

Cognitive Metaphors of Anger and Madness in *The Canterbury Tales*

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This paper presents an analysis of a number of cognitive metaphors, and metaphors based on metonymy pertaining to the concepts of ANGER and MADNESS. The study will approach frequent collocations related to the afore-mentioned concepts and will view them from a cognitive perspective. The analysis takes as its text Caxton's *The Canterbury Tales: The British Library Copies* (ed. by Barbara Bordalejo), a CD-ROM containing the first full-color facsimiles of all copies of William Caxton's first and second editions of the Tales. The theories drawn upon for the analysis include those of Jäckel (1995) and connected with the metaphorization of the mind, as well as those that reflect the strong impact of culture upon emotion (Dźwirek and Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2010, Kövecses 1995, 2000, 2005, 2006). The analysis focuses on the detailed contextual study of the cognitive metaphorical concepts. This paper will demonstrate the close relationship between emotion, culture and the language used to express emotions, and will also reveal emotion to be a conceptualized feeling highly affected by culture. The perspective on metaphor/metonymy continuum will be applied to the analysis of the metaphors linked with the concepts of ANGER and MADNESS.

Keywords: metaphor, metonymy, emotion, culture, concept

1. Introduction

This paper explores semantic profiles of metaphors and metaphors based on metonymies that pertain to the concepts of ANGER and MADNESS in *The Canterbury Tales*. The study will approach commonly-occurring collocations related to the afore-mentioned concepts and examine them from a cognitive perspective.

To begin with, various understandings of the concept of emotion and the close relationship between it, culture and the language used to express it will be discussed with reference to the ideas of Dźwirek and Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2010;

Kövecses 1995, 2000, 2005, 2006). The concept of ANGER will be illustrated as a conceptualized feeling highly affected by the community, as an emotion whose conceptualization is tightly bound to the values shared by the community. In other words, the study of ANGER reflects a close relationship between emotion and culture. This analysis of ANGER suggests that Medieval society was rather reserved and members preferred not to externalize their emotions.

Secondly, in adopting the ideas represented, among others by Kövecses 1995, 2000, 2005, 2006 and Dźwirek and Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2010, who stress that bodily experience is universal, yet that people do not function in isolation but in a variety of contexts which in turn shape metaphors related to emotions. It will be demonstrated that metaphors are not only influenced by the body, but also by social, cultural contexts and other communicative situations. In other words, the study does not deny the universal nature of the processes of metaphorization, but emphasizes that there are some structures within general metaphors which are more common in some national cultures and less common in others. The study will point to the example of the container metaphor. The container metaphor is one of the most frequent metaphors in the conceptualization of ANGER. Yet depending on the culture, history and personal experience, members of some national cultures may identify themselves more with the full container, while others with the overflowing container. The differences are significant for the general description of the two types of national cultures. The society that is more inclined to the full container is the society that is more reserved as they keep emotions within the walls of their container, thus inside themselves. They try not to give vent to their emotions. This kind of image is associated with Anglo-Saxon culture. The concept of an overflowing container is, on the other hand, connected with the society that is more emotional and open.

Moreover, the paper will reflect on the conceptualization of ANGER and MADNESS with a view to pointing out the link between linguistic and cultural contexts, which always seem to interpenetrate. The analysis will also demonstrate that the two concepts are irreconcilable and are conceptualized via different metaphors based on metonymy.

Furthermore, the idea of the metaphor/metonymy continuum will be applied in the paper because the two tools, namely metaphor and metonymy, should not be perceived as distinct and unconnected mechanisms (Barcelona 2000; Cruse 2004; Radden 2000). In his approach to metaphor and metonymy, Radden (2000) claims that they need not be viewed as two opposite processes:

The traditional distinction between metaphor and metonymy can no longer be maintained. The classical notions of metaphor and metonymy are to be seen as prototypical categories at the end points of a continuum of mapping processes. The range in the middle of the metonymy-metaphor continuum is made up of metonymy-based metaphors, which also account for the transition of metonymy to metaphor by providing an experiential motivation of a metaphor (Radden 2000: 105).

Therefore, metaphor can be motivated metonymically, thereby giving rise to metaphor-based metonymy. In other words, metonymy can be viewed as a conceptual prerequisite for metaphor. One example of metonymy-based metaphor, discussed by Barcelona (2000), is the metonymic motivation of most metaphors for emotions (anger, happiness, love etc.) on the basis of physiological or behavioral responses to emotions. For instance, a physiological effect of emotion that is often metonymized is the Affected Heart Rate, (the heart rate, which is believed to change as a result of a strong emotional impact represents emotion), as in the expression: *his heart stopped when he saw her*.

