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**Regionalism in the Congresses of People's Deputies of
the USSR and Russia:
A Case Study of Siberia and the Russian Far East**

by
Seongjin Kim

Submitted for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Institute of Central and East European Studies
University of Glasgow

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The University of Glasgow

CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL

Ph.D. Thesis

This is to certify that PhD Thesis of
Seongjin Kim

has been approved by the Committee for the thesis requirement for
the Doctor of Philosophy in Social Sciences
at July 2001 graduation

Supervisor

Professor Stephen L. White

Department

Date

To my parents

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Abstract

This study is concerned with the influence of regionalism in the Congresses of People's Deputies of the USSR and Russia between 1989 and 1993 and its implications for future reform including the development of federal relations in Russia. In particular, emphasis will be placed on regionalist tendencies developed in Siberia and the Russian Far East.

After *perestroika*, the discussion of federal relations showed varieties of possible developments, ranging from a unitary system to a confederation. Despite these varieties, it appears to be generally perceived that stable and 'genuine' federal relations are required in Russia. However, little attention has been paid to the role of the newly re-emerging political actor, the deputies of the central legislature, who are directly engaged in the establishment of such federal relations.

This study reaches three main conclusions. First of all, regional socio-economic disparities affected the attitudes of deputies towards reform, including changes in centre-periphery relations. Secondly, the analysis suggests that at least two main streams of regionalism were developed during 1989-1993: one developed in the Congresses by the regional deputy groups, and the other outside the Congresses by regional political leaders. Thirdly, despite growing regionalist tendencies in Russia at that time, regional political actors were not strong enough to initiate a federal structure of their preference, lacking horizontal and vertical coordination.

This discussion of regionalism in the Congresses leads us to a further conclusion that regional interest articulation was rather chaotic, hampering legislation of policies and thus facilitating the regionalisation of reform. Despite strong regionalist tendencies in some sub-national units, particularly based on ethno-nationalist sentiments, such a development may erode the legacy of reform as well as regional autonomy itself.

Although further study is required, the regions continue to have a clearly defined influence upon the legislation of federal relations in the Russian parliament. For the legislation of not only *de facto* changes but also 'genuine' federal relations, the regions may need to enhance the level of their coordination on the basis of the consensus on a future federal structure.

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Preface

By the time I started my thesis in the autumn of 1993, Russia was in a new round of huge turmoil. The Russian economy was staggering. Politics evaporated when negotiations among political actors failed and Eltsin dispersed the parliament. Just a year before these dramatic developments, some observers of Russian politics were even talking about the possibility of the collapse of the Russian Federation. However, regional resistance appeared to remain strong only in rhetoric, showing the weakness of 'checks and balances' in a newly emerging 'democratic' system. The abrupt—but quite predicted by the middle of 1993—changes led many to a criticism of Moscow for its undemocratic and violent measures, in which chaotic and uncoordinated regional interest articulation that led the country to a ungovernable situation appeared to be buried.

At the time when the parliament was dispersed in Russia, I was working on the failed Land Reform of 1861 and found a similarity between the Land Reform of 1861 and the reform implemented during the period between 1989 and 1993 in Russia. In both cases, the influence of regions on the decision-making process based on their own regional interests resulted in regionalisation of reform, distorting reform processes. These two historically remote incidents paved the way to this thesis and the regional influence in the national decision-making constitutes the main focus of discussion.

Despite the importance of the regional influence on national decision-making process, however, relatively little attention has been paid in the Western literature to deputies at the Congress of Peoples' Deputies (CPD), a 'newly' emerging political actor where members appeared to be rather independent from their leaders compared with their predecessors. Literature on Russian politics or economy in this transition period paid more attention to regionalisation of reform in policy-implementation than in the decision-making. Neither did the literature on regional elites have drawn sufficient attention to the role of regional deputies in the national parliament, although they were responsible for legislation on every aspect of reform including centre-periphery relations.

Accordingly, this thesis is mainly concentrated on regional interest articulation in the CPD during the transition period of 1989-1993, particularly that of the Siberian and Far Eastern (SIBFE) regions. This thesis seeks to make a contribution to bridging a gap between the analysis of Soviet and post-Soviet legislative working patterns. In addition, the thesis draws attention to the importance of coordinated interest articulation by the regions in their effort to avoid an ungovernable situation or a stalemate which might have precipitated the intervention of a strong centre that might have affected not only centre-periphery relations but also the whole reform itself. The regional reform launched by Putin in 2000 leaves many arrangements still to be defined, including the competence of newly established administrative units, and thus the question of enhancing the level of regional coordination still remains as a major factor in the evolution of federal relations ten years after the end of communist rule.

The thesis starts with a brief literature review on the question of regions in Russian history and of regional interest articulation patterns during the Soviet period. The chapter also includes a discussion of general assumptions, boundaries and methods of analysis.

In the thesis efforts have been made to locate the Russian case in a broader context of comparative centre-periphery relations; this is the main concern of Chapter 2. The chapter starts with a discussion of the basic factors that affect the development of regionalism and centre-periphery relations. It also includes a discussion of the equilibrium between centralising and decentralising forces. Together with a general review, the chapter includes three case studies of relatively 'recently' established federal states: India, Spain, and Belgium. The main reason to select relatively 'recent' federal system is that the problems that arise in the federalisation process may vary depending on the stage of development. Accordingly, the experience of rather historic or well-established federal states such as the United States, Germany, or Switzerland could be too specific (if current) or too outdated (if we look for the initial federalisation period) to be applied to the Russian case.

India is selected because of its multiethnic diversity, relatively poor economic conditions, and the centralised nature of its federal system. Although the Indian federal structure was officially established after British colonial rule, challenges to a centralised federal system reemerged after the Emergency (1975-1977), and thus it is included in the category of "recent" establishment. Spanish experience is included in this discussion because of its unique strategy to cope with the regional challenge by creating Autonomous Communities (ACs) after the death of Franco in 1975, a

transition from a unitary state under the dictatorship to a decentralised—though not necessarily federal—system as a part of the democratisation process. Putin's new administrative units resemble Spanish ACs—although they were formed “from above” in Russia—and thus could give an idea of the possible evolution of federal relations in Russia. The Belgian case is also interesting because of its unique structure—a mixture of territorial and consociational principles—and a series of negotiations in its federalisation process that started after the adoption of the Constitution of 1970.

These three cases show that the growing influence of the regions in the central parliament was and is a major factor in facilitating the evolution of a federal structure. The cases also suggest that the better a crisis management mechanism functions, the more stable the evolution process becomes. The Belgium and Spanish cases indicate that crisis management can be more successful when it is on the basis of consensus and a high level of coordination of political actors.

Based upon these preliminary observations, the following chapters explore the development of regionalism and its impact on reform in the Russian context. In order to examine the strength of regionalism in the national parliament, the backgrounds of regionalism or the existence of socio-economic disadvantages and ‘dispersed’ groups, representation of regions in central decision-making, and the regional interest articulation patterns of deputies in the CPDs will be discussed in Chapters 3 to 6. The resources and strategies of the centre and of the regions affect the equilibrium between centralising and decentralising forces, and this will be discussed in Chapter 7.

Chapter 3 is mainly devoted to a discussion of regional socio-economic disparities, particularly between the SIBFE regions and the European part of Russia and within the SIBFE, and the responses of the SIBFE regions towards reform. In order to identify regional disparities, regional clusters will be tested employing three indicators: economic performance, living standards, and socio-economic stress. In this chapter, *Goskomstat* data and local newspapers published in the SIBFE regions that were consulted in St Petersburg during my research trip will be mainly used.

Chapter 4 consists of three main elements: the representation of SIBFE regions in the CPDs of the USSR and Russia, frequency of speeches made by SIBFE deputies in the four Congresses of the USSR, and a content analysis of speeches made at the first CPD of the USSR. In this chapter, changing interest articulation patterns of SIBFE deputies will be compared to past Soviet experience. For the analysis, the composition of deputies (2,250 deputies of the USSR CPD and 1,068 deputies of the

Russian CPD) is based on the directories published by the CPDs of the USSR and Russia. For the frequency and content analysis, stenographic records published by the CPDs will be consulted.

Chapters 5 and 6 examine the influence of regional factors in the decisions made in the CPDs of the USSR and Russia respectively. Although the regions advocated their respective interests, it did not necessarily mean that they formed a strong voting bloc and thus an empirical analysis is required. Furthermore, during this transition period various functional groups emerged not only in the society but also in the CPDs, which could hamper regional interest articulation. Accordingly, the influence of three groups of factors—personal (gender, generation, and ethnicity), functional ('class' and political affiliation), and regional factors—in roll call votes will be analysed, employing statistical methods such as ANOVA and logistic regression. Existing statistical analyses in this respect tested the influence of only some of the variables included in the analysis and separately, ignoring the danger of the overlapping influence of variables. In this thesis, variables will be put together into a single model to identify a set of major variables that had a strong influence on deputies' voting patterns, which has not been tried before. For the analysis, 39 roll-call votes (17 for the USSR CPD and 22 for the Russian CPD) were selected. Deputies' personal details are based on directories and voting details are based on the results appearing in the stenographic records of the CPDs. A more detailed discussion of the methodology of the statistical analysis appears in an appendix.

In Chapter 7, the economic and political resources of the centre and the regions and their respective strategies will be discussed in order to explore the overall influence of regional demands and the limits of the development of regionalism during the period. Since the equilibrium of centralising and decentralising forces involves at least two parties—centre and regions—discussion of both various sources of weakness of SIBFE regionalism (e.g. the diversification of regional goals, discord among regional political actors, and performance of regional political 'parties' and movements) and the strategy of the centre (i.e. the regional policy of the centre) will constitute the main parts of this chapter. However, the regional policy of the centre—e.g. bilateral negotiations—had double-sided effects. On the one hand, it encouraged the development of regional interest articulation by inviting copy-cat demands. On the other hand, a series of bilateral negotiations hampered coordination between regions after a series of concessions was made as each region sought more favourable terms that were available from bilateral negotiations. The former effect will be included in

Chapter 3 as a part of the background of regionalism and the latter effect will be discussed in this Chapter despite the risk of repetition.

Chapter 8, the concluding chapter, will include a discussion of the influence of regionalism on reform and its impact on future political and economic changes, including federal relations. In this chapter, four scenarios—status quo, the advent of a strong centre or strong regions, and a ‘fourth way’—for the future development of federal relations in Russia will be briefly considered. In addition, the experience of other countries included in Chapter 2 will also be discussed in combination with the current development of Russian politics.

Finally, a brief note on conventions. Citations are given in full when they first appear in each chapter, and thereafter in a shortened form. For the translation of Russian I have used ‘i’ rather than ‘y’ for Russian combination vowels (thus ‘ia’ instead of ‘ya’ for ‘я’, and ‘iu’ for ‘ю’; but ‘e’ for both ‘э’ and ‘е’). Soft (ь) and hard (Ъ) signs are translated into “’” and “”” with some exceptions, especially where they are familiar in English: thus Eltsin (rather than El’tsin), and some placenames such as sub-national units and their regional centres (thus Tiumen rather than Tiumen’, but Noril’sk instead of Norilsk). The position of political figures is difficult, given that most of them have changed over the relevant period. In this thesis, the positions of political figures are in general based on those held at the time to which the discussion refers. Finally I would like to note that I am alone responsible for any inaccuracies and shortcomings in this thesis.

CHAPTER I

Introduction

The main purpose of this thesis is to examine the influence of the regions upon Soviet and Russian decision-making during the transition period of 1989-1993 and its implications for the development of centre-periphery relations. With *perestroika*, socio-economic disparities that developed under the Soviet system resulted in regional diversities in response to directions 'from above' in the process of democratisation and marketisation, demarcating 'winners' and 'losers.'¹ The diverse impact of reform policies and the distortion of 'intended reform' in the regions, particularly in the policy-implementation process, has been a focus of attention not only among Western scholars but also among Russian reformers themselves. Many such studies have placed an emphasis on the need for 'stable' federal relations for a successful transition to a market economy, blaming the centre for its 'negligence' of this question.² However, little attention has been paid to the influence of the regions at the central legislature where the legal basis of 'genuine' and 'stable' federal relations would be adopted.

In the course of reform, changes took place in the political environment suggested an increasing influence of the regions upon decision-making at the centre, which could have hampered efforts to establish 'stable' federal relations.³ First of all, the centre was losing control over the regions. This tendency was not only because of power struggles at the centre, but also because of the absence of institutional mechanisms—for instance, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and union ministries during the Soviet period—whose influence could cross regional borders. Secondly, reform activated the regions, providing them with motives to pursue their own policies and to defend their own interests in the course of reform.⁴ In particular, changes in the electoral system and in the working patterns of parliament led to a new era for open struggles between the conflicting interests of various socio-economic and regional groups.⁵ The interaction between diverse interests, including

that between centre and regions, had a profound effect upon the course and speed of reforms in the Russian Federation.

The interaction between centre and periphery is not a peculiar phenomenon which appeared only after Gorbachev. Should regional socio-economic disparities have affected decision-making at the centre, why should it matter more in the post-Soviet system? How strong is the influence of the regions, and what are the implications for the future of Russia?

In order to examine the influence of the regions upon decision-making at the federal level, this study will focus on the voting behaviour of deputies in the Congresses of People's Deputies (CPDs) of the USSR and Russia that were operating between 1989 and 1993, as decisions made in these Congresses formed the basis of centre-periphery relations. For the analysis, the influence of personal, social, and regional factors upon the voting patterns of deputies in roll-call votes at the Congress will be discussed. The analysis will consider various regional groups, mainly at the republic level in the CPD of the USSR and in lower-level administrative units—89 regions—for the Russian CPD. In particular, emphasis will be placed on the Siberian and Russian Far Eastern (SIBFE) regions and their deputies, considering the strong regionalist tendencies and distinctive socio-economic conditions in the area.

In this introductory chapter, a brief discussion of regional factors in the Russian history will be undertaken. The discussion will be followed by a brief review of centre-periphery relations in Western countries, from which the assumptions of this study can be derived. We shall also discuss in this chapter why the regions matter more in the post-Soviet period than before. Finally, the structure and methods of this thesis will be outlined.

I. 1. Reforms and the Regions in Russian History

The size and location of the territory of a state has been a traditional topic of politics and international relations, particularly when the question of the 'power' of a state is discussed. Apart from the geopolitical point of view, a vast territory has often been regarded as a necessary factor for a state to be a superpower, with their potential human and natural resources. At the same time, however, a huge territory has been considered a burden to a state when it raises questions of long borders to defend, and of political and socio-economic integration, particularly when it contains diverse nationalities with different cultural and historical experiences, and an uneven distribution of wealth.

Russia seems to be a good example of the dual implications of a large territory. A simple geographic and demographic overview shows a dramatic diversity in a territorial expanse that accounts for the seventh of the world's land surface.⁶ Differences between regions in much a huge territory are found not only in natural and demographic, but also in their various socio-economic features. Although the need to reduce regional disparities has been recognised as a major goal of regional policy,⁷ the regional policy of the centre failed to limit regional disparities, but rather deepened a regional division of labour throughout the Soviet period. For instance, industrialisation and the development of natural resources to meet the needs of extensive economic growth have changed the economic structure of Western Siberia from an agricultural and fur-trading region to a resource-extractive economic structure in which, for instance, fossil fuel production has been highly intensified. Despite such changes, however, the basic relations between the western and eastern parts of the Russian Federation have not altered in their essence and have continued to be depicted as 'colonial relations.'⁸

Socio-economic disparities between various regions often resulted in different attitudes towards political and economic changes that had been introduced in the tsarist period. The different attitudes of the regions towards change led in turn to a confrontation of interests in the decision-making process and regionalisation in the policy-implementation process. For instance, regions with different economic structures showed different attitudes towards 'the great liberalisation of serfdom' in 1861, which finally recognised the regional variations of reform and failed to achieve its original goal to free the peasants.⁹

Differences between various regions in their attitudes towards political and socio-economic changes continued throughout the revolutionary¹⁰ and the Soviet period, although any possible regional initiatives were easily overridden by centripetal forces. For instance, regions such as Siberia opposed or at least less actively supported central initiatives on many occasions during the 1920s. When the centre initiated a scheme to change the old tsarist administrative structure into economic units in 1920-1923, the Siberian *Guberniia* Communist Party opposed the plan and demanded regional autonomy (*oblastnichestvo*).¹¹ Another example of regional influence on central decisions can be found in the process of grain procurement and dekulakisation at the end of the New Economic Policy (NEP) period.¹² However, industrialisation and forced collectivisation soon superseded these regional tendencies.¹³

Regional initiatives for economic and political change increased when Khrushchev launched his *sovnarkhoz* reform and activated local initiatives that were expected to make a difference to economic performance.¹⁴ Khrushchev's short-lived reform clearly activated regional initiatives in mobilising resources within their boundaries to attain the targets set by the centre,¹⁵ although a further discussion of which is beyond the boundaries of this study.

Under Brezhnev's rule, the scope for regional initiatives was growing not only in policy implementation but also in the policy-initiation process, although a branch planning system was rehabilitated. Many Western scholars observed that industrialisation and the changing cadre policy under Brezhnev encouraged 'pluralistic' tendencies which gradually modified the environments of the decision-making process and centre-periphery relations,¹⁶ although those environments were far from pluralistic.¹⁷ Expanded size and increasingly more complicated economic activities made it simply impossible for *Gosplan* to control or to decide every detail in practice.¹⁸ Furthermore, the elite recruitment system based on 'trust in cadres' under Brezhnev invited local leaders to represent regional interests not only in the union republics¹⁹ but also in lower administrative units.²⁰ Much empirical research showed an increasing influence of regional leaders in the decision-making²¹ and policy-implementation processes,²² although some other scholars emphasised the dominant role of the central elite and the dependence of regional leaders on central elites in line with the patron-client model.²³ Furthermore, changes in elite politics were accompanied by changes in the participation of the grassroots, which became more institutionalised during the Brezhnev period.²⁴

I. 2. Centre-Periphery Relations in Post-Soviet Politics

After *perestroika*, the environment of centre-periphery relations had clearly changed in many aspects. Despite the peculiarities of Russian politics, the changing environment made it more appropriate to discuss regionalism within the context of centre-periphery relations that can also be found in many countries all over the world such as Britain, Canada, France, the United States, Germany, Italy, Spain, Belgium, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brazil, Nigeria, South Africa, and Tanzania. Although centre-periphery relations in these countries vary from a unitary to a federal system, there is a general literature on the development of centre-periphery relations. It can often be appropriate to discuss such questions in the Russian context, nonetheless the mechanism in the Russian case is less institutionalised, and therefore more difficult to examine.


According to Western experience, a centralised system is supported not only because of the belief that the general will should surpass regional or functional interests, but also because of its ability to provide a more egalitarian distribution of goods and services, stability and public order, and protection of ethnic minorities. By contrast, a decentralised system is advocated because of its supposed contribution to increasing citizen participation in public affairs, restraining the central government's abuse of powers, protecting ethnic minorities by providing them with more autonomy, and providing efficiency at the local level by recognising diversities.²⁵

Based on this rationale, centre-periphery relationships take a form that reflects the development of centralising and decentralising factors. Again the Western literature has shown that the discussion can be pursued in three different dimensions: environments, actors, and the capability of actors.²⁶ According to many Western theorists, centre-periphery relations are put to a new challenge when crises arise. Rousseau and Zariski divide such crises into five categories—crises of identity, legitimacy, penetration, participation, and distribution—and argue that these crises are interrelated:

The crisis of penetration has to do with the changes wrought or attempted by centralising states. The crises of identity and participation are frequently precipitated by reactions to the central government's penetration of the periphery. On the other hand, penetration requires legitimacy in order to be successful, and the centralisers may themselves encourage broader participation in order to enhance their own legitimacy. These crises are interrelated, then, and these interrelationships need to be examined in each political system.²⁷

When the crises are intensified and centre-periphery relations are put to the test, interactions between centre and periphery develop a new pattern based on their resources and strategies. In this regard, Rhodes divides resources into five categories: legal authority, monetary resources, political legitimacy, informational resources, and organisational resources.²⁸ He also mentions eleven strategies employed by the central and local governments: bureaucratic command (direction and control), incorporation, consultation, bargaining, confrontation (local governments' legal or illegal rejection of central policies), penetration (upward, reverse of incorporation), avoidance (ignoring and vetoing other party's initiatives), incentives, persuasion, professionalisation (creation of single-issue policy area), and factorising (subdivision of problems to sub-national units of the government).²⁹ As a result of the interaction, centre-periphery relations crystallise that are somewhere between a unitary and federal or between a centralised and decentralised system (see Figure 1.1).

<Figure 1.1> Interaction Mechanism between Centre and Peripheries



These factors, resources, and strategies have some relevance to the Russian context, although decision-making during the Soviet and post-Soviet period appeared to be heavily dependent on either bureaucratic or 'regime' style methods, ending up with a pseudo-federal system.³⁰ During the Soviet period, regional disparities had intensified as a result of branch planning, despite a regional policy that was supposed to limit the gaps between regions.³¹ Bureaucratic decisions overruled regionalist

tendencies, though the tendencies of incorporation and upward penetration were also apparent.

However, *perestroika* brought qualitative changes in regionalism and the mechanism of interaction between the centre and peripheries. For the regions, *perestroika* was regarded as a crisis—particularly for poorer regions in an economic sense—as well as an opportunity for the regions in the political sense. Given the economic structure that developed under the slogan of the socialist division of labour, price liberalisation, for instance, threatened the state delivery system when suppliers did not implement delivery contracts looking for a more lucrative market that was developing.³² The self-accountancy drive also severely damaged living conditions at the regional level when enterprises that used to supply local services (*sotkul'tbyt*) withdrew their commitment in order to concentrate on their own need.³³ Accordingly, the regionalism that emerged during the *perestroika* period appeared to be more than a simple regional lobby for more funds or a subsidy from the centre, but a struggle for survival.

On the other hand, however, *perestroika* changed the environment which, in turn, altered the mechanism of interaction between centre and peripheries, not only limiting centripetal forces but also activating centrifugal factors in the face of a legitimacy crisis.³⁴ First of all, an oligarchic decision-making process changed into a 'pluralistic' one, making it difficult for the centre to employ a bureaucratic strategy. Under the slogan of 'all power to the soviets,' the legislative branches gained more substantial powers.³⁵ The 'leading role' of the CPSU began to be challenged, which soon accommodated legalised opposition and 'pressure groups.'³⁶ Popular control over elites and bureaucrats went further when electoral reforms made them vulnerable not only to criticism but also to the threat of being removed by the grassroots.³⁷ Furthermore, *glasnost* supported these changes with freedom of speech, which resulted in open competition between regional, economic, and social groups for limited resources.

In these new circumstances, regional demands and their impact also showed differences from past experience, particularly when the centre was losing its power of control over the regions. First of all, regionalist demands no longer confined themselves to 'low politics,' but included questions of 'high politics.' These changes were clearly revealed when the question of a new federal system and a new constitution was discussed in the early 1990s.³⁸ In the process, the federal republics declared sovereignty and the supremacy of republican laws over the decisions of the

central government, developing into a 'war of laws.' Many lower administrative units also followed a similar path to expand their economic rights.

Secondly, regional demands had a much stronger influence on political and economic changes. As many Western scholars observed, the regionalisation of reform at the implementation stage affected the course and speed of reform in the regions.³⁹ In particular, the regionalisation of reform hampered central stabilisation measures and macro-economic activities, as regional authorities showed different attitudes towards price liberalisation and privatisation,⁴⁰ and imposed tariff barriers across regional borders,⁴¹ increasing the importance of systems.⁴² Furthermore, the indigenisation of political elites was more clearly revealed,⁴³ particularly in the Baltic republics where popular fronts were actively participating in political activities.⁴⁴


In particular, the increasing influence of regions on the legislative process is important since legislation at the central level has a nationwide effect and provides the institutional setting for regionalisation. On the one hand, increased inputs 'from below' to decision-making bodies enhance regional autonomy. Equipped with more channels to exert their influence over the decision-making process, regions' denial power over central decisions has increased, either by blocking the adaptation of certain decisions (avoidance strategy), or by simply ignoring central decisions and regionalising implementation (confrontation strategy). The regions' increasing denial power, therefore, has led the centre to employ 'bargaining' and 'consultation' strategies, which have also contributed to increasing regional autonomy.

On the other hand, however, regionalisation of reform without an institutional and legal basis can cause damage to regional autonomy itself at least in the medium term.⁴⁵ If the regionalisation of reform has been an obstacle not only to stabilisation measures, but also possibly to economic growth by discouraging macro-economic activities, such a development might invite pressure to reduce the regions' expanding autonomy. Such a pressure might not only come from the centre,⁴⁶ but also possibly from 'loser' regions and their grassroots, who might prefer 'stability' and 'economic growth' to regional autonomy and freedom.⁴⁷ Furthermore, should the Russian economy decline and the gap between 'winner' and 'loser' regions broaden, it will threaten the legacy of reform and strengthen public support for stabilisation measures which could include 'anti-reform' measures, including a 'strong centre.'⁴⁸ Although a 'strong centre' does not necessarily mean a return to the past,⁴⁹ such a development may bring shifts in the emphasis of reform from economic growth to economic equity and stability. It may also cause changes in centre-periphery relations in which the

centre can reign in the tendencies of regional autonomy. As in Figure 1.2, despite the changes introduced by *perestroika*, the crises that arose at the national and regional levels and the consequent interaction between centre and regions did not seem to produce a 'stable' federal structure.

Should the political circumstances during the period between 1989 and 1992 invite open discussion of a new federal system, what has led the centre and regions to uninstitutionalised bargains rather than to institutionalised and systematic changes in federal relations? My provisional answer to this question is that the conflicting interests of various actors in the legislative process—individual regions, regional groups, and the centre—made it difficult to adopt legislation which could provide a framework for institutional changes.

<Figure 1.2> Reform and Evolution of Centre-Periphery Relations in the Russian Context



In this regard, Slocum has also suggested the difficulties in reaching agreement on a new federal structure not only between centre and regions, but also between the regions:

... not all status games will be engaged in collectively, but the republics *as a group* and regions *as a group* will have incentives to cooperate for the preservation or extension of the constitutional status of

these representative sets of subjects, and political competition at the centre will provide incentives for politicians to seek provincial allies. ... On some issues—most fundamentally, the issue of ethnic federalism versus non-ethnic federalism—the collective interests of the republics will clash with those of the regions, while on other issues (general policies of economic decentralisation) the republics and regions will have an incentive to act in concert against the centre.⁵⁰

In examining my provisional answer to the reasons for the emergence of 'unstable' federal relations, I shall mainly discuss the following questions: the interests of regions or regional groups in the process of reform; the demands of the regions and their cohesiveness in the CPD; the limits of the development of regionalism in the CPD; and the future implications of the regions in the Russian politics.

I. 3. Assumptions, Boundaries and Methods of Research

The new political context that was a result of the process of reform activated not only the regional factor but also other social factors in the CPD.⁵¹ For instance, the development of social groups⁵² or 'associational' interest groups, and their functional interest articulation and lobbies⁵³ were also observed. They surely affected any decisions in their regard in the CPD. Furthermore, the political affiliations of deputies certainly exerted some influence over their decisions.⁵⁴ Both factors are normally regarded as cross-regional factors, and thus may diminish the influence of the regional factor. In this regard, the changing political and socio-economic settings since *perestroika* have had not only a positive but also a negative effect on the development of regionalism or regional interest articulation.

In order to simplify the mechanism of the interactions between centre and regions in the Russian context, the discussion will focus on the political and socio-economic environment, changing behaviour and the political and economic capacity of actors, which has clearly changed after Gorbachev. The analysis will be based on the following assumptions.

