

Siam and its Twin?

Democratization and Bossism in Contemporary Thailand and the Philippines

John T. Sidel

1 The Comparison: Bossism in Thailand and The Philippines

Every modern state commands 'public' agencies, resources, and regulatory powers that may be appropriated for 'private' gain. The formal rules governing the distinction between 'public' and 'private' interests (and their violation or manipulation) serve as the basis for what is commonly identified as 'corruption'. Yet 'corruption' is a phenomenon notoriously difficult to document, to quantify, and thus to compare systematically over time or across cases. Where the structure of 'corruption' manifests itself in publicly visible and enduring forms of **monopoly**, however, greater clarity is possible. Thus, in the case of Indonesia, for example, scholars have amply documented, sector by sector, the monopolistic control over the 'commanding heights' of the economy secured by cronies and children of long-time president Suharto, thus highlighting the 'neo-patrimonial' features of his regime.

In formally democratic regimes, moreover, the entrenchment of numerous local 'bosses' provides an analogous form of monopoly, which, however localized, may be similarly chronicled in newspaper articles, court cases, election records, other public documents, and provincial histories. Hence the considerable scholarly literature on county court house cliques and urban machines in the United States, *mafia* in southern Italy, *caciques* in Latin America.

This essay seeks to identify the political context of corruption in Thailand and the Philippines by tracing the emergence of a social formation in which virtual monopolies over coercive and economic resources within territorially defined bailiwicks are secured and maintained by local 'bosses'. Through a comparative historical analysis of state formation in South East Asia, the essay illustrates the centrality of 'democratization' - the subordination of the state apparatus to elected officials - in facilitating the growth of 'bossism' in Thailand and the Philippines, and not elsewhere in the region. Through a comparative sociological analysis of state and institutional structures, moreover, the essay highlights those factors that best explain variation in the manifestations of bossism seen across cases and over time.

IDS Bulletin Vol 27 No 2 1996

In a region well known for its diversity of linguistic and cultural influences, 'Great Tradition' religions, colonial experiences, ethnic and class configurations, and state and institutional structures, Thailand and the Philippines stand out as particularly unlikely and unpromising candidates for cross-national comparative analysis. Despite their many differences in terms of historical experience and socio-political configuration, however, they share a set of important commonalities that make them distinctive in the South East Asian context and make a 'paired comparison' plausible and promising. First of all, in the era of high colonialism (c. 1850-1940), while ethnically segmented 'plural societies' crystallized elsewhere in the region, Siam and the Philippines provided unparalleled opportunities for the assimilation and upward social mobility of Chinese immigrants and their Sino-Thai/Chinese *mestizo* offspring. Second, in the postwar era of capitalist industrialization, predominantly Chinese and Sino-Thai/Chinese *mestizo* business elites have risen to prominence in the cultural, economic, and political fields. This provides a sharp contrast with Indonesia and Malaysia where these groups have been constrained by 'pariah entrepreneur' status and subjected to the predations of 'indigenous' (*pribumi/bumiputra*) military officers, politicians, and their children and cronies. Third, only in Thailand and the Philippines have such self-conscious and self-confident business elites succeeded in institutionalizing the trappings of bourgeois democracy: a state apparatus firmly subordinated to elected officials, a schedule of regular and competitive elections, a familiar set of recognized civil liberties, and a free and lively press. Fourth, democratic institutions in both countries have not encouraged the emergence of major political parties or social movements fighting for radical social change. Rather, the (re)establishment of democratic institutions since the mid-1980s has given rise to comparable forms of 'bossism': a social formation in which local powerbrokers achieve sustained, monopolistic control over coercive and economic resources within territorially delineated bailiwicks.

This article focuses on the manifestations of bossism observed in Thailand and the Philippines over the past ten years of democratization and seeks to set the phenomenon within a broader historical context. We argue that the recent growth of

bossism in both Thailand and the Philippines reflects a common conjuncture in state formation and capitalist development: the decisive subordination of the state apparatus to elected officials against the backdrop of what might loosely be termed 'primitive accumulation'. By 'primitive accumulation', we refer to a phase of capitalist development in which (i) a significant section of the population has lost direct control over the means of production and direct access to means of subsistence, and been reduced to a state of economic insecurity and dependence on scarce wage labour (i.e. prior to the achievement of 'full' employment and modern welfare capitalism); and (ii) considerable economic resources and prerogatives remain in the 'public' domain and secure (private) property rights have not yet been firmly established by the state. Taken together, these last two conditions signal both the susceptibility of many voters to clientelistic, coercive, and monetary pressures and the centrality of state-based resources and prerogatives for capital accumulation and control over the 'commanding heights' of local economies.

