

### Evaluation of the MSAG/IPSTC train-the-trainer project in physical security and stockpile management

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# **Evaluation of the MSAG/IPSTC train-the-trainer project in physical security and stockpile management**

**Claudia Breitung**

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## SUMMARY

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There are still large deficiencies in small arms and light weapons (SALW) and conventional ammunition (CA) storage and management in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and bordering states. Particularly state capacities to plan and implement physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) interventions remain limited. Addressing these capacity shortfalls, the Multinational Small Arms and Ammunition Group (MSAG, with Germany as the lead nation), in collaboration with the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) in Nairobi, has implemented a PSSM train-the-trainer project since 2014. This report provides an overview of the project's achievements and challenges, and gives recommendations on the way forward to enhance PSSM capacity in the region. The information provided is mostly drawn from interviews with training participants.

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## Main findings

### Capacity-building positively influences PSSM practices in target countries

This evaluation finds that the following outcomes (outcomes can be understood as the shifts in institutional behaviour and knowledge because of the project) have resulted from the project: trainers (to varying degrees) have gained more knowledge in PSSM, and the capacity of each trainer to conduct PSSM trainings has improved significantly. All instructors report a positive shift in confidence, which affects their ability to conduct PSSM trainings. The trainers have also started to integrate the learned principles, skills, and knowledge into their daily work. While some also report success in implementing training content in their home countries, large-scale improvements are the exception due to limited funding in the beneficiary countries. Instructors face particular challenges of implementing what they have learned in countries that are currently in crisis mode (e.g. South Sudan and Burundi). Due to the external circumstances in these states, a large share of the course content is, not immediately applicable.

### The emphasis on didactics and the practical orientation of the course positively affect project outcomes

Almost all trainers confirm in the interviews that the acquired knowledge has been very relevant to them (even though they might not be able to instantly implement what was learned due to e.g. funding restrictions). Trainers as well as course participants in particular appreciate the practical orientation of the train-the-trainer project. The visits to ammunition depots, a major element of the curriculum, bring in practicality to the course and boost training morale and understanding of best PSSM practices. Moreover, most trainers now feel more confident to speak in front of a class, and this is directly related to the course components dealing with didactics (teaching course participants how to deliver lessons on PSSM).

### Military-to-military instruction is a key factor for training success

The project highly benefitted from multi-donor representation in the MSAG forum. Though informal and voluntary in nature, MSAG not only offered a suitable template to coordinate and advocate for donor engagement in the train-the-trainer project but also helped to bring in military expertise from various countries. The project has seen a positive and constructive relationship between MSAG trainers and African instructors. The fact that participants and trainers all have a military background brings in mutual understanding, trust and respect, and is a key factor for training success.

### The selection of target countries did not follow security- or needs-based criteria

The selection of countries to benefit from the training relied on voluntary feedback from Eastern African Standby Force (EASF) member states. It hence neither followed security- nor needs-based criteria. Because of this, relatively stable countries with small national stockpiles are represented in the trainer cohort (e.g. Seychelles) while states that have pressing needs to improve their storage facilities and management and are at high risk of terrorism (e.g. Somalia) have not put forward staff for the current trainer group. Additionally, variances in the countries' personnel structures and sizes have not yet guided the selection of trainers and participants.

### Lack of active support from superiors limits the implementation of principles learned

Some commanders in the beneficiary countries lack technical PSSM understanding. They provide limited active support and only infrequently act upon recommendations given by the PSSM instructors. This lack of support from superiors is reflected, for instance, in the fact that trainers, at times, report being shifted from their duty stations to other units after

having been instructed to become PSSM trainers. These changes in staffing of the armed forces targeted for training has drawn away PSSM training capacity.

### **Funding challenges negatively impact on project outcomes**

The limited funding for PSSM in the target countries is one of the most important factors that negatively affect implementation of PSSM in the beneficiary countries. Although instructors are keen to implement what they have learned and—in most cases—actively approach their superiors on PSSM matters, they usually face enormous funding challenges, which prohibit any further large-scale PSSM interventions. Countries at crisis in particular (e.g. South Sudan and Burundi) have limited resources for PSSM activities.

### **PSSM capacity building activities require clear monitoring arrangements**

The lack of a comprehensive project document (generated at project start) means that the project neither has key performance indicators nor well-documented projected goals and outputs that can be monitored over time. This has significantly hampered the evaluation of project impact and outcomes. Here, the project misses out on an important factor, namely learning from experience. Setting clear monitoring standards upon project initiation would have been an important tool to reveal mistakes, showcasing the project's success and offering paths for learning and improvements.

## Recommendations for future programming

Based on the above-mentioned challenges and success factors, the evaluation provides specific *recommendations* as they relate to the project context and project design and outcomes.

### **Continue with the chosen teaching approach and methods as they have proven to be effective.**

The course has been very successful in supporting instructors to become trainers and to address students in a class. The course should, where possible, react to the variance in trainers' knowledge levels and ensure that the course material and content are well aligned to the instructor's level of expertise. As instructors and participants highly appreciate the practical elements of the training, more practical lessons should be included in the PSSM seminars.

### **To enhance the project's footprint it should be accompanied by resources to improve physical security and stockpile infrastructure in the beneficiary countries.**

A first step in better connecting the project's capacity-building measures with activities directly aiming at improving security and storage infrastructure and management will be to initiate dialogue with national governments to assess the *status quo* of PSSM (including an assessment of donor assistance already provided) and identify connected resource requirements. Such discussions could be part of a discourse over broader lifecycle management for weapons and ammunition based on the ISACS/IATG, which would help in conducting longer forecasts for resource requirements.

### **To improve the project's coordination with other donor and government activities, more information and dialogue are needed**

The project will need to obtain more information on the status quo of PSSM in each country and engage in dialogue with the stakeholders that are already providing funding in this area. The trained instructors can be utilised as first contact points by the actor/agency that is to conduct future PSSM assessments. In order to avoid duplication of activities, existing PSSM assessment reports (by other stakeholders) have to be considered in the analysis. concept of

post-conflict needs to be broadened to include those situations that continues to experience significant levels of violence. In order to analyse and respond adequately to protracted conflict situations, it is necessary to overcome the classical division between pre-, actual, and post-conflict situations and recognise the cyclical re-emergence of conflict.

### **To counteract misperceptions about potential achievements and outcomes in the target countries, outline the project's limitations in crisis countries**

(e.g. in future project documentation). This point should also be well communicated to the instructors. As per design, the project largely provides guidance for security and stockpile management activities to be undertaken in post- or non-conflict environments. However, in order to improve the project's relevance for crisis contexts, the project may consider integrating teaching elements into its curriculum that show up potential links between PSSM and destruction and disarmament measures undertaken in (immediate) post-conflict periods and also elaborate more on temporary storage conditions.

### **Consider revising the selection of beneficiary countries.**

Needs-based and security criteria should guide the selection of a (potential) next trainer cohort. Particularly those countries, where there is a considerable danger of leakages from national stockpiles and that are at high risk of terrorism should be invited to put forward staff for further training. Additionally, the number of personnel trained has to be well adjusted to the training requirements in each country. In light of planned future trainings in the beneficiary countries, the varying personnel needs have to be identified and taken into consideration.

### **Comprehensive project documentation is required to monitor project outcomes**

To avoid disagreements on what the project is expected to deliver and confusion on direction and work requirements, future phases of the train-the-trainer project should have clear and comprehensive project documentation that guides project implementation.



### **Increase awareness of higher ranks in the target countries of the need for PSSM**

The evaluation recommends not to limit the project's capacity-building activities to mid-level technical officers (operational level) but to also target higher ranks in the beneficiary countries. The function of such high-level seminars (on strategic/policy and tactical level) is twofold. First, they sensitise commanding officers regarding the risks of SALW and CA proliferation as well as improper storage and management of SALW and CA, and increase their awareness of PSSM. Second, the seminars support mid-level PSSM instructors in advocating for improvement in PSSM policies and practices and improve the trainers' 'standing' within their units.