Firstly, a brief review showed that the existence of socio-economic disadvantages and 'dispersed groups'⁵⁵ supported regionalist tendencies. However, heterogeneity within a region or regional group was likely to hamper the development of regionalist tendencies.

Secondly, the better represented a region within central decision-making bodies and the more strongly regional deputies articulate regional interests, the better opportunities a region is provided with for regionalism. In particular, the functions of the CPD and the Supreme Soviet made this factor more important. However, functional or associational interest articulation of deputies was likely to reduce regionalist tendencies,⁵⁶ nonetheless functional or sectoral interests might be closely related to a particular region where a particular economic sector was dominant.

Thirdly, the more the regional leaders articulate regional interests, the more opportunities are provided for regions to attain regionalist goals. In this regard, regional leaders who are elected rather than appointed are more likely to express regionalist interests.

Fourthly, the resources and strategies of the centre and regions have also affected the development of centre-periphery relations. The development of regionalism is dependent on support from the grassroots and the successful performance of economic activities in the region, which will legitimise its rationale.

The main emphasis in this study will be upon regional groups in the CPD, since it will be more effective for regions to form a cohesive voting bloc in order to resist any moves initiated by the centre or other regions and to initiate policy that will serve the interests of the bloc. In this analysis, the SIBFE regions and their relations with the centre will mainly be discussed. Despite differences between Western and Eastern Siberia and the Russian Far East in their economic potential, there is some merit in considering the three planning regions altogether. First of all, among the inter-regional associations that appeared in the late 1980s, those of the SIBFE covered more substantial activities than other inter-regional associations. Secondly, the SIBFE regions have a good supporting context for their regionalist tendencies as the SIBFE as a whole has peculiar socio-economic features and a distinctive historical experience compared with the European part of Russia.⁵⁷ Thirdly, the SIBFE regions include units that are diverse not only in their administrative status, but also in their socio-economic features. The existence of diverse regions in turn helps in understanding regions located in the European part of Russia that share similar socio-economic features. Finally, the number of deputies from the SIBFE regions in legislative bodies provides a good basis for the statistical analysis that will constitute a main part of the discussion. In addition to regional boundaries, the main part of the analysis will cover the period between 1989 and 1993, when the first elected CPDs of the USSR and Russia were operating.

Regionalism in Russia in the late 1980s and early 1990s reemerged in the process of democratisation, which enabled us to locate regionalism in Russian in a broader comparative context. The discussion will begin with basic concepts related to centre-periphery relations, e.g. regionalism, federalism and federal principles, and consociationalism in Chapter 2. The chapter will also cover some examples of the varying equilibria between centralising and decentralising forces, and three cases of the 'federalisation' process that will show the importance of regions in central decision-making and coordination among political actors in order to achieve a stable transition.

Within the already mentioned boundaries, the background of SIBFE regionalism will be discussed in Chapter 3. In the chapter, socio-economic disparities—between the SIBFE regions and the European part of Russia, and within the SIBFE regions—and regional responses to reform will be explored. In order to identify regional disparities, regional clusters will be made on the basis of three indicators such as economic performance, living standards, and socio-economic stress. In this chapter, economic data published by *Goskomstat* and local newspapers published in the SIBFE regions will be mainly used. The newspapers were consulted in St. Petersburg in the course of my research trip to Russia.

In Chapter 4, the representation of SIBFE regions in the CPDs of the USSR and Russia and changing interest articulation patterns of SIBFE deputies will be compared with past Soviet experience. For the analysis, the composition of deputies of the CPDs (2,250 deputies of the USSR CPD and 1,068 deputies of the Russian CPD), the frequencies of speeches, and of issues mentioned in their speeches, particularly in the First CPD of the USSR, will be discussed. The necessary data for the analysis was collected from the directory of deputies and stenographic records of the CPDs.

Chapters 5 and 6 examine the influence of regional factors in the decisions made in the CPDs of the USSR and Russia respectively. In this analysis, the influence of personal (gender, generation, and ethnicity), functional ('class' and political affiliation), and regional factors in roll-call votes will be discussed, employing statistical methods such as one-way anova and logistic regression. For the analysis, 39 roll-call votes (17 for the USSR CPD and 22 for the Russian CPD) are selected. Deputies' personal details are based on directories and voting details are based on the results appearing in the stenographic records of the CPDs. Details of the methodology for statistical analyses appear in an appendix.

In Chapter 7, the economic and political resources of the centre and the regions and their strategies will be discussed in order to explore the overall influence of regional demands and the limits of the development of regionalism during the period. In this chapter, the discussion will be mainly concentrated on the diversification of regional goals, discord among regional political actors, performance of regional political 'parties' and movements, and regional policy of the centre.

Finally, the influence of regionalism on reform and its future impact on political and economic changes including federal relations will be considered in the conclusion. Despite the changes in the electoral system in 1993 and the development of 'party politics,' the regional influence on central decision-making remains an important variable in the future of postcommunist Russia.⁵⁸ The discussion will include a brief review of the development of the political situation since 1993, and four scenarios—*status quo*, the advent of a strong centre or strong regions, and a 'fourth way'—for the future development of federal relations in Russia.

¹) For instance, Bradshaw observes that the Baltic republics are clearly 'winners,' while traditional industrial regions such as the Donbass and Kuzbass are relative 'losers' in terms of the creation of joint ventures. Michael J. Bradshaw (ed.), *The Soviet Union: A New Regional Geography?* (London: Belhaven Press, 1991), pp. 11-12.

²) Christine I. Wallich, "Russia's Dilemma," in Wallich (ed.), *Russia and the Challenge of Fiscal Federalism* (Washington, D. C.: World Bank, 1994), pp. 10, 13; Vladimir Gelman and Olga Senatova, "Sub-National Politics in Russia in the Post-Communist Transition Period: A View from Moscow," *Regional & Federal Studies*, vol. 5, no. 2 (Summer 1995), pp. 220-221; and Sergei Shakhrai, "Obshchenatsional'ye interesy Rossii i problemy regional'nogo razvitiia," *Sibir': politika, ekonomika, upravlenie*, no. 1 (1995), pp. 52-63.

³) Ralph S. Clem and Peter R. Craumer, "The Geography of the April 25 (1993) Russian Referendum," *Post-Soviet Geography*, vol. 34, no. 8 (October 1993), p. 495.

⁴) During 1989-1993, regional associations were established not only in the Congress, but also in the regions. For instance, an initiative group of deputies of the USSR CPD from Siberia and the Far East held a meeting in Novosibirsk in January 1990 to work out a draft regionalist platform. *Izvestiia*, 31 January 1990, p. 2. In March 1992, Siberian deputies of the CPD of Russia held a Congress in Krasnoiarsk to adopt a regionalist resolution. *Izvestiia*, 30 March 1992, p. 2. For a brief discussion of the development of regional associations, see N. V. Petrov, S. S. Mikeyev, and L. V. Smirniagin, "Russia's Regional Associations in Decline," *Post-Soviet Geography*, vol. 34, no. 1 (January 1993), pp. 59-66.

⁵) Bradshaw has maintained that being economic winners and losers can be a basis for political cohesion. Bradshaw (ed.), *The Soviet Union*, p. 12. Sutherland and Hanson have also argued that "tension amongst regions and between regions and the centre" has become an important factor in the decision-making process in Russia. Douglas Sutherland and Philip Hanson, "Structural Change in the Economies of Russia's Regions," *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 48, no. 3 (1996), p. 367.

⁶) Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the size of the territory of the Russian Federation accounts for 1.7 million km² in which exist more than 140 ethnic groups, including 23 ethnic groups whose population size is larger than 10 million. Within the territory, population density varies from 3 people per square kilometre in the northern regions to 325 people per square kilometre in Moscow oblast in 1995. The temperature varies from 0 to -5°C in the western part of the territory to -65 to -70°C in northern Siberia in January. Goskomstat Rossii, *Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik 1996: statisticheskii sbornik* (Moscow: Goskomstat, 1996), pp. 11, 16-21, 45.

⁷) Schiffer suggests that only three of eight goals of Soviet regional policy are related with equity category: evenly distributed economic activity throughout the country, equalised economic development between republics and regions which provides all citizen of the USSR with comparable living standards, and evenly distribution of production which eliminates socio-economic differences between urban and rural areas. Jonathan R. Schiffer, *Soviet Regional Economic Policy: The East-West Debate over Pacific Siberian Development* (London: Macmillan, 1989), pp. 5-7.

⁸) Siberian regionalists depicted Siberia as a colony in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. N. M. Iadrintsev', *Sibir' kak' koloniia: v' geographicheskoi, etnograficheskoi i istoricheskoi otnoshenii* (S. Peterburg': Izdanie I. M. Sibiriakova, 1892); and A. Kaufman', "Kolonizatsiia sibiri v' eia nastoiashchem' i budushchem'," *Sibirskie voprosy*, no. 1 (1905), pp. 171-201. Similar views again appeared after *perestroika*. For instance, in an interview with *Sibirskaiia gazeta*, Perov, leader of Siberian Independent Party, complained about the delayed central assistance to normalise socio-economic situation in Siberia, denouncing the central policy as neo-colonialisation of Siberia. Boris Perov, "Sibirskaiia ekonomika golosuet za sibirskuiu nezavisimost'," *Sibirskaiia gazeta*, no. 1 (January 1993), p. 4. Dmitrieva has also noted that the regional policy of the Soviet Union can be called "internal colonialism" when it was blamed for "neglecting the social and cultural needs of regions in favour of central sectoral ministry priorities." Oksana Dmitrieva, *Regional Development: The USSR and After* (London: UCL Press, 1996), p. 23.

⁹) Discussing the memoranda on peasant liberation questions worked out by the various authors, Mavor maintained that the differences in the opinions appeared in the memoranda were "due partly, no doubt, to the degree of intelligence or of generosity of the writers, but chiefly to variations in the density of population, in the fertility of soil, in the indebtedness of the landowners, and in the amount of available capital." After briefly reviewing the different attitudes of the regions—the Central Black Soil regions, non-Black Soil regions, prairie lands, and southern-western *gubernia*—towards the liberation question, he concluded that "a uniform method of dealing with the bondage question would not be a just method," since the attitude of the landowners varied with economic conditions of the regions. James Mavor, *An Economic History of Russia* (New York: Dutton, 1914), pp. 375-379. For a further discussion of the

different drafts of the Provincial Gentry Committees on the liberation programmes, see Terence Emmons, *The Russian Landed Gentry and the Peasant Emancipation of 1861* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), Chapters 4 and 5.

¹⁰) Discussing the economic situation in Siberia, Poppe maintained that "clearly less marked class distinctions" in Siberia than other parts of Russian Empire could be a reason for staggering the development of a Social-Democratic Movement in Siberia. He also argued that the abolition of free trade by Bolsheviks and fixed prices for grain were against the interests of the wealthy peasants, by citing Riabikov's views. Nikolaus Poppe, "The Economic and Cultural Development of Siberia," in George Katkov, Erwin Oberlander, Nikolaus Poppe and George Von Rauch (eds.), *Russia Enters the Twentieth Century* (London: Methuen, 1973), p. 151.

¹¹) For a further discussion, see Edward Hallett Carr, *Socialism in One Country 1924-26*, vol. 2 (London: Macmillan, 1959), pp. 273-303; and James Hughes, *Stalin, Siberia and the Crisis of the New Economic Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 26-34.

¹²) During his visit to Siberia in January 1928, Stalin put the blame on the Party organisations in the region which were sympathetic to kulaks (in the category, perhaps moderately wealthy peasants in Siberia could be included) for the unsatisfactory grain procurement. I. V. Stalin, "O khlevozagotovkakh i perspektivakh razvitiia sel'skogo khoziaistva: iz vystuplenii v razlichnykh raionakh Sibiri v ianvare 1928g.," in *Sochineniia*, vol. 11 (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1949), pp. 3-4. In his address to all Party organisations after his visit to Siberia, he emphasised the need to put to an end to "distortions of the Party line in the practical work in the countryside," which obviously was a warning to regionalisation of grain procurement and de-kulakisation. Stalin, "Pervye itogi zagotovitel'noi kampanii i dal'neishie zadachi partii: ko vsem organizatsiiam VKP(b)," in *ibid.*, p. 15. For more details, see J. R. Hughes, "The Irkutsk Affairs: Stalin, Siberian Politics and the End," *Soviet Studies*, vol. XLI, no. 2 (April 1989), pp. 228-253.

¹³) Although it is difficult to figure out the influence of the deviant development pattern in Siberia during the NEP period on Stalinist industrialisation and collectivisation, it is nonetheless true that Stalin's Siberian visit became a turning point. Hughes, *Stalin, Siberia and the Crisis of the New Economic Policy*, p. 210. However, some Western scholars emphasised the power struggle at the centre as a main reason for the change. For instance, Nove argued that Stalin's collectivisation was connected with his "plotting to isolate and defeat the Bukharin-Rykov group." Alec Nove, "The Soviet Industrial Reorganisation," in Abraham Brumberg (ed.), *Russia Under Khrushchev: An Anthology from Problems of Communism* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 189. For more details on the arguments, see Alec Nove, *Was Stalin Really Necessary?: Some Problems of Soviet Political Economy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1964).

¹⁴) Discussing Khrushchev's virgin land campaign, McCauley maintained that Khrushchev knew that managers of production units "very often made the difference." Martin McCauley, *Khrushchev and the Development of Soviet Agriculture: The Virgin Land Programme 1953-1964* (London: Macmillan, 1976), pp. 59, 107.

¹⁵) In particular, republic authorities were allowed to control their *sovnarkhoz*, nonetheless they were under the control of the centre. For instance, the question of number of *sovnarkhozy* that were to be created in a republic was left to the republic. Nove, "The Soviet Industrial Reorganisation," p. 193. Nove's further comments on the disadvantages of the *sovnarkhoz* system clearly shows that a degree of regionalist tendencies appeared. He asserted that any choice between alternatives would be "guided by the economic interests of its own regions," since "any territorial authorities must feel primary responsibility for enterprises," and therefore *sovnarkhoz* authorities were "driven towards *mestnichestvo* by the planning system itself." Ibid., pp. 196-197. Willerton has also asserted that *sovnarkhoz* reform resulted in devolution of some decision-making to actors in the periphery, and who often ignored the goals of the centre. John P. Willerton, Jr., "Evolving Centre-Periphery Relations in the Soviet Polity," *Problems of Communism*, vol. XXXVIII, no. 6 (November-December 1989), p. 72. A similar argument can be found in George W. Breslauer, "Khrushchev Reconsidered," in Stephen F. Cohen, Alexander Rabinowitch and Robert Sharlet, *The Soviet Union Since Stalin* (London: Macmillan, 1980), pp. 50-70.

¹⁶) For a more detailed discussion, see Gordon Skilling, "Interest Group and Communist Politics Revisited," *World Politics*, vol. XXXVI, no. 1 (October 1983), pp. 1-27; Susan Gross Solomon, *Pluralism in the Soviet Union* (London: Macmillan, 1983); H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths (eds.), *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1971); and Gordon Skilling, "Interest Groups and Communist Politics," *World Politics*, vol. 18, no. 1 (April 1966), pp. 435-451. Hough has maintained that bureaucratic organisations might represent the diverse interests of their constituency and could serve as "a communication channel" for interest articulation. Jerry F. Hough, *The Soviet Union and Social Science Theory* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977), pp. 105-106. Löwenhardt has also asserted that individuals, institutions, and groups influenced the decision-making process and that there were some policy coalitions among them. John Löwenhardt, *Decision-Making in Soviet Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1981), pp. 184-185.

¹⁷) McAuley, for instance, noted five features of the Soviet system which showed clear differences from a liberal-democratic political process: the absence of regular elections to control policy makers; no legalised active opposition which was able to criticise and defeat government proposals; absence of freedom of speech; the absence of autonomous sectors to exert pressure and to be bargained with; and the absence of organised opposition or pressure for change after the adoption of a decision. Mary McAuley, *Politics and the Soviet Union: An Introductory Analysis* (London: Penguin Books, 1977), pp. 151-152.

¹⁸) Nove noted that central planners "do not in fact take the bulk of detailed decisions," and thus there occurred "inescapable delegation (devolution, decentralisation)," a process he described as "central pluralism." See Alec Nove, *The Soviet Economic System* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1977), p. 60.

¹⁹) Discussing the relations between Moscow and union republics, Hodnett insisted that local nationals had greater access to the levers of state power under the Soviet federal system. Grey Hodnett, "The Debate over Soviet Federalism," *Soviet Studies*, vol. 18, no. 4 (April 1967), p. 458; and Grey Hodnett, *Leadership in the Soviet National Republics* (Oakville, Ontario: Mosaic Press, 1978), pp. 101-103, 377-378. Rakowska-Harmstone also maintained that centre-periphery relations had reflected three crucial factors: the indigenisation of republic leaders, a federal system which enabled indigenous republic

leaders to pursue the interests of those minority groups, and the hegemony of the Russian majority together with a growing national chauvinism manifested by them vis-à-vis the national minorities. Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "The Dialectics of Nationalism in the USSR," *Problems of Communism*, vol. XXIII, no. 3 (May-June 1974), p. 10. Gleason has also summarised the demands of republican leaders for decentralisation as 'bureaucratic nationalism.' Gregory Gleason, *Federalism and Nationalism: The Struggle for Republican Rights in the USSR* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 81-104.

²⁰) Moses noted that Brezhnev's cadre policy contributed the development of regionalism. He asserted that a regional leader whose career was built up in the same region would be "more inclined to relate their promotion to their active defence of narrow regional concerns." He also observed that "the Brezhnev leadership did little to discourage regionalism in ethnic or even non-ethnic provinces when increasing numbers of regional first secretaries were 'deliberately' selected from 'the locals' inside the same regions." Joel C. Moses, "Regionalism in Soviet Politics: Continuity as a Source of Change, 1953-1982," *Soviet Studies*, vol. XXXVII, no. 2 (April 1985), p. 187. For more details on Brezhnev's cadre policy, see Robert E. Blackwell, Jr., "Cadres Policy in the Brezhnev Era," *Problems of Communism*, vol. XXVIII, no. 2 (March-April 1979), pp. 29-42; T. H. Rigby, "The Soviet Regional Leadership: The Brezhnev Generation," *Slavic Review*, vol. 37, no. 1 (March 1978), pp. 1-24; and Joel C. Moses, *Regional Party Leadership and Policy-Making in the USSR* (New York: Praeger, 1974).

²¹) For instance, Biddulph concluded that interest articulation by regional leaders exerted "a modest" influence on the revision of the Guideline of the Party for the coming Five-Year Plan. Howard L. Biddulph, "Local Interest Articulation at CPSU Congresses," *World Politics*, vol. XXXVI, no. 1 (October 1983), pp. 28-52. For a further discussion of regional leaders' demand articulation patterns, see George W. Breslauer, "Provincial Party Leaders' Demand Articulation and the Nature of Centre-Periphery Relations in the USSR," *Slavic Review*, vol. 45, no. 4 (Winter 1986), pp. 650-672; George W. Breslauer, "Is There a Generation Gap in the Soviet Political Establishment?: Demand Articulation by RSFSR Provincial Party First Secretaries," *Soviet Studies*, vol. XXXVI, no. 1 (January 1984), pp. 1-25; and Mark R. Beissinger, "In Search of Generations in Soviet Politics," *World Politics*, vol. XXXVIII, no. 2 (January 1986), pp. 288-314. For relations between Moscow and union republics, see Gleason, *Federalism and Nationalism*; Donna Bahry, *Outside Moscow: Power, Politics, and Budgetary Policy in the Soviet Republics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); and Jan Åke Dellenbrant, *The Soviet Regional Dilemma: Planning, People, and Natural Resources* (Armonk, N. Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1986).

²²) Ross, for instance, places his main emphasis upon the periphery rather than the centre, and on the implementation rather than on the input aspects. He argues that the 'pluralist school' put too much emphasis on the input from interest groups, while in the Soviet Union these groups were "far more likely to mould and adapt policies in the implementation stage." Cameron Ross, *Local Government in the Soviet Union: Problems of Implementation and Control* (London & Sydney: Croom Helm, 1987), pp. 3, 204-205.

²³) However, as Miller suggested, the possibility of regional interest articulation remained open even in the patron-client model. Though 'sectoral compartmentalisation' at the centre made it difficult for regional lobbies to exert influence on central policies, he observed that regional lobbies could have influence when a region got its men into a senior position in the centre, or when a region was dominated

by a particular economic branch. John H. Miller, "Putting Clients in Place: The Role of Patronage in Cooption into Soviet Leadership," in Archie Brown (ed.), *Political Leadership in the Soviet Union* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), pp. 85-86 (footnote 11). For more about patron-client model, see John P. Willerton, *Patronage and Politics in the USSR* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); and T. H. Rigby and Bohdan Harasymiw (eds.), *Leadership Selection and Patron-Client Relations in the USSR and Yugoslavia* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1983).

²⁴) Breslauer regarded the Soviet system as "welfare-state authoritarianism," and argued that 'institutional pluralism' ignored the socio-economic basis of the Soviet regime, only dealing with the political dimension of changes since Stalin. George W. Breslauer, "On the Adaptability of Soviet Welfare-State Administration," in Karl Ryavec (ed.), *Soviet Society and the Communist Party* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1978), pp. 3-5. Bialer also argued that participation increased during the Brezhnev period. He suggested the distinction between 'high' and 'low politics,' maintaining that "low politics involves a very high proportion of Soviet citizenry," and "constitutes the very substance of the Soviet system of political participation." Seweryn Bialer, *Stalin's Successors: Leadership, Stability, and Change in the Soviet Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 165-167.

²⁵) Mark O. Rousseau and Raphael Zariski, *Regionalism and Regional Development in Comparative Perspective* (New York: Praeger, 1987), pp. 9-12, 18-22.

²⁶) Mény and Wright listed eleven factors that have exerted influence on the development of centre-periphery relations in the experience of Western countries: the cleavage structure of the country, the weight of the past, the impact of the recent past, the constitutional arrangement, the legal tradition, the prevailing political environment, and the nature of the economic system (environmental factors); the size, organisation and recruitment of the administration, and the nature of the political elite (actors); the forces of resistance to periphery demands, and the resources at the disposal of the periphery in bargaining with the centre (the capability of actors). Yves Mény and Vincent Wright (eds.), *Centre-Periphery Relations in Western Europe* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1985), p. 2.

²⁷) A crisis of identity involves "the development of a sense of membership in a political community." A crisis of legitimacy arises when "a sense of obligation towards the political system and its institution" is diminishing. A crisis of penetration is related to central government's control over its territory. A crisis of participation results in "the question of extending the power to broader masses of the population," and a crisis of distribution leads to "demands for increased material benefits." Rousseau and Zariski observed that these crises are inter-related and that the inter-relationships between them need to be examined in each political system, as there is "apparently no uniform rule" as to the nature of these relationships. Rousseau and Zariski, *Regionalism and Regional Devolution in Comparative Perspective*, p. 78.

²⁸) Authority (or legal authority) means "a mandatory rights to carry out functions or services." Monetary (or financial) resources include funds raised from taxes, service charges, and borrowings. Political legitimacy is involved with "access to public decision-making structures or the right to build public support." Informational resources mean the possession of data and control over the process of collecting and disseminating data. And organisational resources are mainly concerned with the possession

of people, skills, lands and buildings, material equipment, hence, the ability to act directly. R. A. W. Rhodes, "Intergovernmental Relations in the United Kingdom," in Mény and Wright (eds.), *Centre-Periphery Relations in Western Europe*, p. 42.

²⁹) He also maintained that some strategies—bureaucratic, factorising, consultation, incorporation, and incentives—were normally employed by the central government, but others—confrontation, upward penetration, and avoidance—by the local government, because of their nature. *Ibid.*, pp. 52-53.

³⁰) For a discussion of Soviet Federalism, see Stephan Kux, "Soviet Federalism," *Problems of Communism*, vol. XXXIX, no. 2 (March-April 1990), pp. 1-20; Stephan Kux, *Soviet Federalism: A Comparative Perspective* (New York: Institute of East-West Security Studies, 1990); and John Löwenhardt, "Soviet-Russian Federalism in Comparative Perspective," in Takayuki Ito and Shinichiro Tabata (eds.), *Between Disintegration and Reintegration: Former Socialist Countries and the World since 1989* (Sapporo: Slavic Research Centre, Hokkaido University, 1994), pp. 91-125.

³¹) For the principles of Soviet regional policy, see N. Nekrasov, *The Territorial Organisation of Soviet Economy* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974); Denis J. B. Shaw, *Planning in the Soviet Union* (London: Croom Helm, 1981); I. S. Koropeskyj and G. Schroeder (eds.), *Economics of Soviet Regions* (New York: Praeger, 1981); Hans-Jürgen Wagener, "Rules of Location and the Concept of Rationality: the Case of the USSR," in V. N. Bandera and Zinowij Lew Melnyk (eds.), *The Soviet Economy in Regional Perspective* (New York: Praeger, 1973), pp. 63-103; Schiffer, *Soviet Regional Economic Policy*, pp. 3-14; and Dellenbrant, *The Soviet Regional Dilemma*, pp. 10-22, 35-61. For the discussion of regional inequality, see Dmitrieva, *Regional Development*, pp. 65-97; and Ronald D. Liebowitz, "Spatial Inequality under Gorbachev," in Bradshaw (ed.) *The Soviet Union*, pp. 17-37.

³²) Pavel Minakir, *The Russian Far East: An Economic Survey* (Khabarovsk: RIOTIP, 1996), p. 171.

³³) Sarah Ashwin, "'There's No Joy Any More': The Experience of Reform in a Kuzbass Mining Settlement," *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 47, no. 8 (1995), pp. 1374-1375.

³⁴) Gail W. Lapidus and Edward W. Walker, "Nationalism, Regionalism, and Federalism: Centre-Periphery Relations in Post-Communist Russia," in Lapidus (ed.), *The New Russia: Troubled Transformation* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), p. 80. For a further discussion of legitimacy crises and the evolution of the legitimacy of reform, see Mary Buckley, *Redefining Russian Society and Polity* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993); and James R. Miller and Sharon L. Wolchik (eds.), *The Social Legacy of Communism* (New York: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994).

³⁵) White and his colleagues noted that despite the attempts to return to old system by combining the executive and legislative power, Soviet control over executive power increased. Stephen White, Graeme Gill, and Darrell Slider, *The Politics of Transition: Shaping a Post-Soviet Future* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 108-110.

³⁶) Fish argued that new independent associations helped to expose the illegitimacy, corruption, and ineffectiveness of the current system in early 1990s, although these 'civil movements' were still weak

and lacked legal guarantees. Stephen Fish, "The Emergency of Independent Associations and the Transformation of Russian Political Society," *The Journal of Communist Studies*, vol. 7, no. 3 (September 1991), p. 329. For his further discussion, see Stephen Fish, *Democracy From Scratch: Opposition and Regime in the New Russian Revolution* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1995). Kubicek also argued the influence of the 'independent associations' on policy-making in Russia in a corporatist approach. Discussing the changing role of the trade union, he maintained that several unions had managed to obtain their demands, particularly short term interests such as wage increase, with the threats of strike. Paul Kubicek, "Variations on a Corporatist Theme: Interest Associations in Post-Soviet Ukraine and Russia," *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 48, no. 1 (January 1996), p. 38.

³⁷) For instance, For instance, the Second Congress introduced private land ownership, but failed to include the right to sell the lots of land in the face of opposition mainly from deputies from rural areas. The question was not settled until December 1992 when the Seventh Congress recognised the right to sell land that had been paid for in the process of privatisation. For a brief discussion of land reform during 1990-1993, see Sheila Marnie, "The Unsolved Question of Land Reform in Russia," *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol. 2, no. 7 (12 February 1993), pp. 35-37; and Stephen K. Wegren, "The Conduct and Impact of Land Reform in Russia," in Wegren (ed.), *Land Reform in the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe* (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 3-34. Hanson argued that regional political elites supported regionalist interests in order to gain popular support in elections, which developed into a profound conflict with central policy objectives. Philip Hanson, *Regions, Local Power and Economic Change in Russia* (London: Chatham House, 1994), p. 24.

