

# **REHABILITATION AFTER ARMED CONFLICT**

by

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**Presented at  
Development Studies Association Conference,  
SOAS London  
November 11, 2000**

# ABSTRACT

## REHABILITATION AFTER ARMED CONFLICT

**Armed conflict** (war and near war) is **widespread** - over 50 countries and 500 million people are afflicted including large countries with sub-national near wars (e.g. Nigeria, Mexico, Indonesia); on all continents except Australia and Antarctica.

The human and economic **costs** of war are very high. In SSA at least 10 million persons are dead (largely of war linked famine, loss of health service and water access, dislocation/forced migration) with over 2 million each in Mozambique and Sudan. For SSA as a whole 1980-2000 loss of GDP growth usually 1% to 2% annually i.e. with no wars 33% higher GDP probable.

Ending war - or a lull of exhaustion or fragile settlement - is first step in **process** of making/sustaining peace. that process has three pillars - **Reconciliation, Reconstruction, Rehabilitation**. These interact (positively or negatively).

Rehabilitation includes:

- **livelihood** recovery to bring household incomes - especially of war displaced and post war demobilised back to or above poverty line.
- **basic service** - law and order (largely through user friendly police and primary courts), primary education, water, primary health and - less uniformly - agricultural extension restoration.
- **local infrastructure** renewal to support livelihood recovery and service provision and to make possible **market access** as part of livelihood restoration.
- **safety nets** to alleviate calamity (natural disaster) impact to sustain household capacity to continue rehabilitation when the drought (or flood) has passed.

Because it is usually relevant to 50% of households and frequently for high shares of national or regional output, exports, food supply fiscal revenue, rehabilitation should be a **central theme in strategic macro economic** policy and programming.

Because post war contexts differ significantly from post calamity (natural disaster) or economic (polic. terms of trade, debt, etc.) crises rehabilitation does **diverge significantly** from **poverty**

**reduction focused growth** in poor countries which have not faced substantial armed conflict on their own territory.

Rehabilitation is a major strand in **governance**. State legitimacy and public acceptance/mobilisation depend to a large extent on government **capacity to delivery**: the opportunity to raise household incomes; basic services (not least security to go about daily lives/livelihoods without violent disruption i.e. law and order), basic infrastructure and market access.

Rehabilitation is **a process not an event**. Phasing and timing are crucial. The initial three priorities are:

- a. **"going home"** which - usually virtually literally - is the goal of an average of three quarters or more of displaced persons;
- b. restoring **food security** out of own production (or sale of other products plus waged work to buy food) thus replacing food aid except in calamity years;
- c. initial service/infrastructure restoration selected after consultation with users to be on which roads, schools, water units clinics should be restored first.

As a **process**, rehabilitation is not a smooth, ever broadening highway. It is - because post war economies are **fragile** - subject to calamity and external economic **shocks** (and occasionally windfalls e.g. 1999-2000 oil prices). Further the roots of war are rarely eliminated before, at or soon after the cessation of full scale war so that regression into violence or even a full scale return to war are only too possible (e.g. Rwanda, Congo, Angola - severally and jointly).

Contexts vary so much - in history, social capital, society, political culture, weakness vs. failure of state, degrees of underlying bitterness and distrust among combating fractions, economic base, role of diaspora - that detailed generalisations are risky. The easy assumptions that Mozambique and Angola were very similar and Somalia and Somaliland nearly homogenous have proven totally misleading. Mozambique and Somaliland are success processes while Angola and - even more - Somalia are the reverse, indeed are yet to emerge from armed violence.

Rehabilitation is **not replication**. Both war causing and war caused realities prevent that. So do changes in approach - e.g. to primary health care - since armed violence begun (or the basic service structure began to disintegrate which in Sierra Leone is a third of a century ago). Gender

is perceived - not least by women in war torn countries - very differently from a quarter century ago.

However in a different sense "going home" and "recovering" that which was valued and lost are basic goals for most war afflicted households. They need to be part of the rehabilitation process in priority and phasing setting and monitoring/revision as well as mobilisation and operation.

Rehabilitation does not stand alone - it interacts with Reconciliation and Reconstruction. The last includes renewal (probably with more structural changes from pre war) of major infrastructure and directly productive units within a central macro economic strategy and policy which avoids unsustainable fiscal, external price, nutritional, basic service and poverty imbalances. Equally however, unless **Reconstruction** (including strategic resource allocation) treats **Rehabilitation** as a central priority it is almost certain to stall, erode and ultimately collapse.

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November 2, 2000

*Ref: rhg/lab/DSAabstract.doc 15/12/00*

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## **REHABILITATION: Toward Sustainable Peace and Reconciliation for Redevelopment**

**by Reginald Herbold Green**

Development is about human beings. They need four things. First is water. It is the first thing needed to live. Without it a plant, an animal, or a baby dies. Second is food. Without enough of it, life is miserable and short. Third, once water and food are won is health - otherwise the human being becomes sick. Fourth is education, once a human being has water, food and health he needs to learn to open new horizons and unlock new possibilities. And there is a fifth - peace and order. Without these none of the four basic needs can be sustained

- Somali Elder  
Baidoa, 1995

To plan is to choose.  
Choose to go forward.

- Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere

# I

## REHABILITATION: AN INTRODUCTORY SURVEY<sup>1</sup>

Rehabilitation after armed conflict (sub-national, national or transborder) is of increasing importance both in national rebuilding and in international cooperation policy and resource allocation. The reason is partly a rise in humanitarian concern, partly an increased realisation that lack of rehabilitation can result in or contribute to renewed conflict and partly the reality that over fifty countries - in all continents, slightly under half in sub-Saharan Africa - with over 500 million people have recently experienced or are in the throes of sub-national or national civil wars or of wars crossing national frontiers. If cases such as Mexico (Chiapas plus), Indonesia (beyond East Timor), Nigeria (Delta) and India (Kashmir) are included the total (including only directly affected regions) passes 600 million. On the narrower definition, the probable loss of life (including deaths resulting from war caused famine, dislocation and collapse of health - water - sanitary services) over the last two decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century probably exceeds 10 million and the cumulative loss of output \$200,000 million.<sup>2</sup>

**Rehabilitation is part of a triad-Reconciliation** among combatant or ex-combatant factions and those (often the majority) alienated from both (or all), **Reconstruction** of major infrastructure and production units and of macro economic sustainability and **Rehabilitation of household livelihoods and access to basic services as well as to local infrastructure**. The three R-R-R elements interact - reconciliation and religitimation (or legitimisation) of governance are crucial to sustained rehabilitation as are major reconstruction works and macro economic viability. But, without ability to provide effective basic service and local infrastructure access, a government will find it hard to sustain - or even attain - legitimacy just as it will if most households are unable to regain decent livelihoods. Similarly a recovery based only on a few large unit enclaves, even if nominally economically sustainable, is unlikely to have a long political or social life expectancy.

While this study concentrates on post war rehabilitation, **elements of rehabilitation can - and should - be incorporated into wartime survival oriented strategies<sup>3</sup>** and into **programmes for less affected urban and rural areas during wars**. In refugee/displaced person contexts camp self organisation for health, education water and child support programmes using camp members could be practiced more widely as could at least partial provisioning by small farming activities.<sup>4</sup>

Rehabilitation - like other aspects of R-R-R is a **process rather than an event**. It is not - much as this might be desirable - a steady, unidirectional highroad because, while war to peace and abject devastation to modest rebuilt sufficiency are logically continua, setbacks from renewed outbreaks of violence, from other exogenous shocks (as varied as drought and terms of trade) and of policy and programme errors, causing slide backs as well as drives forward on the continua, are much more probable than stable peace building, benign physical and economic environmental climates and near perfect public and private decision taking in respect to rehabilitation.<sup>5</sup>

Rehabilitation - like reconciliation and reconstruction - **cannot usefully be read as simple replication** of the pre war situation. At least in the civil or multi country regional cases,<sup>6</sup> the pre war context almost always contained elements leading to rising levels of tension contribution to the outbreak of armed violence.<sup>7</sup> Even when these were by no means purely or even dominantly economic, rehabilitation programmes may be able to increase cross group social capital through creating mutual economic or basic service interests<sup>8</sup> and/or addressing livelihood and service/infrastructure access grievances. Further war creates two new contextual groups - female headed households (especially bereaved ones) many of whom have **severe adult able bodied hands to mouths to feed ratio constraints**, which need to be addressed if they are to climb out of absolute poverty and demobilised combatants who have often been desocialised and usually have few skills other than the use of weaponry and few assets other than tools of violence, implying that in the absence of programmes directly addressing their livelihood creation needs either armed banditry or renewed war or semi war outbreaks are likely.<sup>9</sup>

However, avoiding pure replication should not be interpreted as requiring a *tabula rasa* approach and the delays of totally reconceptualising and replanning as if nothing valid but existed before and been lost during war. For example:<sup>10</sup>

1. **most refugees/displaced persons want to 'go home'** (often very literally indeed);
2. **most small farming households wish to resume farming and most urban or rural employees to get wage employment (whether formal or 'informal' again;**
3. **criticisms of pre war health, water, primary and continuing education, law and order, veterinary and (perhaps less uniformly) agricultural extension services are usually dominantly as to**



**inadequate quality or quantity not disagreement as to their importance or demands for total reconceptualisation.**

That suggests that first steps toward rehabilitation can use even limited baseline data plus quick consultation with intended beneficiaries to identify and to prioritise a substantial body of programmes and projects of types for which experience does exist.<sup>11</sup>

### **Conceptualisation, Literature, Practice<sup>12</sup>**

**Internationally**, rehabilitation conceptualisation literature - and less uniformly practice - have grown up as **offshoots of calamity (natural disaster) relief and reconstruction work, of conflict theory** and - more recently - **of poverty alleviation** (relief) and reduction thinking. This history has led to distinct limitations and in particular to **marginalisation** into the relief/safety net and the micro/NGO categories with exclusion from central macro and sectoral policy and programming and from governmental strategic priority coordination.

Arguably it has had further - and also marginalising - consequences in:

- a. inadequate examination of interactions with other aspects of achieving an exit from armed conflict e.g. recreation of respected user-friendly police and protecting households from violence.
- b. explaining how ex-combatants can be integrated/reintegrated into civilian livelihoods and social/community relationships;<sup>13</sup>
- c. recognising the value of identifying elements which have worked in other emerging from conflicts settings - and why - but
- d. avoiding simple generalisation<sup>14</sup>, even from multiple cases, because contextual (both historic and geographic as well as economic)<sup>15</sup> realities are complex, divergent and likely to offer both 'bridge out' and 'no through road' signals for rehabilitation scenarios; as well as
- e. generalising somewhat facilely from one or two cases or causally ambiguous correlations.

**Nationally** conceptualisation has often been intuitive rather than formal and/or limited to identifying a set or shopping list of projects or programmes rather than a strategy. This situation is encouraged by external actor - not least the World Bank - failure to respond to strategic approaches

putting war afflicted livelihood, basic service and infrastructure rehabilitation at the core of political economic strategy from macro through local levels.<sup>16</sup> There are exceptions - though only in Mozambique<sup>17</sup> is there a single document outlining and quantifying rehabilitation strategy and that was simply ignored (more than head on rejected) by external funders. Ethiopia's diverse relief, reconstruction, basic services programmes arguably are an R-R-R strategic approach in a country in which most zones have not suffered serious physical destruction or massive war forced human displacement. Eritrea's centrally controlled strategy and practice for state creation and national reintegration does pay specific attention to reversing displacement and organising resettlement to improve livelihood - basic service access - infrastructure. Somaliland - because of its limited state resource base and lack of large official external flows (as a result of non-recognition) has focussed on recreating security (army-police-courts), political legitimacy (melding traditional and modern), basic service access (coordinating INGO, international agency, domestic social sector and state actors) and - as external support has become less constricted - infrastructure rehabilitation/reconstruction as a minimalist conceptualised strategy which is more evident in dialogue than documentation.

The **influence of INGO's** (international non-governmental organisations) on conceptualisation and practice has been substantial and less than wholly benign;

1. the link to calamity relief and rapid recovery from - e.g. - drought has limited recognition that rehabilitation can rarely proceed in a straight line or be viewed as a 1 to 2 year programme because exit from armed conflict is substantially different from exit from drought;
2. because INGO's before the 1980's worked largely with community level projects nominally phased for handover after a limited period, their particular orientations and skills are not ideal for strategic macro programming from national through local level nor with effective collaboration with, or acting primarily as support groups for, national or local government or for domestic social actors/civil society groups (e.g. churches, mosques, trade and farmers unions, women's groups and community or district associations);
3. as a direct result of the temporal urgency of disaster (armed conflict) relief work and the pervasive - albeit very uneven - weaknesses of central and local government and of domestic social actors plus, perhaps, their own bureaucratic, social capital and partner procedures and preferences - **INGO'S have been funded from the North as alternatives to, more than**

**complements to or support groups for, domestic actors.** However necessary this may be under conditions of chaos and extreme conflict<sup>18</sup> it frequently corrodes, fragments and delegitimises domestic actors, prevents national R-R-R strategy and practice from being and being seen to be dominant and creates serious problems of disengagement if *de facto* INGO and aid agency parallel government structures outside domestic accountability and also of financial transparency are created, expanded and sustained.<sup>19</sup>

One clear problem - intellectually and for practitioners - is the limited interaction between postwar political and social economic rebuilding and rehabilitation analysis and programming which is largely weak on political rehabilitation conceptualisation and on links to conflict causation and process<sup>20</sup> and conflict theory and analysis which is less strong on past (or potentially post) war and on the contribution of economic and basic services programming in the transition to peace.<sup>21</sup> To some extent projects such as COPE<sup>22</sup> and "Comprehending and Mastering Conflict"<sup>23</sup> do move these two strands closer together. Whether they do so by synthesis or simply setting side by side may be more contentious.

### **Main Themes and Issues**

As of 2000's end the intellectual and operational position in respect to Rehabilitation can be summarised relatively briefly:

- a. the economic and political important of addressing the livelihoods of literally scores of millions in war ravaged economies in scores of countries is widely recognised, but
- b. integration of rehabilitation into sectoral regional<sup>24</sup> and macro economic strategy formulation and prioritisation is rare,
- c. partly because the origins of attention to rehabilitation tend to treat it as a package of short term, micro safety nets under an emergency rubric not as a more central part of political economic renewal; and therefore
- d. projects (whether in livelihood basic services or/and local infrastructure access) tend to be small, temporary add ons to central macro economic planning and policy, often contracted out to INGO's and other uncoordinated external actions;

- e. varied levels of attention to attempted generalisations (sometimes either from one example or somewhat ambiguous empirical correlations) and to specific contextualities whether historical, social, political or/and economic; resulting in
- f. a certain confusion as to the nature of substantive agreements and disagreements and to the applicability of conceptualisation in one context to another.<sup>25</sup>

The main topics of this paper address ways forward from this relatively unsatisfactory (intellectually, let alone for persons emerging from conflict) position, which is nonetheless much less unsatisfactory than a decade ago when R-R-R received minimal intellectual or specific programming attention.

1. Rehabilitation as Process: Parameters and Interactions;
2. Main Elements in Postwar Rehabilitation;
3. Recurrent Themes and Issues;
4. Country Rehabilitation Heads, Vignettes, Panorama;
5. Flexibility and Margins: Managing Uncertainty.

followed by a brief resume of points and parameters with more than single country applicability.

## II

### PARAMETERS AND LINKAGES: REHABILITATION AS PROCESS

**Rehabilitation is a process** (as are Reconciliation and Reconstruction) **not a once for all event**. It is also a problematic process in that both setbacks in the decline/suspension/ending of armed violence and damaging external shocks (whether literally climatic - e.g. drought - or relating to economic climate - e.g. terms of trade, donor fashions) - are highly probable. Perhaps it would be more illuminating to describe it as processes in the plural – over time and in different regions/districts/zones within one country and among countries at any one time.

Rehabilitation can - probably should under most circumstances - be a component during wars in programmes which are primarily survival support.<sup>26</sup> In the first place there are frequently some major towns and rural areas not physically overwhelmed by war, but suffering from consequential economic (livelihood) and budgetary (basic services) indirect impact. In Mozambique after initial setbacks, mother and child care and primary education in urban areas were pushed beyond 1980 levels and primary health care restored to them while water and sanitation coverage more or less kept pace with urban expansion. Livelihood rehabilitation/augmentation was less marked but opening of large peri urban green zone (allotment) areas and positive preference for women in respect of some allocation processes were important for nutrition (originally in own food grown, later indirectly via cash earned) levels of a not insignificant proportion of very poor households.<sup>27</sup>

Second, displaced person and refugee settlements do offer **opportunities for maintaining at least some independent livelihood capacity and for largely displacee staffed basic service provision**. Most camps afford some opportunities for agricultural or artisanal production and some residents qualified to provide primary education, health services and basic pure water and sanitation facilities. The potential varies with camp location, general area security, stability of population and degree of self organisation by residents (as well as of the goals of the internal leadership).<sup>28</sup> In Angola and Zambia, SWAPO camps were highly organised in respect to basic service provision, artisanal production (including vehicle repair and small scale construction) and education to underpin and build beyond ongoing service and livelihood levels. Agricultural production was much less successful except when linked to child nutrition.<sup>29</sup>

The three reasons why rehabilitation has usually played a lower role than would have been possible and desirable in refugee/displacee contexts are:

1. relatively high bureaucratic concern with controlling rather than empowering displacees/refugees and frequently underestimation of their skill and organisational capacity;
2. lack of finance, UNHCR, WFP or governmental, to do more than provide minimal - or subminimal - food, shelter, water and basic medical care plus vaccination;
3. leaderships (whether in or outside the refugee/displacee groups) who have objectives and priorities quite different from Rehabilitation (or indeed Reconciliation).

