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## CIVILIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION ORGANIZATIONS

*Methods.* The research is based on the application of the systemic and historical approach, combined with the methods of analysis, synthesis, analogy, abstraction, generalization and method of individual expert assessment.

*Novelty of the research.* The authors have identified the civilizational structure of countries using statistically available criteria for the six groups of factors, which allows to determine the homogeneity level of the major regional groups of countries.

*Practical significance.* Identification of civilization structure of countries and regional associations creates the opportunity for adjusting national and subregional integration and disintegration policies.

*The aim of the study* is to determine the civilizational structure of the regional associations of countries. To achieve this goal the following tasks are set and solved:

- to analyze and optimize the existing approaches to the identification of local civilizations;
- to identify the current state of the countries' belonging to this or that civilization, their civilizational structure;
- to reveal the civilizational structure of the major regional blocs.

### INTRODUCTION

Civilization has been an interesting and central topic in the study of humans since the ancient times. The complexity of the civilization as the object of research led to many definitions of the notion. The most prominent scholars in the field, among them Robert W. Cox and Michael G. Schechter, agreed that there are *two conflicting ways of thinking about civilizations*. One, which is taken for this research, represents a civilization as a fixed essence or spirit – Western, or Islamic, or Chinese, or so forth. The other thinks of a civilization as a product of collective human action, an amalgam of social forces and

ideas that has achieved a certain coherence, but is continually changing and developing in response to challenges both from within and from without (Cox, Schechter, 2002: 142).

As will be shown below, the notion of civilization has been given a very special attention since the 18<sup>th</sup> century, followed by the 19<sup>th</sup> century remarkable contributions to the development of civilizational thought which eventually shaped the formation of the theory of civilizations as an advanced interdisciplinary field.

However, the Cold War period of the 20<sup>th</sup> century changed the shift in the civilizational studies due to the political and ideological reasons from viewing harmonious coexistence and fruitful dialogues in the beginning of the century to encounters and confrontations between civilizations till the 90<sup>th</sup> of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Chiozza, 2002).

It should be mentioned that the concept of ‘civilization’ has been employed in contradictory ways – as an ideological tool, as an analytical category and in reference to a long historical journey (Tehrani, 2004).

It is certainly true that the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century has witnessed great input into civilizations research, and nowadays the dynamic investigation of civilizations is being carried out in the framework of economic history, political economy, geo-economics, global and transnational economy, as well as social economy.

World-famous sociologist and theorist of globalization Ronald Robertson argues that a central problem of contemporary civilizational analysis should be the comparison of civilizations with respect precisely to the histories of conceptions of the world as a whole and of civilizational and societal models of global participation. He underlies that globalization theory turns world-system theory nearly on its head – by focusing, first, on *cultural* aspects of the world “system” and, second, by systematic study of *internal* civilizational and societal attributes which shape orientations to the world as a whole and forms of participation of civilizations and societies in the global-human circumstance (Robertson, 1987: 24).

Quite the opposite view is expressed by the well-known U.S. political scientist David Wilkinson, who, on the contrary, argues that there is but one civilization in the world: Central Civilization: once Middle Eastern in scope, now global; once coexistent with others, now solitary and unique – basically Western civilization. Thus, he redefines civilization excluding cultural criterion. For D. Wilkinson, civilization represents a political-military network of interaction (Wilkinson, 1995).

In the paper published in 2000, the authors suggested that the current global situation needs to be related to the structural transformation of the world, including (a) the move from bipolarity towards a multipolar or perhaps tripolar structure, with a new division of power and new division of labour; (b) the relative decline of American hegemony in combination with a more permissive attitude on the part of the USA towards regionalism; (c) the erosion of the Westphalian nation-state system and the growth of interdependence and ‘globalisation’; and the changed attitudes towards neo-liberal economic development and associated political system in the developing countries, as well as in the post-communist countries (Hettne, Soderbaum, 2000).

At the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century many authors have speculated about the nature of the above mentioned problems. In the conditions when the old paradigm does not provide answers to the key questions the only way out is to improve civilizational dialogue and reduce conflict, to focus on cooperation rather than confrontation. We agree

with Prof. Heikki Patomaki who embraces a Wellsian warning about the increasingly likely possibility of a military disaster. He puts it quite eloquently that “the dynamic processes of the world economy shape conditions everywhere. Actors participate in bringing about and steering global political economy processes in various, but often short-sighted, counterproductive and contradictory ways’ (Patomaki, 2017: 4).

After the end of the Cold War, the world became more ideologically homogeneous. There were subsequent attempts to build systems of collective security, and even elements of world statehood – through human rights or economic treaties and in the functionally differentiated sphere of security (Ibidem: 3). Prof. Heikki Patomaki seeks the answer to the question why the world has been reverting to nationalist statism, militarized conflicts and arms races, notwithstanding globalizing forces and the emergence of elements of global constitutionalism and security (Ibidem: 6).

On the one hand, scholars try to comprehend such vast issues using global perspective by pushing beyond globalization studies and encompassing completing configuration of power, while, on the other hand, many scientists innovate within the field of international studies, focusing on nation-state as the primary actor. However, we share the third option taken up by specialists in world regions, who see global phenomena through the lenses of myriad localities (Mittelman, 2013) and in the context of our paper focus on the level of the major civilizations and the leading regional groups.

### **THE HISTORICAL DIMENSIONS OF THE CIVILIZATIONAL APPROACH AND THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE FOUNDING SCHOLARS TO ITS DEVELOPMENT**

According to J. P. Arnason, there are two obviously different ideas of civilization: the one we use when we speak of the origins, achievements or prospects of civilization in the singular, and the other that is invoked when we discuss the criteria for distinguishing and comparing civilizations, the way of drawing boundaries between them, or the various inventories and typologies which have been proposed by analysts of the field (Arnason, 2003: 1).

