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DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA:  
SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES

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
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1. SOCIOLOGY AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:

Development studies, as a separate field of interest in sociology, have been stimulated by the turbulent events in the countries of the third world; particularly by the recent history of countries emancipated from colonial rule. Major foci of interest have been attempts to explain why so many newly independent poor countries have suffered political instability, a retreat from principles of democratic rule, minimal economic growth despite apparently constructive economic development programmes, the growth of serious tribal, regional, and ethnic divisions and conflicts, and, in some cases, rampant Nepotism, corruption, and parasitism, particularly among political and bureaucratic elites, between whom and the masses of the population, wide material inequalities have come to exist.

In this regard the sociology of development has crucial insights to offer, particularly those which combat the all too prevalent popular notion that the instability of developing non-White countries of the third world is due in some way to a fixed tendency towards corruption among the leaders, or to an inherent incapacity on the part of the populations to govern in anything other than simple rural societies, or to a less-advanced position on a mythical scale of 'civilisation'. The setbacks of the developing countries can all be explained perfectly well without any recourse to conceptions of in-born social characteristics or to notions of a backward, primitive mentality among the populations of these countries.

Very broadly and at the risk of over-simplification, we can say that the current problems of many developing countries are due to<sup>1)</sup>:

- a) the distortions and imbalances in the social order of these societies which resulted from colonial rule; a type of rule which generally was not concerned with bringing about orderly change and development in the whole society but only concerned with bringing about changes which would facilitate colonial rule itself and benefit the metropolitan power. These 'imbalances' included, inter alia:

The creation of a locally staffed and prestigious, but subservient administrative bureaucracy not trained to take responsible decisions.

The imposition of a type of education geared to the requirements of administrative and clerical work in the colonial administration and to the culture of the European power.

The stimulation of material expectations and aspirations among the local elites which were appropriate to conditions in the metropolitan country, but not in the developing country.

The weakening or distortion of the roles and authority of the traditional leaders in the society.

The development of types of production and agriculture which were required by the colonial power but not necessarily most advantageous for the newly independent country, and the creation of modern, centralised institutions in the society which could be and were maintained by the authority of the colonial power but which were not sufficiently rooted in the society or supported by local values to function effectively after independence.

Another major problem resulting from the patterns of colonial conquest is that the arbitrary boundaries of countries (particularly in Africa) embrace territories which were by no means ideal for the requirements of viable nationhood. In many cases the countries are too small to support a healthy economy under typically adverse conditions. In other cases the boundaries include peoples with highly divergent cultures, like for example, the Ibo's and the Hausa-Fulani peoples of Nigeria.

b) Certain effects of the economic relationship between the developing countries and the major economic powers. Suffice to say here that there is considerable basis for saying that trade between the rich and poor countries and international aid tend to benefit the rich countries more than the poor, and that other influences emanating from the wealthy nations strengthen retrogressive political tendencies and economic divisions in the poor countries.

c) The problems of developing countries can also be seen as resulting partly from the speed and extent of change to which the societies were subjected during colonial rule and particularly after independence. In the space of a few decades the administrations of most of the developing countries of Africa have been moved to completely reorganise the lives of the mass of the people, who had been part of unchanging small-scale traditional communities with simple technologies but immensely complex and fixed patterns of

social interaction, supported by powerful and intricate belief-systems and mythologies, in which everyone had a clearly defined role and sense of belonging. The model for the reorganisation initially, almost without exception, was the mass technological society of the industrialised world. The architects of independence and the politicians attempted to set the societies on a course of change towards large-scale bureaucratic societies with centralised, nation-wide political, administrative, and economic institutions modelled on those of the more advanced technological societies. This type of society involves constant adaptation to changing technology, changing markets, and changing group interests in the society. Human relations are characterised by considerable instrumentality (i.e. by a well-developed awareness of personal advantages and interests in social interaction), individuals have to strive to achieve their status rather than having the social order ascribe it for them automatically, and the number of different roles and occupations for individuals in the society is vastly greater than in traditional society. In the traditional African society, therefore, production and technology was simple but custom was powerful and complex. The model of the industrialised society, on the other hand, is one in which technology is complex, custom and belief-systems are less complex, and social order and harmony is achieved, not by direct community pressures and expectations, as in traditional society, but by the fact of the larger majority of people being carefully socialised and trained to regulate their own behaviour for personal advantage and social security.

What has occurred in Africa is that the political, administrative, and economic organisations of 'modern' societies were established quickly, and because of their large-scale and comprehensive areas of operation, resulted in enormous power for individuals and groups in key positions - the new elites. These organisations include government departments, political parties, organisations necessary to administer the economy, etc., as well as large heavy industries. However, other features necessary in the 'modern' society could not be established as quickly, or indeed, cannot be deliberately established at all. The actions of powerful politicians, administrators, and businessmen have to be kept under surveillance and regulated by a well-informed public opinion, and by well organised trade unions with a balanced awareness of their own interests. Local community organisations have to be integrated into the national bureaucracy so that neither loses touch with the needs of the other. Family life and child training has to be focussed on preparing individuals to survive in an atmosphere where a balanced and subtle

combination of aggression, competitiveness, initiative, self-control, patience, caution and hypocrisy are required for adequate performance. Mass society requires some degree of mass-participation, which in turn requires mass literacy and mass communication - newspapers, magazines, and substantial rates of radio ownership.

These features of society are generally all slow to develop, hence the politicians and administrators have been free to act without adequate public control, and have therefore been exposed to temptations which their colleagues in western industrialised society are seldom exposed to - relatively unrestricted and unregulated power to serve their own interests, and to feather their own private nests.