The analysis takes as its text Caxton's *The Canterbury Tales*: The British Library Copies (ed. by Barbara Bordalejo), a CD-ROM that containing the first full-color facsimiles of all copies of William Caxton's first and second editions of the *Tales*. The translation of all Middle English examples is mine.

2. The analysis of the concept of emotions

The concept of emotion has been the subject of a wide range of investigations and reconsiderations by numerous linguists and philosophers (Bloomfield 1970; Lakoff 1987; Kövecses 1985, 2005, 2006; Dźwirek and Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2010 etc).

According to Bloomfield (1970), emotion as a subject to investigate is somewhat fuzzy and difficult to define:

Emotion as a choice of topic was controversial, because it had been claimed that emotion as a phenomenon cannot be sufficiently well defined for it to become the object of semantic study (Bloomfield 1970: 139).

With the advent of cognitivism, the overall approach to the role of the mind in the perception and conceptualization of the world has changed tremendously, a move which entailed reconsideration of all linguistic concepts including emotions. The link between emotions, language and culture is one such issue, which has provided much fruitful interdisciplinary research.

One of the enigmas linguists deal with lies at the level of the rendition of complexities of emotions via language. Tissari (2003: 140) maintains that language not only provides emotions with names, but it can be used in many ways to express emotions, which in turn is regulated by social norms. Furthermore, Tissari claims that emotions have to be conceptualized via other more concrete and more delineated concepts. In other words, emotions are mostly expressed via metaphors, which assist people in interpreting and understanding their inner selves.

For some linguists (Dźwirek and Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2010, Kövecses 1995, 2000, 2005, 2006), emotions are complex human experiences closely linked to values shared by the community. They see a close relationship between emotion and culture, and view emotion as a conceptualized feeling highly affected by the culture. The impact of culture, defined in terms of a set of understandings embodied in cognitive models (Lakoff 1982) appears to be undeniable. Consequently, emotion is not a concept whose perception would be shared by members of different nations and cultures, but it is a cultural product and a cultural construct. For Dźwirek and Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (2010), there is no one-to-one correspondence between prototypes of emotional categories in various cultures, which means that the apparently equivalent terms evoke different associations for speakers from different cultures. In other words, there appears to be a close link between the language spoken in a community and a perception of emotion, which becomes a social construct highly influenced by the language, culture, and a set of conventions. Hence, the understanding of culture contributes to the understanding of emotion. Nevertheless, Dźwirek and Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (2010) emphasize that the conceptual discrepancies are not irreconcilable and point to the existing *tertium comparationis*, and thus a common field of reference, for emotions across cultures. Despite the undeniable variations, people are able to share experience and to communicate. They maintain that *tertium comparationis* lies in the sphere of cognitive processes rather than in substances. What is shared is not the concept of a particular emotion but the processes of metaphorization and the structuring of linguistic categories due to spatially structured image schemata common to all humans. Similarly, Kövecses (2005: 285) refers to the idea of *tertium comparationis* in the context of emotions. Kövecses discusses the idea of *tertium comparationis* with reference to the metaphor of embodiment. He explains that there is a link between universal bodily experience and the universality of some metaphors. In other words, the universal body is the basis for many conceptual metaphors. Nevertheless, in spite of universal bodily experience, the human body does not function in isolation, but in a variety of contexts, which in turn shape metaphors

related to emotions. Therefore, metaphors are not only influenced by the body, but also by the social, cultural contexts and the communicative situations. Moreover, metaphors are also created by both a history of contexts, which Kövecses views in terms of environment, society, and culture and by the history of an individual:

The mind is equally the product of culture and embodiment, or, even more precisely, the three are likely to have evolved together in mutual interaction with each other (Kövecses 2005: 294).

Hence, though there is some causal link between metaphor and embodiment, it seems that the role of culture, history and personal experience should, by no means, be neglected. According to Kövecses (2005: 293), cognitive processes are universal, but not their applications. Hence, the concept of emotion is strongly linked to and affected by culture.

