall out when the child is seven years old, the author says that in some children they fall out even earlier if they are formed from unhealthy nutriment (VIII 598. 14 - 16 L1.) Although this author's reasoning is based on his theories of tooth-formation, it is possible that what he observed were cases of scurvy, which is indeed caused by inadequate nutrition.

Non-breast feeding of infants; Weaning

There is no direct evidence for the use of the milk of animals, such as goats and cows, for feeding babies in the period under study.¹²¹ In the words of the character in Antiphanes's *Misoponeiros* (fr. 159 Kock) who envies the Skythians their good sense in giving babies the milk of horses and cows to drink (quoted above, p. 80), lies the implication that Greeks not only did not use these animals' milk for the purpose, but did not usually give their babies non-human milk at all. Certainly, when authors such as Aristotle mention the feeding of milk to babies, human milk is meant.

Nevertheless, it would be surprising if animals' milk, particularly that of goats, was not sometimes used too. Greek literature gives a couple of hints about this. Herodotos tells a story of an attempt by Psammetichos of Egypt to discover which was the oldest nation on earth. He had two newborn infants placed under the charge of a herdsman, with strict instructions that they were to hear no human voice, and the herdsman brought goats to them to feed them (2. 2): it has been noted that this means

"... goats not milk that the babes may nurse not drink".¹²² A leap across the centuries takes us to Longus's *Daphnis and Chloë*, where an exposed baby is discovered by the goatherd Lamon being suckled by a goat, who bestrides the infant carefully, so as not to tread on it with her hooves, while the baby draws the milk just as if it was at its mother's breast. Lamon takes the child home to his wife, and they decide to keep it as their own and entrust it to the goat to suckle, naming it Daphnis (1. 2 - 3).¹²³ Daphnis and Chloë later put their own children under a goat and a sheep to feed (1. 39). According to Hyginus, the herdsmen who found the baby Aigisthos put him to a goat's udder to feed (*Fab.* 87 Rose). These stories might be classified along with all the other tales of miraculous nurturing by animals, were it not for the fact that foundlings of more recent times are known to have been put directly to the udders of goats to feed. The significance of this for ancient practices has been pointed out by William Calder III in a recent article, where he draws attention to an account of the use of goats to suckle children in the Foundling Hospital in Florence in the last century - "not a modern innovation but an ancient survival".¹²⁴ Direct nursing at a goat's udder may well have been a useful standby in the countryside, if the mother's milk failed or the mother had died, and no wet-nurse was available, as well as for foundlings picked up to be reared. In an age when it was difficult to keep supplies of milk fresh, direct udder nursing would have presented itself as an obvious solution in emergencies. I think that it is unlikely that this practice was known in the towns. It does not occur to Plato to make use of it in the *Republic* for the offspring of the Guardian class who are to be reared in a nursing-pen apart from their mothers. Instead, the mothers are to be taken to the pen to give suck, supplemented when necessary by other women who have milk, and the officials in charge of the nurslings must "contrive by every possible device" that mothers do not recognise their own children. Childrearing is to be made as easy as possible for the women of the Guardian class (460 C - D). If direct udder

nursing from goats had been a sight familiar to fifth-century Athenians, might not Plato have anticipated the foundling hospitals of Europe?

Animal milk may also have been given to babies by means of small vessels with a spout ending in an artificial teat, a number of which vessels have been found, some of them in the graves of infants.¹²⁵ But these vessels were also used for giving children water and wine mixed with water, as mentioned by Soranus,¹²⁶ and perhaps less often for milk (cf. pp. 91 - 93 below), though the goats' milk mixed with honey which he recommends for some newborns may have been given by this method (see n. 121 above).

Wine mixed with water was always one of the fluids given to children of all ages in antiquity. In Homer we read of Phoinix offering wine to the child Achilles, which did not always go down well: "Often you would wet the front of my tunic, spitting out the wine in your sorry helplessness" (// 9. 489 - 491). In classical times wine was offered even to very young infants (τὰ παιδία . . . τὰ νήπια, Hipp. *Salubr.* 6, VI 80. 18 ff. Li.). Medical and scientific opinion appears to have been unanimous in its attitude to this: whenever it is mentioned, it is to advise giving wine well-watered or little in quantity. The Hippokratic treatise *On Regimen in Health* advises bathing infants in warm water for a long time and giving them to drink watered-down wine that is not completely cold. The purpose of this is to minimise swelling in the stomach and flatulence, which in turn will reduce the risk of convulsions, and result in bigger babies of a healthier colour (6, VI 80. 18 - 82. 2 Li.).¹²⁷ Aristotle took a very similar view to this when he gave in *On Sleeping and Waking* (3, 457 A 4 ff.) an explanation of the causes of epilepsy, particularly epilepsy that strikes in sleep: wine causes flatulence, especially red wine, and when breath is carried upwards in quantity, it then descends and swells the veins and blocks the passage through which respiration takes place; this is why wine is bad for infants and for their nurses, for possibly it makes no difference whether it is they themselves or their nurses who drink it, and why they must be given it

watered down and in small quantity. The author of *HA* 7. 12 obviously draws on this when he writes, of convulsions in infants, "harm is done, in regard to this illness, by wine, red rather than white, and wine that is not mixed with water, and most foods that induce flatulence . . ." (588 A 5 - 8).¹²⁸ In his very brief treatment of the subject of infants' diet in *Politics* (7. 15) Aristotle simply says that infants should be given little wine, because of the illnesses it causes. The author of the Hippocratic treatise *On Airs Waters Places* gives another reason for giving infants well-watered wine. He associated it with that other ancient plague of infancy, bladder stone. Milk that is not wholesome but too warm and bilious in nature is a major cause, since it heats the bowels and bladder, thereby also heating the urine, thickening it and producing sediment. The author indicates that he considers wine also to be a possible contributory factor with the words "and I maintain that it is better to give infants wine watered down as much as possible, for it heats and dries up the veins less" (9, II 40. 5 - 7 Li.). Finally, the aphoristic work *On Nutriment* hints (more than this it is impossible to say) that wine is not good for babies, in the words: "Milk [is] nutriment, for those to whom milk [is] a natural nutriment, for others not; for others wine [is] a nutriment, for others not" (33, IX 110. 7 - 8 Li.)

Soranus too recommends the use of water or a little watered-down wine for an infant's thirst, after a meal of solid food, or a small piece of soft bread that has been dipped in wine mixed with water (1. 41. 115, 288. 14 - 24 Rose). None of these authorities states that infants should be given no wine at all. The most that can possibly be expected is that infants will be given only a little, and well diluted with water. Therefore we should infer that the use of wine for infants was universal, and that it was not always as well watered as the doctors would have liked. Water that was less than pure would have had some of the harmful bacteria destroyed by the alcoholic content of the wine, and perhaps the hygienic aspect of adding wine to water for infants (though not the reason for it) was appreciated.

Wine was regarded as a wholesome, strength-giving drink, and so it was considered natural to give it to infants. Its immediate effects, if not the possible longer-term ones, would probably have been welcome to most child-carers, in that it rendered babies sleepy. A lone voice pleading for the complete absence of wine from children's diet is Plato's, who in the *Laws* proposes, as one of the measures to encourage children to be keen on singing, a complete ban on wine for children up to the age of eighteen, "teaching that fire must not be poured upon fire either in body or in soul, before they proceed to set to work at their tasks, thus bewareing of the excitable nature of the young" (666 A).

Bladder stone in children is a condition that is several times mentioned in the Hippocratic corpus, and this may provide a clue about inadequate nutrition given to some infants in classical Greece. The connection has been pointed out by Paul Todd Makler in an article in which he applies recent discoveries about bladder stone in children living in the poorest countries of the world to the problem of its occurrence in the ancient world.¹²⁹ The author of *On Airs Waters Places* describes bladder stone in infants, a condition he has noticed in boys more than in girls (9, 11 40. 2 - 42. 6 Li.). He attributes the formation of the stones to the heating of the bladder and urine, and the consequent production of solid matter out of the urine. He describes the effect this has on urination, and the behaviour of children thus affected. He mentions unwholesome milk as one of the causes: hot and bilious milk heats the bladder and urine, producing the effects he has described. The greater warmth of the bladder and the whole body of infants is given as the reason for the occurrence of bladder stone in infants and its non-occurrence in adults by the Hippocratic treatise *On the Nature of Man* (12, VI 62. 21 - 64. 10 Li.). The author of *Diseases* 4 gives a much more detailed description of bladder stone in infants (55. 1 - 7, VII 600. 3 - 604. 17 Li.). He too attributes it to unwholesome milk, from a nurse whose own diet is impure. The impurities in the milk are passed through the

infant's digestive system into the bladder, where they become concreted into sediment and then stone. This process is described in detail, as are the symptoms to be observed in those affected. In *Aphorisms* 3. 26 (IV 498. 4 - 5 Li.) stone is listed as one of the common complaints occurring in children who have passed babyhood, and *Epidemics* (6. 3. 7, V 296. 3 - 4 Li.) notes that "concretion after urination [occurs] more in infants" and asks "is it because they are warmer?" Refusal to cut for stone is one of the undertakings given in the Hippocratic *Oath* (IV 630 Li.). The condition was evidently well known to classical doctors. In contrast, idiopathic bladder stone in children is almost unknown in the developed countries of the modern world. But in Europe before the 20th century and in many of the poorer nations today it was and is quite common. In 1972 the World Health Organisation held a conference on the subject, and it was revealed that bladder stone affecting children aged about one to three years (and more boys than girls) was common in communities accustomed to begin feeding their infants rice gruel at an early stage - even as early as one week - with a corresponding reduction in milk feeds. It is generally agreed that the condition is caused by a diet deficient in protein and fat, which brings about a chemical imbalance and the formation of stones in the urinary tract. The disease disappeared from Europe in the early 20th century because of improved nutrition. But in poor countries many undernourished mothers have inadequate milk, and gruel is substituted in the diet of babies; this substitution may become a custom and continue even when mothers have enough milk. Makler concludes that we may assume that the population of the ancient world shared many of the economic conditions of impoverished regions today, and that the causes of bladder stone in children then were the same as now. Poverty led to inadequate milk production in some nursing mothers, and to the substitution of non-protein food for milk in early infancy. This substitute, Makler suggests, was probably barley gruel, which was a staple of the ancient world's diet and is very frequently mentioned in

the Hippocratic corpus.

A confirmation that very early feeding of cereal was practised in Soranus's day is found in Soranus's criticism of those women as too hasty who after only forty days try to give their babies cereal food. "Until the baby has become firm it should be fed only on milk" advises Soranus (1. 41. 115, 287. 26 - 288. 5 Rose). And it may be no coincidence that one of the Hippocratic authors who describes bladder stone in infants also mentions the lack of milk experienced by many mothers in a particular area, though he ascribes this not to inadequate nutrition, but to the hardness and harshness of the water found in a district exposed to cold winds with hard, cold water (*Aer.* 4, II 22. 6 - 8 Li.).

Thin gruel may have been one of the foods given to infants by means of clay feeding vessels, some of which have been found in children's graves (cf. p. 87 above.) Water, milk, watered wine and honey-mixtures may also have been given in this way. The only literary reference to them is found in Soranus, who says, in the context of weaning: "If the baby sometimes becomes thirsty after its meal, water or watered-down wine may be given to it by means of the artificial teats (πεφιλοτεχνημένων θηλῶν). For the baby draws the liquid safely from them little by little just as from the breasts" (1. 41. 115, 288. 20 - 23 Rose). Such vessels were in use for centuries before Soranus's time, as the archaeological evidence shows. If they were used for milk or gruel they must have been responsible for many infant deaths, for most of them were impossible to clean thoroughly, and this puts these little pots in a rather macabre light, found, as they were, in infants' graves.

They have been described and illustrated in several articles and books (see Figure 1, following p. 97).¹³⁰ Many of the small "guttus"-type vessels were used to fill lamps with oil, but others, which appear to be related to the lamp-fillers in form, have a spout that is conical with a pointed end and a very small opening. There is general agreement that these

vessels were used as feeding bottles for infants, and that they are the vessels referred to by Soranus as having artificial teats. What their everyday name was is unknown. They are distributed all over the Mediterranean region. The lamp-filler type dates from the fifth century BC onwards, and many are of Attic make. Attic feeding bottles of the late fourth century are particularly common. Snijder conjectures that the hard thin spout of the feeding bottle was somehow covered round, to make it more teat-like.¹³¹ Snijder went on to identify a certain variant on the guttus, which had until then been confused with the simple feeding bottle, and, like it, was found in children's graves, but which had in fact a somewhat different function. This is the breast-pump: it was used to extract milk from the breast of a lactating woman, which might then be fed to the baby through the spout. The breast-pump looks at first sight like the conventional ancient feeding bottle, though it is usually higher and more domed than the fairly flat-topped guttus. The essential difference is found when the base of the pump is observed: it has a round opening from which a vertical channel leads inside the vessel. Snijder had the ancient apparatus tested by his colleague Professor van Rooy in the women's clinic at the University of Amsterdam, where it was found that it suited the purpose of breast-pump very well. The experiments revealed two possible ways of using the vessel. It could be filled with water and then placed with the opening in the base over the nipple and with the spout facing downwards; opening and closing the hole of the spout with the finger lets small quantities of water escape, and creates an intermittent vacuum inside the vessel; this produces suction and draws out the nipples to make them longer and freer; thus the milk soon begins to flow and the baby can attach itself more easily to the nipple. Alternatively the vessel, empty of water, could be placed over the nipple, and suction of the spout by the mouth employed to produce a much stronger sucking action and fill the cavity with milk, which might then be given to the child. The breast-pump might have been used in

the latter way by women suffering from the painful condition of fissured nipples, for whom it was imperative that they continued to breast-feed; and relieving the fissured nipples of the infant's sucking would have been the best way of treating them.¹³² Some of the breast-pumps illustrated by Snijder have a phallus-shaped spout, a feature shared by some of the feeding bottles. Snijder interprets this, like the Medusa head found on others of the vessels, as a potent symbol for protecting children from the evil eye.¹³³ Some of the gutti are decorated with pictures of children playing.¹³⁴

Infants were commonly fed at the breast for a year, and often for as long as two years, and cereal and other foods were introduced during this period. But the occurrence of bladder-stone and the criticism by Soranus of those who introduce cereal meals at forty days suggest that some babies were weaned from milk at a very early age (see pp. 89 - 91 above). The Greek verb for weaning is ἀπογαλακτίζειν. Some nursing women discouraged their charges from seeking the breast by putting a bitter-tasting substance on the nipple.¹³⁵ We learn this from a snatch of dialogue from a fragment of Diphilos's comedy *Synoris* (7^o K. 3. 3):

A: "He's angry? A parasite - and he's angry?"

B: "No, but he has anointed the table with gall and weaned himself of it, like the babies."

Soranus disapproves of this method, saying that it is harmful to wean suddenly by smearing something bitter and foul-smelling on the nipples, because the sudden change has a damaging effect and the injury done to the stomach by the drugs can make the infant ill (1. 41. 116, 289. 13 - 17 Rose). Soranus would have weaning done gradually, by the introduction of solid foods from six months onwards, and the gradual withdrawal of the breast when the child is around eighteen months or two years old. He gives various instructions about which foods to introduce and which to avoid, about the best season for weaning, and about the general management of feeding at the period of weaning.

Pre-mastication of food for infants was another practice of nurses and parents. Aristophanes uses this as a metaphor for Kleon's treatment of the Athenian people: "And you feed him [*sc.* the *demos*] badly, just as the nurses do. You chew [the food] and put a little in his mouth, and swallow down yourself three times as much as he" (*Knights* 716 - 718; cf. *Souda* T 687 Adler).¹³⁶ Athenaios reports a story from Klearchos's *Lives* that Sagaris the Mariandynian was so lazy that he was fed from his nurse's mouth right into his old age, so that he might save himself the trouble of chewing (530 c). It is one of the habits of Theophrastos's Unpleasant Man that he will "take the baby from the nurse and feed it himself with food he has chewed, and call it pet names, while making loud kissing-noises and calling it 'Daddy's little scally-wag'" (*Characters* 20. 5). It is the tastelessness of such behaviour, rather than the unhygienic aspect of the feeding, that Theophrastos finds so repulsive. Since there was no knowledge in the ancient world of germs and bacteria, feeding an infant with food chewed in another's mouth was found acceptable by most people. The first caution against the practice in the extant sources comes from Soranus, who advises sometimes giving the infant a piece of bread softened by diluted wine, "for food chewed up into morsels is harmful because it is imbued with phlegm" (1. 41. 115, 288. 23 - 26 Rose).

The word for feeding infants by putting morsels into their mouths is ψωμίζειν. In Aristophanes's *Lysistrata* (17 - 19) Kalonike, while assuring Lysistrata that the women will come, explains that domestic responsibilities make it difficult for them to get away: "One woman has to fuss around her husband, one has to waken the servant, one has to put the baby to bed, another to wash it, another to give it its food (ἐψώμισεν).¹³⁷ According to Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1407 A 2 - 3) Perikles said that the Samians were like little children who accept the morsel of food (τὸν ψωμόν), crying all the while. A little bit of bread was probably the most usual ψωμός or

ψώμισμα. In Aristophanes's *Clouds* (1380 - 1385) Strepsiades rebukes his son Pheidippides for ingratitude and catalogues all the things he did for him when he was an infant: "Considering that I was the one who reared you, you shameless wretch, for I understood all your baby-talk, whatever you meant! You only had to say "bru" and I'd know what it was and give you a drink. "Mamma" you'd say, and up I'd come with bread for you. And you could hardly say "kakka" before I'd have you out the door holding you out in front of me!" (cf. commentary *ad loc.* in Dover's edition of *Clouds* Oxford 1968)

Feeding of older infants

When children became able to put food into their own mouths and thus feed themselves, the time had come for them to acquire some table-manners. The writer of the treatise *On the Education of Children*, which has been incorrectly ascribed to Plutarch, deplores the neglect of serious educational matters by parents who think it important "to accustom their young children to take their food with their right hand and scold them if they stretch out their left" (*Mor.* 5 A). The Scholiast on Aristophanes's *Peace* 123 quotes an ancient saying applied to greedy children who ask for what they ought not to have:

ἦν δ'οἶνον αἰτῆ, κονδύλους αὐτῷ δίδου,

"if he asks for wine, give him a taste of your fist". There seems to be a pun on κόνδυλος, knuckle, depending on its similarity to κάνδυλος, a kind of rich dish or sauce, and this saying explains why Trygaios in the comedy tells his daughter, on his departure in search of food, that when he returns she will get

κολλύραν μεγάλην καὶ κόνδυλον ὄψον ἐπ' αὐτῆ

(cf. notes *ad loc.* in Rogers's edition, London 1913, and Platnauer's edition,

Oxford 1964). Greed and bad behaviour at the table were probably among the things which, we are told in Plato's *Protagoras*, parents sought to discourage "with threats and blows" (325 c - d): "Beginning from when their children are small, and continuing throughout their lives, they both teach and rebuke them. As soon as the child can understand what is said to him, nurse, mother, *paidagogos*, and the father himself make every effort to have the child turn out as well as possible, teaching him and demonstrating to him by every act and word that this is right and that is wrong, this is good and that is bad, this is holy and that is unholy, and that he must do this and not do that. And if he obeys willingly, good; but if not they straighten him with threats and blows as if he were a bent and twisted piece of wood. After this they send him to school . . .".

When children began to be able to chew solid food and feed themselves they were probably given smaller quantities of the sort of food eaten by the rest of the household. Girls were probably given less to eat than boys. Xenophon in his *Constitution of the Lakedaimonians* (1. 3) says that in states other than Sparta girls who are well brought up and who are eventually to become mothers are reared on the most moderate amount of food that is practicable and on the smallest possible quantity of delicacies. They are given either no wine at all or only watery wine. He goes on to point out that girls are expected to work their wool sitting down, and complains that lack of exercise will hardly fit them to produce magnificent children, and contrasts this with the Spartan insistence on exercise for girls. It is unclear whether Xenophon also has female *infants* in mind in what he says about feeding; certainly the remarks about the sedentary occupation of girls can hardly apply to children under the age of five or thereabouts.


It was in Sparta that the diets of boys were carefully regulated to prevent over-eating. Our authority for this is again Xenophon, who contrasts the austere upbringing given to Spartan boys with the treatment received by children elsewhere. Other Greeks, he says, "consider their children's

stomachs the measure of the food they need", whereas Lykourgos ordained that the boys undergoing the Spartan *agoge* should have small meals, so that they might become accustomed to working on an empty stomach, and that they might grow up slim and tall, and with the capacity to forage for themselves (*Lak. Pol.* 2. 1, 5, 6, 7). These prescriptions are for the training of boys past infancy. Did the deliberate under-feeding of Spartan children begin before this? Plutarch says that one of the disciplines imposed by Spartan nurses on their infant charges was that they made them contented with their diet and unfussy about food (ποιεῖν . . . εὐκόλα ταῖς διαίταις καὶ ἄσικχα, *Lyk.* 16. 4). Behind his words may lie the implication that they did not indulge infants in their demands for quantity, any more than for quality and type, of food.


It is likely that with the possible exception of Sparta, Greek girls were given less to eat than their brothers, though at what age this distinction in feeding began is unclear. Soranus advises his readers to pay no heed to the people who advocate weaning baby girls six months later than boys, and notes, correctly, that some female babies are stronger and fleshier than many males (1. 41. 117, 289. 24 - 290. 2 Rose). Some parents and nurses throughout antiquity may have offered baby girls more food, if they shared the idea, criticised by Soranus, that they were weaker. Others may have fed their daughters less than their sons from infancy onwards, believing that boys required more food because their growth and health were more important. Many children throughout antiquity would have been malnourished simply because there was not enough food to go round (cf. pp. 89 - 90 above).

FIGURE 1


Ancient feeding vessels




Ancient feeding vessel
with strainer. Snijder
(1933-34) Abb. 3.



Section through breast-pump,
showing inner funnel.
Snijder (1933-34) Abb. 17.



"Guttus"-type feeding vessel
(breast-pump) of breast-like
shape. Snijder (1933-34) Abb. 11.



Feeding vessel (breast-pump),
with phallus-shaped spout and
inner funnel. Snijder (1933-34)
Abb. 15.

Notes to Chapter One

1 Sokrates, who describes himself in Plato's *Theaitetos* (149ff.) as the son of a midwife, claims to practise midwifery in a metaphorical sense. He says that midwives are always women who have borne children, but are past the age for childbearing and that their skills consist in diagnosing pregnancy, alleviating labour pains by drugs and incantations, easing difficulties in childbirth, causing abortions, and matchmaking. This last skill, according to Sokrates, they take even more pride in than they do in ὀμφαλοτομία, although they usually decline to practise it for fear of being thought to be procuresses.

2 The authenticity of Book 7 of *HA* has been questioned, first by Aubert and Wimmer (*Aristoteles Thierkunde*, Leipzig, 1868, pp. 7 - 11), who conclude, mainly from the infelicity of some expressions used in it, that it was not written by Aristotle. Dittmeyer, in his Teubner edition of 1907 (pp. vii - ix) agreed, citing H. Kühlewein's research into correspondences between Book 7 and various Hippocratic passages (*Philologus* 1884, 42, pp. 127 - 132), and pointing out several un-Aristotelian expressions. D'Arcy Thompson remarked that nearly half of the contents of Book 7 may be closely parallel ed with *GA* Books 3 and 4 (*The Works of Aristotle translated into English*, Vol. 4, Oxford, 1910, note on 581 A). But French scholars later reaffirmed the book's authenticity (J. Tricot, *Aristote, Histoire des Animaux*, Paris, 1957, and Pierre Louis, *Aristote, Histoire des Animaux*, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1964, Vol. 1, pp. vii - xi), on the ground that its faults are hardly more serious than those to be found in certain other Aristotelian works. Pierre Louis, in his introduction to the Budé edition, discussing Books 1 to 9, explains their defects by the suggestion that Aristotle must often have added new information to his scientific works or reproduced old notes without always

taking care to integrate them into the whole, and elsewhere he maintains that *HA* "comme la plupart [des ouvrages] du *Corpus aristotelicum*, renferme des développements qui appartiennent certainement à des moments divers de la carrière du philosophe" ("La classification chez Aristote" in *Autour d'Aristote: Recueil d'Études de Philosophie ancienne et médiévale offert à M. A. Mansion*, Louvain, 1955, p. 302, cf. note 32). Simon Byl has more recently made a study of Aristotle's debt to the Hippocratic corpus (*Recherches sur les grands traités biologiques d'Aristote: Sources écrites et Préjugés*, U.L.B., 1973, pp. 73 - 141) and has redirected attention to a pamphlet by Franz Poschenrieder, *Die Naturwissenschaftlichen Schriften des Aristoteles in ihrem Verhältnis zu den Büchern der hippokratischen Sammlung* Bamberg, 1887; I have not had access to either of these works. Cf. S. Byl, "Les grands traités biologiques d' Aristote et la Collection hippocratique" in *Corpus Hippocraticum: Actes du Colloque Hippocratique de Mons (22 - 26 Septembre 1973)*, ed. by R. Joly, pp. 313 - 326, especially pp. 315 - 316, 319 - 321. While Byl may have succeeded in proving that the borrowings from the Hippocratic corpus found in *HA* 7 no more indicate non-Aristotelian authorship than those found in *GA* or elsewhere, it seems to me that enough doubts remain to make the suggestion of Otto Regenbogen a welcome one, especially as applied to Book 7, *viz.* that Aristotle's successors in the Peripatetic school used his *HA*s as a basic text which they augmented and expanded with their own observations (*Kleine Schriften*, ed. by Franz Dirlmeier, Munich, 1961, p. 274).

3 This normally happens, after modern methods of cutting and clamping or tying, between the fifth and tenth days from birth (A. J. Keay and D. M. Morgan, *Craig's Care of the Newly Born Infant*, Edinburgh etc., 7th edition, 1982, p. 118). Soranus gives as the time three or four days or more, *Gyn.* 1. 38. 110, 285. 3 - 4 Rose.

4 ἐὰν δὲ μὴ συνεξέλθῃ εὐθὺς τὸ ὕστερον, ἔξω ὄντος αὐτοῦ τοῦ παιδίου, ἔσω ἀποτέμνεται ἀποδεθέντος τοῦ ὀμφαλοῦ (Dittmeyer). Cutting inside (i.e. between) two ligatures must surely be the significance of ἔσω . . . ὀμφαλοῦ, according to the best emendation of the corrupt text of this sentence. Even if the original text is not recoverable, it is still most likely that cutting between two ligatures was the procedure here described. Cf. Soranus, *Gyn.* 1. 27. 80 (251. 2 ff. Rose): μὴ ἐξηρημένου δὲ τοῦ χορίου κατὰ δύο τόπους ἀποβροχίζειν δεῖ τὸν οὐραχὸν (used here interchangeably with ὀμφαλὸν) καὶ τότε μεταξὺ διακόπτειν κτλ., showing that this was the recommended practice in the 2nd century AD. Dittmeyer's emendation is to be preferred to that of Aubert and Wimmer in *Aristoteles Thierkunde*: ἐὰν δὲ μὴ συνεξέλθῃ τὸ ὕστερον, ἔξω ὄντος αὐτοῦ τοῦ παιδίου, οὐκ εὐθὺς ἀποτέμνεται ἀποδεθέντος τοῦ ὀμφαλοῦ, although it is probably the case, even if not stated in the *HA* passage, that it was generally considered better to extract a retained placenta before cutting the cord, if possible. In the Hippocratic *Mul.* 1. 46 (VIII 106. 6 - 8 Li.) it is explained how the afterbirth is sometimes retained in the womb so that it can only be expelled with difficulty: τοῦτο δὲ γίνεται ἢν ῥαγῆ βίῃ ὁ ὀμφαλὸς ἢ ἀμαθίῃ ὑποτάμῃ ἢ ὀμφαλητόμος τὸν ὀμφαλὸν τοῦ παιδίου πρόσθεν ἢ τὸ χορίον ἐξιέναι ἐκ τῶν μητρῶν. The prominent word ἀμαθίῃ implies that if the cord is cut skillfully in such circumstances it may be done without harm; and the unusual verb ὑποτάμῃ presumably signifies something different from the usual ἀποτέμνω, such as "cuts away from under". Soranus seems to advise delaying the cutting of the cord in such circumstances, unless the operation to extract the placenta required more than a little time (*Gyn.* 1. 22. 73, 244. 5 - 13 Rose).

5 Aline Rousselle, in *Porneia: On Desire and the Body in Antiquity* (translated by Felicia Pheasant), Oxford 1988, p. 52 says that the avoidance of any metal tool for cutting the cord was a Roman taboo, whose abandonment was urged by the Greek doctors Soranus and Galen. Yet there is surely a possibility that the Greeks also had a superstitious aversion to iron for this purpose: Plutarch reports that people do not take iron into a sanctuary, and that the archon of Plataea was not allowed to touch iron (*Mor.* 819 E, *Aristeides* 21. 4). Cf. also G. E. R. Lloyd, *Science, Folklore and Ideology*, Cambridge, 1983, p. 170 and note 195.

6 Cf. D'Arcy Thompson's translation of *HA* in *The Works of Aristotle* (above, note 2) 588 A 1 - 12 and his note 9, where he suggests that the convulsions beginning with spasms in the child's back might be a symptom of neonatal tetanus.

7 For gynaecological work cf. Hipp. *Mul.* 1. 68 (VIII 144. 22 - 24 Li.): τὴν δὲ ἰητρεύουσάν τὰ στόματα (sc. τῶν ὑστερῶν) μαλθακῶς ἐξανοίγειν, καὶ ἡρέμα τοῦτο δρᾶν, ὀμφαλὸν δὲ ξυνεφέλκεσθαι τῷ ἐμβρύῳ - the female medical assistant here may well have practised on other occasions as a midwife. The double rôle can be seen clearly at Hipp. *Carn.* 19 (VIII 614. 8 - 12 Li.) where midwives are referred to as "female healers who attend women in childbirth"; such women would have practised their healing arts on their own, as well as occasionally collaborating with male doctors. Cf. Fridolf Kudlien, *Der griechische Arzt im Zeitalter des Hellenismus, Abhandlungen der geistes- und sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse der Akademie der Wiss. und der Literatur*, Mainz, Jahrgang 1979, No. 6, p. 89; G. E. R. Lloyd (1983) pp. 69 ff. There is epigraphical evidence for the combined rôle of midwife and doctor in an Athenian gravestone set up by a former patient to a "midwife and doctor" called Phanostrate (*IG* ii/iii² 6873, cf. Christoph W. Clairmont, *Gravestone and Epigram*, Mainz on Rhine,

1970, 53, pl. 25, pp. 130 - 131). The inscription reads:

μαῖα καὶ ἰατρὸς Φανοστράτη ἐνθάδε κείται,

[σ]ύθενι λυπη(ρ)ά, πᾶσιν δὲ θανοῦσα ποθεινή.

The relief depicts the female dedicator seated, clasping the hand of the midwife-doctor, with three young children standing and seated around. The rôle of female medical practitioner is discussed by Helen King in her article "Agnodike and the profession of Medicine" *PCPS* 212 (N.S. 32), 1986, pp. 53 - 77, especially pp. 59 - 60: "The validity of a distinction between 'midwife' and 'obstetrician' . . . must be questioned". In Lysias's lost speech *Against Antigenes* there is a reference to a general agreement among midwives and doctors that a fetus is a living creature: ὥσπερ οἱ ἰατροὶ καὶ αἱ μαῖαι ἀπεφώνησαντο, fr. 8a Thalheim.

8 Cf. also 157 C - D: . . . εἰμὶ αὐτῶν ἄγονος, σὲ δὲ μαιεύομαι . . . ἐξαχθέντος δὲ τότε ἤδη σκέφομαι εἴτ' ἀνεμιαῖον εἴτε γόνιμον ἀναφανήσεται. Also 160 E - 161 A and *passim*, ending with 210 B: οὐκοῦν ταῦτα μὲν πάντα ἡ μαιευτικὴ ἡμῖν τέχνη ἀνεμιαῖά φησι γεγενῆσθαι καὶ οὐκ ἄξια τροφῆς;

9 I disagree with M. F. Burnyeat, who says that this aspect of Sokrates's midwifery "has no analogue in ordinary midwifery": "Sokratic midwifery, Platonic Inspiration", *BICS* 24, 1977, p. 8.

10 The manifold implications of the bathing of newborn infants are discussed by R. Ginouvès in *Balaneutikè : Recherches sur le bain dans l'antiquité grecque, Bibliothèque des écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome*, Fasc. 200, Paris, 1962, pp. 235 - 237.

11 Cf. Hipp. *Carn.* 19 where the author refers anyone who might wonder at a baby being born at seven months to the female healers who attend

women in childbirth: εἰ δέ τις βούλεται καὶ τοῦτο ἐλέγξει, ῥήδιον· πρὸς τὰς ἄκεστρίδας αἰ̄ πάρεισι τῆσι τικτούσησιν ἐλθῶν πυθέσθω (VIII 614. 10 - 12 Li.).

12 It still enjoyed popular recognition in Menander's time, as we can see from Gellius's quotation from *Plokion* (fr. 343 Koerte) and his discussion of it (3. 16. 3). In a passage about the length of gestation in humans he quotes the line γυνὴ κυεῖ δέκα μῆνας; (ὄγ δεκάμηνα), adding that Caecilius, who wrote a play with the same name and plot and extensive borrowings from Menander's play, included the eighth month as a possible period of delivery, although it was omitted by Menander:

"soletne mulier decimo mense parere?

ποῖ nono quoque

etiam septimo atque octavo".

We may infer that the character in Menander's play affirmed that birth was possible in the seventh, ninth and tenth months. Plato makes use of the same popular assumption in *Rep.* 5. 461 D - in the ideal state children will not remain with their parents after they are born, and to avoid any danger of unwitting incest later on, fathers will consider all children their offspring who were born in the seventh or tenth months after they became bridegrooms. The first mention of a seven months' child is found in Homer // 19. 114 - 124, where Hera makes the wife of Sthenelos give birth to Eurystheus in the seventh month of pregnancy, and prevents Alkmene from giving birth at the due time, so that instead of Herakles, Eurystheus inherits Zeus's prophecy and promise that the man born on that day would be lord of all around. Probably of much later origin was the idea that Apollo, who enjoyed an association with the number seven (ἑβδομέμιος and ἑβδομαγέτης were among his epithets, and he was said to have been born on the seventh day of the month - see Pauly's *RE* 2. 22 - 23) was a seven months' child; Schol. on Pind. *Pyth.* hypothesis (Boeckh II p. 297), Schol. on

Kall. *Hymn.* 4. 251 (Schneider p. 128). Lucian makes Hermes tell Poseidon that Dionysos was removed from Semele's womb as a still unfinished fetus of seven months and was put into Zeus's thigh to reach completion and birth in the tenth month (*D. Deor.* 9), cf. a passage wrongly ascribed to Cornutus in *De Nat. Deor.* p. 10 (Osann). This must be the kind of thing Arnobius had in mind when he refers scathingly to goddesses giving birth to seven months' children (3. 10).

13 Cf. W. H. Roscher, *Die enneadischen und hebdomadischen Fristen und Wochen der ältesten Griechen, Abhandlungen der phil.-hist. Klasse der Königl. Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften*, 21, No. 4, 1903, especially pp. 67 - 68.

14 Alexander of Aphrodisias, *In Met.* 28. 30 ff. (p. 38 Hayduck). Cf. *Prob.* 2. 47 (l. 65 Ideler): "Why are seven months' babies viable (ζώσιμα), and eight months' not? Because the number seven is perfect by nature, as Pythagoras and the arithmologers and the musicologers testify. But eight is imperfect." Cf. also Diogenes Laertius 8. 29, of Pythagorean belief: "The embryo first congeals in 40 days and receives its form, and the baby is completed and brought forth according to the ratios of harmony in seven or nine or at the most ten months".

15 Sarah George, *Human Conception and Fetal Growth, A Study in the Development of Greek Thought from the Presocratics through Aristotle*, Ph.D thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 1982, devotes Chapter 4 of her thesis (which I read only after writing most of this chapter) to "The Importance of Number", and discusses numerical theories found in the Presocratics, Hippocratics and Pythagoreans in relation to viability. Her interest, and therefore her emphasis, is different from mine in that it relates to theories of number in fetal development rather than the

influence of theories of viability on the treatment of the newborn infant. Her view that popular belief in the viability of the seven months' child pre-dates and influences its treatment by scientists and doctors coincides with mine. She sums up: "... there are enough indications to the effect that the Greek tendency to seek order, proportion and harmony in nature did play a rôle in their embryological thinking. But there is certainly no consistency" (p. 225).

16 The hebdomadic schemes of Diokles and Straton are discussed by J. Mansfeld in *The Pseudo-Hippocratic Tract ΠΕΡΙ ΕΒΔΟΜΑΔΩΝ ch. 1 - 11 and Greek Philosophy*, Assen, 1971, pp. 162 ff., where he gives a wealth of interesting detail about the hebdomad in medicine and embryology in particular, *passim*, especially pp. 156 - 204. The relevant passages in Nikomachos and Macrobius are presented in parallel by W. H. Roscher in "Die hippokratische Schrift von der Siebenzahl in ihrer vierfachen Überlieferung", *Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des Altertums*, 6. 3 and 4, Paderborn, 1913, pp. 91 - 98.

17 Cf. Galen *Phil. Hist.* 122 (644. 23 Diels): Diokles and Epikouros said that the eighth month was viable, ἄτονώτερον δέ. About the Stoic language attributed to Diokles by Nikomachos (65. 1 - 2 de Falco) see J. Mansfeld (1971) p. 168 and note 65.

18 R. Joly, *Hippocrate*, VI 2, Les Belles Lettres, 1972, pp. 131 - 137.

19 It is elsewhere in the Hippocratic corpus used to refer to dislocation of a joint (*Fract.* 1), expulsion of the afterbirth (*Aph.* 5. 49), decay of flesh, sinews, etc. (*Epid.* 3. 4) and detachment of the eschars (*Art.* 11): L.S.J. ἔκπτωσις II. Cf. K. Deichgräber, *Pseudhippokrates Über die Nahrung, Abhandlungen der geistes- und sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse*

der Akademie der Wiss. und der Lit. in Mainz, Jahrgang 1973, No. 3, pp. 59 - 60.

20 The manuscript traditions and order of the chapters are discussed in detail in the editions of H. Grensemann, *Hippokrates Über Achtmonatskinder, Über das Siebenmonatskind (unecht)*, C. M. G. 1 2. 1, Berlin, 1968, and R. Joly *Hippocrate*, XI, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1970, and in the critical reviews of each, by R. Joly in *Gnomon* 42, 1970, pp. 329 - 332, and by A. Anastasiou in *Gnomon* 45, 1973, pp. 531 - 535, respectively; further in J. Jouanna, "Tradition manuscrite et structure du traité hippocratique *Sur le foetus de huit mois*", *R. E. G.* 86, 1973, pp. 1 - 16; R. Joly "La structure du *Foetus de huit mois*", *L'Antiquité Classique* 45, 1976, pp. 173 - 180; and Ch. Irmer, "Monacensis Arabicus 805 und Scorialensis Arabicus 888; Zwei arabische Bearbeitungen zu *de octimestri partu*", *Hippocratica, Actes du colloque hippocratique de Paris, 4 - 9 Sept. 1978*, 1980, pp. 259 - 264. Grensemann's ordering of the text (he prints Hipp. *Sept.* as part of *Oct.*) and his numeration are used here, followed by the equivalent in Littré's edition of 1851. The question of authorship does not concern us here; suffice it to point out that Grensemann has argued for the authorship of Polybos, son-in-law to Hippokrates: *Der Arzt Polybos als Verfasser hippokratischer Schriften, Abhandlungen der geistes- und sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse der Akademie der Wiss. und der Lit. in Mainz*, Wiesbaden, Jahrgang 1968, No. 2.

21 The first 40 days of pregnancy are, according to this theory, the most critical, for then the danger of miscarriage is at its greatest. At the end of the first 40 days male fetuses are completely formed. The first 40 days after birth are also critical, and if the newborn survives these unimpaired it has a good chance of thriving. The critical sixth tetrakontad is the main subject of the treatise (I. 9 - 16 Gr., VII 448. 21 - 450. 27 Li.).

The crisis periods for pregnancy and fetal development correspond to observable periods at which significant stages in postnatal development are reached (1 Gr., VII 446. 12 - 452. 3 Li.). Cf. *Epid.* 2. 6. 4 (V 134. 2 - 4 Li.), where the child is said to develop in the seventh, ninth, and tenth months, in which the voice develops and it gains strength and control over the hands. Here pre-natal and post-natal development may be clearly seen to have been, in the author's mind, mirror images. The birth of infants with deformities (*Oct.* 9 Gr., VII 444. 1 - 15 Li.) is adduced as a further indication of the sufferings of the eighth month, which in such cases reach an ἀπόσπασσις at this period, that is, a crisis point after which the harmful effects of the illness become concentrated in one part of the body, allowing the rest of the organism to come through. This too is a parallel with adult or post-natal pathology. We should note here too that the hebdomad is not completely neglected by the author of *Oct.*, who says that the first seven days after conception are the ones on which miscarriages most commonly take place, the seventh month is the earliest at which birth can take place, and children undergo various changes in the seventh month of life including the cutting of teeth. Finally, the full-term children are born after seven tetrakontads in the womb (1. 3 - 4 Gr., VII 446. 19 - 448. 4 Li.). Cf. the importance accorded to multiples of seven at *Oct.* 1. 8 Gr. (VII 448. 11 - 21 Li.).

22 One of these is the displacement of the fetus in the seventh month, when it is said to pass into "the part which has yielded" (ἐς τὸ ὑπεῖξαν), after the membranes which previously contained it have slackened; there it usually continues to be nourished and wait out its time (6. 1 Gr., VII 438. 12 - 17 Li.). Cf. *HA* 7. 4, 583 B 30 - 31, see p. 28 above. Could this be the author's way of describing the so-called lightening, when the fetus's head descends into the pelvic cavity at the end of the eighth month in a first pregnancy? (The discrepancy in time need not worry us too much: there are

lots of such inaccuracies in ancient medical observations.)

23 The date of conception is difficult enough to ascertain exactly even with today's advanced state of knowledge, and in fact the modern method of calculating gestational age relies, for the sake of convenience, on counting from the first day of the last menstrual period, which strictly speaking gives menstrual rather than gestational age. (Even then, mistakes may easily be made, and gestational age is repeatedly checked by reference to the fetus's development and size, by means of ultrasound scan for example). Since in a 28-day cycle ovulation will normally occur around the 14th day, the estimation of conception at the fifteenth day of the cycle would usually have been fairly accurate.

24 Dated to the beginning of the 4th century by K. Deichgräber, *Die Epidemien und das Corpus Hippocraticum*, Berlin, 1971, pp. 74 - 75. For the relationship of *Epid. 2* to *Oct.* cf. Grensemann, *Der Arzt Polybos* (above, note 20) pp. 68 - 77.

25 Along with the other divergences from *GA*, we find an inclination towards a hebdomadic structure for certain aspects of gestation and infancy. For a discussion of these and their implications see J. Mansfeld (1971) pp. 176 - 178.

26 It is interesting that ancient Greeks (presumably mothers, midwives and nurses) knew of the benefit to premature infants of contact with wool. This knowledge was rediscovered by the medical profession in Britain in recent years, and premature babies are now laid on woollen fleeces, on which it has been demonstrated that they thrive more.

27 Cf. *GA* 4. 6, 7⁵ A 1 - 4, where the same thing is stated.

28 At GA 4. 6, 775 A 33 - B 2, it is women belonging to nations in which the females have a life of hard work who are said to give birth easily.

29 The many correspondences between HA 7 and certain Hippocratic writings including *Oct.* have been noted by H. Kühlewein and others, cf. note 2 above.

30 Diokles and Aristotle are linked by Censorinus in their belief in the viability of the eight months' child, cf. p. 23 above. Wellmann, *Die Fragmente der Sikelischen Ärzte Akron, Philiston und des Diokles von Karystos*, Berlin, 1901, prints both the Aëtius and the Censorinus passages together as Diokles fr. 174.

31 Cf. Grensemann, *Der Arzt Polybos* (above, note 20), p. 79.

32 It is worth noting that 280 days is nowadays said to be the average duration of pregnancy, calculated from the first day of the last menstrual period, not from the date of conception as *Oct.* would have it. The period of gestation from the date of conception is actually about 266 days. Modern "delivery at term" is said to occur between the end of the 37th and the end of the 41st week (i.e. from the 259th to the 287th days). Cf. note 23 above. In Britain today, a baby is said to be viable at the 28th week of pregnancy at the earliest, and abortion may legally be performed before this date (even though in practice with modern medical care some infants born at 22 weeks may survive and grow up). The nearer the birth is to the 40th week of pregnancy, the more mature and therefore the more likely to survive the baby is said to be. (Keay and Morgan [1982] p. 52; Gordon Bourne, *Pregnancy*, London and Sydney, 1984, pp. 79, 84, 113).

33 E.g. *Carn.* 19 (VIII 610. 3 - 5, 10 - 12 Li.), *Genit.* 5 Jo. (VII 476. 23. ff. Li.), *Nat. Puer.* 13. 1 - 2 Jo. (VII 532. 14 ff., 534. 8 ff. Li.). References to the Hippocratic *On Seed* and *On the Nature of the Child* are from Robert Joly's edition in *Hippocrate* Vol. XI, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1970, and their equivalents in Littré's edition.

34 I am grateful to Mrs. Miriam McIlvride for reading Part One of this chapter in draft and making several suggestions about obstetrical matters.

35 Cay Lienau, *Hippokrates Über Nachempfangnis, Geburtshilfe und Schwangerschaftsleiden*, C. M. G. 1 2. 2 Berlin, 1973, pp. 66 - 67.

36 Reading, with Lienau, *ὀκόταν <μῆ> γόνιμον γένηται παιδίον*. Cornarius, and following him, Littré, proposed *<οὐ> γόνιμον*.

37 *Nat. Puer.* 19. 2, 21. 1 Jo. (VII 506. 9 - 11, 510. 18 - 21 Li.) describes the fetal development of nails, saying that nails take root in about three months for males, and about four for females. (*HA* 7. 4, 585 A 26 - 28 says that women who have eaten too much salt give birth to infants without nails.)

38 Swelling of the face, feet and so on (oedema) is one of the indications of pre-eclampsia, which would indeed have constituted a great danger to the fetus in ancient times. Whiteness of the ears, nose and lips (and possibly the sunken eyes, indicating tiredness) could perhaps be an indication of maternal anaemia - is this what is meant by "watery blood"?

39 For the sake of clarity I use the term "superfecundation" to mean the conception of another fetus when a woman has already conceived

(either immediately after the initial conception [which is possible] or some time after [which is impossible, but was thought possible in ancient times, see note 40]), and "superfetation" to refer to the fetus so conceived. The Greek terms for the superfetation are τὸ ἐπικύημα, τὸ ἐπικυηθέν, τὸ ἐπικυούμενον and τὸ ἐπίγονον. Superfecundation is ἡ ἐπικύησις or ἡ ἐπισύλληψις.

40 Ancient belief in superfecundation held that it was possible for a woman to conceive a second time during pregnancy at some point, either sooner or later, after the first conception. Modern medical science accepts that superfecundation is possible, but only if two ova are released during the same menstrual cycle, and two acts of sexual intercourse follow closely one upon the other. Ancient belief in superfecundation is outlined by Lienau (1973) pp. 98 - 99, and an account of the ancient sources is given by the same author in "Die Behandlung und Erwähnung von Superfetation in der Antike", *Clio Medica* 6, 1971, pp. 275 - 285.

41 *Epid.* 5. 11 (V 210. 12 - 212. 4 LI.); *Vict.* 1. 31 (VI 506. 8 - 13 LI.). In the latter passage, it is said that the superfetation also destroys the previously existing fetus. Cf. for this point *HA* 7. 4, 585 A 4 - 23.

42 Cf. C. Lienau (1973) pp. 50 - 51.

43 But cf. *Dox. Gr.* 411. 26 - 412. 18 (= *VS* 31 A 74) where the MSS. say something very similar about the first breath τοῦ πρώτου ζῶου, followed by a sentence beginning τὴν δὲ νῦν κατέχουσιν, which perhaps makes Diels's excision of πρώτου redundant: cf. W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, Cambridge, 1969, II, p. 219, note 4. There is some slight evidence suggesting that Empedokles may have believed that the

fetus respired in the womb, or at least that it contained the element of air:
I. M. Lonie *The Hippocratic Treatises "On Generation", "On the Nature of the Child", "Diseases IV", A Commentary*, Berlin and New York, 1981, p. 152.

44 *VS* 44 A 27, cf. Kirk and Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, corrected reprint, Cambridge, 1963, 445, p. 341, note 1, and Guthrie (1969) I pp. 278 - 279.

45 I. M. Lonie (1981) pp. 188 - 189 notes that the author of *Oct.* held that the fetus respired in the womb, presumably through the umbilicus until birth. But Lonie's "presumably" is unnecessary.

46 Lonie (1981) pp. 147 - 156 deals thoroughly with pre-natal respiration in *Nat. Puer.* and in ancient embryology as a whole. To summarise respiration in *Nat. Puer.*, the seed "acquires breath", and the breath finds its way out again, and a second lot of breath is drawn in from the mother. It continues in the same way, first of all being warm from its warm environment (everything which is heated emits air and draws in cold air by the same passage) and drawing in cold breath from its mother's breathing (12. 1 - 5 Jo., VII 486. 1 - 488. 13 Li.). The embryo grows (flesh growing from its mother's blood) and distinct members are formed by breath, by a process whereby like is attracted to join like. Head, shoulders, arms, legs, sinews, mouth, nose, ears, nostrils, eyes and genitals are formed. The upper parts of the body now respire through the mouth and nostrils, and the intestines, filling with air, cut off and end respiration through the umbilicus. All its parts are formed by means of respiration (17. 1 - 3 Jo., VII 496. 17 - 498. 17 Li.).

47 *Hipp. Carn.* 6 (VIII 592. 1 - 16 Li.): "And the heat is greatest in quantity in the veins and the heart and this is why the heart has [though

Deichgräber reads ἔλκει for ἔχει] pneuma, being the warmest organ in the human body. It is easy to perceive that the pneuma is warm [but Littré reads τρέφον for θερμόν]: the heart and the hollow veins are in constant movement and the heat is greatest in quantity in the veins <and in the heart> [Deich.]. And this is why the heart draws [ἔλκει Li., Deich., following a correction in main MS., but Jo. has uncorrected reading ἔχει] pneuma, being the warmest organ in the human body. There is another way of knowing this: if someone decides to burn a fire in a house when no wind is blowing in [Deich. omits the negative] the flame moves, sometimes more, sometimes less; and a lamp burning moves in the same way, sometimes more, sometimes less, when no wind moves it [Deich. again omits the negative] that we can perceive to be blowing; and the cold is nutriment [or, fuel - τροφή] for the heat. The infant in the womb compressing its lips sucks from its mother's womb and draws both the nutriment and the pneuma in by its heart; for this [sc. the πνεῦμα: τοῦτο is a correction in the MS. for τό, but Deich. reads the original τό - i.e. "the greatest mass of warmth is in the child when . . ."] is warmest in the infant whenever the mother breathes in. The heat provides the movement in it [i.e. the child, though Li. takes to mean the air] and in the other body [i.e. the mother's, or the rest of the mother's body], as well as in everything else."

48 καὶ ἀντὶ πνεύματός τε καὶ χυμῶν οὕτως συγγενέων, ὅκως αἰεὶ [δ'] ἀνάγκη ἐν τῆσι μήτρῃσι γίνεσθαι συνηθείην τε ἔχοντα καὶ εὐμενεΐην, πᾶσι ξένοισι χρῆται ὠμοτέροισί τε καὶ ξηροτέροισι καὶ ἦσσον ἐξηθρωπισμένοις, ἐξ ὧν ἀνάγκη πόνους γίνεσθαι πολλούς, πολλοὺς δὲ καὶ θανάτους (cf. 3. 4 Gr.).

49 post partum vero utrum victurum sit quod effusum est an in utero sic praemortuum ut tantum modo spirans nascitur, septima hora discernit.

ultra hunc enim horarum numerum quae praemortua nascuntur aeris halitum ferre non possunt: quem quisquis ultra septem horas sustinuerit, intellegitur ad vitam creatus, nisi alter forte, qualis perfectum potest, casus eripiat (Macrobius, *In somn. Scip.* 1. 6. 67). Also recorded for Diokles by Nikomachos (64. 19 - 65. 3 de Falco): ... τὰ τε βρέφη, ὡςπερ ἐσπάρη τε καὶ κατὰ γαστρὸς ἐβδομάδι διωκῆθη, οὕτω καὶ μετὰ τὴν γένεσιν ἐπτὰ μὲν ὥραις τὴν κρίσιν ἴσχει τοῦ ζῆν ἢ μὴ· ἐμπνέοντα γὰρ πάντα τῆς μήτρας ἐξέρχεται τὰ τελεσφόρα καὶ οὐ νεκρὰ ἀποκηθέντα, πρὸς δὲ τὴν τοῦ ἀναπνεομένου ἀέρος παραδοχὴν, ὑφ' οὗ τονοῦται τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς εἶδος, κρισιμωτάτη βεβαιοῦται τῇ ζ' ὥρᾳ ἐπὶ θάτερον, ἢ ζῶν ἢ θανάτον. Cf. 61. 5 - 13 de Falco, which compares the first seven hours of the newborn child to the first seven hours of the sperm in the womb.

50 Of the ὄμφαλός: συγκέκριται δ' ἐκ <τεττάρων> τὸν ἀριθμὸν δύο φλεβωδῶν καὶ δύο ἀρτηριῶν, δι' ὧν εἰς θρέψιν ὕλη αἱματικὴ καὶ πνευματικὴ παρακομίζεται τοῖς ἐμβρύοις, 1. 17. 57 (225. 16 - 18 Rose); again of the umbilical cord: τῶν ἐνταῦθα ἀγγείων τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς कुούσης αἷμα καὶ πνεῦμα διακονικῶς ἐπικεχορηγηκότων τῷ σώματι τοῦ βρέφους, 1. 27 80 (250. 19 - 21 Rose); Cf. ... ὅτι κολληθὲν δεῖ τὸ σπέρμα διατρέφεσθαι, λαμβάνει δὲ τροφὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιφερομένης ὕλης αἱματικῆς τε καὶ πνευματικῆς 1. 10 38 (204. 4 - 6 Rose). At 1. 17. 58 (226. 26 - 227. 6 Rose) Soranus speaks of respiration (ἀναπνοή) taking place through the umbilicus, as part of the argument of those who deny the existence of the amniotic membrane.

51 Cf. *Gyn.* 1. 28. 81 (251. 22 - 25 Rose) where Soranus, remarking that the sudden drop in temperature occasioned by the newborn infant's first exposure to air provokes immediate crying, also fails to connect this crying with the first establishment of healthy respiration.

52 Sarah George (1982) has a useful discussion of πνεῦμα at pp. 151 ff. On the connection between breath and soul or life, she writes: "... the association of life with breath or air is a commonplace among peoples everywhere. A new-born infant must begin to respire at birth in order to live, and the cessation of breathing was ... a sure sign of death. This kind of observation led, in many cases, to an identification of breath with soul. Among the Greeks, a belief in the connection between soul or some divine entity and breath or air was a part of their philosophy virtually from the beginning, and so probably represented ... one of their fundamental presuppositions" (pp. 153 - 154). However I differ with her in her contention that the evidence on the fetus's reception of "this vitalizing force ... seems to come down on the side of breath entering after birth" (pp. 154 - 155).

53 In saying that some non-viable fetuses are "smothered" or "devoid of breath" (ἀποπνιγμένα) by the eighth month, *HA* 7. 4 (583 B 31 - 584 A 1) perhaps hit upon the truth: prolonged lung deflation, due to absence of sufficient amniotic fluid, would indeed deprive the newborn infant of its chance of survival.

54 Cf. I. M. Lonie's discussion of the relationship between theory and experience in Hippocratic authors, (Lonie [1981] pp. 158 ff.) and the examples of popular beliefs which figure in ancient medical theory cited by G. E. R. Lloyd (1983) pp. 82 - 83. Examples of mistakes about observable phenomena: the length of lochial discharge in *Nat. Puer.* 18. 1 - 8 Jo. (VII 498. 27 - 506. 2 Li.), and certain observable facts of childbirth such as uterine contractions, also in *Nat. Puer.* (30 Jo., VII 530. 20 - 538. 28 Li.), cf. Lonie's commentary, esp. p. 245.

55 It may be as well to mention here that my conclusions here and in

the final Chapter (Conclusions) differ slightly from those of R. Etienne in his paper "Ancient medical conscience and the life of children," *Journal of Psychohistory* 4, 1967, pp. 131 - 161 (translated by Michèle R. Morris), especially pp. 152 - 154, although he does not restrict his interest to the newborn, as I do here. He comments that "infant medicine was the poor relative of ancient medicine", and is of the opinion that doctors were not very interested in it. Although he refers to a wide body of evidence, he makes very little of the Hippocratic work *On Dentition*. This is a collection of thirty-two brief statements about infant nutrition and pathological conditions in infants (mostly in unweaned infants), of uncertain date, but probably post-classical. It offers no theories or arguments, but appears to be simply a catalogue of observations already known to medicine, perhaps handed down through several generations of doctors. It might have been used as a manual for paediatric practitioners. Some of the observations are true, some wide of the mark. Some of the symptoms mentioned are symptoms of tuberculosis, gastroenteritis, tonsillitis and diphtheria. The work is mostly wrong about the causes and associated symptoms of these diseases. Many of the statements contain an element of prognosis, some of which are broadly correct. No specific advice about therapy is given, but treatment, albeit unspecified, is mentioned (12, VII 544. 22. - 23 Li.). This little work shows that doctors did attend cases of illness in infants and offer prognosis and advice about treatment (though *newborn* infants are not mentioned, and illness in newborn babies was probably a different matter, as I argue in this thesis). It is also a reminder that there was little chance of success in curing an ill baby, even one past the neonatal stage. I am grateful to Dr. Colin Crawford for his helpful comments on *Dentition*.

56 The wrapping of the umbilical cord round the neck of some babies is a notably accurate observation by this author. Such infants often suffer

from oxygen deprivation, and this can lead to health problems, mental handicap, or even stillbirth.

57 The author may have observed that pregnant women who lose amniotic fluid for days or weeks before a premature birth often give birth to babies that do not survive. This has of course nothing to do with fetal nutrition; the loss of *liquor amnii* deprives the fetus of the means of inflation and deflation of its lungs, with the result that the lungs are insufficiently matured by the time of birth.

58 For some of the ideas behind these theories of sickness and deformity in infants cf. I. M. Lonie (1981) pp. 139 - 140.

59 H. Grensemann, *Knidische Medizin*, Teil I, Berlin and New York, 1975, pp. 80 - 115.

60 But does the fastening of a band of gold around the infant Apollo reflect an everyday practice using a more mundane material? It is just possible that the character in Kallias's comedy *Pedetai* who says "because when I was a child I was bound with a sheaf-band" (ὅτ' ἀμαλλείῳ παῖς ὦν ἐδέθην, fr. 18 Kassel and Austin) is referring to a band that bound him as a swaddled baby. It may also be related to the band passed around the cradle which held the swaddled baby, referred to in Hipp. *Fract.* 22 (see p. 52 above).

61 A similar observation is made by Sokrates in Xenophon's account of the philosopher's lecture to his son Lamprokles about ingratitude to one's mother: "she . . . cares for it, not in return for any reward, and without the baby's being aware of the person who helps it or able to communicate its wants to her", *Mem.* 2. 2. 5 (cf. above, p. 72).

62 Sextus Empiricus *Adversus Mathematicos* 1. 41. Cf. Pindar fr. 193 (Snell): πενταετηρίς έορτά | βουπομπός, έν ᾧ πρώτον εϋνάσθην άγαπατός ὑπό σπαργάνοις : the poet refers to his birth with the phrase "when I was first put to bed in swaddling bands". Cf. also Herodian's phrase about Maximinus's fear lest the Senate and his subjects should pay more attention to τὰ τῆς γενέσεως εϋτελῆ σπάργανα than to his present position, 7. 1. 2 Stavenhagen, and the phrase έν σπαργάνοις καὶ γάλαξιν used of the infancy of the art of painting, by Aëlian, *VH* 8. 8.

63 "*Pannis involutus* : a note on the vocabulary and practice of swaddling", *Proceedings of the Classical Association*, 72, 1975, pp. 17 - 18.

64 William Cadogan, "the father of modern child care", wrote in *An Essay upon Nursing, and the Management of Children, from their Birth to Three Years of Age*, London, (1st published 1748) 10th edition 1772, p. 11: "But besides the mischief arising from the weight and heat of these swaddling-cloaths, they are put on so tight, and the Child is so cramped by them, that its bowels have not room, nor the limbs any liberty, to act and exert themselves in the free and easy manner they ought".

65 Eg., William Cadogan (1772) p. 11: "To which [*sc.* tight swaddling] doubtless are owing the many distortions and deformities we meet with every-where". E. L. Lipton, A. Steinschneider, J. B. Richmond, "Swaddling, a child care practice: historical, cultural and experimental observations", *Pediatrics*, 35, 1965, pp. 521 - 567, quote more references to the subject.

66 In *Arthr.* 53 έκ γενεῆς is opposed to ἡ καὶ ἔτι νηπίω έόντι (IV 238. 2 - 3 Li.), and a similar distinction is made at 60: οἷσι δ' ἄν νηπίοισιν ἔτι έοϋσι τὸ ἄρθρον οϋτως ὀλισθάνον μῆ έμπέση, ἡ καὶ έκ γενεῆς οϋτω γένηται

κτλ. (IV 258. 13 - 14 Li.). At 29 ἐκ γενεῆς δὲ ἢ ἐν αὐξήσει is opposed to πύξεμένῳ (IV 140. 2 - 4 Li., cf. 236. 6 - 7 Li.). On the whole, therefore, I think that this author uses ἐκ γενεῆς to describe congenital conditions, and not loosely to describe conditions produced in the perinatal period.

67 W. L. Newman, *The Politics of Aristotle*, vol. III, Oxford, 1902, comm. on 1336 A 10 - 12; Jean Aubonnet, *Aristote, Politique*, vol. III, part 1, Les Belles Lettres, Paris, 1986, p. 108, note 13.

68 G. Lafaye, art. "Fascia" in Daremberg and Saglio, *Dictionnaire des Antiquités*, vol. II. 2, p. 979; M. Moïssides, "La puériculture et l'eugénique dans l'antiquité grecque", *Janus*, 19, 1914, p. 295; R. Etienne (1976) p. 147.

69 *Pol.* 8. 6. 1 (1340 B 27 ff.): Aristotle gives a partly humorous reason for his opinion that children ought to learn music by singing and making music themselves: Archytas's invention of the rattle was a good idea; "they give it to infants so that by using it they may not break the things in the house, for the young child cannot keep still. Just as this is a suitable occupation for babies, so is education a rattle for older children".

70 *Aer.* 20 (II 74. 8 - 11 Li.): ροικὰ δὲ γίνεται καὶ βλαδέα. πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι οὐ σπαργανοῦνται ὥσπερ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ· οὐ γὰρ νομίζουσι διὰ τὴν ἵππασίην, ὅκως ἂν εὐέδροι ἔωσιν, H. Diller (*Hippokrates Über die Umwelt*, CMG I. 2, Berlin, 1970). ροικὰ and βλαδέα were suggested by Wilamowitz for the MSS: ροϊκά ("flabby") and πλατέα ("squat"). οὐ γὰρ is Heiberg's emendation of οὐδέ. Others have wished to read ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ νομίζουσι, on the ground that the Egyptians probably did not practise swaddling: see note *ad loc.* in W. H. S. Jones's Loeb edition (Vol. I, London, 1923). The general sense is not in doubt: the Skythians have crooked and flaccid

bodies because they have not been swaddled; swaddling would help to produce the kind of physique useful for horsemanship.

71 Cf. *Anec. Gr.* 1. 304. 14 - 16 Bekker: σπαργανώματα: "the first bandages, bands in which the body of newborn infants is bound, to arrange it into a more straight and pleasing shape". Exactly the same idea lay behind the swaddling that was still almost universal in Greece in the 1950s, where babies were swaddled "to keep them from going crooked and to make their backs firm. The gesture of mother love is one of holding a firm, stiff, straight bundle against the breast, not the crooking of the arms to accommodate a cuddling baby." Traditional swaddling, in which the baby was swaddled all over, was still largely practised in the 1950s in the villages, and the custom of partial swaddling (e.g. leaving the arms and legs free by day after the fortieth day) was beginning to replace it, especially in the cities: Margaret Mead (ed.), *Cultural Patterns and Technical Change*, UNESCO, 1953, p. 83, pp. 97 - 98.

72 Aristotle saw a connection between movement in the fetus and newborn and a danger to the physical condition: he noted that in humans more males are born deformed than females, and explained that male fetuses move about more than female ones, and so tend to get broken more. The young creature (τὸ νέον) is easily damaged because of its weakness (*GA* 4. 6, 775 A 4 ff.). It is also worth noting here that he made several observations on movement in infants: rising heat and moisture in the body produce sleep, and infants sleep a lot because all the nourishment is carried upwards; the upper parts of infants are so full of food that for five months they do not even bend their necks, since much moisture rises upwards, and it is probably the same condition that makes the embryo at first lie still inside the womb (*Somn. Vig.* 457 A 4 - 21); it is some time before infants can control their head movements, because of the weight of

the brain; later still do they gain control over the movement of the upper parts of the body, and last of all over the parts whose movement is not connected with the brain, such as the legs (*GA* 744A 32 - 35); bipeds must have a lighter top half and a stronger and heavier bottom half to be able to walk, as is shown by the fact that infants cannot walk upright because they are top-heavy; as they get older the lower parts grow more, until they get big enough to enable them to walk upright (*IA* 710 B 5 - 18).

