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The Weaker Voice in Asymmetric Alliances

*How voice opportunities affect weaker partners' choice for
alliance persistence or termination*

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Introduction

Diplomatic history provides several examples of weaker allies that take themselves out of military agreements with major powers in charge of guarantying for their security. Unfortunately, alliance theorists have barely been focusing on this empirical puzzle, assuming widely that weaker sides in asymmetric relationships take on a passive attitude. Still, we can find many cases of unsatisfied minor allies that prefer to terminate military agreements instead of continuing to benefit from the stronger side's protection. To solve this puzzle, I argue that the *effectiveness of a minor ally's voice* affects its preference for the persistence or termination of an asymmetric alliance. Minor allies can develop specific needs and define their interests in terms of preserving or increasing their autonomy vis-à-vis the stronger partner. On the other hand, great powers can fail in the management of the inter-allied conflict adopting a coercive posture that denies a sufficient degree of autonomy to the weaker side.

Therefore, the following thesis aim to fill a gap in the alliance literature. Indeed, why the weaker side in asymmetric alliances renounces to the stronger ally's protection is an overlooked issue among IR scholars. Although numerous debates developed concerning the origins, costs, benefits, and security dilemmas of military alliances, few contributions touched the topic of alliances' persistence and termination until the end of the Cold War. The debate in the 1990s, moreover, focused quite narrowly on the United States' bipolar alliances. Realist theorists claimed that changes in the conditions supporting the US alliances since the time of their formation could favor the security agreements' dissolution. More specifically, neorealist authors judged the disappearance of the original enemy as the main reason for NATO's lack of cohesion and likely dissolution.¹ Differently, neoliberal institutionalist scholars argued that conditions predicting the alliances' formation were not necessarily

¹ Waltz K., "The Emerging Structure of International Politics", *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1993, pp. 44-79

significant predictors for alliance persistence. These authors, for example, found that the development of assets specificity increased the likelihood of NATO's persistence even though its external environment was significantly transformed.² In light of this debate, statistically oriented scholars emphasized how shifts in the allies' international power could affect the alliances' evolution. James Morrow engaged in large statistical studies finding that changes in the aggregate allies' capabilities affected significantly the alliances' dissolution.³ Other scholars specified this hypothesis finding that either side's change in capabilities could lead to alliance termination.⁴

However, these studies still leave a gap in alliance theory having trouble explaining the variation we find in diplomatic history concerning allies' behavior. On the one hand, they fail to emphasize which specific causal mechanisms characterize asymmetric and symmetric alliances concerning the agreements persistence or termination. Moreover, relatively little attention then has been given to the critical issue of which member state in asymmetric alliances – major or minor ally – is terminating the alliance. Rather the weaker sides in asymmetric relationships are judged as merely passive actors.

Therefore, at the current state of the art, it is unfortunately under-researched why the weaker side in an asymmetric alliance opts for the persistence or termination of its security agreement. Nonetheless, the 20th century diplomatic history provides several examples of weaker partners that unilaterally abrogate military agreements with major powers in charge of

² McCalla R., "NATO's Persistence after the Cold War", *International Organization*, Vol. 50, No. 3 (Summer, 1996), pp. 445-475; Wallander C., "Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War", *International Organization*, Vol. 54, No. 4 (Autumn, 2000), pp. 705-735

³ Morrow J., "Alliances and Asymmetry: An alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances", *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 35, No. 4, November 1991, pp. 903-933; see also Bennet S., "Testing alternative models of alliance duration, 1816-1984", *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Jul., 1997), pp. 846-878

⁴ Leeds & Savun, "Terminating Alliances: Why Do States Abrogate Agreements?", *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 69, No. 4; November 2007, pp. 1118-1132

guarantying for their security. In 1951, Egypt famously terminated the alliance with Britain aiming to increase its independence and autonomy. Differently, other British minor allies tried to preserve their asymmetric alliance in virtue of the benefits they received. In 1955, Iraq was successful in renewing its agreement with London improving its regional status. On the other hand, the US alliances with Australia and New Zealand evolved in a significant different way in the mid-1980s. New Zealand preferred to leave ANZUS while Australia strengthened the tie with the major partner. Therefore, what did lead some minor allies to abrogate unilaterally their security agreements with the major partner while others preferred to strengthen it? How can we explain a minor ally's stance toward an alliance persistence or termination?

The following thesis argues that a weaker ally's quest for autonomy and the effectiveness of its voice opportunities can critically affect the alliance evolution. The argument relies on the following logic. Once the minor partner in an asymmetric alliance suffers from some alliance-deficits, it can start negotiating a greater leeway from the stronger ally to satisfy its needs. It might ask a change in patterns of transactions and a renegotiation of agreements to obtain a better distribution of benefits. Here, the (mis)management of interallied relations can affect significantly the weaker side's preference for the persistence or termination of an alliance. For instance, a stronger side always maximizing its advantage of relative power can favor the resistance and the sense of alienation of the weaker partner. The weaker side's voice ineffectiveness, in these cases, can lead likely to the alliance termination. Differently, if the stronger side accommodates the partner needs, it can enjoy an increased legitimacy by favoring the weaker actor's sense of inclusion. Although the stronger side might pay some costs investing its power resources in the short term, it is more likely to prolong the existing matrix of power in the long run. The weaker side's voice effectiveness then can likely lead to the alliance persistence.

These arguments are defined through a model of asymmetric alliance persistence and termination, while four empirical cases tests its strength. The thesis indeed consists of two parts. Theoretic speculation characterizes

Part I (Chapter I and II), while Part II develops the empirical analyses (Chapter III, IV, V and VI).

The first chapter provides a brief literature review on military alliances' persistence and termination. It analyses the realist, institutionalist and empirical contributions on the topic. Then, the second chapter develops an innovative view entering the debate. It theorizes the impact of an omitted variable, which is the *effectiveness of a minor ally's voice*, defining a model of asymmetric alliance persistence and termination. Afterward the empirical chapters analyze four cases of asymmetric alliances. The third chapter describes the UK-Egypt alliance (1936-1951) as a case of alliance termination. The fourth chapter illustrates the UK-Iraq alliance (1932-1955) as a case of alliance termination. The fifth chapter analyses the New Zealand detachment from ANZUS in the mid-1980s as a case of alliance termination. The sixth empirical chapter, finally, discusses the US-Australia relation from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s as a case of successful alliance persistence.

Part I – The Theoretical Framework

The next two chapters constitute the research theoretic part. The first chapter provides a brief literature review concerning the debate on military alliances' persistence and termination. It analyses the realist, institutionalist and empirical contributions on the topic. The aim is to describe the field's state of the art in order to identify some gaps in the alliance theories. I found two puzzles. On the theoretic level, current studies lead to indeterminate hypotheses concerning the persistence or termination of military alliances. It implies a gap in alliance theory. On the empirical level, alliance theories do not account for cases of minor allies that are actively engaged in terminating their security agreement with a great power. It means ignoring cases of diplomatic history on the base of a wrong assumption (namely, the weaker ally's passive role).

To solve these puzzles, the second chapter defines a model of asymmetric alliance persistence and termination introducing an omitted variable, which integrates a preexisting theoretical framework. I argue that the *effectiveness of a minor ally's voice* affects the weaker side's preference for alliance persistence or termination. Minor allies can develop specific needs and define their interests in terms of preserving or increasing their autonomy vis-à-vis the stronger partner. Once the major ally adopts a coercive posture denying a sufficient degree of autonomy to the weaker side, the alliance termination is more likely to occur. Differently, if the stronger side accommodates the partner's needs, the minor ally has incentives to keep the alliance. Therefore, I theorize the *effectiveness of a minor ally's voice* as a crucial factor to account for several overlooked cases of asymmetric alliance termination and to understand the persistence of successful military agreements.

CHAPTER 1

The Persistence and Termination of Military Alliances

The next paragraphs provide a brief literature review describing the state of the art of the debate and outlining some gaps in alliance theory. The critical questions of interests are the following: how can we explain the states' decision to terminate a military alliance? What are the causes that lead states to break security agreements once welcomed? Why some alliances survive to inter-allied crisis while others end up unilaterally abrogated?

To answer these questions, here we consider three research perspectives as realism, institutionalism and empirical studies. The last paragraph, finally, defines three main causal mechanisms concerning *why* and *how* alliances might persist or terminate.

1. Alliances, threats and balancing behavior: the realist perspective

When realist authors investigate the rationale of military alliances, two key features emerge as states' ontological insecurity coming from an anarchic environment and third parties' aggressive behavior. In this view, the majority of scholars provide a symmetric explanation for alliances formation and termination by emphasizing threats as the glue for the persistence of security agreements.⁵ Ancient and modern thinkers widely consider the value of joining forces against a third party. In his history of the Peloponnesian war, Thucydides describes the implications of the Peace of Nicias, identifying the Spartan threat as the essential reason for the birth of

⁵ See classic books as Morgenthau H.J., *Politics among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace*, New York, Knopf, 1948; Liska G., *Nations in alliance. The limits of interdependence*, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962; Waltz K., *Theory of International Politics*, Reading, Addison-Wesley, 1979

the League of Argos.⁶ Niccolò Machiavelli points out that the presence of "enemies so powerful and dangerous" keeps the allies "chained together"⁷. Jean Bodin argues that minor states oppose the power of the strongest jointly as much as possible in order to preserve their security.⁸

Contemporary realist authors too consider alliances as an expression of states' cooperative behavior against common enemies.⁹ In this view, the «capability aggregation» model relies on the idea of states deterring aggressive parties by keeping an international balance that escapes hegemony. The strict military cooperation among the allies comes in virtue of the convergence of the allies' interests on common foreign policy goals. According to George Liska, "the decision to align [...] is made with reference to national interests" and "depends on the existence of identical interests".¹⁰ Hans J. Morgenthau points out that an alliance requires, for its foundation, "a community of interests."¹¹ Glenn Snyder argues that military alliances "are cooperative endeavors, in that their members concert their resources in the pursuit of some common goal".¹² Even Randall Schweller, although focusing on the phenomenon of bandwagoning, does not ignore "the compatibility of political ends" between partners.¹³ These authors argue that allies aim pursuing conflict with an outside party. By considering the inter-allied cooperation as a reaction to a threatening rising state, alliances find their place within the «balance of power» theory.¹⁴ The father of neorealism Kenneth Waltz calls it external balancing. In his view, states ally

⁶ Thucydides, *The History of the Peloponnesian War*, Penguin Books, 2000

⁷ Machiavelli N., Lettera al Vettori, ten August 1513.

⁸ Cit in Bazzoli M., Introduzione, in Bazzoli M., *L'equilibrio di potenza nell'età moderna. Dal Cinquecento al Congresso di Vienna*, Unicopli, 2006

⁹ Walt S., *The Origins of Alliances*, Cornell University Press, 1987

¹⁰ Liska G., *Nations in alliance. The limits of interdependence*, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962, pp. 26-27

¹¹ Morgenthau H.J., "Alliances in Theory and Practice", in A. Wolfers (a cura di), *Alliance Policy in the Cold War*, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1959, pp. 184-212

¹² Snyder G., *Alliance Politics*, Cornell University Press, p. 1

¹³ Schweller R.L., "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In", *International Security*, XIX, 1, pp. 72-107

¹⁴ The «balance of threat» theory is a variation of this argument. See Walt S., *The Origins of Alliances*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1987.

to balance others power. Stephen Walt provides a variation of this argument by declaring that states do not merely balance a concentration of power, but rather they oppose to perceptions of threats. The author specifies the sources of threat perceptions by considering four factors: aggregate power, geographical proximity, offensive power, and aggressive intentions. The interweaving of these factors determinates the propensity of states to enter into alliances.

As advocates of the balance of power theory, the majority of realist scholars agree that states form military alliances to pursue an «external» target, which is to oppose a common enemy. Shared threats attenuate potential incompatibilities among partners by favoring their military cooperation. In this view, once the enemy is defeated or the threat disappears, there is no need to keep the agreement. The alliance and the allies' cooperation, in other words, persist until the common threat endures. As Osgood Hardy argues, the “withdrawal of external threat may cause alliance to break up”.¹⁵ According to Andrew Scott, “the disappearance of external threat will produce alliance disintegration”.¹⁶ Also Arnold Wolfers argues that “any diminution of the external threat or of the will to meet it will tend to undermine cohesion and render futile any attempts to save the alliance.”¹⁷

Other realist authors focus on domestic threats as a source of international alignment.¹⁸ Steven David develops the theory of ominibalancing to account for Third World states' alignment and

¹⁵ Cited in Holsti O., Hopmann T., Sullivan J., *Unity and Disintegration in International Alliance: Comparative Studies*, John Wiley & Sons; 1st edition March 1973, p. 257

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 257

¹⁷ Wolfers A., *Discord and Collaboration. Essays on International Politics*, Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1962, p. 29

¹⁸ Barnett M. and Levy J., “Domestic sources of alliances and alignment: the case of Egypt, 1962-73”, *International Organization* 45, 3, Summer 1991; Miller E. and Toritsyn A., “Bringing the Leader Back In: Internal Threats and Alignment Theory in the Commonwealth of Independent States”, *Security Studies* 14, no. 2 (April-June 2005) pp. 325-363; Fumagalli M., “Alignments and Realignments in Central Asia: The Rationale and Implications of Uzbekistan's Rapprochement with Russia”, *International Political Science Review* (2007), Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 253-271

realignment.¹⁹ The scholar keeps the key assumptions of balance-of-power theory introducing a domestic explanation that relies on states' internal weakness and political leaders' lack of legitimacy. In his view, the key source of international alignments is the rational calculation of Third World statesmen who look for external powers that can guarantee to keep them in power. Similarly, Michael Barnett and Jack Levy argue that alliances can bring a rapid infusion of funds and other resources benefiting states' internal economy. By emphasizing an alliance as a source of economic resources and military equipment, their contribution mainly fits for Third World states facing resource constraints and threats to domestic political stability. Security agreements can be useful therefore for internal and external security purposes. Eric Miller and Arkady Toritsyn, finally, specify David's argument adopting a leader-centric approach. The scholars estimate the states' internal threats by considering serious physical threats to the leader, such as assassination attempts, coups, secessionist movements, galvanizing opposition leaders and parties that may challenge the political leadership. For our purposes, both realist scholars focusing on *external* and *internal* threats share a standard view about alliances persistence and termination emphasizing states' need for security. For David, the determinants of Third World states' alignment and realignment are the need to balance against the main threats they face. Consequently, the author argues, "if Third World leaders enhance their capabilities to deal with threats on their own (...) the result will be a diminished role for the superpowers in the Third World."²⁰ Decreasing security needs, therefore, lead to alliances dissolution. On the other hand, "so long as conflict persists in the Third World, leaders will seek out the superpowers for assistance."²¹

In sum, realist theories argue that an alliance persists as long as it is a useful tool against a threat. These authors, therefore, claim that changes in the condition supporting an alliance since the time of its formation lead to the security agreements' dissolution. As the security agreement's purpose

¹⁹ David S., "Explaining Third World Alignment", *World Politics*, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Jan. 1991), pp. 233-256

²⁰ *Ibidem* p. 202

²¹ *Ibidem* p. 203

erodes when the enemy is defeated or disappears, a critical predicting of alliances termination is the changes in states' threat perceptions.

However, the limits of these realist models arose at the end of the Cold War. While neorealist authors claimed that the disappearance of the original enemy would have led soon to NATO's dissolution, the US alliances became the cornerstone of the post-Cold War international system.²² As the United States' alliances persisted despite the disappearance of the Soviet Union, a low external threat environment did not lead to the alliances' termination. These circumstances paved the way for the development of an institutionalist paradigm.

2. Alliances, path-dependence and risk management: the institutionalist view

Liberal scholars enter the debate on alliances' persistence introducing new insights from the institutionalist theory. They develop alternative arguments to explain NATO endurance despite a low external threat environment and the loss of the original enemy. Two key features emerge to explain alliances' persistence: processes of path-dependence and states' attitude to risk management. Robert Mc Calla paves the way in this research perspective.²³ The scholar argues that highly institutionalized alliances placed at the center of an international regime (as NATO within the liberal-democratic one) respond more slowly to changes in threats than others that have not developed attendant norms, procedures, and functions. Once a regime exists, "there are internal and external incentives to perpetuate it rather than start anew when problems arise." Therefore, the members of the key regime's organization adopt three general behaviors: resistance to change, affirmation of organizational necessity, and adaptation to change.

²² See Joffe J., "'Bismarck' or 'Britain'? Toward an American Grand Strategy after Bipolarity", *International Security*, Volume 19, N. 4, Spring, 1995, pp. 94-117

²³ Mc Calla R., "NATO Persistence after the Cold War", *International Organization*, Vol. 50, No. 3 (Summer, 1996), pp. 445-475

In general, the institutional framework supports the idea that an alliance can be transformed into a security management institution. By accepting the realist assumption that states act within an anarchical environment, the institutional theory holds that "institutions can be of general value to states in so far as they help them to cope with uncertainty."²⁴ In other words, as states deal with the risk of conflicts and face the issues of uncertainty about other states' intentions, liberal scholars argue, "institutions can serve as the informational and signaling mechanisms that enable states to get more information about the interests, preference, and intentions of other states."²⁵ In this view, Celeste Wallander interprets the persistence of NATO after the Cold War focusing on mechanisms of institutional adaptation.²⁶ Adaptation depends on whether «institutional assets» are specific (dealing with deliberate external threats and/or problems arising from instability and mistrust) or general (providing information and/or developing operative mechanism for deliberation, decision-making, and implementation), and on whether its mix of assets matches the kinds of security problems faced by its members. As NATO was able to cope with security issues as instability, uncertainty, and relations among allies, it persisted within the post-Cold War international system although without its original enemy. Similarly, Kirsten Rafferty (2003) engages in a comparative study of NATO and SEATO.²⁷ The scholar finds that the level of institutionalization affects the alliance persistence or termination once a transformation in the environment occurs. Deep institutionalization raises material and non-material obstacles to exit enhancing the alliance's ability to perform its core military tasks and providing secondary benefits, such as affording allies with greater voice opportunities in the alliance and other international forums. In this view, Rafferty argues that the persistence of NATO, compared with the dissolution of SEATO, provides strong evidence in support of the

²⁴ Haftendorn H., Keohane R., Wallander C., *Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions Over Time and Space*, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 5

²⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 4

²⁶ Wallander C., *op. cit.*, 2000

²⁷ Rafferty K., "An Institutional Reinterpretation of Cold War Alliance Systems: Insights for Alliance Theory", *Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique*, Vol.36, No. 2 (Jun., 2003), pp. 341-362

institutionalist theory. Finally, Jae Jeok Park engages in a comparative study concerning the US alliances in Asia-Pacific.²⁸ The scholar argues that perceptions of lower threats do not affect an alliance persistence if two conditions are met. First, member states consider the alliance as a tool for «order insurance». The security arrangements respond to an undesirable long-term security trend, which may occur in the process of order-maintenance or order building. In other words, the alliance insures against a variety of future challenge to stability and regional order. Secondly, the alliance needs some internal insurance in order to survive. The allies introduce, cultivate or retain arrangements to safeguard their alliances from challenges that might arise because of intra-alliance mismanagement (more likely to emerge when member states miss a common threat). The «insurance for alliance» includes some costs as reconciling with the ally's core strategic interest and providing benefits in non-alliance agenda (i.e., concessions to terms of a free trade agreement). Park applies this framework to the U.S.–Australia alliance persistence (considered as a most-deviant case from threat-centric explanations) and to cases of alliance discontinuation (the U.S.–New Zealand leg of ANZUS in the mid-1980s and the U.S.–Philippines alliance between 1992 and 1999). The empirical analysis confirms that aggregating capabilities to balance or hedge against a specific threat are not a necessary condition for an alliance to persist. Differently, alliance discontinuation occurs in the absence of a mutually perceived threat if its members do not find order insurance benefits or if they have not paid insurance cost.

Other studies combine the insights from the institutionalist literature with the arguments supported by the realist authors. As institutionalist scholars consider threats coming from member-states while realists look at threats coming from third parties, Patricia Weitsman adopts a combined framework to measure the cohesion of alliances and the probability of their persistence or dissolution.²⁹ The scholar argues that the evolution of symmetric military

²⁸ Park J.J., “The persistence of the US-led alliances in the Asia-Pacific: an order insurance explanation”, *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Volume 13 (2013), pp. 337-368

²⁹ Weitsman P., *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2004

alliances is affected by the combined variation of threats internal and external to the alliance. When a high level of «threat internal to the alliance» (meaning member states having neither mutual values nor sense of loyalty) combines with a high level of external threat, cohesion will be difficult but not impossible to realize (because of the primacy of external threats). However, once the level of external threat decreases (as the Allied Power after War World II) the high level of «threat internal to the alliance» will probably lead to the alliance termination.³⁰ Differently, Galia Press-Barnathan looks at asymmetric alliances pointing out that NATO persists precisely because of an increasing threat internal to the alliance.³¹ At the end of the Cold War, the systemic change raised NATO minor partners' fears and strategic uncertainty. As conflicting interests characterize the transatlantic relationship, the American hegemony is the greatest danger for the European countries. According to Press-Barnathan, therefore, NATO persists as a «pact of restraint» for managing minor allies fear of entrapment and eventually provides the opportunity to restrict, and possibly influence, the stronger ally through a coordinated «division of labor», so reducing the risk of abandonment.

In conclusion, although it is not immediately intuitive that rivalry can extend even within alliances, several scholars consider risk management as a critical function of alliances. Besides, we find many comments within classic works. As George Liska notices, “alliances may serve to restrain the more aggressive member states”.³² Paul Schroeder argues that “all alliances in some measure are pacts of restraint, restraining or controlling the actions of the partners in the alliance themselves.”³³ Even Stephen Walt, who

³⁰ Tethering alliances are different cases because these kinds of security agreements (having a high level of threat internal to the alliance) originate precisely to manage the inter-allied conflict.

³¹ Press Barnathan G., “Managing the Hegemon: Nato under Unipolarity“, *Security Studies*, 2006, pp. 271-309

³² Liska G., *Nations in alliance. The limits of interdependence*, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962, p. 40

³³ Schroeder P., "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management", in K. Knorr (eds), *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems*, Lawrence, Allen, 1976, p. 230

mainly focuses on external threats, argues that "the desire to ally in order to aggregate power and the desire to ally in order to manage weaker states are not incompatible."³⁴ IR scholars, therefore, hold that alliances can work both as a tool for «power aggregation» and «power devaluation» as the partners' purposes might be not only to face a common external threat but also to manage risks coming from the ally.³⁵

However, although this perspective sheds more light on alliance policies, the institutionalist debate has some limits. Firstly, it focuses too narrowly on the United States alliances after the Cold War implying limits once institutionalist scholars try to generalize their arguments. Secondly, realists' contributions showed that institutional practices might come both as a minor states' strategy to deal with hegemony and as major states' attempt to exercise asymmetric power. Here, it is still not clear if institutions can independently affect states' behavior or they simply mirror states' power relationships. Consequently, the security institutions literature did not improve significantly our knowledge compared to the classic debate on international institutions.³⁶

3. Alliances and states' change in international power: the empirical studies

Also statistically oriented scholars entered the debate about the persistence and termination of military alliances. By providing a formal model of alliance formation and dissolution, James Morrow makes the case that "a nation will want to break an alliance when it prefers the combination of security and autonomy it obtains without the alliance to that with it."³⁷ This framework entails that alliances can advance either autonomy or security

³⁴ Walt S., *op. cit.*, 1987, p. 8, footnote 20

³⁵ See, for instance, Joffe J., "Europe's American Pacifier", *Foreign Policy*, No. 54 (Spring 1984), pp. 64-82

³⁶ See Mearsheimer J., "The False Promise of International Institutions", *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter, 1994-1995), pp. 5-49

³⁷ Morrow J., *op. cit.*, 1991

and it is successfully tested on a set of 164 military alliances formed between 1815 and 1965. The trade-off security-autonomy concerns both symmetric alliances (where both allies receive security or autonomy benefits) and asymmetric ones (where one ally gains security and the other autonomy). In this view, three motivations make the dissolution attractive: (1) a deterioration of security or autonomy in the alliance; (2) an improvement in security and autonomy out of the alliance; or (3) a shift in the nation's utility function. Asymmetric alliances should be more stable than symmetric security agreements because the allies in the former "derive their benefits from different interests [...] as each side's capabilities and interests change over time, asymmetric alliances are more likely than symmetric alliances to continue to provide net benefits to their members."³⁸ However, a significant decline in the major ally's capabilities favors the dissolution of an asymmetric alliance. From the minor ally's point of view, the declining capabilities of the stronger member reduce the incentive to keep the alliance alive. Concerning the changes in the weaker power's capabilities, they "will not greatly alter the nature of the trade."³⁹ As the minor ally gives autonomy to the stronger partner and receives security, the allied exchange would be unaffected by the weaker ally changes in capabilities. Differently, Jaewook Chung points out that increasing power in minor allies can destabilize an existing alliance.⁴⁰ It may be the case for the weaker partners trying to gain more autonomy within an asymmetric relation. More precisely, as they might suffer the influence of the stronger ally, the weaker side's increase in capabilities can affect significantly the likelihood of alliance termination. However, Chung argues that changes in capabilities of the weaker ally on alliance termination is conditional upon its economic dependence on the stronger ally. Once a weaker ally is highly dependent economically on its partner, it may be restrained from seeking autonomy because it could hamper ongoing economic relations with the stronger ally. Under economic dependence, terminating the alliance can

³⁸ *Ibidem*

³⁹ *ibidem*

⁴⁰ Chung J., "Capability Change, Economic Dependence and Alliance Termination", *The Korean Journal of International Studies* Vol.14, No.2 (August 2016), 209-240

decrease economic benefits from the alliance relationship. Differently, low economic dependence is a permissive condition for alliance termination.

Overall, the security-autonomy model finds general support in the alliance literature. For instance, Scott Bennet considers four major theoretical perspectives to test hypotheses about alliances' endurance: the capability aggregation model; the security-autonomy tradeoff; the influence of domestic politics; and the degree of institutionalization.⁴¹ His sample considers 207 military alliances among peacetime and wartime security agreements between 1816 and 1984. The empirical results find little support for the capability-aggregation model while strongly support the security-autonomy model by implying that the larger the changes in capabilities, the shorter an alliance is likely to be. Moreover, significant differences characterize the endurance of asymmetric and symmetric alliances being the former more stable and durable. Then, mixed support is provided for the interaction between domestic politics and alliance behavior. On the one hand, whereas alliances involving liberal states are likely to last longer than alliances involving illiberal ones, regime changes do not lead to alliances dissolution. Finally, there is no empirical support for the hypothesis that the more alliances are institutionalized the more they perpetuate themselves over time.

Among statistically oriented studies, the article by Ashley Leeds and Bureu Savun presents one main innovation recognizing that alliances can end in different ways.⁴² By evaluating a set of 260 military alliances from 1816 to 1989, the authors find four modes of termination: abrogation (105 cases), fulfillment (47 cases), exogenous loss of independence (33 cases) and renegotiation (75 cases). Then, they develop a model accounting for the alliances that were abrogated due to opportunistic violations. By arguing that alliances termination can be predicted by examining changes in cost and benefits of alliances in comparison to the conditions in effect when leaders joined the security agreements, the scholars consider four main independent

⁴¹ Bennet S., "Testing alternative models of alliance duration, 1816-1984", *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Jul., 1997), pp. 846-878

⁴² Leeds & Savun, "Terminating Alliances: Why Do States Abrogate Agreements?", *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 69, No. 4; November 2007, pp. 1118-1132

variables. These variables are the «level of external threat», the «allies' relative capabilities», the «extent of shared interests» and the «availability of substitute allies». Then, they develop four main hypotheses to predict alliances persistence or dissolution. Firstly, the changing level of external threat suggests that when an alliance member experiences a significant decrease in external threat in comparison to the level of threat when the alliance was formed, the alliance becomes more likely to end in violation of its terms. Secondly, when an alliance member experiences a significant change in international power (becoming too weak or too strong) in comparison to the conditions in effect when the alliance was formed, the alliance becomes more likely to end in violation of its terms. Thirdly, when an alliance member experiences a significant change in internal political processes in comparison to the conditions in effect when the alliance was formed, the alliance becomes more likely to end in violation of its terms. Finally, when an alliance member forms outside alliances, the alliance becomes more likely to end in violation of its terms. The empirical results support the hypotheses except for the third one, so suggesting that domestic politics does not affect alliances persistence or collapse. The authors evaluate «asymmetry» as a control variable confirming Morrow's findings concerning the longer duration of asymmetric alliances compared to the symmetric ones.

In conclusion, statistical N-Large studies successfully widened the debate about alliances persistence and termination. By considering how changes in allies' relative power can affect the alliance evolution, this literature introduced a new factor worth to consider in alliance politics. However, the principal limitation of these works is that scholars analyze the change in power as shifts in actors' attributes exclusively.⁴³ Although a well-

⁴³ They define allies' shifts in power as changes in states' composite capabilities. They calculate states capabilities according to the Correlates of War Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC), which provides the source data from 1816 to 2000. The composite capabilities scores are based on six different indicators of military capabilities: military expenditures, military personnel, total population, urban population, iron and steel production, and energy consumption. For each indicator and each year, a state's share of that indicator is calculated by dividing its score on that indicator by the sum total of all nations' scores on that indicator for a given year. CINC is the average of states' share of

established tradition of IR scholars consider power as a property of the social relations rather than an attribute of the actors, the works above reduced the inquiry to the measurement of the changes in states' composite capabilities. Consequently, we find neither theorized causal mechanisms nor empirical tests concerning the processes of alliances' termination.⁴⁴

4. Main hypotheses, causal mechanisms, and gaps in alliance theory

The previous paragraphs analyzed three research perspectives that investigate the persistence and termination of military alliances: realism, institutional theory, and statistical studies. By combining some of their features, it is possible to define three main causal mechanisms concerning *why* and *how* alliances might terminate.

Firstly, the «successful independence» hypothesis suggests that an alliance may become less attractive for a member state that is experiencing a sensible increase in relative capabilities.⁴⁵ On the one hand, when an ally

these six indicators, providing a measure of its relative capabilities. More precisely, IR scholars have adopted two operational criteria to measure changes in allies' power. Morrow separated each alliance into series of five-year periods, from its formation to its termination. The slope coefficient of a regression of each member's composite capabilities on time (year 1 to year 5 of each period) gives an estimate of the change in its relative capabilities over those five years. Morrow, therefore, relates the allies' changes international power to the likelihood that the alliance will terminate within that specific period. Differently, Leeds & Savun predicted that alliances terminate as the allies experience changes in the alliance costs and benefits in comparison to the conditions in effect when leaders chose to form these alliances.⁴³ Therefore, they measured the proportional change in the international power of each member state since the time the alliance was formed by dividing the current year's CoW CINC score by the score at the time of alliance formation for each member state. If the international power of either of the allies changed more than 10% between alliance formation and the year of the alliance termination, they coded a dummy variable 1 indicating a significant change in international power.

⁴⁴ Remarkably Chung theorizes a causal mechanism for the outcomes of alliances termination. However, he does not provide any empirical pieces of evidence to confirm or disconfirm it. See Chung J., *op. cit.*, 2016

⁴⁵ Berkowitz, "Realignment in International Treaty Organizations", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 27, No. 1, March 1983, pp. 77-96

improves its security position over time, it might be able to face its enemies autonomously by preferring to abrogate existing security agreements.⁴⁶ On the other hand, a rising ally might claim more autonomy to pursue changing foreign policy goals. As the partner might not be able or willing to set its alliance commitment differently by conforming to the new internal balance of power, the alliance is more likely to terminate than when allies' relative capabilities keep stable.⁴⁷

Secondly, the hypothesis of «threat internal to the alliance» suggests that alliances might end as one ally becomes significantly dangerous for the partner.⁴⁸ States whose power is increasing often adopt more ambitious foreign policy goals alarming the allies itself.⁴⁹ Although a rising partner permits the alliance to gain in aggregate power, a stronger ally is more challenging to control, and it might even assume a hegemonic attitude.⁵⁰ Here, scholars mainly stress how an ally can be a source of damages. In this case, the status-quo or weaker partner might opt for breaking the alliance in order to escape an increasing internal threat.

Finally, the «declining credibility» hypothesis suggests that an alliance might deteriorate as members begin to question their partner's reliability.⁵¹ As one's ally is weakening, its material capacity to fulfill the alliance obligations might become insufficient. Asymmetric alliances might be particularly sensitive to this kind of changes. As Liska argues, "a marked decline in the capability of a crucial ally is even more likely to set off dissolution."⁵² However, even minor allies are asked to cultivate specific

⁴⁶ Walt S., *op. cit.*, 1997

⁴⁷ Morrow J., *op. cit.*, 1991; Chun J., "Capability Change, Economic Dependence and Alliance Termination", *The Korean Journal of International Studies* Vol.14, No.2 (August 2016), 209-240.

⁴⁸ See Weitsman P., *op. cit.*, 2004, p. 6

⁴⁹ Walt S., *op. cit.*, 1997

⁵⁰ See Cesa M., *Allies Yet Rivals*, Stanford University Press, 2010

⁵¹ Walt S., *op. cit.*, 1997

⁵² Liska, *op. cit.*, 1962, p. 89-90

capabilities to cope with the alliance security challenges.⁵³ In this view, if the alliance provides less benefit due to missing material support, also major allies can be persuaded to abrogate the security treaty.⁵⁴

Although these hypotheses start to shed light on the processes concerning alliances termination, they come out from scattered suggestions and comments in the literature. In other words, they represent a starting point rather than a conclusive one. It is, therefore, useful to stress two issues. On the one hand, these hypotheses fail to emphasize which specific causal mechanisms characterize asymmetric and symmetric alliances. Relatively little attention, then, receives the critical issue of which member state in asymmetric alliances – major or minor ally – is abrogating the alliance.⁵⁵ On the other hand, they hide that different incentives can affect states' choice to preserve or terminate a security agreement. In other words, these processes leave a huge vacuum of indeterminacy analyzing certain allies' behaviors. Here, it is worth noticing that IR scholars do not deeply theorize about minor allies' behavior in asymmetric alliances, generally assuming their passive attitude. However, history provides several examples of weaker partners that unilaterally abrogate agreements with major powers in charge of guarantying for their security.⁵⁶ In light of these last remarks, the next chapter will adopt an innovative view entering the debate on the asymmetric alliances' persistence and termination.