The civilizational approach focuses mainly on civilizations themselves – their identification, characteristics and formation. The potential of this approach is being introduced in the studies on social and economic aspects of the integration and disintegration interaction of civilizations, both globally and at hierarchically lower levels: macroeconomic, mesoeconomic, microeconomic, and even personal (Sardak, 2017; Radziyevska, 2017; Kasych, 2016).

Within the modern scientific debate on the regional integration, there is an obvious tendency towards studying the feasibility of launching integration blocs, keeping and/or enhancing their sustainability and capacity building, as well as the prospects for their development in general (Hamilton-Hart, 2003; Taylor, 2003). It should be noted that the attention is directed primarily to political and economic factors of their genesis: the political will of the founding states, the economic potential, the common strategic goal and policy orientations, compliance of their laws, etc (Wahl, 2017; Chen, 2011; Enoki, 2009; Bowen, Sleuwaegen, 2007; Radziyevska, 2013).

The issue of identification of the integration associations' civilizational structure has not been paid proper attention yet. However, the role of the civilizational factor has finally occupied its proper place not only in international economics, but also in other disciplines (Cox, 2016).

The emergence of *the civilizational approach* dates back to the ancient times and has been formed due to the advancement in various scientific fields, particularly in philosophy, history, economics, sociology, political science, public administration, governance. The brief information on milestones in the evolution of the civilizational approach development based on the contribution of many civilizational analysts and theorists is given in table 1.

Table 1

**Historical dimensions of the civilizational approach evolution\***

№	Period of time	Description	Founders, contributors, scholars
1	2	3	4
1.	Before the early 18 <sup>th</sup> century	Formation of scientific foundations for understanding: cultural differences of peoples, time periodization of the development of society, peculiarities of trading conduct and governing.	Herodotus, Thucydides, Polybius, Titus Livius, Plato, Aristotle, Lucretius Car, Sima Qian, Blessed Augustine, Al-Biruni, Ibn Khaldun.
2.	The beginning of the 18 <sup>th</sup> century	Emergence and use of the term 'civilization' in the legal sense. Application of the scientific approach to the natural, cultural, geographical, and historical distinctions of peoples. Usage of terminology related to civilizations.	J. Vico, Sh. L. de Montesquieu, F. M. Arue (Voltaire).
3.	The middle of the 18 <sup>th</sup> century	Frequent use of the term 'civilization' in the socio-cultural meaning and its popularization in the scientific literature. Civilization is viewed as culture.	V. R. de Mirabeau, N. A. Boulanger, P. A. d'Holbach, A. Ferguson.
4.	The end of the 18 <sup>th</sup> century	Usage of the term 'civilization' in the context of the periodization of the world history ('savagery', 'barbarism', 'civilization') and the determination of the stage in the development of society.	H. F. von Storck, D. Diderot, M. J. Condorcet.
5.	The first third of the 19 <sup>th</sup> century	Identification of the distinctions between societies that are at different stages of the civilizational development and the use of the term 'civilization' in the plural.	P. S. Ballanche, E. Burnouf, Ch. Lassen, A. von Humboldt, F. Guizot, A. L. Metlinsky.
6.	The middle of the 19 <sup>th</sup> – early 20 <sup>th</sup> century	Discovery of 'local civilizations'. Formation, popularization and development of the civilizational approach in various fields of science.	Ch. B. Renouvier, J. A. Gobineau, F. Rückert, H. T. Buckle, L. H. Morgan, N. Ya. Danilevsky, F. Engels, O. Spengler, N. A. Berdyaev, V. I. Vernadsky, L. Febvre, V. Gordon Childe.
7.	The middle of the 20 <sup>th</sup> – early 21 <sup>st</sup> century	Emergence of the civilizational approach and the theory of 'local civilizations'. Fundamental adaptation and application of the civilizational approach to the social sciences and the humanities.	F. Konechna, A. J. Toynbee, P. Sorokin, F. Braudel, D. Bell, A. Toffler, S. Huntington, L. N. Gumilev, Ye. B. Chernyak, B. N. Kuzyk, G. V. Osipov, Yu. V. Yakovets, O. A. Platonov, V. N. Trostnikov, N. M. Morozov, A. S. Filipenko, Yu. N. Pakhomov, Yu. V. Pavlenko, M. Z. Zgurovsky,

1	2	3	4
			A. D. Gvishiani, O. A. Koppel, O. M. Khimyak, T. V. Kalchenko, S. E. Sardak, S. A. Radziyevska, M. I. Mikhilchenko, Ya. S. Kalakura, O. A. Rafalsky, M. F. Yuriy, B. Nelson.
8.	The end of the 20 <sup>th</sup> – beginning of the 21 <sup>st</sup> century	Multi-criteria insight, criticism, methodological problems and transformation of the civilizational approach.	I. Wallerstein, B. S. Erasov, N. N. Moiseev, L. B. Alaev, M. Ya. Bobrov, N. N. Kradin, Yu. I. Semenov, V. A. Shnirel'man, Yu. V. Zhuliy, S. N. Eisenstadt, S. A. Arjomand, E. Tiryakian, R. Cox.

\* Compiled by the authors.

