

## The Theories of Meaning and Some Reasons for Combining Them in Stainton's Philosophy of Language\*

### *Stainton Açısından Dil Felsefesindeki Anlam Kuramları ve Bunların Uzlaştırılması*

MUSTAFA YEŞİL

*Necmettin Erbakan University*

Received: 05.05.16 | Accepted: 20.06.16

**Abstract:** Stainton mentions there are three different meaning theories giving directions to the linguistic studies and claims none of them can fit well with actual linguistic practice as a whole. As a matter of course, what prompts him to this criticism is that he identifies some strong reasons to combine the theories of meaning. What we try to do here is to classify some basic reasons he focuses on and discuss how his theory works both in terms of explaining what a language, linguistic item, meaning are and in terms of describing the ontological diversity that linguistics relates to.

**Keywords:** Language, philosophy of language, linguistic item, linguistic practice, theories of meaning.

\* This research was supported by TUBITAK (The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey, Programme - 2214/A).



## Introduction

Stainton defines language as a system of symbols which we know and use. When we scrutinize his perspective on language in depth, we realize that definition has an important consistency for both seeing what he wants to do and doing philosophy of language. It seems to me that what the main thing that determines his views on language is his judgements on meaning theories. Stainton says there are three different kinds of meaning theories and claims each one of them cannot itself explain all aspects of a language. Since each theory is not sufficient to illustrate language as a whole, he emphasizes the importance of combining the mentioned theories with reasonable grounds. Instead of explaining each theory here in detail, we will give some brief explanations about what a language, linguistic item and meaning are for each theory. As a matter of fact, this attempt will describe not only what the meaning theories are but also what the ontological gap between them is.

### 1. The Theories of Meaning and the Ontological Gap between Them

Stainton firstly treats *the thing theory of meaning* in terms of describing the system perspective of language and explains what the language treated in this theory is from Frege's (1892, 1918) and Wittgenstein's (1922) philosophical point of view. Because, they, as the key figures of this period, consider language like an algebra working perfectly with its axioms and a model capturing the logical relations among natural language sentences. For Stainton, what they want to tell with this analogy is to draw attention to the fact that language has two kinds of structure as syntactic and semantic that their rules will make language work well like algebra. That is, while syntax describes how minimal parts of sentence are put together into complex whole, semantics gives an account of what each minimal part means and how the meaning relations between minimal parts and whole sentence are combined. In short, the language the thing theory of meaning deals with is an abstract collection of syntactic and semantic rules (Stainton, 2010: 348, 2011: 522, 2006: 916).

As consequence of the mentioned conditions above, the linguistic items system theorists treat like numbers, words, phrases and sentences exist independently of use and users. In other words, they are abstract



types outside the physical world. Stainton gives the example of the novel 'war and peace' to be able to describe the abstractness of types (Stainton, 2010: 348-349). Namely, even if there are thousands of books telling the novel, the novel itself doesn't have a concrete existence. I think giving an example related to numbers will more clearly illustrate the abstract existence of linguistic types. Because, though numbers are written using ink on paper, there is no concrete number in reality. But the mentioned abstract linguistic items enable people performing the mathematical and logical processes like 'two plus two equals four'.

Except Russell who claims the meaning of a logically proper name is the thing out there which the mentioned name stands for -like the meaning of 'al-Khwarizmi' is the scholar who founded algebra-, system theorists treating the thing theory of meaning take also meanings to be abstract things just as what a language and linguistic items are. That is, they are sets of properties, sets of possible worlds and functions from two truth values to one truth value (Stainton, 2010: 349). Stainton, at this point, talks about Frege's revolution on logic and philosophy of language that suggests theorists looking firstly at complete sentences. That is to say, the minimal parts of sentence should firstly be separated into different semantic parts, and then whether or not each minimal part contains the sense of the referent should be checked one by one. Here the senses and propositions system theorist treats are the truth relevant abstract entities, not the mental images or ideas (Stainton, 2011: 528, 2010: 351).

