

Berliner Studien zur Soziologie Europas

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**CONTRASTING GENERALIZED AND POLICY
ATTITUDES TOWARD SOCIAL EUROPE:
UNDERSTANDING THE DISCREPANCIES**

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Abstract

Public attitudes related to social Europe are important for legitimating the aspirations of the European Union and European politicians to deepen European integration. This paper investigates public opinion about social Europe by analyzing attitudes related to the basic principles for European social security measures and attitudes about implementing a uniform European social security system. Based on a survey conducted in 13 European countries, it explores the discrepancies between the two interrelated phenomena and investigates in detail the factors responsible for the strong support for general principles, but fizzling support for the implementation of a European social system. The main findings demonstrate that the value-based mechanisms are primarily responsible for carrying over the positive attitudes towards the general principles to positive attitudes towards a uniform European social security system. In contrast, self-interest does not play a prominent role. Left-leaning individuals, emphasizing the justice principle of need and who identify and trust the European Union are the primary proponents of general principles related to social Europe, as well as for the potential realization of a uniform European welfare system.

1. INTRODUCTION¹

The European Union and its member states are at crossroads of how to proceed with the realization of a social Europe. Social Europe stands for a collection national, transnational, and supranational programs, policies, as well as objectives concerned with providing solidarity to European citizens (Ferrera 2014, 2017). Essentially social Europe makes social concerns of Europeans a common concern of all Europeans by channeling social policy topics into EU legislation. From the five components of social Europe Ferrera named, the “EU social policy” component² in particular has received a lot of controversy. Much of the debate is about whether soft or hard law-making should be employed for this component.

So far, employing soft laws has been the dominant approach in the European social policy field. Primarily open mechanisms of coordination (OMC) objectives and various decrees (e.g. European Pillar of Social Rights) have pushed forward the realization of the social policy component of social Europe (de la Porte & Heins 2014; Leibfried 2015). These solutions ask for little obligation from member states and let them independently decide on tools to achieve the proclaimed tools. In fact, the EU’s commitment to maintain national sovereignty looms over developments to further and strengthen European social policy because any kind of hard lawmaking in this realm would potentially violate nation states’ right for self-governance. It would prod the structure of already existing national welfare states. For example, the European Pillar of Social Rights leaves the realization of the common goals to national strategies to resolve. It does not force certain programs or budgetary obligations on nation states.

As a result of this status quo in European law making, policy makers have tiptoed around the notion of realizing social policy goals with hard lawmaking procedure. However, the question of social Europe and harder forms of lawmaking has gained visibility in the political arena and recently the topic of EU-wide social policy measures are repeatedly on the discussion table (e.g. Macron 2017). Additionally, the scientific community has also picked up on the debate. More and more arguments mount to that enhancing European integration could be (and should be) done with more hard measures and member states should be ready contribute to level the living standards and social rights of all Europeans (Andor et al. 2014; Kilpatrick & De Witte 2019).

If policy makers commit to employing new harder laws for social policy measures on a European scale, then their political decisions should be legitimate and backed by the

¹ This article refers to a survey (Transnational European Solidarity Survey (TESS)) that was conceptualized together with Jürgen Gerhards, Holger Lengfeld, Florian K. Kley and Maximilian Priem (cf. Gerhards et al. 2019a). This research has been the result of a cooperation of the research project SOLIDUS funded by the European Commission in the context of the Horizon 2020 research programme (Grant Agreement No. 649489), and the research unit Horizontal Europeanization funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) (FOR 1539).

² “supranational policies that have an explicit social purpose, be they of a regulative or (re)distributive nature, directly funded by the EU budget” ((Ferrera, Maurizio 2017: 47)).

public's support. Thus, it is important to understand how the general public feels about implementing (hard) measures to realize a social Europe, to introduce schemes connected to EU social policy. The current paper sets out to investigate this by focusing on public opinion related to EU social policy. It offers a better understanding of what drives individuals to support the notion of social Europe.

Conceptually, Baute and colleagues (2018) recently demonstrated that attitudes towards social Europe is a multi-dimensional concept. Such an understanding of attitudes corresponds well with Ferrera's (2014, 2017) theoretical multi-component description of social Europe. From the five dimensions Baute and colleagues identified, *interpersonal solidarity* covers attitudes toward European social policy (the same concept has also been coined European welfare solidarity (Gerhards et al. 2019a), transnational solidarity (Ciornei & Recchi 2017), and supranational solidarity (Díez Medrano et al. 2019)). The current paper's scope covers these attitudes. This paper focuses on the public opinion about how strongly do Europeans support social policy measures executed on the European level. Other Europeans are the direct recipients of these social schemes. In other words, supporting the notion of EU social policy can be understood as the willingness to extend solidarity to Europeans living in vulnerable social positions.

Only a handful of studies focus on the general population's attitude toward EU social policy and they paint a mixed picture (cf. Baute et al. 2018; Vandenbroucke et al. 18 December, 2018). On the one hand, there is clear indication that the majority of Europeans support the notion of European welfare solidarity. There is growing evidence that Europeans are willing to help fellow Europeans in need and extend solidarity to those living in other European countries (Baute et al. 2018; Baute et al. 2019b; Ferrera & Pellegata 2019; Gerhards et al. 2016; Vandenbroucke et al. 18 December, 2018; Vision Europe Summit Consortium 2015). Newest findings even suggest that Europeans almost unanimously support vulnerable Europeans (Gerhards et al. 2019a; Gerhards et al. 2019b). On the other hand, Lahusen and Grasso (2018) are more cautious about proclaiming unconditional support for solidarity among Europeans, when looking at past actions expressing solidarity. Lahusen and Grass (2018) stress that solidarity at the European level is not favored by all Europeans and growing Eurosceptic sentiments undermine solidarity. Thus, this potentially overshadows European solidarity's prominence in the near future. Others name plain self-interest (both connected to personal and national interests) as hurdles for the solidification of European welfare solidarity (Ciornei & Recchi 2017; Genschel & Hemerijck 2018). Furthermore, some findings also indicate that individuals are rather hostile of transferring the competences of the national welfare state to the European level, are only ready if there is a certain level of trust present among the general public (Hooghe & Verhaegen 2017). Lastly, once the general tone of the inquiry is removed, findings point to a lack readiness to support the implementation of a supranational (European) social security system (Baute et al. 2018; Gerhards et al. 2016; Gerhards et al. 2019a; Meuleman et al. 2018). Overall, there are discrepancies in the results.

