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**September, 1979**

# **THE ZIMBABWE JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS**

**(Formerly The Rhodesian Journal of Economics)**

Editors: A.M. Hawkins, J.A.C. Girdlestone and J.M. Robertson

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by

Professor M. W. Murphree\*\*

### I. THE SOCIO-POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS ON PLANNING

The racially-structured nature of the occupational structure in Zimbabwe during the "Rhodesian Years", 1890-1979, with its built-in bias favouring White employees, has been amply documented elsewhere<sup>(1)</sup> and requires no amplification here. Equally patent is the fact that a major policy objective of the new government which comes to power as a result of the February 1980 elections will be to redress this bias. What is not clear is the extent and form which this redressive action will take. The debate on these questions is likely to take place under an obfuscating cloud of assertions concerning goals; propositions stated axiomatically in terms of values and objectives, what is considered to be 'right', 'proper', 'ethical' or 'desirable'.

But planning is not simply "the art of the desirable". It is, like politics, also "the art of the possible". To be effective, planning must take into consideration the constraints which circumscribe progress towards goals and must therefore balance principle with pragmatism. One of the best descriptions of this tension was made by Henry Kissinger who, speaking on U.S. foreign policy, once wrote, "Foreign policy is, like life, a constant effort to strike the right balance between the best we want and the best we can have - between the ends we seek and the means we adopt." While recognizing the importance of "ethical purpose" he went on to add, "But we need as well a mature sense of means, lest we substitute wishful thinking for the requirements of survival."<sup>(2)</sup>

What is true for U.S. foreign policy is also true for development planning in Zimbabwe. We may reach consensus on certain goals: full employment for all, non-discrimination in job placement, increased efficiency and productivity in all occupations and the full development of all manpower talent. But unless we recognize the economic, demographic and socio-political constraints imposed by our condition on these objectives we are being either short-sighted or utopian in our planning.

A detailed discussion of the economic and demographic variables involved lies beyond the scope of this article. This paper concentrates on the socio-political issues in occupational planning. The political content in occupational placement is particularly high because it has to do with jobs, incomes, life styles and status. These items are prominent on the agenda of Black expectations, and any Black government which expects to remain in power in this country must be seen to be providing accelerated advancement and placement for Blacks throughout the occupational spectrum, and to be reducing perceived White occupational privilege, administrative control and executive power. This is a fundamental political dimension of the Africanization issue, of such importance that it often tends to override considerations of an economic, technical or indeed a moral nature.

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\* Revision of a paper first presented to the I.P.M.S.A. Convention, Salisbury, October 19, 1979.

\*\* Director, Centre for Inter-Racial Studies, University of Rhodesia.

## II. REDRESSIVE POLICY : A COMPARATIVE EXAMPLE

Before turning however to Africanization in this country it is useful to examine the broader issues of redressive policy in a specific context. I shall take as my example the United States, since it is from that country that we have the most evidence. The U.S. example must be interpreted with caution as circumstances there are considerably different to our own, but it does nevertheless contain a number of lessons for Zimbabwe.

Redressive employment policy in the United States has been aimed at "redressing" racial imbalances in employment and redistributing occupational placement throughout the spectrum in such a way that racial proportions are reflective of the total population profile. Motivation for this policy has been complex; in part it has been ethical, a value-reaction to the gap between the American dream and the American reality. In part it has been a species of "enlightened self-interest" more instrumental than ethical in nature. In the political sphere this was a reaction to the fear that unless American Blacks received a larger slice of the economic cake "...blacks and whites would grow farther apart, splitting the very fabric of American life."<sup>(3)</sup> In the area of private enterprise it was a policy extension of the insight illustrated by Henry Ford II's statement to the Ford Motor Company's shareholders:

... whatever seriously threatens the stability and progress of the country and its cities also threatens the growth of the economy and your company. Prudence in constructive company efforts to help overcome the urban crisis is demanded not only by our company's obligations as a corporate citizen, but by your management's duty to safeguard your investment.<sup>(4)</sup>

Whatever the motives, the improved economic and occupational location of Blacks has now become a widely accepted policy goal in the United States, often subsumed under the rubric of "affirmative action". Three distinct components in policy can be identified, which correspond roughly to stages in policy implementation. I shall refer to these as *the removal of discrimination, equalization policy* and *preferential treatment*.

a) *The removal of discriminatory legislation and practice.* This was the initial phase in U.S. policy development and predominated in the 1950's and early 1960's. As little legislation existed that was discriminatory per se, the emphasis was on legislating against discrimination in practice, cumulating in the 1964 Civil Rights Act.