⁵³ Kih J. and Kim J., "The Capabilities-based Analysis of Alliance Transformation in the Asia-Pacific: Focusing on the ROK-US and US-Philippines Alliances", *The Korean Journal of International Studies* Vol.14, No.3 (December 2016), 369-389.

⁵⁴ Walt S., *op. cit.*, 1997

⁵⁵ Small and Singer (1982) distinguish among major and minor powers by referring to the following states as major powers: Austria-Hungary from 1816 to 1918; China from 1950 on; France from 1816 to 1940 and from 1944 on; Germany or Prussia from 1816 to 1918, from 1925 to 1945, and from 1990 on; Italy or Sardinia from 1860 to 1943; Japan from 1895 to 1945 and from 1990 on; Russia or the USSR from 1816 to 1917 and from 1922 on; the United Kingdom from 1816 on; the United States from 1899 on. Minor powers are all those states that are not on this list for the given years.

⁵⁶ For instance, the ATOP dataset – covering the period 1815-1989 – includes 28 bilateral asymmetric defensive pacts which ended as abrogated: 13 out 28 are minor ally's abrogation, five are major ally's abrogation, and ten are classified as unclear cases.

CHAPTER 2

The Minor Ally's Voice Effectiveness and the Evolution of Asymmetric Alliances

IR scholars do not deeply theorize about minor allies' behavior in asymmetric alliances, generally assuming their passive attitude. Weaker sides are judged to follow the major ally complying with its preferences in virtue of a beneficial exchange of goods. Certainly, weaker sides in asymmetric relationships can obtain several benefits: enhancing their security and territorial integrity; reducing uncertainty and potential for disputes with third parties; enjoying favorable standards of international behavior from other compliant states. However, history provides several examples of weaker partners that unilaterally abrogate military agreements with great powers in charge of guarantying for their security.⁵⁷ Therefore, what leads a minor ally to abrogate a bilateral security agreement with a great power unilaterally? How can we explain the decision of minor allies to terminate asymmetric alliances once welcomed?

Although IR theories define key points in the debate about the alliances' persistence and termination, they can answer only partially to these questions. On the one hand, realist scholars consider alliances as tools to improve states' security in the face of threatening actors.⁵⁸ On the other hand, institutionalist authors focus on path-dependence processes highlighting the increasing benefits and exit-cost of allied cooperation.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ See Appendix p. 167

⁵⁸ See classic books as Morgenthau H.J., *Politics among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace*, New York, Knopf, 1948; Liska G., *Nations in alliance. The limits of interdependence*, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962; Waltz K., *Theory of International Politics*, Reading, Addison-Wesley, 1979; Walt S., *The Origins of Alliances*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1987.

⁵⁹ See Mc Calla R., "NATO Persistence after the Cold War", *International Organization*, Vol. 50, No. 3 (Summer, 1996), pp. 445-475; Haftendorn H., Keohane R., Wallander C.,

Both perspectives barely reflect on the possibility of one minor ally abrogating a security agreement with a great power unilaterally. Moreover, the most established statistical analyses assume that changes in minor allies' relative power do not affect the evolution of asymmetric alliances.⁶⁰ Also statistical N-Large studies, therefore, adopt the mainstream view considering weaker partners as passive actors.

In light of this gap in alliance literature, the next sections adopt an innovative perspective focusing on the minor ally behavior, its search for autonomy and the voice opportunities in asymmetric alliances.⁶¹

1. The basic theoretical framework

As IR scholars develop two primary explanations for alliances persistence and termination – security concerns and path dependence – the following section develops a 2x2 matrix aiming to define the minor ally's incentives and disincentives to abrogate an asymmetric alliance according to these theories.

Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions Over Time and Space, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 5

⁶⁰ See Morrow J., *op. cit.*, 1991; Bennet S., "Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration, 1816-1984", *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Jul., 1997), pp. 846-878; Leeds B. and Savun B., "Terminating Alliances: Why Do States Abrogate Agreements?", *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 69, No. 4 (Nov., 2007), pp. 1118-1132

⁶¹ Several works paves the way in this research perspective. See De Castro R., "Philippines Defense Policy in the 21th Century: Autonomous Defense or back to the Alliance?", *Pacific Affairs*, Volume 78, Number 3, Fall 2005, pp. 403-422(20); Catalinac A., "Why New Zealand Took Itself out of ANZUS: Observing "Opposition for Autonomy" in Asymmetric Alliances", *Foreign Policy Analysis* (2010) 6, 317-338; Chung J., "Capability Change, Economic Dependence and Alliance Termination", *The Korean Journal of International Studies* Vol.14, No.2 (August 2016), 209-240. More general studies on minor allies are Rothstein R., *Alliances and Small Powers*, Columbia University Press, New York and London, 1968; Reiter E. & Gartner H. (eds.), *Small States and Alliances*, Physica-Verlag, 2001; Von Hlatky S., *America Allies in Times of War. The Great Asymmetry*, Oxford University Press, 2013

1.1. Minor ally's need for security and alliance evolution

The first variable is the minor ally's *security concerns*. Here we consider the most common realist explanation for alliance formation and persistence pointing out the role of menacing third parties.⁶² In this view, weaker allies might experience both internal and external threats. In the former case, the occurrence of threats to the minor ally's regime survival might be the glue for preserving the alliance.⁶³ However, once the domestic threats are defeated or disappears, the need for external support and legitimacy should decrease making the alliance termination more likely. In the second case, external security concerns should increase when neighbor states show aggressive intentions or their military capabilities rise.⁶⁴ Here the need for the alliance might decrease when significant disputes are settled, or regional rival states become significantly weaker.⁶⁵

The threat-hypothesis, therefore, can be formulated as follows.

THREAT HYPOTHESIS: when security concerns increase, the minor ally is less likely to terminate the alliance; when security concerns decrease, the minor ally is more likely to terminate the alliance.

However, how states measure the entity and sources of threats? Firstly, a state involved in a militarized interstate dispute experiences higher security concerns than one having peaceful external relations.⁶⁶ Secondly, one actor might reasonably expect to conflict with states within its politically relevant international environment. In operational terms, it looks at its neighbors and global powers. Security concerns, therefore, might increase if one out of

⁶² Walt S., *The Origins of Alliances*, Cornell University Press, 1987; David S., *op. cit.*, 1991

⁶³ David S., *op. cit.*, 1991

⁶⁴ Walt S., *op. cit.*, 1997

⁶⁵ Other studies point out that external and internal security challenges might reinforce each other. On interrelated threats see Harknett R. & VanDenBerg J., "Alignment theory and interrelated threats: Jordan and the Persian Gulf crisis", *Security Studies* 6, no 3, spring 1997, pp. 112-153

⁶⁶ Correlates of War project provides a detailed data set classifying states involvement in MID.

these actors increase its offensive power and credibly menace a military move.⁶⁷ However, a rising state that develops threatening power resources might not express its aggressive intentions. In these cases, the historical experience can justify an increasing perception about this potential external threat. Thirdly, domestic uprisings might imply that internal opponents seek to delegitimize and destabilize the ruling elite.⁶⁸

1.2. Minor ally's need for gain and alliance evolution

The second variable is the *alliance's remunerative power*. Here we stress that the allies' exchange of resources can bring benefits and it can be then a source of dependence for the weaker side in asymmetric alliances.⁶⁹ Scholars considering power as a property of the social relations (rather than an attribute of the actors) focus deeply on these aspects of alliance politics. They generally define alliance dependence as a function of one ally's needs and alternatives.⁷⁰ Put it simply, one ally is dependent on the other to the extent the partner provides greater benefits than those provided by the next-best alternative are. Therefore, the *alliance's remunerative power* can be measured on the prospect of actors being deprived of something already possessed, namely the alliance «ceasing benefits». As allies exchange some goods, they value each other remunerative power by considering what they are going to lose once the alliance is broken. The path-dependence hypothesis, therefore, can be formulated as follows.

⁶⁷ Walt S., *op. cit.*, 1991

⁶⁸ Gause F. III, "Balancing What? Threat Perception and Alliance Choice in the Gulf", *Security Studies*, no. 2 (winter 2003/4), p. 273–305

⁶⁹ See Schweller R., "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In", *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer, 1994), pp. 72-107 1994; Kim T., *The Supply Side of Security. A Market Theory of Military Alliances*, Stanford University Press, 2017

⁷⁰ Snyder G., *Alliance Politics*, Cornell University Press, 1997

PATH-DEPENDENCE HYPOTHESIS: when the alliance remuneration increases, the minor ally is less likely to terminate the alliance; when the alliance remuneration decreases, the minor ally is more likely to terminate the alliance.

By focusing on the minor ally needs, our measurement of the alliance remuneration should take into account the partners' military cooperation in terms of arms transfers, military training exercise, officers training, and shared intelligence. The major ally's resources should have both an intrinsic and relative value for the other member-state. On the one hand, they might be highly significant in absolute terms because they satisfy some partner's needs; on the other hand, they acquire more or less value in light of their substitutability. In this view, the degree of resources' substitutability provided by one ally points out how the minor partner values the inter-allied military cooperation.


1.3. How security concerns and alliance remuneration affect minor allies' choices?

Once we combine the two variables, four ideal paths for alliance evolution come out (see table below). First, we have a clear case for alliance persistence (B) once security concerns rise while also the alliance remuneration increases. Here, the minor ally has strong incentives to keep the security agreement. On the other hand, the mirror-like case implies the inverse outcome (C). If both security concerns and alliance remuneration decrease, we have an over-determinate case of alliance termination since there are few incentives for the minor ally to keep the agreement.

By considering the case (C), IR scholars point out two underlying causal mechanisms leading to the agreement's dissolution. Firstly, the «successful independence» hypothesis suggests that an alliance may become less attractive as one member-state become able to face its enemies

autonomously.⁷¹ For instance, one ally's security concerns might decrease following a sensible increase in its relative capabilities. In addition, it might be the case that either enemies are defeated or rivalries with neighbors are solved. In this view, as alliances imply costs in terms of resources commitment, the disengagement could favor the internal relocation of resources by favoring domestic productions and well-being.⁷² Secondly, the «declining credibility» hypothesis suggests that states can be persuaded to abrogate the security treaty as the alliance provides less benefit due to missing material support.⁷³ This scenario implies that, whether the alliance's remunerative power decreases, the alliance might deteriorate as members begin to question their partner's reliability. It can occur for several reasons. On the one hand, a state might change its foreign policy goals missing the will to support its partner. On the other hand, as one's ally is weakening its material capacity to fulfill the alliance obligations might become insufficient. Asymmetric alliances might be particularly sensitive to this kind of changes as a decline in the capability of a stronger ally is even more likely to trigger an alliance termination.

The following matrix illustrates graphically the arguments above.



⁷¹ Berkowitz, *op.cit.*, 1983

⁷² See for instance Layne C., "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy," *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 1, 1997, pp. 86-124

⁷³ Walt S., *op. cit.*, 1997

The two remaining alliance paths suggest that we are dealing with indeterminate cases (A and D) as both offers contradictory incentives to the minor ally. These typologies, in other words, cannot predict the outcome of alliance persistence or termination because the variables' inducements collide. Type I suggests that the minor ally security concerns might increase while the alliance's remunerative power decreases. Here a weaker ally faces a significant alliance deficit as the partner does not provide sufficient support. In a way, it resembles the scenario provided by the «declining credibility» hypothesis. Inefficiencies and lack of material support make stronger the incentives for the agreement abrogation. However, the risks of isolation in conjunction with an increasing threat might discourage the alliance dissolution. Differently, the Type II case suggests that the minor ally security concerns might decrease while the alliance provides increasing returns from the allied cooperation. The «successful independence» hypothesis provides the key features of this case as the weaker ally might evaluate that the alliance-costs are too high in light of its reduced need for security. As the minor allies are asked to cultivate specific capabilities to cope with the alliance tasks, there are incentives for a unilateral abrogation.⁷⁴ However, an increasing remuneration from the allied cooperation also provides an inducement for keeping the alliance.

In sum, these typologies cannot infer by themselves if a minor ally might prefer an alliance to persist or terminate. This theoretical gap might come from an underestimation of other critical functions of alliance politics. For this reason, we will focus on the alliance restraint functions formulating a new hypothesis about minor allies' incentives for alliance persistence or termination.

⁷⁴ On minor allies' duties see Kih J. and Kim J., "The Capabilities-based Analysis of Alliance Transformation in the Asia-Pacific: Focusing on the ROK-US and US-Philippines Alliances", *The Korean Journal of International Studies* Vol.14, No.3 (December 2016), 369-389.

2. Restraint in Alliance Politics

Several scholars point out the value of restraint in alliance politics.⁷⁵ This function sheds light on mechanisms of mutual hindrance and influence between allies. As states can have both compatible and incompatible interests,⁷⁶ they might also ally to gain control over the partner, but not necessarily to face a common enemy.⁷⁷ Rather, scholars refer to the restraint of the ally as a tool for reducing the risk of being involved in unwanted conflicts. Josef Joffe, for instance, claims that Bismarck's pact-mania did not aim "to aggregate power but to *devalue* it."⁷⁸ The web of Prussian agreements discouraged the formation of hostile coalitions by preserving the German primacy on the European continent. Gaining control over minor states through the establishment of security agreements, in this view, also increased the control over third states outside the alliance system. Also according to Patricia Weitsman, "adversaries may have incentives to form alliances with each other either to react to threats confronting them or to contain or manage the threat they face from each other."⁷⁹ This kind of behavior, defined as «tethering», indicate that "threats emanate from within alliances as well as from outside them."⁸⁰ For Jeremy Pressman, some alliances "are formed to modify the behavior of someone within the alliance itself more so than any external party."⁸¹ Failure or success of the allies' restraint attempts will depend on their willingness to mobilize power

⁷⁵ The seminal article paving the way for this interpretation is Schroeder P., "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management", in K. Knorr (eds.), *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems*, Lawrence, Allen, 1976, pp. 227-262

⁷⁶ Gilber D. & Rider T., "Prior commitments: compatible interests versus capabilities in alliance behavior", *International Interactions*, 30:309-329, 2004

⁷⁷ Schroeder P., *op. cit.*, 1976; Weitsman P., "Intimate Enemies: The Politics of Peacetime Alliances", *Security Studies*, VII, 1, 1997, pp. 156-192 and *op. cit.* 2004; Pressman J., *Warring Friends: Alliance Restraint in International Politics*, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2008; Cesa M., *Allies yet Rivals*, Stanford University Press, 2010

⁷⁸ Joffe J., "'Bismarck' or 'Britain'? Toward an American Grand Strategy after Bipolarity", *International Security*, Volume 19, N. 4, Spring, 1995, pp. 94-117

⁷⁹ Weitsman P., *op. cit.*, 2004, p. 2

⁸⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 5

⁸¹ Pressman J., *op. cit.*, 2008, p. 19

resources.⁸² Finally, Victor Cha argues that the US choice for bilateral alliances in North East Asia after World War II came from "the desire for maximum and exclusive control over potential dangerous allies."⁸³ Although the alliances aimed to contain the Soviet threat, bilateralism was preferred to multilateralism to constrain "rogue allies" that could engage in aggressive behavior and wars against neighbor states.

In the view of the alliance restraint functions, realist scholars claim that major allies can pursue specific strategies to keep control over their minor partners.⁸⁴ However, several authors claim that also weaker states can bind the stronger ones through institutional mechanisms of consultations and decision-making. For Grieco, institutionalization can be a solution for weaker states to solve "the problem of working with, but not being dominated by, a stronger partner in the context of mutually beneficial joint action."⁸⁵ IR scholars generally recognize that the minor allies "voice opportunities" are a useful tool to restrain stronger partners. In this view, alliance restraint should highlight the role of inter-allied control as the minor ally may use the alliance to address its concerns to the major partner, either looking for its support or aiming to limit its leeway. It is plausible, then, that weaker member-states raise their voice depending on their need to influence the major ally once the latter is involved in international issues that directly affect them. However, there is one main bias in this literature. Those investigating the value of voice opportunities consider this function mainly in the view of the minor partners' *security* concerns while underestimating the value of the minor allies' *autonomy* ambitions. According to Ohtomo, for instance, minor partners might remain in alliances for "a desire to dampen suspicious (reassure others) in order to solve the 'sheep in wolf's clothing

⁸² Pressman J., *op. cit.*, 2008

⁸³ Cha V., "Powerplay. Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia", *International Security*, Vol. 34, No. 3, Winter 2009/2010, pp. 158-196

⁸⁴ On this view applied to NATO after the Cold War see Checchi A., "Tra egemonia e dipendenza. Il realismo e la persistenza della Nato", *Quaderni di scienza politica*, 2005, p. 277-338

⁸⁵ Grieco J., "State interests and institutional rule trajectories: A neorealist interpretation of the Maastricht treaty and European economic and monetary union", *Security Studies*, Vol 5, 1996 – issue 3, pp. 261-306

problem'.⁸⁶ As Japan and Germany did in the post-Cold War period, minor allies might prefer to keep an alliance to reassure the stronger partner and the secondary states about their status quo intentions. In a different vein (but still considering the minor allies' security concerns), Galia Press-Barnathan argues that smaller allies can keep alliances alive in order to "mitigate a future potential threat from their hegemonic partner." Alliances, therefore, can help "to restrain the hegemon [...] and develop semi-independent capabilities in order to create a division-of-labor strategy" that reduces the risks of abandonment and entrapment.⁸⁷ In this view, unfortunately, these scholars do not consider that minor allies might aim to enhance their status or influence in their region through a security agreement with a great power. In other words, weaker partners in asymmetric alliances might not have a status quo attitude or be exclusively persuaded by the fear of abandonment and entrapment.

In sum, the literature on alliance restraint considers both the major and minor allies' behavior. Stronger sides aim to control the weaker ones reducing their freedom and leeway. The latter try to manage the relationship with the potential hegemon reducing risks. However, both perspectives are under-theorized and show limits in analyzing the allies' behavior. For this reason, the next two sections will pave the way for a more comprehensive understanding of interallied relations in asymmetric alliances.

2.1. Asymmetry and major ally's politics of restraint

Restraint behavior characterizes both symmetric and asymmetric alliances. However, as we focus on the latter, we need first to clarify the meanings and effects of asymmetry in alliance politics. IR scholars stress one main feature

⁸⁶ See Ohtomo T., "Bandwagoning to dampen suspicion: NATO and the US-Japan Alliance after the Cold War", *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Volume 3, 2003, pp. 29-55. The original argument of "sheep in wolf's clothing problem" is developed by Kidd A., "Sheep in sheep's clothing: why security seekers do not fight each other", *Security Studies*, 7 (1), 1997, pp. 114-154

⁸⁷ Press-Barnathan G., *op. cit.*, 2006

by referring to an unbalanced distribution in power resources between allies. Asymmetry, therefore, is conceptualized as a gap in capabilities. This view implies a primary distinction between alliances formed by equal partners (either major-major states or minor-minor states) and alliances signed between one stronger power and one weaker actor. However, it is worth stressing that asymmetry does not imply necessarily the unilateral dominion from the stronger to the weaker. Instead, our inquiry in alliance politics suggests excluding these extreme cases. Brantly Womack's general definition looks more appropriate, judging an asymmetric relationship as "one in which the smaller side is significantly more exposed to interactions than the larger side because of the disparity of capabilities, and yet the larger is not able to dictate unilaterally the terms of the relationships."⁸⁸ Nonetheless, the disparity in capabilities favors the establishment of a specific kind of interaction among allies. Firstly, most scholars argue that it implies that allies exchange different types of goods. In Morrow's terms, the stronger actor gains autonomy by controlling the internal and foreign policy of the minor partner while the latter improves its security enjoying the major partner's protection. For instance, agreements with asymmetric obligations might imply the stronger side's unilateral commitment to guarantee the weaker side's security, while the latter makes some political and economic concessions. In this view, even though both allies are bound to specific obligations, commitments might be different and not reciprocal.

IR scholars generally recognize that these features produce some benefits making asymmetric alliances more stable and durable than symmetric ones.⁸⁹ Member states derive their benefits from different needs developing a more stable bargain of interests than those in symmetric relationships. As the bargaining space is wider, alliances are likely to provide net benefits even when each side's capabilities and interest change over time. Asymmetry, in other words, can help to overcome the inter-allied crisis

⁸⁸ Womack B., *Asymmetry and International Relationships*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2015, p. 10

⁸⁹ Morrow J., *op. cit.*, 1991; Bennet S., *op. cit.*, 1997; Leeds A. Savun B., *op. cit.*, 2007

promoting a useful division of labor.⁹⁰ However, other theorists stress some critical features of asymmetry. They contend that asymmetric relationships create differences in attention and perspective among allies by favoring a “structural pathology of misperception”.⁹¹ As the weaker side occupies a smaller share of the great power's international horizon, it suffers from the "sporadic and partial" attention of the stronger partner. On the other hand, the weaker side is particularly concerned because it has more to gain or lose in the relationship than the stronger actor. In this context, "the errors of inattention by the larger side and over-attention by the smaller side reinforce one another in crisis situation."⁹²

However, it is worth stressing that nonreciprocal commitments and differences in perspectives/attention are not the only effects of asymmetry. Although asymmetry does not imply necessarily a unilateral dominion, a gap in capability can also be conceptualized in terms of power differentials among allies. Scholars considering power as a property of the social relations conceptualize asymmetry in the view of dependence disparity, bargaining power and ability to obtain others' conformity.⁹³ Power differentials, in this view, can be interpreted as a tool to “structure relationships, including through method of (attempted) control”.⁹⁴ As the major ally is the preponderant power, it requires the conformity of the weaker partner to its preferences.⁹⁵ This claim can originate from the exchange between protection (provided by the stronger to the weaker) and

⁹⁰ See Locatelli A. & Testoni M., “Intra-allied competition and alliance durability: the case for promoting a division of labor among NATO allies”, *European Security*, 18:3, 2009, pp. 345-362

⁹¹ Womack B., “How size matters: the United States, China and asymmetry”, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 24, Issue 4, 2001, 133-134

⁹² See Womack B., *op. cit.*, 2001 and 2015. See also Shin G.W., Izatt I., Moon R., “Asymmetry of power and attention in alliance: the US-Republic of Korea case”, *Australian Journal of International affairs*, 2016, p. 1-21

⁹³ See Snyder G., *op. cit.*, 1997; Cesa M., *op. cit.*, 2010; Steinmetz R. & Wivel A. (eds.), *Small States in Europe: Challenges and Opportunities*, Ashgate, 2010

⁹⁴ Long T., “It’s not the size, it’s the relationship: from ‘small states’ to asymmetry”, *International Politics*, March 2017, Vol. 54, issue 2, p. 146

⁹⁵ See Cesa M., *op. cit.*, 2010, chapter 3

obedience (promised by the weaker to the stronger).⁹⁶ The weaker ally's duty of obedience might concern different areas of state action. More specifically, the major ally can indicate friends and enemies, or even inhibit the partner to fulfill its ambitions (foreign policy control); it can require its foreign military arms to transit the weaker side's territory, placing them permanently and requiring access to strategic areas (territorial control); it can assure itself the monopoly of the military command (operational military control); it can ask for privileged trade agreements, and it can require to share the alliance burden (economic and financial control); it can influence the internal processes of decision-making (domestic politics control); it can penetrate, finally, the weaker society with its customs and tradition (ideological and cultural control).⁹⁷

An asymmetric relation, therefore, can imply an acknowledgment of different degrees of autonomy among partners. The power of the stronger side relies on its ability to preserve its freedom of action while influencing the weaker partner's choices, or even coercing its behavior. However, scholars recognize that two opposite forces affect the evolution of asymmetric relations. On the one hand, several asymmetric features push the stronger side to establish a coercive relation with the weaker partner. On the other hand, the successful management of an asymmetric relationship requires the acknowledgment of a certain degree of autonomy from the stronger to the weaker side.⁹⁸ It is worthwhile to recall here that history provides several examples of a stronger actor facing the issue of power management. In ancient Greece, for instance, autonomy and hegemony were not contradictory terms. According to Jacqueline de Romilly, the hegemony of the stronger actor was preserved both through active and generous conduct toward the weaker and through avoidance of any reduction of its

⁹⁶ Colombo A., *La solitudine dell'Occidente*, il Saggiatore, Milano, 1994

⁹⁷ *Ibidem* p. 39-52. See also Moon B., "Consensus or Compliance? Foreign-Policy Change and External Dependence", *International Organization*, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Spring, 1985), pp. 297-329; Colombo A., *op. cit.*, 1994; Womack B., *op. cit.*, 2001; Donnelly J., "Sovereign Inequalities and Hierarchy in Anarchy: American Power and International Society", *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 12 (2), 2006, pp. 139-170; Lake D., *Hierarchy in International Relations*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 2009

⁹⁸ Womack B., *op. cit.*, 2001

autonomy.⁹⁹ In ancient China, the Song dynasty was careful managing its relations with its periphery. According to Womack, “the rituals of the tribute system could be seen as an exchange of central acknowledgment of autonomy for signs of deference from neighbors.”¹⁰⁰ In the contemporary international system, many scholars argue that the persistence of the US alliances requires careful management of power by the superpower.¹⁰¹ Indeed weaker sides in asymmetric relationships might define their interests in terms of preserving or increasing their autonomy vis-à-vis the stronger partner. A minor ally can adopt an aggressive strategy in its regional environment, maybe assuming the benevolence of the stronger partner. The latter then can be more or less accommodating toward the weaker side's quest for autonomy, affecting its leeway in the regional context and its capacity of external extraction.

In sum, although the majority of alliance theorists consider the *power aggregation* side of a military alliance, the restraint functions highlight the *power devaluation* one. In this view, an alliance providing protection can also strongly affect the minor ally's freedom of action.

2.2. *The quest for autonomy and the minor ally's voice opportunities*

In the alliance literature, scholars have been starting considering the allies' autonomy concerns and ambitions.¹⁰² For Morrow, a nation's autonomy is

⁹⁹ Romilly J., *The Rise and Fall of States According to Greek Authors*, The University of Michigan Press, 1991

¹⁰⁰ see Womack B., *op. cit.*, 2015, Preface XIV

¹⁰¹ See Thalakada N., *Unipolarity and the Evolution of America's Cold War Alliances*, Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2012; Joffe J., *op. cit.*, 1995; Walt S., "Keeping the World "Off-Balance": Self-Restraint and U.S. Foreign Policy" in *America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power* Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2002

¹⁰² In general terms, George and Keohane (1980) identify autonomy as one out of three states' national interests (physical survival, autonomy, and economic well-being) which they describe informally as "life, liberty, and property." Wendt defines autonomy more precisely as "the ability of a state-society complex to exercise control over its allocation of resources and choice of government" (p. 235, 1999). Then, the scholar observes that

the “degree to which it pursues desired changes in the status quo.”¹⁰³ Howorth & Keeler define the concept as “the political and military capability [...] to take decisions and to embark on initiatives involving the projection of military power with limited or no assistance [from the ally]”.¹⁰⁴ Catalinac embraces Morrow's perspective specifying that one ally's autonomy consists in the capability of "obtaining new concessions or removing old obligations."¹⁰⁵ Chung, finally, adopts a more general definition considering autonomy as "the ability of a state to shape policy without external influence."¹⁰⁶ These authors stress that pursuing autonomy implies a deep interaction among allies. Paradoxically, an increasing autonomy might require even greater coordination and convergence of interests; otherwise, it could be a signal of the alliance's erosion. However, alliance theorists did not investigate how the quest for autonomy can be settled through internal bargaining and the «voice opportunities» functions. This gap is even more evident looking at studies on minor allies in asymmetric alliances. By considering the alliance «voice opportunities» exclusively in the view of states' security concerns, no room is left for the weaker partners' quest for autonomy.

In light of this gap in alliance literature, this section will point out that minor ally's quest for autonomy and the effectiveness of its voice opportunities can affect the alliance evolution critically. Grieco defines effective voice opportunities "as institutional characteristics whereby the views of the partners (including relatively weaker partners) are not just expressed but reliably have material impact on the operations of the collaborative arrangement."¹⁰⁷ Grieco's view implies that minor partners "can work with but not being dominated by a stronger partner in the context of

"autonomy is always a matter of degree and can be traded away when the benefits of dependence outweigh the costs."

¹⁰³ Morrow J., *op. cit.*, 1991, p.

¹⁰⁴ Howorth J. and Keeler T.S., “The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy”, in Howorth J. and Keeler T.S. (eds.), *Defending Europe: the EU, NATO and the quest for European Autonomy*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, cit. p. 6

¹⁰⁵ Catalinac A., *op. cit.*, 2010, p. 325

¹⁰⁶ Chung J., *op. cit.*, 2016, footnote 2 p. 212

¹⁰⁷ Grieco J., *op. cit.*, 1995, p. 288

mutually beneficial joint action."¹⁰⁸ However, which kind of demands might minor allies advance in the context of a military alliance? It is worth remembering that the majority of scholars assume that minor allies aim exclusively to obtain a security guarantee from the major ally. This classic literature supports the idea that alliances are a status quo phenomenon.¹⁰⁹ However, we can find several other insights in the IR literature. Some contributions find that alliances provide significant opportunities for gain (that is the bandwagoning argument)¹¹⁰ while other studies have focused on the quest for autonomy as a significant factor to account for minor allies' behavior.¹¹¹ Here, several circumstances can occur. Either the weaker side in an asymmetric alliance can suffer from some alliance deficits once the partner appears less supportive or useful; or it can fear to become a satellite of the stronger partner; or it can have the issue of maximizing its goals within the alliance.¹¹² In all cases, the weaker side can start negotiating a greater leeway from the stronger ally to satisfy its needs. It might ask a change in patterns of transactions and a renegotiation of agreements to obtain a better distribution of benefits. It can try to pursue a "relational autonomy" that would make more powerful both its independence and its cooperation with the stronger partner.¹¹³

¹⁰⁸ *Ibidem*

¹⁰⁹ For Haas and Whiting, "alliances are more often undertaken for self-preservation than that of self-extension" (1956, p. 161). Morgenthau also argues that "alliances frequently have the function of preserving the status quo" (1959, *Politics among nations*, p. 38)

¹¹⁰ Schweller R., *op. cit.*, 1994

¹¹¹ See De Casto R., "Philippines Defense Policy in the 21th Century: Autonomous Defense or back to the Alliance?", *Pacific Affairs*, Volume 78, Number 3, Fall 2005, pp. 403-422(20); Catalinac A., "Why New Zealand Took Itself out of ANZUS: Observing "Opposition for Autonomy" in Asymmetric Alliances", *Foreign Policy Analysis* (2010) 6, 317-338; Chung J., "Capability Change, Economic Dependence and Alliance Termination", *The Korean Journal of International Studies* Vol.14, No.2 (August 2016), 209-240. See Morrow on the autonomy-security trade-off model *op. cit.*;

¹¹² Rothstein R., *op. cit.*, 1968, p. 61; 122

¹¹³ Autonomy ambitions in alliance politics can be expressed through the concept of «relational autonomy» developed by Russell and Tokatlian. In the authors' words, «relational autonomy, as a condition, refers to a country's capacity and willingness to act both independently and in cooperation with others, in a competent, committed, and

Therefore, how can we define the minor ally's autonomy ambitions? As we focus on states' autonomy ambitions, we aim to measure how states are able to influence international affairs and how they can favorably change their environment. It might imply the *desire to possess* some specific good and the *attempt to change* the goods distribution among states. Within the international environment, these goods might include territory, status, markets, ideology, and the creation or change of international law and international institutions.¹¹⁴ Therefore, the minor ally's quest for autonomy might be expressed pursuing a regional strategy aiming to improve the state's status and influence. For instance, minor allies might aim to increase their capability of external extraction in order to consolidate the state internal strength or reduce the capability-gap with rival neighbor states.¹¹⁵ External extraction may be a useful strategy generating resources that reinforce the domestic position of the state and elude the internal political instability. It can positively affect states ability to invest more resources in domestic goals (more internal mobilization) and eventually reduce domestic pressures (less internal extraction). In these circumstances, an increasing threat might be faced successfully even though the major ally does not

responsible way. Relational autonomy, as an objective national interest (that is, the preservation and expansion of degrees of freedom), is based on a new pattern of activity, a new institutional structure, and a new system of ideas and identities. Practices, institutions, ideas, and identities are defined and developed within a framework of relationships in which "the other" rather than "the opposite" begins to be an integral part of what one is. As a practice, relational autonomy requires increasing interaction, negotiation, and active participation in the elaboration of international norms and regulations that tend to facilitate global governance. Thus, autonomy is no longer defined by a country's power to isolate itself and to control external processes and events, but instead by its power to participate in and effectively influence world affairs, particularly in types of international organizations and regimes». See Russell R. and Tokatlian J.G., "From Antagonistic Autonomy to Relational Autonomy: A Theoretical Reflection from the Southern Cone", *Latin American Politics and Society*, Vol. 45, N. 1, Spring 2003, cit. p. 16

¹¹⁴ Davidson J., *The Origins of Revisionist and Status-quo States*, Palgrave MacMillan, 2006, p. 134

¹¹⁵ Ikenberry, Lake and Mastanduno define external extraction as the "state efforts to accumulate resources from outside its borders." See Mastanduno M., Lake D. & Ikenberry J., "Toward a Realist Theory of State Action", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Dec., 1989), pp. 457-474

provide sufficient material support (Type I case). Neighboring states, for instance, might significantly improve their military technology or show aggressive intentions imposing to extract resources from society rapidly. By taking resources abroad, the minor ally can decrease the domestic pressure avoiding affecting the internal state legitimacy negatively. On the other hand, the minor ally might decide to capitalize on the cost of the alliance commitment once the level of threat is decreasing (Type II case). It might be the case once the weaker partner attempts to use the alliance as a “force-multiplier”¹¹⁶ to increase its capabilities for external extraction. However, these processes might require the benevolence (or even the support) of the major ally. Here a minor ally can measure the effectiveness of its voice opportunities within the alliance.