For our purposes, it is sufficient to summarize that the term ‘civilization’ (from Latin *civilis* – civil, state) has been used in the academic literature for several centuries, and has become widespread. Until the middle of the eighteenth century the scientific foundations for understanding the cultural differences between various peoples had been formed, the attempts to come up with the periodization of the society development had been made, the peculiarities of trade conduct and governing foundations had been described. At that time the term “civilization” was of legal significance and meant a judicial decision that transferred the criminal process to the category of the civil processes. However, over time, the term “civilization” has acquired a meaning of sociocultural significance (as the stage in the development of culture, opposed to savagery and barbarism) and began to denote a society in which the moral principles, the rule of law, the respect for human rights and freedoms are dominated, i.e. where the society is right, civilized.

It is necessary, before proceeding, to underline that not all the civilizational theorists and analysts, who promoted the civilizational approach, as well as the other thinkers that shaped the development of the local civilizations theory, used the term “civilization”, which, however, does not prevent us from considering them the founders of this theory.

The civilization has been defined in many ways. So, the well-known scholars suggested various definitions for civilization.

Initially ‘civilization’ was used synonymously or associated with culture. N. Danilevsky called these large cultural systems “cultural and historical types”, O. Spengler – “high cultures”, A. Toynbee – “civilizations”, A. L. Kroeber – “models of culture based on higher values”, F. Northrop – “cultural systems” or “world cultures”, N. Berdyaev – “great cultures”, P. Sorokin – “large cultural systems and supersystems”, L. Gumilev – used the category of “ethnicity”.

As we can see, the identification of the structure of the global economy as a whole, and its elements in particular, requires the use of the linear-stadial, formational, geopolitical and stadial approaches viewed as the alternative to the civilizational approach which in economic theory has undergone a long historical period of formation and is still being developed. As the result of the long genesis, the potential of the term ‘civilization’ has broadened. Nowadays the following definitions of the term are widely used (*The large explanatory dictionary*, 2007; *The New Encyclopedia Britannica*, 1978, *The Encyclopedia Americana*, 1974):

- the total social heritage of a group or of mankind as a whole, together with its progressive development over time (synonymous with ‘cultural evolution’);
- the level of social development and material culture achieved by some socio-economic formation, as well as the peculiarities of culture development of certain peoples and at particular timelines;
- the set of manifestations of the achieved level of social development;
- modern culture, progress, education;
- what is considered to be the goal of the modern progress;
- in some idealistic theories – the era of degradation and decline as opposed to the integrity and organic nature of culture;
- in the general philosophical meaning – the social form of the movement of matter, ensuring its stability and ability to self-develop by self-regulation of exchange with the environment (human civilization in terms of space device);
- in historical and philosophical meaning – the unity of the historical process and all the material, technical and spiritual accomplishments of mankind in the course of this process (human civilization in the history of the Earth);
- the third stage in the development of human culture, which is preceded by the other two – the time of savagery and barbarity;
- the stage of the world historical process, associated with the achievement of a certain level of sociality (the stage of self-regulation and self-production with relative independence from nature, differentiation of social consciousness);
- society, localized in space and time (local civilization is integral system viewed as a complex of economic, political, social and spiritual subsystems which develops according to the laws of vital cycles);
- an advanced state of human society, in which a high level of culture, science, industry, and government has been reached;
- an advanced state of human society containing highly developed forms of government, culture, industry, and common social norms;
- the growth through time of knowledge and skills that encouraged or allowed men to attain “civilised” behavior;
- the state of being civilized, that is, the possession of good manners and self-control;
- a national or regional style of life;
- the uniqueness of one’s own nation and the differences of one culture from that of any other folk.

With these multi-criteria definitions of ‘civilization’ in mind, we turn to the civilizational structure of the world economy (Table 2).

Table 2

**Civilizational structure of the world economy\***

№	Founders, contributors, authors	Identification Criteria	Local civilizations
1	2	3	4
1.	N. Ya. Danilevsky	Language, political independence of peoples, influence of foreign precedents or modern civiliza-	11 civilizations: Egyptian; Chinese; Assyrian-Babylonian-Phoenician, Chaldean, or Ancient Semitic; Indian; Iranian; Jewish;