³⁸) For a discussion of constitutional debate during 1990-1993, see Robert J. Osborn, "Russia: Federalism, Regionalism, and Nationality Claims," in George Ginsburgs, Alvin Z. Rubinstein, and Oles M. Smolansky (eds.), *Russia and America: From Rivalry to Reconciliation* (London: M. E. Sharpe, 1993), pp. 65-71.

³⁹) For instance, in his research on the regionalisation of reform in two kraises of the Russian Federation, Altai and Primorskii, Kirkow concluded that the regional differentiation of reforms was "not necessarily determined by the centre any more." Peter Kirkow, *Russia's Provinces: Authoritarian Transformation versus Local Autonomy?* (London: Macmillan, 1998), pp. 170-172. Ickes and his colleagues have also argued that regional regulatory environments at the local level hampered the development of market relations. Barry W. Ickes, Peter Murrell, and Randi Ryterman, "End of the Tunnel? The Effects of Financial Stabilisation in Russia," *Post-Soviet Affairs*, vol. 13, no. 2 (April-June 1997), p. 123. For a further discussion, see Timothy Colton, Robert Legvold, George Breslauer, Jack Matlock, Herbert Levine and Victor Winston, "Five Years After the Collapse of the Soviet Union," *Post-Soviet Affairs*, vol. 13, no. 1 (January-March 1997), pp. 1-18; and Michael J. Bradshaw and Philip Hanson, "Understanding Regional Patterns of Economic Change in Russia: An Introduction," *Communist Economies & Economic Transition*, vol. 10, no. 3 (1998), pp. 285-304.

⁴⁰) For instance, Slider examined the different strategies of regional patterns of privatisation of enterprises. He argued that the first stage of privatisation in the Russian Federation demonstrated local and regional diversions in which local elites were re-establishing their "control over resources through the creation of financial-industrial groups." Darrell Slider, "Privatisation in Russia's Region," *Post-Soviet*

Affairs, vol. 10, no. 4 (October-December 1994), pp. 394-395. In their joint report, the Russian Academy of Sciences and Reform International Foundation observed that the policy of macro-stabilisation had proved a failure, and that market relations in Russia had no chance of success without a clearly co-ordinating functioning of federal relations. Russian Academy of Sciences and Reform International Foundation, *On the Strategy of Socio-economic Reform in Russia (Joint Report)* (Moscow: Russian Academy of Sciences and Reform International Foundation, 1992), pp. 4, 19.

⁴¹) For instance, the governors of Kemerovo oblast and Krasnoiarsk krai placed a restriction upon food exports outside their regions. *Moscow Times*, 12 December 1998 (internet service version). Despite the warnings of Ilia Iuzhanov, Federal Anti-Monopoly Minister in July 1999, similar measures were introduced in Lipetsk and Orenburg. *Izvestiia*, 5 August 1999 and Interfax, 9 August 1999, in *RFE/RL Newslines*, vol. 3, no. 24, part I (11 August 1999).

⁴²) Ickes, Murrell, and Ryterman, "End of the Tunnel?" *Post-Soviet Affairs*, vol. 13, no. 2 (April-June 1997), p. 123; and Kathryn Hendley, Barry W. Ickes, Peter Murrell, and Randi Ryterman, "Observations on the Use of Law by Russian Enterprises," *Post-Soviet Affairs*, vol. 13, no. 1 (January-March 1997), pp. 19-41.

⁴³) Robert J. Kaiser, *The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 348-349.

⁴⁴) Urban has observed that well organised popular fronts in the Baltic Republics had made successful electoral campaigns in 1989, raising "relatively clear issue of national identity, self-rule and economic autonomy." Michael E. Urban, *More Power to the Soviets: The Democratic Revolution in the USSR* (Vermont: Edward Elgar, 1990), pp. 109-110. For independent political movements during the early stage of transition, see Geoffrey Hosking, Jonathan Aves, and Peter J. S. Duncan, *The Road to Post-Communism: Independent Political Movements in the Soviet Union, 1985-1991* (London: Pinter, 1992).

⁴⁵) For instance, Iashin observed that a 'hard federation' would be desirable, although a 'soft (weak) federation' was the most probable for Russia. Evgenii Iashin, "Detsentralizatsiia," *Rossia*, vol. 51 (December 1992), pp. 14-15.

⁴⁶) The political drive of the strong centre under a strong president was already experienced when the president dissolved the CPD in September 1993. In this regard, Hahn maintained that main trend of Russian politics in 1990s had seen "steady tendencies towards unlimited executive rule," and that "the new political institutions could be marginalised much as they had been under the old Soviet system." Jeffrey W. Hahn, "Studying the Russian Experience: Lessons for Legislative Studies and for Russia," in Hahn (ed.), *Democratisation in Russia: The Development of Legislative Institutions* (London: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), pp. 258-259. Andrews and Stoner-Weiss have also argued that if the implications of a regionalist phenomenon are far reaching and potentially troubling for political stability, the situation may lead Moscow to the use of force. Josephine Andrews and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, "Regionalism and Reform in Provincial Russia," *Post-Soviet Affairs*, vol. 11, no.4 (October-December 1995), p. 405. Matlock has also doubted that the republics can continue to enjoy the privileges that other units do not have in the long run. Colton, et al., "Five Years After the Collapse of the Soviet Union," p. 13. Dmitrieva has maintained that

institutions, which are "much stronger than those of administrative command methods in their peacetime version," may be needed in order to break the continuity of spatial development. Dmitrieva, *Regional Development*, p. 189. In his speech at the opening meeting of the heads of the executive bodies of republics, kraia, and oblasts, Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin also underlined that no reforms were feasible without a "strong regional policy." *Rossiiskie vesti*, 16 February 1993, p. 1.

⁴⁷) An analysis by Slider and colleagues of the 1993 election showed the regional patterns of support for the parties, whose attitudes towards centre-periphery relations and economic reform were categorised into four groups: economic liberalism and strong region, economic liberalism and strong centre, strong control over the economy and strong centre, and strong control over economy and strong regions. Their analysis showed that the idea of a 'strong centre' was supported in 49 regions, nonetheless more than half of the whole regions were located on the borderline of a strong centre and strong regions. Darrell Slider, Vladimir Gimpel'son and Sergei Chugrov, "Political Tendencies in Russia's Regions: Evidence from 1993 Parliamentary Elections," *Slavic Review*, vol. 53, no. 3 (Fall 1994), pp. 725-729. For details of the attitudes of voters towards those values, see Matthew Wyman, Stephen White, Bill Miller, and Paul Heywood, "Public Opinion, Parties, and Voters in December 1993 Russian Elections," *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 47, no. 4 (June 1995), pp. 591-614.

⁴⁸) Studies of the voting patterns of the grassroots showed that they tended to be closely correlated with the socio-economic situation. Clem and Craumer showed that "successful areas" tended to support Eltsin in the referendum of March 1993. Clem and Craumer, "The Geography of the April 25 (1993) Russian Referendum," pp. 492-493. They also used similar categories to analyse the election and constitutional referendum of December 1993, showing similar evidence to the April 1993 referendum. Ralph S. Clem and Peter R. Craumer, "The Politics of Russia's Regions: A Geographical Analysis of the Russian Election and Constitutional Plebiscite of December 1993," *Post-Soviet Geography*, vol. 36, no. 2 (February 1995), pp. 83-84.

⁴⁹) Analysing the 1996 presidential election, White, Rose and McAllister asserted that Eltsin's victory over Gennadii Ziuganov reflected the success of the Eltsin campaign which created the "fear of a Communist victory by recalling evils of the past." Stephen White, Richard Rose, and Ian McAllister, *How Russia Votes* (Chatham, N. J.: Chatham House Publishers, 1997), p. 266. Wyman has also observed that the 1996 presidential election indicated "most are unwilling to attempt to return to the past." Matthew Wyman, "Elections and Voting Behaviour," in Stephen White, Alex Pravda, and Zvi Gitelman (eds.), *Developments in Russian Politics 4* (London: Macmillan, 1997), p. 128.

⁵⁰) John W. Slocum, *Disintegration and Consolidation: National Separatism and the Evolution of Centre-Periphery Relations in the Russian Federation* (Cornell University Peace Studies Programme Occasional Paper), no. 19 (July 1995), p. 31.

⁵¹) Chiesa discussed the voting patterns of deputies in the CPD of the USSR on the basis of their social ('class') and regional backgrounds and political affiliations, but at the union republic level. Giulietto Chiesa, *Transition to Democracy: Political Change in the Soviet Union, 1987-1991* (Hanover and London: University Press of New England, 1993).

⁵²) For instance, Sakwa maintained that "the social and occupational structure of the Congress" was the key factor in voting patterns. Richard Sakwa, *Russian Politics and Society* (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 61.

⁵³) Neshchadin and his colleagues noted emerging lobbies in Russia in two forms: regional and industrial corporate. They also argued that the goals and methods of both lobbyists largely coincided since the source of funds was virtually the same. A. Neshchadin, A. Blokhin, V. Vereshchagin, O. Grigoriev, L. Ionin, V. Kashin, and M. Maliutin, *Lobbyism in Russia: It's Been a Long Way* (Moscow: Infomart, 1995), p. 34. For more on sectoral lobbies in Russia, see Don Van Atta, "The Second Congress of the Russian Agrarian Union," *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol. 2, no. 31 (30 July 1993), pp. 42-49; Don Van Atta, "The USSR as a 'Weak State': Agrarian Origins of Resistance to Perestroika," *World Politics*, vol. 42, no. 1 (October 1989), pp. 129-149; Stephen Fortescue, "Organisation in Russian Industry: Beyond Decentralisation," *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol. 2, no. 50 (17 December 1993), pp. 35-39; Elizabeth Teague, "Russia's Industrial Lobby Takes the Opposition," *RFE/RF Research Report*, vol. 1, no. 32 (14 August 1992), pp. 1-6; and Philip Hanson and Elizabeth Teague, "The Industrialists and Russian Economic Reform," *RFE/RF Research Report*, vol. 1, no. 19 (8 May 1992), pp. 1-7.

⁵⁴) David Lane and Cameron Ross, "The Changing Composition and Structure of the Political Elites," in David Lane (ed.), *Russia in Transition: Politics, Privatisation, and Inequality* (London: Longman, 1995), pp. 62-63. For a more detailed analysis, see Alexander Sobyenin, "The Current Crisis," in Thomas F. Remington (ed.), *Parliaments in Transition: The New Legislative Politics in the Former USSR and Eastern Europe* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 183-215.

⁵⁵) Duchacek defines 'dispersed groups' as a minority group in terms of linguistic, racial, ethnic, or religious communities dispersed over territories organised and dominated by other groups, which are not assimilated but maintain a separate identity. Ivo D. Duchacek, *Comparative Federalism: The Territorial Dimension of Politics* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), p. 51.

⁵⁶) Rousseau and Zariski, *Regionalism and Regional Devolution in Comparative Perspective*, p. 25. See also, Peter C. Ordeshook, "Russia's Party System: Is Russian Federalism Viable?" *Post-Soviet Affairs*, vol. 12, no. 3 (July-September 1996), pp. 195-217.

⁵⁷) When discussing regional disparities in the former Soviet Union, three macroeconomic regions are often mentioned: Siberia (including the Russian Far East), Central Asia, and other European parts of the Union. Bialer, *Stalin's Successors*, p. 291; and Dellenbrant, *The Soviet Regional Dilemma*, p. 14. After the demise of the Soviet Union, disparities between the SIBFE regions and the European part of Russia seems to be the most distinctive.

⁵⁸) Haspel has also observed that most of the electoral organisations were "temporary alliances" and served deputies' policy needs. Moshe Haspel, "Should Party in the Parliament Be Weak or Strong?: The Rules Debate in the Russian State Duma," in John Löwenhardt (ed.), *Party Politics in Post-Communist Russia* (London: Frank Cass, 1996), p. 197. Stoner-Weiss has also noted that institutional settings such as political parties, the Duma and the Federal Council, and the Constitutional Court are yet to be developed in order to cope with the regional influence. Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, "Central Weakness and

Provincial Autonomy: Observations on the Devolution Process in Russia," *Post-Soviet Affairs*, vol. 15, no. 1 (January-March 1999), pp. 97-103.

CHAPTER II

Dynamics of Centre-Periphery Relations

The prime concern of this chapter is to formulate a framework—setting out factors that affected the structure of centre-periphery relations and interactions of factors in the evolution of such relations—for the discussion of centre-periphery relations in Russia in a broader context. Until recently, the Soviet case has seldom been discussed in the context of comparative centre-periphery relations, partly because of its peculiarity—i.e. extreme centrist features and the gap between constitutional/legal arrangements and practices—and partly because of limited data availability. However, the current trends of federalism which Elazar and Agranoff describes “post-modern” federalism¹ and the democratisation process in Russia, with all its shortcomings, enable us to discuss federal relations in Russia in a broader comparative viewpoint.²

In this chapter, basic concepts such as regionalism, federalism, centralisation and decentralisation/non-centralisation will be discussed. The discussion will be followed by a general overview of various forms of centre-periphery relations—for instance, from unitary to federal system, though it is much more complicated than this simple comparison—and factors that affected the development of centre-periphery relations. In line with the discussion, the development of centre-periphery relations in the context of the Soviet Union and Russia will also be explored.

The discussion in this chapter shows three main features in the evolution of centre-periphery relations within a comparative context. Firstly, the distinctiveness of regions in different socio-economic settings has led to a variety of centre-periphery relations.³ A general review of comparative centre-periphery relations suggests that state structures have been challenged by the interaction between regional distinctiveness and changes in socio-economic and political circumstances. Accordingly, centre-periphery relations have evolved not only in the structures but also in practices, producing various forms in various countries. In particular, uneven

processes of nation-state building and democratisation have contributed to this increasing variety.

Secondly, a structure or a set of institutions is a necessary, but not a sufficient factor in the establishment of 'genuine' federal relations as past Soviet federal experience suggests. Despite diversities in their structural features, differences between unitary and federal systems in this respect have become less clear, because of growing interdependency between central and regional authorities in both systems. Furthermore, centre-periphery relations appear to be more dependent on the corresponding federal arrangements or practices employing federal principles—e.g. the establishment of Scottish and Welsh parliaments in the United Kingdom—than on the formal framework itself. In particular, as in the Spanish model of federal construction, a federation "in process" or "incomplete" federation can also be effective means of solving centre-periphery conflicts, as well as maintaining national unity.⁴

Finally, a mechanism for building consensus on the question of centre-periphery relations appears to be essential in the establishment of or transition to a federal system whether it is "genuine" or "incomplete." As in the Belgian case, which will be discussed in the following, in what way federal relations have been established appears to be more important in the stable evolution of centre-periphery relations than the formal content of federal relations—e.g. demarcation of powers between central and provincial authorities—at a particular time.

II. 1. Basic Concepts Revisited

In the contemporary literature, three factors are regarded as key components of a state: territory, population, and sovereignty. As these key components suggest, territorial integrity is a basic requirement not only in the state-building process, but also in the evolution of state structures. Threats to the territorial integrity of a country come from inside (e.g. separatism as in the collapse of the Soviet Union), as well as from outside (e.g. invasions and conquest). The former is more likely when a country is divided by smaller territories which differ from each other in their historical backgrounds and traditions, ethno-national composition, and socio-economic conditions. However, little attention was paid to the regional level until nationalism emerged and the nation-state building process started.

In the development of the modern state, the term region and its implications for the evolution of a state system have been contested. For instance, theorists of modernisation argued that functional features would replace territorial ones in the modernisation and industrialisation process.⁵ However, even after nation-state building, regional distinctiveness played a major role in the establishment and evolution of state structures.⁶ In fact, compromises between centralising and decentralising/non-centralising forces in which regional factors were involved have increased diversities in state structures.

In line with changes in the state structures, the term region or other terms directly or indirectly related to centre-periphery relations have also evolved. For instance, the term region is now understood to cover not only a geographic area in a state, but also a group of states in the global context. The content of the term may also vary depending on the context in which it is discussed, and thus needs to be explored.

II. 1 (1) A Region and Regionalism

According to Vance, a region is “a homogenous area with physical and cultural characteristics distinct from those of neighbouring areas.” As a part of national domain, a region is “sufficiently unified to have a consciousness of its customs and ideals, and thus possesses a sense of identity distinct from the rest of the country.”⁷ His definition indicates three key factors in defining the term region: a territorial boundary, contents or distinctiveness, and identity.

The central defining characteristics of a region is of course a physical space. However, Vance’s definition of the term ‘area’ is rather ambiguous, as the term ‘region’ is often used in various contexts. In his discussion of regionalism, Keating categorises the term territory into six spatial levels: the global, the continental, the state, the regional, the local, urban and municipal, and the neighbourhood.⁸ In this discussion, the term region indicates the level of territory between state and local.

However, territory is more than physical space itself. It is rather a broad concept of social entity, a place constituted by “social, economic and political construction” and “a sense of identity.”⁹ The content or distinctiveness of a region is also dependent on the context in which the term is used. Although Vance mentions physical and cultural characteristics, identifying a region is often ambiguous because of the criteria involved in the process. For instance, we may employ geographical,

cultural (e.g. language), ethnic, administrative, and economic (e.g. common production patterns and market linkages) criteria. Often a region identified in accordance with various of these criteria may not be identical.

As a social entity, regional distinctiveness in terms of any of these criteria may not have political meaning without the identity through which people in the region are mobilised. In analysing regional identity and regional mobilisation, three elements are noteworthy: cognitive, affective and instrumental ones.¹⁰ The cognitive element is related to knowledge of characteristics of regions such as geographic features, history and political disposition that may be different from other regions. The affective one is how people feel about the region that becomes the basis of "common identity and solidarity." This element links the cognitive element to the instrumental element that forms a basis of "mobilisation and collective action in pursuit of social, economic and political goals."¹¹

The term regionalism represents "the regional idea in action as an ideology, as a social movement, or as the theoretical basis for regional planning; it is also applied to the scientific task of delimiting and analysing regions as entities lacking formal boundaries."¹² The term regionalism differs from nationalism in that the latter recognise a high national unity and upper or national interests transcending the attachment to the local region. It also differs from localism as the latter is involved with a lower level of territorial unit when we accept Keating's levels of territories. In particular, localism was often discussed in the context of decentralisation rather than non-centralisation, terms that will be discussed later. Regionalism should also be distinguished from separatism in that the latter denies the existing single political unity, aiming at independence—i.e. complete sovereignty in all matters—although the frustrated demands of regionalism may be driven into separatism in an extreme case.

II. 1 (2) Unitary to Federal System

Even before the emergence of republicanism or the nation-state building process, regional distinctiveness existed in various forms. However, regional distinctiveness could be compatible with monarchism, as Keating observes, until popular sovereignty and republicanism emerged:

Monarchical states never succeeded in eradicating territorial distinctiveness, even in the age of absolutism. Rulers strove to exercise direct

control by sending out commissary agents, like the French *intendants*, or the Spanish *corregidores*, but still had to compound with local interests. Such territorial diversity is quite compatible with monarchical authority, even absolutism, since what matters is the final authority of the monarch, not the relationship of the territories to each other. It is much more difficult to reconcile with the principle of popular sovereignty and republicanism.¹³

Under the emerging republicanism and popular sovereignty, regional distinctiveness placed a major obstacle upon the empires (such as the Habsburg and the Tsarist empires) in which historical units were multinational regions causing threats to territorial integrity.¹⁴ The state-building process was also challenged by regional peculiarities in countries where political units were rather segmented and loosely combined such as the United States of America. In the process, federalism has been conceptualised in two main forms: European and American federalism. As Hague and his colleagues observes, emphasis was placed upon the cooperation between levels of government in European federalism, while upon the creation of “a central government with limited functions” in American one which became the prototype of modern federal systems:

European federalism, as found in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland, has different origins from the American form. Federalism in the USA is based on a contract in which the states came together to create a central government with limited functions. By contrast, European federalism (particularly in Germany) rests on the idea of cooperation between levels of government. Such solidarity expresses a shared commitment to a united society; federalism display organic links which bind the participants together. The moral norm is ‘solidarity.’ The idea here is that decisions should be taken at the lowest level possible but with the central government offering overall leadership.¹⁵

In the development of modern state, however, federalism has been implemented in two processes: upwards and downwards.¹⁶ Upward process indicates the process in which a federation is formed by the separate units based upon common interests. Although it is rare, a downward process in which a unitary system is restructured as a federation is also possible as in Belgium and possibly in Spain after Franco regime. However, both approaches were to find equilibrium between unity and diversity, and a balance of power between central and regional (provincial or state) authorities.¹⁷

The term federalism, as its conceptualising process indicates, is “the principle of sharing sovereignty between central and provincial (or constituent state) governments,” and a federal system is “any political system which puts this idea into practice.”¹⁸ However, it is rather more complicated than this simple definition, primarily because of “difficulties in relating theoretical formulations to the evidence

gathered from observing the actual operation of federal systems.”¹⁹ Furthermore, the employment of federal principles in unitary systems and the increasing interdependence between central and regional authorities in federal systems has reduced the differences between federal and unitary systems. It has even been argued that the increasing similarities between the two systems make the formal definition of federalism “meaningless.”²⁰

Despite these difficulties, we can distinguish federal systems from other types of political systems. Federal systems differ from unitary systems that partially utilise federal principles or practice. In federal systems, three components—a written constitution, non-centralisation, and areal division of powers—are regarded as key principles.²¹ In federal systems, provincial or regional governments are not subordinated to, but coordinated with the central/federal government under the principle of non-centralisation. Under these principles, functions are either solely allocated to either level of government (exclusive jurisdiction) or shared by both of them (concurrent jurisdiction).²² Non-centralisation differs from devolution in that “no matter how certain powers may be shared by the general and constitutional government at any point in time, the authority to participate in exercising them cannot be taken away from either without mutual consent.”²³ In this context, a constitution that is designed to guard non-centralisation emerges as a prime basis of federal systems.²⁴

The term ‘dual federalism’ has been used to depict a federation in which central and regional/provincial governments retain “separate and independent spheres of action,” as in its original concept.²⁵ However, because of growing interdependence between the two tiers, the prototype of dual federation no longer appears to exist.²⁶ Furthermore, as Agranoff observes, the term “federal” is used “to indicate its larger historical usage to include a variety of federal arrangements.”²⁷

By contrast, in a unitary system, sovereignty resides within the central authority to which regional/provincial authorities are subordinated. In a unitary system, subnational governments may execute central government functions (decentralisation), or may be granted some decision-making autonomy (devolution). As in federal systems, a variety of unitary systems are witnessed. Hague and his colleagues divide unitary systems into two groups: a dual system and a fused one.²⁸ A dual system features a formal separation of central and subnational government as in Britain, while a fused system with a strong centre and “a uniform system of administration applying across the country” exists in France.²⁹

Elazar also divides unitary systems into two—diluted and undiluted—which basically are the same as Hague and his colleagues' terms 'dual' and 'fused.' However, he provides more detailed categorisation of unitary systems that employ federal arrangements: legislative unions, constitutionally decentralised unitary states, and consociational unions on a nonterritorial basis.³⁰ Legislative unions are defined as "a compound polity in which the constituent units find their primary constitutional expression through common institutions rather than through their own separateness," as in the United Kingdom.³¹ Constitutionally decentralised unitary states are mainly based on the constitutional guarantee for local governments of "considerable autonomy" in some areas. However, local powers are determined by the central authorities, and thus are subject to "national supervision, restriction, and even withdrawal."³² Finally, consociations indicate "quasi-federal unions of ethnic (including tribal), religious, or ideological groups that, though not organised territorially, have acquired corporate characteristics of their own and have been able to secure constitutional arrangements designed to preserve their respective integrity within a common polity."³³ Such arrangements have been introduced in the Netherlands, Belgium, Lebanon, and Israel, in some cases together with territorial divisions of power. Although Friedrich's definition of federalism included such relations,³⁴ they would be a variant of unitary system employing federal arrangements, unless they were closely linked with territorial divisions of power.

As briefly mentioned, federalism has been represented not only in federal systems but also partially in decentralised unitary system. However, despite growing similarities between federal and dual unitary systems in practice, decentralised unitary systems differ from federation in that sovereignty lies exclusively with the central government, and thus decentralisation or devolution is not regarded in terms of the rights of subnational authorities but as favours of the central government.

Federations should also be distinguished from confederations in that, in the latter, sovereignty is vested in member states. In a confederation, a greater emphasis is placed on diversity than on unity. Accordingly, the central authority in confederations forms only "a junior partner and is dominated by component states."³⁵ The weakness of central authority in a confederation is clearly demonstrated in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the relatively recent incidence of the establishment of confederal relations. As in the confederation in America that was established in 1781—a classic example of confederation, but one that was called federation at that

time—a confederal system is often pursued when members seek the benefits of scale without closer union.

Federal systems also differ from 'hybrid' types of systems that have both federal and confederal features, but often been neglected. Among Elazar's categories, three of them are noteworthy: associated unions (e.g. the Netherlands Antilles and the Netherlands), federacy (e.g. Puerto Rico and the United States), and condominiums (e.g. the relationship of Andorra with Spain and France).³⁶ These types of relations are mainly involved with more than two sovereign states—though smaller states and a larger state that is often a colonial power in these cases—which could be a feature of confederal relations. At the same time these relations, particularly associated unions and federacy, have federal features, albeit asymmetrical. Instead of full independence, smaller states become a constituent polity of a larger state, but with autonomy and self-government, seeking "the benefits of associations with a greater power without being incorporated within it."³⁷ The difference between associated unions and federacy lies in whether any changes in the relations including dissolution can be introduced on the basis of a unilateral decision (associated unions) or a mutual agreement (federacy).³⁸ Although it is unusual and rare, a condominium in this context identifies a polity (e.g. Andorra) in which "responsibility for governance" or "ultimate authority" is shared by two or more external political entities (i.e. Spain and France in this case), while the polity in question maintains the fullest form of self-rule.³⁹

II. 2. Forces for Centralisation and Decentralisation/Non-centralisation

Those conceptions discussed suggest differences in politics in terms of their structures. However, structural differences—for instance, between unitary and federal systems—reveal only half the picture; clear differences also emerge among unitary and among federal systems in terms of practice. In particular, a unitary system may be more ‘federal’ in practice than a federal one. What causes differences in structures and practices among countries?

A brief review shows a set of answers to this question: uneven processes of nation-state building, industrialisation, democratisation, and welfare-state building; political factors (e.g. political ideology, leadership style, and internal/external circumstances); socio-economic factors (e.g. the existence of ethnic, racial, tribal, and linguistic groups, and regional economic disparities); historical experiences (e.g. experience of autonomy or colonial status); and other factors (e.g. legal and administrative traditions, and geographical demarcation). It is noteworthy that the same factor may have opposite effects, becoming either centralising or decentralising, depending on context or circumstances. Such is the case not only in unitary but also in federal systems, as Schlesinger observes, although he uses the term decentralisation in a broader sense which includes non-centralisation:

Federalism is everywhere a compromise between centralising and decentralising forces. As we have seen, nationalism in Germany operated as a centralising force, but in the two multinational monarchies as a decentralising or even disruptive one. Traditionalism in each case played an exactly opposite part.⁴⁰

Segre has also made a similar observation in his article on regionalism in Italy, pointing out that “an Italian way” has been established as a result of struggles between Communists and Christian Democrats during the cold war period.⁴¹ These observations suggest that it is important to form circumstances that support non-centralisation and reduce the effects of centralising forces in building stable and “genuine” federal relations.