The discrepancies between the empirical results from different research project can stem from the variety of the data collection methods employed (including interview and data collection methods, representativeness of the samples), but also from the scope of the studies and their conceptual realization of the measurement. The measurement of attitudes range from generalized attitudes related to the principles of European social policy (generalized attitudes) to very concrete policy solutions or social policy schemes (policy attitudes). Studies focused more on generalized attitudes, report more positive responses related to European solidarity. In contrast, studies tapping policy attitudes portray far less support for solidarity. In other words, the support of EU social policy fizzles out once it is about concrete policies and not just the general support.

However, when connecting these observations, there is indication that methodological and design related causes are not only responsible for the discrepancies. In studies where both types of attitudes have been surveyed (Baute et al. 2018; Gerhards et al. 2019a), the gap persists, despite of the data stemming from the same data source for both attitude types (from the BNES in 2014 and the TESS in 2016, respectively). This suggests that the reasons behind the inconclusive evidence cannot be related solely to methodological discrepancies between the studies and could also be related to the substantive reasons and mechanisms in the background.

In spite of systematic differences, studies have not investigated the link between generalized attitudes and policy attitudes for this topic, albeit it being important information for policy-makers. In fact, both types attitudes of have been rarely discussed in the same study and have certainly not been connected. The only exception is the paper by Baute and colleagues (2018), where a both generalized attitudes toward European welfare solidarity and policy attitudes is tested in a measurement model. In their framework, generalized attitudes are referred to as principles of interpersonal solidarity and policy attitudes are coined as support for the implementation of European social security system (Baute et al. 2018: 360). The authors confirm that generalized and policy attitudes both are part of the latent concept "attitudes towards social Europe". Furthermore, they verify that generalized and policy attitudes are two separate subdimensions of interpersonal solidarity in their measurement model. The nature of the applied method (confirmatory factor analysis), however, is unsuitable to discuss the rift between the two subdimensions and the causes of this rift.

However, no study has explored so far how and when high support rates for principles of European solidarity break down and Europeans become divided about the realization of social schemes or establishment of institutions adopting the general principles of EU social policy. Nonetheless, understanding why positive generalized attitudes fizzle to less affirmative (even hostile) policy attitudes could provide important information for public policy actors and to ensure the legitimacy of any further political steps to intensify the realization of a social Europe. The reasons for the gap between the two types of attitudes

can be framed as a methodological or as a substantive perspective. This paper focuses on the substantive aspect.³

The current study focuses the relation between generalized and policy attitudes towards European social policy. It poses the research question: what influences the relationship between generalized and policy attitudes towards European social policy? To answer this question the paper explores, what factors are responsible for reported high support rates for attitudes towards the principles of European social policy (i.e. generalized attitudes), but low support rates for attitudes toward uniform European welfare system. Three main groups of factors are discussed, which can be responsible for the discrepancies in response rates: (1) self-interest, (2) specific value orientations underpinning, (3) relations to the EU (and the nation state).

The paper continues by describing the theoretical consideration relevant to explain the difference between generalized and policy attitudes related to European social policy. It describes the potential connections between the two types of attitudes. In the same section, the different mechanisms explaining the relationship of generalized and policy attitudes are also discussed. Furthermore, hypotheses are also developed to test the mechanisms. In the third section of the paper, I discuss the research design and methodological steps employed in the analysis. The fourth section reports the results and gives account of the empirical finding. In the final section of the paper the results are discussed.

2. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

2.1. *Conceptual framework: the link between the two dimensions*

Generalized and policy attitudes are defined in the following but only conceptually, and discussion about the operationalization will be avoided⁴. Generalized attitudes toward European social policy can be understood as the opinions of individuals related to general principles governing European social policy. Such attitudes are typically related to the goals of EU social policy or what is the range of EU social policy that should be achieved. Generalized attitudes do not capture concrete realizations related to EU social policy. In contrast, policy attitudes toward European social policy encompass thoughts of individuals about the implementation of concrete social policy schemes on the European level. That is, policy attitudes describe what people think of schemes ranging from the introduction of basic income schemes, unemployment scheme, EU-wide health insurance, to name a few.

³ Readers interested in the methodological perspective should look into literature on survey measurement and methodological foundations of measuring attitudes (Aalberg 2003; Eagly & Chaiken [1993] 2011; Rokeach 1980, 1968).

⁴ For a slightly different categorization for national welfare state attitudes see Toikko and Rantanen (2017).

To consider the relationship between generalized and policy attitudes toward European social policy and on what is this relationship contingent, it is crucial to understand both the commonalities they share and the distinct differences that set them apart. On the one hand, generalized attitudes and policy attitudes are closely connected and are both associated to the broader concept of *attitudes towards social Europe*. Thus, they share the same topic field and are interrelated enough to be discussed together. On the other hand, they deal with different subdimensions of interpersonal solidarity (Baute et al. 2018). This means that they carry a different meaning for the general public and they also cannot be substituted for each other. That is, they are distinct concepts from one another.

As they are distinct concepts, their association to one another needs to be clarified. This is a rather ambiguous situation. It is uncertain, whether we can assume a causal relationship between the two types of attitudes. On the one hand, generalized attitudes serve the basis for policy attitudes (cf. Aalberg 2003). In a broad enough understanding of generalized attitudes, they could be stand-ins for value-like concepts and they reflect values serving the basis for social Europe. On the other hand, as already noted before, generalized and policy attitudes are two subdimensions of the same concept (Baute et al. 2018). Such evidence suggests that the possible causal relationship between these two types of attitudes is unfounded. Exploring the existence of such causal relationship alone would give enough material for a paper – but would take away the focus of understanding the driving force between these types of attitudes.

So, instead of examining the existence or lack of a causal relationship and what influences this, a different approach is employed in this paper to lead the way out of this theoretical conundrum. Ultimately, the empirically observed gap between the two types of attitudes drives the further investigation of the relationship. So the prime interest of the paper is to understand what factors are responsible for the discrepancy between the types of attitudes.

To investigate this, the paper will utilize a typology, where the two type of attitudes (generalized and policy) constitute two separated dimensions and intersected with each other. To be exact: accepting or rejecting the notion of Europe social policy from a generalized perspective and the perspective of realizing a social policy program are intersected to produce in total four categories. Table 1 demonstrates the depiction of the typology and shows the categories.

Table 1 Typology of attitudes towards social Europe

| | | |
|--|-----------|------------|
| Generalized attitudes \ Policy attitudes | Rejection | Acceptance |
| Rejection | (A) | (B) |
| Acceptance | (C) | (D) |

From a policy perspective and to answer our main research question two categories are the most interesting: cells (B) and (D). In relation to the legitimacy of any kind of political decision regarding the enhancement of social Europe, it is important to understand what factors contribute to someone accepting not only the principles related to EU social policy, but also supporting the implementation of social policy measure. Additionally, it is just as crucial to understand who only agree with the basic principles, but reject the implementation of supranational social policy schemes. Lastly, to solve the puzzle of the discrepancies observed in the literature, it is important to understand how these two groups of individuals differ from each other.