Similarly Rehabilitation is likely to remain relevant to some zones and population groups well after the overall national political and social economic situation can no longer usefully be defined in terms of the post war. Arguably this is the case in much of both Uganda and Somaliland as of 2000. In some zones peace and security came much later than in others (or remain elusive). For some groups - e.g. ex combatants 'warehoused' in the Somaliland armed forces beyond its estimated operational needs - re-entry into civilian livelihoods has proven exceedingly difficult whether for overall economic or retraining cost reasons.

However, the main thrust of this paper turns on the period after (or during a lull which it is hoped to extend and make permanent) war during which R-R-R are central to most households and geographic areas even if not necessarily to Gross Domestic Product.<sup>30</sup>

### **Conditions Conducive To Full Scale Rehabilitation**

Strategic components include:

1. cessation, full suspension or a substantial and relatively long lull in armed violence;
2. relative peace and stability interacting with the reemergence of credible law, order and justice systems as perceived by residents;
3. governmental priority to reducing proportions of households in absolute poverty and near absolute lack of access to basic services and local infrastructure combined with institutional, personnel and financial resources to act on that priority to give it credibility;<sup>31</sup>

4. effective demobilisation of ex combatants into functioning civil society and civilian economy contexts, not into banditry and poverty;
5. an ongoing process of reconciliation (usually multifaceted not simply between two 'sides');
6. a functioning macro economic strategy able to provide a framework within which reconciliation could be pursued (including rehabilitation of large scale infrastructure and production units);
7. limited calamities (natural shocks such as drought or flood as well as external economic debacles whether on terms of trade or donor preferences as to countries or programmes) and catastrophes (reversion to armed violence over substantial areas) combined with at least basic 'trampoline' type survival safety nets to allow households to snap back once the shocks had abated.<sup>32</sup>

These conditions are **by no means absolute preconditions - the outlook for R-R-R would be very bleak if all had to be met in advance or throughout the whole country in all sectors.**

However, the more which are blatantly not met, the less likely emergence from war toward a process leading to peace. Once that process starts it can operate cumulatively with attainment of one condition facilitating advance on others. By the same token even relatively favourable initial conditions on several can erode rapidly if rehabilitation is not visibly begun and/or does not begin to produce visible (to war impacted households) results - not least the ability to 'go home' - within perhaps 18 to 24 months.

The type of preceding war and the nature of its conclusion appears to influence the climate for rehabilitation . A liberation war - from perceived colonial rule, e.g. Somaliland, Namibia , Mozambique to 1975) - combined with a serious effort to build legitimate government structures and political processes is probably the most favourable context. A post independence civil war ended by genuine mediation and a broadly accepted election may - e.g. Mozambique after 1992 - also create a relatively favourable context whereas an unresolved conflict (even if a formal 'peace agreement' is nominally in place) - e.g. Sierra Leone, Somalia<sup>33</sup> is very weak ground for Rehabilitation (not least because it is likely to be characterised both by repetitive outbursts of armed violence or worse and by near total absence of reconciliation).

Beyond this rather general parameter list - and in detail even within it - the conditions for and **course of Rehabilitation processes is highly contextual.** What is needed depends to a large part

on **what has been lost** and is seen to be a **priority for regaining** as well as on **what remains and can be used as a base** for initial winning back.

Perceived history - which can diabolise but can also, perhaps more positively, gild portions of the past - is highly relevant to how robust a context exists for rehabilitation as well as (more obviously) for reconciliation. For example the somewhat roseate vision of later colonial self governance public service and service provision model and hybrid parliamentary/elders system as recalled from the 1950's<sup>34</sup> has been at the heart of rebuilding legitimacy and the operational as well as the symbolic and political aspects of governance in Somaliland.

**Rehabilitation (like other not war/not peace and postwar processes) exists in time.** The past necessarily informs the present - especially the perceived past even if 'objectively' inaccurate. The present informs the future and believed perceptions of the future affect the present. Legitimate institutions and processes - especially those with historic legitimacy and renewed life (in a renewed or mutated form) from reconciliation - determine or at least influence what is possible how and how fast.

While rehabilitation - like reconciliation and governance - is a step by step iterative 'project' or process focusing on items identified as both high priority and high immediate possibility, an **overall strategic frame or 'project' of medium term future goals is usually fairly crucial to mobilisation and to efficient deployment of resources.** The caveat is that rehabilitation - both as to setbacks and as to unforeseen possibilities - is even more uncertain and in more need of flexible implementation and programme revision than non-war economic and social planning and programming.

## **Initial Elements**

**What elements should have temporal priority** in a rehabilitation process is in large measure a contextual question. However, four generalisations appear to hold widely:

1. because war leads to large scale displacement of people and because most (whether rural or urban)<sup>35</sup> wish to return to approximately (or even literally) the places from which they have been forced to flee<sup>36</sup> **return home** is usually a vital early step in rehabilitation. Until it happens



rebuilding livelihoods and providing permanent (as opposed to camp) access to basic services is either impossible or small scale;

2. to be viable, return home requires **security from violent interference with normal life** whether by rebels, border raiders, bandits, 'protecting' troops, police or officials operated with a security force (usually civilian police<sup>37</sup> except for combating formed rebels) and a primary court system which do have civilian credit-credibility;
3. building toward **food security** both in respect to physical supply and national balances and to household entitlements and food balances. Both the breadth (proportion) and depth (shortfall from minimum acceptable level) of food shortages in SSA are closely related to present and historic presence or absence of war.<sup>38</sup> The direct (production) and indirect (entitlement) gains from peace, return home and perceived security can be large and rapid e.g. within 5 years of 1992 (Rome Agreements) Mozambique had regained national food balance in coarse grains and most returnees could feed themselves, while also selling some food (and/or industrial crops) thereby strengthening commerce, transport and urban production with consequent multiplier entitlement effects. Even in the predominantly pastoral economy of Somaliland small stock herd levels, sales and exports as well as crop production regained pre war (1985) levels by 5 or 6 years after the 1991 victory over the Barre regime's occupation army even though substantial (but lesser and intermittent) insecurity was endemic in many pastoral areas until 1996;
4. **basic services** which were widely accessible<sup>39</sup> and highly valued before the war are also likely to be high on returnees' demand lists/tests of the competence and legitimacy of the state. The most usual high priorities (in order) are primary health services, nearby water supplies for households (sometimes for livestock as well human use) and (perhaps less uniformly and with a slightly more relaxed time frame for restoration) primary education.

These heads meet the tests of **rapid visible payoff** to large numbers of households as perceived by them and are usually at least in large part attainable even within very tight resource constraints neither of which holds true for Reconstruction of major infrastructure or large production units.<sup>40</sup>

The initial rehabilitation targets will usually be in large (even predominant) measure replacement/revival/renewal of what existed before, because that is **how most war displaced people especially in rural areas, see** return home, restoration of food security/entitlements and

regaining access to basic services. They do wish to regain what was lost - and - if asked - can usually spell out what has been lost, which parts are most urgently needed back and what particular changes are seen as immediately needed. It is in subsequent processual steps (and even more in reconstruction and reconciliation)<sup>41</sup> that changes and transformation diverging from pre war services and local infrastructure become more important.

This is not to say that certain new conditions – often, e.g. up to 25% to 33% versus 5% prewar female headed households and the effective demise of the right of each adult woman to use and on some male headed household allocation - may not require immediate attention. However, when they do, even a quick consultation process is likely to raise - if less likely to offer agreed approaches to - the relevant issues.

### III

#### DEEPENING, BROADENING, REVIEWING THE PROCESS

While it is important to begin Rehabilitation -- and associated Reconciliation and Reconstruction - programming rapidly, it is desirable also to plot out tentative strategic targets and time scales. In principle - though not often in practice (with Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe partial exceptions), the **R-R-R process, goals, sequences and dated targets can be mapped out before peace is won**. If it is not done then, a similar exercise is appropriate parallel to initial action.

The intrinsic difficulties confronting such an exercise are twofold:

- a. working through goals and means beyond and/or diverging from replication requires data collecting, analysis and pilot project testing which ranges from identifying and broadening national or regional best practice (especially in agriculture) through identification, screening, importation and adaptation of experience outside the country to approaches which may draw on varied experiences but are basically new departures. Coffee management (as to fertilisation, shade, inter-cropping, harvesting) can be an example of the first, micro-credit of the second and pastoral paramedical services of the third (albeit a half remembered precedent existed in Somaliland from the 1950's to late 1960's with a brief and partial revival in the early 1980's).
- b. by definition postwar economies are not stable. In SSA and Asia most were very poor and fragile to start and are prone to climatic and exogenous economic shocks while having few resource margins (domestic or external) on which to draw to alleviate shock impact. Superimposed on that basic set of weakness and uncertainties which are exacerbated as to possible full or partial, national or district continuation or reemergence of armed violence.

The first set of uncertainties and limitations on national coping strategies apply to all poor countries but probably more to post, or emerging from war, areas which are initially particularly dependent on external financial resources, training capacity and - less uniformly - personnel.<sup>42</sup> The second set are unique to them and probably more serious in a majority of cases, although in - e.g. - Mozambique the greatest obstacles to rehabilitation have been IMF constrictions on basic service provision even out of grant aid, too large and intrusive an INGO rule, marginalisation in overall

economic policy and investment by the World Bank and - in 1999/2000 - floods rather than continued or renewed armed conflict which has simply not happened.

The most **complicated** - conceptually and practically - cases are those in which **war is self evidently still an ongoing process** with no end in view but **substantial areas are relatively peaceful** for extended periods and domestic civil society bodies capable of acting in respect to agriculture and basic services exist. The central issues include:

1. whether attempted rehabilitation (and survival support) will **exacerbate/elongate war** because it is a fact of life and death that one cannot provide adequate food and medical care to civilian populations in war zones while the dominant armed forces in these zones go unfed and untreated.<sup>43</sup> The case that it cannot be justified turns in particular on Interahamwe controlled camps in then Zaire over 1994-1996 which precipitated the Kabila-Rwanda-Uganda alliance to overthrow Mobuto and wipe out IH bases (only very partially successful on the latter head leading to the subsequent Rwanda-Burundi-Congo factions war against President Kabila's regime) and the Sudan. Southern Sudan's Operation Lifeline Sudan, like the food aid to the North, is overwhelmingly survival relief in respect to food and medical services, so that it - like the IH camps - has not, to date, been primarily about Rehabilitation measures prolonging war but relief (survival) food doing so..<sup>44</sup>
2. **what is practicable, where.** Probably small farming household production, accessible relatively pure war (protected spring waterhole, shallow well, perhaps deep well or borehole) primary health care (vaccination, health education with prenatal, HIV, malaria emphasis, first aid, simple curative) and education (primary and in some contexts secondary) are the main components. These are likely to be feasible and to have relatively low sunk capital costs to be lost if active war zones shift and to have substantial rapid nutrition, health, education and social capital gains. Both the realities of operating in civil war zones and of expatriate costs in SSA suggest domestic civil society actors (community, and/or church or mosque linked in most cases) with some autonomy from military command structures<sup>45</sup> are the likely best main delivery and design detail actors with INGO's in a technical, key professional and logistical (and usually financial) support role;
3. **How sustainable** are such partial rehabilitation efforts? **How resilient** in the face of renewed conflict? **How useful** after the war? Probably the answers are intrinsically contextual and

equally probably highly uncertain *ex ante*. In central Somalia substantial rehabilitation in and around Baidoa was achieved by several INGO's, WFP, domestic civil society actors, somewhat tenuous local governance service committees and UNICEF over 1992-1995. All were swept away overnight when General Aideed's forces conquered the town – a risk the actors knew from the 1993 UN withdrawal. But in Somaliland a similar (perhaps more water centred) programme over 1992-1995 survived three violent uprisings (with all parties very careful not to damage water, health or education facilities). Similarly in 1992 the Mozambique government's giving priority not just to relief food but also to seeds, tools, medical supplies and reopening health posts and primary schools in Renamo controlled areas (largely under WFP, UNICEF and INGO flags, but often with seconded government personnel and always with high publicity) was perceived then as high risk, but probably helped create the suspension of disbelief and the patience needed for the interminably leisurely UN running of demobilisation and elections to be possible and to contribute to a positive result.

Rehabilitation - especially early on - is highly vulnerable to shocks other than (or in addition to) renewed conflict. Drought (e.g. in Somalia), flood (e.g. in Mozambique), terms of trade (e.g. in Rwanda) all have severe impact especially when food security/entitlements livelihood and reserves against calamities, local infrastructure and state resources have not recovered fully from war.

Optimally, calamities should be faced by maintaining core rehabilitation programme components and augmenting resource flows to reverse shock impact. For example WFP food sold to provide wages a) to entitle - say - flood afflicted households to food and b) to rebuild local transport, basic service and administrative infrastructure while sustaining the rural transport/commercial sector (which literal food for work would damage) is a near optimal approach in at least a range of circumstances. It is a **trampoline safety net** allowing farmers, the rural transport/commerce network and infrastructure to bounce back and is a route through which additional external resources may be mobilisable.

But not all calamities offer such conceptually 'easy' answers or chances for damage limitation and rehabilitation protection. In Acholiland, Gulu town and three districts (especially Gulu and Kitgum) have been hit by the rare, lethal and panic inducing Ebola fever.<sup>46</sup> Resources at both of Gulu's two hospitals (for 300,000 to 400,000 persons in the town, adjacent displaced camps and rural areas) are necessarily diverted to disease containment as are national level health resources -

augmented by WHO assistance. Return home is necessarily blocked to prevent spread of the disease. Therefore food security and services build up (even beyond diverted resource impact) are largely suspended. In this and similar cases about the best that can be sought is to limit the period and extent of the calamity setback, improve knowledge of user priorities for future rehabilitation (with the immediate side benefit of maintaining consultation/contact) and continue planning and mobilisation.

### **Rehabilitation and Reconciliation**

Rehabilitation - even plus Reconciliation and Reconstruction - is not the whole of economic policy and praxis even though in post war contexts it should normally be a fully integrated, central set of themes in it. Therefore operation of a rehabilitation process does have implications for priorities in areas which are, in themselves Reconciliation, Reconstruction or Other:

- a. **Reconciliation** includes restoring **government's capacity - notably in security and basic service delivery**. Therefore training personnel<sup>47</sup> and restoring professional and para-professional wages from sub-poverty line levels<sup>48</sup> are crucial to rehabilitation for reasons much broader than direct employment generation or public service poverty reduction;
- b. **local infrastructure and services do need provincial and national** superstructure - most evidently in cases such as roads to highways but also health posts and clinics to rural to reference hospitals or primary schools to secondary and tertiary, not least teacher training - **to be effective**. Such projects are probably better categorised as **reconstruction** because they are larger, more specialised and inherently directly affecting limited numbers of people but a higher proportion of more trained personnel;
- c. some categories of **non-poor** (and if rehabilitation succeeds modestly well off or more) **households/enterprises' ability to restore their economic roles are crucial to livelihood restoration/poverty reduction**. If small family farming households do not have market access via rural traders/transporters they will remain poor. Therefore macro economic policy to ensure such businesses have credit access (e.g. commercial banks to finance inventories and hire purchase/leasing units to purchase transport equipment) is important.

not via subsidised rates but by influencing financial institution policy and perhaps, by initial period partial loan loss guarantees.<sup>49</sup>

## IV

### COMPONENTS TOWARD REHABILITATION

The components of a rehabilitation strategy are not particularly hard to set out in general terms. However, contextual differences mean that particular projects within broad categories, priorities, sequences and amount of analysis and consultation needed to identify micro content will vary widely, certainly among countries, sometimes among districts within a country and quite probably in a country over time (e.g. immediate prewar/several years on, and also after renewed violence or other setback).

Major **components** include:

1. **livelihood rehabilitation**;
2. **restoration and enhancement/modernisation of basic service access** (including law, order, justice and security);
3. local basic **infrastructure** repair - restoration - maintenance;
4. **market access** (on at least a minimally equitable and competitive basis);
5. parallel **crisis support and snapback** ('safety net' and 'trampoline') structures to alleviate and reverse impact of calamities and catastrophes;
6. overall **macro economic ('adjustment'), micro and macro political (reconciliation) and large infrastructural and production unit restoration (reconstruction)** strategies/programmes/policies interacting with rehabilitation in a positive way and sustainable in their own terms as well as contributing to the sustainability of rehabilitation.
7. **governance** units capable of providing inputs into a/d (both financially and in respect to personnel);
8. **involvement** of local government units, civil society actors and intended programme beneficiaries in data collection, programme design, decision taking, on-going evaluation and review in parallel to involvement in mobilising human-physical-financial and organisational **inputs**;



9. **relationships with external bodies** (national governments, INGO's national bilateral and multilateral agency donor) which are **conducive to rebuilding** (not further dividing and eroding) local and national capacity;

**Livelihood rehabilitation** can be defined as enabling households to achieve incomes (including production used within the household) at or above the absolute poverty line.<sup>50</sup> In the case of perhaps 70% of displaced households in both the past and future, livelihood is primarily small farming production possibly augmented by one or more urban or overseas working (and remitting) members and, more frequently in some but not all contexts seasonal wage labour in agriculture or construction.<sup>51</sup> Urban livelihoods and their rehabilitation are more diverse, problematic and contextual with a majority likely to be informal and especially so called informal wage employment<sup>52</sup> and a significant minority artisanal producers or semi fixed (barrow or stall) place of business.