2.3. *Hypotheses and Alliances Processes*

The theoretical framework sketched above adopts a power perspective that does not share Thucydides' argument claiming that "the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must."¹¹⁷ Although power differentials strongly matter, it is inconvenient assuming that the more powerful is omnipotent while the less powerful is impotent. Indeed an asymmetric approach investigates "how the management of asymmetric relationships can shorten or prolong the existing matrix of power"¹¹⁸ by considering both accommodative and coercive approaches.

By building on the theory of asymmetric relationships, this section develops a new hypothesis about the persistence and termination of asymmetric alliances. It relies on the following logic. In interallied asymmetric relations, if the stronger side always maximizes the advantage of its relative power dealing with the ally, it favors the resistance and the sense of alienation of the weaker partner. In the short term, it can successfully reach its egoistic

¹¹⁶ Crawford T.W., *Pivotal deterrence*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 2001, p. 35

¹¹⁷ Thucydides, *op. cit.*, p. 402

¹¹⁸ Womack B., *op. cit.*, 2015. p. 6

goals; however, it can pay the strategic cost of losing the latter consensus in the long run.¹¹⁹ The weaker side's voice ineffectiveness, in other words, can lead likely to the alliance termination. Differently, if the stronger side accommodates the partner needs, it can enjoy an increased legitimacy by favoring the weaker actor's sense of inclusion. Although the stronger side might pay some costs investing its power resources in the short term, it is more likely to prolong the existing matrix of power in the long run. The weaker side's voice effectiveness then can likely lead to the alliance persistence.

These arguments imply that the major ally might exercise a different degree of restraint toward the weaker partner. By adopting *soft* restraint, it triggers those forces that favor the alliance persistence. Here, two alliance processes are at work touching both external and internal dynamics. Firstly, the major ally is successful in asymmetry management by providing other paths to accommodate the partner's needs. Soft restraint can imply the restrainer bringing its resources to develop a path for satisfying the weaker side's interests.¹²⁰ Indeed favoring too much freedom implies a risk of moral hazard giving incentives to the weaker partner to consider riskier and more aggressive behavior, which otherwise would be avoided. Therefore, a soft restraint approach implies that the stronger side manages the partner requests considering the latter needs as part of the broader alliance strategy. Although conflict of interests might occur, the dominant partner should be able to provide feasible alternatives widening the alliance common goals. Secondly, the alliance gains internal cohesion because the weaker partner recognizes the benefits of the hierarchical relations in virtue of the effectiveness of its voice opportunities. Successful management of asymmetry favors increased authority legitimacy from the weaker to the stronger side. A weaker ally engages in acts of symbolic obedience acknowledging its acceptance of the asymmetric relations.¹²¹ International

¹¹⁹ For related arguments about the limitations on the power of the stronger side in asymmetric relations, see Ikenberry J., *op. cit.*, 2002 and 2015; Deudney J., *op. cit.*, 2006; Lake D., *op. cit.*, 2009

¹²⁰ Pressman J., *op. cit.*, 2008, p. 44

¹²¹ Lake D., *op. cit.*, 2009

obedience implies to follow the leader providing adequate support in the diplomatic and military fields.

Therefore, we can point out the voice-effectiveness hypothesis as follows.

HYPOTHESIS 1: when the weaker partner's voice is effective, the latter is less likely to terminate the alliance.

The voice effectiveness, therefore, indicates the accommodation of the minor ally needs while the stronger side benefits in the long-term in virtue of the renovated cohesion. Differently, the weaker side's voice ineffectiveness implies a coercive attitude that can trigger a process of erosion. Within a context of alliance-deficit (as described by Type I-II cases), a major ally adopting *hard* restraint toward the minor partner favors mismanagement of the asymmetric relationships. By preferring a strategy of hard restraint, it makes ineffective the partner's voice opportunities and obstructs its quest for autonomy. Here two alliance processes are at work. Firstly, the minor ally starts opening to new partnerships to diversify its foreign policy. As the duty of obedience and the limitation of the resources inevitably constrain to take side privileging one relation at the expense of another, the alliance erosion incentivizes the minor ally to evaluate how new friends are beneficial. For instance, it might pursue a new formal alliance that better mirrors the state interests. Moreover, other benefits might be appeasement with a former rival and the development of a new political-economic partnership with regional neighbor states. Finally, as alliances impede the partners from entering into contradictory agreements with someone else, and more specifically an alliance with opponents, the minor ally might also consider the plausibility of improving its relations with a stronger side's rival state.

Secondly, the alliance cohesion starts loosening because the weaker side considers the major ally as a strategic hindrance.¹²² Although the minor ally needs the other side's partial collaboration (or at least its benevolent

¹²² See Xu R. and Rees W., "Comparing the Anglo-American and Israeli-American Special Relationships in the Obama Era: An Alliance Persistence Perspective", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 39, issue 4, June 2017

neutrality) to achieve its national goals, the allies have divergent interests, which obstruct the interallied cooperation. The weaker side, therefore, might seek to lower the levels of the transaction, favoring a lesser degree of policy coordination and showing greater concern about the distribution of benefits.¹²³

According to these arguments, we can advance the voice-ineffectiveness hypothesis as follows.

HYPOTHESIS 2: when the minor ally's voice is ineffective, the latter is more likely to terminate the alliance.

In sum, the voice ineffectiveness favors the minor ally's disaffection as the stronger side does not consider the former's needs. Although the major ally maximizes its relative advantages in the short term, it triggers a process of alliance erosion in the long run.

The table below summarizes the arguments of this section showing how Type I and Type II alliances are likely to evolve.

SCOPE CONDITION	INDEPENDENT VARIABLE		ALLIANCE PROCESSES	OUTCOMES
Minor ally quest for autonomy	Minor ally voice effectiveness →	YES	<i>Soft Restraint</i> <i>Widening common alliance goals</i> <i>Strategic obeisance</i>	Alliance persistence
		NO	<i>Hard Restraint</i> <i>Strategic Hindrance</i> <i>Foreign policy diversification</i>	Alliance termination

¹²³ Tomlin B., Dolan M., Reikhoff H., & Molot M., "Foreign Policies of Subordinate States in Asymmetrical Dyads", *The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 5, No. 4, 1981, pp. 14-39

3. Research design and method

3.1. Research Goal and Types of Cases

This study deals with two puzzles having different nature: a theoretic puzzle and an empirical one. On the theoretical level, the most established hypotheses lead to indeterminate outcomes concerning the persistence or termination of military alliances. It implies a gap in alliance theory. On the empiric level, alliance theories do not account for cases of minor allies that are actively engaged in terminating their security agreement with a great power. It means ignoring cases of diplomatic history on the base of a wrong assumption (namely, the weaker ally's passive role). To solve these puzzles, this research introduces an omitted variable that integrates a preexisting theoretical framework. The research so engages in a hypothesis-modification study.¹²⁴ In other words, it deals with a puzzle which previous contributions overlooked, and adds an undervalued factor to solve it.

It is worthy of defining the type of cases that the study deals. Type I cases are *failed most-likely* case for realism when the minor ally terminates the alliance even though there are increasing security concerns. On the other hand, they are *passed least-likely* cases for institutionalism once the alliance persists although the remuneration is decreasing. Differently, Type II cases are *passed least-likely* cases for realism when the alliance persists despite decreasing security concerns. Finally, they are *failed most-likely* cases for institutionalism once the alliance terminates although the remuneration is increasing.¹²⁵

3.2. Research Methodology

I will analyze four cases, a pair of Type I cases and a pair of Type II cases. The cross-case analysis requires to compare similar cases differing on only

¹²⁴ Rohlfing I., *Case Studies and Causal Inference. An Integrative Framework*, Palgrave MacMillan, 2012, pp. 9-11

¹²⁵ Rohlfing I., *op. cit.*, 2012, p. 93

one cause and having different outcomes (Method of Difference – MoD), and to compare different cases that share only one cause and have similar outcomes (Method of Agreement – MoA).¹²⁶ However, for this study, the MoD constitutes the primary tool of the empirical analysis, while the MoA constitutes a logical extension aiming to emphasize further the empirical results in the view of their generalization.

The table below shows the cases, the variables, and the outcomes.

CASE	SECURITY CONCERNS	ALLIANCE REMUNERATIVE POWER	TYPE	MINOR ALLY VOICE OPPORTUNITIES	OUTCOMES
(1)	Increasing	Decreasing	I	Ineffective	Alliance Termination
(2)	Increasing	Decreasing	I	Effective	Alliance Persistence
(3)	Decreasing	Increasing	II	Ineffective	Alliance Termination
(4)	Decreasing	Increasing	II	Effective	Alliance Persistence

Then, by adopting the method of process tracing, I aim to identify the processes behind the minor ally preferences for alliance persistence or termination.¹²⁷ As in each pair the minor ally's voice opportunities are *effective* in one case and they are *ineffective* in the other, I expect two different processes at work. In order to test the validity of the hypothesized causal mechanisms, some observable implications of the deductive theoretical framework should be found.¹²⁸ In this view, the empirical sections provide evidence through a within-case analysis focusing on key alliance processes.

Primary and secondary sources are both crucial for examining the processes shaping the alliances' evolution within the political and military fields. Clues

¹²⁶ See Rohlfing I., *op. cit.*, 2012, pp. 97-124

¹²⁷ See Beach D. and Pedersen R. B., *Process-Tracing Methods. Foundations and Guidelines*, The University of Michigan Press, 2013

¹²⁸ Bennet A. and Checkel J., “Process tracing: from philosophical roots to best practices” in *Process Tracing. From Metaphor to Analytic Tool*, Cambridge University Press, 2015, p.

can be found in the documentation attesting the history of the interallied relationships as the bilateral joint statements, the guidelines for the defense cooperation, and the alliances' strategic concepts. Moreover, the writings and utterances of political leaders and the public documents of each state might give a more specific idea about the allies' national interests. On the other hand, secondary sources as the interpretations of diplomatic historians can provide a broader understanding of the international context where states acted.

3.3. Case Selection Criteria and Empirical Cases

By considering the type of cases this research deals with (3.1.), the most relevant criterion for case selection is whether the empirical analysis produces surprising outcomes. Therefore, it is peaceful that “the choice of cases is intentional and based on a case's cross-case scores that deviate from the theoretically expected scores.”¹²⁹

The empirical sections analyses the following cases:

- (1) United Kingdom-Egypt alliance from 1945 to 1951 as a case of alliance termination.
- (2) United Kingdom-Iraq alliance from 1945 to 1955 as a case of alliance persistence.
- (3) United States-New Zealand alliance from the mid-1970s to mid-1980s as a case of alliance termination.
- (4) United States-Australia alliance from the mid-1970s to mid-1980s as a case of alliance persistence.

These cases are comparable in virtue of the research's theoretical parsimony. In other words, they approximate to the sketched ideal typologies whether the situational variables (security concerns and alliance

¹²⁹ Rohlfig I., *op. cit.*, 2012, p. 93

remuneration) assume the expected values.¹³⁰ The MoD is feasible to compare the British alliances with the Middle Eastern countries (case 1 and case 2), and the American alliances in the South Pacific (case 3 and case 4). More precisely, I followed two main criteria to select the cases. Firstly, I looked for similarities among the minor allies considering the research's theoretical framework. In other words, given the weaker side's quest for autonomy, I measured whether the states' security concerns and the alliance remuneration produced similar values. Moreover, preferable comparing cases were similar on other relevant variables as the states' size, the internal political system, the geographic region and the historical period.¹³¹ Secondly, I preferred to compare through the MoD alliances having the same major ally (for instance, UK-Egypt as a case of termination and UK-Iraq as a case of persistence).

On the other hand, the logical extension through the MoA is possible because different cases (as the UK-Egypt alliance and the US-New Zealand) produce similar outcomes. Again, the dissimilarity comes firstly from the values that the alliance variables assume. Then, I looked also for other relevant differences, as a different major ally, size, domestic political system, region, and historical period.

¹³⁰ Lijphart A., "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method", *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 65, No. 3 (Sep., 1971), pp. 682-693

¹³¹ Here, the main weakness is the difference in size between New Zealand and Australia.

Part II – The Empirical Analysis

The next four chapters analyze empirically four cases of asymmetric alliance. The third chapter describes the UK-Egypt alliance (1936-1951) as a case of alliance termination. The fourth chapter illustrates the UK-Iraq alliance (1932-1955) as a case of alliance termination. The fifth chapter analyses the New Zealand detachment from ANZUS in the mid-1980s as a case of alliance termination. The last empirical chapter discusses the US-Australia relation from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s as a case of successful alliance persistence.

The four cases follow a similar format. Each begins with a brief introduction describing the alliance treaty's main features and the interallied historical relations. This first section then points out the trigger point in which the minor ally's quest for autonomy emerges. The second section describes the alliance variables: the weaker ally's security concerns, the alliance remuneration, and the weaker side's voice opportunities. Then, it follows an in-depth historical narrative on the inter-allied relations during the period under investigation. This section describes the main events, and it introduces the last paragraphs about the alliance processes. These last paragraphs develop a specific analysis according to the processes of alliance persistence and termination. By looking at cases of alliance persistence, I expect to find evidence of greater cohesion between the allies; while analyzing cases of alliance termination, I expect to find evidence of erosion in the interallied relations.

CHAPTER 3

The Anglo-Egyptian alliance in the early Cold War: a case of alliance termination

Britain and Egypt signed a treaty of military alliance in 1936 modifying the agreements of 1899. The 1936 treaty consisted of 17 articles. Overall, it seemed to favor the weaker ally's autonomy as Egypt gained full sovereign rights (art. 3) and the British government agreed to favor the abolition of the Capitulations in the country.¹³² However, strict military clauses imposed British control over the minor ally territory by limiting its regional aspiration.¹³³ More specifically, Egypt granted Britain the military facilities to protect lines of communication and agreed on the permanence of British troops in the Canal Zone during peacetime (art. 7-8). Then, Egypt allowed the free use of its land, water, and air to the British forces in case of emergency (except the Royal Air Force, which had no restrictions).

The signature of the pact did not solve all issues in the Anglo-Egyptian relations. Indeed the joint administration of Sudan was still a source of complaints by Cairo. In the mid-1930s, although Egypt wanted to increase its influence over the Nile Valley, the treaty provided for the maintenance of the status-quo in Sudan (art. 11).¹³⁴ On the other hand, Cairo enjoyed fiscal freedom due to the end of Capitulations, while the permanence of British

¹³² That system made Britain responsible for the protection of foreign interests in Egypt.

¹³³ Morsy L., "The Military Clauses of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, 1936", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Mar., 1984), pp. 67-97

¹³⁴ On the Sudan issue was already collapsed an effort to forge an Anglo-Egyptian alliance in 1930. As reported by Louis "At that time the Egyptians had insisted on the right of unrestricted immigration into Sudan. The British adamantly refuse to give way to anything that might increase Egyptian influence". See Louis W.R., *The British Empire in the Middle East 1949-1951*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984, p. 229

forces was agreed until Egyptians would be able to defend their territory and the Canal Zone (art. 8) autonomously.

On the outbreak of World War II, the Egyptian government adopted a pro-British foreign policy.¹³⁵ However, the weaker ally's willingness to cooperate with the major one "ebbed and flowed with the fortunes of war."¹³⁶ During the conflict, Egypt preferred a cautious foreign policy, trying both to accommodate the ally and to avoid confrontation with the ally's enemies. At the end of World War II, differently, Egypt defined clearly its foreign policy goals. However, as Cairo's needs and regional plans emerged and were effectively possible to pursue, Britain did not accommodate the weaker ally paving the way for its unilateral treaty abrogation in 1951.

As a case of alliance termination, therefore, our inquiry will analyze the period 1945-1951. We will see that the allies did not overcome the internal crisis as the weaker ally was not successful in its quest for autonomy and the major partner adopted a hard approach. Indeed at the end of World War II, Egypt engaged in a new foreign policy course trying to improve its regional status and modifying the inter-allied relations. On the other hand, Britain was not able to accommodate the weaker partner's needs and support its regional plans. The ineffectiveness of Egypt's voice, therefore, paved the way for the alliance termination.

The following chapter develops in four sections. The first section describes Egypt's ambitions at the end of World War II. As we need to focus on the weaker ally's quest for autonomy as the trigger point of the inquiry, this section depicts the Egyptians' plans for regional leadership and the sources of Cairo's dissatisfaction toward Britain. The second section gives an account of the alliance variables. On the one hand, it measures Egypt's security concerns and the alliance remuneration in order to settle the framework for the empirical inquiry. On the other, it accounts for the Egyptians' voice attempts and its ineffectiveness. The third section describes the Anglo-Egyptians relations historically from 1945 to 1951. The fourth

¹³⁵ See Marlowe J., *Anglo-Egyptian Relations, 1800-1956*, Frank Cass and Company, 1965, pp. 310-319

¹³⁶ Marlowe J., *op. cit.*, 1965, pp. 316

section, finally, gives an account of the alliance processes. It firstly evaluates the British politics of hard restraint. Then, it provides evidence of Egypt's detachment before the unilateral abrogation. These processes of alliance erosion, finally, represent empirical evidence confirming the strength of the alliance termination's model.

1. How to define the case: Egyptians' ambitions after World War II

Following the end of World War II, the primary concern of Egyptian strategists focused around the question "What new order should arise in the Middle East?"¹³⁷ This juncture was crucial for the Egyptian history representing an appropriate starting point for our inquiry for two main reasons. Firstly, Cairo adopted a more ambitious foreign policy in its regional context trying to establish its leadership in the Arab world.¹³⁸ Egypt was "the wealthiest, most populous, most advanced technologically, and generally the most powerful of the Arab states."¹³⁹ Although other Arab states projected to expand their territories and improve their power status in the region (as the greater Syrian project by Jordan and the Fertile Crescent project by Iraq), Egypt served its interests best taking the lead of the Arab States League.¹⁴⁰ Cairo's position in the organization well describes how Egypt was the dominant power among the Arab states and aimed to improve its status. Egypt played a central role in the establishment of the League and preserved its leadership in the organization for three decades. Egyptians held the key roles and functions within the organization. The League had its headquarters in Cairo; it elected Egyptians secretaries-general until 1979; and Egypt was the main financial contributor.¹⁴¹ Moreover, Cairo influenced the League to undermine alternative projects of regional order. The first

¹³⁷ Doran M., *Pan-Arabism before Nasser: Egyptian Power Politics and the Palestine Question*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1999, p. 7

¹³⁸ Doran M., *op. cit.*, 1999, p. 140-141-153

¹³⁹ Marlowe J., *op. cit.*, 1965, p. 322

¹⁴⁰ Hasou T., *The Struggle for the Arab World*, Routledge; 1 edition (January 4, 1985), pp. 6-12

¹⁴¹ Hasou T., *op. cit.*, 1985, pp. 17-47

secretary-general, Abdul Rahman Azzam, had a strong belief that the unity of the Arab world could only be pursued through the Egyptian leadership.¹⁴²

The League, therefore, became a useful tool for Egypt to promote its foreign policy aims and expansionist ambitions against rival projects of regional order, both from Britain and Arab neighbors.¹⁴³

Secondly, Egypt engaged in a new course toward Britain, its major security partner. On 20 December 1945, Cairo asked for a revision of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936. The Egyptian government claimed that “the circumstances which determined the particular character of the Treaty of 1936 have changed (...) it has become necessary to revise it in order to bring it into harmony with the new international situation; its clauses which detract from the independence and the dignity of Egypt no longer correspond to present conditions.”¹⁴⁴

Cairo aimed to stabilize Anglo-Egyptian relations on a level of equality to establish, then, its regional leadership among the Arab states. For this reason, Egyptians raised two main points: the withdrawal of British military forces and the unity of the Nile Valley. Although both issues were delicate, Egypt was less prone to compromise on the latter. Cairo strongly desired to reach political control over Sudan (or even to obtain the unity under the Egyptian crown) to make sure of natural resources as the water of the Nile; to favor emigration for its surplus population; to increase favorable economic relationships and capital investments.¹⁴⁵ Moreover, the control of Sudan could imply the extension of Egyptian interests to the rest of Africa, or at least it improved Cairo status toward neighbor states.¹⁴⁶

In sum, following the end of World War II, Egypt tried to take advantage of the new international environment. The achievement of Arab leadership and the establishment of more favorable inter-allied relations were not

¹⁴² Hopwood D., *Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-1981*, Unwin Hyman/ See Routledge; 2nd Printing edition (April 1983), p. 28

¹⁴³ Doran M., *op. cit.*, 1999, p. 74-75

¹⁴⁴ Kent J. (eds), *Egypt and the Defense of Middle East. Part I 1945-1949*, London: The Stationery Office, 1998, p. 72

¹⁴⁵ Fabumni L.A., *The Sudan in Anglo-Egyptian Relations. A Case Study in Power Politics 1800-1956*, Greenwood Press, London, 1973, pp. 115-135

¹⁴⁶ Fabumni L. A., *op. cit.*, 1973, pp. 165-171

separated issues, but connected factors in the new Egyptian foreign policy course. This new course represents the trigger point of the chapter's analysis, which is the minor ally's quest for autonomy.

2. The Alliance Variables

This section describes the model's variables. Looking from the weaker side's perspective, it measures the Egyptians' security concerns and the alliance remuneration. These variables assume the values as a Type I case. Then, this section accounts for the minor ally's voice attempts. The analysis shows that Egypt's voice was ineffective as the minor ally was not able to improve the interallied cooperation on the ground of its needs.

Overall, the Anglo-Egyptian alliance fits the theoretical framework as a case of alliance termination. Firstly, the case passes the test for case selection successfully, as the Egyptians' security concerns increase while the alliance remuneration decreases in the period under consideration. Secondly, the explicative variable fits the theoretic expectations comfortably as the ineffectiveness of Egyptian's voice led to the alliance termination in 1951.

The following paragraphs will describe the variables in details.

2.1. Egypt increasing security concerns.

2.1.1. Egypt and the Middle East balance of power: Cairo increasing external threats

By considering threats at the regional level, Egypt opposed to projects of reunification embraced by the Hashemite countries.¹⁴⁷ Starting from the 1920s, Jordan developed a greater Syria project aiming to rule a reunified Tran-Jordan-Syria, Lebanon and Palestine. In the early 1940s, Iraq called for a more comprehensive union, the Fertile Crescent project, which provided for the union between a greater Syria with Iraq. Egypt's increasing

¹⁴⁷ Louis W. R., *op. cit.*, 1984, pp. 313-315

concerns, therefore, came from the expansionist ambitions of Jordan and Iraq, which supported the reunification of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Trans-Jordan, and Iraq, while excluding Cairo. A lot was at stake in these inter-Arab relations: the regional leadership; the bargaining power toward Britain; the relationships with other extra-regional powers; and, more generally, the security of every regime. When the Palestine issue arose imminently in late 1947, the question for all Arab countries became “What political authority should replace the British mandate?”¹⁴⁸ As the analyst Michael Doran argued, Egypt was particularly concerned with the issue.

[C]ircumstantial evidence suggests that, especially in the case of King Faruq, the threat posed by King Abdallah’s Greater Syria project constituted the *primary* consideration leading him to champion direct intervention (...) The king, together with Azzam and Hafiz Wahba, had advanced the Arab-bloc formula for regional defense—a proposal designed, at one and the same moment, to contain Jordan, permanently diminish the international status of Iraq, and advance the interests of Egypt in the Anglo-Egyptian struggle (...) Indeed, when King Abdallah refused to relinquish his army to the Arab League, he left no choice to the leaders in Cairo: in order to retain their influence in the Fertile Crescent, they had to go to war in Palestine. If the Egyptian government had failed to join the battle, then the freedom of action that Jordan enjoyed in the military arena would have inevitably translated itself into freedom of action in the political arena as well. Given the proclivities of King Abdallah, the peace conference following hostilities would have resulted in the partition of Palestine between the new Jewish state and Jordan—that is, it would have resulted in the worst-case scenario.¹⁴⁹

Thus, Egypt supported intervention in order to preserve its Arab leadership and to diminish the power of the Hashemite Entente. At the end of the Palestine conflict, Jordan was weakened, and the economic consequences of the war put an end to the Greater Syrian Project. However, Iraq replaced Jordan as the primary threat to Syria independence by supporting the Fertile Crescent project.¹⁵⁰ Moreover, the rise of Israel quickly became a new source of threats for Cairo. As the war demonstrated, Israelis forces were well organized and well armed while the Egyptians ones were ill organized

¹⁴⁸ Doran M., *op. cit.*, 1999, p. 116

¹⁴⁹ Doran M., *op. cit.*, 1999, p. 139. See also Marlowe J., *op. cit.*, 1965, p.326

¹⁵⁰ Eppel M., *op. cit.*, 2004, p. 129

and ill armed.¹⁵¹ Moreover, the Palestine conflict left Egypt with further strategic problems toward its main ally. As the historian John Marlowe argued,

[o]n the one hand, Israel was a power with which Great Britain wished to be friendly. And which she wanted to include with the Arab states in comprehensive scheme for the defense of the Middle East. On the other hand, Israel was a power whose hostility Egypt feared and whose destruction she desired. While Great Britain wanted Egypt to become reconciled with Israel and to dovetail her military preparations into a general plan for the defense of the Middle East against Russia, Egypt viewed her defense preparations as being primarily directed towards the possibility of a local war with Israel. Thus the main condition of a military alliance – identity of strategic purpose – no longer existed.¹⁵²

Although the Egypt-Israel Armistice Agreement provided a period of truce, a border war started in 1949 triggering a slow escalation toward the second Arab conflict of 1956.¹⁵³

2.1.2. *Egypt's regime instability: the increasing internal threats*

Internal turmoil to the Egyptian state characterized the entire period under our study. Anti-government public demonstrations, assassinations and the attempted assassination of public figures, terroristic bombing attacks were a current affair from 1945 to 1952.¹⁵⁴ The Ikhwan (also known as the Muslim Brotherhood) substituted the Wafd as the most radical group in Egyptian politics and became the leader of this campaign of violence in the country.

The historian P. J. Vatikiotis so accounted for the main events from 1945 to 1948:

¹⁵¹ See Marlowe J., *op. cit.*, 1965, p. 328

¹⁵² Marlowe J., *op. cit.*, 1965, pp. 362-363

¹⁵³ Oren M. B., "Escalation to Suez: The Egypt-Israel Border War, 1949-56", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 24, No. 2, Studies on War (Apr., 1989), pp. 347-373

¹⁵⁴ This paragraph mainly relies on Vatikiotis P. J., *The History of Egypt*, The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1969, pp. 355-368

[T]he assassination of Prime Minister Ahmad Maher in February 1945 was followed almost a year later in January 1946 with the assassination of Amin Othman (a known Anglophile) in the streets of Cairo in broad daylight. Othman's assassin had only a month earlier (December 1945) attempted to blow-up Nahhas's car with a hand grenade which missed. There were similar grenade and gelignite attacks on public places perpetrated by the Ikhwan and other radical groups throughout 1946 and 1947 in both Cairo and Alexandria. One of these, a gelignite explosion in the Metro Cinema in which several people were killed, occurred on 6 May 1947, the anniversary of Faruq's accession to the throne.

More ominous was the attempt by the Ikhwan and other extremists to intimidate members of the judiciary with threats of assassination and actual bombing attacks. The secretary of the Cairo Court of Appeals was murdered in March 1948 for his past two years earlier in the Alexandria court trial of Ikhwan 'bombers'. In April, unknown assailants tried to dynamite Nahhas's residence in Garden City.

As the hostilities in Palestine started in mid-1948, the government imposed the Martial Law in the country reducing the internal disorders. On December, Prime Minister Nuqrashi ordered the dissolution of the Ikhwan. The organization responded twenty days later murdering the Prime Minister when he was going up to his office. A few months later, although hostilities in Palestine ended, the Parliament extended the Martial Law for another year.

2.2. The decreasing alliance remuneration: Egypt's dissatisfaction and Britain lack of support

As the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936 granted military sovereignty to Egypt, Cairo increased its pressures to modernize its military forces.¹⁵⁵ Britain had the monopoly over arms supply and armed forces training by making Cairo dependent on the approval of London for improving its military.¹⁵⁶ At the

¹⁵⁵ Gordon well describes the British engagement in the late-1930s to improve and modernize the Egyptian army. See Gordon J., *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1992, p. 41

¹⁵⁶ Morsy writes "Actually with regard to the Egyptian army's standard of efficiency, the treaty imposed a number of restrictions by which it seemed unlikely to disrupt Britain's supremacy in Egypt. Great Britain was given by the Treaty the right to train the Egyptian

beginning of the negotiation for the treaty revision in early 1946, Bevin declared that Britain aimed to modernize the ally's military forces. However, the allies had different views considering Egypt's role in the Middle East. As the historian David Tal pointed out,

Egypt's army commanders hoped to build a modern army consisting of two infantry divisions and one armored division, but Britain's chiefs of staff did not expect the Egyptian armed forces to make a significant contribution to the Western war effort against the Soviet Union, and so they had no interest in significantly strengthening the Egyptian army. Egypt's importance for the British was geostrategic, and all that the chiefs of staff expected of the Egyptian army was an active role in the defense of air bases. Hence they called for the setting up of a more modest force, consisting of two anti-aircraft brigades, two infantry brigades for internal security needs, one field army infantry division and one light armored brigade, comprising a tank regiment and two mechanized regiments.¹⁵⁷

During 1946-1947 Egypt ordered forty-eight planes and about seventy Centurion tanks to Britain. London escaped the ally's request assuming that the Egyptian army did not need these armaments. By April 1947, the Egyptian quest for arms extended to the United States as the Nuqrashi government sent a delegation to explore possibilities for an arms deal. Egyptians again did not obtain any significant collaboration.¹⁵⁸

army by a British mission and according to British military standards. In addition, the armament and equipment, land and air, of the Egyptian forces were not to differ in type from those of the British forces. It thus went without saying that Egypt could not purchase her arms from any country other than Britain. And therefore it could be argued that Britain was in a singular position to ensure that the efficiency of the Egyptian army would not exceed the limit which would enable it to challenge Britain's position in Egypt. England's say in the matter of controlling arms would be decisive. As a matter of fact, the Egyptian government was to have difficulty in obtaining from Britain the necessary arms for its army". See Morsy L., *op. cit.*, 1984

¹⁵⁷ Tal D., "Weapons without Influence: British Arms Supply Policy and the Egyptian-Czech Arms Deal, 1945-55", *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* Vol. 34, No. 3, September 2006, pp. 369-388

¹⁵⁸ As Hahn points out "American policy toward arms supply to Egypt demonstrated intent to collaborate with Britain regarding Egyptian affairs. The idea of supplying arms to Egypt had been under consideration since October 1947, when Egypt requested aid in establishing a small weapons factory. Army staff planners were tempted to honor the request to improve

In mid-1948, the United Nations Security Council approved an arms embargo to Middle East countries. The embargo endured one year forcing Britain to suspend the delivery of arms, which Egypt had already ordered and paid. The lack of adequate British support in arms transfer and military modernization paved the way for Cairo defeat in the Palestinian conflict.¹⁵⁹ Nonetheless, Egypt resumed its demands for arms as the Palestinian hostilities ended. For the fiscal year 1949, the government allocated £52 million for military expenditure "to build an army which will be one of the most formidable in the Middle East."¹⁶⁰ Around 40% of this amount was spent in Britain by an Egyptian delegation, which placed orders for jet planes, tanks, armored cars, and other military equipment. The delivery was planned in 2 or 3 years.

Meanwhile, Britain agreed with the United States and France to regulate arms supply in the Middle East to avoid an arms race. The Tripartite declaration was signed on May 1950 establishing that Arab countries should have delivered arms only for purposes of self-defense and internal security.¹⁶¹ Actually, as Bevin admitted to Acheson at a Foreign Ministers meeting in May 1950, Britain's interest was to keep the Egyptian army at a low level of modernization. Britain, argued the Foreign Secretary, "had treated the Egyptians 'rather shabbily' by providing them with 'junk' arms."¹⁶²

relations with Egyptian military officers, but instead, to avoid antagonizing the British, they advised the State Department to sell Cairo limited quantities of surplus weapons. Even that became impossible on 14 November, when the State Department suspended arms exports to the Middle East pending clarification of the situation in Palestine" p. 65

¹⁵⁹ Tal D., *op. cit.*, 2006. The Egyptian army consisted of three infantry brigades and one armored brigade, equipped with light tanks, some of which were without guns. Its air force, the strongest in the Arab world, consisted of several dozen bombers and jet fighters, but inferior maintenance and lack of experienced personnel meant that to all intents and purposes it was grounded

¹⁶⁰ FRUS, 1950 p. 287

¹⁶¹ Tal D., "The Making, Operation and Failure of the May 1950 Tripartite Declaration on Middle East Security", *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 2 (August 2009), pp. 177-193

¹⁶² cit in Louis W. R., *op. cit.*, 1984, p.

The deficit in arms supply, as the historian David Tal pointed out, was also a British coercive tool to persuade Egypt to comply with London's demands. When treaty negotiations deadlocked in late 1950,

Prime Minister Nahhas Pasha told the Egyptian parliament that 'the Egyptian government no longer regarded the Treaty of 1936 as a basis for Anglo-Egyptian relations'. This was only one step short of abrogating the Treaty, and in response Britain froze deliveries to Egypt of the aircraft and Centurion tanks that it had intended to supply. Egypt's request for sixty additional Centurion tanks was not even considered.¹⁶³

On the other hand, in late-1950 Britain suspended delivery of weapons purchased by Egypt because needed by Britain forces in Korea. During the period under consideration, therefore, the alliance remuneration was low and worsening from the Egyptian perspective.