Thus, the paper’s primary focus will be these two categories. In the following, I will recount different factors, which can influence attitudes towards social Europe. I will focus on mechanisms, which help shed light on why someone support both principles of EU social policy and the implementations of EU social policy. Furthermore, I will also take into account factors that could explain the reasons between a respondent falling into category (B) versus (D).

2.2. *Explanatory mechanisms*

In the following three mechanisms are discussed and how factors related to these mechanisms can potentially affect the support for EU social policy. The three mechanisms are: self-interest, value-orientation, and mechanisms connected to transnationalism. The hypotheses are formulated for each mechanism in pairs. Hypotheses earmarked with ‘a’ address the likelihood that someone will support both generalized and policy attitudes at the same time (instead of another constellation), and those with ‘b’ formulate assumptions about the odds that someone is willing to support policy attitudes on top of generalized attitudes, i.e. these hypotheses help to locate factors responsible for how support disappears between generalized attitudes and policy attitudes.

Several of the explanatory factors for attitudes towards EU social policy is motivated by self-interest. The idea is that those who would be direct beneficiaries of EU social policy would have the interest to also support it. Due to his mechanism, we can expect that those in vulnerable social position, will express higher support rates for the EU social policy. While there are arguments stressing that vulnerable individuals fear that the introduction

of European social policy lead them to turn away from such policies (Berg 2007; Gerhards et al. 2016; Mau 2005), this argument has proven to be ungrounded for the large part (for an exception see Berg 2007). In fact, studies focusing on generalized attitudes and policy attitudes have both found that individuals in lower socio-economic position or with lower social status are more likely to support EU social policy (Gerhards et al. 2016; Gerhards et al. 2019a; Gerhards et al. 2019b; Mau 2005). This argument is also supported in the realm of *national* welfare attitudes, where self-interest guides individuals to support social policy programs as they would be the main beneficiaries of the system.

Previous studies have also presented counterarguments and have explained why vulnerable individuals would oppose European welfare solidarity. The rationale is that self-interest, in fact, leads vulnerable groups to reject European level social policy, because they fear that it will mean less benefits for them. However, their empirical findings did not support this argument. On the one hand, Berg (2007) using the Swedish SOM study from 2004 showed that people from lower occupational classes (i.e. blue collar workers) were more likely to support European level social policy than those from higher classes. On the other hand, neither Mau (2005) using Eurobarometer data from 2000 nor Gerhards et al (2016), with EES data, found indication for a structural divide.

Given these considerations, I hypothesize that:

- H1a. The lower one's socio-economic status the higher the probability that they acceptance of both generalized and policy attitudes towards EU social policy.
- H1b. The odds of supporting both generalized and policy attitudes towards EU social policy is higher for those in low socio-economic positions than for those in high socio-economic position.

We can further expect that the mechanism of self-interest can also be linked to market dynamics (cf. Häusermann et al. 2015). In particular, the double dualization theory of European labor markets emphasizes how the vulnerability gap between insiders and outsiders is marked (Häusermann & Schwander 2014; Heidenreich 2015; Rueda 2014). On the individual level this would mean that if self-interest guides attitudes, then labor market position of individuals can influence their beliefs on EU social policy. Insiders of labor market have a much more cushioned social position than outsiders and they are also less reliant on the welfare state, so they have less interest in the development of EU social policy. On the other hand, outsiders in weak labor market positions could benefit from furthering EU social policy. Self-interest plays a role, because outsiders of European labor markets would not be necessarily the main contributors of EU social policy, but they would certainly be the main target groups and recipients of EU welfare benefits.

Stemming from the nature of the double dualization theory, not only personal interest could motivate individuals, but also national interests can serve as the basis for individuals to support or oppose EU social policy. Double dualization also emphasizes how northern EU countries have more stable labor markets resulting in that citizens of these countries have better chances of securing employment for themselves and having

steady incomes (Heidenreich 2015, 2016). This also means that the vulnerability of those living in southern EU member states is higher: the income inequalities are higher and should citizens lose their employment in these countries, they are less likely to be immediately employed again due to the exclusion mechanisms. Thus, from this follows that the interest of citizens in southern European countries dictates that they support EU social policy more strongly than those living in northern EU member states. Therefore, the following hypotheses can be formulated:

H2a. Individuals living in southern EU countries have higher probability to accept of both generalized and policy attitudes towards EU social policy.

On top of such direct effects of the self-interest mechanism, it is also worth to consider how the vulnerability of individuals in *cross-national relativity* could play a role in their views in EU social policy. Personal and national interests can mount together to influence what individuals think about EU social policy. In particular, individuals would strongly oppose EU social policy if they are in a vulnerable labor market position and live in affluent, prospering countries, where social security systems are of high quality. These people are highly reliant on social security – and an introduction of EU social policy could mean that the social safety net that they strongly depend on could potentially loosen for them. Connected to this, EU social policy would relativize the social position of individuals on an EU scale – and with that also the level of vulnerability. This is in contrast to national welfare states, where individuals share the burden and the benefits of the EU social policy only within their own nation state. Thus, those in more prosperous countries but in a nationally vulnerable position may be better off in some case than affluent individuals in economically poorer countries. Taking these considerations into account:

H3a. Individuals with outsider labor market status living in northern EU countries will have higher probability to accept of both generalized and policy attitudes towards EU social policy.

H3b. The odds of supporting both generalized and policy attitudes towards EU social policy is lower for those vulnerable individuals living in a northern European country.

Moving on to the next mechanism to influence attitudes towards EU social policy, I focus on the how values guide people's disposition about EU social policy. In general, values can be considered the underlying yardsticks for attitudes. Values are often regarded as the abstract foundations that anchor attitudes (Hitlin & Piliavin 2004). Thus, values underpinning EU social policy are relevant for attitudes for EU social policy. If individuals adhere to these underlying values then they should also support the notion of EU policy. The current paper differentiates between two value universes: political value orientations and justice principles.

Political value orientations are considered bipolar: individuals can have either left-wing or right-wing orientations. These value orientations address general principles

partially also associated with welfare state and welfare provision. In particular, left-wing ideology is closely linked historically to redistribution and social policy measures. Furthermore, in the political arena the main contenders of EU social policy are also left-wing politicians (Vesan & Corti 2019). Thus, left-wing ideology could serve as the basis for attitudes toward EU social policy. Recent findings have corroborated this mechanism in case of general attitudes (Gerhards et al. 2016; Gerhards et al. 2019b), as well as policy attitudes (Gerhards et al. 2016). On top of this, the same mechanism is reflected in studies focusing on national welfare attitudes: citizens leftist orientations support universalistic, redistributive policies, while individuals with right-wing orientation are conservative and oppose welfare state provision (Gelissen 2000).