In the following, a brief review of the legacies and forces of centralisation and decentralisation/non-centralisation and various forms of equilibrium will be provided in the various circumstances. Despite the conceptual differences between the terms decentralisation and non-centralisation, the terms will not be dealt with separately in

this part of the discussion as both terms share basic features, i.e. the diffusion of power in unitary or federal systems.

II. 2 (1) Legacies of Centralisation and Decentralisation

The question of power distribution within a national context, particularly the geographical distribution in this context, has long been a controversy in the development of the nation-state. In the process, a vehement argument about centralisation and decentralisation/non-centralisation has broken out, and various forms of political structures have been developed in various countries. In the debates, the arguments of both centralists and decentralists are correct in their respective points and thus the dichotomy between centralism and decentralism may be a false one.

Firstly, in relation to popular sovereignty and democracy, centralists argue that the general will should prevail over regional, local, or functional interests, which, in the worst case, could encourage an anti-system party.⁴² In particular, as Friedrich observes, decentralisation could encourage the development of anti-system party consolidating a secure local and regional basis for such a party.⁴³ Such demands were apparent, for instance, in France⁴⁴ and Italy.⁴⁵ By contrast, decentralists argue that decentralised structures contribute to the participation of citizen and the diversity of grassroots politics. For instance, Elazar points out that decentralisation can lessen "a formidable barrier to participation and communication" caused by the growing size of population.⁴⁶ In particular, decentralisation has been advocated as a means of restraining abuses of power by the central government.⁴⁷ This belief also played a role in the Allies' imposition of federalism in Germany in 1949 on the basis of regional traditions as a safeguard against dictatorship.⁴⁸

The efficiency of the society also became a main focus of arguments. Both centralised and decentralised structures are regarded as essential to improving the performance and efficiency of governments by the own supporters. A centralised government has been claimed to be efficient in the rapid industrialisation and modernisation process,⁴⁹ and in the egalitarian distribution of goods and services.⁵⁰ For instance, Cameron and Hofferbert claim on the basis of their case study of the education sector that a centralised government can better deal with regional disparities by allocating resources to regions in a more egalitarian way than a decentralised government.⁵¹ By contrast, the efficiency of the society also became a compelling reason for decentralisation. In particular, in dealing with local problems, local

government is claimed to be better in dealing with its own problems than the central government.⁵² Supporters of decentralisation also underline the danger of the “distortion” or “delay” of decisions in a highly centralised system in which administrative and communication systems can easily be jammed or overloaded.⁵³

Both supporters of centralisation and decentralisation claim that their own version of the state structure guarantee the rights of ethnic minority groups. Those who support a decentralised government argue that minority groups may find it difficult to safeguard their interests in a highly centralised political system, even when the central government respects the rights of individuals.⁵⁴ Such dangers are evident particularly when the distinctive identity and lifestyle of ethnic or linguistic minority groups are concerned. We may easily find examples that support this claim: the French in Canada, the Catalans and Basques in Spain, the Germans in Southern Italy, numerous ethnic minorities in the Soviet Union, and so on. Centralists maintain that even under a decentralised system the sub-national authority may also dominate ethnic, linguistic, or religious minority groups within their own territorial boundaries.⁵⁵ Although both sides advocate the protection of minority groups and both are correct in their respective claims, it depends on what level the threats to minority groups are being discussed.

II. 2 (2) Forces of Centralisation

Although the same factor may have different effects on the development of centre-periphery relations, we may identify centralising and decentralising forces in a particular context. As a discussion of detailed factors is beyond the main scope of this thesis, the emphasis is placed on centralising and decentralising factors that are commonly identified in the literature: historical experiences and traditions, socio-economic structures, and political factors (see Table 2.2.1).

<Table 2.2.1> Centralising and Decentralising Forces

	Centralisation Forces	Decentralisation & Non-centralisation Forces
<i>Historical experiences and Traditions</i>		
Nation-state building process	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dominant political, economic, and cultural role of the capital city • Secession of a part of territory as a result of separatist nationalism 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Multiple centres • Experiences of regional autonomy
Legal & Administration processes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Jacobin tradition of centralised administration (France) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Traditions of local self-government
<i>Socio-economic and Geographic Features</i>		
Geographic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Relatively Small territory 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Relatively huge territory with geographical barriers
Economic Structure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Highly correlated economic structure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • changing trading patterns and growing competition between regions • A high level of regional disparities
Ethno-cultural composition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Homogeneous 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Heterogeneous
<i>Political Factors</i>		
Democratisation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Status quo</i> in the political processes including elite working patterns 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decentralisation as a course of Democratisation (e.g. Russia, Spain, and South Africa)
Elite recruitment & working patterns	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Appointment of subnational elites by the centre • Clientele relations between central and subnational elites 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Locally elected subnational elites • Indigenisation of subnational elites
Interest articulation patterns	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Functional (or associational) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regional
Party formation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nation-wide parties 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regional parties
Reformist policies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Demands for nation-wide enforcement of new orders 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Differentiation of regional interests

In the history of modern state building, some strong traditions such as centralised administration and experiences of secession of territories as a result of separatist movements have been obstacles to decentralisation or federalisation. Strong traditions of centralised administration could be traced back to the period of absolute monarchy and nation-state building. Centralist drives were particularly apparent in those countries where nation-state building was carried out by central elites in capital cities that were dominant in terms of politics, economy and culture such as Moscow in Russia, and Paris in France.⁵⁶ Such dominance constituted a solid basis for a centralised state structure, particularly when the centre successfully crushed challenges from the regions. For instance, in France, the republican government after the French

revolution faced opposition that mainly concentrated in the Western regions. Throughout the nineteenth century, conflict mainly developed between monarchism and republicanism, identifying regionalism with traditionalism, conservatism and reaction, and centralisation with republicanism, democracy, and secularisation.⁵⁷ Based upon this Jacobin tradition, 'departments' as a regional administrative system have long been supported as a mechanism for uniformity and modernisation.⁵⁸

An opposite experience, the secession of territories, also encourages centralisation tendencies. The fear of separation and secession may lead the centre to make concessions in the direction of a greater degree of decentralisation or to initiate structural changes establishing a federal system. However, on the other hand, the widely spread fear of separation may also delay decentralisation, it is seen as the first step to separation. In Spain, an attempt to introduce federal or decentralised political system was regarded as a threat to national unity after the failed federal experience of Spanish First republic of 1873 in which autonomous status for the Catalans had been granted.⁵⁹ Such a perception also delayed decentralisation in the Soviet Union and other former Soviet federal states before they collapsed. A high priority has also been given to maintaining territorial integrity in India particularly after the separation of Pakistan in March 1956, which provide a strong legacy to its centralisation as will be discussed later.

Secondly, some socio-economic features encourage centralisation, or more correctly encourage passive attitudes towards decentralisation. For instance, a small territory with a highly homogeneous socio-economic structure will seldom encourage decentralisation. Even in large countries that consist of territories of different economic structures, a high level of interdependency between regional economies will also to a degree discourage decentralisation and separatist movements.

Some political factors—actors and their behaviour, representation and interest articulation mechanisms, and internal and external political environments—also encourage centralism. Without mentioning the universal truth that no officials like to relinquish their powers, central officials may fear decentralisation in which "incompetent" subnational officials may cause administrative errors. Central officials, particularly in a centralised system, may prefer the *status quo* to a decentralisation that would require the adjustment of working patterns between central and subnational authorities.⁶⁰ Such reluctance may also come from subnational officials. As for regional leaders who benefited from their well-established *clientela* ties with national elites, decentralisation may threaten their privileges in allocating national resources, as

well as their power bases, particularly if they are appointed by the centre. This makes it easier to understand why some Russian regional leaders supported certain centralisation measures and the abolition of local elections in the 1990s, which will also be discussed later.

Another support for centralisation comes from functional interest groups and class-based nation-wide political parties. Functional interest groups and class-based parties tend to support centralisation, which facilitate maintaining their integrity and discipline.⁶¹ In a passive sense, the development of functional or class groups often deters the development of regionalism because of their cross-regional features. In the same context, urban-rural cleavages reflecting a sectoral conflict between agricultural and industrial sectors, and a cultural conflict between rather more traditional culture and modernised culture.

Our literature review also suggests that reformist policies may demand a centralised government to impose radical reform, particularly when success is at stake as a result of regional resistance.⁶² Although it is not always the case, a centralised system has been preferred in pursuit of rapid socio-economic changes. For instance, modern state-building processes featured centralised and uniform bureaucracy.⁶³ The Russian Revolution and implementation of socialist rule over its territory also demanded a highly centralised political system. Rapid industrialisation policy, similarly, played a major role in establishing a centralised administrative system in the Soviet Union, although there have been contested arguments over the reasons for centralisation under Stalin. One may argue that the demand for centralisation was raised by communism or Leninism itself. However, an increasing role for central government has been witnessed even in decentralised or federal states when reformist policies (e.g. welfare-state building) were launched, because of an increasing need of coordination between various levels of government.⁶⁴ For instance, the Reagan administration's "supply-side approach to public management" in order to reduce the federal budget by reducing the number of federal government managers and federally run or associated domestic programmes in the 1980s yet to require "extraordinary centralisations of policy formation and administrative power."⁶⁵

II. 2 (2) Forces of Decentralisation

Despite uneven levels of decentralisation in both historic and newly established states, the literature has identified a couple of common factors that emerge decentralisation: multiple centres, experience of regional autonomy, socio-economic and cultural heterogeneity, and certain political factors such as elite recruitment patterns on the basis of regional representation.

The existence of regional centres that could challenge the dominant political, economic, and cultural influence of the capital can be a good steppingstone to decentralisation, although it could simply be a parameter that represents regional cleavages in a country. Polycephalous states that have political, economic and cultural cities at the regional level in parallel with the capital city contain possibilities of conflict between the capital city and regional centres. In general, a huge territory with geographic barriers and poor communication and transportation networks facilitates the development of regional centres that are out of the full control of the capital city (e.g. Spain and Australia). Imperial expansion or unification of territories that enjoyed independence or a high level of autonomy during the nation-state building process also contained regional centres as a default (e.g. Germany, Switzerland, Canada and the United States). Similarly, newly established states emerged as polycephalous states as a result of the artificial merger of territories after wars or under colonial rule (e.g. India, Kenya, and Nigeria). In both historic and newly established states, new regional centres have also developed in the process of industrialisation or modernisation, making the picture of regional cleavages more complicated.⁶⁶

Heterogeneity in a country in terms of ethno-national and cultural (e.g. linguistic and religious) composition and levels of economic development that emerge along the lines of regional borders is also a maker of regional identity as a solid basis of decentralisation. As suggested in the emergence of regional centres, imperial expansions or mergers into a single polity either voluntarily or under colonial rule increase heterogeneity in a society. For instance, diversities grew in the United Kingdom, Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union in the process of imperial expansion. Such heterogeneity also features in the socio-economic composition of post-colonial or newly established states such as Canada, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. In particular, most of the post-colonial states in Africa (South Africa, Nigeria, Tanzania and so on) were established on the basis of boundaries that had

never existed previously.⁶⁷ Often these ethno-national and cultural diversities emerged along the regional boundaries as suggested in Table 2.2.2.

<Table 2.2.2> Ethno-Cultural Conflicts in Various Countries

Countries	Minority or Main Conflicting Groups
Switzerland	Flemish, French, and German
Canada	French-speaking Quebec
The United Kingdom	Scottish, Welsh, and Conflicts in Northern Ireland
Holland	Conflict between Catholics (South and South-eastern regions) and Protestant (North and North-eastern regions)
Belgium	Flemish and Wallon nationalism + Dutch- (Flander) and French-speaking (Wallonia and Brussels) linguistic groups
Spain	Basques and Catalans
South Africa	Anglo-Boer division + Zulu nationalism
Nigeria	The Hausa Fulani (the Northern regions), the Yoruba (the Western regions), and the Ibo (Eastern regions)
Kenya	Kikuyu tribalism in Central provinces and other minority groups
Sri Lanka	The Sinhalese (Buddhists and Sinhalese speaking), the Tamils (Hindus and Tamil speaking, the North-eastern regions), and Muslims (the Colombo district)
Indonesia	Conflict between Muslims and Catholics
Malaysia	Malays, Chinese, Muslims, and Indians
India	Hindu nationalism, Punjab and Kashmir separatism
Pakistan	Punjabi and Muhajir (West) and Benglai (East Pakistan) before 1971 Sindhi nationalism (by Sindi-speaking Muhajir), Pathan separatism (Pushto or Hindko-speaking in Northwest Frontier province),
The Soviet Union	Multiethnic
Czechoslovakia	Czechs and Slovaks
Yugoslavia	Croat, Serb, Muslim, Slovene, Albanian, Macedonian, etc.

In these countries, inter-ethnoregional tensions mainly arise from three directions: the fear of cultural erosion by a single hegemonic culture, "a lawful struggle" against occupation and to restore statehood, and uneven economic development.⁶⁸ In the process of nation-state building, the introduction of centrist policies (for instance, public education and official languages) to build a "nation" in these multinational states has often been identified as a threat to the culture of ethno-linguistic minority groups. In response, the need for cultural autonomy has been recognised as an appeasement policy. However, social tensions are growing under the cultural autonomy or even federal arrangements, particularly when a minority group has not voluntarily merged into a state. In many such cases, minority groups raise claims for historic territories in conjunction with the demand that their territoriality should be congruent with the political community. Basque separatism in Spain,

Kashmir separatism in India, Tibetan separatism in China, Kurd separatism in the border of Iran and Turkey, and East Timor in Indonesia are good examples.

Uneven economic development also constitutes a strong basis of growing demands for more autonomy and regional participation in central decision-making. Whether uneven economic development between regions was caused by a traditional structuring or imposed by external factors (e.g. colonial setting or adjustment to changes in external markets and trade patterns), the modernisation and industrialisation process has brought new tensions between “growing and declining” regions.⁶⁹ For instance, tensions arose between agricultural and industrial regions (e.g. southern and northern regions in Italy, and east of the Elbe and the Ruhr in Germany), and between industrial centres in the periphery and financial and banking centres as in the United Kingdom and France.⁷⁰ Growing regional disparities in the process of industrialisation or modernisation and changes in world trade patterns could intensify the competition between regions, which in turn mobilises the regions to defend their own interests, seeking stronger influence or power over decision-making either at the central or regional level. For instance, even in France, an example of a centralised and unitary polity, a close relationship developed between the regional authorities and private sectors in the process of privatisation. In such circumstances, regional authorities found themselves in increasing competition, which became main basis of decentralisation demands in France in the 1980s.⁷¹

Economic disparities are in many cases politicised when a mechanism for the redistribution of wealth is absent or not properly functioning. The politicisation of regional identities depends on various political factors such as elite recruitment and working patterns, and the development of regional political parties. Although elite-led regionalism was apparent in some historic monarchies (e.g. the Habsburg empire and Tsarist Russia), the introduction of universal suffrage in the early twentieth century created the political circumstances in which regions could increase their pressure upon the centre to recognise regional peculiarities. For instance, in Belgium, Dutch was introduced into public administration, legal system, and public education as an official language after the universal suffrage in 1919.⁷²

In combination with universal suffrage, political parties that are based on “subcultures”—particularly those linked with territories—also provide regions with opportunities to articulate their demands, although they are vulnerable to manipulation by the centre. In this context, Keating observes that the importance of places has increased by the development of mass politics in the twentieth century.⁷³ Despite the

development of class-based parties in industrialised countries, regional parties or nation-wide parties that are based on regional support are still found in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Spain, and so on.⁷⁴ Such tendencies are also apparent in post-colonial countries such as Indonesia,⁷⁵ Republic of Korea,⁷⁶ and South Africa.⁷⁷

Demands for decentralisation may be strengthened by elite recruitment and working patterns. Regional or local elites are more likely to answer to the demands of the electorate at their respective levels than simply be agents of the central government. Furthermore, even in state where local elites are accountable to the centre on the basis of a patron-client model, indigenisation of local elites is likely to support decentralisation. Central elites may also mobilise some regions in order to serve their political goals, which may trigger regionalism in other parts of the states.⁷⁸

II. 2 (3) Equilibrium between Centralising and Decentralising Forces

Centralising and decentralising forces, either inherited or newly developed, exist in every country. In the modern state building and its evolution process, a series of compromises between these two forces results in various forms of equilibrium not only in terms of political structures but also in terms of practice.

In this context, Duchacek concluded in his comparative analysis of federalism, applying his "ten yard sticks of federalism," that hybrid types rather than pure-bred federalism were widely found, warning against the tendency "to equate American experience with true federalism."⁷⁹ In the same context, Davis emphasises peculiarities in each federal system, noting that it is not simply a distinction between 'genuine' and 'pseudo-federalism' or 'quasi-federalism':

We have generalised on the theme of the Philadelphia since the early nineteenth century, and the increasingly low yield of this orientation has made it apparent that we must shift our focus from the pursuit of the general to the pursuit of particular. What we must grasp, in sum, is that American federalism is, above all else, not federalism so much as it is American federalism; and for the same reason, it is so whether it is Australian, Canadian, Indian, Swiss, German or any other federalism. It is national culture, however we define it, that impregnates our entire subject matter.⁸⁰

Such particularism goes even further when Elazar emphasised that one of the factors that upholds federalism in Switzerland is the people's federal way of thinking.⁸¹

Regardless of structural features, either federal or unitary, a simple review shows that different decentralising and centralising—or unifying and separating—forces in states resulted in different political structures. In particular, various unifying and separating forces affect new federations. Davis, for instance, noted eleven social factors on the basis of his analysis of states that were under British colonial rule and emerged as federations. The factors that he claimed to be relevant are as follows: the desire of political independence; the hope of economic advantage; the need for administrative efficiency; enhancing the conduct of external relations both diplomatic and military; a community of outlook based on race, religion, language, or culture; geographical factors; the influence of history, similarity and differences in colonial and indigenous political and social institution; the character of political leadership; the existence of successful older models of federal union; and the influence of the United Kingdom government in constitution-making.⁸² In accordance with these factors, he identified unifying and separating motives in Asian federal countries that used to be British colonies.⁸³ Similar unifying and separating forces had also affected other federalisation processes, including the American experience.⁸⁴

The various forms of equilibrium between unifying and separating forces in various countries clearly emerge when the respective competence of centre and regions are compared (see Table 2.2.3). Understandably, a clear difference emerges along the border of unitary and federal system, e.g. France and Switzerland. The level of democratisation may also be one of criteria that could capture the differences, for instance, between Germany and India or Indonesia. However, differences do not always emerge along the border of democratic-authoritarian or federal-unitary systems. For instance, consociational principles recognising the competence of ethno-linguistic groups are employed in both unitary (e.g. Holland) and federal (e.g. Belgium and Switzerland) states while not in many other countries despite the ethno-linguistic conflicts. The regional responsibilities are far much extended in the United Kingdom than in France, although both states are categorised as unitary systems and their political systems have long been institutionalised.

<Table 2.2.3> Distribution of Competence between Centre and Regions (Some Examples)

		Jurisdiction	
	Centre's Exclusive Responsibility	Concurrent Powers	Region's Exclusive Responsibility
Austria	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> civil and labour law, mining, forestry, water law, waterways, population policy, and election to the EU parliament 	<p>Federal Legislation & Execution by Länder</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Changes in Territories; state citizen ship; housing; highway police; sanitation; and inland waterways excluding international corridor <p>Federal Legislation of Basic Principles & Executive Laws/implementation by Länder</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> welfare and population, policy; Land reform; protection of plant; and taxation professional education; territorial planning 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Residual Powers Teachers at compulsory public schools; (Länder can conclude treaties within their independent areas of competence)
Switzerland	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Foreign affairs; the use of army; protection of animals; public works; road traffic; TV & radio; nuclear energy; transport of energy; postal & telegram; banking & insurance; monetary & currency; foreign trade; weapon & military materials 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> civil & criminal law; registration of birth, death, marriage, foreign residence, and refugees; transfer of German cultural property abroad; public welfare; economic affair (stock exchange, banking, mining); labour relations; education; real property transfer; road traffic; and waste disposal 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Residual power to Cantons international treaty; education, church
Germany	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Basic Pact A (excl. public welfare, banking, stock exchange & road traffic) + industrial property right; cooperation between federation & the Länder; Indians & their lands; legislation on legal status of persons in public service; nature conservation; land distribution; and identity document 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Residual power on Länder
Canada	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Basic Pact A + Indians and their lands 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Direct tax within the provinces; borrowing money of the province; hospital; public land; transportation with the province; legislation on non-renewable resources; and legislation on education 	

(cont.)

	Jurisdiction	
	Centre's Exclusive Responsibility	Region's Exclusive Responsibility
Belgium	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Basic Pact A + Laws relating to civil & original responsibility of the Ministers of the King; the budgets and accountants of the state; the determination of Army contingent; Federal cultural & scientific institutions; pensions; and overseas development	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Residual Powers to communities• Basic Pact B + licensing mineral exploitation <French Community & Flemish Community> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• issue decrees on cultural matter, education; and the pension rules <German Community: cultural & personal matters> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• the cooperation between communities & international treaties within the limits of cultural and personal matters; and the use of languages
Brazil	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Basic Pact A + repair & execute national and regional socio-economic development plans; urban development including housing; sanitation; & urban transportation; and nuclear service	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Tax; finance; prison; economic & urban planning; all budget, production & consumption; environmental protection; and education & culture• Residual power• -Supremacy of federal law
India	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• the central parliament by law establish new states or change regional boundaries on such terms and conditions as it think fit; and can abolish the councils of the states• Residual power	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Basic Pact B (excl. economic and social planning) + local government; pilgrimages; intoxicated liqueur; burials; water supply; and land (66 items)
Nigeria	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Basic Pact A + Federal government account; arms & ammunition; aviation & airport; bankruptcy & insolvency; foreign loan; census; income tax; citizenship; and copy right (68 items)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• division of revenue between Federal government and states, among states, state and local governments, and among local governments; antique; tax & duty, electricity; censorship of cinematography; and education (30 items)• Residual power
Malaysia	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Basic Pact A + mineral resources; maritime fishing; communication & transport; education; printing & publishers; and all matters relating federal territories including alteration of regional boarders	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Social welfare; scholarship; town & country planning; irrigation; rehabilitation of mining land & land; and fire safety <List for the states of Sabah and Sarawak.> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• personal law; supply of water power; agricultural & forestry research; charities; and elections to the state assembly• land tenure; agriculture & forestry; housings; public works for state purpose; and state holidays <List for states of Sabah and Sarawak> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• native law & custom; ports & harbours set up by state law; and state libraries & museums

(cont.)

Jurisdiction		
	Centre's Exclusive Responsibility	Region's Exclusive Responsibility
Spain	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Basic Pact A + promotion of general scientific and technological research; maritime fishing; water resources & projects of the waters that run more than one Autonomous Communities; basic norm of TV & Radio; protection of the cultural, artistic & monument that belong the state; academic & professional degree; and referendum• Power not assumed by the ACs will belong to the state <p>Powers devolved to the regions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• city limits; urban & rural police; fair & market, public charities; health & hospital insurance; vocational training; local museums & libraries, town planning tourism & hotels; regional trams & motor services; public work of local interests; lake navigation & port; hunting; inland water fisheries; agriculture & forestry; artisanship; and other matters indicated by constitutional laws	<p><Autonomous Communities (ACs)></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Basic Pact B (excl. fisheries) + organise self-government; alteration of municipal boundaries; regulation of territory, environmental protection; and water projects, canal & irrigation within their interests
Italy	<p>Powers devolved to the regions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• regional planning; tourism; natural environment; definition of properties in housings; aid to enterprises; energy conservation; regional transport planning; small airports; regional railways, canals, & waterways; planning and financing buildings of high schools, agricultural & fisheries colleges; implementation, financing & regional planning of vocational training programmes; and heritage sites, regional museums & libraries	
France	<p>Powers devolved to the regions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• regional planning; tourism; natural environment; definition of properties in housings; aid to enterprises; energy conservation; regional transport planning; small airports; regional railways, canals, & waterways; planning and financing buildings of high schools, agricultural & fisheries colleges; implementation, financing & regional planning of vocational training programmes; and heritage sites, regional museums & libraries	
United Kingdom	<p>Powers devolved to Scottish Parliament: legislative and administrative control of</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Basic Pact B + social works including the voluntary sectors; economic development; financial & other support for Scottish business & industry; promotion of trade & exports; functions in relations with energy sector; tourism; the law and home affairs; environmental protection; water supply; sport; and research & statistics in relations with devolved matters <p>Powers devolved to Welsh Parliament: administrative control in</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Basic Pact B + industry & training; local government; environment; art, culture & Welsh language; and sport	

* Basic Pact of Central Powers (A): (1) External Affairs (incl. Foreign Trade); (2) Defence and Security (military, federal police, and weapons); (3) Economic (Monetary & Stock, and customs); (4) Public service (federal roads and railways, waterways, traffic, public health); and (5) Others (measures and weights)

* Basic Pact of Regional Powers (B): (1) regional economic planning. (2) local public service (healthcare, housing, and compulsory education); (3) local transport (roads and rail- & waterways excluded in the list of federal responsibilities); (4) agriculture, fisheries and forestry; and (5) local libraries, museums and heritages

Various combinations of centralisation and decentralisation forces also have made differences in federal practices which could be more important than federal structures. According to Elazar, the elements of federal process include “a sense of partnership,” “negotiated coordination” and “open bargaining between all parties,” which makes structural federalism meaningful:

... and many come to an conclusion that federalism is as much as matter of process as of structure, particularly if process is broadly defined to include a political-cultural dimension as well. The element of federal process include a sense of partnership among the parties to the federal compact, manifested through negotiated cooperation on issues and programs and based on a commitment to open bargaining between all parties to an issues in such a way as to strive for consensus or, failing that, an accommodation that protects the fundamental integrity of all the partners. Only in politics whose processes of government reflect federal principles is the structure of federalism meaningful.⁸⁵

Using two criteria, structure and process, Elazar’s matrix demonstrates a variety of forms of federalism that are employed in federal and selected non-federal polities. At the end of each extreme in his matrix, Switzerland, the United States, and Canada are classified as counties with federal structures and processes, the USSR and Czechoslovakia as those with federal structures but without a federal process, Israel as a country with a unitary structure but a federal process, and Egypt as a unitary structure without a federal process (for some more examples, see Table 2.2.4).⁸⁶

<Table 2.2.4> Structure and Process in Selected Federal and Non-federal States

		Process		
		Federal	between	Unitary
Structure	Federal	Switzerland, USA Canada, Australia	Malaysia, UAE Yugoslavia, Nigeria	USSR Czechoslovakia
	between	Netherlands, UK Belgium, Tanzania	Italy, South Africa Japan	China, Myanmar Zaire
	Unitary	Israel, Lebanon	Finland, Singapore New Zealand	Egypt, Chile, Poland, France

Source: Examples selected from the Figure in Elazar, *Exploring Federalism*, p. 69 (Figure 2.7).

With his “tentative” classification, Elazar argues that the structure itself is “not sufficient to determine the federal character of any particular polity,” although “we know little about to what extend “the introduction of federal process is a prerequisite for the establishment of a federal structure or structures that can accommodate them.”⁸⁷ In the following, the impact of the elements of federal process in the development of federalism in Belgium, India, and Spain will be discussed in more detail.

II. 3. Federalisation in India, Spain and Belgium

In every country centre-periphery relations have been evolving in accordance with changes and demands from within or from outside. In democratic societies such an evolution process often appears to be quite stable although new challenges are continuously emerging. For instance, consociationalism in Switzerland is now facing challenges as economic resources have been concentrating in Zurich.⁸⁸ By contrast, the evolution of centre-periphery relations in those countries where the mechanism for building consensus is malfunctioning appears to be less stable than in those democratic countries. In the process of changes, various structures and practices have been adopted either as short-term interim measures or as long-term solutions, depending on centralising (or unifying) and decentralising (or separating) forces. A brief observation suggests that changes in practices appear to be a prerequisite to structural changes.