Support needs (and need to support) may vary by type of household. **Demobilised combatants** - especially if young - frequently have limited non violent skills or social capital and experience but the potential for being very dangerous if not reintegrated into civil society and the civilian economy. What is appropriate varies, but the needs are special enough, and the risks of not meeting them high enough, to justify particular analysis and resource allocation (including training programmes as well as tools - urban or rural - for demobilisees). **Returnees** from exile or displacement are almost always the majority of war impoverished households. The special need of 'going home' has been addressed above.

**Female headed households** are likely to have two types of special needs:

- a. bad productive ratios of able bodied hands to hungry mouths because - unlike male headed households - they usually have only one able bodied adult earner;
- b. specific cultural - economic problems which may include, e.g., access to land use rights, to drought animals for ploughing (likely to be especially important to such households because of 'a'), to knowledge of how to manage large stock (sheep, goats and above) which - especially in SSA - usually falls on the male (including boys) side of the gender division of labour.

**Traumatised, physically or mentally partially or fully disabled and/or isolated** (as orphans or old persons) individuals require particular programmes. Their present livelihood generation

capacity is likely to be low, but except for the severely disabled and the aged, recovery is possible. The first step however (humanly and economically) is treatment (which includes even semi trained 'tender loving care in community') and integration into an economically viable household unit, whether their original one or a (usually related) successor.<sup>53</sup> In the case of orphans the largest numbers in SSA may be HIV/AIDS not war orphans but the needs and programmatic implications are largely the same.<sup>54</sup>

Identification specifically on the basis of pre war below poverty line income is not self evidently useful unless to highlight clusters of causal factors - e.g. no negligible access to land and/or - in pastoral districts - core livestock to set up a herd. A literal and formalistic policy to seek to restore livelihoods only to pre war levels of livelihood would raise serious ethical and political problems with no very evident likelihood of positive economic efficiency tradeoff gains.

**Basic services** in the context of rehabilitation virtually always include:

1. **law, order, peace, security** and **justice** as perceived by ordinary households.
2. access to nearby relatively pure **water** - household which may include livestock and small plot irrigation depending on their economic system;
3. preventative, educational (not least in respect to HIV and malaria as well as mother and child), first aid and simple curative **health** services;<sup>55</sup>
4. primary and frequently applied adult, **education**.

**Agricultural extension** and **veterinary** services appear as priorities in some areas, but not all - apparently depending on pre war coverage and perceived usefulness of such services.

The short list is not definitive in the sense that frequently some districts or portions of districts will have special priorities which are genuinely key to them, but are not relevant to other areas e.g. baboon and crocodile control (to protect endangered crops and children respectively). Flood control (more accurately perhaps preemptive flood damage limitation) is also highly specific (e.g. deltas) possible priority.

The particular form of service needed/desired may vary and have extensive - not always self evident - ramifications. An example is draught power (whether oxen or donkeys - a choice related to heaviness or lightness of soil):

- a. in some districts and sub-districts it has been widely used and is usually a war casualty since draught animals can provide military or bandit transport, food and loot (or refugee transport, food and survival assets);
- b. the patterns of use are peculiar, apparently relating to historical presence of dedicated veterinary/agricultural staff and successful initial users more than to ecological or crop pattern divergences;
- c. both draught animals and their users (at least for ploughing) require significant specialist training courses;
- d. the cost of draught animals and ploughs (plus carts if used for transporting goods) is substantial - massive for very poor, war ravaged returnees;
- e. women headed households in principle are in most need of draught power to plough because of limited adult hand power, but in practice animal drawn ploughing has historically usually been virtually entirely on the male side of the gender division of labour.

The operational implications include:

1. recovering (whether from agricultural district records or interviews with farmers) baseline data on whether? how commonly? for what? how trained? who used?
2. determining whether in terms of benefit/cost tradeoffs, support for reintroduction of draught animals would be an efficient use of scarce resources and, if so, how they (plus ploughs, carts) could be made accessible to poor households and, in particular, female headed ones;
3. identifying personnel, promotion and training issues.

In many post war rehabilitation contexts, draught power will not be a priority issue. In Acholiland both some officials and politicians and some researchers and small farming households believe that it is.<sup>56</sup> Pre war 50,000 draught animals were estimated to be in service in Gulu and Kitgum Districts i.e. about one per five households which would imply up to half the agricultural land could have been ploughed by them. However, coverage appears to have been patchy. The heavy black cotton soil of the two districts is unsuitable for hand hoeing, suggesting reintroduction should be economically viable - and a potential breakthrough for 'best local known practice' focussed

agricultural extension. Oxen cost perhaps \$1,000 each. Women rarely ploughed. At most 1,500 - 2,500 oxen have survived.

That is not enough data to act, but it is enough to suggest guidelines for consultation (especially with would be/returnee small farm households), data refining, training and access (e.g. 3 to 5 women 'user teams') conceptualisation, and funds plus personnel (plus oxen) mobilisation if prior steps yield positive answers.

This example is not only not intended to imply animal draught power is central in all or most rehabilitation contexts but also not to conclude that it should/can be a top priority in Acholiland. Rather it serves to illustrate contextual diversity and multiple interacting issues within an apparently simple (or perhaps pair of) basic services - agricultural veterinary support - and to exemplify identifying an issue for urgent study and a study process capable of leading to a quick, informed decision.

**Local basic infrastructure** repair, reconstruction will usually need to focus on roads - bridges - culverts, health posts and clinics, primary schools, wells and other local and small town waterworks plus police stations and other local level governmental buildings. In some cases other facilities, e.g. small scale irrigation will also be key. These facilities/infrastructures are usually heavily debilitated by lack of maintenance during conflict, as well as, or more than - by war time attacks.

The risk is usually not so much in repairing/rebuilding rapidly to previous standards in previous locations. That is broadly correct if most people go home. Even raising size and numbers of facilities to increase access can often be determined to be a priority after quite brief consultations. Rather it lies in long initial delays - hampering livelihood recovery and basic service access restoration - followed by over enthusiastic upgrading. Both result in draining basic services including infrastructure maintenance - resources<sup>57</sup> and creating a serious recurrent/capital budget imbalance.

There is a significant **interaction** between **Rehabilitation of local** infrastructure and **national infrastructure Reconstruction**. The latter poses more need for detailed analysis and more cases for altering pre war patterns, e.g. in Mozambique only the three main rail lines from Maputo, Beira and Ncala would appear to have strong cases for reconstruction. In the case of the Nampula -

Lichinga link there is little case for long term continued use. Unless a major coal development at Moatize justifies a line to a new deep water port (not Beira), with links to Beira and Malawi where it intersects existing lines, reconstruction of the Zambesi delta – Malawi – Moatize line is not on. Beyond a highway replacing the Nampula-Lichinga rail line, the key highway questions in Mozambique do not concern the broad national/provincial highway net but what standards and what maintenance strategies are appropriate.<sup>58</sup>

It is not self evident 'old' basic transport infrastructures were usually inappropriate even if most main routes linked to the main ports. SSA does need to engage more, not less, intensively in international trade. e.g. The 1980's Somaliland highway grid was T shaped with the perpendicular stroke Berbera-Hargeisa and the horizontal the Boramo (Ethiopian Frontier) -Hargeisa - Ethiopian branch to Jijiga - Burao - Erigavo/Las Anod-Somalia route. These broadly follow several century old caravan routes: an Ethiopian Highlands to Red Sea trade route and an internal (and trade route feeder) one linking most of Somaliland's towns and productive rural areas. The ongoing, largely EU (and EU member state) financed, bridge, culvert and other repairs especially on the two routes to Ethiopia (Addis and Djijiga respectively) does relate positively to the needs of livelihood rehabilitation and local infrastructure utilisation as well as to macro commercial and financial (and Ethiopian famine prevention/alleviation as well as international trade) concerns.<sup>59</sup>

The main purpose of transport and communications restoration is to rehabilitate market access and thus livelihood beyond basic food security. That purpose requires a rehabilitated rural trading network linking food, raw material and labour flows to towns; return flows of processed and manufactured goods and both inter and intra district rural trade. The **overriding issue is not public versus private sector but rather small farming household access to reasonably fair price buyers/sellers**. That may well usually be met better by relatively competitive private (or private and voluntary co-op) traders than by state crop purchasing and consumer goods trading corporations. Similarly the issue is not one of subsidising merchants but of ensuring (which may require initial state guarantees to commercial banks or participation in joint venture leasing/hire purchase companies) that enterprises do have access to credit for vehicles and working capital (inventories).

**Crisis** (especially food crisis) safety nets are an important part of sustaining rehabilitation.

Droughts and floods are not suspended because hostilities are. Even low level attacks can rupture

fragile market networks in the process of rehabilitation. During farm rehabilitation outside income from work for (cash for) food projects may often be needed. Food/food aid requirements certainly last at least until the end of the first complete crop cycle after war and are likely to be renewed at one or more points during the rehabilitation process by exogenous events.

### **Economic Good Housekeeping And Rehabilitation**

None of the forgoing denies the necessity of **macro economic good housekeeping** ('structural adjustment' or 'prudence with a purpose' to use alternative presentational styles). Fiscal, price, foreign exchange imbalances need to be held to sustainable levels; incentives (not least peace, law and order) provided for large as well as small businessmen; large scale strategic infrastructure and enterprises reconstructed and/or pioneered (by both public and private sectors). Without this macro context, livelihoods/basic human need costs imbalances will remain unsustainable, basic service access will stagnate and rehabilitation will stall or disintegrate. That, however, is an interface/background issue rather than a part of rehabilitation operational programming.

To act on the previously noted elements of rehabilitation requires several aspects of governance (largely rather boring and tedious ones) be strengthened. Whatever may remain at the time of peace it rarely includes robust, decentralised civil governance with a high capacity to deliver basic services and infrastructure, to analyse in order to determine a policy set which will enhance livelihood and rural/small town market network recovery or to collect data and insights and interact in decision taking, resource mobilisation and programme management with domestic civil society actors. Therefore - because **these capacities are crucial to R-R-R** and turn largely on government financing, staffing, training and openness to participation and to coordination - **their recreation (or creation)<sup>60</sup> is central to rehabilitation**. Because ability to deliver is a (perhaps often the) major test of legitimacy, these capacity aspects of governance - however a political, technical or micro they may seem at first glance - are crucial to maintaining political legitimacy and sustaining reconciliation.

Involvement of local government, communities, civil society bodies and domestic NGO's in data collection, decision taking and implementation for mobilisation, social capital and efficiency of

resource use is important to speed and efficiency of resource allocation and use as well as 'political' reasons.

The strategy for external actor relations needs to be national. But without local capacity to interact/negotiate with INGO's and to present proposals or data to go into them for presentation to bilateral donors and international agencies no such self determination, self respect and honest negotiation strategy can work in a way which is user friendly for poor households in general or those returning from war displacement in particular.

## V

### RECURRENT ISSUES

R-R-R **cannot be reduced** to R as in **Replication** for several reasons:

1. **flaws in what existed** before the war are likely to have contributed to it;
2. **war by its nature creates new facts** which R-R-R must face - e.g. a qualitative as well as quantitative increase in female headed households;
3. certain groups e.g. rank and file **combattants** and **entrepreneurs who have adjusted** to war contexts will often (not always) lose from peace unless attention is given and support (e.g. training, credit access) provided for their rebasing their livelihoods in an economy of peace;
4. **the world's structural shifts are not halted during war** - e.g. the explosive post 1975 rise of HIV and post mid 1980's resurgence of malaria as well as the refocusing of health services on decentralised primary units with more emphasis on education, prevention (including vaccination), mother and child care mean that, while rehabilitation in Mozambique can build from 1975-80 strategy and praxis, health sector rehabilitation in e.g. Somaliland, Rwanda, Ethiopia or even Acholiland (where the suspension of positive change dates back to 1970) would be ill advised to replicate, and have not done so.
5. **certain issues by their nature are integral to war and its settlement** including e.g. justice, amnesty, forgiveness and peace.

#### **Resource Access - Land**

Access to **resources** is central to livelihood rehabilitation. Similarly in respect to governmental institutions, to basic service and infrastructure and, in respect to enterprises beyond household level, to market and general productive/trading/transport economy recovery. The central resources for most displaced persons in most post war contexts is **land**. This is most true for the usually rural 60%-80%, but may also apply to urban displacees who do need secure residence or business sites. However, **land is not the only relevant resource**. Basic services and market access can be considered resources, but have been treated above. Others are input access (e.g. tools, seeds, cutlasses, artisinal raw materials) and credit access.



Whatever the pre war access to resources system, it is most unlikely to have been poor person friendly. This feature means pure replication in all respects would probably increase inequality, render wartime loss of resources likely to be permanent (e.g. land grabbing) and - because almost all returnee households are absolutely poor - discriminate against war afflicted households.

**Peri urban** land is frequently the most confused as to status and the least secure because both agricultural historic usehold right holders and government units claim title while actual occupiers have frequently settled on ill delineated plots with dubious and ill documented transfers (or terms and conditions of continued use) from either. The need for security of use in these areas suggest either documented 39 year (or longer) transferable leasehold to demarcated plots or similar freehold together with programming orderly basic service extension (at least to the extent of keeping plots and access routes for them clear - e.g. something a typical Makonde concentric circle village layout in a peri urban neighbourhood does not do whether its incomers are ordinary migrants or war displaced persons).

**Access to land** is partly contextual - urban (usually freehold and relatively clearly and stably demarcated pre war) is different from rural which varies with the nature of the pre war system (e.g. historic household secure usehold vs individual freehold) and how well - for whom - it worked pre war.

In the urban context, returnee claims in land/improvements should be clarifiable and the return of property should usually be practicable. The problems arise if:

- a. settlement of claims of elites who fled (e.g. from Mozambique) comes long after reallocation and a substantial number of low income households would be negatively affected;
- b. the returnees (as in Rwanda) are associated with (even if not necessarily part of) the losers of a civil war and those occupying the property are associated with the winners and are themselves returnees from an earlier body of refugees.<sup>61</sup>

**Rural** land is usually held either on a freehold basis, on an historic secure household usehold tenure basis or on a mix of both. Mix cases may or may not demarcate clearly between freehold and historic tenure and may or may not record both types of rights. If they do not, as in Mozambique's largely unreformed Portuguese imperial registration system designed to facilitate

land grabbing, very serious risks arise for historic tenure holders especially if they return after absence, the standard case of refugees and internally displaced households coming home.

The issue of secure, hereditary, leaseable **usehold** versus **freehold** has little to do with security of return, of rehabilitation of livelihoods or of access for female headed households. For none is it either a necessary or a sufficient condition. Freehold may increase small farming household security of tenure (or via debt accumulation the reverse), may increase ability to borrow (implying rather foolish banks in many contexts) and/or incentivate higher productivity albeit why, unless prior usehold tenure was insecure and/or credit on crops not well developed, is unclear. However, the enormous personnel, educational and institutional capacity requirements of transition to freehold suggest it is better put further down the phasing list and probably after the rehabilitation process has largely run its course.

What is **key** - and **urgent** - is to **record both freehold and historic titles**, to set up **procedures that prevent one encroaching on the other**, to record historic rules and processes to allow central and local government to relate to them and to avoid assuming that any land is 'vacant' until after return to prevent opportunistic land grabbing. A particular additional problem may arise - as it has in Guinea-Bissau in a pre or inter war context - if long rotation (so called 'shifting cultivation') is practiced with apparently vacant lands those fallow/reforesting prior to rotating back into use. The issue of equal access for female headed households - which often, not always, needs adjustment of the existing versions of historic systems - is treated below.

**Return may not lead to serious conflict.** One positive example is Mozambique historic tenure areas. There the basic conflicts are freehold encroachment on historic tenure land and returnee self resettlement on long abandoned - often up to 10-15 years - freehold land in their home districts.<sup>62</sup> In the historic tenure areas about 10,000,000 people in 2,000,000 households have gone home from refugee, internally displaced or pauperised/hiding in old home areas status. These include 8,000,000 - 9,000,000 small farming sector persons. The number of serious conflicts have been low with sustained, wide reaching violence apparently unknown. Returnees and elders have been able either to identify which household (often by inheritance from a war dead prior designated holder) had a right to which land or/and which household had valid claims for how much/how good alternative or new land. This process was usually facilitated by District and Provincial governments, but carried out by the households and their representatives, especially elders.

