Future Agricultures

Creating Policy Space for Pastoralism in Kenya

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Introduction

This paper reflects on the work of the Ministry of State for Development of Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands between its formation in April 2008 and the elections of March 2013. It is written by those with a first-hand (and therefore subjective) perspective on events[1].

Kenya's arid and semi-arid lands (known as 'ASALs', highlighted on the map) have never enjoyed the kind of policy attention that takes account of their unique capacities and challenges. Pastoralism, the dominant production system in much of the region, has been especially misunderstood. Pastoral areas of Kenya differ from other parts of the country in three important respects: first, in the movement of livestock and people; second, in their demography (low population density and high population growth); and third, in their institutions (customary mechanisms for managing natural resources and security are still strong in many pastoral areas, and are the repository of invaluable indigenous knowledge). These differences are rarely accommodated in national policy or practice.

Northern Kenya has also endured a long history of marginalisation. Both the colonial and the post-colonial administrations oscillated between neglect and abuse of the more remote parts of the north (Ochieng Odhiambo, 2002). Emergency powers in some areas were only lifted in 1992. Prolonged isolation and under-investment has meant that the region has some of the lowest levels of human development in Kenya. In some northern counties adult literacy is below ten percent, net primary enrolment below thirty percent, and fewer than half of children receive all their recommended vaccinations.

The Ministry was created to address these challenges. It was most immediately a product of the National Accord which ended the post-election violence in early 2008 and ushered in the Grand Coalition Government. Agenda 4 of the National Accord, on long-term issues and solutions, drew an explicit link between inequality (with special mention of the ASALs) and sustainable peace. In April 2008 President Mwai Kibaki announced a Minister for Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands as part of the new power-sharing cabinet.

More fundamentally, the Ministry was an outcome of the growing political strength of the people of the ASALs since the restoration of multi-partyism in 1992, and particularly since the 2002 election campaign (Livingstone, 2005). A number of individuals and organisations, in a network that flowed across state/society boundaries, had been pressing for many years for a policy framework that was more attuned to ASAL realities. There was also a growing recognition, particularly in parts of government and the private sector, that the

region's economic potential had been overlooked. The ASAL Policy, approved by Parliament in December 2012[2], represented the end of a decade-long struggle and was thus important for its symbolism as well as its content. Among other things the policy established an institutional framework to oversee its interpretation and implementation and provide dedicated and specialist attention to ASAL issues within government.

The policy documents produced by the Ministry recognise the important differences between and within Kenya's arid and semi-arid areas in their culture, ecology, production system, development status and comparative advantage. The term 'ASALs' is common parlance in Kenya but is too imprecise for an area that now covers more than 80 percent of the country and is home to around 14 million people. Arguably, it has also been profoundly misleading in that it has narrowed policy attention to the different ecologies and their livelihood systems (pastoralism and others) rather than the comprehensive entitlements of citizenship. The term is used in this paper as convenient shorthand for the full scope of the Ministry's geographical mandate. However, the paper's emphasis is on the policy and institutional challenges facing pastoralism, since these are generally subject to greater misunderstanding and contestation in public policy debates.

There are four reasons for writing the paper. First, to promote continuity between administrations by summarising the Ministry's progress thus far and the steps needed to sustain and advance the policy and institutional agenda which it has put in place. A new Cabinet has been constituted in the wake of the March

2013 elections with a different configuration of functions; responsibility for ASAL development now rests with the new Ministry of Devolution and Planning. Second, the allocation of a dedicated ministerial brief for drylands and for a marginalised region is unusual, and therefore this experience may be of wider interest. Published reflections by those involved in government are also less common than observations about government by external parties. Third, formal publication enhances public accountability, allowing scrutiny of the Ministry's choices and actions. Finally, the authors hope to contribute to thinking and debate by those who may find themselves facing similar challenges in future.

The paper begins by summarising the historical, political and institutional contexts within which the Ministry was created, as well as the multiple narratives that have driven policy in Kenya's drylands over time (section 1). Section 2 explains some of the policy choices the Ministry made in interpreting its mandate and shaping the policy agenda. Section 3 reflects on the response of different actors to the policy space opened up by the establishment of the Ministry, while section 4 looks at how it implemented its mandate and its day-to-day engagement with others. Section 5 discusses the institutional framework in more detail and the steps required to strengthen it further. The paper concludes with reflections and recommendations.

1 Background to the creation of the Ministry

The creation of the Ministry was arguably a moment of serendipity, when a number of conditions in Kenya and beyond it coalesced in favour of change. These included a renewed focus on inequality in the wake of the 2007 elections, a history of pastoral civil society activism and struggle which was gradually infiltrating competitive politics, the ongoing search for a new Constitution, the emergence of a discourse around resilience following the 2008–2011 drought, and the choice of minister.

Since 1980 the government had tried various approaches in the ASALs but with little continuity and limited success (Annex 1). The justification for giving the region a separate ministerial brief in 2008 was primarily the growing political salience of inequality, including regional inequality. This had two drivers. First, sustained pressure by pastoralist advocacy networks since the 1990s had gradually pushed the policy spotlight onto pastoralism and the political neglect of arid and pastoral areas[3]. Their efforts coincided with the emergence of the so-called 'new thinking' in pastoral development which validated the rationality and resilience of mobile pastoralism (Scoones, 1995; Niamir-Fuller, 1999). The main adversaries in the 2007 election found themselves obliged to respond to pressure from predominantly pastoral constituencies (which were also largely non-aligned and therefore a growing swing vote), such as promising action on livestock insurance.

Second, the shock of the post-election violence in 2007–2008 moved the issue of equitable development further up the policy agenda. The signatories to Agenda 4 of the National Accord made a commitment that: 'In harmonizing our manifestoes, we shall ensure poverty alleviation and equitable development are top priorities for the Coalition Government', with special attention being given to the most disadvantaged communities in the ASALs and in the urban informal settlements. The Ministry was created as part of this large coalition government in April 2008 to address, in the President's words, the 'unique challenges' facing the region.

1.1 Historical marginalisation

The roots of these 'unique challenges' go back a long way, to the model of political economy adopted by the colonial regime. The railway line from Mombasa to Kisumu, built in the early twentieth century to facilitate the extraction of resources, became the geographical focus of investment to the detriment of areas further afield. The north – then called the Northern Frontier District (NFD) – was also governed under different and more authoritarian measures than the Kenya colony (Aukot, 2008; Hassan, 2008). Colonial administrators were given extensive powers of arbitrary arrest and collective punishment. Movement into and out of the area was tightly controlled. Containment rather than engagement was the priority (Ochieng Odhiambo, 2012).

The post-independence government maintained the same strategy, most ruthlessly in Somali areas affected by the secessionist *Shifta* rebellion where a state of emergency was only lifted in 1992. As the Prime Minister remarked in 2009, the north was just a hole in the map – quite literally, given that the first Demographic and Health Survey to include the whole country was as recent as 2003. All previous surveys had excluded close to 70 percent of Kenya (the present-day counties of Turkana, Samburu, Isiolo, Marsabit, Mandera, Wajir and Garissa: CBS et al, 2004). The region's prolonged isolation starved it of investment and led to the inequalities that are so evident today. Some illustrations of these are given in Annex 2.

There was also continuity between pre-and post-independence administrations in the pattern of economic development and resource distribution. Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965, the pre-eminent policy statement by the post-independence government, argued that public funds should be invested in areas where yields would be greater, in those with 'abundant natural resources, good land and rainfall, transport and power facilities and people receptive to and active in development'. Thus the drier lowlands were dealt a double blow: their prior exclusion from development ('transport and power facilities') now classified them a poor return on investment, while the interpretation of 'potential' in agro-ecological terms ('good land and rainfall') reinforced a presumption that highland crop farming must be more productive than lowland livestock farming. This has influenced the relative level of public investment enjoyed

by these two livelihood systems ever since. While coffee farmers, for example, benefit from access roads, financial services, universal education, research expertise and the periodic write-off of their loans by the government, livestock farmers – and especially pastoralists – enjoy little of the same. These biases persist, despite research which demonstrates that livestock production contributes almost as much as crop production to agricultural GDP (Behnke and Muthami, 2011).

The state's failure to provide these public goods in the ASALs added to the region's challenges, turning the arguments of Sessional Paper No. 10 into a self-fulfilling prophecy. Repeated cycles of crisis, driven by drought or conflict, inflicted on a population that was growing in both size and vulnerability, reinforced public perceptions of the region as a net consumer of national wealth and of pastoralism as unviable. On the contrary, the region's history shows that its contemporary vulnerabilities are not the product of its ecology or production system but rather of conscious political choices taken in Kenya's past. The fundamental challenge is a political one and concerns the chronic imbalance in power and resources between different parts of Kenya. This is what Agenda 4, and subsequently the Constitution of Kenya 2010, recognised. It is why the Ministry was not called a ministry for ASALs, or for drylands, or for pastoralism – the phrase 'Northern Kenya' in its title is a deliberate reference to the historical processes of exclusion and neglect which began in the NFD and still resonate today.

1.2   Policy narratives[4]

As the previous section suggests, two dominant narratives drove the government's approach to the ASALs prior to the restoration of a multi-party political system in 1992. One was motivated by security concerns and the other by a belief that growth in the highlands would eventually trickle down to the drier lowlands. In the 1990s pastoral civil society began to counter these with a narrative of lamentation, articulating the injustice of the region's condition.