In this part of the discussion, a focus will be placed on three cases—India, Spain and Belgium—that have relatively recently been established as federations or expanded their federal practices. The Indian case is selected because of its cultural diversities and mixture of centralising features with a federal structure. Although a federal structure was established during 1950-1956, all democratic institution was suspended during 1975-1977, and thus the discussion of federal questions has relatively recently resumed. The case shows a process of expanding federal principles in a centralised federal structure. The Spanish case is included since the decentralisation process started as a part of the democratisation process, employing interim measures in order to apply federal principles to a unitary system. Among the states that recently converted into federation, in a rather stable transition from a unitary to federal system, was experienced in Belgium, employing both territorial and consociational principles in its federal structure, and it is accordingly included in this discussion.

The observation of changes in these three countries leads us to a couple of suggestions to a federalisation process that may be useful to the Russian case. First, various paths including 'interim' measures could be employed as an alternative to constitutionally established federations, depending on the equilibrium of centralising and decentralising forces. Second, the development of regional parties has played a major role, particularly in building consensus on the structure of a polity and accommodating federal practices. Finally, it appears to be more important to develop

federal processes or practices rather than a structure or contents of a federal system in a particular time of transition period.

II. 3 (1) India: Federalism in 'Stagnation'

The federal structure of India appears to be a good example of a 'minimum' application of federal principles under the name of "unity in diversity"—i.e. a federal structure combined with a strong national government—in a society that contains decentralising forces such as socio-economic and ethno-cultural diversities.⁸⁹

Because of its vast territory and population, regional peculiarities are quite strong in India despite the development of nationalism under British colonial rule. The Federation of India consists of 25 states and seven union territories with more than 84 million population. Among the states, some regions have more than 80 million population (139 million in Uttar Pradesh and 86 million in Bihar), while Sikkim (0.4 million), Mizoram (0.7 million) and Arunachal Pradesh (0.86 million) have less than a million population.⁹⁰ The languages used by more than a million people are more than 30 including 14 official languages, and six main religions are prevailing.⁹¹ Cultural differences have clearly emerged between Northern and Southern regions. In particular, Southern regions such as Andhra, Karnataka, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu, which comprise about 165 million populations, have opposed the use Hindi as their official language.⁹² In terms of religion, Hinduism is dominant (82 per cent of the total population) in 256 out of 356 districts.⁹³ However, as suggested in Table 2.3.1, the Muslim population constitutes majority in Jammu & Kashmir and Lakshadweep, Christians in Meghalaya, Mizoram, and Nagaland, and Sikhs in Punjab.

<Table 2.3.1> Dominant Religious Groups in Some Federal Units in India (1991)

	Popul- -ation	Hindu	Muslim	Christian	Sikhs	Buddhism	Jains
Total	846	82.0	12.1	2.3	1.94	0.76	0.40
<u><States></u>							
Arunachal P	0.8	37.0	1.4	10.3	0.14	12.88	0.01
Assam	22	67.1	28.4	3.3	0.07	0.29	0.09
Bihar	86	82.4	14.8	1.0	0.09	--	0.03
Goa	1.7	64.7	5.3	29.9	0.09	0.02	0.04
Jammu & Kashmir ¹⁾	7.7	32.2	64.2	0.1	2.23	1.17	0.03
Karantaka	44	85.5	11.6	1.9	0.02	0.16	0.73
Kerala	29	57.3	22.3	19.3	0.01	--	0.01
Manipur	1.8	57.7	7.3	34.1	0.07	0.04	0.07
Meghalaya	1.7	14.7	3.5	64.6	0.15	0.16	0.02

Mizoram	0.7	5.1	0.6	85.7	0.04	7.83	--
Nagaland	1.2	10.1	1.7	87.5	0.06	0.05	0.10
Punjab	20	34.5	1.2	1.1	62.95	0.12	0.10
Sikkim	0.4	68.4	1.0	3.3	0.09	27.15	0.01
Uttar P	139	81.7	17.3	0.1	0.48	0.16	0.13
West Bengal	68	74.7	23.6	0.6	0.08	0.30	0.05
<u><Union Territories></u>							
Andaman & Nicobar Islands	0.38	67.5	7.6	24.0	0.48	0.11	0.01
Chandigarh	0.64	75.8	2.7	0.8	20.29	0.11	0.24
Dadra & Nagar Haveli	0.14	95.5	2.4	1.5	0.01	0.15	0.06
Lakshadweep	0.05	4.5	94.3	1.2	--	--	--

¹⁾ Figures from the census of 1981.

Source: M. Mijayanunii, *Census of India 1991: Religion* (New Delhi: Office of the Registrar General and Census Commissioner, 1995), pp. xi-xxiii.

Together with cultural differences, socio-economic differences also emerged between the Eastern and Western parts of India. Among the regions of Eastern India including Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh and parts of Madhya Pradesh, perhaps only Calcutta has own industrial base while other regions are underdeveloped. By contrast, in Western India, the economic capacity of Bombay, Asmedabad in Gujarat, and Pure in Maharashtra has been growing, and a stable level of agricultural production has been maintained in Punjab where the land is relatively fertile.⁹⁴ According to Rothermund's observation, such regional disparities have already emerged under British colonial rule:

The striking differences between Western and Eastern India have not been suddenly emerged in recent years. We have seen that under British colonial rule. Eastern India had been the major source of agricultural exports and that the export-oriented industry of Calcutta had been firmly in British hands, whereas in Bombay and Ashemedabad another type of industry had grown up which was basically geared to the home market and was led by Indians. During the Great Repression and the Second World War Calcutta declined, whereas Bombay made rapid strides ahead.⁹⁵

During the early period of nation-building process in India after the British colonial rule, these religious and economic disparities encouraged the establishment of a strong central government. Since 1950 three principles—socialism, secularism, and federalism—have been continuously pursued until recently.⁹⁶ First, under the name of 'socialism,' the national government takes responsibility for the development of infrastructure and heavy industries for modernisation and economic development. Second, 'secularism'—an equal regard for all religions—has been advocated in order to minimise the involvement of religion with state affairs. Secularism appeared to be a

natural development considering the religious conflicts just after the independence in August 1947, which claimed millions of lives.⁹⁷ Finally, federalism on the basis of linguistic groups has been pursued in order to maintain “unity in diversity.”

On the basis of these principles, a federal structure was established in 1950-1956 under the strong leadership of the first Prime Minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. Although the Constitution of India formally vest all executive powers in the President—e.g. the appointment of the Prime Minister (Article 74), the governors of states (Article 155.1), members of the Supreme Court (Article 124.2) and the High Court (Article 127), and administration of union territories (Articles 234 and 240)—these powers are to be exercised upon the advice of the Prime Minister.⁹⁸ In particular, the Prime Minister has been a dominant political actor in India not only at the national but also at the state level though the domination of the Indian National Congress in Parliament, which has the right to elect the President (Article 54), to form a new state or to alter the territorial boundary of any state (Article 3), and to abolish the state legislative council (Article 169). As a result, the centre has dominated the states in the process of restructuring the territorial boundaries.⁹⁹ Furthermore, regional authorities have been heavily dependent on the patronage of the Prime Minister as the dismissals of chief ministers of the Congress Party in the states assemblies showed.¹⁰⁰

Despite the emergence of a strong centre, however, challenges to the centralised federal system emerged in the late 1960s, particularly with the rise of Hindu nationalism and discontents of minority groups, and the emerging pluralist politics together with the split of the Congress Party in 1969.

Regional challenges to centralised federation have risen from the reorganisation of states' territorial boundaries and the principles applied in granting the statehood. During the process, the national government rejected to recognise any demands that were secessionist, religious, or raised by only one of major linguistic groups. Accordingly, the central government would not create linguistic states on “objective” grounds.¹⁰¹ As a result, territorial disputes have been developed in Maharashtra, Gujarat, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Andhra, Punjab, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, and Karantaka.¹⁰² Such territorial disputes encouraged the development of regionalism and hindered economic coordination between states.¹⁰³ Furthermore, Hindu nationalism evoked the secessionist movement, particularly in Kashmir and Punjab, resulting in “more-or-less continual war” involving the Indian Army and police force.¹⁰⁴

Despite violent measures by the centre, growing regional identities continue to affect centre-periphery relations in India, particularly when regional parties emerged. Since 1967 the dominant Congress Party became rather defensive, particularly because of the poor economic situation, forcing it to form coalition government.¹⁰⁵ Together with nation-wide opposition parties, regional parties enjoyed success in the state assembly elections since 1970s, controlling the state assemblies.¹⁰⁶ For instance, All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK) in Tamil Nadu, the Telugu Desam in Andhra, the Akali Dal in Punjab, the National Conference in Jammu & Kashmir, the Asom Gana Parishad in Assam, and the Shiv Sena in Maharashtra either won majorities or became the first opposition party in the state assembly elections held between 1985 and 1992.¹⁰⁷ These regional parties are advocating greater autonomy and focus upon specific state issues. However, regionalism has been suppressed and still appears to be too weak to overturn the centralised federal structure in India. For instance, Punjab and Jammu & Kashmir regional parties were dismissed and presidential rule was imposed, and the Congress Party won a dubious victory in the state assembly election in Punjab in 1992.¹⁰⁸

II. 3 (2) Spain: 'Federation in Process'

As regional problems reemerged in India after the Emergency rule (1975-1977), similar discussions or changes were taking place in Spain after the Franco dictatorship. In both cases regional parties won strong support at least in regional parliamentary elections, and leading parties were facing challenges in the national parliament and forced to look for coalitions. However, changes in centre-periphery relations appear to be more stable and extensive in Spain—although it remains as a unitary system—where consensus for decentralisation has been more strongly maintained and a series of more institutionalised negotiations between the centre and regions have been taken place.

Current changes in centre-periphery relations in Spain started after the death of General Franco in 1975. When the dictatorship finally ended, King Juan Carlos I won wide support for “weakening centralisation,” and a new Constitution was adopted in 1978 after sixteen months of debate. The new Constitution recognised the rights to autonomy of the nationalities and regions (Article 2), to self-government of municipalities, provinces and Autonomous Communities (ACs, Article 137), and to their own official languages in the respective ACs (Article 3). On the basis of the new

Constitution, 50 provinces were reorganised into 17 ACs, to which an unprecedented transfer of powers has been implemented.

Regionalism has featured in Spanish politics since its early period of state building. Regional problems emerged in the early fifteenth century and administration was organised on the basis of former kingdoms or principalities until the end of eighteenth century.¹⁰⁹ However, after the war of independence (1808-1813) regions were artificially reorganised into 50 provinces, which faced strong resistance from historic regions such as the Basque and Catalonia. Although the first major regional reform was introduced during the Second Republic (1931-1939), it only lasted five years as the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) broke out, which was soon followed by the Franco dictatorship.

Regional administrative reform after the Franco dictatorship differs from previous attempts in many respects. First, regionalism has grown in most regions, though in some cases it is simply defensive, as well as in historic regions, and is better equipped with institutionalised support. Prior to 1975, regionalism was prevalent only in the Basque country and Catalonia, while in other regions there was little evidence of regionalist sentiment until the 1980s.¹¹⁰ However, growing economic disparities¹¹¹ and democratisation in such forms as the development of regional political parties and election campaigns encouraged the development of regional identities.¹¹²

In particular, the development of regional parties or non-state wide parties is a feature of the democratisation process. Although there were some regional differences, regional parties won on average between 16 and 20 per cent of the vote in the regional parliamentary elections during 1983-1995.¹¹³ Regional parties were particularly strong in the Basque country (63.8 per cent), Catalonia (51.6 per cent), and Navarre (46.3 per cent). About the average level of support was also obtained in Canary Islands (28.1 per cent), Aragon (24.0 per cent), Cantabria (22.6 per cent) Galicia (17.9 per cent), and Balearic Islands (17.5 per cent).¹¹⁴ Furthermore, Some regional parties such as Convergence and Union (CiU) in Catalonia, and the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) and People's Unity (HB) in the Basque country were represented in the national parliament where the majority disappeared since the early 1990s.¹¹⁵ As a result they took part in the coalition government with their regionalist programmes after the 1993 (with the Spanish Socialist Party, PSOE) and 1996 (with the People's Party, PP) general elections.¹¹⁶

Second, regional reform after the Franco dictatorship differs from previous

reforms in its level of transfer of power to the regions. The Constitution of 1978 acknowledges the right of provinces to form ACs (Article 143.2), their own autonomous institutions (Article 147); they have given spheres of exclusive competence including the right to self-government, and the alteration of municipal boundaries (Article 148, more in Table 2.2.3). Furthermore, the Senate was to be elected on the basis of territorial representation including four members from each province, three from each two major islands and so on. The ACs are also entitled to be represented at least by one member and additional one member for every million habitants (Article 69.1.).¹¹⁷

Although it may be incomplete, Spanish regional reform was more extensive than in India. In Spain, two factors are noteworthy: consensus on regional reform in which regionalist parties' roles have been increasing particularly in the 1990s, and two-tier approaches including interim measures to respond the demands of particular regions for separate treatment and to achieve greater parity.

After the Franco dictatorship, there developed an increasing consensus in favour of weakening centralisation in Spain as a basis of the democratisation process. The major parties facing the election in 1977 basically agreed on the need of some degree of devolution, although there was variety in the interpretation of decentralisation or the status of regions; the right-wing preferred simple administrative decentralisation, whereas the left-wing recommended the extended Second Republic model of regional reform.¹¹⁸ In particular, the victory of the left-wing Democratic Centre Union (UCD), led by Adolfo Suárez, created clearly favourable situation for a federalist approach to regional questions when the UCD members had the largest share in the committee for drafting a new Constitution (three out of seven).¹¹⁹ Furthermore, concerns of military intervention in circumstance of 'disintegration' were growing, particularly after the failed anti-regionalist *coup d'état* by police and the military in Valencia and Madrid, which also facilitated the consensus-building process, as in the Pact on the Regions (*pacto autonómico*) of 1981.¹²⁰

Another important actor in maintaining or even expanding such federalist consensus particularly in the 1990s is the growing influence of regionalist parties. In the course of shifting power from the UCD (6.5 per cent of support) to the PSOE (48.4 per cent) in 1983 and from the PSOE (37.5 per cent) to the PP (38.9 per cent) in 1996, the role of regionalist parties has been growing, and thus the pressure on the major nation-wide parties for a further transfer of power has been maintained.¹²¹ Agranoff and Gallarín also observes that such bargains between leading nation-wide parties and

regionalist parties have helped to accelerate "Spain's federal development":

In the eighteen years that this form of territorial organisation has been in place, Spain has differentiated its previous unitary structure through a series of negotiations and agreements while reinforcing self-government and sharing power with regions. After the 1996 parliamentary elections, power shifted to a minority government led by the right of centre Popular Party (PP), with the support of three regional nationalist parties. The bargains struck with these three parties in return for support will accelerate Spain's federal development. Thus, Spain is adopting federal arrangement through its *Estado de las Autonomías* or state made up of autonomies.¹²²

Another strong basis of transition has been a two-tier approach of the centre towards regional demands. As in any other country, regional demands are different among the regions in Spain. For instance, 'historic regions' such as the Basque countries and Catalonia have been advocating broader and more extensive transfer of power than other regions. When the ACs were created, the Constitution allowed a 'rapid' path for those regions, considering their status during the Second Republic and previous referendum results for autonomy, by allowing them an immediate acquisition of the competences listed in Article 148. This procedure was applied to the Basque country, and Catalonia in 1979 and Galicia in 1981. Other way to attain AC status—so called 'slow path'—is to hold a referendum and win the support of participating municipalities (Article 143) but to wait five years for further rights (Article 149). This two-tier path was in effect a special treatment for the historic regions, which of course is asymmetric. However, the Constitution also provides any region that does not belong to the above category of historic regions but wishes the rapid path with a third way, bridging the gap between the historic and other regions. The third way demands two referendums, one for AC as a whole and another in each province that has joined the AC. Among the regions only Andalusia followed this path and claimed its autonomy in 1981.

Another example of the two-tier approach to meet the demands for separate treatment and the need to achieve greater parity can be found a series of pacts. As a result of a separate deal between the central parliament and ACs, an asymmetric power transfer could occur, since the bargaining powers of ACs are different. For instance, the PP party concluded a separate agreement with three nationalist parties—the PNV, CiU, and Carnaries Coalition (CC)—in return for entering the coalition in 1996.¹²³ However, alongside the separate deals, the centre made efforts to level the competence of the ACs through multiparty agreements. For instance, the *Acuerdo Autonómico* of 1981 brought uniform regional elections, term limitations for regional deputies,

subjection of regional governments to a no-confidence vote upon the petition of 15 per cent of each assembly, regional supervision of provincial government and so on.¹²⁴ The Pact of Autonomy of 1992 also introduced a fifteen per cent income sharing between the centre and ACs, levelling competence in this regard among seventeen ACs.¹²⁵

Despite the relatively extensive regional reform, however, the Spanish model of centre-periphery relations appears to be far from non-centralisation. The Constitution of 1978 still emphasises the “indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation” (Article 2). The political structure still preserves centralist administrative bodies. Despite the consensus on “weakening centralisation,” there is still a tension between centralism and federalism even among the socialists, who appear to be more supportive of federal ideas than other main political groups in Spain apart from the regionalists.¹²⁶ Although the Spanish model of transition does not clearly intend to build a federation, it shows that some interim measures for “unity and diversity” or “self-rule and shared-rule” are useful to enhance the stability and to expand federal ideas in the transition of a centralised system to a more democratic and decentralised one.


II. 3 (3) Belgium: A 'Stable Transition to Federation with Consociationalism'

Belgium's federal structure appears to be quite unique with its territorial and consociational principles, and to be more complicated than other federal structures. In Belgium linguistic demands are accommodated through a two-tier system: regions on the basis of the territorial principle, and communities on basis of the linguistic groups. The federalisation process in Belgium also appears to be stable and peaceful as a result of employing both asymmetric and equalising measures to meet the demands for diversity and unity, and both formal and informal negotiations in building consensus.

Belgium was created as a strong unitary state in the 1830s. However, the conflicts between linguistic groups throughout its history, particularly in the 1960s, paved the way to a federal state, which for the first time in Belgian history was officially recognised by the throne in July 1988. Belgium currently consists of three regions (Wallonia, Flanders, and Brussels), three linguistic communities (French-, Flemish- and German-speaking), nine provinces, and 589 municipalities. Three regions are formed on the basis of territorial boundaries. The Flander region includes four provinces (Antwerp, Limburg, East Flanders, and West Flanders, about 40 per cent of the national territory and 57.8 per cent of the population). The Walloon region

consists of four regions (Hainaut, Liège, Namur and Luxembourg) and part of Brabant (about 60 per cent of the national territory with 32.4 per cent of the population). The Brussels region covers 19 municipalities. The communities, however, are not based on territorial units, but on linguistic groups. The French-speaking community includes the Walloon region and parts of Brabant and Brussels. The Flemish-speaking community covers Flemish provinces and also parts of Brabant and Brussels. The German-speaking community consists of about 70,000 Germans in Liège province and part of Brussels.

<Figure 2.1> The Federal Structure of Belgium



Source: Alexander Murphy, "Belgium's Regional Divergence: Along the Road to Federation," in Graham Smith (ed.), *Federalism: The Multicultural Challenge* (London: Longman, 1995), p. 87 (Figure 3.2).

Although both regions and communities—both were merged in the Flemish region—have their own legislative and executive structures, direct elections did not held until the 1990s. The community councils were composed of all deputies of the national parliament and directly elected members of the Senate in each linguistic group (dual mandate). The executive bodies of the communities are part of central

government, and the numbers and mode of appointment of executive officers are different between Brussels and other regions.¹²⁷

Such a complexity originated from the conflicts and negotiations between linguistic groups which, as Hooghe observes, have been a mixture of "three major games": "Flemish nationalism versus the Francophones on cultural identity, Walloon nationalism versus Flanders and Brussels on socio-economic grievances, and (Francophone) Brussels versus the rest of the country on centre-periphery matters."¹²⁸

Although the history of conflicts dates back to the late eighteenth century, the conflicts and negotiations in the 1960s deserve particular attention as they paved the path to a federation. In the 1960s three major factors brought qualitative changes to the regionalist movements: territorial 'unilingualism,' the shifting economic disparity between the Walloons and Flanders, and the emergence of strong nationalist parties in each linguistic region.¹²⁹

In the nineteenth century, French was the official language in Belgium, whereas a majority of Belgians speak Dutch. In 1898, the Equalisation Act recognised bilingualism in the Flander regions (Flemish and French), whereas the rest of the country remained unilingual. Unilingualism in the Flanders (Flemish) and Walloon (French) regions was introduced by the language law of 1932 to meet the territorial bilingualism of Flanders. Territorial unilingualism was finally adopted in 1963, creating four language regions, which developed into linguistic communities in the constitution of 1970.¹³⁰

While language issues—though linked to socio-economic and political issues—triggered Flemish nationalist movements, the shifting economic structure and growing Flemish nationalism constituted the basis of Walloon nationalism. Walloon nationalism emerged after the Second World War as a reaction to the decline of the economy in the region (see Table 2.3.2). Walloons feared not only the declining regional economy, but also the growing political influence of Flanders in the Flemish-dominated national parliament, particularly on issues of the restructuring of its economic structure.¹³¹

<Table 2.3.2>Regional Economic Disparities in Belgium (1955-1988)

	Share of GDP			Gross Regional Product Per Capita (national average=100)		
	Flanders	Wallonia	Brussels	Flanders	Wallonia	Brussels
1955	44.2	34.2	21.6	87.3	100.6	140.8
1963	49.8	31.3	18.9	90.0	93.2	169.7
1970	53.9	29.1	17.0	96.0	88.9	152.6
1980	56.9	27.6	15.5	99.6	84.4	152.4
1988	58.7	26.3	15.0	101.9	80.8	152.6

Source: NIS, *Statistische studiën*, no. 91 (Brussels: NIS, 1991), pp. 76-83, in Liesbet Hooghe, "Belgium: From Regionalism to Federalism," *Regional Politics & Policy*, vol. 3, no. 1 (Spring 1993), p. 51 (Table 2).

Another significant political development occurred when community parties were established representing each linguistic region including Brussels by the middle of 1960s. There emerged the *Volksunie* (VU) in the Flanders, formed by a group of dissidents from the *Christelijke Volkspartij* (CVP) in 1954. In Brussels, the French-speaking population formed the *Front Démocratique des Francophones de Bruxelles* (FDF) in 1964, facing a growing militant Flemish movement in the region. After the bitter strike in 1960-61, the Walloon defensive movements fused into the *Parti Wallon* in 1965 and the *Rassemblement Wallon* (RW) in 1968.¹³² These three community parties waged successful campaigns in the 1965 general elections and onward (see Table 2.3.3), then joined the coalition governments in the 1970s.

As developments in the 1960s suggests, challenges to the country's political structure demanded more radical measures than simple territorial unilingualism. The coalition government (CVP/PSC-PSB/BSP) formed after the election of 1968 set the revision of the Constitution as its main task. Although the coalition government lacked a two-thirds majority (142 votes of the 212 seats required, but only 128 seats), four main amendments—the establishment of four linguistic communities (Article 59 *bis*) and three regional councils (Article 107 *quater*), an alarm-bell system (Article 38 and 38 *bis*), and the 'special majority' for adopting laws for the implementation of Articles 59 *bis* and 107 *quater*—were adopted in December 1970 with the support of the *Volksunie* (20 seats).¹³³ However, the implementation of those Articles that required a 'special majority' and inter-party conflicts in the coalition governments delayed the restructuring. Although the government of 1970 declared that "the unitary structure had become obsolete,"¹³⁴ it took nearly twenty years to introduce significant changes.

<Table 2.3.3> Composition of the House of Representatives (% of vote)

	1961*	1965*	1968*	1971*	1977*	1981	1985	1987	1991	1995
PSC						7.9	7.9	8.0	7.7	7.7
CVP	41.5	34.4	31.8	30.1	36.0	21.3	19.5	19.5	16.8	17.2
PS						12.7	15.6	15.6	13.5	11.9
SP	36.7	28.8	28.0	26.4	27.1	12.4	14.9	14.9	12.0	12.6
PRL						8.6	9.4	9.4	8.1	10.3
PVV	12.3	21.6	20.9	15.9	15.5	12.9	11.5	11.5	12.0	13.1
FDF/RW	-	2.3	5.9	11.2	7.1	4.2	1.2	1.2	1.5	-
VU	3.5	6.7	9.8	11.1	10.0	9.7	7.9	8.1	5.9	4.7
PSB/KPB	3.1	4.6	3.3	3.1	2.1	2.3	1.2	0.8	0.1	-
Ecolo	-	-	-	-	-	4.8	2.5	2.6	5.1	4.0
AGALEV	-	-	-	-	-	2.7	3.7	4.5	4.9	4.4
UDRT	-	-	-	-	-	1.1	1.2	-	0.2	-
Vaams Blok	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.4	1.9	6.6	7.8
Front National	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	1.1	2.5
Van Rossem	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.2	-
Others	2.9	2.1	-	-	-	-	2.3	2.0	1.5	2.9

Among the general elections held between 1961-1995, those of 1965, 1974, and 1978 are excluded.

* Figures are aggregated.

PSC (Parti Social Chrétien), CVP (Christelijke Volkspartij), PS (Parti Socialiste), SP (Socialistische Partij), PRL (Parti Réformateur Libéral), PVV (Partij voor Vrijheid en Vortuitgan), FDF (Front Démocratique des Francophones), RW (Rassemblement Wallon), VU (Volksumie), PSB/BSP (Parti Socialiste Belge/Belgische Socialistische Partij), Ecolo (Walloon Ecologists), AGALEV (Anders Gaan Leven (Flemish Ecologists)), and UDRT (Union Démocrate pour le Respect du Travail)

Sources: John Fitzmaurice, *The Politics of Belgium: A Unique Federation* (London: Hurst, 1996), pp. 272-273 (Appendix C).

The process of federalisation since 1970 can be divided into three stages: the initial stage (December 1970-May 1980), the moulding stage (June 1980-August 1988), and the round-off stage (September 1988-). During the first stage, the establishment of regional and community executives and implementing laws for the newly revised Constitutional Articles had been sought. During the second stage, the changes in the state structure—e.g. the merger of the Flemish community and region, and the establishment of the arbitration court—were introduced, aiming at preserving the unitary features and introducing federal arrangements. The constitutional amendments of May 1980 also expanded the competence of regions and communities on cultural and 'personal matters' such as local welfare services, hospital services and vocational training, which were expanded together with some financial sources.¹³⁵ The federal structure was finally established at the third stage based on the *Accord de la St Michel* of 1992. The *Accord* included the direct election of councils for five-year terms after 1994, although the power of the Senate, the unequal competence of

constituent regions and communities, particularly relating to the unique status of Brussels, and fiscal measures have still to be considered.¹³⁶

The Belgian federalisation process during the period between the 1960s and 1990s suggests a couple of features that led to a stable and successful transition from a unitary to federal state. First, the process appears to be more important than the content of particular stage or time. As Hooghe observes, in the federal model the actors tended to pay "more attention to the process of conflict management than to the outcome in terms of content."¹³⁷ In Belgium, an alarm-bell system, a 'special majority,' and a transition based on stages—i.e. negotiations for necessary implementation laws and then incarnation of agreement in the constitution, for instance the revision of the Constitution in 1980 was to reflect the Egmont Pact of 1978—became a guarantee of no turning-back, and thus made the transition process moves forward.

Second, the Belgian experience also emphasised the importance of regional parties in the transition. During the transition period, regional parties enjoyed their power of 'casting-vote' in forming coalition governments with their relatively small numbers of parliamentary seats. Negotiations, particularly during the first and second stages, were normally conducted before a coalition was formed, in which regional parties could strongly put forward their demands, facilitating the federalisation process, as in Spain.