H4a. The more left-oriented political values individuals have higher probability to accept of both generalized and policy attitudes towards EU social policy.

H4b. The odds of supporting both generalized and policy attitudes towards EU social policy is higher for more left-oriented individuals.

On top of the political value orientation, justice principles are also relevant for attitudes towards EU social policy. Justice principles constitute citizens' preferences for a certain distributional logic. The justice principle 'need' states that share of goods should be distributed such that everyone's basic needs are met. This principle is reflected in the general notion of EU social policy. Additionally, the need principle is considered a core principle for *national* welfare states (Arts & Gelissen 2001). Empirically, Gerhards and colleagues (Gerhards et al. 2019a; Gerhards et al. 2019b) have identified the need principle being positively associated with general attitudes toward EU social policy. Based on these considerations, those people who adhere to the need principle are the ones who not only support EU social policy in general, but are ready to commit to implementing an EU-wide social policy schemes.

H5a. The more need-oriented individuals have higher probability to accept of both generalized and policy attitudes towards EU social policy.

H5b. The odds of supporting both generalized and policy attitudes towards EU social policy is higher for more need-oriented individuals.

In both cases (political value orientation and justice principles) the commitment to the values can influence the effect they have on attitudes. The more strongly a person is committed to values support the EU policy, the stronger the mechanism with manifest in attitudes. Thus, the intensity of response could mitigate the effect of political value orientations and justice principles.

The last set of factors are related to concepts of transnationalism and cosmopolitanism. This factor is related to the transnational embeddedness of individuals and their connectedness the affairs reaching beyond their nation state. But the character of factors is mixed, because the transnationality of individuals can be understood both from a structural and cultural perspective. While transnationalism from a structural perspective

reflects how mobile individuals are across national borders and how connected they are internationally, the cultural aspect of transnationalism is related to value and affectual underpinnings associated to cosmopolitanism.

Structurally, those individuals who engage in transnational practices and are less confined to national containers, will also have a higher chance to move and make use of EU-wide policies and regulations (not only limited to social policy). Transnationally connected individuals would be open to measures implemented on the EU level in general, because their point of reference is not confined to the nation state due to their transnationality. Thus, it is relatively easy to comprehend the notion transnational (or supranational) measures for transnationally mobile individuals.

However, there is also the counterargument related to how transnationality is just another marker for being affluent. In fact, those who engage in transnational practices are more likely to be affluent in their own country (Delhey et al. 2015; Mau & Mewes 2009). Drawing on the self-interest mechanism, individuals who are transnationally well-connected would have little interest in EU-wide social policies. They already have the ability to move around the EU and live where it best fits their interests thanks to the EU right to free movement decree (The Treaty of Lisbon 2007). However, there is growing evidence that transnational practices foster positive attitudes towards the European Union (Kuhn 2015). This would suggest that potentially transnational practices potentially also promote other aspects connected to European integration.

H6a. Individuals engaging in more transnational practices are more probable to accept both generalized and policy attitudes towards EU social policy.

H6b. The odds of supporting both generalized and policy attitudes towards EU social policy is higher for those with higher transnational engagement.

The cultural aspect of transnationality can also prove to be relevant in shaping attitudes toward EU social policy. Recently, cosmopolitanism has been emphasized as a new cleavage where cosmopolitans and nationalists line up against each along several aspects (Teney et al. 2014; Zürn & Wilde 2016). Given the nature of EU social policy and how it breaches national interests and considers the interests of Europeans independent of their nationality, the nationalists can be expected to be strong opponents toward EU social policy in general. In contrast, those exhibiting strong affectual ties to the EU will also be likely to feel solidarity toward other Europeans. This latter argument has been demonstrated in a recent publication from Kuhn and colleagues (2017). The coauthors demonstrate that cosmopolitanism does play a key role in whether Europeans are ready to redistribute income across European borders. Furthermore, Baute and colleagues (2019a) show that identifying with the EU promotes transnational solidarity among Europeans. Thus, having primarily sense of connectedness to Europe could boost the support for generalized and policy attitudes as well.

H7a. Individuals identifying with Europe will have more probability to accept of both generalized and policy attitudes towards EU social policy.

H7b. The odds of supporting both generalized and policy attitudes towards EU social policy is higher for those identifying with Europe.

Lastly, the perception of the competences of the executing body of policy measures can also play a crucial role for the support of EU social policy. Hooghe and Verhaegen (2017) emphasize that EU social policy (but effectively any EU-wide policy with an “intrusive” nature) cannot function without the trust of individuals. For individuals to be willing to allow measures to be carried over to the EU level – they need to trust the body executing the tasks related to these measures. If they lack trust in the EU and its institutions, they should be less willing delegate new competences to the EU. While general attitudes towards EU social policy do not refer to the executing body of the measures, policy attitudes are directly connected with the body implementing the changes. Thus, while we can expect that trust in the EU is fosters attitudes towards EU social policy, but more likely most relevant for the policy attitudes aspect.

H8a. Individuals more trusting toward EU institutions will have higher probability to accept of both generalized and policy attitudes towards EU social policy.

H8b. The odds of supporting both generalized and policy attitudes towards EU social policy is higher for those more trusting toward EU institutions.

Additionally to the high trust for positive attitudes, the performance of *national* governments may also intensify the support for EU social policy. Baute and colleagues (Baute et al. 2019b) emphasize the possible spillover effects of trust in national institutions being crucial into the trust in institutions on the EU level. If citizens do not feel that their government is competent enough, the EU taking over competences may be a welcomed alternative. This mechanism can potentially detected at both individual and country level. At the individual level, if citizens distrust their government, they potentially also question their competences to secure a social safety net. This would lead to them being open to transferring competences to the EU level.

H9a. Individuals less trusting toward their own national government will have a higher probability to accept of both generalized and policy attitudes towards EU social policy.

H9b. The odds of supporting both generalized and policy attitudes towards EU social policy is higher for those with less trust in their own national government.

On the country level, corruption can be a stand-in for lack of institutional trust. Therefore the presence of corruption could be potentially be a factor hindering individuals to be more open and supportive of EU social policies. The presence of corruption in a society indicates the violation of procedural justice norms and the lack of transparency related to governmental transfers. The funding from the EU is a significant and essential part of national budgets, especially in countries situated more on the

periphery, or those, which have been more strongly affected by the economic crisis. Additionally, funding from the EU is distributed by policy makers on the national level. However, if corruption is an issue in a given country, individuals may wish to transfer the competences related to EU funding to potentially more trustworthy actor at the EU level. From this follows that EU social policy could be seen as best executed also from an EU level and individuals will be more supportive of EU social policy, if their governments do not ensure the “safe” redistribution of EU funding.