The first public document that framed the ASALs from a perspective of potential rather than deficit was the Economic Recovery Strategy produced by the NARC government in 2003. By 2007, when the national development plan was published (Kenya Vision 2030), the ASALs were being talked of as the 'new frontier' for development, in part because of a perception that agricultural areas were reaching the limits of their productivity. The discourse was starting to shift in a more progressive direction but its application still raised concerns. Planners and bureaucrats within the agriculture and water sectors argued that the region's economic potential would be best enhanced through modernisation, privatisation and sedentarisation – in effect making the drylands 'more like us'. Meanwhile the language of the 'new frontier', often used by central planners, senior politicians and parts of the media, risked legitimising extraction, presenting ASAL resources as ripe for exploitation by either the state or private investors. There was very little appreciation in policy terms of the specific potential and particularities of pastoralism (rather than of livestock production), or acceptance of pastoralism on its own terms[5].

The Ministry's position was that the ASALs are part and parcel of Kenya but that they have unique constraints and attributes which require greater nuance in public policy – a balance between diversity and unity. Government policy and practice should take account of what makes the ASALs unique without compromising on core principles of governance. For example, pastoralism should enjoy the same level of public investment as other production systems not just for instrumental reasons (such as boosting economic growth), but because it was the fair and right thing to do. Without it, the playing field on which the performance of different economies and livelihood systems is inevitably judged would never be level.

The Constitution of Kenya 2010 reinforces the 'diversity in unity' position. It attests to the common citizenship of all Kenyans but requires the state to respect diversity. The words 'equality', which affirms universal rights, and 'equity', which recognises pre-existing inequalities, sit side-by-side in the national values and principles of governance. The Constitution goes further by creating mechanisms through which inequalities can be reduced[6]. It also addresses many of the Ministry's early concerns about discriminatory laws and regulations that were the product of the region's historical experience, making these in effect unconstitutional[7].

Looking beyond Kenya, two other developments supported the more rights-based agenda of the Ministry. First, the African Union's Policy Framework for Pastoralism in Africa (African Union, 2010) affirmed the Ministry's position on pastoralism. When the ASAL Policy was tabled at Cabinet in 2012 it could be presented as clearly in line with a set of principles which the government had already endorsed. Second, the discourse around resilience, which became more prominent in the wake of the 2011 drought in the Horn of Africa, reinforced the Ministry's arguments for equitable investment in public goods, and for a more appropriate balance between addressing the immediate manifestations of vulnerability and their underlying causes.

2   Making choices

Faced with a long list of expectations and demands, limited financial and technical resources, and the possibility that its life span might be limited to one term of government (given that the coalition was a temporary and expedient measure), the new Ministry had to make choices. It decided to prioritise systemic change, concentrating its efforts on measures to re-balance policy and institutional priorities in the long-term interests of the region.

To some extent this went against the grain. Most of the incentives within government in systems of planning, resource allocation and performance management favour the delivery of tangible projects. The public also

expects to see that its ministries are visible, their names on the sign-boards that claim patronage of clinics, schools and water points. However, the Ministry saw itself as a different kind of ministry, created not to duplicate or supplant the work of the main sectors (particularly those responsible for the provision of infrastructure and services) but to help them understand and become more responsive to the distinct needs of the region, their lack of responsiveness having been a key factor in its under-development. Such an approach, it was felt, was more likely to deliver lasting change.

From its early days the Ministry saw itself as a time-bound mechanism through which investment into the ASALs could be enhanced and directed in line with their particular circumstances and needs. The metaphor of an 'acceleration lane' was used, helping the region 'catch up' with the rest of the country. The principle of being time-bound was rooted in a desire to avoid parallel development in the ASALs, for both philosophical and pragmatic reasons. First, the ASALs had a history of exclusion and differential treatment, as section 1 explained, and were still too often perceived as somehow separate from the mainstream of national life. Second, it was neither appropriate nor practical for a single ministry to deliver on behalf of the government across such a large area. The only viable approach was for each sector to become more responsive to the needs of the region.

With this in mind, the Ministry decided to work in four ways.

1. **Coordination.** This was understood to mean the coordination of development policy, planning and resource allocation, both across government and with other stakeholders. It would involve more than the elimination of inefficiencies. The word most often used was 'amplify': the Ministry would ask each of its counterparts to reflect on the reasons for lack of progress in the ASALs in specific areas of their mandate. It would then use its specialist knowledge to help them achieve their goals. The trick would be to avoid getting drawn into the detailed business of delivery – most memorably expressed as 'don't pick up the shovel' by one of the consultants who designed the institutional framework (Anderson and Kirira, 2009) – but rather to look for changes at a systemic level.

2. **Selective implementation of programmes and projects.** The important word was 'selective', i.e. not routine. The Ministry would implement projects that added value, by filling gaps in service provision or by piloting approaches that could be scaled up by the sectors. It would also implement programmes and projects that did not obviously fall within another ministry's mandate, such as drought management.

3. **Policy, legal and institutional reform.** This would include the development of new policy and the review of existing policy in light of ASAL priorities, as well as the elimination of discriminatory laws, regulations and procedures and the creation of an ASAL institutional framework.

4. **Regional interaction.** Inter-governmental contact would be essential given that many ASAL counties lie along Kenya's international borders, and given the frequent cross-border movement of pastoralists in both directions.

The Ministry's successes and failures in each of these four areas are discussed in section 4.

Finally, in formulating its policy agenda the Ministry sought to re-frame the government's approach to the ASALs using four key messages. First, that the ASALs are a region of untapped potential and opportunity, but that this potential will remain unrealised without accelerated investment in the enabling environment for development. Second, that the stabilisation and development of the region is a national priority and concern, of benefit not just to the region but to the nation as a whole. Third, that the citizens of the ASALs have the same rights to development as any others, but that these rights must be fulfilled in ways that take account of the region's particular attributes and constraints. And finally, that the term 'development' means more than simply economic development, but is rather a deeper process of expanding people's opportunities and freedoms.

The policy documents disaggregate the generic concept of 'ASALs' (illustrated in Figure 1), highlighting three broad priorities which have greater resonance in different parts of the region.

1. **Inequality:** actions to close the gap between the marginalised north and the rest of Kenya, particularly in public goods such as infrastructure, social services and security. These public goods are often referred to in Kenya as 'foundations for development', being prerequisites for economic growth, social justice and political stability[8]. Without these foundations, investors do not invest, public officers resist their postings to the region, the cost of doing business rises, and the prospect of stability falls. Without the infrastructure to access markets and economic opportunities, and without the services that build human capital, people lack the means to protect themselves against risk and build their resilience[9].

2. **Pastoralism:** Actions to improve the quality of service delivery and governance for mobile populations and those living in sparsely populated areas. The policy recognises that pastoral communities differ from others in their mobility, demography and institutional arrangements and requires that this diversity be accommodated in approaches to service delivery, devolution, the census and electoral practice.

3. **Aridity:** actions to strengthen climate resilience and sustainable livelihoods, and to reduce risk. In most semi-arid areas, whose place within the

Figure 1: ASAL policy priorities by county			
Policy priority	**Counties in Northern Kenya** Turkana, West Pokot, Baringo (East), Samburu, Isiolo, Marsabit, Mandera, Wajir, Garissa, Tana River, Lamu	**Other pastoral counties** Kajiado, Narok, Laikipia	**Semi-arid counties** Kwale, Kilifi, Taita Taveta, Meru, Tharaka Nithi, Embu, Kitui, Makueni, Nyeri
Aridity: strengthening climate resilience and ensuring sustainable livelihoods.	• Institutionalisation and delivery of the drought management system • Integration of climate adaptation & drought risk reduction into planning • Land and natural resource management		
Pastoralism: promoting pastoral mobility and institutional arrangements	• Service delivery (education, health, water) in ways appropriate for nomadic communities • Cultural rights		
Inequality: reducing inequality between the north and the rest of Kenya and strengthening national cohesion.	• Infrastructure • Security • Legal reform • Social protection		

nation is generally not questioned (either by their populations or by the state)[10], the principal challenges are the deepening constraints on production in light of population growth, young people's movement away from the land, and climate change. In the north and other pastoral areas these technical interventions are also important but will have little impact unless the other two priorities are also addressed. Across all the ASALs the policy authorises the establishment of mechanisms to manage climate risks.

3   Policy actors

While policy narratives were evolving in a more sympathetic direction, and the inadequacies of the state's response in the ASALs becoming ever more apparent, the actual creation of the Ministry was unexpected. Arguably, it may not have happened without the crisis that followed the 2007 elections, since a large coalition government gave more latitude in the distribution of ministerial portfolios. A cabinet position for ASALs proved to be critical. Several civil servants in previous governments had tried to advance a more progressive ASAL agenda but were constrained by having to convince their minister. A cabinet position gives direct access not only to political decision-making at the highest levels but to contact with the most senior civil servants. This creates the space for alternative perspectives to counter more entrenched views (Keeley and Scoones, 2003).

The creation of the Ministry may be regarded as the opening of a 'policy space' (Grindle and Thomas, 1991; Cornwall and Coelho, 2006) – a time when 'interventions or events throw up new opportunities, reconfiguring relationships between actors within these spaces or bringing in new actors, and opening up the possibilities

of a shift in direction' (Brock et al, 2001). Policy spaces have different forms and functions. One typology suggests five (KNOTS, 2006), namely conceptual (where new ideas are introduced into policy debates), bureaucratic (the formal policy-making process), invited (government-led consultations with selective stakeholder participation), popular (external pressure on policy-making) and practical (facilitating exposure for policy-makers to new approaches and ideas). The Ministry created space for most of these, and this section discusses how the various actors responded.