Now we need to inquire into what a language, linguistic item and meaning are to detail what the structure of the second meaning theory we are discussing is. Though Stainton doesn't describe what a language is in detail for this theory, it is easy to understand what it is from his point of view. This is because the mentalists who adopt *the idea theory of meaning* consider language as the vehicle of thought. Indeed this depiction is a reflection of the deep discussion that treats whether or not language determines thought and vice versa (Stainton, 1996: 2-3). For instance, Fodor (1975) claims each human has a mental language called *mentalese* that consists of strings of words rather than mental pictures. As a matter of course, it is possible to increase the examples related to this. But what the important thing here for Stainton is that the viability of language



depends on whether or not there are mental images, intentions and strings of words. Namely, language, for idea theory of meaning, is a mental structure (Stainton, 1996: 117-118).

To what linguistic items are for idea theory of meaning, they are expressive of ideas. In other words, linguistic items are meaningful if and only if they correspond to mental images, intentions and strings of mental words. Since mental images or copies of impressions are assigned to words and sentences, humans can meaningfully use sound patterns. For Stainton, this approach actually means that if there are no mental image, intention and string of word, no linguistic item or sound pattern will correspond to such mental entities to be meaningful. In a nutshell, linguistic items, for idea theory of meaning, are sound patterns that their contentfulness depend on whether there are mental entities or not (Stainton, 2011: 527, 1996: 100).

As is evident from its name, for idea theory of meaning, what the linguistic items refer to are mental images, ideas, copies of impressions, remembered sensations, intentions or strings of mental words (Stainton, 1996: 196). In which case, meaning of a linguistic item is what one mentally grasps. For instance, though one doesn't currently see any table, he can flawlessly understand the word 'table'. Because, what the thing giving the meaning to this word are the mental images or copies of impressions associated with the previous experiences. Just as mentalists claim, the word 'red' corresponds to the internal sensation of redness rather than to external red things. On that sense, what one mentalist approves as meaning is what he means to mentally refer or grasp (Stainton, 2014: 2, 1996: 30).

Stainton, from *the use theory of meaning*, describes language as a socio-cultural activity and claims language has many kinds of usages. In fact, what he means by saying language is used in a multiple way is to demonstrate that it is relevant to human action, thought and culture. What's more is that people don't merely use language to describe the world. So, although some system theorists focus on descriptive statements with the intention of purifying the language of science, language is a larger activity area than what they really concentrate on. As a matter of fact, that many actions like asking question, giving order, making bet and promising are



performed in a language clearly lays language's card on the table as a human activity which has many kinds of usages (Stainton, 1996: 151-156, 2010: 349).

As to what linguistic items are for use theory of meaning, they are tools in which spatiotemporally located speech acts are performed. For Stainton, one might reasonably complain saying that 'we don't need to know all the formal complexity and abstractness included in the thing theory of meaning to be able to learn about what the standing meanings of its linguistic items are'. Along the same line, one may fairly enter a protest saying that 'we don't need to be familiar with all the individuality and indeterminacy contained in the idea theory of meaning to be able to grasp the mental meanings of its linguistic items'. For us, what the mentioned different attitudes tell us is that each meaning theory uses the linguistic utterances with various purposes (Stainton, 2014: 2, 2011: 529). By all means, it is not possible for a linguist who treats only either descriptive statement in terms of being abstract or sensation word in terms of being mental to tolerate what use theorist physically performs to be a speech act (Stainton, 1996: 156).

For Stainton, the meanings contained in the use theory are the uses and actions performed linguistically by humans. That is to say, they are neither abstract objects such as mathematical functions and sets of possible worlds nor mental images, intentions or strings of mental words. The mentioned meanings can be taken as language-games, speech acts and general directions. In addition to this, Stainton says the thing that determines the meaning here is community use rather than individual use. Briefly stated, the meaningfulness in this theory is included in the way humans use linguistic utterances and the actions humans perform in language. That is, when someone grasps a meaning, he principally grasps the way in which linguistic usage or action is performed. Just as someone who is said 'thank you' understands how it is used and performed, for what purposes and in what circumstances (Stainton, 2010: 349, 1996: 30).