H10a. Individuals living in countries with high level of corruption will more likely exhibit the acceptance of both generalized and policy attitudes towards EU social policy.

Overall, the above stated thoughts hypothesize systematic differences between people and the reason why their attitudes toward EU social policy can differ. As the hypotheses cover a broad range of topics, should all the above stated hypotheses be rejected, it may well be, that there is no structural/cultural background for the difference in attitudes. In other words: then no systematic differences could be determined at all. Then the results (or rather: the lack thereof) would suggest that the nature of how individuals support vague concepts much more easily than a very specific formulation of some sort of implementation connected to the same topic. In this case, measurement of the concepts would be the sole contender for the perceived discrepancies.

3. DATA AND METHODS

To investigate the theoretical assumptions, the empirical analysis uses the Transnational European Solidarity Survey (TESS), a unique general population survey stemming from primary data collection.⁵ TESS was carried out in 13 EU countries⁶ between May and November of 2016 with CATI method of telephone interviews (both landline and mobile). Respondents were exclusively registered national citizens aged 18 or older at the time of the survey. TNS Opinion and Social, the public opinion polling institution that is also responsible for the Eurobarometer surveys, carried out the survey. After listwise deletion

⁶ For funding reasons we had to restrict our survey to 13 countries. The survey was carried out in Austria, Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Slovakia, and Sweden. We systematically selected these countries in order to gather the broadest spectrum of EU countries. We considered the following aspects: (a) whether a country formerly received or currently receives financial aid in relation to the Eurozone crisis; (b) whether the country is a member of the currency union or not; (c) to which welfare state regime the country belongs (i.e. liberal, social-democratic, conservative, Mediterranean, post-socialist). Additionally, we considered how long they have been members of the European Union. We included both founding members of the European Economic Community (EEC), as well as relatively young EU Member States.

of missing values among the variables applied in the analysis, the number of cases reached 9,143 respondents.

TESS is an optimal dataset to test the previously discussed assumptions, because it provides items to measure both generalized attitudes and policy attitudes.⁷ Thus, information and data is available to construct the bidimensional typology (see Table 1). For the first dimension of the typology (generalized attitudes), four items are available in the TESS to measure as four-point Likert-scales: (1) the European Union should guarantee access to health care for everyone in the EU, (2) the European Union should guarantee a decent standard of living for the elderly in the EU, (3) the European Union should guarantee a decent standard of living for the unemployed in the EU, and (4) the European Union should reduce income differences between the rich and poor in the EU. For the second dimension of the typology (policy attitudes), there is only a single stand-alone item with the following wording (Gerhards et al. [unpublished]: 29): “There should be a uniform social welfare system for everyone in the EU, even if this leads to an increase in taxes and social spending in [COUNTRY].”

Before constructing the typology, it was ascertained that the two dimensions are not only theoretically separate dimensions, but also empirically (see Appendix for details on the measurement model). Following this the items were treated to operationalize the typology. First, the responses were dichotomized for all items. For the first dimension, respondents consenting to all four generalized attitude items (i.e. responding with tend to agree or fully agree) were put into one category, while everyone else declining at least one were grouped together to another.⁸ Similarly, for the second dimension respondents favoring introducing a European welfare system were in one category, while those rejecting the notion were in another category. The four-category typology was then formed by intersecting the two dimensions. The categories were the following: (a) rejecting both principles and implementation, (b) accepting only principles, (c) accepting only implementation, (d) accepting both dimensions.

To test the hypotheses a set of independent variables were included in the analysis. At the individual level, the socio-economic status of individuals were measured by their highest level of education (divided into three categories: primary or less, secondary, and tertiary), their occupational class based on the EGP class scheme (Evans 1992), and the equalized household income divided into deciles for cross-national comparability. The TESS dataset lacks variables to well capture insiders and outsiders of the labor market. However an attempt is made to divide respondents based on their employment status (with categories: fully employed or self-employed, employed part-time, unemployed,

⁷ For details on the individual distributions of the single items: see (Gerhards, Jürgen et al. 2019a; Gerhards, Jürgen et al. 2019b).

⁸ Several other versions of the typology were tested, where the cut-off points and constellations of the four items were different. The analyses were replicated with the different versions, but the results are. See supplement for more details.

inactive). Two variables captured the mechanisms related to value dispositions. Political value orientation was measured by the established index of self-placement on a left-right scale (Lo et al. 2013). Preference for the need distributive principle was measured by the responses to the statement, "Income should be distributed in a way that ensures everyone's basic needs are met" (Gerhards et al. [unpublished]: 95). For the third dimension of mechanisms, transnationalism, several concepts were operationalized. Transnational practices captures whether individuals have contact with foreigners or whether they themselves have lived abroad as a dummy variable (0 meaning they have had some kind of transnational experiences in the past). Identification with one's own nation state and identification with the EU were summarized in a four-category variable (1 meaning no identification, 2 only identification with nation state, 3 only with EU, and 4 identification with both). Lastly, trust in national institutions and EU are also hypothesized to be connected to attitudes toward EU social policy. Given again the duality and the potentially connectedness of the two items, they were combined into a four-category variable (1 meaning no trust in institutions, 2 only trust in nation institutions, 3 trusts only EU, and 4 trusts both). Furthermore, I also controlled for number of kids in household, age, and gender, as these factors potentially can be connected to self-interested mechanism. For details on the exact wording of the items, see the TESS codebook (Gerhards et al. [unpublished]). To control for contextual affects attributed to respondents living in different countries, country dummies were also inserted into the analysis.