73 M. Moïssides (1914), p. 297, records that moulding of babies' heads was practised by women in Greece in his day: in Epeiros the midwife presses the baby's head vertically from top to bottom, and in Chios and elsewhere the pressing is done in circular fashion around the temples.

74 On artificial deformation of the skull from prehistoric times onwards, see Srboljub Živanović, *Ancient Diseases*, translated by Lovett F. Edwards, New York, 1982, pp. 200 - 204.

75 It is worth noting here that the Amazons were said to dislocate the joints of their male offspring while they were babies, some at the knees and some at the hips, in order to make them lame and thus unable in later life to conspire against the female sex. Males were used as manual workers in sedentary occupations. The author of the Hippocratic treatise *On Joints*, after recording this, adds "whether this is true, I do not know. But I know that this would be the result of dislocating joints in infants", *Arthr.* 53 (IV 232. 7 - 13 Ll.).

76 Cf. Menander *Samia* 225 - 226: "The baby was lying on the couch where it had been dumped out of the way, howling".

77 A. D. Fitton Brown (1975) p. 17.

78 Hilde Rühfel, *Das Kind in der Griechischen Kunst: Von der minoisch-mykenischen Zeit bis zum Hellenismus*, Mainz am Rhein 1984, p. 152, Abb. 36, 37, 60 - 63.

79 Lipton, Steinschneider and Richmond (1965), p. 539: "The literature seems to indicate that infants are often tolerant of prolonged restraint and may even *demand* to be swaddled later in the first year of life when weaning from the restraints is attempted. Others, however, readily give up the restraints and may demand early freedom." Cf. on p. 532, the experience of parents whose baby had been tightly swaddled in the Moscow hospital where she was born: "Upon reaching home and unbinding the child the parents discovered that she cried incessantly until she was rebound tightly." This is also attested to by the Navajo Indians, who keep their babies swaddled and bound to a board up to 18 hours a day for the first three months and thereafter gradually less and less: "... babies do get very attached to their cradleboards which they come to regard as a place of comfort. They clamour to be put on the board rather like western babies demand their bottles": from an article in the *Sunday Times*, 16.7.78, to which my attention was kindly drawn by Mr. A. F. Garvie.

80 Because the figure of twenty days seemed to contradict Soranus's statement in 31. 87 that maternal milk may be given after feeding with goats' milk and honey for the first three days, Ermerins emended the MSS.: εἴκοσι το τριῶν. But Soranus only permits maternal milk after the first three days if no wet-nurse can be procured for this period; moreover, he surely does not mean the first three days after birth (since for the first two of these no food is to be offered at all), but the first three days of the feeding régime (above, p. 60). Twenty days does seem a surprisingly long period to withhold the mother's milk, given that the colostrum period (not explicitly mentioned by Soranus) lasts only two to three days; and in order

to prevent the milk from becoming a discomfort to the mother and then drying up, it would have to be pumped out or sucked out by someone else during this time. Nevertheless, twenty days may well be what Soranus wrote: Caelius Aurelianus (or possibly Muscio) in his Latin version of Soranus's *Gynaecology* reads "maternum enim lac usque ad XX dies est separandum" (Caelius Aurelianus *Gynaecia, Fragments of a Latin version of Soranus's Gynaecia from a thirteenth century manuscript*, edited by Miriam F. Drabkin and Israel E. Drabkin, Baltimore, 1951, Supplement to the *Bulletin of the History of Medicine* No. 13, p. 44); Aëtius of Amida, who based this part of his medical work largely on Soranus said that it is preferable not to give the mother's milk before the fourth day, but his treatment of the subject is brief and cursory, and he may well have had in mind Soranus's advice about using the mother's milk after the first three days if no wet-nurse is available, in 31. 87.

81 Colostrum is the translucent fluid, high in protein but lower in sugar and fat than milk, secreted by the maternal breast for the first two or three days after birth. It gradually changes in composition, until by the third or fourth day more milk than colostrum is produced, after which the proportion of colostrum continues to fall (Keay and Morgan [1982] p. 133). Colostrum helps to protect newborn babies from dangerous illness: its high content of lactoferrin inhibits the production of harmful bacteria, which might otherwise multiply in the baby's stomach and intestines and cause the vomiting and diarrhoea that in ancient times would generally have proved fatal. The Greek term for it is *μύδος*, usually translated "beestings"; it more often refers to the first lactation in animals than in humans, and was evidently prized as a delicacy.

82 Wolfgang Lehmann, *Die Ernährung des Säuglings im Laufe der Jahrtausende*, Belp, 1954, p. 15, mentions that Hippokrates advised waiting

four days before giving the mother's breast; but I have been unable to find any reference to support this in the Hippocratic corpus. Aristotle's account is identical in most respects to that of *Nat. Puer.*, and this theory of lactation may go back to Empedokles: cf. Lonie (1981) pp. 204 - 206. It probably also accords with an obscure reference to milk in primiparae, in Hipp. *Epid.* 2. 3. 17 (V 118. 9 - 10 Li.), which seems to connect the readiness of the milk with a change in the nutriment, at the end of the eighth month: πρωτοτόκων τὰ γάλακτα, τῆς μὲν ὀκταμήνου ἀπαρτιζούσης, τῆς δὲ τροφῆς μεταβαλλούσης.

83 *GA* 776 B 4 ff. gives an account of the concoction of the nutriment; milk is concocted blood; lactation and menstruation cannot take place together. Cf. Hipp. *Epid.* 2. 3. 17: the next part of the reference to milk quoted in note 82 above reads: διὸ τὰ γάλακτα, ἀδελφὰ τῶν ἐπιμηνίων, πρὸς δεκάμηνον τεινόντων γενόμενα, κακόν ("wherefore milk, which is related to the menses, when produced in women who are approaching the tenth month, a bad sign").

84 Cf. 777 A 22 - 27 where Aristotle makes a similar point about the coincidence of the fitness for use of the milk and the birth of the child.

85 "For this reason Damastes deserves criticism for his advice that the mother offer the breast immediately to the baby, on the grounds that nature has provided the early production of milk so that the baby may have nourishment straight away. They also deserve censure who follow him in this matter, such as the book they call "Apollonion". For they wish by persuasive language to make a clever evasion of the clear facts." The reason given by Damastes, whoever he may have been, for the presence of the mother's milk supply as soon as the baby was born, and his opinion of its purpose, perhaps implies that he followed Aristotle on this subject. If

the practice of suckling by the mother soon after birth required to be upheld by skilful arguments, it must have lost ground - to the school of opinion exemplified by Soranus - since Aristotle's day.

86 For much of what follows on theories of pre-natal nutrition, especially as expressed in *Nat. Puer*, I have made use of Lonie's detailed commentary (1981).

87 The author apparently forgot that at a certain stage in the fetus's development, umbilical respiration, one of whose functions is to enable the fetus to draw off the nutrient material carried by the umbilical cord, is cut off, and replaced by respiration through the mouth and nose. Cf. above note 46, and Lonie (1981) commentary on 17. 3 (p. 188) and p. 209.

88 Lonie (1981) concludes that his silence on the subject indicates that it was probably not a view he shared: pp. 208 - 209.

89 *Diokles von Karystos*, Berlin 1938, pp. 166 - 167.

90 The presence of fecal matter in the intestine of newborn babies was also noted by the author of *Nat. Puer* and *Morb. 4*, who thought that flat worms are sometimes found in it, produced apparently out of putrefied milk upon which the fetus has fed while in the womb, *Morb. 4* 54. 2. Jo., VII 594. 24 - 596. 10 Li. However this author does not say that the fetus imbibes milk through the mouth, as we have seen (above, p. 63).

91 What he saw will have been the clusters of chorionic villi, the sponge-like or finger-like growths reaching from the placenta into the uterus, which are observable in many ruminants, and which in humans are only present in this form for the first 12 weeks of gestation.

92 M. Schmidt, *Didymi Chalcenteri Grammatici Alexandrini Fragmenta* (1854), p. 220 fr. 14.

93 A. B. Cook in "The bee in Greek mythology", *JHS* 15, 1895, p. 6, suggests that Euripides may have been familiar with this legend, since the Bacchantes in his play draw milk, wine and honey from the soil. Ovid credits Dionysos with the discovery of honey, *Fasti* 736.

94 The prophetic connotation is also found in the Homeric *Hymn to Hermes* 552 - 563, where the Moirai feed on honeycomb and because of this declare the truth willingly; if deprived of honey they tell lies.

95 Aët. *VH* 10. 21, 12. 45; Dio Chrysostom 64. 23; Philostr. *Im.* 2. 12; Eust. *Vit. Pind.* (in *Scriptores Graeci Minores*, Westermann) gives two versions: one in which Pindar while out hunting at Helikon lay down and fell asleep, and had honeycomb put in his mouth by a bee, and took this as a sign that he must compose poetry, and another in which the sign of the bee happened when he was an infant. Pausanias records a tale of bees covering Pindar's lips with honeycomb when he lay down near the road on his way to Thespiai (9. 23. 2).

96 Cic. *Div.* 1. 78, Pliny *NH* 11. 55, Val. Max. 1. 6 ext. 3, Olympiod. *Vit. Plat.* 382 - 383 Westermann; Focas *Vit. Virg.* 28. 32. Homer and Menander were also said to have honey carried to their lips by bees, but not necessarily in infancy (*Anth. Pal.* 2. 342 - 343, 9. 187).

97 Cf. Hes. *Theog.* 81 - 84: when the Muses see a king at his birth, "they pour sweet dew upon his tongue, and from his mouth flow soothing words".

98 J. G. Müller, *Erklärung des Barnabasbriefes*, Leipzig, 1869, pp. 17 -

20; T. W. Crafer (ed.) *The Epistle of Barnabas*, London, 1920, The Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, *Texts for Students* no. 14, pp. iv - v; Pauly's *RE* 3. 25, "Barnabas".

99 *S. Ignatii Martyris Epistolae Genuinae . . . adduntur S. Ignatii Epistolae . . . ad haec S. Barnabae Epistola* edidit et notas addidit Isaacus Vossius, London, 1680, 2nd edition, pp. 310 - 311. The Paulus passage quoted is from 1. 5, and says that the first food given to the newborn child should be honey and then milk, twice or at most three times a day. When it seems eager for it and appears able to digest it, it may be given a little solid food. The Aëtius reference says that honey must be given before any other food, being most easily skimmed off for the infant to lick, butter being avoided as bad for the stomach. Then a tepid mixture of honey and water may be given in drops. After this the mother may give the child her milk, having first drawn off the thick part of it and washed her breasts with warm water (4. 3).

100 *Scholia in Dionysium Thracem, Commentarius Melampodis seu Diomedis in Artis Dionysianae* ed. A. Hilgard, In *Grammatici Graeci* 1. 3 p. 35, lines 14 - 21.

101 Pauly's *RE* 15. 399 - 404 Gudeman, especially 403, 404.

102 A. Boeckh, *Pindari Opera, Pindari Epinicionum Interpretatio Latina cum Commentario Perpetuo*, Leipzig, 1821, p. 158.

103 Notably by H. Usener, "Milch und Honig" *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie* N.F. 57, 1902, especially pp. 193 - 194. Cf. Pauly's *RE* "Milch", 15. 1570 - 1571, 1578 Herzog-Hauser, and "Mel", 15. 379 - 383 Maur and Schuster. A. B. Cook (1895) pp. 1 - 24 identifies connections of bees and

honey with chthonic deities, nymphs, and the rebirth of the soul.

104 Boeckh (following Schneider), Usener and the authors of the Pauly's *RE* articles (above, note 103) all report the custom; an example of an unwarranted assumption about its significance is found in the Pauly article on "Mel", 381, namely that a child might be exposed before having tasted honey, but exposure of a child after it had tasted honey counted as murder.

105 Cook (1895) p. 3, notes that a related custom turns up in nineteenth-century Rhodes, where infants are placed in a cradle eight days after birth and have their lips touched with honey by an older child, with the words, "Be thou sweet as this honey".

106 [Plutarch] *On the Education of Children* 5 (*Mor.* 3 c - f): the unknown author of this essay says that mothers ought to suckle their own children. They will perform the task with true affection, whereas wet-nurses and nursemaids have a spurious and assumed affection since they love for pay. Nature provides mothers with milk for the purpose of nursing, and the feeding bond enhances the natural affection mothers feel for their offspring. Mothers must make the greatest effort to feed their children, but if they are prevented by physical infirmity or because they are in a hurry to bear more children, nurses should be chosen with extreme care. Cf. Favorinus's discourse on the necessity for a mother to feed her child herself in Aulus Gellius's *Noctes Atticae* 12. 1. Plutarch himself sounds much more like Xenophon's Sokrates than the essay falsely attributed to him (see above): he commends his wife on her noble behaviour and real love for her son Charon who had died in childhood - she had nursed him at her breast and had undergone surgery when her nipple was bruised. This injury was probably the reason why a later child, their little daughter, on whose death he consoles his wife, had a wet-nurse: "for she used to ask her nurse

to offer her breast and feed not only other babies but even the toys and playthings she was fond of, just as if inviting them to her own table, out of kindness sharing the good things that she had . . .", *Consolation to his Wife* 5 (*Mor.* 609 E), 2 (608 D).

107 "Τροφός", *Glotta* 16, 1928, pp. 274 - 279.

108 *Od.* 11. 448 - 449, *Il.* 22. 82 - 83, *Od.* 19. 482 - 483, *Il.* 6. 388 - 389, 466 - 467, 22. 503. It is not clear whether τιθήνη here signifies a wet-nurse, as we should expect from the term. Cf. Eust. *Comm.* on *Il.* 6. 399, and Herzog-Hauser in Pauly's *RE*, *loc. cit.* (above, p. 73).

109 Δημητρία τίτθη, Νουμηνίς τίτθη, Συνέτη τίτθη, Φιλύρα τίτθη, Χοιρίνη τίτθη, Ἄρτεμι[σία] τίτθη: *IG* 11² 11084, 12330, 12682, 12996, 13065, 10843; Φάνιον Κορινθία τίτθη: *IG* 11² 9079; <ἐ>νθάδ<ε> γῆ κατέχει τίττην παίδων Διογείτου ἐκ Πελοποννήσου τήνδε δικαιοτάτην. Μαλίχα Κυθερία, *IG* 11² 9112; Σωπάτρα Μακέτα τίτθη χρηστή, Νεαρά τίτθη χρ<η>στή, Τίτθη χρηστή, Τκί>τθη χρ<η>στή, Παιδευσις τίτθη χρ<η>στή[ς], *IG* 11² 9271, 12242, 12815, 12816, 12387. Cf. also τίτθη, *IG* 11² 12812 and 12813.

110 *IG* 11² 1559, lines 60, 63. Cf. Marcus N. Tod, "Some Unpublished 'Catalogi Paterarum Argentearum'", *Annual of the British School at Athens* 8, 1901 - 1902, pp. 197 - 230. There were "numerous freedwomen described merely by the title παιδίον, who in all probability acted as domestic servants", p. 210.

111 According to the usual interpretation of the play, as given by F. H. Sandbach, Chrysis is able to feed Moschion's baby because she has recently given birth herself, but lost her own child. Moschion would have explained

this in an early speech, no longer extant. It is this circumstance which is alluded to in lines 54 ff.:

τὸ παιδίον γενόμενον εἴληφ' οὐ πάλαι
ἀπὸ] ταύτομάτου δὲ συμβέβηκεν καὶ μάλα
]ν ἡ Χρυσίς · καλοῦμεν τοῦτο γὰρ
πάλαι.

Sandbach follows earlier editors in restoring a form of τίκτω in line 56: [ἔτικτε]ν in his *OCT* edition, and emending μάλα in line 55 to μάλα' εὖ. It is the circumstance that Chrysis has milk and so is able to suckle Moschion's child, and that she has lost her own child (during Demeas's absence) and so is able to substitute Moschion's without provoking suspicion in the mind of Demeas, that is referred to in line 55 as a lucky coincidence. Sandbach has made clear his belief that Chrysis's intervention saves the baby from the only alternative fate possible for it, namely exposure ("Two notes on Menander (*Epitrepontes* and *Samia*): . . . 2. Had Chrysis In *Samia* lost her own child?", *Liverpool Classical Monthly* 11, 1986, pp. 158 - 160). He argues for this interpretation in opposition to the view expressed by Christina Dedoussi and accepted by others, that Chrysis had *not* recently given birth, that she had no milk, and was merely using the breast to pacify the baby when Demeas spotted her, and that he wrongly jumped to the conclusion that she was suckling. Dedoussi replied to Sandbach, defending her view, in "The future of Plangon's child in Menander's *Samia*", *Liverpool Classical Monthly* 13, 1988, pp. 39 - 42. In my view, only if more of the text of the play had been preserved would it be possible to be certain whether Chrysis had borne and lost a child. As things stand, both views are arguable. For discussion of what the baby's fate would have been had Chrysis not taken him in, see pp. 168 - 170 below. I incline to the view that exposure was not being considered for Moschion's baby, and that he wanted if possible to rear him. If this is true, then it was not *necessary* for the purpose of the plot for Chrysis to have milk. But it does not rule

this out, and Chrysis's ability to suckle may be considered a neat solution to the practical problem.

112 Fuller sources of evidence for the farming out of children in the period under study are lacking. But there are documents from Ptolemaic Egypt, of the period just after this, which give an interesting insight into the practice as it existed there and then. One such is *P. Oxy.* 1. 37, an account of a lawsuit of AD 49, about the identity of a child, a foundling which had been claimed as a slave by Pesouris, and given to Saraeus to nurse. The nurse claimed that the child had died while with her, but Pesouris claimed as being his own a child which Saraeus was nursing, which she maintained was her son. Judgement was given in Saraeus's favour, on the ground that the child resembled her in its features, on condition that she pay back the money she had received for nursing it. *P. Oxy.* 1. 38 shows that Pesouris (here called Syrus) refused to accept the judgement.

113 See Keay and Morgan (1982) p. 141, for evidence from a 1907 study of the milk supply of a wet-nurse who suckled a varying number of infants over a period of days: "As the demand increased so did her milk supply."

114 Observations on this subject are found in Horst-Dieter Blume, *Menanders "Samia": Eine Interpretation*, Darmstadt, 1974, pp. 105 - 106, especially note 45; K. Schmidt, "Die griechischen Personennamen bei Plautus", *Hermes* 37, 1902, p. 181 (Canthara); James Curtis Austin, *The Significant Name in Terence*, *University of Illinois Studies in Language and Literature*, Vol. 3, no. 4, Nov. 1921, pp. 58 - 60 (Canthara); H. G. Oeri, *Der Typ der komischen Alten in der griechischen Komödie, seine Nachwirkungen und seine Herkunft*, Basle, 1948, pp. 53 - 58.

115 Cf. line 237 where Demeas explains that the old woman whom he overheard talking about the baby is Moschion's τίτην, who was once his slave and is now free. It will be this person, still around in the household, to whom Parmenon refers in line 302. Cf. Gomme and Sandbach, *Menander: A Commentary*, Oxford, 1973, note on *Samia* 237.

116 Fr. 80 Kassel and Austin (= fr. 80 - 82 Kock, in R. L. Hunter, *Eubulus: the Fragments*, Cambridge, 1983). Cf. Hunter's commentary *ad loc.*

116a Hilde Rühfel (1984) I pp. 194 - 197, Abb. 76 - 78.

117 What Aristotle says in *HA* 3. 20 (522 A 4 - 6) suggests that some elderly wet-nurses also managed to start suckling again some time after their normal lactation had ceased: "In females that are not pregnant, a little milk has been produced by using certain foods, and indeed it has been produced in elderly women (πρεσβυτέραις) by milking - enough, in fact, in some of them to suckle an infant". R. S Illingworth, *The Normal Child: Some Problems of the Early Years and their Treatment*, 7th edition, Edinburgh, London and New York, 1979, p. 2, confirms the existence of the phenomenon of "non-puerperal lactation" in primitive peoples, mentioning the breast-feeding of babies by their grandmothers among the Javanese, Maoris, North American Indians, South Americans and Africans, and citing two cases of menopausal women lactating copiously as a result of breast-feeding their grandchildren in Lagos, Nigeria. So the elderly nurse typical in Greek art and literature may not always have been redundant or retired! There is a reference to non-puerperal lactation in Hipp. *Aph.* 5. 39 (IV 544. 14 - 15 Li.): "If a woman who is neither pregnant nor has given birth has milk, her menstruation has ceased".

118 Also I. 35. 98 (274. 8 - 9 Rose): milk is spoiled by sexual

intercourse; and cf. 1. 37. 105 (279. 17 - 21 Rose): milk is spoiled by the disturbance immediately after taking a bath.

119 Aristotle *GA* 777 A 14 - 19: women while suckling do not menstruate or conceive, in the natural course of events; if they do conceive the milk dries up because the nature of milk is the same as that of menstrual fluid, and nature cannot supply enough to produce both; while one of them is secreted the other is lacking, unless something violent or abnormal is done. Cf. Lonie (1981) pp. 204 - 206, commentary on *Nat. Puer.* 21; *Hipp. Mul.* 1. 73 (VIII 152. 22 - 154. 8 Li.); [Ar.] *HA* 7. 11, 587 B 30 - 31.

120 Heat is given a different function in the formation of teeth in *Carn.*, which attributes the hardening of teeth to their relative hotness, saying that the glutinous and fatty content of bone is, in the case of teeth, dried up by the heat: 12, VIII 598. 7 - 11 Li.

121 But Soranus advises giving a newborn baby goats' milk mixed with honey for the first three days of feeding, if there is no wet-nurse (see above, p. 67).

122 William M. Calder III, "Longus 1. 2: the she-goat nurse" *CP* 78, 1983, pp. 50 - 51.

123 Likewise Chloë is fed by a ewe in the cave where she has been abandoned, 1. 5.

124 See note 122 above. This is confirmed by Augusto Guida, "More on she-goat nurses", *CP* 80, 1985, p. 142, with evidence of the use of goats to feed infants whose mothers had died in the plague, in 16th-century France. There is a delightful story of animal-nursing quoted by Sir J. G.

Frazer in his *Commentary on Pausanias's Description of Greece*, 2. 26. 4 (Vol. 2, p. 235), from the 1865 number of *Transactions of the Ethnological Society of London*: "Mr. Francis Galton says: 'It is marvellous how soon goats find out children and tempt them to suckle. I have had the milk of my goats, when encamping for the night in African travels, drained dry by small black children, who had not the strength to do more than crawl about, but nevertheless came to some secret understanding with the goats and fed themselves.'"

125 G. A. S. Snijder, "Guttus und Verwandtes", *Mnemosyne*, 3rd ser., vol. 1, 1933 - 1934, pp. 34 - 60; Dieter Klebe and Hans Schadewaldt, *Gefässe zur Kinderernährung im Wandel der Zeit*, Frankfurt, 1955, pp. 5 - 16.

126 1. 41. 115 (288. 21 - 22 Rose): ὕδωρ ἢ ὕδαρες οἰνάριον δοτέον αὐτῶ δια τῶν πεφιλοτεχνημένων θηλῶν.

127 Grensemann, *Der Arzt Polybos* (see above, note 20), p. 82 wishes to connect this advice with the statement in *Oct.*, which he attributes to Polybos, that the sudden change from the congenial environment of the womb to unsuitable and unaccustomed substances produces illnesses.

128 Perhaps some such idea about the effect of wine on babies influenced Spartan women in the practice which Plutarch attributes to them of bathing infants in wine as a test of health, on the grounds that this causes convulsions and loss of consciousness in epileptic and sickly children (Plut. *Lyc.* 16. 3). Or it could be that the reason Plutarch attributes to the women for doing this has been drawn from the idea that wine causes convulsions in infants.

129 "New information on nutrition in ancient Greece", *Klio* 62, 1980,

pp. 317 - 319.

130 Snijder (1933 - 34), and Klebe and Schadewaldt (1955); J.H.C. Kern, "An Attic 'feeding bottle' of the 4th century BC in Leyden", *Mnemosyne* 10, 1957, pp. 16 - 21; Anita E. Klein, *Child Life in Greek Art*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1932, p. 6.

131 Possibly with a teat made of parchment or tanned udder-nipple: Klebe and Schadewaldt (1955) p. 8.

132 Also, human milk was prescribed by ancient doctors for various conditions in adults. There are a number of references to this in the Hippocratic corpus: in pessaries for gynaecological use (*Mul.* 1. 74, VIII 156. 10 Li.; 1. 84, VIII 206. 13, 19, 208. 10 Li.; *Mul.* 2. 158, VIII 336. 8 Li.; 2. 162, VIII 340. 7 Li.; 2. 179, VIII 362. 13 Li.; 2. 205, VIII 394. 9 - 10, 396. 5 Li.; *Steril.* 243, VIII 458. 2 Li.; *Nat. Mul.* 32, VII 352. 13 Li.; 109, VII 426. 6 Li.); in a drink to predict female fertility (*Steril.* 214, VIII 414. 18 Li.); in an ophthalmic preparation (*Mul.* 1. 105, VIII 228. 12 - 13 Li.); in a preparation to inject into the ear (*Morb.* 3. 2, VII 120. 9 Li.). The breast-pump might have been used to extract milk for such purposes. The instrument most commonly used in ancient medicine to draw off body fluids was the bell-shaped cupping-glass, σικύη, which was heated and placed on the appropriate part of the body. This might be used on the breasts in order to suppress menstruation, according to *Aph.* 5. 50 (IV 550. 5 - 6 Li.): γυναικὶ τὰ καταμήνια ἦν βούλη ἐπισχεῖν. σικύην ὡς μεγίστην πρὸς τοὺς τιτθοὺς πρόσβαλλε. Snijder (1933 - 34) pp. 55 - 56, suggests that a secondary function of the breast-pump might have been as a substitute for the σικύη in certain cases: in use on the female breasts the σικύη presented the danger that the whole breast might be sucked in and swell up so much that it would be difficult to free it, whereas the breast-pump presented no such

problem.

133 In the belief of ancient Greeks the evil eye (ὄφθαλμὸς βάσκανος) was an especial danger to children, and Plutarch explains how ill-will can be transmitted through the eyes to produce a physical effect on the object beheld (*Mor.* 680 D). He says, "We know of persons who seriously injure infants by looking at them, and the infants' bodily condition is affected by them, because of its softness and weakness, whereas the strong and compacted bodies of older people are less affected". The effect can be produced even unintentionally by some people: "If we reckon to be true what many people say about those bewitched by the evil eye, I suppose you are aware that even friends and relatives, and, by a few people, even fathers, are thought to have the evil eye, so that women do not show their babies to them, nor let them be looked at for long by such people" (*Mor.* 682 A). Cf. H. de Ley, "Beware of blue eyes! A note on Hippocratic pangenesiis (*Aer.* ch. 14)", *L'Antiquité Classique* 50, 1981, pp. 192 - 197, especially note 12; O. Jahn, "Über den Aberglauben des bösen Blicks bei den Alten", *Berichte über die Verhandlungen der Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig, phil.-hist. Klasse*, 7, 1855, pp. 28 - 110, especially pp. 34 - 35, 40 - 45.

134 Klebe and Schadewaldt (1955) *Abb.* 10, 11.

135 According to M. Moïssides (1914), p. 310, this practice was still in use in 1914.

136 Cf. Aristotle *Rhet.* 1407 A 8 - 10: Demokrates likened the orators to the nurses who swallow down the morsel of food and daub the infants' lips with saliva. Sextus Empiricus (*Adv. Math.* 2. 42) characterises the demagogue in similar terms: "In word and in appearance he promises to do

everything for the public good, but in truth he provides nourishment from no healthy source, being like the nurses who give the babies a little piece of pap and swallow down the whole".

137 Cf. Ar. *Thesm.* 692: ... τοῦτο δ' οὐδέποτε σὺ ψωμίεις.

Chapter Two

Exposure and Infanticide

There are many references in Greek literature and inscriptions to getting rid of unwanted babies at birth. In most states the preferred method was exposure, the abandonment of the child in some place outside the family property. The scope of this thesis entails restricting ourselves to studying the evidence from the classical and Hellenistic ages, though the practice of abandoning or killing unwanted newborn infants continued into the Roman age. Much of the modern scholarly debate on this subject has centred on Athens, and we will look at this in detail in Part Two of this Chapter. Much of what can be said about exposure in Athens will also have been true of it elsewhere in Greece. But there is one notable exception to this, and this is where our study of the subject must begin.

Part One

Infanticide in Sparta

In his *Life of Lykourgos* (16. 1 - 2) Plutarch says the following about the treatment of newborn infants in Sparta:

τὸ δὲ γεννηθὲν οὐκ ἦν κύριος ὁ γεννήσας τρέφειν, ἀλλ' ἔφερε λαβῶν εἰς τόπον τινὰ λέσχην καλούμενον, ἐν ᾧ καθήμενοι τῶν φυλετῶν οἱ πρεσβύτατοι καταμαθόντες τὸ παιδάριον, εἰ μὲν εὐπαγῆς εἶη καὶ ῥωμαλέον, τρέφειν ἐκέλευον, κληῖρον αὐτῷ τῶν ἐνακισχιλίων προσνείμαντες· εἰ δ' ἄγγενές καὶ ἄμορφον ἀπέπεμπον εἰς τὰς λεγομένας Ἀποθέτας, παρὰ τὸ Ταύγετον βαραθρώδη τόπον, ὡς οὐτ' αὐτῷ ζῆν ἄμεινον οὔτε τῇ πόλει τὸ μὴ καλῶς εὐθύς ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρὸς εὐεξίαν καὶ ῥώμην πεφυκός.

As Plutarch himself says in the opening sentence of this biography, nothing about the life and work of Lykourgos is absolutely certain. Even the existence of Lykourgos the Spartan lawgiver has been disputed in modern times. But this uncertainty does not invalidate what Plutarch writes about the system Lykourgos was said to have imposed on Sparta, many of whose features certainly did exist.

What are we to make of this custom of official control over the rearing of newborn infants and official discarding of undesirables? Unfortunately there is no other direct evidence about this Spartan practice. The matter is further complicated by its connection by Plutarch with Spartan land tenure, since this is a Spartan institution about which our information contains blanks and apparent contradictions. Plutarch attributes the reason for the custom to what might be called a policy of eugenics, but it has been argued in recent times that the motivation was a less-than-rational fear of deformity or monstrosity. The special nature of exposure in Sparta, the existence of an official system to decide whether to rear or not, its

connection with land distribution, and its precise motivation are special problems worthy of examination. There is also the question of whether this official inspection to decide on what was worth rearing applied to female infants as well as male. We must bear in mind also that Plutarch in his *Lykourgos* is writing not of the Sparta of his own day but of what he knows of a much earlier Sparta, and that references to Sparta in Plutarch and other authors show that many of the "Lykourgan" institutions fell into disuse before or during the classical age.

Unwanted children

Plutarch says that the elders of the tribes, when they judged a newborn infant to be ill-born and deformed "sent it away to the so-called Apothetai, a pit-like place by Mount Taygetos", and makes it clear from the words that follow that this meant death for the infant. Whether these infants were thrown to their deaths into the pit-like place, or simply abandoned there alive and left to die, is unclear from the passage. The mention of a βαραθρώδης τόπος, presumably a natural chasm, perhaps gives a hint of the purpose to which such a topography might have been applied. On the other hand, we know that at Athens and elsewhere in Greece the usual means of getting rid of an unwanted baby was by exposure, ἀπόθεσις, the simple abandonment of the child, and the Spartan Ἀπόθηται may serve to remind us of it; moreover, those who wanted to dispose of newborn infants generally chose to expose them alive partly at least out of a desire to avoid the religious pollution that affected those guilty of homicide. Nevertheless it is not impossible that the unwanted infants at Sparta were thrown into the chasm, the gruesome task perhaps delegated to a helot (whose state of religious purity or pollution would not have mattered to the Spartans).

However this may be, there is an important respect in which the Spartan disposal of infants differed from exposure elsewhere, in that it was always intended to deprive the child of life. Whereas in the rest of the Greek world "exposure" does not invariably equal "infanticide", in the Spartan state no "exposure" that did not equal "infanticide" was known.¹ For this reason I think it permissible to allude to the Spartan practice as "infanticide" rather than "exposure", while withholding judgement as to whether that infanticide was direct, by throwing to death, or indirect, by abandoning to die.

Plutarch is, however, perfectly clear about the chief feature which distinguished the Spartan practice with regard to rearing infants from that found among other Greeks: "The father did not have authority to rear his offspring, but carried it to a place called a *lesche* where the elders of the tribes sat and examined the baby, and, if it was well-formed and strong, ordered him to rear it . . .". In other Greek cities the male head of the household acknowledged and named the newborn offspring born to him, or if he did not wish to rear it gave the order for it to be exposed. In Sparta the decision was not in the father's hands. The elders of the tribes were probably the eldest men of each tribe into which all Spartan citizens were organised. The *lesche* was a meeting-place for Spartans in their leisure hours, and probably each tribe used a different one, for there were several.² Glotz in his article "Expositio" (see p. 180 below) expressed the belief that only if a Spartan wished to rear his son did he take the child to the elders to have the decision ratified, and that he would only submit one son to this examination but did not have to ask permission to expose his other children, whom he exposed, almost without fail, on his own account. But this is not a satisfactory interpretation of Plutarch's words, and it is difficult to believe that normal and healthy younger children of Spartan citizens were almost always denied life, the state declining to interfere in this wholesale disposal of its future citizens. It is contradicted by a remark of Aristotle's, that the legislator encourages Spartans to have several sons by means of

certain incentives (see p. 149 below), and it cannot be what Plutarch had in mind, for he appears to have thought that the state provided a secure future means of livelihood for each healthy and well-formed child: "... [they] ordered him to rear it, assigning it one of the 9000 lots". This matter of land distribution as it affects the interpretation of Plutarch's account will be discussed in due course. Another question is raised by D. M. MacDowell in this context: whether the infants' Spartan parentage was investigated at this stage. He says: "Since a Spartan citizen had to have Spartiate parents, it is highly probable that the elders did satisfy themselves on this point before admitting a boy to the tribe . . . , even though there is no evidence for it. But a healthy boy found to have a non-Spartan parent did not have to be exposed; this was a class from which some mothakes were drawn" ([1986] p. 54).

The fate of babies not deemed well-formed and strong was as follows: "If it was ill-born and deformed they sent it away to the so-called Apothetai, a pit-like place by Mount Taygetos, on the basis that it was better both for itself and for the city that that which was not from the beginning naturally well-fitted for health and strength should not live". Plutarch makes clear the purpose of the Spartan custom of infanticide: it was to weed out at birth children who appeared unlikely to grow into robust and able-bodied adults, both for their own sakes and for the sake of the Spartan state. The latter sought to avoid burdening itself with citizens who would be unable to contribute to its military strength. It is in the context of rearing hardy children that Plutarch mentions infanticide. The upbringing of Spartan boys, from the age of six onwards, would have had the effect of shortening the life of most congenitally weakly children: they would hardly have survived the rigours of the militaristic discipline and demanding outdoor life (though Agesilaos managed to do so, but the extent and origin of his lameness are not known, cf. p. 152 below). It seemed to the Spartans better for such a child himself to destroy him at birth rather than see him slowly destroyed by the Spartan *agoge*. The same thinking underlay the

women's practice of bathing newborn infants in wine instead of water, as Plutarch's next sentence makes clear, and he goes on "for it is said that the epileptic and sickly ones are made to lose consciousness by the unmixed wine and fall into convulsions, while the healthy ones are rather hardened and strengthened in their constitution". These things constituted a policy of eugenics, carried out not as an expression of an ideological belief about the purity of the race, but as the practical first step in a system single-mindedly devoted to the raising of stalwart citizens for the army.

Plutarch does not clearly indicate whether both sexes of infants underwent the tribal examination, but we are probably safe in assuming that τὸ γεννηθέν includes female as well as male offspring. There is no likelihood that deformed and sickly girls would have been reared when boys were not. Although women were not required to fight in the army, they were expected to lead healthy and active lives and to produce healthy children for the future. Spartan girls did not go through the *agoge* but they were drilled in physical exercises and encouraged to participate in competitive athletics. It is unlikely, though, that κληροί were assigned to females, since Spartan women were able to be supported by the landed property of their fathers, and after marriage by that of their husbands, and women did not have to keep up contributions to a common mess.

Since the reason for the Spartan practice of infanticide for unwanted babies is clear from Plutarch's words and fits with what is known of the Spartan way, there is no need to attribute it to any other kind of motivation. The attempt by Marie Delcourt to attribute it to a superstitious fear of the τέρας, the offspring μὴ ἑοικῶς τοῖς γονεῦσιν, which engendered fear in ancient societies and was the sign as well as the cause of the anger of the gods, has been refuted by P. Roussel.³ Delcourt bases her argument on the premise that the state in ancient times only demanded exposure and death of infants who were τέρατα and whose continued existence would bring

calamity upon the whole community, and this kind of exposure she says is always meant by the term ἀπόθεις and its cognates. Exposure by parents was carried out, she says, for reasons of illegitimacy or poverty, and was not always required to result in the baby's death: this is termed ἔκθεις. Roussel has shown that these distinctions between ἀπόθεις and ἔκθεις, and between state-controlled exposure of τέρατα and parental exposure for social reasons, are mistaken. Delcourt argues that if the object of the state was simply to rid itself of the "ill-born and deformed", it would suffice simply to exclude them and their offspring from citizenship and participation in public life. The question implied is, why expose them? But a Spartan might well have asked, why not expose (or kill) them? They were of no use to anyone; they were "not worth rearing", a concept familiar to ancient Greeks everywhere. That a child so deformed as to be deemed a τέρας also engendered fear in the minds of Spartans is credible, but the custom of infanticide described by Plutarch cannot have been motivated solely, or even principally, by such a fear. Plutarch contrasts the fate of the infant considered εὐπαγές καὶ ῥωμαλέον with that deemed ἄγγενές καὶ ἄμορφον, the "well-formed and strong" with the "ill-born and deformed". The latter are not only the τέρατα, but must include those with various kinds of physical deficiencies, including general weakness.

Granting of lots to infants reared

We now come to the more problematical part of Plutarch's testimony, namely the assignation of one of the 9000 lots of land, κληροί, to each healthy infant. If the state was to have an adequate supply of land for this purpose, the lots must have reverted to the state on the death of their occupants. Yet Plutarch says elsewhere that Spartan sons regularly

inherited their fathers' estates. Again, if each Spartan was allocated a parcel of land, how could the state of affairs which Aristotle describes have come about, namely inequality in property ownership, the land having passed into the hands of a few, with a consequent, and disastrous, fall in the number of those who qualified for Spartan citizenship? Are we to think of the lots being allocated to each healthy Spartan while he was still a baby, or was the decision made at that stage simply one of affirming the infant's right to a lot, which would actually be allocated to him when he reached maturity? In discussing these questions it is necessary to bear in mind that the system of land-ownership at Sparta was, at least for part of its history, peculiar, in that an equal allocation of property to Spartan citizens had at some period of time been made, and for some period of time Spartans appear to have enjoyed equal shares in part of the state's territory. The question of Spartan land distribution has been tackled by many scholars, so that all that is really required here is to survey what is already well-trodden ground.

Scholarly conclusions on the matter have varied enormously from each other.⁴ For example, P. Cartledge has argued the case for a once-for-all distribution of lots in the seventh century, which then became private property and were thereafter divided among the children of the family. The fact that qualification for citizenship depended on owning enough property to be able to contribute to a common mess may have encouraged a general malthusianism, with the object of creating a single heir for family property (especially where the family was rich) and keeping that property intact, and with the consequence of a decline in citizen population.⁵ But D. Asheri concludes that there once was a system in force at Sparta which allowed only one heir to occupy his father's estate, and provided all the other sons with lots of their own. If this was the case, the problem of keeping family estates intact was not a motive for limiting the size of families.⁶ What is not in dispute is that a system whereby land was allocated to Spartans at birth by the state (or approval was made for land-allocation later) would

have peculiar implications for the laws of succession and inheritance. The three main aspects of Spartan land tenure of relevance to *Lyk.* 16 are the supposed equality of ownership, inalienability (and indivisibility) of land allotments, and inheritance.

The 9000 lots mentioned by Plutarch at *Lyk.* 16. 1 had already been described by him as equal, each capable of producing 82 medimnoi of barley with a proportionate quantity of liquid crops (*Lyk.* 8. 7). Polybios also attributes to Sparta the equal distribution of public land (τῆς πολιτικῆς χώρας) of which no citizen may possess more than another (6. 45).⁷ Plato in the *Laws* says that at the time of the Dorian invasion Sparta's legislators established a certain equality of property among the citizens, and he uses this feature of Spartan organisation as a model for his own ideal state (684 D). Plutarch's account in his *Life of Agis* of the means by which Spartan wealth came to be concentrated in the hands of a few, is in accord with the institution of equality of property until a certain point in Sparta's history: a certain ephor called Epitadeus, who had quarrelled with his son, proposed a law to permit Spartans to give during their lifetime or bequeath their οἶκος and κληρος to anyone they wished. The Spartans accepted his proposal, thereby destroying their excellent constitution and bringing about the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few and consigning the rest to poverty (*Agis* 5. 3 - 4). So, according to Plutarch, equality of ownership once existed at Sparta, but did not last. Aristotle in the *Politics* criticises the gross inequality of property that obtained in Sparta in his own day: it has come about, he says, that some Spartans own far too much property, while others have a very tiny amount, and as a consequence the land has passed into the hands of a few (1270 A 16 ff.). Underlying this we may assume the belief, which Aristotle would have shared with Plato and others of his time, that originally the land was more evenly distributed among all. He blames the law permitting gift or bequest of already existing property (τὴν

ὑπάρχουσιν), and the practices of giving large dowries and giving heiresses in marriage to men already wealthy for the disastrous ὀλιγανθρωπία afflicting Sparta, and says that it is better for a city to make itself full of men by the equalisation of property (1270 A 20 - 40).

Modern scholars have made various comments about equality of property in Sparta. Some hold that it was a myth invented in the fourth century, arising from a tradition about the approximate similarity in size of original holdings; that complete equality in fact never existed, and as time passed inequality grew.⁸ Cartledge, as we have seen, takes a view close to this, suggesting that the land that was divided into roughly equal lots was the territory conquered in Messenia, and that this has led to the tradition of strictly equal allotments; he believes in a distribution at the time of the conquest, and that the lots then became private property, resulting in inequality of ownership ([1979] p.168). Since the Spartan citizens called themselves ὅμοιοι, they must have thought themselves equal in some respect: W.G. Forrest suggests that the equality was not of ownership, since there was private land, nor of the right to make political decisions, but equality of all citizens as citizens, that is, equality under the law and an equal duty to serve the state.⁹ Another feature of this equality, Forrest claims, was the κλήρος, an allocation of land made equally to all citizens (many of whom also possessed private land). If the κλήροι were allotted at birth, as Plutarch says, then the potential ὅμοιοι were designated even before they became adults, and we have to assume that the number of available κλήροι was about the same as the number of ὅμοιοι desired by the state.

The division of the land into private property and state-controlled property which was allocated in equal lots is behind the distinction which is mentioned in one of Herakleides Lembos's excerpts from Aristotle's *Constitutions*:

πωλεῖν δὲ γῆν Λακεδαιμονίοις αἰσχρὸν νενόμισται. τῆς ἀρχαίας
μοίρας οὐδὲ ἔξεστι (12, Dilts).

It was considered shameful in Sparta to sell land, and selling the ancient portion was not even permitted. This is confirmed by Plutarch in his treatise on "The Ancient Customs of the Lakedaimonians" (*Mor.* 238 E), where he reports that "some have said that any foreigner who submitted to the way of life of the régime in accordance with the plan of Lykourgos had a share in the portion allocated from of old (μετεῖχε τῆς ἀρχῆθεν διατεταγμένης μοίρας); but selling it was not allowed". It may be inferred from this that the ancient portion could not be sold by anyone. Even after the *rhetra* of Epitadeus, the sale of the κλῆρος, the ancient portion, was not permitted by law, though giving and bequeathing it was, and by taking advantage of this law some men contrived to acquire a multiplicity of estates (Plutarch *Agis* 5. 3 - 5). Aristotle in the *Politics* (1270 A 20 - 22) says that the legislator made buying property or selling the existing estate (τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν) not honourable (οὐ καλόν), but permitted giving or bequeathing by anyone who wished. In another part of the *Politics* Aristotle probably had Sparta in mind, among other states, when he says that in ancient times there was in many cities a law against selling "the original lots" (1319 A 11 - 12). From all of this evidence we may understand that this law against sale of lots remained in force, but its effect was considerably weakened by the *rhetra* of Epitadeus permitting gift or bequest even of the original κλῆρος. It was this measure which ended the inalienability of κλῆροι, and eroded the system whereby each Spartiate was assured of a piece of land of which he might enjoy the usufruct during his lifetime.

The question of inalienability is linked to that of heritability, and both lead on to the problem of how the κλῆροι were allocated and transmitted. Plutarch's account of the distribution of κλῆροι at *Lyk.* 16. 1 makes no mention of inheritance. It seems to suggest that there was always

an adequate supply of lots for allocation, which might lead us to think that the κληρος must have reverted to the state, or the tribe, on the death of its occupant. But at *Agis* 5. 2 Plutarch clearly states that each father left his κληρος to his son. After saying that Spartan affairs began to sicken and decline soon after the conquest of Athens filled Sparta with gold and silver, he goes on:

οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν οἴκων ὃν ὁ Λυκοῦργος ὥρισε φυλαττόντων
ἀριθμὸν ἐν ταῖς διαδοχαῖς, καὶ πατὴρ παιδὶ τὸν κληρον
ἀπολείποντος, ἄμῳς γέ πως ἡ τάξις αὕτη καὶ ἰσότης διαμένουσα
τὴν πόλιν ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνέφερον ἁμαρτημάτων.

He then describes the *rhetra* of Epitadeus and its effect. This passage does not say how provision was made for more than one son. By the time Aristotle wrote his *Politics* some large families with little property were unable to provide adequately for all their sons: the legislator, says Aristotle, encouraged the citizens to have as many children as possible, and there is a law making the father of three sons exempt from military service, and a father of four sons exempt from all taxes. And yet, he says, it is obvious that when many are born and the land is so divided many of necessity become poor (1270 B 1 - 6). By this time much of the land had become concentrated in the hands of a few people, and if there had at some time been a system which granted a lot to each son who did not inherit his father's lot, it was evidently no longer possible to operate it.

The evidence has been interpreted in different ways by scholars. L. Ziehen (1933) has argued that the state must always have held a reserve-pool of κληροι for allocation to younger sons of Spartans whom the father's κληρος was too small to support. D. Asheri ([1963] pp. 5, 6) has argued that the κληρος could support no more than one male Spartan at a time, that only one son could be allowed to inherit it, and that for the other sons the state provided by assigning unoccupied lots. A compromise between

the pool theory and the inheritance system is presented by Oliva, who interprets Polybios's πολιτικὴ χώρα as the property, throughout antiquity, of the Spartan state; κλήροι were occupied, not owned, by Spartans, and often Spartan sons would be allocated what had been their father's κλήρος, and this system operated like the usual inheritance system, but formally the state owned the land and its allocation of κλήροι became a symbolic act representing the state's supreme ownership, a kind of formal confirmation of the sons's right to co-own and later occupy by himself his father's κλήρος ([1971] pp. 36 - 37). Cartledge, on the other hand, does not believe that a pool of inalienable estates was ever held by the state; the "ancient portions" were simply those held by aristocracy in Lakonia before the land in Messenia was annexed, and, according to his interpretation, Sparta always had the usual Greek system of partible inheritance ([1979] pp. 168, 309). Michell argues that the κλήρος was state property and was entailed to the son of the occupant; it was inalienable and the occupant could not dispose of it by will (and no Spartan was ever left landless), but he could mortgage it and run up debts, and poverty came about through these last two activities ([1964] pp. 208 - 211). A recent contribution to the subject has been made by D.M. MacDowell, who points out the effort made by the Lykourgan system to maintain an unvarying number (9000) of households in Sparta, each with one κλήρος ; one son inherited his father's κλήρος, and there was probably a law enabling any other sons to be adopted as heirs by men with no son of their own; there was probably also a law enabling the κλήρος of a man with no son to be held after his death by his daughter and her husband; but in the fifth century the number of Spartiates was already falling, and some κλήροι must have been left unoccupied, and it was probably in the later fifth century that the *rhētra* of Epitadeus changed the Lykourgan system in the way already described; this in itself, along with other changes in the laws about heiresses and wills which must have taken place around the same time, by

allowing the concentration of land in the hands of a few and the corresponding impoverishment of some other families, accelerated the decline in Spartan manpower. The freedom thus given to Spartans to dispose of their property, both private land and κλῆρος, as they wished, ensured the final destruction of the Lykourgan system of a fairly constant number of 9000 households and destroyed the system whereby every Spartiate who had been allowed by the elders of the tribes to survive could expect, even if he had several brothers, to possess a κλῆρος for his own use ([1986] pp. 89 - 110).

This last interpretation of the evidence allows a harmonious reconciliation of Plutarch's testimony at *Lyk.* 16 with that at *Agis* 5. Before the system broke down (some time in the fifth century), babies passed as fit to be reared were destined upon reaching manhood to take possession of a κλῆρος in the land belonging to the city, which would produce the wherewithal for his essential contribution to the common mess. Usually it would be the father's κλῆρος which supported the adult son in this way, and the κλῆρος was regularly passed on from father to son. A younger son for whom his father's land could not provide, would be adopted by a childless man or would marry the daughter of a man with no son of his own, and so enter upon his κλῆρος. Perhaps when neither of these solutions was available to a younger son the state could assign to him a κλῆρος which had fallen vacant (by the dying out of a household). The inspection at birth and the rejection of babies unfit to be reared was a measure calculated to ensure that Sparta was populated only with able-bodied soldiers. It was not a measure for limiting the population. Producing plenty of healthy sons, not limiting their production, was the concern in Sparta. The guarantee of an equal share for each citizen in the city's land was part of the design to keep the population at an optimum level. The assignation of lots must have been nominal while the Spartan was a baby: it was in effect a promise of a piece

of land sufficient to support him in adulthood, and this was a measure intended to enable the Spartan soldier, so carefully reared and trained, to live the life of a soldier in the service of his country, and to free him from the need to earn a living. The régime which demanded of all Spartan citizens that they spend all their lives in the service of the state, and which was capable of organising the upbringing of boys and the discipline of men on the required scale, was certainly capable of running the "Lykourgan" system of land distribution.

After the system of the equal distribution of 9000 κλήροι had broken down it must have become impossible for the elders of the tribes to allocate a lot to each healthy baby (or rather to guarantee his later possession of a lot). Did the inspection for fitness to be reared fall into disuse at the same time? Plutarch certainly writes of it in the past tense. I think that this custom would have been continued as long as the *agoge* of boys and the rigorous training of soldiers was maintained, since it was the first step in that process. The fact that King Agesilaos (born 444) was lame at least from boyhood (Plut. *Ages.* 2. 3) does not necessarily indicate that the custom was already being abandoned at this date - it could be that the offspring of kings were not inspected in the same way as other Spartan babies, just as kings did not undergo the usual *agoge* (Plut. *Ages.* 1. 2); in fact, Agesilaos was exceptional in that despite his royal birth he was given the *agoge*, and if it is correct that the law about inspection continued in force as long as the *agoge* persisted, then it would not have been abandoned by this date. In any case, we do not know that Agesilaos was actually impaired from birth. (Cf. Mitchell [1964] p. 110 n. 3.) Many aspects of the Lykourgan system started to crumble in the later part of the fifth century and many of its institutions were abandoned during the fourth century. By the mid-third century, we are told, King Agis wanted to restore the ancestral *agoge* (Plut. *Agis* 4. 2). After the tribal inspection of infants was discontinued, Spartan families may well have exposed unwanted children on their own account.¹⁰

Part Two

Exposure in Athens and elsewhere

To rear or not to rear?

In Plato's *Theaitetos* 160 E 5 - 161 A 4 Sokrates, carrying on the metaphor that Theaitetos is pregnant with ideas and he himself as midwife will help to deliver Theaitetos of them and then inspect them, compares the definition of knowledge offered by Theaitetos to a newborn infant:

τοῦτο μὲν δὴ, ὡς ἔοικεν, μόλις ποτὲ ἐγεννήσαμεν, ὅτι δὴ ποτε τυγχάνει ὄν. μετὰ δὲ τὸν τόκον τὰ ἀμφιδρόμια αὐτοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐν κύκλῳ περιθρεκτέον τῷ λόγῳ, σκοπούμενους μὴ λάθῃ ἡμᾶς οὐκ ἄξιον ὄν τροφῆς τὸ γιγνόμενον, ἀλλὰ ἀνεμιαῖόν τε καὶ ψεύδος. ἢ σὺ οἶει πάντως δεῖν τό γε σὸν τρέφειν καὶ μὴ ἀποτιθέναι, ἢ καὶ ἀνέξῃ ἐλεγχόμενον ὄρων, καὶ οὐ σφόδρα χαλεπανεῖς ἔάν τις σοῦ ὡς πρωτοτόκου αὐτὸ ὑφαιρή;

An earlier passage in the *Theaitetos* has the same theme:

προσφέρου οὖν πρὸς με ὡς πρὸς μαίας ὑὸν καὶ αὐτὸν μαιευτικόν, καὶ ἃ ἂν ἐρωτῶ προθυμοῦ ὅπως οἶός τ' εἶ οὕτως ἀποκρίνασθαι· καὶ ἔάν ἄρα σκοπούμενός τι ὦν ἂν λέγῃς ἡγήσωμαι εἶδωλον καὶ μὴ ἀληθές, εἶτα ὑπεξαίρωμαι καὶ ἀποβάλλω, μὴ ἀγρίαινε ὥσπερ αἱ πρωτοτόκοι περὶ τὰ παιδιά (151 B 9 - C 5).

These passages show that if a newborn infant was considered οὐκ ἄξιον τροφῆς it might be taken from its mother, even if it was her firstborn, and "put away". The verb ἀποτιθέναι is commonly translated "expose", by which is meant putting the newborn baby out of the house and abandoning it. A common consequence would have been the death of the baby, especially if

the place in which it was abandoned was lonely and frequented by beasts of prey. But some babies were picked up and rescued by passers-by, often to be reared as slaves; this would have been more likely to happen in populated places, and it was perhaps the thought that the child might be picked up which consoled some parents and absolved them from the guilt of direct infanticide.¹¹

The *Theaitetos* passages are important evidence for the practice of exposure, even though it is only referred to metaphorically, for the metaphor is picked up several times in the dialogue, and no Greek author gives the specific and direct information on the practice that we should like to have. What, then, does the *Theaitetos* tell us about the putting away of unwanted children? It tells us beyond doubt that some newborn infants in fifth-century Athens were taken from their mothers and exposed. This was the fate of those infants considered "not worth rearing" (160 E 8, 210 B 9). What made an infant not worth rearing is a question about which the *Theaitetos* tells us little. Sokrates will dispose of that which is ψεύδος, εἶδωλον or μὴ ἀληθές (150 C 2, 151 C 4 - 5, 161 A 1), and since a baby cannot be false, a phantom, unreal or untrue (a point made at 150 A 10 - B 2) these words must refer to the arguments themselves. He also refers to that which is ἀνεμιαῖον (157 D 2, 161 A 1, 210 B 9), the "windy" or "wind egg". The word ἀνεμιαῖον is sometimes used with ὄον, and ὑπνημία is used by Aristotle of eggs produced without impregnation (GA 750 B ff., HA 6. 2, 559 B 21 - 560 A 9). A "windy" pregnancy is what is nowadays referred to as a phantom pregnancy, a false pregnancy in which a woman experiences many of the symptoms of pregnancy, including amenorrhea and swollen abdomen, without fetation, and it was a phenomenon known in the ancient world.¹² But a newborn infant cannot be ἀνεμιαῖον, and Sokrates therefore uses this term of the spurious or unfruitful *argument*, the term of course having been suggested by its connotation with pregnancy. It is contrasted with γόνιμον (157 D 2, cf. 150 C 2) which can mean productive

or fruitful, or, of an infant, likely to live, that is, viable. So γόνιμον may refer either to the argument or to the metaphorical infant, and Plato probably exploits the ambiguity of the term.

We must be careful not to take out of a mere metaphor more than is justified, but I think that one of the things the midwives would have inspected the newborn infants for was their viability: γόνιμον ἢ οὐ γόνιμον; was the question which all concerned with the birth would have asked themselves, and the question of viability and non-viability and how to recognise them was one of the matters which medical men addressed at this period (above, pp. 21 - 32). It is not known what were the signs indicating viability which the fifth-century midwife would look for in the newborn infant. Many centuries later Soranus listed several specific signs that midwives will consider, and said that from the opposite indications the child unfit to be reared might be recognised (above, p. 18). But all that we can say for fifth-century Athens is that some in some way physically defective babies were rejected. Soranus's testimony has at least one thing in common with that of *Thet.*: the midwife plays a key rôle in identifying that which is not worth rearing. Her experience of newborn infants would perhaps have given her a certain expertise in recognising those neonatal problems that were especially serious, and this was supplemented, no doubt, with a good deal of midwives' lore. The ultimate decision whether to rear would surely have been taken in accordance with the wishes of the head of the household, and factors other than the midwife's opinion would have influenced it, such as, for example, whether the baby was a first-born son, and how much an addition to the family was wanted. A decision not to rear must often have caused anguish to the mother, and this in fact is clear from the *Theaitetos* passages.

There is no evidence that all babies born with physical deficiencies were rejected (except in Spartiate households, see above, ch. 2 part 1).¹³ The author of the Hippocratic treatise *On Joints* is able to describe various

kinds of congenital deformities and dislocations, and methods for treating them. The physicians to whom the writer addresses this work include those who practise in populous cities (72, IV 296. 6 - 7 Li.), so that it is not inappropriate to discuss his remarks in an Athenian context. Some people were congenitally "weasel-armed" (οἱ καλούμενοι δὲ ἐκ γενεῆς γαλιάγκωνες, *Arthr.* 12, IV 114. 1 Li., cf. 53, IV 236. 5 - 238. 1 Li.), having "shrivelled upper arms and swollen elbows" ¹⁴; this sounds a rather distressing deformity, though we are told such people are well able to use the arm (IV 114. 8, 236. 17 - 21 Li.). Another congenital deformity of the arm is where there is complete ankylosis of the elbow, with the bones below the injury shortened (*Arthr.* 21, IV 134. 5 ff. Li.). Congenital dislocations of the hand and of the finger joint are described (*Arthr.* 28 and 29, IV 138. 14 - 15, 140. 2 - 4 Li.). More serious are congenital dislocation of one or both hips (*Arthr.* 53 and 56, IV 238. 2 - 6, 242. 18 - 244. 10 Li.), and of the head of the thigh bone (*Arthr.* 55 and 58, IV 240. 19 ff., 252. 17 ff. Li.). Congenital dislocation of the knee is known (*Arthr.* 82, IV 322. 11 Li.) as is that of the bones connecting the foot with the leg (85, IV 324. 1 - 2 Li.) and of the foot (87, IV 326. 14 - 15 Li.). Congenital club-foot is also described by this author, along with its treatment (it has been argued above [p. 51], though, that some cases of club-foot which the author took to have been caused in the womb may possibly have been caused by bad swaddling). It seems, then, not to have been the case that all infants who were born with such defects or sustained them during birth were rejected and left to die. Some, if not all, were reared and given medical treatment to cure or correct the deformity, and the author of *On Joints* was enthusiastic about giving such treatment: in the case of dislocation of the thigh bone he says

πλείστης δὲ ἐπιμελείης δέονται οἷσιν ἂν νηπιωτάτοισιν
 έοϋσιν αὕτη ἡ συμφορὴ γένηται· ἦν γὰρ ἀμεληθῶσι νήπιοι
 έόντες, ἀχρήϊον παντάπασι καὶ ἀναυξές ὅλον τὸ σκέλος
 γίνεται (55, IV 242. 11 - 14 Li.),

and he gives similar advice in cases of club-foot ἐκ γενεῆς (62, IV 264. 2 - 7 Li.). He states what he believes to be the proper attitude to treating the kinds of cases he describes in this work, including those that are congenital, in the following words: "Someone might object that such matters are outside the scope of medicine. Why, after all, should one take any further thought about cases which have become incurable? This attitude is far from being the right one; for to understand these matters too is part of the same science, and it is impossible to separate them. It is important to devise means of treating the curable cases so that they do not become incurable . . . And it is important to study the incurable cases so as not to inflict unnecessary harm. Clear and masterly prognoses are possible by discerning in what direction and in what manner and at what time each case will have its outcome, whether it turns to the direction of curability or incurability" (58, IV 252. 8 - 17 Li.). This sums up the attitude taken by this physician to what some people evidently thought to be hopeless cases. The author appears to be replying to the kind of contention expressed by a fellow Hippocratic writer in *On the Art of Medicine* (VI 4. 18 - 6. 1, 26. 7 - 9 Li.), that it is no part of the art of medicine to treat incurable diseases. But in the opinion of the author of *Joints*, all cases must be examined in order to determine which ones can be helped and in order to learn what needs to be known to enable one to offer helpful prognosis. One of the things to be forecast was whether and how much the patient would be able to use the afflicted hand or arm or leg. Orthopaedia was an area of medicine in which real help, and not just prognosis but therapy too, could be given, especially, as the author points out, when the patient was treated while young. This Hippocratic treatise provides evidence that some babies who were physically less than perfect were reared, and that some doctors at least were happy to treat them. Of course the kind of defects mentioned in this work were mostly not life-threatening and did not affect a baby's viability.

It was not always the father of the child who decided to expose it. A

number of references to exposure in comedy present it as an unmarried girl's method of getting rid of her baby. In *Clouds* (530 - 532) Aristophanes, addressing the audience through the Chorus, mentions an earlier play of his which he gave to someone else to produce. He describes this metaphorically in terms of a παρθένος who gave birth to a child and exposed it, whereupon another girl picked it up and gave it a home:

κάγώ, παρθένος γὰρ ἔτ' ἦν κούκ ἐξῆν πώ μοι τεκεῖν
ἐξέθηκα, παῖς δ' ἑτέρα τις λαβοῦσ' ἀνείλετο,
ὕμεις δ' ἐξεθρέψατε γενναίως κάπαιδεύσατε.

By παρθένος Aristophanes must mean "unmarried girl", not "virgin". The ease of reference to the exposure and picking up of a baby implies that the audience were familiar with such events in real life. There were many stories about unmarried girls of myth and legend who exposed babies, but Aristophanes does not compare himself to one of these. He envisages himself as an ordinary παρθένος, and the person who picks up the foundling as "another girl". The motive for exposure in such a case must have rested on the unmarried state of a girl who was "not allowed to give birth". Exposure of illegitimate children, either by their unmarried mothers, or members of their mothers' families, was probably common throughout antiquity, and indeed has been in many other ages since.

These then are two categories of children whom it was sometimes deemed necessary to expose in fifth century Athens: illegitimate babies, and those whom inspection showed to be "not worth rearing" presumably because of physical deficiency. Unless this were the case, the use of references to exposure to illustrate a different point in *Theaitetos* and *Clouds* would not make sense.

Evidence from New Comedy

There are many references to exposure in the plays of New Comedy. They are interesting and instructive because they may tell us something about the attitude which the playwright might expect Athenians of his day to take towards exposure, and they may also show what were thought to be understandable motives for exposure. They cannot tell us anything about the frequency of exposure in Athens. The plays are set in contemporary Athens and the subjects which Menander and other playwrights chose for their plots had to be things that audiences would understand and recognise, and the kind of things which just *might* happen to them one day.¹⁵ But mundane incidents do not make successful plots, and so plays had to feature incidents of a romantic and exciting nature. They also had to have happy endings - for all but the wicked characters. So it would be a mistake to read the plays as straightforward evidence for real life, or to expect the frequency of events such as exposure and subsequent reunion of family members to be a direct reflection of their incidence in reality. No one disputes that exposure was practised in Athens of Menander's time, as it was before and after, and it is legitimate to use the plays as a window on some of the attitudes and motives connected with exposure which Athenian audiences might be expected to understand.

We find in New Comedy motives for exposure besides the common one of fear and shame on the part of an unmarried mother. Menander's *Perikeiromene* is about the re-discovery of children exposed by their father because he was too poor to keep them. The goddess Agnoia tells how a woman rescued twins, who, it is clear from what follows, were exposed by their father. The girl, Glykera, she kept and reared as her own daughter, and the boy, Moschion, she gave to a rich woman called Myrrhine. When the children grew up, Moschion fell in love with Glykera. Before her adoptive mother died, Glykera was told by her of her origin as a foundling, and told of

harshly. This is not to say that the audience was to be expected to condone the exposure of any child born into impoverished circumstances. Pataikos is presented being confronted by his daughter's sorrow and regret (τάλαιν' ἔγωγε τῆς τύχης, 810) and by her wondering inquiry into his reason for exposure; a father would require a very strong reason for exposing his children, in order not to appear heartless in such a scene, and such a reason Menander gives Pataikos - the double reason, in fact, of the death of his wife and the loss of all his money. Apparently the reunion of father and daughter is a loving one: οὐκέτι καθέξω. φιλιτάτ[η, χαίρει], (824). Glykera's laments are directed at bad fortune, rather than at her father's action (807, 810, cf. 805). It is an emotional scene, and Pataikos must be supposed to feel its poignancy too. There is no indication in the extant text that he feels anything as strong as remorse, nor does any character speak in condemnatory terms about him. Menander must surely intend his audience to accept as reasonable Pataikos's actions and the explanation given for them. It is not unreasonable to assume that most members of the audience, if placed in Pataikos's circumstances and dealt such a blow by Fate, might have done the same as he.