As is seen, all the three meaning theories explained above disagree about what a language, linguistic item and meaning are. That is to say, like they may differently treat language as an abstract collection of formal rules, a vehicle of thought or a socio-cultural activity, they may differently



treat what a linguistic item and meaning are as an abstract, mental or concrete structure. Stainton draws attention to this deep discrepancy as an *ontological gap* between the theories of meaning and explains about what the thing that should be done to be able to consider the structure of language as a whole. Because, though each theory depends on some reasons like clarifying the science of language, efficient transfer of feelings and effective communication, each of them cannot itself represent the whole language. For instance, linguistic types are abstract entities existing in space and time, but they cannot themselves cause utterances. In a similar way, like no collection of utterances can constitute a type, individual and indeterminate feelings in the mind cannot represent a systematic structure (Stainton, 2010: 351). In this case, the thing we should do is to present some other obstacles of meaning theories described by Stainton and then explain about how his combining theory works.

## 2. Restriction of Relation between Linguistic Items and Their Meanings

From Stainton's point of view, *the restriction of relation between linguistic items and their meanings* can be taken as an important obstacle relevant to the theories of meaning. As a matter of fact, though each theory might have some obstacles irrelevant to others, what the mentioned restriction tells us is that when only one theory is taken into consideration, it is not possible to associate all the linguistic items with corresponding meanings. Now we need to scrutinize whether or not this claim is valid for each meaning theory.

For thing theory of meaning, what the mentioned relation proves is that it is not possible all the linguistic items to be associated with external object. Even if some linguistic items can be connected with some external things like objects or truth values to be their meanings, since there are unlimited numbers of expressions in language, there will be no correspondence between some linguistic items and meanings. Stainton gives the examples of 'hello' and 'but' to be able to give an account of the relation in question. That is to say, even if the given expressions are meaningfully used in language, they cannot definitely be associated with truth values as their meanings. In short, from the thing theory of meaning which links linguistic items with their abstract meanings like truth value



and function, it is not possible to account for all the expressions included in a language (Stainton, 1996: 198-199).

Stainton also states it is not possible all the linguistic items to connect with their meanings like internal images, copies of impressions and intentions. Even if claimed some linguistic items get their meanings from mental images, how some words like 'the', 'seven', 'from' etc. connect with their internal images or intentions and what their mental images are is a big problem for some variants of idea theory of meaning (Stainton, 1996: 101). What is more, because internal images and intentions are too specific, sound patterns might be connected with very different kind of possible meanings on request. Just as this approach is not sufficient to match all the sound patterns in language with mental images or intentions, it's strict individuality and indeterminacy is a threat both for sociality and knowledge of language.

As we said before, for use theory of meaning, the meaning of an utterance is determined by how it is conventionally used, and since there are lots of different conventional usages, there are many distinctive meanings. This means that it is possible for a use theorist to connect utterances with language-games, speech acts and general directions. Since what the thing that determines the usage here is conventional use rather than individual, words, phrases and sentences already have standing meanings. As it is, what the thing we should do ask here is whether or not standing meaning conventionally determines the use of language as a whole. Namely, if conventional linguistic meaning completely determines the usage of language, how do we explain the role of speaker in terms of using language? Or, are what the things that refer conventional linguistic expressions rather than people? Stainton considers language as a tool with which a certain activity is performed and claims humans may say one thing but mean different thing using this tool in some cases. He gives the example 'Mr. x has very neat handwriting' to clarify what he wants to explain. In fact, he with that sentence he has used in a reference letter wants to tell that Mr. x is incompetent as a student. Namely, the man who has intentionally written that sentence also intends the meaning of the sentence. For Stainton, just as one speaker may individually mean something by a word or sentence that it doesn't conventionally mean, he



may also use an expression to refer to the things which the expression itself doesn't refer to (Stainton, 1996: 184). That the mental images, intentions and so on individually determine the usage clearly shows us that even if conventional meaning determines the general structure of language, linguistic usage appears to be generally conventional, not entirely. What's more is that since what use theorists mean with usage is the activities or behaviours humans conventionally perform, it is not possible for use theory of meaning to cover all the usages in language.