Another positive case is Somaliland. Pastoral land (and water) use rights on return from 1991 have not led to more quarrels than usual and none (at least in respect to pastoral rights *per se* as opposed to 'rent' due for their use for an airport or port) of them violent or large scale despite (as in Mozambique) over 50% wartime displacements.

In Somaliland agro-pastoral areas recorded titles have existed since the post war British period. Again return has not led to a higher or more violent level of quarrels even though a number of holders are Somalians who came in and got title during the Barre regime. When a satellite based cadastral survey was launched it was welcomed.<sup>63</sup> In fact so eager to know exact boundaries and to receive updated certificates were the household heads that they quickly compromised cross claims.<sup>64</sup> The macro goal was to avert agro pastoral encroachment on neighbouring pastoral areas partly because this would threaten drought year fallback grazing capacity and partly because it would in some cases lead to serious inter lineage group and sub clan conflict.

Uganda which had a semi registered/semi historic title system in Acholiland has adopted freehold registration nationally but - partly because of the very real risk better educated, better connected Kampalans can come up faster with 'better' papers than actual displaced historic users - has deferred its application.<sup>65</sup> That should allow local government and elders time both to sort quarrels on return and to address the female headed household issue (to avert all freehold in practice going to men and extinguishing women's traditional rights on household land held in a male name).

In Mozambique the risk - general to parallel historic theme/freehold systems as, e.g., in the Philippines - is that continued allocation of titles (including 'concessions' which by giving all or one crop marketing monopolies to concessionaires positively cry out that they are unconstitutionally abrogating historic 'secure' small farming household use rights!) with no reference to prior occupation, not disputes over or reallocation of historic tenure, is the basic land law obstacle to sustaining the success of returning home. This is all the more true because it is a visible symbol of a belief (belied by output, food supply and export figures) that only large farms and foreign farm operators could be productive. That myth runs for over 500 years from Portuguese *prazeiros*, plantation and settler farmers through independence era state farms to sustain abandoned Portuguese unit production and to introduce large scale irrigation and support for -in British colonial policy terms - 'yeoman farmers' and replacement estate operators to the present search for 'good' South African farmers eager to leave the 'Rainbow Nation' and set up on 'virgin soil' in

Mozambique. While there have been successes - at least in production - in general the history has been one of violence, insecurity for small farming households, mediocre output trends and much social and political grief.<sup>66</sup> On the face of it **return home/rehabilitation are a time to suspend not replicate or seek to transform such 'modernisation'**.

### **Resource Access: Tools, Food Inputs**

**Seeds, tools** and, in many cases, **livestock** access are crucial to livelihood recovery as is **food 'working capital'** for the rehabilitation of land and housing and awaiting first crop harvest period after return home. Beyond highlighting the need there is not too much cross country generalisation can offer beyond the warning that contexts vary widely.

Seed-tool-food 'packages' should logically be **provided in areas of return** - if these can in practice be pre-identified and distribution nets set up. Who distributes (INGO's, local government, central government, WFP, UNHCR) matters less. Second best is provision of 'packages' in refugee and displaced person camps/settlements before return. In this variant, structures for identification and delivery exist but coverage is likely to be very incomplete (self or family - community help refugees and displaced persons are in practice excluded) and the 9-15 months likely food needs to first harvest are hardly best provided in a single 'package'. Loans are unsuitable - primarily for administrative reasons in respect to recovery

**Food access** is in fact a larger and longer lasting challenge than that of seeds and tools. Usually - at least if the war period and displacement exceeded 18 months - 9 to 15 months are needed to reclaim (e.g. re-clear, re-drain) land, restore housing, plant, tend and achieve (drought and flood permitting) a harvest. In the case of plantations this is comprised in labour cost (wages) and treated as investment in fixed asset restoration. The same logic applies to 'return home'. The households - on return very rarely have the 'entitlements' to secure food (nor - less uniformly - close household members earning elsewhere and remitting). The logical general solution is work for cash to buy food (e.g. via WFP and ILO guided labour intensive small to medium scale construction/civil engineering) to restore food entitlements, local infrastructure and the rural commerce/transport network.

In practice, because such logical solutions have proven very hard to get in place in time, the actual system is '**phased return**'. Refugees/displaced persons remain on camp registers but most able bodied, adult household members go home to reclaim land/rebuild houses/plant crops while returning monthly to pick up rations collected by wives and children staying on in camp.<sup>67</sup> That practice is **not** fraud, but a sensible way of coping with slow, rigid bureaucracy to secure the means to restore livelihood bases.<sup>68</sup>

Analogous issues can arise for artisans and - as noted earlier - rural commercial operators. These are quite context specific. Urban artisans may or may not have had to sell their tools, demobilisees graduating from training courses presumably need tool kits to benefit. On the face of it local government or domestic social actor operated identification of beneficiaries and grants of tools would seem appropriate as the administration (including personnel and institutional) costs of tiny loan collection outweigh plausible benefits and local level actors can probably identify appropriate recipients. In practice few such programmes have been mounted in post war rehabilitation contexts though they do exist with some results in non war contexts - e.g. in Tanzania linked to vocational education.

**Livestock** access is often an intractable issue in contexts in which pastoral income was dominant pre war and most of the herds failed to survive requisition, theft, disease and displacement. Community/lineage mutual insurance schemes break down when loss levels are over 50% (perhaps over 25%). Viable sources of replacement livestock may be hard or impossible to identify and tap. Somaliland's<sup>69</sup> 1991-99 success in near total restoration of sheep and goat and - probably - 75% plus of cattle and camel herds is not widely replicable:

- a. a significant proportion of flocks and herds had been safeguarded in exile in Ethiopia;
- b. kinship mutual insurance systems were strong;
- c. sheep and goats breed much faster than cattle allowing shorter flock than herd recovery cycles;
- d. diaspora remittances provided many households the cash to buy (or not to sell during recovery period) cattle and in Ethiopia's Somali region there was a suitable source (genetically and commercially) of cattle and camels.

In Acholiland (Uganda) a head on state assault on replacing the \$200 million plus herd loss (90% of cattle and drought oxen) is not practicable because neither the finance nor the beasts to buy can be identified. But selective 3 to 5 year programmes focussed - e.g. - on drought oxen (up to 50,000 and \$50 million) and on artificial insemination might be viable and meet the clear Acholi need-demand-priority for means to enable them to restore herds and therefore the majority of their pre war cash income from livestock sales.<sup>70</sup>

The cattle (and to a lesser extent sheep, goats, camels) problem is at the core of the reason that **calamity or catastrophe afflicted pastoralists face greater barriers to returning home and restoring livelihoods** than do agriculturalists or agro pastoralists. The Somali pastoralist's lament to the reporter who in the early 1990's noted that the rains and the pasture had returned: 'Yes, the rains have come and brought back the grass, but they have not brought my dead camels back to life' is relevant to the end of hostilities and insecurity - access to grazing land and water points, yes, the herds to utilise them, no.

Access to **credit** is important to rehabilitation - including as noted earlier commercial credit to the rural transport and merchant sectors vital to restore market access and therefore, the cash income element of small farming household livelihoods. The same considerations apply to medium and small enterprises (urban and rural) in construction, manufacturing, property operation or rental, services and trade.

For micro enterprises and households (overlapping categories, but given usual separation of incomes and budgets quite possibly often two micro enterprises in one household) different concerns and approaches arise. 'Normal' commercial banks, leasing/hire purchase companies and their analogues cannot lend viably to such enterprises:

1. their operating procedures for risk analysis as well as for loan management and collection lead to costs per loan which cannot be covered by interest on micro loans;
2. as large, impersonal, 'they' entities, such enterprises have few social claims on borrowers and the costs of legal processes exceed any possible recoveries on micro loans. Thus they are likely to have medium to high non-recovery rates.

Specialised micro credit institutions may or may not be able to overcome those barriers:

1. to the extent they are embedded in institutions also providing technical and operational information/advice and facilitating access to inputs and markets they may be able to spread overhead costs over a wider base;
2. to the extent the lending body (directly or via an intermediary) is perceived as 'us', part of society, morally valid and that it lends largely to members or to small groups whose links mean an individual's default would lead to significant losses of social capital and of community respect, they can often reduce loss rates dramatically.

These factors suggest a large state, enterprise or INGO single purpose micro credit provider may have many of the problems of a bank. It can probably only avert these by operating through a domestic social sector (mosque, church, trade union, women's group, community organisation voluntary small farmers' co-op) which does have social ethical status and, therefore, leverage and also a multipurpose programme to provide sharing of overheads.<sup>71</sup>

These credit access issues are not unique to post war rehabilitation and adequate access to poor persons/households and appropriate enterprises rarely existed pre war. But with very large numbers of 'old' and 'new' poor households and for rebuilding social capital parallel to livelihoods they are potentially crucial in many such contexts.

### **Basic Services And Safety Nets**

**Access to basic services and to safety nets** are crucial to rehabilitation. Increased health, knowledge and access to water (to increase time available for other uses - not least school for girls - as well as to increase pastoral and garden plot productivity and health) are relevant to present as well as to future ability to enhance household livelihoods. So is an assured work for cash for food or, if that is administratively impracticable, distribution of rations after floods and droughts. Without it rehabilitation will certainly be subject to setbacks and the process may collapse.

Basic services and safety nets have in general been discussed in other sections. Special access areas relevant in particular to demobilisees and, in some cases, returning small farming households are **vocational training** and **agricultural extension** (backed by veterinary services and market

availability of the - usually 4 to 6 - key veterinary products, including rock salt, relevant to common disease control in particular zones).

**Demobilisees** usually have little pre-war vocational experience or training. Both those (often a large majority) intending to return to their family background of farming and those seeking artisanal or semi skilled employment can benefit from training. Food, housing, (in barracks or camps where practicable) and six months training (based on an employment/self employment potential survey) can - judging by Zimbabwe experience - reintegrate/integrate two thirds to three quarters of demobilisees into viable civilian livelihoods. The alternatives of abject poverty, 'self help' use of guns and 'stockpiling' in the armed forces (practiced by Ghana in the 1970's and Somaliland from 1995) are less attractive and ultimately more costly.

What **agricultural extension** can offer varies widely. Probably **generalisation of 'domestic best practice'** (an approach Mozambican sources suggest is central to results obtained beyond cotton and cashew) has the most general quick payoff potential if field officers are (or can rapidly be trained to be) competent to identify, comprehend and extend. For some crops there may be other shelf/pipeline knowledge and techniques. Many extension services in SSA have next to no adapted/locally field tested knowledge to extend. That does underline the case for more research and adaptation/testing of internationally available knowledge. but that is a process largely outside of, and over a longer time span than, rehabilitation proper.

### **Access Barriers - Fees And Charges**

**Charges and fees** to returnees engaged in initial livelihood rehabilitation are a **mirror image access issue**. They create obstacles to access for poor households in general and for rural rehabilitees, who have very low cash incomes even after restoring basic household food security, in particular.

Water to a degree poses different considerations than health and education. In urban areas alternatives to public sector supply normally carry significant cash and/or opportunity (time) costs. In rural areas the main cost is likely to be time. In both cases the time cost is likely to reduce ability to work or to produce for cash - especially in pastoral or irrigation contexts so that a cash and/or time water burden sharing arrangement may be both acceptable to users and practicable.



Timing and structuring of charges to fit with seasonal income stream patterns is apparently easier than for health and education whose point of use timings tend to correspond to low income periods. A substantial portion of user contributions can be via user committee mobilisation of labour and materials for routine management/maintenance. Even so, in the early stages of rehabilitation a case can be made for temporary waiver of the cash (not the labour and materials) element of both recurrent and - especially - establishment or reconstruction capital costs.

**Fees, charges and cost sharing** issues have to date rarely been raised in the specific context of rehabilitation, but do have special significance during its early years. Even in general fees for health and education by central governments have relatively poor success records: revenues below targets (and often under 5% of total primary level costs, or - say - ten cents per bottle of beer or pack of cigarettes), widespread corruption, high collection cost to revenue ratios, very high exclusion of potential user rates even when waiver schemes exist in principle (or alternatively very patchy efforts to collect). The World Bank (based on **ex post** studies) has become less enthusiastic, albeit the IMF has not. Especially in SSA schemes are still expanding.<sup>72</sup>

Highly **decentralised** systems with more **flexible** waiver, contribution (not necessarily primarily at point of use or all in cash) and decision taking structures at local government, community and domestic civil society group level do have **more cases of success**, but such cash and participation sharing approaches appear to need **substantial social capital bases and institutions which are both technically competent in respect to financial management and respected as service deliverers**. They are all more successful in respect to water than to health and education.<sup>73</sup>

The initial rehabilitation period appears unlikely to be one in which these conditions can usually be met:

1. household cash incomes - especially in isolated areas - are very low while - with poor transport and sparse service coverage - the time opportunity costs of using services are higher than in other areas, often absolutely and certainly relative to cash income;
2. social capital has usually been war eroded even in areas in which ethnic cleavages are not prominent. While successful rehabilitation processes do tend to have a two directional positive relation with such cleavages, it is unlikely that joint fee collection is an optimal starting point;

3. local government and - less uniformly - local civil society bodies are still building or rebuilding from low levels of service delivery and financial managerial capacity and may (e.g. in Rwanda where pre 1994 local government seems to have been more about security policing than service delivery) have previous negative histories to overcome.<sup>74</sup>

However, Somaliland<sup>75</sup> can be cited as case in which domestic NGO social actors have played a major role in health and education recovery with fees (and exemptions) prominent in their financial operations, while local governments have used urban water (largely UNICEF/INGO restored on the capital works side) as a means to build credibility and also to achieve modest surpluses for - e.g. - sanitation. However, in respect to health and education coverage - while above 1985 levels - is very low and appears to exclude (however unintended) poor persons and also most pastoral households because adequate clinic or school size (except mobile school and community paramedic) for fee based viability cannot be achieved. Moreover, Somaliland's partial success is probably heavily dependent on very high remittance levels which inject cash into household and domestic NGO budgets.

Possible approaches include:

1. a strategic decision that all charges be at local governance/social actor level with freedom to determine timing, level, nature (cash and/or agreed services such as maintenance and goods such as food, building materials, furniture) and exemption provisions;
2. special grants in rehabilitation zones to allow local government units to waive most fees (or charge at very low levels) during the initial rehabilitation period;
3. where overseas remittances are actually or potentially substantial, systematically promote diaspora member contributions to civil society/domestic NGO and local governance basic service provision to reduce fee levels needed;
4. develop government/civil society actor partnerships to augment domestic civil society group service provision if these groups have perceived capacity and legitimacy and state service provider coverage will necessarily remain limited for an extended period.<sup>76</sup>

## Rehabilitation And Gender

**Gender and patterns of womens' participation** issues arise in the rehabilitation context for three reasons:

1. wars have disproportionately negative affects on women (and children and aged who are usually particular concerns of women), creating particular needs for redress/restitution in the R-R process.<sup>77</sup> That factor is enhanced because war creates greater 'enforced opportunities' - men dead or away at war - for women leading to greater post war organisation, clarity of agendas and - often - self confidence;
2. the increase (often of the order of 5% to 25%) of female headed rural households during civil wars requires attention to women's access to land as a foundation for livelihood opportunities if these households including their children are not to be locked into absolute poverty;
3. time, attitudes and knowledge (including knowledge by women returning home) have not stood still during war. Therefore, the replication of pre war social, economic and household relations will rarely be desirable and often would be impracticable.

In principle a fourth category would be inequitable, oppressive or iniquitous gender relations which had been significant contributing causes to war. In practice such relations have indeed existed in some contexts, but do not appear in themselves to have contributed to armed conflict.

The most general gender 'issue' requiring special attention and priority is the increased proportion of female headed households. These - unless headed by wage employed full or semi professionals - are particularly likely to be caught in an absolute poverty trap. The reason is not primarily that they are female headed, but that they have a **poor able bodied hands to earn/hungry mouths to feed ratio** because they are overwhelmingly single able bodied adult/multiple dependent (children, disabled, aged) households.<sup>78</sup> This indicates a need not just for access to land but also for techniques/technology to reduce the working time availability disadvantages facing these households. These are likely to be context specific:

- a. the example of animal traction power and the complexities of introducing it have been discussed in other sections of this paper;

- b. increased access to nearby water saves womens' and girls' time for household, directly income generating, educational and other purposes;
- c. small scale, inexpensive units to mill maize, decorticate millet and sorghum, crush oilseeds can offer reduced labour time, low cost (versus shop purchase) nutritious weaning food and cash income if training, microcredit and womens's self organisation can be promoted jointly.

None of the above relate only to female headed households or only in the context of rehabilitation. All are of special concern to women and to children because they fall almost totally on the female side of African gender divisions of labour and of incomes (and children - except in many cases for school fees - on the female side of budget obligations). Evidently when successful such innovations benefit not so poor households (including their male members) in non war contexts. The reason for their coverage here is that they and similar innovations and access broadening discussed above can be of particular benefit to female headed households in rehabilitation processes.