At the same time however, Americans were learning that to de-racialize their society it was not sufficient to simply de-discriminate. This might suffice to provide equality of *opportunity* for individual "minority" group members fortunate enough to take advantage of it, but did not provide for equality of *attainment* for racially-defined minority groups which, "by virtue of past discrimination, continued to suffer the effects of that discrimination".<sup>(4)</sup> The status quo ante would thus be perpetuated indefinitely, and racial tensions within the society continue to persist. Thus it was argued, in the words of Purcell and Cavanagh, that "... justice is not achieved simply by assuring the rights of persons as individuals; it also requires just socio-economic institutions. When encrusted patterns of education, employment, and housing put one group at a disadvantage, we are obligated to change those institutions"<sup>(6)</sup> This insight was the fundamental argument underlying redressive policy, and led to the second component part of that policy, which I have termed "equalization policy".

b) *Equalization policy.* Equalization practice involves the government and the private sector in "... spending extra time and money ... to make current opportunities equal in recruiting, hiring, training, and helping to promote..."(7) Blacks. Equalization practices are not per se preferential; they do not give Blacks advantages over Whites, but merely make open competition a realistic possibility since they are aimed at redressing background disadvantages, allowing Blacks to compete in the occupational market place with Whites on an equal footing. An example might be that of a mining company which makes greater efforts to recruit Black high school students than it does to recruit White students: this merely brings to the attention of Black youth employment opportunities that their White counterparts have known of for years from the informational osmosis of their own sub-culture. It is an equalization tactic, not a preferential one, since it is designed simply to open up competition in the job market.

c) *Preferential treatment.* Equalization policy, which could be justified in terms of the American ethic, was however found to be too slow in producing the results required by the U.S. racial crisis. To further accelerate Black advancement, preferential treatment was therefore progressively introduced as a third component in redressive policy, covered by the rubric "affirmative action", or more pejoratively by such terms as "the benign quota" or "reverse discrimination". Preferential treatment was much more difficult to reconcile with American values since it was discriminatory, specifically giving preference to Blacks over Whites in hiring and promotion because they are black. The justification was therefore largely an instrumental rather than an ethical one; the U.S. was faced with a crisis which demanded immediate solution, and such a solution required the temporary expedient of adopting discriminatory practice to eradicate the structural basis of discrimination. Principle was tempered by expedience - an anticipatory variant of Kissinger's advocacy of a necessary compromise between the ends sought and the means adopted.

The implementation of preferential policies has been attempted largely through the imposition of quota targets for various categories of employers, backed up with the sanction of the withdrawal of Federal contracts and funds in the case of non-compliance.(8) Attempted implementation has been attended by a plethora of legislative suits, expensive administrative costs, and the occasional light relief provided by the attempt to quantify affirmative action goals. The University of California, Berkeley, has been quoted as saying, for instance, that over the next thirty years its goals are to hire additionally 1,4 Orientals in architecture, 1,38 Blacks in social welfare, and 0,05 American Indians in drama.(9) It has also been attended by a rush to claim "minority" status on the part of a wide range of individuals and groups, a situation paralleled in India by that Government's attempts to apply a "benign quota" solution to the caste divisions of Indian society. On the Indian case van den Berghe comments,

Castes competed with one another for the coveted status of "backwardness" so as to qualify for preferential treatment and a quota protected from open competition. Pressures built up to refine the classification into "backward" and "more backward", until in an endeavor to clarify the situation, the Government of India appointed a Backward Classes Commission which in 1955 submitted a report listing 2 399 castes as "backward" and worthy of discrimination in reverse. To paraphrase Orwell, all animals were backward but some were more backward than others.(10)