With the establishment of political parties and of administrations, modelled along colonial lines, but expanded in order to administer the processes of modernisation, an elite of politicians and bureaucrats has been created comprising, for the most part, people for whom wealth and power is a very new and titillating experience. This group exists in extreme contrast to the poverty and powerlessness of the large mass of peasants and urban workers, since the former enjoy salaries and circumstances matching those of the former colonial rulers, whose places they have taken. Hence a very serious class division has come to exist in most developing African societies. Yet, the peasants and workers are not sufficiently aware of their class-interests to organise appropriately and dissatisfactions and frustrations have often tended to coalesce around tribal or regional loyalties and hostilities. The seething but uninformed frustration of the masses has also provided support for politicians seeking quick success and military officers staging coups. The organisations necessary for cultivating an informed awareness of their real interests among workers and peasants are absent - trade unions have not become powerful in most African countries - and the sporadic but intense manifestations of large-scale dissatisfaction have been unconstructively directed, producing political instability and little else.

The tragedy with many countries in Africa is that the colonial powers demonstrated to local populations the rewards of mass-organisation and modernisation, but because they allowed so few to participate responsibly in government and political organisations, the discipline, skills, and the everyday attitudes required to perform adequately in a modern administration were not properly imparted.

d) It would also seem that many of the specific techniques employed to encourage modernisation and change have been designed and applied without a proper analysis of the social situations in which they have been applied, and without adequate prior experimentation. Peasant subsistence farmers have been exhorted to work much harder and grow cash crops, and specific techniques have been recommended without first establishing whether these peasants are willing to sacrifice leisure, various types of social rewards, the security of mutual interdependence in the village community (which includes community support for the individual homestead in times of need), in order to make relatively small profits from cash crop farming. Cash crop farming requires hard work, keeping produce for your own gain, and a certain element of risk. The element of risk is particularly important, since purchases of seeds, fertiliser, improved stock, etc., can result in debt if yields are insufficient. Also deterministic and supernatural beliefs about the causes of good and bad harvests, typical of peasants everywhere, are often not taken into account.

Then again, the type of leaders and instructors in local situations in the rural areas are often poorly trained. Critical shortages of educated people in poor countries meant that almost everyone with some education, shortly after independence, could obtain attractive work in the rapidly expanding civil service in the cities. Work in the rural areas came to be devalued, and this stigma has tended to remain, despite growing unemployment in the towns. The crucial task of providing services in rural areas suffers through lack of adequate skills. Generally, the type of education provided in most African countries is still largely based on European curricula imported by missionaries and colonisers. Too few children are trained for practical tasks, and too many for the social accomplishments and the literary and arithmetical abilities required for white collar work in the civil service.

In large measure the continuing poverty of countries in Africa is due to the high rate of population increase of between 2% and 3% per annum. Birth control programmes are urgently needed, but have little chance of succeeding in communities where children are parents' only security in old age. The provision of social security and attempts to influence family planning must go hand in hand. Nowhere in Africa have these problems been tackled with any systematic policies.

Where local urban or rural organisations have been established to facilitate change in specific situations (school-boards, service organisations, co-operatives, etc.), many of the people involved have found themselves ill at ease in very novel situations. One almost inevitable response to the uncertainty of the new situation is for participants to over-emphasise the formal, constitutional roles and to overlook the functions for which the organisations were established. As a result so many of the committees and groups involved operate in a type of stultified ritual which achieves little.

These, and hosts of other specific problems need to be carefully studied before greater success will be achieved in mobilising local communities for the tasks of modernisation and development.

The foregoing has been a very sketchy outline of only some of the reasons why many African states have failed to live up to the promises of independence. The rather shallow and emotional slogans and ideologies of protest, and the mass political organisation which accompanied the struggle for independence were far from sufficient to mobilise and integrate the population at large for sustained mass action for modernisation. Despite outstanding technical efforts on the part of agricultural extension officers, participation of rural populations in the development of territories has been disappointing, and involvement of rural populations in political life and decision-making is insignificant. Communication between the city and the mass of the peasant populations has tended to deteriorate in many African countries.

In recent years there have been promising signs that a few political leaders, particularly President Nyerere of Tanzania, are making a careful analysis of the ills of independent Africa and are taking steps to counteract the trends which have been outlined above. Social scientists like Rene Dumont\*, to give but one prominent example, are contributing significantly to the process of self-examination in Africa. It seems that one can anticipate an increased receptivity to objective critical analyses of development policies by social scientists throughout Africa in years to come.

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\* False Start in Africa: Sphere, London, 1966.





The role of the sociologist in the field of development studies is four-fold. First, intensive analyses of the causes of failures in modernisation in specific regions and countries must be undertaken. Such analyses have to be somewhat more focussed than the usual analyses of social change and social dislocation. The nature of the processes occurring in particular African countries should be studied as movements towards modernisation; i.e. they should be studied within the framework of the goals of development. Secondly, much empirical and experimental work needs to be done in local communities, and particularly in the setting of subsistence agriculture, in exploring the functioning and the usefulness of various modernising organisations, development techniques and educational techniques in specific social and cultural situations in which policies are applied. Thirdly, the impact on social and political events of various types of economic programmes, industrial technology, and external economic and political influences have to be looked at very carefully. Fourthly, and possibly most important of all, the sociologist must take a critical view of developed industrial societies, carefully consider the dislocation and likely setbacks which developing countries will have to endure before attaining a state of modernness and technological sophistication, assuming that present policies are maintained, also equally carefully consider the value of aspects of traditional African society, and on the basis of these assessments formulate alternative goals for the societies and alternative policies for a solution of the really pressing problems of human need in the poor countries of Africa. Modern industrial mass consumption society with all its idealism and greed, creativity and dullness, magnificent technology and pollution, comfort and suburban boredom, exhilaration and neuroses, is not the only model for developing societies to adopt as a goal. Mounting doubts about the quality of 'civilisation' in the affluent societies have far-reaching implications for the third world. In short, the sociology of development, once the scientific analysis of existing problems in developing countries is well-established, and has provided the necessary insights, requires to become very practical and at the same time, idealistic as well. Indications thusfar are that if present trends continue, decades, if not a century or more, will elapse before some under-developed states reach the stage where the opportunities and life chances of the mass of the people will improve significantly. Some authors believe that this is inevitable<sup>2)</sup>, but others have advanced convincing arguments that meaningful human development can take place much sooner if African politicians and their known and unseen advisors, inside and outside the particular countries, relinquish many of the present goals of modernisation and formulate more realistic models at which development should aim<sup>3)</sup>.