Finally, the Belgian case suggests some useful measures—a combination of 'separate treatment' and multilateral agreement pacts through official and unofficial channels, and of recognition of principles and provisional measures—in building consensus among the regional or nationwide political actors. The federal constituents of Belgium enjoy a rather different competence, as already mentioned, as a result of separate negotiation. However, in addition to separate negotiation, multiparty pacts such as the Egmont Pact and the *Accord de la St Michel* had also been achieved, and emphasis the appeared to be placed on multiparty pacts than on separate negotiations. Although asymmetric state structure and competences remain problematical, it would not be desirable to simply ignore regional peculiarities. In this context, the Belgian government employed another tactic: recognition of changes in principle with transitional arrangements. For instance, Bill no. 461 of 1978 stipulated the establishment of separate elections on the basis of direct elections for the regional and community legislatures in principle, it still proposed that the elections would be held later.¹³⁸ However it still proposed that the elections would be held later. The elections

for regional councils—as already in the German community council and Brussels regional councils—would be held together with European election of 1999 in accordance with the *Accord de la St Michel* of 1992.

¹) In his discussion of the “federalisation” process in Spain, Agranoff maintains that the developments in Spain represent “post-modern” federalism which means “reconstruction of states reflecting the paradigm shift to federal non-centralisation based on forms of power sharing.” Robert Agranoff, “Federal Evolution in Spain,” *International Political Science Review*, vol. 17, no. 4 (October 1996), p. 386. For a further discussion of the paradigm shift in this context, see Daniel J. Elazar, “From Statism to Federalism: A Paradigm Shift,” *ibid.*, pp. 417-429.

²) Agranoff and Gallarín suggest that it would be possible to discuss the centre-periphery relations in Russia in line with the discussion of a number of countries that are in transformation “from unitary to federal” such as Spain, Belgium, Ethiopia, and South Africa. Robert Agranoff and Juan Antonio Ramos Gallarín, “Toward Federal Democracy in Spain: An Examination of Intergovernmental Relations,” *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, vol. 27, no. 4 (Fall 1997), p. 2.

³) For instance, Elazar clearly showed varieties of centre-periphery relations using various sets of factors such as structure and process. See Daniel J. Elazar, “The Role of Federalism in Political Integration,” in Elazar (ed.), *Federalism and Political Integration* (Tel Aviv: Turtledove Publishing, 1979), pp. 13-57, 27; Daniel J. Elazar, “Contrasting Unitary and Federal System,” *International Political Science Review*, vol. 18, no. 3 (July 1997), pp. 237-251; and Edward C. Page, “Patterns and Diversity in European State Development,” in Jack Hayward and Edward C. Page (eds.), *Governing the New Europe* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), pp. 9-43.

⁴) In his discussion of principles of federal evolution, Agranoff maintained that “the act of creating a federation is not the only way of federal design,” and that “unitary states can differentiate themselves and build in such arrangement, as Spain is doing, representing a federation in process.” According to him, a formal or constitutionally created federation was not the route to federalism in the “post-modern” trends. He suggests that “federal compacting” or “covenanting” could be an alternative way of creating federation through “self-rule plus shared rule.” Robert Agranoff, “Federal Evolution in Spain,” *International Political Science Review*, vol. 17, no. 4 (October 1996), p. 386. According to Elazar, “self-rule and shared rule” is the simplest definition of federalism. Daniel J. Elazar, *Exploring Federalism* (Tusaloosa and London: The University of Alabama Press, 1987), p. 12.

⁵) Theorists of modernisation have argued that the territory is a feature of a ‘traditional’ society, and thus would diminish in accordance with the socio-economic changes. For instance, Durkheim argued that territorial criterion would be replaced by functional one in the development of division of labour and organisation of society. Emile Durkheim, George Simpson (trans.), *The Division of Labour in Society* (London: Collier Macmillan, 1964), pp. 27-28, 187. Deutsch also argued that territorial cleavages would give away to economic one as peripheral territories were incorporated into national political and social system. Karl Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality* (Cambridge, M.A.: MIT Press, 1966), pp. 97, 102-103. Such arguments are continued in the

1990s with the emphasis of spreading global influence of economics, culture, and politics. See Bertrand Badie, *La fin des territoires: Essai sur le désordre international et sur l'utilité sociale du respect* (Paris: Fayard, 1995).

⁶) The influence of regions keep appearing as a key factor in the changes of state structure, not only in the former Soviet countries but also in the rest of the world. For an exploration of recent development of regionalism in the Western countries, see Michael Keating, *The New Regionalism in Western Europe: Territorial Restructuring and Political Change* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998).

⁷) Rupert B. Vance, "Region," in David L. Sills (ed.), *International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 13 (London & New York: Macmillan & Free Press, 1968), p. 377.

⁸) Keating, *The New Regionalism in Western Europe*, p. 7.

⁹) Ibid.

¹⁰) Ibid., p. 86.

¹¹) Ibid.

¹²) Vance, "Region," in Sills (ed.), *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 13, p. 378.

¹³) Keating, *The New Regionalism in Western Europe*, pp. 20-21.

¹⁴) For a further discussion of emerging federalism in these empires in the nineteenth century, see Rudolf Schlesinger, *Federalism in Central and Eastern Europe* (London: Kegan Paul, 1945).

¹⁵) Rod Hague, Martin Harrop, and Shaun Breslin, *Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction*, 4th ed. (London: Macmillan, 1998), p. 172.

¹⁶) Ibid.; and Carl J. Friedrich, *Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice* (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 7.

¹⁷) Graham Smith, "Mapping the Federal Condition: Ideology, Political Practice and Social Justice," in Graham Smith (ed.), *Federalism: the Multiethnic Challenge* (London: Longman, 1995), p. 5; and Daniel J. Elazar, "Federalism," in David L. Sills (ed.), *International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 5 (London & New York: Macmillan/Free Press, 1968), p. 354.

¹⁸) Hague, Harrop, and Breslin, *Comparative Government and Politics*, p. 168.

¹⁹) Elazar argued five difficulties arise in attempts to define the term federalism. Other difficulties mentioned are arising from the confusion of following aspects: the federal principle as a broad social concept and federalism as a narrow political device, two classic but different conceptions of federalism, authentically federal system and political systems which utilise elements of the federal principle, and federalism and "intergovernmental relations" as distinct political phenomena. Elazar, "Federalism," in Sills (ed.), *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 5, p. 353.

²⁰) Royal Commission on the Constitution, *Royal Commission on the Constitution 1963-1973 Report*, vol. 1 (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1973), p. 152. King also observed that "the unitary/confederal/federal (henceforth u/c/f) typology" had never been significant. Preston King, *Federalism and Federation* (London: Croom Helm, 1982), p. 134. In fact, federalism as ideology

varies—for instance, centrist and decentrist federalism—depending on the purpose federalism is serving. For more discussion, see *ibid.*, pp. 17-68 (Part One). Also see Smith, "Mapping the Federal Condition," in Smith (ed.), *Federalism*, pp. 4-7.

²¹) Elazar, "Federalism" in Sills (ed.), *International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 5, p. 357; and Elazar, *Exploring Federalism*, pp. 157-168. Riker has also suggested three components of federal system: two levels of government that rule the same land and people, at least one area of action in which it is autonomous, and some guarantee of the autonomy of each government in its own sphere. William H. Riker, *Federalism: Origin, Operation, and Significance* (Boston: Little Brown & Company, 1964), p. 11.

²²) Hague, Harrop, and Breslin, *Comparative Government and Politics*, p. 169.

²³) Elazar, "Federalism," in Sills (ed.), *International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 5, p. 357; and Elazar, *Exploring Federalism*, p. 166.

²⁴) Elazar, "Contrasting Unitary and Federal Systems," p. 241.

²⁵) Hague, Harrop, and Breslin, *Comparative Government and Politics*, p. 173.

²⁶) *Ibid.*

²⁷) Agranoff, "Federal Evolution in Spain," p. 386.

²⁸) Hague, Harrop, and Breslin, *Comparative Government and Politics*, p. 177.

²⁹) *Ibid.*

³⁰) Elazar, *Exploring Federalism*, p. 44.

³¹) *Ibid.*, p. 48.

³²) *Ibid.*, p. 49.

³³) *Ibid.*, pp. 49-50.

³⁴) Friedrich has described federalism as "a union of groups that may be nation-states or communities such as churches, trade unions, or political parties." Friedrich, *Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice*, p. 11.

³⁵) Hague, Harrop, and Breslin, *Comparative Government and Politics*, p.169.

³⁶) Elazar, *Exploring Federalism*, pp. 54-58. For examples, see Table 2.3, in *ibid.*, pp. 55-56; and Ronan Paddison, *The Fragmented State: The Political Geography of Power* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), p. 33 (Table 2.2).

³⁷) Elazar, *Exploring Federalism*, pp. 54-55.

³⁸) *Ibid.*, p. 55.

³⁹) *Ibid.*, pp. 57-58.

⁴⁰) Rudolf Schlesinger, *Federalism in Central and Eastern Europe* (London: Kegan Paul, 1945), p. 11. For more on the different views of regionalism or politicisation of regions in various countries, see Keating, *The New Regionalism in Western Europe*, pp. 28-31.

⁴¹) D. V. Segre, "Regionalism in Italy: An International Conflict Internalized," in Elazar (ed.), *Federalism and Political Integration*, pp. 133-141.

⁴²) Robert A. Dahl and Edward R. Tufte, *Size and Democracy* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1973), pp. 11-12.

⁴³) Carl J. Friedrich, *Limited Government: A Comparison* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974), pp. 58-59.

⁴⁴) Discussing the possible civil war between religious factions in France, Jean Bodin advocated a centralised state in order to ensure domestic tranquillity. Rufus S. Davis, *The Federal Principles: A Journey Through Time in Quest of a Meaning* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 43-47.

⁴⁵) The Italian Christian Democratic Party had resisted the creation of the Italian autonomous regions for more than 20 years since it feared emergence of "red-belt" in north-central Italy around Bologna and Florence. Mark O. Rousseau and Raphael Zariski, *Regionalism and Regional Devolution in Comparative Perspective* (New York: Praeger, 1987), p. 11

⁴⁶) Daniel J. Elazar, "Cursed by Bigness or Toward a Post-technocratic Federalism," *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, vol. 3, no. 4 (Fall 1973), pp. 283-298.

⁴⁷) Samuel P. Huntington, "The Foundation Fathers and the Division of Power," in Arthur Maass (ed.), *Area and Power: A Theory of Local Government* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959), pp. 173-179.

⁴⁸) Hague, Harrop, and Breslin, *Comparative Government and Politics*, p. 172.

⁴⁹) Lucian W. Pye, "The Legitimacy Crisis," in Leonard Binder, et al., *Crises and Sequences in Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 139-141.

⁵⁰) David R. Cameron and Richard J. Hofferbert, "The Impact of Federalism on Education Finance: A Comparative Analysis," *European Journal of Political Research*, no. 2 (September 1974), pp. 225-258; and Gordon Smith, *Politics in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis*, 3rd ed. (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1980), p. 231.

⁵¹) Cameron and Hofferbert, "The Impact of Federalism on Education Finance," pp. 247-248.

⁵²) For details, see Wallace E. Oates, "Decentralization of the Public Sector: An Overview," Robert J. Bennett (ed.), *Decentralization, Local Government, and Markets: Towards a Post-Welfare Agenda* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. 43-58; Michael Crozier, trans. by William R. Beer, *Strategies for Change: The Future of French Society* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1982); Robert A. Dahl, *Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy vs. Control* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982); Smith, *Politics in Western Europe*, p. 206; and Carl J. Friedrich, *Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice* (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 4-7, 72-73.

⁵³) See Crozier, *Strategies for Change*, pp. 72-80; and Dahl, *Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy*, p. 103.

⁵⁴) Rousseau and Zariski, *Regionalism and Regional Devolution in Comparative Perspective*, p. 19. For a brief review of ethnic problems in this context, see Ivo D. Duchacek, "Federalist Responses to Ethnic Demands: An Overview," in Elazar (ed.), *Federalism and Political Integration*, pp. 59-71.

⁵⁵) Michel Crozier, trans. by William R. Beer, *Strategies for Change: The Future of French Society* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1982), pp. 67-68; Dahl, *Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy*, p. 104; and Smith, *Politics in Western Europe*, pp. 229-230, 238.

⁵⁶) Keating, *The New Regionalism in Western Europe*, p. 22.

⁵⁷) Ibid., pp. 22-23; and Rousseau and Zariski, *Regionalism and Regional Devolution in Comparative Perspective*, p. 23

⁵⁸) Keating, *The New Regionalism in Western Europe*, p. 25.

⁵⁹) Ibid., p. 30; and Montserrat Giubernau, "Spain: A Federation in Making," in Smith (ed.), *Federalism*, p. 241.

⁶⁰) Steven L. Solnick, "Russia's Asymmetric Federation: Are All Differences Alike?" unpublished paper presented to ESRC Research Seminar, London School of Economics, 31 January 2000, p. 34; and Rousseau and Zariski, *Regionalism and Regional Devolution in Comparative Perspective*, pp. 23-24.

⁶¹) Stein Rokkan and Henry Valen, "Regional Contrasts in Norwegian Politics," in Erik Allardt and Stein Rokkan (eds.), *Mass Politics: Studies in Political Sociology* (New York: Free Press, 1970), pp. 190-247; and Rousseau and Zariski, *Regionalism and Regional Devolution in Comparative Perspective*, p. 24.

⁶²) Rousseau and Zariski, *Regionalism and Regional Devolution in Comparative Perspective*, pp. 24-25.

⁶³) Keating, *The New Regionalism in Western Europe*, p. 21.

⁶⁴) For a discussion of changes in centre-periphery relations in the process of welfare-state building, see Keating, *The New Regionalism in Western Europe*, pp. 39-71.

⁶⁵) David B. Walker, *The Rebirth of Federalism: Slouching toward Washington* (Chatham, N. J.: Chatham House Publishers, 1995), pp. 154-155.

⁶⁶) Keating, *The New Regionalism in Western Europe*, pp. 22-24. Elazar discusses the development of regional centres as a merit of federation rather than as a background. However, he provided examples of regional centres and their roles in various countries. See Elazar, *Exploring Federalism*, pp. 71-78.

⁶⁷) For the impact of colonial rule in this context, particularly in African countries, see Philip Mawhood and Malcolm Wallis, "Ethnic Minorities in Eastern Africa: Kenya and Tanzania," *Regional Politics & Policy*, vol. 3, no. 1 (Spring 1993), pp. 170-189, 174-175; and Martin Dent, "Ethnicity and Territorial Politics in Nigeria," in Smith (ed.), *Federalism*, pp. 128-153.

⁶⁸) Smith, "Mapping the Federal Condition," in Smith (ed.), *Federalism*, pp. 10-12.

⁶⁹) Keating, *The New Regionalism in Western Europe*, p. 23.

⁷⁰) For more examples and features of conflicting economic interests, see Keating, *The New Regionalism in Western Europe*, pp. 23-24.

⁷¹) John Loughlin and Sonia Mazey, "Introduction," *Regional Politics & Policy*, vol. 4, no. 3 (Autumn 1994), pp. 2-3. The article is a part of a series of articles reviewing the regionalisation process in

France during 1982-1992.

⁷²) Frank Delmartino, "Belgium: A Regional State or A Federal State in the Making?" in Michael Burgess (ed.), *Federalism and Federation in Western Europe* (London: Croom Helm, 1986), pp. 35-36.

⁷³) Keating, *The New Regionalism in Western Europe*, p. 31.

⁷⁴) For a brief discussion of the question, see *ibid.*, pp. 95-101. For the Italian case, see Tom Gallagher, "The Rise of the Regional Leagues in Italy," *Regional Politics & Policy*, vol. 3, no. 2 (Summer 1993), pp. 65-87.

⁷⁵) Donald K. Emmerson (ed.), *Indonesia beyond Suharto: Polity, Economy, Society, Transition* (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1999).

⁷⁶) Although very brief, Bedeski correctly showed regional support for political parties in the Sixth Korean republic. Robert E. Bedeski, *The Formation of South Korea: Reform and Reconstitution in the Sixth Republic Under Roh Tae Woo, 1987-1992* (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 73. The main cleavage emerges between the Southeast and Southwest parts of the republic because of uneven economic development particularly since 1970s and manipulation of political leaders in order to mobilise electorates for their support.

⁷⁷) Adrian Guelke, "South Africa's 'Peace' Elections: the Regional Dimension," *Regional Politics & Policy*, vol. 4, no. 2 (Summer 1994), pp. 117-125.

⁷⁸) For instance, Mawhood and Wallis observe that the development strategy under Moi's administration, the 'District Focus,' that started in the 1980s is mainly designed to reallocated more resources in less developed areas where his supports are coming, serving his political objectives. Such a shift of economic policies was encountered by regional resistance increasing tensions between regions, which facilitated the development of regional identity. Philip Mawhood and Malcolm Wallis, "Ethnic Minorities in Eastern Africa: Kenya and Tanzania," *Regional Politics & Policy*, vol. 3, no. 1 (Spring 1993), pp. 170-189, 177.

⁷⁹) Ivo. D. Duchacek, *Comparative Federalism: The Territorial Dimension of Politics* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), p. 274. His "ten yard sticks" are as follows: extensive control over foreign relations, immunity against succession, independent sphere of central authority, amending federal constitution, indestructible identity and autonomy, residual and significant powers, bicameralism and equal representation of unequal states, two sets of courts, the supreme court, and clear division of power. *Ibid.*, pp. 201-275.

⁸⁰) S. Rufus Davis, *Theory and Reality: Federal Ideas in Australia, England, and Europe* (Queensland, Australia: Queensland University Press, 1995), p. 38.

⁸¹) Elazar, *Exploring Federalism*, pp.192-197.

⁸²) Davis, *The Federal Principle*, p. 128.

⁸³) *Ibid.*, pp. 128-130.

⁸⁴) For discussion of federalism in the United States during its early stages, see Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, *The Federalist: A Collection of Essays Written in Favour of the New Constitution, As Agreed upon by the Federal Convention, September 17, 1787*, 2 vols. (New York: J.

and A. M'Lean, 1788) (the collection of a series of 85 articles first appeared in New York newspapers in 1788 with the signature of *Publius*).

⁸⁵) Elazar, *Exploring Federalism*, p. 67.

⁸⁶) *Ibid.*, p. 69.

⁸⁷) *Ibid.*, p. 68.

⁸⁸) Graham Smith, "Mapping the Federal Condition: Ideology, Political Practice and Social Justice," in Smith (ed.) *Federalism*, p. 16.

⁸⁹) For a brief discussion of unifying and separating forces in India, see Davis, *The Federal Principles*, p. 128.

⁹⁰) India Office of the Registrar General and Census Commissioner, *Census of India 1991: Final Population Total (Series 1)*, vol. 1 (New Delhi: Office of the Registrar General and Census Commissioner, 1992), pp. 16-19.

⁹¹) For language groups and language problems, see Paul R. Brass, *The Politics of India since Independence: The Politics of India* (The New Cambridge History of India, vol. IV.1), 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 129-168, 137-139 (Table 5.1).

⁹²) Vijay Joshi and I. M. D. Little, *India: Macroeconomics and Political Economy, 1964-1991* (Washington, D. C.: World Bank, 1994), p. 13.

⁹³) A. K. Dutt and S. Davgun, "Religions patterns of India with a Federal Reorganisation," in K. V. Sundaram and Sudesh Nangia (eds.), *Population Geography* (New Delhi: Heritage Publishers, 1985), pp. 150-175.

⁹⁴) Dietmar Rothermund, *An Economic History of India* (London: Croom Helm, 1988), pp. 181-184. For further discussion of regional economic disparities, see Shalendra D. Sharma, *Development and Democracy in India* (London: Lynne Rienner, 1999), pp. 143-186; and G. P. Mishra (ed.), *Regional Structure of Development & Growth in India*, vol. 1 (New Delhi: Ashish Publishing House, 1985).

⁹⁵) *Ibid.*, p. 184.

⁹⁶) Corbridge, "Federalism, Hindu Nationalism and Mythologies of Governance in Modern India," in Smith (ed.), *Federalism*, p. 104.

⁹⁷) When Colonial India was separated into India and Pakistan, Hindu nationalism and Muslims were clashed resulting mass-migration, killings, and assassination of Mahatma Gandhi in January 1948. *Ibid.*, p. 103. For more detailed discussion of Hindu nationalism and ethno-religious conflicts in India during Colonial period and just after the independence until 1950, see Christophe Jaffrelot, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), Chapters 1 and 2.

⁹⁸) Brass, *The Politics of India since Independence*, p. 45.

⁹⁹) For the reorganisation of states in the early stage of federalisation process, see Corbridge, "Federalism, Hindu Nationalism and Mythologies of Governance in Modern India," in Smith (ed.), *Federalism*, pp. 103-107; and B. L. Sukhwai, *Modern Political Geography of India* (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1985), pp. 25-67.

¹⁰⁰) Even when the power of the Prime Minister is under challenges, Rajiv Gandhi dismissed 22 chief ministers of the Congress Party during 1985-1989. For more discussion, see B. D. Dua, "The Prime Minister and the Federal System," in Javes Manov (ed.), *Nehru to the Nineties: The Changing Office of Prime Minister in India* (London: Hurst & Company, 1994), pp. 20-47, 39; and Krishna K. Tummala, "The Indian Union and Emergency Powers," *International Political Science Review*, vol. 14, no. 4 (October 1996), pp. 373-384.

¹⁰¹) Brass, *The Politics of India since Independence*, pp. 172-174.

¹⁰²) For details, see Sukhwai, *Modern Political Geography of India*, pp. 38-51 (Table 1).

¹⁰³) *Ibid.*, p. 52.

¹⁰⁴) Brass, *The Politics of India since Independence*, p. 172. For more discussion of secessionist movements in Punjab, the Northeast, and Kashmir, see *ibid.*, pp. 192-227.

¹⁰⁵) T. V. Sathyamurthy, *Class Formation and Political Transformation in Post-Colonial India* (Delhi: Oxford University, 1996), p. 441. For causes for the defeat of the Congress Party, see Sukhwai, *Modern Political Geography of India*, pp. 129-130. For the results of the parliamentary elections during the period between 1952 and 1991, and nation-wide opposition parties, see Brass, *The Politics of India since Independence*, pp. 78-89.

¹⁰⁶) For the result of state assembly elections between 1970 and 1980, see Sukhwai, *Modern Political Geography of India*, pp. 222-243.

¹⁰⁷) *Ibid.*, p. 89. For the share of seats between the Congress Party and principal opposition parties in the state assemblies in 1987-1992, see *ibid.*, pp. 90-91 (Table 3.4).

¹⁰⁸) *Ibid.*, p. 89.

¹⁰⁹) Mike Newton, "The Peoples and Regions of Spain," in David S. Bell (ed.), *Democratic Politics in Spain: Spanish Politics after Franco* (London: Frances Pinter, 1983), p. 100.

¹¹⁰) Christopher J. Ross, *Contemporary Spain: A Handbook* (London: Arnold, 1997), p. 93.

¹¹¹) According to Newton, the gap between the richer and poorer regions of the country grew under the Development Plans of the Franco regime, which only "succeeded in widening it and generating a sense of grievance in poorer areas like Andalusia and Galicia." Newton, "The Peoples and Regions of Spain," in Bell (ed.), *Democratic Politics in Spain*, pp. 103-104.

¹¹²) Ross, *Contemporary Spain*, p. 93. For a list of regional parties represented in the regional or national parliament, see *ibid.*, p. 94 (Table 3.4). For more discussion of the history and cultural background of Spanish regions, see Robert W. Kern, *The Regions of Spain: A Reference Guide to History and Culture* (London: Greenwood Press, 1995).

¹¹³) Francesc Pallarés and José Ramon Monetro, and Francisco José Llera, "Non State-wide Parties in Spain: An Attitudinal Study of Nationalism and Regionalism," *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, vol. 27, no. 4 (Fall 1997), p. 140.

¹¹⁴) *Ibid.*, p. 141 (Table 1). Figures are the average vote won by regionalist parties in each region in the regional parliamentary elections during 1983-1995. For the performance of these regional parties in

the elections, also see Ross, *Contemporary Spain*, pp. 83-97.

¹¹⁵) José Amodia, "Politics in Contemporary Spain: Establishing and Consolidating a New Democracy," in Teresa Lawlor and Mike Rigby (eds.), *Contemporary Spain: Essays and Texts on Politics, Economics, Education and Employment, and Society* (London: Longman, 1998), pp. 17-18.

¹¹⁶) For the general election results during the period between 1977 and 1996, see Ross, *Contemporary Spain*, p. 53.

¹¹⁷) Carlos Flores Jaberías, "The Spanish Constitution: English Translation of the Official Text Published in the Boletín del Estado of December 29, 1978," in Albert P. Blaustein and Gisbert H. Flanz (eds.), *Constitutions of the Countries of the World: Spain* (New York: Oceana Publication, 1991), pp. 57-58, 73-76.

¹¹⁸) Robert Agranoff, "Inter-governmental Politics and Policy: Building Federal Arrangements in Spain," *Regional Politics & Policy*, vol. 3, no. 2 (Summer 1993), p. 20; and Newton, "The Peoples and Regions of Spain," in Bell (ed.), *Democratic Politics in Spain*, p. 105.

¹¹⁹) Ross, *Contemporary Spain*, p. 52.

¹²⁰) *Ibid.*, p. 77.

¹²¹) For the regionalist demands of the CiU and the PNV, and the responding promises of PSOE (completion of transfer of powers, and reform some of the autonomous statutes) in the election of 1993, see Richard Gillespie, "The Hour of the Nationalities: Catalan and Basque Parties in the Spanish General Election of 6 June 1993," *Regional Politics & Policy*, vol. 3, no. 3 (Autumn 1993), pp. 177-191.

¹²²) Agranoff and Gallarín, "Toward Federal Democracy in Spain," pp. 1-2.

¹²³) *Ibid.*, p. 15. According Keating, the pacts of 1992 between the PSOE-PP and nationalist parties in 1993 and 1996 provided for "extended financial powers and participation of European Union matters. Keating, *The New Regionalism in Western Europe*, p. 69.

¹²⁴) Agranov and Gallarín, "Toward Federal Democracy in Spain," p. 14.

¹²⁵) *Ibid.* For more about the bargains and evolution of bargaining pacts in the 1990s, also see Robert Agranoff, "Federal Evolution in Spain," *International Political Science Review*, vol. 17, no. 4 (October 1996), pp. 386-393.

¹²⁶) Montserrat Guibernau, "Spain: A Federation in the Making?" in Smith (ed.) *Federalism*, pp. 248-249. For more discussion of various spectrum in the 1980s within major national and regional parties including extreme left, regional left, communist, socialist, PNV, CiU, UCD, and extreme right on various question related to regional autonomy, see Richard Gunther, Giacomo Sani, and Goldie Shabad, *Spain After Franco: The Making of a Competitive Party System* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 251-261. For the problems in building federalism in Spain, also see Agranoff, "Inter-governmental Politics and Policy," pp. 20-24; and Agranoff, "Federal Evolution in Spain," pp. 394-401.

¹²⁷) For details, see John Fitzmaurice, *The Politics of Belgium: A Unique Federalism* (London: Hurst, 1996), pp. 147-158.

¹²⁸) Liesbet Hooghe, "Belgium: From Regionalism to Federalism," *Regional Politics & Policies*, vol. 3, no. 1 (Spring 1993), p. 48.