Compared to the centralized authoritarian regimes found elsewhere in South East Asia, where 'monopoly rents' and 'protection rents' circulate among dominant party members, state functionaries, military officers, and presidential (or prime ministerial) family members and friends, bossism in contemporary Thailand and the Philippines reflects the **decentering** of 'rent-seeking opportunities' away from the national capital and the central state apparatus and towards province, district, and town, private capitalists, gangsters, and 'political entrepreneurs'. A comparative analysis of the diverging patterns of local bossism found in Thailand and the Philippines since the mid-1980s highlights the importance of both state formation and the timing of 'democratization' relative to capitalist development for explaining variations in this social phenomenon in the two countries. The remainder of this brief essay sets the historical context and traces both the consequences of 'democratization' in the 1980s, and the effects of ongoing processes of capitalist development today, for the emergence and durability of bossism in Thailand and the Philippines.

2 Thailand: From Bureaucratic Polity to Bossism

In striking contrast with the state-making 'patchwork' of the Western colonial powers elsewhere in South East Asia, the incorporation of the dynastic realm known as Siam into the world economy from the mid-nineteenth century saw the emergence of a centralized bureaucracy virtually unencumbered by concessions to localized forces of socio-linguistic diversity and residual aristocratic privilege. Following the *coup d'état* of 1932, control over this apparatus of provincial administration shifted from the hands of absolutizing monarchs and, in the post-war era, passed to avowedly anti-communist and 'development'-orientated military officers, in what came to be known as a well-insulated (if internally factionalized) 'bureaucratic polity'.

In this context, the institutional constraints upon embryonic manifestations of local bossism were significant. The steady growth of rice cultivation provided ample opportunities for capital accumulation through control over the expanding circuitries of production and distribution, and a provincial economic elite accordingly emerged, based in landownership, moneylending, milling, marketing, and transportation as well as such illegal activities as gambling and smuggling. At the local level, moreover, the election of lifetime village headmen and, for groupings of several villages, commune headmen allowed small-town businessmen to exercise a measure of influence over the flow of central government patronage. A pattern of what James C. Scott (1972) has identified as 'market corruption' thrived, with pliable and predatory local agents of various central government ministries open to the 'purchase' of their discretionary and regulatory powers over the local economy. Yet these local government officials were only available, as it were, for temporary rent rather than permanent sale, and at prices to a considerable extent dictated by competitive bidding, as decisions with regard to appointment, promotion, removal, and transfer were made by Bangkok-based bureaucrats rather than up-country bosses. At the national level, an analogous pattern persisted, with the dominant banking empires obliged to include ranking army generals on their boards of directors, and the syndicates

running the opium and heroin trade operated by rival cliques within the military establishment.

By the 1970s, however, three interrelated (and well-documented¹) changes had begun to expand the domain for local bossism in Thailand. First of all, a pattern of steady economic growth, stimulated in no small part by the American-sponsored Vietnam War boom in the country, greatly expanded and multiplied the activities, resources, and external linkages of provincial elites in the Thai countryside. Owners of paddy fields and rice mills rechannelled capital into gasoline stations and ice plants, mining claims and logging concessions, construction companies and real-estate firms, and shifted energies into cultivating Bangkok-based banks for loans and district- and province-level bureaucrats for building permits, land titles, public works contracts, zoning ordinances, and various concessions, franchises, and regulatory breaks. Second, with the growth of armed revolutionary movements in neighbouring Laos and Cambodia and the emergence of peasant-based organizations and mobilizational efforts in some areas of the Thai countryside, the government in Bangkok initiated a counterinsurgency campaign that entailed both the infusion of considerable state funds for 'rural development' and the creation of local paramilitary organizations in rural communities. These intertwined processes broadened the scope and volume of resource flows and state-based prerogatives available to provincial businessmen in rural Thailand.