3.1   Public engagement and pastoral civil society

Between August and December 2008 the Ministry held a series of public forums across the ASALs. These built on earlier consultations around the draft ASAL policy (Annex 3). While the creation of the Ministry was widely welcomed, two responses were common in all these forums. First, some participants could only repeat the 'narrative of lamentation' referred to above. Perhaps understandably, long years of neglect had left part of the ASAL population unable to think of its relationship with government in anything other than passive terms. The second response was that the Ministry was nothing more than a token gesture – a 'political creation', something familiar to Kenyans who understand politics as an exercise in patronage. The most frequently cited evidence in support of the second view was the small size of the Ministry's budget, the argument being that if the government were serious about the ASALs it would have backed the new organisation with a budget to match. Costings prepared in 2006/07 for an earlier draft of the ASAL policy suggested that the region would need around Kshs. 30bn of investment per year for the next

ten years[11], sourced from the government, the private sector and development partners. The Ministry's first development budget in 2008/09 was Kshs. 832m[12], a large sum but modest by ministerial standards. Moreover, half of it was counterpart funding for a long-standing IDA-financed project that had been moved under the Ministry's remit[13]. A brief reflection on this budget debate highlights two issues of more general interest. The first is how the Ministry chose to interpret its mandate, particularly with regard to the rest of government, and the second is how the delivery of that mandate was affected as much by generic weaknesses in governance as by challenges peculiar to the region.

The size of a ministerial budget tends to be interpreted by both the public and political class alike as an indicator of ministerial power. In this respect Kenya is not alone: in most countries budgets are jealously guarded. However, the Ministry was more concerned with the level of resources allocated to the ASALs as a whole (not just its own budget), as well as the mechanisms to ensure that these allocations would be used to good effect. It would be unwise, it argued, to seek to appropriate the ASAL-related budgets held by others: first, because as a young institution it had limited implementation capacity, but second, because it saw its strategic priority as being to help the rest of government meet its obligations in the ASALs, not usurp their functions. Territorial arguments about budgets would only antagonise colleagues with whom the Ministry wanted to engage. Moreover, a separate ministerial brief was arguably not in the best interests of a region long accustomed to differential treatment. The ASALs needed to be brought into the heart of government, not left on the margins.

The allocation of public finance to the ASALs did increase during the Ministry's tenure. In the 2010/11 budget, for example, Kshs. 13bn was allocated to seven ministries for projects in the region. However, budgets are allocated without mechanisms to ensure that funds actually reach the region and are used in a manner appropriate to its context. This touches on the second issue, of generic weaknesses in governance. The Ministry's start-up budget was low partly because governments can find it hard to redistribute resources to new initiatives (Sutton, 1999, citing Crosby, 1996). In Kenya this is due to several factors, including a system of incremental budgeting, the political imperative of 'equal treatment', and a planning system which is inadequately informed by a comparative analysis of competing priorities. Further, weak systems of control allow individual bureaucrats to act autonomously and with impunity[15]. Even if budgets are allocated for a particular purpose, ministries may re-direct them to other ends without being held to account.

This highlights again why the Ministry attached such importance to the institutional framework and to mechanisms through which each part of government could be held more accountable for its commitments to the region. It also cautions against assuming that the constraints to progress in the ASALs lie only in things distinctive to the region (such as the biases against pastoralism held by some in the bureaucracy and political class). The 'normal' shortcomings of government also play their part[16]. For example, the nearly two-month hiatus in access to public funds as the financial year closes and then re-opens is a major impediment to timely drought response if environmental conditions worsen at the year's end.

The Ministry's response at the public consultations, both to those enthralled by history and those sceptical about the government's intent, was to challenge them to think differently. First, marginalisation may be a reality but it was no longer a necessity; the means were gradually being put in place through which to reverse it. This argument was later greatly reinforced by the promulgation of a new Constitution in 2010, especially its Bill of Rights and the introduction of devolved governance. Second, a more progressive spin could be put on the Ministry as a 'political creation', in that the political system was responding to legitimate public pressure from pastoralists and others. Moreover, whatever the motivation behind its creation, the Ministry now existed and was an opportunity to exploit.

Other elements within the region were already thinking and acting along these lines. The Ministry formed a close partnership with the Pastoralist Shade Initiative, an emerging platform for the voices of pastoralists across Kenya, which tries to operate in a manner that draws on traditional methods of governance but adapts them to modern expectations (with women working alongside male elders, for example). As well as formal engagement[17], there was frequent informal contact when members of the network would approach the Ministry for assistance, often to deal with outbreaks of inter-communal conflict. The Ministry's open-door policy and its ability to channel concerns to counterpart ministries gave pastoralist elders direct access to senior levels of government. In this regard the members of Pastoralist Shade demonstrated a level of initiative, tenacity and energy that was often lacking among the more formally organised parts of civil society.

3.2   NGOs

The response of development NGOs to the policy space created by the Ministry was highly variable. Some recognised the shared agenda which had opened up and immediately came forward to support and take advantage of that opportunity; examples of some of these partnerships are listed in Table 1. Others continued to operate in parallel to government, with occasional, perfunctory contact. Both types of response were made by both international and Kenyan civil society organisations.

From the Ministry's perspective, the more effective partnerships with NGOs, such as those in Table 1, had the following qualities in common:

- A willingness to first ascertain the government's policy priorities and then work with these, rather than bring a

Table 1: Examples of constructive engagement by civil society organisations	
SOS Sahel UK and subsequently IIED	Technical assistance to the Minister's office Long-term support on nomadic education, climate change and pastoralism
RECONCILE (Resource Conflict Institute)	Technical assistance in developing the Vision 2030 strategy Facilitation of several public events for the Ministry and frequent dialogue on pastoralism
ELMT/RELPA[18]	Technical assistance in designing the Northern Kenya Investment Fund, delivered by Pipal Ltd Funding for first consultative meeting with pastoralists
Capacity Kenya / Intrahealth International	Research on human resources for health Provision of bursaries for health professionals from the region
Brookings Institution	Research on education financing Advocacy on equity in governance, particularly under devolution

pre-determined agenda to the table. There was a clear difference between the NGOs which saw the Ministry as simply a means to advance their own agendas and the NGOs which saw it as an opportunity to advance a broader public policy agenda. This also requires a willingness to subsume organisational brand and identity.

- A commitment to sustained rather than one-off engagement, with as much continuity of personnel as possible.

- A willingness to be challenged as much as to challenge, advocacy between civil society and government being a two-way process.

- The capacity to match dialogue with practical assistance (technical or financial) wherever possible.

- Recognition of the complementary functions of government and civil society. There were two significant shortcomings of parts of the NGO sector. First, a reluctance to accept that certain functions, such as security, education or social protection, remain the responsibility of the government and that NGOs can, and should, only ever play a subsidiary role. Second, a failure to be strategic about their comparative advantage, particularly in risk-taking and innovation which, if fruitful, can subsequently be taken to scale by government. Successful scale-up requires that the long-term institutional home for pilot activities be identified from the outset, in order to ensure maximum buy-in. This further reinforces the importance of sustained and early engagement by those NGOs wishing to influence government practice.

The kind of constructive partnerships illustrated in Table 1 require, on the part of government, a level of openness to the ideas and expertise of others, and, on the part of NGOs, a more nuanced political analysis of the state. The dominant narrative that characterises countries like Kenya, of states captured by their societies, their bureaucracies tainted by corruption and inefficiency – and which perhaps bolsters the instinctive preference of many NGOs for arms-length engagement, whether out of caution or a sense of moral superiority – arguably increases the obligation on non-state actors to keep testing the truth of that narrative and look for the policy spaces and like-minded individuals who are always there.

3.3 Development partners

On the whole the Ministry enjoyed very constructive relationships with development partners, despite some early scepticism about whether or not the Ministry would 'last', and whether it had the necessary influence to engage effectively with what were seen as its more powerful counterparts. These views echo those of the public about what constitutes authority and influence within government.

Donor relationships were of three broad kinds. First, the 'conventional' western donors were at home with a ministerial mandate focused on poverty and inequality and with a minister who could speak their language. They also appreciated the strategic significance of the Ministry, despite its limited resources and uncertain future, and stepped forward with significant levels of development assistance. At times they also provided invaluable reinforcement of the Ministry's agenda[19]. The second group were governments in the Middle East and North Africa, as well as some independent organisations[20], with cultural or religious ties to northern Kenya and therefore an emotional affinity with the region. This partnership involved both bilateral assistance in areas such as roads, energy and health, and philanthropic or community-based activities such as higher education scholarships, voluntary medical missions and measures to advance basic rights and freedoms. The third group were countries looking to invest in the region, such as China, where the contact was of a more procedural kind and centred on specific contracts or projects.

Development partners' contact with the Ministry tended to be led by their livelihoods, food security or climate change specialists, with far less engagement by those working on basic services, governance or

infrastructure; the former approached the Ministry, while the Ministry had to seek the latter out. Once again this illustrates the tendency to frame the ASALs primarily from the perspective of their production system and ecology, despite the fact that regional development necessarily touches on all aspects of life. While in theory livelihoods frameworks are comprehensive in their scope of analysis, in practice organisations allocate their resources against sectors.

The most consequential issue with which the Ministry had to deal was an audit of the Arid Lands Resource Management Project's activities in 2006-08 by the World Bank's Integrity Vice-Presidency (INT). The audit process had numerous shortcomings, including a lack of competence and professionalism on the part of INT, a lack of transparency on the part of the Bank, the Bank's failure to deal adequately with criticism (which was interpreted as defensiveness), and INT's reliance on complaints from a single, partisan source (whose private investigation INT then made use of, instead of working to verify the third party's allegations). Worse still, poor management of the process hurt people in the region (by the withdrawal of drought contingency finance just at the moment when it was most needed) and damaged the prospects for its long-term development (by casting doubt, on dubious evidence, on whether locally managed development was indeed possible).

After two-and-a-half years of investigation INT was unable to produce any evidence of corruption, a fact which the Bank's country director verbally admitted[21]. There were instances of shortcomings in ALRMP's administrative procedures but none of these were of sufficient concern to justify the expense and disruption that had been caused. The Ministry chose not to acquiesce but to challenge both the process and its outcomes throughout. However, it did not make these criticisms public, which has allowed the Bank's (and the original complainant's) version of events to become erroneously established as truth[22].