### **In the beneficiary countries, training on the job for staff working in the field of PSSM should continue**

According to information received from the instructors, MSAG already provides some technical guidance to the instructors even outside the framework of the PSSM train-the-trainer course (though more in an ad-hoc manner). Such prolonged technical support highly benefits the project's sustainability and improves the project outcomes. Technical guidance to the instructors should continue, though the project would need to clearly outline the scope of such advisory services (particularly in light of MSAG's limited human resources). In the beneficiary countries, instructors should provide technical assistance and training on the job for staff working in the field of PSSM (on division and headquarter level), as this will boost implementation of PSSM interventions. displaced returnee, has not been addressed sufficiently. Consequently, more research in this area is needed. A clarification of the link between return and peace in general could yield significant insights for practices that help end PFD.

### **A clear roadmap is required to hand over the project to RECSA**

As part of the handover process from MSAG to RECSA, RECSA's existing resources (available staff, availability of operational funds, etc.) must be assessed and resource requirements identified. Such an

assessment should not only be concerned with RECSA's capacity to organise additional PSSM workshops in the beneficiary countries and to train additional trainer cohorts but rather take a broader angle and look into RECSA's institutional capacities to manage the whole project cycle. Ideally, the project cycle starts with the training of regional instructors. However, the project should then move beyond classroom training and also ensure that the imparted knowledge is indeed utilised in the beneficiary countries (e.g. through continuous support of trainers and on-the-job training of seminar participants, sensitisation of the armed forces also on strategic and tactical levels, improved coordination with assistance programmes aiming at the improvement of PSSM infrastructure, etc.).

# Introduction

## Project context

The (ongoing) Physical Security and Stockpile Management Train-The-Trainer Project implemented by the Multinational Small Arms and Ammunition Group<sup>1</sup> (with Germany as the lead nation) in collaboration with the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) in Nairobi started in 2014. Its goal is related to the fact that there are still large deficiencies in small arms and light weapons (SALW) and conventional ammunition (CA) storage and management in the region. Large stocks of SALW and CA are yet to be destroyed, states struggle to raise the safety and security of their storage facilities and stockpiles to an acceptable level, and the capacities of the states' armed personnel to plan and implement PSSM interventions remain limited.

The project targets members of the Security Forces of East African States that are signatories to the Nairobi Protocol (2004) for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons. Following the Nairobi Declaration (2000)<sup>2</sup> the Nairobi Protocol entered into force in 2006. It is a legally binding document that requires member states to put into place the needed legislation and operational measures for the control of small arms and light weapons (SALW) both in state-owned and civilian possession. The Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA), an intergovernmental organisation, was established in 2005 to build the capacity of member states and to coordinate and monitor the implementation of the Nairobi Protocol. In this context RECSA works closely with the national focal points (NFPs) on small arms.

As a result of the Nairobi initiative, member states have conducted measures to harmonise their legislation on SALW and conventional ammunition

(CA) control and to improve SALW tracing. Despite varying degrees of progress at national levels (especially marking efforts of the Burundian and Tanzanian military are behind), RECSA member states have made considerable progress in firearms-marking and record-keeping. According to information provided by a RECSA representative, the police forces in Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, for instance, have completed their marking exercises. Member states have also undertaken significant initiatives to destroy firearms and ammunition since the signing of the Nairobi Declaration.

Despite marking and destruction efforts in the past years, the physical security and stockpile management is still in a poor state in most of the RECSA member states. Large stocks of SALW and CA are yet to be destroyed, the member states struggle to increase the safety and security of their storage facilities and stockpiles to an acceptable level, and the capacities of the member states' armed personnel to plan and implement physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) interventions remain limited. These shortcomings negatively impact on security in the RECSA region. Mismanaged and unstable stockpiles not only continue to pose an immediate threat to the civilian population and may lead to serious damages of infrastructure in the vicinity of storage facilities but leakages from these stockpiles have also the potential to fuel crime, terrorism, and armed conflicts thus leading to national and regional instability and threatening the security of states.

Given the limited capacities of the armed forces in the RECSA member states to design and conduct PSSM operations, MSAG (with Germany, represented by the Federal Armed Forces Verification Centre, taking the project lead) conducted four PSSM seminars for East African officers in 2012 and 2013 (two each year). This was followed by an introduction of the train-the-trainer PSSM project in 2013. The adoption of the train-the-trainer modality aimed at promoting sustainability by handing over responsibility for PSSM instruction to local institutions thus allowing for gradual withdrawal of MSAG from PSSM training in the region.

<sup>1</sup> \ MSAG is an apolitical, multinational, informal platform of states that exchange best practices and coordinate international assistance in the field of physical security and stockpile management (PSSM).

<sup>2</sup> \ The Nairobi Declaration (2000) on the Problem of the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa has since then been signed by 15 countries: Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.

The training content is based on internationally accepted and approved standards regarding the management of SALW and CA, such as the International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS) and the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG). Although the ISACS/IATG have proven to be suitable in managing arms and ammunition, they are *voluntary* standards that provide practical guidance on putting in place effective SALW and CA controls. It is hence up to the RECSA member states that are holding the stocks of SALW and CA to utilise these international standards. Although the African trainers who have been instructed by MSAG can provide crucial advice on improving stockpile management in their home countries, it is up to the leadership of the armed forces to decide to what degree ISACS/IATG indeed influence PSSM training and operations.

PSSM operations in the RECSA region oftentimes follow a piecemeal approach. Donor governments not only provide assistance through RECSA but also engage bilaterally with the armed forces or the NFPs in the RECSA member states. Although in theory RECSA should be coordinating all of these SALW and CA interventions, the information flow between RECSA and the national levels does not seem to be sufficient to adequately control the full lifecycle of SALW and CA in the region. Moreover, donor support for PSSM interventions is reported to be of *ad hoc* or (at times) in-kind nature, which aggravates even further coherent and consistent SALW and CA regulation.

While some RECSA member states, like Seychelles, Uganda, Rwanda or Kenya are (relatively) stable and hence allow for planning and consistent implementation of PSSM interventions, other member states, like Burundi or the Republic of South Sudan have highly unstable security environments. In these countries, the strategic priorities are focused on re-establishing or maintaining the state's monopoly of the use of force and re-instating security. In such instances PSSM, as much as it can help to prevent and/or stop to fuel internal conflicts, is rather overlooked by national actors.

## Project objectives and key indicators

By design, the objective of the train-the-trainer project is to instruct East African officers from states that are signatory to the Nairobi Protocol in PSSM and to enable them to independently deliver lessons on PSSM in their home countries based on international SALW and CA control standards. Consequently, the project intends to positively impact on the practices undertaken by the trained instructors upon return to their home institutions. In the long run these intended behaviour changes serve to improve PSSM in the RECSA region.

The project does not have prescribed key performance indicators at project level. As there is no project document available that clearly outlines project objectives and key indicators, the above-mentioned objective has not been drawn from original project documentation but is implicit to the project design.

## Intended main beneficiaries

The direct beneficiaries of the train-the-trainer project are sixteen (16) African officers who were instructed by MSAG to conduct PSSM trainings in their home countries (three trainers from Seychelles, four from Kenya, three from Burundi, two from South Sudan, three from Rwanda and one trainer from Uganda).

## Project concept and implementation arrangements

In implementing the train-the-trainer project, MSAG (with the Verification Centre in the lead) closely collaborates with the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) in Nairobi, Kenya. The IPSTC provides the infrastructure for the PSSM seminars and also plays a marginal management role (especially with regard to inviting officers from RECSA member states). Usually, the IPSTC involves its cooperation partner, the East African Standby Force Coordination Mechanism (EASFCOM) to forward invitations for the PSSM seminars to the RECSA member states.

Collaboration between MSAG and RECSA in the framework of the train-the-trainer process started in 2013/2014. However, RECSA's engagement was largely limited to facilitating some of the workshop sessions in the train-the-trainer seminars. Cooperation between MSAG and RECSA has intensified since the first quarter of 2015. In March 2015, the RECSA Executive Secretary visited Germany as the project's lead nation. As a result of this visit, RECSA was asked to compile a Statement of Requirement to identify the needs related to PSSM trainings in the region.