Third, the social forces generated by the Vietnam War boom began to combine with the internal contradictions of army rule to shift the locus of national-level power away from the military establishment and towards previously ceremonial and impotent parliamentary institutions. Whilst an initial period of unprecedented openness in 1973-1976 led to a harsh right-wing backlash against the most vocal proponents of democratization, the intensity of factional rivalries at the highest echelons of the army derailed efforts to reconstruct a military-dominated 'bureaucratic polity' and delivered increasing political leverage and legislative authority into the hands of parliament. Thus, although an appointed Senate and threats of a *coup*

¹ For scholarly accounts, see Anderson, Ockey 1992; Phongpaichit *et al.* 1994 and Turton 1989.

d'état left considerable power in military hands, Bangkok's agro-business, banking, commercial and industrial magnates began to view parliament as an essential avenue of influence and rechannelled their resources accordingly. Whilst Bangkok-based magnates commanded tremendous financial resources, only province-based businessmen enjoyed links to large blocs of voters in the country's overwhelmingly rural constituencies, and parliamentary seats promised influence over (or inclusion among) cabinet ministers, central ministries, and local agents of the Thai state. With the vast majority of parliamentary (multiple-seat) constituencies located in **rural** areas, it is thus no surprise that by 1990, nearly half of the members of the Cabinet were identified as provincial businessmen.

Against this backdrop, by the mid-1980s observers of Thai politics had begun to comment on the growing manifestations of local bossism, most prominently with reference to what have come to be known as *chao pho* (or *jao poh*), Thai 'godfathers' of a distinctly *mafioso* variety (Ockey 1993). These *chao pho* are identifiable through their interrelated activities in three realms. First, they are visible through the multiplicity and monopolistic quality of their economic activities within loosely defined territorial bailiwicks, in terms of accumulation of proprietary wealth (agricultural land, real-estate properties, mills, processing centres, factories; shares in banks and industrial firms), acquisition of state-derived concessions, contracts, and franchises (e.g. logging, mining, public works, transport), and involvement in illegal rackets (e.g. drug trade, gambling, smuggling). Second, *chao pho* have achieved great prominence and power through their successful service as - or provision of - vote brokers (*hua khanaen*) in elections, delivering parliamentary constituencies or regional clusters of constituencies to Bangkok-based patrons, local clients, or themselves on election day, through a combination of coercion, vote-buying, and electoral fraud. Third, *chao pho* have become notorious for their control over local state agencies, most notably the coercive apparatuses, and their ability to achieve effective local monopolies over the organization of (state and extra-state) violence within their bailiwicks, for use in capital accumulation, electoral manipulation, and enforcement of illegal rackets.

Compared to the forms of local bossism observed elsewhere, the contemporary Thai variant is distinctive in two key respects. First, the transfer of effective control over the state apparatus to **elected** officials came **relatively late** *vis-à-vis* the process of capitalist development, with enormous Bangkok-based financial, agro-business, and industrial conglomerates and up-country magnates with province- or region-wide empires already entrenched and equipped with ample resources for electoral competition. Thus prominent Bangkok bankers and industrialists have themselves assumed political party leadership posts or otherwise engineered alliances with regional clusters of *chao pho*, and provincial businessmen have in some cases exercised *chao pho*-like influence over multiple constituencies or even provinces. Second, the subordination of the state apparatus to a parliament drawn from multiple-seat constituencies and without proportional representation has encouraged a highly fluid system of political parties held together largely by patronage networks (regional and national) and personal ties and coalition governments stitched together through multi-party Cabinets. Thus *chao pho* exercising control over several constituencies have found it relatively easy to install themselves or their stooges in Cabinet and thereby to wield considerable influence over the internal affairs of key central ministries and their local agents.

As suggested by the ascent of up-country construction magnate and provincial gangster-politician, Banham Silpa-archa, to the premiership following the 1995 elections, the social and institutional constraints upon the power and influence of *chao pho* in contemporary Thailand are rather limited. The brief reassertion in 1991-92 of military prerogatives was relatively diffident and ultimately disastrous, proving that the social costs of a full-blown authoritarian relapse are simply no longer sustainable in Thailand. Whilst a handful of former army officers have made the transition to civilian political careers and secured parliamentary and even cabinet seats, the military establishment itself today enjoys only limited institutional autonomy from parliament and limited economic relevance for businessmen. Labour unions, peasant groups and non-government organizations command very little electoral influence, and election-monitoring efforts by a group known as Poll Watch to curb vote-buying, violence, and electoral fraud do not appear to have

seriously disrupted *chao pho* methods for mobilizing rural Thai voters. Meanwhile, the much vaunted 'urban middle-class reformism' of the Bangkok-based Palang Dharma party has evidently fallen victim to the realities of parliamentary coalition-making and campaign financing, as signalled by the assumption of party leadership by a prominent business tycoon.