While the Bank's management of the audit left much to be desired, the Ministry's other main development partners, including DFID, Danida, the European Union, JICA and several UN agencies, all found creative ways to maintain their partnership through a difficult period to the satisfaction of both parties.

3.4   Parliament

The ASAL MPs were sympathetic and supportive of the Ministry. During the 10th Parliament (2008–2013) they numbered 74 out of the total membership of 224. Although an informal Pastoral Parliamentary Group had been established in 1998 and later reconstituted in 2003 (Livingstone, 2005), there was no formal ASAL grouping in parliament. At times it was clear how effective an organised alliance could be. For example, the debate that preceded parliament's final approval of the revenue-sharing formula on 27 November 2012 resulted in a higher allocation to arid counties than originally proposed, since

their MPs pressed as a group for a greater weighting to be given to poverty in the final formula, and a lower weighting to population.

Despite well-publicised stories of the inappropriate use of MPs' constituency development funds (CDF), it is important to remember that the CDF was the first public finance of any meaningful size to be systematically targeted on an ongoing basis to northern Kenya. In a situation of highly unequal access to the public purse, the CDF provided the kind of basic investment in things like classrooms and clinics which other parts of the country had long taken for granted.

The role of the 11th Parliament (2013 –) will be even more significant given the enhanced powers of the national assembly over the executive, and the creation of the senate, whose purpose is to represent the interests of the new counties. Parliamentary committees will be instrumental in ensuring that the executive delivers on both the ASAL policy and constitutional commitments to marginalised communities. However, the Ministry's experience was that NGOs interested in ASAL or pastoral advocacy had limited contact with parliament, and that this represented a major disconnect with the changing locus of political authority in Kenya[23].

3.5   Researchers

The policy agenda of the Ministry was unashamedly political in that it sought to challenge a lack of fairness in the distribution of public resources and the biases that underpinned this. It had no intention of 'depoliticising' the process (Sutton, 1999). From empirical observation, the Ministry believed that the arid lands had been comparatively starved of appropriate public investment (and equally that they had for far too long been inappropriately subsidised with large amounts of relief aid, particularly food aid). In practice it was not always easy to support this with evidence, largely because of limitations in the way government data is recorded and analysed. These limitations were perhaps a further illustration of how previous governments had felt little need to accommodate the specificities of the ASALs in their operating systems.

First, 'arid' or 'semi-arid' are not terms used to identify government spend. Second, records kept by line ministries do not adequately record the geographical distribution of resources; their data may also contradict that kept by local officials. Third, the dominant unit of analysis until recently has been the province, which combined both arid and non-arid areas. In 2009 the Ministry commissioned a status report of the region from the Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA), but the work was severely limited by these constraints. In the following year the Prime Minister required line ministries to provide his office with ASAL-specific data on budgets and activities; very few could do so with accuracy. For these reasons the approved ASAL policy requires that allocations to the region be identified as such and ring-fenced.

However, some evidence did exist, and wherever possible the Ministry used sources validated by government[24]. Where data was not easily available, it commissioned research to find it, such as the studies by the Brookings Institution on the use of the education budget (Watkins and Alemayehu, 2012), and by Capacity Kenya/Intrahealth International on the allocation of human resources in the health sector (MDNKOAL and IntraHealth International, 2012). Both re-analysed existing data in ways which drew out regional inequalities and vulnerabilities otherwise hidden by the system. Powerful graphics helped to convey the extent of inequality and provided material which the Ministry could then use in its own presentations. Both studies have been instrumental in advancing policy thinking within their respective sectors. Research commissioned by other organisations, such as that by DFID on the economics of early response (Fitzgibbon, 2012), also helped to build a case, particularly if its authors had been able to analyse public expenditure in adequate depth.

The Ministry also sought ways through which pastoralists' voices could be heard by decision-makers in a more direct way. One example was a series of consultations with pastoralist children and parents to capture their views on the education system, the video of which complemented a review of global approaches to the education of nomadic peoples (MDNKOAL and IIED, 2009; Krätli and Dyer, 2009). Both were presented to education policy-makers in a forum in January 2010.

3.6   Private sector

The Ministry's contact with the private sector was a major area of weakness. This was despite the fact that some individuals within the private sector were the first to spot the significance of creating a ministry for the region. There are perhaps several reasons for this. First, there were few businesses and investors already active in the north for the reasons discussed in section 1, and therefore few potential partners already on the ground or with interests in the region. Second, private sector contact with government is generally mediated through the ministries responsible for trade or industrialisation, or in government/private sector roundtables which tend to take an aggregate view rather than focus on different parts of the country. The Ministry failed to make best use of these opportunities. Third, a pre-condition for private sector investment is public sector investment in the foundations for development, the limitations of which were discussed above. Although several international investors expressed interest in the livestock and farming sectors, none took further action once it was clear that an adequate transport, energy and communications infrastructure was still some years off.

Given the region's unfavourable investment climate, the Ministry chose to prioritise the establishment of an investment fund dedicated to the region. This is described in more detail in section 5.

3.7   Individuals

The preceding paragraphs are inevitably something of a generalisation. The stance taken by each organisation was often determined by a particular individual; partnerships certainly waxed and waned as individuals entered and left office (especially country managers). As previously mentioned, the ASAL Policy was developed over a long period of time. A number of individuals made critical contributions during this period, both within and outside government. Individual MPs, researchers, activists, civil servants, donor representatives, consultants, and NGO staffers formed a loose network of people who shared the same commitment to the policy and more generally to advancing ASAL interests. This network meant that the Ministry could always draw on the support of allies within state and non-state agencies, within customary institutions and formal organisations, and across multiple sectors.

Inside the Ministry, individuals were also key. The appointment of a minister with a different profile – with less understanding of, and sympathy towards, pastoralism, or without such a wide circle of relevant contacts – would have led to different outcomes. Final approval of the policy document by Cabinet and Parliament was arguably in larger part the result of trust in his judgment rather than a forensic evaluation of its content[25].

Ministerial positions require the ability to juggle competing interests. The multiplicity of demands within government, from the constituency, parliament, the executive and cabinet, let alone those from external stakeholders, are such that it would be very easy to lose sight of the strategic agenda. To counter this, the Minister made a conscious effort to build a team around him who would help, in his words, keep him on track. His technical adviser, and a small group of civil servants specialised in different areas, came together to play this role and keep the Ministry linked to external sources of good practice and new ideas.

The experience of the Ministry does challenge the rather normative view of politicians in much of the literature. Interrogations of the motives of the powerful generally conclude that these are selfish. Cornwall & Coelho (2006) pose the rhetorical question: 'What incentives motivate [state officials] to invest in creating a more enabling environment and act in the interests of poorer and more marginalized citizens?' Their answers are largely a mix of political expediency and self-interest. While the weight of experience might justify these views, it is surely reasonable to entertain the possibility of politicians motivated by something other than self-interest (Jones et al, 2013). And until political parties in states such as Kenya become stronger, ideological differences are generally going to be found at an individual rather than an institutional level. Chambers (2006) advocates win-win approaches and argues for a

'pedagogy of power', noting that while there are manuals for working with the powerless, there are none for working with the powerful in order to transform power relations 'from above'.

4   Policy engagement and reform

The term 'policy', in the context of this paper, is understood to mean not just the bureaucratic process of reaching consensus on a formal policy position but also the day-to-day interactions and activities which themselves convey policy positions. Both these are the subject of this chapter.

The Ministry used four main strategies to challenge the assumptions and stereotypes which had driven past policy. First, it looked for strong evidence with which to underpin its arguments, as discussed in the preceding section. Second, it offered an alternative storyline – one that emphasised opportunity and potential where the dominant view of the region was still generally negative. For example, it presented northern Kenya as the gateway to growing markets in Ethiopia and South Sudan, and beyond them to the Gulf[26]. Third, it repeated the same messages consistently both in public statements (speeches, presentations) and in private conversations until it started to hear the same language, anecdotes and examples being used by others. Fourth, it built partnerships with the like-minded, both within government and outside it; some examples of these were discussed in section 3.

This work was greatly helped by the fact that the wider policy environment in the country was so focused on reform. The political agenda in Kenya at the time was dominated by the process of constitutional reform, driven by an appreciation that Kenya's institutions of governance were failing all its citizens, not just those in the arid lands. Further, the coalition government provided an unexpected degree of stability, in that it was politically difficult to unpick individual parts of it. The personal style of the President was also one which allowed his ministers a significant degree of latitude to implement their portfolios.

The Ministry's official mandate was to provide policy direction and prioritisation of programmes across a wide range of thematic areas[27]. The list reflects the thinking of senior civil servants prior to the Ministry's creation. The Ministry interpreted this mandate in four ways, as section 2 explained, each of which is now discussed in turn.

4.1   Coordination: amplifying the work of government

The Ministry made limited progress in improving formal coordination[28], but reasonable progress behind the scenes in its influence on various sectors. Its contact with each line ministry took place on different levels, including formal correspondence, face-to-face meetings with ministers and permanent secretaries, technical discussions between civil servants, public workshops, and corridor conversations at Cabinet; informal engagement was often effective. It was important to look for win-win solutions, to share the credit for successes and avoid partisan positioning. Progress was variable, stronger in some sectors than in others, and depended on things like its own technical competence and the interest of the counterpart ministers and permanent secretaries[29]. Now that formal ASAL coordination mechanisms have been approved, to be chaired at the highest level of government, the latitude which individuals can exercise should in theory reduce.