1	2	3	4
	(Danilevsky, 2008).	tions, formation of a federation or political system of states, a unidirectional life cycle, religion.	Greek; Roman; Neo Semitic or Arabian; Germanic-Roman or European; Eastern European, Slavic, All-Slavic or Russian.
2.	A. J. Toynbee (Toynbee, 2001: 82–85).	Religion and the form of its organization, as well as the territorial remoteness from the place of origin of the civilization.	21 civilizations: Andean, Arab, Babylonian, Far Eastern primary, Far Eastern in Korea and Japan, Hellenic, Egyptian, Western, Indian, Hindu, Iranian, Mexican, Old Chinese, Mayan, Minoan, Orthodox Christian primary – in Byzantium and the Balkans, Orthodox Christian in Russia, Syrian, Hittite, Sumerian, Yucatan.
3.	S. Huntington (Huntington, 1993: 22–49).	Territory and religion.	8 civilizations: Western, Orthodox, Islamic, Chinese, Indian, Japanese, Latin American, African (sub-Saharan Africa).
4.	E.D. Frolov (Frolov, 2006: 96–100).	The commonality of geopolitical conditions, the primordial linguistic affinities, the unity or proximity of the economic and political systems, the similarity of culture (including religion) and mentality.	14 civilizations: Ancient Egyptian; Sumerian; Babylonian; Old Jewish; Ancient (Greco-Roman); Byzantine; Arabic; New Western European (with overseas zones of settled Europeans in North America, Australia, New Zealand); Latin American; Slavic-Russian; Indian; Chinese; Japanese; Ancient American civilization (descendants of the Aztecs, Incas and Maya).
5.	A. Bosworth (Bosworth, 2003).	Writing systems, i.e. the essence of what a civilization actually is: a culture resting on complex and evolving structures of information and knowledge. Genealogy of civilizations – relationships of distance and nearness among existing civilizations.	The families of (existing and extinct) civilizations: the Middle Eastern family (Arabic, Hebrew, Ethiopic, Mongolian), the Greek family (Greek, Etruscan, Coptic, Visigothic, Georgian, Armenian, Cyrillic, Glagolitic, Western), the Brahmi family (Indic, Tibetan, Dravidian, Sinhalese, Khmer, Thai, Lao, Burmese, Malayo-Polynesian), the Chinese family (Chinese, Japanese, Korean), the American family (extinct).
6.	G. V. Osipov, B. N. Kuzyk, Yu. V. Yakovets (Osipov, Kuzyk, Yakovets, 2007).	Science, education, culture, ethics, ideology.	12 civilizations: North American, Latin American, Western European, Eastern European, Eurasian, Japanese, Chinese, Indian, Buddhist, Muslim, African, Oceanic.
7.	A. S. Filipenko (Filipenko, 2002, 2007).	Territory and religion.	8 civilizations: Western, Confucian, Islamic, Hindu, Latin American, African, Orthodox-Slavic, Japanese.
8.	M. Z. Zgurovsky, A. D. Gvishiani (Zgurovsky, Gvishiani, 2008).	Faith, beliefs, changes, conflicts, freedoms, identification, thoughts, knowledge, nature, politics, elements of society; the value of human life, the freedom of the individual in society, the status of women in society, the degree of religious penetration into social life/status of religion, ethnic homogeneity, openness or closeness to other cultures, traditionalism in culture, political radicalism.	12 civilizations: Western-North American, Western-European, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic-Arab, Islamic-Turkic, Islamic-Malayan, Hindu, Slavic Eastern Orthodox, Slavic Western Catholic, Latin American, African.
9.	R. Cox, M. G. Schechter,	Territory, geopolitics, cultural patterns, the status of women,	Western and Eastern civilizations with particular focus on American, European,

1	2	3	4
	H. Innis (Cox, Schechter, 2002).	the struggle for self-government, rights and freedoms, visions of reality and the sets of values, time and space, forms of economic and social organization, perceptions of reality.	Islamic, African, Chinese, Russian, Japanese.
10.	H. Fang (Fang, 2014).	Historical growth, political factors: nations, states, powers; religion, spiritual belief.	8 systems of civilization: Asian Pacific, South Asian, Mediterranean Atlantic, Mid-Eastern Arabic, North American & Australian, Latin American, African System, and Jewish.

\* Compiled by the authors.

Thus, in the 21<sup>st</sup> century the theory of civilizations has been developing dynamically with particular focus on the description of civilizations, the analysis of their characteristics, as well as the tools for measuring indicators and mechanisms for optimizing their economic development. However, it should be noted that the civilizational approach has not been clearly unified and is being criticized for a number of reasons. For example, various indicators are reflected in the names of civilizations, e.g. territorial, religious, national, socio-political, etc. People, belonging to different civilizations, do not share common values; their standards of living, the state of living conditions, the level of production differ (this can be seen even in the case of the most developed regional integration union – the EU) (Ivashchenko, Orlova, 2017). In addition, within one country the population is often divided into segments belonging to different local civilizations. Therefore, the above-mentioned points necessitate the continuation of further research in this direction.

### **THE THEORETICAL APPROACH TO THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE MODERN LOCAL CIVILIZATIONS**

Taking into account that the modern society is not homogeneous and the entire population of the world can be characterized according to the following criteria: gender, age, citizenship, nationality, status, material well-being, education, knowledge of languages, religious affiliation, participation in the labor force/working life, cultural activities, etc., it is logical to arrive to the conclusion that the local civilizations do exist, mainly on the particular territory, and it is within them the commonality of people, the core representatives with the dominant characteristics of the corresponding local civilizations (biological characteristics, world outlook, sustainable patterns of behavior, values, customs, dynamic abilities, etc.) are formed.

Consequently, the civilizational approach is based on two key aspects. The first is the territory, and the second is the commonality of people.

However, adherents and critics of the civilizational approach justly point out that the main problematic issue is the appropriate mechanism for the criteria identification of local civilizations. For example, if the civilizations were more or less related to some territories until the end of the 19th – the middle of the 20th century, in the



21st century in the conditions of globalization the population of many territories no longer has a clear civilizational identity.

In our opinion, the above-mentioned methodological collapse in the scientific development of the civilizational approach emerged because of the complexity (as well as cost, unethicity, lack of legislative basis) of statistical estimation of the indicators that determine the belonging of an individual, small and large groups, states and regional associations to a particular local civilization. Moreover, the complexity of statistical estimation is explained by:

- the fuzzy identification of categories that serve as the basis for forming conscious and unconscious commonality of people (for example, world outlook, spirituality, homeland, conscience, etc.);
- the unwillingness of people to respond or the deliberate concealing of indicators that identify the civilizational affiliation (for example, religious affiliation, confession, being believer/non-believer, and/or supporter of the dominant ideology, loyalty to the institute of state, etc.);
- the absence of a reliable methodology determining the correlation of the indicator with the civilizational affiliation;
- the lack of a unified methodology for measuring the indicator (for example, it is unclear how on a scientific basis to measure reliably the belonging of countries to a particular local civilization);
- the absence of legal mechanism (or its prohibitory effect) for measurement of the indicator (for example, determination of nationality by DNA genealogy);
- the high dynamics of changes in indicators, which makes it difficult to identify the civilizational affiliation of an individual or the country as a whole (for example, due to the high intensity of migration and tourism flows, it is hard to define the dominant language and culture of individuals);
- the filigree in the understanding of the territorial dispersion of local civilizations and their centers of gravity (for example, some researchers, mentioned in Table 2 (Toynbee, 2001: 82–85; Huntington, 1993: 22–49; Frolov, 2006: 96–100; Filipenko, 2002, 2007) single out the Western civilization and include into the territory of its domination Europe, North America, Australia, New Zealand, while other scholars (Zgurovsky, Gvishiani, 2008) are convinced that the Western civilization is divided into European and North American, but on the territory of Oceania single out Oceanic civilization (Osipov, Kuzyk, Yakovets, 2007).