**Rehabilitation is not a magic bullet** - given what came before an unsettling analogy! - to resolve all issues and to reverse all inequities. Rehabilitation - and even R-R-R- agendas - are not identical to gender agendas even if they overlap. Rehabilitation's contribution lies primarily in the areas of livelihood and access empowerment. To play those roles effectively, requires attention to actual gender divisions of labour, of household budget obligations on input of labour time and meeting certain cash expenditure categories and claims on labour time and categories of cash income receipt. African household budget patterns vary widely, but are rarely one household/one budget forms and similarly while gender obligations/claims balances are frequently highly unequal, unilateral male claim/female obligation patterns are virtually unknown. For example, in some contexts increased male calls for female labour input into crops whole sale proceeds the men keep have resulted in parallel food crop (for household use or sale with proceeds to women) labour inputs from men or the husband paying wages to his wife directly or via a more complex multi household circuit.<sup>79</sup>

Because patterns vary - e.g. as to whether men or women are obligated to pay school fees - the determination of gender impact of particular measures requires contextual knowledge. Division of labour patterns - e.g. that girls and women collect water and do routine water point (and household) maintenance but men do contribute in cash and labour to water system initial construction - also

can have a major impact on the gender gains division of particular programmes. Given the labour time scarcity in many female headed households noted above, rehabilitation measures should seek to balance labour savings in favour of women.

While access to resources (including basic services) and economic opportunities is probably the focal rehabilitation contribution to gender issues, empowerment on one front can be relevant to others. For example, because water collection, water point maintenance and collection/management of water use area are 'womens' work' (with male mobilisation usually limited to labour and/or cash to establish facilities), men may well accept women taking a leading role in User Committees to manage - maintain - collect funds for spares and servicing by technical personnel. In turn success by women in one area is likely - not certain - to lead to increased access to leadership roles in others.

### **Food Aid - Uses And Problems**

**Food aid** and its relation to **food security** are recurrent issues in respect to rehabilitation as well as to survival assistance during catastrophes or calamities. The debate tends to comprise several sub-issues:

- a. national physical availability and capacity to distribute related to hungry household entitlements (which may lead to similar conclusions in the case of very poor persons in a poor, food short, war torn - whether at war or just after - context);
- b. quantity of food provided versus timing (i.e. late food aid may fail to avert dearth or even famine, but later damage farming household income recovery in a subsequent good harvest year during which the late 'aid' creates a glut);
- c. appropriate place and timing of food supply to returnee households vs. the naïve argument that 0 to 6 months food provided at camps for use after 'return home' will normally be adequate;
- d. balancing administrative feasibility, avoidance of leakage and support for (damage to) commercial food network in evaluating issuing rations, providing food for work, employing to work for cash for food. Failure to recognise that, when feasible, the last should have the most positive impact on infrastructure and rural commercial sector rehabilitation and - if paralleled

by food rations and/or meals (perhaps via local domestic social actions to aged, disabled and other unable to work groups - should have few offsetting negative effects is likely to lead to poorer actual than possible programmes.

True the case for food aid rests on two assumptions:

1. food aid is given for mixed reasons (including Northern farmer interests) and its termination would not lead to substantial increases in cash grants;
2. in some countries food aid is harder to divert and more likely to reach poor persons than is cash.

The first proposition almost certainly is valid - in whole or in large part - for the USA, the EU and a majority of its members and for Canada, Australia and Japan. The second is not as robust as it might seem - the potential for diversion of food and the leakiness of food delivery pipelines can be very high - but is at least partly valid.

The general - subject to contextual modification - rehabilitation position vis a vis food aid may include:

1. **Rehabilitation usually requires substantial external grant inputs** into countries/regions with substantial overall physical shortages of food. Therefore grant food aid in basic staples or readily saleable deficit commodities (e.g. sugar, vegetable oil, dried milk) can be useful;
2. **Food aid to be clearly positive requires a strategy for appropriate timing and location of delivery** over the rehabilitation process with by steps to achieve provider compliance (as to amount, timing and quality and actual recipient logistical and delivery implementation capacity).
3. **building interaction among rehabilitation process infrastructure renewal, rural commercial network recovery, household cash income regeneration and household/personal food entitlements by selling donated food to provide cash for wages and tools in support of seasonal employment for returning households:**<sup>80</sup>

## Governance And All That

**Governance** issues raised repeatedly in the R-R-R context include:

- a. capacity and efficiency
- b. probity and user friendliness;
- c. participation and decentralisation
- d. community, local government, central government, INGO, external agency relationships.

**Capacity** is clearly a functional issue. Most post conflict governments, especially in rural areas which were previously conflict or insurgent controlled zones, are weak in respect to personnel and institutional capacity. All are weak financially and, almost always, logistically. R-R-R - not least in food security - and even sketchy basic service access in 'return home' poses heavy, complex and largely new burdens.

The central issue is how to restore capacity (especially if it had collapsed pre war or the war had extended for half a decade or more). None of the R-R-R heads is one in which there is room for total spin-off to the household, civil society and/or enterprise sectors.

But in the **short run the goals of capacity building and dependence reduction may well not coincide**. **Rapid external - agency and INGO - injections** are simpler to organise (although much more expensive per unit of services delivered)<sup>81</sup> than local social actor or government capacity restoration. In principle they can complement current public and domestic NGO activity and train personnel for them. In practice there is a **high risk of their substituting for, fragmenting and eroding domestic capacity - both public and private**. Contextual patterns vary widely - Uganda (Acholiland) and Somaliland appear to have achieved broadly complementary and capacity building relationships<sup>82</sup> whereas UNOSOM in Somalia<sup>83</sup> and most - not all - INGO's/agencies in Mozambique illustrate a substitution, fragmentation and erosion process.<sup>84</sup>

In respect to rehabilitation capacity the issue is not the need for greater efficiency but how to define efficiency (or **efficiencies?**)- within a cost ceiling? unit cost of services? number of units of services delivered? lives saved? degree of poverty reduction? All can be valid targets, but efficiency toward one may entail a negative tradeoff with another. Similarly **present capacity and**

**capacity building** - i.e. present and future efficiency may well have tradeoffs (especially in centrality and pervasiveness of foreign institutional and personnel roles).

**Capacity is not only a technical question - it goes to the heart of political legitimacy.** A government perceived as unable to provide an absence of recurrent violence and disorder at least significant health, education and water services and calamity alleviation oriented food security will - at the best - have conditional and challenged legitimacy. **Improved service delivery** - in coverage and in quality - can **consolidate, deepen and broaden legitimacy.** Both **African governments and insurgents often act on that premise** - targeting basic services and food security logistics, to protect on the government side and to destroy (including mutilation, kidnapping and killing of personnel) on the insurgent.<sup>85</sup>

**Probity** (absence of pervasive corruption especially when it limits and distorts access as well as leaking away resources) and **user friendliness** (a civilian police force open to the public and perceived as seeking to avert disorder and violence and to catch as well as deter criminals - as in Somaliland<sup>86</sup> - is an example) are objectives which most R-R-R users, most SSA governments and most outside agencies and INGO's endorse. The differences relate to interpretation of causes, to priorities and to workable means to improve matters.

'**Corruption**' by personnel paid much less than the household poverty line wage is arguably a form of '**privatised, decentralised, flexible**' **user fees** enforced by 'need'. While undesirable, it may have limited distorting effects and be better than having no staff on the job. The only cure involves phased recovery of wages to the household basic poverty line parallel to training, professional and procedural regulations and provision of better tools for the job'. Pay is **not a sufficient condition** to restore probity and enhance efficiency but it is - except in the very short term - **a necessary one.**

'**User Friendliness**' - as perceived by users - who do not necessarily have identical perceptions to expatriate, or even highly educated urban based national, experts - is a factor in capacity to deliver useful services, in efficiency (useful service unity cost) and in rehabilitation legitimacy. It appears to be highly contextual in part relating to what was delivered - and valued - before the war and to perceived beneficiary groups.<sup>87</sup>

**Accountability** is sometimes linked to probity and sometimes to participation/user friendliness. Perhaps oddly it is less frequently viewed as a background from which to increase efficiency.



Accountability - especially in community R-R-R contexts - should begin literally. The presentation of **oral and written verbal and numerical accounts** (in the technical sense). Without these civil society (and senior officials or politicians) cannot 'call to account', identify areas of gross inefficiency (in respect to their goals) and pinpoint opportunities for reallocation (away from - probably 'traditional' - activities of low or low immediate priority to potential users, or non-users as the case may be).

**Decentralisation** is frequently (perhaps usually in SSA) pursued on two points: **deconcentration of central government operations** with more delegated authority to act at provincial, district and city level and **decentralisation to elected local governance units**.<sup>88</sup> The logic appears to be that new or renewed local government units cannot, or cannot yet administer large programmes or large units and therefore - for speed, flexibility, user friendliness reasons - local governance needs parallel decentralised central government units. While - especially in R-R-R contexts - there is a not inconsiderable element of realism to this logic it is also arguable that political and official (professional/bureaucratic power division) conflicts of interest play a large role.

Whether new institutions and especially two parallel sets **are** a resource allocation priority under R-R-R depends on the context both as to what functioning institutions exist, how close to the civil society pre war institutions were and whether (as in Mozambique<sup>89</sup>) war has led to substantial *de facto* deconcentration to provinces and districts.

**Participation** should go **beyond consultation** (even if the latter is taken into account in programme design) and **approach co-determination**, especially when local government structures are weak. The case for it is three fold: **efficiency** in programme and project selection, design and operation (ordinary local households know a great deal which officials and experts do not, as well as sometimes visa versa); **mobilisation** of user community resources to augment governmental (much more practicable when users feel their views are taken into account and they share in management); good **governance** (which as normally defined, goes beyond elections, accountability as to use of funds and petitioning).

The problems with instituting, sustaining and building **participation** turn on the fact that it has **significant time costs** - before decisions and their implementation and to all those participating. External actors - however pro participation in principle - clearly resent the delays; officials and professionals are none too keen to spend many hours in dialogue; poor households and women in

particular are short of time so that participation often has quite high opportunity costs for them and will not be sustained unless payoffs are apparent.

The immediate aftermath of war is a time at which participation can be especially valuable:

1. those returning home can help fill in both **pre war baseline** data (likely to have been incomplete and/or lost) and a revived baseline for the **present deteriorated position**;
2. they can also indicate their **capacities, lacks and priorities** as a set of parameters within which to allocate resources more efficiently from broad strategy to programmatic, policy and project packages;
3. as well as indicating what **material** and **labour** contributions to **cost sharing** and what **work for cash for food time** are likely to be available.

This process, at least first time around, needs to be rapid even at the expense of approximation of data (which can later be refined by further rounds of dialogue) and use of less than optimal survey/observation techniques. The results will usually include 'non obvious' - particularly historical and environmental context linked - elements.

### **External-Civil Society-Government Interaction**

In **rehabilitation** (in some cases unlike survival support) the case for domestic leadership combined with supporting (hopefully on a medium term phase down basis) external actor participation is strong. Sustainability cannot be based on permanent external dominance in finance, top personnel, knowledge and research. Rehabilitation is not a very fashionable area in the first phase and tends to have a short shelf life - e.g. no war for two years, no real external memory of the need for rehabilitation may not be an unreasonable rule of thumb.

Government to government (at strategic priorities and transfer levels) negotiated agreements on broad 3 to 6 year programmes with main policy, sectoral and project clusters identified may be the most feasible route to a coordinated, medium term approach with pre determined phasing from external and domestic sources.<sup>90</sup>

Governmental (and IFI) services - except for special small project funds<sup>91</sup> which can be very useful within a strategic frame but are unlikely to form an adequate whole - are bureaucratically and in

respect to personnel ill fitted to negotiating with and - less uniformly - to working alongside local government and domestic social sector (whether religious group, women's organisation, domestic NGO or trade/peasants' union) actors because of contextual, language, accounting, knowledge and outlook barriers.

In theory INGO's should be able to work both with domestic governments and with local social sector actors. In practice this is by no means uniformly the case either in all countries or for all INGOs. Action Aid, CIIR, in many cases Oxfam, and SCF and - among international agencies which to a degree operate on the ground in the South (and raise funds in the North) as if they were INGOs - UNICEF are evidence that the theory is not totally aberrant. Others - e.g. World Vision, Medecins sans Frontieres (France)<sup>92</sup>, CARE (USA) - are evidence that disastrous fragmentation and erosion of domestic capacity (both government and social actor) can result.

The negative result is particularly likely if there is an 'overload' of external funds designated for use via INGOs, weak government capacity to negotiate (frequently because of lack of alternative resource flows, not of negotiators nor of ability to design programmes) and/or domestic social actors whose outlook, style and bureaucratic/managerial process are very different from those of INGOs and whose desperate need for financial resources, training and - usually - specialised personnel<sup>93</sup> makes bargaining between each of them and a large INGO no less unequal than between a weak national government and the World Bank or its largest bilateral aid agency partner. This catalogue of problems is not in itself anybody's 'fault' - it is a consequence of past war and present inherent inequality of bargaining strength. But it is a warning to seek to include:

- a. **honest dialogue** - including two way criticism - to lead to clearer understanding of problems and of divergent perceptions;
- b. accepting that **national coordination** (at least during post war periods other than in respect to some calamity survival crises) is only possible if either domestic government led or co led by the national government and a resident external agency (or INGO) head acceptable to them;
- c. building in **training to reduce professional, managerial and accounting weaknesses** of domestic social actors and local government units as well as at central government level;
- d. engaging in realistic analysis of buildup of user social actor, local government and central government **possible fund buildup** and of parallel expenditure requirements to achieve

manageable phase downs of financial flow scheduling (possibly in part substituting domestic governance unit for INGO or donor agency financing for domestic social actors).

### **After Such Conflict What Forgiveness?**

**Justice/amnesty, impunity/immunity and redress/forgiveness** are not primarily rehabilitation issues as rehabilitation is defined here. They relate primarily to achieving and sustaining valid processes of reconciliation in particular country (or zone within a country) and time contexts.

However, for precisely that reason they are directly relevant to forwarding or impeding the process of rehabilitation. Unless former combatants and their core supporters are willing to co-exist, talk, work, and - preferably<sup>94</sup> - live together, neither rehabilitation nor local governance prospects are positive and recurrence of armed conflict - perhaps escalation out of individual clashes which in other contexts would be contained quickly - is all too likely. Neither pursuit of total justice (with the margin of error tilted against unwilling or at least pressured participants on the losing side) nor mindless pragmatism seeking to wipe out the memory of the war is particularly likely to work well. What is morally, administratively, emotionally and economically feasible is much less self evident and would appear to be very context specific.

If justice is taken to mean systematic trials of all offenders on the losing side - and preferably gross offenders among the winners - then it is likely to be practicable only in cases of total military victory, limited numbers of overt opponents of the new government and general stability. Even so commitment to reconciliation has led e.g. Mozambique (in 1975), Somaliland and Ethiopia to mount quite limited - or in the case of Somaliland to date no<sup>95</sup> - war crimes trials of top leaders of the former regime and notorious perpetrators of crimes against humanity.

Rwanda is an exception and one which illustrates the problems which arise when the defeated side remains capable of armed attacks, the majority of the population while not openly antagonistic are at best passive supporters of the new regime and the number of accused is very large.

Realistically 500,000 odd Rwandans participated in genocide from running with killer mobs (often in the fear that holding back would put their own lives at risk) and up to 150,000 have been arrested. Commitment to due process means than on realistic estimates trying all of them would take 25 to 50 years. Lack of resources means prison conditions are very bad so that well before the

trials were completed at least half the accused would have died, charged but untried. Division of the charges into three classes: capital genocide, follower participation in genocide and mob participation with local courts to try the last category having powers to fine, reprimand and impose limited imprisonment (usually less than served awaiting trial) have not worked well because of fear of what would actually happen to fringe participants who confessed and faced local courts. From both reconciliation and economic perspectives the outcome is deeply unsatisfactory. Since the alternative was seen - probably correctly - as mob 'justice' against suspects this gloomy comment on the 1994-00 results is not a condemnation of the choices made but a comment on the deepness of the dilemmas.

Attempting such trials during a war - as Sierra Leone did in 1997-8 - is very unlikely to be productive. It tends to hamper subsequent negotiations for 'peace with amnesty' as well as being likely to be very uneven justice with most of the worst offenders not in hand to be tried.

Truth and justice hearings following a negotiated settlement with amnesties are an option rarely taken after civil wars - the notable exception being South Africa. Rehabilitation conceptualisation and logic throws little light on when such processes are feasible or desirable, let alone on the basic dilemma of whether to call to account crimes against humanity on the part of those who were armed supporters of the present governments.

**Redress** - in respect to economic loss - is unlikely to be a practicable twin to amnesty on the criminal front. First, a real risk of massive judgements can only deter negotiating peace or taking up an amnesty offer. Second the judicial processes and divisions of liability pose massive problems. Third it is exceedingly unlikely that any substantial resources for family capital or more general rehabilitation can be won in this way except under very unusual circumstances.

In Acholiland in 1999 most Acholi did favour a universal amnesty but also the right to sue ex Lord's Resistance Army members for damages. The fact that this would deter taking the amnesty, would be embrangled, prolonged and expensive judicially and could hardly make a dent in the \$300 million plus (two thirds livestock) war losses were perceived and indeed informed government policy, but did not override a deep desire for redress. In Somaliland **per contra** where agro-pastoral land rights had been sold under the Barre regime to Oromo and to Southern Somalis these transfers have been accepted if proper procedures and payments to the then government authorities were made.