The sacred cows of heavy industrial development, booming cities, increasing gross-national product (without considering how wealth is distributed) not to mention prestige buildings, sleek modern bureaucracies, armies of Ph.D.'s and academic achievement and education for its own sake need careful scrutiny. This is not to say that all of these goals are not valid; they simply have to be balanced by the addition of human development as a central aim.

## II. 'DEVELOPMENT' IN SOUTH AFRICA:

Over the past two or three years there has been a marked upsurge of interest in 'development' in South Africa. In part, the impetus for this enthusiasm has spread to South Africa from other parts of Africa and from academic institutions focussing on development studies in Europe and America. The obvious outlet for this interest are the impoverished African territories in Southern Africa, including the African reserves or 'homelands' which constitute roughly 14% of South Africa's territory.

The need for development in the African 'homelands' is very pressing indeed. The extent and depth of poverty is deeply disturbing. In one of these territories, Sekukuniland, it has been found that roughly 50% of African children die before the age of 5 years<sup>4)</sup>. In the Transkei, it has been suggested that 40% of children die before the age of 10 years<sup>5)</sup>. The average per capita income of Africans in the homelands appears to have been approximately R101 to R113 per annum in 1966/67<sup>6)</sup>. The homeland areas are, overwhelmingly, areas of subsistence agriculture. The performance of the subsistence economy is appallingly low. In most areas the grain yield is only roughly 2½ bags per morgen<sup>7)</sup>. In the Zulu homelands, near Durban, for example, the average maize yield is roughly 1.8 bags per acre. In these areas the average size of a household's cultivated land is between 1.75 and 2 acres<sup>8)</sup>. If one considers that the annual grain requirements for a family of 6 is about 16 bags the extent of the shortfall in good production is obvious. In the Transkei, the 12% of the inhabitants who work outside the area as migrant labourers earn slightly more than the total Gross Domestic Product of the Transkei. This is a very clear indication of the very low productivity of the Transkeian agriculture<sup>9)</sup>.

Many of these homeland areas could produce very much more than they do at present - even in agriculture. It has been estimated that these areas

could provide an adequate standard of nutrition for more than 5 times their current underfed populations<sup>10)</sup>. Some homeland areas have a very favourable agricultural potential - roughly three-quarters of the area of the homelands has an average annual rainfall of over 20 inches, compared with roughly one-third of the area of the Republic as a whole<sup>11)</sup>. Although in some areas the advantages of high rainfall are counteracted by the disadvantage of broken and hilly terrain (in the Transkei less than one million of the total of 4.5 million morgen is suitable for arable farming), stockfarming could be much more lucrative than at present. Even areas with poor potential - like Zululand, for example, where roughly 84% of the African reserve territory is not arable<sup>12)</sup> - there is nonetheless room for considerable improvement in yields on the land which is suitable and for improved stock farming on the remainder.

The Department of Bantu Administration and Development and the Bantu Investment Corporation are rendering salutary service in the agricultural and general development of the reserves. However, there would appear to be a need for and a scope for private organisations, including churches, to contribute to the development of these areas. In order that such efforts be appropriate to the needs of the African people, however, it is necessary to consider the problem of development in the light of the broader socio-political situation in South Africa.

The development of the homelands in South Africa is being presented to the world and to people in this country as a justification for permanently withholding political rights and rights to land and property ownership from Africans in the major part of South Africa - the 'White' areas, which include virtually all cities, towns and developed industrial and agricultural areas. In compensation, Africans are being granted rights which are centred in and restricted to the 'homelands', which are being developed towards political independence in the future. Since South Africa's economy is dependent on Africans for 70% of its labour requirements, and since there is no indication that the proportion of Africans in the labour force is likely to decrease in future years, very considerable economic interdependence between the 'homelands' and the rest of South Africa is inevitable, in perpetuo. Although the authorities presently encourage White capital to establish industrial undertakings in the reserves in order to provide some employment for the 'homeland' labour force in their own areas, this development is not likely to be strikingly successful<sup>13)</sup>. In fact, as Professor Reynders has

shown, it seems that it is going to be only just possible for industry in the reserves and in the border industrial areas, to absorb all new male entrants to the labour force in the reserves<sup>14)</sup>, (and the bulk of opportunity is likely to be in the border industrial complexes in 'White' South Africa). Bearing in mind these probabilities, the official goals of separation and development are not likely to lead to any significant decrease in the extent to which future industrial growth in South Africa as a whole is dependent on African labour. As Thomas points out<sup>15)</sup>, the needs of the economy are likely to be met, increasingly, by efficient transportation of African migrant workers to and from the reserves, border areas, and other industrial areas on a daily, weekly, and monthly basis<sup>16)</sup>. When a government minister said in 1968 that it was the government's intention to proceed to build South Africa's economy on contract (migrant) labour<sup>17)</sup>, he was merely stating the reality within which the separation of the races is likely to be pursued as long as the present government remains in power. For these reasons, the homelands can never be independent from South Africa in a full sense.

In addition to the existing patterns of labour migration between the 'homelands' and South Africa, it seems that a steady stream of Africans from the 'White' areas are likely to be resettled in the homelands in towns and other settlements close to 'White' industrial complexes. Thus more and more migrant labourers are likely to be added to the present figure of somewhat over one million<sup>18)</sup>. Already the 'homelands' have a significantly higher population density than the rest of the country (over twice the population density of the country as a whole), and this disparity is likely to increase in future years as a result of both the high rate of increase in the reserves (2 to 3% per annum) and as a result of resettlement policies. Although it is clearly impossible for all the Africans in the 'White' urban areas to be resettled in the 'homelands', the latter seem destined to carry the increasing burden of artificial population increase in years to come.