Aside from the problems of implementing affirmative action policy, it continues to raise for American policy planners such fundamental questions as these:

- Does preferential treatment give the impression that the hard-won *achievements* of individuals are instead *conferred* benefits?
- Does the policy heighten rather than alleviate racial tensions by causing resentment among discriminated-against majority groups?
- Does the policy, in practice, benefit only upwardly mobile Blacks, leaving the problems of the "Black underclass" largely untouched?(11)
- Does the dilution of principle with pragmatism not augment rather than diminish racial consciousness? As Alan Pifer, President of the Carnegie Corporation, put it: "Some may question whether Government, in its zeal to count and categorize, may, paradoxically, in fact be stressing the importance of minority group membership, just when it seeks to make such membership irrelevant."(12)

The continued persistence of the issues reflected by these questions should be sufficient warning against any facile adoption of redressive policies elsewhere. On the other hand, it must be recognized that such policies have, in certain respects, made significant progress towards the goals they have been designed to achieve.(13)

## III. AFRICANIZATION IN THE BLACK STATES

Turning now to the same issue in the post-independence experience of the Black States of Africa, we find that, in varying degrees, the same motives for, and components of, U.S. redressive action policies are present. The African context however introduces two further factors which become critical components of policy formation. These are the issue of *racial sovereignty* and the issue of *local and expatriate White skills*.

a) *Racial sovereignty*. In the United States, redressive policy has aimed at the effective integration of minority groups into the structures of American society, not the change of the structures themselves. In Africa, on the other hand, pressures for Black occupational advancement are part and parcel of a larger drive for complete cultural and political sovereignty. A diffuse principle operates in all these states which declares the fundamental importance of asserting and re-creating a black identity submerged by colonialism. This has meant that, in essence, majority rule in Africa is an ethnic and not a democratic conception.(14) Having achieved independence, Black nationalist leaders are under the further requirement of demonstrating that theirs is a government "of, for and by Blacks", to paraphrase Lincoln. Under White rule considerable resentment built up amongst Blacks against Whites and Asians, and newly independent Black governments have been under great pressure to improve the economic and social conditions of their Black populations and to reduce racially-linked gaps in standards of living. To ignore this pressure would be, for Black governments, to fly in the face of political expediency. Furthermore, these governments must be seen to be accelerating Black placement at points in the occupational spectrum conceived (either correctly or incorrectly) as being "power positions". In this regard the "public interface" is particularly

important. Pressures for "Africanization" ("Blackenization" would be the technically more correct, though more inept, term) have therefore been particularly great in the public service and in positions of public prominence.

b) *Local and expatriate White skills.* The second issue is that of local and expatriate White skills. Faced with the political necessity of being seen to Africanize, at the same time Black leaders are required to demonstrate their ability to maintain and indeed improve the administrative and economic infrastructures they have inherited from the colonial past. Their dilemma lies in the fact that often, for an indeterminate transitional period, they are dependent upon non-Black skills to do this. And, to either hold or acquire these skills, it is often necessary for them to resort to reward structures which appear to perpetuate the inequities of the past. How do you Africanize, for political reasons, when you can't for economic reasons? How do you narrow wage gaps, for reasons of ideology and social stability, when you can't for reasons of skill-retention? The dilemmas reflected by these questions thus render the task of the Black politician infinitely more difficult than that faced by American managers attempting to implement affirmative action policy.