At this point, what the restriction of relation between linguistic items and their meanings reveals is that each one of the mentioned meaning theories cannot itself describe all the aspects of a language. In fact, that each theory works well for different kind of expressions clearly confirms the conclusion we have mentioned above. That is to say, while the thing theory of meaning works well using proper names and definite descriptions; the idea theory works well in terms of explaining the sensation words; and the use theory works well for indexicals like 'this', 'here', 'there', 'I', 'you' as pointing terms (Stainton, 1996: 151). As Stainton states, what this conclusion explicitly elicits is the importance of combining the meaning theories to be able to make language work well.

### 3. The Diversity of Ontological Categories That Linguistics Relates to

From Stainton's point of view, *the diversity of ontological categories that linguistics relates to* can also be taken as an important reason to combine the meaning theories. Because according to his claim, although Platonism, mentalism and physicalism dominate the ontological categories related to linguistics, nevertheless, they are individually insufficient to illustrate the objects of study in linguistics. That is to say, even if they bring one or more issues to forefront, none of them can fit well with actual linguistic practice as a whole. As a matter of course, it is not difficult to see how the mentioned three traditions roughly correspond to the theories of meaning in terms of regarding what a language, linguistic item and meaning are. But, we need to explain what he means with the diversity of ontological categories that linguistics relates to be able to detail his reasons for combining the theories of meaning.

Stainton states that the language humans speak in a community is by





equal measures abstract, mental, physical and social thing. Just after laying emphasis on abstractness of some concepts or processes like 'two plus two equals four', 'sets of possible worlds', 'truth values', 'functions' and so on, he states the word 'abstract' has traditionally two very different usages in linguistics. No doubt, the elements contained in the first usage are Platonic objects like numbers and other logical-mathematical things. For Stainton, what distinguishes them from others is that they have existence independently of physical world and human activity. On the other hand, the second kind of abstractness that linguistics relates to depends on physical world and human activity. Namely, the abstract concepts embodied in this usage like 'The Silk Road', 'The Gallipoli Strait', and 'The Middle East' are the human made abstract structures constituted by physical, mental and social relations.

Mental issues that linguistics relates to is another ontological category Stainton wants to draw attention to. He mentions the term 'mental' is also used in two different senses. The expressions included in the first usage represent or refer to some states in the mind like emotion, pain, dream, hallucination, tickle and so on (Stainton, 2014: 6, 2011: 528). In fact, even if some philosophers claim they can physically be reduced to neural states and explained, from Stainton's point of view, the mental states in question are included in the ontological category that linguistics relates to in any case. To the second usage, it represents the historical background related to mental states. Namely, what the previous philosophers try to describe is whether internal sensations or external things determine the meanings of words in language. By all means, in this context, what the things giving the meanings to the words in language are the mental images or copies of impressions associated with the previous experiences. Just as someone claims the word 'red' gets its meaning from internal sensation of redness rather than external red things. For Stainton, even that words have usages is an enough reason to insert this category in linguistic ontology.

As in the previous two explanations, Stainton mentions that the term 'physical' is used in two senses. For him, the first usage contains the objects quantified by sciences like physics and chemistry. Namely, this means that what such a science can 'see' is physical. For instance, the man



who can physically see a particular rock can use the word 'rock' to refer to the rock. On the other hand, what about the words of odours, tastes, blues? Do they refer to physical things or other things? For Stainton, if we regarded the first usage to be a unique criterion, many objects related to everyday experience would not be physical things. Because, even if scientists say the wave function, loop quantum and etc. are real things, they are not considered physical things in everyday sense. Stainton says some philosophers like Quine have tried to restrict the scope of linguistics to observable behaviors, namely, behaviorism. No wonder, what this apprehension focuses on is putting to brakes on alleged mental processes and meanings afloat in the third realm that may determine the science. But, for Stainton, the scope of language being a tool with which a certain activity is performed is larger than the field of language that its evidence base is restricted to only observational behaviors.