Attempts to encourage development in the homelands should take account of the fact that the official homelands development policy is, in part, a cynical attempt to justify continuing apartheid in the 'White' areas, and a means of enabling more and more Africans to be removed from the 'White' areas. This cynical instrumentability is by no means characteristic of the attitudes of all the officials working in the departments responsible for homeland development, nor is it characteristic of all the supporters of the government.

However, the conception of 'homeland' development as a means of legitimising White control in South Africa is an important central element in the policy of separate development and this fact cannot be overlooked.

There are a number of additional implications in the policy of separate development for the future of the under-developed regions in South Africa. Some possibilities and probabilities are outlined below.

1) Many 'homelands' will probably have to continue to exist as small, fragmented and discontinuous territories. The reserves in Natal are one example of this, and so are the Tswana homelands. The policy of separate development has been launched with White interests in mind, and this policy basis is not compatible with the expropriation of large chunks of 'White' territory in order to enlarge and consolidate the homelands<sup>19)</sup>. Furthermore, since the policy has derived much of its ideological content from Afrikaans Nationalist ideals, it specifically requires that different Bantu 'Nations' develop separately. Thus, possible advantages to be derived from consolidating and combining some of the smaller reserves into substantial blocks of land will be lost. The justification given to the policy of 'homeland' fragmentation is that evidence from elsewhere in Africa suggests that different tribes do not welcome integration with one another and that attempts to force such integration have resulted in inter-tribal conflict. There are undoubtedly examples of such conflict. (Nigeria and to a lesser extent Zambia, being prominent examples), but there are also territories in Africa (more of them in fact) where the existence of different tribes has not resulted in disruptive conflict. (Ghana, Tanganyika, being examples). Furthermore, tribal conflict, where it has occurred, has usually been vastly exacerbated by economic conflicts, the opportunism of certain politicians, and by inarticulate frustrations which find indirect outlet in 'artificial' tribal conflict. The chances are that if no tribal divisions had existed in African territories, conflict would have taken other forms. This is not to say that there are not many advantages in tribal homogeneity, but it is doubtful whether these advantages outweigh the tremendous economic disadvantages of the fragmentation of the reserves of South Africa into 8 separate future mini-states, with some of these 'states' based on numerous disconnected pieces of land<sup>20)</sup>.

An additional point that requires to be borne in mind is that the South African system of separate development for different 'Ethnic Units' does not

exclude the possibility of tribal rivalries. The concept of 'tribe' has no fixed reference. The Xhosa-speaking people of the Transkei 'homeland' for example, are composed of a number of clusters of tribes under paramount chiefs. Despite similarity of language, there have been signs of strong inter-tribal rivalries in the Transkei<sup>21)</sup>.

2) In many ways the presence of the powerful and wealthy state of South Africa confers economic advantages on under-developed states in Southern Africa which many other African territories lack. For Malawi, Mocambique, Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland, the Republic at least offers opportunities for some cash income through migrant labour, even if such labour is poorly paid. If one views the 'homelands' as prospective independent states whose economies and per capita incomes are to be compared with other African countries rather than with those of South Africa, then the territories can be seen as enjoying the same advantages. Yet the ways in which the labour of the homelands is likely to be exploited falls far short of the ideal as far as the 'homeland' territories themselves are concerned. Firstly, the migrant labourers only remit a proportion of their wages home - the bulk of these wages are spent in the 'White' areas. With migrant workers from the Transkei, for example, only 20% of their earnings are sent back<sup>22)</sup>. Secondly, the profits of the industries in which the migrants work are not able to be taxed by the 'homeland' authorities. Industries established inside the 'homelands' will be 'foreign' companies, exporting most of their profits back into the Republic. Thirdly, the absence, for long periods each year, of migrant workers means that the 'homelands' are deprived of a large proportion of their most productive manpower. In addition, in years to come, terms of trade and tariff arrangements between the 'homelands' and South Africa could operate to the relative disadvantage of the former, as is the case with most under-developed states in their trading relations with industrialised countries. Raw materials and basic foodstuffs are exported at relatively low prices, whereas finished products are imported at relatively high prices. In this way 'homelands' could conceivably help to subsidise the relatively high wages paid to non-migrant workers in the Republic. We might find a 'rich get richer and the poor get poorer' syndrome in the relationship. A growing disparity in wealth between the developed and the under-developed areas in Southern Africa is inevitable anyway, but the disparity could be even wider as a result of the possible process outlined above.

3) It would appear that the 'homelands' like so many other African territories are likely to inherit a relatively very wealthy tiny minority of bureaucrats and traders when they do attain independence. Because the African civil servants will have been employed formerly in the Department of Bantu Administration and Development at a relatively high wage rate (albeit lower than that of Whites) their position will be very favourable relative to the rank and file of 'homeland' citizens.

By 1969 there were already 4 500 African traders in the 'homelands'<sup>23)</sup>, many of them established with assistance from the Bantu Investment Corporation. In a recent interview, the Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, Dr. Koornhof spoke with pride of individual African entrepreneurs who had accumulated great wealth and luxurious motor cars<sup>24)</sup>. While trading activity enables individual Africans to gain valuable business experience which could be applied to more productive activity in time to come, it is regrettable that the traders should become inordinately wealthy in relation to the mass of the people. Thus we can already see the nascience of a sharp class division developing in the homelands.