Terence adapted his *Heautontimoroumenos* from Menander's play of that name. If the scene in which we learn that a girl had been exposed because her father, Chremes, did not want a daughter, is a faithful reflection of a Greek original - as we might expect - then it tells us something about the conflicting feelings and values in relation to exposure that might have operated in a Greek household. In this scene Sostrata reminds her husband Chremes of his order many years ago to do away with their baby daughter:

"meministin me gravidam et mihi te maximo opere edicere,
si puellam parerem, nolle tolli?" (626 - 627).

Sostrata has a confession to make: instead of ensuring the baby did not survive she had given her to an old Corinthian woman to expose (629 - 630).

Chremes takes Sostrata to task about her disobedience of the real intention behind his order:

"... si meum

imperium exsequi voluisses, interemptam oportuit,

non simulare mortem verbis, reapse spem vitae dare" (634 - 636).

He supposes that she did it out of pity, but blames her for abandoning the child to an unknown fate thinking "It doesn't matter what happens, as long as she stays alive". This was a completely irresponsible attitude, according to Chremes - their daughter might have ended up by being a prostitute or sold as a slave (632 - 643). Sostrata makes a further confession - she gave the old woman her ring to put with the exposed child, for she did not want her to die without any share of their possessions. Chremes in his exasperation makes what is surely a sarcastic reply: "Oh, well done - you saved your conscience and the baby" (653). Sostrata has now rediscovered the ring in the possession of Bacchis, a courtesan who is staying in their house. (The ring belongs to Antiphila, who of course turns out to be their long-lost daughter, and this makes possible her marriage to Clinia.) The exchanges between Chremes and Sostrata in this scene are full of interest for the subject of exposure. Chremes, after criticising his wife's disobedience to him and thoughtlessness about the future, attributes his former attitude to his daughter to his less fortunate circumstances then. But now he would like a daughter:

"non licet hominem esse saepe ita ut volt, si res non sinit.

nunc ita tempus fert mi ut cupiam filiam: olim nil minus" (666 -
667).

Chremes has forgiven his wife but says he is too easy going. This must strike the audience as ironic in view of his dealings with his wife and daughter (and Sostrata is still afraid of his harshness at lines 664 - 665). Although there is a little irony in the characterisation of Chremes here, he

is allowed by the playwright to excuse his past decision in just two lines, and he is not made to admit to any guilty feelings. Sostrata on the other hand is full of apologies and meekness. We are led to the conclusion that Chremes's actions and values, as a head of the household who expects his commands to be obeyed and admits to no good in any action that disregards his authority, would have appeared to Menander's original audience (assuming that Terence has taken over this scene directly from Menander) as not at all unusual. If the female members of the Greek audience (if there were any) might have sympathised more with the wife's action, no account is taken of this by the playwright, and it must remain a matter for speculation. There is another point of interest which this scene brings out. Chremes's words make it clear that, for him, mere exposure was not enough, because there was a chance that the child might be rescued (a chance made more likely by the accompanying ring? - cf. line 653). What he wanted was the death of the baby. (It is not specified how Sostrata was expected to bring this about; suffocation, for example, springs to mind as a well-known traditional method of infanticide.) In entrusting the baby girl instead to a woman "exponendam", Sostrata harboured the hope that she would survive. There must have been a fairly high chance of rescue for exposed babies in populated places, and no doubt parents who cherished this hope for a healthy normal child would have put the baby out well wrapped up, or even swaddled.

Chremes's prejudice against a daughter is the only specific example in comedy of the exposure of a child because she is a girl and not a boy. In a fragment of Poseldippos's *Hermaphroditos* (11 Kock) we find the startling generalisation that:

ὕδον τρέφει πᾶς κἄν πένης τις ὦν τύχη.

θυγατέρα δ' ἐκτίθησι κἄν ἢ πλούσιος.

The first part of the statement is contradicted by Pataikos's action in Menander's *Perikeiromene*: he exposed both twins, male and female, and

the second by Alexis fr. 162^{κσζκ}_λ, where a daughter and a son are brought up in a very poor household. The second part is even more of an exaggeration than the first, and belongs to a class of quotations in which characters lament the uselessness and expense of bringing up girls, including the following:

εὐδαιμονία τοῦτ' ἔστιν υἱὸς νοῦν ἔχων·

ἀλλὰ θυγάτηρ κτήμ' ἔστιν ἐργῶδες πατρί (Men. *Anepsioi* fr. 54

Koerte),

χαλεπὸν γε θυγάτηρ κτήμα καὶ δυσδιάθετον (Men. *Halieus* fr. 18

Koerte),

περιάξω τὴν ἑμαυτοῦ θυγατέρα

τὴν πόλιν ὄλην· οἱ βουλόμενοι ταύτην λαβεῖν

λαλείτε, προσκοπεῖσθε πηλίκον κακὸν

λήψεσθ'...

(Men. fr. 581 Koerte),

and

κόρης ἀπαλλαττόμεθα ταμιείου πικροῦ (Anaxandrides fr. 78 Kock =

Diphilos fr. 134 Kassel and Austin).

These in turn belong to a much wider class of derogatory remarks about women. The Poseidippos fragment is much less useful than it would have been if we knew by what character and in what circumstances it was said. It is clearly an exaggeration, but as Sandbach points out, there must have been something to exaggerate ([1973] p. 35). Perhaps when the head of a household wished to limit the size of his family, because of lack of means, to just one or two children, girls would have been less welcome than boys, since the latter might in time contribute to the family income, while the former would require a dowry. But it has been argued that economic pressure might work in favour of girls, since they were probably less expensive to bring up than boys (they were fed and educated less) and their dowry would not deplete the family's landed property, whereas boys would each be entitled to inherit a share of the family farm (where there was one) which, if it was small, would not bear too much subdivision.¹⁷

Considerations such as these would have varied according to the nature of the economy of individual households. Perhaps, if girls were in general less welcome than boys (though there is no demographic evidence that they were exposed in greater numbers, pp. 206 - 207 below), it was due not so much to conscious economic forecasting on the part of their parents, but rather to a fairly general prejudice which favoured sons over daughters.¹⁸

But we may be sure that the birth of a baby was often greeted with worries about the financial strain that it represented. In Plautus's *Truculentus* Phronesium bewails the expensiveness of children and catalogues the needs of a household with a baby: they need food for the baby and his mother, they need a maid to wash him, a nurse with milk to feed him - and large quantities of wine for the nurse to drink day and night! - they need wood, coal, swaddling clothes, pillows, cradles, clothes, oil, corn (902 - 908). But the list is comically exaggerated: in a household where a mother fed her baby herself, the needs of a newborn baby would not be very great. It would only be as the child grew older that it became more expensive to keep him or her, and some families would probably have to think of the future when deciding whether or not to rear a child. A character in Menander's *Plokion* says:

ὦ τρισκακοδαίμων, ὅστις ὦν πένης γαμεῖ
καὶ παιδοποιεῖθ' (fr. 335 Koerte).

In Terence's *Hecyra*, adapted from Apollodoros's play of the same name, an exposure is planned but not carried out. Philumena is about to have a baby, conceived as a result of a rape by the man she later married. Neither is aware that her husband Pamphilus is the father. Philumena's mother assures him that the child will be exposed, and she will tell her husband that it was stillborn. She uses these reassuring words:

"... dicam abortum esse: scio nemini aliter suspectum fore
quin, quod veri similest, ex te recte eum natum putent.
continuo exponetur: hic tibi nil quicquam incommodi..." (397 -

Thus faces will be saved all round. But Philumena's father finds out, and, thinking that the baby was conceived properly in wedlock, upbraids his wife for planning to do away with the child, and, as he thinks, break up the marriage. The baby is saved from the fate which was planned for it by Pamphilus's mistress, Bacchis. She had been given a ring he had taken from the girl he raped: the ring is recognised as being Philumena's and Pamphilus is revealed as the child's father. This exposure was planned because Philumena's mother regards it as a disaster to have to rear a child whose father they do not know:

"hoc mi unum ex plurimis miseris relictuom fuerit malum
 si puerum ut tollam cogit, quous nos qui sit nescimus pater" (570
 - 571).

Her attitude accords with family law and custom of classical and Hellenistic Athens, where a child's paternity was the key to his or her acceptance into the family.

Davus in Terence's *Andria*, adapted from Menander, takes the same view as that taken by the mother-in-law of *Hecyra* of bringing up a baby whose existence will cause embarrassment. Pamphilus and Glycerium have decided to acknowledge the child she is expecting: "quidquid peperisset decreverunt tollere", which intention Davus describes as "amentium" (218 - 219). Later Pamphilus confirms his intention:

"... pollicitus sum suscepturum. *Dav.* o facinus audax! *Pam.* hanc
 fidem
 sibi me obsecravit, qui se sciret non desertum iri, ut darem"
 (401 - 402).

The slave assumes that an illegitimate child, whose existence might get in the way of a desirable marriage, should not be acknowledged, literally "taken up", by the father. He does not have to state what its fate would then have been. But the only exposure in this play is a pretended one, when

Davus makes Glycerium's maid pretend to expose Glycerium's newborn baby on his master's doorstep (721 - 796). In Plautus's *Amphitryo* (the original of which may have been Philemon's *Nux Makra*) explicit instructions are given by the departing father-to-be to rear the baby, from which we may infer that the possibility existed of not doing so. Jupiter says to Alcmena, who is about to bear the child he has fathered:

"menses iam tibi esse actos vides.

mihi necesse est ire hinc; verum quod erit natum tollito" (500-501).

Mention must also be made here of several plays in which a child is exposed by its mother because, like Aristophanes's play (above, p. 158), it was conceived while she was unmarried, usually as a result of forceful seduction. Menander's *Epitrepontes* is about what happened when a shepherd found an abandoned baby and picked it up along with the trinkets he found with it. This child had been borne by Pamphile five months after her marriage to Charisios, while the latter was away, and she had exposed it in the countryside. But Charisios, who must have heard about this on his return, and not realising that *he* was the baby's father (as a result of his drunken rape of an unknown girl at a festival), left his wife. All ends happily, of course, when the man chosen to arbitrate between claimants to the baby's trinkets turns out to be the baby's grandfather, and true identities are established by recognition of the ornaments. The extant text of the play does not allow us to draw any firm conclusion about Pamphile's feelings about her exposure of her baby; there is a possible clue in fr. 8 where a speaker, presumably Pamphile, says

ἐξετύφην μὲν οὖν

κλαίουσ' ὄλωσ.

and she may be referring to her feelings after abandoning her baby (Gomme and Sandbach [1973] p. 357), but the words might instead refer to her feelings after Charisios left her. Plautus's *Cistellaria* is an adaptation of Menander's *Synaristosai*. The play is set in Sikyon, and we are told that a

man from Lemnos raped a girl at a festival, and she bore a baby girl and gave her to a slave of her father to expose; he did so, at or near the race-course, and stayed to watch a procuress pick her up and take her back to her courtesan friend. Years later, the Lemnian, now a widower, came back to Sikyon and married the woman he once raped, and sent the slave to find the abandoned child. The girl is found and sent back to her real family, with the "crepundia" which were left with her as a baby, "parentes te ut cognoscant facilius" (636). Her mother immediately recognises the tokens, and says to the slave:

"crepundia

haec sunt, quibuscum tu extulisti nostram filliolam ad necem"

(663 - 664).

The daughter is reunited with her parents, and her marriage to the man she loves is now possible. The mother is shown to be overjoyed to reclaim her daughter, but there is no trace of any feelings of regret about the exposure in *Cistellaria*. Whether there was a scene in the Greek original similar to that of Glycerium's confrontation with Pataikos in *Perikeiromene* is impossible to know.

There is no exposure in Menander's *Samia*, in which the baby of Moschion and Plangon, as yet unmarried, is an embarrassment to the young couple and a potential cause of paternal wrath. But there has been recent scholarly discussion on the subject of exactly what fate was planned by Moschion and the others for this child. The argument turns on the rôle of Chrysis as the baby's saviour: did she intend to keep the baby permanently and pass it off for the future as the offspring of herself and Demeas, or was her care only to be a temporary expedient until Moschion and Plangon had obtained permission to marry and could reveal their baby's existence? It is impossible to be sure whether Chrysis was actually represented in the play as having milk: see Chapter 1 note 111. But on the subject of the alternative fate of the baby it is possible to be a little less tentative.

Sandbach envisages no alternative fate for the baby but exposure, and he argues that it is the intention of Chrysis to keep the baby for good. Only when events take an unforeseen turn (Nikeratos spies Plangon giving the baby the breast) does Moschion decide to reveal to Demeas the baby's true parentage. Christina Dedoussi, on the other hand, thinks that the baby could never have been intended for exposure, because Moschion had already acknowledged his paternity and promised to marry the mother.¹⁹ Chrysis's care for the baby is only a temporary solution, and it is intended all along that Moschion and Plangon will take their son back when they are married. The extant text of the play gives no explicit answer to the problem. But what is, I think, clear, is what might have happened to the baby if Chrysis had not been willing to take him. She herself says, in explanation of her willingness to risk Demeas's anger:

πρότερον δ' ἔγωγε πάντ' ἄν ὑπομείναι δοκῶ

ἢ τοῦτο τίτθην ἐν συνοικίᾳ τινὶ

(lines 84 - 85).

(There follows a lacuna in the MS.) The assumption is that Moschion would have given his son to a wet-nurse living in a tenement somewhere in Athens. This shows that he had at least considered keeping him, and this would have necessitated only finding a temporary nurse for him. This makes more likely the possibility that Chrysis was only to keep the baby until he and Plangon were in a position to take him back. I think it is Chrysis's allusion to the hired wet-nurse that casts doubt on exposure as the alternative fate for the baby. It is not the case, as Dedoussi argues (pp. 40 - 41), that "it was . . . impossible for an ancient audience to think that this child's future could be exposure." Actually Moschion could have had the baby exposed, and neither the fact that he had informally acknowledged his paternity nor the fact that both parents were Athenian citizens who hoped to be united in marriage could have saved the child from this fate. This hypothetical point has no direct bearing on the play, but it is worth making as part of a discussion of exposure in Athens. Moschion's position

vis-à-vis his child is not what it would have been for a *married* father who had expressed the intention of rearing the child born to him. Such a father would have performed the naming ceremony, thus formally acknowledging the child as his, a few days after birth (see Chapter 3 Part 2).

New Comedy is not a straightforward record of social history, but the incidents and attitudes we find in plays must bear some relation to real life in Athens. Exposure of unwanted babies is, like the rape of unmarried girls at festivals, one of those things that sometimes happened in Athens, and that lent itself to exploitation in the plots of romantic comedies. It has been argued by Gilbert Murray that these elements in the plots of New Comedy have little to do with real life in Athens, and that they are rather elements of myths associated with a kind of fertility ritual appropriate to the worship of Dionysos.²⁰ He examines and compares the plots of plays involving exposure and recognition by Euripides and Menander, and argues that rapes, illegitimate birth, exposure, and recognition in New Comedy are elements "modelled on the supernatural myth" that lay behind this kind of "Ritual Play". Speaking of New Comedy he says: "If anyone is still disposed to think that these somewhat disreputable plots are due merely to a realistic presentation of the manners of the 'young puppies' of an immoral age, and not to some fixed fertility pattern, conscious or unconscious, let me shatter his complacency with one blow. Plutarch says expressly that in all Menander's hundred dramas there is no case of παιδὸς ἄρρενος ἔρωσ (*Quaest. Conv.* 8. 3. 8). . . . A realistic description of an immoral age would have abounded in ἄρρην ἔρωσ. A fertility ritual has no place for it" (p. 51). I think it is possible to answer this argument by admitting that the prevalence of such elements in the plots of New Comedy probably does owe much to tragedy, and behind that, myth (cf. pp. 172 - 173 below), while maintaining that the *treatment* of these themes in the plays can still tell us something about practices and attitudes in real life in Athens. The

setting of the plays is contemporary Athens. The characters are meant to represent ordinary Greeks. Much of the dialogue and action is of a fairly mundane nature. The plays do not present events of a supernatural character, but restrict themselves to the realm of the possible, ranging from the improbable to the predictable. The motives and plots may originate in traditions of various kinds, and many aspects of contemporary life undoubtedly are ignored, but, within the given themes and plots and in the aspects of life that are included, the treatment has to make sense in the context of contemporary Athenian life.

The significance of exposure in comedy does not lie in its prevalence, and it is true that it proves nothing about the frequency of its occurrence in real life. But comedy must not be dismissed as evidence for attitudes to exposure. Menander often used it in his plots, and he does not appear to put forward any view on exposure that challenges the common understanding of it.²¹ These plays shed light on aspects of the Hellenistic Athenian understanding of exposure. In *Perikeiromene* Pataikos is not presented as a man who wantonly exposed his children, but is instead given an apparently compelling reason in the form of sudden overwhelming misfortune. In *Heautontimoroumenos*, on the other hand, Chremes is not condemned as heartless for exposing a daughter simply because he did not want one. In the play on which Terence based his *Andria* the idea of exposing an unwanted illegitimate child was presented as the sensible course of action. In *Epitrepontes* and *Synaristosai* babies are exposed by unmarried girls. All these things point to a general assumption in Menander and his audience that these various circumstances could constitute adequate reasons for exposing an unwanted child.

An excursus on related aspects of the treatment of infants in
Comedy

A: Recognition of exposed children

The plays of New Comedy do not tell us how frequent exposure of unwanted babies was in contemporary Athens, but we may be sure that exposure, whatever its commonness, occurred far more often than reunion of parents with children lost to them in infancy or abandoned by them as babies. Recognition and reunion of this kind, though, is a prominent feature of Middle and New Comedy, and a little must be said about it before we pass on.

The Scholiast who wrote:

ἔχομεν παρὰ τοῖς κωμικοῖς ὅτι τινὰ τῶν ἐκτεθέντων παίδων ἀπό
τινῶν σημείων ἐν αὐτοῖς ὄντων ἀνεγνωρίζοντο (Kock III p. 465,
fr. 313)

probably had in mind Menander's *Epitrepontes* and *Perikeiromene* among others. In *Epitrepontes* the disputed matter which is taken to arbitration is the possession of the trinkets found with the abandoned baby. Daos the shepherd picked up baby and trinkets, and gave the baby to Syros the charcoal burner to bring up. Syros claimed the trinkets too, and after making some compelling arguments, including the argument that the baby might be from a noble family and the trinkets necessary for its later recognition, wins the backing of the arbitrator. This was the stuff of stage dramas, as a character in the play himself reminds us: Syros refers to a play about Neleus and Pelias, the sons of Tyro, in which children discovered their parentage by means of tokens picked up with them²² and he also cites a couple of incidents of recognition by means of tokens in other, unnamed, plays (lines 325 - 343). He attempts to prove his point by invoking instances from the plots of romantic plays (τραγωδούς, line 325), rather than by arguments from "real life". Recognition of lost children by means

of tokens was also a familiar ingredient of plots on the comic stage; it occurs in Menander's *Sikyonios*, and Plautus's *Cistellaria*, *Rudens* and *Vidularia*. The titles of many of the lost plays also seem to betray some such content.²³ It is quite probable that in real life many exposed children were accompanied by such trinkets: some mothers may have entertained a wild hope that they might enable the child, if it survived, to trace its parentage in later life,²⁴ and that they might indeed enhance its chances of rescue in the first place. And if it died, the baby would at least "not be without a share in [its parents'] possessions" (Ter. *Heaut.* 652); it would have been laid out, so to speak, for death with some funeral ornaments, cf. Plaut. *Cist.* 663 - 664, see p. 168 above. The Greek terms for such tokens were σπάργανα and (as instruments of recognition) γνωρίσματα, and the Latin "crepundia".²⁵ Leaving tokens with an abandoned child may have been common, but instances of their leading to a later recognition cannot have been. The origin of the recognition motif in comedy may be traced to tragedy and myth.²⁶ Plays were then written with recognition plots and everyday, non-mythological characters.²⁷ The recognition of lost children provides the comedies with the elements of excitement and romance, and the happy ending, that are essential to the plot.

B: Suppositious children

In his *Titthe* Menander makes a nurse say, probably to the audience: "Has any of you ever begged or lent a baby, dearest gentlemen?" (fr. 396 Koerte). Borrowing and lending of babies are fairly common transactions on the comic stage. A fragment of Alexis's *Stratiotes* (209 Kock) preserves the following dialogue:

A: "Take this."

B: "What is it?"

A: "The baby I got from you people, I've brought back."

B: "Why? Don't you want to bring it up?"

A: "No, for it's not ours."

B: "It's not ours either."

A: "But you lot gave me it."

B: "Not gave."

A: "What then?"

B: "We gave it *away*."

A: "What it's not right for me to accept?"

In real life mothers of unwanted children probably often preferred to pass their baby on to someone who would find another home for it, rather than to abandon it to the much more uncertain fate of exposure. And slaves instructed to carry out the task of exposure must sometimes have managed to pass the baby on to someone else. Many healthy babies who were exposed must have survived long enough to be picked up in the days following exposure. So it seems to have been possible in fifth- and fourth-century Athens for a woman who needed a baby to procure one. This would generally be for the purpose of providing her husband with a child, preferably a son, when her own baby had died or been stillborn. Aristophanes even implies that it was done by women who failed to conceive at all (see below). The purpose of marriage was to provide an heir for the husband, and wives who failed to do so might have feared divorce. It would surely have been possible to practise the deception only on a husband temporarily absent on campaign or business, though Aristophanes in *Thesmophoriazusai* pictures it happening under the husband's very nose. Even allowing for comic exaggeration, several passages in this play indicate that Athenian women were suspected by men of deceiving their husbands in this way. Included in a curse against people who cheat women is the person who "informs against her who brings in a suppositious baby" (340). Euripides is accused of making husbands so suspicious of their

wives that women can no longer do any of the things they used to: "Why, a woman who can't have children and wants to pass one off as her own, can't even get away with this, for their husbands now sit right next to them" (407 - 409). Mnesilochos, in female guise, mentions that he knows of a woman who pretended to be in labour ten days, while she sent out to buy a baby; the husband is running around trying to buy something to help with the birth, while the old midwife brings in a baby in a pot, its mouth stuffed with honeycomb to keep it quiet; the wife then cries out that she's giving birth, the baby is produced, and the smiling midwife congratulates the husband on a child so like himself in every particular. "Don't we do these wicked things? Yes, by Artemis, we do!" (502 - 518). This again is one of the crimes Mnesilochos accuses women of in a later scene: "Nor [have I yet told] how you took for your own the baby boy your slave gave birth to, and swapped it for your baby daughter" (564 - 565). This practice of secretly substituting another's child for one's own was known as ὑποβάλλεσθαι and the child thus brought in to a household was ὑποβολιμαῖος, "suppositious". Implying that someone was a suppositious son was an insult which, in Old Comedy, Telekleides threw at Charikles (ὡς ἔφου τῆ μητρὶ παίδων πρῶτος ἐκ βαλλαντίου, fr. 41 Kock), and Eupolis at the sons of Hippokrates (fr. 112 Kassel and Austin). It was not confined to the stage: Demosthenes uses it against Meidias, the secrets of whose origins were "just like a tragedy" (21. 149).²⁸ These references to bringing in suppositious babies show it as a wrong done to a husband (in deceiving him into thinking that another's flesh and blood is his own) and a matter of shame to the child in later life (who suffers the indignity of being told that he has been bought and the general social stigma of having irregular origins). Repudiation by the supposed father and loss of inheritance rights might be the fate of a suppositious child whose secret was found out. But in New Comedy these considerations are of less importance than the usefulness of this practice as the basis of plots in which real identities were to be established in the

course of the action. This was probably the outcome in those comedies entitled *Hypobolimaios*, written by Alexis, Eudoxos, Philemon, Kratinos the Younger (whose play is also referred to as *Pseudhypobolimaios*), and Menander (whose *Hypobolimaios* is alternatively entitled *Agroikos*, and was adapted by Caecilius as *Hypobolimaios* or *Rastraria*). There was also a *Hypoballomenai* written by Epinikos. In Plautus's *Truculentus*, whose original is unknown, Phronesium obtains a baby to pass off as her own, in order to gain money from her lover, by means of sending out maidservants here, there and everywhere to seek out a baby; eventually one is found by her hairdresser, whose work took her to many households.

The law: Athens

There was in Athens no law prohibiting a father from exposing his newborn children. The passages about exposure in Plato's *Theaitetos* (see above, pp. 153 - 154) imply that the rejection and exposure of a child by its father was not prohibited by law. And fathers in New Comedy who rediscover the children they or their wives had exposed as infants do not hesitate to make this past action known and evidently do not fear prosecution or punishment. Nor was there any Athenian law that explicitly empowered a parent to expose his newborn child, and there was no need for such a piece of legislation. Athenian law took no interest in the fate of children whose parents decided not to rear them. As A. R. W. Harrison puts it, "... the act of exposure was legally negative in character", and he describes the Athenian father's right to expose his child as "the absence of a duty to introduce it into the family".²⁹

Did Athenian law forbid the killing by means more violent than exposure of a newborn infant by its father? I think that Athenian law was probably powerless to prevent this. Those responsible for bringing a

prosecution in homicide cases were the victim's relatives,³⁰ but a newborn infant who had not yet been acknowledged by its father and accepted into the family *had* no relatives, for legal purposes.³¹ So when we hear Chremes in Terence's *Heautontimoroumenos* telling his wife that she ought to have killed their baby daughter and not simply exposed her ("interemptam oportuit", line 634, cf. p. 163 above), perhaps we are entitled to suppose that the character in Menander's original actually said this - it need not be a slice of Roman *patria potestas* imported into the play by its Latin author. Of course once a child had been acknowledged by the father and the family had begun to rear it, it could not be killed with impunity: there was no law that explicitly empowered a father to kill his child and the statement of Sextus Empiricus that a law of Solon's permitted parents to kill their own children is rightly rejected by almost all authorities³²; and a child that had been accepted into a family did have champions in Athenian law.

Athenian law gave the person who picked up an exposed baby and reared it no rights over the child. A. R. W. Harrison ([1968] I p. 71) points out, "The finder of an exposed child might at his discretion treat it as slave or free, but he acquired no rights over it and he could not even adopt it, since adoption of a minor was a reciprocal transaction between the adopter and the adopted child's father or his representative". If the child was later found by his or her father, parental rights remained in force, and the plots of New Comedy reflect this.

In view of the fact that declaration of paternity was at Athens a formal act, consisting in the naming of the child before witnesses (see Chapter 3 Part 2), it is interesting that in New Comedy fathers who have never formally acknowledged their children but instead exposed them, on rediscovering them years later simply and without ceremony resume parenthood. It seems that in these cases the father, by the simple and informal act of receiving and welcoming the returned child, must be

presumed to make thereby a declaration of his paternity and the child's legitimacy (for these children are not νόθοι). This point is hypothetical, since no instance is known of an exposed child returning to his or her original family in real life. It is presumably not a contingency which would have been covered by an actual piece of legislation.

The law: Gortyn

The law code of Gortyn in Crete, inscribed in the fifth century BC, laid down the law on the exposure and rearing of a child born after divorce. I quote the relevant part of the law in the translation of R. F. Willetts.³³

"If a wife who is separated (by divorce) should bear a child, (they) are to bring it to the husband at his house in the presence of three witnesses; and if he should not receive it, the child shall be in the mother's power either to rear or expose; and the relatives and witnesses shall have preference in the oath as to whether they brought it. And if a female serf should bear a child while separated, (they) are to bring it to the master of the man who married her in the presence of two witnesses. And if he do not receive it, the child shall be in the power of the master of the female serf; but if she should marry the same man again before the end of the year, the child shall be in the power of the master of the male serf, and the one who brought it and the witnesses shall have preference in the oath. If a woman separated (by divorce) should expose her child before presenting it as is written if she is convicted, she shall pay, for a free child, fifty staters, for a slave, twenty-five. And if the man should have no house to which she shall bring it or she do not see him, there is to be no penalty if she should expose the child. If a female serf who is unmarried should conceive and bear, the child shall be in the power of the master of her

father; but in case the father should not be living, it shall be in the power of the masters of her brothers." (Col. III line 44 - Col. IV line 23).

The laws set out above determine which individual was to have jurisdiction over a child born after the legal separation of its parents. A divorced free woman was required to have her newborn child brought to the house of its father, who had the right to rear it. If he declined to do so, it returned to its mother, who then had the right to choose whether to rear or expose it. If she exposed it without first having it presented to her former husband, she was liable to a fine of fifty staters. But if the ex-husband had no house to which the child could be brought, or could not be found, the woman was entitled to expose her child without incurring any penalty. In the case of a divorced serf-woman, the child was offered first to her ex-husband's master; if he did not receive it, it passed into the power of her own master. If the divorced serf went ahead with the exposure of her child without complying with this law, she was to be fined twenty-five staters. The child of an unmarried serf-woman was by law the property of her father's master (or if her father was dead, her brothers' masters). Children born to free parents still legally married were in the power of their father, as the next lines of the code show: "The father shall be in control of the children and the division of the property and the mother of her own property" (Col. IV lines 23 - 27, Willetts's translation). This meant that the undivorced father of a child had the right to decide whether to rear or expose it. The law code does not have to state this explicitly, because it can be assumed that the right of a father to expose his newborn child is part of his legal power over his children (τὸν πατέρα τῶν τέκνων . . . καρτερόν ἔμεν, col. IV, 22 - 23). Only the exception to this rule, namely when the parents are divorced and the child is born after this, needs to be stated, and this is what the law code does here.

The law: Thebes

A Theban law prohibiting exposure is recorded by Aelian (*VH* 2. 7), who approves of it as being particularly humane. It is forbidden, he says, on penalty of death, for a Theban man to expose an infant or cast it out into the wilds; but if the father of the child is in extremes of poverty, whether the child is male or female, he may bring it to the authorities straight after its birth in its swaddling bands. The authorities take the baby and give it to the man who pays the lowest price (or "who pays a price, however low" - τῷ τιμὴν ἐλαχίστην δόντι). An agreement and compact is made with him that he rear the baby and when it has grown keep it as his slave, receiving its service in return for the expenses of rearing it. Aelian records this in the present tense, but gives no indication of the date of the law. G. Glotz in his article "Expositio" in Daremberg and Saglio's *Dictionnaire des Antiquités* (2. 1, pp. 937 - 938) saw in it a suggestion both of the desire evident in Romans under the Flavians to define the legal condition of rescued children and of the Roman institution of *alimenta* and he conjectured that the Theban law may belong to the 1st or 2nd century AD. C. Patterson has suggested that it may be Hellenistic ([1985] p. 122). She observes that under this law the parent does not sell the child: "[The child] is apparently worth very little until a potential owner invests the cost of its rearing." Or it could be that the Theban authorities were concerned not to set up a *market* in unwanted babies: perhaps this is the significance of the τιμὴ ἐλαχίστη.

The law: Ephesos

Undated also is a law of Ephesos mentioned by Proclus in his Commentary on Hesiod's *Works and Days* 494. *A propos* of Hesiod's remark

about the idle man who will suffer in winter and "press his swollen foot in his thin hand", Proclus discusses one of the effects of sedentary life in swelling the feet, and of starvation on the body in swelling the feet and making the upper parts thin. He mentions a law of Ephesos which forbids a father to expose his children "until his feet are swollen through starvation" (καὶ εἷς νόμος ἐν Ἐφέσῳ μὴ ἐξεῖναι πατρὶ παιδῶν ἀποθέσθαι ἕως ἂν διὰ λιμὸν παχυνθῆ τοὺς πόδας). This Ephesian law, then, forbade exposure except by families who could show evidence of the direst poverty.

These laws of Thebes and Ephesos show evidence of a desire to restrict the practice of exposure, in the one case by banning it altogether and making an alternative arrangement for infants whose impoverished families simply could not rear them; in the other by limiting the use of exposure to those affected by extreme poverty. The laws may perhaps belong to an age when exposure was, for ethical reasons, found less acceptable by public opinion - when it was considered that only the poorest people had any justification in ridding themselves of supernumerary children. It is at attitudes to exposure on the part of philosophers, moralists and public opinion (insofar as this last is ascertainable) that we must look next.

Exposure in a political and moral context

In Book 5 of the *Republic* (457 c - 461 e) Plato deals with the subject of marriage and procreation among the class of guardians. He argues that it will be found both useful and practicable for all the guardian women to be wives in common of all the guardian men, and for all their children to be brought up together in common. He begins his argument about the methods for ensuring excellence in successive generations of guardians

by having Sokrates observe that in breeding dogs, birds and horses it is desirable to breed from the best of them, and while they are in their prime. Sokrates readily obtains Glaukon's assent to the proposition that failure to breed in this way would result in deterioration and that this applies to the human race also. In order to apply these principles to the guardians, the rulers will have to practice a certain amount of deception, just as a doctor might do when administering medicines. How is this to be done? :

Δεῖ μὲν . . . τοὺς ἀρίστους ταῖς ἀρίσταις συγγίγνεσθαι ὡς πλειστάκις, τοὺς δὲ φαυλοτάτους ταῖς φαυλοτάταις τούναντίον, καὶ τῶν μὲν τὰ ἔκγονα τρέφειν, τῶν δὲ μή, εἰ μέλλει τὸ ποιμνιον ὅτι ἀκρότατον εἶναι, καὶ ταῦτα πάντα γιγνόμενα λανθάνειν πλὴν αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἄρχοντας, εἰ αὐτὸ ἢ ἀγέλη τῶν φυλάκων ὅτι μάλιστα ἀστασίαστος ἔσται (459 D 7- E 3).

Sokrates goes on to propose that festivals be instituted at which the marriages may take place, and that the rulers control the number of unions, in order to keep the population stable, taking account of such things as wars and epidemics, so that the city may become neither too large nor too small. Devices must be invented to ensure acceptance by all of the greater opportunities for breeding given to the better guardians. As soon as they are born, children will be taken into the charge of the officials:

τὰ μὲν δὴ τῶν ἀγαθῶν . . . λαβοῦσαι εἰς τὸν σηκὸν οἴσουσιν παρὰ τινὰς τροφούς χωρὶς οἰκούσας ἐν τινὶ μέρει τῆς πόλεως . τὰ δὲ τῶν χειρόνων, καὶ ἑάν τι τῶν ἐτέρων ἀνάπηρον γίγνηται, ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τε καὶ ἀδήλῳ κατακρύψουσιν ὡς πρέπει (460 C 1 - 5).

And as for those children born of guardian-class parents above or below the permitted ages for procreation (twenty to forty years of age in the case of women, twenty-five to fifty-five for men), they will have been born without the benefit of the sacrifices and prayers that are offered for

regular marriages, but are instead "born out of darkness with dangerous intemperance". The same law will apply to offspring of parents of the right ages but not officially united: the child will be said to be "a bastard and illegitimate and unholy" (νόθον καὶ ἀνέγγυον καὶ ἀνίερον). Men and women past the age of procreation may associate freely (provided no incestuous union takes place), after a solemn warning that if a child is conceived it must not see the light of day, and that if by chance a child is born it must be dealt with on the understanding that there is no rearing for such (ὡς οὐκ οὔσης τροφῆς τῷ τοιούτῳ). Glaukon accepts all this as reasonable (μετρίως λέγεται) (460 C 6 - 461 C 8).

These measures are to apply to the guardian class only. It is only the purity of the guardians with which Plato is concerned. The security of the state is to be entrusted to the excellence of its ruling caste. The strict rules for breeding do not apply to the whole population.

With his words at 459 D 7 - E 1 Plato makes it clear that any offspring born to the worst of the guardians must not be reared. To all Greeks of his day μὴ τρέφειν carried the implication of exposure. That was what was normally done with newborn infants who were not reared. In the context of newborn infants τρέφειν and τροφή indicate rearing in the sense of acknowledging, keeping and maintaining the baby, as opposed to rejecting it. Examples of this usage may be found in Plut. *Lyk.* 16. 1, Plat. *Tht.* 160 E 5 - 161 A 4, Men. *Ph.* 810 - 812, Posidippos fr. 11 Kock, Gortyn Code III. 49, Arist. *Pol.* 1335 B 19 ff., Polyb. 36. 17. 5 - 10 (pp. 139, 153, 160, 163, 178 above, pp. 189, 193 below). No modified sense of τρέφειν, such as educating or bringing up in a special way, is possible in the context. A little further on Plato says that the offspring of the inferior parents, along with any defective child that is born to the good parents, must be hidden away in secret (ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τε καὶ ἀδήλῳ κατακρύψουσιν). This expression is less explicit than μὴ τρέφειν. It is periphrastic, and has been

thought to contain two possible types of ambiguity: does it mean depriving the child of life or not; and does it have spatial reference – “in a secret place” – or just a generalised meaning “in secret”? Some scholars have argued that the words ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τε καὶ ἀδήλῳ refer obliquely to an actual place in the territory of Plato's city-state where these infants were to be exposed, like the Spartan Ἀποθέται of Plutarch *Λγκ.* 16. 2. This view is argued by H. D. Rankin.³⁴ Rankin seems to imply that what Plutarch writes at *Λγκ.* 16. 1 – 2 about the Spartan Ἀποθέται is taken from this passage in the *Republic*. (I do not think this likely: Plutarch has several details about the Spartan procedure which he could not have got from Plato.) Rankin argues secondly that ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ κτλ. should not be taken as a generalised adverbial phrase, but that ἐν should here retain its spatial significance; ἀπορρήτος means “forbidden” or “secret”; the phrase has connotations of a matter which is too solemn and serious – possibly in its ritual or religious implications – to be divulged or mentioned openly. Although he says of ἄδηλος that it is “[not] primarily ‘spatial’ in its emphasis”, he tentatively concludes that “ἄδηλος added to ἀπορρήτος tends to reinforce the spatial or topological aspects of the phrase ἐν ἀπορρ. καὶ ἀδήλ.”. But ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ is usually used by classical authors to mean “in secret” without any reference to place (see examples in LSJ II. 1), and it is most natural to understand it in this way here. The phrase ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τε καὶ ἀδήλῳ is basically tautological, but the use of ἀπορρήτῳ gives the phrase a solemn flavour and fits in with the “intensity and fervour” of Plato's language at 461 A 3 – B 7 that has been noted by Rankin ([1965], pp. 413 – 414). It is natural to understand the phrase ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ κτλ., standing as it does in the context of μὴ [τρέφειν] and οὐκ οὔσης τροφῆς, as “a euphemism for infanticide”.³⁵ But other commentators deny that ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ κτλ. carries any implication of infanticide, and by them the

phrase may also be taken either in a generalised sense - "in secrecy and in mystery" - or have spatial reference, not to a place of exposure, but to another place in the city where these infants will be brought up, their origin as guardians' children unknown.³⁶ In order to reconcile their interpretation of ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ κτλ. with the passage at 459 D 7 - E 1, these scholars advance the interpretation of μὴ [τρέφειν] as denial, not of any rearing whatever, but of rearing and education as guardians. The same significance is applied by them to the denial of τροφή to infants born to guardians past the official age for procreation (461 C 6): τροφή here must refer not to physical rearing but to educational upbringing.³⁷ In other words, such infants would be allowed to live, but would be deprived of the upbringing given to the guardian class, so that they would have to be relegated to a lower social group. As I have argued above (p. 183), no such sense for τρέφειν and τροφή is possible in the context.

Those who deny that Plato intended exposure or infanticide as the fate of the infants mentioned in these passages in the *Republic* support their claim by reference to two other passages, one in *Republic*, the other in *Timaios*. At *Timaios* 19 A 1 - 5 there is a summary of *Republic*'s discussion of this subject:

καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε τὰ μὲν τῶν ἀγαθῶν θρεπτέον ἔφαμεν εἶναι, τὰ δὲ τῶν κακῶν εἰς τὴν ἄλλην λάθρα διαδοτέον πόλιν· ἐπαυξανομένων δὲ σκοποῦντας αἰεὶ τοὺς ἀξίους πάλιν ἀνάγειν δεῖν, τοὺς δὲ παρὰ σφίσιν ἀναξίους εἰς τὴν τῶν ἐπανιόντων χώραν μεταλλάττειν;

According to this, the offspring of good guardians should be reared, and those of bad guardians secretly dispersed in another part of the city; as the guardians' children grow up they should be assessed for their own qualities and promoted or demoted accordingly to the appropriate class. And in Book 3 of the *Republic* (415 A 7 - C 6) Sokrates says that the rulers must keep a careful watch on the mixture of metals - gold, silver, bronze, iron - in the

souls of the offspring of guardians: children with bronze or iron elements in their nature, even if they are the offspring of guardians, must be put among the farmers and artisans, and children with gold and silver qualities who are born to parents of the lower class must be put in the guardian or auxiliary class.

It is certainly true that in *Timaios* demotion and not destruction of sub-standard children born to guardians is intended. The first sentence of *Timaios* 19 A 1 - 5 does conflict with an interpretation of *Republic* 459 D 7 - E 3 and 460 C 1 - 5 as advocating the denial of rearing - that is the denial of life - to such children. The second sentence (ἐπαυξανομένων . . . μεταλλάττειν;) merely summarises *Republic* 415 A 7 - C 6, a passage which is not concerned with weeding out sub-standard children from the guardian class at birth, but with allocation of social class, on the basis of the qualities which appear in them as they grow, to all surviving children later in their childhood. Neither the passage at *Republic* 415 A 7 - C 6 nor the second sentence of *Timaios* 19 A 1 - 5 conflict with the interpretation of "not rearing" and "hiding away in secret" as denial of life. The conflict between this interpretation of the *Republic* passages and the summary given of them in the first sentence of *Timaios* 19 A 1 - 5 shows that Plato had changed his mind or was simply being inconsistent at this point.³⁸

Another argument that has been advanced by those who deny that Plato intended the exposure of sub-standard guardian-class infants in *Republic* is that denial of life to such children would be unnecessary.³⁹ The discussion at *Rep.* 459 - 461 is about the means whereby the guardian class is to be kept pure, and it seems unnecessarily drastic to expose children who are expected to turn out not to be good enough for the guardian class but who will after all be no worse than many others in the lower strata of the city. But what is important is not how such a measure strikes us today but how it would have seemed to Plato and his contemporaries. The closest approximation of any real Greek state to the ideals and

methods laid down in *Republic* was of course found in ancient Sparta. The entrusting to state-officials of the decision whether to rear infants born to the ruling class was (or had been) actually practised in Sparta, and Plato must have known of it. Denial of life to sub-standard infants did not strike the Spartans as an unnecessary measure that had to be mitigated by finding another way of excluding them from Spartiate society. And when Plato says that certain infants in the *Republic* should not be reared (μη [τρέφειν]), that "there is to be no τροφή for such", he could expect to be perfectly well understood by his Athenian contemporaries for whom the choice between rearing and not rearing their offspring was a real choice. When he wrote *Timaios* Plato seems to have thought of another way of ridding the guardian class of unwanted newborns. But he had not had this idea in mind when writing the *Republic*.

But it must be admitted that Plato in the *Republic* stops short of naming ἀπόθεις as the means by which rearing was to be denied. H. D. Rankin has noted his reticence on the matter of exposure and abortion (μηδ' εἰς φῶς ἐκφέρειν κύημα, 461 c 5, unmistakably means abortion but is a periphrastic expression rather than the straightforward ἀμβλίσκειν). He attributes it to a carefully maintained εὐφημία due to emotional and moral scruples (Rankin [1965] pp. 415 - 416). The same sensitivity which made him exclude stories about the quarrels of the gods from his ideal state also prevented him from being explicit about exposure. Rankin's conjectures about the mind and feelings of the philosopher are plausible. But Plato's periphrastic expressions in some of these passages in the *Republic* can, I think, just as easily be explained as being a matter of style and taste. He uses euphemism at 460 c 3 -5, but at 459 d 7 - e 1 and 461 c 6 - 7 his references to "not rearing" are straightforward. Adam's comments still ring true (even after several attempts in the intervening decades to show that exposure was not very common in Athens): "... Plato's abolition of

marriage would strike the Greeks as far more revolutionary and offensive than his toleration of infanticide", and "... it seemed to him as ... it would have seemed to many, if not most, of his contemporaries, by no means one of the most peculiar and distinctive features of his commonwealth" (Adam [1902] vol. I pp. 358 - 359). Plato does not explicitly name exposure as the means whereby the state is to be rid of newborn infants of inferior or more elderly guardians as well as of deformed infants born to the other guardians, partly because he does not need to do so in order to be understood by his contemporaries, and partly perhaps because to do so might have seemed tasteless and stylistically harsh and have detracted from the elevated language of this passage.

In Plato's *Laws* the quality of all the citizens and not just of the topmost class is of great concern, and excellence in the citizens is taken care of by the rigorous παιδεία and the flawless laws, not by a policy of breeding from the best. In fact a balance of qualities is to be aimed at by mating people with dissimilar qualities.⁴⁰ Plato does not say whether all children born are to be reared. The great problem of the state in the *Laws* is to keep the size of the population stable, so that there shall be no shortage or accumulation of property. In Book 5 the plan for keeping the number of land-holdings at 5040 is described (740 B - 741 A). The lot-holder must leave the land to one heir only. Of his other children the females are to be given in marriage, and the males are to be given to childless citizens to adopt. But if there is a general surplus of children or indeed a shortage, the decision about what to do will be referred to the highest authority, who will find out a device to keep the number of households at no more than 5040:

μηχαναὶ δ' εἰσὶν πολλαί· καὶ γὰρ ἐπισχέσεις γενέσεως οἷς ἂν
εὖρους ἢ γένεσις, καὶ τούναντίον ἐπιμέλειαὶ καὶ σπουδαὶ
πλήθους γεννημάτων εἰσὶν (740 D 5 - 8).

There are many devices: there are ways of checking birth when the

birth-rate is high, and in the case of the opposite problem, rewards may be given for procreation. If all these measures fail to limit the population, as a last resort citizens may be sent away to form a colony.

The ἐπισχέσεις γενέσεως are presumably chiefly contraceptive and abortive practices. In the *Laws* some measure of birth-limitation would be achieved by the law requiring men to wait until they are thirty before they marry. Sending out colonies is reserved as the means of dealing with surplus population in the last resort. Exposure is not mentioned, and while it may be that it is to be numbered among the many, unspecified, traditional μηχαναί, it is also true that exposure was not a traditional method in any part of Greece for limiting the size of the population. It was used by families for disposing of unwanted newborn infants and in Sparta by the elders of the tribes for killing weakly and deformed babies. There is no mention in the *Laws* of the problem of sub-standard babies and its solution; it would be in such a context that exposure might have a place, as in *Republic*.

Aristotle in his discussion of the ideal constitution in his *Politics* does make some recommendations about what should be done with unwanted children. In Book 7 (1335 A - B) he describes the measures that should be taken by the legislator for ensuring that the bodies of the young be as good as possible. Marriage and procreation must be made the subjects of legislation: women should marry at about eighteen years of age, men at about thirty-seven, and they should have their first child soon afterwards. He touches on the various arrangements that must be made to ensure health and fitness in those who are to be parents, and in particular in women during pregnancy. Then he deals with the exposure and rearing of offspring:

περὶ δὲ ἀποθέσεως καὶ τροφῆς τῶν γιγνομένων ἔστω νόμος
μηδὲν πεπηρωμένον τρέφειν · διὰ δὲ πλῆθος τέκνων ἔαν ἡ τάξις
τῶν ἐθῶν κωλύη μηδὲν ἀποτίθεσθαι τῶν γιγνομένων, ὠρίσθαι
δὴ δεῖ τῆς τεκνοποιίας τὸ πλῆθος, ἔαν δὲ τισι γίγνηται παρὰ

ταῦτα συνδουασθέντων, πρὶν αἰσθησιν ἐγγενέσθαι καὶ ζῶην, ἐμποιεῖσθαι δεῖ τὴν ἄμβλωσιν· τὸ γὰρ ὄσιον καὶ τὸ μὴ διωρισμένον τῇ αἰσθήσει καὶ τῷ ζῆν ἔσται. (1335 B 19 - 25).

"Concerning exposure and rearing of newborn infants, let there be a law against rearing any deformed infant. But on account of a large number of children, if the arrangement of customs prevents the exposure [*sc.* for this reason] of infants born, the rate of procreation must be limited, and if a child is conceived by people who mate in contravention of this, abortion must be employed before sensation and life have begun; for the distinction between what is lawful and what is not shall be decided by the possession of sensation and life."

The first sentence of this is clear enough both in text and interpretation: in effect Aristotle advocates a law like the Spartan one, which saw to it that no deformed child lived. Exposure of physically defective newborns was widespread outside Sparta too, though it was not enjoined by law and some parents chose to rear infants born with dislocations and deformities, as we have seen above (pp. 155 - 157). But Aristotle here anticipates no objections to compulsory exposure of the deformed.

The second sentence has difficulties, both textual and interpretational. The first *ἐάν* is omitted by some of the MSS., which has the effect of making *ἡ τάξις τῶν ἐθνῶν κωλύει* parenthetical (and one editor has proposed *ἡ γὰρ τάξις τῶν ἐθνῶν κωλύει*); if this reading is accepted, Aristotle may be understood to say that custom in general forbids exposure as a means of limiting the population. If *ἐάν* is read, he acknowledges that custom may forbid it, or that custom forbids it in some places. In fact there is no evidence that any Greek society practised exposure for the purpose of population limitation. Individual families practised it as a

crude means of family limitation, but that is a different matter from organised exposure for the common interest or the interest of the state. Plato in *Republic* Book 5 proposed a careful control of the number of sexual unions in order to keep the population stable (460 A 2 - 6); in *Laws* Book 5 he is vague, perhaps deliberately so, about the "devices" for limiting the population (see pp. 182 and 189 above). But, with the exception of Sparta, real Greek states were not organised in such a way as to enforce exposure for the interests of the state. If by διὰ δὲ πλῆθος τέκνων κτλ. Aristotle means a surplus of population in the state, as opposed to too many children in individual families, then it might be argued that, as Aristotle could have had no means of knowing whether custom would in fact rebel against exposure of infants for the purpose of population control, the reading εἰάν is slightly more likely (though I would not wish to press this argument).

A second difficulty is posed by the punctuation after τρέφειν. Some editors place a comma after τρέφειν, which makes ἔστω νόμος govern ἀποτίθεσθαι (and a comma is needed after κωλύη too). A stop must be put after ἀποτίθεσθαι τῶν γιγνομένων. One would translate: "Concerning exposure and rearing of newborn infants, let there be a law against rearing any deformed infant, and, on account of a large number of children, if the arrangement of customs prevents exposure [*sc.* for this reason], let there be a law against exposure [*sc.* for this purpose] of infants born." With this punctuation, Aristotle advocates a law against exposure of supernumerary children, even where the practice is already forbidden by custom. It also entails understanding ἀποτίθεσθαι with κωλύη as well as with ἔστω νόμος.⁴¹ It is better to place a stop after τρέφειν, in common with Immisch in his Teubner edition of 1929, and with Viljoen (1959, pp. 66 - 68): Aristotle recommends that procreation be limited by law, as he does not wish to risk offending against customs that may prevail by advocating exposure as a means of population limitation; when this legal measure fails

to prevent conception of unwanted children, abortion must be used in the early stages of pregnancy.

Aristotle suspected that there would be opposition to exposure of supernumerary children in the interests of population control. He seems to have had some sympathy with this feeling himself, and was ready to make a concession to it in his ideal constitution. It is interesting that he anticipated no such opposition to the use of enforced abortion for the same purpose (even though abortion would put the health and even life of the mother at risk, in addition to killing the child). His stipulation of abortion *πρὶν αἰσθησιν ἐγγενέσθαι καὶ ζῶην* shows that his scruples were chiefly against the causing of suffering to a living, sentient creature, and this explains his readiness to acquiesce in the reluctance to expose.⁴²

A strong distaste for exposure is expressed by Isokrates in his *Panathenaikos* (122), if it is to exposure of infants, and not expulsion of older persons, that he refers in his words *ἐκβολὰς ὧν ἐγέννησαν*. Isokrates lists this among the wicked deeds found in the legendary past of states other than Athens: murders of fathers, brothers and guests, matricide, incest, fathers eating the flesh of their own children, drownings, blindings, and so many other evil deeds that playwrights never run short of plots for their plays. Exposure is probably meant by or at least included in the things meant by *ἐκβολαί* here, and Isokrates claims that there are no instances of this in the myths and legends that made up the history of Athens. So it was evidently possible in Athens of the later fourth century to view the kind of exposure found in myths and legends as cruel and immoral.

As we have seen above, the laws of Thebes and Ephesos are the only known examples of legislation restricting exposure in the Greek world. Polybios in the second century BC may have been the first Greek to propose in writing that laws ought to be made throughout Greece making it compulsory for parents to rear their offspring.

This proposal occurs in a remarkable passage in which Polybios expresses what is evidently a deeply held belief that the population of Greece had declined noticeably and that the two causes of this were the failure of many to marry and the refusal on the part of those who did marry to rear more than one or two children born to them.

"In our times", says Polybios, "the whole of Greece has been overtaken by childlessness and a general lack of population, as a result of which the cities have become deserted and it has come about that there is a dearth, even though we have been subject neither to continuous wars nor to epidemic conditions. Now if someone advised us on this matter to send and ask the gods what we must say or do to increase our numbers and to populate our cities better, would he not seem stupid, since the cause is manifest and the remedy is in our own hands? For people have turned away to pretentiousness and love of money and even laziness, and are unwilling to marry, or if they do marry, to rear the children born to them, but at most one or two, in order to leave their children rich and to bring them up in luxury - and so the evil quickly grew without being noticed. For in families where there were only one or two children and war carried off one and disease took the other, it is obvious that of necessity houses were left empty and, just as happens to swarms of bees, in the same way gradually the cities became resourceless and impotent. There was no need to ask the gods about this and find out how we were to be released from such a predicament. For anyone you chance to meet will tell you that people themselves have the most power to do this, by changing their priorities, and if not, by making laws that the children born shall be reared" (36. 17. 5 - 10).

There has been much discussion of this passage and its implications.⁴³ There are two issues raised by what Polybios says. One is the question of the extent of *ἀπαιδία* and *ὀλιγανθρωπία*. The other is the attitudes and social *mores* underlying people's decisions not to have and

not to rear children. Most commentators accept that there had been a great decline in population throughout Greece by Polybios's day (though this is denied by Engels [1984] p. 392, who claims that Polybios is exaggerating). Many of them point out that emigration, especially by mercenaries and their families, must have had something to do with it. Probably Polybios is generalising when he says that cities have become deserted and that there exists dearth in the land. The real extent of this is difficult to quantify. What is of greater interest here is the insight of Polybios into the social and behavioural aspect of reluctance to have or to rear children. Many people are unwilling to marry; many who do marry are unwilling to rear the children born to them. The general background to this behaviour is an attitude of pretentiousness, love of money, and laziness, according to Polybios. The specific reasons for the desire of parents to rear at most one or two children is the desire to leave their children rich and to bring them up in luxury. When we make allowance for the "emotionally weighted" language here (Walbank [1979] *ad loc.*), we are left with the notions that certain men preferred to pursue what would nowadays be called an affluent and enjoyable "lifestyle" than to give themselves the trouble of raising a family, and that those who did marry and have children preferred to rear just one or two in order to remain prosperous and to leave their children in the same condition. There is nothing unworthy of belief in that. The conclusion may be drawn from Polybios's statement that the unwillingness for financial reasons on the part of people of means to raise a large family was one of the reasons for the exposure of infants in Greece in his day. This holds good even if we question Polybios's analysis of this attitude as the main or only cause of the *ὀλιγανθρωπία*, and even if we remain in doubt as to the extent of the *ὀλιγανθρωπία* itself. We should be cautious, however, in taking Polybios's statement as evidence that families who reared only one or two children exposed *all* the others born to them (and indeed he does not say this): then as ever in ancient Greece a high

proportion of newborn infants died through natural causes.

Polybios deplores the refusal to rear children for what he sees as selfish financial reasons. He says nothing about the other reasons which emerge from Athenian evidence and which would certainly still have weighed in his day, namely exposure of infants "not worth rearing" because they were deformed or were thought non-viable, and exposure of infants by people in extreme poverty. He says nothing about exposure of illegitimate children. These motives for exposure had surely not been supplanted by the motive of which Polybios writes. The phenomenon which has aroused his indignation was that of families, who could have afforded to rear more children, dying out for lack of heirs, rather than exposure itself.

Polybios's strictures take us up to the end of our period of inquiry, but it is worth looking briefly at what was said on the subject by Plutarch, in the age of Greece's domination by Rome, and at the subsequent history of ancient attitudes to exposure. In his essay "On Affection for Offspring" (incomplete in the extant MSS.) Plutarch rejects the arguments that Nature has given animals a superior (in the sense of being disinterested) love of offspring and that humans love their children only for the benefits they can bring. "...They [i.e. fathers] do not cease rearing children, especially those who least need children", says Plutarch (*Mor.* 497 A). By these he means the rich, who least need to get themselves heirs by procreation, as there are always all too many seeking to become their heirs, and the birth of a child to a rich man can lose him most of his so-called "friends". This may appear to contradict what Polybios said; but in fact the Plutarch passage simply shows the other side of the coin. At 497 C - E Plutarch raises the subject of those who do not seem to love their offspring. If human feelings for offspring are not inferior to those of animals, how is this to be explained? Man's natural condition can be obscured and distorted by evil; the fact that cruelty to offspring is regarded as unnatural shows that the norm in Nature is love for one's young. "For the poor", says Plutarch, "do not rear children

in the fear that if they are brought up less well than they ought to be they will become slave-like and boorish and lacking in all the finer things; regarding as they do penury as the ultimate evil they cannot bear to communicate it to their children like some dangerous and terrible disease..." (here the MSS. run out). Plutarch's testimony here shows that a motive for exposure that had already existed when Menander presented his *Perikeiromene* in Athens (see pp. 159 - 161 above), and probably long before, still continued in his day. Poverty had always been a factor in much of the exposure that went on throughout Greece, throughout the ages. Polybios does not even mention it - it could be taken for granted, like exposure of deformed and illegitimate babies.

Polybios had singled out the rich and selfish for his especial criticism, and a Roman Stoic philosopher of the first century AD, commenting in the Greek moralist tradition, added his voice to this. Gaius Musonius Rufus referred to Greek as much as to Roman practice in pouring bitter criticism on rich parents who refuse to rear all their children so as to leave more wealth to their firstborn.⁴⁴ This he saw as not only sinful, but inexpedient too, since many brothers are more useful than much money. Musonius is unusual among moralists of the time in that he recommended *πολυπαιδία* and not simply *παιδοτροφία*. He advocated the rearing of *all* children for three reasons: that not rearing them all harms the state (by causing a decline in population); that it is a crime against the race and a sin against the gods; and that rearing all one's children gains respect and support.

The evidence shows that exposure continued to be practised, whatever the moralists said.⁴⁵ But in the passages of Plato, Aristotle, Isokrates, Polybios and Plutarch examined above, it is possible to detect stirrings of consciousness about the morality of exposure from the fourth century onwards. In *Republic* Plato justifies its use in his ideal state, while taking refuge at one point, as we have seen, in a periphrastic

expression, probably for reasons of style and taste. In *Timaios*, some years later, he has apparently changed his mind about the use of exposure, though in his failure to make the change clear he may almost be said to have fudged the issue. In *Laws* he is deliberately vague about methods of population control. Aristotle was aware that exposure of physically perfect babies for the sake of population control might be morally unacceptable to some communities; is he perhaps conscious too that some people - a growing number perhaps? - deplored the exposure of healthy babies by families who claimed to have too many mouths to feed? ⁴⁶ L. R. F. Germain ([1975] p. 235) may be correct in attributing to classical Athens, the "great seminary of thought", an incipient opinion more sensitive to issues such as exposure than places elsewhere in Greece in the classical age. Judging by Thucydides's version of Perikles's Funeral Speech (2. 35 - 46), Athenians in the late fifth century liked to think of themselves as the educators of Greece. This kind of sentiment is attested for the following century by Isokrates, as we have seen. Polybios reserves his harshest criticism for the wealthy who limit their families by refusing to rear some of their offspring. Plutarch shows some understanding for the motives of the very poor who expose their children.

The exposure debate

It is impossible to present a study of exposure in Athens without a thorough review of the 20th-century debate on the subject, for much of what has been written concerns the question of the prevalence of the practice in classical Athens (though some of the articles referred to here also discuss exposure in the wider Greek world).⁴⁷ G. Glotz in an article ("Expositio") in Daremberg and Saglio's *Dictionnaire des Antiquités* (2. 1, pp.

930 - 939) was the first to catalogue exhaustively all the literary references to exposure, and he concluded that it was an event in daily life in nearly all Greek towns and cities, motivated by feelings of shame and fear about illegitimate births and by poverty. Glotz noted that much of the evidence came from Athens, but stated his opinion that it applied to all of Greece, and that the practice may have been more restricted in Athens than elsewhere (p. 930). Glotz used all the available evidence, including that from New Comedy, in his study, and it was perhaps his omission to justify his use on an equal footing of all types of evidence that provoked subsequent attacks on the relevance of some of that evidence to historical fact.

In 1920 La Rue Van Hook published an article in which he claimed that the ancient evidence for the exposure of children in the Athens of Aristophanes and Menander, especially in citizen families, does not show it to be anything more than a quite rare occurrence.⁴⁸ He did not deny that infants would have been abandoned everywhere and at all times, including antiquity "by unmarried mothers, by prostitutes, by victims of poverty, vice, dissipation, brutality, war and slavery", but very much doubts that "the vote of the Athenian mother would be frequently cast for the repudiation of her own child, or that her influence, in the matter of the fate of legitimate offspring, would be without weight". He is correct to reject tragedy, comedy, myth and later authors as evidence for the prevalence of exposure in Classical and Hellenistic Athens, but he fails to take account of the passages in Plato's *Theaitetos* quoted at the beginning of Part Two of this chapter. These suggest that the influence of an Athenian mother might indeed be without weight in this matter. His assessment of the evidence also fails to accord Athenian comedy its value in helping to fill in the picture of attitudes to exposure.

In 1922 H. Bolkestein agreed with Van Hook's verdict, contending that there is no evidence for the "unrestricted right" of a Greek father "of

killing or exposing his legitimate children born in wedlock", and that exposure by parents in classical Athens was not a normal occurrence.⁴⁹ Bolkestein devotes most of the article to a refutation of the notion, found in Scholiasts and lexicographers,⁵⁰ that the literal meaning of χυτρίζειν and ἐγχυτρίζειν is to expose babies in pots, and that ἐγχυτρίστριαι were the women employed to despatch unwanted infants in this way. Bolkestein prefers to derive the words from χύτρος, which he defines as a hole in the ground, and concludes that ἐγχυτρίζειν means "to throw into a pit, viz a sacrificial pit, and hence to sacrifice to the dead", and that ἐγχυτρίστριαι were the women who performed these sacrifices. Such sacrifices were burned up and destroyed, hence the figurative meaning of the verb in Aristophanes of "destroy". Bolkestein is right to deny that χυτρίζειν and ἐγχυτρίστριαι have anything to do with exposing infants in pots. But a better explanation of the meaning of χυτρίζειν (used by Aristophanes, *Wasps* 289, meaning "destroy", and also, according to the Scholiast on this passage, by Sophokles, Aischylos and Pherekrates in the sense of "kill") is that it is a metaphor from cookery: to "pot" so-and-so.⁵¹ Bolkestein's general verdict on exposure in classical Athens is unsatisfactory because he too ignores the evidence in Plato's *Theaitetos*.

But an Athenian custom of exposing babies in pots is not entirely exploded. We still have to account for a joke in Aristophanes's *Frogs*: one of the misfortunes of Oedipus was

ὅτε δὴ πρῶτον μὲν αὐτὸν γενόμενον

χειμῶνος ὄντος ἐξέθεσαν ἐν ὀστράκῳ (1189 - 1190).

A clay pot must at least sometimes have been the piece of household equipment that came to hand when a receptacle was needed for a baby that was to be abandoned out of doors. It may be from this reference that the Scholiasts and lexicographers derive their information that infants were exposed ἐν χυτραίς, which they then go on erroneously to apply to χυτρίζειν

and ἐγχυτρίστρια. A pot would have been all the more appropriate as a receptacle for exposing babies in, in that deceased infants were commonly put in amphoras to be buried. Thus an exposed child was in a sense being prepared for burial by being put into a pot.

In 1951 Rodney S. Young published an article describing funeral pyres found inside the ancient city of Athens.⁵² These included seventeen small pyres *in situ*, together with ten other groups of remains of small pyres that had been disturbed and scattered; one of them dated to the mid 5th century, the others from mid 4th to mid 3rd centuries BC. They contained remains of burnt bones, a few of which could be identified as of non-human origin. Most of the pyres had between one and two dozen little pots and vases (partially burnt, therefore thrown on at the time of cremation), some of them ordinary domestic items, some miniatures of domestic pots, and others, including the "dummy" alabastra, usually associated with graves. These pyres, says the author, "we have somewhat reluctantly concluded to be the remains of infant cremations". The reluctance stems from the facts that neither burial nor cremation was normally practised within the city walls after the archaic period, and that the bodies of infants were normally buried (usually in pots), not cremated. Nevertheless the number of these pyres found in the small area excavated, mainly in an area to the south-west of the Agora and west of the Areopagos, but also in places just outside the boundaries of the Agora itself, "would seem to indicate that the practice was fairly common in the second half of the fourth and the first half of the third centuries" (*loc. cit.* p. 110).