2.3. Egypt's voice attempts and its ineffectiveness

In the period under study, the inter-allied disputes developed on two main issues raised by Egypt. Indeed, Cairo contested both the presence of British troops situated on its territory and the disunity of the Nile Valley, which implied the lack of political control over Sudan by Egypt. As the historian Roger Louis argued, these were "the two points on which the King, the leaders of the Wafd, and virtually all other Egyptians could agree."¹⁶⁴

At the beginning of the negotiations for the treaty revision, Egypt attempted to increase its degree of autonomy without challenging the primacy of Britain in the Middle East. According to the scholar Michel Doran,

Sidqi Pasha regarded as hopeless any attempt to force the British to renounce completely their claim on Egyptian facilities and territory. Seeing no possibility of prying Egypt completely loose from the grip of the Empire, he sought instead to reduce and regulate British power, to create a legal and institutional framework of alliance that

¹⁶³ Tal D., *op. cit.*, 2006

¹⁶⁴ Louis W. R., *op. cit.*, 1984, p. 229

would safeguard Egyptian independence in time of peace and minimize the extent of British interference in domestic affairs in time of war.¹⁶⁵

The Egyptians, therefore, attempted to establish an equal relationship with Britain. As the British ambassador to Egypt, Sir R. Campbell, reported in 1946, Cairo desired more freedom of action to be agreed in an amicable settlement.¹⁶⁶ The ambassador recorded a personal conversation with Sidky Pasha to the Foreign Office as follows.

Egyptians then wanted an alliance, but on a footing of real equality. The basis should be that of two friends, a big and a small one, but equals in status. There could not be friendship unless it was of a kind in which the smaller friend could say to the larger not "I want to do such and such: may I?" but "I am going to do such and such". Sidqi was certain that as friends, we could together contribute all that was necessary to the defense of our common interests (...)

[Sidqi] deprecated the provision (as he put it) to submit Egyptian foreign policy to Britain (Article 5). (I said this was surely common form in Treaties of this kind and bound both parties: while Sidqi admitted this, he said the presence of British troops gave the provision an unequal character).¹⁶⁷

Similarly, Egypt considered the condominium over Sudan as a British occupation undermining Cairo's ambitions of unity with Khartoum. As the historian James Marlowe pointed out, Egyptians were convinced that

the British government was determined, irrespective of the real wishes of the Sudanese people, to separate the Sudan from Egypt, and considered that the implementation by Great Britain of a policy of progressive self-government in the Sudan would enable her to ensure this. Egypt was therefore unwilling to acquiesce in a policy which was designed, in her consideration, to defeat her aims and ambitions as regards the Sudan.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁵ Doran M., *op. cit.*, 1999, p. 71

¹⁶⁶ Kent J. (eds), *Egypt and the Defense of Middle East. Part I 1945-1949*, Institute for Commonwealth Studies, London: The Stationary Office, 1998, pp. 83-85

¹⁶⁷ *Ibidem*, pp. 83-85

¹⁶⁸ Marlowe J., *op. cit.*, 1965, p. 359

The Sudanese constitutional reform provides a useful example of Egyptians suffering the British dominance. In 1947-1948 London and Cairo attempted to agree on the Sudanese constitutional reform. Although it was established a committee made by British, Egyptians and Sudanese representatives, Cairo found unacceptable the final draft agreement. The reasons were the following: the draft overlooked the fundamental principle of unity between Egypt and Sudan under the Egyptian Crown; it increased the powers of the British Governor-General (rather than empowering the Egyptian king); Egyptians had a minimal participation in the Executive Council (two members out of eighteen); the Sudanese participation was inadequate compared to the powers of the Governor-General.¹⁶⁹ However, the British government decided to promulgate the ordinance unilaterally despite the Egyptians claims. For Egypt, it was a new display of "contemptuous indifference to the views and feeling of a joint partner in the Sudan venture."¹⁷⁰

In sum, London had monopolized the administration of Sudan and denied the Egyptians project of unity. Moreover, it maintained three times the number of troops in the Suez Canal Zone permitted under the treaty of 1936. From the Egyptian's perspective, the lack of British's recognition of Cairo's national aspirations made ineffective any attempt to voice and forced the minor ally to oppose the dominant partner directly.

3. The Anglo-Egyptian relations from 1945 to 1951

3.1. The framework of the Anglo-Egyptian disputes

Following the end of World War II, the Anglo-Egyptian disputes focused mainly on the revision of the alliance treaty. On 20 December 1945, Egyptians wrote to the British government asking to start negotiations. Cairo pointed out the main issues to settle:

¹⁶⁹ Fabumni L. A., *op. cit.*, 1973, pp. 270-273

¹⁷⁰ Fabumni L. A., *op. cit.*, 1973, p. 272

(...) The presence of foreign forces on our soil in peace-time, even if stationed in distant areas, is still wounding to national dignity, and can only be interpreted by Egyptian public opinion as the tangible sign of a mistrust which the British Government themselves, we believe, must regard as unjustified. (...) It goes without saying that the negotiations will include the question of the Sudan and will be inspired by the interests and aspirations of the Sudanese.¹⁷¹

In April 1946, London decided to send a delegation to Cairo. When the talks opened, Ernest Bevin – Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs during Clement Attlee's office period – expressed hope that Anglo-Egyptian relations could strengthen "on a footing of full and free partnership as between equals in defense of their mutual interests, and with full respect for the independence and sovereignty of Egypt."¹⁷² Actually, Bevin wanted to preserve the essential figures of the 1936 treaty but removing all grounds for Egyptian claims of British occupation.¹⁷³ He knew that the British military presence in Egypt was crucial on strategic grounds. "If we move out of the Mediterranean" Bevin explained to the Defense Committee in mid-1946, "Russia will move in, and the Mediterranean countries, from the point of view of commerce and trade, economy and democracy, will be finished."¹⁷⁴ Moreover, London was committed to self-government in Sudan, and it was incompatible with the Egyptian's project of unity with Sudan.¹⁷⁵

On the other hand, Ismail Sidqi – the Egyptian Prime Minister during the 1946's negotiations – received the British delegation asking the unconditional withdrawal of military forces from the country. Sidqi argued that the presence of foreign forces undermined Egyptian sovereignty, violated the United Nations Charter, and interfered in Egyptian domestic politics.¹⁷⁶ Although the British did not expect this tight line, Attlee and Bevin preferred to accommodate the Egyptians announcing their intention to withdraw the troops from the country. As the Chief of Staff explained, "It

¹⁷¹ Kent J. (eds), *op. cit.*, 1998, p. 72

¹⁷² cit. in Hahn P. L., *The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956*, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill and London, 1991, p. 31

¹⁷³ Louis W. R., *op. cit.*, 1984, 232-233

¹⁷⁴ cit in Hahn P. L., *op. cit.*, 1991, p. 30

¹⁷⁵ Louis W. R., *op. cit.*, 1984, pp. 230-231

¹⁷⁶ Hahn P. L., *op. cit.*, 1991, p. 30

would be better...to make a bold gesture at the outset... and thus hope to gain the willing cooperation of the Egyptian Government in negotiating the base and other requirements in Egypt which are essential to us both in war and also in peace."¹⁷⁷ According to this view, London announced the troops to be evacuated from Cairo and Alexandria by the end of the year.¹⁷⁸

However, London could not accept to leave the country unconditionally. When Bevin told the House of Common that he would not "leave a vacuum [in Egypt]", the negotiations in Cairo entered a prolonged impasse.¹⁷⁹ Moreover, the issue of Sudan was even more complicated. In late April, Hubert Huddleston – General Governor of Anglo-Egyptian Sudan – expressed publicly in favor of a free and independent Sudan “which will define ... for itself its relations with Great Britain and with Egypt”.¹⁸⁰ Cairo instead wanted the unity of the Nile Valley under the Egyptian crown. Although Bevin publicly repudiated Huddleston’s statements, he was determined to support the Sudanese self-government. The status of Sudan became soon the "stone wall" (as Bevin used to say) of the Anglo-Egyptian discussions, even more than the troops' withdrawal.¹⁸¹

3.2.From the Sidqi- Bevin agreement to the Egyptian appeal to the Security Council

In October 1946, Sidqi traveled to London personally to negotiate a compromise with Bevin. The two leaders agreed on many issues as the evacuation of British troops and the establishment of a joint defense board to activate in the event of war in the Middle East. However, the Sudan issue was handled through an ambiguous compromise. While Cairo demanded the British recognition of Egyptian sovereignty in Sudan, the British supported

¹⁷⁷ cit. in Hahn P. L., *op. cit.*, 1991, p. 30

¹⁷⁸ Marlowe J., *op. cit.*, 1965, p. 339

¹⁷⁹ Bullock A., *op. cit.*, 1983, p. 252

¹⁸⁰ cit. in Hahn P. L., *op cit.*, 1991, pp. 34-35

¹⁸¹ Louis W. R., *op. cit.*, 1984, p. 231

the Sudanese right of self-determination.¹⁸² The Bevin-Sidqi protocol finally recognized both "the framework of unity between the Sudan and Egypt under the common crown of Egypt" and the right of Sudan to achieve independence and decide its own future.¹⁸³

The British and Egyptian claims over Sudan were partially conceivable, but different interpretations made them incompatible. In the British view, the protocol did not alter the *status quo* in Sudan unless Sudanese people asked for some change. Differently, as Sidqi came back to Cairo, he declared he had secured the Egyptian-Sudanese unity. It provoked rioting in Khartoum by pro-British parties. On the other hand, Bevin publicly repudiated Sidqi's declaration, and Attlee later explained that British "had to regard the susceptibilities and real interests of the Sudanese people" against the Egyptian elites.¹⁸⁴

The turmoil favored Sidqi's resignation, while the new Prime Minister Nuqrashi publicly announced to the Egyptian House of Representatives the break of the negotiations. Since Britain aimed to divide Sudan from Egypt, Nuqrashi announced that Egypt would appeal to the Security Council for obtaining the foreign troops' withdrawal from the entire Nile Valley.¹⁸⁵

In August 1947, Egyptian and British officials debated during Security Council sessions at Lake Success. Cairo, however, was not able to obtain a favorable resolution in the following months.¹⁸⁶ The historian Peter Hahn so described this period:

Between January 1947 and April 1948, the Anglo-Egyptian impasse over the Canal Zone base and Sudan hardened. Britain frustrated Egypt's appeal to the Security Council in 1947, and Bevin failed to resume productive Anglo- Egyptian negotiations in early 1948. The irreconcilable British and Egyptian aspirations regarding Sudan that produced deadlock in December 1946 persisted in 1948. Meanwhile, British strategists reconsidered their willingness to evacuate the Canal Zone base by 1949 and decided to

¹⁸² Louis W. R., *op. cit.*, 1984, p. 246-249;

¹⁸³ Bullock A., *op. cit.*, 1983, pp. 323-324

¹⁸⁴ Hahn P. L., *op. cit.*, 1991, p. 34

¹⁸⁵ *Oriente Moderno*, 1947, 1/3

¹⁸⁶ For detailed accounts see Marlowe J., *op. cit.*, 1965, pp. 343-349 and Hail P. L., *op. cit.*, 1996, pp. 23-43

retain facilities there for as long as possible. In April 1948, Britain and Egypt were further from settlement than they had been in December 1946.¹⁸⁷

Meanwhile, the end of the British mandate in Palestine opened a new issue in the Egyptian foreign policy agenda.

3.3. The Palestine conflict

On 15 May 1948, Britain terminated its mandate over Palestine leaving a massive vacuum of power in the country.¹⁸⁸ That same day David Ben-Gurion proclaimed the state of Israel triggering the Arabs' armed reaction. The Egyptian government expected the war to be a quick and easy task to solve in few days.¹⁸⁹ However, Israel prevailed on the Arab states and invaded Egypt on 7 January 1949. Although the two countries signed a bilateral armistice at Rhodes on 24 February, Cairo brought back heavy losses from the conflict in both military and financial terms.

The Arab defeat originated from both the Israeli military superiority and the inter-Arab divisions and conflicting ambitions.¹⁹⁰ For our purposes, the Palestinian conflict and the establishment of an Israeli state affected the Anglo-Egyptian relations negatively in several ways. While Britain failed to respond to Egypt's demands for help during the war, Cairo intensified the restrictions on the Suez Canal shipping. Moreover, the Israeli invasion of Egypt demonstrated that Cairo was incapable of defending its territory without foreign assistance. That strengthened the British's belief that complete and unconditional withdrawal was inopportune, especially in the Suez Canal Zone. On the other hand, the establishment of the Israeli state restricted the freedom of action of both allies. Egypt now considered Israel

¹⁸⁷ Hahn P. L., *op. cit.*, 1999, p. 63

¹⁸⁸ See Hail J. A., *Britain's Foreign Policy in Egypt and Sudan 1947-1956*, Ithaca Press, 1996, pp. 45-55

¹⁸⁹ See Mayer T., "Egypt's 1948 Invasion of Palestine", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Jan., 1986), pp. 20-36

¹⁹⁰ See Mayer T., "Arab Unity of Action and the Palestine Question, 1945-48", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jul., 1986), pp. 331-349

as a stronger hostile neighbor it had to deal with. Britain had lost Palestine as a possible alternative military base in the Eastern Mediterranean.¹⁹¹

3.4. The last round of negotiations

In early January 1950, Nahhas Pasha became again Prime Minister of Egypt. At that time, Bevin reached Cairo to engage in several conversations with Egyptian ministers about the desirability of a new agreement. The historian Alan Bullock so described Bevin's conversation with Saleh el-Din, the Egyptian Foreign Minister:

In conversation with the Foreign Minister, [Bevin] pointed to the American use of bases in the UK as part of the NATO defense plan, arguing that, with NATO looking after the defense of Western Europe and with the USA taking an increased interest in the Far East, there was a gap in the Middle East. Saleh el-Din agreed about the gap but would not accept that Americans using facilities in the UK were in the same position as the British in Egypt: the difference was that the USA and the UK treated each other on the basis of equality. This was the heart of the matter as far as the Egyptians were concerned: even without raising the question of the Sudan, they were unwilling to consider any defense agreement without the prior evacuation of the Canal Zone, a condition that the British, including Bevin, equally stubbornly refused to consider.¹⁹²

British forces in 1950 numbered over three times the amount of 10,000 allowed by the treaty. More precisely, the 'Land Striking Force' accounted for 7,000; the Royal Air Force and army defense units, 10,000; and the personnel of General Headquarters and base troops, 13,000.¹⁹³

In March, the Egyptian government asked to resume negotiations. In late May, the formal meetings took place in Cairo. However, in late 1950 Anglo-Egyptian negotiations were still deadlocked.¹⁹⁴

When Herbert Morrison substituted Bevin as Foreign Secretary, the British government still believed that appeasement of Egypt would lead to a

¹⁹¹ Marlowe J., *op. cit.*, 1965, pp. 358

¹⁹² Bullock A., *op. cit.*, 1983, p. 752

¹⁹³ Louis W. R., *op. cit.*, 1984, p. 715

¹⁹⁴ See Hail J. A., *op. cit.*, 1996, pp. 59-69

deterioration of the British's position as a world power.¹⁹⁵ After the failure of negotiations in mid-1951, the British tried to define a new security agreement with Egypt including the United States, known as the Middle East Command (MEC). However, the British were not able to give a new look to the combined Anglo-American engagement. As the historian Peter Hahn pointed out,

[a]s originally conceived in London, however, the MEC would ensure Britain's hegemony at the expense of Egypt and the other Arab states, which would be relegated to an advisory role only. Not were the Americans willing to concede the Arabs a truly equal voice, either in the negotiations regarding Egypt's right to restrict traffic on the Suez Canal or in those involving the Anglo-American plan for the MEC. They sided with the British in the dispute over transit rights and settled for a plan that would give Egyptian officers only nominal command of British troops. In these and other ways the Anglo-Americans treated Egypt as an unequal partner, which helps to explain the anti-western demonstrations in Cairo and the decision of the government there to reject the Anglo-American proposal and abrogate the treaty of 1936.

4. The British hard restraint and the Egyptian detachment: the processes of alliance termination

This last section accounts for the alliance processes leading to the security treaty termination. Firstly, it describes the British politics of restraint. The analysis shows that the stronger ally adopted a hard posture increasing the weaker partner's dissatisfaction. Secondly, it focuses on the Egyptian's attitudes before Cairo's unilateral act of alliance abrogation. Since the failure of Bevin-Sidqi agreement, we can find evidence of the Egyptian detachment on two main plans: attempts to diversify arm suppliers and attempts to undermine the British primacy in the Middle East building an alternative defense system of alliances.

¹⁹⁵ Louis W. R., *op. cit.*, 1984, pp. 720-725

4.1. Britain politics of hard restraint

Following the end of World War II, Britain still considered Egypt as a key ally in the Eastern Mediterranean because of its geographical position connecting the African and the Asian continents. The Suez Canal Zone, then, was an invaluable overseas asset, which assured the oil supplies from the Middle East and a quick connection with colonial and ex-colonial states. Therefore, keeping the military access on the Egyptian territory in wartime (and eventually stationed troops in peacetime) was a core British interest as much as the exclusive control of the Suez Canal Zone.

In the British strategy, the control over Sudan represented the best tool to restrain the Egyptian ambitions and freedom of action.¹⁹⁶ Because of the interdependence between the two countries, British politicians thought, "who control Sudan, then control Egypt".¹⁹⁷ Therefore, preserving the division of Egypt and Sudan was essential for the British power projection. As the analyst Lawrence Fabumni pointed out,

Britain struggled against the 'Unity of the Nile Valley' for fear that Egypt-Sudanese union might create one of the strongest power states in the Mediterranean and the most powerful in the Red Sea – a state that would include both the 22 million Egyptians and the 8 million Sudanese, whose military potentially was fully brought home to the British during the First World War, the Italo-Abyssinian War, and the Second World War. Within a short space of time, such a state might challenge British interests and authority in the Mediterranean and Africa. With a natural desire to prevent, or at least delay, the formation of such a state, Britain persistently maneuvered to maintain the Sudan under the British regime, thereby ensuring its effective influence on Egyptian policy.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁶ As Bullock points out, "The British looked at Sudan as one of the most important British bases in the whole Middle East and Africa, and must have free use of it. Amongst these uses would be the power to prevent Egypt giving assistance to the enemy in any future world conflict". See Bullock A., *Ernest Bevin. Foreign Secretary 1945-1951*, Heinemann, London, 1983, p. 472

¹⁹⁷ See interview to Noqrashi *Oriente Moderno* 1947 7/9 pp. 183-4

¹⁹⁸ Fabumni L. A., *op. cit.*, 1973, p. 199

Moreover, in the view of preserving Britain's status as a great power in the early Cold War, British imperial strategists wanted to hold London primacy in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.¹⁹⁹ They rejected any retreat strategy fearing that Britain could be considered as a junior partner by its former wartime allies. According to the scholar Michel Doran,

The weakness of Britain vis-à-vis the superpowers compelled statesmen in London to gird themselves for a struggle with their wartime allies, who, purely on the basis of the arrogance of power, might not be inclined to respect British interests in the postwar era. Contemplating the present differential in capabilities and gambling that the economic recovery of Britain would diminish that differential, British diplomatists resolved that they must refuse to relinquish control over traditional spheres of interest. They believed that if their government, as a result of temporary weakness, allowed its international position to erode, then even after an economic recovery it would be impossible for Britain to regain the status of a great power. Retreat, they reckoned, would be permanent; hunkering down offered the only basis for hope.²⁰⁰

Therefore, British politicians opposed the «retreat thesis» in the Middle East to avoid the Russian involvement in the Mediterranean countries and to preserve bargaining power with Americans. The appeasement to Egypt in early 1946 originated from the belief that both Palestine and Cyrenaica were likely to be available for stationing troops. However, following the decision in early 1947 to withdraw from Palestine and the failure of Bevin-Sidqi protocol, British decided to reaffirm the 1936 military clauses, which gave Britain the right to keep forces in Egypt in peacetime. Moreover, British strategists valued that the increasing Soviet threat imposed the deployment of a significant military contingent in Egypt, despite Cairo's opposition.²⁰¹ When the Korean War broke out in 1950, the possibility of an enlarged conflict made essential the strategic control of the Middle East. Notwithstanding Egypt's demands, Britain considered Cairo as a junior ally that had to conform to London's requests. In May 1950, the British Chiefs of Staff described the ideal military arrangements in the Middle East as “a

¹⁹⁹ Louis W. R., *op. cit.*, 1984, p. 31; Kent J., *British Imperial Strategy and the origins of the Cold War*, Leicester University Press, Leicester, 1993

²⁰⁰ Doran M., *op. cit.*, 1999, p. 36

²⁰¹ Kent J., *op. cit.*, 1993, pp. 134-182-183

regional pact consisting of the UK, the Arab League States, Israel, Turkey, Persia and possibly Greece, in which *Egypt as a willing partner would provide the base facilities required.*"²⁰² As Bevin's biographer Alan Bullock pointed out, the COS expressed the widespread view that Egypt was a weaker ally that had to comply with the British interests. This strategic view was the core of the British politics of hard restraint and paved the way for the Egyptian's detachment from the major ally.

4.2. Egypt looking for alternative arms suppliers

Because of the British policy of weapons supply, since 1947 Egypt attempted to explore an arms deal with third countries, both from the western and communist bloc. In April 1947, Prime Minister Nuqrashi sent a delegation to the United States asking to establish a U.S. military mission and to agree on a weapon supplies arrangement.²⁰³ The U.S., however, preferred to avoid antagonizing the British and limited the aid to Cairo. Then, as the tension arose in Palestine, the State Department suspended any arms export to the Middle East.²⁰⁴ On the other hand, Cairo started negotiations also with the communist bloc. In 1947, Egypt ordered weapons from Czechoslovakia totaling 368 million Koruna.²⁰⁵ However, the embargo imposed by the Security Council made ineffective this attempt by Cairo to establish a new channel of weapons supply.

In 1949, following the defeat against Israel, buying arms became an even more urgent issue. Egypt came back to the major ally, but Britain suspended the arms supply because of the deadlock on the treaty negotiations. In 1951, the Waft government, without reporting to Britain, sent another delegation to Europe in search of arms.²⁰⁶ Because of these efforts, Egypt signed a new

²⁰² Bullock A., *op. cit.*, 1983, p. 831

²⁰³ Gordon J., *op. cit.*, 1992, p. 41

²⁰⁴ Hahn P. L., *op. cit.*, 1999, p. 62

²⁰⁵ Laron G., "Cutting the Gordian Knot: The Post-WWII Egyptian Quest for Arms and the 1955 Czechoslovak Arms Deal", Working Paper #55, Wilson International Center, February, 2007

²⁰⁶ Gordon J., *op. cit.*, 1992, p. 41

agreement with Czechoslovakia on 24 October 1951, which committed to provide Cairo with “arms and ammunition – to be selected by Egyptian experts – worth about 600 million Egyptian pounds, to be paid in Egyptian cotton.”²⁰⁷

4.3. Egyptian diplomacy undermining the British primacy in the Middle East

On the other hand, the Egyptian detachment from Britain expressed on the strategic ground of international diplomacy. Firstly, Cairo challenged the ally in the United Nations. As Doran reported,

During the first meeting of the Security Council, the Egyptian delegation, which held one of the temporary seats, displayed an alarming tendency to support the anti-British initiatives of the Soviet Union. In the case of Indonesia, for instance, the Egyptians were the only members of the council who voted together with the Poles and the Soviets for the immediate withdrawal of British troops; in the case of the Levant, the Egyptians also pursued an anti-British line. Though less aggressive on the matter of Greece, Cairo nonetheless did not fall in directly behind London.²⁰⁸

The failure of the Egyptian appeal to the Security Council suggested focusing more strictly on inter-Arab relations. Since the collapse of the Bevin-Sidqi agreement, Egypt initiated an anti-British campaign looking for the support of other British's allies as Jordan and Iraq. In January 1947, the ambassador in Cairo raised a severe warning writing to London.

There is every indication that King Farouk, and [the Secretary General of the Arab League Abd al-Rahman] Azzam are endeavoring to undermine friendly Hashemite rulers in Iraq and Trans-Jordan; thus the Egyptian influence is being used to alienate Arab states generally from Great Britain...It seems to me that an essential condition of maintaining our positions in the Middle East is that we should show firmness, by which both friends and enemies will realize that we are not going to allow ourselves to be driven out of the Middle East by Egypt and that our patience and conciliatory

²⁰⁷ Cit in Laron G., *op. cit.*, 2007

²⁰⁸ Doran M., *op. cit.*, 1999, p. 30-31

attitude during negotiations does not mean we can be driven to any position the Egyptians choose.²⁰⁹

This Egyptian's new attitude represented a juncture in the interallied relations because the weaker ally opposed the dominant partner directly. Following the British withdrawal from Palestine, Cairo strengthened its policy aiming to undermine the British primacy in the region. As Doran pointed out,

The Arab-bloc initiative is certainly of intrinsic interest, but the timing of King Faruq's approach also adds to its historical importance. The Palace's decision to launch a proposal for a new regional order during the civil war in Palestine suggests a connection between the initiative for an Arab League defense organization and the end of the British Mandate. First and foremost, the idea of creating an Arab bloc commands attention because immediately after the Palestine war the Egyptians did, in fact, establish an Arab League Defense Pact.

The establishment of a system of Arab collective security was realized then in 1950. It was a further step to pursue Egyptian independence, to exclude Britain and favor the Egyptian primacy in the region.²¹⁰

5. Conclusion

On 8 October 1951, the Prime Minister Nahhas asked the Egyptian Parliament to abrogate the 1936 treaty and the 1899 condominium agreement. The Parliament approved with an overwhelming majority giving full support to Nahhas. The decision was justified by the lack of British's recognition of Egypt national aspirations: London had monopolized the administration of Sudan and denied the Egyptians project of unity; it maintained three times the number of troops in the Suez Canal Zone permitted under the 1936 treaty; and denied Cairo the supplies of arms and

²⁰⁹ Cit in Doran M., *op. cit.*, 1999, p. 48

²¹⁰ Doran M., *op. cit.*, 1999, pp. 194-196

equipment necessary for its defense.²¹¹ In sum, the British's intransigence made as ineffective any Egyptian attempt to voice and forced the minor ally to oppose the major partner directly until the decision to terminate the alliance unilaterally.

For the purposes of our inquiry, we found abundant evidence that voice ineffectiveness led to Egypt detachment and unilateral abrogation in 1951. The government of Sidqi had a vision of regional order "that would have diminished, but not eliminated, British participation in regional defense."²¹² Following the failure of Bevin-Sidqi agreements, Egypt was not able to establish a favorable interallied cooperation preferring to renounce the major partner's protection.

²¹¹ Hail J. A., *op. cit.*, 1996, p. 73; Fabumni L. A., *op. cit.*, 1973, pp. 284-285

²¹² Doran M., *op. cit.*, 1999

CHAPTER 4

The Anglo-Iraqi alliance in the early Cold War: a case of alliance persistence

Britain and Iraq signed a treaty of defense alliance in 1930, which became valid after Iraq's admission to the League of Nations in 1932. The treaty replaced all previous agreements between the two countries (Article 7) and was supposed to last for 25 years (Article 11). It was a typical defense pact between one great power and one minor state including asymmetric and non-reciprocal obligations between the partners. On the one hand, Britain provided protection to the weaker ally against third parties (Article 3). London, then, was in charge of Iraqi needs in the military field, as arms supplies and military training (annex Article 5). On the other hand, Iraq guaranteed the use of facilities on its territory – as railways, rivers, ports, aerodromes, and means of communication – and assistance to the major partner in the event or imminent menace of war (Article 4). Moreover, Iraq granted Britain two sites upon Iraqi territory to install airbases and maintain military forces (Art. 5).

The treaty did not oblige Baghdad to consult the British on domestic matters, but the system of advisers in the Iraqi administration became an effective instrument of external political influence.²¹³ As the scholar Joseph Sassoon pointed out, “the British continued their policy of giving the Iraqis more power in administering their own affairs, while continuing to influence them through the advisers. A good illustration of this policy was the 1936 agreement transferring ownership of the Iraqi State Railways to the Iraqi government, while leaving all the key positions in British hands”.²¹⁴ Similarly, in the field of foreign affairs, the weaker ally used to conform to

²¹³ Elliot M., *Independent Iraq. The Monarchy and British Influence*, Tauris, London-New York, 1996, p. 140

²¹⁴ Sassoon J., *Economic Policy in Iraq 1932-1950*, Frank Cass, London, 1987, p. 24

the major partner's choices. As World War II broke out and Britain declared war on Germany, Baghdad broke off diplomatic relations with Berlin and assured its cooperation to London.

However, by March 1940, the interallied relations suffered a deep crisis because of the British request of stationing troops in Basra.²¹⁵ When London – facing a difficult fight with the Germans – sought to enforce the treaty, the new Iraqi premier Rashid Ali feared another British military occupation and led a revolt in April 1941. The British suppressed the revolt in four weeks and entered in Baghdad by the end of May 1941. The new Iraqi government led by Nuri as-Said fully supported the major ally and declared war on Germany at the beginning of 1943.²¹⁶

For the purposes of our inquiry, the interallied crisis of 1941 cannot be a trigger point because Iraq mostly missed control over its domestic and foreign policy. As two British analysts pointed out, "Iraq was in an important sense an occupied country during the war (...) Her history in this period was shaped in the main by forces operating far away from her territory and over which she could exert no control".²¹⁷ Moreover, Rashid Ali's plan to favor the Germans looked like an attempt of bandwagoning, rather than a quest for Iraqi autonomy.

Differently, we will analyze the period from the end of World War II to the British's adhesion to the Baghdad Pact in 1955. As a case of alliance persistence, the allies overcame an internal crisis as the weaker ally was successful in its quest for autonomy and the dominant partner adopted a soft approach. From the Iraqi perspective, the Baghdad Pact was not merely a product of the Cold War, but the result of a struggle for regional dominance.²¹⁸ As the historian Elie Podeh argued, "Nuri considered the Baghdad Pact a substitute for the Fertile Crescent plan and the Arab League

²¹⁵ Penrose E.T. and Penrose E.F., *Iraq: International Relations and National Developments*, London, Ernest Benn, 1978, pp. 101-103

²¹⁶ Hunt C., *History of Iraq*, London, Greenwood Press, 2005, pp. 71-72

²¹⁷ Penrose and Penrose, *op. cit.*, 1978, p. 106

²¹⁸ See Seale P., *The Struggle for Syria. A Study of Post-War Arab Politics 1945-1958*, Tauris, London, 1965; Podeh E., *The Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World. The Struggle over the Baghdad Pact*, Brill, Leiden, 1995; Yesilbursa B. K., *The Baghdad Pact. Anglo-American defense policy in Middle East, 1950-1959*, Frank Cass, London-New York, 2005.

– schemes he had devised but there were either blocked or taken over by Egypt.”²¹⁹ It was not merely a security agreement, but an alliance that enhanced Iraq's regional and international status. On the other hand, Britain was able to accommodate the weaker partner's needs and support its regional plans. The effectiveness of the Iraqi's voice, therefore, avoided the alliance termination.

The following chapter develops in four sections. The first section describes the Iraqi ambitions at the end of World War II. As we need to focus on the weaker ally's quest for autonomy as the trigger point of the inquiry, this section depicts the Iraqi's plans for regional leadership and the sources of Iraq dissatisfaction toward Britain. The second section gives an account of the alliance variables. On the one hand, it measures the Iraqi security concerns and the alliance remuneration in order to settle the framework for the empirical inquiry. On the other, it accounts for the Iraqi voice attempts and its effectiveness. The third section describes the Anglo-Iraqi relations historically from 1945 to 1955. The fourth section, finally, gives an account of the alliance processes. It firstly focuses on the Britain politics of soft restraint. Then, it analyses the weaker ally's strategic obedience and the major side's policy concessions. These processes represent empirical evidence confirming the validity of the alliance persistence's model.

1. How to define the case: Iraq ambitions at the end of World War II

At the end of World War II, the Iraqi quest for autonomy expressed in two ways: the pursuit of regional leadership and the demand for changes in interallied relations.

In 1943, the Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri already presented to Britain its plan for Iraqi leadership in the Arab world. The aim was to make Iraq the dominant state of the Fertile Crescent – an area including Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Trans-Jordan, and Palestine – while marginalizing Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The union with Syria was the cornerstone of this regional

²¹⁹ Podesh E., *op. cit.*, 1995, intro

project. Moreover, Iraq aimed to reinforce its status becoming the leading intermediary between the Arab states and the non-Arab countries of the region, Turkey and Iran.²²⁰

Once Nuri failed to persuade Britain to his Fertile Crescent project, he attempted to establish an inter-Arab organization under Iraqi leadership. The Arab League, however, soon became a tool for the Egyptian's foreign policy. According to the scholar Elie Podeh, "Nuri long harbored resentment against the British for allowing this to happen (...) He subsequently viewed a regional defense pact centered on Baghdad as a powerful countermeasure to Egyptian domination of the League". Such a pact could attract other Arab states and isolate Cairo. The Baghdad Pact, therefore, became a modified version of the Fertile Crescent project aiming to combine the three Iraqi's main goals after World War II: achieving Arab hegemony, revising the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, and confronting the Soviet threat.²²¹

Indeed changes in interallied relations – and specifically the revision of the 1930 Treaty – became a significant issue in Iraqi domestic agenda after World War II.²²² As Sassoon pointed out,

[t]owards the end of the war, the Iraqi press began calling on Britain 'to remove the last vestige of imperfection in Iraq's independence'. The government formed by Tawfiq as-Suwaydi in February 1946 set up a committee to study the treaty's revision, and the subsequent fall of Suwaydi's government three months later did not alter this trend of thought among Iraqi politicians. British officials began reporting 'slight signs of increased anti-British feeling', expressed in sharp press attacks on British advisers.²²³

Iraqi politicians, therefore, aimed to increase Iraq's independence by removing the limitations enforced by the 1930 treaty. Many issues were at stake. Firstly, the British control on the Habbaniya and Shaiba air bases

²²⁰ Eppel M., "Iraqi Politics and Regional Policies, 1945-49", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Jan., 1992), pp. 108-119

²²¹ Cit. Podeh E., *op. cit.*, 1995, p. 251

²²² Eppel M., *Iraq from Monarchy to Tyranny. From the Hashemites to the rise of Saddam*, University Press of Florida, 2004, p. 59

²²³ Sassoon J., *op. cit.*, 1987, p. 25

represented a limitation of the country sovereignty. Therefore, an alternative defense system had to be defined to preserve British interests and Iraqi security.²²⁴ Then, the British influence in Iraqi administration and domestic politics had to be limited. It is not a case, as the historian Daniel Silverfarb reported, that in 1946 and 1947 "Iraqi leaders dismissed nearly all of the British advisers whom they had employed during the war and did not replace them."²²⁵ In foreign affairs, finally, Iraqi politicians desired greater freedom and support from the partner to gain leadership in the Arab world.²²⁶ The British's preference for Egypt, however, impeded the realization of Iraqi regional leadership. In this view, the British adherence to the Baghdad Pact in 1955 was hugely significant for the Iraqi ambitions: it was the first time that Britain took side clearly between Iraq and Egypt in favor of Baghdad.