4) As has already been mentioned, the resettlement of African populations formerly living in 'White' areas seems likely to result in a substantial growth of urban populations in the 'homelands'. Already over 106 000 urban dwellings have been built, and, according to the Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, no fewer than 169 new towns in the 'homelands' have been planned; a number of which have already been built<sup>25)</sup>. Urban settlement in the homelands appears to be the single largest item on the budget for 'homeland' development<sup>26)</sup>. It is quite conceivable that the 'homeland' territories will soon be the most urbanised African areas on the continent.

Urban development can bring with it tremendous advantages if such development draws families away from over-populated and poverty-stricken subsistence farming areas, and if such urban development provides a stimulus for improved agricultural production in the rural areas. At the moment, urban development in the 'homelands' is probably doing neither. The populations are, generally, resettled groups from the 'White' areas, and the produce they consume is produced in the 'White' areas. There also appears to be little of the type of contact between urban and rural areas which is likely to

diffuse improved expertise and changed attitudes to production to the rural areas. It seems that the 'homeland' territories are likely to inherit almost the very same problem which Dumont<sup>27)</sup> and others find in Africa - alienation of the poverty-stricken rural areas from the new towns and cities.

5) In its anxiety to stimulate development as rapidly as possible, the government is spending large amounts on the establishment of certain economic growth points in the reserves. For example, the cost of Sithebe, Natal's first industrial growth point will be about R7,265,000 in all<sup>28)</sup>. This level of expenditure on development is obviously a very welcome and positive contribution. However, in view of the points made under 4 above, and in view of the extremely high cost of creating heavy industrial employment in growth points (approximately R4 000 per job) it is a pity that expenditure on development is not more evenly spread between growth points and new towns on the one hand, and on the rural subsistence economy on the other. A dramatic illustration of the relative neglect of the latter is the fact that there are four times the number of trained White personnel in the Parks Board in Natal as there are in the agricultural section of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development in Natal<sup>29)</sup>. In 1970 there were only roughly 750 trained African agricultural extension officers in the field in all the reserves combined<sup>30)</sup>.

6) The wider socio-political framework also imposes a certain character on human relations and communication in development in South Africa. To a large extent development is being pursued by the government with ulterior motives, and many Africans are aware of this and react to this. A study of my own in Durban, for example, has shown that less than 10% of Africans in a Durban Township view the 'homelands' and their development favourably<sup>31)</sup>. The political issues in development in South Africa, plus the fact that the government does not encourage the more altruistically motivated White 'liberals' and academics to participate in the development of the 'homelands' has probably created an image of development which will not assist in gaining the whole-hearted support of the 'homeland' communities.

These are some of the particular characteristics and problems of development in South Africa's African reserves which result from the wider political policies in terms of which the development is presently taking place. In the third section of this paper, some of these problems will be



referred to once again in considering what constructive action can be taken in local development issues. The political implications of 'homeland' development prompt many talented and well-meaning people in South Africa to avoid taking any constructive interest in problems in this area. In certain opposition circles, Black and White, the feeling is that the more fully the 'homelands' are developed, the more the government will be encouraged to re-settle Africans from the 'White' areas in these areas; thus aggravating problems in the 'homelands' and alienating more and more Africans from the places where they are likely to work for the rest of their lives. This attitude is very understandable, but it does represent somewhat of an oversimplification. These are many more factors impinging on the issue of the future of Africans in the 'White' areas than the extent of development in the 'homelands'. One of these factors is the tremendous cost of transportation which the government will have to bear (or subsidise generously) if very many more Africans in 'White' areas are resettled far away from their places of work. There are, however, many other factors as well, and even the National Party press has recently published pleas for a 'different' policy with regard to urban Africans in 'White' areas<sup>32)</sup>. Furthermore, there are possibly ways in which the development of the 'homelands' can benefit the political and economic position of all Africans in South Africa, as will be pointed out presently. There seems no cogent reason why everyone who is responsive to human need should not seek opportunities to assist in the development of under-developed regions in South Africa.

### III. ACTION FOR DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA:

In considering what lines of action to suggest for development in South Africa, the social scientist in the local situation must take a wide range of factors into account. He must heed the mistakes and successes of modernisation and development in Africa as a whole. He must take into account the particular constraints and opportunities in the local situation (keeping a wary eye on political and ideological pitfalls). He should also make a critical assessment of the goals of development, guarding against the ulterior motives of politicians, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, against his own ethnocentric biases in favour of a particular model of society as a goal (the bias is usually in favour of the model of the industrialised, technological, mass-consumption society). Then, with all these considerations in mind, he must look at the grass-roots situation of under-development in the reserves,

realising that the problem is not only one of simple poverty, but also one of deeply entrenched traditional conservatism, and of economic backwardness, which implies much more than poverty. As Hobart Houghton has pointed out<sup>33)</sup> (in regard to the Transkei) economic backwardness involves a vicious circle of 'debilitating' factors which reinforce each other. These factors include poor health and education, apathetic attitudes, low productivity, low or non-existent income, low capacity to save, absence of capital, lack of structures and organisations through which development can occur; which in turn reinforce low productivity, etc., etc.

With all these factors in mind, I will attempt a few broad and tentative suggestions for action aimed at development in South Africa's reserves. I will not be so presumptuous to attempt any recommendations in regard to the larger questions of official development policy. Even if I had the knowledge to do this, such proposals would not meet the present need, which, as I understand it, is essentially for ideas about what private bodies can contribute to development. In thinking of private organisations, I am including not only churches and mission establishments, but other service organisations as well, such as universities, university institutes, private institutes for the study of South Africa's problems, as well as voluntary organisations.

It is always easiest to be negative, and therefore the first possible task for private organisations which comes to mind is that of studying government policy and its effects very thoroughly in order to criticise authoritatively those aspects of policy which are adverse in their effects. As a standard for assessing policy and its effects one can take the concepts of 'human development' and 'community development'. These aspects of policy which are not aimed at the fullest possible human development for the greatest possible number of people require to be critically evaluated in public. Similarly, aspects of policy which do not have as an ultimate goal the upliftment of whole communities to a stage at which they can participate responsibly and free of external manipulation in the economic and political life of Southern Africa, should also be critically evaluated in public.