3. The semantic profile of ANGER

Expressions that pertain to ANGER can be expressed via the following metaphors:

BODY IS A CONTAINER FOR ANGER

ANGER IS FIRE

ANGER IS AN UNWANTED PERSON (personification of anger)

ANGER is frequently conceptualized as a substance in a container, which can be exemplified by the metaphors:

- (1) *He hath grete ire and wrath in himself* (The Tale of Malibee 157)
‘He *had* great anger and wrath *in himself*’
- (2) *He that is irous and wrathfull may not deme well* (The Tale of Malibee 157)
‘He that is angry and *full of wrath* may not judge well’
- (3) *Yen ful of anger and of ire* (The Summoner’s Tale 273)
‘Eyes *full of anger*’
- (4) *litil ire in his herte I laft* (The Reeve’s Prologue 8)
‘I left a *little ire in his heart*’

The concept of the container has been frequently analyzed in literature (Fabiszak 1999; Lakoff 1987; Krzeszowski 1997). Lakoff (1987) stresses that one of our most salient experiences is that of our BODY AS A CONTAINER. Krzeszowski (1997) also refers to the primary experience of the CONTAINER schema, container as a place of safety:

The axiological ambivalence of the schema is grounded in the contradictory values associated with being in or getting out of the original container. On the one hand, we experience getting out of the container as being born and as gaining freedom. On the other hand, getting out of the container may be experienced as leaving the security of the protective confines of the shelter and as being exposed to various external dangers (Krzeszowski 1997: 142).

Consequently, the container is not only a place, where emotions are located, but it is a safe place to store all kinds of emotions. From this perspective, the container image can be related with the propensity not to display emotions. Accordingly, people keep emotions inside themselves. People feel safer if they keep emotions inside the container and do not let it overflow with them. By overexposing themselves, people run the risk of losing a feeling of security and control over one's balanced self. They may lose face and their ability to protect it. The contexts (1-4) indicate that members of Medieval society preferred not to externalize feelings and tried not to be too emotional. In (1), the speaker has great ANGER in himself. In other words, he does not give vent to this emotion, but keeps ANGER inside himself. In (2, 3 and 4), the container image can be said to be full, but not overflowing, thus implying that the particular society does not want to display emotions. Additionally, in (4), the expression *litil ire I laft* 'little ire I left' suggests that the ANGER was controllable to the extent that the person experiencing the emotion allowed a small amount to remain. Secondly, ANGER was conceived as a negative emotion. People tried not to be excessively emotional and not to externalize their emotions. In the analyzed examples, various parts of the body (eyes, heart) or the entire body can be containers for ANGER. The contexts show that ANGER can be great, but nevertheless people can control it. In other words, the elements of security, control and inner balance predominate in the container schema.

ANGER can also be conceptualized via the source domain of fire, which leads to the metaphor ANGER IS FIRE. The contexts below illustrate this kind of mapping:

- (5) *He shal not quenche the fyre of anger and of wrath* (The Parson's Tale 554)
 'He shall not put out the fire of anger and of wrath'
- (6) *He was redy with his yren hoot* (The Miller's Tale 621)
 'He was ready with his hot anger'
- (7) *The cruel ire reed as ony glede* (The Knight's Tale 1139).
 'The cruel ire; red as any live coal'
- (8) *Fyre brennyth me* (The Knight's Tale 154)
 'Fire is burning me'
- (9) *He wext al reed* (The Shipman's Tale 111).
 'He turned red'

According to Kövecses (2000: 113), the concepts of fire and heat are primarily associated with the metaphorical comprehensions of emotions. He claims that such metaphors are characterized by mapping the heat of fire upon the intensity of the situation. It should also be emphasized that emotions conceptualized via fire metaphors tend to come on unexpectedly and often change abruptly. They may also be self-destructive or destructive to others. Consequently, the source of fire is by no means creating a sense of safety and rather closer to invoking a sense of unpredictability, change and anxiety. The contexts above rarely evoke the highly destructive power of ANGER; in fact there is only one context in sentences (5-9) that does, namely context (8). It reflects the mapping of the final stage of fire, hence the process of burning, upon the intensity of ANGER. The process of burning implies the association of unbearable pain, suffering and even torment. Therefore, the person affected by this kind of ANGER is deeply hurt.