Some years later Jean Rudhardt attempted to identify who the infants of these puzzling cremations might have been.⁵³ Young had considered that the remains, even though fragments of calcified bone were difficult to identify (and some were of animals), were definitely of human cremations, because of the presence of vases, and that they must be of

young children because of the smallness of the graves. Rudhardt looked for an explanation of the circumstance that these infants are separated from their families in houses which must have been roofless and abandoned at the time of cremation (for surely cremation could never have taken place in dwellings with roofs and inhabitants), in an area which was apparently depopulated during the fourth century. He considers that Plutarch's information that infants are not given the customary funeral rites ("Consolation to his Wife" 11, *Mor.* 612 A) is further evidence that these burials are exceptional in character. Rudhardt concluded that the infants could have belonged to either or both of two categories: infants who died in the first few days after birth, before their formal introduction to the family (which was not, therefore, required to bury them among the family members); babies who had been exposed in the ruins of deserted houses, who had to be cremated, after their death, where they lay. In the latter case the burning of the bodies would have been carried out for hygienic as well as religious reasons, and the cremation does not necessarily conflict with the custom of not performing funeral rites for infants, since it may have been of a purificatory rather than funerary nature. He considers the presence of animal remains in some of the pyres confirmation that the burning had to do with purification rather than funerals.

Unfortunately not enough is known about classical and Hellenistic Athenian customs in disposing of the bodies of those many infants who died before being formally given a name and accepted into the family to enable Rudhardt's first hypothesis to be taken any further. And there is too much uncertainty about the nature of these pyres to make his second hypothesis more than a possibility. No contemporary literary source says that funerals were never given to infants in classical and Hellenistic Athens, and Plutarch's remarks are too general to be pressed into service as evidence for this particular period and place.⁵⁴ In Greek burial customs, especially with regard to infants and children, there are too many

exceptions to the "rules" to make it possible to say with certainty what the significance of the circumstances of these pyres might be. The idea that they are the remains of purificatory cremations of exposed infants is a possibility, though it raises the question as to who would have bothered to offer one or two dozen little pots and saucers on the pyre of an infant exposed by its parent. The demarch, who, as Rudhardt points out, was the official with responsibility for burying unclaimed bodies and purifying the deme, was required to do so at the smallest possible cost, and to exact double the amount from those responsible for the dead person (the dead person's family, or, in the case of a slave, owner) or, failing that, pay it himself (Dem. 43. 58). Material remains of exposed children elude our grasp.⁵⁵

One of the questions that has preoccupied those scholars interested in the subject of exposure has been: how common was it? As we have seen, Van Hook and Bolkestein were keen to disprove its commonness in the citizen families of classical Athens, and so was A. W. Gomme, who was the first to bring in to the debate arguments from the demographical study of classical Athens.⁵⁶ Gomme believed the citizen population of Athens to have increased between 500 and 430 and between 400 and 320. This is the nub of Gomme's demographic argument against a high rate of exposure in classical Athens: "Assume a death-rate of 20 in classical Athens . . . , and there must have been a correspondingly high birth-rate - effective birth-rate, that is, excluding the still-born and infants killed at birth; higher than in modern Greece [the table he prints shows 30.1 per 1000 per year for this] ; and we reach the conclusion that there is nothing in what we know of the population of Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries to suggest that infanticide by exposure was at all common, was in any sense a regular practice" (p. 79). Gomme used inappropriate comparisons (tables from late 19th and early 20th century Europe) to give postulated birth and death rates for classical Athens,⁵⁷ but even if they were right, his

argument does not seem to work. He reasons that the *effective* birth rate - that is, the live-birth rate excluding those exposed at birth - must have been as much as 10 per thousand per year higher than the death rate, and concludes that the numbers of those killed at birth can only have been low. But what is to preclude the actual live-birth rate from having been even higher - say, 35 per 1000 - so that as many as 5 per 1000 infants could have been killed at birth without diminishing that increase in population which is Gomme's starting point?

In an article published in 1980 Donald Engels made what is basically the same mistake.⁵⁸ Engels puts forward the propositions that "the rate of natural increase for any ancient population was small or nonexistent" and that "the highest average population growth rate in antiquity was probably little more than 1 per 1000 per year for any long period and for any large population" (pp. 115, 116). (It is conceded that higher rates of increase than this are possible in limited locations and for limited periods.) Arguing from the premise that the ancient Greek and Roman populations were largely stable (with a growth rate near 0, and the birth rate and death rate nearly in equilibrium), Engels concludes that there could not have been a high rate of female infanticide - for this would have increased the death rate over the birth rate so much as to produce a decline in population which did not in fact take place. It is indeed likely that the growth rate of the ancient Greek population, including that of classical Athens, was very low⁵⁹; but if the birth rate was that much higher than the death rate to begin with (say 45 and 35 per 1000 per year respectively),⁶⁰ then an infanticide rate of 10 per 1000 per year would have the effect of stabilising population growth. There is nothing in Engels's argument to preclude this. The fallacy has been pointed out in three recent articles.⁶¹

In 1984 Engels responded with another article, in which he stood by demography as being of use in the debate on infanticide in the Greek and Roman world.⁶² He questions his critics' use of evidence from certain

primitive societies which show that quite high rates of female infanticide are in fact possible and need not result in a fatal decrease in population. Engels points out the distinction between cultures which have stable populations as a result of the balance of high birth rate and high death rate ("pre-transitional"), and those whose birth rate remains high while the death rate is in process of being cut, resulting in an era of population growth ("transitional"). He admits that high rates of infanticide are possible in transitional societies with large surpluses of births over deaths, but maintains that such rates are not possible in pre-transitional societies (except among small groups for short periods). We must look for demographical analogies to ancient Greece and Rome only among other pre-transitional societies, says Engels, and he cites Medieval and Renaissance Europe and early Ming China as two examples; in neither was infanticide practised extensively. Engels challenges those who posit a significant and sustained surplus of births over deaths in ancient Greece or Rome to explain what "unique factors" were at work to produce this unheard-of situation. Perhaps the cautions that Engels gives on pp. 389 - 390 - against using modern underdeveloped societies as analogies for ancient societies that were so very different in their cultures - have some bearing on this problem. Do we in fact have enough reliable evidence about the complex cultural factors affecting population in any of these pre-transitional societies to make analogies about the birth rate or about specific practices such as infanticide? For example, is it known how the access of females of child-bearing age to useful gynaecological medicine in early Ming China or Medieval and Renaissance Europe compares with that in classical Athens? Until such factors have been examined and compared, doubts must remain about the usefulness for comment upon particular social practices of such generalised (and often hypothetical) evidence as is given by historical demography.

The second part of Engels's article questions the value of literary

sources (which Engels designates "anecdotes") as evidence about the structure of ancient populations, and in particular about the practice of infanticide or exposure. His conclusion is that "all the anecdotes, generalizations and specific cases in ancient sources concerning infant 'exposure' tell us no more than that the practice existed; it is impossible to infer the rate of exposure". This last comment is correct; but literary sources do tell us rather more than that exposure existed, as I have attempted to show above. Engels is under the misapprehension that "no source from the classical era mentions the practice of infant exposure in classical Athens" (p. 393). The three passages about "not rearing" infants upon which he comments belong to Hellenistic and Roman times. He is right to remind us that exposure did not necessarily result in death, but in discussing the financial value of infants for the slave market as an indication that most unwanted children would be "sold, not killed", he neglects to take into account the different laws and different social mores in force in different parts of Greece, let alone "the Greco-Roman era". In concluding that a 10 per cent rate of infanticide for healthy children in the Greco-Roman era cannot be demonstrated, Engels has modified his previous assertion of its impossibility. His approach to the subject of exposure and infanticide is in my view unsatisfactory, in that it places too much value on historical demography and too little on the literary evidence, with the consequence that almost nothing worth saying can, apparently, be said.

Between the appearances of Engels's two articles came one by Mark Golden (1981) in which the model life tables were again invoked to provide information about the practice of exposure, this time specifically in Athens. Golden begins by assuming that the passages in Plato's *Theaitetos* which mention the inspection and possible rejection of newborn infants (see p. 153 above) show that "healthy children ostensibly born within marriage could be exposed".⁶³ His interest in this article is in the question of whether more female infants tended to be exposed than male, and in

historical demography as a method of determining the extent of exposure. Golden concentrates on marriage patterns as a cultural factor that would affect the birth rate, and, in classical Athens, affect the practice of exposure. He attempts to show by the use of demographic calculations that there would regularly have been an oversupply of women of marriageable age in Athens and asks us to consider the possibility that the easiest way for men to avoid this problem would have been for fathers to expose their baby daughters at birth, concluding that "... 10 percent or more does not seem unlikely". Cynthia Patterson ([1985] pp. 108 - 110) has shown that Golden's conclusions do not follow from the facts at his disposal, so that it is unnecessary to repeat her arguments here.

It will be as well to mention here two attempts to prove a high rate of exposure from demographical evidence of another kind (though they do not have to do with classical Athens). W. W. Tarn argued in *Hellenistic Civilisation* from inscriptions, especially those from third-century Miletos recording the names of Greeks granted Milesian citizenship, along with those of their families, that the small proportion of daughters to sons showed that "more than one daughter was very seldom reared; and infanticide on a considerable scale, particularly of girls, is not in doubt" in Hellenistic Greece.⁶⁴ The motivation for this he attributes to poverty, to "the fear of too many mouths to feed". Recently Sarah Pomeroy has returned to the Milesian inscriptions recording the names of Greek mercenaries and their families enrolled as citizens in the third and second centuries.⁶⁵ Boys greatly outnumber girls, and men outnumber women, as Tarn had noticed. Pomeroy suggests various possible explanations for this, and concludes that none reasonably accounts for it without the exposure or neglect of female offspring, and she goes on to outline various circumstances which would have discouraged the rearing of daughters in Hellenistic Greece, especially among mercenaries, soldiers and immigrants. The inscriptions discussed by Tarn and Pomeroy do not provide evidence to

support their conclusions. Greeks were quite likely to overlook daughters when enumerating or naming the members of their families. Prosopographical evidence cannot be relied upon to mention all the daughters of a household, and the inscriptions "are not systematic records of mortality" as has been pointed out by Cynthia Patterson ([1985] p. 111). She also points out that the mercenaries were not typical of the Greek population as a whole, and if they did tend, because of the pressures of their mode of life, to expose many of their daughters such inscriptions do not provide evidence of it. Still less do they prove that the mass of the Greek population did so.

Historical demography cannot provide any answers to questions about the frequency of exposure in Greece or in classical Athens in particular. This is because we do not have the necessary precise information about such things as birth rate, infant death rate, percentage of population aged 0 - 5 years, and so on. Assumptions and model life tables are not enough to go on. And evidence culled from other sources, such as graves and inscriptions, is likely to be misleading.⁶⁶ Another reason is that exposure did not always result in the death of the baby. Children of citizen families who were exposed were lost to the citizen population, it is true, but many of them survived to enter the free non-citizen or slave populations. Even if it is about infanticide rather than exposure that we seek answers in demography, the attempt is futile, for the first reason given above. Furthermore, many and possibly most, of the infants selected not to be reared were those who suffered from a physical deficiency that would have prevented their surviving childhood in any case.

This last point is one of the many useful observations made by Cynthia Patterson in her recent article (1985), in which she addresses herself to the question of the causes of exposure in ancient Greece. This refreshing treatment of the subject reaffirms the importance of the literary sources and argues that the quest for quantification of the

practice of exposure, with its underlying, and misguided, assumption that only if it occurred at a rate of at least 10 per cent can it be deemed to have had social significance, has led to a neglect of questions which *can* be answered from the evidence at our disposal, namely those about the reasons for the practice. These are examined under the headings "The Physically Defective Child", "The Illegitimate Child", "Too Many Mouths" and "The Unwanted Female", and the following arguments are made: that physically defective children were routinely exposed, though judgements about likely viability and the necessary degree of deficiency must have been complex and involved female birth-attendants as well as the male head of the household; that illegitimate babies were at high risk of exposure, though many such healthy babies probably found their way into the hands of those who for one reason or another wanted them; that it may have been families with a certain amount of property rather than the very poor who were concerned to limit the number of children by exposure, and, conversely, some households could make good use of the work obtainable from many sons and daughters; that pressure of increasing population may well not have caused individual families to sacrifice their children to the interests of the state; and that there is no evidence that, in general, the addition of daughters to a family was considered a problem or more of a future economic drain than numerous sons, so that it is impossible to generalise about the frequency of exposure of female infants. In concentrating on the "why" rather than the "how much", Cynthia Patterson steers the debate back to discussion of the real evidence and makes interesting and useful points.

Part Three

Exposure in myth and legend

Reports of the exposure of Greek newborn infants are most frequently to be found in myths and legends - legends not only about demi-gods and heroes, but also about certain historical characters said to have been exposed. Exposure stories are told about the infancy of at least thirty Greek deities and heroes, and this is a motif which Greek mythology has in common with tales told about kings, heroes and gods of the Near Eastern area, including Persia, some of which were also told by Greek authors for Greek readers. A few common features leap out at the student of exposure stories: many of the rejected children are the offspring of gods, often with a mortal mother, or of kings, and they themselves grow up to be heroes or rulers; they survive under the most unlikely circumstances, and although they are exposed in lonely and wild places where wild beasts might be expected to make an end of them, many are instead suckled by the wild creatures and then rescued by hunters or herdsman; when grown to adulthood they return to their rightful places and many go on to have distinguished careers, whether glorious or notorious. So their exposure and rescue are just the first amazing and miraculous adventures in their eventful lives, experiences which mark them out from the beginning as destined for future greatness.

There are also a few rulers who were in fact historical characters, and about whose lives a certain number of facts are known, about whom stories of exposure and rescue were told. These stories suggest something about their divinely favoured status: like the infant gods and demi-gods of mythology they were said to have been rescued from dangerous circumstances by what could only be a divine providence which had ordained that they attain glory and power despite human attempts to prevent it.

Let us look first at the mythical persons about whom stories of

exposure and rescue were told. The basic elements in each tale are set out, along with the references to the literary source, in Table 2 (following p. 228). In many cases more than one version of the story are extant, and I have listed alternative versions only where they differ markedly.

Some aspects of exposure-myths

Table 2 shows that the most common reason for exposure in myth is shame or fear at the birth of a child (sired, usually, by a god or hero) to an unmarried woman. Exposure in some of these cases is at the hands of the woman's father, in whose eyes she is disgraced, no matter how distinguished a personage her lover is claimed to be. In some of these tales the woman herself is punished, sometimes by being cast out along with her child. In others of the unmarried-mother type, the infant is exposed by the woman herself, having concealed her pregnancy, in order to keep the birth secret. Rarely does the divine person who has thus fathered a child take any trouble over the mother's fate, though in some exposure myths the divine father ensures the survival of his son. But in some cases the exposed child, when grown to manhood, comes to the aid or protection of his mother, or takes vengeance on her persecutors. These myths lent themselves to dramatisation in the Athenian theatre, and Sophokles and Euripides wrote several tragedies about such women as Danaë, Antiope, Auge, Melanippe, and others. The plots of such plays often begin with trouble and persecution for the child and his mother, and their separation, and end with reunion. In *Epitrepontes* Menander has one of his characters alert the audience to the parallel between the exposed infants of tragedies and the possible fate of children exposed along with recognition tokens in more mundane circumstances. And in this play, as in others of New Comedy, the exposed child is indeed restored to his parents, and all ends satisfactorily. The

exposure-plots of New Comedy derive from romantic tragedies, but they had added point for an Athenian audience for whom exposure of babies by unmarried mothers (complete with little ornaments and tokens, in some cases) was a familiar occurrence in real life (cf. pp. 172 - 173 above). The exposure-motif is prominent in myths that have survived partly because it was used so much by fifth- and fourth-century dramatists. Stories of this kind evidently had much appeal for the Greeks, and perhaps the stories in which an abandoned or doomed child survived, against great odds, were found especially satisfying.

An important element of the exposure-motif is the rescue of the child, often in glamorous or miraculous circumstances. Of course, in real life Greeks who exposed an unwanted child would certainly not have expected it to be tended by animals, and they could hardly even have hoped for it to be reared among herdsmen, but the popular stories of exposure and rescue of heroes and demi-gods presumably had some effect if only at the emotional level, at least on unsophisticated people. They are far from being dark tales of suffering and punishment for an act forbidden by the gods.

Table 2 also contains several examples of a certain variant in the exposure-motif: casting out to sea in a chest. Perseus and his mother met this fate at the hands of Akrisios, and there is a version of the Oedipus-myth in which Oedipus was set out to sea in a *λάρναξ* and picked up by Polybos's wife at the sea-shore. In Euripides's version of the story of Auge and Telephos, both were put into a *λάρναξ* by Aleos and submerged in the sea, but Athene made the chest cross the sea to Asia, where Teuthras married Auge and adopted Telephos as his son. There is a version of the myth of Dionysos's origins in which he was cast out to sea with his mother in a *λάρναξ*, and washed up at Brasiai in Lakonia. The *λάρναξ* is also used at sea in mythology for purposes other than exposure: Thoas the father of Hypsipyle was set adrift in a *λάρναξ* to save him (Ap. Rh. 1. 622 ff.). Deukalion's vessel is called a *λάρναξ* by Apollodoros (1. 7: 2) and Lucian

(*Syn. D.* 12). A *λάρναξ* was often a coffin (Hom. *Il.* 24. 795, Thuc. 2. 34), and like pots used for burials the *λάρναξ* could be a coffin for the exposure of infants. The use of a coffin gave a kind of burial if the child died. So the *λάρναξ* is associated with death, but its passengers in myth in fact are saved; and in Greek thought water too is often associated with death and rebirth. It has been argued that a "symbolism of death and rebirth is quite obviously operative in the case of Deukalion and other comparable Flood-myths, and by comparison, the ambiguity between destruction and salvation in the motif of exposure by *larnax* becomes perfectly comprehensible".⁶⁷

One of the reasons for exposure that is found in some myths is a prophecy about the killing or overthrow of a father or grandfather by the new member of the family, and examples can be seen in Table 2. The same theme of prophecy about overthrow gives rise to a variant on the exposure-motif, notably in the case of Zeus, who was hidden away by his mother in a wild environment to escape the murderous intent of his father Kronos. There are so many elements in the various versions of this myth that are familiar to us from exposure-myths, that it is fair to regard it as an "inverted" exposure. Inverted-exposure stories are set out in Table 3.

The significance of exposure in myth

The theme of the threat to an elder member of the family posed by the birth of a child, of the child destined to kill its father, is a common one in Greek mythology. A psychological explanation has been advanced by P. Roussel, who says that the oracles which announce a newborn or unborn child's destiny "expriment, en les exagérant pour des cas d'exception, les inquiétudes plus ou moins précises que le cercle auquel il appartiendra éprouve à la venue d'un enfant chargé de possibilités ambiguës" ([1943] p.

12). The myths and legends give dramatic expression to the mixed feelings with which the family may greet the birth of a new member, with its potential for strength, alongside its present weakness and needs. Roussel in this context also discusses exposure for religious reasons, and the notion of the τέρας, the creature with an abnormality which was felt to be disturbing and dangerous, and which was a sufficient reason for the casting out of a child.

D. B. Redford, using a historical and sociological analysis, has gone so far as to argue that it was in fact the social phenomenon of the exposure of unwanted infants that gave rise to the literary motif of the hero cast out as a baby.⁶⁸ Such tales told of divine characters need not have been current earlier than those told about humans, and indeed, he argues, the motif is not really appropriate for the characters of mythology, who are powerful personages, unsuited to have been cast out themselves or to have had their offspring subjected to such treatment: "It is far more likely that those examples in which gods and goddesses play a part belong to an advanced stage in the humanization of the pantheon, and are patterned on tales told of human heroes" (p. 224).

Others have attributed the origins of the exposure-motif in myth and legend to ritual of a particular kind. Gilbert Murray believed that it was connected with a fertility ritual appropriate to the worship of Dionysos (see note 20 and pp. 170 - 171 above). Gerhard Binder has also noted that exposure and rescue played an important part in the regular enacting of the myth of Dionysos in the Mysteries associated with that god ([1964] p. 36). But he connects this with initiation, rather than fertility, ritual. Binder explores in depth the significance of the connection between kingship and exposure, especially in the legends told of Cyrus and Romulus. Cyrus, though a Persian, featured prominently in Greek culture, thanks to the attention of Herodotos and Xenophon, among others, and the story of his exposure, as well as that of his legendary forebears, may help to shed light on the Greek

tradition of exposure in myth and legend.⁶⁹

The exposure of Cyrus

The chief source for the exposure of Cyrus is Herodotos 1. 107 - 122. The story goes, according to Herodotos, that Astyages, King of the Medes, had a dream that water flowed from his daughter Mandane to cover all Asia. This made him fear to give her in marriage to any Mede of an appropriately high rank, and he married her instead to Kambyses, a Persian of a rank lower than a Mede of middle class. Then, after another warning dream, Astyages, fearing that his daughter's offspring would supplant him as king, ordered the death of his daughter's first child. The child was given to the servant Harpagos decked out for burial, but he could not bring himself to kill the baby and passed him instead to the cowherd Mitridates and his wife Spako (which, Herodotos tells us, in Median means "dog"), with orders to expose him. But this woman had recently been delivered of a dead child, and she persuaded her husband to lay out the dead child instead, and keep the royal baby. The cowherd put his dead child into the vessel that the other was carried in, decked it with the ornaments, put it out in a wild place, and satisfied Harpagos's officer that the exposure had been carried out as ordered. Thus Cyrus was secretly brought up in the cowherd's house.

The next episode in the story Herodotos tells as follows. When Cyrus was ten years old he was playing with other boys of his age in the herdsman's village, and in this game the others chose him as their king. He assigned tasks to his playmates such as housebuilding and acting as bodyguard. But one boy disobeyed and was severely punished by Cyrus, whereupon he complained to his father, a prominent man, who reported the outrage to Astyages. Astyages, when he had Cyrus brought before him, thought the boy looked familiar, and extracted the truth about the child's

identity from the cowherd. After cruelly punishing Harpagos for disobeying his orders, he sent Cyrus, on the advice of the Magi, back to his real parents. They made up a story that Cyrus had been suckled, not by the woman Spako, but by a bitch, to make the story seem more amazing.

Pompeius Trogus gave the same story, up to the entrusting of the child to the herdsman (Justin *Epit.* 1. 4). He then told how the herdsman exposed the baby but later gave in to his wife's pleading to retrieve it. When he went to the place in the woods he found the baby Cyrus being suckled and protected by a bitch. Moved to pity, he picked up the child and brought him home. His wife asked that her newborn child (which had been born alive, not dead) be exposed instead, and that she be allowed to bring up the other. This account says that the woman's name was later Spakos because that is the word for dog. The account goes on to describe how the children's game led to Cyrus's recognition. (1. 5, 6).⁷⁰

One of the chief differences in the accounts of Cyrus's early life are in the reports given of his lineage. Herodotos, writing just a century after Cyrus's death, had heard that his maternal grandfather was Astyages the Median king, and his father was Kambyses, a Persian of non-noble family. By Herodotos's time there were several different accounts of Cyrus's life to choose from, as he tells us himself (1. 95). Xenophon wrote that Cyrus's father "is said to have been Kambyses, King of the Persians", and his mother, "it is generally agreed", Mandane, daughter of Astyages, King of the Medes (*Cyropaideia* 1. 2. 1). Ktesias, writing at the end of the fifth or beginning of the fourth century, said that Cyrus was not related to Astyages (*FGH* 688 fr. 9): Photios tells us this (but nothing else about Cyrus's early life) in his summary of Ktesias (36 A 9 - 10). Ktesias's *History* was used as a chief source by Nikolaos of Damascus in his account of Cyrus's history; Nikolaos says that Cyrus was descended from the Mardois, that his father was Atradates a penniless robber and his mother Agroste a goatherd, and Cyrus himself was so poor that he went to the court of King Astyages to serve the

king's servants in return for food and clothing (*FGrH* 90 fr. 66.2 - 4). The cuneiform inscriptions of the Achaimenids confirm that Cyrus was indeed the son of Kambyses, and the grandson of an earlier Cyrus; Kambyses was King of Anshan. Cyrus came to power after attacking Astyages while in his service, defeating him and taking him prisoner. It is probable that Cyrus was, as Ktesias says, not related to Astyages.⁷¹ The legend that tells of his relationship to Astyages is an invention that puts Cyrus in the position of legitimate heir to Astyages's throne. The story that his father was a robber and his mother a goatherd is another fabrication; it endows Cyrus with excessively humble origins and makes his rise to power seem the more miraculous, and it connects him with lowly people of the countryside in the tradition of other great Persians of legend.

Xenophon's idealised account of Cyrus's education and life does not mention exposure. Xenophon is concerned to present Cyrus's greatness as a product of his education and upbringing, rather than a matter of destiny. But Xenophon does give prominence to hunting, which is an important feature in the myths and legends of other Persian rulers said to have been exposed and brought up in the wilds (*Cyropaideia* 1. 4. 15 ff.).

The account of Cyrus's early life which Herodotos had heard and passed on, together with a rationalistic interpretation of Cyrus's suckling by the bitch, is similar to stories told of many other Persian heroes and kings. Exposure is followed by tending by wild animals, and eventual restoration to the status of king. It is evident, as Binder explains, that the exposure legend that was attached to Cyrus was intended to place him in the tradition of the great Persian rulers of legend and history, who were said to have been rescued by or otherwise connected with humble people, especially herdsmen and their wives. The playing of a game with his peers in which the royal child distinguishes himself is also a feature of the stories about other Persian kings, and this king-game attributed to Cyrus certainly looks like much more than children's play when compared with Plutarch's account

of customs attached to Persian royal inauguration at Pasargadai. Plutarch describes some elements in an initiation ritual that has explicit connections with Cyrus's kingship, and in which the ceremonial food and drink symbolise a hardy and rustic way of life (*Artaxerxes* 3. 1 - 2, cf. Hdt. 1. 71, and Nikolaos of Damascus fr. 66). Underlying the king-game described by Herodotos is a ritual connected with initiation and accession to the throne. For example, in the king-game the chosen person assigns the task of house-building to one of the others, and Binder interprets this as a ritualised repetition of one of the basic skills which the mythical kings were thought to have taught to men, in common with skills such as fire-making, agriculture and the making of clothes from hides. The Persians, according to Binder's explanation, liked to make ritual repetitions of aspects of the simple and hardy way of life, because it represented for them the ideal, brought from the steppe-lands where their ancestors had wandered centuries before as herdsmen and nomads.

Binder also sees in this evidence of a more general initiation and training that was a feature of Persian education of nobles and princes. It certainly seems to have some elements in common with the description of Persian education given by Strabo (15. 3. 18). We read here that Persian education trained boys from the age of five until they were twenty-four in the use of the bow and the javelin, in riding and in speaking the truth. Myths were used in education to present the deeds of gods and men, evidently by acting them out as well as telling them. The teachers divided the boys into groups of fifty, and appointed the sons of kings and satraps as their leaders. They were given training in endurance, in tending flocks and staying out all night, and in surviving on wild fruits such as terebinth, acorns, and wild pears.

The exposure of Cyrus and the other Persian kings and heroes can be seen in this context as a transplantation of an understandable motif onto a cultic myth that had lost its original significance. The exposure-motif is

thus a traditional and romanticised expression of a very ancient custom of sending a child away into a pastoral or wild environment for a primitive form of education that involved practical training and some form of initiation into adulthood.

Greek mythical exposure and initiation ritual

When we turn back to Greek myth and legend we find the same exposure-motif and related motifs as are found in the legends about Cyrus and other Persian kings and heroes. If the Persian myths are connected with initiation ritual, might not the same be true of the Greek? Bruce Mitchell, in a thesis which sets out to explain the significance of the rôle of the herdsman in literary bucolic poetry, uses an analysis of a similar type to Binder's to explore in some depth the correspondence between puberty-initiation and the exposure-motif with its related variants in Greek myth ([1985] pp. 26 - 33 and 272 ff., see note 67 above).

Mitchell rejects the notion that the exposure-myths, with their common sequence of miraculous but ostensibly fortuitous events could have been based directly on the social phenomenon of exposure, though the latter certainly existed (p. 29). And the recurring motif of the herdsman requires a more subtle explanation than the obvious appropriateness of his presence in the narrative. Besides those myths in which herdsmen are given a baby to expose, there are those in which they get custody of a child by means other than finding them in the countryside, and also those in which exposed children are not rescued by herdsmen or hunters but later become such themselves. There are also many young men of noble birth in myth and legend who become herdsmen, without having been exposed as babies. In explanation for the attribution of one of the humblest occupations of antiquity to so many mythical princes and heroes, Mitchell suggests that

"the exposure-motif has been adduced as a rationalisation of this manifest incongruity" (p. 29). The exposure-motif was attached to some stories which tell of princes and heroes living apart from their families and society, often as herdsmen and hunters, in order to make sense of their circumstances. The parallel motif of the education in the wilds, for example by Cheiron of Jason, Aristaïos and many others, shows "the same apparently incongruous combination of high culture with a remote and uncivilized setting" (p. 31), and the kourotrophic function of the rescuer or educator gives a clue to the significance of the exposure-motif, which Mitchell concludes has to do with a regular process of education. The pastoral work of these princes and heroes tends to be a temporary episode in their lives which ends at adulthood, and the theme of transition to adulthood suggests that this motif in myth reflects the most primitive form of education - the ritual of puberty initiation. Mitchell outlines the striking structural correlation between the exposure-motif and puberty initiation, and he also deals with those aspects of the exposure-myths which do not at first sight seem to share the theme and structure of initiation ritual. The exposure of infants is not training and initiation, but there is a common underlying structure in the expulsion of child by parent, "and it is quite possible that with the degeneration of formal initiation ritual, the myth became rationalized by importing the most obvious type of situation which could give a comprehensible motive to a function which had lost a meaningful referent" (p. 274). The theme often found in exposure-myths of fear that a newborn child will kill or overthrow its father corresponds to the feelings of hostility between successive generations which are given ritual expression in puberty initiation. There is a further connection between putting out a newborn infant to die and the symbolic death undergone by an initiand, which is often followed by a period when infancy is imitated.

The analyses of Binder and Mitchell do appear to provide a credible

bridge between myth and custom. Mitchell is careful to point out that not all myths have a corresponding ritual, but that some basic human phenomena have found expression in both myth and ritual, both of which may then develop, interact, and diverge. The exposure-myths make sense, at the level of narrative, on their own. But they also contain, Mitchell argues, certain explicit themes, such as education and training for adulthood, and it is legitimate to look for the social institution which was related to these themes, and with which the myths themselves interacted (pp. 272 - 273).

The exposure-myths in the form in which we have them have been crystallised at a stage at which their connection with puberty initiation was long forgotten. The phenomenon of the exposure of unwanted infants, on the other hand, persisted throughout classical antiquity. It must have been the familiarity of the Greeks with this phenomenon that in part at least was responsible for the popularity of the exposure-myths, their frequent retelling, their powerful appearance on the dramatic stage, and their survival in the works of post-classical mythographers. There is one further context in which the exposure-motif surfaces, which remains to be explored in this chapter.

Characters in Greek history said to have been exposed

We have seen that legends about the exposure and rescue of Cyrus had arisen soon after his death, putting him in the tradition of great Persian rulers and heroes. The legends suggested that Cyrus's special destiny had singled him out from among other boys and that his great future had been foreshadowed by portentous episodes. The impulse to wrap the cloak of heroic status and divine election around other historical figures can be seen in the accounts of the early lives of three Greek rulers: Agathokles, Hieron II and Ptolemy I Soter.

Agathokles was born about 361 BC and became tyrant of Syracuse in 317/16. Diodoros tells us of the miraculous events surrounding his birth and rearing (19. 2. 2 - 7). His father Karkinos had troubled dreams about the child his wife was about to bear. He sent to Delphi to ask about the baby, and was told that he would cause great misfortunes to the Carthaginians and all Sicily. Karkinos exposed the baby and set a watch over him to ensure his death. But when after some days the child was still alive and while the watchers were neglecting their task, the child's mother came secretly by night and took him to her brother. The child was named Agathokles and grew up excelling others in strength and beauty. When he was seven years old, Karkinos noticed him playing with children of his own age, and when he realized that his own child, if he had lived, would have been the same age, Karkinos regretted his action and wept; whereupon his wife revealed what she had done, and Karkinos accepted his son, and took his household to Syracuse. Diodoros also records that Karkinos was a poor man and taught his craft of pottery to Agathokles.⁷²

Attempts have been made to unravel the various sources which lie behind Diodoros's account.⁷³ Agathokles had favourable accounts of his life written by his brother Antandros, and by another contemporary, Kallias. One of the sources used by Diodoros was Timaios, and Polybios (12. 15) quotes him as saying that Agathokles was a potter. Timaios was very hostile to Agathokles, and so he is unlikely to have transmitted the story about the foiled attempt to kill him at birth, with its details that reflect glory on the tyrant. Douris was another source of Diodoros, and the exposure story may have come through him: he had a penchant for bizarre and miraculous stories. The connection of Agathokles's family with pottery-making may be correct, but it has been doubted that his family was a poor one: family connections mentioned by Diodoros (19. 3. 1, 3. 3) perhaps make humble origins unlikely. It has been suggested that Karkinos owned a ceramics factory and was a wealthy man, and that the young Agathokles learned the trade in order to

take his place in the family business (Berve [1952] p. 22). Timaios distorted this to pour scorn on Agathokles's origins; but it was incorporated into the exposure story for the same reasons that humble origins were attributed to Cyrus. The similarity of the story told of Cyrus to that of Agathokles has been noted by Bauer ([1882] pp. 564 - 565). Ure prefers to trace the influence back to the story of Kypselos ([1922] pp. 209 ff., cf. pp. 225 - 228 below). It is not impossible that motifs from both Herodotean accounts influenced the tale of Agathokles's exposure.

Hieron II came to power as *strategos* of Syracuse soon after 276 BC. After some notable military successes in Sicily, he was elected king in 269 or 265 (the date is uncertain). He ruled till his death in 215. Justin's *Epitome* of Pompeius Trogus gives the following account of Hieron's origins. His father Hierokleitos was a nobleman descended from Gelon the former tyrant of Sicily, but his mother was of a very low family, and this was a source of shame - for she was a slave, and for this reason Hieron was exposed by his father as a source of disgrace to the family ("velut dehonestamentum generis", 23. 4. 6). (We are not told whether Hierokleitos had married the slave woman, nor precisely in what the "disgrace" lay.) As a helpless infant he was fed for many days by bees. When his father was told of this miraculous happening he retrieved the baby and reared him for the glorious career that was foreshadowed by it. Once when he was at school with other boys of his age a wolf snatched away his writing tablet. As a young man going into his first battles an eagle sat on his shield and an owl on his spear. There follows a eulogistic passage about Hieron's qualities.

This story of Hieron's origins was invented either by Hieron himself or by his admirers. Hieron probably claimed descent from Gelon in order to add prestige to his kingship. The claim that Hieron's mother was a slave is probably equally spurious; and the precise nature of the disgrace of Hieron's birth is not really clear from Justin's account. It provides some sort of motive for exposure by his father, but as a coherent and plausible

explanation it leaves something to be desired. The feeding by bees has been inspired by the story of Zeus's miraculous nurturing (see Table 3 below). The eagle on Hieron's shield represents the presence of Zeus, and the owl that of Athena. Like Cyrus and Agathokles, Hieron was said to have been singled out from among his schoolboy-peers. The inventor or inventors of this tale were evidently not content with only one miraculous token of the child Hieron's future destiny. The legend which told of the direction of Cyrus to Pasargadai by birds of omen probably also furnished the eagle-and-owl motif for the story of Hieron's military début. The connections with earlier exposure-type legends, especially with that of Cyrus, are unmistakable.⁷⁴

Aelian tells the story of the exposure of Ptolemy I Soter: Lagos "married Arsinoë the mother of Ptolemy Soter. Lagos exposed this Ptolemy, as not being his son, on a bronze shield. An account has leaked out from Macedonia which says that an eagle made frequent visits to the baby, and, stretching out its wings and hovering over him, it sheltered him from the violent rays of the sun and, when it rained, from the heavy rain. It frightened off the flocks of birds, and tore apart quails and fed the baby on the blood, as if it were milk" (Ael. fr. 285, *Souda* Λ 25 Adler, cf. *Souda* Α 963, 965 Adler).

This legend belongs to the tradition that Ptolemy was really the son of Philip II, who having made his mistress Arsinoë pregnant, gave her to Lagos as wife. Quintus Curtius Rufus says that Ptolemy was related by blood to Alexander, and that some people believed him to be Philip's son; it was certainly known, he says, that he was the offspring of a mistress of Philip's (9. 8. 22). This tradition is also reported by Pausanias: "The Macedonians consider Ptolemy to be the son of Philip, son of Amyntas, but in name the son of Lagos, for his mother was pregnant with him when she was given as wife to Lagos by Philip" (1. 6. 2). An entry in the *Souda* reports that Philip consorted with Arsinoë, left her pregnant by him, and married

Olympias (E 74 Adler). In fact Arsinoë herself seems to have belonged to a branch of the Macedonian royal house, and so, through his mother, Ptolemy really was descended from the Argeads. The story of direct descent from Philip II, as a bastard son of his, may have been put about around the beginning of Ptolemy's reign in order to surpass Antigonid claims to Argead blood, or it may simply be a later third century invention designed to add to the prestige of Ptolemy I.⁷⁵

The Macedonian house traced its ancestry back to Herakles, and through him to Zeus. This is why the eagle, the bird of Zeus, was said in the legend to have been the infant Ptolemy's saviour. The story of Ptolemy's exposure adds another dimension - miraculous intervention and a suggestion of divine favour - to the tale of his origin as a bastard son of Philip II.

Cyrus the Great was heir only to the throne of Anshan, but overthrew Astyages to become King of the Medes, and went on to build up the Achaemenid Persian Empire. Agathokles, Hieron II and Ptolemy I Soter set themselves up as kings and attempted to found new dynasties (in which only Agathokles failed). In this common feature of their histories lies the significance of the exposure-story connected with each of them. They could not be said to have been born into the succession and reared as princes; therefore an origin of another kind had to be ascribed to them, an origin outside kingship, which would nonetheless mark them out as fit for kingship.⁷⁶ Having thus been placed outside the kingship in the tradition, they could also be readmitted to it: in the case of Cyrus and Ptolemy I, reputed descent from Astyages and Philip II, respectively, was incorporated into the story. The manner of its incorporation in the narrative owes everything, in each case, to the exposure-myths and legends associated with Persian and Greek heroes (see Table 2). Indeed most of the elements in the stories of the exposure of Cyrus, Agathokles, Hieron II and Ptolemy I can be paralleled from the exposure-myths and legends of gods and heroes (and that

of Cyrus also influenced the legends about Agathokles and Hieron). These motifs are incorporated into the narratives with, in some places, patchy results: for example, we have seen that the motive ascribed to Hierokleitos for exposing his son does not entirely make sense; in the Cyrus-story, Cyrus's maternal grandfather, although he has no son, is depicted as fearing overthrow by the grandchild who might naturally have been considered simply his heir; in the stories of Agathokles and Hieron, their fathers having exposed them later change their minds about rearing them; and as for Ptolemy, we do not hear, in the story that has come down to us, how he re-entered human society at all. Be that as it may, however, the tales served their purpose in adding to the prestige of a kind of divine election and to the kingly claims of their subjects.

Before we leave this subject, mention must be made of one other Greek historical figure to whose early life exposure-type motifs were attached. Like the other historical figures mentioned in this section, Kypselos, tyrant of Corinth, founded a new dynasty (albeit short-lived). He was himself related to the Bacchiad line only on his mother's side. Herodotos (5. 92) tells the story of how Labda the lame, daughter of Amphion the Bacchiad, was married out of the Bacchiad line, to Eëtion of Petra. Eëtion went to Delphi to ask why the couple had had no children, and was told that Labda would bear a rock which would fall on the rulers and bring justice to Corinth. The Bacchiads, who had already been given an oracle to similar effect, heard and understood this one. They sent ten men to kill the child, and they planned that the first one to hold the child should dash him to the ground; but the baby smiled at the man who held him and he could not bring himself to kill him but instead passed him on to his neighbour; and the child was likewise passed on to each of the ten, none of whom would do the deed. Later they came back, resolved this time to carry the plan through, but meanwhile Labda had overheard their plan and hid the baby in a κυπέλη. The men did not find him, and the child, called Kypselos

after his hiding place, grew up to be tyrant of Corinth. There follows an extremely abbreviated account of Kypselos's outrageous behaviour as tyrant.

Nikolaos of Damascus (*FGrH* 90 F 57), whose account comes from Ephoros, tells that after the men out of compassion for the baby, which had held out its arms and smiled, had abandoned their intention of murder, they told Aëtion the truth. He then removed the child for safety (ὑπεκτίθεται) to Olympia, and brought him up there as a suppliant to the god. Later he took the boy Kypselos to Kleonai; he was distinguished in appearance and ἀρετή. Pausanias (5. 17. 5) describes in detail a λάρναξ in the temple of Hera at Olympia, which he claims is the κυψέλη in which Kypselos was hidden by his mother. Pausanias also passes on the information that the chest had been dedicated by the Kypselids. He explains that κυψέλη was the old Corinthian word for chest. Plutarch (*Mor.* 163 F - 164 A) has "the poet Chersias" mention, in the context of people who had been saved from apparently hopeless circumstances, Kypselos, who as a newborn baby smiled at the men who had been sent to take him away whereupon they turned back; and when they changed their minds again and came to look for him they did not find him, for he had been put away (ἀποτεθέντα) into a κυψέλη by his mother. Chersias adds that Kypselos erected a building at Delphi, in thanks to the god for having stopped his crying and prevented the men who were looking for him from finding him. (This passage does not mention the dedication of the chest at Olympia.)

What exactly was the κυψέλη of Hdt. 5. 92, and did it have anything to do with the λάρναξ described by Pausanias? The κυψέλη was probably not a chest. Herodotos's story says that Labda hid her baby in the last place that she thought the men would look. They searched the house thoroughly, and failed to find the baby. They would hardly have overlooked a household chest. The only authority equating κυψέλη with an old Corinthian word for what other Greeks called a λάρναξ is Pausanias (5. 17. 5), and this

definition has probably been invented to bring the connection of the chest at Olympia into line with the story of Kypselos as told by Herodotos. The *κυψέλη* of Herodotos was probably a beehive or a large terracotta storage-jar. Georges Roux has argued most persuasively for the former.⁷⁷ It is highly improbable that the *λάρναξ* described by Pausanias had anything to do with Kypselos's hiding-place; it has been questioned whether it was even dedicated by the Kypselids. Plutarch does not mention it, when he remarks on Kypselos's offering at Delphi. The scenes depicted on the chest described by Pausanias had evidently not been interpreted in ancient times as having anything to do with Corinthian history or legend, and the resemblance of the decoration to the François Vase indicates a date after 550 BC.⁷⁸

A discussion of the different traditions behind the accounts of Herodotos and Ephoros has been given by A. Andrewes, in which he points out that Herodotos, although his account is very hostile to Kypselos, tells a story which portrays the baby Kypselos as the hero and his persecutors as the villains.⁷⁹ This tale and the two oracles favourable in tone to Kypselos which Herodotos recounts were, Andrewes argues, already traditional elements in the history of Kypselos before Herodotos's time, and probably belonged to the early tradition which saw Kypselos as a beneficent and popular ruler. Herodotos uses the "fairy-tale" about Kypselos's escape from danger, apparently unaware that it does not accord in tone with the (probably later) version of Kypselos's badness which he chooses to transmit. Herodotos's use of the "fairy-tale" can be explained by his obvious enjoyment of anecdotes like this for their own sake.

Kypselos's story is not an exposure-legend.⁸⁰ Yet it does contain some motifs reminiscent of the exposure tales told of gods and heroes. In some ways it is like what we have called the inverted exposure of Zeus and Poseidon (see Table 3) in which the infant under threat because of a prophecy about his future overthrow of the old order is put away into a

place of hiding. J.-P. Vernant, analysing the myths from a psychological perspective, has pointed out several correspondences in the narrative structure between the legends of Kypselos and Oedipus.⁸¹ They were respectively son of Labda the lame and grandson of Labdakos the lame, and both are named after an incident in their danger-ridden infancy. In both cases a prophecy was made about a threat to their elders from the child that was to be born. Each is passed from hand to hand by those instructed to kill him (Oedipus from one herdsman to another, Kypselos from nine of the ten men each to his neighbour). He does not mention the variant on the Oedipus myth which tells of Oedipus's exposure in a *λάρναξ* and casting out to sea (see Table 2). But the *λάρναξ*-connection probably is a red herring, since Kypselos's *κυψέλη* was not a chest, and he was not rejected and cast out on water, but hidden from his persecutors for his safety.

The legend of Kypselos in its turn probably influenced one of the versions of that of Cyrus: in Justin's account, epitomising Pompeius Trogus, the baby Cyrus smiles at the herdsman's wife, thus evoking her pity (1. 4. 12). In the main Greek version of the Cyrus-story, as given by Herodotos, Cyrus is passed from one man to another, because the first cannot bear to kill him, and we have seen above that this is a motif also found in the Oedipus myth. Kypselos as a boy was said to have been distinguished in appearance and *ἀρετή*, as were Cyrus and other survivors of exposure. There may then have been some influence from the Kypselos-story on later exposure stories, but there was also a pool of exposure motifs in myth and legend which all such stories could and did draw upon.

What is the meaning of the prevalence of exposure as a motif in Greek myth and legend, and its appearance in historical biography? Exposure in myth does not merely reflect reality.⁸² The prevalence of this motif shows that it was a practice known and understood throughout the ages of

myth-making (including the period of classical tragedy), probably grafted on to replace an ancient ritual of a kind no longer known or even intelligible. It was a theme that happened to lend itself to the dramatic reversal of fortunes that made such effective plots for classical drama and rather clumsier ones for the biographies of a certain type of ruler. Its immense popularity as a motif for tragedies and comedies in the classical and Hellenistic theatre partly accounts for its employment in the reports of the early lives of fourth- and third-century kings, which also had the stories of Cyrus as a precedent. The relationship between exposure in myth and legend and exposure in real life is, then, a rather distant one. From the treatment of the exposure stories in mythical accounts, and in particular their treatment in drama, we may draw some conclusions of a very general nature about popular attitudes to unwanted children. With only one exception (that of Linos), the rejected infants are rescued, and this makes possible a fairly cheerful treatment of the theme in the stories and plays. This accords with a generally sanguine attitude to exposure (cf. p. 211 above), and indicates that the distaste expressed by Isokrates for such stories (12. 122, cf. p. 192 above) was not typical of his age, but was perhaps felt only by a minority of people, mostly the educated and sophisticated. It has been said that there was no tragedy of an unwanted baby in Greek drama, and this has some truth in it: pathos expressed for children is reserved for the *wanted* children, those already part of a family.⁸³

Table 2: Exposure of mythical persons

PERSON EXPOSED	BY WHOM EXPOSED	HOW AND WHERE	REASON FOR EXPOSURE	SUBSEQUENT FATE	REFERENCE
Telephos	Aleos (grandfather)	On Mount Parthenios in Arkadia	Shame at pregnancy of unmarried Auge (by Herakles)	Suckled by a doe, taken up and reared by herdsmen	Apollod. 2. 7. 4, 3. 9. 1
	Auge (mother)	In bushes on Mt. Parthenios where she had just given birth	Aleos would not believe that it was Herakles who had made Auge pregnant, and sent her away with Nauplios to be drowned; she gave birth on the way	Suckled by a doe and rescued by herdsmen; given to King Korythos	Diod. Sic. 4. 33. 7 - 12
	Aleos	With mother Auge, in a chest, cast out to sea	Shame at rape of unmarried Auge (by Herakles)	Chest carried safely across sea, cast ashore at River Kaikos in Teuthrania; mother and son rescued by King Teuthras	Eur. <i>Telephos</i> as recorded by Strabo, 13. 1. 69 (cf. Eur. fr. 696 ff. Nauck) Paus. 8. 4. 9
(Other variants: Paus. 8. 48. 7; Sir J.G. Frazer <i>Pausanias's Description of Greece</i> , Commentary, vol. 2, pp. 75 - 76)					
Asklepios	His mother Koronis	On a mountain near Epidauros called Titthion	Koronis wished to keep secret from her father Phlegyas that she had borne a son by Apollo	Suckled by a goat, guarded by the goat-herd's dog; rescued by goatherd (who saw lightning flash from the child)	Paus. 2. 26. 4 - 5

(Alternative version in Paus. 2. 26. 6 and Pind. *Pyth.* 3. 24 - 46: Koronis while pregnant by Apollo slept with Ischys; Artemis killed her in punishment, but when she was placed on the pyre Hermes (Paus.) or Apollo (Pind.) snatched the child out.)

Table 2: Exposure of mythical persons

PERSON EXPOSED	BY WHOM EXPOSED	HOW AND WHERE	REASON FOR EXPOSURE	SUBSEQUENT FATE	REFERENCE
Aiolos and Boiotos	Melanippe (mother)	Given by Melanippe to her Nurse to put into a cowshed, on Poseidon's orders	Melanippe's fear of her father after being made pregnant by Poseidon	Suckled by a cow; found by cowherds and given to M.'s father, who ordered them to be burned as monstrous births	Eur. <i>Mel. Soph</i>
				Found by a herd and reared by Theano, Queen of Metapontos	Eur. <i>Mel. Desm.</i> , cf. Hyg. <i>Fab.</i> 186
Amphion and Zethos	Antiope (mother)	In a cave at Eleutherai, where Antiope gave birth as she was being taken to Thebes	Antiope's fear of her father, after being made pregnant by Poseidon	Found and rescued by a shepherd	Paus.1. 38. 9., cf. 2. 6. 1 - 4 Evidently the version in Eur. <i>Antiope</i> , cf. Hyg. <i>Fab.</i> 8
Ion	Kreousa	In a cave on Akropolis of Athens	Shame or fear of father, after being made pregnant by Apollo; desire for secrecy	Rescued by Hermes, at Apollo's behest; taken to Delphi	Eur. <i>Ion</i> esp. 10 - 50, 338 - 352, 897 - 918, 947 - 965, 1398 ff.
Atalanta	Iasos (father)		Because she was a girl, and her father wanted male children	Suckled by a bear; rescued and reared by hunters	Apollod. 3. 9. 2, cf. Theog. 1290 - 1291;
		On Mount Parthenios (Ael. <i>VH</i>)		Ael. <i>VH</i> 13. 1	

Table 2. Exposure of mythical persons

PERSON EXPOSED	BY WHOM EXPOSED	HOW AND WHERE	REASON FOR EXPOSURE	SUBSEQUENT FATE	REFERENCE
Aigisthos	Pelopia (mother)		Prophecy to Thyestes that his daughter's son would be his brother's avenger	Found by herdsmen and put to a goat's udder to feed; reared by Atreus	Hyg. <i>Fab.</i> 87, 88 (Rose)
Oedipus	Laios and Jocasta (parents)	Ankles pierced, given to servants to expose on mountainside	Prophecy to Laios that his son would kill him	Passed on by herdsmen to a servant of King Polybos; reared by Polybos	Soph. <i>OT</i> , Diod. Sic. 4. 64. 1, Eur. <i>Phoin.</i> 22 - 26
		Thrown into a chest and cast out to sea		Washed up at Sikyon; Oedipus reared by Polybos	Schol. Eur. <i>Phoin.</i> 26, Hyg. <i>Fab.</i> 66
Miletos	Akakallis (mother)	In a wood	Fear of her father Minos, after having a child by Apollo	Suckled by wolves (Apollo's plan); found by herdsmen and reared	Ant. Lib. 30. 1
Hippochoos	Alope (mother)	Given to Nurse to expose	Presumably because Alope was unmarried and had been made pregnant by Poseidon	Suckled by a mare, picked up by a herdsman; given to another herdsman	Hyg. <i>Fab.</i> 187 (Rose) cf. Rose's note <i>ad loc.</i>
(Hippochoos was exposed again, after the Nurse had confessed to Alope's father (Kerkyon) who the baby was: Hyg. has the story of the double exposure)					
Parthenopaios	Atalanta (mother)	On Mount Parthenios	Presumably because Atalanta had been made pregnant by Meleager, who was not her husband	Found by herdsmen and reared	Hyg. <i>Fab.</i> 99, cf. 70 (this is a late version: Rose, note)

Table 2: Exposure of mythical persons

PERSON EXPOSED	BY WHOM EXPOSED	HOW AND WHERE	REASON FOR EXPOSURE	SUBSEQUENT FATE	REFERENCE
Lykastos and Parrhasios	Phylonome (mother)	Cast into the River Erymanthos	Fear of her father, because she had been made pregnant by Ares (in the guise of a shepherd)	Borne along by the river, and washed up in a hollow oak tree; (said by a wolf threw her cubs into the river and suckled the babies; a shepherd saw this and reared them	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 314 E - F. (said by him to be from Zopyros's <i>Historia</i>)
Pelias and Neleus	Tyro (mother)		To keep secret the birth of the twins, Tyro having been made pregnant by Poseidon in the guise of the River Enipeus	The babies were picked up by a horse-keeper and one was named Pelias (after a mark on the face, it having been kicked by a horse); the other he named Neleus Neleus was suckled by a bitch who had lost her puppies Pelias was fed by a horse	Apollod. 1. 9. 8, cf. Soph. <i>Tyro</i> I and II Eust. on Hom. <i>Od.</i> 11. 253 Ael. <i>VH</i> 12. 42
	Tyro	In a σκάφη			Soph. <i>Tyro</i> , acc. to Schol. Ar. <i>Lys</i> 138
Meliteus	The nymph Othreis (mother)	In a wood	The Nymph's fear of Hera, because Zeus had slept with her (the Nymph)	Found and fed by bees, (Zeus's plan); then found by Phagros, son of Apollo and Othreis, while herding flocks, and picked up, reared and named by him	Ant. Lib. 13

Table 2. Exposure of mythical persons

PERSON EXPOSED	BY WHOM EXPOSED	HOW AND WHERE	REASON FOR EXPOSURE	SUBSEQUENT FATE	REFERENCE
Daphnis	Mother		To keep secret the birth from her father, knowing that he would not believe that she had been made pregnant by Chrysos		Schol. Theok. 7. 78/79 A
	Mother		Presumably because she had been made pregnant by Hermes (Mercury)	Found by herdsmen among the laurels and named Daphnis	Serv. <i>ad</i> Verg. <i>Ecl.</i> 5. 20
	Parents, Dionysophanes and Klearista	Given to the Nurse, Sophrone, to expose in the countryside, with tokens	Dionysophanes thought that three children were enough, and exposed the fourth	Suckled by a goat and found by the goat-herd Lamon; reared by Lamon and his wife and nursed by the goat	Longus <i>Daphnis and Chloë</i>
Chloë	Her father	In a cave of the Nymphs, with ornaments	Father claimed to have been too poor to rear a daughter, having spent what little he had as trierarch and choregos	Suckled by a ewe; found by shepherd Dryas; reared by Dryas and his wife	As above
Euadne	Pitane (mother)	Given to maid-servants to expose in a deserted place	Presumably to keep the birth secret, after being made pregnant by Poseidon	Picked up and reared by Aipytos	Schol. Pind. <i>Ol.</i> 6, p. 156 25 - 29 Boeckh
(Pind. <i>Ol.</i> 6. 31 - 34 says Pitane sent Euadne to Aipytos for him to rear: the Scholiast on Pindar claims that the alternative version above is the true one.)					
Iamos	Euadne (mother)	On the ground where he had just been born, hidden among rushes and pansies	Euadne was unmarried and had been made pregnant by Apollo (Meanwhile her guardian Aipytos had gone to Delphi to seek an oracle about the birth)	Two snakes fed him with honey	Pind. <i>Ol.</i> 6. 44 ff.

Table 2: Exposure of mythical persons

PERSON EXPOSED	BY WHOM EXPOSED	HOW AND WHERE	REASON FOR EXPOSURE	SUBSEQUENT FATE	REFERENCE
Linus	Psamathe (mother)		Fear of her father Krotopos, after she had been made pregnant by Apollo	Found and destroyed by sheepdogs of Krotopos	Paus. 1. 43. 7 (Linus not named)
				Picked up by a herd and reared among the lambs; cf. later destroyed by Krotopos's dogs	Konon <i>Dieg.</i> 19, Kallim. <i>Ait. frn.</i> 26 - 28
Paris	Priam (father)	Given to a servant to expose on Mount Ida	Prophecy that Paris would bring ruin on Troy	Suckled by a bear, then rescued by the servant who had exposed him	Apollod. 3. 12. 5 (cf. Frazer's note <i>ad loc.</i> in Loeb edn. for more refs.)
				Found and reared by herdsmen and named Paris	Hyg. <i>Fab.</i> 91 (from Eur. <i>Alexandros</i> : Snell, <i>Hermes Einzelschriften</i> 5, 1937)

Table 2: Exposure of mythical persons

PERSON EXPOSED	BY WHOM EXPOSED	HOW AND WHERE	REASON FOR EXPOSURE	SUBSEQUENT FATE	REFERENCE
Hekate	Pheraia (mother)	At the meeting of three roads	Because Pheraia had been made pregnant by Zeus	Found and reared by a herdsman of Pheres	Schol. Theok. 2. 35/36 A
Aichmatoras	Alkimedon (grandfather)	Along with Phialo his mother, on Mount Ostrakina in Arkadia	Because unmarried Phialo had had a child (by Herakles)	A jay heard the baby cry, imitated its cries, and alerted the passing Herakles, who then saved the mother and child	Paus. 8. 12. 2 - 4
Herakles	Alkmene (mother)	In the place that was later named the Plain of Herakles	Fear of the jealousy of Hera (because Zeus had slept with Alkmene)	Picked up by Athena and returned to Alkmene to rear	Diod. Sic. 4. 9. 6 - 7
Antilochos (son of Nestor)		On Mount Ida ?		Suckled by a bitch	Hyg. <i>Fab.</i> 252
Phylakides and Philandros	The nymph Akakallis ? (mother)			Suckled by a goat	Paus. 10. 16. 5
(No exposure is mentioned by Paus., our only source for this story, in his brief allusion to the tale, but it is possible that, like Asklepios, the twins were exposed and found by a goat, or like Aigisthos, found by a herdsman who fed them at a goat's udder.)					
Perseus	Akrisios (grandfather)	With mother (Danaë), in a chest, cast out to sea	Prophecy to Akrisios that his daughter would bear a son who would kill him; Akrisios did not believe that it was Zeus who had made Danaë pregnant	Chest washed up on Seriphos, Dictys took the boy and reared him	Apollod. 2. 4. 1 (cf. note <i>ad loc.</i> in Loeb edition for more refs.)
Dionysos	Kadmos (grandfather)	In a chest with mother, Semele, cast out to sea	Discovery of the birth by Kadmos	Chest washed up at Brasiai on southern promontory of Lakonia, with Semele dead, but Dionysos alive; the inhabitants reared Dionysos	Paus. 3. 24. 3 (Paus. says this story is unique to this part of Greece.)

Table 3: Inverted exposure in myth

PERSON EXPOSED	BY WHOM EXPOSED	HOW AND WHERE	REASON FOR EXPOSURE	SUBSEQUENT FATE	REFERENCE
Zeus	Rhea	In Crete (mother)	To prevent Kronos from swallowing him (after a prophecy to Kronos that he would be overthrown by one of his children); Rhea gave Kronos a stone to swallow instead	Suckled by a goat	Lucian <i>Sacr.</i> 5 (he uses the word ἐκτεθείς) cf. Arat. <i>Phain.</i> 163 - 164
	Rhea	On Mount Ida; given by Rhea to the Kouretes to rear	As above	Taken by the Kouretes to a cave and given to the Nymphs who gave him honey and milk, and fed him at the udder of the goat Amaltheia	Diod. Sic. 5. 70. 2 - 3; cf. Kallim. <i>Hymn to Zeus</i> 32 - 53; cf. Ovid <i>Fasti</i> 3. 443 f.
				Fed by bees	Ant. Lib. 19 <i>Serv. ad Verg. Georg.</i> 4. 150
				Born on Mount Dikte in Crete and suckled by a passing sow	Athen. 375 F - 376 A
Poseidon	Rhea (mother)	In Arkadia, among a flock of lambs	To hide him from his father Kronos, who was intent on devouring all his children; Rhea gave Kronos a foal to swallow instead		Paus. 8. 8. 2

Notes to Chapter Two

- 1 That is not to say that the other inhabitants of Lakedaimon, who to a great extent lived outside the Spartan system, the *perioikoi*, may not have practised the ordinary Greek kind of exposure and sometimes have rescued abandoned children of their own people.
- 2 D.M. MacDowell, *Spartan Law*, Edinburgh, 1986, p. 53.
- 3 M. Delcourt, *Stérilités mystérieuses et naissances maléfiques dans l'antiquité classique*, Bibliothèque de la Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres de l'Université de Liège, Fasc. 88, 1938, especially pp. 37ff.; P. Roussel, "L'exposition des enfants à Sparte" *REA* 45, 1943, pp. 5 - 17.
- 4 A recent article by Stephen Hodkinson refers to all the modern scholarship on the subject: "Land tenure and inheritance in classical Sparta", *CQ* N.S. 36, 1986, pp. 378 - 406.
- 5 P. Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, London, 1979, pp. 308 - 309.
- 6 D. Asheri, "Laws of inheritance, distribution of land and political constitutions in ancient Greece", *Historia* 12, 1963, pp. 1 - 21. Cf. also P. Oliva, *Sparta and her Social Problems*, Amsterdam, 1971, p. 37, and L. Ziehen, "Das Spartanische Bevölkerungsproblem", *Hermes* 68, 1933, p. 224.
- 7 For the sense of πολιτικὴ χώρα see MacDowell (1986) p. 91.
- 8 A.H.M. Jones, *Sparta*, Oxford, 1967, p. 45; F.W. Walbank, *A Historical*

Commentary on Polybios, Oxford, 1957, Vol. I, p. 730; H. Michell, *Sparta* Cambridge, 1964, pp. 207 ff.; Hodkinson (1986) pp. 378 - 394.

9 W.G. Forrest, *A History of Sparta*, London, 1980, pp. 51 - 52.

10 K.M.T. Chrimes, *Ancient Sparta* Manchester 1949, p. 54, points out that more than one Roman Emperor addressed letters to the Spartans on the subject of the unusual frequency of exposure at Sparta, although they do not seem to have enforced any change. By this time it was of course the parents who were responsible for exposure. But it is interesting that it seems to have been a particular problem in Sparta.

11 Newborn infants can survive unattended for surprisingly long periods. In the devastating earthquake which hit Mexico City, 19 - 20 September 1985, many babies were found alive in the wreckage of the city's maternity hospitals, some of them more than a week after the earthquake (see *The Times* 23.9.85, 25.9.85, 27.9.85, 30.9.85). Dr. Edmund Hey of Newcastle University is quoted as saying, "A normal baby can probably survive without food and water better than an adult." A baby's temperature can fall from a normal 37° C to 30° C without harm, and in babies with a reduced temperature loss of water takes place more slowly than usual, so that the harmful effects of severe dehydration may be postponed for 10 days or more. Babies can survive for two weeks or more without food (*Sunday Times* 29.9.85). Modern medical skills did much to save the lives of newborn infants rescued from the Mexico City ruins; desperate cases would not have been saved in ancient Greece, but in favourable conditions some infants may have survived without harm for a day or two, or more. Cf. the experience of William Cadogan with the infants of the Foundling Hospital in London in the 18th century: "There are many instances, both ancient and modern, of infants exposed and deserted, that have lived several days" (*An*

Essay upon Nursing, and the Management of Children from their Birth to Three Years of Age, 10th edition, London 1772).

12 Phantom pregnancy seems to be referred to in an inscription from the Sanctuary of Asklepios at Epidauros: Σωστράτα Φεραί[α παρ]εκύησε κτλ., *IG iv² 122*, 26 ff. For medical references see Lonie (1982) p. 247. A good example from modern Greece is the classic phantom pregnancy of Nitsa in Nicholas Gage's *Eleni*, Part 4 ch.14.

13 Cf. M. Schmidt, "Hepalstos lebt - Untersuchungen zur Frage der Behandlung behinderter Kinder in der Antike", *Hephaistos* 5/6, 1983/84, pp. 133 - 161, see especially pp. 138 - 139.

14 E. T. Withington, *Hippocrates* III (Loeb), p. 229 note 2.

15 Cf. D. M. MacDowell, "Love *versus* the law: an essay on Menander's *Aspis*", *Greece and Rome* 29, 1982, p. 50.

16 Gomme and Sandbach, *Menander: a Commentary*, Oxford, 1973, p. 523.

17 W. K. Lacey, *The Family in Classical Greece*, London, 1968, p. 165.

18 Doubts have been cast on the existence of this general prejudice by C. Patterson in "Not worth the rearing: the causes of infant exposure in ancient Greece", *TAPA* 115, 1985, pp. 103 - 123, see pp. 119 - 120.

19 F. H. Sandbach, "Two notes on Menander (*Epitrepontes* and *Samia*): . . . 2. Had Chrysis in *Samia* lost her own child?", *Liverpool Classical Monthly* 11, 1986, pp. 158 - 160; Christina Dedoussi "The future of Plangon's child in Menander's *Samia*", *Liverpool Classical Monthly* 13, 1988, pp. 39 - 42.

20 "Ritual elements in the New Comedy" *CQ* 37, 1943, pp. 46 - 54.

21 That Menander was capable of using the comic stage as a platform from which to challenge the rightness of an Athenian law and custom has been shown by D. M. MacDowell (1982) pp. 42 - 52.

22 Euripides wrote a *Tyro*: for a summary of its plot, see Gilbert Murray (1943) p. 47. Astydamas the Younger wrote a play entitled *Tyro* (*Souda* A 4265 Adler) as did Karkinos (*Stob. Flor.* 103. 3), both in the 4th century. Sophokles wrote two plays of this name.

23 As well as Menander's *Plokion*, perhaps also his *Kekryphalos* (a kind of woman's head-covering). Plays entitled *Daktylios* were written by Menander, Alexis, Amphis, Philemon and Timokles. Menander, Philemon and Sophilos each wrote a play entitled *Encheiridion*.