Table 2 Overview of descriptive statistics for independent variables

| Variable | Mean | SD | Min | Max |
|--|-------------|-----------|------------|------------|
| Age | 54.05 | 16.38 | 18 | 97 |
| Number of kids in household | 0.36 | 0.77 | 0 | 8 |
| Female(ref.: male) | 0.54 | --- | 0 | 1 |
| <i>Level of education</i> | | | | |
| Tertiary | 0.39 | --- | 0 | 1 |
| Secondary | 0.57 | --- | 0 | 1 |
| Primary or lower | 0.04 | --- | 0 | 1 |
| <i>EGP-Class</i> | | | | |
| Upper class (I) | 0.22 | --- | 0 | 1 |
| Upper middle class (II) | 0.16 | --- | 0 | 1 |
| Center middle class (IIIa) | 0.17 | --- | 0 | 1 |
| Lower middle class (V & VI) | 0.12 | --- | 0 | 1 |
| Self-employed (IVab & IVc) | 0.05 | --- | 0 | 1 |
| Routine non-manual (IIIb) | 0.17 | --- | 0 | 1 |
| Unskilled manual workers & agriculture (VIIa & VIIb) | 0.06 | --- | 0 | 1 |
| EGP-Class n.a. | 0.04 | --- | 0 | 1 |
| Income | 5.56 | 2.84 | 1 | 10 |
| <i>Employment status</i> | | | | |
| Full-time or self-employed | 0.44 | --- | 0 | 1 |
| Part-time employed | 0.08 | --- | 0 | 1 |
| Unemployed | 0.06 | --- | 0 | 1 |
| Inactive | 0.43 | --- | 0 | 1 |
| <i>Political value orientation</i> | | | | |
| Center | 0.34 | --- | 0 | 1 |
| Far Left | 0.1 | --- | 0 | 1 |
| Moderate Left | 0.22 | --- | 0 | 1 |
| Moderate Right | 0.25 | --- | 0 | 1 |
| Far Right | 0.09 | --- | 0 | 1 |
| Preference of Need Justice Principle | 3.63 | 0.66 | 1 | 4 |
| Experience with cross-border practices(ref.: none) | 0.66 | --- | 0 | 1 |
| <i>Identity</i> | | | | |
| Identifies with Both | 0.75 | --- | 0 | 1 |
| Identifies with None | 0.02 | --- | 0 | 1 |
| Identifies with (Only) EU | 0.03 | --- | 0 | 1 |
| Identifies with (Only) Nation | 0.2 | --- | 0 | 1 |
| <i>Level of trust</i> | | | | |
| Trusts Both | 0.28 | --- | 0 | 1 |
| Trusts None | 0.39 | --- | 0 | 1 |
| Trusts (Only) EU | 0.16 | --- | 0 | 1 |
| Trusts (Only) Nation | 0.17 | --- | 0 | 1 |

Additionally, two hypotheses also addressed country-level mechanisms, so several macro level variables related to these hypotheses were also incorporated into the analysis. In particular, the prosperity of countries is measured by a set of macro-economic and inequality indicators: GDP per capita, unemployment rate, level of income inequality. For

an indicator for corruption, the corruption perception index (CPI) from Transparency International (Transparency International 2015).

Given the nominal measurement level of the typology, multinomial logistic regression (MNL) was employed. MNL is from the family of general linear models, where the dependent variable is nominal. MNL can be considered a set of binary logistic models, where each of the categories of the dependent variables are compared to one another. MNL models are estimated with maximum likelihood estimation and the main value for the fit of the model is the likelihood value of the model. MNL can be seen as a probability model, in the sense that the coefficients of the model express the probability of respondents falling into a specific category compared to the chosen reference category (Long 1997). These probabilities are dependent on the explanatory variables in the model. MNL can be used in both bivariate and multivariate cases. For this paper, MNL is the main method to understand what are the main factors influencing the way individuals think about European welfare solidarity.⁹

The majority of the hypotheses focus on individual level mechanisms. So the first set of models the individual level variables are inserted step-by-step based on their thematic focus. Given the number of countries (N=13), the analysis does not apply hierarchical modelling, but instead operates with clustered standard errors and controls for country contextual effects with country dummies. In case of the analysis focusing macro level effects, a two-step approach is undertaken where the tau values of the country dummies are contrasted with the macro level variables described previously. Analyses were conducted in Stata (version 15) and in R (version 3.5.3).

4. ANALYSIS

4.1. Overview of the typology

The descriptive statistics shows that respondents are spread out across all four categories of the typology (see Table 3, for overview). A large percentage of respondents support both the general principles of EU social policy, as well as its institutionalization. However, the rate does not reach half of the sample size – so we cannot talk about absolute majority standing headstrong behind both generalized and policy attitudes. In contrast, a lower rate of respondents are against the institutionalization, but support the general principles. This rate is about half the rate of respondents with positive general and policy attitudes. Similar amount of respondents are against European welfare solidarity in general and support neither general principles nor institutionalization. In total, this makes up about one fifth of all respondents. Lastly, the fourth category also has considerable number of

⁹ To check the robustness of the results, logistic regression was also conducted for the two typology categories with theoretical relevance. However, to empirically correctly model the four-fold typology, employing a multinomial logistic regression is more accurate.

respondents. In this category are those, who support institutionalization, but do not agree with general principles underlying them.¹⁰

Table 3 Distribution of respondents among

| Generalized attitudes Policy attitudes | Rejection | Acceptance |
|---|-----------|------------|
| Rejection | 20.4% | 19.6% |
| Acceptance | 14% | 45.6% |

If we would look at any of the alternative operationalizations, where the typology would only consider one of the subdimension of general principles (social security or redistribution), the division among the respondents would be similar. The rate of those supporting institutionalization of EU social policy and redistributive principles or social security wobbles around 50%. By such an operationalization you have few individuals with negative general and policy attitudes (13% and 15%, respectively), and the rate of individuals only supporting general principles is higher (30% and 24% respectively).

Given the comparability of the different operationalizations the subsequent analysis will only focus on the typology that incorporates both subdimensions of principles. When the analysis was conducted for typologies only incorporating one of the subdimensions, the effects were, in fact, more pronounced. In the following, the mechanisms influencing individuals to fall in a certain typology category will be investigated. Given the focus of the theoretical framework, we are most interested in understanding what influences the chances of someone supporting the general principles of EU social policy and its institutionalization in form of a European social security system. Second topic of interest is the odds that someone will positively support both general principles and policy measures compared to those only supporting the general principles. The former is investigated by predicted probabilities, while the latter can be best understood with odds ratios (OR).

4.2. *The relevance of self-interest*

A look at the Wald-test shows that variables capturing the self-interest exhibit mixed effects. Level of education, occupation, and employment status have little to no effect on

¹⁰ These individuals represent a special subgroup, where it is not clear why they support more restrictive measures but not general aspects of EU social policy. On the one hand, it could be an indication that indeed general and policy attitudes are not causally related. But we, furthermore, cannot exclude the possibility that respondents misunderstood the question and their sole support for institutionalization is an artefact. Within the framework of the study, however, there is no means to investigate this question further.

attitudes towards EU social policy. On the other hand, income has an exceptionally strong effect based on the value of the Wald-test. The slopes of the predicted probabilities also reflect the effect of income. The higher the household income of an individual, the less likely will he or she support general principles of the European welfare state solidarity and the introduction of a uniform social security simultaneously. However, the actual impact of income when looking at predicted probabilities is moderate: a hypothetical individual in the lowest decile have about 7 percentage point higher probability to support EU social policy compared to those from households in the highest income decile. On top of the significant effect of income, gender also proved to be significant for attitudes towards EU social policy. While gender, is not a direct measure of weaker socioeconomic status, the labor market position of women is considered more vulnerable than that of men (Addabbo et al. 2015; Castellano & Rocca 2019). Thus, the social position of women are also reflected in our results: women more likely support the principles and the institutionalization of EU social policy than men.