In the energy sector, for example, the combination of a sympathetic minister, regular breakfast meetings between ASAL MPs and the two ministers, and a mechanism for channelling finance (the Rural Electrification Fund) led to substantial progress. By June 2011 the Rural Electrification Authority had installed solar photovoltaic systems in 476 schools and health centres in the ASALs, with funds to connect a further 380 facilities over the coming two years[30]. In the education and health sectors, progress was helped by clear and indisputable evidence of the problems[31]; competent and dedicated civil servants in the Ministry who built strong links with their counterparts; and, in the case of health, the transfer of the Ministry's permanent secretary to the Ministry of Medical Services. By the end of the parliament the Ministry of Education had pushed forward with the establishment of a National Council for Nomadic Education (see also Box 2 below), while the ministries responsible for health were clearly moving resources to the north (such as funds to construct and staff a wide range of health facilities, of which there were previously very few) and disaggregating data to show their performance in arid areas[32].

Progress in other sectors was slower. In roads, for example, the dominant view was that current traffic levels should determine investment; there was less appreciation that the provision of roads also creates strong economies[33]. This has since changed as a result of pressure from a variety of sources including the private sector, the media and IGAD, which all reinforced the Ministry's argument that a better road network in the north was critical for regional connectivity, for accessing new markets, and to reduce hunger[34]. Nevertheless, progress on specific roads was glacial and required constant monitoring to ensure that commitments made by the National Highways Authority were being followed through. In the security sector there was strong engagement in the first two years, resulting in a progressive strategy to reduce inter-communal violence, developed by the two ministries, MPs and local leaders. However, the strategy was inadequately implemented. The imperative of containment rather than engagement runs deep within the security sector and proved impervious to change.

As well as bilateral contact with individual ministries, the Ministry used similar methods to try and influence how it (and by extension the ASALs) was perceived in

government. The default position of many policy-makers, not just within government, is still to view ASAL areas (and particularly pastoral areas) through the lens of their production system. Despite the Ministry's clear multi-sectoral mandate, in any process of national planning or budgeting it would generally be allocated to a working group for the agriculture sector, or possibly the economic pillar, but never to the social or political pillars[35]. This ignores the fact that ASAL citizens have multiple identities and needs beyond their roles as producers, and that these are becoming ever more salient as processes of diversification, commercialisation and sedentarisation change the landscape of economic activity and social identity in the ASALs (Catley et al, eds, 2013).

4.2   Projects: value addition to the sectors

While the Ministry avoided encroaching on the mandate of the line ministries, and while its priority was systemic change, it did have a modest budget for activities which it used in three ways: to fill gaps not met by the ministries, to pilot new approaches which the sectors could scale up, and to work on issues which were not being addressed by other parts of government, such as drought management or attitudinal change.

The 'gap-filling' projects were all carried out in partnership with the relevant line ministry in areas of water, health, education and planning. The latter included projects to organise and fund integrated spatial plans for Mandera and Wajir towns and lay the foundations for a spatial planning policy for the region. Urban centres in arid areas are growing rapidly and haphazardly, while spatial planning models are informed by conditions in the densely populated agrarian highlands and therefore less useful in the lower-density drylands.

There was less success in the other two categories. Testing new approaches required access to technical, financial and managerial resources which were generally not available. The most important activity which the Ministry wanted to take on was a campaign to change the attitudes and 'mental models' which underpin policy towards the region. Numerous myths and misconceptions about pastoralism and the drylands lie at the root of the narratives discussed in section 1 (Swift, 2003; UNDP/UNCCD, 2011). The widespread ideological preference for 'greening' the arid lands comes from a mind-set that seeks to turn them into something they are not, rather than accept them for what they are. In 2009 the Ministry outlined a project it called 'One Kenya' which, through a variety of approaches and partnerships, would strengthen interaction between Kenyans in different parts of the country and challenge the attitudes held on both 'sides' – i.e. the negative attitudes often held by other Kenyans towards the north in particular, and the feelings of separation and inferiority which persist among those in the north. There were no resources to follow through on an initial stakeholder event. The Ministry hoped that the National Commission on Integration

> **Box 1: Some characteristics of Kenya's arid and pastoral areas**
>
> 1. Remote from the centre of economic and political power in Kenya, with rudimentary transport, energy and communications systems.
>
> 2. Dispersed population, scattered across large areas of land in relatively small settlements.
>
> 3. Distinct livelihood system (pastoralism) requiring the mobility of livestock and people.
>
> 4. Social system places a premium on communal patterns of decision-making and ownership. Customary institutions still play an important role in security and the management of both natural resources and indigenous knowledge.
>
> 5. Environment prone to cyclical drought and the impacts of climate change.

and Cohesion, established in 2008 in the aftermath of the post-election violence, might pick up the baton, but this did not happen. The justification for the project is still relevant, however, and could perhaps be followed up by others.

4.3   Policy, legal and institutional reform: changing the rules of the game

Section 1 described how the promulgation of the Constitution took care of overdue legal reforms. The institutional framework is the subject of section 5. This section discusses both the formal and informal processes of policy formulation and engagement, as well as the Ministry's work on the Constitution.

The search for a national policy framework more attuned to ASAL realities (Box 1) started in 2003; Annex 3 contains a timeline of the process. By the end of the government's term in March 2013 the Ministry had published and launched three policy documents, each with a different purpose (Table 2).

Early drafts of the ASAL policy under the previous government had tended to focus on food security, giving prominence to issues of production and the factors on which this depended (such as natural resource management). Input was generally limited to the agriculture sector ministries which prioritised technical interventions and measures to minimise risk[36]. The Ministry expanded the scope of the policy process by involving a wider range of sectors and by giving it a more political bent, putting the social, cultural, legal and institutional impediments to development on the table as well (such as the attitudes and biases discussed in the preceding section)[37].

Table 2: ASAL policy documents			
Title	National Policy for the Sustainable Development of Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands, Sessional Paper No. 8 of 2012 (RoK 2012a)	Vision 2030 Development Strategy for Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands (RoK 2012b)	Ending Drought Emergencies in Kenya: Medium-Term Plan (RoK 2012c)
Status:	Approved by Cabinet, 11 October 2012 Passed by Parliament, 6 December 2012	Endorsed by the Ministry of State for Planning, National Development and Vision 2030, 16 August 2011	Original framework approved by Cabinet, 11 October 2012
Purpose:	To re-frame the Government's approach to the ASALs, as a region of potential, not just challenge, where Government will think and act differently by taking its unique characteristics into account, but whose citizens are entitled to the same basic rights in development as other parts of the country.	To complement and deepen the national development plan by showing how it can be realised in the context of the region, and to integrate ASAL priorities into national development policy and planning.	To show how Kenya will end drought emergencies within ten years. The document represents the first five-year plan for implementing the Vision 2030 strategy.

The tendency in government is to seek uniformity, which is why a more nuanced policy response for a particular region such as the ASALs proved so problematic. Most policy documents do now include a separate section or chapter on the ASALs. While on the one hand this may be welcome recognition of the specific and separate measures which the region requires, on the other it may suggest that they are still being treated as an afterthought rather than an intrinsic part of each sector's analysis.

Uniformity is also a feature of the systems and procedures through which government operates. The allocation of recurrent budgets is one example, whereby an officer in Marsabit will receive the same monthly allocation for fuel and vehicle repairs as an officer in Muranga, regardless of the fact that Muranga would fit into Marsabit 28 times over[38], and regardless of the wide disparities in their infrastructure and population distribution. Box 2 shows how the Ministry of Education changed its resource allocation systems to prioritise the north, and gives other examples of policy changes in the education sector that resulted from its interaction with the Ministry.

Research by the Brookings Institution (Watkins and Alemayehu, 2012) revealed how a system that on the surface seems logical and fair actually conceals deep inequalities. Kenya's system of per capita pupil grants, based on the numbers of children in school, discriminates against counties with low enrolment. The budget share of Turkana county, for example, is less than 40 percent of the county's share of the primary school-age population and less than one-third of its share of the secondary school-age population, because many children in this predominantly pastoral county are out of school. Were these per capita grants to be allocated based on the numbers of children, rather than the numbers of children in school, counties with large out-of-school populations could use the additional funds to provide alternatives to a school-based system.

The Ministry's work on the Constitution was driven by the need for both policy-makers and people in the ASALs to appreciate the distinct opportunities and challenges which the Constitution offered for the region. A series

Box 2: Examples of changes in the education system in response to ASAL concerns
In 2012 a vehicle containing the Director in charge of Field Services in the Ministry of Education (MoE), and the Permanent Secretary and Director of Human Capital Development from the Ministry, got stuck near Loiyangalani where the passengers spent a night in the bush. Since then, MoE vehicles are allocated as a priority to education officers in the north. Loiyangalani was also the first beneficiary when the MoE received new vehicles recently.
Some secondary schools in the north have now been upgraded to the status of 'national' schools. Their new status brings additional funding and resources. National schools admit students from the whole country, but were previously only found in non-ASAL areas.
The Basic Education Act 2012 recognises madrassas for the first time and proposes to integrate them with the school curriculum.
In early 2013 the Ministry of Education announced a review of its free primary and secondary education programmes, including the system of capitation grants which discriminates against out-of-school children. Free secondary education is only available in day schools, which are scarce in the north.

of forums for political leaders, other professionals and elders, cascaded from the national level to the county, were organised to highlight two things: the importance of leadership motivated by developmental goals, and the special needs of the ASALs which would require attention during the process of constitutional implementation. Discussions during these forums focused on the generally low levels of institutional capacity in many arid and pastoral counties[39], the threats to devolution posed by clan-based politics, and the particular challenges facing women leadership aspirants in cultures where female public roles are severely circumscribed and female literacy levels low. While it is difficult to evaluate the impact of these forums, there is anecdotal evidence that they influenced the way some counties prepared themselves for the 2013 elections. The Brookings Institution research on education financing discussed above, and the willingness of its authors to communicate their findings in repeated public events, also influenced debates about revenue allocation under a devolved system.