Thus, within the civilization approach there exist the first group of theoretically-determined indicators of civilization distinction which at the beginning of the second decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century are considered to be not statistically measurable, and the second group of indicators which may serve as identifiers and are viewed as measurable (Grunberg et al., 2007). The results of the author's research on parametrization and evaluation of human resources global development (Sardak et al., 2017; Sardak, Sukhoteplyi, 2013) allow to identify the local civilizations according to the six parameters (Table 2). The parameters are described in detail and analyzed with the help of the identifying measurable indicators. So, each parameter consists of the indicators, information on which is provided by international organizations, state authorities, integration associations' bodies, etc.

Table 3

## Indicators for identification of local civilizations\*

№	Parameter to be measured	Description of the parameter	Statistically measurable identifying indicators
1.	Natural	Territory/land base.	Continental identity/affiliation The main region with high concentration of countries that belong to this particular civilization.
2.	Biological	Physiological characteristics of the population.	Race, nationality, ethnic group, status, socially defined affiliation. Actual life expectancy, expected life expectancy at birth, illness, disability.
3.	Technical	State of science, production, technology development, level of manufacturing industry.	Technological mode. Anthropogenic activity (active-technogenic or passive-anthropogenic). The number of intellectual property objects. The number of the research institutions and their employees. The state of industrialization (pre-industrial, industrial or post-industrial). The possession of nuclear weapons. Space agencies, participation in space programs. Participation in military blocs.
4.	Economic	The rationality in the use of resources, the implementation of production (manufacturing), distribution, exchange and consumption processes.	The country's status in the international ratings (developed, developing). The type of economic system (natural economy, administrative-command, transitional, transformational, market). Ranking by macroeconomic indicators: GDP, GDP <i>per capita</i> , poverty rate, etc.
5.	Social	Fulfillment of socio-cultural needs.	The dominant language. Indicators of socio-cultural development (duration of education, the number of literate, the number of social and cultural sites/facilities).
6.	Governing	Government influence on resources and processes to achieve certain results, the effect of power.	Duration/period of independence. Citizenship. Political system. Religious affiliation. The degree of integration into regional associations.

\* Compiled by the authors.

The method for local civilizations identification, described above, requires taking into account two points that significantly complicate the identification of the population for its belonging to a particular civilization. Firstly, in the second decade of the 21st century there exist more civilizations than studied by the above-mentioned scholars (see Table 2), which significantly complicates their identification within the framework of this study. Secondly, even while applying the identifying indicators, difficulties arise with the local civilization identification due to the impossibility of clearly substantiating the criteria (the number of groups, clusters, segments, stages, shares, etc.).

For example, according to the natural parameter, if one uses the geographical approach to the division of continents, it is possible to select 5 indicators (Eurasia, America, Africa, Oceania, Antarctica); more detailed perspective offers 8 indicators

(Europe, Asia, North America, South America, Africa, Australia, Oceania, Antarctica), and if the subregions are taken into account (for example, in Europe only, there can be 5 indicators: Northern Europe, Southern Europe, Western Europe, Central Europe, Eastern Europe). Thus, the number of indicators may be calculated in dozens. In case the biological parameter is used, the number of indicators can vary starting with 3 (simplified division into races (Rushton, 2000) up to hundreds (nationalities) and thousands (ethnic groups) (Lynn, 2006).

Technical parameter presupposes valid calculations of the number of intellectual property objects, applications for patents, obtained patents, author's certificates, trademarks, signs for goods and services, etc. Economic parameter also has its weak points since there are different calculation methods used not only by the international organizations, but also by the state statistics services of countries for widely-used indicators (e.g., GDP according to the IMF and the World Bank). On the social dimension, there are also significant difficulties with measuring the key identifying indicators, although the most accessible and objective country data is provided in UNDP annual reports. The governing parameter requires obtaining the accurate data on various indicators, among which is the religious affiliation, but it is also important to keep in mind some tendencies taking place nowadays – there is the increase in the number of religious denominations and the marginalization of the religious consciousness in the conditions of ecumenism.

The two points mentioned above compel to make some simplifications. First, it's necessary to divide all the civilizations into the two groups depending on the number of their representatives – numerous civilizations and small civilizations; then to do further research focusing on numerous civilizations only. Secondly, to provide the qualitative, rather than quantitative, characterization of a local civilization based on the method of individual expert assessment. On the basis of these assumptions, the authors identify the characteristics of just nine numerous local civilizations (Table 4).

It is important to mention that to the group of small local civilizations (SLC) belong: the ancient American civilization (descendants of the Aztecs, Incas and Maya – currently about 1% of the world population); North Korean civilization (0.3%); Semitic-Jewish (0.19%); oceanic (0.006%); numerous micro-civilizational societies: the ancient civilizations, which managed to survive, the cradle civilizations, as well as the artificial communities and settlements (including eco-settlements), etc.