In certain Black countries the issue is further complicated by the question of local versus expatriate White skills. Resident Whites are far more experienced in local conditions and, presumably, have a greater stake in the success of the economy and the state generally. At the same time they may drag into the new era the baggage of prejudices and social relationships engendered in the colonial period and their continued incumbency of positions of importance and authority may be an irritant, with the implication that the old order has not really changed. Expatriate Whites on short-term contracts are less ostensibly a reminder of the colonial past. The ethos and the ideology of the new state may require less subjective adjustment on their part. They are more manoeuvrable, and easily dispensed with at the end of their contracts if this is desired. On the other hand their lack of experience with local conditions often renders them less efficient, and they are usually far more expensive, both in local currency and foreign exchange.<sup>(15)</sup> In most Black states there has been considerable substitution of expatriate for local White skills, and the planning issue is probably wrongly conceived in the phrase "expatriate versus local White skills" - appropriate planning involves finding the right "mix" required.<sup>(16)</sup>

Finally, it would be wrong to suggest that all Black leaders are merely instrumental in their attitudes towards resident White populations. Some are genuinely committed to non-racialism, and pressures for Africanization have plunged them into the same value dilemma that has plagued American planners. Is the policy to be "localization" (which would be consistent with the principle of non-racialism) or is it to be "Africanization" (which would be inconsistent with the principle)? A good illustrative case is that of Tanzania. In 1962 the Government appointed a Commission on Africanization, the terms of reference of which included "... a detailed and comprehensive investigation into every cadre and grade in the Civil Service with a view to ensuring that a satisfactory plan for complete Africanization exists."<sup>(17)</sup> Speaking in retrospect in 1971, President Nyerere had this to say of the immediate post-independence period December 1961 - January 1964:

At the same time a deliberate policy of 'Africanization' of the public services was being pursued in the full recognition that this was itself discriminatory. For before all citizens could be treated equally, it was necessary to rectify the position in which the nation's civil service was dominated by non-Africans, and to make

it reflect in some measure the composition of the society ... Once we had demonstrated - to ourselves and others - that being an African did not have to mean being a junior official, the nation was able to accept that in some fields we can, without shame, hire the skilled people who are needed. This had been done by January, 1964, and we were therefore able to revert to a policy of priority to citizens regardless of their racial origin. This is the policy today. Every citizen has the right to be considered on his or her merits, regardless of race, religion, or sex. (18)

Thus in Tanzania Africanization meant a preferential rather than an equalization policy and was racially discriminatory, as Nyerere freely admits. But under the guidance of Nyerere it was seen as a temporary expedient, and subsequently phased out, to be replaced by a policy of Tanzanization. In certain other Black states the temporary expedient has tended to develop into a permanent principle.

To conclude this section, five important observations arise from the experience of Africanization in the Black states which are important for planning in Zimbabwe:

- 1 The motivations for redressive policy (Africanization) are similar to those existing in the United States, but the political imperatives are even greater and lead to demands for its implementation on a greatly telescoped time scale.
- 2 Likewise the constraints on policy, both practical and in terms of value-conflict, are similar. These constraints are compounded, in the African case, by acute skill-shortages in certain sectors, which make policy implementation far more difficult in the African context.
- 3 The "local versus expatriate White skills" issue tends to be seen differently by Whites and Blacks. Local Whites, not unnaturally, tend to view the issue from a perspective fraught with insecurity. Blacks, although not completely ignoring the value questions involved, tend to give more weight to immediate political imperatives. In practice policy has not been of the either/or variety, but has sought to achieve the right developmental "mix".
- 4 Pressures for Africanization are occupation-specific. Pressures for Africanization tend to be greatest in two types of occupation:
  - a) those which have high public visibility, are involved in the public interface and are



seen to be positions of power and importance, and b) those for which the potential for Black skill substitution is in ready supply.

- 5 Pressures for Africanization are time-specific. Pressures for Africanization are greatest at, and immediately after, independence and flow from a combination of high aspirations and political uncertainty, placing the Black government under intense compulsion to both provide jobs for, and be seen to be managing with, Black skills. Over time these pressures tend to diminish somewhat, in the case of those Black governments which establish themselves firmly and when economic considerations begin to balance political ones.