In sum, in the aftermath of World War II Iraq clearly expressed a quest for autonomy. The effectiveness of the weaker side's voice, then, led to the persistence of the Anglo-Iraqi alliance through the Baghdad Pact.

2. The Alliance Variables

This section describes the variables that lead the empirical inquiry. Looking from the weaker side's perspective, it measures the Iraqi security concerns and the alliance remuneration. These variables assume the values as a Type I case. Then, this section accounts for the minor ally's voice attempts and its effectiveness. The analysis shows that the Iraqi voice was effective as the minor ally was able to improve the interallied cooperation on the ground of its needs.

Overall, the Anglo-Iraqi alliance fits the theoretical framework as a case of alliance persistence. Firstly, the case passes the test for case selection

²²⁴ Louis W. R., *The British Empire in the Middle East 1945-1951*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984, p. 322

²²⁵ Silverfarb D., *The Twilight of British Ascendancy in the Middle East. A case study of Iraq 1941-1950*, MacMillan, London, 1994, p. 77

²²⁶ Eppel M., *op. cit.*, 2004, p. 60

successfully, as the Iraqi security concerns increase while the alliance remuneration decreases in the period under consideration. Secondly, the explicative variables fit the theoretic expectations comfortably as the effectiveness of the Iraqi voice led to the alliance renewal in 1955. The following paragraphs will describe the variables in details.

2.1. Iraq increasing security concerns

2.1.1. External threats: Iraq and the Middle East balance of power

At the end of World War II, Iraqi's general external threats still concerned the integrity of the country borders toward neighbor states as Iran and Turkey. As Eppel pointed out,

Iraq had signed the 1937 Saadabad Pact of friendship and cooperation with Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan, and the four states shared a common interest in preventing the establishment of a Kurdish state. Nonetheless, relations between them were characterized by suspicion. Iraq felt threatened by the superior strength of Iran and Turkey and the unresolved border issues and disputes.²²⁷

Moreover, Baghdad was involved in limiting the influence of rising actors in the Arab world as Egypt and Israel. On the one hand, Iraq and Egypt were involved in a struggle for regional dominance since 1945. The Arab system then polarized in two main blocs: the Hashemite countries, Iraq and Jordan, opposed to the Egypt-Saudi entente. Once Nasser took power in 1952, the struggle intensified as Cairo assumed a more aggressive policy aiming to lead the Arab countries against the western powers. Then, while the struggle for the regional leadership with Egypt developed on the strategic ground of inter-Arab relationships, Iraq fought and lost in Palestine against the Israeli military forces in 1948-1949.²²⁸ The war did not avoid the establishment of an Israeli state and demonstrated the Iraqi military weakness.

²²⁷ Eppel M., *op. cit.*, 2004, p. 60

²²⁸ See Silverfarb D., *op. cit.*, 1994, pp. 159-170

Finally, the Soviet Union was another source of security concerns for Iraq. Following the end of World War II, Moscow pressured the “Northern Tier” countries demanding territory and base rights from Turkey (Kars, Ardhan, and Bosphorus) and supporting separatist movements in Iraq and the communist forces in the Greek civil war.²²⁹ Iraqi politicians, therefore, feared both the strengthening of the domestic challenge posed by the Iraqi Communist Party, and the Soviet’s support to the Kurd minorities.

2.1.2. *Internal threats: the regime instability and the Cold War nexus*

Analyzing Iraqi internal security since 1945, the historian Matthew Elliot argued that “the country problems were very great and the extent of discontent correspondingly large, so that the regime faced a day-to-day struggle for survival with the threat of disorder or coup d’état rarely absent.”²³⁰ Iraqi domestic security concerned the maintenance of internal order, political stability and the assurance of the subordination of ethnic groups as the Kurds to the central government.

In the years following the end of World War II, the streets of Baghdad often hold violent antigovernment demonstrations led by illegal communist organizations.²³¹ Iraqi politicians perceived the threat of communism to the monarchy seriously. Leftist ideas were widely appreciated by students (almost 85% of students of secondary and higher institutions belonged to leftist organizations by 1954), and the Communist Party reached approximately 5.000 members by 1953-1954.²³² The first large-scale uprising broke up in January 1948, known as *Wathba*. A few months later, as the Arab-Israeli war began, the government declared the martial law terminating the series of strikes and demonstrations. In November 1952, domestic unrest erupted again in violent public disturbances. As the police

²²⁹ Yesilbursa B. K., *op. cit.*, 2005, intro

²³⁰ Elliot M., *op. cit.*, 1996, p. 36

²³¹ Silverfarb D., *op. cit.*, 1994, pp. 84-87

²³² Romero J., *The Iraqi Revolution of 1958. A Revolutionary Quest for Unity and Security*, University Press of America, New York, 2011, p. 4

was unable to keep the order, the Regent turned to the army and martial law was declared.

Although internal order was restored partially in 1953, the country's political stability was not: from 1953 to 1958, 11 Cabinets changed and 9 different persons held the office of Prime Minister.²³³

On the other hand, Iraq's internal weakness came from the complex composition of its population. Following the end of World War II, Iraqi politicians began to fear that Soviets could support Kurd separatism and, eventually, invade Iraq through Kurdistan. Kurds composed indeed almost 20% of the Iraqi population inhabiting adjacent areas in Iran, Turkey, and Iraq. Traditionally unreceptive to rule from Baghdad, the Kurds rose against the central government in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s.²³⁴ Once the cold war reached its peak in the early 1950s, Iraqis felt that Kurds might achieve substantial support from an extra-regional superpower. As the historian Roger Louis pointed out, "the geographical proximity of the Soviet Union instilled a fear of Russian expansion in some Iraqi nationalists that most Egyptian nationalists never shared."²³⁵

2.2. *The Alliance remuneration*

At the end of World War II, Britain reduced its ability to provide Iraqi military forces with equipment and supplies. The British inefficiency had two main reasons. Firstly, the United States imposed restrictions on British export of military equipment that Britain had received under the Lend-Lease program. Secondly, London decided to decrease its internal production of military equipment in order to favor the production of civilian goods.²³⁶

This alliance-deficit increased tensions in Anglo-Iraqi relations. As Louis pointed out, Iraqi "wished to modernize the army with new military vehicles

²³³ Penrose E.T. and Penrose E.F., *op. cit.*, 1978, p. 119

²³⁴ Kolodziej E. A., "Iraq", pp. 227-246, in Kolodziej E. A. and Harkavy (eds.), *Security Policies of Developing Countries*, Lexington Books, 1980; Silverfarb D., *op. cit.*, pp. 39-53

²³⁵ Louis W. R., *op. cit.*, 1984, p. 325

²³⁶ Silverfarb D., *op. cit.*, 1994, p. 100

and equipment and to have the British send a military mission to Iraq to train a nucleus of officers in the use of modern weapons.”²³⁷ London, however, offered only second-hand merchandise while Iraqis officers wanted new equipment.

In mid-1947, Baghdad refuted most of the second-hand equipment belonged to the British forces that were evacuating the country.²³⁸ Once the Palestine conflict broke out and Britain adhered to the international embargo on the supply of arms to the Middle East, the Iraqi army did not have any tanks. Although Baghdad requested new supplies, Britain refused to sign any new arms contracts because of the international agreements, and plausibly facilitated Israeli victory.

During the early 1950s, Iraqi officials often complained because of delays in the delivery of British arms and ammunition. Moreover, they argued that London assigned a small number of vacancies in British Army training courses to Iraqis.²³⁹ By describing the mood of Iraqi officials toward the major ally, the historian David Silverfarb pointed out that

[t]o them it appeared that Britain was attempting to keep the Iraqi armed forces as a type of police, equipped and trained only for internal security, and therefore incapable of threatening Britain’s position either within Iraq or elsewhere in the Middle East. Even when Britain did deliver weapons, the Iraqis complained about the continual delays, the frequent receipt, and the fact that they had to pay what they considered to be excessively high prices.²⁴⁰

In mid-1950, Britain signed the Tripartite Declaration with France and the United States to control arms supply in the Middle East. The western powers aimed to avoid an arms competition in the aftermath of the Palestinian conflict.²⁴¹ However, Iraqis felt that they were getting little support from the British ally. In 1951, a senior British intelligence officer

²³⁷ Louis W. R., *op. cit.*, 1984, p. 325

²³⁸ Silverfarb D., *op. cit.*, 1994, pp. 100-102

²³⁹ Perry R., *Britain in Iraq During 1950s: Imperial Retrenchment and Informal Empire*, August 2013, unpublished manuscript, p. 114

²⁴⁰ Silverfarb D., *op. cit.*, 1994, p. 107

²⁴¹ Jabber P., *Not By War Alone. Security and Arms Control in the Middle East*, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1981, pp. 63-81

reported about the Iraqi discontent writing that “the view is strongly held that the failure by the West to supply arms to Iraq in adequate quantities will tend to heighten the feeling of isolation and despondency felt by many Iraqis, and encourage a policy of neutrality.”²⁴²

In February 1953, Nuri met British and American diplomats and strongly pressured them for arms. As the scholar Daniel Williamson reported, "Nuri stated that he ‘was not satisfied with the policies of the British and United States governments in furnishing equipment and supplies’. Nuri expressed a desire for the most modern arms available and claimed that Iraq could pay for these arms, although dollars were in short supply”. At the Iraqi request, the British answered quite coldly. Williamson reported on the meetings between Nuri and Troutbeck, the British ambassador to Baghdad:

Troutbeck expressed support for Iraq's goal of an expanded military and claimed that London was willing to live up to its treaty obligations to assist Iraq. However, the ambassador said that Britain "would only consider further assistance as part of the regional defense problem." (...) When Nuri renewed the Iraqi request for a grant of arms later in the summer, Troutbeck told more bluntly that it would be impossible to fulfill his request. As Troutbeck explained, Britain had many bilateral and multilateral military alliances and could not afford to a precedent by giving arms to Iraq, as its other allies would then demand similar.²⁴³

Although the alliance treaty established that Britain had to provide Iraqi forces with "arms, ammunition, equipment, ships and airplanes of the latest available pattern (...) whenever they may be required"²⁴⁴, Iraqi officers and politicians were dissatisfied by the major ally supplies, both in quantitative and qualitative terms. Although the Iraqi forces had sufficient equipment to keep internal order, it was not possible to adopt an ambitious policy in the Arab world. In this view, the alliance remuneration was insufficient for Iraqi's goals.

²⁴² cit. Perry R., *op. cit.*, 2013, p. 114

²⁴³ Williamson D., “Exploiting Opportunities: Iraq Secures Military Aid from the West, 1953-56”, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Feb., 2004), pp. 89-102

²⁴⁴ Anglo-Iraqi treaty, 1930, Clause 5.

2.3. *Iraq's voice attempts and its effectiveness*

At the end of World War II, Iraqi politicians wanted to revise the alliance treaty to establish a balanced relation with Britain, not as one imposed by a stronger partner upon a junior one. The historian David Silverfarb argued that also formal aspects became significant for Iraqi politicians.

For Iraqi leaders the clauses requiring them to give precedence to the British ambassador in Baghdad over the representatives of all other nations and preventing them from elevating the status of their legation in London to that of an embassy were some of the annoying features of the treaty. Although these diplomatic provisions did not have much practical effect, they symbolized Britain's dominant position in Iraq and Iraq's subordinate status. The fact that Egypt had an embassy in London, and thereby a superior status to Iraq, made this restrictions particularly irritating.²⁴⁵

Another symbol of Britain's overweening presence in Iraq was the British control of air bases at Habbaniya and Shaiba. In August 1947, General Renton – the head of the British military mission in Iraq – wrote to the FO.

[F]rom the Iraqi officers point of view the retention of bases of foreign power in their country is humiliating and this is being continually rubbed into them by all other Arab countries as an instance of incomplete independence (...) any attempt to bind Iraq to provide bases for a further period would be bitterly resented in the Army as a whole as humiliating and unnecessary.²⁴⁶

However, in a later memorandum, Renton reported that the Iraqi army still desired more in-depth cooperation with the major ally, but on equal footing.

I know that the leading officers of the younger generation of the Army will expect great thing from a Joint Defense Board (...) to serve on the Joint Defense Board would be the ambition of all the best officers of the Army, especially of those who had graduated at the British Staff College.²⁴⁷

²⁴⁵ Silverfarb D., *op. cit.*, 1994, p. 127

²⁴⁶ *cit.* in Louis W. R., *op. cit.*, 1984, p. 327

²⁴⁷ *cit.* in Louis W. R., *op. cit.*, 1984, p. 333

However, once the Iraqi parliament rejected the Portsmouth Treaty in January 1948, the two allies waited several years before entering in new negotiations. A second opportunity came in 1953-1954 when Iraq gained more internal stability, and Britain switched from Cairo to Baghdad as its main regional ally in the Middle East. Waldemar Gallman, the United States ambassador in Baghdad during 1954-1958, so described Nuri's ideas and determination in his memories.

[In August 1954] Nuri made a more detailed statement before the Financial Affairs Committee of Parliament. The British government, he said, had been notified that Iraq did not intend renewing or prolonging the 1930 Treaty, nor would Iraq be prepared to replace the treaty by another bilateral agreement as was customary before World War I. In any negotiations Iraq would be guided by Articles 51 and 52 of the United Nations Charter which contain principles for defense and the maintenance of peace as exercised by sovereign, independent countries throughout the world.²⁴⁸

Iraqis, therefore, made clear that the Anglo-Iraqi relations had to evolve on an equal footing. The British control of air bases at Habbaniya and Shaiba, for instance, was no more feasible because it was a violation of Iraqi sovereignty.

On the other hand, Baghdad needed the ally's support for pursuing its regional leadership. Nuri plans had been already rejected by Britain on several occasions. In 1943, Britain did not favor the original Fertile Crescent project; in 1945, Britain did not support Iraqi leadership of the Arab League; in 1949 and 1951, Nuri proposed an Arab defense pact tied to the West, but London refused.²⁴⁹ In 1955, the plan for the Baghdad Pact became Nuri's last occasion to raise Iraqi voice, restoring the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty on favorable terms and establishing the basis for a regional defense organization centered on Baghdad.²⁵⁰

The British adhesion to the treaty in April 1955 evidenced that Iraqi voice attempts became effective finally. While the agreement established that Iraq

²⁴⁸ Gallman W. J., *Iraq Under General Nuri. My Recollection of Nuri al-said, 1954-1958*, The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1964, p. 28

²⁴⁹ See Podede E., *op. cit.*, 1995, pp. 46-49

²⁵⁰ Podede E., *op. cit.*, 1995, pp. 140-141

did not commit beyond its borders (Article 3), the air bases of Habbaniya and Shaiba were transferred to Iraq sovereignty. Moreover, Britain made several concessions. London joined a pact which invited other Arab states to adhere and implicitly (but clearly) excluded Israel; it took sides between Iraq and Egypt in favor of Baghdad; it linked the persistence of the Anglo-Iraq special agreement to the continuation of the Baghdad Pact (Article 9, letter b).

The Baghdad Pact, finally, realized the Iraqi requests to Britain since the end of World War II and made effective the weaker side's voice in the alliance.

3. The Anglo-Iraqi relations from 1945 to 1955

3.1. The Iraqi-Turkish agreement and the conflict in Palestine

Following the end of World War II, Iraq needed to formulate a new regional policy able to increase its international status. The failure of earlier projects – as the Fertile Crescent plan rejected by Britain and the missed leadership of the Arab League impeded by the Egyptians – imposed a different strategy. To obtain a central role among the Arab states and gain a privileged position toward the Western powers, Iraq moved to strengthen relationships with its main non-Arab neighbor, Turkey.

In summer 1945, Nuri adopted an initiative to improve cooperation between Baghdad and Ankara. He aimed to create a counterweight to Egypt introducing Turkey in the Arab politics and advantaging Iraq because of a special relationship with Ankara. Moreover, Iraq's connection with Turkey could encourage the Syrian to establish a federation with Baghdad.²⁵¹ In March 1946, Nuri signed an Iraqi-Turkish agreement increasing cooperation in the areas of economics, communications, culture, and security. During his visit, Nuri declared that Turkey had a new status as a leader of the Arab countries.²⁵²

²⁵¹ Eppel M., *op. cit.*, 2004, p. 70

²⁵² Cit. Eppel M., *op. cit.*, 1992

Secondly, Iraq became the leading promoter of the Arab struggle against Zionism and the establishment of a Jewish state. According to the scholar Michel Eppel,

[a]t Arab League conferences between 1945 and 1948, Iraq—in contrast to the moderate approach adopted by the League secretary and by Egypt—took extreme militant positions regarding the Palestine question. Under the influence of Nuri al-Said and given the importance of the Palestine question in domestic Iraqi politics, Iraq transformed its own extremism with regard to the Palestine conflict into a means of undermining Egypt's status and that of the secretary of the Arab League. According to Iraqi accusations, the League and its secretary were neglecting Palestine and refraining from taking any definitive stand in its defense, due to excessive weight placed by the League on Egyptian interests. In this way, Iraq was able to substantiate its argument to the effect that it was the staunchest supporter of the Arab nationalist cause.²⁵³

Actually, from the 1930s on, Iraq exploited the Palestine question to realize its ambitions in Syria and its aim of Arab leadership in the Fertile Crescent. Moreover, during the Iraqi economic crisis of 1946-48, many Iraqi politicians thought that active involvement in Palestine could redirect the public opinion attention from domestic issues to an external nationalist topic. At the end of the conflict, Iraq did not participate in the peace negotiations and did not sign the armistice agreement with Israel. As Eppel argued,

[t]his was perfectly in line with the Iraqi pattern of behavior which had prevailed regarding Palestine since the 1930s: obvious and declared adoption of a rigid, uncompromising position, exploiting the Palestine conflict to reinforce Iraq's status in the inter-Arab arena as the champion of the pan-Arab nationalist struggle and to strengthen the nationalist image of the politicians and governments of Iraq in the eyes of domestic nationalist public opinion.²⁵⁴

The Palestinian conflict also produced tensions in the Anglo-Iraqi relations. In January 1948, when Britain still held the mandate, Iraq infiltrated about 900 volunteers – most of whom were former soldier or police officers – in Palestine to support the other Arab armed sections. London protested for

²⁵³ Eppel M., *op. cit.*, 2004, p. 71

²⁵⁴ Eppel M., *op. cit.*, 2004, p. 87

this illegal movement of armed forces within a territory still under its control, but Baghdad did not order any withdrawal. Once the conflict broke out in May, Iraqi officers criticized the British for not supporting them in the fights and for London's adherence to the international embargo. Britain, on the other hand, tried to persuade the weaker ally uselessly to accept the truce called by the Security Council and, later, the Bernadotte's proposal. Finally, the allies differed on the recognition of the Palestinian government in Gaza.²⁵⁵ The conflict in Palestine, therefore, aggravated the Anglo-Iraqi relations, which were already tense after the failure of the treaty revision.

3.2.The abortive Treaty of Portsmouth

Britain and Iraq began discussions for the treaty revision in May 1947 and concluded the negotiations in mid-January 1948. The Portsmouth treaty confirmed the fundamental British interests in Iraq and provided for some improvements in the weaker ally position.²⁵⁶ Iraqi negotiators believed that the new agreement was definitively better than the older one. As the historian David Silverfarb argued,

[Iraq negotiators] had secured shared air bases, gained some control over Britain's previous unrestricted right to move troops across Iraq, ended the obligation to consult with Britain on matters of foreign policies, and obtained the elimination of the levies, the military mission, and the requirement to hire only British subjects as advisers and employees (except for the armed forces). They had also received a number of valuable British-owned installations for free, procured financial assistance for the training of their officers in British military schools, and secured the termination of the railway agreement.²⁵⁷

On the other hand, Britain obtained the right to use the air bases of Habbaniya and Shaiba in war and peace, and to keep the British units under their own command. Moreover, the treaty stipulated that Britain remained

²⁵⁵ See Silverfarb D., *op. cit.*, 1994, pp. 159-172

²⁵⁶ See Silverfarb D., *op. cit.*, 1994, pp. 133-140

²⁵⁷ Silverfarb D., *op. cit.*, 1994, p. 140

the only supplier for Iraq in military matters, as arms supply and officers training.

In general, the Portsmouth treaty made several concessions to the weaker side. However, wide popular opposition in Iraq developed against the new agreement. While Iraqi negotiators ignored demonstrations in early January, the signature of the treaty was followed by two bloody demonstrations, during which the police opened fire against the crowd and killed many protesters.²⁵⁸ As strikes and demonstrations broke out, the political forces demanded the rejection of the treaty transversally in order to end the British presence in Iraq. Iraqi politicians, even the pro-British ones, heavily criticized the agreement. The most important issue concerned the British use of the air bases of Habbaniya and Shaiba. Other criticisms focused on article 3, which apparently forced Iraq to support Britain in all distant conflicts involving the major ally.²⁵⁹

The popular insurrection of January 1948 became known as *Wathba* and forced the Prime Minister Jabr to resign, while the new government informed the British that the Iraqi parliament could not ratify the Portsmouth Treaty. However, the Anglo-Iraqi treaty was only partially responsible for the uprising. According to the scholar Joseph Sassoon,

(...) the Portsmouth Treaty was abrogated not because of its contents but rather due to the circumstances surrounding its signature: the atmosphere of secrecy, and the fact that no Arabic translation of the text was prepared, aroused suspicions in nationalist circles in Iraq about the government's intentions. The atmosphere of distrust was undoubtedly exacerbated by the financial crisis developing in Iraq in 1948, and by the events in Palestine.²⁶⁰

Other domestic issues concerned the government's rejection of the opposition demands for civil liberties and changes in the electoral system, which would guarantee free and direct election.²⁶¹ The repudiation of Portsmouth Treaty, in other words, was mainly due to a domestic crisis,

²⁵⁸ Romero J., *op. cit.*, 2010, p. 94

²⁵⁹ See Silverfarb D., *op. cit.*, 1994, pp. 141-145

²⁶⁰ Sassoon J., *op. cit.*, 1987, p. 26

²⁶¹ Cit. Romero J., *op. cit.*, 2010, p. 94

which fed a firm anti-British opposition, rather than objectively unfavorable agreement terms.²⁶²

3.3. Projects of regional defense: 1950-1954

After the demise in Palestine and the failure to renew the agreement with Britain, Iraq engaged in new attempts to settle a favorable system of regional defense. In November 1949, Nuri proposed to Britain the establishment of an Arab defense pact tied to the West.²⁶³ Nuri aimed to oppose the Arab Collective Security Pact which Faruq – King of Egypt – proposed attending the October 1949 session of the Arab League. The Iraqi Prime Minister attempted firmly but in vain to ruin the Egyptian project. In November 1950, Nuri tried to persuade Syrian and Lebanese leaders to consider a regional pact based on the NATO model. In February 1951, Nuri made a last attempt proposing to the Ralph Stevenson – the British ambassador in Cairo – a different version of the Egyptian proposal which made possible for Britain and other states (as Turkey) to join. However, the Arab states and Britain did not want to oppose Egypt, and both rejected Nuri's proposals.²⁶⁴

On the other hand, Iraq tried to strengthen the Hashemite union with Jordan. However, Britain opposed to closer bilateral ties between Baghdad and Amman. During 1950 and 1951, the two countries exchanged several proposals to form a union, but London restrained the attempts of the two weaker allies.²⁶⁵ Therefore, to avoid isolation, Iraq joined the Arab Collective Security Pact led by Egypt in February 1951.²⁶⁶

In 1950-1952, Britain still considered Egypt as the main actor in Middle East. London defined two projects of regional defense system with the support of the United States, and both centered on Egypt. In September

²⁶² Eppel M., *op. cit.*, 2004; Hunt C., *op. cit.*, 2005

²⁶³ Podeh E., *op. cit.*, 1995, p. 46

²⁶⁴ Podeh E., *op. cit.*, 1995, p. 48

²⁶⁵ Romero J., *op. cit.*, 2010, p. 190

²⁶⁶ Eppel M., *op. cit.*, 2004, p. 129

1951, the two western powers proposed the "Middle East Command", which should involve the United States, Britain, France, Turkey, and Egypt as founding members. In June 1952, Britain and the United States projected a new plan for establishing the "Middle East Defense Organization". Both projects considered Iraq as a secondary actor and failed because of Egyptian refusal.²⁶⁷

In May 1953, the United States promoted a new plan, the "Northern Tier", which relied on Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and Iraq. It was the first western regional project in Middle East that excluded Egypt. As the cornerstone of this defense system, Turkey and Pakistan signed a security agreement in February 1954. The two signatories engaged in consulting and co-operating in three areas of defense: exchange of information; arms production; and defense against third parties. Besides, the treaty invited any state willing to cooperate in its goals to join.²⁶⁸

3.4. The formation of the Baghdad Pact

Iraq was warmly invited to join the Turkish-Pakistan pact increasing the Egyptian's fear to be isolated. However, the agreement between Turkey and Pakistan was not suitable for Baghdad's goals. Nuri, for instance, felt that the terms for third states accession to the pact were too broad, and did not explicitly excluded Israel. Moreover, the pact could not serve as a cover for the renewal of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty and did not enhance Iraqi aspirations for the Arab hegemony. Britain, on the other hand, did not pressure Baghdad to join fearing to lose control over the ally because of the direct American involvement in the project.²⁶⁹

In March 1954, the Prime Minister Jamali informed the governments of Turkey and Britain that Iraq would not have signed the pact. In summer, Nuri opened new negotiations with the British. Again, Nuri proposed to link the revision of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty to the establishment of a regional

²⁶⁷ Eppel M., *op. cit.*, 2004, p. 130

²⁶⁸ Podeh E., *op. cit.*, 1995, p. 69-81-82

²⁶⁹ Podeh E., *op. cit.*, 1995, p. 69-70

organization centered on Baghdad. While the attempt to include Egypt failed, Nuri undertook intense negotiations with Turkey. In January 1955, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan showed a positive attitude toward a possible Iraqi-Turkish agreement.²⁷⁰ Nuri, therefore, decided to continue the talks with Ankara although the strong opposition by Cairo. On February 24, Iraq and Turkey signed the alliance and opened to additional states to join.

The American ambassador Gallman described Nuri's speech following the signature of the pact.

During the debate on the [Iraqi-Turkish] pact in the Chamber, Nuri again spoke at length. Iraq's co-operation under the pact would, he said, be based on three principles. First, Iraq would not accept commitments outside her frontiers or the frontiers of members of the Arab League Collective Security Pact. Secondly, the government of Iraq alone was responsible for the defense of Iraq and no other government could dictate to Iraq the conditions under which she was to co-operate. Thirdly, Iraq's foreign policy would be based on full sovereignty and on equal rights between the contracting parties. He said again that the pact was in line with Iraq's traditional foreign policy and in no way ran counter to the charters of the Arab League and of the Arab Collective Security Pact. Iran and Pakistan would be welcomed into the pact, and he hoped that the United States and the United Kingdom would join. He placed special significance on the fact that adherence by the United Kingdom would mean the termination of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930.²⁷¹

The Iraqi-Turkish pact provided for cooperation in the security and defense fields between the two countries. Article 5 opened to any Arab League states to join while implicitly excluded Israel. As the historian Elie Podeh argued,

[t]he signing of the Iraqi-Turkish Pact was the most significant turning point in Arab politics since 1948. It shattered the Arab system, leading to new political groupings and new patterns. The Arab system was now clearly divided in three camps: Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Yemen; Iraq, with Western support; and the "floating" Arab states – Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. The possibility of accession by other Arab states (...)

²⁷⁰ Podeh E., *op. cit.*, 1995, p. 106-107-110-111

²⁷¹ Gallman W. J., *op. cit.*, 1964, p. 55

prompted Egypt to launch an all-out offensive against Iraq and the three wavering states.²⁷²

Britain joined the Iraq-Turkey pact officially on April 4 signing a Special Agreement with Iraq. The British adherence to the pact, therefore, had two functions. On the one hand, it permitted to revise the Anglo-Iraqi. On the other, it was supposed to favor Iraqi regional leadership inducing other Arab states to join.

4. The British's soft restraint and Iraqi loyalty: the processes of alliance persistence

This last section accounts for the processes leading to the alliance persistence. Firstly, it describes the British politics of restraint. The analysis shows that the stronger ally adopted a soft posture neutralizing the sources of internal opposition. Britain favored the development of a system of regional defense that satisfied the weaker side needs and requests. On the other hand, Iraq preferred to strengthen the relationship with the old ally instead of turning toward a new one as the United States, which was a feasible strategic alternative in 1954.

4.1. Britain politics of soft restraint

Britain's approach to Iraq had two different phases. Following the end of World War II, London was more concerned to manage the Anglo-Egyptian relations as the cornerstone of its strategy in the Middle East. However, already at the time of the abortive Portsmouth Treaty in 1948, Bevin assumed an accommodative attitude toward Iraq. Looking at the collapse of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty negotiations in 1946, he wanted to avoid similar mistakes. The British Prime Minister emphasized that nothing other than a basis of "equality" in interallied relations and a "complete independence"

²⁷² Podesh E., *op. cit.*, 1995, p. 125

could satisfy the Iraqi aspirations.²⁷³ Actually, although some rhetoric, the Portsmouth treaty effectively represented an improvement in the weaker ally autonomy. Unfortunately, as described in the historical section, it was not ratified because of the domestic instability affecting Iraq in 1948.

However, in the late 1940s Britain did not accommodate Iraqi plans for the alliance renewal within a new regional defense system. Britain indeed aimed to settle an agreement with the Egyptians as its regional hub. Nuri often complained that Iraq deserved to be considered on an equal footing with Egypt, instead of being treated as a secondary actor by Britain.²⁷⁴

In 1952 the British started to change their attitude. As the scholar Daniel Williamson argued,

[f]rom 1952 to 1954, the British moved away from their earlier plans to send major reinforcements to the Middle East in case of a general war toward promoting military self-reliance among their allies in the region. Particularly after the July 1954 Anglo-Egyptian Agreement ended the British plan to center regional defense on the massive Suez base, the concept of a Northern Tier position became paramount in British defense thinking concerning the Middle East. Western alliances with Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan would form a defensive cordon on the Soviet Union's southern border. *Iraq was the key Arab piece of the Northern Tier puzzle*, and Britain therefore needed to promote good relations with Baghdad to secure its cooperation in a regional defense pact.²⁷⁵

As Iraq rejected the American “Northern Tier” project in mid-1954, Eden sent the following note to the British mission in Iraq.

Generally speaking I agree we should leave Nuri to make the running with other Middle East Governments. I do not wish to put pressure on him to join [the] Turkish-Pakistan Pac if he thinks other solutions preferable.²⁷⁶

On September 1954, Sir John Troutbeck, the British ambassador to Iraq from 1951 to 1954, wrote to the Foreign Office expressing a similar point of view.

²⁷³ Louis W. R., *op. cit.*, 1984, p. 331

²⁷⁴ Podeh E., *op. cit.*, 1995, p. 54

²⁷⁵ Williamson D., *op. cit.*, italics added, 2004

²⁷⁶ cit. in Podeh E., *op. cit.*, 1995, p. 93

Nuri is reverting to an old idea which he put to me so long ago as 1951 [regional defense pact] (...) This may therefore prove our last chance of agreeing with the Iraqis some reasonable arrangement for defense (...)

There is something to be said for trying to tie them up in an arrangement based on their own ideas, rather than force them into a Western-made plan. Our efforts hitherto to do this have failed lamentably.²⁷⁷

During the Turkish-Iraqi negotiations in January 1955, Nuri wanted to be sure about the British support for his initiative. As the scholar Richard Jasse reported,

Nuri asked Wright whether London would blame Iraq for any break with Egypt. The British Ambassador assured Nuri of Whitehall's 'sympathy and support in the general aims she was pursuing. The pact was viewed by the Foreign Office as in the best interests of Iraq and its Middle East neighbors. Britain hoped that Nuri would successfully lead the Arab League, including Egypt, to accept his plan. Wright emphasized, 'But there must be a lead to follow and only Iraq could continue to give it. My advice was to be polite and reasonable but firm and in the last resort not to be deflected' by Egypt.²⁷⁸

Finally, Britain fully supported the Iraqi-Turkish pact and then joined the Baghdad Pact establishing a pro-Western alliance where Baghdad was the leading Arab state. The British's soft restraint, therefore, paved the way for the renewal of the Anglo-Iraqi alliance and preserved Britain's dominant position in the region temporarily.

4.2. The British concessions to the weaker ally

Britain made several concessions to the weaker partner to save the alliance from termination. We can consider three main points.

²⁷⁷ Cit Jasse R. L., "The Baghdad Pact: Cold War or Colonialism?", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Jan., 1991), pp. 140-156

²⁷⁸ Cit Jasse R. L., *op. cit.*, 1991

Firstly, the Special Agreement of 1955 provided for Iraqi control over the air bases of Habbaniya and Shaiba. Although Britain preserved the right to use the bases in wartime under Iraqi invitation, Baghdad increased its independence significantly.

Secondly, Britain showed noteworthy strategic flexibility giving up its preference for a bilateral agreement – assuring more control on the weaker partner – in favor of a multilateral arrangement. Moreover, the Special Agreement of 1955 subordinated the persistence of the Anglo-Iraqi alliance to the success of the Baghdad Pact, which practically coincided with the Iraqi's achievement of the leadership among Arab states.

Finally, Britain took side into the Arab struggle for domination in favor of Baghdad. In the late 1940s, London aimed to preserve the link with Egypt considering Cairo as the key actor of the Middle East. The Baghdad Pact, differently, raised the Iraqi regional position and status promoting a scheme that could potentially isolate Cairo. The Britain support, in this regard, was strongly significant within Nuri plans.