24 Gomme and Sandbach (1973) p. 308.

25 For tokens as grave-ornaments cf. Longus *Daphnis and Chloë* 4. 24: Dionysophanes exposed Daphnis with the ornaments not as recognition-tokens but as funeral ornaments (ἐντάφια). For σπάργανα cf. Ch. 1 Part Two, pp. 48 - 50. Γνωρίσματα: Men. *Epit.* 303, Plutarch *Theseus* 4. 1. In Plautus's *Miles Gloriosus* Pyrgopolinices is threatened with the removal of his "abdomen" and its stringing round his neck like a child's "crepundia" (1398 - 1399). Cf. Plaut. *Cistellaria* 635; and Cic. *Brut.* 313: "quoniam totum me non naevo aliquo aut crepundiis, sed corpore omni videris velle cognoscere".

26 Comedies on mythological themes which involved exposure and

recognition were written by Antiphanes (*Aiolos*), Euboulos (*Auge*, *Danaë*, *Ion* - and possibly *Xouthos* - and *Antiope*), and Philyllios (*Auge*). The probable source of Euboulos's *Antiope* was Euripides's play of the same name, and his *Auge* may also have come from Euripides: R. L. Hunter, *Eubulus: The Fragments*, Cambridge 1983, pp. 96 - 97, 104 - 105. Cf. also the list of such comedies made by Gilbert Murray (1943) pp. 49 - 51.

27 T. B. L. Webster, *Studies in Menander*, Manchester 1950, p. 171.

28 There are other non-fictional references to the practice: Aristotle *Rh. Al.* 1421 A 29 (parents love their own offspring more than τῶν ὑποβαλλομένων). In Sparta the wife of King Anaxandrides is said to have been accused of plotting ὑποβλέσθαι (Hdt. 5. 41).

29 *The Law of Athens*, Oxford 1968, vol. 1, pp. 71, 73.

30 *IG* i² 115. 20 - 23.

31 In this sense, I agree with C. Patterson (1985) p. 105 in her view that killing a βρέφος differed legally from killing a παῖς who was a recognised and named member of a family. (However, βρέφος and παῖς are not terms with a particular *legal* significance.)

32 Sextus Empiricus, *Hypot. Pyrrh.* 3. 211: ὁ Σόλων Ἀθηναῖος τὸν περὶ τῶν ἀκρίτων νόμον ἔθετο καθ' ὃν φονεύειν ἕκαστῳ τὸν ἐαυτοῦ παῖδα ἐπέτρεψεν (Ruschenbusch, *Σόλωνος Νόμοι*, F 136 [under Missverständenes und Korruptes]). R. Tolles, *Untersuchungen zur Kindesaussetzung bei den Griechen*, Dissertation Breslau 1941, argues for the law's authenticity. G. van N. Viljoen, "Plato and Aristotle on the exposure of infants at Athens",

Acta Classica 2, 1959, pp. 60 - 63, argues against this. Scholarly opinion in general comes down on the side of rejecting Sextus Empiricus's testimony: Harrison (1968) I p. 71 note 2; L. R. F. Germain, "Aspects du droit d'exposition en Grèce", *Revue Historique du Droit Français et Étranger* 47, 1969, pp. 182 - 183; also Germain, "L'exposition des enfants nouveau-nés dans la Grèce ancienne. Aspects sociologiques", *Recueils de la Société Jean Bodin pour l'Histoire Comparative des Institutions. L'Enfant. 1^{re} Partie: Antiquité - Afrique - Asie*. Brussels 1975, pp. 211 - 246, see pp. 223 - 225.

33 *The Law Code of Gortyn*, edited with introduction, translation and a commentary by R. F. Willetts, *Kadmos*, Supplement 1, Berlin 1967.

34 H. D. Rankin, "Plato's eugenic εὐφημία and ἀπόθεσις in Republic Book V", *Hermes* 93, 1965, p. 407 - 414, especially pp. 411 - 413. Glotz in his article "Expositio", *Daremberg and Saglio* 2. 1, p. 938, had already taken the phrase in the sense of "dans un lieu secret", as had Jowett and Campbell in their edition (*Plato's Republic, Text with Notes and Essays*, Oxford, 1894) vol. III, pp. 231 - 232: "... will be put away in some mysterious unknown place".

35 J. Adam, *The Republic of Plato* edited with critical notes, commentary and appendices, Cambridge, 1902, vol. I, note on 460 c line 18.

36 For the generalised sense see F. M. Cornford, *The Republic of Plato*, Translated with Introduction and Notes, Oxford, 1941, p. 157 and note 1. The latter view is taken by G. van N. Viljoen, "Plato and Aristotle on the exposure of infants at Athens", *Acta Classica*, 2, 1959, pp. 58 - 69, see p. 64.

37 Cornford (1941) p. 155 and note 2; Viljoen (1959) p. 64; J. J.

Mulhern, "Population and Plato's Republic", *Arethusa* 8, 1975, pp. 265 - 281, see pp. 276 - 277. Rankin (1965) p. 410 weighs up the possibilities in respect of the meaning of τρέφειν and τροφή in these passages and concludes that "the ambiguity . . . seems to tend towards physical severity, rather than educational deprivation".

38 " . . . It is not necessary that Plato should be perfectly consistent: he may have altered his mind or may have forgotten", Jowett and Campbell (1894), vol. III, p. 232. Adam (1902) vol. I Appendix 4 (p. 359) argues that *Timaios* 19 A 1 - 5 summarises not the passages in *Republic* Book 5, but the Book 3 passage, 415 B - C. I think this is true of the second sentence of the *Timaios* passage, as I have said above, but I do not think it can be maintained for καὶ μὴν . . . πόλιν.

39 Cornford (1941) p. 155 and note 2; Mulhern (1975) pp. 275 - 276.

40 The mating policy of the *Laws* is examined closely by W. W. Fortenbaugh, "Plato: temperament and eugenic policy", *Arethusa* 8, 1975, pp. 283 - 305.

41 Some translators and commentators, though, have taken πλήθος τέκνων as the understood object of κωλύη (or κωλύει). Viljoen objects to this "that it makes Aristotle regulate only for states which already have some limitation of children, while in fact he laid down the need of such a limitation as a general rule . . .".

42 This passage has been usefully discussed by Viljoen (1959), pp. 66 - 69. E. Eyben, in "Family planning in Graeco-Roman antiquity", *Ancient Society* 11, 1980, pp. 5 - 82, see p. 37, also provides some references and comments on the passage, and points to a "serious difficulty": "how could

Aristotle have moral objections against abortion after sense and life have begun while having no scruples against exposure?" (i.e. insofar as he does not reject exposure as a means of population control for states where public opinion does not oppose it). In answer to this it might be argued that abortion was a direct and (to a sentient creature) painful means of terminating life; exposure did not involve the direct infliction of pain and may have seemed less cruel. Jane M. Oppenheimer discusses the biological implications of Aristotle's comments on abortion in her article "When sense and life begin: Background for a remark in Aristotle's Politics (1335 b 24)", *Arethusa* 8, 1975, pp. 331 - 343. Cf. also Martin P. Golding and Naomi H. Golding, "Population policy in Plato and Aristotle: some value issues", *Arethusa* 8, 1975, pp. 345 - 358, esp. pp. 355 - 356.

43 F. W. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybios*, Oxford, 1957 - 1979, vol. III, pp. 680 - 681; M. Rostovtzeff, *The Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World* Oxford 1976, vol. II, pp. 623 ff., vol. III, pp. 1464 - 1465; A. Landry, "Quelques aperçus concernant la dépopulation dans l'antiquité gréco-romaine", *Revue Historique*, 177, 1936, pp. 1 - 33; Jean Bérard, "Problèmes démographiques dans l'histoire de la Grèce antique", *Population* 2, 1947, pp. 303 - 312; Pierre Salmon, "La population de la Grèce antique: Essai de démographie appliquée à l'antiquité", *Bulletin de la Société Royale Belge de Géographie*, 79, 1955, Fasc. 1 - 2, pp. 34 - 61; A. Aymard and J. Auboyer, *L'Orient et la Grèce Antique, Histoire Générale des Civilisations*, Vol. I, 2nd edition, 1955, pp. 434 ff.; L. P. Wilkinson, *Classical Attitudes to Modern Issues* London, 1979, p. 22; E. Eyben (1980) p. 24; A. W. Gomme, *The Population of Athens in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries BC*, Oxford 1933 p. 81; D. Engels "The use of historical demography in ancient history" *CQ* 34, 1984, pp. 386 - 393, see p. 392.

44 Fr. XV B: ὁ δὲ μοι δοκεῖ δεινότατον, οὐδὲ πενίαν ἔνιοι προφασίζεσθαι

έχοντες, ἀλλ' εὖποροι χρημάτων ὄντες, τινὲς δὲ καὶ πλούσιοι, τολμῶσιν ὅμως τὰ ἐπιγινόμενα τέκνα μὴ τρέφειν, ἵνα τὰ προγενόμενα εὖπορῃ μᾶλλον κτλ. A.C. van Geytenbeek, *Musonius Rufus and Greek Diatribe*, Assen, 1963, pp. 78 - 88, explains and sets in context Musonius's thoughts on the relationship of parents and children.

45 A. Cameron, "The exposure of children and Greek ethics", *CR* 46, 1932, pp. 105 - 114, concluded that "... the views of pagan moralists like Musonius coincided with those of the Christians, and from this time onwards there is no rational defence of infanticide except in the special case of deformed children, and even that soon disappears", but even so, "... the practice of exposure persisted into mediaeval ... times" (p. 113).

46 This depends on whether, in writing the sentence διὰ δὲ πλῆθος τέκνων κτλ., Aristotle had in mind strictly surplus *population*, rather than supernumerary children *in a family*, cf. pp. 190 - 191 above.

47 Much of the ancient evidence and modern scholarship on the subject is reviewed by E. Eyben in "Family planning in Graeco-Roman antiquity", *Ancient Society* 11, 1980, pp. 5 - 82, especially pp. 12 - 24, 32 - 42, 48 - 50. Recently an essay by Ruth Oldenziel has appeared: "The historiography of infanticide in antiquity: a literature stillborn" in *Sexual Asymmetry : Studies in Ancient Society*, edited by Josine Blok and Peter Mason, Amsterdam 1987, pp. 87 - 107.

48 "The exposure of infants at Athens" *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association*, 51, 1920, pp. 134 - 145.

49 "The exposure of children at Athens and the ἐγχυτρίστριαι", *CPh* 17, 1922, pp. 222 - 239.

50 Hesychios E 68 Latte: ἐγχυτρίεις· ἀποκτεινείς· μετενήκται δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς χύτραις ἐκτιθεμένων παίδων. Also Hesychios E 69 Latte: ἐγχυτρίζειν· ἐκτιθέναι βρέφος ἐν χύτρᾳ. *Souda* E 191 Adler: ἐγχυτρίστριαι· αἱ τὰς χοὰς τοῖς τετελευτηκόσιν ἐπιφέρουσι. Μίνως ἢ Περὶ νόμου. ἔλεγον δὲ καὶ τὸ βλάψαι καταχυτρίσαι, ὡς Ἄριστοφάνης. ἐγχυτρίστριάς δὲ λέγεσθαι καὶ ὄσαι τοὺς ἐναγεῖς καθαίρουσιν αἷμα ἐπιχέουσαι ἱερείου, καὶ τὰς θρηνητριάς, ἔτι γε μὴν καὶ τὰς μαίας τὰς ἐκτιθείσας ἐν χύτραις τὰ βρέφη. Cf. Schol. Ar. *Wasps* 289, Schol. Pl. *Minos* 315 c.

51 See D. M. MacDowell's edition of Aristophanes's *Wasps* Oxford 1971, commentary on line 289 and references there.

52 "Sepulturae intra urbem", *Hesperia* 20, 1951, pp. 67 - 134, especially pp. 110 - 134, plates 49 - 54.

53 "Sur quelques bûchers d'enfants découverts dans la ville d'Athènes", *Museum Helveticum* 20, 1963, pp. 10 - 20.

54 Still less specific are the comments of Pliny, *NH* 7. 72, and Juvenal, *Sat.* 15. 139 - 140, cited by Rudhardt. Several Athenian infants are mourned in paintings on lekythoi of the late 5th century: Hilde Rühfel, *Das Kind in der Griechischen Kunst: Von der minoisch-mykenischen Zeit bis zum Hellenismus*, Mainz am Rhein 1984, pp. 110 - 122, Abb. 44 - 49.

55 A. Preus in his article "Biomedical techniques for influencing human reproduction in the fourth century BC", *Arethusa* 8, 1975, pp. 237 - 263, claims the fact that "J. L. Angel found skeletal remains of 175 newborn infants in just one Athenian well" as evidence that many exposed babies were not rescued (p. 256). But Angel in the article in question, "Skeletal

material from Attica", *Hesperia* 14, 1945, pp. 279 - 363, described a find of infant remains from the late Hellenistic period (150 - 1 BC), which "shed no direct light on cause of death: either starvation or plague would seem most plausible" (p. 311). He notes that the well's contents have been ascribed to the consequences of Sulla's siege of Athens in 84 BC.

56 Gomme (1933) Note C: "The size of Athenian families and the exposure of children", pp. 75 - 83.

57 M. H. Hansen, *Democracy and Demography: The Number of Athenian Citizens in the Fourth Century BC*, Denmark 1986, pp. 8 - 12, has now made clear the importance in classical research of rejecting statistics from post-18th-century Europe for these purposes, and of relying instead on computerised models of population, such as those given by Coale and Demeny, *Regional Model Life Tables and Stable Populations*, Princeton New Jersey 1966.

58 "The problem of female infanticide in the Greco-Roman world", *CPh* 75, 1980, pp. 112 - 120.

59 Hansen (1986) pp. 10 -11 too accepts a Roman analogy for the classical Greek population: average life expectancy at birth of about 25 years, and a natural increase in the population of less than 5 per 1000 per year. This estimate is widely accepted: cf. Peter Garnsey, *Famine and Food Supply in the Graeco-Roman World: Responses to Risk and Crisis*, Cambridge 1988, p. 64.

60 Engels postulates "birth and death rates between 34 and 50 per 1000 per year": (1980) p. 118.

61 M. Golden, "Demography and the exposure of girls at Athens" *Phoenix* 35, 1981, pp. 316 - 331; W. V. Harris, "The theoretical possibility of extensive infanticide in the Greco-Roman world", *CQ* 32, 1982, pp. 114 - 116; C. Patterson (1985) pp. 103 - 123.

62 See note 43.

63 I do not think that this can be the import of Sokrates's words as "midwife" to Theaitetos. What the significance of his words is I have attempted to show above at pp. 153 - 155.

64 Tarn and Griffith, *Hellenistic Civilisation*, 3rd edition, London 1952, pp. 100 - 102.

65 "Infanticide in Hellenistic Greece" in *Images of Women in Antiquity* edited by Averil Cameron and Amélie Kuhrt, London and Canberra, 1983, pp. 207 - 222.

66 See above, p. 188. D. Engels (1980) pp. 112 - 114, marshalls the arguments against using material from ancient graves as evidence for sex ratios or age distribution in the population. Cf. also M. Golden (1981) p. 327, and P. Garnsey (1988) pp. 63 - 68, especially p. 67.

67 Bruce W. Mitchell, *A Study of the Figure of the Herdsman in Greek Myth, with reference to the Background and Origins of Literary Bucolic Poetry*, D. Phil. Thesis, Oxford, 1985, p. 277. Cf. G. Binder, *Die Aussetzung des Königskindes: Kyros und Romulus, Beiträge zur Klassischen Philologie*, 10, Meisenheim am Glan, 1964, p. 37.

68 "The literary motif of the exposed child", *Numen* 14, 1967, pp. 209

69 Binder (1964) explores in detail exposure in the Persian tradition, and lists 121 characters both mythical and historical said to have been exposed in the traditions of Greece, the Near East, Israel, Persia, India, Turkey, Mongolia, Germany, and elsewhere.

70 The exposure of Cyrus is alluded to by Isokrates (5. 66), and the nurturing of Cyrus by a bitch is mentioned by Aelian (*VH* 12. 42). Nikolaos of Damascus gives an account, taken from Ktesias, of Cyrus's early life (*FGrH* 90 F 66). In this account Cyrus was not related to Astyages. His father was Atradates, who because of penury had taken to robbery, and his mother Agroste was a goatherd. There is no story of exposure, though the dream of water flowing from his mother does appear, as dreamt by Agroste herself, and when Astyages learned of it he pursued Cyrus unsuccessfully. Shortly before winning a victory over the Medes at Mount Pasargadai, Cyrus looked for the nearby house of his parents where he had spent his childhood, pasturing goats. When he came to his father's house he made a sacrifice of wheatmeal, and using cypress wood and laurel wood made a fire. Immediately from the right came thunder and lightning, and birds of omen showed him the way to Pasargadai.

71 Pauly's *AE* Suppl. 4, 1143.

72 Another incident is recorded by Diodoros (19. 2. 8), in which Agathokles's mother erected a statue to him, and later a swarm of bees was found settled upon it; this was interpreted as a sign of his future glory. Justin (*Epit.* 22. 1) states that Agathokles "ad regni maiestatem ex humili et sordido genere pervenit".

73 H. Berve, *Die Herrschaft des Agathokles*, *Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil.-hist. Klasse*, 1952, Heft 5, especially pp. 4 - 21. Cf. Adolf Bauer, "Die Kyros-Sage und Verwandtes", *Sitzungsberichte der Wiener Akademie, Phil.-hist. Klasse*, 100, 1882, pp. 495 - 578, see 564 ff.; Niese's article "Agathokles" in Pauly's *RE* 756; Binder (1964) p. 72; P. N. Ure, *The Origin of Tyranny*, Cambridge 1922, pp. 208 - 211.

74 H. Berve, *König Hieron II*, *Abhandlungen der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, phil.-hist. Klasse, Neue Folge* Heft 47, 1959, pp. 7 ff., 60 ff., discusses the sources of Justin's account and of the admiration for Hieron found in several Greek and Roman authors.

75 W. W. Tarn, "Two notes on Ptolemaic history: 1. The lineage of Ptolemy", *JHS* 53, 1933, pp. 57 - 61, argued that this story originated around the year 305 BC, and that Arsinoë could not in fact have been descended from the Macedonian royal house; the lineage that makes her a descendant of Amyntas I was invented some years later. F. Jacoby, "Die Schmeichelei des Kallikrates", *Hermes* 69, 1934, pp. 214 - 217 rejects the evidence which Tarn claimed for an early origin of the story that Ptolemy was Philip II's bastard son. Charles F. Edson Jr., "The Antigonids, Heracles and Beroea", *HSCP* 45, 1934, p. 213 - 246 (see p. 222 note 3 and p. 224 note 2) while accepting Tarn's proof of the early date (305) for the legend of Philip II as father of Ptolemy, rejects Tarn's reasoning which led him to conclude that Arsinoë was not an Argead; she was indeed descended from Amyntas I, but the legend which gave Ptolemy direct descent from Philip II was invented to make Ptolemaic claims to Argead blood stronger than those of the Antigonids. Cf. also Pauly's *RE* 23. 2, 1603 ff.; H. Berve, *Das Alexanderreich auf Prosopographischer Grundlage II*, Munich, 1926, pp. 329 - 330.

76 In the case of Pyrrhos of Epeiros, it was precisely because he really *had* been born into the royal line and was, with the help of his friends, able to succeed his father Aiakides, that no exposure-story arose about him. The tale of the vicissitudes of his infancy might otherwise have lent itself to embellishment as an exposure-legend. Plut. *Pyrrh.* 2 - 3 tells the story of the flight into safety of the servants with the infant Pyrrhos after his father Aiakides had been deposed; how they managed the crossing of a fast-flowing river with the help of a man called Achilles; and how Glaukias King of Illyria took pity on the infant and gave him sanctuary; after a boyhood in exile, Pyrrhos returned to the throne of Epeiros (cf. Justin *Epit.* 17. 3. 16 - 22). The episode is probably for the most part historical: P. Lèveque, *Pyrrhos, Bibliothèque des Écoles Françaises d' Athènes et de Rome*, 185, Paris, 1957, pp. 271 - 272. The infant Pyrrhos's adventures were almost as exciting and amazing as an exposure-story, and in themselves they have the effect of presenting him as favoured by providence (or at least by the hero Achilles, from whom Pyrrhos traced his descent) and destined in spite of human hostility, to take his place on the throne.

77 "ΚΥΨΕΛΗ: où avait-on caché le petit Kypsélos?", *REA* 65, 1963, pp. 279 - 289. P. N. Ure (1922) pp. 195 - 207, concludes that Herodotos used κυψέλη in the sense of a large terracotta vase, and he goes on to suggest (pp. 207 - 214) that Kypselos may have adopted or inherited his name not from his infant hiding-place but from the pottery-trade, in which, Ure thinks, either he or his family engaged. Roux, on the other hand, suggests (pp. 288 -289) that the story that Kypselos was hidden in a beehive may have arisen from a false etymology of his name, which was actually taken directly from κυψέλος, a species of swallow which builds a hive-shaped nest, often among the rocks: "Le tyran, comme son totem, ne vivait-il pas ἐν πέτρῃσι ?" (Eëtion and Labda had their house in a village called Petra, according to Herodotos).

78 A summary of scholarly debate on the matter up to the end of the nineteenth century is given by H. Hitzig and H. Blümner, *Des Pausanias Beschreibung von Griechenland*, Leipzig, 1901, commentary on 5.17. 5 (Vol. II pp. 395 - 398); cf. also Ure (1922) pp. 198 - 199. E. Will, *Korinthiaka: Recherches sur l'Histoire et la Civilisation de Corinthe des Origines aux Guerres Médiques*, Paris, 1955, pp. 412 - 414, argues for the tradition that the chest was dedicated by the Kypselids.

79 *The Greek Tyrants*, London 1956, pp. 45 - 47.

80 Binder (1964) says (p. 151) that Nikolaos of Damascus's account contains an exposure, in that Eëtion had the child exposed at Olympia. But the word used is ὑπεκτίθεται, which just means "hides away". Plutarch uses the word ἀποτεθέντα at *Mor.* 164 A, which happens to be one of the terms sometimes used for exposure. But I do not think that Plutarch here consciously represents Labda's action as an act of exposure.

81 "From Oedipus to Periander: lameness, tyranny, incest in legend and history", *Arethusa* 15, 1982, p. 19 - 38.

82 Lloyd deMause, ed., *The History of Childhood*, New York 1974, claims this for infanticide (to which he assimilates exposure) in myth: "The image of Medea hovers over childhood in antiquity, for myth here only reflects reality. . . . [P]arents routinely resolved their anxieties about taking care of children by killing them . . ." (p. 51).

83 L. A. Post, "Dramatic infants in Greek", *Classical Philology* 34, 1939, pp. 193 - 208, see p. 203; G. M. Sifakis, "Children in Greek tragedy", *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 26, 1979, pp. 67 - 80: children represented in Greek tragedy are always the victims of misfortune.

Chapter Three

Ceremonies Performed for Infants

Children born into Greek families embodied hope for the future, a fact of which Homer and Hesiod leave us in no doubt. They were the heirs, the future workers and providers, and the promise of continuation of the family, the kinship group, and the community. In a world in which many fathers died young in battle, and mothers in childbirth, it was natural that children should have had their places in the family and kinship group secured for them from earliest infancy. The desire to secure the child in its place in the ἄγχιστεία, the immediate family group, with all the important consequences of this, was expressed in certain simple ceremonies, given solemnity by their religious content and by the presence of witnesses from among the family members and kinship group. From babyhood Greek children were introduced to the gods and spirits who protected the household, and to the household itself, of which they were formally recognised members.

Part One

Amphidromia

Evidence for the amphidromia

The amphidromia is referred to three times in classical Athenian authors, and their evidence of a custom that was practised in every household of their day is supplemented by the remarks of lexicographers and scholiasts of later centuries who attempted to explain what the amphidromia was. From the apparent copying of second-hand information about this subject by the latter it seems that the custom had fallen into disuse by their time. The evidence about the amphidromia is all from Athens, and if other states celebrated certain family rites for newborn infants, as is likely, nothing is known about them.

The most informative classical reference is found in Plato's *Theaitetos* 160 E - 161 A. Sokrates has been comparing his services in the argument to those of a midwife, and likens Theaitetos's definition of knowledge to a newborn infant, which they have with difficulty brought into the world. "After the birth", he says, "we must run round in a circle performing the amphidromia for it [literally: we must run round its amphidromia] in our argument, examining it lest we fail to notice that that which has been born is not worth rearing but windy and false." Or does Theaitetos think that he must without fail rear his offspring and not expose it, or will he bear to see it examined and not be too angry if someone takes it away, even though it is his firstborn? (see p. 153 above for the text of this passage).

It is interesting that another scrap of classical evidence about the amphidromia also presents it as a ceremony that was the concern of women. In Aristophanes's *Lysistrata*, 757, Lysistrata jokingly refers to the helmet

which one of the women has put under her dress to simulate pregnancy: "Won't you stay here for the amphidromia of the helmet?"

The amphidromia is also mentioned in a fragment of the comic playwright Ehippos which is also (apart from the first three lines) ascribed to Euboulos (Athenaios 9. 370 c - d, 2. 65 c - d). A character in the play asks:

"Then why is it

That there's no garland on the front of the doors,
And no smell of cooking smites the prominent nostrils,
If there's an amphidromia on, in which it is customary
To roast a slice of Chersonese cheese
And to boil a cabbage adorned with olive oil
And to bake little breasts of plump lambs
And to pluck doves and thrushes and chaffinches too
And to nibble little cuttlefish along with sprats
And to beat lots of octopuses very hard
And to drink lots of cups of unmixed wine?" (Ehippos fr. 3 Kassel

and Austin, Euboulos fr. 148 Kassel and Austin).

Euboulos fr. 2 Kassel and Austin, from *Ankulion*, may belong with this fragment, since it refers to the "tenth day" of a baby.¹ In fr. 2 someone addresses a group of women and exhorts them to dance the whole night through on the baby's δεκάτη, and the speaker promises to give as a prize three fillets and five apples and nine kisses (see p. 256 below).

A few more details are given by lexicographers and scholiasts, but it is difficult to tell whether they drew from some source or sources unknown to us, or whether their explanations of the amphidromia are simply the result of conjectures based on the scant evidence outlined above (or, as is likely, both influences are at work in different parts of the lexical references).² According to most of the references, it was round the hearth

that the baby was carried at a run (schol. Plat. *Thet.* 161 A, Harpokration *σ.κ. ἀμφιδρόμια* (l. 27. 6 - 9 Dindorf), Hesychios A 95 Latte, *Souda* A 1722 Adler, Photios A 1317 Theodoridis). Hesychios, under *δρομιάμφιον ἥμαρ* (Δ 99 Latte), says that those who ran round the hearth did so naked.³ The scholion on Aristophanes *Lys.* 757, however, says that they ran round the baby as it lay. Most scholars accept that the amphidromia did involve running round the hearth, and reject the testimony of the scholion on *Lysistrata*.⁴ The hearth in a Greek household was a holy place, and it has been thought appropriate in various ways as the centre of this ceremony. On the other hand, there is nothing inherently inappropriate about putting the infant in its cradle or directly on the ground and running round it. Soranus in his *Gynaecology* notes, in the context of how to recognise that which is worth rearing, that one of the first things to be done by the midwife after the birth of a child is to place it upon the ground (l. 26. 79 = 248. 14 - 15 Rose). There are a few Roman references to this, and to the related custom of standing a newborn infant upon the ground, but it is impossible to say whether it was really a Greek custom also, and, if it was, whether it was connected with the running round.⁵

Two of the late sources give the information that the women who had assisted at the birth purified their hands on the day of the amphidromia (schol. Plat. *Thet.* 161 A, *Souda* A 1722 Adler). Presents were given by the members of the household and relatives (schol. Plat. *Thet.* 161 A says that the presents were given to the child; Harpokration *loc. cit.* and Photios *loc. cit.* that they were given to those who carried the child round the hearth; *Souda* A 1722 Adler and Hesychios A 95 Latte do not specify to whom the presents were given). All the above sources except Hesychios add that the presents were usually octopuses and cuttlefish, which seem unlikely gifts for a baby. The list of things to eat at the amphidromia in Euboulos fr. 148 includes octopus and cuttlefish. Probably guests usually contributed to the feast,⁶ and if octopus and cuttlefish were traditional constituents of it, they would

often have brought these. But there is reason to believe that other gifts besides eatables were brought, especially for the child - as presents from the relatives, friends and members of the household.⁷ In Bekker, *Anecdota Graeca* I. 207. 14 and Photios A 1317 Theodoridis, a sacrifice to the gods is said to have taken place during the amphidromia.⁸ According to the reference to the amphidromia in *Etymologicon Magnum* (89. 54 - 90. 5), a loaf was baked in the ashes during this ceremony.

The date of the amphidromia

Accounts vary as to the date on which the amphidromia was held. Some say it was on the fifth day after the birth (schol. Plat. *Thet.* 161 A, *Souda* A 1722 Adler), Hesychios (Δ 99 Latte) that it was on the seventh, and the scholiast on Ar. *Lys.* 757 says it was held on the tenth. The others do not specify the day. In some of the above sources the occasion of the amphidromia is said to have been the day on which the baby was also named (schol. Ar. *Lys.* 757, schol. Plat. *Thet.* 161 A, Harpok. I. 27. 6 - 9 Dindorf, and Hesychios A 95 Latte). Only *Souda* A 1722 Adler (followed exactly by Apostolios 2. 56) makes a definite distinction between the amphidromia, held on the fifth day, and the naming ceremony held on the tenth. The rest of the evidence seems to indicate that the two ceremonies may often have coincided, but that the usual day for naming was the tenth day, with the occasional alternative of the seventh (cf. pp. 257 - 259 below).

Women's role in the amphidromia

The reference to the amphidromia in Plato's *Theaitetos* shows that it was at least sometimes the job of the midwife to assist the mother with this ceremony, and that it was connected with the decision to rear a healthy and well-formed child. That women played the most prominent role in the amphidromia is suggested by several other passages. The women who had assisted at the birth purified their hands for the amphidromia (schol. Pl. *Tht.*, *Souda loc. cit.*, see p. 249 above): this was to cleanse themselves of the ritual pollution that attached to birth, and it would be a prerequisite of every Greek rite, as it was of Roman religious ceremonies, that those about to pray or take part in a ceremony must first wash their hands.⁹ It is likely that it was one of the women involved in the birth – possibly the midwife, possibly accompanied by the mother of the woman who had given birth, and perhaps often by the baby's mother herself – who carried the child round the hearth. The *Theaitetos* reference suggests this. The feminine gender of the participle, τρέχουσαι, in the Scholiast's commentary on this passage, need not be a careless corruption of τρέχοντες, but could well be a straightforward, and correct, interpretation of what Plato in fact indicated.¹⁰ The other commentators may simply use the masculine gender for a generalised, undetermined subject: none of them states precisely who did the running round. In Euripides's *Elektra* (652 – 654), Elektra pretends that she has given birth to a son, so as to bring Klytaimestra to her: she requires her mother's help for the purification ceremony after the birth, and when Klytaimestra arrives, asks her to perform the sacrifice for her, since she does not know how to, not having borne a child before (1124 – 1127). Klytaimestra replies that the midwife should have done this (1128), but agrees to perform it herself (1132 – 1133). Here there is no suggestion of a carrying round the hearth (and since the baby did not exist that would have been impossible anyway), but this rite of purification and sacrifice

performed by women may also have been part of the amphidromia in the real households of classical Athens.¹¹ This is not to say that men were not present at the amphidromia, or took no part in the proceedings – it seems to have been a family ceremony to which relatives and friends were invited – but on the whole the evidence leads to the conclusion that women did the "running round" and performed whatever rites of purification and sacrifice belonged to the occasion. And the task of cooking the feast (cf. Euboulos fr. 148 [see p. 248 above]) probably fell to the women members of the family in many households.

The significance of the amphidromia

As for the significance of the amphidromia, Plato's reference in *Theaitetos* suggests that it was linked with the acceptance of a newborn child by its parents and its reception into the family.¹² Plato's reference to the amphidromia also suggests that it may have involved a kind of ritual inspection (cf. pp. 254 – 255 below). The actual acknowledgement by a father that the child was his own offspring was part of the naming ceremony (see Part Two below), which probably often occurred on the same occasion as the amphidromia. But the act of carrying round the hearth, even if it was performed on the same day, was distinct from the act of naming, and was, as we have seen, performed by women. The amphidromia would never have been performed for a child whom it had been decided to expose, and exposure was the alternative to holding the amphidromia: this is the point of the *Theaitetos* passage. The amphidromia then was not the official acknowledgement of paternity, but it was a ceremony of acceptance into the household and of introduction to the family cult.¹³ Family religion was one of the most important fundamentals of Athenian private life. It was appropriate that the hearth should have been the focal point of this

ceremony, since it was the holy place of the house and acceptance there meant acceptance by the whole family.¹⁴ H. J. Rose ([1957] p. 110) interprets the run round the hearth as a ritual for "blowing off [the baby's] strangeness and at the same time exposing it to the beneficent radiation of Hestia"; and the nakedness of the runners as a magical way of eliminating hindrances and promoting the influence of the ritual; "thus at one and the same ceremony he is rid of whatever is strange and uncanny in his newness . . . and assimilated to his human status as a member of a particular family".

The amphidromia may also have had the significance of a purification rite. Birth like death carried pollution.¹⁵ The women who had assisted at the birth purified their hands for the amphidromia, since they had been polluted by contact with the birth. Presumably the baby and its mother also required purification, as well as anyone else who had come into contact with them. Some scholars have argued that this was the purpose of running round the hearth, with its purificatory and apotropaic fire.¹⁶ Others deny that the run round the fire in the hearth had any such significance.¹⁷ The purification of the women's hands was probably done by washing, but it is possible that carrying the infant round the hearth was thought to have cathartic significance, and to be an apotropaic measure too, to keep hostile *daimones* from harming ^{the} vulnerable child.¹⁸ From Hesychios (Σ 1791 Schmidt) we learn that it was the custom in Attika whenever a boy was born to put a garland of olive before the doors, and for a girl, wool, because of the wool-spinning she would do later in life. This is a rationalistic explanation for the custom and not its original reason, according to Deubner.¹⁹ He says that the woollen fillet would originally have been attached to the wreath to enhance its effect, which was apotropaic. To the apotropaic function of the olive and wool, others have added the suggestion of their cathartic value.²⁰ By classical times they were probably also seen as symbols of the child's future sphere of activity. They may also have been useful as a means of indicating to outsiders that a child had just been

born,²¹ and of announcing its sex, and, to anyone sharing the fears and scruples of Theophrastos's Superstitious Man, as a warning not to set foot inside the house! Photios II 128. 6 - 9 Naber says that when a child was born the house was daubed with pitch to drive away the *daimones*.

Other suggestions have been made about the religious significance of the amphidromia. Glotz wished to see in it the last vestige of a very ancient superstition, that of the trial or ordeal by fire, which both tested the child's descent from good stock, its legitimacy, and at the same time tempered its body, to make it strong and vigorous. He cites the mythical testing by Thetis of her offspring in boiling water and fire as an example of a belief which, he says, was shared by Greeks and Semites. C. Gruppe saw in the amphidromia a clear suggestion of decision by ordeal whether to rear the child: originally, he conjectures, the child was held, perhaps in a winnowing fan, long enough over the fire for the participants to complete a quick run round the altar, and the less harsh customs of later times modified this to the carrying round of the child. J.-P. Vernant expanded this hypothesis into a ritual in which the infant was both carried round the fire and deposited on the ground by the hearth, both of which actions have, in myth, the significance of a trial imposed on the child. In the amphidromia, he says, this was a ritual test of legitimacy, at the end of which the child has been connected to the domestic hearth and is accepted and acknowledged by its father.²² Vernant does not say what the sign that the child was illegitimate would have been in this test. The amphidromia was only performed for an infant whose father had already decided to accept and not expose it, as Vernant acknowledges, so presumably the trial was purely symbolic, and its outcome already known. Whether the ritual element of the amphidromia really did have such a significance for the Greeks who practised it is impossible to know for certain. But it is certainly connected by Plato in the *Theaitetos* with an inspection of the child (160 E 6 - 161 A 1), which suggests that the ceremony of the amphidromia did include at

least a ritual *inspection* (even if not a *test*). This could have been a symbolic re-enacting of the actual inspection carried out at birth: a ritual that was carried out only for infants that had passed their initial examination and had survived the first few days after birth, a ceremonial inspection whose outcome was in fact already known.

Not content with ordeal by fire, lustration, catharsis, apotropaic power, or ritual of acceptance, as the possible significance of the amphidromia, some scholars wish it to be regarded as a ceremony in which the important element was the running.²³ According to this explanation, the relation with the hearth was of secondary importance. The significance of the running by the participants lay in the power that was supposed to be transferred, by sympathetic means, to the development of the child's limbs, and in particular to his ability to run in later life. Various examples are cited of the belief found in other cultures that a certain act performed by a newborn child's parent will influence in a mystical or magical way the child's health and welfare.

Part Two

Naming

The naming of a newborn infant must have been carried out at all times and in all places. The ancient Greek evidence for the family ceremony and the legal significance of naming all comes from Athens, though it is likely that naming in other Greek states too was marked by a ceremony of some kind within the family, and that it also had significance for a father's acknowledgement of paternity elsewhere in Greece.

The δεκάτη

Euboulos fr. 2 (Kassel and Austin) shows that the δεκάτη was connected with dancing festivities, which could be prolonged into the night:

εἶέν γυναικες· νῦν ὅπως τὴν νύχθ' ὄλην
ἐν τῇ δεκάτῃ τοῦ παιδίου χορεύσετε.
θήσω δὲ νικητήριον τρεῖς ταινίας
καὶ μῆλα πέντε καὶ φιλήματ' ἑννέα.

In Aristophanes's *Birds* 494 - 498, Euelpides tells how the crowing of a cock in the evening was the occasion of his losing his best cloak of Phrygian wool. He was once invited to a baby's δεκάτη, he says, and he had a bit to drink in town, and then he fell asleep, and before the others dined the cock crowed. And thinking it was dawn, he set off home to Halimous. It was on his way home that he was attacked and robbed of his cloak. This vignette also suggests that the festivities connected with the δεκάτη took place in the evening. At lines 922 - 923 of the same play there is a fanciful reference to the naming of the imaginary city of Nephelokokkygia and the celebration of its δεκάτη: the expression used is θύω τὴν δεκάτην, which

shows that a sacrifice was offered. This brief passage makes it perfectly clear that the δεκάτη was the occasion on which a baby was given its name:

οὐκ ἄρτι θύω τὴν δεκάτην ταύτης ἐγὼ,
καὶ τοῦνομ' ὡσπερ παιδίω νῦν δὴ 'θέμεν;

The scholion on *Birds* 494 quotes a line from Euripides's lost *Aigeus*:

τί σε μάτηρ ἐν δεκάτῃ τόκου ὠνόμαζεν; (fr. 2 Nauck).

These references to naming on the tenth day are corroborated by a couple of passages in Attic orators. In Demosthenes's speech *Against Boiotos* (39. 22, cf. 40. 28), Mantitheos says that Boiotos claimed that his (Mantitheos's) father observed the tenth day for Boiotos and named him: to testify to this Boiotos had produced witnesses. Mantitheos adds that no one would observe the δεκάτη for a child whom he did not believe to be his, nor, having observed it and loved the child as his own, would he afterwards deny him. In Isaios's speech *On the Estate of Pyrrhos* (3. 30, 70) the speaker says that witnesses have given evidence that they were present at the δεκάτη of the child claimed to be their nephew's daughter, and testified that the child was given the name Kleitarete by her father, after her grandmother²⁴; these great-uncles claimed that they took part in the celebrations on this occasion.

The date of naming

The testimony of a passage in Book 7 of Aristotle's *HA*, however, muddies the waters a little with regard to the date of naming (cf. chapter 1 note 2 on the authorship of *HA* 7). In a brief passage on convulsions in babies, their frequency and causes, the author makes the following remark:

τὰ πλείστα δ' ἀναιρεῖται πρὸ τῆς ἐβδόμης· διὸ καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα
τότε τίθενται, ὡς πιστεύοντες ἤδη μᾶλλον τῇ σωτηρίᾳ (7. 12,

This is usually taken to mean that most of the infant deaths that occur, occur before the seventh day (rather than that most infants born die before the seventh day). For this reason their parents give them their names then (that is, on the seventh day), relying on their greater chance of survival. This offers an explanation for the custom of waiting a few days before performing a ceremony for a newborn infant: when neonatal mortality was so high, it was prudent, no doubt for emotional and psychological reasons, as well as economic, to hold the required ceremonies only after the infant had shown a sign of its ability to survive (the hebdomad was important in this context in popular belief and had found its way into medical thought too, in some circles, cf. pp. 41, 46 above), and this had become a custom followed by everyone. The choice of the tenth as the day for naming may have been more usual, but it cannot have been universal, even in Athens, in the fourth century BC, if we are to trust the unknown Peripatetic who was responsible for this passage in *HA* Book 7.

The lexicographers and scholiasts reflect this difference: all give the tenth as the date of naming, and some also give the seventh as an alternative (schol. Ar. *Lys.* 757, schol. Ar. *Birds* 494, 922, Harpok. *s.v.* ἑβδομηρομένη [l 102. 14 - 103. 4 Dindorf], Hesychios Δ 67, cf. E 73 Latte, *Souda* A 1722, Δ 186, E 26 Adler, Bekker, *Anecdota Graeca* I. 237. 26).

Probably, then, the name was normally given on the tenth day, but could be given as early as the seventh, but not normally earlier than that. The naming occasion possibly sometimes coincided with the amphidromia. Even if we disregard all the post-classical sources as being untrustworthy, the distinction between amphidromia and δεκάτη is not quite so clear-cut as has recently been maintained.²⁵ Feasting is mentioned for both festivals (see pp. 248, 256 above). The participation of women seems to have been a part of both (see pp. 247 - 248, 251 - 252, 257 above). The name could be given on the seventh day (see pp. 257 - 258 above). A sacrifice was offered

in connection with the women's purification ceremony, and also at the naming (see pp. 251 - 252, 256 - 257 above). Would many households have stretched to two separate feasts within days of each other, in honour of the same newborn infant? Richard Hamilton offers the suggestion that "the whole ritual complex - the running around, sacrifice, preparation for feast, feast - could take several days" (Hamilton [1984] p. 250). But then what are we to make of Plato's contrasting of the conspicuous pomp and feasting enjoyed by the Persians for the birth of an heir to the throne with the home-life of the typical Athenian: "when we are born, as the comic playwright says, even the neighbours hardly notice anything" (*A/k.* I 121 c 7 - D 2)? It is probably safe to assume that when the amphidromia and the naming were performed for the same infant on different days, the feasting would not have been done twice over, and that it would normally have been reserved for the tenth-day naming, as being the more social occasion, the occasion on which friends and relatives were required as witnesses.²⁶

The significance of the naming ceremony

But as far as the significance of the rite is concerned, there is indeed an important distinction between naming and the amphidromia. It appears from two speeches of Demosthenes (39 and 40) that a father's act of naming his child had special significance for his acknowledgement of paternity. The first speech, *Against Boiotos, concerning the name*, was delivered by Mantitheos, the son of Mantias, against a man who claimed also to be the son of Mantias and to be entitled to call himself Mantitheos. The speaker was unsuccessful, and Boiotos, alias Mantitheos, was thus recognised by the court as being Mantias's son (by another woman) and as being entitled to use the name Mantitheos. The second speech, *Against Boiotos, concerning his mother's dowry*, probably not by Demosthenes

though attributed to him, was also made by Mantitheos against the same man, as a claim to withhold from his two half-brothers the portion of his father's estate which was brought by his mother as her dowry - since his mother was not their mother. The verdict in this case is unknown.

A detailed explanation of all the circumstances surrounding both speeches and of the significance of the speeches for filiation and paternity has been given by Jean Rudhardt.²⁷ He shows that Boiotos (as we shall call him to distinguish him from Mantitheos the speaker of the speeches) was the son of Mantias by his first marriage to Plangon, and that when he celebrated the δεκάτη for him, Mantias gave him the name Mantitheos, his own father's name, as was customary for the firstborn son in Athenian families. Soon afterwards he began to suspect Plangon's fidelity, and repudiated her, all the more readily since her dowry had never been paid, and he then ceased to regard the boy as his son, no longer believing himself to be the father. The boy spent his childhood with Plangon and her family, and became known as Boiotos, the name of one of his uncles. Mantias married again, and when a child was born of this union he named him Mantitheos, and presented him to his phratry and had him registered in the deme under this name, thus declaring his paternity. But at a later date Mantias resumed relations with Plangon, and another son, Pamphilos, was born. Mantias maintained her in comfort with her two sons, and, although he was probably still living with his second wife, again treated Plangon as a wife, as if he had never divorced her. But Boiotos had not been introduced by Mantias to his phratry and was thus not officially recognised as his son - a very serious matter, as it deprived him of inheritance rights. When he attempted to force Mantias by means of legal action to acknowledge him, Mantias asked Plangon, who was required to take an oath before an arbitrator, not to swear that Boiotos was his son. Plangon agreed, with the inducement of a payment of 30 minas. But when called upon to take the oath, she broke her promise to Mantias and swore that Boiotos, and Pamphilos too, were sons of Mantias.

This act compelled Mantias to acknowledge Boiotos.

Mantias had already acknowledged Boiotos in the private family ceremony of the δεκάτη (39. 22 and 40. 28). This was not enough in itself to make him legally recognised as Mantias's son, although together with Plangon's oath that Mantias was the father it probably would have been. When presented as evidence in a court of law, these two things would probably have gained a verdict that Mantias must acknowledge him as his son: the threat of such legal action was sufficient to make Mantias attempt to persuade Plangon not to take the oath. There is mention in the speeches of ποιεῖσθαι as the act of "making" someone one's son (39. 35, 40. 29); this ποίησις signifies the making of an Athenian child of legitimate birth the member of a family and the son of a particular father, either by acknowledgement of a child of the same blood or by adoption. Leaving aside adoption which does not apply here, the ποίησις which Boiotos demanded and eventually obtained was constituted by a number of acts, the first of which was the celebration of the δεκάτη. The next was the introduction to and registration in the phratry (see Part Three below). Over the years other acts completed the ποίησις, including registration in the deme; eventually its subject was accepted into the family, the phratry and the city.

The celebration of the δεκάτη was the first step in this process, but it was not an irrevocable one, as is shown by Dem. 39. 39:

εἰ δ' ὁ μὲν νόμος, ὃν πάντες ἐπίστασθ' ὁμοίως ἐμοί, τοὺς
γονέας ποιεῖ κυρίους οὐ μόνον θέσθαι τοῦνομ' ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἀλλὰ
κἂν πάλιν ἐξαλείψαι βούλωνται κάποκῆρυξαι κτλ.

But, having acknowledged a child at the naming ceremony, a father could revoke this probably only if he had reason to believe the child was illegitimate, by the formal act of repudiation, ἀποκήρυξις. Aristotle says that the witness of legitimacy or illegitimacy always rested with the mother: "As far as children are concerned, it is above all the women that

define the truth" (*Rhet.* 2. 23, 1398 B), and he gives a few examples of this, one of which is the present case. Plangon's oath seems to bear this out. Had she refused to swear that Boiotos was Mantias's son, Boiotos's case would have been ruined. Since she swore that he was his son, and Mantias had already given him a name, Mantias was left with no option but to introduce and register him in the phratry. But in Andokides's speech *On the Mysteries* (1. 125) we find a man swearing on oath that a child is not his, even though the mother claims that he is. However, the details of this case are not completely clear, and the man later did acknowledge his paternity of the boy. In practice one can imagine few mothers testifying that a child was illegitimate. Revocation of acknowledgement of paternity must have been very rare, and when it did happen, it was a very serious matter, which would have affected a man's whole life: in his family relationship and place in family worship, in his claim to inheritance, and in some cases in his ability to prove his right to citizenship if this were contested.²⁸

The significance for the first speech of Mantias's celebration of the δεκάτη for Boiotos - a point evidently made much of by Boiotos in his own speech (39. 22, 40. 28) - lies in the proof it gives of Boiotos's entitlement to the name Mantitheos, which is the subject at issue. (Boiotos had refused to accept an earlier verdict about the inheritance which was given against him, claiming that he was not Boiotos but Mantitheos.) For Boiotos was born first - Plangon having been Mantias's first wife - and so was given his paternal grandfather's name. The significance of the celebration of the δεκάτη with regard to Boiotos's eventual full acknowledgement lies in the fact that the name was never formally withdrawn by Mantias (by ἀποκήρυξις) - if it had been, Mantitheos would certainly have used it as his chief weapon in his first speech. Having carried out the first step in acknowledgement, Mantias was obliged, since he could not obtain Plangon's word that the boy was not his, to carry out the completion of acknowledgement. This must have been the general rule that

applied in such cases in Athens.

Part Three

Registration in the phratry

The amphidromia was performed for a child whose father had decided to acknowledge it, and he declared his acknowledgement of the baby by giving it a name in the presence of the family members. But these were only the first steps in the formal acknowledgement of a legitimate child, and for a son so acknowledged, and perhaps also for a daughter, a father was obliged to perform certain other acts during the course of its childhood, in order to ensure its public acceptance as a legitimate child born of citizen parents, with important consequences for the inheritance rights and indirect significance for the citizenship of the child. We are concerned here only with events in infancy, and it appears that one of the acts which confirmed a Greek person's filiation was usually performed during infancy, namely registration in one of the phratries (φρατρίαί), the ancient "brotherhoods" or kinship groups, which persisted in importance long after Kleisthenes had substituted organisation into geographical, rather than tribal, units as the prerequisite of citizenship. From the references to phratry membership in Attic orators it appears that in the fifth and fourth centuries in Athens it could be invoked as evidence of legitimate birth as acknowledged by the father, and of entitlement to citizenship. Evidently it was a universal custom among Athenian citizen families to enrol their young in the phratries.

At Athens, and in other Ionian cities, the introduction of children into their father's phratry took place during the annual festival of the Apatouria, in the month of Pyanopsion (corresponding to October/November). This festival was celebrated over three days, the last of which, designated Κουρεῶτις, was the day for introduction to the phratry. The phrase used for this was ἄγειν or εἰσάγειν εἰς τοὺς φράτερας. For the rules and procedures of

the phratries with regard to admission there is scattered evidence in the literary sources, in particular in the orators, supplemented chiefly by an inscription recording decrees made by a phratry in Dekeleia in Attika in 396/5 BC and after, the so-called "Demotionid Decrees".²⁹

The age of admission

The age at which a person was admitted to the phratry was evidently important. Lysias in his speech *Against Nikomachos* (30. 2) uses the following insinuations to cast doubt on Nikomachos's origins: "Now, to tell how Nikomachos's father was a public slave, and what kind of things he himself practised when he was young, and what age he was when he was introduced to the members of the phratry, would be a long story."³⁰ It was normal to be introduced to the phratry by one's father when one was a young child, and a late introduction suggested to suspicious minds that one's qualifications for membership were dubious. The references to admission to phratries found in classical literature indicate that it was done in infancy, probably soon after birth. In Demosthenes's speech *Against Euboulides* 57. 54, Euxitheos makes the point that his relatives are helping him because it is right, and not because he has induced them to: "When I was an infant they introduced me at once to the members of the phratry (παιδίον ὄντα μ' εὐθέως ἤγον εἰς τοὺς φράτερας), and they took me to the [shrine] of Apollo Patroios (or, perhaps, they introduced me to the cult of A. P.: εἰς Ἀπόλλωνος πατρώου μ' ἤγον), and to the other holy places (εἰς τὰλλ' ἱερά). And yet I do not suppose that as a child I induced them to do these things by giving them money. In fact my father himself when he was alive swore the oath customary to the members of the phratry and introduced me, knowing that I was a citizen born of a citizen woman married to him, and witnesses have testified to these facts".³¹ In Andokides's speech *On the Mysteries* (1.

126), Kallias's son was a παιδίον when his relatives first attempted to get him introduced to the phratry. Kiron was also introduced to the phratry when he was an infant: in Isaios's speech *On the Estate of Kiron* (8. 19) he says that his father introduced his children to the members of the phratry ἐπειδὴ ἐγενόμεθα. Similarly, Sositheos introduced his son Euboulides into the phratry of Hagnias (in order to make a claim on the boy's behalf to the estate of Hagnias, whose ἐπίκληρος, he claimed, was Sositheos's wife and the boy's mother) "when he was born" (ἐπειδὴ δ' οὐτοσί ὁ παῖς ἐγένετο) according to Demosthenes's speech *Against Makartatos, regarding the Estate of Hagnias* (43. 11). In the speech attributed to Demosthenes, *Against Neaira* (59. 57 - 59), the speaker tells how Phrastor had taken as wife the non-citizen daughter of Neaira, having been told that she was a citizen; when Phrastor found out the truth he sent away his wife, who was now pregnant. But when he fell ill and was nursed back to strength by his wife and Neaira, he decided to take back the baby (τὸ παιδίον) and make him (ποιήσασθαι, cf. p. 261 above) his son, since he thought that he would not last long and did not wish to die without an heir. It was while he was still in a state of weakness from his illness that Phrastor attempted to introduce the child to his phratry: the child was therefore still in its infancy, probably in its first year. Presentation at this age is confirmed by a phrase in one of the Demotionid decrees, enacting that the name of each candidate for introduction was to be inscribed and posted up "in the first year or the year in which he offers the κούρεον" (τῶι πρώτῳ ἔτει ἢ ὧι ἂν τό κούρεον ἄγει, IG ii²1237. 118 - 119).³² So, when we hear the Chorus in Aristophanes's *Frogs* insulting Archedemos

ὅς ἐππέτης ὦν οὐκ ἔφυσε φράτερας (line 422),

the point of the insult is clear: Archedemos, though seven years old, had not grown - and we expect the word "teeth" to follow, instead of which Aristophanes slyly slips in "phratry members".³³ The joke depends on the

fact that anyone with a claim to legitimate birth may be expected to be a member of a phratry (which Archedemos apparently is not); and furthermore that introduction to a phratry regularly took place within the first few years of life. The joke does not rely on seven years being the upper age-limit for introduction to the phratry; seven being rather the significant age for cutting one's second teeth.³⁴

The entry in the *Etymologicon Magnum* under Ἀπατούρια (118. 54 - 119. 1) says that at this festival Athenian fathers registered children born in that year. But Proclus in his Commentary on Plato's *Timaios* (27 E, 88. 11 - 23 Diehl) records of the Apatouria, among other things, that on the third (Κουρεῶτις) day of the festival boys (κούρους) were registered in the phratries at the age of three or four (τριετείς ἢ τετραετείς ὄντας) (cf. schol. Pl. *Tim.* 21 B, where the same information is given).³⁵ L. Deubner, interpreting this as "in their third or fourth year" adduced as confirmation of this Philostratos's statement (*Heroik.* 12. 2) that Athenian children were crowned with a garland of flowers at the Anthesteria in the third year from their birth.³⁶ Deubner interprets this as a ceremony of blessing for children, who by their third year had survived the most dangerous years of infancy, and he connects it with Proclus's testimony about the age of introduction to the phratry, arguing that the ceremony at the Anthesteria in early spring for each child preceded his introduction to the phratry in the Apatouria of the following autumn: children whose third birthday fell after the Anthesteria and before the Apatouria would be presented to the phratry in their fourth year, and those who had their third birthday between the months Pyanopsion and Anthesterion would have been presented in their third year. But even if the ages fit this suggestion (though τριετείς ἢ τετραετείς is better understood as "three or four years old"), they are attested only by late sources, and there is no evidence that children were always presented to the phratry in the autumn following their garlanding at the Anthesteria. The classical sources suggest that the introduction to the

phratry was done earlier in infancy than the third year (as we have seen above). Beauchet is probably right in saying that there was no fixed *rule* about the age of introduction.³⁷ But there was presumably a general custom. Beauchet points out that it was in the interest of the establishment of the child's legitimacy for the parents to present it to the phratry as soon as possible (*ibid*). And the evidence comes down in favour of introduction at the next Apatouria after the child was born.

It was certainly possible to depart from this norm, and introduce a child at a later age, if for some reason it had not been possible to effect the introduction in early infancy, for example, in introducing an adopted son (cf. Is. 7. 16). Several references in Attic orators show that phratries accepted people introduced even in adulthood (and in each case the speaker is able to use the late introduction to suggest serious irregularities in the person's status or claims).³⁸

A second presentation

In one of the decrees made by the Dekteleia phratry in 396/5 a resolution was passed that notice was to be given to the phratry members of candidates about to be introduced, whose names were to be posted up "in the first year or in the year in which he offers the κούρειον". It appears from this phrase that there were two different occasions when a child could be presented to the phratry. One was in its first year, as we have seen. The other, the year in which the κούρειον was offered, may have been a second presentation, or an alternative occasion of presentation.

Pollux (8. 107) records only one presentation for boys, which happened εἰς ἡλικίαν προελθόντων, and the κούρειον was sacrificed. Part of Pollux's testimony in this passage, about an offering called γαμηλία made for girls on coming of age, is inaccurate (see p. 272 below). But it is

possible that he does preserve an account accurate in part, and that the κούρειον really was offered for boys when they "came of age", which here probably means the age of puberty.

Rudhardt discerns confirmation of a double presentation in some words used by Demosthenes in *Against Boiotos* (39. 4).³⁹ It seems, he says, that the two ceremonies were normally separated by many years: the first in infancy, the second at puberty. But in the case of a late presentation, like that of Boiotos, the two ceremonies were performed much more closely together - either within a year or two of each other, or even at the same Apatouria. Rudhardt wishes to assign two distinct functions to the two ceremonies: the first was to present, the second to register. He bases this interpretation on a sentence in which the speaker recalls how it was that Boiotos and Plangon's other son Pamphilos came to be given full recognition as Mantias's sons:

εἰσήγαγ' , ἐποίησατο, ἵνα τὰμ μέσῳ συντέμῳ, ἐγγράφει τοῖς
Ἄπατουρίοις τουτονὶ μὲν Βοιωτὸν εἰς τοὺς φράτερας, τὸν δ'
ἕτερον Πάμφιλον κτλ.

Rudhardt translates: "Mantias les introduisit; il les reconnut, bref, pour passer sous silence les intermédiaires, il les fit inscrire dans sa phratrie, celui-ci sous le nom de Boiôtos, le second sous le nom de Pamphile".

But I do not think that registration could normally have taken place only years after the initial introduction and acceptance by the phratry. The phrase in Dem. 39. 4, ἵνα τὰμ μέσῳ συντέμῳ, may naturally be taken as going with the whole sentence, not just with ἐγγράφει. If there had been no registration on the first occasion, the phratry members would have had only their own memories on which to rely for the first introduction. On the first introduction the father swore the oath and the phratry members voted: what was the purpose of this if not to get the child registered? References to introduction and registration in the orators do not suggest that they were separate functions of two distinct ceremonies.⁴⁰

If a child presented to the phratry in infancy was registered on that occasion, what need was there for a second presentation at the end of childhood? This question is not directly answered by the sources, but it is not difficult to envisage an occasion which would have necessitated a second presentation, accompanied by sacrifice, to the phratry. Boys who had been introduced to the phratry in infancy must at some point have become full participating members, with the privileges and responsibilities (such as voting) attached to phratry membership. This would have been a natural occasion for further sacrifice and a second "introduction" ("presentation" is a better term) to the members, and it probably took place at coming-of-age.⁴¹

The existence of two presentations to the phratry is relevant to the distinction between the two sacrifices of which we hear in the context of introductions to the phratry: μέλον and κούρειον. A distinction is drawn between them in the first decree of the Dekeleia phratry, in the context of the priest's perquisites (IG11²1237. 5 - 6, cf. p. 273 below). Scholiasts and lexicographers mention both μέλον and κούρειον, without making clear in what the distinction between them lay (*Et. Mag.* 533. 29 - 40, Harpokration s.v. μέλον and μειαγωγός (I 200. 15 - 201. 9 Dindorf), schol. Ar. *Frogs* 798). Some scholars follow certain ancient commentators in deriving κούρειον from κοῦρος, and Wyse points out an analogy with the corresponding παιδήϊον at Delphi.⁴² Others derive κούρειον from κείρειν, and conclude that it was a sacrifice connected with the cutting of hair, a rite performed at puberty.⁴³ The latter derivation is convincingly argued by Jules Labarbe, who connects a reference to a pastoral sacrifice called κούρειον, in an inscription from the Mykale peninsula, with the annual shearing, κουπά, and concludes that this confirms that the κούρειον of the phratries was connected with a rite of hair cutting. He goes on to confirm, from the reference to the κούρειον in Is. 6. 2, and his interpretation of the

complicated chronology of this speech, that this was normally offered at the introduction of boys who had reached the age of puberty, which in official terms at Athens coincided with the end of their sixteenth year (cf. the phrase ἐπὶ δίετες ἠβῆσαι for the completion of the eighteenth year).⁴⁴ The μείον, the "lesser" sacrifice, was the smaller of the two, and the priest of the Dekeleia phratry was given smaller perquisites from it than from the κούρειον (see p. 273 below). The μείον, then, was the sacrifice offered at the introduction of infants, and the κούρειον the larger sacrifice made at the presentation of boys after their sixteenth year.⁴⁵

The introduction of girls

Phratries, societies of φράτρες, a word which originally meant "brothers" (though it had lost this application in most of the dialects by the historical age), evidently did not include women among their full participating members, and the oath recorded by one of the Dekeleia decrees that had to be taken by witnesses at the introduction of children mentions only the son (υἱόν) and not the daughter of the introducer (IGii² 1237. 109 - 111). The omission of females is also noticeable in a definition of συνοικεῖν in [Dem.] 59. 112: it is to live together so as to have children and introduce the sons to the phratry members and demesmen. But there is one piece of evidence for the introduction of girls to phratries, in Isaios's speech *On the Estate of Pyrrhos* (3. 73 - 80). The speaker argues that his opponent's claim to the estate of Pyrrhos, which is based on the claim that Phile is Pyrrhos's legitimate daughter, is false. If Pyrrhos had been regularly married to the woman who bore Phile, he would have recognised the girl as his daughter and introduced her to his phratry as his legitimate daughter, making her

ἐπίκληρος and leaving instructions that a son born to her should inherit the estate (3. 73, 75). But in fact, continues the speaker, Pyrrhos neither contributed a γαμηλία to his phratry when he married, nor did he introduce his daughter to the members of the phratry. This he would obviously have done if he had really married and the girl really was his legitimate daughter (79). Isaios's argument is dubious: Pyrrhos may have died before he could introduce his daughter to the phratry.⁴⁶ Nevertheless the accusation does show that it was possible to introduce a daughter to one's phratry.⁴⁷ But we should be warned against accepting that it was invariably done for legitimate daughters by the falsity of Isaios's other argument, that an offering called γαμηλία was invariably made to the phratry by Athenian citizen men on the occasion of their marriage. The offering of a γαμηλία, probably accompanied by a feast, may have been a common custom, but it was neither a legal requirement nor an act invariably performed.⁴⁸ Perhaps only those girls who were in a position to be ἐπίκληροι were given an introduction to their fathers' phratries, that is, girls whose fathers, at the time of their birth, had no legitimate male offspring.

Pollux (8. 107) records that κόραι as well as κόροι were introduced to phratries at coming-of-age (εἰς ἡλικίαν προελθόντων) (cf. *Souda* A 2940 Adler), and he goes on to say that the κούριον was an offering sacrificed for males and the γαμηλία for females. The γαμηλία was, as we have seen, an offering connected with marriage, and it is not relevant to a father's introduction of his infant daughter. So the passage in Isaios 3 is the only reliable evidence that girls could be introduced to phratries in their childhood. Upon marriage it may have been usual for a man to enter his bride's name on the phratry's register.

The procedure

From scattered references in the orators and the Demotionid decrees a picture, albeit filled out by a certain amount of conjecture, can be built up of procedure for admission, though we have to bear in mind that phratries were independent of each other, and that variations in procedure from phratry to phratry probably existed. Common to all of them seems to have been the sacrifice of an animal. Part would have been given to the priest of the phratry. The priest of the phratry of the Dekeleians also got a specified amount of money (3 obols from the μέλον sacrifice, one drachma from the κούρειον), and from the κούρειον also a specified quantity of wine and a certain weight of cake (*IG* ii² 1237. 5 - 8). The rest of the sacrifice would have been distributed among the members of the phratry.⁴⁹ The oath taken by the person who was doing the introducing (usually the father) was an important part of this ceremony. Placing his hand on the victims or the altar⁵⁰, he swore that the child being introduced was the legitimate son of a citizen woman.⁵¹ The Dekeleia phratry required witnesses to swear also, using the following oath: "I testify that he whom he is introducing is his own son born in wedlock from his lawful wife. This is the truth, by Zeus Phratrios. Many blessings on me if my oath is true; if it is false, the opposite" (*IG* ii² 1237. 109 - 113): for their regulations on witnesses see pp. 274 - 275 below). In some phratries, and perhaps in all, any member who objected to the introduction of a candidate, on the ground that he was not the legitimate son of a citizen woman, could make his objection known and prevent the introduction from going ahead, perhaps by personally removing the sacrificial victim from the altar.⁵² The objection could perhaps be argued by the objector, and debated by the phratry on the spot.⁵³ Then the question of admission was put to the vote by the *phratriarchos*. In at least one of the phratries, and possibly in all, the vote was taken while the victim was burning on the altar: the phratry members each took a voting pebble

from the altar, and, presumably, deposited it in one of two urns.⁵⁴ It was a secret ballot.⁵⁵ If the vote was favourable - and it would presumably be unanimous unless someone had objected publicly - the name of the boy was inscribed on the register of the phratry.⁵⁶

Among the Demotionid decrees is one providing that phratry members must be given notice of candidates about to be introduced: "Menexenos proposed: the phratry members have decided concerning the introduction of children that the other things according to the previous decrees [shall stand]; but, in order that the phratry members may know who are those about to be introduced, in the first year or in the year in which the κούρεον is brought, the name shall be listed by the phratriarch along with the name of the father, and of the deme, and of the mother and her father and deme, and when they have been listed the phratriarch shall inscribe them and post them up publicly in whatever places the Dekeleians frequent, and the priest shall also post up the names having inscribed them on a white tablet in the shrine of Leto" (IG II² 1237. 114 - 125). This regulation represented a tightening of the controls on admission, since it gave potential objectors notice of intention to introduce.