In the suggested study the above described methodology with special focus on individual expert assessment allowed the authors to identify local civilizations which resulted in determining the civilizational affiliation of countries as of 2018.

It is obvious that the authors have encountered certain difficulties during the civilization identification, namely: the insufficiency of reliable statistical indicators characterizing all the countries at a particular time; the impossibility to take into account the resident population and migrants with tourists, for which there may be significant differences; the difficulty of identifying the forces of attraction of countries to the central country of gravity; the lack of methodological aspects of the division of countries according to the civilization affiliation in case they are located at the junction of civilizations; the absence of criteria indicators of civilizational affiliation of countries; the complexity of identifying the small civilizations.

Table 4

## Characteristics of local civilizations\*

№	Civilization	Parameter characteristics					
		Natural	Biological	Technical	Economic	Social	Governing
1.	Western (W)	Europe, North America, Australia, New Zealand.	Mostly white. High life expectancy.	Leadership in innovation. Post-industrial status. Possession of nuclear weapons or the country's membership in NATO. High priority for the participation in space programs.	Developed market economies.	Dominance of the English language. High level of education. Cultural self-identification. Focus on citizenship rather than nationality.	Stable level of statehood, effective institution of Public Administration and citizenship. Formally Christianity; tolerant and marginal attitude to religion. Ecumenism. Democracy.
2.	Chinese (Confucian) (C)	Territory of the People's Republic of China.	Predominantly mongoloid race. Average and high life expectancy.	High innovative activity. Possession of nuclear weapons. Active participation in space programs.	Economically developed country with a market economy.	Dominance of the Chinese language. High level of education. Cultural self-identification.	Stable institute of Public Administration and citizenship. Communist ideology. Prevalence of Confucianism.
3.	Indian (Hindu) (In)	Territory of India.	Many nationalities. Average life expectancy.	Dominance of agrarian and industrial sectors. Possession of nuclear weapons.	Fast-growing country with market economy. High economic disparity between people.	Dominance of English and Hindi as state languages and many official languages. Cultural self-identification.	Stable institute of Public Administration, along with caste division. Dominance of Hinduism.
4.	Latin American (L)	The territory of Latin America.	Descendants of miscegenation (Indian, negroid, and white races). Average life expectancy.	Dominance of agrarian and industrial sectors. Catch-up development.	Developing countries. Transformation processes in progress.	Spanish, French, Portuguese and local languages. Quite high level of cultural self-identification.	Stable institute of Public Administration. Dominance of Catholicism.

5.	Islamic (Muslim) (Is)	Asia and North Africa.	Arabs, Turks, Malays. Average life expectancy.	Dominance of agrarian and industrial sectors. Steady progress in innovation development.	High economic disparity between countries. Active stage of transformation processes.	Dominance of the Arabic language and a variety of local cultural self-identifications.	Public Administration. Dominance of Islam.
6.	Buddhist (B)	South, South-East and East Asia.	Multi-ethnic composition. Average life expectancy.	Dominance of agrarian and industrial sectors.	Developing countries. Evolutionary character of transformation processes.	Different languages. Multi-cultural self-identifications.	Coherence between various state institutions.
7.	Orthodox Slavic (East European, Eurasian) (OS)	Eurasia.	Mostly white. Average life expectancy.	High level of technical development. Possession of nuclear weapons. High priority for the participation in space programs.	High dynamics of transformation processes.	Dominance of the Russian language. Transformational self-identification.	The stable institute of Public Administration. Accumulation of Orthodox Christianity.
8.	African (A)	Sub-Saharan Africa.	Negroids and mulatto. Average and low life expectancy.	Adaptational technological sufficiency.	Developing countries.	Language diversity. Local filigrance of self-identification.	Locality of institutes for Public Administration.
9.	Japanese (J)	Japan.	Japanese. High life expectancy.	High level of technical development.	Economically developed country with a market economy.	Dominance of the Japanese language. High self-identification. Strong culture.	Stable institute of Public Administration. Religious syncretism.

\* Compiled by the authors.

The authors have analyzed the civilizational structure of 17 regional associations as of the beginning of 2018:

1. North America – NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement, 1994) – 3 countries;
2. South America – MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market, 1991) – 5 countries;
3. South America – ACN (Andean Community of Nations, 1969) – 4 countries;
4. Europe – EU (European Union, 1993) – 28 countries;
5. Eurasia – CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States, 1991) – 9 countries;
6. Eurasia – Eurasian Customs Union EACU (2010) – 5 countries;
7. Eurasia – EES (Eurasian Economic Space or Single Economic Space, 2012) – 5 countries;
8. Eurasia – EAEU (Eurasian Economic Union, 2015) – 5 countries;
9. Eurasia – BSEC (Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, 1992) – 12 countries;
10. Eurasia – GUAM (Organization for Democracy and Economic Development, 1999) – 4 countries;
11. Asia – SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, 2001) – 8 countries;
12. South-East Asia – ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 1967) – 10 countries;
13. The Asia-Pacific region – APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, 1989) – 21 countries;
14. The Asia-Pacific region – TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership, 2016) – 12 countries;
15. Western Africa – ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States, 1975) – 15 countries;
16. Southern Africa – SADC (Southern African Development Community, 1992) – 15 countries;
17. Eastern Africa – EAC (East African Community, 2000) – 6 countries.

Having collected information on the structure of regional associations, the authors identified their civilizational structure, taking into account the share of countries by population (Table 5). The regional associations under consideration are presented in accordance with the chronology of their establishment.