4.3. Britain or the United States? The Iraqi preference for London

Iraq demonstrated its strategic obeisance to the major ally once he felt recognized and favored its needs by Britain. Evidence of this process is the Iraqi preference for London instead of Washington as its main ally in 1954, and the Iraqi hard posture toward the Soviet Union in late 1954.

In the early 1950s, the alliance-deficits pushed Iraq to strengthen relations with the United States. In 1951, the two countries concluded a technical-assistance agreement providing for American advises and aid in agriculture, public health and general economic development. In March 1953, Baghdad formally requested military assistance from the United States expressing a clear preference for American arms.²⁷⁹

However, when Iraq in 1954 had to choose between Britain and the United States as its major partner, Baghdad preferred the British ally. On the one hand, Iraq did not join the Turkish-Pakistani agreement, so undermining the

²⁷⁹ See Williamson D., *op. cit.*, 2004

American "Northern Tier" project. On the other, Nuri excluded the United States from his plan and did not even inform the State Department about its negotiations in late 1954.²⁸⁰ The "Northern Tier" plan was indeed the foundation of the American Middle Eastern policy and did not enhance the Iraqi leadership in the Arab world. Differently, Nuri's plan privileged the British ally providing a framework for the alliance renewal and favoring the British influence in the region.

Then, Iraq hardened relations with the Soviet Union once Britain switched to Iraq as its key ally in the region. As the scholar Juan Romero pointed out,

[a]s a preparation for the signing of the Turco-Iraqi Pact Nuri severed diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union on January 3, 1955, thereby unnecessarily alienating a great power. The Iraqi prime minister was the only head of government in the Northern Tier who took such an extreme step. Nuri's action confirmed to Moscow that the Pact was directed against the Soviet Union. It is possible Nuri believed he would impress his allies by breaking relations with the U.S.S.R.²⁸¹

5. Conclusions

As a case of alliance persistence, the Anglo-Iraqi relation from 1945 to 1955 appropriately represents how allies can overcome an internal crisis. Actually, the Anglo-Iraqi Special Agreement of 1955 still provided for an alliance with asymmetric obligations under British leadership. However, the alliance persistence now was strictly linked to the success of the Baghdad Pact (Article 9, letter b), and the establishment of an Iraqi leadership among Arab states.

For our purposes, we found sufficient evidence that the effectiveness of the Iraqi voice led to the alliance persistence. Although both the allies reached significant achievements, the regional project centered on Iraqi needs. Firstly, the agreement established that Iraq did not commit beyond its borders (Article 3) and transferred to Iraqi control the air bases of Habbaniya and Shaiba. Moreover, Britain made several concessions: it

²⁸⁰ Podesh E., *op. cit.*, 1995, p. 92

²⁸¹ Romero J., *op. cit.*, 2010, pp. 28-29

joined a pact that invited other Arab states to adhere and implicitly (but clearly) excluded Israel; it took side between Iraq and Egypt in favor of Baghdad; it linked the persistence of the Anglo-Iraq special agreement to the continuation of the Baghdad Pact (Article 9, letter b).

The signature of the Baghdad Pact, finally, showed that the weaker ally voice attempts were effective paving the way for the alliance persistence instead of its termination.

CHAPTER 5

The New Zealand's exit from ANZUS in the mid-1980s: a case of alliance termination

ANZUS Pact was signed in September 1951, and came into effect early in 1952. It was the cornerstone of New Zealand's security establishing a new link with the United States and Australia. The treaty committed the member-states to mutual aid in order to "maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack" (art. 2). Then, the allies agreed to "consult together" in case of issues affecting their territorial integrity, political independence or security (art. 3). Finally, it established the parties co-operating in case of an armed attack on any of them in the Pacific Area (art. 4). To New Zealand, the pact provided several benefits. Firstly, ANZUS provided for US intervention against regional threats (as a resurgent Japan or an aggressive China) substituting the protection that Great Britain was no more able to assure. Then, it paved the way for several bilateral and trilateral agreements to strengthen the weaker side's defense forces. Finally, although the alliance was asymmetrical due to the differences in size and power of its member-states, the ANZUS Council annually provided an opportunity to exchange views, information, and coordinate policies among the allies.²⁸²

On the other hand, the treaty provided a regional area to the United States forces to exercise and operate. Then, the alliance assured port and airfield access to the US forces in New Zealand, while two American installations – a navy base and an astronomical observatory – were putted in place on two New Zealand's south islands.²⁸³ Nonetheless, the US enjoyed the weaker

²⁸² Hoadley S., *New Zealand United States Relation*, The New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Wellington, November 2016, p. 42

²⁸³ Donnini F., *ANZUS in Revision. Changing Defense Features of Australia and New Zealand in the Mid-1980s*, Air University Press, Alabama, February 1991, pp. 26-29

ally's support during the Cold War in the Asia Pacific region. As one scholar defined it, ANZUS was a "showcase" alliance for more than 35 years.²⁸⁴ It provided a useful tool to contain communism, promoting the western values of freedom and democracy, and bringing security and stability in the South Pacific region. New Zealand also took responsibilities of collective defense supporting US forces in Korea and Vietnam.

However, in the mid-1980s an interallied crisis broke out paving the way for the alliance termination. Wellington's denuclearization policy and non-conformity to the stronger side's requests triggered a process of non-reciprocity in interallied relations. On 11 August 1986, the United States formally ended its security commitment to New Zealand. A few months later, Prime Minister Lange said: "New Zealand is better out of ANZUS."²⁸⁵ The US-NZ relations downgraded from the status of "allies" to that of "friends". The former allies preserved cordial relations that did not imply any alliance's obligation.²⁸⁶

Still, Wellington's preference to pursue unilateral denuclearization compromising its alliance membership remains puzzling. Although security concerns were low, ANZUS provided significant benefits for a small country like New Zealand. Therefore, this chapter investigates the weaker side's voice opportunities to evaluate whether this factor affected the alliance evolution. The analysis shows indeed that New Zealand's voice was ineffective paving the way for the alliance termination. As the minor ally was not able to improve the interallied cooperation on the ground of its needs, it renounced to the principal ally protection and military cooperation.²⁸⁷

The following chapter develops in four sections. The first section describes New Zealand's ambitions starting from the end of the 1970s. As we need to focus on the weaker ally's quest for autonomy as the trigger

²⁸⁴ Donnini F., *op. cit.*, 1991

²⁸⁵ Alves D., "The Changing New Zealand Defense Posture," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Apr. 1989), pp. 363-381

²⁸⁶ McMillan S., *Neither Confirm Nor Deny. The Nuclear Ship Dispute between New Zealand and the United States*, Praeger, New York, 1987, p. 155

²⁸⁷ See also Catalinac A., *op. cit.*, 2010

point of the inquiry, this section describes how New Zealand redefined its defense posture and which sources of dissatisfaction developed toward the United States. Then, the second section gives an account of the alliance variables. On the one hand, it measures the New Zealand security concerns and the alliance remuneration in order to settle the framework for the empirical inquiry. On the other hand, it accounts for New Zealand voice attempts and its ineffectiveness. The third section describes the US-NZ relations historically from the mid-1970s to mid-1980s. The fourth section, finally, gives an account of the alliance mechanisms focusing on the US politics of hard restraint and New Zealand's detachment from the alliance. These processes represent empirical evidence that confirms the validity of the alliance termination's model.

1. How to define the case: New Zealand ambitions since the 1970s

Three main features characterized New Zealand's posture in the early 1970s: the search for greater independence, a growing focus on the South Pacific region, and the policy of denuclearization.

In the early 1970s, the Kirk government proclaimed that New Zealand had to achieve a higher degree of independence from its allies: "We want New Zealand's foreign policy to express New Zealand's national ideals as well as to reflect our national interests."²⁸⁸ The goal was to move New Zealand away from close conformity to the US foreign policy. Kirk declared "New Zealand (...) intends to follow a more independent foreign policy. It has emerged from the phase in its national development where it allowed its policies to be determined by the views and interests of its most influential ally (...) We must in future be more self-reliant, and self-reliance requires independence of judgment and action."²⁸⁹

Since the mid-1970s, the National party governments also supported a more independent strategic posture. The 1978 and 1983 NZ's Defense White

²⁸⁸ McCraw D., "From Kirk to Muldoon: Change and Continuity in New Zealand's Foreign-Policy Priorities", *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 55, No. 4 (Winter, 1982-1983), pp. 640-659

²⁸⁹ McCraw D., *op. cit.*, 1982

Papers sustained a defense policy more self-reliant focusing on the South Pacific region. The 1978 Defense Paper clearly expressed this change in NZ's defense posture: "in the past our alliances have led us to concentrate our military efforts in areas distant from New Zealand, like the Middle East, Korea or Southeast Asia. Today the situation is different. In present circumstances New Zealand can best contribute to the strength of the western world by helping preserve peace and security in our own part of the world, particularly the South Pacific".²⁹⁰ The 1983 Defense Paper confirmed this new posture. New Zealand aimed to promote training, exercises, and exchanges with the South Pacific countries to develop skills to manage low-level emergencies in the region and to support New Zealand's broader interests and security demands.²⁹¹

Although Wellington's pursuit of greater autonomy did not imply a split from its most reliable ally, it paved the way for growing internal opposition. Interallied frictions developed mainly because of New Zealand's policy of denuclearization. At the 1974 meeting of the ANZUS Council, the New Zealanders promoted the idea of a South Pacific Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone, which the United States rejected. In the mid-1980s, Wellington anti-nuclear instance strengthened. Gerard Hensley, a former NZ's diplomat, described the origins of New Zealand's posture in these terms:

There were explanations for this [NZ's anti-nuclear posture]: the British and American tests in the Pacific, one of which the young David Lange saw from an Auckland balcony; the French atmospheric tests in the South Pacific from which some fallout drifted over New Zealand and put radioactive strontium-90 in the nation's milk and which led Norman Kirk, the Prime Minister, to send a frigate to the test area in protest; and the continuing tests underground at Mururoa long after the other nuclear powers had retreated to their own countries.

But the strength of New Zealand's distaste was probably reinforced by distance. Where most in the West (and in the East no one had any voice) reluctantly accepted being defended by these weapons as a necessary evil, some New Zealanders felt that their country in its remoteness could perhaps dissociate itself entirely from this evil, and in doing so give a lead which might help the world to come to its senses on disarmament.

²⁹⁰ Janaki K., "International Regimes, New Zealand and the Pacific", in Alley R., *New Zealand and the Pacific*, Boulder, Colo. : Westview Press, 1984.

²⁹¹ Alves D., *op. cit.*, 1989

A dissenting missionary zeal was never far below the country's consciousness, and the hope of setting a moral example and leading the world to better things was beguiling.²⁹²

As the Labour party won the 1984 election, the government decided to sacrifice New Zealand's operational membership in ANZUS to promote its anti-nuclear policy. Although Wellington did not aim to abrogate the alliance treaty, it was determined to change the terms of New Zealand cooperation. The weaker ally called for the renegotiation of the agreement to establish its non-involvement in ANZUS nuclear activities.

In sum, New Zealand's strategic posture slowly changed since the 1970s. A greater focus on the South Pacific implied a detachment from the global concerns of its most reliable ally. The attempt to change the US-led status-quo in the region is the trigger point of the inquiry.

2. The Alliance Variables

This section describes the model's variables. Looking from the weaker side's perspective, it measures firstly New Zealand's security concerns and the alliance remuneration. These variables assume the value as a Type II case. Then, the section accounts for the minor ally's voice attempts to start reporting on the validity of the explicative model. The analysis shows that New Zealand's voice was ineffective as the minor ally was not able to improve the interallied cooperation on the ground of its needs.

Overall, the split of New Zealand from ANZUS in the mid-1980s fits the theoretical framework as a case of alliance termination. Firstly, the case passes the test for case selection successfully, as New Zealand's security concerns decrease while the alliance remuneration increases in the period under consideration. Secondly, the explicative variable fits the general expectations comfortably as New Zealand's ineffective voice plausibly led

²⁹² Hensley G., *Friendly Fire. Nuclear Politics and the Collapse of ANZUS, 1984-1987*, Auckland University Press, 2013, pp. 7-8

to the alliance termination. The following paragraphs describe the variables in details.

2.1. The South Pacific in the mid-1980s: a low threat environment for New Zealand

To New Zealand, the signature of the ANZUS pact in 1951 provided long-term security insurance against a resurgent Japan and an immediate one against any aggressive communist country, as China and the Soviet Union. In 1957, the NZ Defense Paper concluded that "the threat arises today from the world-wide activities of the Communist bloc."²⁹³ During the 1950s and 1960s, threats were believed to develop in Southeast Asia pushing New Zealand's military involvement in Malaysia and Singapore supporting Britain, and Vietnam supporting the United States. However, the security environment radically shifted at the end of the Vietnamese war. As the scholar David McCraw pointed out,

By the 1970s, [New Zealand's] security environment was changing. China was at odds with the Soviet Union, and seeking better relations with Western nations as a result. The United States was seeking an accommodation with both China and the Soviet Union and, along with Britain, was withdrawing militarily from Southeast Asia. Both major New Zealand political parties realized that, in the future, New Zealand would have to formulate new and more self-reliant policies concerning Asia.²⁹⁴

As the superpower rivalry decreased in the region, New Zealand focused increasingly on specific South Pacific issues as economic survival and internal political unrest.²⁹⁵ NZ's Defense spending fell from nearly 4.7 percent of GNP in 1974 to about 1.8 in 1977, one of the world's lowest figures. Although the Cold War tensions slightly increased at the end of the

²⁹³ Cited in Huntley W., "The Kiwi that roared: Nuclear-Free New Zealand in a nuclear-armed world", *The Nonproliferation Review/Fall*, 1996

²⁹⁴ McCraw D., *op. cit.*, 1982

²⁹⁵ Pugh M., *The ANZUS Crises, Nuclear Visiting and Deterrence*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 35

1970s, NZ's defense expenses did not increase significantly.²⁹⁶ Instead, the government started to emphasize the lack of a direct military threat to New Zealand because of its geographical isolation. As the American analyst Wade Huntley argued,

The most striking aspect of New Zealanders' growing regional awareness was the perceived absence of serious regional threats, which came to be a consensus view in security debates and a staple premise in Defense Reviews from the late 1970s onward. This conclusion marked a virtual reversal of nineteenth-century judgments of the bearing of geography on threat perception. Whereas regional isolation had been originally seen as a source of vulnerability, by the 1980s most had come to see it as a source of protection.²⁹⁷

Therefore, New Zealand's security perceptions had significantly altered since the signature of the ANZUS pact in 1951. As two American scholars pointed out,

By 1984, the former enemy Japan had become New Zealand's largest overall trading partner, and growing trade with, and knowledge of, China has steadily reduced fear of that country since diplomatic links were established in 1973. Fear of the Soviet Union undoubtedly persists despite important trade links with that country, but the Communist threat today appears to most New Zealanders as more distant and less virulent than that of two or three decades ago.²⁹⁸

On the other hand, New Zealand enjoyed internal political stability, and there were no sources of domestic threats. In a 1985 paper, the Prime Minister David Lange wrote that New Zealand faced no threat of military aggression. The stability of the South Pacific, therefore, was its primary concern. That goal could be pursued depending "on the economic

²⁹⁶ McKinnon M., *Independence and Foreign Policy. New Zealand in the World since 1935*, Auckland University Press, 1993, pp. 196-204

²⁹⁷ Huntley W., *op. cit.*, 1996

²⁹⁸ Jackson K. and Lamare J., "Politics, Public Opinion and International Crisis: the ANZUS issue in New Zealand Politics", in Bercovitch J. (eds.), *ANZUS in Crisis. Alliance Management in International Affairs*, MacMillan Press, 1988, pp. 162-163

development of the region and on the absence of destabilizing outside influences.”²⁹⁹

2.2. *The ANZUS remuneration: New Zealand’s increasing benefits from the alliance*

To New Zealand, military cooperation with the US provided remarkable benefits.³⁰⁰ Firstly, the weaker ally enjoyed privileged access to American sources and information. As the Australian historian Stephen Hoadley pointed out, New Zealand developed intelligence cooperation with the United States on three levels.

The first was participation in the UKUSA network, wherein all five members submitted all their data and received intelligence on the topics they requested. Members could also make special requests. New Zealand requested additional information on French nuclear testing in the early 1970s and mid-1990s. (...)

The second form of intelligence collaboration was direct consultation. The Director of the US National Security Agency Admiral Bobby Inman visited the newly established GCSB [Government Communication Security Bureau of NZ] in 1980. Other Americans visited for varying periods to proffer specialist advice, gain familiarity, or just cement the working relationship. These were paralleled by personal contacts by Directorate of Defence Intelligence and Security Intelligence Service (New Zealand’s counterintelligence agency) with US, British, Canadian, and Australian counterparts.

The third form of intelligence collaboration, which began in 1981, was the seconding by the GCSB of a New Zealand liaison officer to the National Security Agency at Fort Mead near Washington.³⁰¹

Secondly, New Zealand had the opportunity to purchase US military technology and equipment on very favorable terms. The basic framework of the US-NZ military cooperation was an arrangement signed in May 1965 (the “Cooperative Logistic Arrangement Relating to the Supply Support of

²⁹⁹ Cited in Johnston R., “Geopolitical transition and international realignment: The case of New Zealand”, *Geopolitics and International Boundaries*, Vol.2, No.3 (Winter 1997) pp.43-69

³⁰⁰ See Donnini F., *op. cit.*, 1991, pp. 29, 117-120; Hoadley S., *op. cit.*, 2016, pp. 78-83

³⁰¹ Hoadley S., *op. cit.*, 2016, p. 99

the Armed Forces of New Zealand by the United States Department of Defense”) establishing the principles of common security objectives and mutual aid. According to the agreement, New Zealand’s requests enjoyed the same priority as those of the US armed services in peacetime. Then, the wartime supplies of military equipment were covered by the “Memorandum of Understanding on logistic support” (MoU) signed in June 1982. Finally, New Zealand was privileged in the application of the Arms Export Control Act adopted by the US in 1976. As Hoadley reported, “the Act established a daunting array of eligibility requirements, some of which, if applied strictly, had the potential to penalize New Zealand.”³⁰² However, New Zealand benefited from a special status with Australia, Japan, and the NATO allies.

Thirdly, New Zealanders had the opportunity to exercise and train regularly with American armed forces. The modest NZ's defense forces, therefore, obtained a high operational efficiency and professional competence sharing operation doctrines and tactics with a stronger partner as the US. Typical of these training led by the US were the RIMPAC maritime multilateral exercises operating in the Hawaiian waters (which involved NZ, US, Canada, Japan and Australia in 1983 and 1985) and exercise TRIAD involving air, land and sea forces from all ANZUS member-states. These exercises provided military training in a variety of tactical environments using high technology equipment that would have been unfeasible for a small country like New Zealand.³⁰³

Finally, New Zealand strongly benefited from the cooperation on defense science matters with the westerns allies. As the analyst Peter Jennings pointed out, the New Zealand Defense Science Establishment (DSE) was very small carrying out little basic research. It relied on scientific cooperation with the US and UK, most notably under the "Technical Cooperation Programme", which focused mainly on sonar technology and Mine Counter Measures research. As the DSE argued in its Annual Review

³⁰² Hoadley S., *op. cit.*, 2016, pp. 80-82

³⁰³ Jennings P., *The Armed Forces of New Zealand and the ANZUS Split: Costs and Consequences*, Occasional Paper No. 4, New Zealand Institute of International affairs, 1988, p. 8-9

in 1986, scientific research in New Zealand was heavily dependent on international cooperation.³⁰⁴

In sum, the military cooperation with the US provided remarkable benefits to New Zealand's armed forces, which would have been not feasible otherwise for a small country.

2.3. The policy of denuclearization: New Zealand voice attempts and its ineffectiveness

New Zealand's voice attempts focused mainly on making Washington benevolent about Wellington's policy of denuclearization.

As the Labor party gained power in 1984, it called for a renegotiation of the ANZUS treaty. New Zealand's primary requirements were the following:

- 1) the recognition of NZ's unconditional antinuclear stance;
- 2) the unfettered right to actively promote a nuclear weapons free South Pacific;
- 3) the acceptance of absolutely equal partnership on all issues and the requirement that decisions under the terms of the agreement be unanimous; and
- 4) a guarantee of the complete integrity of New Zealand's sovereignty.³⁰⁵

The policy of denuclearization was at the core of Wellington's claims. The Labor government argued that ANZUS was not a nuclear treaty, and New Zealand was not willing to be defended by nuclear weapons. Washington was invited to accept the weaker ally's stance in virtue of an equal partnership. Minister of Defence Frank O'Flynn wrote in the introduction to his ministry's *Annual Report* for 1984-1985:

We have made it clear that we do not ask or wish to be defended by nuclear weapons. We do not agree that our participation in ANZUS requires us to adopt nuclear defense strategies. We are meeting our collective security obligations in other ways as we have always done and will continue to do.³⁰⁶

³⁰⁴ Jennings P., *op. cit.*, 1988, pp. 27-28

³⁰⁵ Cited in Carpenter P.G., "Pursuing a Strategic Divorce: the U.S. and the ANZUS alliance", Cato institute Policy Analysis no. 67, February 27 1986

³⁰⁶ Cited in Hoadley S., *op. cit.*, 2016, p. 50

On the other hand, many new Zealanders were convinced that the US “neither-confirm-nor-deny” policy was a way to limit the independence of its smaller ally. In 1985, Lange adopted this line in his speech at the Oxford Union debate: “We are actually told that New Zealanders cannot decide for themselves how to defend New Zealand.”³⁰⁷ Then, commenting on its major ally, the Premier said: “to compel an ally to accept nuclear weapons against the wishes of that ally is to take the moral position of totalitarianism, which allows for no self-determination.”³⁰⁸

Once New Zealand’s government denied the access of the US navy Buchanan, it followed a deep interallied crisis. However, the weaker ally tried to keep ANZUS alive in several ways. Lange suggested through diplomatic channels that a Perry-class frigate – widely believed as non-nuclear – could be an acceptable substitute for avoiding intrusive port inspection. Washington, however, rejected the proposal.³⁰⁹ Still, Wellington tried to involve the stronger partner in its internal legislation process. Although assuming New Zealand’s anti-nuclear posture, the Labor government was prepared to share drafts of its anti-nuclear legislation to find an acceptable solution for both sides. Washington, on the other end, refused even to discuss the bill claiming “if the legislation proceeds our defense obligations will be effectively terminated.”³¹⁰ Finally, New Zealanders proposed also to solve the issue through a confidential US undertaking to send only non-nuclear capable ships to New Zealand’s ports, but Washington refuted again.³¹¹

In mid-September 1985, the Deputy Prime Minister Palmer visited Washington. He talked severely with the Assistant Secretary of State for Pacific Affairs Paul Wolfowitz at the State Department. The former NZ diplomat Gerard Hensley reported Palmer’s speech as follows.

³⁰⁷ Thakur R., “Creation of the Nuclear-Free New Zealand Myth: Brinkmanship without a Brink”, *Asian Survey*, Vol. 29, No. 10 (Oct., 1989), pp. 919-939

³⁰⁸ Thakur R., *op. cit.*, 1989

³⁰⁹ Thies W. & Harris J., “An Alliance Unravels: The United States and Anzus”, *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 46, No. 3 (SUMMER 1993), pp. 98-126

³¹⁰ McKinnon M., *op. cit.*, 1993, p. 284

³¹¹ Jackson K. and Lamare J., *op. cit.*, 1988

The opening line (in the recollection of at least one of those present) was: ‘We New Zealanders are a uniquely spiritual and caring people.’ It went on to argue that *the United States and New Zealand*, a large and a small democracy, *should acknowledge each other’s principles. But the US did not recognize New Zealand’s*; in fact it was being un-American in going against its own principles in the way it was treating its smaller ally. There were frequent references to the American Constitution and other revered texts. The clear message seemed to be that ‘you have abandoned your own morality and principles.’³¹²

As Palmer came back from Washington, the Labor government started to think seriously about leaving ANZUS. Lange declared “if the ANZUS Treaty requires us to accept nuclear weapons, then it is the treaty which is the obstacle to the maintenance of good relationships between New Zealand and the United States.”³¹³ On the other hand, the weaker ally did not succeed in its attempts to overcome the crisis. The ineffectiveness of voice opportunities led New Zealand to detach quickly from ANZUS.

3. The US-NZ relations from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s

3.1. When economic diplomacy prevails on traditional security: New Zealand’s pursuit of greater independence.

As an Australian historian argued, in New Zealand “economic independence in the 1970s and 1980s was frequently presented in terms of diversification, the necessary break from dependence on one country.” This new foreign policy of trade “contrasted with the traditional foreign policy of alliances, security and defense.”³¹⁴

Indeed, there was continuity between the Labour and National party governments from 1970 to 1984. In the early 1970s, Kirk established relationships with two major communist countries as China and USSR to

³¹² Hensley G., *op. cit.*, 2013, pp. 205-206, *italics added*

³¹³ Jackson and Lamare, *op. cit.*, 1988

³¹⁴ McKinnon M., *op. cit.*, 1993, p. 219

favor New Zealand economic diplomacy. As the scholar David McCraw pointed out,

One of Labour's first foreign-policy acts was to recognize the People's Republic of China; similarly, the Labour government moved quickly to re-establish an embassy in the U.S.S.R. Kirk said that it was in New Zealand's political and economic interests to respond to Soviet desires for friendly relations. In order to remove "an anomaly" in New Zealand's relations with the Soviet Union, the Labour government in 1974 formally recognised the Soviet Union's 1940 annexation of the Baltic states, a step that Britain, Canada and the United States had never been prepared to take. The establishment of good relationships with the Soviet Union was important enough to the Labour government to take priority over the principle of self-determination of peoples.³¹⁵

New Zealand also voted for China admission to the United Nations in 1971 recognizing the government in Beijing in 1972, while the Nixon government refused to do so until 1979.

Following the 1975 election, the National Party government followed the Labour enthusiasm for expansive economic diplomacy. By emphasizing New Zealand's need for greater leeway in its economic relations, the Prime Minister Robert Muldoon declared in 1978 "on the change of government in 1975 it was obvious that New Zealand had to adopt a different stance in our relationship with our friends, allies and trading partners. We could no longer afford to be a country that said "yes" to everyone and end up with the short end of the stick."³¹⁶ The Iranian case was significant in that sense. As McCraw reported,

Although eager to strengthen its alliance with the United States, the Muldoon government has not made this its first priority. As has been made evident on several occasions, it is New Zealand's trading interests which are of primary concern. In January 1980, for example, the government refused to support a U.S. call for a United Nations embargo on trade in non-food items with Iran. The latter was a buyer of New Zealand's wool, and was developing as a major market for its lamb. The export of wool to Iran for the first nine months of 1979 had been worth about \$17 million, and \$110 million worth of lamb was due to be shipped in 1980. The National government was

³¹⁵ McCraw D., *op. cit.*, 1982

³¹⁶ McKinnon M., *op. cit.*, 1993, p. 216

unwilling to halt trade with Iran, and the Prime Minister said that the United States was "quite clear" on New Zealand's views. In April 1980, with the American hostages in Iran still not free, President Carter imposed an embargo on food shipments to Iran, and again asked American allies to do likewise. Muldoon said: "We have said we would not adopt self-damaging policies. I think they would understand if we did not change our minds. Finally, when the U.S. severed diplomatic relations with April, and asked other countries to follow suit, Muldoon said that New Zealand's ambassador would not be withdrawn immediately since he was due to leave in a matter of weeks anyway, and had some tidying up to do."³¹⁷

Then, New Zealand improved its relationships with communist countries. Although trading relations with the Soviet Union were ambivalent and fluctuating, the bilateral trade was increasing in the late 1970s. On the other hand, the Muldoon government confirmed a keen interest in more solid relations with China.

The Prime Minister's first overseas visit in April 1976 included China, because he wanted to "register New Zealand's interest in strengthening [its] cordial associations." When the Minister of Foreign Affairs visited China in October 1977, it appeared that one purpose of the visit was to reassure the Chinese that New Zealand's increased trade with the Soviet Union did not mean a lessening of interest in its relationship with China. The National government declared itself unworried by Chinese diplomatic expansion in the South Pacific; and even China's testing of an intercontinental ballistic missile in the South Pacific in May 1980 was acknowledged with understanding. China's invasion of Vietnam in February 1979, while deplored, was not strongly condemned. The government merely called upon China to withdraw. The Muldoon government's interest in China is based partly on a perceived community of strategic interest in opposing Soviet expansion, and increasingly on China's trading potential.³¹⁸

In the mid-1970s, therefore, economic diplomacy became New Zealand's primary concern. The need for greater leeway in that foreign policy's area came at the expense of traditional security considerations of collective defence.

³¹⁷ McCraw D., *op. cit.*, 1982

³¹⁸ *Ibidem*

3.2. The US-NZ relations in a changing South Pacific

New Zealand's reorientation toward the South Pacific region was speeded in the 1970s following the independence of several South Pacific microstates. As colonies of great powers no longer surrounded it, New Zealand led (with Australia) these newly independent states to create the South Pacific Forum. The Forum was established in 1971 and aimed to regulate and improve regional economic cooperation. Wellington shifted to South Pacific the majority of its bilateral aid (around 78% in 1985) pushing for the economic sufficiency of the region. Moreover, it dropped import controls from its neighbors under the SPARTECA arrangement.³¹⁹

As New Zealand financed the Forum and supported its weaker member-states, it was also engaged in promoting some common regional interests. The first issues in US-NZ relations arose precisely because of the initiative of a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ). As an Australian scholar pointed out,

The New Zealand Labour government SPNFZ initiative, while supported strongly by the island states at the July 1975 South Pacific Forum, and by the UN General Assembly (110 votes to 0, with 20 abstentions) in a joint resolution sponsored by New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and Fiji, was vigorously opposed by the United States (...) the [United States] primary concern was the zone's potential restriction of transit of nuclear-armed forces, both within territorial waters/airspace, and on/over the high seas.³²⁰

However, the SPNFZ initiative weakened after the election of conservative governments in New Zealand and Australia in late 1975. The Muldoon National Party government expressed in-principle support for the SPNFZ but judged the proposal as unsuitable for keeping good relations with the United States. In 1982, however, the same New Zealand's government

³¹⁹ Hoadley S., "New Zealand's Regional Security Policies", in Baker R. (eds), *The ANZUS States and Their Region. Regional Policies of Australia, New Zealand and the United States*, Praeger, 1994

³²⁰ Hamel-Green M., *The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty: a critical assessment*, Australian National University, 1990, p. 2

firmly opposed to the main ally, which failed in the ratification of the Law of Sea.³²¹

On the other hand, New Zealand in early-1980s was still engaged in promoting ANZUS cooperation in the South Pacific region. The defense paper of 1983 emphasized New Zealand's need for self-reliance within a framework of increasing interallied cooperation. In early 1984, the NZ Secretary of Foreign Affairs argued:

It will be of overriding importance for New Zealand that the South Pacific generally should remain western-oriented ... to avoid the development of conditions of political or economic instability which the Soviet Union or other unfriendly or opportunistic power could exploit [and] to ensure that the western powers themselves (I am thinking particularly of France, the United States and Japan) are responsive to South Pacific concerns.³²²

Following the election of mid-1984, also the Labour government recommitted itself to the ANZUS Treaty and a close relationship with the American ally. Nonetheless, the government aimed to redefine New Zealand's contribution to the alliance. It triggered the ANZUS crisis.

3.3. The Nuclear Ships Dispute

As the Labour party won the 1984 election, it proceeded with its anti-nuclear policy. The government announced that nuclear-armed ships or aircraft were not welcomed to New Zealand ports or airfields. Moreover, NZ's armed forces renounced to participate in joint exercises involving any use or simulated use of nuclear weapons. Although the Labour government reaffirmed its adherence to ANZUS, it was restricted to conventional defense of the member-states.³²³

On the other hand, the United States had a growing need for reliable allies in the Pacific. As Washington planned to expand its combatant vessels from

³²¹ McKinnon M., *op. cit.*, 1993, p. 269

³²² Cited in McKinnon M., *op. cit.*, 1993, p. 259

³²³ Hamel-Green M., *op. cit.*, 1990, p. 75

345 in 1982 to 600, the number of ship visits to the Pacific countries was likely to increase. As one Australian analyst observed,

[t]he trend towards long-range nuclear weaponry deployed on mobile platforms, coupled with increasingly global anti-submarine weapon (ASW) and electronic surveillance programs involving tactical ASW nuclear weapons, serves to explain the heightened US concern about transit and port access rights in its approach to Nuclear Free Zones (NFZs) from the early 1970s onwards. The globalization of US nuclear weapon deployment on mobile naval and air platforms resulted in a limitation of the areas in which the United States was prepared to contemplate NFZ establishment (...) the United States was prepared to support NFZs only in land regions where it did not have major nuclear weapon deployment (Latin America, South Asia, Middle East, and Antarctica) and was opposed to all proposals perceived to constrain either its land-based nuclear deployments (European and Balkans NFZ proposals) or mobile nuclear forces (Indian Ocean ZOP, SPNFZ, Mediterranean NFZ).³²⁴

Although the Labour government proclaimed a firm anti-nuclear policy in July 1984, the US administration avoided a confrontation with the weaker ally. The ANZUS Council regularly met in Wellington, personnel and intelligence exchanges continued, and the October 1984 TRIAD exercise took place in New Zealand as scheduled.³²⁵

The Labour government, however, reiterated that ANZUS was not a nuclear treaty taking further distance from US nuclear policy. As one New Zealander scholar pointed out,

This meant that no NZ Navy ship would be permitted to exercise in a nuclear mode with ships of the US Navy nor would the Government allow nuclear-armed or nuclear-powered vessels of the United States to enter internal waters or ports. In the absence of assurances from the United States or its own assessment to the contrary, the NZ Government would assume that any vessel capable of carrying nuclear weapons was potentially carrying them, and would deny that vessel entry. But conventionally powered and armed warships would still be welcome.³²⁶

On the other hand, the United States reaffirmed its “neither-confirm-nor-

³²⁴ Hamel-Green M., *op. cit.*, 1990, p. 110

³²⁵ Hoadley S., *op. cit.*, 2016, p. 50

³²⁶ Hoadley S., *op. cit.*, 2016, p. 49

deny” policy about the presence of nuclear weapons on any of its vessels. In this view, a ban on nuclear-capable vessels implied a ban on all US navies and aircraft.