Since social activity area gives humans an opportunity for both using language and producing new concepts, Stainton considers this scope to be another ontological category that linguistics relates to. He gives the examples of performatives like 'I promise', 'I swear' and phatic expressions like 'hello', 'by', 'hey' to be able to explain the issue better. This is because these linguistic expressions and so on are used both for structuring social interactions and representing them rather than giving an information or proposition about physical things. In other words, what one who learns the meanings of the mentioned expressions learns are the social conditions in which certain speech activities are performed. What's more is that it is not possible to embed some words of complex social entities like 'mortgages', 'Bollywood', 'Tuesday' and so on in language without taking into account the social structure (Stainton, 2011: 529). Here another issue Stainton raises concern about is the existence of social norms that determine the criteria between right and wrong use of language. In short, social activity area is not an ontological category that can be neglected in linguistics.

#### 4. My Argument to Combine the Theories of Meaning

*Premise I.* If there is a relation between mind and language, then there is a relation between mind and knowledge.



**Premise II.** There is a relation between mind and language.

**Conclusion C.** There is a relation between mind and knowledge.

When we consider the three different meaning theories mentioned above, the most important thing we realize is that the thing and use theorists want to escape from treating mental issues in their structural explanations. Although these theorists try to avoid mental issues, we don't think they are completely successful in terms of doing something like that. Namely, we claim that not only one theory but also others relate to mental structures in terms of containing the relation between mind and language.

After saying what we call as mind is the brain being able to do different kinds of abstract activities, we need to explain ontologically the relation between mind and language. We know Stainton has mentioned the diversity of ontological categories that linguistics relates to as "abstract", "mental" and "physical". When we look at the abstract categories that system theorists relate to, we see two different kinds of abstract entities existing in the structure of language. While the first of them looks like Platonic entities like 'numbers', 'sets', 'truth values' and so on, existing independently of physical world and human activity, the second kind of them is the human-made abstract concepts like 'The Silk Road', 'The Gallipoli Strait', 'The Middle East' and so on constituted by physical, mental and social relations. We know that many of the philosophers say there are no abstract entities like Plato and Frege claim. Furthermore, even if they have existence independently of physical world and human activity, they should have objectively reduced to mind. On the other hand, as al-Fârâbî says, we think there are no truth and falsity in isolation independently of human mental activity. Namely, since there are no truth and falsity in the nature; we obtain them depending on our mental activities. To the second kind of abstract concepts that system theorists relate to, although their existence depends on the physical entities, they have abstract existence in mind in terms of enabling to the thinking process.

For Stainton who says there are two different linguistic points of view on mental issues, it is not possible for individual and indeterminate feelings in mind to make a systematic linguistic structure (Stainton, 2010: 351). Namely, we use some concepts in a language community to refer to



the mental situations, but we very well know the concepts we use can't totally represent what we really think and feel. That mental contents like emotion, pain, dream, etc. are too individual and complex to determine a structure for the knowledge of language doesn't mean there is no relation between mind and language. Because, in spite of the mentioned individuality and complexity, we the humans use language to tell what we think, feel, intent, and so on.

The last ontological category that linguistics relates to is interested in physical area. From Stainton's point of view, we need to add not only what we physically see, touch, smell, taste, etc. but also linguistic behaviours and social activities we observe to this category. We know some philosophers like Russell have tendency to consider meaning as a physical thing the name speaker uses stands for. Russell's theory seems to work from a logical point of proper names. We very well know that we humans can use a word or proper name to be able to refer directly to a physical thing like 'the' man, rock, building and so on. But, we claim that it is not possible for the physical thing we directly refer to to be considered as meaning. Because, the physical thing we directly refer to is not a meaning, but is the physical thing existing out there. In other words, what an individual reference refers to is who a unique person is or what an individual experiment, action, etc. is. Even if we don't accept the physical thing existing out there as meaning, that language is logically used in this context to refer to an individual physical thing may show us there is a relation between mind and language in terms of including intentional usage.