**Forgiveness** through historic (evolving traditional) methods has been highly and perhaps surprisingly effective in Mozambique<sup>96</sup> and Acholiland. It has been both communal<sup>97</sup> and religious group and has been linked to trauma counselling and resocialisation for, e.g., child soldiers, girl slaves and initially kidnapped<sup>98</sup> ex-combatants. The key elements appear to be acceptability to the community and a sense of re-entry into the community by returning persons.

Somaliland - partly via the sub clan and lineage/'blood' group systems and partly by general tacit agreement on what past conduct to 'forget' - has achieved similar results. Probably luckily, Barre's 'divide and rule' practices meant Somaliland troops had not served in Somaliland nor, in general, in Puntland. Therefore their reentry as coerced victims who had done Somalilanders no harm was easy - indeed they are at the core of the present Somaliland Army. Similarly Somaliland merchants who prospered in Mogadishu under Barre (necessarily involving 'side payments') are accepted as are civil side ex public servants and even ministers (excluding defense and interior). For example the last Barre Prime Minister heads a mobile telephone company, albeit his rehabilitation would not extend to his being a politician or an elder.

The limits to this type of reconciliation probably arise primarily in cases of crimes against humanity by the ex-combatants within their own local community (e.g. Sierra Leone) and ethnic conflict bordering on or being genocide (e.g. Rwanda, Burundi). Personal knowledge of atrocities against persons close to oneself presumably make forgiveness much harder (and less general) while historic (albeit not necessarily Christian and Muslim) forgiveness/reentry process are limited by ethnic groups and can hardly be expected to transcend them after genocide.

## VI

### REDEEMING THE TIMES: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE

Time present contains the results of time past and the shaping of time future. By the nature of time it contains them as a process which can alter – for better or worse – the continuing meaning of the past and the prospects for the future. **Rehabilitation following war is a process to redeem time to achieve broadly specified and generalisable goals** in respect to household poverty reduction/income generation, access to basic services (beginning with user friendly law – order – freedom from violence) availability of infrastructure, market access and legitimate, participatory governance and civil society.

In most cases rehabilitation **begins with return home and the recreation of household food security** based increasingly on direct production of entitlements resting on production – work – sales to buy food. Those processes and its broadening and continuation are closely linked to Reconciliation and Rehabilitation. Processes because Rehabilitation is highly contextual e.g. the present if it flows from a past successful liberation war against external rule is very different from that of post (or not so post) civil war presents in which centuries of conflict (not all violent) erupted in genocide and the main perpetrators remain at large and still waging war.

The reality of repetitive climatic and economic contextual calamities and in many cases of the catastrophe of – at least partial – reversion to armed violence means that Rehabilitation processes are fragile, problematic and prone to set-backs. Operationally that implies – if R-R-R are to be both sustainable and actually sustained – safety nets, flexibility in budgeting and , if at all practicable, contingency reserves as well as pre arranged contingency resource provision lines.

Because Rehabilitation seeks to reduce the risks of future resort to armed conflict; because war creates new realities (if higher proportions of female headed households, mass displacement and death and because for better and worse external factors (whether the impact of global economic relations and internationally acceptable domestic economic policies for poor countries or state of the art conceptualisation and practice in respect to primary health services) rehabilitation is more than and different from simple replication of pre war realities. However, beginning with return home a main theme in participatory (and even intelligently designed less participatory) rehabilitation processes is recovering that which was valued and lost.

Because Rehabilitation in post war contexts is usually crucial to a majority of residents and returnees and the losses – absolutely and relative to what had existed – are usually heavy resource requirements are significant. \$1,250 to \$1,500 per household over a five to six year period may be a middle of the road estimate for injections external to those of rehabilitating households needed. By the same token returns can be high in overall - as well as poor household - output growth, in material physical food security as well as household entitlements, in multiplier interactions with rural commerce and transport and urban production and finance as well as in fiscal revenue (largely via indirect taxation) and exports (plus food import saving). Even on conservative calculations perfectly normal GDP calculations not weighted for share to low income household nor for locality/community imbalance reduction and state legitimacy rebuilding may well show higher short and medium term benefit/cost ratios than ‘standard’ large scale infrastructure and production units.

The scope and scale of Rehabilitation as well as its interaction with other sectors indicate it should be at the core of strategic analysis, planning, budgeting and programming from national macro through sectoral and district to community project and household micro levels. Both because contextual realities are an area of domestic comparative advantage and because legitimacy reconstruction and sustainability posit national leadership and ownership with governmental co-ordination and parameter setting at national through village levels with which local governance and domestic social actors can relate (and influence) and to which external agencies – including INGO’s – can provide complementary input of finance, personnel and knowledge with built in medium term training, hand over and phase out.

Rehabilitation – like any other thematic entry point to development – is not a silver bullet nor a highroad to utopia. It needs to relate to other strategic themes including macro economic good housekeeping (the maintenance of sustainable levels of fiscal, external, price, food and entitlement imbalances and adequate overall resource flow growth rates which is the medium term analogue to structural adjustment), reconciliation, reconstruction and to new investment and poverty reduction basically unrelated to war or its immediate aftermath.



## Selected Signposts For Action

1. Rehabilitation should be seen by postwar governments (central and local), domestic social actors, INGO's and external agencies as **politically, socially and economically central**, not marginal;
2. Therefore it should be treated as a **strategic component of macro and sectoral, policy and programme as well as local and project analysis, planning, budgeting** (in terms of decision taking time institutional capacity and personnel as well as finance), articulation up from and down to specific projects and monitoring/review for a medium term (initially five to six years may be a generally suitable working estimate);
3. With at least an analysis and monitoring unit nationally with key regional/district sub-units and some programmes (and domestic social actors plus INGO's) quite specifically charged with reconstruction even if others – e.g. basic service provision – will normally be more suited to implementation by line ministries and local governance bodies;
4. Because Rehabilitation is **key to reestablishment of government legitimacy** and should be highly influenced and informed by contextual factors which are unlikely to be external experts areas of comparative advantage **national ownership led and coordinated by the central government is of special importance in Rehabilitation** (as well as Reconciliation) even though a **mix of national and local government, domestic social act or and INGO operational involvement will usually be desirable**;
5. With **early attention to sustainability through phased enhancement of domestic institutional and personnel capacity** (especially through built in training elements in all external programmes whether as to road maintenance of simple, functional domestic social actor accounting systems and bookkeepers to operate them) and phased reduction of external financial support;
6. Backed by **pre-agreed flexibility finance to meet direct** (e.g. safety net, emergency repairs) **and indirect** (e.g. revenue) **loss from climatic or terms of trade calamities**. Pre-arrangement is crucial because the lag involved in negotiating new support from a *tabula rasa* after a crisis arises will seriously impair the pace of rehabilitation (and past calamity recovery) and can collapse the R-R-R process;

7. Recognition is needed that **time is crucial to R-R-R** and that **detailed good governance/basic service provision preconditions are normally not merely unrealistic but self defeating because without R-R-R good governance and legitimacy, basic service provision/household livelihood restoration are impossible** and that – in most cases – external finance and often some specialist expatriate personnel are a precondition to full scale R-R-R;
8. This implies that once a serious postwar government with a start toward coherent R-R-R strategy and implementation is in place **external debt service should be suspended** pending more formal qualification for and provision of HIPC (highly indebted poor country) debt writedown;
9. Because one goal of R-R-R (for domestic as well as foreign actors) is usually enhanced participation in user friendly forms **external actors need to avoid actions which fragment and erode domestic capacity – governmental, civil society and household**. The massive injection of INGO's with broad, heavily funded programmes at best parallel to and often competitive with domestic (public, social sector or private) ones is a serious weakness characterizing post war 'support' in several countries and one producing rising (in depth and breadth) resentment;
10. Research on Rehabilitation to date is relatively limited – especially at country strategic level. Probably there is enough work on conceptualisation and generalization to suggest that – operationally at least – more in depth country studies are the first priority net refining conceptualization or drawing up more detailed checklist. Another priority may well be closer cooperation of Peace Studies/Sustainable Peace research with that on Rehabilitation which is usually understressed and in particular underarticulated in respect to potentially operational prolegomena.

Rehabilitation is frequently a strategic necessity for post war economies, polities and societies. It is never a silver bullet, an easy highroad to utopia nor a complete monist strategy. Basically it turns (echoing T.S. Eliott) on the **quest to recover what was lost and won and lost again and now in times and places which rarely seem propitious**.

The case made here is for **including Rehabilitation** (and R-R-R) **not excluding or marginalizing 'economic good housekeeping'** (medium term sustainable imbalance and growth management as

the successor to short term structural adjustment to end unsustainably rising imbalances and sinking growth rates). A focus on the war dispossessed should not preclude attention to attention to non war aspects of poverty nor one or restoring toward enhancing displaced household incomes bar attention to continued progress in less poor/less war eroded areas or capitalizing on new large scale economic activities (both of which can contribute fiscal and external account gains toward R-R-R. The real strategic issues are of balance and of priority – i.e. of allocation of scarce resources toward multiple ends to achieve at least minimal acceptable progress toward each. At strategic (vs. marginal programme scope or project choice level) seeking to answer either/or formulation is to ask the wrong questions. **Rehabilitation** has been **excluded strategically** and/or **marginalized** in resource allocations. **Reversing that misconceptualisation/malprioritisation** should not be marred by a Foucault's Pendulum (or similar deconstructionist) exclusion of all other elements from possible/possibly desirable overall policy and allocation strategies.

### **Rehabilitation Now To Avert Civil War Later?**

Pre-emptive rehabilitation is – in terms of human welfare, economic cost saving and both national and regional stability – an attractive idea. While literal physical and displacement damage analogous to war is rare – although that done by petroleum exploration and production in Nigeria's Delta zone is arguably virtually at that level – deprivation of and inequalities toward excluded/marginalised areas and peoples can create contests in which the same means can be argued for an reconciliation and re-legitimation as well as poverty reduction grounds.

**The problem is that most pre civil war regimes have little interest in reconciliation let alone large resource allocations to disfavoured groups/areas for rehabilitation and frequently little capacity to act if they did.** To imagine Comrade Ras Mengistu Hailie Mariam operating an R-R-R strategy to include Tigreans and Eritreans (or Saiid Barre acting in the same way toward Somalilanders and Puntlanders) is to engage in an exercise in the surreal. For from half to a full decade before full scale civil war exploded the governments of Somalia, Zaire and Sierra Leone were empty shells so far as user friendly law and order, civil governance or basic service and local infrastructure delivery went. Where this was not so reaching out to dispossessed peoples was often totally antithetical to the *raison d'être* of ruling elites e.g. return home for 1959 and later Wa Tutsi exiles would have destroyed the self image of the ruling Wa Hutu elite – when President

Habuyamira appeared to agree to it at Arusha in 1994 he was promptly assassinated by ultra chauvinists who arranged for the shooting down of his return flight.

However, because of the potential gains, **analysis (prompt and at least tentatively action oriented) is highly desirable in cases in which a reconciliatory and rehabilitation oriented approach might have or secure state and government support.** The most likely case may be **the Delta zone of Nigeria.** President Obasanjo and much of his government do appear to wish to avert violence – to restore decent governance, to reduce human deprivation, to sustain vital oil revenue flows, to enhance Nigeria’s prestige and self image. Their oil revenue sharing formula does provide the fiscal means. Shell’s realisation that oil cannot be produced amid armed hostility, has made it potentially open to environmental rehabilitation and employment training/jobs for the Delta peoples. Appropriate institutional structures (and Delta trust in them) and dialogue to overcome entrenched fear and suspicion on one side and entrenched distrust and hatred on the Delta sides appear – together with working out with the Delta peoples a strategic rehabilitation programme – unfulfilled but not unfulfillable preconditions for rolling back the very real risk of civil war. In such a context analysis toward ‘pre-emptive rehabilitation before war’ may be useful.

## NOTES

1. This paper is in conjunction with "Rehabilitation, Sustainable Peace and Development: Toward Reconceptualisation" by R.H. Green and I. Ahmed (IDS, 1998 for initial Cope Workshop), "Toward A Macroeconomic Framework for Somaliland's Postwar Rehabilitation And Reconstruction" by R.H. Green (IDS, 1998 for 1st Somaliland National Reconstruction Conference, Hargeisa, October 1998), Ahmed and Green, "The Heritage of War and State Collapse in Somalia and Somaliland: local level effects, external intervention and governance reconstruction", and I. Ahmed, "The Legacy of Complex Emergencies in Somalia and Somaliland: local effects, rehabilitation and approaches to peacemaking and state reconstitution (IDS, 2000 for concluding COPE Workshop), COPE Working Papers 4,11, 23, 37, the third also is in Adedeji (ed.) **Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts. The search for Sustainable Peace and Good Governance**, Ch. 14, London/New York: Zed Books: 257-281.
2. Rough estimation and extrapolation along the lines of UNICEF's **Children On The Front Line** (New York, 1987, 1989) which indicate well over 2 million lives and \$70,000 million output lost in the SADCC (excluding South Africa) countries over 1980-1992 concentrated on, but by no means (especially in respect to lost GDP) solely in, Angola and Mozambique.
3. UNICEF, *op. cit.*, formulated such elements in respect to Southern Africa in some detail.
4. Except for farming (which was unpopular except when related to child nutrition) SWAPO's 1989's camps in Angola and Namibia illustrate what can be done. For farming the experience of non-camp Mozambican refugees in 'relative' peopled districts in Malawi and Tanzania is illustrative.
5. Shocks and policy errors are not unique to R-R-R contexts. However because political legitimacy human and economic resource availability, and household margins above survival are usually - though not always e.g. post liberation war political legitimacy is usually high - especially constrained in post war situations their impact - especially on already war afflicted poor, households and on national political - economic stability are more severe than in non-war economic and public provision crises contexts - e.g. Mozambique versus Tanzania in relation to adverse weather shocks at the turn of the millennium.
6. This proposition may be less true in border war cases. Reconstruction of what has been lost since 1998 is likely - if possible - to be an appropriate strategy in the Ethiopian and Eritrean border areas.
7. The 1959-90 histories of Burundi and of Rwanda leading to the explosive escalation of war in both - especially Rwanda - are illustrative.
8. For example, in 1995 a top priority of the new Rwandais Government was rehiring its 'missing' two thirds of health workers (mostly wa Hutu) and reactivation of a reformed (toward primary health services with rural plus mother and child clinic emphasis) health sector. The perceived value of a common, cross ethnic public service and of universal access to a highly desired service as evidence of the states will and ability to serve all Rwandans were seen by the Minister of Health as important in themselves and complementary to the priority he attached to universal primary health services.

9. Well designed and organised retraining can - e.g. Zimbabwe - facilitate entry or reentry into viable livelihoods for at least two thirds of ex-combatants but is not cheap. Ironically the lowest cost 'safe' approach is 'stockpiling' ex-combatants with food, clothing, pocket money, barracks housing (if desired) and permission to develop parallel civilian livelihoods. Both Ghana in the 1980's and Somaliland since 1991 have practiced variants of this approach with positive results, albeit Somaliland since 1998 has attached priority to mobilising external resources to permit a training - public works transition to civilian livelihoods for 12,500 to 15,000 'spare' soldiers (versus 5,000 soldiers, 5,000 civilian police and 1,500 prison custodians seen as needed by the three separate uniformed services).
10. This list is based on observations and interviews in several SSA countries as well as on observed actions and demands by returnees. The basic service priority list is relatively uniform across war and non-war surveys and participatory assessments with poor people in several SSA countries (including non-war cases such as Tanzania and Zambia).
11. That proposition may appear self evident. In practice, it is not. Even the desire to 'return home' and the centrality of such return to livelihood reconstruction and to livelihood reconstruction and to geographic programming of service rehabilitation is frequently seriously underestimated - e.g. Acholiland in Uganda prior to the 1999 Reconstruction and Peace Agenda meetings.
12. For a much fuller review of strands in conceptualisation and of rehabilitation literature see Green and Ahmed (Cope Working Paper, *op. cit.*)
13. Conflict theory work on gainers and losers from war is potentially relevant but - to date - not operationally linked. Fear of loss is the key economic (and social and physical) reason to hesitate at the prospect of peace for most combatants. Assured safe return home, reintegration into civilian society and social - basic service - infrastructure access are likely to be key instruments for allaying such fears.
14. This paper leans on the author's personal experience with about fifteen (including two in Asia) countries from operational and observational as well as research perspectives particularly in the COPE and 'Conflict Comprehension and Mastery' (ACDESS) programmes and as a 1986-94 part time Mozambican civil servant.
15. While simple economic correlation's - e.g. high ratio of commodity exports/high risk of civil war - can be partial or misleading, they can also yield insights. Major commodity resources (e.g. diamonds and petroleum in Angola) can create both the motivation for seeking central power at almost any price and the means to sustain both governmental and insurgent military machines. Land shortage can lead to violent conflict over present allocation, potential land loss and/or local governmental structures with powers over future allocation.
16. The separation of 'development' from 'emergency' has tended to lump R-R-R with calamity relief and therefore with safety nets to alleviate poverty caused by shocks and to facilitate emergence from relatively short, self limiting and reversing shocks affecting a relatively limited, proportion of a nations households.
17. The Mozambique strategic paper is National Planning Commission, 'Reconstrucao: The road from emergencia to desenvolvimento: livelihoods and macro economics' (Maputo, 1992) excerpts and analysis from which are more readily accessible in Hanlon, J., **Peace Without Profit**.