The obtained results demonstrate the civilizational structure of the regional organizations of countries in dynamics. It's possible to conclude that the civilizational composition of some regional groups has remained homogeneous for many years while that of the others has appeared to become less stable. Nevertheless, the integration blocs of both types of civilizational composition demonstrate dynamic development.

## CONCLUSION

The historical dimensions of the civilizational approach formation are described, the key founders' contributions to the development of the civilizational approach are characterized. On the basis of the analysis of the scientific and methodological input of the followers and the critics of the civilizational approach the authors reveal the civilizational approach potential for the studies in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Table 5

The civilizational structure of the regional associations of countries as of the beginning of the 2018\*

Year of establishment	Regional association	Description	Indicators	W	C	In	L	Is	B	OS	A	J	Small local civilizations
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
1967	ASEAN	Mln, people	647.4	111.7	4.3	7.9	0.0	263.6	157.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	102.0
		%	100.0	17.2	0.7	1.2	0.0	40.7	24.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	15.7
1969	ACN	Mln, people	109.0	9.1	0.0	0.0	91.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.0	8.0
		%	100.0	8.4	0.0	0.0	83.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.0	7.4
1975	ECOWAS	Mln, people	367.6	24.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	39.2	0.0	0.0	295.1	0.0	8.8
		%	100.0	6.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	10.7	0.0	0.0	80.3	0.0	2.4
1989	APEC	Mln, people	2912.1	572.3	1408.6	8.3	149.6	274.5	127.9	108.5	6.7	115.4	140.4
		%	100.0	19.7	48.4	0.3	5.1	9.4	4.4	3.7	0.2	4.0	4.8
1991	MERCOSUR	Mln, people	295.9	53.7	0.0	0.0	231.1	1.5	1.0	0.4	4.8	0.0	3.3
		%	100.0	18.1	0.0	0.0	78.1	0.5	0.4	0.1	1.6	0.0	1.1
1991	CIS	Mln, people	235.3	29.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	69.5	0.5	127.9	0.0	0.0	8.0
		%	100.0	12.4	0.1	0.1	0.0	29.6	0.2	54.3	0.0	0.0	3.4
1992	BSEC	Mln, people	339.3	75.4	0.1	0.1	0.0	98.6	0.4	156.6	0.1	0.0	7.9
		%	100.0	22.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	29.1	0.1	46.1	0.0	0.0	2.3
1992	SADC	Mln, people	342.4	56.1	0.0	0.4	0.0	7.9	0.0	0.1	264.7	0.0	13.2
		%	100.0	16.4	0.0	0.1	0.0	2.3	0.0	0.0	77.3	0.0	3.9
1993	EU	Mln, people	508.9	479.7	0.2	0.5	0.3	6.1	0.3	18.9	1.0	0.0	2.0
		%	100.0	94.3	0.0	0.1	0.1	1.2	0.1	3.7	0.2	0.0	0.4

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
1994	NAFTA	Mln, people	490.3	332.9	3.2	0.4	112.8	3.6	3.6	0.2	6.7	0.0	26.9
		%	100.0	67.9	0.7	0.1	23.0	0.7	0.7	0.0	1.4	0.0	0.0
1999	GUAM	Mln, people	62.0	27.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	10.9	0.0	24.1	0.0	0.0	0.1
		%	100.0	43.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	17.5	0.0	38.8	0.0	0.0
2000	EAC	Mln, people	185.6	35.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.0	0.0	0.1	140.9	0.0	3.4
		%	100.0	18.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.2	0.0	0.1	75.9	0.0
2001	SCO	Mln, people	3154.7	122.7	1380.0	1222.3	0.0	296.4	4.6	113.5	0.0	0.0	15.2
		%	100.0	3.9	43.7	38.7	0.0	9.4	0.1	0.1	3.6	0.0	0.0
2010	ECU EACU	Mln, people	180.6	26.3	0.1	0.1	0.0	22.3	0.5	123.8	0.0	0.0	7.5
		%	100.0	14.6	0.1	0.1	0.0	12.3	0.3	0.3	68.5	0.0	0.0
2012	EES	Mln, people	180.6	26.3	0.1	0.1	0.0	22.3	0.5	123.8	0.0	0.0	7.5
		%	100.0	14.6	0.1	0.1	0.0	12.3	0.3	0.3	68.5	0.0	0.0
2015	EAEU	Mln, people	180.6	26.3	0.1	0.1	0.0	22.3	0.5	123.8	0.0	0.0	7.5
		%	100.0	14.6	0.1	0.1	0.0	12.3	0.3	0.3	68.5	0.0	0.0
2016	TPP	Mln, people	830.5	390.8	5.5	2.9	149.6	24.3	30.1	0.2	6.7	115.4	105.1
		%	100.0	47.1	0.7	0.4	18.0	2.9	3.6	0.0	0.8	13.9	12.7

\* Calculated by the authors.



The aspects for the local civilizations identification are examined. The authors suggest their theoretical approach to the identification of the modern local civilizations according to the six parameters: natural, biological, technical, economic, social, and governing.

The civilizational affiliation of countries is revealed and the civilizational structure of the major regional associations of countries is identified.

The results demonstrate that some regional associations have been more homogeneous in terms of civilizational composition for many years, while others are less, which does not interfere with their dynamic development.

In summary, it is obvious that the globalization processes have reinforced certain transformations in the existing civilizations towards their homogenization: the traditionally distinctive features of civilizations dominant till the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century started to erode gradually. At the same time in the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century great progress in science and technology (computer technologies, the Internet, the transnationalization of production, the rapid development of the means of communication and transportation) had huge impact on all spheres of life and had led to breakthrough in all fields of sciences which resulted, firstly, in the changes of civilizations territorial boundaries and, secondly, in the increasing number of people living on the territory of one civilization but mentally belonging to some other civilization. Thirdly, there has appeared a certain 'non-civilizational' population segment which is increasing and is formed primarily by people with 'blurred' civilizational mentality or those which consciously alienate from all the civilizations. Thus, the countries differ by their degree of belonging to this or that civilization.