Unless one is completely and intractably committed to the ideal of a common society for all territories within South Africa, there is a great deal of merit to be found in certain aspects of the present government's policies, and with regard to these aspects the government should be given its due. On

the other hand, there are aspects of official policy and there are also certain possible implications in government policy which are very much less commendable from the point of view of 'development' as outlined above. Some of these aspects and implications have been mentioned in the previous section.

It is doubtful for example, whether township development or population resettlement schemes in areas where there is little work available and no scope for agriculture can be called development<sup>34)</sup>. Similarly the prohibition on construction of further family dwellings for Africans in 'White' areas leading either to illegal lodging or to settled urban dwellers being forced to move to reserves, from where they have to migrate to their places of work, cannot be seen as relating to sound development in any way<sup>35)</sup>. The difficulties presently being faced by Bantu authorities in Zululand in accommodating displaced people are also not part of healthy development<sup>36)</sup>.

At a broader level, there are the disturbing implications of the policy of separate development which arise from the possibility that the mutual economic interdependence of South Africa and future politically independent 'homeland' states will lead to a type of 'neo-colonial' manipulation of weak states by a powerful controlling power. Some degree of economic interdependence will be unavoidable, but dangers of economic links leading to a 'puppet' independence in the future (with all its attendant evils) must be combatted by constant well-founded critical comment. Other disturbing implications of current policies have already been mentioned (in the previous section) and require no further comment here. Suffice to say that certain aspects of separate development have proceeded too far to be halted or reversed - reality demands that they be accepted. But, these aspects tend to have two faces - on the one hand the genuine face of healthy development for culturally distinctive peasant communities which are at this stage only very tenuously integrated into the common area of South African society; on the other hand, the more cynical face of separate development as justification for continued domination over all Blacks. The former can be encouraged to the full; the latter must constantly be exposed for what it is.

In considering practical development aid which private organisations can offer, one is faced with certain practical limitations. The most important limitation is the restriction on entry into the African reserves for any non-African private individual with the exception of ministers of religion.

Permission can be obtained but delays and red tape tend to discourage individuals. This is where the church is in a very favourable position. Needless to say, it is extremely regrettable that well-intentioned people have their access to the reserves limited by regulations and red tape.

Contributions to development have to be formulated within a framework of goals for the territory concerned. Increasingly, it is being emphasised by experts that the goal of a highly mechanised affluent, mass-consumption society is inappropriate for under-developed territories in Africa<sup>37)</sup> (or elsewhere for that matter). Some industrialisation is obviously necessary, but the cost in investment of very rapid industrialisation is so great (Hobart Houghton mentions a capital investment of up to R7 000 per job in industry in the Transkei) that this cannot be the only strategy for development. Development must also rest on the improvement and transformation of agriculture. Furthermore, this transformation should not be sought with primarily economic goals in mind. The social costs of swift economic development may be so great as to offset material advantages. Social dislocation, the breakdown of family life, the erosion of communal values in traditional culture, and the community conflicts which can arise from causing peasants to become greedy and competitive, are prices which are too high to pay for economic development<sup>38)</sup>. The emphasis should be first on the eradication of hunger and disease, and then on community development rather than purely on economic development.

It has been shown that there is scope for the development of traditional African agriculture, provided certain relatively minor adjustments can be made to customary laws relating to land tenure<sup>39)</sup>. The Department of Bantu Administration and Development is attempting to achieve development within the framework of traditional practice with its village resettlement schemes which rationalise patterns of grazing and planting<sup>40)</sup>. It would seem as if such schemes have merit, but require far more intensive guidance from agricultural extension officers than is presently being given. There are, for example, only roughly 50 African agricultural officers in Zululand. Not only should the government be encouraged to boost this number, but local churches can assist in the process of communication. There is no reason why churches should not arrange meetings between agricultural officers and local peasants in groups, and then assist peasants in understanding the guidance given and in overcoming their problems, fears and reservations. There are probably other ways in which churches can facilitate the communication between agricultural officers and local peasants.

A tremendous problem affecting traditional agricultural development is the fact that such a large proportion of able-bodied males are absent due to the migratory labour system. This proportion is as high as 70% in some areas. Abundant migrant labour from the reserves also has another effect, that of contributing towards low wages for Africans in the cities and in the economy generally. If the number of migrant labourers offering their services in distant cities can be reduced it will not only benefit the economic circumstances of urban Blacks in general, by giving them greater bargaining power, but it will also benefit agriculture in the reserves. This is one way in which the development of the 'homelands' will assist in the general improvement of the circumstances of all non-Whites in the Republic.

However, at the present time the populations in the reserves desperately need the cash income derived from migrant labour. One theoretical solution, or attempt at a solution, could be the following. If blocks of land dispersed among the tribal lands in the reserves could be set aside for industrialised agriculture, run by the Bantu Authorities themselves, then wage employment could be offered to would-be migrants close to their own gardens. Employment would have to be on a part-weekly basis to allow men to do their own ploughing and planting as well as working. Such industrialised agricultural projects would have to include some processing of produce or other light industrial functions, in order to make it possible for some work to be offered all year round. This would not only offer opportunities for cash income close to the tribesman's home, but such schemes would have a powerful 'demonstration effect' on the local subsistence agriculture and provide workers with experience relevant to their own farming problems. Others have also mentioned the desirability of some type of organised agricultural production, in order to stimulate the agricultural development of the reserves<sup>42)</sup>. This type of development has certain advantages over agricultural settlement schemes with freehold title, particularly since the latter often disrupt social life, undermine the co-operative basis of traditional African society, and tend to facilitate the emergence of an agricultural landowning elite who in turn exploit less favourably placed peasants<sup>43)</sup>.