4.4   Regional interaction

Stability and progress in Kenya's border counties will not be achieved without stability and progress among their neighbours. Pastoralists are natural pan-Africans; their movement into adjacent countries is an important productive strategy to be protected and promoted. The potential of cross-border trade and investment, and the risks from cross-border insecurity, require harmonised policy approaches between governments. These were the considerations behind this fourth area of work.

However, it was something of a poor relation. Both the Minister and Assistant Minister took part in cross-border peace meetings from time to time, alongside other political leaders, and the Ministry participated in relevant inter-governmental delegations. But there was no structured and funded process of interaction between regional governments on issues specific to the arid lands. Nor was this work an explicit part of the Ministry's formal mandate. Moreover, ministerial mandates in each country differed. The IGAD initiative on drought resilience[40], which emerged in the wake of a summit of heads of state and government in the Horn of Africa in September 2011, has provided a framework for periodic contact but not (yet) for strengthening policy harmonisation between countries.

5   Institutional framework

Previous studies on the ASALs have noted that the quality of a policy document is rarely matched by the quality of its implementation (Moris, 1999). Despite efforts to strengthen performance management in Kenya, accountability for the implementation of policy remains highly variable across government. This is a particular concern for any issue, such as pastoralism, which cuts across the deeply ingrained architecture of autonomous sectors within which both governments

and the aid system organise their work, and which requires action to be taken by those sectors. People do not compartmentalise their lives in the way that governments and donors tend to do, and therefore mechanisms are needed to ensure that group-based concerns, such as ASAL development, are adequately addressed by the sector-based structure of government.

Over and above this general challenge, there are reasons why coordination and institutional capacity matter in the ASALs in particular, and why the Ministry prioritised mechanisms to strengthen policy delivery. First, the costs of doing business in the region are high, given its size and poor infrastructure, and therefore the way in which resources are directed matters even more. Second, poor coordination, such as badly sited water infrastructure or conflict-insensitive projects, can be severely destabilising. Third, the institutional capacity to coordinate is often weaker in arid areas given their remoteness, operating constraints, and limited human resources. Fourth, meaningful public participation in the political process is harder for populations who are mobile, remote, less literate and coping with chronic hardship. Finally, the inflexible frameworks and timelines of centrally driven planning and budgeting systems make them less effective in environments such as drylands where variability is high.

A final consideration was continuity. There was a strong possibility that the Ministry might not continue beyond its first five-year term. What is striking about the history of ASAL development in Kenya is how little institutional continuity there has been (Annex 1). The Ministry of Reclamation and Development of Arid, Semi-Arid and Wastelands had barely established itself in 1989 before it was subsumed into another ministry. And although the Arid Lands Resource Management Project had a long life, it was moved between three different ministries during that time. Each new institution takes at least a year or two to negotiate the bureaucracy and become fully operational; this is a significant proportion of a five-year government term. Given that reversing decades of neglect is bound to take time, it is hardly surprising that there has been so little apparent progress in the ASALs when there has been no chance to sustain a consistent and coherent approach. For these reasons the Ministry looked to establish permanent institutions, such as state corporations, which are less vulnerable to ministerial restructuring. The institutional framework developed by the Ministry and approved in the ASAL policy has four elements shown in Figure 2.

The framework combines the twin imperatives of mainstreaming and specialism. On the one hand, arid and pastoral areas, like any others in Kenya, should be the responsibility of the main line ministries and fully integrated within sector plans and budgets. On the other hand, arid and pastoral areas have distinct needs which have hitherto been ignored, and need champions within the sectors until such time as changes in approach, attitudes and systems have been institutionalised.

Table 3 lists the ASAL-focused organisations promoted by the Ministry and explains the status, justification and purpose of each. The first two will enhance the coordination and harmonisation of ASAL priorities across the sectors; the others will improve responsiveness to ASAL priorities within a particular sector. All of them are either just formed or in the final stages of design, and therefore the table also highlights some of the risks that lie ahead and strategies to mitigate these. Over and above all of them is the new ASAL Cabinet Sub-Committee.

Figure 2: ASAL institutional framework

1. Cabinet oversight of the progress made across Government in delivering the ASAL Policy. An ASAL Cabinet Sub-Committee, chaired by the President or Deputy President and supported by an inter-ministerial committee of Principal Secretaries, will provide high-level policy direction and hold each sector to account.

4. ASAL Secretariat, to support all these structures and ensure stronger integration of policies, institutions and practices for sustainable development in the ASALs.

3. Stakeholder coordination through the ASAL Stakeholder Forum (ASF), which provides a platform at both national and county levels for dialogue between government, UN agencies, development partners, NGOs, the private sector and ASAL citizens. The inaugural meeting of the ASF was held in July 2012.

2. Specialist institutions to ensure that the ASALs are given adequate attention within each sector. These include the National Drought Management Authority (and associated drought contingency fund), the National Council on Nomadic Education in Kenya, and the Livestock Marketing Board. They also include institutions outside government, including the Northern Kenya Education Trust and the Northern Kenya Investment Fund.

Table 3: ASAL-focused organisations – status, justification, purpose, risks and mitigating strategies			
Organisation	**Status**	**Justification and purpose**	**Risks and mitigating strategies**
1. ASAL Secretariat	Operational: provided for within the ASAL Policy but not yet formalised.	The ASAL Secretariat is the coordinating point for the whole ASAL agenda. Its role is to support each part of the ASAL institutional framework (including servicing the cabinet structures), to monitor delivery of the ASAL policy, and to promote policy coherence and harmonised action across the ASALs. Knowledge management is the basis of its work. Given the strategic and multi-sectoral nature of its mandate, the optimum location for the ASAL Secretariat is in the institution responsible for coordinating government business.	As section 1 explained, the incentive in government is to be seen to 'deliver' – to have a large budget, large establishment, and high profile. In practice what are often required, particularly for a cross-cutting issue such as ASAL development, are the skills to facilitate, influence and collaborate, and the willingness to share both the credit and the blame for results.\n\nThe Secretariat operates at the centre of a complex web of actors, interests and concerns. It will need sustained and high-quality technical support from development partners to build up the capabilities needed to work effectively in such a context. It must also be fully institutionalised in government for maximum impact.
2. ASAL Stakeholder Forum (ASF)	Operational: inaugural meeting held in July 2012.	The ASF is a platform for dialogue at both the national and county levels between government, ASAL citizens and a wide variety of agencies (donors, researchers, investors, NGOs). Its role is to enhance networking and coordination, joint action and advocacy, and peer accountability. While there are structures that bring organisations together within a particular sector or grouping, only the ASF provides a space where the full range of issues, interests and actors can come together.	The history of pastoral advocacy in Kenya has been marked by circular debates as individuals come and go – most notably on the viability and future of pastoralism. Conversations also tend to take place between the like-minded. Members of the ASF need to find ways to settle debates and move on, so that they can become a more concerted force to challenge deep-seated biases and beliefs in wider Kenyan society towards the arid lands and pastoralism.\n\nThe diversity of the ASF's membership, in the type and location of organisation and the issues that concern them, means that careful facilitation of the dynamics within the forum will be required.
3. National Drought Management Authority (NDMA)	Operational: State Corporation gazetted in November 2011.	Drought is a normal phenomenon in drylands, but failure to manage it well presents a major threat to the region and to national development. The NDMA will give permanent and specialist attention to these risks.\n\nAs a semi-autonomous state corporation, the NDMA enjoys greater stability, financial flexibility and protection from political pressure than projects or ministries. Its mandate gives it the powers to ensure harmonisation and adherence to quality standards by all actors.	State corporations are often set up to generate efficiencies for the government. However, the NDMA is a different kind of parastatal in that it must deliver for the many stakeholders involved in drought management in Kenya as much as it does for the government. It is therefore even more incumbent on the Authority that its systems are robust and its staff competent.\n\nFurther, its mandate requires it to respond not just to each successive drought in turn (the 'drought cycle') but to the wider dimensions of vulnerability, particularly under climate change. This will require new skills, strategies and partnerships, as well as a willingness by the international humanitarian system and development actors to work differently (for example by eliminating parallel systems of early warning, planning and coordination).

4. National Drought and Disaster Contingency Fund (NDDCF)	Pending: being established by the National Treasury.	Early response not only reduces suffering but in the long run is more cost-effective. The NDDCF will provide the set-aside funds needed for early response and a mechanism through which new sources of risk finance (for example from climate funds or insurance) can be channelled.	The biggest risk facing the NDDCF is loss of trust; its governance must be above reproach. As a multi-donor trust fund it will have multiple stakeholders which must all have complete confidence in its systems. Strong governance will in turn attract a wider range of investors to the fund.
5. Livestock Marketing Board (LMB)	Approved: provided for within the National Livestock Policy, 2008, but not yet operational.	The livestock sector has not enjoyed the same degree of public support as other production systems, for example in research, marketing and financial services. In this respect the LMB is an equalising measure which will maximise the potential of the livestock sector.	State corporations in Kenya have had a very mixed track record; a few have been very effective, many others not so. The calibre of the board and senior staff will be key. Experience in countries such as Somalia also shows how effective livestock marketing can be with no government oversight or support. The LMB will therefore need to define its role with care. Close collaboration with pastoral civil society, livestock traders and the cooperative movement will be key in order to identify the LMB's comparative advantage[41].
6. National Council on Nomadic Education in Kenya (NACONEK)	Approved: provided for within the Basic Education Act, 2013, but not yet operational.	It is sometimes said that Kenya has a Ministry of Schools rather than a Ministry of Education. An education system that requires attendance at fixed schools forces nomadic families to make unreasonable choices between their culture and livelihood and the education of their children. NACONEK will introduce educational approaches and methodologies which are more in sympathy with nomadic values and lifestyles.	In the passage of the Basic Education Act through parliament, the purpose of NACONEK was diluted by adding the word 'marginalisation' to the interpretation of its functions. The Ministry of Education and Council members should ensure that NACONEK retains its intended focus on the specific challenges posed by mobility. Partnerships with pastoral civil society and with the network of global specialists in nomadic education will help to ensure this.
7. Northern Kenya Education Trust (NoKET)	Operational: registered in 2010.	Given the limited access to education and training in arid and pastoral counties, NoKET gives bursaries at secondary and tertiary levels, with a bias towards girls, and advocates improvements in the education system and the mechanisms through which bursaries are targeted and provided. NoKET is registered as an independent trust but has a Memorandum of Understanding with the Ministry of Education to guarantee a certain number of places in national schools for NoKET scholarship girls.	There are already many sources of bursary support in Kenya, and NoKET risks delivering only more of the same. It has two distinguishing features which extend its interests beyond that of its individual beneficiaries. First, its ultimate goal is to expand the pool of skilled professionals who can then support the region's development; this should influence how it disburses its funds. Second, it aims to develop a harmonised mechanism for bursary support which ensures both cost-effectiveness and tighter targeting to the poorest families across all such schemes.