#### IV. AFRICANIZATION IN ZIMBABWE

No cogent evidence exists to suggest that the Africanization experience in Zimbabwe is likely to be significantly different to that in the Black states already reviewed. We like to proclaim that we are unique in Africa, and indeed there are features to this country's situation which differ significantly from those of many Black states. There are currently more resident Whites in this country than in any other Anglophone state north of the Limpopo. The economy is highly diversified, with an industrial and commercial base significantly oriented towards internal markets and developed largely by home-grown entrepreneurial efforts. Formal education structures are comparatively well developed, and the country possesses a stock of trained, if not experienced, Black skills far in excess of that which existed in most Black states at the time of independence. At the same time the country comes to independence at the end of a far more protracted and bitter struggle than has been the case in most African states. All these factors will undoubtedly influence the specifics of redressive policy, but are unlikely to significantly alter the duplication here of the general pattern of policy motivation and implementation encountered elsewhere.

To fix our current situation in developmental sequence it is instructive to look at our recent history in the context of the components of redressive policy in the United States and Black Africa, regarding these components as progressively cumulative stages in policy formation and implementation. It will be recalled that these "stages" have been: a) anti-discriminatory legislation and practice, b) equalization practice, and c) preferential treatment, or, in the African context, "Africanization". In my treatment here I shall occasionally cite South African examples, not because I consider the South African case to be identical but because the South African experience is also a significant comparative yardstick.

*a) Stage One : The encouragement of anti-discriminatory legislation and practice.*

Unlike South Africa, legislation in Rhodesia relating to employment was rarely ostensibly discriminatory. Some discriminatory legislation did exist, as the Quenet Commission reported in 1976.<sup>(19)</sup> Discriminatory practice was another matter, and was ubiquitously present. A study conducted by our Centre in 1973-74 found that "... employment policy and practice in respect to the

allocation of jobs and rewards for work are generally not merit-based, and ... are constrained by the mechanisms of racial discrimination."<sup>(20)</sup> But at the same time a combination of factors - a changing political climate, a shortage of White skills and a growing "enlightened self-interest" on the part of larger employers - produced a movement to eradicate discriminatory employment practice, in some ways reflected in the recommendations of the Quenet Report. (In South Africa the Wiehahn Report can be considered in certain respects a parallel.) Realizing the dangers of being over-precise chronologically, I would nevertheless suggest that the years 1975-76 roughly represent the inception of the anti-discriminatory phase in this country, in however a very diluted form.

*b) Stage Two : Equalization practice.*

As the validity of anti-discriminatory practice became generally accepted, the aspect of redressive policy I have called equalization practice began to gain credibility, augmented by an increasing skill shortage in certain sectors of the economy. Thus, in a research exercise conducted at the University of Rhodesia in 1978, Dr. Broby found management largely committed to "equal opportunity" programmes:

Training programmes for Africans at supervisory and management levels have already been implemented and the introduction of equal job opportunities is being generally explored. Concepts such as localisation, indigenisation, and africanisation have become part of senior management's repertoire. The term 'localisation' appears to have taken preference over the others, as it is devoid of any racial connotation. 'Localisation' is already widely practised both here and elsewhere by many of the multinational corporations trading in this country. Indeed, a policy of localisation has been put forward as one of the arguments in favour of the presence of multinationals in developing countries. Such a personnel policy provides expanded job opportunities for the indigenous population, and is contributory to the creation of a pool of well-trained manpower.

The neutrality of the "equal opportunity employer" approach reflects the rational goal of the enterprise in combining labour, capital resources and managerial expertise in the best possible way. This policy, espoused by the Institute of Personnel Management (Southern Africa) rejects 'africanisation' since it is claimed that this would lead to discrimination in reverse, and such a state of affairs would not be in the interests of the individual or the enterprise. Equal opportunity, they say, opens the way for a truly multi-racial environment, at least as far as the work context is concerned.<sup>(21)</sup>

Thus, with the repeated caveat that my chronology is imprecise and overlapping, I would suggest that the "equalization" phase in this country commenced during the years 1977-1979. In South Africa the chronology has been roughly the same, although the ostensible emergence of this policy has been somewhat later. The Code of Conduct of the Urban Foundation and the Sullivan Principles reflect variants of this policy.(22)