Another of the Demotionid decrees also concerns the admission of new members, including infants. Nikomachos proposed (lines 68 - 113) that the three witnesses to the suitability of the candidate for admission (who must have been referred to in a decree now lost, ὃς εἴρηται, lines 71 - 72) must come from the θίασος of the man who is introducing. A θίασος was a smaller group than the phratry, a private association which worshipped a particular deity. The fellow θιασῶται would be closely acquainted with the introducer and his family circumstances. The decree goes on to say that these witnesses are to give evidence on the questions asked and take the oath by Zeus Phratrios. At the examination of the candidate the θιασῶται of the introducer must vote first by secret ballot on the admission of the candidate⁵⁷, and may take part in the debate of the whole phratry that

follows the public counting of the votes of the θίασος. They may not take part in the subsequent vote of the phratry on admission. If the θίασος votes to admit and the phratry as a whole disagrees, the θίασος is fined 100 drachmas, with exception of any θιασώτης who had argued against admission in the debate. If on the other hand the θίασος votes against admission, the introducer may accept their decision and withdraw, or appeal to the whole phratry: if they then vote for admission, the registration goes ahead, but if they too reject the candidate, the introducer is fined 100 drachmas.⁵⁸ The principle, which has been explained by Wade-Gery (see note 58), was that the vote of the θιασῶται is substituted for the conscience of the introducer: "The Phratry was too big to trust its own judgement, so the Thiasoi are made responsible for their members", and the decree proposed by Nikodemos gives "more precaution against intruders". Andrewes has pointed out that this function of the θίασοι of this phratry was exceptional: θίασοι are not mentioned in the orators in this context, as we should expect had they generally played any part in admission to the phratries.⁵⁹

Admission to other bodies

Some of the references in the orators to admission of children to phratries include allusions to other bodies to which they were presented, most notably to a clan (γένος). According to Isaios's speech *On the Estate of Apollodoros* (7. 15 - 16), Apollodoros, having decided to adopt his sister's son Thrasylllos, brought him to the altars and introduced him to the clansmen and to the phratry members (ἤγαγέ με ἐπὶ τοὺς βωμοὺς εἰς τοὺς γεννήτας τε καὶ φράτερας); after the proper ceremony had been observed, Thrasylllos was admitted and his name was entered on the common register (εἰς τὸ κοινὸν γραμματεῖον). In the speech *Against Neaira* ([Dem.] 59. 59) it

is Phrastor's fellow clansmen (the Brytidai) who are said to have refused admission to Neaira's daughter's son, when Phrastor presented him "to the phratry members . . . and to the Brytidai". Some details are given here about the actions of the γεννήται in impeding the child's registration among themselves (οὐκ ἐνέγραφον αὐτὸν εἰς σφᾶς αὐτούς). No more is heard of the attempted introduction εἰς φράτερας, and it looks as if the refusal of the clansmen of entry into the γένος automatically barred the child's admission to the phratry. In And 1. 127 Kallias is said to have introduced to the Kerykes (a γένος), despite the objection of one member, the boy, ἤδη μέγαν ὄντα, whom he had disowned as an infant before the phratry; Andokides adduces this as an example of disgraceful behaviour. A different group, the ὀργεῶνες, is mentioned in the context of introduction to the phratry in Isaios's speech *On the Estate of Menekles* (2. 14), where the person whom Menekles had adopted, insisting on the legality of his adoption, holds up, as evidence of its regularity, his introduction by Menekles to the phratry and his registration among the demesmen and the ὀργεῶνες (. . . ποιησάμενος εἰσάγει με εἰς τοὺς φράτερας παρόντων τούτων, καὶ εἰς τοὺς δημότας με ἐγγράφει καὶ εἰς τοὺς ὀργεῶνας).⁶⁰

There has been much discussion of the γεννήται and ὀργεῶνες and their relation to the phratries.⁶¹ All three groups are mentioned in a fragment of Philochoros (*FGrH* 328 fr. 35 a):

τοὺς δὲ φράτορας ἐπανάγκες δέχεσθαι καὶ τοὺς ὀργεῶνας καὶ
τοὺς ὀμογάλακτας, οὓς γεννήτας καλοῦμεν.

"It is compulsory for the phratry members to admit both the *orgeones* and the milk-brothers, whom we call clansmen." This fragment has been interpreted as a clause of a law which compelled the phratries to admit these groups, the γεννήται and ὀργεῶνες. Andrewes has argued that ὀργεῶνες were small groups of upper-class men, who, like the members of clans, guarded jealously access to their ranks. The phratry was constrained

to accept these people, because their rules for admission were even more stringent than those of the phratries: acceptance by one's fellow ὄργεῶνες or γεννήται guaranteed fitness for membership of the phratry. The mass of phratry members belonged to neither kind of group, and only became members of sub-groups within phratries after the creation of θίασοι, which may have happened during the Periklean period (Andrewes [1961]).

If someone qualified for admission to a γένος or a group of ὄργεῶνες, it seems that there was no need for a further ceremony of admission to the phratry. And when a candidate was introduced to both γένος and phratry in the kind of joint admission mentioned in Is. 7. 15 - 16, his name was entered on a register held in common by γένος and phratry (Is. 7. 1, 16, IG ii² 1237. 98, cf. note 56 above).

The significance of phratry membership for legitimacy

In Athens legitimate children (γνησίοι) were those born to a woman properly married by ἐγγύη or ἐπίδικασία. The law about children born to a woman married by ἐγγύη is quoted in a speech of Demosthenes (46. 18):

ἦν ἂν ἐγγυήση ἐπὶ δικαίοις δάμαρτα εἶναι ἢ πατὴρ ἢ ἀδελφὸς
ὁμοπάτρῳ ἢ πάππος ὁ πρὸς πατρός, ἐκ ταύτης εἶναι παῖδας
γνησίους.

A woman who was an ἐπίκληρος was awarded to the man who was to be her husband by ἐπίδικασία, and the children produced by such a marriage were, likewise, legitimate. Bastards (νόθοι) were those born outside marriage, and they suffered from various disabilities resulting from their exclusion from the legal relationship with the family (ἀγχιστεία), in particular their

inability to inherit if γνησίαι existed (and after 402/1 to inherit even in the absence of γνησίαι).⁶²

A father's introduction of his child to his phratry was part of his acknowledgement of paternity, part of the process of ποίησις, of making the child his, that started with the formal naming of the child (see p. 261 above). This process could not be performed on behalf of an illegitimate child, for a father could not lawfully get an illegitimate child registered in a phratry, even if he wished to. It was in order to prevent the introduction of illegitimate children that the phratries made those introducing new members swear an oath that the candidate was born in wedlock, and gave the members an opportunity to scrutinise the candidates. In Isaios's speech *On the Estate of Philoktemon* (6. 21 - 22) Euktemon did succeed in getting an illegitimate child introduced to his phratry, but only by swearing a false oath and inducing his legitimate son Philoktemon not to obstruct the introduction. (Philoktemon had at first prevented Euktemon's introduction of the boy by removing the victim from the altar, but later he agreed to the introduction on condition that the boy's inheritance rights be restricted, fearing that if he did not comply with his father's wishes the latter would in any case beget other, legitimate, children to share the inheritance.) Precautions against introduction of illegitimate children by evasion of phratry law evidently did not exist or were not enforced to the same extent in all phratries at all times in the classical age. We have seen (pp. 274 - 275 above) that the Dekeleia phratry tightened its precautions in the fourth century by replacing the father's oath by the testimony under oath of three witnesses, who risked incurring a fine if their testimony was thought by the rest of the phratry to be false. From the evidence available it seems that in classical Athens the phratries' laws and procedures on admission were for the most part strictly enforced, with the effect that a person's registration in the phratry list counted in the eyes of the world, or at least in those of juries, as evidence of legitimate birth.⁶³

A father who believed a child to be his own lawful issue born in wedlock, and who had chosen to rear him and perform the naming ceremony, was not able to persist in a refusal to introduce the child to his phratry and thus deny him public acknowledgement of paternity. This is evident from Dem. 39 and 40. As we have seen in Part Two above, Plangon's oath that Boiotos was Mantias's son, along with the fact that Mantias had already held the naming ceremony for him, compelled him, under threat of legal proceedings, to introduce him to his phratry (39. 2 - 4). The fact that a father did not have the right to refuse this acknowledgement of paternity to his legitimate issue means that non-membership of a phratry was in effect evidence of illegitimacy. If, on the other hand, a man had declined to acknowledge a child borne by his wife and give him a name, the child would probably never be able to compel him to introduce him into a phratry, for such a child was, by reason of his father's original omission of acknowledgement and naming and continued refusal of acknowledgement, a νόθος.⁶⁴

The significance of phratry membership for citizenship

The content of the oath demanded by the phratries shows that phratry membership also had some significance for a person's citizenship. The introducer had to swear that the candidate's mother was a woman of citizen status (ἀσπή, see note 51). The citizen status of an Athenian mother was made a prerequisite of citizenship by a law proposed by Perikles in 451/50. The law said:

μη μετέχειν τῆς πολέως ὃς ἂν μὴ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἀστοῖν ἧ γεγονώς

(Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 26. 4, cf. Plut. *Per.* 37).

Before that date, it is likely that having a citizen Athenian father had been sufficient qualification for citizenship. The stress on the mother's

citizenship found in the phratry oaths must have been added after this date, and A. Andrewes has argued that it shows that the Periklean legislation affected the phratries and possibly even "imposed explicitly an amendment of their old oath".⁶⁵ The legislation was probably not retrospective in effect: those born of non-Athenian mothers before the passing of the law were not disfranchised. But this put in a potentially difficult position those who had been born before 451/50 of a non-Athenian mother but not enrolled in the deme by then: they were entitled to citizen status, but might have difficulty in proving it. If they had been registered in a phratry, this would be useful evidence in their claim to entitlement to membership of a deme, and thus to citizenship. Disputes about the entitlement to citizenship of μητρόξενοι claiming to have been born just before 451/50 may have necessitated legislation on the matter, and to this legislation, Andrewes argues, probably belong Philochoros fr. 35 (see p. 276 above) and Krateros fr. 4 (*FGH* 342 F 4).⁶⁶ The latter, he conjectures, may be an appendix to the law, providing as it does "that phrateres alleged to be of foreign birth on both sides should be dealt with not by the phratry but before the *nautodikai* by any qualified citizen" (Andrewes [1961] p. 13).

Another view, though, has recently been advanced by Cynthia Patterson.⁶⁷ She argues that membership of a phratry had always been the key to citizenship, and that until 451/50 when "Pericles set forth his requirement for 'having a share in the city' " there had been "no *polis* law defining or controlling membership of the demes and phratries": "until the mid-fifth century traditional rules and identity (both deme and phratry membership) were sufficient to determine who was an Athenian citizen" (pp. 3 - 4). Membership of a phratry was not just useful when it came to presenting one's claim to be enrolled in a deme, and thus the citizen body - it was a prerequisite. Since illegitimate children were not accepted by the phratries, it follows that illegitimate children could not become citizens. Patterson interprets Perikles's citizenship law, Philochoros fr. 35 and

Krateros fr. 4 as evidence that the Athenian state in the mid fifth century "began to take a direct role in setting criteria for its membership" (p. 28).

But if it is true that bastards could be Athenian citizens, provided they were born of two Athenian citizen parents, it is evident that membership of a phratry was not a prerequisite for citizenship. The evidence that being a νόθος was not a bar to citizenship has been brought to light by D. M. MacDowell.⁶⁸ It is threefold: Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 42. 1 says that those born of two citizen parents and registered in the deme at eighteen years of age qualify for citizenship, without any mention of phratry membership; two Athenians were condemned to disfranchisement along with their descendants *both illegitimate and legitimate* ([Plut.] *Ethika* 834 A - B); in Isaios 3. 45 we learn that Nikodemos had allowed Pyrrhos's daughter, who if legitimate had to be taken in marriage by a relative, to be given in marriage instead to a non-relative, who was a citizen, at a date when it was against the law for a citizen and non-citizen to marry. P. J. Rhodes has attacked each of these as evidence that bastards could be citizens, but his objections were not accepted by K.R. Walters in a recent article.⁶⁹ The evidence that illegitimate birth was not a bar to citizenship still stands. When a man wished to demonstrate his entitlement to citizen status, before a deme or in a court of law, it would have been very helpful if he could cite his registration in a phratry, since the criterion for citizen-qualification after 451/50 (birth from two Athenian citizen parents) was also one of the requirements of the phratries. When Bolotos compelled Mantias to introduce him to his phratry and thus acknowledge him as his son, he was able to claim citizen rights as well as an estate and a father (Dem. 39. 34, cf. 39. 31 and 2). If Bolotos had not been able to demonstrate that Mantias was his father, it might have been difficult for him to prove that his father was an Athenian. But non-membership of a phratry did not in itself disqualify a man from citizenship. It might, though, make it difficult for some non-members to prove their citizenship, if it was contested.

Notes to Chapter Three

- 1 R. L. Hunter, *Eubulus: The Fragments*, Cambridge 1983, p. 88.
- 2 Cf. the comments of Richard Hamilton, "Sources for the Athenian Amphidromia", *Greek Roman and Byzantine Studies* 25, 1984, pp. 243 - 251.
- 3 For ritual nakedness see J. Heckenbach, "De nuditate sacra sacrisque vinculis", *Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten*, Vol. IX, Heft 3 Giessen, 1911, especially p. 14. Also: L. Deubner, *De Incubatione capita quattuor*, Leipzig, 1900, § 24 and references there; H. J. Rose, "The religion of a Greek household", *Euphrosyne*, 1, 1957, pp. 95 - 116, see p. 110.
- 4 Schol. Ar. *Lys.* 757: ἀμφιδρόμια δὲ ἡ δεκάτη ἡμέρα τῶν τικτομένων παιδίων, ἐν ᾗ τὰ ὀνόματα αὐτοῖς τιθέασι περιδραμόντες κειμένους (κειμένους Rutherford, κειμένοις Dübner; the Codex Ravennas has the abbreviation κειμέν). The information given by the *Lysistrata* scholion is explicitly rejected by: August Preuner, *Hestia-Vesta, Ein Cyclus Religionsgeschichtliche Forschungen*, Tübingen 1864, p. 55; J. Vürtheim, "Amphidromia", *Mnemosyne* 34, 1906, pp. 73 - 78; L. Deubner, "Die Gebräuche der Griechen nach der Geburt", *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie* 95, 1952, pp. 374 - 377, see p. 376; B. B. Rogers, who in his edition of *Lysistrata* (London, 1911) follows Claudius Puteanus in bracketing κειμένοις in his note on line 757. By the following, the hearth as the object of the running-round is preferred: E. Samter, *Familienfeste der Griechen und Römer*, Berlin, 1901, pp. 59 - 62; Stengel, article "Amphidromia" in Pauly's *RE* I. 1901 - 1902; K. F. Hermann and H. Blümner, *Lehrbuch der Griechischen Alterthümer*, Tübingen, 1882, pp. 281 - 282; I. von Müller, *Die Griechischen Privat- und Kriegsalterthümer*, Munich, 1893, pp. 160 - 162; G. F. Schoemann and J. H. Lipsius, *Griechische Alterthümer*, Berlin, 4th edition, 1920, vol. II pp. 590 -

591; E. Rohde, *Psyche*, London, 1925, p. 295. But others have argued that the scholion on the *Lysistrata* is not in error but simply testifies to the fact that the details of the ceremony differed from city to city: S. Reinach, *Cultes, Mythes et Religions*, Paris, 2nd edition, 1908, vol. I p. 145 (this chapter is the same as the article in *L'Anthropologie*, 10, 1899, pp. 663 - 670); cf. C. Gruppe's review in *Berliner Philologische Wochenschrift*, 26, 1906, pp. 1135 - 1140, see pp. 1137 - 1138; S. Eitrem, *Opferitus und Voropfer der Griechen und Römer*, Kristiania, 1915, pp. 173 - 177, also accepts that both forms of running round may hold good.

5 References in Deubner's article "Birth (Greek and Roman)" in Hastings's *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* II, p. 649.

6 Cf. M. Nilsson, *Griechische Feste von religiöser Bedeutung, mit Ausschluss der Attischen*, Leipzig, 1906, p. 116 (comparison of the Libyan astydomia with the Athenian amphidromia).

7 Eur. *Ion* 1127 and Kall. *Hymn to Artemis* 74 refer to ὀπτήρια, evidently presents given to a child on his or her first appearance before friends and relatives. Cf. E. Spanheim, *Callimachi Hymni Epigrammata et Fragmenta*, 1761, p. 220; cf. also Aisch. *Eum.* 7 which refers to γενέθλιος δόσις. In Terence's *Phormio* 46 - 50 Davus complains (with comic exaggeration) that the slave Geta will have to spend all his savings on presents for his mistress's baby, when she has one.

8 Also in Eur. *Ion* (805 - 807) Xouthos, having been given Ion as his son, goes into the sacred tents to offer on behalf of the boy ξένια καὶ γενέθλια, and to join with this new son in a feast. Cf. 651 - 653: the public feast and birth-day sacrifices which were not made before are promised:

θουσαί θ' ἄ σου πρὶν γενέθλι' οὐκ ἐθύσαμεν. Cf. Also Pl. *Alk.* I 121 c 7: "all Asia" γενέθλια θύει for the eldest son of a Persian king. Comment on γενέθλια is given by Richard Hamilton (1984) pp. 247 - 248 and Mark Golden "Names and naming at Athens: three studies", *Echos du Monde Classique/Classical Views* 30, N. S. 5, 1986, pp. 245 - 267, see p. 255 n. 28.

9 Cf. Plaut. *Amph.* 1094, and H. J. Rose (1957) p. 107.

10 Against this view: S. Reinach (1908) I pp. 138 - 139 and J. Vürtheim (1906) pp. 73, 75, 76. But it is accepted by S. Eitrem (1915) pp. 175 - 176, and by Schoemann and Lipsius (1920) II p. 590, that the women did the running round (though Eitrem thought that the mother herself would not have taken part).

11 Elektra asks her mother to perform these rites on the child's tenth moon (δεκάτη σελήνη παιδός, line 1126). J. D. Denniston in his commentary (*Euripides, Elektra* Oxford 1939, pp. 131 - 132) takes this to mean the child's tenth day (or possibly evening, cf. p. 256 above), comparing it to the phrase δέχ' ἡλίους which Elektra utters in answer to the question πότερα πάλαι τεκοῦσαν ἢ νεωστὶ δῆ; earlier in the play (lines 653 - 654, cf. Denniston's note *ad loc*); cf. note 15 below. But Richard Hamilton has recently argued for the meaning attributed to the phrase in LSJ: "... 'moon' (σελήνη) elsewhere means 'month' and probably means that here (so LSJ). Elektra, then, is asking Clytaemestra to sacrifice in the tenth month, i.e. the birth month of the child, and so we have no specific day mentioned, although we still have a feminine sacrifice that should be in the hands of the midwife", Hamilton (1984) p. 246. He infers from this that "the scholiast to *Thet.* 160 E was correct to give the midwives a prominent role and that Photius and *Anec. Bekk.* were correct to talk of sacrifice". Golden (1986) p.

254, interpreting δεκάτη σελήνη as tenth day, suggests that it is the δεκάτη and not the amphidromia to which Elektra lures her mother, because, he thinks, the amphidromia was only attended by those who had been present at the birth itself.

12 Cf. M. Schmidt, "Hephaistos lebt - Untersuchungen zur Frage der Behandlung behinderter Kinde in der Antike", *Hephaistos* 5, 1983, pp. 133 - 161, see p. 135: a positive decision to rear the child already taken after birth was repeated in a symbolic and celebratory form. L. R. F. Germain ("L'exposition des enfants nouveau-nés dans la Grèce ancienne. Aspects sociologiques", *Revue de la Société Jean Bodin pour l'Histoire Comparative des Institutions. L'Enfant. 1^{re} Partie: Antiquité - Afrique - Asie*. Brussels 1975, pp. 211 - 242, see pp. 226 - 227) sees in Plato's testimony to the amphidromia a trace of a ceremony that at some time before the late 5th century had entailed the compulsory exposure of certain infants by an unknown third party. He is unable to say what were the origins of this "eugenic control". But his conjectures about the origins of the amphidromia are backed up neither by Plato's text itself nor by any other source.

13 Reinach (1908) p. 138 rejects this notion, on the ground that the amphidromia was celebrated for children of both sexes and girls could not carry on the domestic cult. But the women of the household certainly took part in family religion, and although most girls married and were transferred to their husband's hearth, those who did not marry and lived on in their father's house, and those who were widowed or divorced, and so came back to it, would have been important participants in the family religion. So there is no reason to believe that girl babies did not require introduction to the domestic cult.

14 Cf. E. Samter (1901) p. 62: comparison with the introduction of a

bride to the hearth of her new home.

15 Theophrastos, *Characters* 16. 9: the Superstitious Man will not set foot on a tomb or come near a dead body or a woman in childbed, but says he must keep himself from being polluted. Eur. *Elektra* 651 – 654:

Ελ. λέγ' ὦ γεραιέ, τάδε Κλυταιμίστρα μολῶν·

λεχῶ μ' ἀπάγελλ' οὔσαν ἄρσενος τόκῳ.

Πρ. πότερα πάλαι τεκοῦσαν ἢ νεωστὶ δῆ;

Ελ. δέχ' ἡλίους, ἐν οἷσιν ἀγνεύει λεχῶ.

δέχ' is Elmsley's emendation of the MSS.' λέγ' (in *Euripidis Heracleidae et Medea*, Oxford 1828, comm. on *Herac.* line 602). See the remarks of Denniston (*ad loc.*) on the sense of ἀγνεύειν here: he concludes that Elektra means, not that she must undergo purification, but that she must abstain from sexual intercourse for this period. Cf. E. Fehrle, *Die Kultische Keuschheit im Altertum, Religionsgeschichtliche Versuchungen und Vorarbeiten*, vol. 6, Giessen 1910, p. 49, who points out that ἀγνεία and its cognates signify religious purity, and that the commonest forms of pollution in everyday life were sexual intercourse and contact with the dead, and that ἀγνεύειν commonly means to keep oneself pure from these two forms of pollution, and sometimes simply to abstain from ἀφροδίσια. But since *birth* was a third carrier of religious pollution it seems more likely that this is the one from which Elektra says she requires to be purified. (On Elmsley's emendation, accepted by most editors, cf. R. Hamilton [1984] p. 246 n. 19).

16 C. Böttiger, *Amalthea* vol. I, Leipzig, 1820, p. 56; A. Preuner (1864) pp. 53 – 61; E. Rohde (1925), p. 295; cf. J. Grimm, *Teutonic Mythology*, translated by J. S. Stallybrass, London, 1883, vol. II p. 625.

17 E.g. L. Deubner's article in *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*

(1909) II pp. 648 - 649; Schoemann and Lipsius (1920) p. 590: purification by means of purificatory objects.

18 Cf. J. G. Frazer, "Putting children on the fire", App. I to Loeb edition of Apollodoros vol. II, pp. 311 - 317; also, Frazer, "The youth of Achilles", *Classical Review*, 7, 1893, p. 292 - 294; on the apotropaic force of the circle, cf. W. Pax, "Sprachvergleichende Untersuchungen zur Etymologie des Wortes ἀμφίπολος", *Wörter und Sachen*, 18, 1937, pp. 29, 52 - 53. He points out that another power of the circle was to radiate upon those within it the beneficent force of the centre.

19 Hastings's *Encyclopaedia of Religion* II p. 648.

20 Rohde (1925) p. 295; Pauly's *RE* I, 1901; H. Diels, *Sibyllinische Blätter*, Berlin, 1890, p. 120, shows that both the olive wreath and the wool-fillet are symbols of expiation having been sought or obtained.

21 Hermann and Blümner (1882) p. 281.

22 G. Glotz, *L'Ordalie dans la Grèce Primitive*, Paris, 1904 (reprinted 1979, Arno Press, New York), pp. 105 - 106; C. Gruppe, *Berliner Philologische Wochenschrift*, 26, 1906, p. 1138; J.-P. Vernant, *Mythe et Pensée chez les Grecs*, Paris, 1971, vol. I pp. 159 - 163.

23 Proposed by Reinach (1908) pp. 139 - 145; accepted by Deubner, Hastings's *Encyclopaedia of Religion* II p. 648; objected to by Gruppe, *Berliner Philologische Wochenschrift*, 26, 1906, pp. 1138 - 1139, Eitrem (1915) p. 175, and Vürthelm (1906) p. 77.

24 Children were often named after their grandparent or another

relative. On names given to children, see Hermann and Blümner (1882) pp. 284 - 285, I. von Müller (1893), p. 162, L. Beauchet, *Histoire du Droit Privé de la République Athénienne*, Paris 1897, vol. I pp. 341 -342; and, most recently, Golden (1986) pp. 257 - 267, who publishes research on the frequency of "linked" names within families during the classical period.

25 Golden (1986) pp. 253 - 255.

26 Cf. Rose (1957) p. 111: "... it may be that practice varied in different families, some getting all the ceremonial over at once, others dividing it".

27 "La reconnaissance de la paternité, sa nature et sa portée dans la société athénienne", *Museum Helveticum*, 19, 1962, pp. 39 - 64.

28 A. R. W. Harrison, *The Law of Athens*, Oxford, 1968, vol. I p. 175.

29 IG ii² 1237. Wilamowitz (*Aristoteles und Athen*, Berlin 1893, vol. II, pp. 259 - 261) argued that "the Demotionidai" mentioned in the inscription is the name of the phratry, and the "house of Dekeleia" a department of the phratry. But H. T. Wade-Gery (*Essays in Greek History*, Oxford, 1958, pp. 116 - 134) refuted this and argued that the phratry must be the "Dekeleleis" of the inscription, and the "Demotionidai" a fairly small aristocratic body of men within this phratry who formed a sort of panel of experts and court of appeal against a negative decision of the phratry on membership. A. Andrewes ("Philochoros on phratries", *JHS* 81, 1961, pp. 1 - 15) agrees with this explanation and suggests that the Demotionidai are a γένος in this phratry (p. 9), cf. pp. 276 - 277 above. The decrees are also discussed, with agreement on the identity of the Demotionidai, by W. E. Thompson, "An interpretation of the 'Demotionid' decrees", *Symbolai*

30 Nikomachos's father, if he was a slave, could neither have belonged to a phratry nor introduced his son. E. S. Shuckburgh, *Lysiae Orationes XVI*, London, 1882, p. 337, suggests that Nikomachos may have been enrolled in his maternal grandfather's phratry. Later in the speech (30. 27), Lysias says that Nikomachos's ancestry fits him to be sold (i.e. as a slave), and that he has become a citizen from being a slave. If this is true, Nikomachos may have entered a phratry after he became a naturalised citizen. But it is possible that Lysias is not telling the truth in his allegations about slave status. They are the only evidence for it: cf. Kirchner's *PA* 10934.

31 On this passage cf. the remarks of Andrewes (1961) pp. 6 - 7. Apollo was worshipped under the title Πατροῦος in Attika as an ancestral god (in legend he was the father of Ion, founder of the Ionians). The presentation of children to Apollo Patroios may have taken place at the annual Thargelia, in which the phratries played a part: cf. Is. 7. 15; H. W. Parke, *Festivals of the Athenians* London 1977, pp. 148 - 149. According to Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 55. 3, the question put to magistrates (on examining them on their suitability for office) immediately after the question about parentage, was "whether he has an Apollo Patroios and a Zeus Herkelios, and where these shrines (ιερά) are".

32 See note 29 and p. 274 above for discussion of the inscription and this decree. Other interpretations have been made of the meaning of τῶι πρώτῳ ἔτει ἢ ᾧ δὲ τὸ κούρεον ἄγει: see W. W. Wyse, *The speeches of Isaeus, with Critical and Explanatory Notes* Cambridge 1904, pp. 358 - 359 for a discussion of them.

33 The scholia *ad loc.* tell us that φράτερας is a comic substitution for

"teeth"; the *Souda* holds the additional information that it is a pun on φραστῆρες, "the teeth that *tell* the age", referring to this passage (φ 692 Adler). Archedemos "the blear-eyed" was a demagogue, who earned unpopularity in some circles for his activities (especially being the leading accuser of one of the generals of Arginoussai); doubt was cast on his Athenian origins by Eupolis (fr. 80 Kassel and Austin); see Kirchner's *PA* 2326 for literary references to him.

34 Cf. Solon 27. 1 - 2: παῖς μὲν ἄνηβος ἑὼν ἔτι νήπιος ἔρκος ὀδόντων
φύσας ἐκβάλλει πρῶτον ἐν ἔπτ' ἔτεσιν.

35 We learn a little about another event of the Apatouria in the passage in *Timaios* (21 B): Kritias, reminiscing about an incident at the Apatouria on the Koureotis day when he was ten years old, says that on that day there was a traditional event for children, when their fathers organised contests for them in poetry recitation.

36 L. Deubner, *Attische Feste*, Berlin 1932, pp. 115 - 116. Illustrations of children participating in the Anthesteria (of which the second day was called Χόες) are found on numerous small jugs: these feature children with jugs in their hands, and children walking or crawling to a low table on which stand presents for them, including jugs of wine and fruit; others show children playing with toy carts and pet animals. Some of the children in these vase-paintings wear garlands, and in some the garland is around the neck of the little jug in the picture: Hilde Rühfel, *Kinderleben im klassischen Athen: Bilder auf klassischen Vasen*, Mainz am Rhein 1984, pp. 125 - 174, Abb. 71 - 83, 96 - 99; Anita A. Klein, *Child Life in Greek Art*, New York, 1932, pp. 25 - 26. Rühfel suggests (pp. 165 - 166) that the small jugs which depict crawling infants were designed for children *under* the age of three, who at least in late-5th-century Athens (to which these vases

belong), with its turmoil of plague and war, were included in the blessing and protection given by Dionysos at this festival.

37 L. Beauchet, *Histoire du Droit Privé de la République Athénienne*, Paris, 1897, vol. I, p. 344.

38 And. 1. 127; Dem. 44. 41, 44; Dem. 39 and 40.

39 Rudhardt (1962) pp. 56 - 57.

40 Dem. 43. 11, 14: Sositheos introduced his son to Hagnias's phratry ἐπειδὴ . . . ἐγένετο, and the sacrifice was made and the vote taken that the child was rightly and properly introduced, cf. 43. 81. [Dem.] 59. 59: on the attempted introduction (εἰσήγεν) of Neaira's daughter's infant son to Phrastor's phratry and γένος, the γεννήται voted against the child and did not register (οὐκ ἐνέγραφον) him. Is. 7. 16: there is the same law whether a man introduces (εἰσάγη) his natural son or adopted son: he must swear the oath, etc., and when he has done this the others must vote, and if the vote is favourable then and only then register (ἐγγράφειν) him on the common list.

41 These functions are assigned to the two ceremonies by: A. Mommsen, *Heortologie: Antiquarische Untersuchungen über die städtischen Feste der Athener*, Leipzig 1864, p. 310; Samter (1901) p. 71 - 72; and P. Stengel, *Die Griechischen Kultusaltertümer*, 3rd edition, Munich 1920 (*Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft*, Müller V. 3) pp. 233 - 234.

42 Wyse (1904) pp. 359, 364; Beauchet (1897) p. 344.

43 Mommsen (1864) p. 310; Wilamowitz (1893) II p. 271, n. 16; Samter

(1901) pp. 72 - 73; Stengel (1920) p. 233.

44 Jules Labarbe, "L'âge correspondant au sacrifice du κούρειον et les données historiques du sixième discours d'Isée", *Bulletin de la Classe des Lettres de L'Academie Royale de Belgique* 39, 1953, pp. 358 - 394.

45 That μέιον and κούρειον were, respectively, smaller sacrifice for introduction of infants, and larger offering for introduction of older boys is the position taken by most authorities: Mommsen (1864) p. 308; Wilamowitz (1893) II p. 271 n. 16; Samter (1901) pp. 70 - 73; G. Busolt, *Griechische Staatskunde*, 3rd edition, Munich 1920 (*Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft*, Müller, VI 1. 2) p. 961; Stengel (1920) p. 233; cf. the discussion in Wyse (1904) pp. 358 - 359.

46 The speaker claims that Pyrrhos had died at least twenty years before (3. 1, 57), and that Phile had been married more than eight years (3. 3). Most Athenian girls were probably married at about the age of 14, some as young as 12. Wyse concludes that Phile was an infant when Pyrrhos died (1904) p. 276, cf. notes on 3. 31. 2 and 3. 73. 6, 7.

47 Ulrich Kahrstedt, *Staatsgebiet und Staatsangehörige in Athen, Studien zum Öffentlichen Recht Athens*, Stuttgart 1934, vol. I, p. 240, accepts the Isaios reference as evidence that girls were regularly introduced, "wie zu erwarten" - for, he thinks, the phratry-lists of women would have given the information about the mothers of genuine citizens that was necessary for the operation of Perikles's citizenship law.

48 A. R. W. Harrison, *The Law of Athens*, Oxford, 1968, vol. I, p. 7 and n. 2.

49 Cf. Dem. 43. 82: Makartatos was far from objecting at the time of Euboulides's introduction to the phratry: ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν μερίδα τῶν κρεῶν ὄχετο λαβὼν παρὰ τοῦ παιδὸς τουτουί, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι φράτερες. Παρὰ here cannot mean "from the hand of", as Euboulides was introduced ἐπειδὴ . . . ἐγένετο (43. 11, cf. p. 266 above), but perhaps means "from the registration of the child".

50 Is. 7. 16 (κατὰ τῶν ἱερῶν); And. 1. 127 (λαβόμενος τοῦ βωμοῦ).

51 Is. 7. 16: ἐξ ἀστῆς . . . καὶ γεγονότα ὀρθῶς. Is. 8. 19: ἐξ ἀστῆς καὶ ἐγγυητῆς γυναικὸς. Dem. 57. 54: ἀστὸν ἐξ ἀστῆς ἐγγυητῆς αὐτῷ γεγενημένον. [Dem.] 59. 60: ἐξ ἀστῆς γυναικὸς καὶ ἐγγυητῆς κατὰ τὸν νόμον. Cf. And. 1. 127, and Wyse (1904) p. 559.

52 Dem. 43. 14, 82: Makartatos declined to remove the victim from the altar, which would have been the action to take if the candidate was being introduced improperly. Is. 6. 22: Euktemon could not at first get the boy whom he claimed to be his son introduced, because his son Philoktemon would not agree, and the phratry members would not admit him, but the κούρειον was removed. Cf. Wyse (1904) note *ad loc.* According to Dem. 43. 82, Makartatos, if he had removed the victim, would have made himself ὑπεύθυνος, "answerable". Perhaps an objector had to justify his objection before the phratry, and if he failed had to withdraw his objection and/or submit to a fine – cf. Wyse *ibid.*

53 Is. 8. 19: Kiron mentions that when his father introduced him to the phratry and took the oath, "none of the phratry members made any objection or argued that this was not true, although there were many of them and they examine such matters with great care".

54 Dem. 43. 14: "the phratry members . . . took the pebble while the victims were burning, and carried it from the altar of Zeus of the Phratry . . . and cast their votes. . .". Cf. *IG* ii² 1237. 29: "they shall take the pebble from the altar", when voting after examining cases of alleged wrongful admissions.

55 Dem. 43. 82: . . . κρύβδην ἔφερον τὴν ψήφον.

56 Is. 7. 16: "when the man who is introducing has done this (i.e. sworn), nonetheless the others must decide by vote, and if it is in favour, then and not until then inscribe him (i.e., the new member) on the common register (εἰς τὸ κοινὸν γραμματεῖον): so strict are the rules they observe". Cf. [Dem.] 59. 59: an adverse vote by the γεννήται. *IG* ii² 1237. 96 - 98: if all the phratry members vote in favour, the new member is to be inscribed on the common lists (εἰς τὰ κοινὰ γραμματεῖα).

57 *IG* ii² 1237. 78 ff. The θιασῶται who are required to vote first by secret ballot are presumably the whole θίασος, rather than the three θιασῶται required to take the oath and act as witnesses.

58 Wade-Gery (1958) pp. 125 - 126.

59 Andrewes (1961) p. 12

60 Wyse (1904), note *ad loc.*, rejects the notion that the ὀργεῶνες here are a group within the phratry, because admission to their ranks is mentioned separately from admission to the phratry: they must rather be, he says, the other kind of ὀργεῶνες, the members of a private religious association who worshipped a particular deity, like the θίασος of Herakles,

into which Astyphilos was introduced, Is. 9. 30. But Isaios is concerned at 2. 14 to make as much capital as possible out of his client's acceptance by these bodies, and so it is not unnatural that he should string out the list of bodies to which he was admitted, cf. Andrewes (1961) p. 9.

61 Especially by Andrewes (1961), who cites references to previous discussions. On pp. 3 - 9 he marshalls the evidence for the relationship between phratries and γένη, pointing out its strong suggestion "that gennetai were admitted automatically to the phratry".

62 Harrison (1968) I pp. 61 - 68 gives a full account of the law on this matter.

63 Cf. Harrison (1968) I pp. 68 - 70.

64 The continued refusal of acknowledgement must have been of great significance in this matter, if we are to trust the testimony of New Comedy, in which a father who had not acknowledged a child and had had it exposed might, on rediscovering the child, simply resume relations with it and begin to treat it as his own. The rediscovered child is, apparently, not a νόθος. Cf. pp. 177 - 178 above.

65 Andrewes (1961) pp. 13 - 14. Andrewes does not say why it would have been found necessary for legislation to prescribe an amendment to the phratry oaths. According to him, phratries in the classical age performed a social function, rather than providing an essential qualification for citizenship (that was the function of the demes). Perhaps Perikles's citizenship law had an indirect effect on the oath: after his proposal became law, the principal and avowed purpose of marriage, namely the procreation of legitimate children, became impossible for a marriage between a citizen

and non-citizen, and this may have effectively prevented such marriages being contracted; some scholars have even maintained that the law must have contained a clause outlawing marriage between a citizen and a non-citizen. Some phratries, in line with their concern not to admit the illegitimate, may have voluntarily amended their oaths to include the phrase ἐξ ἄσπης in order to lay emphasis on the requirement for legitimate birth. It is well to remember that the witnesses' oath of the Dekeleia phratry, as recorded in the Demotionid decrees, (and possibly also the introducer's oath) simply declared that the candidate was γνήσιον ἐγ γαμετῆς (IG ii² 1237. 110 - 111).

66 ἔὰν δέ τις ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ξένοιον γεγονῶς φρατρίζη, διώκειν εἶναι τῷ βουλομένῳ Ἀθηναίων, οἷς δίκαι εἰσί. λαγχάνειν δὲ τῇ ἔνῃ καὶ νέῃ πρὸς τοὺς ναυτοδίκας.

67 *Pericles' Citizenship Law of 451 - 50 B. C.*, (*Monographs in Classical Studies*, Arno Press), New Hampshire 1981.

68 "Bastards as Athenian citizens", *CQ* N.S. 26, 1976, pp. 88 - 91.

69 P. J. Rhodes, "Bastards as Athenian citizens", *CQ* N.S. 28, 1978, p. 89 - 92; K. R. Walters, "Perikles' citizenship law", *Classical Antiquity* 2, 1983, pp. 314 - 336. The comments of Patterson ([1981] pp. 31 - 33, notes 20 and 29) do not succeed in refuting MacDowell's interpretation of the evidence.

Chapter Four

Orphans

The Greek word ὀρφανός has a slightly different meaning from the English word "orphan", in that a Greek child became an ὀρφανός when its father died, whether or not its mother was still alive.¹ A motherless child whose father was living was not an ὀρφανός. Throughout this chapter the word "orphan" will be used in its Greek sense.

Nearly all the evidence available to us on the treatment of Greek orphans is Athenian. Hardly anything is known about orphanhood in other cities, and so it is to orphans in Athens that this study is restricted. Much of the evidence happens to be about orphans who were past the years of infancy, but this evidence holds good for infants too and so it is legitimate to use it in a study of the treatment of infants. The manner in which orphans were treated under the laws made by the Athenian people provides an insight into the attitudes of Athenians towards this particular category of children, and this insight is useful to have when we wish to contemplate classical attitudes to children in general.

Under Athenian law, guardians, ἐπίτροποι, had to be appointed for orphans, to carry out the duties of a father. There were no orphanages.

Appointment of guardians

Often a father would appoint guardians for his children when he thought his death was imminent. Demosthenes provides us with a picture of the entrusting of himself, aged seven, and his sister, aged five, to guardians by his father when he knew that his illness would be fatal. Demosthenes's

father gave his children into the hands of his chosen guardians, and placed Demosthenes on Aphobos's knees (Dem. 28. 15 - 16, cf. 27. 4 - 5). Diodotos made a similar arrangement when he was called up for service as a hoplite (Lys. 32. 5). That such an arrangement was quite common is suggested by the words attributed to Sokrates by Xenophon (*Mem.* 1. 5. 2), where he talks about the qualities anyone would look for in a man to whom he entrusted his children and property at the end of his life. It was probably common throughout the Greek world: Pindaros, tyrant of Ephesos, is said to have left his son and most of his property in the guardianship of a relative before going into exile - exile being a kind of civic death (Aelian, *VH* 3. 26).

This oral agreement could be supplemented by a written will. (Indeed if there was no written will it could easily be contested after the father's death. ²) Demosthenes claims that his father left a will containing instructions to his guardians, which the guardians destroyed (Dem. 27. 40 - 41, 64; 28. 4 - 6; 29. 42 - 44). Diodotos gave his brother Diogeiton, whom he appointed as guardian, a will, but we do not hear that Diogeiton, on being challenged as to his management of the property, produced this will or was ever asked to (Lys. 32. 5, 22).³ Pasion the banker died leaving a will to the effect that Phormion his trusted freedman was to marry his widow and be one of the guardians of his younger son (Dem. 36. 8, 30). Aristotle provided for the guardianship of his children in his will, which is preserved by Diogenes Laertios (5. 11 - 16). Aristotle had two children of his own, a son Nikomachos (still an infant, παιδίον, at the time of the writing of the will) and a daughter Pythias, for whom he nominates as guardian (and as future husband of Pythias) his already adult adopted son Nikanor; Nikanor was evidently absent when the will was made, and five other men were appointed to act as temporary guardians of the estate and the children until Nikanor should arrive.⁴ We may deduce from Isaios's speech *On the Estate of Astyphilos* (9), that if Theophrastos was Astyphilos's guardian as well as his stepfather - and he certainly performed the duties of a guardian (27 -

30) - he would have been appointed by the will of Euthykrates, Astyphilos's deceased father. Otherwise the guardianship would have fallen to Thoudippos, Euthykrates's brother.⁵ (See pp. 301 - 302 below.) In such cases a guardian is often spoken of as having been "left" as guardian (καταλειφθείς), as Perikles was by Alkibiades's father.⁶ We may assume that anyone nominated as guardian in a will would have given his consent before the will was drawn up.

A father's choice often rested on a near relative, but he could also appoint one or more friends not related to the family.⁷ Demosthenes's guardians were two of his father's nephews and one of his friends from boyhood. In Lysias's speech *Against Diogeiton* (32. 5) the close family ties of Diogeiton to his brother's children are stressed: Diogeiton's daughter married his brother, so that he was both uncle and grandfather to his three wards. The banker Pasion appointed his freedman, who was at that time not a citizen, to marry his widow and be one of the guardians of his ten-year-old son; we do not know if the other guardian or guardians, including Nikokles, had citizen status.⁸ In Isaios's speech *On the Estate of Hagnias* (11), the defence speech in the prosecution of a guardian by a fellow-guardian for maltreatment of an orphan, Theopompos is one of the guardians of his brother's son and is prosecuted by another guardian, apparently not a brother; since only one guardian was a brother, it is likely, as Harrison points out, that both were appointed by the father.⁹

But there must have been orphans whose father had made no provision for their guardianship. It was the duty of the archon to see that they were provided with a guardian.¹⁰ Aristotle lists among actions which are brought before the archon, which he would preside over in court, actions for establishing guardianship (εις ἐπιτροπῆς κατάστασιν), and for deciding between claims to guardianship (εις ἐπιτροπῆς διαδικασίαν) (*Ath. Pol.* 56. 6). A statement in Demosthenes 44. 66 suggests that services to relatives, possibly including guardianship, could be imposed by law, just as the law

conferred rights of succession.¹¹ In Lysias's speech *On the Property of Aristophanes* (19. 9) the speaker, who has charge of his sister's orphaned children, says, "We are compelled to bring up three little children". This can only mean that the duty has been laid upon him by law. Such language could hardly be used of an agreement with the deceased father. The speaker's father, the children's maternal grandfather, had previously been their guardian, until his death. In Isaios's speech, *On the Estate of Kiron* (8. 42), Diokles had become the guardian of his adoptive sister's son, although the boy's father Lysimenes had been in dispute with him over some property. This makes it unlikely that Lysimenes would have nominated Diokles.¹² The language of Isaios 1. 9 perhaps suggests that Deinias automatically became the guardian of his brother's children.¹³ When Deinias died, Kleonymos the brother of the children's mother, took charge of the children's upbringing and interests, which means that he became their guardian (1. 12); he is unlikely to have been nominated by Deinias, since the two men were enemies (1. 9). In the Hypothesis to Isaios's speech *On the Estate of Aristarchos* (10) we are told that when Aristarchos died his brother Aristomenes became the guardian of Aristarchos's children *κατὰ νόμον* (although this may just mean "in accordance with custom", and in any case a hypothesis is not necessarily a reliable source of information).

It is likely that in all these cases the guardian was appointed by the archon in accordance with a law that laid down the order of precedence for guardianship. Probably if the orphan had an elder brother who had attained the age of majority he would have headed the list. In Lysias's speech *Against Theomnestos* (10. 5), the speaker says that, on the death of his father, ὁ πρεσβύτερος ἀδελφός Pantaleon took over everything and became "our" guardian. It is possible that Pantaleon was the father's elder brother, rather than the speaker's, but the fact that the speaker specifically calls him πρεσβύτερος perhaps swings the balance in favour of his being the speaker's brother; the fact that he was an *elder* brother would have much

less significance and perhaps be unworthy of mention if he was the father's brother. If we do accept that Pantaleon was the speaker's elder brother, we still have no means of knowing whether Pantaleon was nominated by his father, or was assigned the duty by the archon.¹⁴ Diogeiton, as soon as the eldest of his wards came of age, handed over to him the responsibility of finding the means to support himself and his younger brother (Lys. 32. 9). It is difficult to determine what the legal position is here. It is unlikely that it happened automatically that when the eldest ward attained the age of majority, he took over the guardianship of his younger siblings from the existing guardian. This is Schulthess's theory, but it is inconsistent with a situation in which a guardian is appointed other than an elder brother, when an adult brother exists, as is the case in Dem. 36. 8.¹⁵ If a guardian appointed by will wished to resign his guardianship as soon as a relative nearer in kin to the wards appeared, we should expect that he would have to notify the archon of this wish to hand over the guardianship, yet according to Lys. 32 Diogeiton simply informs the young man of his intention. But Lysias is not concerned to go into the details of procedure here, and it suits his purpose quite well merely to mention Diogeiton's act, perhaps glossing over the legal process by which he did it; it is significant that he does not actually accuse Diogeiton of breaking the law by passing on the guardianship. The full thrust of his accusation is directed at Diogeiton's mismanagement of the property and his pretence that the children had only been left 20 silver minas and 30 staters. The most likely conclusion, which necessarily contains a large element of conjecture, appears to be that a guardian could resign his guardianship, at least when there was a nearer relative able to take it over, and that the archon would then appoint a guardian according to the legal order of precedence - in this case the elder brother of the ward.

The next in order of precedence would have been the brothers of the deceased. What happened if there were more than one brother is uncertain:

the guardianship may have devolved on the eldest, or they may all have had to share the duty. Deinias, as we have seen, became guardian of his brother's children (Is. 1. 9), as did Aristomenes (Is. 10 Hyp.). In Isaios's speech *On the Estate of Apollodoros* (7) we find that Apollodoros was under the guardianship of his father's brother Eupolis, whether by will or by legal appointment by the archon it is impossible to say.

It is likely that if there were no adult male relatives on the father's side, it would have fallen to brothers of the orphan's mother, and failing these, to other adult males on the mother's side, to take on the guardianship, and that the order of precedence was the same as it would have been, in the absence of orphans, for inheritance of the property. Whether paternal and maternal grandfathers figured in this list is unknown. In Lysias 19 we find that a man became guardian of a daughter's children: he may well have been appointed by the orphan's father before he met his death by execution. When the grandfather died, his son, the children's maternal uncle, was compelled to take over, being, evidently, the children's closest adult male relative, according to the order of precedence (see p. 300 above). Diokles was guardian of his adoptive sister's son (Is. 8. 42). The relationship of Dikaiogenes III to his wards, in Isaios's speech *On the Estate of Dikaiogenes* (5), is that of first cousin to the orphans' mother. It has been conjectured that the guardian may have been related in some way to Theopompos, the children's father.¹⁶

Returning to Aristotle's list of cases which fell to the competence of the archon, it is to be expected that actions εἰς ἐπιτροπῆς κατάστασιν occurred firstly when one claimant (or two or more joint claimants) emerged: either by virtue of nomination in a will, or by virtue of close relationship to the orphan. Although no definite example exists of would-be guardians who had been nominated in a will presenting themselves before the archon for their guardianship to be confirmed, it is likely that, given the archon's duty to look after the interests of orphans, the ratification of

testamentary guardianships would have been one of his duties.¹⁷ As for the claimant who would have presented himself before the archon by virtue of his relationship to the orphan or orphans, several cases have been mentioned above, many of which will have come into this category, and there are two cases in which a claim before the archon is reported (see note 17). Secondly, when neither had any guardian been appointed by the father, nor did any relative appear before the archon to assume the duty, it would have fallen to the archon to appoint a suitable guardian. Although it is not possible positively to identify any such case from the evidence about non-testamentary guardianship, it could be that the compulsion referred to by Lysias (19. 9) falls into this category (see p. 300 above).

The action εἰς ἐπιτροπῆς διαδικασίαν will have taken place when more than one claimant to the guardianship appeared: whether a will was produced by one of the parties, or the claims were made simply on the basis of relationship. A διαδικασία was presumably needed also if two relatives each said that the other ought to be the guardian. A disputed case would have been referred by the archon to court for decision by the jury.¹⁸ An outline has been given above, as far as is possible from the evidence, of the order of priority in accordance with which the jury was required to give its verdict. A will, of course, if accepted as genuine, took precedence over any other basis of a claim.

What the archon's duties were beyond this in relation to the appointment of guardians, the paucity of evidence prevents us from saying with certainty. Aristotle lists shortly after the actions for establishing guardianship and for deciding between claims to guardianship, a case simply called ἐπίτρ[οπ]ον αὐτὸν ἐγγράψαι. What this accusative and infinitive construction grammatically depends on is not clear from the context, which begins by listing γραφαί and δίκαι with the genitive, as in ὀρφανῶν κακώσεως, then slips into the construction εἰς with accusative, as in εἰς

ἐπιτροπῆς κατάστασιν, and then has this isolated accusative and infinitive. Beauchet says that it refers to the obligation of every testamentary or statutory guardian to declare to the archon his intention of exercising the guardianship, so that the archon might confirm his claim.¹⁹ But it seems more likely that that would be the first step in what would become an action εἰς ἐπιτροπῆς κατάστασιν or εἰς ἐπιτροπῆς διαδικασίαν, rather than a completely separate action.²⁰ Harrison suggests that the expression might refer to cases which arose out of the compelling of a reluctant guardian to undertake his duty, perhaps through the action of ὁ βουλόμενος, or out of a challenge to the right of one who had assumed the position of guardian to hold it.²¹ None of the other interpretations given by translators and commentators appears to explain the phrase satisfactorily.²²

Duties of a guardian towards his ward's person

A guardian's duties with regard to his ward were twofold: the care of the person of the orphan, and the administration of the property until the orphan came of age. One of his primary duties in the former of these aspects of guardianship was the provision of a home for the orphan under his care. From the orphan's point of view, especially an infant orphan, one of the most significant aspects of life must have been the place of the orphan's mother in his or her life, in particular the mother's continued presence or her removal to another household. It often happened that the widowed mother married her children's guardian, in which case the orphans would have had the same home as their mother. Phormion, as we have seen, was made the guardian of Pasion's child and given the child's mother in marriage (Dem. 36. 8). A similar arrangement was made by Demosthenes's father before he died (Dem. 27. 5, 28. 16), although Aphobos apparently did not marry the widow, after taking, according to Demosthenes, her dowry (27. 13

- 17, 56).

These provisions are sufficient to show that the law attributed to Solon (D.L. 1. 56), that a guardian may not marry the orphan's mother (and that the person to whom the estate passes on the orphan's death may not be his guardian) either never existed or had become obsolete by the fourth century. I. E. Karnezis has attempted to show that this law still operated in Athens in the age of the orators, but the evidence contradicts the conclusions which he draws.²³ Karnezis's argument that Aphobos was not entitled to marry Demosthenes's mother while Demosthenes was a minor is based partly on the assertion that the testament of a father with minor sons was not valid unless the sons died before reaching puberty. This contention appears to be supported by Dem. 46. 24:

ὅ τι ἂν γνησίῳν ὄντων υἰέων ὁ πατήρ διαθήται ἐὰν ἀποθάνωσιν
οἱ υἱεῖς πρὶν ἐπὶ δέιτες ἡβᾶν, τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς διαθήκην κυρίαν
εἶναι.

But even if the διαθέσθαι of this law is taken to mean testamentary bequest of goods rather than creation of an heir by adoption, it must be admitted that in the fourth century at least, a man was free to make limited bequests to his widow, as is shown by the will of Pasion (Lys. 32. 6; cf. Dem. 36. 34, 45. 28). Such bequests did not greatly detract from the value of the estate. (Konon's bequests to his nephew and brother were rather large - though still less than a fifth of his estate - but the fact that much of his property lay outside Attika, in Cyprus, may be significant: Lys. 19. 39 - 40.) Accordingly Demosthenes does not object to his father's bequests to his widow and daughter and to the guardians.²⁴ Karnezis furthermore would have his readers believe that the giving of Demosthenes's mother to Aphobos was done merely by will, and says that if Demosthenes's father had wished them to marry at once he could have given Kleoboule in marriage on his death-bed. But that is precisely what he did, according to Dem. 28. 15 - 16. Finally, it is inconceivable that Demosthenes should represent his father as

having given his wife in marriage to Aphobos, along with the use of the family house, with the idea in mind that "if he made these men even closer in their relationship to me, their guardianship of me would be none the worse because of this additional relationship" (27. 5), if marriage between a guardian and his ward's mother was prohibited in Demosthenes's day.²⁵

There was, then, no legal obstacle in the way of Aphobos's marriage to Demosthenes's mother while Demosthenes was a young orphan in his care. There are further indications in the orators that such an arrangement was fairly common. When the brothers Nausimachos and Xenopeithes claimed damages against their guardian's children after the guardian's death, one of those claimed against spoke of the disgraceful business of bringing such an action so many years later, when almost everyone who had knowledge of the guardianship was dead, including the orphans' mother who "knew all about it" (Dem. 38. 6). This is similar to what is said of the mother of Pasion's children in Dem. 36. 14, who had married the younger boy's guardian, and it probably implies that the mother of Nausimachos and Xenopeithes was living in the same household as the guardian and her children, although there is no direct evidence of this. Astyphilos, in *Isaios* 9. 27 - 29, was taken into the home of Theophrastos, who had married the boy's mother. Although the speech does not state that Theophrastos was guardian to Astyphilos, he is recorded as having performed the duties of guardianship: he educated him, planted his estate and farmed it and handed over the property to Astyphilos when he came of age. We may assume, therefore, that Theophrastos was his guardian, and that he had been appointed as such by a will or possibly by the archon. There is no evidence to support the idea that the man who married an orphan's mother automatically became the child's guardian.²⁶

On the contrary, when a widow married someone other than her children's guardian, the mother and orphans could be separated. It was the duty of guardians to decide where their wards should live, unless specific

arrangements had been made in a will, and most would have taken them into their own houses. The speaker of Lysias 32 gives the impression that after the first year of their orphanhood the children of Diodotos had a different place of residence from that of their mother and her new husband. During the first year mother and children had all lived in Peiraleus, presumably together, but afterwards, when their stock of supplies there began to be exhausted, their guardian sent the children up to the city and gave their mother, his daughter, in marriage (τοὺς μὲν παῖδας εἰς ἄστυ ἀναπέμπει, τὴν δὲ μητέρα αὐτῶν ἐκδίδωσιν, 32. 8). Demosthenes says of his mother, "We are her only children, and for our sakes she passed her life in widowhood", perhaps implying that if she had been remarried her children would have suffered in some way, perhaps by being deprived of her company (Dem. 29. 26). But Apollodoros, whose guardian was his father's brother Eupolis, was taken in by his mother's new husband Archedamos to live with his mother and stepfather, because Archedamos could see that Eupolis was depriving Apollodoros of all his property (Is. 7. 6 - 7). That Archedamos probably did not become Apollodoros's legal guardian is shown by the fact that he waited until Apollodoros came of age before helping him to recover his property. This case shows that a man who married a widow could, presumably with the consent of the orphans' guardian, take his wife's children under his roof. For young children, accustomed to spending all their time in their mother's company, it would have been more traumatic to be deprived of her presence than of their father's. Perhaps it was customary for infants whose father had died to remain with their mother while very young, and only later to take up residence with the guardian - but this is only conjecture. It was also at the discretion of guardians whether orphan siblings were kept together or assigned different homes. We learn from Plato's *Protagoras* (320 A) that Perikles removed Kleinias from the influence of his brother Alkibiades by sending the former to live with Ariphron, Perikles's fellow-guardian.

Another of the guardian's most important duties was to provide food, clothing and other necessities for the orphan or orphans in his care. Lysias's speech *Against Diogeiton* (32) gives us a good idea of what a guardian was expected to provide, and of the probable expense. Diogeiton had denied part of his debt to his wards' estate, but eventually admitted to the rest and produced receipts and expenses amounting to 7 talents and 7000 drachmas for the maintenance of two boys and their sister for eight years. This works out at 5 obols a day for food; for shoes, laundry and hair cutting he had no monthly or yearly account but reckoned it all together for the whole time, at more than a talent. He said that he paid 5000 drachmas for the father's tomb, of which only half came out of the children's money (although the speaker alleges that Diogeiton did not pay anything towards the tomb, which cost 2500 drachmas). For the Dionysia he produced an account of 16 drachmas as the price of a lamb and charged half to the children. For other festivals and sacrifices he charged the children over 4000 drachmas, counting in other sundries to make this total. He also equipped a trireme, along with another citizen, for 48 minas, and charged half of this to the children's account (20 - 22, 24). This inflated account of expenses is rejected by the speaker, who gives his own reckoning of what ought to have been spent, at the very most, on two boys and a girl, a paidagogos and a female slave, at 1000 drachmas a year, a little less than 3 drachmas a day (28). This evidence was being presented to a jury well acquainted with the cost of living, and so we have to accept that it would have been possible to provide for three children for such a sum. Demosthenes does not mention that he and his sister had slaves to attend them while they were under guardianship, but they probably had. He certainly had teachers, though he claims that Aphobos deprived them of their wages (27. 46). Perikles provided a paidagogos, a slave, for his ward Alkibiades (Pl. *A/K*: I 122 A).

Lysias 32 shows that the expense of maintaining orphans was to

be defrayed from the orphans' property. If the orphans had none, the guardian apparently had to provide it himself, which could in some cases prove a heavy burden: the speaker in Lysias 19 claims that he has none of the property of Aristophanes, the wards' deceased father, but is in fact owed money from the estate, and has not recovered their mother's dowry (32). All of the family property that appears to have survived is about 1000 drachmas' worth of personal effects (31), hardly enough to support three children for several years.

If a guardian neglected to maintain his ward, it was the archon's duty to exact maintenance, according to Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 56. 7: τοὺς ἐπιτρόπους ἐὰν μὴ δίδῳσι τοῖς παῖσιν τὸν σῖτον οὗτος εἰσπράττει. Presumably failure to provide adequate maintenance was one of the things for which a guardian could be prosecuted by εἰσαγγελία κακώσεως ὀρφανῶν, over which the archon presided (see pp. 315 - 316, 320 - 322 below). A δίκη σίτου is mentioned in Bekker's *Anecdota Graeca* (238. 7 - 9) as a kind of suit instituted against guardians who did not provide maintenance (σίτον καὶ τροφάς) for orphans and their mothers. A δίκη could not be brought by ὁ βουλόμενος. But presumably it could be brought by a guardian against a fellow-guardian who refused to provide his share of the maintenance. Perhaps it could be brought by a relative of the orphan who was not one of his guardians: in Dem. 27. 15 we learn that Demochares, the husband of Demosthenes's aunt, "had words with" Aphobos over his failure to provide σῖτος for Demosthenes's mother (and about his unwillingness to let the property). Perhaps Demochares was able to threaten Aphobos with a δίκη σίτου.

The property of orphans

The subject of the administration of the property of orphans by their guardians is a large one and various aspects of it have been examined by scholars in detail.²⁷ The succession of orphans to their fathers' estates upon coming of age, and the problems that might be encountered, are outside the scope of this thesis, which is concerned only with the infancy of children. It will suffice therefore to give a fairly general account of the duties of guardians towards their wards' property, and the legal redress available in cases of maladministration.

It was the duty of a guardian to look after his ward's property and to hand it over to the ward when the latter reached the age of majority, along with an account showing how much had been spent on the ward's maintenance and how much income the estate had generated.²⁸ The guardian had certain powers over the property - he became κύριος of it (Is. 1. 10; Dem. 28. 16, 36. 22) - and certain obligations. The prime obligation and the most general one was to look after the interests of his ward: thus when an orphan's adult brother was found to be dissipating their common, as yet undivided, estate at an alarming rate, the guardians, against the instructions in the will, divided the property immediately between the two sons, in order to preserve for their ward his share of the capital (Dem. 36. 8). Kleonymos looked after the affairs of the orphans in his care "as if they were his own" (Is. 1. 12). Guardians had a specific obligation to manage their wards' estates in such a way that, if at all possible, they produced income. Theophrastos, we are told, acting in the capacity of guardian to Astyphilos, planted the boy's estate and farmed it and doubled its value (Is. 9. 28). It is part of Demosthenes's accusations against his guardians that not only did they misappropriate much of his capital, they also mismanaged his property in such a way that a potentially profitable estate produced nothing (Dem. 27. 47 - 48, 50, 60 - 61). Demosthenes claims that questions

about the mysterious non-existence of income from a large estate were asked by the arbitrator, and that Aphobos had no reply to make (27. 50).

One way of obtaining income from an orphan's estate was to let the entire estate out, τὸν οἶκον μισθῶσαι, land, liquid assets and all. A father might instruct that this be done in his will, as Demosthenes claimed his father had done (Dem. 27. 40; 28. 15; 29. 29, 42, 59), although his guardians denied it (28. 5, 7). If there was no mention of leasing the property in the will, a guardian might still arrange for this to be done, thus ensuring a return on the orphan's capital and ridding himself of the burden of managing the estate. Laws existed about the leasing of orphans' estates, but they no longer survive (Dem. 27. 58). It appears that the laws permitted, but did not compel, a guardian to have his ward's estate leased.²⁹ A guardian who was accused of neglecting his ward's interests by failing to have the estate leased could defend himself by showing that he himself was managing the estate profitably (Dem. 27. 59; 38. 23). A guardian did not let the estate himself. The procedure for leasing was laid down by law: the guardian requested the archon to lease the estate, and an auction was held under the archon's supervision and in the presence of a jury. Objections could be made by anyone who had evidence of an irregularity in the request. The lease went to the highest bidder. Two or more persons could put in a joint bid for the lease, and the guardian could bid for it himself, as is evident from Isaios 6. 36 - 37, where the speaker accuses his opponents of attempting to get hold of Euktemon's property by having themselves registered as guardians of two boys whom they claimed had been adopted by Euktemon's deceased sons: ". . . they requested the archon to let the estates as being the property of orphans, so that part of the property should be leased in the children's names, and part put up as security and mortgage stones set up while Euktemon was still alive, while they themselves, becoming lessees, would receive the income. On the first day that the courts met, the archon put the lease up for auction and they attempted to

get the lease. But some who were present reported the scheme to the relatives, and they came and unfolded the business to the jurors, and so the jurors voted that the estate should not be leased". Insufficient detail about the plot makes it impossible to ascertain just how this scheme was to work, but it does show that it was at any rate legal for a guardian to bid for the lease of his own ward's estate. This did not put guardians in an anomalous position, as has been claimed, since the transaction was not a private contract between guardian and lessee, but an arrangement made by the archon, at the request of the guardian, or at the request of another person (cf. prosecution by φάσις, see pp. 313 - 314 below), in the ward's interest.³⁰ The leasing was in the orphan's interest because it guaranteed the preservation of the estate and a certain income from it: the lessee had to put up security - ἀποτίμημα - of an amount sufficient to guarantee the return of the estate. It could be in the guardian's interest since, as we have seen, it freed him from the responsibility of managing the estate, and it would have furnished him with an excellent line of defence if the orphan were to attempt to bring a δίκη ἐπιτροπῆς against him in later years. A guardian who took the lease himself similarly simplified his responsibilities, in that, having returned the estate to the grown-up ward and paid the rent, he had satisfied his ward's claims as far as property was concerned, while cutting the complications of his account and the risk of prosecution for bad guardianship to a minimum. Moreover, if he could extract more profit from the estate than was due in rent, he could get for himself an income, unlike the guardian who managed his ward's estate himself without taking the lease.