In fact, what we want to focus on here is the generalities that scientific and linguistic structures depend on. It is clear that all of the scientific areas like physics, biology and chemistry owe their own abstract existence to the generalities. We know that language is a structure representing us the generalities or categories that scientific areas need to. In fact, what the real discover or designer of these generalities or categories is the human mind giving existence to the language. As a result, that all of the ontological categories linguistics relates to contain a relation between mind and language can be taken as an important reason to combine the theories of meaning.

That there is a relation between mind and knowledge is another rea-



son to combine the theories of meaning. We will try to explain what we mean with this reason considering al-Fârâbî's point of view. He claims that human mind (brain) has three different parts or levels in terms of having functionality to achieve knowledge. That is to say, while the first part performs the actions of memorization and recalling, the second part does the action of imagination. As for the third part, it practises the thinking activity (al-Fârâbî, 1995: 85-89). Both of the second and third parts can take the content they need from the first part. But, the second part doesn't check whether its imagination and content is true or false. Namely, although the ability of imagination here takes its content from five sense organs to act with and can make some new extra imaginations produced from this content or sense data, the only thing it does here is mental activities.

We know many philosophers like Frege and Russell criticize Locke and the other members of the mentalist tradition for their language and meaning theories. I think the critics here are really right, because mental ideas in that sense are too indeterminate and individual for language and meaning theories. When we look at al-Fârâbî's papers on this issue, we see that the ability of imagination in human as a second epistemological level is not appropriate to form a scientific picture. Al-Fârâbî clearly says that any knowledge system can't be structured from this second epistemological level.

To the third epistemological level, al-Fârâbî considers it as the thinking ability that human has. For him, that this ability checks the truth values of the propositions it treats differentiates its content from mental imaginations. The main principles of all sciences are the production of this epistemological level. Namely, knowledge of language, logic, physics, etc. as systematic structures are represented by the thinking ability that human naturally has. We know that our minds are the main operators arranging our behaviours, categorizing the individual actions and situations we see, suggesting us to purify the scientific language, allowing the speech we intent to do and so on. Furthermore, considering mind as a multi-sided structure doesn't mean knowledge of all sciences is full of ideas or mental imaginations.

Some philosophers with their extreme critics may ignore the perfect



thinking ability that differentiates human from other living beings or the ability of imagination that makes us individual with our own world. For instance, some behaviourists concentrate on observation area for the sake of objectivity and then grow a tendency to deny the role of mind in terms of explaining the knowledge of language. Al-Fârâbî says the knowledge of language as a structure is arranged by the grammarians, poets, etc. who live in that language community. Even if this structure is based on the thinking ability included in the third part of the brain, its grammatical rules like “the knowledge of simple words”, “the knowledge of rules concerning to the compound words”, etc. may change from one community to another. That is to say, grammatical rules of language in a community are not in universal character like the principle of logic, physics, chemistry, and so on. For al-Fârâbî, this doesn’t mean that there isn’t knowledge of language. In addition to that, al-Fârâbî doesn’t accept the idea of innate knowledge of language (Brook and Stainton, 2000: 49), but claims that human has some innate capacities to learn and use language. He also claims that all languages share semantically (not in word and syntactic level) the subject-predicate structure and then regards this ground as the fundamental area for both linguistics and logic (Türker, 2007: 212). As a result, what al-Fârâbî says here is that human mind not only categorizes what is seen, touched, heard, etc. but also structures the language and knowledge human has.