| 8. Northern Kenya Investment Fund (NKIF) | Pending: design work completed. | The NKIF will expand and incentivise private sector engagement in the region by providing businesses with the equity they are often unable to secure from financial service providers in Nairobi (who perceive the region as high risk). The NKIF will be an impact investment fund, required to deliver both social/ environmental and financial returns. It will be a private sector facility, with an independent fund manager, but with linkages to the ASAL Secretariat which will, for example, facilitate its access to stakeholders in the region and negotiate appropriate incentives with the National Treasury and the county governments. Again, the NKIF is seen as an affirmative action measure until the financial services sector becomes more responsive to the region's needs. | Private sector investment in the ASALs has often had negative consequences, such as the alienation of land, and has generally delivered few benefits to local communities. The NKIF is designed to provide not just financial returns but direct benefits for the region in terms of poverty reduction, employment and economic growth. The governance and management of the fund must keep sight of these twin objectives. |

6　　Concluding remarks

The policy and institutional reforms described in this report are not yet widely known or understood. They are also at a fledgling stage and will need close follow-up and support. This section discusses some of the risks that may lie ahead, identifies lessons that may be applicable elsewhere, and makes recommendations to the various actors involved.

First, policy spaces close as well as open (Neilson, 2001). The future context for ASAL development may be more or less conducive than it has been during the 10th Parliament of 2008–2013. Individuals will change positions. Development partners may shift priorities. The ASAL agenda must compete for attention at a time of significant institutional change and uncertainty in Kenya. Devolution may impede or facilitate policy implementation. Contestation over resources may increase as the redistributive agenda of both the Constitution and the ASAL Policy becomes clearer. Under the Constitution, government ministers are no longer parliamentarians but technocrats; it remains to be seen whether that change will have any implications in terms of sustaining an overtly political agenda.

Second, change and continuity co-exist (Krznaric, 2007). Some shifts have clearly taken place. Jones and Villar (2008) identify five possible dimensions of policy impact in the political debate and agenda; language and rhetoric; procedural change; policy content; and

behaviour change. The Ministry arguably achieved some degree of change in the first four. Evidence of the fifth and most crucial (behaviour change) is as yet less obvious, or else has not yet had time to manifest itself, being a consequence of the other four. However, these changes are not being introduced onto a clean slate. The ASAL Policy is being superimposed on existing policy frameworks and public institutions and must find a way of percolating through them. Policy-makers are 'inheritors before they are choosers'; new initiatives enter a policy environment 'dense with past commitments' (Rose, 1993). Formal passage of the document does not guarantee universal enthusiasm for, or even understanding of, its provisions.

Third, bringing the ASALs further into the heart of government will present new dilemmas. As the region moves more prominently into the limelight it will become implicated in different processes and power struggles, attracting the attention of other actors and interests. Developments around land, extractives, investment and settlement are all likely to bring new challenges for pastoralism. The importance of the young ASAL institutions lies in the opportunity they offer for pastoralists and other ASAL citizens to participate in these debates on a more equal footing.

This report has provided a snapshot of a period of policy and institutional reform when the interplay of actors and their interests allowed certain narratives and priorities to come more prominently to the fore. The identities

and roles of these actors will now change. Some will occupy different positions, from which they will be able to maintain their support for ASAL priorities, while new ones have joined the scene: a number of professionals from both the private and the public sectors, well-respected in their fields, now occupy positions of authority within the county governments. The challenge now is to translate a network of individuals into a network of institutions that can sustain the process of policy reform and implementation that has been started. The extent to which this succeeds will depend on the extent to which individuals hold themselves accountable to the policy direction and institutional changes which Parliament has adopted.

Box 3 draws together some of the lessons identified in the course of this report which may be of wider relevance and interest.

Box 3: Lessons learned

1. A five-year term of government is far too short a time to have meaningful impact on the structural causes of chronic poverty and inequality. These are generational challenges which require continuity of approach and delivery between administrations. The focus should therefore be on establishing a permanent institutional framework which can provide this.
2. The finite nature of ministerial positions and the many competing demands on ministers highlight the importance of focus and prioritisation and of mechanisms that will help keep processes on track.
3. The openings for policy reform often develop in an unplanned way, often when a number of favourable conditions unexpectedly coincide. Constant monitoring of the policy environment, and the skills to recognise and capitalise on these opportunities when they arise, are essential for those wishing to influence policy either within government or outside it.
4. Policy change may involve framing an issue differently and offering an alternative narrative, as much as weighing up objective evidence and options. Evidence is, however, critical in generating legitimacy for the new narrative.
5. The long period of time over which the main ASAL policy document was developed was frustrating, but the successive consultative meetings which reached strikingly similar conclusions ensured that there was strong public consensus on the final policy priorities.
6. Many of the blockages to reform lie in the way in which development as a process is structured and organised. Discrete projects, sectors, and financial years are inadequate mechanisms to deal with the fluid and dynamic nature of change.

Recommendations

The following recommendations to the various actors mentioned in this report focus on measures which will strengthen continuity and consolidation of the reform process as it continues to play out in the years to come.

Pastoral civil society:
- Build active partnerships with the new ASAL institutions, particularly the ASAL Stakeholder Forum, the Livestock Marketing Board, the NDMA and NACONEK, to ensure that pastoralists' interests are front and centre in the agendas of these organisations.

- Play an active role in governance at the county level and ensure that county leaders act in accordance with constitutional principles.

Parliament:
- Ensure that the Constitution's principles and commitments are put into practice, particularly, for the ASALs, those concerning devolution, public finance, the Bill of Rights and affirmative action.

- Press for accountability from the executive in meeting the commitments set out in the ASAL policy documents, including the proper functioning of the institutional framework.

National government:
- Strengthen the emerging ASAL institutional framework and ensure sustained high-level engagement in the cabinet coordinating structures.

- Finalise the establishment of any pending organisations, specifically the National Drought and Disaster Contingency Fund, the Livestock Marketing Board and the National Council on Nomadic Education.

- Act on all commitments in the ASAL policy documents, particularly investments in the foundations for development.

County government:
- Engage with the emerging ASAL institutional framework and negotiate working modalities with relevant institutions, such as the NDMA.

- Use legislative and executive powers to protect and promote pastoralism at the local level, either independently or in collaboration with neighbouring counties.

Development partners
- Expand investment in the foundations for development, either directly through the sectors (roads, education, health, energy, ICT, security) or through dedicated institutions (such as the Livestock Marketing Board and NACONEK).

- Use new structures such as the ASAL Stakeholder Forum, ASAL Secretariat and ASAL donor group to continue improving alignment with the priorities set out in the ASAL policy documents.

- Provide technical assistance to the new ASAL institutions, including linkages to international good practice.

NGOs:
- Re-think advocacy strategies in light of the changing nature of political authority in Kenya, particularly the enhanced powers of parliament and the establishment of county governments.

- Re-think partnerships with government in order to reinforce the efforts of those pursuing a progressive agenda in the ASALs.

- Create space and support for pastoral civil society in its advocacy at both county and national levels.

Researchers:
- Continue helping build a strong evidence base for ASAL decision-making, addressing the current limitations in the data.

- Support processes to monitor the consequences of change, both negative and positive, expected and unexpected.

Private sector:
- Participate actively in the ASAL Stakeholder Forum.

- Use round-table forums with government to press for investments in the foundations for development.

Acknowledgements

END NOTES

1. The authors are the Minister and his technical adviser. From here onwards the term 'the Ministry' is used, rather than its full title or long acronym (MDNKOAL).

2. Sessional Paper No. 8 of 2012 on the National Policy for the Sustainable Development of Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands.

3. These networks included the Kenya Pastoralist Forum, the Pastoralist Thematic Group and the Pastoral Parliamentary Group. Their activities were supported by both state and non-state organisations, including the government's Arid Lands Resource Management Project (ALRMP) and a number of national and international NGOs.

4. The first part of this section draws on Ochieng Odhiambo, 2012.

5. Casual references to models pursued by countries such as Botswana or Israel, which also have substantial livestock populations or dryland areas, tended to ignore the full costs of those models, such as the hardships experienced by poorer pastoralists and hunter-gatherers in Botswana (Cullis and Watson, 2005), and to undervalue Kenya's rangelands (Barrow and Mogaka, 2007; Behnke and Muthami, 2011).

6. These include the principles governing public finance (Article 201), the allocation of a minimum budget threshold to the new devolved counties (Article 203.2), the Equalisation Fund (Article 204) and various affirmative action measures (for example, Article 56).

7. For example, both the Stock Theft and Produce Act of 1933, which provided for collective punishment, and the Indemnity Act of 1970, which protected members of the security forces from the consequences of their actions in the north, were still on the statute book when the Ministry was created in 2008. A number of discriminatory administrative regulations were also in place, such as those governing access to ID cards or the requirement that any flight to the north required permission from the police. At that time there was also no high court or land registry in any part of the north.