The train-the-trainer project has been largely conceptualised and planned by MSAG and implemented jointly with the IPSTC (with the notable exception of a recent training in Uganda that was organised by RECSA). The project intends to enable African officers to independently deliver lessons on PSSM in their home countries. It is composed of four phases in the course of which training responsibility is gradually handed over to African instructors. In the first phase, the "moderating" phase MSAG instructors trained a group of African officers some of whom would then be selected to become future PSSM instructors. In the second phase, the "mentoring" phase, the pre-selected group jointly conducted PSSM seminars with MSAG representatives. This was followed by a "monitoring" phase in which the selected African instructors taught a group of African officers in PSSM basics. At this stage, MSAG instructors still provided them with background support. In the final phase ("observing and assisting") the African instructors autonomously conducted a PSSM seminar targeting officers from RECSA member states. At this juncture, MSAG representatives only acted as observers and provided assistance in the preparation and follow-up of the seminar. Only after completion of the monitoring phase were African instructors certified as PSSM trainers.

MSAG member states have been involved to varying degrees in the planning and implementation of the train-the-trainer PSSM project. While Germany, represented by the Verification Centre, took the project lead in terms of management and instruction, other member states, including Canada, Sweden, France and Austria provided training personnel on site. Moreover, Denmark, Austria and Germany provided funding for several PSSM seminars.

## Project outputs

The outputs of the train-the-trainer project are discussed below: training curriculum, training manual, and a train-the-trainer methodology and resulting cohort of 16 trainers.

### Development of a training curriculum and manual

Prior to the start of the train-the-trainer project, a training curriculum and manual was developed by MSAG based on a first draft, which was provided by the United States via its Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).<sup>3</sup> The initial curriculum version already took into consideration the International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS) with the aim to give clear and comprehensive guidance to practitioners and policy makers on fundamental aspects of SALW and CA control. Throughout the various phases of the train-the-trainer project, the training modules<sup>4</sup> were continuously revised and updated by MSAG.

### PSSM seminars for future African PSSM instructors ("moderating phase")

The training methodology, largely developed by MSAG, is based on a four-phase model. In the first phase, which started in December 2013, MSAG (in collaboration with the IPSTC) conducted a PSSM seminar targeting 30 selected African officers. The aim behind this workshop was to train and select a competent

3 \ The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) is an agency within the United States Department of Defense and is a Combat Support Agency supporting the Combatant Commanders and Services in responding to any weapons of mass destruction threat.

4 \ The following modules were delivered by the African instructors in the PSSM training in January 2016: (1) Introduction to PSSM, (2) IATG/ISACS, (3) Risk management, (4) Ammunition basics, (5) United Nations Hazard Classification System, (6) Ammunition compatibility, (7) Ammunition paintings and marking, (8) Ammunition storage and handling, (9) Ammunition surveillance and proof, (10) SALW marking and tracing, (11) Physical security measures (External), (12) Physical security measures (Internal), (13) Arms security, (14) Ammunition inventory management, (15) Stockpile elimination, (16) MANPADS threat, (17) Transportation of arms, ammunition and explosives, (18) Emergency planning and response  
Currently, the EASF draws its membership from 10 active member states including Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda, which are signatories to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Eastern Africa Standby Force. The Republic of South Sudan enjoys the status of observer in EASF since April 2013.

African trainer cohort for PSSM. Invitations for this introductory PSSM seminar were sent out via the IPSTC/EASFCOM to the ten member states of the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF)<sup>5</sup>. Those EASF states that gave positive feedback through EASFCOM were asked to assign officers to be trained as PSSM instructors and to make them available on a long-term basis for future PSSM seminars.

Eventually, 27 officers participated in the introductory training. In order to ensure efficient training activities and to meet the technical requirements of a PSSM seminar, the participants were grouped by the MSAG instructors in the course of the first seminar into specialties (according to their areas of competence and interests): “ammunition log & tech”, “security” and “general issues.” Despite this assignment into specialty groups, each participant was asked to continue to cover some general areas.

MSAG was able to assess each student’s personal qualification by evaluating their performance in class (the student’s self-confidence, teaching and English language skills), competence in the subject (PSSM) as well as by a process in which each participant was asked to introduce himself/herself and to give a short presentation in front of class summarising one of the training modules. Additionally, MSAG instructors conducted interviews with each participant at the end of the seminar to assess their competence and availability for future PSSM trainings. Based on this selection process, MSAG representatives developed a ranking list of students (subdividing them into “qualified” and “well-qualified” candidates). The 20 well-qualified candidates were invited to the follow-on seminar.

The follow-on seminar for those 20 participants who had previously qualified was conducted by MSAG in close collaboration with the IPSTC in March/April 2014. The aim of this seminar was to enable the students to autonomously conduct training sessions on PSSM by providing them with the necessary instruction techniques. Against this background, they

<sup>5</sup> \ Currently, the EASF draws its membership from 10 active member states including Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda, which are signatories to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Eastern Africa Standby Force. The Republic of South Sudan enjoys the status of observer in EASF since April 2013.

were trained mainly in small groups in accordance with the assigned areas of competence (with each group being supervised by one to two MSAG instructors). Within the small groups, the students were familiarised with the assigned modules, guided in researching for additional information and briefed on the basic aspects of methodology and didactics. Each participant then had to conduct one or two demonstration lessons on different subjects in front of the class.

#### **PSSM seminars for regular African students (“mentoring and monitoring phases”)**

MSAG representatives together with the selected group of instructors jointly conducted two PSSM trainings for African officers in 2014 (“mentoring phase”).

In April and October 2015, two more PSSM seminars took place in Kenya utilising the African instructors to train new students from RECSA member states. These courses were part of the “monitoring” phase in which the African instructors were asked to present the PSSM modules that they had been trained in during previous seminars. In the framework of these courses, some African instructors also acquired the necessary skills to teach other course units. Throughout the monitoring phase, MSAG instructors offered guidance and coaching in the background.

#### **PSSM seminar for regular African students (“observing and assisting” phase)**

In line with the planned, gradual withdrawal of MSAG from PSSM trainings in East Africa, RECSA became the coordinating body to implement a PSSM seminar in Jinja, Uganda, in January 2016. This was the initial step in handing over ownership of the train-the-trainer project from MSAG to RECSA/IPSTC.

In close collaboration with the Ugandan National Focal Point on Small Arms and the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), RECSA organised the seminar, which targeted 27 members of the Uganda National Police, the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF), the Uganda Prisons Service and the Uganda Wildlife Authority. In the framework of this workshop, 11 African instructors independently delivered the course units largely without MSAG involvement.



## Research methodology and restrictions

The major objectives of this evaluation are to assess how much the African instructors have learned through the project and to evaluate to what degree they utilise the acquired skills, knowledge and learned principles in their respective duty stations. In a third step, the evaluation assesses whether instructors are able to implement what they have learned in the training, resulting in PSSM improvements.

In order to explore what has been learned in the PSSM trainings, the evaluation, in theory, would need to compare the skills and knowledge level as well as behaviour patterns of the trainers before and after the training. Given that there is no baseline assessment available that provides more information about the instructors prior to the training, the success of the course has been difficult to gauge.

Due to the missing baseline data, the evaluation had to rely on information retrieved through semi-structured face-to-face and telephone interviews with the African instructors and coordinating agencies. In total 13 (out of 16) trainers were interviewed in January/February 2016 (two of these interviews had to be conducted by telephone). One instructor could not be interviewed due to health reasons. Two trainers did not respond to interview requests. An additional two face-to-face interviews were conducted with representatives of the German Federal Armed Forces Verification Centre and the Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA), amounting to 15 interviews in total.

As the face-to-face interviews were conducted in the framework of the PSSM course in Uganda, the interviewer had a chance to get an impression of how the instructors behave in class. In this way the interviews were supplemented by participant observation.

A qualitative research approach was deemed to be most feasible, first because of the small sample size and second, because the evaluation tries to capture dynamic processes over time. The semi-structured interviews allowed the interviewers to have a lengthy discussion with the African instructors to find out in detail about their personal history, career paths and knowledge of PSSM prior and after the MSAG training.