If land and other resources permit, churches and mission establishments could take a lead in this type of development by starting experimental projects on which local peasants are employed in organised farming and in small-scale processing of farm produce, or other forms of small-scale production

for the local market, or in the construction of irrigation dams, furrows, etc. for crop production. A large number of practical problems would have to be overcome to make such a project successful, but the purpose of an experimental scheme would be precisely to study problems and attempt various solutions. In such a venture the church should work in close collaboration with social scientists, ethnologists, and agricultural experts at a university.

Small-scale manufacturing industry in the rural areas of the reserves is another priority which deserves attention from private organisations. Dr. E. F. Schumacher and his London-based Intermediate Technology Development Group have done a great deal to propagate this approach to rural development, and have introduced into countries like Botswana and Zambia various types of simple agricultural technology which can be manufactured by peasants. Water-storage equipment and rain-catchment storage wells, designed by Schumacher's group, can enable vegetables to be grown in dry areas. Mission establishments could consult Dr. Schumacher and other experts on these processes and use church buildings and land for the manufacture and trial use of such equipment, engaging local peasants to help in the experiments. Universities also have a role in studying the local needs in the reserves in order to design simple equipment which can be produced and maintained by unskilled peasants for local use. Professor Leistner<sup>44)</sup> and others have drawn attention to the positive effect on rural life of small production centres in the rural areas. Churches could effectively use some of their buildings to house community centres where possibly small-scale production of useful articles could be conducted on an experimental basis using local labour. This could stimulate similar developments in nearby villages if the Bantu Authorities became convinced of the utility of this type of endeavour. It is essential that such production be simple, labour-intensive and not 'labour-saving' and that the articles produced are geared to local needs and not to a different culture. There is scope for inventiveness and imagination in this type of experiment.

Possibly the most valuable contribution which churches and other private bodies can make to human development in the reserves is in the area of peasant skills, attitudes and morale. Elsewhere in this paper I have drawn attention to the doubts being expressed about the suitability of conventional education in under-developed regions. I was horrified to see a breakdown of pupils and teachers according to type of training establishment in the Tswana reserves, and in Botswana in 1968. Each of the two areas had only

one vocational training school out of a total of 593 and 274 ordinary schools respectively<sup>45</sup>). The number of pupils in vocational and craft training was miniscule compared with the number studying such non-essential subjects as Latin, European history, and literature in conventional schools. Each of these two territories has a problem of unemployed or under-employed school-leavers. The difference between an unemployed craftsman on the one hand, and an unemployed matriculant on the other, however, is that the former can make useful things on his own, whereas the latter agonises in unproductive frustration.

The need for vocational training is so urgent that I would suggest that private organisations take the step of attempting to provide informal instruction in short crash craft courses, even if the 'certificates' are not recognised initially.


An even greater need in under-developed regions lies in the area of attitudes and values. Throughout Africa, even the most remotely situated tribal peasants have to some extent or another been so affected by colonial influences as to desire consumer goods and other trappings of what they see as a superior 'civilisation'. Some of these aspirations are healthy, others are not conducive to the type of development which under-developed areas have to experience. In order to get any development started, as it were, a spirit of 'self-help' has to be engendered, and a spirit of community service. The ideal would be for peasants to relinquish those aspects of tribal conservatism which contribute to the vicious circle of backwardness, and yet to retain a pride in their own co-operative kin-based institutions. The church's greatest resource is people, and with the assistance of social scientists and African leaders group-training courses could be designed to influence the thinking of local tribal headmen and other leaders in such a way as to facilitate the emergence of a more positive attitude to development. The same type of group-training sessions could and should be used to change attitudes towards family planning and a host of other issues relevant to development. There is a great need for churches in under-developed areas to avoid at all costs the role of providing 'other wordly' panaceas for the peasants and to develop human relations skills, tailored to the local situation, which are relevant to the problems of under-development. One specific suggestion is that literacy training has immense value, especially if the content of training and the words used to teach reading are such as to produce a more sophisticated awareness of community issues and goals. The

church, in its human relations and communicating role should also keep a watching brief on any negative strains and tensions which emerge in communities as they begin to change. These problems can often be constructively dealt with in group sessions, provided the ministers (group leaders) have an intimate knowledge of community issues.

Needless to say, this type of role for the church probably requires that a somewhat changed curriculum for missionary training be introduced, or that special courses for missionaries be instituted. Above all, it requires that missionaries jettison totally their former, colonially inspired role of 'civilising the natives' into middle-class urban ways and bookish habits. There would appear to be a far more crucial practical role for missionaries in developing areas.

Finally, I would like to emphasise once again that what I have said applies, in the South African context, only to Africans permanently resident in the reserves, and furthermore only to those reserves where there is a reasonable consensus among both leaders and tribesmen that an autonomous development is what they want. My remarks do not apply in the slightest to those African communities which are an integral and permanent part of the common society and the developed economy of South Africa. These communities have a right to share the prosperity of a developed economy with the rest of South Africa's peoples, and churches and other private groups should guard against attempting to foist separate development on communities which do not wish it and on people to whom the policy is not applicable in objective terms.