8. The term is used in Kenya Vision 2030, the national development plan. The plan is structured around a number of these foundations and three pillars: economic, social and political. The Ministry's use of the word 'foundations' was deliberate, in order to echo the discourse of national development planning.

9. The emphasis on infrastructure and services in the policy documents should not be interpreted as a bias in favour of either settled populations or livelihoods other than pastoralism. The absence of these basic foundations undermines all livelihood systems, including pastoralism, particularly given the latter's evolution under the impact of processes of commercialization and differentiation. The challenge is how to ensure the provision of infrastructure and services in ways which are in harmony with nomadic systems.

10. Section 1 discusses the historical challenges to citizenship in northern Kenya.

11. Approximately US$375m, using an exchange rate of US$1 = Kshs. 80. The large size of the budget estimate was because the investments required were generally high cost (such as road construction) and because of the depth of the region's neglect.

12. Approximately US$10.4m.

13. This was the Arid Lands Resource Management Project, financed jointly by the government and the World Bank.

14. The Economic Stimulus Programme announced in the 2009 and subsequent budgets, for example, proposed the allocation of equal resources to each constituency, regardless of need. This was erroneously presented as a form of 'equitable development' (GoK, 2009), but it ignores the significant differences in operating context across Kenya. As an illustration: to immunise a child in one of Nairobi's informal settlements may cost only a fraction of what is required in a remote county with poor infrastructure and a predominantly mobile population.

15. The most notorious example of this during the Ministry's tenure was in May/June 2009, when the President authorised an increase of Kshs. 5bn in the Ministry's development budget for the coming year. Despite a chain of subsequent instructions to this effect from the Head of the Public Service, the Minister for Finance and the latter's Permanent Secretary, officials lower down the hierarchy in Treasury chose not to act.

16. Conyers (2007) makes a similar argument with regard to decentralisation, arguing that its weaknesses are a function of broader problems of governance.

17. This included an initial consultation meeting in March 2009, another on the ASAL policy in February 2010 and two forums on the Constitution in July and October 2011.

18. The Enhanced Livelihoods in the Mandera Triangle (ELMT) project was part of the Regional Enhanced Livelihoods for Pastoralist Areas (RELPA) programme, funded by USAID and implemented by CARE.

19. One example was prior to the annual roundtable between government and development partners in 2012, when it became clear that ASAL concerns – including that of drought resilience, which at the time was highly topical – had been overlooked in the agenda. Development partners' submissions lent clear backing for the Ministry's successful presentation of an ASAL sector note.

20. The Christensen Fund, for example, which supports biological and cultural diversity.

21 In a meeting on 3 August 2011.

22 A recent publication by Chatham House on drought early warning and early action, for example, wrongly described the ALRMP as having closed in 2010 due to corruption. First, corruption was not proved, and second, the project was scheduled to close in that year anyway.

23 One exception was an active network of national and international civil society organisations engaged in advocacy on NGO legislation.

24 Examples include the Government of Kenya's household budget survey of 2005/06 and subsequent constituency poverty analysis (RoK, 2007); ReSAKSS research on the potential of the livestock sector in North-Eastern Province (Rakotoarisoa et al, 2008); and Behnke/Muthami (2011) on the contribution of livestock to the Kenyan economy, produced in collaboration with the National Bureau of Statistics.

25 Earlier drafts had, however, been reviewed in detail by technocrats in the line ministries.

26 Historically, Kenya has tended to look west and south, to the East African Community, for regional trade and cooperation, overlooking the possibilities across its northern and eastern borders.

27 'Infrastructural development, planning and encouragement of townships along main roads, livestock development, livestock industries, water supply, natural resources management, mineral resources exploration and development, tourism development, human resources development, irrigation development, and tapping of solar and wind energy' (Presidential Circular No. 1/2008).

28 An initiative by the Prime Minister's office to strengthen ASAL coordination in 2010 failed because of the information constraints discussed in section 3. Approval of the Cabinet coordination structures was secured only towards the end of the Ministry's lifetime. The ASAL Secretariat was established on an informal basis in 2010 but has not yet been adequately formalised. The ASAL Stakeholder Forum held its first meeting in July 2012.

29 The Ministry needed civil servants with a deep knowledge of the region. Unfortunately this was not something prioritised by the centrally driven and inflexible recruitment process, such that it was allocated officers whose understanding of the ASALs was variable. Some civil servants made an exceptional effort to get on top of their new brief, but this was due to their own initiative rather than something which the human resource system deliberately fostered.

30 Information provided by the Rural Electrification Authority in August 2011.

31 Data generated by the line ministries was complemented by other research such as the annual assessments of learning outcomes conducted by UWEZO.

32 One example is the Health Sector Performance Report, July 2009 – June 2010.

33 An example of this was a World Bank conference on agriculture and infrastructure in early 2009, which also discussed agricultural areas solely in terms of crop production, overlooking the contribution of livestock.

34 See, for example: 'Only peace and railways can break the cycle of hunger in the Horn', The East African, 1-7 August 2011. See also the presentation by the IGAD Executive Secretary to Kenya's permanent secretaries on 6 April 2009 (http://www.igad.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=142:executive-secretary-briefs-the-permanent-secretaries-of-kenya&catid=46:executive-secretary&Itemid=123, accessed 12 April 2013).

35 See footnote 8.

36 The framework for Action Against Hunger developed by the Ministry of State for Special Programmes in June 2006, for example, lists ten ministries which are 'most directly involved and relevant' in tackling food insecurity. The list is dominated by those within the agriculture sector, the only additions being the Ministries of Health and Trade.

37 Some of the legal impediments are mentioned in footnote 7.

38 Marsabit is 70,961km2 and Muranga is 2,559km2

39 Technical capacity in arid and pastoral areas is often lower than required given poor educational achievement (due to chronic under-investment) and the reluctance of public officers to be posted there. Central ministries also have a tendency to post their most junior and inexperienced officers to the most difficult areas.

40 IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI).

41 Key partners will include the Kenya Livestock Marketing Council and the Community Owned Financial Initiative (COFI). The latter is the first sharia-compliant savings and credit cooperative (SACCO) in Kenya and was launched in December 2012.

42 Ministry of Reclamation and Development of Arid, Semi-Arid and Wastelands

43 There were, of course, many projects in the ASALs prior to the Arid Lands Resource Management Project, but none with the latter's dominance, particularly on the national stage. For a helpful summary, see Moris, 1999.

44 Ministry of State for Special Programmes

45 Ministry of State for Development of Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands

46 The actual situation is more messy than presented here, with multiple narratives overlapping and competing (Ochieng Odhiambo, 2012). For example, the 'security/containment' narrative is still present today, although less dominant than during the state of emergency and now co-existing with other narratives.

47 Sources: 1a) Kenya National Adult Literacy Survey, 2007; Ministry of Education, 2012; 1b) Demographic and Health Survey, 2008-09; 1c) UNICEF Kenya, 2011; 1d) Kenya National Human Development Report, 2009; 1e) UWEZO Annual Learning Assessment, 2011

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Annex 1: Timeline of Government approaches in the ASALs and policy narratives

	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13
	1980s								•					**1990s**						•				**2000s**					•			**2010s**		

Ministry

- Ministry of Reclamation & Development of Arid, Semi-Arid & Wastelands (1989-93)
- Ministry of State for Development of Northern Kenya & other Arid Lands (2008-13)

Department

- ASAL Section, Ministry of Planning (1980-88)

Project

Arid Lands Resource Management Project (1996-2010)

- Office of the President (1996 - 2003)
- Ministry of Special Programmes (2003 - 2008)
- MDNKOAL 2008 - 2010

Annex 2: Illustrations of inequality affecting arid and pastoral areas[47]

Fig. 1a: Adult literacy / distribution of adult literacy teachers

Adult illiteracy, Mandera (%)	
Adult illiteracy, Kiambu (%)	
No. adult literacy teachers, Mandera	
No. adult literacy teachers, Kiambu	

Scale: 0 20 40 60 80 100

For every adult literacy teacher there are 1,780 illiterate adults in Kiambu and 53,111 illiterate adults in Mandera

Fig. 1b: Children receiving all recommended vaccinations

Kenya (average): 77.4
Northern Kenya: 48.3

Fig. 1c: Index of ante-natal care

Kenya (average): 0.72
Northern Kenya: 0.46

Fig. 1d: Human development index

Nyeri: 0.63
Turkana: 0.33

Fig. 1e: Percentage of girls out of school

Nairobi: 1.2
North Eastern: 18.3

Annex 3: Timeline of ASAL policy development

Date	Activity
July 2003	ALRMP initiates a review of the 1992 draft policy framework developed by the MRDASW, with support from UNDP and Acacia Consultants. Inter-ministerial Task Force established.
9–10 December 2003	National policy formulation workshop.
February 2005	Regional consultations.
April/May 2005	Sessional Paper ready for presentation to Cabinet.
January 2006	Revised policy produced and circulated.
2007	DFID provides support to the policy formulation process including a consultation meeting with MPs.
April 2008	Creation of MDNKOAL.
August–December 2008	MDNKOAL hosts consultation meetings across the region.
2009	Vision 2030 development strategy for Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands formulated with support from RECONCILE. Draft ASAL policy document of 2007 revised and shared widely with external stakeholders.
December 2009	Consultation meeting with MPs.
February 2010	Consultation meetings with elders (through Pastoral Shade) and with development partners. Comments incorporated from line ministries.
March 2010	Policy documents submitted to the Cabinet Office.
August 2010	Policy documents re-submitted to the Cabinet Office.
January 2011	Policy documents revised in light of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, and re-submitted to the Cabinet Office in June 2011.
11 October 2012	Policy documents passed by Cabinet.
6 December 2012	Sessional Paper passed by Parliament.