For the sake of analysis, context (8) can be juxtaposed with context (5), which also refers to the high temperature of feelings. These two contexts are only apparently similar. Both contexts are not mild with regard to the conceptualized force of fire. In (5), the temperature of ANGER seems also to be high as the person is not able to extinguish it. Nevertheless, this sentence was expressed by the priest during the sermon; hence the discourse was rather artificial and required exaggeration and hyperbole. In other words, it was not the speaker that referred to his subjectively experienced ANGER and a possible mode of dealing with it. Consequently, sentences (5) and (8) should not be classified with the same criteria. In (8), the speaker analyses his ANGER and his subjective perception of this emotion. He is emotional and does not care about losing face. In (5), however, it is not the individual that voices his emotions, but the priest who judges and refers to the emotion experienced by another person. Additionally, he is utilizing hyperbole

and exaggeration. Therefore, though the sentence shows the mapping between the intensity of fire and the power of ANGER, it is not the experiencer of ANGER that created this form of mapping, but the third person standing to his rear and describing the whole situation. Consequently, in the analysis of the link between language, culture and the emotion expressed by the language, sentences like (8) are more informative than sentences exemplified by context (5) as they reflect subjective emotions and subjective ways of expressing these emotions. It shows how the experiencer perceived his ANGER and how he described it linguistically; the sort of mappings he used to understand and express his inner self. In contrast, contexts like (5) are evaluative and judgmental. As has already been stated, context (5) is not informative of the link between language, culture and the emotion expressed by that language because the speaker does not externalize his own emotions. It can, however, be one of the sources that reflect the perception of the society toward ANGER. Thus, ANGER as an emotion was perceived as unwelcome and undesirable. The priest, by saying that the person cannot put out his ANGER, implied that ANGER is a sin and therefore it should be extinguished.

Other contexts evoke ANGER of a lesser degree. Thus, ANGER can be just red (7, 9) or hot (6). Such adjectives are rather mild when juxtaposed with the phenomenon of the burning rampant fire. *Red* refers only to the color of fire, and not to its destructive power. Similarly, the adjective *hot* does not evoke much fear as it is first associated with the concept of heat, which is less threatening, rather than with the concept of fire.

Moreover, these metaphors have a clear metonymic basis, and hence they rely on the metonymic model of the target. They are based on the metonymy PHYSIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF ANGER STAND FOR ANGER, which means that when people are angry, they feel agitated or become red. The red color, however, when juxtaposed with the unpredictable and often dangerous behavior, is further metaphorically associated with fire. Therefore, the metaphor reflects a close interaction with metonymy and should not be classified as pure metaphor.

As has already been mentioned at the beginning of this section, ANGER can also be personified, thereby giving rise to the metaphor ANGER IS AN UNWANTED PERSON. This personification of ANGER is evident in the following contexts:

(10) *When his ire is thus agon* (The Knight's Tale 924)

'When his ire goes away'

(11) *Ire rechles* (The Maniciple's Tale 175)

'reckless ire'

(12) *Thy anger doth me sore smerte* (The Summoner's Tale 384)

'Your anger inflicts me sharp pain'

(13) *Leef thyn ire* (The Summoner's Tale 381)

'Leave your ire'

These contexts are evocative of the personification of ANGER as it becomes endowed with human qualities and traits. ANGER can thus go away (10). The study also shows that ANGER was conceived as unwelcome and unwanted as it could be reckless (11) or inflict pain (12). However, humans can also control ANGER as it is possible to leave ANGER the way one leaves an unwanted or unwelcome person (13).

4. Jäckel (1995) Metaphor of the mind

Jäckel (1995) illustrates a metaphor linked with the rational mind, namely MENTAL ACTIVITY IS PHYSICAL MANIPULATION. Based on a detailed study, his analysis has shown that the most prevalent metaphors for rational thought involve physical manipulation. Thus, the concrete domain connected with physical manipulation is used to refer to the abstract domain of the rational mind, exemplified by such expressions as: to have an *incisive* mind, to *store* ideas, or to *work out*. Jäckel claimed that the manipulation model is deeply entrenched in our mind. According to this metaphor, memory is conceived as a kind of *a storehouse* where ideas are kept; *entities* (ideas) are *stored* in the mind's container where they can be *handled* or *fiddled with*. Hence, ideas can be conceptualized in various ways. They can be *stored* in the mind's *container* or *put into it* by someone. Additionally, the mind can be conceived of as *a storehouse* and also as *a tool* whose usage initiates actions. Yet, mental processes, according to Jäckel (1995: 221), can also be analyzed without recourse to the source domain of manipulation. In his analysis, Jäckel discusses other alternative models that pertain to the domain of intellect, such as IDEAS ARE SELF-PROPELLED ENTITIES (the idea just *came* to him, the thought had *crossed* my mind), THINKING IS A JOURNEY (reason *leads* me to that conclusion), UNDERSTANDING IS EATING (she has an *insatiable* curiosity), UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING (he is very *bright*). The present analysis of the metaphors of MADNESS relies on one of the metaphors analyzed by Jäckel, namely MENTAL ACTIVITY IS PHYSICAL MANIPULATION.