*c) Stage Three : Preferential treatment (Africanization)*

In my view 1979 heralded the third phase, that of Africanization. As indicated in the Broby quote cited earlier, White-dominated management has moved well into the "equalization policy" phase, but balks at a further move to preferential treatment for Blacks. Blacks, on the other hand, are cynical about what they regard as the Whites' sudden concern for non-discriminatory policy in employment after decades of discrimination in their favour, seeing it as a defensive camouflage for the maintenance of previously derived privilege. Amongst Blacks all the arguments adduced for preferential treatment in the United States are reiterated, but in this case augmented by precipitously high expectations regarding the implications of Black Government. Rising sharply with the March 3rd agreement of 1978 and cresting even higher with the installation of the Government of National Unity in June 1979, these expectations have led Blacks to demand accelerated placement and promotion throughout the occupational spectrum at a pace which cannot be achieved merely by equalization policy, but only by preferential treatment. Any Black government which expects to remain in power, and any management in the private sector which hopes to retain a stake in the economy, ignores this pressure at its peril. The question is not therefore whether an Africanization policy should be introduced, but what its components should be.

## V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Africanization concerns both Blacks and Whites. And both the Blacks and the Whites involved in the policy planning process have an interest in ensuring that Africanization policy in this country achieves a constructive balance between "the ends we seek and the means we adopt", between political exigencies and economic realities, between sectional interests and the common good. It is with this goal in mind that I make some concluding observations and suggestions on what I regard as the inevitable development of an Africanization policy in Zimbabwe:

1. The recognition of Africanization policy should be explicit and statements made as to its intent, duration and extent, avoiding the uncertainties of covert ad hoc implementation.
2. The occupation-specific nature of Africanization pressures should be carefully analysed. The policy should, in effect, not simply be "an Africanization policy", but rather a set of policies in respect to given occupational categories.

3. The time-specific nature of Africanization pressures should similarly be carefully forecast, and in respect to given occupations. The importance of manpower planning exercises at this point is obvious.
4. The phasing of transitional developments is of critical importance, with the tendency being for Africanization pressures and the crisis in White insecurity to unfortunately coincide. Techniques aimed at de-synchronizing these coincidences are desirable, giving the necessary lead-time for a planned restructuring of roles and attitudes.
5. White skills are, and undoubtedly will be, of great importance to the economy. This very importance may, however, be a liability in that it tends to cause Black resentment. The value of their skills should therefore be muted and not self-proclaimed, and their expertise exercised in ways which avoid sensitive interfaces in political and economic structures.
6. Efforts should be made to provide Whites displaced by Africanization policies with opportunities for occupational mobility to positions where their skills are transferable and needed.
7. Africanization policy, especially at the middle and higher levels of management, must avoid being merely cosmetic window dressing, otherwise it will fail in its objective. As long as Black staff regard management as "they", genuine Africanization has not taken place and the organization concerned will continue to be in jeopardy. Africanization therefore requires appropriate placement in critical, decision-making line management as well as in more peripheral positions so that Black staff acquire a proprietary sense of identification with the organization.
8. Africanization is clearly discriminatory - granting preferential employment treatment to one person over another equally or better qualified *because he is black*. Such a policy, however necessary for political reasons, will in the long run be disasterously counter-productive *unless he has the potential to achieve required performance standards within an appropriate time span*. The developmental requirements of the nation therefore impose this limit on the implementation of Africanization policy: it must extend only insofar as this potential is available, or else be held in

abeyance until it is. The importance of competent selection and training procedures is an obvious corollary.

9. The principal justification for the discriminatory nature of Africanization is that it is a temporary suspension of the principle of non-racialism to achieve the ultimate entrenchment of that principle. Continual vigilance is therefore required to ensure that the means does not distort the goal and that the expedient does not become the principle. The policy should therefore be designed within specific time frameworks, and implementation subject to continuous review.

For the immediate future, Africanization in Zimbabwe is, in one form or another, inevitable. Its dilemmas and contradictions will pose grave questions for the health of both the economy and the national ethos. But its introduction does not necessarily mean either economic chaos or the complete disappearance of Zimbabwean Whites from the occupational spectrum. With judicious planning and wise implementation it can be restricted to a temporary phase leading from Africanization to Zimbabweanization. But to ignore its current imperatives, either by futile denial or by covert ad hoc response, would be to, once again, substitute wishful thinking for the requirements of our survival, both national and sectional.