The interallied crisis quickly escalated when Deputy Prime Minister Palmer denied port access to the USS *Buchanan* in January 1985. While Washington claimed that New Zealand was infringing the ANZUS treaty, Wellington did not recognize any obligation concerning nuclear cooperation. Almost immediately, the United States adopted several counter-measures. As an Australian scholar reported,

Once the *Buchanan* visit was irrevocably cancelled, the US response was swift and extensive. Exercise *Sea Eagle* and all other scheduled exercises, training and familiarisation exchanges, and military courtesy calls involving New Zealand, and an undisclosed quantity of intelligence flow, were immediately discontinued. High-level US officials and flag-rank officers declined to meet their New Zealand counterparts for nearly a decade.³²⁷

In sum, ANZUS became quickly inoperative as a trilateral alliance. It was mostly substituted by two bilateral alliances, which forced Australia into two separate relations with the United States and New Zealand.

3.4. The ANZUS split

In mid-1985, New Zealand supported the regional initiative for a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. However, the Labour government adopted a flexible attitude discouraging those, like the Melanesian island states, seeking stricter anti-nuclear provisions. As one Australian scholar argued,

the New Zealand response to the treaty was subordinated to a wider South Pacific strategy of reassuring its ANZUS partners that New Zealand was serious about supporting ANZUS and Western interests in the South Pacific region. As such, the New Zealand response represented a successful example of the treaty's intended role as

³²⁷ Hoadley S., *op. cit.*, 2016, p. 53

a measure to channel regional anti-nuclear responses in a pro-ANZUS direction and to prevent the emergence of regional anti-nuclear alliances.³²⁸

Although New Zealand did not aim to export its anti-nuclear policy, the legislative process concerning the anti-nuclear bill was progressing quickly. In December 1985, the Labour government sent the "New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Bill" to Parliament. The United States, however, warned the weaker ally that ANZUS was incompatible with a member state's anti-nuclear posture. On 15 April 1986, Ambassador Paul Cleveland made a speech to the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs in Wellington. His warning anticipated US intentions:

in the event the draft legislation is passed in its present form, the United States will fully review its security relationship with New Zealand with the likely outcome being the suspension of its ANZUS security commitment to New Zealand.³²⁹

In addition, Lange later acknowledged that he had received "a written warning delivered in person by US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State James Lilley."³³⁰ However, these warnings did not impede New Zealand's Parliament to approve the Nuclear Free Bill.

The ANZUS split quickly materialized in mid-1986. As the Nuclear Free Bill proceeded, on 27 June 1986, Secretary Shultz suspended US security obligations to New Zealand saying "we part company as friends, but we part company as far as the alliance is concerned."³³¹ Then, the Memorandum of Understanding was not renewed in mid-1987 removing New Zealand from the group of allies enjoying easy access to the US's weapon supply.³³² The United States, finally, did not adhere to the Rarotonga treaty that established the SPNFR. Although the treaty did not hinder the US strategic posture in the Pacific directly, Washington feared it could encourage other states to adopt an

³²⁸ Hamel-Green M., *op. cit.*, 1990, p. 80

³²⁹ Hoadley S., *op. cit.*, 2016, p. 53

³³⁰ Cited in Hoadley S., *op. cit.*, 2016, p. 53

³³¹ Hoadley S., *op. cit.*, 2016, p. 53

³³² Donnini F., *op. cit.*, 1991, p. 102

anti-nuclear posture as the former ally New Zealand.³³³

4. The United States' hard restraint and the New Zealand detachment: the processes of alliance termination

This last section accounts for the alliance processes leading to the security treaty termination. Firstly, it describes the US politics of restraint. The analysis shows that the stronger ally adopted a hard posture increasing the weaker partner's dissatisfaction. Secondly, it focuses on New Zealand behavior. Although the weaker ally avoided confrontation with the major one trying to minimize the sources of frictions, we find evidence of detachment in two prevailing attitudes: New Zealand's focus on greater self-reliance and the pursuit of a closer relationship with Australia.

4.1. US politics of hard restraint

By the 1980s, the United States placed heavier emphasis on the Pacific. As it actively promoted nuclear-powered units in the navy, the Regan administration held that ships' access was necessary for a maritime alliance as ANZUS.³³⁴ Moreover, the US looked at ANZUS as one of a series of global alliances. New Zealand anti-nuclear feelings could encourage other allies that like Greece, Denmark, Spain, Iceland, and Japan. At the beginning of ANZUS crisis, the admiral W. Crowe (CINCPAC) sent a telegram to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger describing the issue.

As you are aware a number of other countries with nuclear sensitivities, notably Japan, Australia, and our NATO allies, are watching closely how we handle this situation. In December 1984, the State Department submitted a request for blanket diplomatic clearance for 1985 with advice that a ship visit to New Zealand is planned to follow

³³³ Hamel-Green M., *op. cit.*, 1990, p. 117

³³⁴ Hensley G., *op. cit.*, 2013, p. 112

ANZUS exercise Sea Eagle 85-1-[censored]. *Our ultimate objective is unfettered port access, while maintaining our neither Confirm nor Deny policy.*³³⁵

As it was strongly determinate to keep US ships access and the neither-confirm-nor-deny policy, the Regan administration announced its intent to retaliate against New Zealand the same day that Lange denied the port access to the US Buchanan. As an American scholar pointed out,

The United States in 1985 and 1986 introduced several serious punitive measures. The superpower cut off New Zealand's access to high grade intelligence, canceled all military exercises involving joint participation of American and New Zealand forces (highly valued by the small but professional New Zealand military), postponed indefinitely the annual ANZUS Council meeting, and finally, "closed" the long-standing and valuable "open door" policy between officials at various levels of the two governments.³³⁶

Although US officials often portrayed New Zealand as having isolated itself, the retaliatory measures taken by Americans imposed a *de facto* isolation to Wellington. New Zealander's officials were excluded from any meetings in which US intelligence could be discussed, they lost easy access to the Pentagon for consultation and could not benefit anymore of US military training.³³⁷ In other words, the US administration pursued a discriminating policy deliberately to discipline the weaker ally. As an Australian scholar argued,

[t]he flavor of the US measures and comments was best caught by US ambassador to Australia William Lane, who said: "New Zealand has been a bad boy and must be punished." The State Department dissociated itself from Lane's remark. However – in their paternalism, in their view that New Zealand had transgressed, and in their view of what had to be done to a transgressor – the words caught an important element in the US attitude toward New Zealand.³³⁸

³³⁵ Clements K., "New Zealand's Role in Promoting a Nuclear-Free Pacific", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 25, No. 4, Special Issue on Militarization and Demilitarization in Asia-Pacific (Dec., 1988), pp. 395-410, *italics added*

³³⁶ Donnini F., *op. cit.*, 1991, p. 21

³³⁷ McMillan S., *op. cit.*, 1987, p. 98

³³⁸ McMillan S., *op. cit.*, 1987, p. 99

4.2. *New Zealand's new strategic posture*

In the middle of the ANZUS crisis, New Zealand emphasized more strongly its policy of greater self-reliance. In the 1985 MOD Annual Report, the Defense Minister O'Flynn reiterated that New Zealand did not intend to shape its forces to act "as an appendage to overseas forces ever ready to be deployed to wars in distant lands."³³⁹ Instead, New Zealand intended to develop armed forces able to protect the country sovereignty and regional stability, moving quickly in case of requests of help from neighbor countries. The Labour government was firm and cohesive on these points. As a New Zealander scholar pointed out,

The need to be more self-reliant in defense and security and to assume a greater leadership role in the South Pacific was spelt out in two Cabinet papers [Cabinet Papers of 18 March and 1 April 1985] (...) The argument was that, though the basic ANZUS guarantee remained, its operational character had changed and the withdrawal of military and intelligence cooperation was irreversible, barring an unlikely backdown by either side. New Zealand would have to do more on its own. By safeguarding its security interests in the immediate neighborhood, and by ensuring that the South Pacific did not become an area of instability and conflict, New Zealand could display its reliability and in time seek a more stable relationship with both the United States and Australia.

During the 1985-1986 ANZUS crisis, the government developed "the most fundamental change in defense policies (...) occurred since World War II." The 1987 White Paper was transparent on New Zealand's fundamental principle to improve its defense strategy.

This country must exercise greater self-reliance and, as far as possible, maintain the ability to meet or deter credible threats to our security or interests *using our own resources*.³⁴⁰

³³⁹ Cited in Jennings P., *op. cit.*, 1988, p. 52

³⁴⁰ Cited in Jennings P., *op. cit.*, 1988, p. 53, *italics added*

It represented a significant alteration in New Zealand's strategic priorities emphasizing the ability to operate alone in the region, rather than as a part of a coalition of allied forces.

On the other hand, Wellington recognized the risks of isolation. Following the *Buchanan* diplomatic incident, the Labour government began supporting a closer defense association with Australia. Defense Minister O'Flynn expressed this goal in early 1985.

Curtailment of defense cooperation by the United States has...underlined importance to New Zealand of exercising and training with Australian forces...In essence, our aim is to increase cooperation and so preserve, to the extent that our joint resources permit, the present satisfactory security situation in the region.³⁴¹

An Australian scholar depicted the paradox of New Zealand new posture.

The US measures that were taken against New Zealand made it all the more important for the Lange government to secure commitments of defence cooperation from Australia as a partial compensation for a perceived vacuum left by US withdrawal from military cooperation. Concern to secure increases in Australian defence cooperation, successfully implemented in the form of increased bilateral exercises, military personnel exchanges, joint purchase arrangements, increased coordination in defence communications networks, and collaboration in logistics, meant that New Zealand was constrained from pursuing any diplomatic challenge to the Australian government's SPNFZ initiative. To have sought more comprehensive denuclearization arrangements regionally would have risked forfeiting the valued Australian military assistance that partially compensated for US withdrawal of defense cooperation.

The detachment from the United States forced New Zealand within another asymmetric relation to feel the vacuum left by ANZUS termination. However, the political relationship between Australia and New Zealand did not imply any nuclear obligation to the weaker side.

³⁴¹ Jennings P., *op. cit.*, 1988, p. 71

5. Conclusion

As a case of alliance persistence, the US-NZ relation from the mid-1970s to mid-1980s appropriately represents how a mismanaged interallied crisis can lead to the alliance termination. Although ANZUS was a “showcase” alliance for more than 35 years, New Zealand’s denuclearization policy and non-conformity to the stronger side’s requests triggered a process of non-reciprocity in interallied relations until the alliance termination.

For our purposes, we found sufficient evidence that the ineffectiveness of New Zealand's voice led to the weaker side detachment from ANZUS. As Wellington was not able to improve the interallied cooperation on the ground of its needs, it renounced to the principal ally protection and military cooperation. The former allies preserved cordial relations avoiding the stricter obligations of an asymmetric military alliance.

CHAPTER 6

The US-Australia relation in the mid-1980s: a case of alliance persistence

At the end of World War II, Australia turned to the United States looking for protection against the possibility of a revived Japanese rearmament and rising communist powers.³⁴² As the country ratified the ANZUS treaty in 1952, it achieved two kinds of benefits. Firstly, Canberra obtained the US's assurance of aid in the event of armed attacks from third countries (art. 4). Washington therefore replaced Britain – Canberra's erstwhile protector – that was not able to provide any security guarantee. Secondly, Australia obtained the privileged access to the major ally's military hardware, training and intelligence networks, so confirming its status as the main actor in the South Pacific region. On the other hand, Canberra supported the major ally in its military campaigns during the 1950s and 1960s by sending a total of 15000 service personnel to fight in the Korean War and nearly 47000 to the Vietnam War.³⁴³

Acting as the Australia's great power guarantor, the US assured its presence in the South Pacific region positioning some military bases on the Australian soil. These defense, communications and intelligence installations were critical to the US global posture. As the scholar Desmond Ball argued, the agreements on the North West Cape communications station (1963), and the satellite intelligence facilities at Pine Gap (1966) and Nurrungar (1969) in central Australia were extremely significant in Washington's strategic planning.³⁴⁴

³⁴² Smith G., Cox D., Burchill S., *Australia in the World: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy*, Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 60

³⁴³ Firth S., *Australia in International Politics*, Allen&Unwin, 2005, p. 34

³⁴⁴ Ball D., "The Strategic Essence", *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 55:2, 2001, pp. 235-248

For the purposes of our inquiry, it is useful analyzing the interallied relations from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s. In that period, the allies were facing the most significant crisis of ANZUS history. However, they overcame the major issues triggering the processes of alliance persistence. From the Australian perspective, the alliance voice opportunity was a major benefit of the relationship with Washington. As the former Prime Minister Keating wrote, the alliance provided standing for Australia to have its “voice heard in Washington”, especially about developments in its region.³⁴⁵ On the other hand, the US was able to accommodate the weaker partner's needs and requests of greater autonomy. The effectiveness of the Australia's voice, therefore, avoided the alliance termination during the major crises of ANZUS history.

The following chapter develops in four sections. The first section describes Australia's ambitions from the early 1970s to the mid-1980s. As we need to stress the weaker ally's quest for autonomy as the trigger point of the inquiry, this section focuses on the Australia's foreign and defense policy. Then, the second section gives an account of the alliance variables. On the one hand, it measures Australia's security concerns and the alliance remuneration in order to settle the framework for the empirical inquiry. On the other, it accounts for the weaker ally's voice attempts and its effectiveness. The third section describes the US-Australia relation historically from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s. The fourth section, finally, gives an account of the alliance processes. It firstly focuses on the major ally's politics of soft restraint. Then, it analyses how Australia gave assurances to its major partner, still increasing its autonomy. These processes represent empirical evidence that confirms the validity of the alliance persistence's model.

³⁴⁵ cited in Bisley N., “‘An ally for all the years to come’: why Australia is not a conflicted US ally”, *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 67:4, 2013, pp. 403-418

1. How to define the case: Australia ambitions since the mid-1970s

By the mid-1970s, three main features were characterizing Australia's renovated posture in the alliance: the review of the agreements concerning the US military bases; a new defense policy, which aimed to Australia's self-reliance; and, finally, a regional policy of arms control and denuclearization.

As the Labor party came to power in the early 1970s, it started scrutinizing the interallied agreements concerning the US bases on the Australian soil. The government judged that the US Naval facility at Northwest Cape violated the country's sovereignty. The allies then agreed that the station would become a joint US-Australia facility involving a greater number of Australian personnel in its operation, establishing an Australian National Communications center alongside the American station, and appointing an Australian naval officer as deputy commander of the entire facility.³⁴⁶ Moreover, the Barnard-Schlesinger agreement included two significant concessions in deference to Australia. First, the Head of Australian Defense Staff in Washington obtained special access to high-level officials in Washington at very short notice. Secondly, as the scholar Thomas-Durell Young points out, the "accord established a regular forum for discussions between senior Australian service and civilian defense officials with their American counterparts concerning the strategic implications of Northwest Cape to Australian security".³⁴⁷

This deeper cooperation between the allies favored the policy of self-reliance that Australia was adopting during the 1970s. Actually, by 1959 Australia's defense planners were already thinking to shape the country's defense forces independently of allies. As the Australian scholar Paul Dibb points out, "[i]t was stated that, in certain circumstances, 'Australia might have to rely completely on her own defensive and economic capacity for an

³⁴⁶ Young T., "The Australian-United States strategic relationship: Merely an issue of suitable real estate?", *Comparative Strategy*, 8:1, 1989, pp. 125-138

³⁴⁷ *Ibidem*

indeterminate period”³⁴⁸ However, this view was rejected by Cabinet, which preferred to prepare Australia for involvement in limited wars in Southeast Asia and required organized forces to act effectively with the major ally.

It was only during the 1970s, following the American’s defeat in Vietnam, that the need for the self-reliant ‘defense of Australia’ arose as a serious intention. As Dibb pointed out,

Elements of this new policy appeared in the 1972 public document Australian Defense Review, which argued for a more independent national defense capability and for self-reliance as laying ‘claim to being a central feature in the future development of Australia’s defense policy’. The big breakthrough, however, was the 1973 Strategic Basis of Australian Defense Policy which set the course followed, by and large, up to the late 1980s. It asserted that Australia ‘must now assume the primary responsibility for its own defense against any neighborhood or regional threats’. Recognition was given to the fundamental requirements that flowed from the enduring features of Australia’s geographic circumstances. In particular, it identified the importance of capabilities for surveillance; naval and maritime air defense; long-range transport; responses to hostile landings; defense infrastructure and communication networks; comprehensive intelligence; and industrial, scientific and technological support.³⁴⁹

Finally, in the early 1980s Australia manifested an unprecedented interest in arms control and nuclear disarmament.³⁵⁰ As the Labor party won elections in 1983, the government committed to work “towards meaningful détente and effective measures of arms control” and opposed to “operations involving nuclear weapons from Australian territory”.³⁵¹ As two scholars pointed out “(i)n his first year as Foreign Minister, Hayden took his party’s foreign policy platform seriously. He went to the brink of becoming *persona*

³⁴⁸ Dibb P., “The Self-Reliant Defense of Australia: The History of an idea”, in Huisken R. & Thatcher M. (eds.), *History as policy. Framing the debate on the future Australia’s defense policy*, ANU Press, 2007, pp. 11-28

³⁴⁹ *Ibidem*

³⁵⁰ Findlay T., “Disarmament and Arms Control”, in Mediansky F.A. (eds.), *Australia in a Changing World. New Foreign Policy Directions*, MacMillian Press, 1992, p. 167

³⁵¹ Cited by Goot M. & King P., “ANZUS Reconsidered: the Domestic Politics of Alliance”, in Bercovitch J. (eds.), *ANZUS in Crises. Alliance Management in International Affairs*, MacMillian Press, 1988, p. 111

non grata in Washington with his pressure on the United States over arms control issues, especially the comprehensive test ban [...] By late 1984, United States' officials were talking of a 'major diplomatic rift'. To paraphrase a commentator of the time, Hayden's lack of enthusiasm for Shultz and the Pentagon were reciprocated in overwhelming measure."³⁵² Australia's policy of arms control and nuclear disarmament was the main issue in the interallied relation.³⁵³ The Hawke government opposed the US "Strategic Defense Initiative" (namely the *Star War* project), refusing "to participate because of what were seen as the destabilizing implications of the proposed scheme". Moreover, Canberra did not cooperate with the major ally on the MX missile project.³⁵⁴

In sum, by the mid-1970s, Australia engaged in several attempts to increase its autonomy in the context of the asymmetric alliance with the US. However, the successful management of the alliance internal issues triggered processes of alliance persistence instead of termination. Therefore, as the weaker side's voice was effective, the allies were able to overcome several sources of crisis.

2. The Alliance Variables

This section describes the variables that lead the empirical inquiry. Looking from the weaker side's perspective, it measures Australia's security concerns and the alliance remuneration. These variables assume the values as a Type II case. Then, this section accounts for the minor ally's voice attempts and its effectiveness. The analysis shows that Canberra's voice was effective as the minor ally was able to improve the interallied cooperation on the ground of its needs.

Overall, the US-Australia alliance fits the theoretical framework as a case of alliance persistence. Firstly, the case passes the test for case selection

³⁵² *Ibidem*

³⁵³ Cheeseman G., *The Search for Self-Reliance. Australian Defence Since Vietnam*, Longman Cheshire, 1993, pp.8-12

³⁵⁴ Smith G., Cox D., Burchill S., *op. cit.*, 1998, pp. 72-77

successfully, as Australia's security concerns decrease while the alliance remuneration increases in the period under consideration. Secondly, the explicative variable first the theoretic expectations comfortably as the effectiveness of the Australia voice led to the alliance persistence. The following paragraphs describe the variables in details.

2.1. The South Pacific in the mid-1970s: the Australian low threat outlook

Following the end of World War II, Australia looked for the United States' protection against potential Japanese rearmament and rising threats from the communist powers. However, the South Pacific strategic environment changed significantly in the early 1970s. As three Australian scholars pointed out, "with the election of the Whitlam government, the low threat outlook became the official outlook. Whitlam's minister for defense, Lance Barnard, stated that Australia would face 'no threat for fifteen years', and while this shocked the domino school, it proved accurate".³⁵⁵ Although the 1975 Strategic Basis Paper recognized the potential for Soviet penetration of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific, it judged that the strategic and political opportunities open to the Soviet Union did not provide a "sufficient basis for any significant challenge to the strategic position of the United States in the Pacific" and, by association, did not menace Australia's interests as an ally of the United States.³⁵⁶ Moreover, the 1975 paper recognized that "Moscow had legitimate interests of its own in the area, and continued to affirm that there was no present likelihood of major strategic pressure or major military threat against Australia, its territories, maritime resources zones or lines of communication".³⁵⁷

In the late 1970s, the liberal Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser returned briefly "to the 'big threat' imagery, initially in concern expressed over Soviet naval expansion in the Indian Ocean, and then with the Soviet invasion of

³⁵⁵ Smith G., Cox D., Burchill S., *op. cit.*, 1998, p. 63

³⁵⁶ Dupont A., *Australia's Threat Perceptions: A Search For Security*, SDSO, Canberra, 1991, p. 78

³⁵⁷ Dupont A., *op. cit.*, 1991, p. 78

Afghanistan”.³⁵⁸ Although anti-Soviet rhetoric characterized the Government’s declaratory policies in foreign affairs and defense, the professional advisers were significantly less alarmist in their evaluation of the Soviet threat. They continued to judge that “the prospect of major, direct assault on Australia was 'remote and improbable', and that the Soviet Union was highly unlikely to militarily menace Australia or its territories.”³⁵⁹

As the Labor party won election in 1983, “the low threat outlook became entrenched in defense-policy planning documents.”³⁶⁰ As the scholar Alan Dupont argued,

In regard to Indonesia, which was considered to represent the most likely threat to Australia's security interests, the 1983 Strategic Basis Paper asserted that Australia's 'enduring strategic interest was 'to avoid significant Indonesian attack against, or foreign occupation of Papua New Guinea...Implicit in Australia's defense of Papua New Guinea against attack from Indonesia [was the] risk of attack against Australia itself'. However, Indonesia was thought unlikely to develop a capacity 'to sustain intensive joint operations against Australia [for] at least 10 years’”³⁶¹

This view was also confirmed by the 1986 report to the Ministry for Defense Paul Dibb, which began with the following words:

Australia is one of the most secure countries in the world, it is distant from the main centers of global military confrontation, and is surrounded by large expanses of water which make it difficult to attack. Australia’s neighbours possess only limited capabilities to project military power against it...Australia faces no identifiable military threat and there is every prospect that our favorable security circumstances will continue.³⁶²

In sum, Australian official assessments from the early 1970s to the mid-1980s have been reiterating that the country faced no foreseeable threats.

³⁵⁸ Smith G., Cox D., Burchill S., *op. cit.*, 1998, p. 63

³⁵⁹ Dupont A., *op. cit.*, 1991, p. 81

³⁶⁰ Smith G., Cox D., Burchill S., *op. cit.*, 1988, p. 63

³⁶¹ Dupont A., *op. cit.*, 1991, p. 85

³⁶² Cited in Smith G., Cox D., Burchill S., *op. cit.*, 1998, p. 63

Consequently, as the scholar Desmond Ball pointed out, the vitality of the US-Australia alliance was “threat insensitive”.³⁶³

2.2. *The Alliance remuneration*

Australia benefited from the alliance with the US on three main levels: combined military exercises and training, military supplies, and intelligence sharing.

Firstly, the minor ally’s military forces could train and exercise with the stronger partner’s ones. Combined exercises demonstrated the US’s capabilities as a reliable partner, and favored a stable security environment demonstrating the allies’ strength and resolve.³⁶⁴ The Australian Defense Force (ADF) conducted a wide range of exercises with the US Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps. The most significant ones from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s were the Kangaroo exercises held in 1974, 1976, 1979, 1981, 1983, and 1986. As the scholar John Blaxland pointed out,

[t]hese tested evolving joint (interservice) and combined (international) command arrangements focused on the defense of Australia. The first exercise Kangaroo in 1974, for instance, involved 15000 troops and forty ships. It was designed to be a major test for Australian forces of joint service procedures and doctrines, and included an amphibious lodgment. The United States supplied an amphibious task group, Great Britain supplied eight ships and Royal Marines, and New Zealand also contributed contingents from its three services³⁶⁵

Secondly, Australia entered into many logistic agreements with the United States under the aegis of the alliance relationship. As Gary Brown argued,

As early as 1951, the Americans formally declared Australia eligible for aid under the Mutual Defense Assistance program though little activity took place until the later sixties when the ADF began to acquire US rather than British equipments in some

³⁶³ Ball D., *op. cit.*, 2001

³⁶⁴ Blaxland J., “US-Australian military cooperation in Asia”, in Dean P., Fruhling S., and Taylor B. (eds.), *Australia’s American alliance*, Melbourne University Press, 2016

³⁶⁵ *Ibidem*

quantity. But in 1965, by which time Australia had placed orders with the United States for three Charles F. Adams class DDGS and for twenty four F-111 long range strike aircraft, the two countries signed a Memorandum on co-operative logistic support. This was succeeded in 1980 by a fresh Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and in 1985 by a renegotiated version.³⁶⁶

The 1980 MoU listed many types of defense items and services which the US made available to Australia in peacetime. These included: weapons systems and equipments; spare parts; munitions, ammunitions, explosives; modification kits; test equipment; specialist services; training; repair services and so on. The agreement then provided that

[s]ubject to its laws and regulations and the exigencies of war, the United States will continue to provide logistic support materiel and services [...] to Australia during periods of international tension or in circumstances of armed conflict involving either or both parties.

The MoU therefore assumed a vital role in Australian's long-term national security planning process. Still in the 1987 White Paper, the government announced that

[o]ur agreements with the United States also provide for the supply of munitions and equipment in an emergency, alleviating the need for large-scale stockpiling by the ADF.

And, in tabling the Paper, Defense Minister Beazley spoke confidently of Australia's "guaranteed access to ready resupply of essential war-stocks".³⁶⁷ Finally, as Ball argued, intelligence sharing was a main resource for both allies.

From the 1960s to the early 1990s, the United States maintained in Australia more than a dozen (and in the 1960s and 1970s, more than two dozen) installations concerned with military communications, navigation, satellite tracking and control, and various forms of intelligence collection, including half a dozen seismic stations which

³⁶⁶ Brown G., *Breaking the American Alliance. An Independent National Security Policy for Australia*, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defense, No. 54, 1989, p. 66-67

³⁶⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 68

monitored underground nuclear detonations (NUDETS) and other facilities which provided information for the US Ocean Surveillance Information System (OSIS). Three of these installations were vital elements of the US strategic command, control, communications and intelligence (C31) system which supported the US strategic nuclear posture: the 'joint facilities' at North West Cape, Pine Gap and Nurrungar.³⁶⁸

Australian governments on both political sides judged that the maintenance of the 'joint facilities' was in Australia's interests. Moreover, beginning in the early 1980s, there was increasing involvement by Australians in the operation of these facilities, and increasing use of them for direct Australian purposes. In particular, the Royal Australian Navy became the principal user of the North West Cape communications station, increasing its communications with both its submarines and its Indian Ocean Fleet more generally.³⁶⁹

2.3. Australia's voice attempts and its effectiveness

Having effective voice in the alliance was a key purpose for Australia when ANZUS was established. As the scholar Nick Bisley wrote,

privileged access to Washington was and remains a key purpose for ANZUS. Indeed, for Percy Spender, the person more responsible for ANZUS than anyone else, this was a fundamental concern (...) Spender rightly recognized that, for Australia, the most important decisions in its security future would be being taken in Washington. It was hoped that the treaty would ensure Australia was, at the very least, part of the informational loop (...) Of course, Australia is not an equal partner, and one should recognize that access does not automatically imply influence. Nonetheless, the alliance provides a not inconsiderable foot in the policy door in Washington, without which Australia would be distinctly worse off.³⁷⁰

Also Paul Keating – Australian Prime Minister from 1991 to 1995 – judged that “ANZUS's main and critical benefit may simply be this: it provides

³⁶⁸ Ball D., *op. cit.*, 2001

³⁶⁹ Ball D., *op. cit.*, 2001

³⁷⁰ Bisley N., *op. cit.*, 2013

standing for us to have our voice heard in Washington, especially about developments in this part of the world”.³⁷¹

During the period under investigation in this chapter, we can find two significant occasions in which Australia’s voice was effective. Firstly, Australia obtained a renegotiation of the US bases arrangements on favorable terms. As the scholar Thomas-Durell Young pointed out,

[t]he consultative and liaison arrangements established by the Barnard-Schlesinger accord were expanded following a May 1978 incident when the Australian public learned that the United States had decided to upgrade the satellite ground terminal at Northwest Cape without first notifying the Australian Minister for Defense. On 16 January 1979, R.N. Hamilton, the first assistant secretary, Strategic and International Policy Division of the Australian Department of Defense, and Michael Armacost, deputy assistant secretary of defense (East Asia, Pacific and Inter-American Affairs) agreed [...] that the United States had ‘an obligation to keep Australia fully informed of all likely and impending decisions with respect to the operations of the installations’. This accord apparently has replaced the Barnard-Schlesinger agreement in importance to Australia, since it expanded the venue for consultations to include the other Joint Facilities as well. Australian efforts in 1981 to expand still further its Washington liaison arrangements in the area of the operation of the Joint Facilities were evidently less productive than initially hoped. Nonetheless, Australian Minister for Defense Gordon Scholes and U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger agreed in 1983 to improve the lines of communication between their two defense departments concerning Northwest Cape.³⁷²

The development of these joint Australian-American facilities tied Australia more closely into the management of global strategic affairs and, at the same time, gave added influence in Washington.³⁷³

Secondly, Australia preserved its regional policy of arms control and denuclearization during the ANZUS crises in the mid-1980s, and opposed the US requests of nuclear cooperation. Indeed the Hawke government was able to eschew any endorsement concerning the US Strategic Defense

³⁷¹ cited in Bisley N., *op. cit.*, 2013

³⁷² Young T., *op. cit.*, 1989

³⁷³ Gelber H., “Australian Interests: Politics and Strategy towards the 1990s”, in Mediansky F.A. (eds.), *Australia in a Changing World. New Foreign Policy Directions*, MacMillian Press, 1992, p. 71

Initiative declining Australia's participation. However, it did not trigger processes of alliance erosion, as happened to the US-New Zealand relationship. Therefore, describing Australia's policy in the 1980s, the former Prime Minister Gareth Evans pointed out that,

[o]n nuclear disarmament and arms control, Australia became very active and vocal both regionally and on the world scene, taking the position that our hosting various space-defence facilities jointly with the United States should be regarded not as inhibiting our speaking out on global disarmament issues, but as helping establish our credentials for doing so.³⁷⁴

3. The US-Australia relations from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s

3.1. Rethinking Australia's place in ANZUS

In the early 1970s, Australia pursued independent initiatives according to the new climate of regional affairs in Asia and the South Pacific. As Philip and Roger Bell pointed out,

The Labor administration of Whitlam (1972-75), and to a lesser degree Fraser's Liberal-Country Party Government (1975-82), did not blindly follow American leadership on all matters. Under Labor, specifically, the alliance was exposed to new tensions as Australia sought a more autonomous role in global affairs, anticipated US policy by recognizing the People's Republic of China, and immediately withdrew its forces from Vietnam³⁷⁵

Although the Labour government seemed more detached from the American alliance, it was a liberal Prime Minister, Malcom Fraser, which clearly expressed Australia's new perspective concerning alliance relationships. As Fraser used to argue, the interests of the United States and the ones of

³⁷⁴ Evans G, and Grant B., *Australia's foreign relations: in the world of the 1990s*, Melbourne University Press, 1995, p. 29

³⁷⁵ Bell P., and Bell R., *Implicated. The United States in Australia*, Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 149

Australia were not necessarily identical, and Canberra's first responsibility was to assess its own. It was a strong change of paradigm and, in the words of Coral Bell, "not exactly the Holt or Menzies tone of language about the alliance".³⁷⁶

During the early 1970s, moreover, "Australia worked towards a new, and largely bipartisan, approach to Australian defense. Part of that effort was devoted to a new definition of the role and value of the American alliance."³⁷⁷ A clearly independent Australian defense policy was released in the seminal 1976 Defense White Paper. The White Paper regionalized the country's priorities arguing that "the area of Australia's primary strategic concern was the adjacent maritime area—the countries and territories of the Southwest Pacific, PNG, Indonesia and the Southeast Asia region". Moreover, it argued that the requirements and scope for Australian defense activity should be limited essentially to these areas closer to home. Finally, looking at the country's defense requirements, the document stated that the primary requirement was for increased self-reliance:

We no longer base our policy on the expectation that Australia's Navy or Army or Air Force will be sent abroad to fight as part of some other nation's force, supported by it. We do not rule out an Australian contribution to operations elsewhere if the requirement arose and we felt our presence would be effective, and if our forces could be spared from their national tasks. But we believe that any operations are much more likely to be in our own neighborhood than in some distant theatre, and that our Armed Forces will be conducting joint operations together as the Australian Defense force.