It should be noted that the relatively small sample is due to the size of the trainer pool. As there was

only one trainer cohort available for questioning, the interviewers were only able to evaluate a small number of subjects. However, this is not regarded as a major research limitation. The available interviews—combined with the observations from the PSSM seminar in Uganda—are sufficient evidence to make informed statements about whether or not the instructors have learned something from the train-the-trainer seminar and to what degree they utilise the knowledge they received. They also provide enough insights into the stumbling blocks and challenges of the project.

While the evaluation has gathered sufficient data to come to conclusions and—based on these—provide recommendations for future programming, one has to keep in mind that the chosen research approach of interviewing the instructors bears the danger of receiving socially desirable answers. Even though the instructors were informed prior to the interviews that the evaluation does not analyse trainer performance but the overall utility of the project, most instructors seemed to perceive the interview as a way of monitoring their work. Hence, answers might have been more positive than the realities and procedures on the ground. Although the evaluation has tried as much as possible to triangulate the information received from the respondents, it was not possible to independently verify everything that was mentioned in the interviews.

One particular difficulty regarding the cross-checking of information is the limited amount of secondary information that the evaluator had access to. According to information received from the Verification Centre, no project document is available outlining indicators as well as projected outputs and outcomes. The evaluator did not have access to progress or tracer reports that could give further insights into the success and failures of the project and serve as a way of verifying the information retrieved from the instructors.

Furthermore, it should be noted that the scope of this evaluation did not allow for an analysis of the present status of PSSM in the instructors' countries of origin. The only country visited in the framework of the evaluation was the Republic of Uganda. Therefore, the evaluation cannot independently verify the

achievements on the ground that the instructors claim to have made. Photo verification was only obtained for the case of an ammunition depot of the Seychelles police and coast guard.

External monitoring of the results the instructors claim to have made is generally a very challenging task, as PSSM is an utmost sensitive area to engage in. Understandably, states are hesitant to allow outsiders to access their armouries. During a previous monitoring visit to Uganda, for instance, MSAG representatives were not granted direct access to ammunition sites (though access was granted to one ammunition depot in the course of the PSSM seminar in January 2016).

The evaluation moreover cannot ascertain whether improvements in PSSM training and practices in the target countries necessarily stand in direct correlation with the train-the-trainer seminar or whether these improvements are connected to other factors that have not been considered in the analysis. In Kenya, for instance, prior to 2013, demolition of stockpiles took place periodically and on-needs basis. According to information obtained from one of the African instructors, the units in charge of demolition had no permission to destroy stockpiles on a broad scale. Reports on the need for large-scale demolition were not acted upon. However, since March 2015, the Kenyan Army has begun to develop a more structured approach to demolition and allowed for large-scale destruction. To what degree this 'change of mindset' is conditioned by the instructors' recommendations and input is difficult to gauge.

## Project outcomes

In the following, project outcomes at the time of evaluation will be examined. Outcomes differ from project outputs in so far as they are the short- to medium-term changes that follow on from project activities and the production of outputs. Implicitly the train-the-trainer project is designed in such a way that outcomes can be measured by answering the following questions: How much knowledge was transferred to the African instructors? How much learning took place (learning)? How well do the instructors and trainees incorporate the learned principles, skills, and knowledge into their jobs on a permanent basis (change in behaviour)? Have the instructors been able to implement what they have learned in the training? Have there been improvements in PSSM (results)? Ideally, the project by now should have achieved the short-term outcome of a knowledge transfer and also show visible changes in behaviour. The trainers should be in the position to utilise the knowledge and skills acquired during the project, thus positively changing the institutional performance of their respective organisations. However, since all instructors only completed their instructor training in 2015, there is little time between completion of the instructor training and the evaluation. This begs the question to what degree results (implementation of training content and changes in PSSM in the countries of origin) could be achieved in the fairly limited time frame. Changing PSSM practices does not happen overnight, and one needs to give the instructors and the involved countries enough time for implementation.

This evaluation finds that the following outcomes (outcomes can be understood as the shifts in institutional behaviour and knowledge because of the project) have resulted from the project:

- \ trainers (to varying degrees) have gained more knowledge on PSSM;
- \ the capacity of each trainer to conduct PSSM trainings has improved significantly;
- \ all instructors report a positive shift in confidence, which affects their ability to conduct PSSM trainings;
- \ trainers have also started to integrate the learned principles, skills, and knowledge into their daily work.

- \ some also report success in implementing training content in their home countries, large-scale improvements are the exception due to limited funding in the beneficiary countries.

### Learning

The evaluation affirms that the train-the-trainer seminar has provided the instructors with mostly new and relevant information on PSSM. While the overwhelming majority of the instructors report to have had a basic or advanced knowledge of PSSM prior to the training, two instructors mentioned that PSSM had been a complete new concept to them. Accordingly, assessments of how much was learned in the course of the project differ depending on the level of PSSM knowledge the instructors had before joining the MSAG training. Trainers who had basic knowledge of PSSM describe the train-the-trainer course as an “eye opener”. For them knowledge gains were highly satisfactorily. One instructor commented, for instance: “The way we used to do things, we were just doing them for the sake of keeping arms (...) I did not know that there is a distance required between one magazine and another or one magazine to a human settlement. I was taught that knowledge.” This statement indicates that the course raised awareness that a change of existing PSSM routines was necessary.

Instructors who were already familiar with PSSM prior to the course claim that the training “upgraded” their knowledge and has brought “new dimensions” to their understanding of PSSM (“the training has broadened my mind”). Knowledge transfer to this group has been satisfactory. Only one instructor who already had vast experience in PSSM mentioned that the material provided in the course was too limited and basic in some areas (e.g. in the field of record-keeping). According to this respondent, the course leaves limited opportunity to go beyond the restricted scope of the material. This particularly applies to people with a good understanding of PSSM. For the above-mentioned seminar participant learning outcomes have only been moderately satisfactorily.



Among the seminar modules/components that are most appreciated by the trainers and that contain new relevant information are ‘ammunition basics’, ‘interactive SALW guide’, ‘ammunition storage and handling’, ‘risk management’, ‘hazard qualifications’, ‘ammunition compatibility’, ‘ammunition painting’ and ‘IATG implementation support toolkits’ such as the ‘quantity distance map’.

The capacity of each trainer to conduct PSSM trainings has improved significantly largely because of the seminar components that address teaching methods/didactics. The instructors were familiarised with facilitating class discussions, speaking in front of a group, keeping students attentive during class and giving presentations. The overwhelming majority now feels more confident to stand in front of a class and to address a larger audience.

A couple of instructors moreover appreciated in the interviews the fact that the course taught them to be apolitical (using the ‘diplomatic approach’). To the instructors, this course element seemed to be important as it helps them to address their superiors in their home countries and advocate for improvements in PSSM.

## Change in behaviour

All instructors report that the course has raised their awareness of PSSM, and that it has helped them in their reflection upon PSSM infrastructure, practices and managerial routines in their own country. Most trainers, when reporting back to their commanders after attending the PSSM training, gave recommendations on how to improve PSSM.

The evaluation also finds that some instructors have initiated changes in the PSSM and logistics trainings in their home countries based on what they had learned in the MSAG course. In Kenya, for instance, MSAG training modules (about marking and identification of ammunition, required distances of ammunition depots and magazines) have been integrated into the training schemes of the school for ammunition technical officers (ATOs). The Burundian military has included MSAG training components in their

teaching curriculum for non-commissioned officers responsible for the care of ordnance, arms and ammunition.

Furthermore, many trainers report that being a PSSM instructor helps them to be more confident in approaching their superiors on PSSM matters (“we are like ambassadors, we go and advise, we use a diplomatic approach to convince our superiors”).

In addition, the train-the-trainer course plays its part in promoting a regional approach towards PSSM. Based on the evaluator’s observations, the trainers have grown together as a group. Although the class is not uniform and, due to personal relationships, some nodes in the network are stronger than others, the group shows cohesiveness, which is critical to the project’s sustainability. Trainers report that even outside the regular courses they are in contact with each other and exchange ammunition information. The course thus promotes regional cooperation on SALW and CA control. However, given the small size of the trainer cohort, this effect should not be overestimated.