¹²⁹) Murphy observes that a significant change encouraged the Belgians to think that there existed two distinct ethno-linguistic regions during and after World War I. Alexander Murphy, "Belgium's Regional Divergence: Along the Road to Federation," in Smith (ed.), *Federalism*, p. 81. For the development of situation in the 1960s, see Liesbet Hooghe, "Belgian Federalism and the European Community," in Jones and Keating (eds.), *The European Union and the Regions*, pp. 137-140; and Fitzmaurice, *The Politics of Belgium*, pp. 44-63.

¹³⁰) Hooghe, "Belgium," pp. 49-50.

¹³¹) *Ibid.*, p. 52.

¹³²) For the development these parties and other nation-wide parties, see Fitzmaurice, *The Politics of Belgium*, pp. 170-221 (Chapter 6).

¹³³) An alarm-bell system was desired to give each linguistic group to suspend the adoption of certain language laws with the support of two-thirds majority vote of a linguistic group. The 'special majority' in this context required a majority vote in each linguistic group and at the same time two-thirds of overall support in the Parliament. *Ibid.*, p. 49; and Hooghe, "Belgium," p. 55.

¹³⁴) *Parlementaire Handelingen, Senate, 1969-1970*, 18 February 1970, pp. 777-778.

¹³⁵) Fitzmaurice, *The Politics of Belgium*, p. 130.

¹³⁶) For the problems in connection with the third phase, see Els Witte, "Belgian Federalism: Towards Complexity and Asymmetry," *West European Politics*, vol. 15, no. 4 (October 1992), pp. 104-113.

¹³⁷) Hooghe, "Belgium," p. 65.

¹³⁸) According to Versmessen's observation of national and regional elections in May 1995, regional issues were overwhelmed by national issues such as social security provisions. It suggests that direct elections for regional or community council might not have been a urgent issues at least for the general public. Elke Versmessen, "In the Kingdom of Paradox: The Belgian Regional and National Elections of May 1995," *Regional and Federal Studies*, vol. 5, no. 2 (Summer 1995), p. 245.

CHAPTER III

Revitalisation of Regionalism In the SIBFE

Regionalism in Siberia and the Russian Far East (SIBFE) has a long history which dates back to the middle of the nineteenth century. Being aware of the backwardness of their 'homeland,' a group of students from Siberia in St. Petersburg led by N. M. Iadrintsev and G. N. Potanin—both are also students then—raised the question of 'colonial' appendage in connection with the relationship between the Siberian regions and the European part of Russia.¹ Discussing the negative impact of central policies in the region, they advocated decentralisation and political, economic and cultural autonomy as solutions to the backwardness of Siberian socio-economic conditions. According to Allison's observation, the main concerns of the 'forefathers' of Siberian regionalism could be divided into four areas: the economic exploitation of Siberia by the European part of Russia, the deteriorating living conditions of the native people in Siberia, the pernicious effects of the prisoner exile system, and the need for local autonomy in order to realise Siberia's own destiny and potentials.²

Early Siberian regionalism reached its culmination when the Siberian Regional Union Congress was convened in 1905. At the Congress, the delegates demanded regional autonomy with an independent Siberian Duma, local finance, and local legislation.³ Siberian regionalist demands developed into more separatist tendencies in the 1910s. In March 1917, the committee of the Siberian Democratic Federalist Party in Verkhneudinsk (Ulan-Ude) issued a draft 'minimum programme' that included the creation of a 'United State of Siberia.'⁴ Separatist goals were again clearly articulated when the First Siberian Regional Conference was held on 8 August 1917 in Tomsk. At the conference, more ardent desires for a Siberian statehood were witnessed when a Siberian Duma and a Siberian Soviet were proposed, and a Siberian flag was adopted.⁵ In January 1918, the Siberian Regional Duma established the Provisional Government of Autonomous Siberia, and the new Provisional Government of Siberia in Omsk declared Siberian independence in July 1918.⁶ Although such a development was

arrested when Stalin began to rein in regionalist tendencies, it sporadically came to the surface during the Soviet period.⁷

After *perestroika*, regionalism has reappeared in the SIBFE, because of the disparities between the region's increasing economic contribution and the declining living standards in the area. Since the 'colonial' relations of the SIBFE with the centre remained unchanged, most current demands were echoed the early regionalist demands.⁸ The association of deputies from the SIBFE regions was formed at the end of 1989, which was soon followed by the regional associations in the SIBFE. In March 1992, the first Congress of the People's Deputies (CPD) of Siberia was held in Krasnoiarsk which sought to link the regional associations and their deputies in the CPD of Russia. Deputies also demanded regional autonomy in their economic and political relations with the centre. The questions of the restoration of the Far Eastern Republic and an establishment of a Siberian republic again appeared in their discussion. Although the majority of the general public did not support the idea,⁹ Although the majority of the general public did not support the idea,¹⁰ the experience of autonomy—i.e. the Far Eastern Republic¹¹—supported the development of regionalism, as already discussed in Chapter 2.

What has made the regions reappear on the surface in Russian politics? What are the demands of the SIBFE regions in particular? In the process of economic reform, some changes were regarded as threats or possible threats to the SIBFE regions. Firstly, the changing economic development strategy posed a considerable threat to the SIBFE regions. When the past strategy of extensive growth was replaced by an intensive growth strategy, investment priorities could be shifted to the European part of Russia where infrastructures were relatively well developed. Secondly, the central drive for economic self-accountancy and price liberalisation also caused serious problems in the delivery of necessary goods. As for the SIBFE regions, 'marketisation' could lead to a substantial increase in the cost of transportation and the prices of goods and services. By contrast, the price of resources, the main products of the SIBFE, remained under state control. The changes aggravated the living standards in the SIBFE. In the process, the regions were inclined to create a regional barter system and to claim the right with their own resources and wealth to cope with socio-economic crises in the regions.

However, the economic disadvantages of a region do not necessarily develop into regionalism or regionalisation of reform on a massive scale. The political reforms followed by *perestroika* also supported the regional manoeuvre. First of all, *glasnost*'

encouraged the development of regionalism by revealing socio-economic disparities between the SIBFE and the European part of Russia. Secondly, 'democratisation' enabled regions to discuss their situations from a regional point of view, and to articulate their interests more openly. Changes in political structures such as the abolition of the CPSU, the introduction of a new parliamentary system and the collapse of the Soviet Union also provided regions with opportunities to initiate more 'genuine' federal relations. Elections to the local leaderships also have turned local leaders more into agents of regional interests than those of the centre. Furthermore, power struggles at the centre weakened centripetal power, which in return strengthened the power of regions in the relationship between centre and peripheries. As a result of the shifting balance of power between centre and regions, the centre employed bilateral negotiations which had double-sided effects on the development of regionalism. Bilateral negotiations encouraged copy-cat demands, but at the same time, weakened regionalism by providing the regions with various paths to attain their goals and thus hampered coordination efforts. The latter aspect of bilateral negotiations will be discussed in Chapter 7.

In this chapter, the peculiar economic structure of the SIBFE regions, political and economic changes and their impact on the SIBFE regions, and the SIBFE's demands will be discussed. The chapter also includes an analysis of within-group disparities by scrutinising the socio-economic conditions of individual administrative units in order to examine the possible level of coordination among the SIBFE regions.

III. 1. The SIBFE as a Resource Appendage

III. 1. (1) The Resource-Oriented Industrial Structure of the SIBFE

The SIBFE regions have long been regarded as resource frontiers that have served the needs of the Russian heartland. During the Tsarist period, the SIBFE provided the European part of Russia not only with their agricultural products, but also with their natural resources such as fur, fish, and non-ferrous metals. In the nineteenth century, non-ferrous metal production became a main stimulus of colonisation of the SIBFE, replacing the fur trade. During 1882-1893, the SIBFE produced about 75 per cent of Russia's entire gold output.¹² By 1910, gold regions such as Vitim, Zeia, Bureia, Olekminsk, Amursk, Maritime and Ussuriisk were producing about one-third of Russia's gold production—53,800 pounds, worth 290 million rubles.¹³

Perhaps more importantly, the SIBFE was providing the European part of Russia with its agricultural products until the early nineteenth century. For instance, the SIBFE accounted for nearly 90 per cent of Russian butter exports during 1906-1913.¹⁴ SIBFE butter was the fourth main 'agricultural'—including forest and maritime products—export item of Russia, only surpassed by bread, wheat and timber. In 1913, the SIBFE exported agricultural, forest and maritime products, worth 148 million rubles, including butter (66 million rubles), fur (28 million rubles), meat (10.5 million rubles), and fish (1.4 million rubles).¹⁵

During the Soviet period, the SIBFE continued to be viewed as a resource frontier. Under Stalin, the regions were producing more resources in order to meet the need for extensive growth. In particular, Soviet regional or regional location policies had emphasised the need to reduce transportation costs by locating industries close to the resources used, and to the markets. Furthermore, in order to maximise economies of scale, economic regions had been specialised. When the Soviet economy started to stagnate in the 1960s, consistently increasing consumption of resources per unit of production resulted in a series of massive search projects that intensified the development of resource industries in the SIBFE.

In addition, a strategic consideration also affected the industrial structure of the SIBFE, particularly in the Russian Far East, mainly because of its remoteness from the European part of Russia. This strategic consideration emerged after World War II.¹⁶ Because of this consideration, machine-building industries in the Far East were developed for primarily military purposes. Such a structure became a heavy burden for some Far Eastern regions—e.g. Primorskii and Khabarovsk kraia and Amur oblast—in the process of conversion of the military industrial complex.¹⁷ The burden in turn contributed to the development of regionalism in the Russian Far East.

As a result of regional specialisation policies, the SIBFE became ever more specialised in raw resources production (fossil fuel and non-ferrous metals), energy, and energy intensive industries in general (see Table 3.1.1). In particular, the industrial structure of the SIBFE shows that the region was rather dominated by one or two industrial sectors. For instance, fossil fuel industries accounted for almost half the industrial production in Western Siberia in 1993. In Eastern Siberia, fossil fuel and non-ferrous metal industries consisted more than half the industrial production. In the Far East, non-ferrous metal and food processing sectors produced more than 53 per cent of the whole industrial production.

<Table 3.1.1> Branch Structure of Industrial Production (1993)

Economic Regions	Electric Power	Fossil Fuel	Ferrous Metals	Non-ferrous Metals	Machine Building	Chemical	Wood & Paper	Construc- tion Materials	Glass	Light Industry Processing	Food Processing	Flour & Wheat	Resource	Resource
													(A)	(B)
North	10.1	11.2	20.7	9.2	6.5	5.0	16.8	3.2	0.2	1.6	13.1	1.3	20.4	37.2
Northwest	9.5	12.6	1.4	3.9	26.6	5.6	7.3	4.4	0.6	7.8	14.5	2.7	16.5	23.8
Central	6.6	7.2	2.6	2.4	29.5	6.6	3.9	5.7	0.8	13.0	15.1	2.5	9.65	13.5
Volgo-Viarka	7.5	10.6	3.9	0.6	39.8	8.9	5.1	3.1	0.6	6.2	10.6	1.9	11.2	16.3
Central Chemozem	10.4	0.0	29.1	0.0	16.5	6.8	1.3	5.1	0.1	4.4	22.9	2.7	0.0	1.3
Volga	9.2	14.9	1.7	1.7	33.5	14.2	1.5	4.4	0.3	4.5	10.8	2.5	16.6	18.1
North Caucasus	10.8	6.8	3.0	2.9	17.5	7.5	3.3	5.9	0.6	5.4	30.4	4.1	9.7	13.0
Urals	9.5	14.2	19.6	7.9	20.7	7.9	2.8	3.8	0.4	2.8	7.5	1.9	22.1	24.9
West Siberia	9.1	49.2	7.3	2.4	9.2	5.8	2.1	3.1	0.1	2.2	7.1	1.8	51.6	53.7
East Siberia	9.3	15.4	2.0	35.2	7.8	5.1	8.4	3.6	0.2	2.8	7.5	1.5	50.0	59
Far East	11.9	10.5	1.2	28.4	7.6	0.9	5.3	4.4	0.2	1.3	25.5	1.6	38.9	44.2
Kaliningrad ob	9.1	2.2	3.0	0.1	13	0.4	13.3	4.3	0.0	2.5	43.3	5.1	2.3	15.6
RF TOTAL	9.1	16.3	8.3	7.6	20.5	7.2	4.3	4.2	0.4	5.1	13.0	2.2	23.9	28.2

Resource (A) = fossil fuel + non-ferrous metals

Resource (B) = Resource (A) + wood & paper

Source: Goskomstat, *Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik 1994* (Moscow: Goskomstat Rossii, 1994), pp. 616-621.

The patterns of regional division of labour are clearly evident when the production share of economic regions in each industrial sector is considered. For instance, Western Siberia—more exactly Khanty-Mansi and Iamalo-Nenets autonomous okrugs—produced 67.9 per cent of the whole gas condensed oil production of Russia in 1985, which increased to 70.9 per cent during 1990-1993. The region also produced 82.4 per cent of Russia's natural gas in 1985, which also rose to more than 90 per cent during 1990-1993 because of declining gas production in the Urals. As for coal production, the SIBFE accounted for 72.4 per cent of the whole coal production in Russia in 1985 and 76.4 per cent during 1990-1993. The region also produced more than 60 per cent of fish and maritime products (mainly in the Far Eastern regions), and more than 30 per cent of sawn timber and cellulose, chemical fabric, and plastics. By contrast, the region made a modest contribution in manufacturing sectors such as paper, ferrous metallurgy, construction materials and machine building—excluding military purpose machine building—sectors in which the European part of Russia has made the largest contributions.¹⁸

<Table 3.1.2> Production share of Main Industrial Products by Economic Regions (1985-1993)

Industrial Branches	Units	RF Total		SIBFE		West Siberia		East Siberia		Far East	
		1985	1990-93	1985	1990-93	1985	1990-93	1985	1990-93	1985	1990-93
<u><Fossil Fuel & energy></u>											
Oil	(1,000t)	542307	1732325	68.4	71.4	67.9	70.9	-	0.003	0.5	0.4
Gas	(mil m ³)	462014	2543411	82.9	90.9	82.4	90.4	0.01	-	0.4	0.5
Coal	(1,000t)	395198	1391858	72.5	76.3	37.0	36.2	22.4	27.6	13.0	12.6
Electricity	(bil kw/h)	962	4115.5	29.9	31.5	10.3	12.3	15.6	14.7	3.7	4.5
<u><Wood & Paper and Fish & Maritime></u>											
Sawn timber	(1 km ³)	79.5	235.1	40.5	37.2	11.5	11.1	21.2	19.6	7.8	6.4
Cellulose	(1,000t)	7953.9	23986.0	30.6	31.4	-	-	23.4	24.7	7.2	6.6
Paper	(1,000t)	5029.7	16497.1	7.0	6.1	0.04	-	2.4	2.2	4.5	3.9
Fish & Maritime	(1,000t)	7769.6	24527.2	54.7	60.5	0.5	0.6	0.2	0.2	54.0	59.8
<u><Ferrous Metallurgy></u>											
Iron ore	(mil t)	104	356.1	16.3	16.7	3.8	4.5	12.5	12.2	-	-
Smelt cast Iron	(mil t)	57.1	195.3	18.0	16.4	18.0	16.4	-	-	-	-
Smelt Iron	(1,000t)	88707	292097.0	16.8	15.7	14.7	13.5	0.8	0.7	1.2	1.4
Iron tube	(1,000t)	11509	36297	4.6	3.8	4.6	3.8	-	-	-	-
<u><Chemicals></u>											
Sulfuric acid	(1,000t)	12017.3	42310	8.6	11.1	3.7	3.6	1.7	3.8	3.3	3.7
Fertilizer	(1,000t)	17304	43321.0	5.6	5.6	3.4	3.7	2.2	1.9	-	-
Chemical fabric	(1,000t)	725.4	2024.6	27.5	32.6	15.7	18.6	11.8	14.0	-	-
Plastic	(1,000t)	3013	10741.0	22.1	30.8	14.0	17.6	7.9	12.9	0.2	0.3
<u><Construction Materials></u>											
Cement	(1,000t)	79089	272098.0	22.6	22.6	8.4	9.0	7.9	8.3	6.3	5.4
Reinforced concrete	(1,000t)	71731	263563.0	21.7	21.2	10.3	11.3	5.8	4.5	5.6	5.3
<u><Machine Building & Domestic Electronics></u>											
Automobile crane		14957	50298.0	3.7	5.2	-	-	1.8	3.0	1.9	2.2
Light automobile	(1,000)	1164.7	4052.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Freezer/fridge	(1,000)	3452.5	14149.1	25.1	24.7	-	-	21.3	21.4	3.8	3.3
Washing machine	(1,000)	3271.5	19149.7	21.7	19.9	8.8	11.8	7.0	5.0	5.9	3.1
TV set	(1,000)	4773.3	16815.8	16.9	14.2	9.2	8.5	7.7	5.7	-	0.1

Source: Goskomstat, *Promyshlennost' 1996* (Moscow: Goskomstat Rossii, 1996).

III. 1. (2) Perestroika as a Crisis for the SIBFE

Under such a specialised economic structure, *perestroika* had become a crisis as well as an opportunity for the regions. In terms of a crisis, the SIBFE economy was facing a three-dimensional threat: continuing economic decline, changing investment priorities, and self-accountancy under the 'absurd' price system. First, although it was not confined to the SIBFE, a drastic economic decline had been witnessed in the SIBFE since the 1980s which triggered regionalist resentment against the central authorities and central economic policies. A physical industrial production indicator showed that Russian industrial production had fallen by nearly 35 per cent in 1993 and just to half in 1995 compared to the production level of 1989. Industrial production had fallen more severely in relatively more industrialised regions such as Central region and the Urals than other economic regions. In general, the physical industrial production of the SIBFE regions had fallen by about 30 per cent in 1993, compared to the 1989 level.

These general indicators and the expanding share of industrial production of the SIBFE in terms of monetary value during 1990-1993 seem to suggest that the industrial decline in the SIBFE was relatively less disastrous than other economic regions. However, the SIBFE's increasing share of the whole industrial production in monetary terms was partly because of the decreasing contribution of other economic regions, and the increasing prices of energy resources since 1992. Furthermore, the SIBFE's major industrial sectors suffered a relatively high degree of decline in terms of physical volume in the early 1990s. For instance, comparing to the physical volume production of 1985, gas condensed oil and maritime production had fallen by nearly 35 per cent, chemical fabric and thread by more than 50 per cent, and steel tube by nearly 65 percent. In particular, sawn timber production had decreased by 75 per cent in the SIBFE as a whole, and nearly 90 per cent in Eastern Siberia (see Table 3.1.3).

<Table 3.1.3> Industrial Performance of the SIBFE Regions (1990-1993)

	RF Total		SIBFE Total		West Siberia		East Siberia		Far East		Other Regions	
	1990	1993	1990	1993	1990	1993	1990	1993	1990	1993	1990	1993
Territory	100.0	-	74.7	-	14.2	-	24.1	-	36.4	-	25.4	-
Population	100.0	-	21.8	-	10.2	-	6.2	-	5.4	-	38.2	-
<i>Share of industrial production in terms of monetary value (% to the RF total)</i>												
Share	100.0	100.0	20.3	27.8	10.6	14.0	5.7	7.7	5.0	6.1	79.7	71.2
<i>Physical Industrial Production (1989=100)</i>												
Shift (total)	99.9	64.8	-	-	99.1	71.2	98.0	71.2	98.0	71.1	-	-
<i>Shift of Physical Industrial Production by Industrial Sectors (1989=100)</i>												
(Fossil Fuel & Energy)												
oil	95.3	65.3	101.9	66.3	102.0	66.3	-	-	77.2	64.7	80.7	63.0
gas	138.6	133.9	150.9	147.9	150.8	147.8	-	-	177.1	175.5	79.5	66.0
coal	100.0	77.4	104.6	81.0	103.0	73.6	111.9	96.1	96.5	76.1	88.1	68.0
electricity	112.5	99.4	116.9	106.0	139.2	114.7	100.1	98.3	124.7	113.6	110.6	95.1
(Timber & Fish)												
Timber	94.3	51.4	95.8	25.9	91.9	48.1	100.9	11.8	87.6	31.6	93.3	56.1
fish	101.4	56.2	110.2	66.7	100.2	56.6	88.0	91.3	110.4	66.7	90.8	43.6
(Metallurgy)												
Iron ore	102.9	73.2	103.6	75.7	112.8	92.3	100.8	70.8	-	-	102.5	72.7
smelt cast												
iron	104.0	71.6	99.0	67.0	99.0	67.0	-	-	-	-	105.1	72.9
smelt iron	101.0	65.8	98.7	63.2	96.8	63.9	84.7	45.2	131.2	67.2	101.5	66.3
steel tube	103.6	50.4	101.7	35.1	101.7	35.1	-	-	85.7	-	103.7	51.2
(Chemicals)												
sulphur	106.2	68.6	140.0	69.0	100.3	69.3	250.0	133.0	127.8	35.9	103.1	68.6
fertilizer	92.3	57.3	86.4	60.1	93.3	68.3	75.5	47.0	-	-	95.0	58.6
chemical												
fabric	92.8	48.0	107.1	51.8	107.6	49.7	106.3	54.6	-	-	87.5	46.6
plastic	108.1	74.5	152.7	85.4	145.6	74.3	164.4	104.6	183.3	100.0	95.4	71.5
(Construction Materials)												
reinforced												
concrete	110.7	70.3	122.8	65.4	124.0	71.8	128.1	69.8	115.2	49.1	107.6	71.8
cement	105.0	63.1	108.9	52.1	111.5	59.3	114.8	56.2	98.1	37.1	103.8	66.3
(Machine Building and Domestic Electronics)												
automobile												
crane	93.3	76.6	115.4	110.3	-	-	133.5	137.6	98.2	84.3	92.5	75.1
automobile	94.7	82.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	94.7	82.1
freezer/												
fridge	109.3	100.8	105.4	100.7	-	-	103.5	104.0	116.2	81.9	110.6	100.9
washing												
machine	165.6	119.2	163.9	100.6	214.7	169.7	154.5	51.8	99.5	55.5	166.1	124.4
TV set	98.8	83.5	84.5	57.7	80.3	64.5	89.6	45.7	-	-	101.7	89.1

Newly developed energy resources in Eastern Siberia are ignored.

Shift of Physical Industrial Production by Industrial Sectors calculated by author.

Sources: Goskomstat, *Rossiiskaia Federatsiia v 1992 godu: statisticheski ezhegodnik* (Moscow: Respublikanskii informatsionno-izdatel'skii tsentr, 1993), pp. 5-10; Goskomstat, *Promyshlennost' 1996*.

Secondly, the shift of development strategy introduced by Gorbachev was perceived as a threat to the SIBFE. Gorbachev emphasised an 'intensive growth' policy that was based on scientific and technological progress, modernisation of existing facilities, and resource-saving policies. It was regarded as an emphasis on the development of the European part of Russia where the economic potential and infrastructure was relatively well developed.¹⁹ The competition for investment between the European part of Russia and the SIBFE has a long history. Even after Central Asia was ruled out of the competition as a result of the breakdown of the Soviet Union, still the same unfavourable factors that affected the ability of the SIBFE regions to attract investment—labour shortage, undeveloped infrastructure, harsh natural conditions, and long distances from the Russian heartland—remained unchanged.²⁰ Furthermore, the total volume of investment had continued to decrease because of budget deficits, inflation, wage rises, and a greater priority for 'non-production' sectors. According to the Russian Academy of Sciences and Reform International Foundation, capital investment had decreased by 48 per cent in the first nine months of 1992 alone.²¹

During 1985-1993, most of the economic regions received capital investment that was about the same proportion to their contribution to the whole industrial production in Russia. However, the SIBFE as a whole received about one-third of total capital investment during 1985-1993, which was larger than its contribution to industrial production and population size. Despite the decreasing capital investment in absolute terms in Russia as a whole, the SIBFE steadily received about the same proportion—not in absolute volume—of investment.

However, the problem is that capital investment in the SIBFE had been concentrated on a few administrative units and carried out in a highly selective manner.²² For instance, Tiumen oblast alone took nearly ten to sixteen per cent of total investment during 1985-1993, although the absolute volume of capital investment in the oil/gas industries also suffered a huge cut after 1989.²³ The amount allocated to Tiumen was a bit smaller than the amount to the Central regions, about the same as to the Urals, and larger than the amount taken by any other economic region. Therefore, as the falling share of Eastern Siberia suggested, the increasing share of Tiumen and other resource-rich regions were fulfilled at the cost of other regions in the SIBFE.

<Table 3.1.4> Capital Investment in the Russian Federation (1990-1993)

Administrative Units	Investment Share (RF Total=100)				Per capita Investment (1,000 rubles)				Per capita Investment (RF Average=100)				
	1985 ¹⁾	1990 ²⁾	1991 ¹⁾	1992 ²⁾	1993 ²⁾	1990	1991	1992	1993	1990	1991	1992	1993
<u>European Russia</u>	67.7	67.1	66.2	67.7	66.0	1.45	1.20	15.56	153.78	85.8	84.8	86.7	84.3
North	4.7	5.1	4.8	5.5	4.4	2.09	1.65	23.87	195.62	123.4	116.5	132.9	107.2
Northwest	4.4	4.6	4.5	3.6	3.2	1.39	1.13	11.53	105.44	82.4	79.8	64.2	57.8
Central	17.8	17.6	15.8	16.0	18.0	1.44	1.09	14.04	160.96	85.4	77.0	78.2	88.2
Volgo-Viatka	4.8	4.8	4.9	4.3	4.8	1.43	1.22	13.52	154.05	84.4	86.4	75.3	84.4
Central Chernoziem	4.8	4.6	4.4	4.7	3.8	1.47	1.20	16.32	130.58	87.2	84.3	90.9	71.6
Volga	10.9	10.3	10.7	11.0	10.6	1.57	1.36	17.70	172.28	92.9	96.1	98.6	94.4
North Caucasus	7.5	7.6	7.9	7.1	7.0	1.13	0.98	10.93	108.84	66.8	69.3	60.9	59.7
Urals	12.2	11.9	12.7	15.2	13.7	1.46	1.31	19.84	181.73	86.5	92.2	110.5	99.6
Kaliningrad oblast	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.5	1.42	1.16	11.87	158.74	84.3	81.8	66.1	87.0
<u>The SIBFE</u>	33.8	33.1	33.3	34.9	33.9	2.57	2.16	28.71	284.77	151.9	152.2	159.9	156.1
West Siberia ³⁾	18.9	18.1	18.5	23.9	21.1	3.01	2.56	42.16	376.93	178.2	180.9	234.8	206.6
(Tiumen oblast)	11.5	10.4	10.6	16.0	13.7	8.42	7.07	135.98	1193.57	498.5	499.1	757.3	654.2
East Siberia	7.1	7.1	6.9	3.6	5.9	1.93	1.57	10.51	173.48	114.1	110.9	58.5	95.1
Far East	7.7	7.9	7.9	7.3	6.9	2.47	2.06	24.27	238.08	146.0	145.7	135.2	130.5
RF TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	1.69	1.42	17.96	182.44	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

¹⁾ 1991 price; ²⁾ real price; ³⁾ West Siberia inclusive of Tiumen oblast

Sources: Goskomstat Rossii, *Kapital'noe stroitel'stvo v Rossiiskoi Federatsii* (Moscow: Goskomstat Rossii, 1994), pp. 11-12; and Goskomstat, *Rossiiskii statisticheskie ezhegodnik 1994*, pp. 441-443.

Declining investment was also apparent in per capita capital investment. Most Siberian regions—excluding Kemerovo, Tomsk, Tiumen, and Krasnoiarsk—fell short of the Russian average. Again, per capita investment in Tiumen oblast was nearly five times the Russian average in 1990-1991, and increased to nearly 7.5 times in 1992. Although the per capita investment level was still higher in the Far Eastern regions than the Russian average, it showed decreasing trends during 1990-1993 with a few exceptional cases such as Tiumen, Kemerovo, Sakha, and Kamchatka.