In this context, the most effective and important constraints upon *chao pho* influence and activities appear to be those exercised by individual Bangkok-based and foreign capitalists and by the structural logic of capitalist development. As various (Bangkok-based and foreign) conglomerates have extended direct control over the production and distribution of goods and services to the provinces, *chao pho* methods of electoral mobilization will accordingly grow more costly and face greater challenges. Such is the promise of 'democratization', but for the foreseeable future *chao pho* will retain if not the premiership then at least a considerable share of seats in parliament, control over the Cabinet, and discretion over the agencies and resources of the state apparatus.

3 The Philippines: Bossism, American-Style

In sharp contrast with Thailand, the incorporation of the Philippine archipelago into the world economy in the nineteenth century did not stimulate serious efforts to create a centralized bureaucracy, and the imposition of American colonial rule at the beginning of the twentieth century introduced a pattern of state formation unique in South East Asia. Under Spanish colonial rule, local executives at the settlement and municipal level were elected under a limited franchise and the supervision of Spanish parish priests. By the late nineteenth century, an emerging class of predominantly Chinese *mestizo* landowners, merchants, and moneylenders thus exercised - if not directly, then through relatives or other proxies - a measure of discretion over local affairs through local elected offices. At the turn of the century, moreover, the invading American forces combined a campaign of brutal repression with a strategy of cooptation in their efforts to 'pacify' the archipelago, and the rapid devolution of local authority to elected officials held obvious attractions to the provincial elites who

had led the Revolution against the Spaniards and resistance against the Americans. Thus elections to municipal office, based on highly restricted suffrage and freed from the intervention of ecclesiastical authorities, were first held in 1901, soon followed by those for provincial governors (1902), representatives to a national Philippine Assembly (1907), an American-style bicameral legislature (1916), and, under a Philippine Constitution and Commonwealth, a directly elected presidency (1935).

In classic American style, and under the rubric of rapid 'Filipinization', these elected Filipino officials enjoyed enormous discretion over the emerging state apparatus. Elected municipal mayors retained their Spanish-era discretionary powers over local law-enforcement, public works, and taxation, winning complete independence from parish priests and full authority to appoint municipal police forces. Whilst elected governors enjoyed somewhat similar law-enforcement and taxation powers at the provincial level, representatives to the national legislature gained control over a hastily constructed and rapidly 'Filipinized' national state apparatus. Within their own districts, legislators exercised effective discretion over the disbursement of 'pork barrel' funds for public works and the appointment of constabulary commanders, district engineers and superintendents of schools, provincial fiscals, treasurers, and assessors, judges of the court of first instance, and local agents of the Bureau of Lands. In Manila, meanwhile, these legislators likewise exerted influence over the awarding of contracts, concessions, and monopoly franchises, the appointment of officials in national government agencies, and the allocation of loans by the Philippine National Bank (PNB). Finally, with the election of a Commonwealth president in 1935, a (directly elected) national executive took office, assuming powers in domestic affairs far greater than those of his American counterpart.

Following Philippine independence in 1946, the continued subordination of the agencies of the national state apparatus to this multi-tiered hierarchy of **elected** officials combined with the ongoing process of 'primitive accumulation' and the expanding economic role of the Philippine state with import-substitution industrialization to facilitate the emergence and entrenchment of bosses in numerous localities and at various levels of state power. The

frequency of elections and the overlapping and conflicting prerogatives of municipal, provincial, and congressional authorities have guaranteed continuous dynamism and exerted competitive pressure upon aspiring powerbrokers, yet bosses have been able to construct and through persistent electoral victories retain personal fiefdoms through the accumulation of economic and coercive resources within a given bailiwick. In some localities, a concentration of land or other forms of proprietary wealth has facilitated the entrenchment of dynasties over successive generations; in others, the extent of state control over the 'commanding heights' of the local economy has permitted long-term rule by a single boss but thwarted efforts at dynasty-building. In still other localities, boss rule has entailed the delivery of 'brokerage' services to a cartel of local business magnates. Throughout, the key to boss rule has lain in the accumulation and retention of a preponderant share of the key resources for local electoral success: a retinue of loyal personal followers, large quantities of money for buying votes and bribing election officials, and coercive resources to reinforce both personal and pecuniary considerations.