A number of ὄροι, mortgage stones, from Attika and several other places exist, which were set up on property used as security against the lease of an orphan's estate. At the time of leasing the prospective lessee had to offer to the archon security, usually in the form of real property, roughly equal, presumably, in value to the orphan's estate, and the archon sent

valuators to value both the property offered as security and the estate up for lease (Harp. *δ.κ. ἀποτιμηταί κτλ.*, I 51. 12 - 52. 6 Dindorf). It is possible that only the liquid part of the estate had to be secured in this way; any landed property would itself have to be returned, so that all that would have been required was a prohibition on the lessee's alienating the orphan's land.³¹ In Isaios 2. 9 and 27 - 28 reference is made to the partnership of Menekles in the lease of the estate of NIKIAS's children: evidently Menekles was obliged to sell the property he had put up as security when the time came to deliver back the orphan's estate. The property he had put up as security was his share of some land owned jointly by himself and his brother, and Menekles found himself involved in a dispute with his brother about the sale of this land, but eventually he sold part of it and handed over 7 minas and a talent to the orphan. Demosthenes tells us that the orphan Antidoros got over 6 talents out of an original estate of 3 talents and 3000 drachmas, as a result of the letting of the property; Theogenes, who took the lease, counted out this money publicly in the Agora (Dem. 27. 58). This shows that the total rent due was paid as a lump sum when the lease expired.

Legal action could be taken by anyone who wished against a guardian who was required to have his ward's estate leased but did not do so (including, presumably, those who failed to have the estate leased although it would in fact have been better to lease it, cf. note 29 above), or who acted illegally in regard to the leasing. This was done by *φάσις* and was called *φάσις ὀρφανικοῦ οἴκου*. Whether it resembled other types of *φάσις*, in which a successful prosecutor received half of the sum paid in penalty by the defendant, is unknown. H. J. Wolff argues that the *φάσις* in connection with orphans' estates was quite different from the other known *φάσεις*, and that it was not a criminal accusation, basing his argument on Harpokration's wording *δ.κ. φάσις: λέγεται μὲν καὶ ἐπὶ δημοσίου ἐγκλήματος. . . . λέγεται δὲ*

καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὀρφανικῶν οἴκων (I 299. 7 ff. Dindorf). He suggests that when the court decided in favour of the prosecutor of a guardian who had failed to have his ward's estate leased, the consequence was that the estate was then leased, not that the guardian suffered a penalty.³² Against this, if we accept that Plato's provision on this matter in the *Laws* accurately reflects Athenian practice, it is possible to hold that half of the penalty exacted from the convicted defendant went to ὁ φαίνων.³³ The only mention of φάσις ὀρφανικοῦ οἴκου found in the orators is in Dem. 38. 23, where the speaker anticipates and counters his opponents' claim that their guardians had not let their property with the explanation that "your uncle Xenopeithes did not want this, but after Nikides prosecuted him by φάσις, he persuaded the jurors to let him manage it himself."

The speaker in Lys. 32 points out that the guardian Diogeiton "was permitted under the laws which deal with orphans . . . to let the estate . . . , or to buy land and bring up the children on the income" (32. 23), cf. note 29. The wording of this shows that, like leasing of orphans' estates, the buying of land with orphans' money was permitted but not insisted upon by law. The Lysias fragment (91) quoted in the *Souda* (E 55 Adler), which says, "Although the law instructs guardians to put the property of orphans into land (ἔγγειον), this man made us known as people with property at sea (ναυτικούς)" should not be interpreted to mean that all property of orphans had by law to be put into land. This oratorical fragment does not contradict the interpretation that the law mentioned the buying of land with orphans' money as a permitted course of action (perhaps laying down that *if* the money of orphans was invested, it must be invested in land); the strong wording used is intended to point the contrast between the sensible type of investment provided for by the law and the risky business of venturing orphans' money on bottomry, which if not explicitly forbidden by law, would not have been sanctioned by it. One of the accusations made against

Diogeiton was that he "sent off to the Adriatic a cargo worth 2 talents and at the same time he told their mother that the risky venture was the children's, but when it arrived safely and was doubled in value he claimed that the transaction was his own" (Lys. 32. 25). An example of the buying of landed property with orphans' assets is provided by Dem. 38. 7, where the speaker claims that the guardians of Nausimachos and Xenopeithes collected the debts owed to the orphans and sold some of their movables and slaves, and with the money bought landed properties (χωρία) and tenements (συνοικία).

The εισφορά property tax was one to which propertied orphans were liable, and their guardians took responsibility for paying it on their behalf (Dem. 27. 7 - 9, 36; 28. 4, 11; 29. 59; Is. fr. 23. 2 - 3). The speaker in Lys. 32. 24 evinces great indignation in his accusation that Diogeiton used some of his wards' money for his share in equipping a trireme: the state exempted orphans from λειτουργία while they were children and for a year after they came of age.

Maltreatment of orphans by their guardians

The general term for maltreatment is κάκωσις, but no definition of exactly what constituted this exists in the ancient sources. There is little evidence for the maltreatment of the persons of orphans by their guardians. Most of the speeches about orphans and guardians deal with disputes about property rather than accusations of wrongdoing against orphans' persons. The latter type of accusation is mentioned in passing in Isaios 5, where Dikaiogenes, the next of kin and guardian of Kephisodotos and others, is accused of robbing his wards of their rightful property, and of depriving them of the daily necessities of life, of buying up their family house and demolishing it to make a garden for himself, and of sending Kephisodotos to

Korinth (in the army) with his brother Harmodios instead of a follower (ἀντ' ἀκολούθου). "This", says the speaker, "is the extent of his *hybris* and villainy" (10 - 11). Two of these specific accusations are about his treatment of his wards' persons, and the significance of the charge about sending Kephisodotos in place of a follower lies presumably in imposing on a person of citizen birth a duty normally assigned to a slave, perhaps implying meanness on the part of Dikaiogenes. In imputing ὕβρις to Dikaiogenes, the speaker is accusing him of wantonly depriving the children of their rights, but Dikaiogenes was not prosecuted for this, so that we cannot know whether a jury would have judged him responsible for serious harm to his wards. The allegation of ὕβρις was made, no doubt, with an eye to the fact that it was something which the law specifically required the archon to protect orphans from (Dem. 43. 75, cf. p. 318 below). One of the accusations against Diogeiton touched on in Lysias's speech of that name (32. 16) is that when Diogeiton sent his wards away to provide for themselves, they were wearing worn-out clothes and had no shoes on their feet. The most common form of maltreatment to a ward's person would probably have been deprivation of adequate food and clothing. But there are few complaints of this in extant speeches, and no means of knowing how common it was.

Another possible form of maltreatment of orphans would have been their sexual exploitation, and Aischines mentions a law which says that if a parent or guardian hires a boy out for prostitution, the person who does so and the person who hires him are both to be prosecuted (1. 13). But there is no evidence that orphans were commonly the victims of sexual exploitation. In a Lysias fragment (75), Pytheas, who was left as guardian of Teisis by the latter's father, is said to be Teisis's lover. But the ward, Teisis, is already grown-up at the time of the incident recounted in the fragment, and the guardian is not actually accused of having been his ward's lover while the ward was a minor. Aischines (1. 158) recounts an incident in which Diophantos "the so-called orphan" brought a foreigner before the archon and

accused him of having robbed him of 4 drachmas in an affair of male prostitution, and quoted the laws that instruct the archon to take charge of orphans. But the details of the case are not known, in particular whether Diophantos was prostituted by his guardian, or was already adult when the incident described by Aischines occurred: the malicious little story is only mentioned by Aischines in an attempt to associate Timarchos with male prostitutes. Protection of an orphan in such circumstances could be achieved not merely by means of the γραφή ἐταιρήσεως, but by the εισαγγελία κακώσεως ὀρφανῶν, which was much more advantageous for the plaintiff.

When Menander makes one of his characters say, "If you are eager to do your duty by your son, you will have for him a true protector, not someone watching for him to die" (fr. 605 Koerte), he must have had in mind the sinister fate to which orphans with greedy and unscrupulous guardians were thought to be at risk. In Athens an orphan's guardian was often none other than the person who would inherit the orphan's property if the child were to die. It is possible that the law Diogenes Laertios ascribes to Solon, that an orphan's guardian may not marry the orphan's mother and that the person to whom the estate passes on the orphan's death may not be his guardian, discussed on p. 305 above, did once exist at Athens but had been repealed by the age of the orators, or it may be that a law similar to one known to have existed at Thurioi and ascribed to Charondas was mistakenly attributed to Solon.³⁴ This law of Charondas stated that the property of orphans was to be looked after by the nearest relatives on the father's side, but that the orphans themselves were to be in the care of the relatives on the mother's side. The explanation given for this law is that the mother's family had no interest in the inheritance, and so would not plot against the orphan's life, while the arrangement deprived the father's relatives, who would inherit, of the opportunity to plot, and encouraged them to administer the property well in case they should one day succeed to it (Diod. Sic. 12.

15). There is no reason to doubt the existence of this law. H. F. Jolowicz suggests that it is spurious because there is no evidence that there was any need to protect orphans from the evil intents of those who stood to inherit their property.³⁵ This seems an insufficient basis on which to declare that the law never existed; rather we should interpret the law as an indication that the lawmaker of Thurioi considered that some orphans did require to be protected from unscrupulous guardians.³⁶

But in classical Athens, as we have seen, there was no prohibition on the care of an orphan by the person who would gain if the orphan died. In fact this was the very person who was often required by law to act as guardian. The orphan was protected from ill-treatment at the hands of his guardian by the action *εἰσαγγελία κακώσεως ὀρφανῶν*, which could be brought by anyone who wished. The law which describes the archon's duties in respect of orphans and *epikleroi* says that he is to take action *ἐὰν δέ τις ὑβρίζη ἢ ποιῆ τι παράνομον* (Dem. 43. 75). Although the definition of *κάκωσις* is nowhere explicitly set out, it is, as we have seen, possible to infer that it included the starvation or malnourishment of an orphan by his guardian, as well as serious cases of deprivation of the other necessities of life; an action, probably also *εἰσαγγελία*, for maltreatment of parents (*κάκωσις γονέων*) was possible in cases where aged parents did not receive the necessities of life, including a home, from their son.³⁷ (The possibility of a *δίκη σίτου* for orphans deprived of adequate maintenance has already been mentioned, p. 309 above.) It would also have been possible for an accuser to argue that the sexual exploitation of an orphan, and violence done to him, were examples of *κάκωσις*. There can be little doubt that the *εἰσαγγελία κακώσεως ὀρφανῶν* could have been used in all the circumstances outlined above, even though all the cases in which it figures in the orators are to do with the protection of the orphan's property rather than person. This may have been partly because *κάκωσις* of this kind would have been difficult to

prove. It is also possible that the availability of such an action, extremely favourable as it was to the accuser and perilous for the defendant, did much to prevent crimes against the persons of orphans (which would, after all have been so much less financially rewarding than stealing their property), and one would like to think that this accounts for the dearth of examples. But another possible explanation is that Athenians were more concerned about protecting the property of orphans than about taking an interest in their personal welfare, and that they tended to leave the latter to the orphan's guardian or guardians. It has been conjectured, on the basis of phrases in Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 56. 7, that the archon himself had a direct rôle in ensuring the welfare of orphans and epikleroi (and widows pregnant at the time of the death of their husbands), besides his duty to preside over the δίκαι, γραφαί, εισαγγελίαι, and so on, that were brought before him.³⁸ The same term is used of his rôle both in this passage and in the law from which it appears to be derived: after listing the court cases about orphans and epikleroi over which the archon presided, *Ath. Pol.* sums up

ἐπιμελεῖται δὲ καὶ τῶν ὀρφανῶν καὶ τῶν ἐπικλήρων . . . καὶ κύριός ἐστι τοῖς ἀδικοῦσιν ἐπιβάλλειν ἢ εἰσαγεῖν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον (*Ath. Pol.* 56.7).

The law said:

ὁ ἄρχων ἐπιμελείσθω τῶν ὀρφανῶν καὶ τῶν ἐπικλήρων . . .
τούτων ἐπιμελείσθω καὶ μὴ ἐάτω ὑβρίζειν μηδένα περὶ τούτους.
ἐὰν δέ τις ὑβρίζη ἢ ποιῇ τι παράνομον, κύριος ἔστω ἐπιβάλλειν
κατὰ τὸ τέλος κτλ. (Dem. 43. 75).³⁹

The term ἐπιμελείσθαι may be understood as indicating the archon's general duty to "have charge of" or "look after" orphans and epikleroi, which is specified by the law, and by the *Ath. Pol.*'s list of cases, as his duty to hear and deal with cases of maltreatment, referring them on to the court where necessary, and his duty to appoint guardians in accordance with the law

(this latter duty is not mentioned in the part of the law quoted in Dem. 43. 75, but is clear from the *Ath. Pol.*'s catalogue). It is not necessary to interpret the archon's duty of ἐπιμελεῖσθαι as an additional obligation to care for orphans in a direct, practical, or executive capacity, and indeed it is difficult to see how he could have done so. The archon was, after all, not a social worker, and cannot be supposed to have been acquainted with the personal circumstances of all the orphans, epikleroi, and widows pregnant at the time of the husband's death during the year of his office. He had to rely on those who did have knowledge of these persons and their circumstances to bring any abuses to his attention.

The εἰσαγγελία κακώσεως ὀρφανῶν

The procedure in this kind of εἰσαγγελία was that any volunteer informed the archon of the maltreatment of an orphan by his or her guardian or guardians. The archon made a preliminary enquiry (ἀνάκρισις), and had the power to impose on an offender a penalty up to a certain limit prescribed by law. But if he deemed the offence to deserve a greater penalty than that which he himself was empowered to impose, he summoned the accused before a jury, giving him four days' notice, and stated the penalty which he thought appropriate. The accuser then conducted the prosecution. The jury gave its verdict, after hearing speeches from both sides, for conviction or acquittal. If they convicted, they voted again to choose between the penalty proposed by the offender and the penalty that had been proposed by the archon.⁴⁰ It may have been the case that at some time before the fourth century when these rules obtained, it was entirely up to the archon to impose a fine or secure a conviction.⁴¹

The procedure was made attractive to the champion of the orphan's cause by the rule that the prosecutor did not have to pay the usual fees

(πρυτανεῖον and παράστασις) which were forfeited if the case were lost. Nor was he subject to the fine of 1000 drachmas, as was the prosecutor in a γραφή, if he failed to get a fifth of the votes. The time limit set by the water clock was not used. If the prosecutor abandoned the case he was not subject to the usual penalty.⁴² Thus the procedure by εἰσαγγελία was much more advantageous to the prosecutor than was a γραφή. Even when the indictment or the action itself is called a γραφή, it is safe to say that the actual procedure in such a case was by εἰσαγγελία.⁴³

In the event of conviction the jury selected the penalty by choosing between the respective proposals of archon and defendant. No particular penalty was specified by law. The first consequence of conviction must surely always have been that the guardian was deprived of the guardianship, and the penalties exacted could be severe, including ἀτιμία, heavy fines, and confiscation of property.⁴⁴ Juries were inclined to be sympathetic to orphans and to deal severely with those who wronged them.⁴⁵

It seems likely that plaintiffs in such cases often exploited the tendency of juries to be swayed by feelings of pity for orphans. In Dem. 53. 29 the jury is warned that the defendant and his friends will procure some orphans or epikleroi to stir their feelings. Sokrates disdained to parade his sons before the jury and beg for acquittal (Pl. *Apol.* 34 D), but others were not so scrupulous. The mock-trial scene in Aristophanes's *Wasps* (891 - 1008, especially 976 - 978) gives us some idea of the scenes that took place in Athenian courts when children were brought in as mute but snivelling witnesses. Orphans presented in this way must have been the most effective means of all of inducing juries to cast their votes for sympathy. The effect aimed at would have been very much like that of the appearance of children on the tragic stage, where they were always represented as undeserving victims of misfortune and usually remained entirely silent - small figures of considerable pathos.⁴⁶

Isaios's speech *On the Estate of Hagnias* (11) is a speech in defence against an εἰσαγγελία for maltreatment of an orphan. Theopompos was being prosecuted in this way by his fellow guardian, on the ground that he had not given their ward, the orphan son of Theopompos's brother Stratokles, a promised half-share in the estate of Hagnias, an estate which Theopompos had succeeded in having adjudicated to himself in a διαδικασία. Theopompos defends himself by denying that he had ever made such a promise and by pointing out that Stratokles's son had no claim to the estate in law: if he had had such a claim, he would have been able to put in his claim to the estate in the διαδικασία. He rejects his opponent's suggestion that he is much wealthier than Stratokles's son and his four sisters and that he has been mean in his dealings with them, and claims that he has managed the orphan's property so as to increase its value. This part of the argument is not strictly relevant to the accusation and defence, but it must have been usual in such cases for the jury to hear affirmations and denials about the relative wealth of guardian and ward, and accusations of meanness about money bandied about. Since Theopompos's son Makartatos later inherited the estate of Hagnias along with the rest of this father's property, it is evident that Theopompos was successful in his defence against the εἰσαγγελία.

The δίκη ἐπιτροπῆς

The εἰσαγγελία κακώσεως was available, as we have seen, for redressing wrongs against orphans while they were still minors. But many orphans who felt that their guardianship had been badly managed were left to take action themselves when they reached adulthood. With the δίκη ἐπιτροπῆς the law provided a means for them to sue their guardians for up to five years after the guardianship had ended (Dem. 38. 17).⁴⁷ The most

famous such cases are those instituted by Demosthenes against his guardians: "I instituted actions for guardianship against Demophon and Therippides and against the defendant (Aphobos) because I had been robbed of all my property. When my action against Aphobos first came to court, I proved clearly to the jury . . . that he along with them had robbed us of all that was left us . . ." (Dem. 29. 6).

Lysias's speech *Against Diogeiton* (32) is a δίκη ἐπιτροπῆς against Diogeiton brought by the eldest of his wards, in which the speaker on his behalf is the female ward's husband. In Isaios 7. 7 - 10 we learn that Archedamos saw that Apollodoros was being deprived of his property by his guardian and took him into his care, and when he became a man helped him to bring an action for guardianship, which was successful. In Lys. fr. 43 the speaker complains that the sons of Hippokrates are bringing a groundless action against him, and that he had managed their property well and had handed it back to them.

The action provided a means for the plaintiff to compel the guardian to submit an account of his management of the guardianship and to pay damages if the court upheld the orphan's claim. The two parties had to come before an arbitrator before the matter came to court (Dem. 27. 49 - 51). If the plaintiff failed to receive a fifth of the votes, he had to pay a penalty (ἐπωβελία) of one sixth of the damages claimed, which went to the successful defendant.⁴⁸ Damages were fixed by assessment and counter-assessment (Dem. 27. 67; 29. 8, 30). The speaker in Dem. 38, the defence speech in a δίκη βλαβῆς which arose out of claims for damages against the sons of Nausimachos's and Xenopeithes's guardian, mentions some of the advantages enjoyed by plaintiffs in a δίκη ἐπιτροπῆς: they play on the sympathy felt by juries for orphans, and even though Nausimachos and Xenopeithes are now grown men they may be expected to weep before the court to elicit pity (38. 19 - 20, 27).

Female orphans

Everything that has been written so far in this chapter applies to male orphans, and to a large extent also to females. But whereas a male orphan on reaching manhood became legally responsible for himself, an Athenian citizen woman never did, and so the treatment of the orphanhood of females must have differed to some extent from that of males. Since we are concerned here with the infancy of children, it will not be necessary to discuss in depth the marriage of female orphans - the area where the distinction between male and female orphans is most acute - but it is necessary to ask to what extent the guardianship of girls departed from the rules and conventions described so far in this chapter.

We saw at the beginning that Demosthenes's father provided for the future care of both his children before he died. He gave his five-year-old daughter to Demophon in marriage (ἐγγυῶν) with a dowry, with instructions that he marry her when she reached a suitable age, in ten years' time (Dem. 27. 5; 29. 43). Diodotos instructed that his young daughter be given a dowry of one talent, but did not betroth her to anyone (Lys. 32. 6). Aristotle's will gives his daughter to Nikanor to marry when she is old enough, and in the meantime nominates him as her legal representative (κύριος) and guardian, and gives further instructions about her marriage if Nikanor should die before marrying her or before children are born (D. L. 5. 11 - 12).⁴⁹ That a father could appoint for his young daughter a guardian other than the man who was eventually to marry her is shown by Lysias 32; but it would probably have been common for a father to do as Demosthenes's father did, appointing as guardian or one of the guardians, the man to whom he also betrothed his daughter by ἐγγύη. Although Demosthenes is not explicit about the ἐπιτροπή of his sister by his three guardians, his phrase τὰ σώμαθ' ἡμῶν εἰς τὰς χεῖρας ἐνέθηκε παρακαταθήκην ἐπονομάζων (28. 15) strongly suggests that the appointed guardians were to perform the same function towards

both children.

When a female orphan's father had failed to appoint a guardian for her by will or *inter vivos* before his death, we must assume that, unless she was an epikleros, a guardian was appointed for her in exactly the same way as for a male orphan. When the girl grew up, her paternal grandfather or adult brother would have given her in marriage (Dem. 46. 18); if neither of these existed, and the girl was not an epikleros, perhaps she was given in marriage by her guardian.⁵⁰ Presumably the guardian could marry her himself, if he wished. If a young girl's father died leaving no legitimate male heirs, the girl was an epikleros as well as being a female orphan. Such a girl was given in marriage by the process of ἐπιδικασία, with the object of providing a male heir to her father's property. It is impossible to say with certainty from the available evidence whether the epikleros was assigned to her future husband by ἐπιδικασία as soon as she became an epikleros or only when she reached the age for marriage. If the former was the case, the successful claimant would have exercised the functions of ἐπίτροπος until he married her (unless he was himself a minor, in which case his guardian would have looked after the girl as well); if the epikleros was not given in marriage until she reached maturity, the question arises as to who looked after her till then, and there is no evidence to answer it.⁵¹ The archon was of course responsible for male and female orphans alike: that is, for seeing to it that they were provided with a guardian and dealing with complaints about the mismanagement of their guardianship. He also received the claims to the hand of an epikleros in ἐπιδικασία or διαδικασία.

The duties of guardians toward female wards were the same as toward males, except that guardians had to continue providing for girls until they were married, and had to arrange the marriage of their female charges (unless the father had done this before he died). It would have been usual for the guardian to provide a dowry, if the girl's father had not already done so in his will. If the orphans in his care had some property, the guardian

could have provided dowries for the female orphans out of this.

Female orphans could not be heirs to property in their own right as boys could. It would however have been possible for a father to leave his daughter a limited bequest in his will, as well as her dowry: any such property the guardian was required to preserve and defend. A considerable amount of property might be attached to an epikleros. This had to be inherited by her male issue, if she had any, and in the meantime would have been administered by her future husband or her guardian.

A female orphan could be maltreated in the same ways as a male, and it would surely have been possible for an outsider to come to her defence by means of the εἰσαγγελία κακώσεως, even if she was not an epikleros. Aristotle's words in *Ath. Pol.* 56. 6 have been invoked to maintain that, of female orphans, only epikleroi were entitled to such protection.⁵² But this is not at all clear from the simple statement that the archon dealt with and referred to a court cases of maltreatment of orphans and maltreatment of epikleroi. As a special category of orphan, with special rules governing the disposal of her property and her hand in marriage, it is quite natural for the epikleros to be listed separately alongside the ordinary orphans of both sexes. The presence of ἐπικλήρου κακώσεως in the list does not eliminate all other females from ὀρφανῶν κακώσεως. If, as we have argued, the action ὀρφανῶν κακώσεως applied to cases of offences against the person as well as property, it seems reasonable to believe that girls were afforded such protection too.

It is likely that actions ἐπικλήρου κακώσεως were only those brought against ἐπίτροποι and κύριοι for maltreatment to which *only* epikleroi were liable, that is, mismanagement or misappropriation of the property connected to the epikleros, or failure in some way to do their duty by her as an epikleros, and that maltreatment of epikleroi which did not involve infringement of the special rules about epikleroi was dealt with by actions

ὀρφανῶν κακώσεως.⁵³ There is no extant speech belonging to a case of εἰσαγγελία ἐπικλήρου κακώσεως. In Demosthenes 37 we hear that Pantainetos had lumped in with various other charges against Euergos, an accusation that he had entered the apartments of the epikleroi and his mother, and apparently Pantainetos read out the laws about epikleroi in court. But he never brought the case before the archon, who was competent to deal with offences against epikleroi. This suggests that the ἐπίτροπος or κύριος of an epikleros could himself accuse a person of an offence against the epikleros, such as a personal affront; this would not have been by εἰσαγγελία, which was only used against guardians and relatives, but would nevertheless have been done before the archon.⁵⁴ Epikleroi would have been considered particularly to deserve legal protection, both because they were unable to defend themselves and because they were the vehicles by means of which an estate was kept in the family and transmitted to its heirs.

Dem. 27 - 30 and Lys. 32 show that a grown-up male orphan who brought a δίκη ἐπιτροπῆς against his former guardian would include the wrongs perpetrated against his sister in his accusations. Probably a grown-up female orphan could, in theory, have had her husband bring a δίκη ἐπιτροπῆς against her former guardian (if the two were different people) on her behalf, but this would seldom, if ever, have occurred, if only because of the extreme unlikelihood of a female orphan having anything but an insignificant amount of property.

In Gortyn the regulations for "heiresses", there called πατροῖδοι, were slightly different from those at Athens. In the Gortyn Code we find regulations for the treatment of πατροῖδοι too young to marry. When a girl became a πατροῖδος while not of marriageable age (that is, under twelve), her father's brothers administered the property, giving her half the produce, but if there was no ἐπιβᾶλλον - the kinsman entitled to claim her

hand in marriage - the πατροῖκος had charge of all the property and produce and remained with her mother until reaching the age for marriage, and if she had no mother she was brought up by her mother's brothers (Gortyn Code VIII 51 - 53). A later modification of this law rules that in default of an ἐπιβάλλον or ὀρπανοδικασταί (not mentioned in the earlier codification), the πατροῖκος shall be brought up by her mother, but paternal and maternal relatives were to take charge of the property until she was married (XII 6 - 19).⁵⁵

State maintenance of orphans

There is some slight evidence that in an age prior to that of the orators, the Athenian state may have provided food for orphans (as distinct from *war*-orphans, a subject that will be dealt with shortly). Aristotle in the *Ath. Pol.* (24. 3) lists orphans among the beneficiaries of practical arrangements made by Aristides in the early fifth century for a sufficient food supply:⁵⁶

κατέστησαν δὲ καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς εὐπορίαν τροφῆς, ὥσπερ Ἀριστείδης εἰσηγήσατο. . . . ἔτι δὲ πρυτανεῖον καὶ ὀρφανοὶ καὶ δεσμωτῶν φύλακες· ἅπασι γὰρ τούτοις ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν ἡ διοίκησις ἦν.

These orphans were given maintenance at public expense. The source does not tell us when this privilege was first granted to orphans, nor that the orphans were those whose fathers had been killed in war, though it has been assumed by modern scholars that they were.⁵⁷ Solon's name is connected with food (σίτος) for widows and orphans by a late source (Harpokration s.v. σίτος, I 274. 1 - 4 Dindorf, repeated in *Souda* Σ 502 Adler): the information that income for feeding women and orphans is called σίτος is here attributed to Solon's first axon and Aristotle's *Ath. Pol.* This reference of the lexicographers to *Ath. Pol.* is probably to 56. 7 (rather than to 24. 3,

where the word $\sigma\acute{\iota}\tau\omicron\varsigma$ is not used), where we are told that the archon exacts $\sigma\acute{\iota}\tau\omicron\varsigma$ from those guardians who neglect to provide it for their wards (cf. p. 309 above). The $\sigma\acute{\iota}\tau\omicron\varsigma$ referred to in Solon's law need not have been given to orphans and widows bereaved by war. So, nothing is certain about $\sigma\acute{\iota}\tau\omicron\varsigma$ for ordinary orphans in Solon's time, except that it was the subject of a piece of legislation. It may be that Solon instructed that food be provided by the city for orphans and widows who had no other means of support and were in danger of starving.⁵⁸

There is, on the other hand, abundant evidence that at Athens the children of men who had died in battle, fighting for their country, were given maintenance and education at public expense until they reached adulthood. A close look at the evidence is necessary to determine when and how this arrangement operated.

We learn from D. L. 1. 55 that Solon enacted that the sons of those who died in battle be maintained and educated at public expense. We have already noted Aristotle's reference (*Ath. Pol.* 24. 3) to the arrangements made by Aristeides for the securing of a food supply, the beneficiaries of which included orphans, though, as we have seen, *war*-orphans are not specified.⁵⁹ The first mention of public maintenance of war-orphans by an author referring to a practice of his own day is in Thucydides's version of the funeral oration of Perikles (2. 46), where it is stated that the city will henceforth ($\tau\omicron\upsilon\ \acute{\alpha}\pi\omicron\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\theta\delta\epsilon$) maintain the children of the fallen until they come of age. What Perikles refers to here is a current practice already well known to his hearers. The funeral speech of Aspasia, as reported by Sokrates in Plato's *Menexenos*, refers to the state maintenance of war-orphans, in a context whose vagueness appears to embrace the Peloponnesian War as well as later wars (cf. 246 A - C). The city, it is claimed, acts as a father towards the orphans while they are children, and when they reach manhood sends them away with full military equipment (248 D - 249 B). The character in Kratinos's comedy *Pylala* must have been

addressing a war-orphan when he said, the city has educated you and maintained you with public money until adulthood (fr. 183 Kassel and Austin).

When war-orphans who had received public maintenance came of age, they paraded into the theatre at the Dionysia and a herald announced them, calling them by their patronymics, as young men whose fathers died in battle fighting for their country, and whom the city has maintained until adulthood (Lys. fr. 42 b, see note 60 below; Isok. 8. 82). At this ceremony the orphans wore the full armour given them by the city (Aischin. 3. 154).

In the Lysias fragment referred to, which comes from his speech *Against Theozotides*, we find vigorous opposition to what appears to be Theozotides's proposal to restrict the privilege of public support to exclude νόθοι and adopted sons.⁶⁰ Theozotides also appears as proposer of a decree, partly preserved on a stele excavated from the Agora, to give the sons of Athenians who "died violent deaths in the oligarchy coming to the aid of the democracy . . . because of their loyalty and bravery" an obol per day for maintenance.⁶¹ R. S. Stroud has attempted to show that it was this decree for which Theozotides was opposed by Lysias's client, rather than a decree restricting state maintenance to legitimate sons of those who died in *war*. He rests this identification chiefly on the stipulation in the decree that the obol per day be given to sons of *Athenians*, thus excluding sons of metics, slaves and foreigners, and, as Stroud thinks, illegitimate sons of Athenians, who met their deaths in this way. But even νόθοι and ποιητοί could be παῖδες Ἀθηναίων, and there is in fact nothing in the decree to exclude them. Furthermore, when we look at the Lysias fragments, we find the speaker presenting the picture of the herald at the Dionysia ceremony proclaiming that the city has maintained these youths whose fathers died ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ μαχόμενοι, and then having to announce that bastards and adopted sons are excepted because of Theozotides. This certainly gives the impression that it was the privileges given to *war*-orphans from which Theozotides wished

to exclude bastards and adopted sons, and we should therefore reject Stroud's theory that identifies the proposal attacked in the speech with the decree of Theozotides found in the Agora. There is unfortunately no means of giving a secure date to the proposals of Theozotides opposed in the Lysias speech, and Stroud's suggestion that they belong to the period soon after 403/2 is on his own admission tentative. The dating of the decree found in the Agora to 403/2, on the other hand, based on the theory that the oligarchy referred to is likely to be that of the Thirty and their successors the Ten, is rather better established. We do not know whether Lysias's client won his case, but since no mention is made, in later references to the custom of giving war-orphans state maintenance, of the exclusion of bastards and adopted sons, it perhaps seems likely that he did.

There is, however, some evidence, albeit fragmentary, in the decree of Theozotides which is relevant to the question of state maintenance of orphans whose fathers were killed in war. If Stroud's reconstructions of lines 10 - 11 and 16 - 19 are correct, it appears, respectively, that the amount given to war-orphans by the state was an obol per day and that it was distributed from the Prytaneion, and that before 404 they were paid this sum by the Hellenotamiai.

State maintenance of war-orphans, and the ceremony in the theatre that marked the end of the orphans' dependance, was, therefore, an institution still alive at the end of the fifth century. Did it continue during the fourth century? In a speech of 330 BC, we find Aischines (3. 154 - 155) referring to the proclamation in the theatre as a thing of the past.⁶² Isokrates (8. 82) some years earlier, in 355 BC, also made a reference to this ceremony at the Dionysia, though in much vaguer terms than Aischines, in the past tense (*παρεισήγον*). Some scholars have inferred from this that state maintenance of war-orphans had ceased by this time.⁶³ But all that can be inferred from the Aischines and Isokrates passages is that the practice of making a proclamation and holding a parade had been

discontinued. That war-orphans continued to receive state maintenance during the second half of the fourth century (in particular during the years c. 336 - 322) is proved by two pieces of evidence. Aristotle (*Pol* 2. 5. 4) says that Hippodamos of Miletos proposed a law that the children of those killed in war should receive maintenance at public expense, as if this law had not previously been enacted anywhere else; but in fact this law exists at present in Athens and in other cities.⁶⁴ And it is to state maintenance of war-orphans that Hypereides refers in his Funeral Speech, where he says of the dead of the Lamian War, in 322 BC, that the goodwill of their country will be established as their children's guardian:

ὅσοι δὲ παίδας καταλελοίπασι, ἡ τῆς πατρίδος εὐνοια ἐπίτροπος
αὐτοῖς τῶν παίδων καταστήσεται (42).

The future tense of the verb has the same significance as ἀπὸ τοῦδε in Thuc. 2. 46, namely that state maintenance of the orphans to whom Hypereides alludes will begin now, from their orphanhood. (It should not be taken, as it seems to be by Stroud (1971) p. 289 n. 23, to mean that state maintenance of war-orphans had fallen into disuse until this point.) Public maintenance of war-orphans, therefore, continued throughout most, and perhaps all, of the fourth century.⁶⁵

We know from literary texts of war-orphans who do not seem to have collected their daily obol. The children of Diodotos, who was killed fighting at Ephesos, did not receive any public money for their maintenance, as is shown from the detailed scrutiny to which their expenses are submitted by the speaker (*Lys.* 32. 20 - 28). Diodotos left enough money for this to have been unnecessary. Alkibiades and Kleinias, whose father was killed at Koroneia, were war-orphans, and it is highly unlikely that they, as children of a wealthy family, would have collected an obol each a day from the state. This was a means of support of which wealthy families would have declined to avail themselves. Indeed it is likely that the obol was intended only for those poor enough to need it.

According to Plato (*Menex.* 248 E - 249 A) the responsibility for the care of war-orphans in Athens fell to the highest office of the state:

διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν προστέτακται φυλάττειν ἀρχῆ
ἥπερ μεγίστη ἐστίν.

This can only mean the eponymous archon, who, as we have seen, was responsible for looking after all orphans of citizen families. The scholion on Dem. 24. 20 refers to the polemarch as the official in charge of war-orphans, but that is probably a mistake.⁶⁶ There is a reference in Xenophon's *Poroi* (2. 7) to an ἀρχή nowhere else attested for Athens: the ὀρφανοφύλακες. The context tells us little about them. They must have existed at Athens as an ἀρχή: Xenophon mentions them by way of a model for a proposed board of μετοικοφύλακες, saying, "And if we set up metoikophylakes as an office of state, just like orphanophylakes, and if there was given some mark of honour to those who brought forward the greatest number of metics, this too would make the metics more well-disposed . . .". The ὀρφανοφύλακες have been discussed in the most recent commentary on Xenophon's *Poroi*, by Philippe Gauthier.⁶⁷ He concludes that the suggestion by J. H. Thiel, that the ὀρφανοφύλακες were a board of officials with responsibility for war-orphans, is the best explanation of their existence. The alternative, that ὀρφανοφύλακες played an intermediate rôle between archon and ἐπίτροποι for the care of all orphans, may, as Gauthier rightly says, be discounted because there is no mention of them in Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 56. 6 - 7, nor in Demosthenes's speeches against his guardians, nor indeed in any of the oratorical sources on the care of orphans.⁶⁸ On the other hand, the omission of Aristotle in *Ath. Pol.* to mention the officials with responsibility for war-orphans is not surprising, since he does not mention this special category of orphans at all.⁶⁹ The conjecture that the ὀρφανοφύλακες were responsible for war-orphans is a plausible one, especially since it is difficult to see what other functions

they could have fulfilled. If this was the case, what exactly were their duties? Gauthier mentions the administration of war-orphans' property, but war-orphans would surely have had ἐπίτροποι, just as ordinary orphans had, who would have managed any property belonging to their wards in the usual way. Another duty suggested by Gauthier is the overseeing of the proper distribution of public funds. This is something that did not have to be done for ordinary orphans, and so it may have required the attention of a war-orphan-official or officials. If Stroud's reconstructions and conjectures about lines 15 - 18 of the Theozotides decree are correct, the officials who had until 404 been responsible for paying war-orphans their daily obol may have been the Hellenotamiai. It could be that after the disestablishment of the board of the Hellenotamiai, ὀρφανοφύλακες were appointed to discharge this duty.⁷⁰ If Xenophon intended the comparison between μετοικοφύλακες and ὀρφανοφύλακες to extend beyond the first clause of his sentence, this might be evidence of a further duty discharged by ὀρφανοφύλακες, namely the keeping of a list of war-orphans, just as each of the μετοικοφύλακες of Xenophon's proposal was to produce some kind of list of metics under his charge.⁷¹ There probably was a register of orphans entitled to draw a daily obol from the state, and if the ὀρφανοφύλακες were indeed responsible for war-orphans, they may well have been the officials charged with keeping the register. These, then, are two specific duties which can be conjectured to have belonged to the ὀρφανοφύλακες. They may be reconciled with the passing reference in Plato's *Menexenos* to the duty of the μεγίστη ἀρχή to φυλάττειν war-orphans if we bear in mind that the ultimate responsibility for the welfare of war-orphans, as of ordinary orphans, did indeed lie with the archon, while the duties of the ὀρφανοφύλακες were probably limited to the executive business of doling out obols and keeping a register. In time of war the large number of war-orphans may well have necessitated the appointment of special

assistants to the archon for this purpose.

If there was a list of war-orphans, some kind of official enquiry would have to have been held into the status of children who claimed to qualify for it. There is in fact a reference to an inspection of orphans in the *Constitution of the Athenians* falsely attributed to Xenophon. Writing of annual business, the author says:

πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἀρχὰς δοκιμάσαι καὶ διαδικάσαι καὶ ὄρφανούς
δοκιμάσαι καὶ φύλακας δεσμωτῶν καταστήσαι. ταῦτα μὲν ὅσα
ἔτη (3. 4).

War-orphans are not explicitly mentioned, but it is difficult to see what other orphans would have required a δοκιμασία. In Lys. 32. 24 the speaker mentions a δοκιμασία which applied to orphans in general:

ὄρφανοῖς οὓς ἡ πόλις οὐ μόνον παῖδας ὄντας ἀτελεῖς
ἐποίησεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπειδὴν δοκιμασθῶσιν ἐνιαυτὸν ἀφήκεν
ἀπασῶν τῶν λητουργιῶν.

On the basis of this passage it has been maintained that all orphans had a special δοκιμασία to certify that they were able to take over their own property from their guardians. But Lysias's words do not say that they were scrutinised *qua* orphans. All Athenian youths were subjected to a δοκιμασία on reaching the age of eighteen, before being registered in the deme. Orphans would have been scrutinised in this way along with everyone else, so that there would have been no need for a special δοκιμασία of orphans to determine whether they were of age and entitled to take over the management of their property.⁷² The Lysias passage simply means that after the δοκιμασία to which all youths were subject, orphans were exempt from λητουργίαι for a further year. The only orphans who required a special δοκιμασία were war-orphans: they would each have undergone this only once, at the beginning of orphanhood, to ascertain that the father was Athenian and had indeed died fighting for Athens.⁷³

None of the sources on war-orphans at Athens makes any explicit mention of female orphans. The reference is usually to οἱ παῖδες, although sometimes to υἱεῖς (Pl. *Menex.* 248 D; D. L. 1. 55). The ceremony in the theatre was obviously intended only for male war-orphans. But there is no reason to believe that their sisters would have been allowed to starve, and we may assume that a daily obol was allocated to girls too. It is possible, although there is no evidence, that female war-orphans whose families could not afford to dower them, were given a dowry by the state on reaching marriageable age, as was enacted in Rhodes in 305 BC (Diod. Sic. 20. 84. 3: cf. note 64 above).

Notes to Chapter Four

1 E.g., Diodotos's children are orphans, and have a mother living, Lys. 32. 23, 24; Charidemos is called an orphan, and his mother is still living, Dem. 58. 32.

2 It appears that in the classical age the making of an oral will was legal, though it was more common to make a written one. I am indebted for this information to Miss Denise Tucker, whose thesis *Testamentary Inheritance in Athenian Law* (University of Glasgow, M. Litt. 1988) I read before making the final revision of this chapter.

3 It is true that Lys. 32 does not explicitly say that the appointment of Diogeiton as guardian was one of the provisions of the will left by Diodotos, but I think it is safe to assume that it was. Denise Tucker, though, doubts that it was ([1988] pp. 207 - 208).

4 This is the interpretation of Aristotle's will and household affairs in Tucker (1988) pp. 231 - 257 and Appendix I, "The positions of Nicanor and Nicomachus in the household of Aristotle", pp. 542 - 550. I have benefited in this chapter from her analysis of Aristotle's will and her discussion of the previous scholarship on the subject.

5 W. Wyse, *The Speeches of Isaeus*, Cambridge 1904, note on 9. 27. 6, 7 (p. 624).

6 Plato *A/k.* I 104 B, cf. Plut. *A/k.* 1; also Lys. frs. 43, 75 (Thalheim).

7 Cf. Lys. 32. 3: οὕτως αἰσχροῦς . . . ἐπιτετροπευμένους ὑπὸ τοῦ πάππου

ὡς οὐδεὶς πῶποτε ὑπὸ τῶν μηδὲν προσηκόντων ἐν τῇ πόλει.

8 Dem. 36. 8; 45. 37. Harrison, *The Law of Athens* Vol. I, p. 99 and n. 4 thinks that at least one of the guardians of a citizen boy had to be a citizen.

9 Harrison (1968) vol. I p. 101.

10 H. F. Jolowicz, "The wicked guardian", *Journal of Roman Studies* 37, 1947, pp. 82 - 90) asserts that, although guardianship of this kind existed at Athens, it was not always needed, especially where there was little property involved: if a family was reasonably united, they might manage without much regard to the law (p. 83). I agree that it would have been possible for relatives of Athenian orphans who had little or no property simply to assume responsibility for their care without recourse to the archon. But we must bear in mind that in some fairly poor families there may have been reluctance to undertake the care of unpropertied orphans, and that when two such sets of relatives each said that the others ought to be guardians, resort would need to have been made to the law, via the archon.

11 δικάϊως γὰρ ὁ νομοθέτης, οἶμαι, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰς ἀτυχίας τῶν οἰκείων καὶ τὰς ἐκδόσεις τῶν γυναικῶν τοῖς ἐγγύτατα γένους προσέταττε ποιεῖσθαι, οὕτως καὶ τὰς κληρονομίας καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν μετουσίαν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀποδέδωκεν.

12 Cf. Is. fr. 6, from the speech *Against Diokles Concerning some Land*.

13 Δεινίας ὁ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀδελφὸς ἐπετρόπευσεν ἡμᾶς θεῖος ὢν ὀρφανούς ὄντας. Cf. O. Schulthess, *Vormundschaft nach attischem Recht*, Freiburg

1886, p. 65; L. Beauchet, *Histoire du droit privé de la république athénienne*, Paris 1897, Vol. II, p. 170.

14 Beauchet remarks that an Athenian would hardly have bothered to make a will if he already had a son who was of age ([1897] II p. 175). But Aristotle made a will when his adopted son Nikanor was already adult (see p. 298 above). Although a man with sons had no need to make a will to dispose of property, he could make a will for other purposes, e.g. providing guardians for his young children, nominating a husband for his daughters and wife, freeing slaves, making small bequests, etc. Even though in the absence of a will the guardianship would devolve by law on a certain person, such a father might still wish by means of a will to make his choice clear and make absolutely certain that no rival claims would be countenanced.

15 Schulthess (1886) p. 67.

16 Wyse (1904) note on 5. 10. 1, 2 (p. 417).

17 Is. 6. 36 has been used as evidence that registration of testamentary guardianship was required: Androkles and Antidoros (and possibly others not named) have themselves declared guardians of Euktemon's two sons (said to have been born of a liaison with Alke) after Philoktemon and Ergamenes, the boys' guardians, had died (though the main thing that is here registered with the archon is the posthumous adoption of the two children by the deceased elder sons of Euktemon): ἀπογράφουσι τῶ παιῶν τούτων πρὸς τὸν ἄρχοντα ὡς εἰσποιήτω τοῖς τοῦ Εὐκτῆμονος ὑέσι τοῖς τελευτηκόσιν ἐπιγράψαντες σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐπιτρόπους. But if this action is also a registration of guardianship it is not necessarily a testamentary guardianship: there is no mention in the speech of the will which some scholars have imagined Androkles and Antidoros produced on this occasion (Beauchet [1897] II, p. 184, Schulthess

[1886] pp. 55, 73). Again, in Is. 4. 8, where among the claimants to Nikostratos's estate was Ameniades, who "appeared before the archon with a son of Nikostratos's under three years old, although Nikostratos had not been in Athens for eleven years", there is no indication that Ameniades was claiming the guardianship by virtue of a will. See Harrison (1968) I, p. 103.

18 Harrison (1968) I p. 102 and n. 2.

19 Beauchet (1897) II p. 183.

20 Beauchet thinks that ἐπιτροπῆς κατάστασις was instituted only when no one came forward to take on the responsibility (1897) II, p. 183.

21 Harrison (1968) I p. 102 n. 2.

22 A brief summary of interpretations is given by P. J. Rhodes in *A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia*, Oxford 1981, note on 56. 6.

23 Σολώνειοι ἐπιτροπικαὶ διατάξεις κατὰ τὴν ἐποχὴν τῶν Ἀττικῶν ῥητόρων καὶ τὸ συγκλητικὸν δόγμα (*Dig. 23, 2, 59*), Athens 1976, with English summary. To take the case of the guardianship of Demosthenes, Karnezis concludes that Aphobos and Demophon could not marry their designated brides during Demosthenes's minority, because Demophon was required to marry Demosthenes's sister only after ten years had elapsed, which date coincided with Demosthenes's coming-of-age, and because the testament of a father with minor sons was not valid unless the sons died before reaching puberty. But in fact the ten-year lapse mentioned in Dem. 29. 43 has to do specifically with the five-year-old girl's reaching the age for marriage (ὅταν ἡλικίαν ἔχη - τοῦτο δ' ἔμελλεν εἰς ἔτος δεκάτον

γενήσασθαι), not with Demosthenes's coming-of-age.

24 On the testament of a father with minor sons living: Lipsius, *Attische Recht*, p. 511; L. Gernet, *Droit et Société dans la Grèce ancienne* Paris 1955, pp. 146 - 149; Harrison (1968) I, p. 75 n. 3, p. 85 and n. 1, pp. 151 - 152; G. E. R. de Ste. Croix, *Classical Review* N. S. 20, 1970, p. 389; E. Ruschenbusch, "ΔΙΑΤΙΘΕΣΘΑΙ ΤΑ ἑΑΥΤΟΥ, Ein Beitrag zum sogenannten Testamentsgesetz des Solons", *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, Romische Abteilung* 79, 1962, pp. 307 - 311; D. Asheri, "Laws of inheritance, distribution of land and political constitutions in ancient Greece", *Historia* 12, 1963, pp. 1 - 21, see p. 9.

25 Cf. D. M. MacDowell, *Classical Review* N. S. 28, 1978, p. 176; L. R. F. Germain, *L'Antiquité Classique* 48, 1979, pp. 397 - 399.

26 Schulthess (1886) p. 69; Beauchet (1897) II, pp. 178 - 179.

27 Schulthess (1886) pp. 116 - 173; Beauchet (1897) II, pp. 221 - 257; M. I. Finley, *Studies in Land and Credit in Ancient Athens 500 - 200 BC, The Horos Inscriptions*, New Brunswick 1951, pp. 38 - 44; H. J. Wolff, "Verpächtung von Mündelvermögen in Attika", *Festschrift Hans Lewald*, Basel 1953, pp. 201 - 208; O. Schulthess in Pauly's *RE* s. κ. Μίσθωσις οἴκου.

28 Dem. 27. 48 - 50, 60 - 61; Lys. 32 *passim*; Lys. fr. 43; Is. 9. 28 - 29; Is. frr. 22, 23.

29 Lys. 32. 23: καίτοι εἰ ἐβούλετο δίκαιος εἶναι περὶ τοὺς παῖδας. ἐξῆν αὐτῷ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους, οἱ κείνται περὶ τῶν ὀρφανῶν καὶ τοῖς ἀδυνατοῖς τῶν ἐπιτρόπων καὶ τοῖς δυναμένοις, μισθῶσαι τὸν οἶκον ἀπηλλαγμένον πολλῶν

πραγμάτων ἢ γῆν πριάμενον ἐκ τῶν προσιόντων τοὺς παῖδας τρέφειν. Cf. Dem. 27. 58: τούτῳ γὰρ ἐξῆν μηδὲν ἔχειν τούτων τῶν πραγμάτων, μισθώσαντι τὸν οἶκον κατὰ τουτουσὶ τοὺς νόμους. When Demosthenes in his third speech against Aphobos points out that Aphobos did not lease the estate "although the laws ordain it and my father wrote it in his will" (τῶν νόμων κελεύοντων καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐν τῇ διαθήκῃ γράψαντος, 29. 29), he is evidently not saying that the laws *compel* guardians to lease their wards' estates. The verb κελεύειν here means something like "permit" or "provide for": it signifies that if the guardian decides to lease the estate, the laws prescribe the procedure by which it must be done. D. M. MacDowell has shown that this usage is known from several other classical references to laws, and that it must be the sense of Demosthenes's words here. He suggests that the law on the leasing of orphans' estates may have read "if it seems better (βέλτιον) for the estate to be leased", followed by the procedure to be used: "The authenticity of Demosthenes 29 (*Against Aphobos III*) as a source of information about Athenian law", in the forthcoming volume of *Symposion* (1985). I am grateful to Professor MacDowell for letting me see the typescript of this article.

30 Pointed out by H. J. Wolff (1953) in answer to reservations such as that expressed by Wyse (1904) pp. 526 - 527. Cf. also Finley (1951) pp. 38 - 44, especially p. 42, and Harrison (1968) I, pp. 105 - 107, 293 - 296.

31 Harrison (1968) I, pp. 256 - 257, 293 - 296 gives a full discussion.

32 Wolff (1953) p. 207.

33 Pl. *Laws* 928 c. Cf. Harrison (1968) I, p. 116 and n. 1.

34 Cf. F. E. Adcock, "Literary tradition and early Greek code-makers", *Cambridge Historical Journal* 2, 1927, pp. 95 - 109, see p. 107; E. Ruschenbusch, *Σόλωνος Νόμοι, Die Fragmente des Solonischen Gesetzeswerkes mit einer Text- und Überlieferungsgeschichte*, Wiesbaden 1966, F 131 and p. 44.

35 Jolowicz (1947) pp. 82- 90.

36 See pp. 327 - 328 above for the care of πατροιδκοι at Gortyn by the maternal relatives. But this is not really similar to the Charondas law, since the πατροιδκος was not an ordinary orphan, and her person would in any case be handed over to the man who would, in the event of her death before bearing children, probably inherit her property, when she reached marriageable age and married him.

37 Lys. 13. 91; Aischin. 1. 28; Dem. 24. 103, 107; Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 56. 6.

38 Rhodes (1981), comm. on *Ath. Pol.* 56. 7, pp. 633, 635: ἐπιμελεῖται δὲ καὶ τῶν [ὀρφ]ανῶν κτλ.: "It is easy to understand that in archaic Athens the archon's obligation to care for those who had been bereft of their κύριος may have involved substantial executive duties; what duties he retained in the classical period beyond acting as εἰσάγουσα ἀρχή for lawsuits concerning them is not clear." Οὐ καὶ τοὺς ἐπιτρόπους,] ἂν μὴ [δι]δῶσι . . . εἰσπράττει: "Wards during their minority were not legally in a position to complain of injustice on the part of their guardians, so this may be a matter in which the archon had the right of initiative and was expected to see for himself that wards were not deprived of their due . . . : no doubt he would only exercise this initiative in particularly flagrant cases of injustice". Harrison (1968) I p. 102 n. 2 says of ἐπιμελεῖται δὲ καὶ τῶν

[ὄρφ]ανῶν καὶ τῶν ἐπικλήρων καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν ὅσαι ἂν τελευτ[ήσαντος τοῦ ἀνδρ]ὸς σκή[πτω]νται κύειν: "this indicates clearly that the archon's duty to look after the interests of orphans, heiresses and pregnant widows was not confined to his direction of court proceedings"; cf. p. 103: "significant executive duties" are suggested by the above passage.

39 Cf. Aischin. 1. 158: Diophantos quoted τοὺς νόμους . . . οἱ κελεύουσι τὸν ἄρχοντα τῶν ὄρφανῶν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι (cf. p. 317 above). Also Dem. 37. 46: Pantainetos never brought a case of alleged wrong-doing against epikleroi to the archon ὃν τῶν τοιούτων οἱ νόμοι κελεύουσιν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι.

40 Dem. 43. 75; Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 56. 6. Cf. Dem. 37. 46. Harrison (1971) II pp. 4 - 5, (1968) I pp. 117 - 119; Beauchet (1897) II pp. 276 - 290.

41 E. Ruschenbusch, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Athenischen Strafrechts*, Köln 1968, pp. 54 - 55; Harrison (1971) II p. 4; MacDowell (1978) p. 94.

42 Is. 3. 46 - 47, 11. 31; Harpokration *σ. κ. εἰσαγγελία* and *κακώσεως* (I 104. 17 - 19 and 167. 5 - 13 Dindorf); Dem. 37. 45 f., 58. 32.

43 Dem. 58. 32; Men. fr. 279 Koerte; Is. 11. 28. Harrison (1968) I pp. 117 - 119; MacDowell (1978) pp. 94 - 95.

44 Is. 11. 31: "he hopes to take my property and deprive me of the guardianship"; Dem. 58. 31: a fine of 10 talents; Is. 11. 13, 35: "to place me in serious danger" (περὶ τῶν μεγίστων εἰς κίνδυνον καθιστάναι), "to undergo personal danger" (κινδυνεύειν περὶ τοῦ σώματος) - he probably has in mind here the kind of risk to the σῶμα that meant ἀτιμία, loss of citizen rights,

rather than death; Is. 3. 47, 62: "the severest penalties" (ἔσχάται τιμωρία), "he would have risked his person (σώματος) and his entire property"; Is. 1. 39: "the greatest penalties and the most extreme disgrace" (ταῖς μεγίσταις ζημίαις καὶ τοῖς ἐσχάτοις ὀνειδέσει).

45 Dem. 58. 31, cf. 38. 20 and 53. 29.

46 I. Weiler, "Zum Schicksal der Witwen und Waisen bei den Völkern der Alten Welt: Materialien für eine vergleichende Geschichtswissenschaft", *Saeculum* 31, 1980, pp. 157 - 193, see pp. 163 - 181, argues that the Greeks keenly appreciated the pitiableness of widows and orphans and that this motivated their practices towards them. For the representation of children in tragedy, see G. M. Sifakis, "Children in Greek tragedy", *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 26, 1979, pp. 67 - 80.

47 S. Humphreys, *The Family, Women and Death*, London etc. 1983, p. 5 points out that it was often impossible to find a man outside the household to champion the orphan's cause against the guardian, and that the five cases for which detailed evidence exists in the orators were brought by the wards themselves against their guardians for mismanagement. "No one took action . . . while the wards were still children."

48 That the ἐπωβελία was imposed in guardianship cases is shown by Dem. 27. 67: "If my opponent is acquitted . . . I shall be liable to pay ἐπωβελία of a hundred minas". That it was paid to the defendant is shown by Dem. 47. 64.

49 The law that a female orphan may not marry her guardian (or her guardian's son) (Syrianus on Hermog. 2. 72 Rabe) was evidently not an

Athenian one.

50 Dem. 46. 18: ἦν ἂν ἐγγυήσῃ ἐπὶ δίκαισις δάμαρτα εἶναι ἢ πατὴρ ἢ ἀδελφὸς ὁμωπάτηρ ἢ πάππος ὁ πρὸς πατρός, ἐκ ταύτης εἶναι παιδᾶς γνησίους. ἐὰν δὲ μηδεὶς ἦ τούτων, ἐὰν μὲν ἐπίκληρός τις ἦ, τὸν κύριον ἔχειν, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἦ, ὅτῳ ἂν ἐπιτρέψῃ, τοῦτον κύριον εἶναι. If ὅτῳ ἂν ἐπιτρέψῃ means "to whomever [her father] has entrusted her" this law gives no clue about the appointment of a husband for a female orphan for whose marriage her father had not made provision before his death. But such a girl must have had a guardian, on whom the duty of disposing of her hand would surely have fallen. Cf. Harrison (1968) I p. 20 n. 3 for a different view, that the duty would have devolved on the archon.

51 The father of Kallippe left her in Euktemon's care when he went to Sicily, where he died. Euktemon later claimed her hand as an epikleros, and married her. She had two sons, but they, according to the speaker, were born more than 30 years after her father's death: Is. 6. 13, 46. All this shows is that a suitably qualified guardian could claim his ward's hand in marriage, if she was an epikleros.

52 Harrison (1968) I p. 112 n. 4, p. 117.

53 Is. 3. 46: καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἰσήγγελες πρὸς τὸν ἄρχοντα κακοῦσθαι τὴν ἐπίκληρον ὑπὸ τοῦ εἰσποιήτου οὕτως ὑβριζομένην καὶ ἄκληρον τῶν ἐαυτῆς πατρῶων καθισταμένην, ἄλλως τε καὶ μόνων τούτων τῶν δικῶν ἀκινδύνων τοῖς διώκουσιν οὐσῶν καὶ ἐξὸν τῷ βουλομένῳ βοηθεῖν ταῖς ἐπικλήροις;

54 Cf. Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 56. 7.

55 Cf. R. F. Willetts, *The Law Code of Gortyn*, Berlin 1967, *Kadmos* 346

Suppl. 1, pp. 26 - 27.

56 Plutarch in his *Life of Aristeides* (37) reports that the statesman's own daughters were given in marriage from the Prytaneion and given dowries by the city of 3000 drachmas each, because Aristeides died a poor man, and that his son Lysimachos was given money and land, as well as payment of four drachmas per day. When Lysimachos died his daughter is said to have been granted state maintenance, "as much as the Olympic victors". No doubt these honours were bestowed out of a feeling of gratitude to Aristeides.

57 R. S. Stroud, "Greek inscriptions: Theozotides and the Athenian orphans", *Hesperia* 40, 1971, pp. 280 - 301, see p. 288; Rhodes (1981) commentary on 24. 3.

58 Stroud (1971) p. 288 cites Solon's concern for the preservation of Athenian οἴκοι in support of this possibility.

59 A decree of c. 460 BC by the Eleusinians gives orphans some kind of special privileges in the Eleusinian Mysteries: *IG* I³ 6c. 41 (= *SEG* X. 6) lines 122 - 125. Again, the orphans are not actually designated as the children of men killed in battle, but most commentators have assumed this to be the case. Entirely different reconstructions are given by each editor. Not in doubt is the reading τὸς ὀρφανός (line 124). But the lack of evidence about the context does not allow us to talk of an "explicit mention of war-orphans", Stroud (1971) p.288.

60 [ὁ δὲ] πάντων δεινότατον εἶ [τὸ κάλ]λιστον τῶν ἐν τοῖς [νόμο]ις κήρυγμα Θεοζο[τίδ]ης διαβαλεῖ καὶ ψεῦδος [κα]ταστήσει· Διονυσίοις γὰρ [ἔτα]ν ὁ κήρυξ ἀναγορεύη τοὺς [ὀρ]φανοὺς πατρόθεν ὑπειπῶν [ἔτι] τῶνδε τῶν

νεανίσκων οἱ πατέρες ἀπέθανον ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ μαχόμενοι ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος ἄνδρες ὄντες ἀγαθοὶ [καὶ] τούτους ἡ πόλις ἔτρεφε μέ[χρι] ἥβης. ἐνταῦθα πάτερα χωρὶς περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν καὶ τῶν νό[θ]ων ἀνερεῖ λέγων ὅτι τούσδε διὰ Θεοζοτίδην οὐκ ἔτρεφεν ἢ πάντας ἀ[ναγορε]ύων ὁμοίως [τοὺς ὀρφανοὺς τῶν] ποιητῶν καὶ τῶν [νό]θων [καταψεύσε]ται περὶ τῆς τροφῆς ὑποσι[ωπῶν];

61 The inscription is published with a commentary by Stroud (1971).

62 Aischin. 3. 154: τίς γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ἀλγήσειεν ἄνθρωπος Ἑλληναὶ καὶ παιδευθεὶς ἐλευθερίως, ἀναμνησθεὶς ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ ἐκεῖνό γε, εἰ μὴδὲν ἕτερον, ὅτι ταύτη ποτὲ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ μελλόντων ὥσπερ νυνὶ τῶν τραγῳδῶν γίγνεσθαι. . . . ὁ κῆρυξ . . . ἐκήρυττε τὸ κάλλιστον κήρυγμα κτλ. 3. 155: τότε μὲν ταύτ' ἐκήρυττεν, ἀλλ' οὐ νῦν.

63 Stroud (1971) p. 289 and n. 23.

64 Exactly which other cities remains unknown. At Rhodes a decree was passed in 305 BC that the parents and children of those who died in battle should be maintained at public expense, their daughters given a dowry by the state, and their sons, on reaching manhood, crowned in the theatre at the Dionysia and presented with a full suit of armour (Diod. Sic. 20. 84. 3).

65 It has been suggested that when the institution of the ἐφηβεία operated in Athens, there would have been no need for public support of war-orphans: A. A. Bryant, "Boyhood and youth in the days of Aristophanes", *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 18, 1907, pp. 73 - 122, see pp. 87 - 88 and p. 88 n. 2; G. Mathieu, *Mélanges offerts à A.-M. Desrousseaux*, Paris 1937, pp. 315 - 316. This argument is refuted by Chr. Pélékidis, *Histoire de l'éphébie attique*, École française d'Athènes 1962, pp. 16 - 17, who points

out that state maintenance of war-orphans would have ceased as soon as they reached adulthood (μέχρι ἡβης) and became ἔφηβοι.

66 Stroud (1971) p. 289 discusses the point and gives references to scholarship on the matter. It is, as he says, "difficult to see how [the polemarch] could have been called the *μεγίστη ἀρχή* in Plato's day".

67 Philippe Gauthier, *Un Commentaire historique des Poroi de Xenophon, Hautes Études du Monde Gréco-Romain III 8*, Paris and Geneva 1976, commentary on 2. 7, pp. 68 - 72.

68 Schulthess (1886) p. 8 takes the view that the *ὀρφανοφύλακες* might either have been officials appointed shortly before 355 (the date of *Poroi*) and after Demosthenes's speeches against his guardians 9 years previously, perhaps created to deal with a sudden upsurge in maltreatment of orphans, or simply a term for the archon and his *πάρεδροι*, who together assumed the character of an orphans' commission. Schulthess (p. 9) backs up these suggestions by referring to Photios *σ.κ. ὀρφανισταί· ἀρχὴ ἐπὶ τῶν ὀρφανικῶν ἵνα μηδὲν ἀδικῶνται* (II 30. 10 Naber), saying that *ὀρφανισταί* was probably another name for *ὀρφανοφύλακες*. But the classical sources are unanimous in attributing this function to the archon, and their testimony is to be preferred to that of Photios, as also to that of the *Souda* ο 652 Adler: *ὀρφανιστῶν· ὀρφανισταί εἰσιν οἱ τοὺς ὀρφανοὺς τρέφοντες. ἢ ὀρφανισταί, ἀρχὴ Ἀθήνησι τὰ τῶν ὀρφανῶν κρίνουσα*. Gauthier (1976) p. 70 suggests that the lexicographer mistakenly ascribed to Athens functions of officials outside Athens: *ὀρφανοφύλακες* existed at Naupaktos in the 2nd century BC where it seems they had a rôle in protecting orphans' property, and also at Gorgippia (on the Bosphoros); *ὀρφανισταί* at Histria protected the interests

of orphans; and ὀρπανοδικασταί were created at Gortyn (cf. Willetts [1967] p. 27).

69 The absence of references to ὀρφανοφύλακες in sources later than Xenophon's *Poroi* need not be attributed to the supposed discontinuation of state support for war-orphans in the fourth century, as Stroud thinks (1971) p. 290. The scarcity and nature of references to war-orphans themselves makes this absence understandable.