## Results

Many instructors report to have very limited means to influence arms and ammunition storage and management on the ground. Most instructors tell of, if any, smaller scale interventions that do not require huge financial resources. Lack of active support from superiors and limited financial resources are given as main reasons why PSSM interventions are not being implemented.

Occasionally, and depending on the funding situation and the command’s willingness, PSSM recommendations provided by the African instructors are, however, taken into consideration and acted upon. One instructor from the Kenya Defence Forces, for instance, made a PSSM assessment triggered by his attendance in the first MSAG course in 2013. He shared the assessment with his superiors also providing recommendations on how to improve PSSM in future. As a result of this report, he was asked by his superiors to assess the stockpile situation in Somalia, where the Kenyan Army has a contingent in the

framework of the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). The two-month assessment mission took place in March/April 2014. Based on this very mission, a technical team (including the aforementioned PSSM instructor) was sent to Somalia in December 2014 to implement what had been recommended. The team was exchanged in January 2016, replacing the PSSM instructor with another officer who had also participated in one of MSAG's trainings.

According to information provided by the instructors, certain PSSM practices have changed and some storage sites have been upgraded/improved based on guidance provided in the MSAG seminars (as previously mentioned, the evaluator is not in a position to independently verify these claims):

One instructor from the Kenya Defence Force, for instance, claims that the Kenyan military maintains a replica of an ammunition depot. Storage in this replica facility has been improved based on best practice examples provided in the MSAG course. Gaps in internal and external security in other storage sites in Kenya have been identified and the security situation has improved (e.g. all depots are now equipped with CCTV).

In Uganda's general depot (and other depots in the country) ammunition has been re-arranged according to compatibility criteria.

Based on recommendations given by the instructors, the Seychelles police (special unit) has improved the security of one depot (security lights were installed, there is additional fencing including barbed wire, security personnel is on site 24 hours). The Seychelles military is now using heat (burning) as a tool to destroy surplus weapons. The coast guard built a new, larger armoury in 2014 (also taking into account principles that were taught in the MSAG training). The funding for this armoury was provided by the United Arab Emirates.

The SPLA has constructed an internal perimeter fence around the main ammunition depot in Juba. Ammunition in this depot was re-organised according to compatibility groups but still kept in the same store due to lack of funding to construct other magazines.

The Burundian instructors have raised awareness of safe distance of existing magazines and suggested new locations for depots but because of lack of government funds, these recommendations were not acted upon.

Standard operating procedures of the Rwandan Arms Ordnance Regiment are constantly updated and have also been adjusted after the MSAG training. Ammunition has been re-arranged according to compatibility groups in at least one armoury in Rwanda.

Some African instructors have also been able to pass on their newly obtained knowledge to their colleagues by organising internal PSSM trainings in their units. For instance, two PSSM refresher courses were implemented in Kenya after the MSAG 'demonstration seminar', which took place in March/April 2014. Two PSSM courses (with integrated MSAG modules in the curriculum) were implemented in 2014/2015 in Rwanda targeting the military (50 participants) and prison services and the Rwandan police (42 participants). One officer from the Rwandan police reports to have trained his staff in arms inventory management, record-keeping and destruction. Another instructor from the Seychelles coast guard organised training for all ship armourers, instructing them in weapons storage and handling. In South Sudan and Burundi, no trainings were conducted due to lack of funds (though collegial exchange about the seminar content took place).

On the regional level, the instructors did not independently carry out further trainings (without MSAG involvement) (i.e. in Nairobi) either. The implementation of regional courses will require external funding and designated management structures (e.g. through RECSA).

## Key factors affecting implementation and outcomes

In summary, the below-mentioned factors have affected or are likely to affect the implementation and project outcomes in a positive way:

- \ Relevance of course content;
- \ emphasis on didactics in teaching curriculum;
- \ practical orientation of PSSM seminars;
- \ shortlisting of trainers;

- \ flexibility of project management to adjust implementation arrangements;
- \ positive relationships between MSAG trainers and African instructors;
- \ multi-donor involvement in the MSAG forum;
- \ RECSA's ability to coordinate and manage training seminars.

In summary, the below-mentioned factors have affected or are likely to affect the implementation and project outcomes in a negative way:

- \ Lack of project documentation and designated monitoring standards;
- \ selection of target countries;
- \ language barrier of French-speaking instructors;
- \ limited capability of trainers to cover various PSSM fields in the training due to assignment of specialties;
- \ lack of incentives for African instructors;
- \ lack of active support from higher ranks;
- \ loss of capacities due to changes in staffing;
- \ limited funding for PSSM in target countries;
- \ unclear personnel needs in target countries;
- \ political instability in target countries (e.g. South Sudan, Burundi);
- \ limited institutional capacity of RECSA (beyond seminar organisation capacity).

Almost all trainers confirm in the interviews that the acquired knowledge is very *relevant* to them (even though they might not be able to instantly implement what they had learned due to e.g. funding restrictions). The course content relates to the major challenges the instructors are facing on the ground in their home countries.

The fact that most trainers feel confident to speak in front of a class is directly related to the course components dealing with *didactics* and *methods*.

The *practical orientation* of the train-the-trainer programme is much appreciated by trainers and course participants alike. The visits to ammunition depots bring in practicality to the course and boost training morale and understanding of best PSSM practices. They also serve as a tool to test whether course participants have internalised the lessons they participated in.

Another factor positively affecting project outcomes is the *shortlisting of instructors*. The trainers were well selected and are capable of teaching participants of different national backgrounds (the only slight point of criticism is the language ability of one or two French-speaking instructors). The process to shortlist trainers is based on a thorough skills assessment and it is well structured and documented.

The project management has also shown *flexibility in adjusting implementation arrangements*. Initially, the project envisioned handing over management responsibility to the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC). As this plan did not materialise and RECSA emerged as a potential partner to play a management role, RECSA took the project lead for the PSSM seminar in Uganda.

A further crucial point for the project's success in producing the first trainer cohort is the positive and *constructive relationship between MSAG trainers and African instructors*. The fact that participants and trainers all have a military background in particular brings in mutual understanding, trust and respect.

The project not only benefited from MSAG's broad military expertise but also took advantage of the *multi-donor representation in the MSAG forum*. Though informal and voluntary in nature, MSAG offered a suitable template for coordinating and advocating donor engagement in the train-the-trainer project.

One of the factors negatively affecting project outcomes is the *lack of project documentation*. Due to the fact that there was no comprehensive project document (which should have been generated at project start), the project does not have key performance indicators and well documented projected goals and outputs that can be monitored over time. It therefore has shortcomings in terms of planning, monitoring and reporting. Consolidated sources of information showing project progress (in accordance with pre-determined indicators) are not available despite the fact that the project has performed satisfactorily and succeeded in its overall goal to establish a regional PSSM trainer cohort. Here, the project misses out on an important factor, namely learning from experience. Setting clear monitoring standards upon project initiation would have been an important tool to reveal

mistakes, showcasing the project's success and offering paths for learning and improvements. Due to a lack of agreed-upon monitoring standards and indicators, the project was monitored on an *ad hoc* basis (e.g. not all instructors were visited in-country). Hence, the project management could not independently verify for all countries to what degree instructors indeed implement PSSM interventions in their home countries.

The project also faced certain shortcomings regarding the selection of beneficiary countries. Invitations for the first PSSM seminar in December 2013 were channelled through the IPSTC and the Eastern Africa Standby Force Coordination Mechanism (EASFCOM) to all the EASF member states. As not all member states followed the invitation and some trainers dropped out in the course of the training process, *some countries are not represented* in the current trainer cohort. This is an important shortcoming as some of these countries (e.g. Somalia) have enormous PSSM needs that need to be addressed in order to maintain regional security. Not involving them in PSSM train-the-trainer courses poses a risk to the sustainability of project outcomes.

The evaluation moreover finds that some *French-speaking instructors* could not always express themselves clearly enough, which resulted in the fact that the English-speaking course participants faced challenges in following the course content. This bears the risk that participants not only miss out on important information but they might also misunderstand what the instructor intends to say. French-speaking participants, vice versa, might face challenges in following their English-speaking instructors.