When focusing solely on the factors relevant for the cut-off between the support for general principles and institutionalization, the results shed further light on the mechanisms at large. Income and gender play a less prominent role than before (the coefficient is only significant when not controlled by other relevant factors in the realm of values and transnationalism), while occupation and level of education seem to matter for the divide between the two categories of interest. The odds that someone will support not only general principles but also the institutionalization of EU social policies decreases if they have a secondary education instead of tertiary. Those in lower occupational classes have higher odds to support only the general principles of EU social policy but not institutionalization.

Lastly, the macro level analysis conducted with a two-step regression reveal that national self-interest can motivate attitudes. There is a higher percent of respondent supporting both the general principles and the institutionalization in countries, which are less prosperous and have high levels of (net) income inequality. Also corresponding to the arguments in previous section, the data shows that in southern EU member states, the predicted probabilities are significantly higher than in Western or Eastern member states.




Figure 1 The effect of unemployment rate and income inequality on the predicted probability that identification and institutional trust on attitudes towards social Europe

All in all, the results shows that the mechanism of self-interest only has a moderate effect on attitudes towards social policy and in fact does not motivate individuals to transfer their general attitudes toward policy attitudes. While the general tendency is true that the more likely you might rely on social policy in general due to your socioeconomic position, the more likely they support both the general principles and the institutionalization of EU social policy. However, the data indicates that people in lower occupational classes are less likely to go the extra mile for the institutionalization of the EU social policy.

4.3. *The relevance of values*

In contrast to socioeconomic position, indicators associated to values and also transnational have clearer and stronger effects. Both self-placement on a left-right scale as well as the preference for the need justice principles show a clear association with attitudes toward EU social policy. Individuals placing themselves on the far-left or moderate left side of the scale have more than 10 percentage points higher probability to be in the category where general principles and policy implementation is both supported than those in the center of the political scale, and close 20 percentage points higher probability than those at the right end of the political self-placement scale. The relevance of the need principle preference is also demonstrated by the analysis. Those respondents who have a strong preference for the need principle are four-fold more likely to have supportive attitudes towards the general principles and the actual institutionalization of EU social policy if holding everything else on average values.

Both left-right placement, as well as preference for the need principle are also relevant when investigating whether the value disposition of respondents motivate their attitudes

between general and policy attitudes. The odds increase of choosing also the institutionalization of EU social policy if someone in left-leaning (compared to those in the center field). In contrast, respondents placing themselves on the right end of the political scale are not significantly different from respondents in the center. Preferences towards the need principle also increase the chances of choosing not only the general principles of EU social policy, but also supporting its institutionalization. All in all, there is indication that attitudes towards EU social policy are rooted in value orientation of individuals.




Figure 2 Predicted probabilities for the effect of value orientation on attitudes towards social Europe

4.4. The relevance of transnationality

Lastly, the analysis also investigates whether various transnational aspects of respondents attributes were also associated with their attitudes towards EU social policy. The Wald-test yielded that while the transnational practices are only marginally relevant for attitudes towards EU social policy, identity and institutional trust play a role in shaping attitudes. A look at predicted probabilities shows that in case of identity, the crucial aspect is whether individuals exclusively identify with only their nation state. These individuals have in average 15 percentage point less chance to support EU social policy than anyone who identifies (also) with the EU and even among those who do not identify with either the EU nor their own nation state. Trust in the national government and EU institutions also is relevant for attitudes towards EU social policy. Someone exhibiting institutional trust on the national and the EU level will have the highest probability to support the general principles and the institutionalization of EU social policy. On average this is significantly higher than those have only trust in their own government and also those lacking institutional trust at both spatial levels. A complementary finding on the macro

level is, that in countries, where the corruption perception index is low (i.e. there is higher levels of corruption reported), the predicted probabilities for preferring both general principles and the institutionalization of EU social policy are higher. However, the connection is not particularly strong.

When focusing on the odds for individuals to only support general principles instead of both principles and the institutionalization of EU social policy, the results mirror the effects discussed on the previous paragraph. The odds are significantly lower for someone to support both types of attitudes, if respondents have exclusively a national identity. In case of trust, the picture is much more nuanced. The support of both dimensions of attitudes of EU policy (in contrast to only general principles) is contingent on both the trust in national and EU governments. In all other cases (when only trusting institutions at one of the spatial level or none at all), the odds are higher for individuals only to support the general principles of EU social policy and not its institutionalization. Thus, these results indicate that it is not enough for individuals to be disillusioned by their own government to then be open to organize a social safety net at the European level, but the trust in the EU institutions is also indispensable. All in all, the results indicate that trust and identity foster attitudes toward EU social policy.




Figure 3 Predicted probabilities for the effect of identification and institutional trust on attitudes towards social Europe

5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This study set out to understand what factors influencing attitudes towards EU social policy. It had a unique approach in conceptualizing and connecting generalized and policy attitudes. It developed a typology to analyze the connection between these two types of attitudes and the factors, relevant for them. Three main individual level mechanisms were hypothesized to be relevant: self-interest, value-related and transnationalism. Survey data from the TESS dataset were applied to the analysis.

The results clearly show that there are systematic differences between individuals who are willing to go “all in” for the realization of a stronger social Europe. The divide is strongly of cultural nature, so filling structural differences. While hypotheses reflecting the self-interest mechanisms were to a large degree rejected, the analysis supported hypotheses addressing mechanisms related to value disposition and as transnationalism proved to be relevant for attitudes. Thus, findings of this paper reflect on recent findings from Lahusen and Grasso (2018), who emphasize how Euroscepticism is one of the main obstacles undermining the strengthening of European solidarity.

The probability of individuals to support both the generalized and policy attitudes decrease as the household income of individuals increased. Only H3 relating to macro level manifestation of self-interest can be contended: in countries with negative GDP growth rates and with high levels of unemployment rate are more likely to support both general principle of social Europe individuals support to a larger degree both principles and policies related to social Europe. In contrast, results overwhelmingly support hypotheses aimed at testing the relationship between attitudes and cultural mechanisms.

Those having a leftist political orientation and subscribing to the need principle push individuals are more likely to support generalized and policy attitudes at the same time.