Heineman/James Curry/Irish Mozambique Solidarity/International African Institute, (London 1994).

18. In such cases saving life in the short run requires using all experienced capacity e.g. in 1991-3 Somalia refugee camps with monthly infant mortality in excess of 100 UNICEF did - and was right to - concentrate on grab (and house), dab (of food), jab (vaccination). Similarly Medicin Sans Frontieres precisely because it is syndico anarchist in philosophy and simple curative care focussed is possibly the body most able to work in active, disputed war zones and across firing lines, but the same characteristics limit its suitability for postwar rehabilitation of a national health system with high priority to preventative, educational, environmental and nutritional aspects and with government coordination.
19. If external actors are perceived as complementary to, and work within parameters set by, domestic actors (including social sector actors) phasing down of external resource inflows may be painful, tedious and slow but poses few conceptual snags. But if multiple, parallel, externally designed headed and financed service systems have been implanted, it is hard to see how phased handover to whom can be arranged. In poor countries domesticating INGO national unit staff and programme design may be possible - if rare to date - but even then no firm civil society resource base can readily be identified.
20. See for example, "Emergency - rehabilitation development: sequence or detour?" in Simon Maxwell (ed.) 'Linking relief and development', Institute of Development Studies, **Bulletin**, 25-4, (IDS-Sussex, Falmer, 1994).
21. The War Torn Societies project illustrates this. Its flagship Mozambique study is, in general, weakest on economics and does not address rehabilitation of livelihoods or of local level infrastructure while its basic services chapters (which exclude consideration of the role of police and primary courts) do not address the gaps and priorities resulting from finance and access constraints during the war.
22. See COPE papers and also "Rehabilitation, sustainable peace and development: towards reconceptualisation", with I.A. Ahmed, **Third World Quarterly** Vol 20 No 1: 189-206, 1999 and December 2000 **Disasters** Special Issue.
23. See Adedeji (ed.) **Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts. The search for Sustainable Peace and Good Governance**, Ch. 14 "Towards a Macro-Economic Framework for Somaliland's Post-War Rehabilitation and Reconstruction", London/New York: Zed Books: 257-281, 1999.
24. In a number of countries recurrent near war or war conditions characterise certain regions but not the whole country e.g. the Eastern half of Ghana's Northern Region; Acholiland and certain other Regions of Northern and Western Uganda the Casamance in Senegal, arguably the Delta in Nigeria. Even if these do not constitute national level civil wars (and at least the Nigerian case could become that because of the location of hydrocarbon fields and the parallel Southwestern 'opt out' movement), they are central to regional macro and sectoral economics and can rarely be dealt with by short term safety nets.
25. It is perfectly plausible to argue on available data both that Somaliland is making sustained process on political reconciliation and institutional (re) construction on economic and service

rehabilitation and - more recently – on main infrastructure rehabilitation while also perceiving the Sudan to constitute a complex, intensifying crisis (or set of overlapping crises) in which only limited livelihood/service rehabilitation within a basically survival under war frame are possible. It is not plausible to argue that the political base of a won liberation war (as perceived by Somalilanders) in Somaliland is now available to Sudanese or, indeed, that the remittance economic lifeline enabling R-R-R to proceed in Somaliland can be paralleled in the Sudan so long as the Khartoum Junta lacks both Northern and Southern legitimacy and the interactions of and within Southern and Northern Democratic fractions on the insurgent side(s) remain highly complicated and fraught with tensions - in the South recurrently breaking out in violence. But *per contra* there is no evident reason the constraints - contextual parameters - applying in the Sudan should be assumed to be particularly relevant to Somaliland nor necessarily a guide to the restrictions on R-R-R in Somalia.

26. For a more elaborated presentation in respect to Southern Africa see UNICEF **Children On The Front Line**, (New York, 1997, 1999).
27. This is a poorly researched area. Fragments of data exist in scattered Mozambique studies and internal papers on other topics.
28. For example, Interahamwe organised camps as bases for current (in then Zaire) or potential future (in Tanzania) revenge against the Rwanda Patriotic Front led government and discouraged diversion of energy toward rehabilitation, especially if organised outside the IH command structure.
29. The apparent reason for the disinterest in general agriculture according to the then Deputy Secretary for Health was the difference in climatic and soil patterns from those in Namibia plus the relatively adequate supplies of basic rations available from WFP via the SWAPO governmental structure.
30. In Mozambique restoration of displaced small farming households to Tanzanian levels of output could - with direct multiplier effects - have raised national product 50%. In Angola and Namibia the potential was - as of 1990 - probably 10% to 15% and 2.5% respectively because oil and diamonds in Angola and mining, large scale ranching and fishing in Namibia dominated GDP. However, in Angola the proportion of households dependent on small scale farming rehabilitation was at least 40% and in Namibia perhaps 25% so that the political and socio economic potential impact of livelihood rehabilitation, as well as that in many districts, was potentially comparable to that in Mozambique. In one sense it might be easier as the large scale sectors – especially in Angola – yield fiscal flows per capita qualitatively higher than in Mozambique.
31. This condition poses particular problems in respect to new governments in previously 'failed states' (e.g. then Zaire, Sierra Leone) as contrasted with those which had maintained at least some operational capacity (beyond waging war) throughout the period of conflict (e.g. Mozambique) and to liberation movements which had the experience of operating significant programmes in liberated areas or in exile (e.g. Namibia, Eritrea).
32. Usually such safety nets have had to be official donor financed - including indirectly via INGO's - but in the cases of Eritrea and Somaliland diaspora remittances have been dominant.



33. The 'Parliament', 'Executive' and 'President' emerging from the 1999-2000 Somalia Conference in Djibouti have not to date altered the Somalia situation in any basic way. A majority of delegates were exiles. Somaliland, but also Puntland and Baidoa (Rahanweyn Confederacy) which are much less unstable than the balance of Somalia, were 'represented' only by exiles and dissidents. From the point of view of each of these zones (and not only of their present leaders) the new 'President' (Barre's last Defense Minister) and three of the 'executive' from which his nomination emerged (General Morgan, Barre Security Police head Col. Omar Jess and Barre's last Chief of Staff) are quite literally war criminals guilty of "crimes against humanity" in the present international law meaning of that term. Their initial fleeting visits to Mogadishu like those of their 'Parliament' were covered by multiple hired merchant militias who do not necessarily support them politically.
34. Because of the 30 year gap between the Somalia conquest of the then Republic of Somaliland in 1961 after it voted overwhelmingly not to join in the United Republic of Somalia and the 1991 armed liberation from Barre forces, relatively few present political and even fewer senior civil servants have much first hand experience from within that system. The accuracy of recreation on the operational ministerial side its surprisingly high - the *deja vue* recollection of Anglophone West Africa of the early 1960's can be very strong for any observer who has experienced both. The will to obliterate the intervening URS structures and procedures is, in this case, a positive Rehabilitation/Reconciliation force e.g. in the recreation of a uniformed, civilian (separate from the Army and the Defense Ministry) police force and of a magistrates' court system using primarily (British) Somaliland Code Law, common law and some civil law elements of Sharia law with former URS code law (derived directly from Mussolini's Italian Code) used only for gap filling.
35. Persons displaced to towns and (usually via relatives) integrated socially and economically are exceptions, but it is often open to question whether they would have migrated to cities war or no war. e.g. Mozambique's urban population indeed rose from 10% to 30% over 1975-95. But Portuguese policy limited black urban residence so that 10% was artificially low and the Tanzanian urban proportion (in that case in the absence of war or famine) is also 30% suggesting the 1995 Mozambique figure is not abnormally high.
36. Demobilised combatants - at least below officer level - also tend to choose to return to pre war homes and occupations e.g. Mozambique and the two failed lulls/demobilisations in Angola. Eritrea is an exception because state policy is to resettle both returnees and demobilisees in patterns unlike previous district and village ones.
37. This is a contextual question. In general civilians tend to prefer civilian to military policing e.g. the priority to civilian police restoration/separation from army in Somaliland. But, if police have an history of oppressive, violence and corruption there may be no great preference for them over the army e.g. Acholiland at the turn of the millennium because the Uganda police force has (throughout Uganda) had a very bad reputation for over a third of a century. The (British) Somaliland civilian police, however, were largely respected and trusted unlike their Italian style military police successors of the United Republic of Somalia.
38. See FAO. **The State of Food Insecurity in the World**, (Rome, 2000).

39. For example in Somalia surveys do not show primary health services - especially by the state - as high priority because of lack effective colonial or URS provision and because there has been what would elsewhere be regarded as over emphasis on hospital curative services. In Somaliland because the late British period did feature a more robust and primary oriented health service health stands with water as a key and relatively well staffed ministry and one which (under UNICEF guidance) has focussed on vaccinations, oral rehydration, mother and child and clinic oriented primary services, although it has yet to restore the pastoral area paramedical network which was arguably the crown jewel of the postwar British colonial health service development.
40. In several cases - e.g. Sierra Leone in 1996-97 before the military/RUF coup - concentration was on urban road, sewer and related works. These may meet the tests of lesser vulnerability to renewed outbreaks of violence and of 'safe' project designs 'on the shelf' but it is hard to believe that even urban residents (let alone the 80% plus of displaced persons who are usually rural) would put them high on priority lists. Nor are they 'sustainable' in the sense of generating entitlements not dependent on continuing external finance - unlike, say, restoration of crop/livestock production. As humanitarian intervention the traffic circles, gutters and carriageways of Freetown seemed to be analogues of ineffective humanitarian randomness paralleling Joseph Conrad's French cruiser firing untargeted salvos into the Congo jungle as an example of military intervention in the early stages of his exploration of the (European) **Heart of Darkness** in the Congo ultimately symbolised by Mister Kurtz and his driveway lined with human (African) skull topped posts. One need not imply bad faith or ill will to point to the potential for disaster in misuse of very scarce resources.
41. The danger - because of rehabilitation marginalisation - is that these large, long payoff, limited livelihood/entitlement generation reconstruction projects will be disproportionately central to macro economic investment policy and allocation as in the case of the ROCS (major highways) project in Mozambique (see Hanlon, *op. cit.*).
42. The actual expatriate personnel figures would suggest uniformly high requirements. However, they may mislead. In Mozambique 3,000 1992-95 expatriates at a cost of over \$300 million a year in large part replaced 3,000 tertiary educated Mozambicans working at lower levels abroad because of sub-subsistence to sub-lower middle class domestic salaries. They would be returnees at a gross cost of perhaps \$12.5 to \$20 million a year. Aid finance for technical assistance or INGO's is not in practice fungible into even bridging domestic salary support whatever the benefit/cost ratios. Mozambique's Ministry of Health actually asked for a controlled test between a government and an INGO primary health care programme at district or provincial level to compare cost and care efficiency and was turned down out of hand. As the unit cost of INGO PHC seems to be tenfold (at least fivefold allowing for maximum unrecorded health goods transfers to state health services) that of the Ministry of Health and the quality little, if any, better (arguably worse on prevention and education) the challenge and response are both interesting. Somaliland **per capita** is a relatively successful R-R-R case with only 250 expatriates (because it is not recognised), but could certainly use rather more specialists (perhaps 100-150), plus training courses to avoid massive gaps in citizen personnel when present senior officials retire well before a full scale universally/public service institute will be on stream.

43. In practice food for armed forces viewed with some approval, or at least not severe disapproval, by donors is often donor financed using Nelsonian 'blind eye' techniques whether with budget support and food aid to be sold or bloc distribution to camp systems including basic civil governance but also army elements e.g. Mozambique and SWAPO's camp system in Angola respectively. If the armed forces are seen as deeply unacceptable, either food is not provided to anyone (rare) or substantial debate and partial withdrawal combined with food seizure by the military units results (e.g. the then Zaire Interahamwe controlled Rwandan's refugee camps and the Red Cross food supplies to Renamo controlled zones in Mozambique).
44. The case against relief/rehabilitation support in the Sudan has been most cogently argued by Joanna Macrae and Mark Duffield. The case for has been spearheaded by Oxfam and Christian Aid (in conjunction with South Sudanese civil society actors) e.g. Roger Riddell and David Bryll, **Guardian**, 16 October 2000, p20 who argue that there can be INGO and civil society access to most people most of the time, are substantial pockets of relative and relatively lasting peace and growing numbers and capacity of domestic civil society actors autonomous from the SPLA military. Therefore initial food production, medical, water and education rehabilitation are both feasible and desirable both in terms of present human welfare and the post war base for full R-R-R (whatever the military/political end game and outcome). In the IH case the logical alternative to allowing the use of the camps as reorganisation, retraining and reinvasion bases was not necessarily starving all Rwanda's refugees and exiles alike, but inserting a UN armed guard contingent to control the camps - an exercise the Security Council rejected. Of the three options - forcing civilian refugees to return to Rwanda to be fed, controlling the camps to extrude IH/Exide 'Government' elements and letting IH rebuild it appeared even at the time - and much more so today - that the international community was choosing the worst.
45. In the South Sudan case such bodies exist and are becoming stronger as well as increasingly tolerated and welcomed by the SPLA. See **Guardian**, *op cit, loc cit*, and also *passim* articles on Sudan previous two weeks. In the Rwanda camps case IH took good care to suppress them in then Zaire and sought to do so in Tanzania camps which were cordoned and policed by day by Tanzania but under LH control at night. Interestingly even under those unfavourable conditions, autonomous mother and child care and, less overtly, Anglican 'civil society' type groups emerged and operated.
46. Arguably Ebola fever is a war catastrophe. The strain in Gulu is South Sudanese (not Congolese) so that the most probable entry is via Lord's Resistance Army raiders, deserters or escaped captives and/or refugees returning from Sudan. The problem in coping even beyond the absence of preventative or curative treatment is lack of knowledge of the host animal (both human beings and other primates die once they contract Ebola) so that predicting outbreaks, designing ways to avoid them and developing spread limitation and initial contagion minimisation are virtually non-feasible.
47. This may be a sector with potential for preparation during war. For example from the mid 1980's to early 1990's several thousand Mozambican primary school teachers fled to refugee or displaced person camps or urban areas. Most were in known locations and in receipt of pay but not fully employed. Most were also less than fully qualified. Despite earlier internal suggestions, only in 1992 did the approach of large scale further training while waiting for the ability to redeploy to rural areas build up substantial momentum and then on the initiatives of

two or three Provincial Directorates not the national Ministry. The problem is most acute where - as in Mozambique - a high proportion of basic service personnel before war were not qualified or where - as in Somalia and Somaliland - there has been minimal professional or para professional training and recruitment for over a decade and a half so that restoration/maintenance of previous levels, let alone expansion, faces a growing crisis even after war because of unreplaced retirements.

48. See A. Adedeji, R.H. Green and V. Jamal, **Pay, Professionalism and Productivity** UNICEF, UNDP, (New York 1997) for fuller case on the negative results of paying front line professional 'salaries' as low as one quarter the household absolute poverty line.
49. Banks in SSA - especially when they have just engaged in financial and loan procedure reconstruction - are often so cautious as to rural loans or new credit instruments (e.g. leasing) as to threaten to constrict economic revival especially in rural areas led by small and medium enterprises. This can justify risk sharing type partial guarantees (preferably for a fee) to encourage priority lending flows, but neither justifies nor creates a need to subsidise either merchant transporters or the banks.
50. The \$1 standardised purchasing power per capita per day yardstick used by the World Bank for international comparisons and aggregations has severe limitations for operational country use. A specified absolute poverty line budget for a household of 5 or 6 costing stated goods/services and - probably - converting to \$ on a relatively free (which may mean parallel) market basis to have a less unstable one country measurement over time is preferable, where possible, partly because IMF/UNDP conversions to standard purchasing power - especially within SSA - are often open to grave reservations.
51. In 1960's East Africa access to seasonal wage labour income tended to be a key determinant of poor or not so poor household income status. In Southern Mozambique from the 1940's migrant labour in South African mines was key to building up tools, herds and other assets needed to raise a farm's production capacity above the household poverty line.
52. While the typical sizes vary, except for street trading the typical informal business has substantially more employees than owner managers (up to an average of 7 times as many in West Africa).
53. Mozambique, for example, placed at least 200,000 orphans (including *de facto* orphans who may have had living parents but with no evidence where they were) in new households as members with quite limited use of initial, and no continuing, material incentives.
54. However, a special problem arises for HIV/AIDS orphans who may be or are HIV positive. Only close relatives - and not always they - are likely to accept the risk of accepting/loosing a new son or daughter let alone taking in a new household member with a maximum realistic life expectancy of 3 to 4 years.
55. These represent a shift in emphasis from most pre-war systems which relates to general rethinking and redesign of poor country health services beginning in the 1970's.
56. Discussions with researchers and participants at September 1999 Reconstruction and Peace Agenda Workshop.