At the end of the second decade of the twenty-first century, according to the economic dimension, the dominant position in the world space is occupied by the Western civilization, the rise of which is largely due to the effects of various factors, e.g. – religious – the spread of Protestantism; political – the democratization of society, the formation of “melting pot” model and the active stage of the regional integration processes; economic – the spread of liberalism. Nevertheless, the logic of the deployment of the historical dynamics of human development indicates the inevitability of changing the current situation through prolonged civilizational conflicts.

However, taking into account the prognostic scenarios of prospective development of mankind, along with the global periodization and the global influencing factors, it is possible to assume that since 2030 the shifts in the global social dynamics will result in changes in the civilizational structure of the world, as well as in the civilizational structure of the regional associations of countries (Sardak, Sukhoteplyi, 2013).

## **PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH**

In the framework of this study the authors suggest some areas of research that will refine the achievement of the goal of identifying the civilizational structure of regional associations of countries. However, it is necessary to admit the weaknesses, complexities and recommendations that will enable the scientific community to gradually optimize the assessment methodology within the anticipated trajectory of the civilizational approach development in the future.

The first perspective direction is the improvement of the assessment methodology: first, the optimization of the methodology of individual expert assessment; second, the development and testing of the collective methodologies; third, the development and testing of mechanistic evaluation techniques for the general public with the help of computer programs.

The second direction is the evaluation, in retrospect, of those regional groups that disintegrated and the investigation of an existence of a possible relation between the level of homogeneity of their civilizational structure and the disintegration process.

The third perspective direction is the finding of the minimal binding civilization ratio of the cultural identity of the regional association, which we hypothetically determine as at minimum of 40% according to at least one civilizational component. So, for the regional organization to be stable it's necessary to have in itself at least 40% of core culture as one civilization constituent.

The fourth direction is the forecasting of the integration stability of countries and regions.

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### ABSTRACT

The paper advances a new comprehensive complex approach to the investigation of the civilizational aspects in the development of regional associations of countries.

The research starts with the overview of historical dimensions of the civilizational approach and the contribution of the founding scholars to its development. It continues with the analysis of the scientific and methodological input of the followers and the critics of this approach.

The authors suggest their theoretical approach to the identification of the modern local civilizations according to six parameters: natural, biological, technical, economic, social, and governing.

The civilizational affiliation of countries and the civilizational structure of major 17 regional associations of countries are identified.

The results demonstrate that some regional groups have been more homogeneous in terms of civilizational composition, others – less homogeneous, which does not interfere with their dynamic development. However, the logic of the historical dynamics of human development indicates the inevitability of changing the current situation through prolonged civilizational conflicts resulting in significant changes in the global social dynamics and the civilizational structure of the world and of regional associations of countries.

The identification of the civilization structure of countries and regional associations contributes to the rational decision-making in the areas of international economic relations and to the formation of the integration/disintegration policies on the national and regional levels.

It is predicted that from 2030 global social dynamics will undergo a fundamental breakthrough that will radically change the civilizational structure of the world and regional unions of countries.

**Keywords:** civilization, local civilization, regional integration organization, country, disintegration

### STRUKTURA CYWILIZACYJNA ORGANIZACJI INTEGRACJI REGIONALNEJ

#### STRESZCZENIE

Artykuł przedstawia nowe kompleksowe podejście do badania aspektów cywilizacyjnych w rozwoju regionalnych stowarzyszeń między państwowych.

Na początku artykułu dokonano przeglądu historycznych wymiarów podejścia cywilizacyjnego i wkładu naukowców będących jego założycielami w jego rozwój. W dalszej części następuje analiza wkładu naukowego i metodologicznego zwolenników i krytyków tego podejścia.

Autorzy sugerują teoretyczne podejście do określenia współczesnych cywilizacji lokalnych z zastosowaniem sześciu parametrów: przyrodniczego, biologicznego, technicznego, ekonomicznego, społecznego i zarządzania.

Sklassyfikowano cywilizacyjną przynależność krajów i strukturę głównych 17 regionalnych stowarzyszeń międzypaństwowych.

Wyniki pokazują, że niektóre grupy regionalne są bardziej jednorodne pod względem cywilizacyjnym, zaś inne mniej, co nie zakłóca ich dynamicznego rozwoju. Logika historycznej dynamiki rozwoju ludzkości wskazuje jednak na konieczność zmiany obecnej sytuacji będącej wynikiem długotrwałych konfliktów cywilizacyjnych, powodujących znaczące zmiany w globalnej dynamice społecznej i strukturze cywilizacyjnej świata oraz regionalnych stowarzyszeń państw.

Określenie struktury cywilizacyjnej krajów i ich regionalnych stowarzyszeń przyczynia się do racjonalizacji procesu decyzyjnego w obszarach międzynarodowych stosunków gospodarczych oraz do kształtowania polityki integracji/dezintegracji na poziomie krajowym i regionalnym.

Przewiduje się, że po 2030 r. globalna dynamika społeczna ulegnie fundamentalnemu przełomowi, który radykalnie zmieni strukturę cywilizacyjną świata i regionalne związki międzypaństwowe.

**Słowa kluczowe:** cywilizacja, cywilizacja lokalna, organizacja integracji regionalnej, kraj, dezintegracja