As outlined above, all instructors were assigned specialties based on their job expertise and experience (though some trainers also cover general PSSM fields). While this is comprehensible from a technical point of view, the evaluator finds that—from a project design perspective—the *assignment of specialties* limits the capability of the trainers to conduct PSSM trainings independently. Only very few trainers have the ability to lead participants through all course units. This has the disadvantage that whenever training is conducted

it requires several instructors to be on site to teach all the course modules. This is not only expensive but it also limits the teaching repertoire of each instructor.

As mentioned in the preceding chapter, the instructors, when starting the training, had varying levels of PSSM knowledge. Although the project seems to have dealt with these variances fairly well (the overwhelming number of instructors report to have learned something new), the project could be even more effective in imparting knowledge if instructors had fairly similar levels of knowledge when joining the course (though this might be difficult to achieve from an implementation point of view).

A further point of criticism emerging from the interviews is the *lack of incentives* given to the African instructors (so far the project has provided no material or in-kind incentives). While this factor has not yet negatively affected project implementation, it might, however, be a critical point in the future. If instructors are given no incentives (of material or in-kind form), they might lose interest in the project and discontinue their engagement as PSSM instructors, and this can threaten the project's sustainability.

Another key factor influencing project implementation, results and sustainability is the backing instructors receive from their superiors. Those instructors who report some success in changing PSSM practices on the ground (e.g. in Kenya, Seychelles) had strong active support from their direct superiors and higher levels. Once this support is lacking, instructors—no matter how highly qualified they are in training others—have little leeway in promoting change. Several trainers note that, although they have given advice on improving the stockpile situation in their countries, these recommendations have not been acted upon. This, in most cases, is either related to the lack of funding available for PSSM or to the *absence of active support from higher command levels*. According to information provided by the instructors, officers in charge of overseeing PSSM activities often-times do not have sufficient and technical know-how and understanding of PSSM. They hence do not see the urgency to act upon deficits in arms and ammunition storage and security. In order to address these shortcomings, the project will need to intensify its

engagement in the target countries to make higher ranks more aware of the importance of PSSM.

According to some trainers, their superiors had also not been adequately informed about the concept of the train-the-trainer course. Some commanders see the PSSM course as a one-time event and are not aware that the course requires long-term commitment of the PSSM trainers (although this had been communicated in the invitations for the events). Hence, some instructors report that they are facing challenges in convincing their superiors of their need to attend the various phases of the train-the-trainer course. More sensitisation for higher ranks in the target countries is required to counteract such misperceptions (strategic/policy level).

The sensitisation of superiors is most important also to avoid that *trainers are being shifted from their duty stations* to other units after they have been instructed to become a PSSM trainer. One instructor from Seychelles, for instance, reports that he was transferred to another unit after attending the PSSM course. Although he still tries to get involved in promoting PSSM, he is no longer officially in charge of overseeing stockpiles. The project management will need to reflect upon how to handle such changes in staffing (which can also occur due to retirement, staff being sent on mission, etc.) as these can threaten project sustainability.

The *limited funding for PSSM* in the target countries is doubtlessly one of the most important factors that negatively affect implementation of PSSM in the beneficiary countries. Although instructors are keen to implement what they have learned and—in most cases—actively approach their superiors on PSSM matters, they usually face enormous funding challenges that prohibit any further large-scale PSSM actions. In the interviews, the instructors report of only few larger investments in improving storage structures in the target countries. In Seychelles, for instance, the coast guard built a new armoury, based on recommendations provided by a PSSM trainer. Infrastructure was apparently also upgraded in Kenya and Rwanda (though the evaluation cannot make any judgment concerning the scale of these improvements in infrastructure). Despite these positive

trends, most instructors mention that they implemented activities that did not require huge amounts of financial resources. Capacity-building alone can therefore only have a limited impact on the safety and security of storage facilities. In order to increase its impact, the project management will need to reflect upon how to link capacity building with investments in storage infrastructure.

What is important to consider in this respect is that PSSM needs in each country differ greatly depending on the size and standards of the existing stockpiles as well as the size of the armed forces, including the number of personnel that plans and executes PSSM interventions. Particularly with regard to capacity building, the latter point is of enormous importance. So far, the beneficiary countries have gained equally from the project's capacity building activities. *Variances in the countries' personnel structures* and sizes have not been taken into consideration. Given that in the framework of the project, only the first trainer cohort has been certified, this has not negatively affected programme implementation. However, in the light of planned future trainings in the beneficiary countries, the varying personnel needs have to be identified and taken into consideration. The number of personnel trained has to be well adjusted to the training requirements in each country.

The country context therefore sets the baseline for any PSSM intervention. PSSM activities turn out to be particularly challenging in those *countries that face political instability*. The Republic of South Sudan and Burundi, for instance, are currently in a state of national crisis. Although South Sudan and Burundi are facing the greatest PSSM needs among the targeted countries and are the highest risk to regional security, it is difficult for the South Sudanese and Burundian instructors to promote regular PSSM interventions. This is because their governments' military, security and budgetary policies focus on dealing with internal security threats rather than looking into potential improvements to sustainably secure and manage the national stockpiles.

At this juncture, it should be emphasised that the project's curriculum has not been designed for countries in crisis but provides guidance for stockpile



management measures to be undertaken in post- or non-conflict environments. Hence, it has—per design—only limited immediate applicability to staff working in conflict situations. Although the course might not have an immediate relevance to those instructors whose countries are in crisis mode, when taking a longer-term vision, the knowledge is still considered to be of value. Instructors from South Sudan and Burundi consider making use of their newly acquired skills and knowledge as soon as the situation in their countries allows and windows of opportunity open up.

As mentioned in the introductory chapter, in order to enhance the project's regional ownership, preparations are ongoing to hand over management responsibility from MSAG to RECSA. It is planned that RECSA will utilise the existing training capacities to organise further trainings in the states that are signatories to the Nairobi Protocol. Having successfully conducted the PSSM seminar in Uganda in January 2016, RECSA has proven that it *is able to independently organise and manage* such train-the-trainer seminars and has the necessary expertise to manage the current PSSM trainer cohort.

Although RECSA very successfully implemented the recent PSSM training in Jinja, Uganda, some question marks regarding *RECSA's long-term institutional capacities* remain. Many RECSA staff members have third-party funded positions. Only a limited number of RECSA staff has knowledge of PSSM and is hence able to play a crucial management role in the project. As soon as third party funding for PSSM training courses stops, RECSA's financial ability to continue building a regional PSSM capacity also appears to be limited. Most of RECSA's funding comes from external donors. While RECSA member states contribute to the organisation's operating funds, many dues-paying members are in arrears. Given the above-mentioned challenges it is essential to reflect upon the project's long-term visions and management arrangements in closer detail.

## Conclusions and recommendations

Findings and recommendations are presented below and are structured, first, relating to the context of the project and the wider strategic environment and, second, relating to the project design and outcomes.

### Project context and strategic environment

The project has succeeded in producing a cohort of African officers to deliver lessons on PSSM in their home countries. Almost all instructors (with only few exceptions) confirm that their knowledge has increased due to the training, and many use the acquired skills (to some extent) in their daily work. However, one of the biggest challenges mentioned by the instructors is the lack of resources available in their countries to improve storage and stockpile infrastructure and management.

#### **To enhance the project's footprint it needs to be accompanied by resources to improve on physical security and storage infrastructure in the beneficiary countries**

A first step in better connecting the project's capacity-building measures with activities directly aiming at the improvement of security and storage infrastructure and management will be to initiate a dialogue with national governments to assess the *status quo* of PSSM (including an assessment of donor assistance already provided) and identify connected resource requirements. Such discussions could be part of a discourse over broader lifecycle management for weapons and ammunition based on the ISACS/IATG, which would help in conducting longer forecasts for resource requirements.

Currently, donors appear to work on short-term goals, pursuing a piecemeal approach towards PSSM in the RECSA region. Donors are providing funding for the improvement of storage facilities and management in various countries but the extent and form of this support appears not to be well documented. RECSA, for instance, is not always informed about the support that is provided directly to the national focal

points (NFP) in the field of SALW and CA control. Due to his lack of information, assistance programmes lack coordination.