Stainton says that knowledge of (a public) language is not necessary for communication (Stainton, 2016: 9). That is right, we know that many people in each community speak their languages without knowing the rules of grammar included in them. On the other hand, many people who know the rules of a different language they want to speak can’t speak very well. Even if what is theoretically wanted for this issue is to combine the knowledge-that and knowledge-how, it isn’t possible for each speaker. But, we can easily see here the role of mind in two different ways in terms of propositionally knowing-that and habitually knowing-how. We don’t surely claim that knowing habitually how to speak means having the knowledge of language consciously as a system of symbols. What we want to say here is that mind has many different kinds of roles related to language and knowledge, and that doesn’t require what mind represents to



be totally ideas and imaginations. As my argument says, there is an “intrinsic relation” between mind and knowledge.

### Conclusion

For Stainton, that each one of the meaning theories are individually not sufficient to contain all the ontological categories that linguistics relates to is a strong reason for combining them. But, we need to pay attention to that what Stainton tries to combine are certainly not ontologies, but the meaning theories giving directions to the linguistic studies. So how is he doing that? Stainton firstly lays emphasis on the deep relevance between psychology and philosophy of language and then, tunes in combining the theories of meaning. Namely, according to his claim, since there is a connection between human mind and language, psychology and philosophy of language are directly related to each other. What's more is that the relevance of psychology doesn't require that language be full of ideas.

The psychological processes involved in human reasoning show Stainton how to combine the mentioned meaning theories. He reawakens his distinctive definition of language and thus installs a combination between them. That is to say, what the definition 'language is a system of symbols which we know and use' tells us is that there is an abstract system; we humans mentally represent of the rules in it; this shared knowledge enables to install a combination between the abstract and physical sides of language. No doubt, what the most important thing this attempt does is to establish a link between the ontological gaps. For Stainton, the primary component that enables to this combination is the human mind/brain. Because, it both shapes -from physical, mental and relations of humans- the knowledge of language to be abstract system and stores its rules. Moreover, these rules are important both in terms of showing how human mind works with acoustic waves and in terms of describing how language is recursively used and learned.

### References

Al-Farabi (1995). *Ara Abl al-Madina al-Fadila* (ed. Ali uû Mulhim). Beyrut: Dar wa Maktaba al-Hilal.



- Brook, A. & Stainton, R. J. (2000). *Knowledge and Mind*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Stainton, R. J. (1996). *Philosophical Perspectives on Language*. Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press.
- Stainton, R. J. (2006). Meaning and Reference: Some Chomskyan Themes. *Handbook of Philosophy of Language* (eds. E. Lepore & B. Smith). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 913-940.
- Stainton, R. J. (2010). Philosophy of Language. *The Pragmatics Encyclopedia* (ed. L. Cummings). London: Routledge, 348-353.
- Stainton, R. J. (2011). The Role of Psychology in The Philosophy of Language. *Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language* (eds. D. G. Fara & G. Russell). London: Routledge, 525-532.
- Stainton, R. J. (2014). Philosophy of Linguistics. *Oxford Handbooks Online* (ed. S. Goldberg). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1-17.
- Stainton, R. J. (2016). A Deranged Argument against Public Languages. *Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy*, 59 (1), 6-32.
- Türker, S. (2007). The Arabico-Islamic Background of al-Farabi's Logic. *History and Philosophy of Logic*, 28 (3), 183-255.

**Öz:** Stainton dilbilim çalışmalarına yön veren üç farklı anlam kuramının mevcudiyetinden bahsetmekte ve bu kuramlardan hiç birisinin dilbilimsel uygulamayı bir bütün olarak ifade edemeyeceğini iddia etmektedir. Aslında onu bu türden bir eleştiri sürecine yönelten şey anlam kuramlarını uzlaştırmaya yönelik bazı kuvvetli gerekçeler ortaya koymasıdır. Bu çalışmada yapmak istediğimiz şey Stainton'ın yoğunlaştığı bazı gerekçeleri tasnif etmek ve onun kuramının işlev biçimini hem dilin, dilbilimsel aygıtın ve anlamın ne olduğunu izah etme bakımından hem de dilbilimin konu edindiği ontolojik çeşitliliğin tasviri bakımından sorgulamaktır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Dil, dil felsefesi, dilbilimsel aygıt, dilbilimsel uygulama, anlam kuramları.