On the other hand, the Fraser government obtained a *de facto* reinterpretation of the ANZUS treaty. More specifically, the government received a written assurance from the US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance that the treaty covered also Australian interests and territories in the Indian as well as the ones in the Pacific Ocean (although the treaty mentioned only the latter). As the change arose from Canberra's reaction to the major ally's

³⁷⁶ Bell C., *Dependent Ally. A Study in Australian Foreign Policy*, Oxford University Press, 1988, p. 146

³⁷⁷ Edwards P., *Permanent Friends? Historical Reflections on the Australian-American Alliance*, Lowi Institute Paper 08, 2005

initiative (that originally aimed at the demilitarization of the Indian Ocean), the formal enlargement of ANZUS activities was a strong testimony of the Australian diplomatic strength in the late 1970s.³⁷⁸ Nonetheless, in his March 1980 speech, Australian Minister for Defense Jim Killen announced that Australia military forces were to increase the frequency of air and naval deployments in the Indian Ocean and expand the airborne surveillance of Australia's ocean.³⁷⁹ As the historian Graeme Cheeseman pointed out,

In September, the prime minister announced that agreement had been reached with the governments of Malaysia and Singapore for the resumption of multi-national exercises under the existing Five-Power Arrangements, and that a detachment of Australian long-range maritime patrol aircraft, together with aircrew and supporting personnel, would be deployed to Butterworth to help conduct surveillance operations in the Eastern Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. At the same time, a joint team from Australia and New Zealand was dispatched to the South Pacific to "survey the surveillance capabilities and requirements of the South Pacific Forum Island States", and Australian economic and military aid to these states was stepped up.³⁸⁰

3.2. The Hawke government: between loyalty and independence

Hawke described in his autobiography how he approached Regan in the mid-1983 suggesting to review the ANZUS alliance: "I proposed the review not to derogate from the importance of ANZUS but to strengthen the alliance and enhance its relevance."³⁸¹ The Australian government asked to reconsider the arrangements for the joint facilities and proposed several arms control initiatives including a nuclear free zone for the South Pacific. The Labors were finally successful in the renegotiations on the joint facilities, and significantly enhanced Australia's involvement "establishing the principle of Australian Governments having 'full knowledge and

³⁷⁸ Bell C., *op. cit.*, 1988, p. 149-150

³⁷⁹ Cheeseman G., *op. cit.*, 1993, p. 11

³⁸⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 11

³⁸¹ cited in Jennings P., "The Politics of Defence White Papers", *Security Challenges*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2013), pp. 1-14.

concurrency' of their activities".³⁸² The government considered the outcome as a more controlled and equal relationship with the major ally. As the Defense Minister Kim Beazley assessed: "As we ministers got a deeper understanding of what the joint facilities did and their levels of capability, which were really quite massive, the more it appeared to us that there was value in those joint facilities for Australian purposes."³⁸³

Overall, the Hawke government reinforced congruence of interests in the interallied relationship. It was the case, for instance, concerning a substantial issue that earlier seemed contentious, that was East Timor. Although the Indonesian incorporation of East Timor was an issue for many Labour party activists in mid-1970s, both Canberra and Washington converged by the mid-1980s on avoiding antagonizing Jakarta. Then, the Hawke government showed few concerns (characteristic of most left-wing governments elsewhere in the world) when the US invaded Grenada in late 1983.³⁸⁴

On the other hand, the Defense Minister Kim Beazley reiterated the view that the Australian-American relationships served Australia's interests without hindering out Canberra's capacity to develop and sustain an independent foreign and defense policy.³⁸⁵ The Hawke government, therefore, continued the Fraser government's policy supporting for strategic nuclear arms control, CTB (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) and non-proliferation. Its own initiatives included the creation of a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, the establishment of a Peace Research Centre and the appointment of a Disarmament Ambassador.³⁸⁶

³⁸² *Ibidem*

³⁸³ cited in Jennings P., *op. cit.*, 2013

³⁸⁴ Bell C., *op. cit.*, 1988. pp. 179-180

³⁸⁵ Cheeseman G., *op. cit.*, 1993, p. 178

³⁸⁶ Findlay T., *op. cit.*, 1992, pp. 168-172

3.3. The persistence of the US-Australia alliance

By the mid-1970s, Australia looked progressively at the Pacific as its primary area of interest. In pursuing Pacific regionalism, but still keeping solid its relationship with the major ally, the Hawke government reached several achievements consolidating Australia as the only regional power. The principal result was the Treaty of Rarotonga of 1986 that established a nuclear free zone in the South-West Pacific. The same year Canberra solved a second dispute obtaining the signature of a Pacific fisheries treaty. Here the dispute developed between very small islands (which based their economy on the exploitation of the Exclusive Economic Zones) and powerful US lobbies (as the American Tunaboat Association, which refused to pay fees). In the late 1986, the parties reached an agreement thanks to the joint efforts of the US State Department (which provided a consistent amount of funds) and the Australian Foreign Service. In both cases, Australia assumed a significant diplomatic role as a mediator between disputant parties. Similarly, Canberra acted to limit damage to its own and other interests during the ANZUS dispute between the US and New Zealand. It firstly maintained its own connection with Washington, which was the main actor in ANZUS. On the other hand, although criticizing Wellington for its unwillingness to compromise, Canberra preserved also the relationship with the neighbor, which had in the older ANZAC agreement of 1944 an independent basis.

In the mid-1980 and during the ANZUS crisis, Australia was able to assume a delicate diplomatic function within several issues involving the US in the South-Pacific region. Acting with a significant independence and freedom of action, the minor ally was able to consolidate its role as the key regional power, still preserving the relationship with the major ally.

4. The US's soft restraint and the Australian assurances: the processes of alliance persistence

This last section accounts for the processes leading to the alliance persistence. Firstly, it describes the US politics of restraint. The analysis shows that the stronger ally adopted a soft posture neutralizing the sources of internal opposition. Washington did not oppose the minor ally's quest for greater autonomy and its regional policy of denuclearization. On the other hand, Australia was able to provide assurances to its major partner favoring the cohesion of the alliance instead of its erosion, still preserving the changes it aimed to achieve.

4.1. The US politics of soft restraint

Describing the US attitude in the mid 1980s toward Australia, the American scholar Henry Albinsky wrote that

[t]he United States has for the most part been sensitive in its dealings with Australia and mindful of the political difficulties with which Hawke needs to contend. Earlier American tendencies to take the ANZUS alliance somewhat for granted, to be less than scrupulous about advising and consulting with the partners on the US intentions, have been corrected. Benign neglect has been rectified with the shock of New Zealand's wayward policies and fresh appreciation of Australia's strategic value.³⁸⁷

This soft attitude characterized the US's behavior toward Australia in several circumstances. Firstly, once the Australian government asked to reconsider the arrangements for the joint facilities, they significantly enhanced Australia's involvement. As Peter Jennings pointed out, the Labors were finally successful in the renegotiations on the joint facilities, and significantly enhanced Australia's involvement "establishing the principle of Australian Governments having 'full knowledge and

³⁸⁷ Albinski H., "Australia and the United States", in Mediansky F.A. (eds.), *Australia in a Changing World. New Foreign Policy Directions*, MacMillian Press, 1992

concurrence' of their activities".³⁸⁸ The government considered the outcome as a more controlled and equal relationship with the major ally.

Secondly, the major ally did not oppose the Australian strategy of self-reliance, which found definite expression in the famous Dobb report of 1987. As Kim Beazley pointed out discussing this interallied issue, the United States showed concerns in the mid-1980s because of the evolution of the minor ally's defense posture. As the former Defense Minister recorded,

The United States was concerned that Australia directions might limit its willingness to support allied efforts in Cold War trouble spot and diminish Australia's commitment to Southeast Asian security. The New Zealand ban on possible nuclear ship visit was raw.³⁸⁹

However, the major ally did not oppose the Australian plans finding appropriate to the alliance its strategy of self-reliance.³⁹⁰

Finally, Washington did not oppose to the minor ally's policy of regional denuclearization at the time of the SPNFR negotiations. Although the US believed that supporting the SPNFR could be seen as an endorsement of New Zealand's ban, it did not block or prevent the treaty as it could have. As Hawke wrote in his memories, "in the best of all possible worlds the US no doubt wished they had never heard of SPNFR. But they did not seek to stand in our way."³⁹¹

4.2. *The Australian policy of regional denuclearization*

The Prime Minister Hawke proposed the creation of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFR) at the South Pacific Forum in Canberra in the late August 1983. As the scholar Andrew Carr pointed out,

³⁸⁸ Jennings P., *op. cit.*, 2016

³⁸⁹ Beazley K., "Sovereignty and the US alliance", in Dean P., Fruhling S., and Taylor B. (eds.), *Australia's American alliance*, Melbourne University Press, 2016

³⁹⁰ *Ibidem*

³⁹¹ cited in Carr A., *Australia as a Middle Power Norm Entrepreneur in the Asia Pacific, 1983-2010*, University of Canberra, PhD thesis, 2012

Australia was 'central' to the development and ratification of the treaty of Rarotonga which bans the manufacture, stationing, testing and use of nuclear weapons in the South Pacific. This was an Australian initiative to codify the already strong support for the norms of non-proliferation and non-possession in the South Pacific. Yet, Australia was also encouraged by the region to undertake a leadership role in developing and codifying the SPNFZ.³⁹²

Australia chaired the drafting process, leveraging both on its bureaucratic resources and on political weight to shape the outcome toward its own preferences. The main issue was the US hostility to the nuclear weapons free zone. On the other hand, many South Pacific countries had much radical non-proliferation views than Canberra. It forced Australia into a delicate diplomatic activity that tried to take care of US security concerns while creating a document that the South Pacific countries could support. The Hawke government was successful because it was able to control the framing and the language of the treaty, by using methods of persuasion and even "a bit of bullying" its smaller neighbors to obtain a favorable outcome.³⁹³ In the meantime, Canberra provided assurances to its major ally. As Carr argued,

[Australia] sought to provide assurance to Washington through its control of the drafting process that the treaty would not restrict the transport of nuclear weapons. Australia used its embassy in Washington and a personal visit by the Foreign Minister, Bill Hayden, to frame the SPNFZ for the US government as 'not...a means of insulating our region from the consequences of nuclear war nor of absolving us of any responsibility for contributing to the maintenance of peace. In fact... the contrary is the case.'³⁹⁴

Finally, the treaty of Rarotonga was the most significant product of the Australian anti-nuclear policy in the South Pacific region. It entered into force on December 12, 1986, following the ratification of eight Forum states. The document required signatory states not to manufacture, station,

³⁹² *Ibidem*

³⁹³ *Ibidem*, p. 93

³⁹⁴ *Ibidem*

or test nuclear devices in the region. On the other hand, the treaty enabled nuclear states to continued access to the high seas of the South Pacific, while leaving restrictions or denial on port and airfield access to each signatory party to decide.³⁹⁵

4.3. *Australia's self-reliance within the alliance*

By the early 1970s, Australia abandoned the principle of “forward defense” – as manifested in its military commitment to South Vietnam – preferring that of “self-reliance”.³⁹⁶ In March 1972, the McMahon government assessed that “Australia requires to have the military means to offset physical threats to its territory and to its maritime and other rights and interests in peacetime, and should there ever be an actual attack, to respond suitably and effectively, preferably in association with others, but, if needed, alone”.³⁹⁷ The 1976 White paper explained the implications of this transformation arguing that

[a] primary requirement arising from our findings is for increased self-reliance. In our contemporary circumstances we can no longer base our policy on the expectation that Australia's Navy or Army or Air Force will be sent abroad to fight as part of some other nation's forces and supported by it. We do not rule out an Australian contribution to operations elsewhere, if the requirement arose and we felt that our presence would be effective, and if our forces could be spared from their national tasks. But we believe that any operations are much more likely to be in our own neighborhood than in some distant or forward theatre, and that our Armed Services would be conducting operations together as the Australian Defense Force.³⁹⁸

Through the self-reliance strategy, Australia aimed to escape the stigma of dependency in the ANZUS relationship, also achieving a greater

³⁹⁵ Young T., *op. cit.*, 1989

³⁹⁶ Ball D., *op. cit.*, 2001

³⁹⁷ White H., “Four Decades of the Defense of Australia: Reflections on Australia Defence Policy over the Past 40 years”, in Huisken R. & Thatcher M. (eds.), *History as policy. Framing the debate on the future Australia's defense policy*, ANU Press, 2007, pp. 163-188

³⁹⁸ *Ibidem*

independence. More specifically, self-reliance implied that Canberra would no longer base its force structures principally to fight as part of American-led coalitions in distant conflicts. Differently, it aimed to focus on the defense of the Australian continent, its maritime areas and airspace.

The 1983 Strategic Basis paper gave priority to the development of military capabilities appropriate to the independent defense of Australia.³⁹⁹ According to the critics of the ANZUS alliance, Australia's new posture emphasized the recognition of a requirement spelt out in the treaty itself for "continuous and effective self-help".⁴⁰⁰ Actually, the self-reliance strategy did not aim to achieve isolationism or any break with the major ally. Rather, "self reliance" meant that Australia still relied significantly on ANZUS. As the former Minister for Defense, Kim Beazley argued in a speech in the mid-1988,

[the US] gives Australia the technological edge we need to enable less than 1% of the Earth's population to guard 12% of its surface. Without that help, Australia cannot sustain a self-reliant defense posture. In this fundamental way, our alliance is literally essential to our self-reliance.⁴⁰¹

Therefore, self-reliance could really be achieved only within the ANZUS alliance, which was through the interallied cooperation.

5. Conclusions

As a case of alliance persistence, the US-Australian relation from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s appropriately represents how allies can overcome an internal crisis. In the context of an asymmetric relationship, we found significant evidence that the effectiveness of the minor ally's voice provided the needed benefits for guarantying the alliance persistence. Although the Australian quest for autonomy might erode the alliance, the US soft posture paved the way for accommodating the allies' needs and requests. The

³⁹⁹ Dibb P., *op. cit.*, 2007

⁴⁰⁰ Brown G., *op. cit.*, 1989

⁴⁰¹ Cited in Cheeseman, *op. cit.*, 1993

alliance therefore persisted despite the changes and frictions that characterized the most critical period of the ANZUS alliance.

Conclusions

Asymmetry and voice opportunities: the ties that bind

An asymmetric relation, by definition, implies an acknowledgment of different degrees of autonomy among the interested actors. The power of the stronger side relies on its ability to preserve its freedom of action while influencing the weaker partner's choices, or even coercing its behavior. Power differentials, in this view, can be interpreted as a tool to structure relationships, including through method of control. In military alliances this originate basically from the exchange between protection (provided by the stronger to the weaker) and obedience (promised by the weaker to the stronger). The weaker ally's duty of obedience might concern different areas of state action. The major ally, for instance, can try to inhibit the weaker partner's foreign policy limiting its leeway. Then, the stronger side can exercise territorial control imposing the presence of its troops in the minor partner's country. Finally, the major side can influence the weaker ally's domestic affairs pushing the internal processes of decision-making on its preferences.

As the empirical analysis pointed out, even cases of successful alliance management did not escape these features of asymmetric relations. Indeed, Britain exercised significant foreign policy control over Iraq for the entire decade following the end of World War II. Before the signature of the Baghdad Pact, Nuri plans had been already rejected by Britain on several occasions. In 1943, Britain did not favor the original Fertile Crescent project; in 1945, Britain did not support Iraqi leadership of the Arab League; in 1949 and 1951, Nuri proposed an Arab defense pact tied to the West, but London refused. Then, issues of territorial control characterized the US-Australia relation. As the Labor party came to power in the early 1970s, it started scrutinizing the interallied agreements concerning the US bases on the Australian soil. The government judged that the US Naval facility at Northwest Cape violated the country's sovereignty. The allies then agreed that the station would become a joint US-Australia facility involving a

greater number of Australian personnel in its operation, establishing an Australian National Communications center alongside the American station, and appointing an Australian naval officer as deputy commander of the entire facility. On the other hand, the major ally's control on some portion of the weaker partner's territory was an insolvable issue in the Anglo-Egyptian alliance. Sidqi Pasha often admitted that the presence of British troops gave an unequal character to the Anglo-Egyptian alliance. However, Egypt regarded as hopeless any attempt to force the British to renounce completely their claim on Egyptian facilities and territory, trying instead to reduce and regulate British power, and to create a legal and institutional framework of alliance that would safeguard Egyptian independence in time of peace and minimize the extent of British interference in domestic affairs in time of war. Indeed the stronger ally's influence in the weaker ally's domestic policy was a common feature in the empirical analysis. It was particularly evident in the US-New Zealand relation with regard to the issue of denuclearization. It is worth noting that the NZ's Labor government was prepared to share drafts of its anti-nuclear legislation to find an acceptable solution for both sides. Washington, however, refused even to discuss the bill claiming that the legislation should simply be deleted from the ally's domestic agenda.

Therefore, the empirical cases clearly showed that two opposite forces affected the evolution of these asymmetric alliances. On the one hand, several asymmetric features pushed the stronger side to establish a coercive relation with the weaker partner. On the other hand, the successful management of an asymmetric relationship required the acknowledgment of a certain degree of autonomy from the stronger to the weaker side. The effectiveness of the weaker ally's voice opportunity, therefore, represented a key function in the alliances overcoming the internal issues. Although the voice effectiveness could not fully compensate the power differential among allies, it mitigated the power relationship. Moreover, the analysis considered weaker sides in asymmetric alliances that already suffered from some deficit in terms of either decreasing remuneration from the alliance or decreasing need of protection. Both Egypt and Iraq complained about Britain lack of support although internal and external threats arose significantly. On the

other hand, New Zealand and Australia felt more secure following the collapse of the communist threat, and tried to promote some change in the alliance. In these cases, the successful management of asymmetry implied opening to the weaker side's needs to preserve the alliance. Here, the cases of alliance persistence showed how the allies could overcome internal crisis giving renovated strength to the alliance. Indeed the signature of the Baghdad Pact in 1955 showed that the weaker ally voice attempts were effective as the regional project centered on Iraqi needs. Firstly, the agreement established that Iraq did not commit beyond its borders and transferred to Iraqi control the air bases of Habbaniya and Shaiba. Moreover, Britain made several concessions: it joined a pact that invited other Arab states to adhere and implicitly (but clearly) excluded Israel; it took side between Iraq and Egypt in favor of Baghdad; it linked the persistence of the Anglo-Iraq special agreement to the continuation of the Baghdad Pact. Similarly, the US-Australia relation in the mid-1980s persisted despite the changes and frictions that characterized the most critical period of the ANZUS alliance. Although the Australian quest for autonomy might erode the alliance, the US soft posture paved the way for accommodating the weaker partner's needs and requests. The *effectiveness* of the minor ally's *voice*, therefore, was crucial to understand the persistence of these successful military agreements. On the other hand, the cases of alliance termination pointed out the key features of asymmetric alliance mismanagement. As Egypt adopted a more ambitious foreign policy following the end of World War II, it asked to revise the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936. Cairo aimed to stabilize the Anglo-Egyptian relations on a level of equality to establish, then, its regional leadership among the Arab states. However, the lack of British's recognition of Egypt national aspirations led to the weaker side decision to abrogate the treaty: London had monopolized the administration of Sudan and denied the Egyptians project of unity; it maintained three times the number of troops in the Suez Canal Zone permitted under the 1936 treaty; and denied Cairo the supplies of arms and equipment necessary for its defense. Therefore, the British's intransigence made as ineffective any Egyptian attempt to voice and forced the minor ally to oppose the major partner directly until the decision to

terminate the alliance unilaterally. Similarly, New Zealand's denuclearization policy and non-conformity to the stronger side's requests in the mid-1980s triggered a process of non-reciprocity in interallied relations until the alliance termination. Although ANZUS was a "showcase" alliance for more than 35 years, New Zealand's strategic posture significantly changed in the 1970s. As Wellington was not able to improve the interallied cooperation on the ground of its needs, it renounced to the principal ally protection and military cooperation.

In light of the research, it looks still unfortunate that IR scholars barely theorize on minor allies' behavior in asymmetric alliances, generally assuming their passive attitude. Differently, it is definitely needed focusing on the processes that shorten or prolong an existing matrix of power. In other words, it is worthy of analyzing how the management of an asymmetric relationship can favor its persistence or termination. For these purposes, the research theoretic part described several alliance processes to point out the weaker ally's loyalty or detachment. Looking at cases of alliances persistence, the focus was on the major ally *soft* restraint. Here, two alliance processes were hypothesized to be at work touching both external and internal dynamics. Firstly, wheatear the major ally was successful in asymmetry management by providing paths to accommodate the partner's needs. Successful management implied a stronger side managing the partner requests and considering the latter needs as part of the broader alliance strategy. This feature was particularly evident in the Anglo-Iraqi alliance. Indeed, in mid-1954 the concept of a Northern Tier position became paramount in British defense thinking concerning the Middle East. The idea was that Western alliances with Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan would constitute a defensive cordon on the Soviet Union's southern border. Iraq was recognized as the key Arab piece in this regional puzzle, and Britain decided to promote good relations with Baghdad to secure its cooperation in a regional defense pact. As Iraq rejected the American "Northern Tier" project in mid-1954, Britain fully supported the Iraqi-Turkish pact and then joined the Baghdad Pact establishing a pro-Western alliance where Baghdad was the leading Arab state. The British's flexible strategy, therefore, paved the way for the renewal of the Anglo-Iraqi

alliance and preserved Britain's dominant position in the region temporarily. Secondly, the alliance persistence model hypothesized a weaker partner recognizing the benefits of the hierarchical relations in virtue of the effectiveness of its voice opportunities. Successful management of asymmetry, in other words, would imply an increase in the legitimate authority from the weaker to the stronger side. In this regard, the US-Australia alliance clearly showed a weaker ally engaging in acts of symbolic obeisance acknowledging its acceptance of the asymmetric relation. More specifically, Australia chaired the drafting process of the Rarotonga treaty, leveraging both on its bureaucratic resources and on political weight to shape the outcome toward its own preferences. For Canberra, the main issue was the US hostility to the nuclear weapons free zone. On the other hand, many South Pacific countries had much radical non-proliferation views than the US's ally. It forced Australia into a delicate diplomatic activity that tried to take care of the US security concerns while creating a document that the South Pacific countries could support. The Hawke government was successful because it was able to control the framing and the language of the treaty, by using methods of persuasion and even "a bit of bullying" its smaller neighbors to obtain a favorable outcome. In the meantime, Canberra favored the major ally obtaining that the treaty would not restrict the transport of nuclear weapons.

Looking at cases of alliances termination, the focus was on the major ally *hard* restraint as an indicator of asymmetric relationship mismanagement. Here two alliance processes were hypothesized to be at work. Firstly, wheatear the minor ally opened to new partnerships to diversify its foreign policy. It implied, for instance, a minor ally trying to improve its relation with a rival state of the major partner. This feature was particularly evident in the Anglo-Egyptian alliance. Indeed the analysis evidenced the Egyptian detachment on two main plans: attempts to diversify arm suppliers and attempts to undermine the British primacy in the Middle East. Firstly, in 1947 Cairo started negotiations with the communist bloc ordering weapons from Czechoslovakia. Although the embargo imposed by the Security Council made ineffective this attempt by Cairo to establish a new channel of weapons supply, in 1951 the Waft government (without reporting to Britain)

sent another delegation to Europe in search of arms. Thanks to these efforts, Egypt signed a new agreement with Czechoslovakia on 24 October 1951, which committed the communist country to provide Cairo with arms and ammunition. Then, Egypt led the establishment of a system of Arab collective security in 1950. It was a further step to pursue Egyptian independence, to exclude Britain and favor the Egyptian primacy in the region. On the other hand, the alliance termination model hypothesized a weaker side considering the major ally as a strategic hindrance. The weaker side, therefore, should lower the degree of policy coordination. This feature was particularly significant in the US-New Zealand alliance with regard to the issue of denuclearization. As the NZ Labor government claimed that ANZUS was not a nuclear treaty, Washington was invited to accept the weaker ally's stance in virtue of an equal partnership. Indeed the anti-nuclear policy was at the core of Wellington's regional strategy. The ship-dispute on port access showed that New Zealand was not more willing to cooperate on nuclear issues. Then, the major ally's refusal became an obstacle to the weaker partner regional policy, and consequently an obstacle to the persistence of the alliance.

Finally, the empirical analysis evidenced the strength of the theoretic model of alliances' persistence and termination. Indeed the effectiveness of the weaker sides' voice led to the alliances' persistence, while a mismanagement of the asymmetric relations paved the way for the security agreements termination. However, further researches will hopefully consider different cases, and eventually will use different research methods and ways of measurement to improve these findings. As voice opportunity is a key function of asymmetric alliances, it surely needs further investigation and attention by IR scholars.

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APPENDIX – cases of bilateral alliances’ abrogation in ATOP dataset (1815-1989)

Alliance	Type	Beg	Term	Evolution	Atop interpretation
Austria-Hungary – Two Sicily	Defense/ Consultation pact	1815	1820	Abrogation by minor ally violation	King Ferdinand of 2 Sicilies grants constitution in violation of secret Article II. Austria overthrows Ferdinand in March, 1821 (Langer, 1972: 700). TERMCAUS 8
Austria-Hungary – Tuscany	Defense/ consultation pact	1815	1848	Abrogation by minor ally violation	Austria-Sardinian War of 1848 – Tuscany fights against Austria. TERMCAUS 6
Austria-Hungary – Piedmont	Defense pact	1831	1848	Abrogation by minor ally violation	War between the parties TERMCAUS 6 Charles Albert declared war on Austria at the start of the War of Italian Unification (Gilber, 2008, pp. 127)
China – United Kingdom	Defense pact	1846	1856	Abrogation by minor ally violation	On October 8, 1856 China seized a British ship at Canton. Britain attacked and occupied Canton with French help in 1857 (Kohn, 1999 p. 343 and Langer, 1972 p.911) TERMCAUS 6
Austria-Hungary – Modena	Defense pact	1847	1859	Abrogation by minor ally violation	Duke of Modena forced to flee due to peaceful revolution opposed to Austria (Albrecht – Carrie, 1973: 103). TERMCAUS 4
Austria-Hungary – Parma	Defense pact	1848	1859	Abrogation by minor ally violation	Duke of Parma forced to flee due to peaceful revolution opposed to Austria (Albrecht – Carrie, 1973: 103). TERMCAUS 4
France – Amman	Defense pact Consultation pact	1874	1883	Abrogation	Treaty for French Protectorate (Langer, 1972: 907) after conflict between parties TERMCAUS 6
China – Russia	Defense/offense pact	1896	1900	Abrogation by minor ally violation	Russia fights against China in the Boxer Rebellion TERMCAUS 6 The Boxer Rebellion brought an end to the formal terms of this alliance (Gilber, 2008, pp. 199)
France – Belgium	Defense pact	1920	1936	Abrogation by minor ally violation	Belgium denounces and reasserts neutrality following German reoccupation of Rhineland TERMCAUS 4
France – Czechoslovakia	Consultation pact	1924	1938	Abrogation by major ally violation	Munich Agreement – France makes a deal with Germany for Germany to annex Czech territory TERMCAUS 8
France – Czechoslovakia	Defense pact	1925	1938	Abrogation by major ally violation	France allows Germany to annex Czech territory – Munich agreement. TERMCAUS 8
URSS - Turkey	Neutrality pact Nonaggression pact	1925	1945	Abrogation by major ally violation	USSR denounces and asks for territorial concessions (Langer, 1972: 1297). TERMCAUS 4
Italy – Spain	Neutrality pact	1926	1936	Abrogation by major ally	Italian intervention in Spanish Civil War TERMCAUS 4
Russia/URSS – Afghanistan	Neutrality pact Nonaggression pact	1926	1979	Abrogation by major ally	Russia invades Afghanistan TERMCAUS 6

URSS – Persia	Neutrality pact Nonaggression pact	1927	1941	Abrogation by major ally violation	Soviet and British forces enter Iran and install a regime that will cooperate in WWII (Langer, 1972: 1309) TERMCAUS 8
Italy – Albania	Defense pact	1927	1939	Abrogation by (major/minor?) ally violation	Italy invaded Albania TERMCAUS 6 The defense pact soured in 1931 as Albania tried to distance itself from Italian foreign policy. Albania even signed trade agreements with Greece and Yugoslavia in 1934, prompting Mussolini to send fleet of ships to the Albanian coast as a show of force. Ultimately, the defense pact ended with the Italian invasion of Albania in 1939 (Gilber, 2008, pp. 263)
Italy – Turkey	Neutrality pact	1928	1935	Abrogation by minor ally violation	Turkey participates in sanctions against Italy (Langer, 1972: 1000) TERMCAUS 8
Italy – Ethiopia	Nonaggression pact	1928	1934	Abrogation by major ally violation	Italy invades Ethiopia TERMCAUS 6
Italy – Greece	Neutrality pact Consultation pact	1928	1935	Abrogation by minor ally violation	Greece participates in sanctions coalition v. Italy (Langer, 1972: 1000) TERMCAUS 4
URSS – Finland	Nonaggression pact Neutrality pact	1932	1939	Abrogation by major ally violation	USSR denounces treaty (Langer, 1972: 1224) TERMCAUS 4 The terms of the treaty ended with the Soviet invasion of Finland, after Finns 'refusal to sign a new agreement that was much more favorable to Soviet interests (Gilber, 2008, p. 283)
URSS – Poland	Nonaggression pact Neutrality pact	1932	1939	Abrogation by major ally violation	USSR invades Poland TERMCAUS 6
Germany – Poland	Nonaggression pact	1934	1939	Abrogation by major ally violation	Germany denounces the agreement (Langer, 1972:1039). TERMCAUS 4
URSS – Cezchoslovakia	Consultation pact Defense pact Neutralità pact	1935	1938	Abrogation by major ally violation	Great powers allow Germany to annex large portions of Czechoslovakia TERMCAUS 4 The alliance officially ended with the collapse of the communist government of CZ in 1989 (Gilber, 2008, p. 304)
United Kingdom – Egypt	Consultation pact Defense pact	1936	1951	Abrogation by minor ally violation	Egypt abrogated the treaty (BFSP, vol. 158, p.768). TERMCAUS 4
Germany – Denmark	Nonaggression pact Neutrality pact	1939	1940	Abrogation by major ally violation	Germany invades Denmark, which results in Danish capitulation and loss of independence. TERMCAUS 4
URSS – Estonia	Defense pact	1939	1940	Loss of independence (coded as abrogation)	
URSS – Latvia	Defense pact	1939	1940	Loss of independence (Coded as Abrogation)	
USSS – Lithuania	Defense pact	1939	1940	Loss of independence (Coded as Abrogation)	
URSS – Finland	Nonaggression pact	1940	1941	Abrogation by minor ally	War between members (WW II) TERMCAUS 6 On 25 June, 1941, Finland joined Germany in its attack on the

					Soviet Union (Gilber, 2008, p. 337)
UK – Thailand	Nonaggression pact Neutrality pact	1940	1940	Abrogation by minor ally violation	Thailand attacks French Indochina TERMCAUS 8
URSS Yugoslavia	Defense/offense pact	1945	1949	Abrogation by minor ally violation	Yugo-Soviet split TERMCAUS 4 Relationship soured when Tito declared Yugoslavia neutrality during the cold war and began pursuing a policy of isolation in 1948 (Gilber, 2008, p. 355)
United Kingdom – Jordan	Defense pact Consultation pact	1948	1957	Abrogation by minor ally violation	Terminated by Jordan TERMCAUS 4
United Kingdom – Lybia	Defense pact Consultation pact	1953	1970	Abrogation by minor ally	Grenville and Wasserstein (1987, 351) says the treaty was terminated after Colonel Gaddafi overthrew King Idris on September 1, 1969. Britain and American troops withdrawn from Libyan bases on March 30 and June 30, 1970. TERMCAUS 4
UK – Egypt	Consultation pact	1954	1956	Abrogation by minor ally violation	Egypt announced abrogation. UK was involved in military conflict with Egypt following Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal. TERMCAUS 8
United States – Taiwan	Defense pact	1954	1980	Abrogation by major ally violation	The treaty was replaced by unilateral declaration by the United States- Taiwan Declaration Act (Plischke, 1991) TERMCAUS 4
United Kingdom – Iraq	Defense pact	1955	1959	Abrogation by minor ally violation	Iraq terminates agreement following 1958 military coup due to change in foreign policy orientation TERMCAUS 4
United Kingdom – South Africa	Defense pact	1955	1975	Abrogation	Terminated by exchange of letters between members (UNTS) Britain cancels due to political unease in supporting apartheid government TERMCAUS 4
France – Morocco	Consultation pact	1956	1966	Abrogation	France recalls ambassador and breaks diplomatic relations over conflict regarding Ben Barka Affair. TERMCAUS 4
United States of America – Iran	Defense pact Consultation pact	1959	1979	Abrogation by minor ally violation	Iranian government announces intention to leave CENTO - later in the month US personnel services terminated (Keesings Record of World Events, 1980) TERMCAUS 4
France – Mali	Defense pact Consultation pact	1960	1960	Abrogation by minor ally violation	Mali ends membership in French Community and demands renegotiation of agreements after the secession of Senegal (Facts on File November 30, 1960). TERMCAUS 4
France – Madagascar	Defense pact	1960	1973	Abrogation by minor ally violation	Exchange of letters - Madagascar demands change in relations TERMCAUS 4
United Kingdom – Nigeria	Defense pact Consultation pact	1960	1962	Abrogation by minor ally violation	Nigerian freedom of action: Domestic and international protest (Keesings March 1962; Idang, 1970). TERMCAUS 5
URSS – Poland	Defense pact	1965	1991	Abrogation by minor ally violation	Poland's Defense Minister announced that his country's military alliance with the USSR was over and Poland was now isolated and neutral. TERMCAUS 4

URSS – Egypt	Consultation pact Nonaggression pact	1971	1976	Abrogation by minor ally violation	Egypt denounces unilaterally due to Soviet refusal to reschedule debts, supply spare parts, and supply arms TERMCAUS 4
URSS – Iraq	Consultation pact Nonaggression pact	1972	1990	Abrogation by major ally violation	Gorbachev and Russian Parliament demand break in response to Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. TERMCAUS 7
URSS – Somalia	Consultation pact Nonaggression pact	1974	1977	Abrogation	According to Somalia it is Soviet support of Ethiopia in conflict with Somalia. Soviets claim it is because they refuse to support Somalia's expansionist/aggressive policy toward Ethiopia TERMCAUS 4
URSS – Afghanistan	Consultation pact Nonaggression pact	1978	1979	Abrogation	USSR executes Afghan leader and installs a new leader TERMCAUS 8
URSS – Malta	Consultation pact Neutrality pact Nonaggression pact	1981	1987	Abrogation by minor ally violation	New Maltese leader declares that Malta will disregard consultation clauses (Associated Press, May 27, 1987) TERMCAUS 4