Such results are not all that surprising, considering how the operationalization of self-interest does not stem from attitudes, whereas the value are much closer related to attitudes. Thus, the analysis lacks items where respondent reflect on their own economic and social standing. So the low effects can be partially attributed to this. Another limitation of the paper is that it has not (could not) clear up, whether respondent in this latter category are merely an artefact due to measurement and operationalization issues, or such response patterns are related to the competences of respondents. Such issues can be addressed where better measurement tools are available and research agendas are specialized for these specific issues. In particular, to understand the connection between general and policy attitudes, panel analysis and even experimental design research designs would make substantive contribution to our understanding of the underlying mechanisms. Nevertheless, given that some systematic differentiation among respondents could be identified, this indicates that typology was not completely at random. Furthermore, since level of education and other structural factors were weak,

Ultimately, this current paper could only scratch the surface of the issues surround social Europe. It provides some basic observations related to the relation between generalized and policy attitudes. It lacks a methodological approach (due to the nature of the available data) of understanding the psychometric mechanism underlying these two types of attitudes. Furthermore, the scope of the paper also ignored the mechanisms associated with individuals lacking any commitment to the notion of social Europe, as well as those who reject the principles of social Europe, but nonetheless welcome the implementation of a uniform European social welfare system.

From an applied perspective this analysis has contributed to understanding whether there are any social groups emerging who potentially can push forward the realization of a European welfare state in the European Union. Or on the flip side: whether there are any social groups who particularly have the potential to hinder the development of a welfare state that provides a safety net for all Europeans. The results clearly indicate that European integration and the realization of a social Europe is not contingent on the action of structural interest groups. Instead, the support seems to be value-driven, with a touch of pragmatism about trusting institutions: social Europe is not an alternative to national welfare systems, but is rather a viable rather as an add-on only if EU as a supranational organization has solidified and gained a certain level of credibility. Looking at this connection from another perspective: the deepening of social Europe should not be the sole driver of European integration.

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8. APPENDIX

Table 4 Measurement model

| <i>Indicators</i> | Factor loadings | |
|--|-----------------|-----------|
| [EU] should guarantee access to health care in the EU | 0.701 | 0.623 |
| [EU] should guarantee a decent standard of living for the elderly in the EU | 0.784 | 0.754 |
| [EU] should guarantee a decent standard of living for the unemployed in the EU | 0.735 | 0.666 |
| [EU] should reduce income differences between the rich and poor in the EU | 0.662 | 0.584 |
| Uniform social welfare system for everyone in the EU | 0.394 | - |
| CFI | 0.992 | 0.996 |
| RMSEA | 0.015 | 0.011 |
| AIC | 103709.561 | 78646.118 |

Source: TESS 2016, own calculations, N= 8 922. Confirmatory factor analysis. Standardized factor loadings and fit-indices.

Notes: + p<.1 * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001

Table 5 Macro level effects on predicted probabilities for supporting general principles and institutionalization of social Europe

| <i>Macro variables</i> | |
|---|-----------|
| GDP per capita (in 1000 USD) | -0.512+ |
| Government social spending (percent of GDP) | -0.388 |
| Poverty Rate (percent) | 0.685* |
| Income inequality (Gini index) | 2.335*** |
| GDP growth rate (percent) | -0.558** |
| Unemployment Growth Rate (2008-2015), % | 1.439** |
| Southern Europe | 19.701*** |

| | |
|-----------------------------|--------|
| Corruption perception index | -0.41* |
|-----------------------------|--------|

Source: TESS 2016, own calculations, N=13. Bivariate OLS regression with predicted probabilities for each country from M6 pooled regression as dependent variable and macro level indicator as independent variables with country clustered robust standard errors

Notes: + p<.1 * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001

Table 6 Macro level effects on predicted probabilities for supporting only general principles related to social Europe

Macro variables

| | |
|---|---------|
| GDP per capita (in 1000 USD) | 0.01 |
| Government social spending (percent of GDP) | 0.034 |
| Poverty rate (percent) | 0.194* |
| Income inequality (Gini index) | 0.08 |
| GDP growth rate (percent) | -0.157* |
| Unemployment growth rate (2008-2015), % | 0.211 |
| Southern Europe | 1.251 |
| Corruption perception index | -0.062 |

Source: TESS 2016, own calculations, N=13. Bivariate OLS regression with predicted probabilities for each country from M6 pooled regression as dependent variable and macro level indicator as independent variables with country clustered robust standard errors

Notes: + p<.1 * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001

Table 7 Odds ratios for supporting only generalized principles versus support both generalized principles and implementation of a European social security system

| | M1 | M2 |
|--|----|---------|
| Sex (Ref.: Male) | | 0.974 |
| [1] Non- or primary | | 1.080 |
| [2] Secondary | | 1.066 |
| [3] Tertiary | | (ref.) |
| [1] Upper class (I) | | (ref.) |
| [2] Upper middle class (II) | | 1.044 |
| [3] Center middle class (IIIa) | | 0.783* |
| [4] Lower middle class (V & VI) | | 0.933 |
| [5] Self-employed (IVab & IVc) | | 0.852 |
| [6] Routine non-manual (IIIb) | | 0.992 |
| [7] Unskilled manual workers & agriculture (VIIa & VIIb) | | 0.722 |
| deciles | | 1.011 |
| [1] Full-time or self-employed | | (ref.) |
| [2] Part-time employed | | 0.835 |
| [3] Unemployed | | 1.028 |
| [4] Inactive | | 0.943 |
| [1] Left | | 1.371** |
| [2] Moderate Left | | 1.503** |

| | |
|-----------------------------|---------|
| [3] Center | (ref.) |
| [4] Moderate Right | 0.883 |
| [5] Right | 0.907 |
| Justice: Basic needs (mis.) | 1.309** |

| | M1 | M2 |
|---------------------------------------|----------|----------|
| [0] Identifies with neither | | 1.017 |
| [1] (Only) EU | | 1.537* |
| [10] (Only) National | | 0.619*** |
| [11] Identifies with both | | (ref.) |
| [0] Trusts neither | | 0.544*** |
| [1] Trusts (Only) EU | | 0.783** |
| [10] Trusts (Only) National | | 0.547*** |
| [11] Trusts both | | (ref.) |
| Trust: European Union (mis., rev.) | | |
| No engagement | | 1 |
| Some engagement | | 1.094 |
| Age in 10 years | 1.140*** | 1.135*** |
| Household: Number of kids | 0.994 | 1.000 |
| Netherlands | 1.220*** | 1.521*** |
| Germany | 1 | 1 |
| Spain | 2.651*** | 2.929*** |
| Poland | 1.558*** | 2.006*** |
| Sweden | 1.609*** | 2.082*** |
| Greece | 0.905** | 1.406*** |
| Hungary | 1.460*** | 1.871*** |
| Austria | 0.777*** | 0.863*** |
| Republic of Cyprus | 1.262*** | 1.886*** |
| Ireland | 1.214*** | 1.541*** |
| Portugal | 1.766*** | 2.048*** |
| Slovakia | 1.006 | 1.198*** |

| | | |
|--------------|---------|---------|
| France | 1.339** | 1.798** |
| Observations | 9143 | 9143 |
| R^2 | | |
| AIC | 22580.7 | 21348.2 |

Exponentiated coefficients

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$