5. The semantic profile of MADNESS

Expressions that pertain to MADNESS can be expressed via the following metaphors:

MADNESS IS TOTALLY OR HALF ABSENT MIND

MADNESS IS A DAMAGED WIT

MADNESS IS A TROUBLEMAKER

MADNESS IS THE DEVIL IN THE CONTAINER

MADNESS can thus be conceptualized as a totally or half-absent mind (the first metaphor), or as a mind, which does not function well. This kind of holistic, uniting approach can be observed in three of the above metaphors, namely MADNESS IS A DAMAGED WIT, MADNESS IS A TROUBLEMAKER and MADNESS IS THE DEVIL IN THE CONTAINER.

In the metaphor of total or partial absence, what can be absent is *mynde*, *hed* or *wit*. Collocations that include *mynde* can be exemplified by the following contexts:

(14) *out of mynde* ‘out of mind’ (The Pardoner’s Tale 166)

(15) *mynde is goon* ‘mind is gone’ (The Summoner’s Tale 362)

(16) *half out of mynde* ‘half out of mind’ (The Prioress Tale 142)

Madness is frequently perceived as either the total absence of mind or the mind existing in a fragmented state. In (14) and (15), there is a complete separation of mind and body. In other words, there is no link between the mind and the body as the body does not receive signals from the mind. Additionally, in (15), there is an implication that the mind disappeared somewhere, while in (16), it is only half of the mind that is outside of the person.

Collocations based on the absent *hed*, or absent *wit* can be exemplified by contexts (17-19):

(17) *lese hed* ‘lose head’ (The Knight’s Tale 357)

(18) *lose wit* ‘lose wit’ (The Wife of Bath’s Tale 1068)

(19) *wit was al away* ‘wit was all away’ (The Franklin’s Tale 275)

All of these expressions (14-19) are based on the metonymy THE PART STANDS FOR THE WHOLE, as *mynde*, *hed*, and *wit* stand for the intellectual human side. The connection between *mynde*, *hed*, *wit* and the individual has been severed. MADNESS is thus conceptualized as the force that overpowers the human and makes him/her act irrationally. MADNESS can thus unexpectedly cut off the connection between the mind of an individual and his/her body. Consequently, because of this lack of connection, the individual acts irrationally, and loses control over his/her behavior. Additionally, he/she cannot put an end to MADNESS as he/she has lost the tool (mind) required to control the behavior.

Structurally, the metaphorical projection of MADNESS IS THE ABSENT MIND is based on the prior metonymy THE PART STANDS FOR THE WHOLE. Likewise, collocations (17-19) are grounded in the same type of metonymy, yet they contain additional information that *wit* or *hed* have been lost. MADNESS is then perceived as the lost object (*hed*, *wit*). Such contexts imply that possessing *wit* may

not be permanent, as one can always lose *wit*. Moreover, this metaphor can also be viewed as part and parcel of a more general metaphor MENTAL ACTIVITY IS PHYSICAL MANIPULATION (Jäckel 1995). Jäckel (1995: 206) indicates that the contexts that centralize the loss of one's *wit* are grounded in the metaphor MENTAL ACTIVITY IS PHYSICAL MANIPULATION. According to Jäckel, self-control can be conceptualized as thus holding the mind as a tool. Therefore, *mynde*, *hed* and *wit* can be considered as storage containers, whereas the total loss of *wit* metaphorically stands for real insanity.

As has already been mentioned, apart from metaphors of complete or partial absence, MADNESS can be also conceptualized as the mind that does not function well (MADNESS IS A DAMAGED WIT, MADNESS IS A TROUBLEMAKER, MADNESS IS THE DEVIL IN THE CONTAINER). MADNESS IS A DAMAGED WIT and MADNESS IS A TROUBLEMAKER are metaphors of personification, whereas MADNESS IS THE DEVIL IN THE CONTAINER evokes the concept of a damaged brain by means of emphasizing the link with the dark, uncontrollable and frightening sphere. In all these conceptualizations, the perception of reality is altered because the mind is absent or distorted. Consequently, a person cannot have control over his/her MADNESS, nor can he/she manipulate it.