NOTES

1. See, for instance, M.W. Murphree et al, Education, Race and Employment in Rhodesia. Salisbury: Artca Publications, 1975, pp. 213 - 218. Also M.W. Murphree and D.G. Baker, "Racial Discrimination in Rhodesia," in Case Studies on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, W.A. Veenhoven, ed. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1976, Vol.V, pp. 377-413.
2. Henry Kissinger, "America and the World: Principle and Pragmatism." Time Essay, Time, 27 Dec., 1976, p.45.
3. Theodore V. Purcell and Gerald F. Cavanagh, Blacks in the Industrial World: Issues for the Manager. London: Collier Macmillan, 1972, p.281.
4. Quoted in Purcell and Cavanagh, 1972, p.8. The issue of corporate responsibility in issues of social stability is discussed in Purcell and Cavanagh, pp. 5 - 10, and, in the Southern African context, in M.W. Murphree et al., 1975, pp. 1 - 9, 301 - 303.
5. Revised Order Number 4 (41 CFR, Part 60 - 2). The Congressional Record 36 : 234, Dec. 4, 1971. Department of Labour, United States Government, Washington.
6. Purcell and Cavanagh, 1972, p. 280.
7. Purcell and Cavanagh, 1972, pp. 275 - 276.
8. Some of the more important relevant legislation is to be found in: a) President Kennedy's Executive Order No. 10925 of 1961, b) Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, c) Executive Order No. 11246, and d) General Order No. 4 issued in January 1970 by the Office of Federal Contract Compliance.
9. New York Times, 28.3.75, p.23.
10. Pierre L. van den Berghe, "The Benign Quota: Panacea or Pandora's Box?" Report on the International Research Conference on Race Relations. Aspen, Colorado, June 1970, p. 180.
11. This argument is complex, and not elaborated in this paper. Its most effective exposition is to be found in W.J. Wilson's The Declining Significance of Race: Blacks and Changing American Institutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978.
12. Alan Pifer, The Higher Education of Blacks in the United States. Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1973, p.26.
13. See W.J. Wilson, 1978, p. 151.
14. Ali A. Mazrui, Towards a Pax Africana. A Study of Ideology and Ambition. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967, pp. 21 - 41.
15. See Allen Walters, "High Cost of Expatriates." Commerce, July 1979, pp. 17, 19.

16. The dynamics of motivation operating on resident White populations in independent Black states are explored in M.W. Murphree, "Whites in Black Africa: their status and role." Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol.1, No.2, April, 1978, pp. 154 - 174. More specifically, with regard to policy suggestions, see M.W. Murphree, "The Role and Status of Western Man in Africa," South African Journal of African Affairs, Vol. 9 , Nos. 3/4, 1979, pp. 116 - 122.
17. Report of the Africanization Commission, 1972. Government of Tanganyika, Dar-es-Salaam: The Government Printer, 1963, p.1.
18. Julius K. Nyerere, Tanzania Ten Years After Independence. Report submitted as President of TANU to the TANU National Conference, Dar-es-Salaam, Sept. 1971. Dar-es-Salaam: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. n.d. pp. 6, 8.
19. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Racial Discrimination 1976. (The Quenet Commission) Salisbury: Government Printer, June, 1976.
20. M.W. Murphree et al., 1975, p.297.
21. M.L. Broby, "The African Manager - A Profile for Development." The Rhodesian Journal of Economics, Vol. 10, No. 4, Dec. 1976, (Issued 1979) p.192. Regarding Dr. Broby's reference to the "equal opportunity employer" approach, it is of interest that the Delta Corporation now advertises itself as "An Equal Opportunity Business." See back cover advertisement, The Zimbabwe Journal of Economics, Vol. One, No. One, March 1979.
22. Interested readers are further referred to the South African Outlook, Vol. 109, No. 1295, May 1979. The entire issue is a valuable report on these and other labour codes in the South African context.

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