57. Labour intensive approaches can reduce cost and maximise cost sharing with returnee communities for seasonal labour and local building materials are likely to be easier to mobilise than cash.
58. Cf Hanlon *op. cit.* for perceptions of the World Bank's flagship ROCS national highway project turning on these issues and the related diversion of potential local infrastructure and services programmes to the highways combined with a continuity in not conceptualizing or integrating a viable maintenance strategy.
59. The upgrading of several of these routes as war roads by President Barre, whose aim was to suppress Somaliland, does not invalidate their present value for rebuilding pastoralism, internal and external commerce. Similarly in Acholiland, roads in several areas are now denser, more accessible and better maintained to facilitate military response to the Lord's Resistance Army. Their existence and location are key to local infrastructure rehabilitation planning and may alter patterns of farming household settlement.
60. Very often both capacity in general and decentralised capacity accountable to users in particular were defective long prior to the outbreak of war. In cases such as Sierra Leone and (then) Zaire that decay of capacity was at least a substantial background factor in the loss of legitimacy facilitating the rise of civil war. It would be otiose in rehabilitation to seek to replicate capacity only up to the pre war levels if these were manifestly a major 'part of the problem', not of the answer. It is arguable that government supply of cement and roofing, community building of floor slabs, pole frames and temporary walls plus wooden desks, benches, cabinets for books/materials - i.e. downgrading primary school buildings - to concentrate on teachers' salaries and training together with books, writing materials, chalk and blackboards is appropriate to the initial phases of rehabilitation. But if pre war district and local bookkeeping/bookkeepers meant 50% of spending was unallocable because initial entries were incorrigibly unintelligible, another 25% went lost-strayed-stolen (facilitated by opaque bookkeeping) and only 25% clearly went to intended uses, it is folly not to include properly trained bookkeepers and transparent book keeping systems in first stage rehabilitation as a necessary, if not sufficient, condition to the rapid reduction of corruption and increase of accountability. 'No accountability without accounts' deserves to be a more important good governance rallying cry than is usually the case.
61. In Rwanda returning wa Tutsi (including descendants as the majority of refugees date to 1959-60) have been temporarily - at least in terms of policy goal - housed in 'vacant' urban/peri urban buildings and to a lesser extent on 'vacant' peri urban and rural farm plots. These are recognised officially to be the property of wa Hutu who fled in 1974. On their return they have - not surprisingly - found those in possession unwilling to relinquish buildings or farms, local level authorities less than energetic in supporting them and alternative plot/home provision lagging badly.
62. For example in Angonia District in Tete (a maize and potato basket) colonial settler freeholds were turned into state farms (after settler abandonment) which were then abandoned in the early 1980's during the upsurge of the civil war. In large part these have been occupied by returnees step by step over 1986-1994. Both some ex settlers and the Lands Commission (for new freehold grants) have called for their expulsion with obvious probable conflictual results, not

least because these farmers have rehabilitated their livelihoods and made a large contribution to national (especially Beira) food security.

63. Discussions on site and later with John Drysdale who headed the survey.
64. No farm could be demarcated unless the occupier and all adjacent holders agreed on boundary points. This procedure rapidly diffused cross claims (which may have been as much game playing as fully serious) because holders wanted clear, up to date entitlement documents.
65. Uganda has a very diverse mix of *de facto* rural tenures. Feudal recorded tenure - notably in Buganda and Bunyoro - has partially (but often opaquely and contestedly) transmuted into individual freehold tenure. So in practice has historical secure, heritable household usehold tenure in some areas, especially if tree and bush crop (coffee, tea) are dominant. A variety of such household, usehold tenures survive - some formally recorded but with gaps and dubious entries in registers. In pastoral and peripheral areas some more communal/more frequent reallocation systems survive. Dotted in are plantation (and urban) freehold enclaves e.g. sugar, tea. Standardising, re-recording and arbitrating a generalised transition to freehold will be a major exercise entailing substantial personnel, institution erection and consultation costs and one which does not (at least in immediate post war areas as contrasted to those with limited violence for the last decade and a half) appear to have high temporal priority. The deferral of implementation suggests that position has support within the Uganda government with the apparent contrary signal of early passage of an Act relating at least as much to USAID and World Bank agendas and leverage as it does to Uganda government and/or interest group concerns.
66. Most of the changes in tenure from the *prazeiro* (feudal 'knights' of the sword) through chartered company to *empresaria* (state farm) modes have been injected by war with the lesser recent resistance to tenure change partly because the general 1981-1992 phase of the 1963-1992 war subsumed land tenure conflict and partly because many freehold grant holders, seeing they could not secure and enforce 'quiet possession' have not sought to push their claims. However, the situation remains volatile if large numbers of 'concessions' and large family farm freeholds were to be created and attempted to be enforced. The economic doubts about general freehold/mechanisation driven modernised agriculture are underlined by the pre 1970 (and apparently post 1995) record of 90% of domestic food and 60% of agricultural exports flowing from the (disfavoured) historic usehold tenure small farming sector familial (household sector).
67. On the southern (Zambesi River) border of Malawi and Mozambique literally hundreds of thousands of refugees rotated from camps to rehabilitation of farms and back to camp to collect rations during 1992-1994. This greatly puzzled some observers who, erroneously, thought the massive 'return' flow to Malawi was of refugees who had given up and were returning to camp to stay.
68. Evidently return to camp for food to rebuild by many does create a cover for fraud by others. It also wastes time and energy on treks, disrupts families yet again and reduces the working time deployable so long as some adults need to stay in camp to collect rations and care for children.
- 69 See Somaliland country discussion elsewhere for fuller contextual setting.

70. The largely expatriate - or at least non-Acholi - suggestion that cattle restoration in general is ecologically undesirable is not shared by Acholi households nor does it appear likely to be valid ecologically. Under interior east African upland plain conditions, livestock, annual crops and - less uniformly - tree crops can be symbiotic with livestock on land unsuitable for crops, or under grass fallow and contributing manure to tree crops (e.g. bananas in Kagera Region of Tanzania) and horticultural plots.
71. See J. Fairly 'New Strategies For Micro enterprise Development, Integration and the Trickle Up Approach' in **Journal of International Affairs**, *op. cit.* for fuller reflections on micro credit in general and the case for its institutional integration with knowledge and service delivery in particular.
72. For a review of the general issue see R.H. Green, "A Cloth Untrue: The Evolution of Structural Adjustment in Sub-Saharan Africa" in **International Affairs**, 52, 1, 1998, and for an update (including notes on World Bank accepted reports of weaknesses) see N. Dunne "Fees issue entangles US debt relief plan", **Financial Times**, 18 October, 2000, p12.
73. Water is probably easier to run on a cooperative basis because user management/maintenance committees can reduce cash maintenance costs substantially, the cash as well as opportunity costs of no or non functional nearly water delivery are perceived as high by households and - like health - fees can be projected equally across the year and can rarely literally be collected at point of use (albeit they are in some Somaliland systems).
74. In respect to local (and central) government in Uganda, see E.A. Brett "Responding to Poverty in Uganda" in **International Affairs**, *op. cit.*
75. Discussions with officials, domestic NGO leaders in Somaliland in 1995 and 1998.
76. Mozambique has sought to adopt this approach with respect to religious institution schools and clinics from 1992-3 but has been limited by financial constraints as has Tanzania in respect to religious body (almost all Christian in practice but with a few Islamic) secondary schools and hospitals which it has partially subsidised (as well as providing staff training) for four decades.
77. See COPE Working Papers specifically focussed on women in conflict listed in bibliography for a fuller discussion.
78. Male headed single adult/multiple dependent households could in principle be a similarly disadvantaged category. However, it is in practice virtually an empty box. Men who have lost/been separated from their spouses and have dependents in practice remarry.
79. Discussions with African gender researchers in both East and West Africa.
80. Hard to do - need to plan ahead - costs are greater than pure pre food aid variant and perhaps greater than commercial builder cost (with no food aid) **but** less than food for survival plus contract infrastructure building e.g. Botswana regular PWD and Drought infrastructure programmes.
81. The INGOs' higher unit costs relate primarily to the cost of expatriate personnel and the logistics of supporting them, as well as to a tendency to desirable but higher than essential material infrastructure (e.g. four wheel drive vehicles).

82. Observation and discussions on several visits for diverse sponsors over 1994-1999 and especially at the 1998 Somaliland and 1999 (Acholiland) R-R-R/Peace Agenda workshops.
83. Observation and discussions in Mogadishu and Baidoa in 1993 and 1995.
84. For a detailed - if slightly overstated - account of this process in Mozambique see Joseph Hanlon, **Mozambique - Who Calls The Shots?**, Zed Press, London 1994 and Hanlon *op. cit.* Hanlon underestimates the coping processes used at all levels in dealing with donors/outsideers whom it is seen as dangerous to refuse or to criticise harshly head on. These are by no means negligible in impact. But many are inefficient in resource cost/desired outputs terms. A common example is to accept external agency desired programmes and personnel which are not domestic priorities, and/or cannot be used, in order to gain funding for priority programmes and technical assistance. This approach 'works' but - at least as perceived by Mozambicans - wastes potentially more fruitful resource use. Donors may well have a mirror image view having accepted the Mozambican priority elements to achieve Mozambican acceptance of theirs. The problem is much more general than R-R-R and does not (as is sometimes asserted) rest on donor conspiracy nor recipient duplicitousness but on inequalities of power, lack of flexibility and divergent perceptions in contexts more often than not characterised by opacity.
85. In Mozambique Renamo focused on rural terrorism to prevent family farming for self provisioning and urban food supply and on destruction of primary schools, water systems and health posts and centres while the government prioritised getting food through and repairing/rebuilding health - education water facilities and protecting their personnel. Legitimacy/capacity more than direct military gains were at stake in these priority campaigns.
86. Discussion and observation in 1995 and 1998. Civilian police are armed but on normal duty keep the arms out of sight. They are perceived as polite to Somalilanders as well as expatriates and do appear to be successful in halting escalation of minor clashes between individuals into larger lineage group to sub clan armed conflicts, a 'progress' which is historically the most volatile feature of Somali socio-political interaction. Vendors and chatters congregate outside Hargeisa's Central Police Station and exchange greetings with police. With a contextual translation one is in the world of Dixon of Dock Green and 'Here-Here! What's All This?'
87. Except in open ended participatory dialogue - whether in R-R-R or other contexts - users are unlikely to prioritise services they have never received from the state (e.g. low stress on desire for state primary health services in Somalia in 1985 and subsequently).
88. For a brief - and more positive than most - survey of post war Uganda see E.A. Brett 'Responding to Poverty in Uganda: structures, processes and prospects' in **Journal of International Affairs**, *op. cit.*
89. Mozambican provinces have very substantial *de facto* powers at Executive (Governor) and Official (Provincial Commissioner) levels including (within tight overall and looser sectoral ceilings/floors) Recurrent Budget. By distracting central attention and disrupting communications **war substantially increased autonomy**. For example the *de facto* province of Maputo Cidade was much more closely overseen and much less autonomous precisely because ministries had easy access and tended to teleguide even areas (e.g. primary education



and health) in which substantial (if fuzzy) powers had been delegated to provinces and were exercised by those less close to Ministerial headquarters.

90. This problem is not unique to rehabilitation. In Mozambique many projects - e.g. provincial hospitals, agricultural infrastructure schemes - were negotiated by the central government with associated 3 to 5 year grants toward early year recurrent costs. The central government ministries administered during the 3 to 5 year period intending to hand over to provincial governments thereafter. As the latter had - up to that point - not been integrally involved in the projects and received no sudden income boost to meet the recurrent cost burden, the process, predictably, has worked very badly.
91. These can be very innovative and small user friendly. Overall this may be particularly true of UK operations (and least of EU) albeit variation is high within donor programmes because the attitudes of the head of the mission in a country and of his/her small projects assessment/disbursement officer are crucial.
92. In two of these cases the convictions of the INGOs (neo-Christian theocratic in one case and syndico-anarchist in the other) are central to the problems of cooperation and coordination. Each is humanly concerned and usually highly professionally competent/motivated but normal relationships with governments or domestic social actors are inherently virtually unattainable.
93. The gaps need case by case scrutiny. Middle level management, secretarial and book keeping/accounting weaknesses are often at least as great as (or greater than) those of professionals or top managers. That applies to local governments - and sometimes central governments - as well as to domestic social actors.
94. In Rwanda it has proven impossible in some areas to maintain or restore non ethnic villages in the aftermath of genocide even though of 800,000 dead up to 300,000 were 'moderate' wa Hutu. Many pre war mixed villages have been recreated as neighbouring wa Hutu and wa Tutsi villages and at least several urban neighbourhoods have become homogenous. The motive is fear - exacerbated by continued IH attacks which use resident supporters and informants.
95. Somaliland would prosecute senior military and security police personnel guilty of crimes against humanity in Somaliland as well as some associated political figures, but none has been Somaliland.
96. This seems to have been facilitated by Renamo's practices of kidnapping many of its combatants (making them perceived as victims as well as perpetrators) and rarely deploying them against their own villages or immediate areas (making returnees relatively innocent of attacks against the community to which they sought reentry).
97. Community (almost always intra ethnic group), as well as religious, procedures often involve public 'accounting' of/for past actions even if compelled to do them. Expatriate professionals have queried these - especially for girls/young women kidnapped as porters/prostitutes. However, it is unclear that the returnees have similar objections if the ordeal leads to full 'return home' to their locality and religious congregation communities. Nor in the absence of an alternative acceptable to civil society is criticism necessarily in returnee interests.
98. An irregular declension problem arises: liberation forces 'mobilise'; governments recruit/conscript; insurgents 'kidnap'. The boundaries are often in the eye of the observer and

the judgement of history on the movement. In Mozambique, however, 'kidnap' is widely (and accurately) used in respect to Renamo's methods which are seen as distinctly unlike the government's even by persons not particularly supportive of Frelimo.

## **AUTHOR NOTE**

Reg Green has been a student of the applied political economy of Africa for over forty years observing researching, teaching, advising and acting as a civil servant in forty eight countries. He has been a faculty member at the Universities of Ghana, Congo (then Zaire), East Africa (Institute of Social and Economic Research), Dar es Salaam, Yale and the Institute of Development Studies, Sussex from which he has just retired after twenty six years. He has advised the governments of Ghana, Uganda, Botswana, Swaziland, Tanzania, Mozambique and Somaliland as well as SWAPO of Namibia, the East African Community, the Southern African Development Community, the Economic Commission for Africa, UNICEF, the ILO and UNDP. He has worked with/advised the World Council of Churches, the British Council of Churches, the Catholic Institute for International Affairs, the (Philippine) Freedom From Debt Coalition, the International Centre for Law in Development, the African Development Bank and the African Centre for Development, Economic and Security Studies. His work on rehabilitation grew from the mid 1980's out of poverty, wartime survival, economic community calamity response (drought) and national economic strategy work for UNICEF, Mozambique, Tanzania, ACDESS, SADC, ADB, ECA in a dozen African countries.

## METHODOLOGICAL AND SOURCE NOTES

### Means And Methods

While this paper flows directly from the 1997-2000 COPE project, it has a broader and longer background affecting/informing its methodology and sources and its applied focus. The earliest components flow from 1960's experience and observation in Ghana, Uganda and Tanzania while working on quite different themes and from a 1979 Commonwealth Secretariat Mission to Uganda as part of the failed effort at governance reconstruction and macro economic capacity rebuilding undertaken in the immediate post Amin era.

However of the three main streams into it, the first relates to a series of Southern African consultancies and operational assignments in and for Mozambique and SADC (then SADCC) covering both war time catastrophe and post war drought catastrophe survival support and rehabilitation analyses, strategic frames, policies and programme development. Via UNICEF consultancies in respect to the impact of refugees from Rwanda and Burundi on Tanzania and on Somalia/Somaliland (the first from 1987 as well as 1993 and 1994 and the second in 1995) the conflict oriented work extended to the Great Lakes and the Horn.

The second main input was two missions led by Professor Adedeji of ACDESS - the first on a semi related topic and the second ACDESS' ongoing 'Crisis Comprehension and Mastery' project in 1995 and 1997 followed by an ACDESS/UNDP conflict workshop in Mali in 1998. These covered Southern Africa (Mozambique and Angola), Central Africa (Rwanda and Burundi), the Horn (Ethiopia, Somaliland, Somalia) and West Africa (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mali).

The third was COPE proper with two project workshops and participation in national workshops in Uganda, Somaliland and Sri Lanka as well as related panels and presentations in the UK and at the World Council of Churches in Geneva.

Much of the material on which this paper is based is published in UNICEF, ACDESS, COPE and Mozambique work cited below.

Other portions came from discussions at workshops and in the field ranging from a President , a Prime Minister, an Archbishop, Bishops, Ministers through government officials, elected local government leaders, domestic social actors, INGO staff to ordinary camp residents and returnees.

Other contributions come from students from countries surveyed participating in IDS (Sussex) seminars and courses. Much of this material is - by its nature - not published nor directly citable. Also not citable directly are several memos on 'what is to be done' prepared for governments and institutions in four countries.

Special thanks for insights and discussions and for comments and criticisms are due to Ismail Ahmed and Robin Luckham of IDS. Lionel Cliffe and Philip White of Leeds, Adebayo Adedeji of ACDESS and Joana Macrae of the London School of Tropical Hygiene and Medicine.

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