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## FOOTNOTES

- 1) See inter alia, the following analyses: Dudley Seers and Leonard Joy (Eds.) Development in a Divided World: Pelican, Penguin Books, 1970  
Rene Dumont: False Start in Africa: Sphere/Andre Deutsch, 1966.  
P. C. Lloyd: Africa in Social Change: Penguin African Library, 1967.  
Peter Worsley, The Third World; Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1964.  
Marion E. Doro and Newell M. Stultz (Eds). Governing in Black Africa: Perspectives on the New States: Prentice Hall, 1970.  
Stanislav Andreski, The African Predicament: Michael Joseph, 1968.  
S. N. Eisenstadt (Ed). Readings in Social Evolution and Development: Pergamon, 1970.
- 2) The French author, Maister.
- 3) Dumont: op. cit.: Seers and Joy, op. cit.: Colin Legum 'Africa on the Rebound': New Society, 25/5/1967, No. 243. & Dr. E. F. Schumacher of the Intermediate Technology Development Group, London.
- 4) P. M. Leary and J. E. S. Lewis, 'Some Observations on the State of Nutrition of Infants and Toddlers in Sekukuniland': South African Medical Journal, Vol. 39, 1965, p. 1156.
- 5) See report in Research in the Star: (weekly). 14th March 1970.
- 6) W. H. Thomas (University of Stellenbosch): Decentralisation and Homeland Development: An Economic Perspective: Paper delivered at a Research Seminar, Abe Bailey Institute, Cape Town, 8/10/1970, p. 11.
- 7) Laurence Morgan, The Natal Mercury: 22/1/1971. The figure he gives is one of 2½ bags per morgen.
- 8) Institute for Social Research: A Bantu Homeland: University of Natal, Durban, 1968. The compilers found that yields varied between 1.8 and 3 bags per acre in 1967, with an average of 1.4 bags in 1966.
- 9) D. Hobart Houghton, 'The Economics of Developing Countries with Special Reference to the Transkei': in W. Backer (Ed). The Economic Development of the Transkei: University of Fort Hare, Lovedale Press, 1970, p. 10.
- 10) Laurence Morgan: Natal Mercury: 23/1/1971. The figure is probably optimistic.
- 11) J. H. Grobler: 'Die Landboupotensiaal van die Bantoe gebiede': Journal of Racial Affairs, Vol. 21: Jan. 1970, p. 3.
- 12) Figures on arable land in Zululand furnished by the Department of Bantu Administration and Development.
- 13) See, inter alia, Thomas, op. cit.: and Hobart Houghton, op. cit.
- 14) H. J. J. Reynders, 'Die Werkverskaftings potensiaal in die Tuislande met besondere verwysing na Nywerheidsdesentralisasie' in Tuisland Ontwikkeling, 'n Program vir die Sewentigjare: S.A.B.R.A. Pretoria, 1970.
- 15) Thomas, op. cit.

## Footnotes (2)

- 16) See also M.C. Botha 'Staatsmasjinerie wie die Bevordering van Tuisland-ontwikkeling' in S.A.B.R.A. : op. cit. p. 12, and also paper by Dr. J. J. Burger in the same issue.
- 17) Reported in Financial Mail: 19/7/1968, p. 198.
- 18) Thomas, op. cit. p. 2.
- 19) G. L. van L. Froneman, Deputy Chairman of the Bantu Affairs Commission, now Minister, at the S.A.B.R.A. Congress, 1967.
- 20) Thomas, op. cit., p.21.
- 21) W. D. Hammond-Tooke, 'Chieftainship in Transkeian Political Development' Journal of Modern African Studies. Vol. 2, No. 4, 1964. pp. 513-529.
- 22) Mentioned by Hobart Houghton, op. cit., p. 11.
- 23) Report on the progress of Homeland Development by Minister M.C. Botha in Bantu: March 1969.
- 24) Interview with Minister M.C. Botha by Otto Krause, Rapport: 5/9/1971
- 25) Same interview as above.
- 26) Mentioned by Professor Moolman in S.A.B.R.A. op. cit., 1970, p. 49.
- 27) Dumont, op. cit., chapter 7 and 14.
- 28) Laurence Morgan, Natal Mercury: 20/1/1971.
- 29) Laurence Morgan: Natal Mercury: 18/11/1970.
- 30) M. C. Botha: S.A.B.R.A. op. cit.
- 31) L. Schlemmer 'City or Tribal Homeland: A Study of Patterns of Indentification among Africans in Durban' Paper read at the 2nd congress of Sociologists of Southern Africa, Lourenco Marques, June 1971.
- 32) See for example, editorial by Schalk Pienaar: Rapport: 29/8/1971.
- 33) Hobart Houghton, op. cit., pp. 7 - 9.
- 34) Muriel Horrel: A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa: Institute of Race Relations 1968, pp. 125 - 137 & 1969 pp. 121 - 126.
- 35) Horrel, op. cit., p. 174, 175 (1969).
- 36) Horrel, op. cit., 1970: pp. 110-111.
- 37) Brian Phipps: 'Rural Development or Social Dislocation: An African Dilemma?' Paper read at the 2nd congress of Sociologists of Southern Africa, Lourenco Marques, June 1971, p. 6. Hobart Houghton op. cit., p. 13, 14, & G.M.E. Leistner, 'Some Thoughts on Bantu Development' Journal of Racial Affairs: Vol. 21, 1970. pp. 41 - 50.

- 38) Seers & Joy, op. cit., pp. 106 - 108.
- 39) A.J.B. Hughes: 'Tribal land Tenure - An Obstacle to Progress?' The South African Journal of African Affairs, Vol. 1, 1971. pp. 56 - 73. See also Phipps, op. cit.
- 40) A Bantu Homeland: op. cit. p. 42 passim.
- 41) Laurence Morgen: Natal Mercury: 22/1/1971.
- 42) Inter alia, Mr. Pepler, Director of Development and Agriculture, Dept. of Bantu Administration and Development, quoted in Natal Mercury, 14/4/1971: Dr. G. M. E. Leistner in 'Bespreking van die referaat van Prof. Reynders', S.A.B.R.A. op. cit., 1970, p. 84, pleads for large-scale mobilisation for public works, including agricultural development work. See also Hobart Houghton op. cit., p. 14.
- 43) See Phipps, op. cit., 1970, pp. 4, 5, for a full discussion.
- 44)= Leistner, op. cit., 1970, pp. 46-47 and Laurence Morgen, Natal Mercury, 17/2/1971.
- 45) W.J. O. Jeppe, 'Comparative Development of the Public Services in Botswana and the Western (Bantu) Areas' in The South African Journal of African Affairs: Vol. 1, 1971., pp. 132, 133.

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