#### **To improve the project's coordination with other donor and government activities, more information and dialogue are needed**

The project will need to obtain more information on the *status quo* of PSSM in each country and engage in dialogue with the stakeholders that are already providing funding in this area. The trained instructors can be first contact points for the actor/agency that is to conduct future PSSM assessments. In order to avoid duplication of activities, existing PSSM assessment reports (by other stakeholders) have to be considered in the analysis.

Concerning the course content, most instructors confirm that the curriculum is relevant to their daily work and that they utilise the information and knowledge that was acquired. However, instructors face enormous challenges when it comes to implementing what they have learned. This particularly holds true for those countries that are currently in crisis mode (e.g. South Sudan and Burundi). In these states, due to the external circumstances, most of the course content is not immediately applicable. Results on the ground can hardly be achieved.

#### **To counteract misperceptions about potential achievements and outcomes in the target countries, the project should outline its limitations in crisis countries**

(e.g. in future project documentation). This point should also be well communicated to the instructors. As per design, the project largely provides guidance for security and stockpile management measures to be undertaken in post- or non-conflict environments. However, in order to improve the project's relevance for crisis contexts, the project may consider integrating teaching elements into its curriculum that show up potential links between PSSM and destruction and disarmament measures undertaken in (immediate) post-conflict periods and also elaborate more on temporary storage conditions.

## Project design and outcomes

All instructors feel more confident in approaching their supervisors and addressing a class and larger audiences (even with higher ranking officers). Almost all interviewed instructors confirm that the training has taught them something new and is relevant to their daily work. Satisfaction levels are high. Knowledge gains, however, vary depending on the PSSM knowledge that instructors had before joining the MSAG training. Instructors with a fairly limited PSSM understanding had a very steep learning curve, while knowledgeable trainers did not perceive all the course elements as equally informative. Independent from their level of expertise, participants and instructors emphasise the benefit of having practical exercises.

**The project should therefore continue with the chosen teaching approach and methods as they have proven to be effective.** The course has been very successful in supporting instructors to become trainers and to address students in a class. The course should, where possible, react to the variance in knowledge levels and ensure that the course material and content are well aligned to the instructor's level of expertise. As instructors and participants highly appreciate the practical elements of the training, more practical lessons should be included in the PSSM seminars.

Another course element, which could be further adjusted, is the assignment of specialty areas. Although understandable from a technical point of view, the assignment of specialty areas limits the ability of each instructor to cover a broad range of course modules. In light of future trainings to be conducted in the beneficiary countries, this also has negative cost implications, as it requires many trainers to facilitate the various sessions and specialty areas. **Future programming should thus consider minimising the number of trainers needed to facilitate PSSM trainings** (e.g. to a maximum of four—a number that was initially foreseen for the train-the-trainer project). This will not only broaden the teaching skills and repertoire of each individual trainer; African instructors will find the project also to be less time consuming.

Regarding the project design, another point to reflect upon would be the selection of target countries. Invitations for the train-the-trainer course were channelled through the IPSTC and EASFCOM to all the EASF member states. As not all member states followed the invitation, and some trainers dropped out in the course of the training process, some EASF countries are not represented in the current trainer cohort. The selection of countries to benefit from the training hence relied on the countries' voluntary feedback and was rather arbitrary. It neither followed security- nor needs-based criteria. Because of this, relatively stable countries with small national stockpiles are represented in the trainer cohort (e.g. Seychelles) but states that have pressing needs to improve their storage facilities and management and are at a high risk of terrorism (e.g. Somalia) did not put forward staff for the current trainer group. **The project management should hence contemplate revising the selection of beneficiary countries.** Needs-based and security criteria should guide the selection of the (potential) next trainer cohort. Particularly those countries, where there is a considerable danger of leakages from national stockpiles and that are at high risk of terrorism should be invited to put forward staff for further training.

The evaluation moreover finds that the lack of project documentation and monitoring indicators has significantly hampered the measurement of project impact and outcomes. To avoid disagreements on what the project is expected to deliver and confusion on direction and work requirements, **future phases of the train-the-trainer project should have clear and comprehensive project documentation that guides project implementation.**

Despite the lack of project documentation, the instructors were well selected and the process to shortlist candidates is clear and comprehensive. However, variances in the countries' personnel structures and sizes have not yet guided the selection of trainers and participants. Given that it was the first trainer cohort that was certified in the course of the project, this factor has not negatively affected programme implementation.



However, in light of planned future trainings in the beneficiary countries, **the varying personnel needs have to be identified and taken into consideration.** The number of personnel trained has to be well adjusted to the training requirements in each country.

Another factor to take into account with regard to the selection of a potential second trainer cohort is the trainees' language ability. The evaluation finds that some Francophone instructors face language barriers in conveying the course content. The respective trainers lack the ability to provide information outside the margins of the modules they have been assigned to instruct. **Therefore, either translators should be used to overcome existing language barriers between Francophone and Anglophone students and instructors or, alternatively, a PSSM train-the-trainer course for French speaking countries should be designed.**

Next to language abilities, the technical expertise of the African instructors is a key factor for project success. PSSM is a very dynamic subject that requires practitioners to continuously inform themselves about new developments and to refresh their skills and knowledge in this area. Particularly given the technical developments in the field of SALW and CA, learning about PSSM is a continuous process that does not end. The current cohort of instructors will also require refresher or advanced trainings. However, as of now, continuous, structured guidance of both instructors and participants who have attended PSSM trainings is not foreseen in the project. The PSSM workshops are a one-time event with no planned follow-up and continued on-the-job training. While MSAG already provides some technical guidance to the instructors even outside the framework of the PSSM train-the-trainer course (e.g. technical experts from the German Federal Armed Forces Verification Centre answer technical e-mail inquiries from the instructors), this technical support is of an *ad-hoc* nature.

Prolonged technical advice highly benefits the project's sustainability and improves on the project outcomes. Technical guidance of the instructors should hence continue, though the project would

need to clearly outline the scope of such advisory services (particularly in light of MSAG's limited human resources). **In the beneficiary countries, instructors should provide technical assistance and training on the job for staff working in the field of PSSM (on division and headquarter level), as this will boost implementation of PSSM interventions.**

Besides continued on the job training, higher ranks in the target countries will have to be approached more actively in the course of the project. This is because instructors at times face resistance from their supervisors in furthering their course. Some commanders appear to lack technical PSSM understanding. Hence, they only provide limited active support and do not always act upon recommendations given by the PSSM instructors (though inaction is to a large degree connected to the lack of resources). The instructors also report that at times their direct superiors have not been adequately informed about the concept of the course. Some instructors hence have faced resistance from their commanders when needing to join subsequent phases of the train-the-trainer course.

**The evaluation thus recommends not to limit the project's capacity-building activities to mid-level technical officers (operational level) but to also target higher ranks in the beneficiary countries.**

The function of such high-level seminars (on strategic/policy and tactical level) is twofold. First, they make commanding officers more aware of the risks of SALW and CA proliferation, the improper storage and management of SALW and CA and increase awareness of PSSM. Second, they support mid-level PSSM instructors in advocating for improvement in PSSM policies and practices and enhance the trainers' 'standing' within their units.

High-level seminars will also assist in advocating for staff continuity and avoiding that instructors that have been trained are shifted to other duty stations. Changes in staffing (e.g. due to personnel being shifted to other units, retirement, etc.) of the armed forces targeted for training pose a serious risk to project sustainability. Needless to say, the project has only limited means to ensure that staff members that have been trained in PSSM are not drawn to other

duty stations or being posted to other missions, etc. The commanding officers in the beneficiary countries are the ones to manage human resources and to ensure that the capacity building that was done was not done in vain. All the project can do is to **advocate on highest levels for staff continuity, to make the top command aware** of the need for PSSM and to explain the crucial role the instructors play in imparting knowledge to the armed forces.