Thus bosses have succeeded in entrenching themselves in various localities throughout the archipelago and at all levels of state power. In countless small towns, claims to rice fields, coconut groves, and sugar plantations, control of agricultural credit, distribution, input, and processing networks, and command over municipal lands, mangroves, and fishing grounds, law-enforcement, patronage, public works, and rackets have combined to sustain the electoral and economic fortunes of numerous perennial mayors. At the congressional district and provincial levels, long-time congressmen and governors have relied more heavily on state office to control 'nodal' economic choke-points and key natural resources: sugar centrals and cement factories built up with PNB behest loans, electricity and transportation companies awarded franchises, construction and real-estate firms offered preference in contract bidding and zoning ordinances, logging and mining concessions provided on public lands. With municipal and provincial law-enforcement agencies subordinated to mayoral and gubernatorial control, moreover, 'provincial warlords' have enjoyed control over so-called 'private armies' as well as lucrative rackets in gambling, smuggling, and other illegal activities.

Whilst bosses have flourished in numerous municipalities, congressional districts, and provinces, the distinctive institutional structures of the Philippine state and the pattern of private capital formation in the archipelago have obstructed the ascension of boss rule to the national (i.e. presidential) level. Alongside the American-style single-district/single-representative House of Representatives, the bicameral national legislature has included a Senate whose 24 members are elected on a nation-wide basis. With its manifold patronage powers enshrined in the Constitution and its 24 members proven in the national electoral arena, the Senate has often served as an effective Trojan horse and launching pad for anti-administration opposition forces and campaigns against the re-election bids of presidential incumbents, thus preventing the entrenchment of national bosses. Furthermore, the national oligarchy has reinforced this pattern of factional competition for the presidency and thwarted national state-based monopoly, by providing generous funding to opposition candidates and preventing the 'commanding heights' of the national economy from falling into the hands of a single boss.

In the only case of national-level boss rule, long-time president (1966-86) Ferdinand Marcos overcame these obstacles under national conditions roughly analogous to those which have allowed bosses to entrench themselves at the local level. In the mid-1960s, the increasing availability of foreign loans and assistance programmes, necessity for national state intervention in 'development', and dependence of the oligarchy on government loans and special incentives allowed Marcos in his first term (1966-69) to extend presidential prerogatives to unprecedented supervisory powers over national law-enforcement and military agencies and unparalleled regulatory powers over the national economy. Benefiting also from the importance of Philippine air and naval bases to the American war effort in Indochina and the support of the Nixon Administration, Marcos won re-election in 1969 and, with American blessings, abolished Congress and declared martial law in 1972. Ruling henceforth by decree, Marcos centralized a national police under the Armed Forces, established quasi-governmental monopolies for major commodity exports, and parcelled out regulatory and proprietary control over the other 'commanding heights' of the

national economy - banking, construction, energy, media, ports, telecommunications and transportation - among a close circle of family members, cronies, and frontmen. Only in the mid-1980s, when the world recession and the ensuing domestic financial crisis led to government bankruptcy and threatened American withdrawal of support, did Marcos' national boss rule begin to unravel. Overly reliant on office-based resources and unable to establish a firm economic base independent of the state, Marcos, like many small-town and provincial bosses, was unable to withstand the hostile intervention of a superordinate power (i.e. the U.S.) and to pass on his bailiwick to successive generations in classic dynasty form.

Since the fall of Marcos in 1986 and the subsequent reestablishment of regular, competitive local, congressional and presidential elections in the Philippines, the process commonly known as 'democratization' has seen the reflowering of local bossism throughout the archipelago. Pork barrel and patronage appointments have, to a large extent, reverted to congressional hands, a Philippine National Police firmly subordinated to legislative and local executive authority has replaced the Marcos-era Philippine Constabulary/Integrated National Police, and a new local government code has restored - and indeed strengthened - the prerogatives of municipal mayors and provincial governors over local agencies and resources of the state apparatus. Given the manifold spoils of these multitudinous offices, elections have been fiercely contested, through machine mobilization, vote-buying, fraud, manipulation, and violence. Small wonder that much recent journalistic and scholarly research has focused on 'bosses', 'political clans', 'dynasties', and 'warlords'.

Meanwhile, however, significant changes are clearly observable in the post-Marcos manifestations of bossism in the Philippines. New election laws, for example, have eliminated the pre-martial law inclusion of two political parties in the vote-counting process, thereby upsetting the established

pattern of two-party competition (characteristic of presidentialism) and undermining party alignments and loyalties in general. Political parties are thus institutionally far weaker today in the Philippines than they were in the 1950s or 1960s. At the national level, moreover, the withdrawal of American military facilities, the end of the Cold War, and the wariness of foreign creditors and donors towards authoritarian *étatisme* have combined with the domestic trends noted above to limit the possibilities for another Marcos-like figure to emerge.