The metaphor MADNESS IS A DAMAGED WIT illustrates *wit* as poorly-functioning, which can be illustrated by the collocation – *mad wit*:

(20) *I will not telle goddis pryute*

It suffisith the but yf thy wit be mad

Ye haue as gret a grace as Noe had (The Miller's Tale 372-374)

'I will not say God's secret; It should suffice you; but if your wit is mad; you had such a great grace as Noe had'

In this context *wit* is personified as it is the person, rather than *wit*, than can be described as mad. Moreover, *wit* is damaged; therefore, the individual has no control over his/her MADNESS.

The other metaphor of personification can be MADNESS conceptualized as a troublemaker, which can be exemplified by the context:

(21) *O trouble wit o ire reckless* (The Manciple's Tale 175)

'O troublesome wit, o reckless ire'

Here, *wit* is viewed as the entity that makes people act irrationally and that creates chaos in their lives.

MADNESS can be also conceptualized as a devil in the container, which can be exemplified by the context:

(22) *But natheless, for fere yet he quook*

So was the deuyl in his mynde (The Summoner's Prologue 41)

'But nonetheless for fear he trembled, so was the devil in his mind'

The concept of the Devil was associated with evil, misery, darkness and destructive qualities. The conceptualization of the human mind as a container for the Devil sees a transfer of the devilish qualities upon the human mind. To put it metaphorically, the devil constitutes a super-human force; witty, tricky and cunning. It is believed to be slyer than a human who is bound to lose in any confrontation with the Devil.

6. Conclusions

The juxtaposition of metaphors of ANGER and MADNESS shows that the two concepts are irreconcilable and conceptualized via different metaphors and metaphors based on metonymy. To begin with, ANGER is an emotion highly affected by context culture, whereas MADNESS is not a cultural construct, but is caused by neuronal disorders.

A closer look at the conceptualization of ANGER reflects a close relationship between emotion, culture and the language spoken in a community. According to Kövecses (2005: 285), despite universal bodily experience, humans do not function in isolation, but in a variety of contexts, which shape metaphors related to emotions. Therefore, metaphors are not only influenced by the body, but also by social, cultural contexts and communicative situations. Moreover, metaphors are also created by both a history of contexts, which Kövecses views in terms of environment, society and culture, and by the history of an individual. Consequently, despite the universality of some metaphors, it seems that the role of culture, history and personal experience should, by no means, be neglected. Therefore, though the processes of metaphorization are common to all humans, there are some structures within the more general metaphors which are more common for some national cultures than for others. The analysis of the metaphors of ANGER in the corpus has shown that Medieval society was rather reserved and preferred not to externalize emotions. They didn't wish to overexpose themselves too much. Consequently, ANGER was frequently conceptualized through the substance in a container metaphor. The concept of a container suggests the feeling of safety. Moreover, the image of a container metaphor recorded in the collocations is that of a full container, and not of an overflowing container. In other words, ANGER is kept within the walls of the container, thus within the speakers. Its tension is not so high as to cause it to overflow the container. The image of a society that evolves is the society that does not externalize emotions. Furthermore, ANGER appears to be

an emotion that was unwelcome, and to a large extent controlled by a human. Such an image is reflected in phrases *leef thyn ire* 'leave your ire', *a litil ire in his herte* *I laft* 'I left a little anger in his heart', or *quenche the fyre of anger* 'put out the fire of anger'. ANGER is also conceptualized via the source domain of fire to refer to the destructive character of ANGER. Nevertheless, the illustrated metaphors were somewhat mild and did not express excessively destructive power (e.g., hot, red), or they were expressed by the priest during a sermon, thereby requiring exaggeration and hyperbole. In the analyzed corpus, there were no collocations represented an excess of ANGER. Moreover, ANGER was perceived as a negative and undesirable emotion.

As for the structuring of ANGER, it is conceptualized via metaphors based on metonymy – THE PHYSIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF ANGER STAND FOR ANGER.

Contrary to ANGER, MADNESS was conceptualized via metaphors based on metonymies THE PART STANDS FOR THE WHOLE. So MADNESS appears to be visualized as the loss of a rational, logical tool (*wit, hed*) or in terms of partial or complete separation of the mind from the body. Unlike ANGER, which can be frequently controlled by the experiencer, and which is of limited duration, MADNESS controls the human due to the lack of a proper connection between mind and body. The individual cannot manipulate his/her MADNESS in the same way he/she can manipulate his/her emotions. The individual cannot end his/her MADNESS in the same manner as he/she can put an end to ANGER.

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