Advocating for continued PSSM engagement starts with the instructors themselves. The project depends on them to actively promote PSSM in their home countries and to spread knowledge to others. This, however, can only be achieved if the trainers are also given enough personal incentives to continue with the PSSM trainings. So far, the project has not provided any material incentives (e.g. per diems) for the African instructors. As most trainers feel that the course has provided them with additional skills and knowledge, this has been enough encouragement to motivate instructors to continue with the training process. However, in future, the lack of incentives might negatively affect project outcomes. With the number of trainings in the beneficiary countries increasing, instructors might see less and less personal benefits in passing on their knowledge to others.

**For that reason, the project management should reflect upon which form of benefits could be given to the instructors to motivate them to continue with the training process.** Incentives do not necessarily have to be of a financial nature but can also be in-kind (e.g. 'certification' for PSSM instructors). The matter of incentives has to be well coordinated between all donors that play an active role in the project.

Last, in light of the planned hand-over of the train-the-trainer project to RECSA, the project management will need to further look into RECSA's existing institutional capacities. With the successful conduct of the PSSM seminar in Uganda in January 2016, RECSA has proven to be able to independently organise and manage train-the-trainer seminars and has the necessary expertise to manage the current PSSM trainer cohort. However, RECSA's long-term institutional capacity to independently promote PSSM

interventions appears to be limited. Few staff members are experienced in PSSM. External donors provide most of RECSA's funding. RECSA member states also contribute to the organisation's operating funds, but many dues-paying members are in arrears.

**Therefore, as part of the handover process, an assessment of RECSA's existing resources (available staff, availability of operational funds, etc.) ought to be conducted in the framework of the project and resource requirements identified.** Such an assessment should not take too narrow a view and only be concerned with RECSA's capacity to organise additional PSSM workshops in the beneficiary countries and to train additional trainer cohorts. Instead, a broader angle should be taken where RECSA's institutional capacities to manage the whole project cycle are examined. Ideally, the project cycle starts with the training of regional instructors. However, training within the project should then move beyond the classroom and also ensure that the imparted knowledge is indeed utilised in the beneficiary countries (e.g. through continuous support of trainers and on-the-job training of seminar participants, sensitisation of the armed forces also on strategic and tactical levels, improved coordination with assistance programmes aiming at the improvement of PSSM infrastructure, etc.).

# Annex

## Documents reviewed

- \ Afrikapolitische Leitlinien der Bundesregierung, [http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/RegionaleSchwerpunkte/Afrika/Afrika-Leitlinien\\_node.html](http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/RegionaleSchwerpunkte/Afrika/Afrika-Leitlinien_node.html)
- \ MSAG Train-the-Trainer Concept - general approach
- \ IPSTC Train-The-Trainer Concept
- \ RECSA Concept Note In-Country Physical Security and Stockpile Management Training
- \ MSAG PSSM Seminar Instructor Handbook 2015

## List of interview partners

Name	Organisation/Component	Position	Interview Date
<i>Capt. Justin Mugeni Pamba</i>	Kenya Defence Forces	PSSM Trainer	23 January 2016
<i>Lt. Silver Maari</i>	Uganda People's Defence Force	PSSM Trainer	23 January 2016
<i>Sub-Inspector Pedro Christin Robert Edmond</i>	Seychelles Police	PSSM Trainer	24 January 2016
<i>Major Franky Joseph Hoareau</i>	Seychelles People's Defence Forces	PSSM Trainer	24 January 2016
<i>Capt. Steven Banyaga</i>	Rwanda Defence Force	PSSM Trainer	24 January 2016
<i>Capt. Peter Bith Lueth Deng</i>	Sudan People's Liberation Army	PSSM Trainer	24 January 2016
<i>Lt. Col. Makur Akec Reec Mangok</i>	Sudan People's Liberation Army	PSSM Trainer	24 January 2016
<i>Maj. Thaddee Nzoyihiki</i>	Burundi National Defence Force	PSSM Trainer	24 January 2016
<i>Maj. Noel Antonio Gomme</i>	Seychelles People's Defence Forces	PSSM Trainer	25 January 2016
<i>Maj. Kizito Ndereyimana</i>	Burundi National Defence Force	PSSM Trainer	25 January 2016
<i>Lt. Col. Bekaan</i>	Federal Armed Forces Verification Centre	Section leader, Arms Transfers and Humanitarian Arms Control	26 January 2016
<i>Lt. Frank Kamanzi</i>	Rwanda Defence Force	PSSM Trainer	26 January 2016
<i>Godfrey Bagonza</i>	Regional Centre on Small Arms	Project Manager	27 January 2016
<i>AIP Copain Musoni Rwengo</i>	Rwanda National Police	PSSM Trainer	29 January 2016
<i>Maj. Martin Githuku Njugana</i>	Kenya Defence Forces	PSSM Trainer	1 February 2016

## Interview guideline (for instructors)

### General questions:

Name:

Age:

Rank:

Country:

What is your position/role now?

When did you first attend the one-week PSSM training course in Nairobi?

What was your position/role when you first attended the training course?

How were you selected to attend the PSSM training course? When were you selected as a trainer? Were you told why were you selected?

Can you tell me about the process of being trained to become a trainer? What does it involve? Do you focus on specific modules or were you trained to teach the whole course?

### Reaction:

Did you enjoy the whole process of training to become a PSSM trainer? What did you enjoy/ did not enjoy in particular?

What were some of the good/bad things about the training process?

How did you find the training duration/trainers?

Did you feel like anything was missing from the training? What do you generally think of PSSM training?

### Learning:

How well did you know about/Did you have much awareness of PSSM prior to the training? Please elaborate.

What did you learn from the PSSM training? Can you provide some insights into what you have learned? Can you give examples?

What did you learn when you were trained to be an instructor? Can you give examples (e.g. how to present material, how to interact with students, how to make sure the students understand, etc.....).

What were some of the challenges of the whole experience?

How much has your knowledge increased as a result of the training (slightly/ significantly/not at all)?

Have you acquired additional skills? If yes, which ones?

### Behaviour:

Was the information you received in the training relevant to your job? If yes, in what way(s) was it relevant? If no, why not?

Has your training changed the way that you do your job? If yes, in what way(s)? If not, why not? Can you provide examples?

Are there other ways in which you applied what you have learnt in your job/organisation? If yes, how?

Has participating in the train-the-trainer programme helped your career? Or had any other benefits/disadvantages?

## Results:

What kind of training does your organisation currently provide in terms of PSSM?

Is PSSM seen as important in your organisation? Was it always seen as important?

Do you train colleagues in your own organisation? If yes, have you encountered any difficulties, or any support in doing this? If you don't train colleagues in your own organisation, why not?

Are individuals in your organisation keen to participate in this kind of training?

What do your commanders think of your training and your role as a PSSM instructor?

What do your colleagues think of your training and your role as a PSSM instructor? Have they given you any feedback?

Has your organisation changed anything related to PSSM since you participated in the training?

Do you provide PSSM training outside your organisation (i.e., in Nairobi or elsewhere)?

If yes, what kind of PSSM training?

If training takes place (either inside your own organisation or in Nairobi or elsewhere):

Do you feel confident when you present the material?

Do you or your organisation have any plans to further promote PSSM? If yes, how? If not, why?

## LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

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AMISOM	African Union Mission to Somalia	AMISOM
ATO	Ammunition technical officer	ATO
BICC	Bonn International Center for Conversion	BICC
CA	Conventional ammunition	CA
DTRA	Defense Threat Reduction Agency	DTRA
EASF	Eastern Africa Standby Force	EASF
EASFCOM	Eastern Africa Standby Force Coordination Mechanism	EASFCOM
IPSTC	International Peace Support Training Centre	IPSTC
ISACS	International Small Arms Control Standards	ISACS
MSAG	Multinational Small Arms and Ammunition Group	MSAG
NFP	National focal point	NFP
PSSM	Physical security and stockpile management	PSSM
RECSA	Regional Centre on Small Arms	RECSA
SALW	Small arms and light weapons	SALW
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army	SPLA
UPDF	Uganda People's Defence Force	UPDF

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The responsibility for contents and views expressed in this *Working Paper* lies entirely with the author.

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