More importantly, perhaps, a subtle change in the linkage between 'business' and 'politics' is currently under way in the Philippines. In several provinces where suburban industrial and commercial growth is most pronounced, local bosses have abandoned efforts at local empire-building in favour of brokerage services for Manila-based or foreign capital, winning lucrative construction and real-estate deals but skimming only percentages (for permits, zoning ordinances, and union-busting services) on new golf courses, industrial estates, and residential subdivisions. Some major illegal rackets (e.g. narcotics) are similarly centralized and internationalized, leaving local bosses to serve merely as franchise dealers or recruiters for urban-based and foreign syndicates. In the House of Representatives, well established plantation owners and logging concessionaires now rub shoulders with commercial bankers, real-estate moguls, and shipping magnates far more interested in the overall healthy of the domestic economy, whilst the nationally elected Senate is packed with corporate lawyers, media personalities, machine politicians and well-heeled fixers - rather than the sugar barons and industrial tycoons of yesteryear. Whilst Manila's top magnates reap considerable benefits for their campaign contributions, today not a single major conglomerate is in fact **directly** represented in the national legislature, a striking contrast with the senatorial rolls of the pre-Marcos era, or, for that matter, the parliament in contemporary Thailand.²

² In the Senate, the sole exception to this rule is Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, the successful corporate lawyer who served in successive Marcos administrations, primarily as Minister of Defense, and thereby amassed an empire in coconut processing and wood products that he has

converted into a network of real-estate and investment holding companies. In the House of Representatives, scions and sons-in-law of several prominent industrialists also hold seats.

4 Conclusion

As the preceding analysis has suggested, one of the primary consequences of 'democratization' in Thailand and the Philippines since the mid-1980s has been the re-flowering of 'bossism' in numerous localities in these two countries. The common manifestations of bossism in Thailand and the Philippines - the electoral and economic entrenchment of powerbrokers with virtually monopolistic control over entire localities - reflect a decisive change in the nature of their **states**, namely the subordination of their apparatuses to elected officials, rather than essential features of these two very different **societies** as the conventional wisdom on 'local strongmen' would have us believe (Migdal 1988). Elsewhere in South East Asia, centralized single-party machines (e.g. UMNO in Malaysia) and military apparatuses (e.g. ABRI in Indonesia) have encapsulated local gangsters and magnates within sharply delimited realms of influence and power. We have shown how the differing institutional structure of the state and timing of 'democratization' vis-à-vis capitalist development have accounted for the peculiar variations of bossism found in Thailand and the Philippines, namely region-wide *chao pho* and gangster-banker

clustering in parliament and cabinet in the first instance and a multi-tiered and overlapping hierarchy of bosses with looser links to major conglomerates in the second.

As for projecting ongoing trends in Thailand and the Philippines into the foreseeable future, it is tempting to draw upon other examples of 'bossism' from elsewhere in the world. Certainly today's labour activists, NGOs, election-watch movements and civil-service reformists in these two countries are reminiscent of analogous forces arrayed against bossism at other times and in other places, and the structural logic of global capitalism does tend to shift casinos and construction contracts from gangster to corporate hands. Yet the resilience of English 'Old Corruption', American county court cliques and urban machines, Italian (and no doubt Russian) *mafia*, and Latin American *caciques* is also worthy of note. Thai and Filipino bosses will undoubtedly retain numerous rackets, real-estate deals, and parliamentary seats for many years to come. Such is the reality of 'democratization', not only in South East Asia, but throughout the developing world.

References

- Anderson, Benedict, 1990, 'Murder and progress in modern Siam', *New Left Review*, 181 May/June: 33-48
- Migdal, Joel S., 1988, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press
- Ockey, James, 1992, 'Business leaders, gangsters and the middle class: societal groups and civilian rule', Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University
- _____, 1993, 'Chaopho: capital accumulation and social welfare in Thailand,' *Crossroads*, Vol 8, No 1: 48-77
- Phongpaichit, Pasuk and Piriyaarangsarn, Sungsidh, 1994, *Corruption and Democracy in Thailand*. Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University Political Economy Centre
- Scott, James C., 1972, *Comparative Political Corruption*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall
- Turton, Andrew, 1989, 'Local powers and rural differentiation,' in Gillian Hart, Andrew Turton, and Benjamin White (eds), *Agrarian Transformations: Local Processes and the State in Southeast Asia*, Berkeley: University of California Press: 70-97