70 Stroud does not find it possible to restore the title of the official(s) responsible for paying the orphans of the men who fell fighting for the democracy. The space in which their name must have appeared is 15 letters long (too short for τὸς ὀρφανοφύλακας - though the right length for τὸν ὀρφανοφύλακα !):

διδόναι αὐ[τοις¹⁵κα]θ
ἀπερ [τ]ῶν ἐν τῷ [.¹⁷]τ
ὄς Ἑλληνοταμίας (lines 16 - 18).

It is also possible, as Stroud points out, that the same official or officials were responsible for paying war-orphans and orphans whose fathers were killed fighting the oligarchy, and that they were not the Hellenotamiai (if there is a full stop before the end of line 17, with τὸς Ἑλληνοταμίας starting a new sentence on a different subject).

71 Gauthier (1976) pp. 71 - 72 suggests that there may have been ten ὀρφανοφύλακες, one to take responsibility for the war-orphans of each tribe. The idea of a distinction for the official representing the largest number of persons applies only to the putative μετοικοφύλακες, and not to the ὀρφανοφύλακες, since no one would dream of congratulating the latter for having in his tribe a longer list of war-orphans than any of his colleagues.

72 The information in Bekker *Anec. Gr.* I 235. 11 ff. has probably been wrongly surmised from the Lysias passage: Δοκιμασία· δοκιμάζονται δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐφ' ἡλικίας ὀρφανοί, εἰ δύναται τὰ πατρῶα παρὰ τῶν ἐπιτρόπων ἀπολαμβάνειν.

73 For different views see E. Kalinka, *Die Pseudoxenophontische Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία*, Leipzig and Berlin 1913, pp. 283 - 284; Stroud (1971) p. 291 and n. 30; Wilamowitz, "Von des attischen Reiches Herrlichkeit", *Philologische Untersuchungen* 1, 1880, pp. 1 - 96, see p. 26 n. 47; cf. W. G. Forrest, "The date of the Pseudo-Xenophontic Athenaiion Politela", *Klio* 52, 1970, pp. 107 - 116, see pp. 113 - 114.

Conclusions

Of all the aspects of the ancient treatment of infants, exposure and infanticide have in the past been singled out for attention. It has naturally been found provoking that a barbaric practice should flourish in an immensely civilised culture. The incongruity is real, and attempts to diminish it, by showing that exposure was not significant or claiming that it was not cruel, have not been found satisfactory.¹ At best, they beg questions about what constitutes significance or cruelty. Much valuable research and many useful insights into Greek exposure of newborn infants already exist. I hope to add a little more understanding to the problem by considering it in the context of the treatment of infants in general, especially of the newborn.

The most profound difference between newborn infants in ancient and modern times is in their chances of survival. The first question to be asked is, how did adults in classical Greece react to the problem of a very high neonatal death rate?

Ancient midwives and doctors alert us to the precariousness of neonatal life by their concern with the viability of the newborn infant. Birth-attendants acquired a certain skill in giving a prognosis for viability within the first few hours of a baby's life. For parents, the first few days made the issue even clearer: they gave their child a name only on the seventh day, because only then did they dare begin to believe in the likelihood of its survival (Arist. *HA* 7. 12, 588 A 8 - 10). Faced with their inability to help very weak or sick newborn babies, doctors as well as parents resigned themselves to the neonatal deaths. This attitude of resignation in the medical professions meant that they did not attempt to intervene to save certain babies, those who had been pronounced non-viable. The fact that they had almost nothing to offer in the way of therapy does not mean that they were uncaring. It was an important tenet

of Hippocratic ethics to refrain from medical intervention rather than to do harm, and doctors were particularly reluctant to attempt to treat newborn infants who were almost certain to reward their efforts by dying in any case. They show their concern in another way, by attempting to explain, with the aid of their research on reproduction and embryology, cases of non-viability and perinatal death: the Hippocratic authors of *Genit.* and *Nat. Puer.* and of *Oct.*, for example, offer some such explanations. Doctors and scientists in the fifth and fourth centuries were interested in infant pathology and physiology. But they do not seem to have challenged the popular view that it was not wrong to let newborn infants die.

Parents must in general have shared this attitude of resignation to neonatal deaths. But this is not to say that they were untouched emotionally or psychologically by the experience of their own offspring's death and of high neonatal mortality all around them. It is interesting to speculate on what effect this harsh fact of life might have had on parents' attitudes to their newborn children. Did it, for example, incline them to be indulgent and over-protective, or did their fears surface in repressive attitudes and practices? There is of course no simple answer to such questions, both because of the sparseness of evidence, and because they are about complex psychological and anthropological matters. But that does not mean that there is nothing to be said about them.

It is useful, first, to consider what might have been the response of parents who were told that their newborn child was non-viable or not worth rearing. Such a prognosis or opinion might be given by the midwife, joined perhaps by other female birth-attendants. When a prognosis of non-viability was given, some parents probably chose not to trust it entirely, but instead to adopt a wait-and-see approach. They would care for the baby, feeding it if it was able to suck the breast, and swaddling it. If the baby was still alive at the end of a few days - seven or ten days,

perhaps - they might go ahead with the usual family ceremonies of celebration and acknowledging acceptance, including the giving of a name. This may indeed seem to us the only sensible - the only possible - approach. But for the ancient Greeks another possibility existed. A decision might be made very soon after the baby had been pronounced non-viable not to attempt to rear it at all. Inhumane as such a decision may appear to us, it was not entirely illogical. For some people, the low probability of the baby's survival made the child not worth the trouble of attempting to rear. Other parents, for whom this was in itself an insufficient reason not to rear, may have been put off the attempt in the belief that, in the unlikely event of survival, the child would never be healthy or strong, and that its life would either not be worth living or would be too much of a burden to themselves. There is another consideration which may sometimes have been added to the previous one, namely that in attempting to rear a weak or a very ill baby they risked keeping it alive for some days, weeks or even months, only to lose it during its infancy, when they had already become fond of it and would accordingly suffer more grief at its death. If a newborn infant was found to be viable, but was deficient in some other way, for example by reason of deformity, the midwife might in such a case also tender her opinion that the baby was not worth rearing. In making his decision, the head of the household must have taken several other factors into consideration, such as the degree of deficiency with which the baby was afflicted, whether the child was male or female, whether it was his firstborn, the number of children already in the family, whether an addition was very much wanted, and the degree of health and strength of the mother and the likelihood of her bearing healthy children in the future.

In one sense the acquiescence in the death of a newborn infant thought to be non-viable and the act of exposure are equivalent: they are simply a matter of letting a baby die. In the modern civilised world and in

Christian ethics they are by no means morally equivalent. In the ancient Greek world, the uses of and judgements about exposure are usually expressed in relation to the various possible motives behind it: some motives among the medical, social and economic ones were considered to justify exposure, some of them of greater significance than others for different communities and at different times. In many circumstances the two things *were* evidently morally equivalent, in a society in which the extreme precariousness of the lives of newborns was not balanced against a view of them as inherently precious to an all-loving God. No: Nature, by being so unsparing of them, almost seemed to endorse the low value put upon them by human society.

From an anthropological point of view, infanticide might be considered the ultimate form of repressive behaviour towards children. What of the children who were reared - do we have evidence of repressive behaviour in the treatment of infants by ancient Greeks? We certainly do for Sparta, where, Plutarch tells us, nurses bathed babies in wine as a test of their strength and in order to weed out those prone to convulsions. They did not indulge their charges in food preferences. They taught them to be unafraid of the dark and of being left alone, and disinclined to ignoble bad-temper and crying (*Lyk.* 16. 3 - 4). Plutarch's tone is approving, but he does not mean that Spartan nurses eliminated fear of the dark and of being alone and temper-tantrums and crying by protecting infants from these things and giving them no occasion for them. It is more likely that what he means is that they refused to indulge these fears and kinds of behaviour by giving in to them. Plutarch is writing about customs reported of Sparta in an earlier era, and insofar as the tradition behind the reports is reliable, it provides evidence not of the actual effect of Spartan upbringing but of the methods of training used on infants. These are characterised by a low degree of indulgence from early infancy (that is low "initial indulgence"), an early age of socialisation, and, probably, a fairly high degree of severity

in socialisation, in the area of dependence training.² Plutarch also tells us that it was for these training practices that some people bought Spartan nurses for their children: evidently some Greek families craved this kind of upbringing for their infants in preference to that obtainable at the hands of non-Spartan nurses.

So Spartan austerity, extending even to the care of infants, was remarkable in the ancient world and evidently not typical of Greek life elsewhere. But it did influence Plato's thinking on institutions desirable for good government. Plato must have been the first to express ideas on the treatment of infants with a view to producing specific effects on their souls, though he does not entirely follow the Spartan model for the treatment of infants. Crying, for example, he regards as a sign of pain, unhappiness and fear, and he deduces that this is so in infants from his observation that nurses can quieten a crying baby by offering it what it wants. Good effects - cheerfulness and courage - are to be produced in infants by protecting them from the kind of thing that makes them cry, though not by indulging them with many pleasures, which will have a lasting effect of ruin upon their characters (*Laws* 791 E - 792 E). Aristotle in the *Politics* makes an explicit criticism of the *Laws*' recommendation to prevent crying: on the contrary, crying in babies contributes to their growth and gives them a kind of exercise (1336 A 34 - 39). Greek nurses must have been oblivious to this kind of argumentation, and continued to check crying by rocking their babies and giving them things to suck, or to leave them to wail, according to their own convenience and habits. Aristotle's recommendation to begin inuring children to cold from their earliest years and his approval of the barbarian practice of dipping infants in a cold river may have helped introduce the custom to Greece, for by Soranus we are told some of the Greeks did this. But otherwise there is no evidence that Plato and Aristotle changed the treatment of infants. Both remark that habits are formed from earliest

infancy, but there was nothing new in that observation.

Aristotle's brief remarks at *Politics* 7. 15 show that he had given some thought to the nature of infancy and made some observations of infants. Fairly close observation of young children and some thoughtfulness about their nature by artists are attested by Athenian vase-paintings of the last quarter of the fifth century.³ Both Aristotle and the vase-painters recognised that play was one of the most important elements in the lives of infants: they seem to have observed that it was the nature of infants to play. Aristotle in his remarks on the inappropriateness of teaching children under five and of giving them difficult tasks, and the appropriateness of play, rather records observations than produces original ideas on the upbringing of infants.

In the classical and Hellenistic ages parents and nurses reared infants without the benefit of the advice of philosophers, moralists and politicians. The freedom from intellectual and professional interference in child-care was balanced by the standardisation achieved by the influence of tradition. Traditional practices in infant-care were handed down by the experts - that is, the people, predominantly women, experienced in the practical care of children. It was the power of tradition rather than the reasoned ideas about its benefits that gave swaddling its centuries-long grip on baby-care. From a psychological point of view, it is possible to see swaddling as the response of adults to their own profound fears about newborn babies. Babies in ancient times were highly susceptible to illness and swift death. The fears are sublimated as a concern with the bodily frame of the newborn, with its supposed fragility: if left to itself, it will grow crooked and twisted, or it will break easily. It must be moulded and encased in bands. The same is true of the rubbing and stretching found necessary for infants' bodies. The treatment thus meted out to newborn infants has a characteristic of repression, in that it was physically severe, and at the same time exhibits the indulgent quality of an extreme form of

protectiveness.

Greek nursing and weaning practices (outside "Lykourgan" Sparta) exhibit the general characteristics now found in primitive societies the world over. The latter have been analysed to show a high degree of initial indulgence (that is, a high degree of indulgence of the child's natural behaviour in feeding for a certain duration, the granting of considerable freedom to the child in performing this initial behaviour, and a high degree of encouragement of the initial behaviour, along with a low amount of anxiety in the adult about the behaviour [see note 2]). The characteristics of initial indulgence in feeding found in primitive societies correspond closely to ancient Greek practices: the mother or wet-nurse assumes the duty of being continuously near the infant and feeding it whenever it seems hungry; she uses the breast to pacify the child when it cannot be quietened any other way. Greek babies were probably given free indulgence in oral satisfaction: we do not hear of rigid feeding schedules, nor of deliberate neglect or rejection (though the latter two things may of course have happened in individual cases). Also in age of socialisation and severity of socialisation, Greek feeding practices seem to correspond to those found in primitive societies. The average age of weaning in the latter is about two and a half years, and in ancient Greece it was usually not much less. The pattern of severity in socialisation typical of primitive societies (given a median rating of 11 on a scale of 3 to 21), is similar to the pattern found in ancient Greece: food supplementary to breast-milk is introduced fairly early (during the first year), especially starch-based gruel and premasticated solids, and the proportion of this supplementary food is gradually increased. Finally a means of discouraging suckling is used, such as daubing a bitter substance on the breast, but rarely more severe than this.

In places other than Sparta, Greek training practices with regard to the tendencies of infants to behave in a dependent way also seem to

correspond in some respects to dependence training in primitive societies. As far as the sparse evidence shows, Greek practices possibly share the following common characteristics with practices in many primitive societies: the infant until weaning is never far from the mother or nurse, it is usually in physical contact with her and sleeps with her, she always responds to its crying (for example by offering the breast and removing the source of discomfort), and she responds to the child's demands and attends to its wants. This adds up to a high degree of initial indulgence. But it is difficult to be certain about this, and it may be that some child-carers in ancient Greece were near the lower extreme of indulgence, in that, for example, they put infants into cradles and left them to scream. The practice of swaddling babies makes it easier to leave them unattended; on the other hand, swaddling makes babies less demanding and more passive.

There is almost no evidence for Greek practices in dealing with the other areas of infant behaviour thought by most human societies to require regulation (anal, sexual and aggressive behaviour). According to Protagoras in Plato's dialogue of that name, the parents, nurse and *paidagogos* begin to exert discipline over the behaviour of children as soon as they are able to understand what is said to them. The teaching proceeds by means of example and exhortation, and disobedience earns corporal punishment: "they straighten him with threats and blows as if he were a bent and twisted piece of wood" (325 c - d). The image of the twisted piece of wood is probably Plato's own (he uses it elsewhere: *Gorg.* 525 A, *Thet.* 173 A), but this attitude is by no means a Puritan belief in the fundamental badness of the child, whose will requires to be broken from infancy: only the disobedient are to be punished. But this passage shows that corporal punishment was not reserved for children past the years of infancy. The favourite means of instilling obedience into children was to frighten them with stories about bogeys such as Mormo and Lamia.

Protagoras's mention of the father, alongside mother, nurse and

paidagogos, is a useful reminder that Greek fathers did not live a life remote from their youngest children. It is true that most of the practical child care was administered by women, but it is important to remember that the role of fathers was not confined to acknowledging, naming and introducing into the phratry. The evidence is scattered, and partly anecdotal: the image springs to mind of Agesilaos astride a stick, playing horse with his little children (Plut. *Ages.* 25. 11). Among Aristophanes's ordinary Athenians, the doting father Strepsiades in *Clouds* claims credit for performing the most basic tasks in the care of his baby son. Theophrastos, in his sketch of the Unpleasant Man, shows the father pre-masticating food and taking (to Theophrastos's mind) a vulgar delight in his baby. It is a fair guess that Aristotle and some of the Hippokratiks derived much of their knowledge of infant physiology and pathology from close observation of their own offspring (there were in those days no Foundling Hospitals to provide doctors with opportunities for observation of infants *en masse*). Apparently, small children did not spend *all* their time out of sight in the women's rooms of the house. No doubt some of them made their presence felt as much as Themistokles's young son seems to have done, according to the rueful remark attributed to the Athenian statesman by Plutarch: he said that his son was the most powerful individual in Greece, for the Athenians dominated the Greeks, he, Themistokles, dominated the Athenians, the boy's mother dominated him, and the boy dominated his mother (Plut. *Them.* 18. 5).

Several such vignettes show the amusement and pleasure taken in young children by their parents, but the predominant impression of the general parental mood is of anxiety about the early years. Plato in the *Republic* (450 c) puts into Glaukon's mouth the request to Sokrates to explain his views "about the rearing of children while they are still young, in the interval between birth and education, which is thought to be the most troublesome part" (ἐπιπονωτάτη).

Having children was extremely important. The main reason for a man to marry was to produce legitimate offspring, as the formal expression used in betrothal makes clear. The desire for children for their own sake may have existed, but it is not actually adduced in the sources, because there existed a specific reason for having legitimate children that was universal and of overwhelming importance. Sons, or failing these, grandsons, inherited the family property and the duty to observe the family cults. They looked after the living occupants of the household, in particular their aged parents, and paid the due respects to the dead. A man with a son could die in the expectation that all he had worked for in life would be preserved and that his memory would be honoured. The first formal act of a father towards his legitimate child was to acknowledge and name the child in the presence of witnesses, and this secured the child's place in the immediate family (ἀγχιστεία). The second was his presentation of his baby son to his phratry, giving him his place in that more artificial or distant, but very important, kinship group.

The obsessions with legitimacy and citizenship ensure that little is heard in the sources about children who were born outside these states. Almost nothing is known, for example, about slave children, except that they were the property of their mother's master. Nearly all the evidence about orphans applies to legitimate children of citizen families, and it leaves the distinct impression that they were the orphans thought to deserve the most sympathy. Theozotides even wanted to exclude the illegitimate and adopted children who had been orphaned by war from state benefits. Most Athenians who knew their Homer would have been stirred by the pathos of Andromache's lament for the orphaned Astyanax, made especially poignant for them, as for the bard's original audience, by the great contrast of the infant's once-privileged treatment and great expectations in life with his present plight (// 22. 499 ff.).

The care of orphans of citizen families at Athens may have been a

concern of Solon's legislation, as part of his attempt to preserve Athenian οἴκοι. Throughout the fifth and fourth centuries the care of these orphans was considered a very important matter, the responsibility of the highest official of the state, and the subject of special legislation. In the speeches of the orators we usually find orphans mentioned in the context of property disputes. We sometimes find their status as orphans being manipulated by litigants in order to gain some stake in a considerable estate for themselves, as in Isaios 6. There can be no doubt that much of the interest in the welfare of orphans arose from an appreciation of their importance as heirs to family property. But it would be too cynical to maintain that this was the only reason for the Athenian desire to protect orphans. Their very helplessness recommended them to the Athenian state as candidates for special protection. If Athenian juries were capable of being stirred to pity by the sight of them, concern for their fatherless state must have been one of the motives for the public desire to protect them.⁴ Their practical care was primarily the responsibility of their own family, but the state, in the person of the archon, exercised an overriding responsibility towards them, and the ordinary citizen was at liberty to use the law to defend them and their property.

It is very difficult to tell what life was like for the individual orphan. Much must have depended on the character of his or her guardian, and on the presence or absence of the mother. A gloomy note is sounded by Kriton in Plato's work of that name (45 D), where he appeals to Sokrates not to betray his sons (one of them a μαιράκιον, the other two infants, Pl. *Apol.* 34 D, *Phaid.* 116 B) by accepting the death penalty: "as far as you are concerned, they will have to suffer whatever chance brings them. Probably they will meet with the kind of fate that usually happens to orphans in their orphanhood." But Kriton leaves this fate unspecified, and his words do not bear the weight of an impartially considered judgement.

It was recognised that children, being unable to help themselves,

required special protection and care from adults. Adults were motivated by affection and pity for children, but these feelings were not generally allowed to transcend practical and social considerations, which might dictate a different form of treatment from that prompted by disinterested affection.

Notes to Conclusions

1 A. W. Gomme and D. Engels are two scholars who have tried to show that exposure was not significant in terms of the numbers exposed: Gomme, *The Population of Athens in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries BC*, Oxford 1933; Engels, "The problem of female infanticide in the Greco-Roman world", *Classical Philology* 75, 1980, pp. 112 - 120, and "The use of demography in ancient history" *Classical Quarterly* 34, 1984, pp. 386 - 393. Cf. A. Cameron, "The exposure of children and Greek ethics", *Classical Review* 46, 1932, pp. 105 - 114: "the cruelty involved in infanticide even by exposure is very slight", p. 105.

2 John W. M. Whiting and Irvin L. Child, *Child Training and Personality*, Yale University Press 1966, especially pp. 63 - 68.

3 Hilde Rühfel, *Kinderleben im klassischen Athen: Bilder auf klassischen Vasen*, Mainz am Rhein 1984, pp. 168 - 174.

4 A funerary stele from Peiraeus of the last quarter of the fifth century well illustrates the sadness felt at the death of a father: the relief shows a bearded man (representing the deceased) leaning on a stick and holding the hand of a small girl, the two figures gazing intently into each other's eyes: H. Rühfel, *Das Kind in der Griechischen Kunst: Von der minoisch-mykenischen Zeit bis zum Hellenismus*, Mainz am Rhein 1984, Abb. 52, p. 128.

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Index of Ancient Sources

Aëlian	<i>VH</i> 2. 7	180
	3. 26	298
	8. 8	118 n. 62
	10. 21	126 n. 95
	12. 42	Table 2, s.v. Pelias and Neleus, 242 n. 70
	12. 45	126 n. 95
	13. 1	Table 2, s.v. Atalanta
	fr. 285	223
Aëtius	4. 3	127 n. 99
	5. 18. 3	24, 28-29
Aischines	1. 13	316
	1. 28	343 n. 37
	1. 158	316 - 317, 344 n. 39
	3. 154 - 155	330 - 331, 348 n. 62
Aischylos	<i>Ag.</i> 1606	48
	<i>Choe.</i> 755 - 760	47-48, 50, 80
	<i>Eum.</i> 7	283 n. 7
Alexander of Aphrodisias	<i>In met.</i> 28. 30 ff. (38 Hayduck)	104 n. 14
Alexis	fr. 162 Kock	164
	fr. 209	173 - 174
	<i>Daktylios</i>	233 n. 23
	<i>Hypobolimaïos</i>	176
Alkmaion of Kroton	<i>KS</i> 24 A 17 D-K	64
Anaxagoras	<i>KS</i> 59 A 110 D-K	62
Anaxandrides	fr. 78 Kock	164
Andokides	1. 125	262
	1. 126	265 - 266
	1. 127	276, 291 n. 37, 293 n. 50, 51
<i>Anecdota Graeca</i>	1. 207. 14 Bekker	250
	1. 235. 11 ff.	351 n. 72
	1. 237. 26	258
	1. 238. 7 - 9	309
	1. 304. 14 - 16	120 n. 71
<i>Anthologia Palatina</i>	2. 342 - 343, 9. 187	126 n. 96



Antiphanes	fr. 159 Kock	80, 85
	<i>Aiolos</i>	234 n. 26
Antoninus		
Liberalis	13	Table 2, s.v. Meliteus
	19	Table 3, s.v. Zeus
	30. 1	Table 2, s.v. Miletos
The Apocrypha	<i>Epistle of Barnabas</i> 6. 17	68
Apollodoros	1. 1. 6 - 7	68
	1. 1. 7	47
	1. 7. 2	211
	1. 9. 8	Table 2, s.v. Pelias and Neleus
	2. 4. 1	Table 2, s.v. Perseus
	2. 7. 4, 3. 9. 1	Table 2, s.v. Telephos
	3. 9. 2	Table 2, s.v. Atalanta
	3. 12. 5	Table 2, s.v. Paris
Apollonios Rhodios	1. 622 ff.	211
	4. 1129 - 1134	68
Aratus	<i>Phain.</i> 163 - 164	Table 3, s.v. Zeus
Aristophanes	<i>Birds</i> 494 - 498	256
	922 - 923	256 - 257
	<i>Clouds</i>	360
	530 - 532	158
	1380 - 1385	95
	<i>Frogs</i> 422	266 - 267
	1189 - 1190	199 - 200
	<i>Knights</i> 716 - 718	94
	<i>Lysistrata</i> 17 - 19	94
	757	247 - 248
	<i>Peace</i> 123	95
	<i>Thesm.</i>	174
	340	174
	407 - 409	174 - 175
	502 - 518	69, 175
	564 - 565	175
	608 - 609	74
	692	137 n. 137
	<i>Wasps</i> 289	199
	891 - 1008	321
Aristophanes of Byzantium	<i>Epit.</i> 1. 93	40

Aristotle	<i>Ath. Pol.</i> 24. 3	328 - 329
	26. 4	279
	42. 1	281
	55. 3	289 n. 31
	56. 6	299, 302 - 304, 326, 333, 343 n. 37, 344 n. 40
	56. 7	309, 319 - 320, 328 - 329, 333, 343 n. 38, 346 n. 54
<i>GA</i>	740 A 34 - 36	65
	741 B 38 - 742 A 8	39 - 40
	744 A 32 - 35	120 - 121 n. 72
	745 B 23 ff.	65
	746 A 19 - 20	64
	750 B	154
	772 B 7 ff.	27
	773 B 7-18	35
	773 B 11	34
	775 A 1 - 4	108 n. 27
	775 A 4 ff.	120 n. 72
	775 A 33 - B 2	109 n. 28
	776 A 15 - B 3	60 - 61
	776 A 15 - 777 A 27	63
	776 B 4 ff.	124 n. 83
	776 B 4 - 777 A 27	65
	777 A 7 - 15	62
	777 A 14 - 19	133 n. 119
	777 A 22 - 27	124 n. 84
	788 B 10 ff.	84
<i>HA</i>	522 A 2 - 4	60
	522 A 4 - 6	132 n. 117
	559 B 21 - 560 A 9	154
	Book 7	98 - 99 n. 2, 108 n. 25, 109 n. 29
	583 B 29 - 584 A 2	28, 40
	583 B 30 - 31	107 n. 22
	583 B 31 - 584 A 1	115 n. 53
	584 A 34 - B 18	27
	584 B 2 - 4	50
	585 A 4 - 23	35, 111 n. 41

Aristotle	<i>HA</i> 585 A 26 - 28	110 n. 37
	585 A 29 - 31	60
	587 A 9 - 25	16, 100 n. 4
	587 A 27	40 - 41
	587 A 28 - 33	60
	587 A 34 - 35	41
	587 B 16 - 18	84 - 85
	587 B 27 - 30	82
	587 B 30 - 31	133 n. 119
	588 A 1 - 12	101 n. 5
	588 A 5 - 8	46, 88
	588 A 8 - 10	257 - 258, 352
	<i>IA</i> 710 B 5 - 18	121 n. 72
	<i>Pol.</i> 1268 A 6 - 11	332
	1270 A 16 ff.	146 - 148
	1270 B 1 - 6	141 - 142, 149
	1319 A 11 - 12	148
	1335 A - B	189
	1335 B 5	11
	1335 B 19 - 25	183, 189 - 192, 196 - 197, 236 - 7 n. 41, 42, 238 n. 46
	1336 A 3 ff.	71, 88, 357
	1336 A 10 ff.	52 - 54
	1336 A 12 - 18	20
	1336 A 34 - 39	356
	1340 B 27 ff.	119 n. 69
	<i>Rhet.</i> 1398 B	261 - 262
	1407 A 2 - 3	94
	1407 A 8 - 10	136 n. 136
	<i>Rh. Al.</i> 1421 A 29	234 n. 28
	<i>Somn. Vig.</i> 457 A 4 - 21	120 n. 72
	457 A 7 - 16	78 - 79
	<i>ap.</i> Herakleides Lembos 12 Dilts (fr. 611. 12)	147 - 148
Arnobius	3. 10	104 n. 12
Athenaios	65 C - D	248
	370 C - D	248
	375 F - 376 A	Table 3, s. v. Zeus
	530 C	94
<i>BGU</i>	IV 1058, pp. 86 - 89	83
Caecilius	<i>Hypobolimaïos</i> or <i>Rastraria</i>	176

Censorinus	<i>De die nat.</i> 6. 3	62
	7. 2 - 7	23, 109 n. 30
Cicero	<i>Brutus</i> 313	233 n. 25
	<i>Div.</i> 1. 78	126 n. 96
[Cornutus]	<i>De nat. deor.</i> 10 Osann	104 n. 12
Curtius	9. 8. 22	223
Demokritos	<i>ap. Arist. GA</i> 788 B 10 ff.	84
	<i>KS</i> 68 A 144 D-K	63 - 64
Demosthenes	21. 149	175
	24. 103, 107	343 n. 37
	27	327, 333
	27. 4 - 5	298, 304, 306, 324
	27. 7 - 9	315
	27. 13 - 17	304 - 305, 309
	27. 36	315
	27. 40 - 41	298, 311
	27. 46	308
	27. 47 - 48	310 - 311
	27. 48 - 50	341 n. 28
	27. 49 - 51	310 - 311, 323
	27. 56	304 - 305
	27. 58, 59	311, 313, 342 n. 29
	27. 60 - 61	310 - 311, 341 n. 28
	27. 67	323, 345 n. 48
	28	327, 333
	28. 4 - 7	298, 311, 315
	28. 11	315
	28. 15 - 16	298, 304, 305, 310, 311, 324 - 325
	29	327, 333
	29. 6	322 - 323
	29. 8	323
	29. 26	307
	29. 29	311, 342 n. 29
	29. 30	323
	29. 42 - 44	298, 311, 324, 340 - 341 n. 23
	29. 59	311, 315
	30	327, 333
	36. 8	298, 301, 304, 306, 310, 338 n. 8

36. 14	306
36. 22	310
36. 30	298
36. 34	305
37	327
37. 45 f.	344 n. 42
37. 46	344 n. 39, n. 40
38. 7	315
38. 17	322
38. 19 - 20	323, 345 n. 45
38. 23	311, 314
38. 27	323
39	259 - 263, 279, 291 n. 38
39. 2 - 4	279
39. 4	269
39. 22	257, 261, 262
39. 31 - 34	281
39. 35	261
39. 39	261
40	259 - 263, 279, 291 n. 38
40. 28	257, 261, 262
40. 29	261
43. 11	266, 291 n. 40, 293 n. 49
43. 14	291 n. 40, 294 n. 54
43. 18	293 n. 52
43. 75	316, 344 n. 40
43. 81	291 n. 40
43. 82	293 n. 49, 293 n. 52, 294 n. 55
43. 58	202
43. 75	318, 319 - 320
44. 41, 44	291 n. 38
44. 66	299 - 300, 338 n. 11
45. 28	305
45. 37	338 n. 8
46. 18	277, 325, 346 n. 50
46. 24	305
47. 55 - 56	75

Demosthenes	47. 64	345 n. 48
	53. 29	321, 345 n. 45
	57. 35 - 45	77 - 78
	57. 54	265, 293 n. 51
	58. 31	345 n. 45
	58. 32	337 n. 1, 344 n. 42, n. 43
	59. 57 - 59	266, 275 - 276, 291 n. 40, 294 n. 56
	59. 60	293 n. 51
	59. 112	271
	Didymos	<i>ap.</i> Lactantius <i>Div. inst.</i> 1. 22
Dio Chrysostom	64. 23	126 n. 95
Diodorus Siculus	4. 9. 6 - 7	Table 2, <i>s.v.</i> Herakles
	4. 33. 7 - 12	Table 2, <i>s.v.</i> Telephos
	4. 64. 1	Table 2, <i>s.v.</i> Oedipus
	5. 70	67
	5. 70. 2 - 3	Table 3, <i>s.v.</i> Zeus
	12. 15	317 - 318
	19. 2. 2 - 7	221
	19. 2. 8	242 n. 72
	19. 3. 1, 3	221
	20. 84. 3	336, 348 n. 64
Diogenes		
of Apollonia	<i>KS</i> 64 A 25 D-K	64
	<i>KS</i> 64 A 28	36, 41
Diogenes		
Laertios	1. 55	329, 336
	1. 56	305, 317
	5. 11 - 16	298, 324
	8. 29	104 n. 14
	9. 19	42
Diokles of Karystos	<i>ap.</i> Censorinus <i>De die nat.</i> 7. 2 ff.	23, 109 n. 30
	<i>ap.</i> Galen <i>Phil. hist.</i> 122 (644. 23 Diels)	105 n. 17
	fr. 27. 10 ff. Wellmann	64
	fr. 174. 1-5	28
	fr. 177	24, 41, 46, 113 - 114 n. 49
Dionysios of Thrace	<i>Ars Grammatica</i> 6 (Uhlig, <i>Gram. Gr.</i>)	68 - 69
Diphilos	fr. 73 Kassel and Austin	50
	fr. 75	93

Diphilos	fr. 134	164
Donatus	<i>Comm. Ter. Eun.</i> 753	49
Empedokles	<i>ap. Censorinus De die nat.</i> 7. 2 ff.	23
	<i>Dox. Gr.</i> 411. 26 - 412. 18	111 n. 43
	425. 23 - 426. 4	36
	<i>KS</i> 31 A 74 D-K	111 n. 43
	<i>KS</i> 31 A 75	23
	<i>KS</i> 31 A 79	62
	<i>KS</i> 31 B 68	62
	<i>KS</i> 31 B 69	23
Ehippos	fr. 3 Kassel and Austin	248
Epikouros	<i>ap. Galen Phil. hist.</i> 122 (644. 23 Diels)	105 n. 17
Epinikos	<i>Hypoballomenai</i>	176
<i>Etymologicon</i>		
<i>Magnum</i>	89. 54 - 90	250
	118. 54 - 119. 1	267
	533. 29 - 40	270
Euboulos	fr. 2 Kassel and Austin	248, 256,
	fr. 80	78, 132 n. 116
	fr. 148	248, 249, 252
	<i>Auge, Danaë, Ion, Xouthos, Antiopè</i>	234 n. 26
Eudoxos	<i>Hypobolimaïos</i>	176
Eupolis	fr. 112 Kassel and Austin	175
Euripides	<i>Alexandros</i>	Table 2, s.v. Paris
	<i>Antiopè</i>	Table 2, s.v. Amphion and Zethos
	<i>Auge</i>	234 n. 26
	<i>Elektra</i> 651 - 4, 1124 - 33	251 - 252, 284 n. 11, 286 n. 15
	<i>Ion</i>	48 - 49, Table 2, s.v. <i>Ion</i>
	651 - 653	283 - 4 n. 8
	805 - 807	283 n. 8
	1127	283 n. 7
	<i>Mel. Soph., Mel. Desm.</i>	Table 2, s.v. Aiolos and Boïotos
	<i>Phoin.</i>	Table 2, s.v. Oedipus
<i>Telephos</i>	Table 2, s.v. Telephos	
<i>Tyro</i>	233 n. 22	
fr. 2 Nauck	257	
frr. 696 ff.	Table 2, s.v. Telephos	

Euryphon of Knidos	<i>ap. Censorinus De die nat.</i> 7. 2 ff.	23
Eustathius	<i>Commentary on Il.</i> 6. 399 <i>Od.</i> 11. 253	74, 129 n. 108 Table 2, s.v. Pelias and Neleus
	<i>Vit. Pind.</i>	126 n. 95
Favorinus	<i>ap. Gell.</i> 12. 1	83
Focas	<i>Vit. Virg.</i> 28. 32	126 n. 96
Galen	<i>Phil. hist.</i> 122 (644. 23 Diels)	105 n. 17
Gellius, Aulus	3. 16. 3	103 n. 12
	3. 16. 7	25
	12. 1	83, 128 n. 106
Gortyn Code	Col. III 44 - col. IV 27	178 - 179, 183
	Col. VIII 51 - 53	327 - 328
	Col. XII 6 - 19	328
Harpokration	σ.κ. ἀμφιδρόμια, I 27. 6 - 9 Dindorf	248 - 250
	σ.κ. ἀποτιμηταί, I 51. 12 - 52. 6	312 - 313
	σ.κ. ἑβδομευομένα, I 102. 14 - 103. 4	258
	σ.κ. εἰσαγγελία, I 104. 17 - 19	344 n. 42
	σ.κ. κακώσεως, I 167. 5 - 13	344 n. 42
	σ.κ. μείον, μειαγωγός, I 200. 15 - 201. 9	270
	σ.κ. σίτος, I 274. 1 - 4	328
	σ.κ. φάσις, I 299 7 ff.	313 - 314
Herodian	7. 1. 2 Stavenhagen	118 n. 62
Herodotos	1. 71	217
	1. 95	215
	1. 107 - 122	214 - 217, 228
	2. 2	85 - 86
	4. 110 - 117	57
	5. 41	234 n. 28
	5. 92	225 - 227, 228
	6. 69	22
Hesiod	<i>Theog.</i> 81 - 84	126 n. 97
Hesychios	A 95 Latte	248 - 250
	Δ 67	258
	Δ 99	249
	E 68, 69	239 n. 50

Hesychios	E 73	258
	Σ 1791 Schmidt	253
Hippocratic Corpus	<i>Aer.</i> 4 (II 22. 6 - 8 Li.)	91
	9 (II 40. 2 - 42. 6)	88, 89
	14 (II 58. 11 - 60. 8)	56 - 57
	17 (II 66. 4 - 68. 2)	57
	20 (II 72. 22 - 74. 8)	57
	(II 74. 8 - 11)	54, 119 n. 70
	<i>Alim.</i> 33 (IX 110. 7 - 8)	88
	42 (IX 112 - 116)	24
	<i>Aph.</i> 3. 26 (IV 498. 4 - 5)	90
	5. 39	132 n. 117
	5. 49	105 n. 19
	5. 50 (IV 550. 5 - 6)	135 n. 132
	<i>Art.</i> 3 (VI 4. 18 - 6. 1)	157
	11	105 n. 19
	13 (VI 26. 7 - 9)	157
	<i>Arthr.</i> 12 (IV 114. 1, 8)	156
	21 (IV 134. 5 ff.)	156
	28 (IV 138. 14 - 15)	156
	29 (IV 140. 2 - 4)	118 n. 66, 156
	53 (IV 232. 7 - 13)	121 n. 75
	(IV 236. 5 - 238. 1)	156
	(IV 238. 2 - 6)	118 n. 66, 156
	55 (IV 240. 19 ff.)	156
	(IV 242. 11 - 14)	156 - 157
	56 (IV 242. 18 - 244. 10)	156
	58 (IV 252. 8 - 17)	157
	(IV 252. 17 ff.)	156
	60 (IV 258. 13 - 14)	118 - 119 n. 66
	62 (IV 262. 10 - 264. 10)	51, 156 - 157
	72 (IV 296. 6 - 7)	156
	82 (IV 326. 14 - 15)	156
	85 (IV 324. 1 - 2)	156
	87 (IV 326. 14 - 15)	156
	<i>Carn.</i> 6 (VIII 592. 1-16)	39, 112 - 113 n. 47
	(VIII 592. 11 - 594. 4)	64
	12 (VIII 598. 7 - 11)	133 n. 120
	(VIII 598. 11 - 17)	84 - 85
	19 (VIII 610. 3 - 5, 10 - 12)	110 n. 33

Hippocratic Corpus	<i>Car.n.</i> 19 (VIII 612. 1 ff.)	23-24
	(VIII 614. 8 - 12)	101 n. 7, 102 - 3 n.11
	(VIII 614. 11)	16
	(VIII 614. 22 - 24)	29
	<i>Dent.</i>	116 n. 55
	<i>Epid.</i> 2	108 n. 24
	2. 1. 7 (V 78. 13)	26, 31
	2. 3. 17 (V 116. 10 ff.)	26
	(V 118. 9 - 10)	124 n. 82, n. 83
	2. 6. 4 (V 134. 2 - 4)	107 n. 21
	3. 4	105 n. 19
	4. 10 (V 148. 24)	81
	5.11 (V 210. 12 - 212. 4)	35, 111 n. 41
	6. 3. 7 (V 296. 3 - 4)	90
	<i>Fract.</i> 1	105 n. 19
	22 (III 492. 1)	52, 117 n. 60
	<i>Genit.</i>	46
	5 Jo. (VII 476. 23 ff.)	110 n. 33
	9. 1 (VII 482. 3 - 9)	45
	9. 2 (VII 482. 9 - 14)	45
	10. 1-2 (VII 484. 1-14)	45
	<i>Jusj.</i> IV 630. 11	90
	<i>Morb.</i> 3. 2 (VII 120. 9)	135 n. 132
	4	46
	4. 54. 1 (VII 594. 22 - 23)	21
	4. 54. 2 (VII 594. 24 - 596. 10)	125 n. 90
	(VII 596. 5 - 6)	21
	4. 55 1 - 7 (VII 600. 3 - 604. 17)	89 - 90
	<i>Mul.</i> 1	46
	1. 27 (VIII 70. 18 - 21)	33
	1. 44 (VIII 102)	81
	1. 46 (VIII 106. 6 - 8)	100 n. 4
	(VIII 106. 7)	16
	1. 68 (VIII 144. 22 - 24)	101 n. 7
	1. 73 (VIII 152. 22 - 154. 8)	133 n. 120
	1. 74 (VIII 156. 10)	135 n. 132
	1. 84 (VIII 206. 13, 19, 208. 10)	135 n. 132
	1. 105 (VIII 228. 12 - 13)	135 n. 132
	2. 158 (VIII 336. 8)	135 n. 132
	2. 162 (VIII 340. 7)	135 n. 132
	2. 179 (VIII 362. 13)	135 n. 132

Hippocratic Corpus	<i>Mul.</i> 2. 205 (VIII 394. 9 - 10, 396. 5)	135 n. 132
	<i>Nat. Hom.</i> 12 (VI 62. 21 - 64. 10)	89
	<i>Nat. Mul.</i> 32 (VII 352. 13)	135 n. 132
	93 (VII 410. 10 ff.)	81
	109 (VII 426. 6)	135 n. 132
	<i>Nat. Puer.</i>	46
	12. 1 - 5 Jo. (VII 486. 1 - 488. 13)	112 n. 46
	13. 1 - 2 (VII 532. 14 ff., 534. 8ff.)	110 n. 33
	13. 4 - 15 (VII 492. 7 - 494. 8)	63
	14. 1 - 2 (VII 492. 8 - 21)	63
	17. 1 - 3 (VII 496. 17 - 498. 17)	112 n. 46
	17. 2 - 3 (VII 498. 2 - 15)	3
	18. 1 - 8 (VII 498. 27 - 506. 2)	115 n. 54
	19. 2 (VII 506. 9 - 11)	110 n. 37
	21. 1 (VII 510. 18 - 21)	110 n. 37
	21. 2 - 4 (VII 510. 24 - 512. 23)	63
	21. 3 - 4 (VII 512. 7 - 23)	60
	22. 1 (VII 514. 6 - 8)	45, 55, 63
	30 (VII 530. 20 - 538. 28)	115 n. 54
	30. 5 (VII 534. 14 - 15)	63
	<i>Oct.</i>	Table 1, 106 n. 20
	1 Gr. (VII 446. 12 - 452. 3)	107 n. 21
	1. 1 - 16 (VII 446. 12 ff.)	25
	1. 3 - 4 (VII 446. 19 - 448. 4)	107 n. 21
	1. 8 (VII 448. 11 - 21)	107 n. 21
	1. 9 - 16 (VII 448. 21 - 450. 27)	106. n. 21
	1. 14 (VII 450. 11-16)	46
	2. 1 (VII 452. 4 - 6)	25, 31
	2. 1-2 (VII 452. 4 - 8)	25
	2. 3 (VII 452. 9 - 13)	26, 30, 38, 46
	2. 4 - 7 (VII 452. 13 - 454. 13)	44
	2. 4 - 3. 8 (VII 452. 13 ff.)	25
	2. 8 - 9 (VII 454. 14 - 456. 3)	45
	3. 1 (VII 456. 4)	37
	3. 1-3 (VII 456. 5 - 17)	37
	3. 3 (VII 456. 11-15)	41, 113 n. 48
	3. 4 (VII 456. 17 - 20)	45
	3. 5 (VII 456. 20 - 458. 2)	62
	3. 5 - 7 (VII 456. 20 - 458. 9)	38
	4. 1 (VII 458. 11-13)	26
	4. 2 - 7 (VII 458. 13 - 460. 9)	26, 32

Hippokratic Corpus	<i>Oct.</i> 4. 6 - 7 (VII 460. 4 - 9)	26
	4. 8 (VII 436. 1-2)	26
	5. 1- 6. 2 (VII 436. 8 - 438. 21)	28
	5. 1- 6. 3 (VII 436. 8 - 440. 4)	25
	5. 4 - 5 (VII 436. 15 - 438. 8)	31
	5. 6 (VII 438. 9)	31
	6. 1 (VII 438. 12 - 17)	107 n. 22
	6. 3 (VII 438. 21 - 440. 4)	26
	6. 4 - 7. 3 (VII 440. 4 - 442. 4)	25
	6. 5 - 6 (VII 440. 8 - 12)	26
	6. 6 (VII 440. 9 - 12)	26
	7. 1-2 (VII 440. 13 - 442. 4)	29
	7. 2 (VII 442. 1 - 4)	22
	9 (VII 444. 1 - 15)	107 n. 21
	9. 1 - 2 (VII 444. 1 - 8)	25, 29
	9. 4 (VII 444. 12 - 15)	25, 31
	10. 1 - 3 (VII 444. 17 - 446. 1)	31
	10. 4 (VII 446. 1 - 5)	26, 30, 31
	<i>Salubr.</i> 6 (VI 80. 18)	87
	<i>Sept.</i>	106 n. 20
	<i>Steri.</i> 214 (VIII 414. 18)	135 n. 132
	243 (VIII 458. 2)	135 n. 132
	<i>Superf.</i>	110 n. 35
	1 (VIII 476. 1 - 12)	34-36
	3 (VIII 478. 1 - 3)	32, 110 n. 36
	11 (VIII 482. 23 - 484. 2)	33
	15 (VIII 484. 9 - 17)	33 - 34, 40, 43 - 44
	17 (VIII 484. 21 - 486. 6)	33
	<i>VC</i> 18 (III 250. 9 - 11)	54
	<i>Vict.</i> 1. 19 (VI 492. 23 - 24)	20, 56
	1. 26 (VI 498. 17 - 23)	27
	1. 31 (VI 506. 8 - 13)	111 n. 41
Hippon	<i>ap. Censorinus De die nat.</i> 7. 2 ff.	23
	<i>KS</i> 38 A 17 D-K	64
Hipponax	12. 2D (19 West)	16, 19
Homer	<i>Il.</i> 6. 388 - 389, 466 - 467, 22. 82 - 83,	
	503	129 n. 108
	9. 489 - 491	87
	19. 114 - 124	103 n. 12
	22. 499 ff.	361
	24. 795	212

Homer	<i>Od.</i> 11. 448 - 449, 19. 482 - 483	129 n. 108
Homeric Hymn	<i>To Delian Apollo</i> 120 - 122	47
	<i>To Hermes</i> 151, 237 - 241, 301, 305 - 6	47
	552 - 563	126 n. 94
Hyginus	<i>Fab.</i> 8 Rose	Table 2, s.v. Amphion and Zethos
	66	Table 2, s.v. Oedipus
	70	Table 2, s.v. Parthenopaios
	87	86
	87, 88	Table 2, s.v. Aigisthos
	91	Table 2, s.v. Paris
	99	Table 2, s.v. Parthenopaios
	186	Table 2, s.v. Aiolos and Boiotos
	187	Table 2, s.v. Hippothoos
	252	Table 2, s.v. Antilochos
Hypereides	42	332
[Iamblichos]	<i>Th. Ar.</i> 61. 5 ff.	24
<i>Inscriptiones Graecae</i>	ii ² 115. 20 - 23	234 n. 30
	i ³ 6c. 41. 122 - 125	347 n. 59
	ii ² 1237	265, 288 n. 29
	1237. 5 - 8	270, 273
	1237. 29	294 n. 54
	1237. 68 - 113	274 - 275
	1237. 78 ff.	294 n. 57
	1237. 96 - 98	277, 294 n. 56
	1237. 109 - 113	271, 273, 296 n. 65
	1237. 114 - 125	274
	1237. 118 - 119	266
	ii ² 7873	74
	ii ² 9079, 9112, 9271, 10843, 11084, 12242, 12330, 12682, 12812, 12813, 12815, 12816, 12387, 12996, 13065	129 n. 109
	ii ² 1559	129 n. 110
	ii/iii ² 6873	101 - 102 n. 7
	iv ² 122. 26 ff.	232 n. 12
Isaios	1. 9	300, 302, 338 n. 13
	1. 10	310

Isaios	1. 12	300, 310
	1. 39	345 n. 44
	2. 9	313
	2. 14	276, 295 n. 60
	2. 27 - 28	313
	3. 1	292 n. 46
	3. 3	292 n. 46
	3. 30	257
	3. 45	281
	3. 46 - 47	344 n. 42, 345 n. 44, 346 n. 53
	3. 57	292 n. 46
	3. 62	345 n. 44
	3. 70	257
	3. 73 - 80	271 - 272
	4. 8	340 n. 17
	5	302, 315
	5. 10 - 11	315 - 316
	6. 2	270
	6. 13	346 n. 51
	6. 21 - 22	278, 293 n. 52
	6. 36 - 37	311 - 312, 339 n. 17
	6. 46	346 n. 51
	7	302
	7. 1	277
	7. 6 - 7	307
	7. 7 - 10	323
	7. 15 - 16	268, 275, 277, 289 n. 31, 291 n. 40, 293 n. 50, 51, 294 n. 56
	8. 19	266, 293 n. 51, 53
	8. 42	300, 302
	9. 27 - 30	294 - 295 n. 60, 298 - 299, 306, 310, 341 n. 28
	10 <i>hyp.</i>	300, 302
	11	299, 322
	11. 13	344 n. 44
	11. 28	344 n. 43
	11. 31	344 n. 44
	11. 35	344 n. 44

Isaios	fr. 6	338 n. 12
	fr. 22, 23	341 n. 28
	fr. 23. 2 - 3	315
Isokrates	5. 66	242 n. 70
	8. 82	330 - 331
	12. 122	192, 197
Justin	<i>Epit.</i> 1. 4 - 6	215
	1. 4. 12	228
	17. 3. 16 - 22	244 n. 76
	22. 1	242 n. 72
	23. 4. 6	222
	23. 4. 7	68
Juvenal	<i>Sat.</i> 15. 139 - 140	239 n. 54
Kallias	fr. 18 Kassel and Austin	117 n. 60
Kallimachos	<i>Ait.</i> fr. 26 - 28	Table 2, s. v. Linos
	<i>Epigram</i> 51	75
	<i>Hymn to Artemis</i> 74	283 n. 7
	<i>Hymn to Zeus</i> 32 - 53	Table 3, s. v. Zeus
	47 - 53	67
Konon	<i>Dieg.</i> 19	Table 2, s. v. Linos
Krateros	<i>FGrH</i> 342 fr. 4	280 - 281, 296 n. 66
Kratinos	<i>Hypobolimaios</i>	176
	fr. 183 Kassel and Austin	329 - 330
Ktesias	<i>FGrH</i> 688 fr. 9	215
Lactantius	<i>Div. inst.</i> 1. 22	67
Longus	<i>Daphnis and Chloë</i>	Table 2, s. v. Daphnis and Chloë
	1. 2 - 3, 39	86
	4. 24	233 n. 25
Lucian	<i>D. Deor.</i> 9	104 n. 12
	<i>Sacr.</i> 5	Table 3, s. v. Zeus
	<i>Syr. D.</i> 12	211 - 212
Lysias	1. 9 - 10	71 - 72
	10. 5	300 - 301
	13. 91	343 n. 37
	19	302
	19. 9	300, 303
	19. 31 - 32	309
	19. 39 - 40	305
	30. 2	265, 289 n. 30
	30. 27	289 n. 30

Lysias	32	323, 324, 327, 337 n. 3, 341 n. 28
	32. 3	337 - 338 n. 7
	32. 5	298, 299
	32. 6	305, 324
	32. 8	307
	32. 9	301
	32. 16	316
	32. 20 - 24	298, 308, 314, 315, 332, 335, 337 n. 1, 341 - 342 n. 29
	32. 25	314 - 315
	32. 28	308
	fr. 8a Thalheim	102 n. 7
	fr. 42b	330 - 331, 347 - 348 n. 60
	fr. 43	299, 323, 337 n. 6, 341 n. 28
	fr. 75	299, 316, 337 n. 6
	fr. 91	314
Macrobius	<i>In somn. Scip.</i> 1. 6. 63 ff. 1. 6. 67	24 113 - 114 n. 49
Menander	<i>Daktylios</i>	233 n. 23
	<i>Encheiridion</i>	233 n. 23
	<i>Epitr.</i>	167, 171, 172, 210
	303	233 n. 25
	325 - 343	172
	fr. 8	167
	<i>Heautontimoroumenos</i>	161, 177
	<i>Hypobolimaïos</i> or <i>Agroïkos</i>	176
	<i>Kekryphalos</i>	233 n. 23
	<i>Perikeiromene</i>	159 ff., 163, 171, 172, 196
	15, 352ff.	49
	742 - 744	160
	755 - 773	160
	796 - 812	160 - 161, 183
	824	161
	<i>Plakion</i>	233 n. 23
	<i>Samia</i>	168 - 170
	54 ff.	129 - 130 n. 111

Menander	84 - 85	77, 169
	225 - 226	121 n. 76
	237, 302	76, 132 n. 115
	301 - 303	78
	<i>Sikyonios</i>	173
	<i>Synaristosai</i>	167, 171
	fr. 18 Koerte	164
	fr. 54	164
	fr. 279	344
	fr. 335	165
	fr. 343	103 n. 12
	fr. 396	173
	fr. 454	78
	fr. 581	164
	fr. 605	317
Musonius	fr. XV B	196, 237 - 8 n. 44
Nikolaos		
of Damascus	fr. 15. 12 - 13 Dindorf	49, 51
	<i>FGrH90</i> fr. 57	226
	66. 2 - 4	215 - 216
	66	242 n. 70
Nikomachos		
of Gerasa	61. 5 - 13 de Falco	114 n. 49
	64. 19 - 65. 3	114 n. 49
	<i>ap.</i> [Iambli.] <i>Th. Ar.</i> 61. 5 ff.	24
Olympiodoros	<i>Vit. Plat.</i> 382 - 383 Westermann	126 n. 96
Ovid	<i>Fasti</i> 3. 443 f.	Table 3, s. v. Zeus
<i>Papyrus</i>		
<i>Oxyrhynchus</i>	1. 37, 38	131 n. 112
Paulus of Aigina	1. 5	127 n. 99
Pausanias	1. 6. 2	223
	1. 38. 9	Table 2, s. v. Amphion and Zethos
	1. 43. 7	Table 2, s. v. Linos
	2. 6. 1 - 4	Table 2, s. v. Amphion and Zethos
	2. 26. 4 - 5	Table 2, s. v. Asklepios
	3. 24. 3	Table 2, s. v. Dionysos
	5. 17. 5	226 - 227
	8. 4. 9	Table 2, s. v. Telephos
	8. 8. 2	Table 3, s. v. Poseidon

Pausanias	8. 12. 2 - 4	Table 2, s.v. Aichmagoras
	9. 23. 2	126 n. 95
	10. 16. 5	Table 2, s.v. Phylakides and Philandros
Philemon	<i>Daktylios</i>	233 n. 23
	<i>Hypobolimaios</i>	176
Philochoros	<i>FGrH</i> 328 fr. 35 a	276, 280 - 281
Philolaos of Kroton	<i>KS</i> 44 A 27 D-K	36-37, 41, 112 n. 44
Philostratos	<i>Heroik.</i> 12. 2	267
	<i>Im.</i> 2. 12	126 n. 95
Photios	A 1317 Theodoridis	248 - 250
	II 30. 10 Naber	349 n. 68
	II 128. 6 - 9	254
Pindar	<i>Nem.</i> 1. 37 - 38	47
	<i>Ol.</i> 6. 44 ff.	Table 2, s.v. Iamos
	45 - 47	68, 70
	<i>Pyth.</i> 4. 114	47
	fr. 193 Snell	118 n. 62
Plato	<i>Alk.</i> I 104 B	299, 337 n. 6
	121 C - D	259, 284 n. 8
	121 D	57
	122 A	308
	<i>Apol.</i> 34 D	321, 362
	<i>Gorg.</i> 525 A	359
	<i>Krit.</i> 45 D	362
	<i>Laws</i> 666 A	89
	684 D	146
	740 B - 741 A	188 - 189, 191, 196 - 197
	788 C	10
	788 C - 791 C	55
	788 D	54
	789 E - 790 B	54
	791 E - 792 E	356
	794 D 8 ff.	58
	928 C	314
	<i>Menex.</i> 246 A - 249 B	329, 333, 334, 336
	<i>Phaid.</i> 116 B	362
	<i>Prot.</i> 320 A	307
325 C - D	96, 359	

Plato	<i>Rep.</i> 414 A - C	185 - 186	
	450 C	360	
	457 C - 461 E	181 - 188, 191, 196 - 197, 235 -6 n.34 - 38	
	460 C - D	86	
	461 D	103 n. 12	
	<i>Tht.</i> 149 ff.	98 n. 1	
	150 A - B	154	
	150 C 2	154	
	151 B - C	18, 46, 153 - 154, 176	
	157 C - D	102 n. 8, 154	
	160 E - 161 A	102 n. 8, 153 - 154, 176, 183, 198 - 199, 205, 247, 251 - 252, 254 - 255	
	173 A	359	
	210 B	102 n. 8, 154	
	<i>Tim.</i> 19 A	185 - 186, 196 - 197, 236 n. 38	
	21 B	290 n. 35	
	Plautus	<i>Amph.</i> 500 - 501	167
		1094	284
<i>Cist.</i>		173	
635		233 n. 25	
636 - 664		167 - 168, 171, 173	
<i>Miles</i> 1398 - 1399		233 n. 25	
<i>Rud.</i>		173	
<i>Truc.</i>		176	
902 - 908		78, 165	
<i>Vid.</i>		173	
Pliny	<i>NH</i> 7. 72	239 n. 54	
	11. 55	126 n. 96	
Plutarch	<i>Agesilaos</i> 1. 2, 2. 3	152	
	25. 11	360	
	<i>Agis</i> 4. 2	152	
	5. 2	149 ff.	
	5. 3 - 4	146, 148 ff.	
	<i>Alk.</i> 1	299, 337	
	1. 2	75	
	<i>Aristeides</i> 21. 4	101 n. 5	
	37	347 n. 56	

Plutarch	<i>Artaxerxes</i> 3. 1 - 2	217
	<i>Lyk.</i> 8. 7	146
	16. 1	183
	16. 1 - 2	139 - 142 and ff., 184
	16. 3	20, 134 n. 128, 355
	16. 4	56, 97, 355
	<i>Per.</i> 37	279
	<i>Pyrrh.</i> 2 - 3	244 n. 76
	<i>Them.</i> 18. 5	360
	<i>Thes.</i> 4. 1	233 n. 25
	<i>Mor.</i> 3 C - F	128 n. 106
	5 A	95
	163 F - 164 A	226 - 227, 245 n. 80
	238 E	148
	314 E - F	Table 2, s.v. Lykastos and Parrhasios
	337 D	48
	497 A - E	195 - 197
	608 D	82, 128 - 129 n. 106
	609 E	128 - 129 n. 106
	610 E	82
	612 A	201
	680 D, 682 A	136 n. 133
	819 E	101 n. 5
[Plutarch]	<i>Ethika</i> 834 A - B	281
Pollux	8. 107	268 - 269, 272
Polybios	6. 45	146
	12. 15	221
	36. 17. 5	183, 192 - 197
Poseidippos	fr. 11 Kock	163 - 164, 183
Proclus	<i>Comm.</i> on Hes. <i>WD</i> 494	180 - 181
	<i>Comm.</i> on Pl. <i>Tim.</i> 27 E, 88. 11 - 23 Diehl	267
Rufus	<i>ap.</i> Oreibasios 3. 156 (<i>C.M.G.</i> VI 2. 2. 136)	64
Scholia	Aristeides 458. 21 Dindorf	172
	Ar. <i>Ach.</i> 463	69 - 70
	Ar. <i>Birds</i> 494	257, 258
	Ar. <i>Frogs</i> 422	289 - 290 n. 33
	798	270
	Ar. <i>Lys.</i> 138	Table 2, s.v. Pelias and Neleus
	757	249, 250, 258, 282 n.

Scholia	Ar. <i>Peace</i> 123	4
	Ar. <i>Thesm.</i> 506	95
	Ar. <i>Wasps</i> 289	69 - 70
	Dem. 24. 20	199, 239 n. 50
	D.T. 6	333
	Eur. <i>Phoin.</i> 26	69
		49, 51, Table 2, s.v. Oedipus
	Kall. <i>Hymn.</i> 4. 251	103 - 104 n. 12
	Pind. <i>Ol.</i> 6, p. 156 25 - 29 Boeckh	Table 2, s.v. Euadne
	<i>Pyth.</i> Hyp.	103 n. 12
	Pl. <i>Minos</i> 315 c	239 n. 50
	Pl. <i>Tht.</i> 160 E	284 n. 11
	161 A	248 - 251
	Pl. <i>Tim.</i> 21 B	267
	Theok. 2. 35/36 A	Table 2, s.v. Hekate
	7. 78/79 A	Table 2, s.v. Daphnis
	Servius	Table 2, s.v. Daphnis
	Table 3, s.v. Zeus	
Sextus Empiricus	<i>Adv. math.</i> 1. 41	118 n. 62
	2. 42	136 - 137 n. 136
	<i>Hypot. Pyrrh.</i> 3. 211	177, 234 - 235 n. 32
Solon	27. 1 - 2	290
Soranus	<i>Gyn.</i>	12, 13, 17
	1. 3. 14 (180. 20 - 181. 3 Rose)	64
	1. 10. 38 (204. 4 - 6)	114 n. 50
	1. 17. 57 (225. 16 - 19)	62, 114 n. 50
	1. 17. 58 (226. 26 - 227. 6)	114 n. 50
	1. 22. 73 (244. 5 - 13)	100 n. 4
	1. 26. 79 (248. 14 ff.)	18 - 19, 155, 249
	(249. 2 - 4)	30
	(249. 7 - 8)	42
	1. 27. 80 (250. 4 ff.)	17
	(250. 9 - 10)	41
	(250. 19 - 21)	114 n. 50
	(251. 2 ff.)	100 n. 4
	1. 28. 81 (251. 8 - 12)	20
	(251. 12 - 252. 4)	21
	(251. 22 - 25)	114 n. 51
1. 28. 82 (252. 9 - 23)	20	
(252. 23 - 25)	19	

Soranus	1. 29. 83 (253. 16 - 23)	52
	(254. 7 - 8)	50
	1. 29. 83 - 84 (253. 14 - 256. 15)	55
	1. 29. 84 (256. 9 - 15)	51
	1. 29. 111 (285. 16 - 18)	58
	1. 30. 85 (256. 17 - 25)	52
	1. 31. 86 (258. 6 - 20)	67
	1. 31. 86 - 87 (257. 19 - 259. 21)	60, 122 n. 80
	1. 31. 87 (259. 9 - 14)	61, 124 n. 85
	(259. 14 ff.)	67
	(259. 21 - 260. 21)	73
	1. 32. 88 (263. 7 - 21)	79, 82
	(264. 1 - 3)	83
	1. 34. 96 (272. 3 - 7)	79
	1. 35. 98 (274. 6 - 7)	79
	(274. 8 - 9)	132 - 133 n. 118
	1. 36. 101 - 103 (275. 26 - 278. 27)	56
	1. 37. 105 (279. 17 - 21)	133 n. 118
	1. 38. 110 (285. 3 - 4)	99 n. 3
	1. 39. 111 (286. 7 - 10)	58
	(286. 16 - 19)	51
	1. 41. 115 (287. 26 - 288. 5)	91
	(288. 14 - 24)	88
	(288. 20 - 23)	91, 134 n. 126
	(288. 23 - 26)	94
	1. 41. 115 - 116 (287. 25 - 289. 17)	82
	1. 41. 116 (289. 13 - 17)	93
	1. 41. 117 (289. 24 - 290. 2)	97
<i>ap. Muscio</i> 99 (35. 21 Rose)	79	
Sophokles	<i>Oedipus Tyrannos</i>	Table 2, s. v. Oedipus
	1035	49
	<i>Tyros</i> I and II	Table 2, s. v. Pelias and Neleus
<i>Souda</i>	A 963, 965 Adler	223
	A 1722	248 - 251, 258
	A 2940	272
	A 4265	233 n. 22
	Δ 186	258

<i>Souda</i>	E 26	258
	E 55	314
	E 74	223 - 224
	E 191	239 n. 50
	Λ 25	223
	Ο 652	349 n. 68
	Σ 502	328
	Τ 687	94
	Φ 692	290 n. 33
Stobaios	<i>Flor.</i> 103. 3	233 n. 22
Strabo	13. 1. 69	Table 2, s.v. Telephos
	15. 3. 18	217
Straton	ap. Censorinus <i>De die nat.</i> 7. 2 ff.	23
Stobaios	<i>Florilegium</i> 4. 34. 72 Hense	80
Syrianus	On Hermog. 2. 72 Rabe	345 - 346 n. 49
Telekleides	fr. 41 Kock	175
Teles	ap. Stob. <i>Flor.</i> 4. 34. 72 Hense	80
Terence	<i>Andr.</i> 218 - 219, 401 - 402, 721 - 796	166 - 167
	<i>Hæaut.</i> 626 - 667	162 - 163, 171, 173, 177
	<i>Hec.</i> 397 - 400, 570 - 571	165 - 166
	769	78
	<i>Phor.</i> 46 - 50	283
Theognis	1290 - 1291	Table 2, s.v. Atalanta
Theokritos	<i>Id.</i> 3. 15 - 16	84
Theophrastos	<i>Characters</i> 16. 9	286
	20. 5	94, 360
Thucydides	2. 34	212
	2. 35 - 46	197, 329, 332
Valerius		
Maximus	1. 6 ext. 3	126 n. 96
Xenophanes	<i>VS</i> 21 A 1 D-K	42
Xenophon	<i>Cyr.</i> 1. 2. 1	215
	1. 4. 15 ff.	216
	<i>Lak. Pol.</i> 1. 3	96
	2. 1, 5, 6, 7	97
	<i>Mem.</i> 1. 5. 2	298

Xenophon

Mem. 2. 2

72, 80, 117 n. 61

Para. 2. 7

333 - 335

[Xenophon]

Ath. Pol. 3. 4

335