Thirdly, economic self-accounting under the existing price system became a tangible threat to the SIBFE regions. It is understandable, as the regions were to deliver their products to other regions in return for the products they lacked under the existing regional division of labour.²⁴ However, self-accountancy and price liberalisation delayed delivery of goods when regions and enterprises were seeking more favourable terms in their barter relations or a more profitable free market. In particular, economic self-accountancy was regarded as a form of economic sovereignty in the former Union republics such as the Baltic republics, and often resulted in control over the transfer of goods for 'domestic' consumption. Such a trend was regarded as a serious threat to the economy and became a major focus of debate in the USSR CPD, as will be discussed in Chapter 3.

The main problems of self-accountancy did not come from the idea itself, but from the price system, which would leave many regions and enterprises unable to sustain their own economy. The Soviet price system was a 'two-tier' one. Under the system, the prices of raw materials and agricultural products were lower than the international price. By contrast, those of manufactured goods were formed to have more profits, although of which about 60 per cent would go into the national budget.²⁵ As Aganbegian noted, the price system ignored the cost concept and assumed resources were available to an enterprise 'for free.' According to him, two immediate problems—the difference in prices between raw resources and manufactured goods, and between industrial and agricultural products—had to be sorted out before any significant self-accountancy measures could be taken. In order to tackle the problems, he suggested to double the prices of raw materials at least, while the prices of other manufactured goods had to be held to a lower level of increase or even a decrease.²⁶

Under the given price system, economic self-accountancy seemed to be a threat rather than an opportunity for the SIBFE regions. Despite the need to adjust the price system, however, the prices of agricultural products showed relatively lower levels of

increase than industrial products.²⁷ Although energy prices were raised higher than the average price rise in the industrial sector in January 1992, still the price of crude oil, gas, and coal was relatively lower than that of processed goods such as gasoline and diesel fuel, little of which was produced in the SIBFE.

<Table 3.1.5> Price of Energy Resources (1991-1993)

	1991	1992	1993
Crude Oil	0.07	3.6	22.3
Gasoline	0.1	6.1	54.2
Fuel Diesel	0.1	5.6	54.1
Heavy Fuel Oil (<i>Mazut</i>)	0.006	2.9	21.7
Gas (1,000 m ³)	0.001	0.2	1.2
Coal	0.002	0.7	5.1

1,000 rubles/ton

Source: Goskomstat, *Rossiiskii statisticheski ezhegodnik 1996*, p. 399.

In this regard, the SIBFE regions were far from benefiting from the process of price liberalisation, which developed into a main resentment of the SIBFE.²⁸

III. 2. Deteriorating Living Standards and Social Conditions

The question of underdeveloped social conditions in the SIBFE and the need to bridge the gap between the European part of Russia and the SIBFE had been recognised not only by the SIBFE regional authorities, but also by the central authorities.²⁹ Despite the concerns, however, living conditions in the SIBFE had been deteriorating after *perestroika*.

First of all, despite the higher monetary income levels in the SIBFE than in the European part of Russia, 'real' income had decreased after price liberalisation, launched in January 1992. Secondly, the consumption of goods and services had fallen because of the lack of purchasing power and supplies. In particular, the state delivery system and enterprises that provided a major portion of consumer goods and local public services, had withdrawn from these sectors to survive the self-accounting drive. Thirdly, environmental disasters aggravated living conditions, together with harsh natural surroundings. In particular, enterprises under the Union ministries had seldom taken the social costs of their economic activities into account, which often caused threats to natural environments and the traditional ways of life of ethnic minority groups.

Such circumstances led regional authorities and the grassroots to complain about living conditions in the SIBFE. For instance, an initiative group of SIBFE deputies in the USSR CPD adopted a draft platform at a meeting in Novosibirsk in January 1990, showing their concerns about the development of living conditions in the area:

In Siberia and the Soviet Far East, infant mortality reaches 20-40 per cent and mortality between the age of 16-45 is 1.2-2.3 times higher than the European parts of Russia. Life expectancy is five to seven years shorter than the average of the RSFSR. ... One-third of population does not have proper education and health care. Siberians and Far Easterners are 2.2-2.5 times—6.7 times in Tiumen—more exposed to air pollution than those in the European parts of Russia.³⁰

Similar complains were repeatedly expressed at the First Siberian Congress of the People's Deputies, held in Krasnoiarsk in March 1992. In the meeting, A. Novikov, the Chairman of Krasnoiarsk *kraisovet*, urged the central authorities to take necessary measures to deal with deteriorating living conditions in Siberia which were worse than in the central regions of Russia.³¹ The feeling of crisis was shared by the grassroots when more than 65 per cent of Siberians thought their material well-being had fallen to a low or very low level, and more than 80 per cent thought they simply could not cope with market relations.³² Such deteriorating social conditions and general perceptions on the matter became a solid basis of regionalist movements in the area.

III. 2 (1) Deteriorating 'Real' Income and Expenditure Level

During the Soviet period, harsh natural and climatic conditions were perceived as an obstacle to the economic activities in the area not only because they decreased the productivity of labour and capital investment, but also because they worsened chronic labour shortage problems in the Far Northern and the SIBFE regions. As part of the solution, wages had been set considerably higher in the area and central subsidies had been given to deliveries of necessary goods, although these measures failed to cope with the problems.³³ Furthermore, after *perestroika*, these measures to deal with the peculiar local situation had almost collapsed, particularly when price liberalisation and decreasing central subsidies caused a price rise in the area, lowering 'real' income levels.³⁴

As shown in Table 3.2.1, industrial workers in four planning regions such as the North, Western and Eastern Siberia and the Far East received much higher wages than those in other regions of Russia. Even under the economic reform, the wage gap between these four economic regions and others grew wider. In particular, workers in the Far East received almost double the national average wage in 1993.

<Table 3.2.1> Average Monthly Wage of Industrial Production Personnel (1985-1993)

	Average Monthly Wage					% to RF Average				
	1985	1990	1991	1992	1993	1985	1990	1991	1992	1993
North	289.6	405.7	764.1	10336.3	92.7	131.7	130.5	126.2	146.3	146.2
Northwest	202.4	293.3	559.8	5225.9	47.8	92.0	94.3	92.4	74.0	75.4
Central	195.9	282.7	552.4	5524.3	48.5	89.1	90.9	91.2	78.2	76.5
Volgo-Viatka	195.7	273.1	510.1	5344.3	49.8	89.0	87.8	84.2	75.7	78.5
Sen Chernozem	189.0	268.0	512.4	5800.5	50.8	85.9	86.2	84.6	82.1	80.1
Volga	197.6	275.4	512.9	5862.2	54.5	89.9	88.6	84.7	83.0	86.0
North Caucasus	192.5	272.3	523.9	5234.3	45.4	87.5	87.6	86.5	74.1	71.6
Urals	217.2	306.1	603.1	7403.1	63.1	98.8	98.5	99.6	104.8	99.5
West Siberia	250.5	364.8	742.4	10146.5	90.4	113.9	117.3	122.6	143.6	142.6
East Siberia	260.7	368.7	782.8	10864.2	94.0	118.6	118.6	129.2	153.8	148.3
Far East	341.2	484.9	929.2	11822.7	126.7	155.2	156.0	153.4	167.4	199.8
Kaliningrad ob	214.1	297.9	556.9	5037.5	49.2	97.4	95.8	91.9	71.3	77.6
RF Average	219.9	310.9	605.7	7064.0	63.4	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Wages in rubles until 1992, and 1,000 rubles in 1993

Source: Goskomstat, *Promyshlennost' 1996*, pp. 271-273.

Due to high wages, monetary income levels were also higher in the SIBFE and the North than in any other region.³⁵ However, a higher monetary income level does not necessarily mean a higher level of real income in Russia, since it fails to reflect the real purchasing power of income because of the wide variety of prices of goods and services. For instance, as far as monetary income and expenditure were concerned, most SIBFE regions including Altai krai and the Republic of Tyva showed higher income levels than other administrative units in the Russian Federation. However, at the same time, the prices of basic goods in the SIBFE cities were much higher than in the most cities of the European part of Russia.

Considered in terms of a basket in which included the most important foodstuffs—a kilogram of beef, sausage, bread, animal butter, vegetable butter, potato, a litre of milk, and ten eggs—the price of a basket was highest in the Far East. For instance, a basket of basic foodstuffs cost about 4,500 rubles in Ulianovsk, but about 26,000 rubles in Magadan in 1993. All other SIBFE cities ranked high in terms of living costs, although Omsk, Ulan-Ude in Buriatia, and Kyzyl in Tyva could be exceptional cases.

<Table 3.2.2> Per Household Income and Expenditure (the First Quarter of 1993)

Planning Regions	Monetary Income/Expenditure		Average Price (basket)	'Real' Income/Expenditure		Saving (% of income)
	income	expenditure		income	expenditure	
North	17695.6	9549.5	11008.2	1.6	0.9	45.3
Northwest	9379.4	7298.1	9269.3	1.0	0.8	22.6
Central	9736.4	7755.6	8895.3	1.1	0.9	21.3
Volgo-Viatka	8547.5	6075.1	9228.0	0.9	0.7	29.0
Central Chernozem	8853.1	5980.9	8306.2	1.1	0.7	32.4
Volga	9675.7	6020.6	8710.5	1.2	0.7	35.8
North Caucasus	6455.4	3163.2	9419.9	0.7	0.3	51.7
Urals	11302.0	6900.6	10987.0	1.0	0.6	38.5
West Siberia	14756.1	6667.7	11739.6	1.3	0.6	54.6
East Siberia	12122.6	6831.5	10921.4	1.1	0.6	43.6
Far East	20542.9	10525.6	18143.3	1.1	0.6	46.5
Kaliningrad ob	7477.3	7858.7	9460.0	0.8	0.8	-5.1

Moscow oblast, Leningrad oblast, Jewish autonomous oblast, and autonomous okrugs are excluded in the table because average prices are not available.

Sources: Goskomstat, *Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoe polozhenie RF v ianvare-marte 1993 goda*, pp. 145-146 (monetary income and expenditure); and *Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik, 1994*, pp. 599-607 (prices of basic foodstuffs).

Based on the shopping basket price, we can produce an indicator which gives a rough idea of real purchasing power. In addition, we can develop another indicator of consumption levels in terms of the units of basket consumed, without considering the prices of other commodities or services.³⁶ In terms of purchasing power, income levels in the SIBFE regions were drastically decreased, particularly in Primorskii, Khabarovsk, Amur, and Sakhalin, as high living costs were compensated by high monetary income. Among the SIBFE regions, Tiumen, Magadan and Irkutsk oblasts, Krasnoiarsk krai and Republic of Sakha maintained a relatively high level of real income.

As far as the consumption aspect is concerned, expenditure in terms of a shopping basket unit suggests that consumption levels in the SIBFE were generally very low.³⁷ Among the SIBFE regions, only four regions—Tiumen oblast, Krasnoiarsk krai, Irkutsk oblast, and Republic of Sakha—maintained average or higher consumption levels than the Russian average. It also suggests that monetary expenditure levels were rather exaggerated and failed to reflect the prices of goods. For instance, per household monetary expenditure during the first quarter of 1993 was about 14,300 rubles in Magadan oblast, but about 10,000 rubles in Tiumen oblast. However, in terms of a shopping basket unit, people in Tiumen (0.86) consumed more than in Magadan (0.55), although they spent less money.

Obviously, lower levels of consumption were also caused by a shortage of supplies, though it was not a new problem at all. However, it was getting worse when the state delivery system was being replaced by a market system which was far from being fully developed.³⁸ Another reason could be rocketing inflation caused by price liberalisation and decreasing subsidies for transportation costs. In particular, high monetary incomes combined with a shortage of goods fuelled inflation, and thus offset its intended positive effect.³⁹ In this regard, a relatively high proportion of savings may indicate that people in the area were rather 'forced' to save their incomes.⁴⁰

III. 2 (2) Underdeveloped Infrastructure and Public Services

Lower level of consumption in the SIBFE can also be found in the public service sector such as housing, education and cultural facilities, health care, heat and water supply, communication, roads, and so on. Even without considering their quality, housing, road, and telephone services were notably undeveloped in the SIBFE. The problem has often been blamed for the higher level of emigration from the area.⁴¹

During the Soviet period, investment in the 'non-productive' sectors had been given a relatively low priority, particularly in the SIBFE.⁴² Assumptions of this kind came with increasing challenge. The mine workers' strikes that started in Kemerovo oblast in July 1989 and soon spread all over the mining areas were in part an extreme form of demand for the development of the social sphere.⁴³ A sign of change in priorities was revealed in the guidelines for the Five-Year Plan, which were adopted at the 27th Party Congress of the CPSU in February 1986.⁴⁴ As a result, capital investment for the non-production sector continuously increased from 27.4 per cent in 1985 to 29.1 per cent in 1990, 31.4 per cent in 1991, 36.2 per cent in 1992, and 41.5 per cent in 1993.⁴⁵

Despite increasing investment and constructions, however, problems in the social sphere such as housing, heat and water supplies remained acute in the SIBFE.⁴⁶ First of all, the increasing cost of construction of social infrastructure should be blamed for the situation. The cost was much higher in the SIBFE,⁴⁷ and thus a noticeably growing proportion of investment to the social sphere still failed to meet the need. Furthermore, ever-increasing costs forced enterprises, which were facing a cost-accounting drive, to withdraw their services (*sotskul'tbyt*, public services of enterprises' responsibility), which local authorities also found it difficult to finance.⁴⁸

<Table 3.2.3> Development of Social Infrastructure in the Russian Federation (1990-1993)

	Housing Space (m ² per habitant)			Road (km on 1,000 km ²)			Number of Telephone (per 100 family in urban area)			Number of Doctors (per 10,000 people)			Hospital Beds (per 10,000 people)			Use of Fresh Water (1,000 m ³ per capita)			People in Higher Education (among 1,000 people)		
	1985	1993	1985	1993	1985	1993	1985	1993	1990	1993	1990	1993	1990	1993	1990	1993	1990	1993	1990/91	1993/94	
<i>RF Average</i>	14.9	17.4	21.0	26.0	24.5	41.5	43.4	45.0	43.4	138	129	0.65	0.57	19.2	17.1						
North	15.0	18.0	13.0	18.0	18.1	39.0	40.2	41.4	40.2	140	134	0.92	0.81	9.4	9.8						
Northwest	17.1	18.9	110.0	133.0	45.8	70.7	53.9	64.0	53.9	128	112	1.03	0.91	32.1	27.8						
Central	16.2	18.6	125.0	147.0	41.5	58.1	49.2	55.6	49.2	139	130	0.46	0.41	26.2	22.8						
Volgo-Viatka	15.0	17.7	79.0	93.0	18.9	35.4	38.4	36.8	38.4	144	139	0.31	0.29	15.8	14.9						
Central Chernozem	16.3	19.0	116.0	160.0	19.0	38.7	38.6	36.8	38.6	141	137	0.37	0.31	16.0	15.0						
Volga	15.0	17.2	67.0	88.0	15.5	30.1	43.1	41.6	43.1	134	126	0.63	0.49	18.3	16.5						
North Caucasus	14.5	16.6	116.0	126.0	17.2	33.5	38.1	41.0	38.1	127	113	1.36	1.15	15.0	13.4						
Urals	14.2	16.7	60.0	70.0	15.9	32.6	39.2	37.8	39.2	141	136	0.53	0.49	15.0	13.6						
West Siberia	13.7	14.1	13.0	18.0	15.9	31.8	43.1	42.8	43.1	135	126	0.49	0.41	19.2	17.1						
East Siberia	12.8	15.9	8.5	9.5	11.2	26.5	42.2	40.5	42.2	145	138	0.82	0.71	18.0	16.3						
Far East	12.8	16.0	3.9	4.5	17.9	33.1	48.2	49.0	48.2	148	143	0.43	0.39	15.4	14.1						
Kaliningrad ob	15.0	17.1	301.0	306.0	18.9	28.9	37.7	42.0	37.7	143	134	0.42	0.31	18.1	12.6						

Sources: Goskomstat, *Rossiiskii statisticheski ezhegodnik, 1996*; and *Sotsial'naia sfera Rossii, 1996*.

Secondly, a continuing emphasis on the development of the social sphere was not accompanied by the delivery of necessary materials for construction.⁴⁹ Despite the growing numbers of enterprises and their performance in terms of monetary value, physical production and employees in this sector were decreasing in the early 1990s. Therefore, it was getting more difficult for the SIBFE regions to procure construction materials, since the regions had a weak industrial basis of construction materials (see Table 3.1.1), and thus were dependent on deliveries of construction materials from other regions.⁵⁰

<Table 3.2.4> General Index of Construction Material Industry

	1970	1980	1990	1991	1992	1993
Number of Enterprises	-	1971	2074	2217	5053	6767
Production Total (bil rub)	8.8	13.1	20.2	44.2	562	5125
Production in Physical Volume (% of previous year)	109	101	99.1	98	80	84
Number of Employees (1000)	1111	1252	1097	1067	1136	1095
Workers among Employees	954	1046	918	893	962	929

Source: Goskomstat, *Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik 1996*, p. 532.

Finally, despite some advances in the social sector, success had been spoiled by the unbalanced and uncoordinated development of other social sectors in the SIBFE. Housing, one of the most serious problems in the regions, demonstrated the seriousness of unbalanced development. Together with an absolute shortage of housing space, about 20 per cent of the housing stocks in Russia did not (or only partially) have running water, sewerage, central heating, and gas. The figure was still higher in the Russian Far East.⁵¹ According to Pin'ski, only 30 per cent of housing was specially designed for climatic conditions in Siberia in the early 1980s.⁵² Complaints about the quality of housing—and the lack of water, heat, gas and electricity—were heard in other SIBFE regions, particular in the remote rural areas where those supplies are more desperately needed to survive harsh natural and climatic conditions.⁵³

The problems of unbalanced development were again demonstrated when the electricity supply deteriorated in the Russian Far East. A relative 'success' in housing construction in the area, where electricity generating capacity was very low (see Table 3.1.2), made this success almost obsolete, when energy shortages forced heat to be supplied in shifts, leaving rooms temperatures at no more than 10 degrees centigrade in winter.⁵⁴

Problems are also found in other social sectors such as health care and education. As far as the numbers of doctors and hospital beds were concerned, people in the SIBFE appeared to enjoy about the same—or even better—level of services as compared with the European part of Russia (see Table 3.2.3.). However, the matter is not that simple. Similar numbers of doctors and hospital beds in a far wider territory meant that locals had sometimes to make a long journey to see a doctor in the area where the transportation system was much worse.⁵⁵ It might also mean that people in the SIBFE had less opportunity to see a doctor. Furthermore, the quality of medical service was rather low, considering outdated medical facilities and the shortage of medicines and other necessary supplies such as hot water and heat in the area.⁵⁶ Furthermore, a reduction of medical services was also reported in the Russian Far East, because of the closing down of state medical facilities.⁵⁷

III. 2 (3) Deteriorating Environmental Surroundings

Environmental problems constitute another important aspect of living conditions. During the Soviet period, a series of laws on the issue were adopted, particularly under Brezhnev.⁵⁸ However, environmental concerns had been given a lower priority than economic efficiency, and had been discussed in a 'corporatist' manner.⁵⁹ Under Gorbachev, Soviet environmental policies underwent significant changes, because of growing worries after the Chernobyl' accident in April 1986 and widespread environmental activism stimulated by ecological *glasnost*.⁶⁰ Despite the changes, however, the problems remained unsolved during the Soviet period, mainly because of the bureaucratic resistance of the central ministries, inefficient facilities to cope with the problems, a shortage of financial support, and lack of determination of the Soviet authorities.⁶¹ Ecological problems severely damaged living conditions in the SIBFE, and thus became a good stimulus for active public participation.

In fact, ecological movements were launched in the 1960s in Siberia after the establishment of two cellulose plants in the Lake Baikal in 1958 led by Grigorii Galazii, director of the Limnological Institute of the Siberian Academy of Sciences.⁶² In March 1965, an appeal entitled "In Defence of Lake Baikal" was adopted at a congress of Russian writers,⁶³ and soon the "Village Prose School" was formed by Valentin G. Rasputin, V. Astafe'v and A. V. Skalon, drawing attentions to environmental problems.⁶⁴

Among many indicators of environmental problems, air pollution was one of the main complaints of the SIBFE regions. Air pollution was more serious in regions such as the Urals, Western and Eastern Siberia where extractive, metallurgical, and chemical industries were developed.⁶⁵ The Russian Far East, where a relatively small population lived on a huge territory, seemed to be less severely affected by air pollution. However, relatively densely populated cities in the area also were reported to suffer high levels of pollution.

<Table 3.2.5> Emission of Dust in the Atmosphere from Stationary Sources (1985-1993)

Planning Regions	1985	1990-93	Shift (1993)	% of RF Total	
	(1000 t)	(1000 t)	(1985=100)	1985	1990-93
North	3230	3168.5	85.4	8.2	10.7
Northwest	1032	760.3	57.7	2.6	2.6
Central	4471	2687.3	47.9	11.4	9.0
Volgo-Viatka	1156	860.3	60.3	2.9	2.9
Central Chernozem	1529	963.0	47.4	3.9	3.2
Volga	3078	2120.0	58.6	7.8	7.1
North Caucasus	1988	1315.3	42.9	5.1	4.4
Urals	9197	7102.0	63.5	23.4	23.9
West Siberia	6376	4908.5	67.7	16.2	16.5
East Siberia	5224	4300.8	72.5	13.3	14.5
Far East	1843	1452.3	65.5	4.7	4.9
Kaliningrad	129	80.0	50.4	0.3	0.3
All Russia Total	39253	29718.0	63.1	100.0	100.0

Source: Goskomstat, *Rossiiskii statisticheski ezhegodnik*, 1994, pp. 572-574.

According to *Goskompriroda's* report on the state of Soviet environment which was released in 1989, 26 cities in the SIBFE were included in the list of 99 highly polluted cities in Russia in 1989,⁶⁶ and 17 SIBFE cities were listed in the 68 Soviet cities with the highest levels of air pollution in 1989.⁶⁷ A report *Goskomstat* published in 1989 covered 104 cities of the USSR, and also reported the level of air pollution in the 17 cities of the SIBFE.⁶⁸ According to these sources, air pollution was worst in Noril'sk in Evenki autonomous okrug, where the largest nickel combine in Russia is located. Noril'sk metallurgical plants alone emitted about 2.34 million tonnes of pollutants (or 6.2 per cent of the total amount of pollutants in Russia) in 1988, and remained far worse in 1990 than any other cities in Russia.⁶⁹ Air pollution was also very severe in Novokuznetsk, Omsk, Angarsk, and Krasnoiarsk.

<Table 3.2.6> Noxious Emissions into the Atmosphere from Stationary Sources in Some Cities in Russia (1985-1990, 1,000 tons)

		1985	1987	1988	1990
North					
Vologoda oblast	Cherepovets	685.1	671.7	646.7	599.7
Northwest					
G. St. Petersburg	St. Petersburg	276.0	254.1	236.4	-
Central					
G. Moscow	Moscow	411.0	369.1	311.8	273.8
Riazan oblast	Riazan	185.4	213.9	163.8	-
Iaroslavl oblast	Iaroslavl	272.9	256.0	231.5	-
Volgo-Viatka					
Kirov oblast	Kirov	100.9	102.7	104.2	-
Central Chernozem					
Belgorod oblast	Belgorod	365.3	280.0	227.7	-
Lipetsk oblast	Lipetsk	752.8	722.1	684.1	643.1
Volga					
Volgograd oblast	Volgograd	365.3	280.0	227.7	206.9
Samara oblast	Samara	173.2	160.5	147.1	122.0
	Tol'iatti	135.2	137.3	125.8	103.3
Saratov oblast	Saratov	195.3	195.1	186.6	-
North Caucasus					
Rep Chechen-Ingush	Groznyi	341.2	308.5	297.7	238.3
Urals					
Rep Bashkir	Ufa	382.3	349.1	304.0	260.3
	Sterlitamak	213.9	181.7	157.9	132.0
Orenburg oblast	Orenburg	134.7	134.9	142.0	-
	Novotroitsk	294.5	290.9	233.9	220.4
Perm oblast	Perm	267.1	217.5	193.0	152.2
Sverdlovsk oblast	Nizhnii Tagil	680.0	685.0	640.0	559.3
	Kamensk-Ural'skii	184.4	127.9	115.8	72.2
Cheliabinsk oblast	Cheliabinsk	435.8	446.7	426.9	391.5
	Maginitogorsk	904.1	871.4	849.0	791.1
West Siberia					
Altai krai	Barnaul	208.5	183.7	183.6	165.1
Kemerovo oblast	Kemerovo	167.7	134.6	122.0	94.7
	Novokuznetsk	1001.9	892.9	833.0	572.7
	Prekop'evsk	45.7	43.3	40.9	41.3
Novosibirsk oblast	Novosibirsk	232.1	228.4	235.2	-
Omsk oblast	Omsk	529.2	479.4	440.4	438.8
Tiumen oblast	Tiumen	54.1	39.5	45.1	-
East Siberia					
Krasnoiarsk krai	Krasnoiarsk	341.8	291.0	258.6	244.5
	Noril'sk	2518.0	2400.1	2342.7	2298.8
Irkutsk oblast	Irkutsk	78.7	89.4	94.4	-
	Angarsk	508.8	466.8	430.5	391.3
	Shelekhov	77.7	64.7	50.0	44.6
	Usol'e-Sibirskoe	102.6	94.9	95.7	.
	Bratsk	200.5	173.0	157.6	.
Far East					
Khabarovsk krai	Khabarovsk	231.3	172.8	171.3	141.1
Amur oblast	Komsomolsk-na-Amure	84.9	77.1	70.0	64.0
Sakhalin oblast	Iuzhno-Sakhalin	29.9	26.7	29.2	26.0

Sources: Goskomstat, *Okhrana okruzhaiushchei i ratsional'noe ispol'zovanie prirodnykh resursov v SSSR* (Moscow: Goskomstat, 1989), pp. 22-24; and Goskomstat RSFSR, *Narodnoe khoziaistvo RSFSR, 1990: statisticheskii ezhegodnik* (Moscow: Goskomstat, 1990), p. 309.

Cellulose-paper, chemical and metallurgical industries are blamed for air pollution in Eastern Siberia, and oil and gas industries caused main problems in Western Siberia, particularly in the northern part of Tiumen oblast. According Mnatsakanian's summary, only 64-70 per cent of gas in oil fields was used in the late 1980s, while the rest was simply burned off.⁷⁰ Gas industries in the area also generated similar pollution in the process of extracting, processing and transporting. Furthermore, according to Wolfson, 70-170 gas pipeline accidents occurred annually and were responsible for the emission of 2,850 million cubic metres during 1970-1988, mainly because of the wear and tear of pipelines.⁷¹

Such air pollution became a serious threat to public health. For instance, in Kemerovo city, 20.6 per cent of newborn babies were already ill, 30-40 per cent were born prematurely, and almost half the children under the age of fifteen suffered respiratory illness.⁷² Similar cases were observed in other cities and industrial centres such as the Kuznetsk basin, Novosibirsk, Noril'sk, and so on.⁷³

Secondly, water pollution in many rivers, lakes and water reservoirs became a major threat to public health and nature. In particular, Lake Baikal has been one of the most popular issues not only in the SIBFE but also in Russia as a whole, because of its enormous size and unique natural qualities.⁷⁴ Despite the 'conservation efforts' during the Soviet period,⁷⁵ the lake suffered significant levels of pollution, mainly caused by dumped industrial waste from cellulose-paper plants, urban sewage, precipitation of air pollutants, and land erosion and contamination caused by agricultural activities. The most serious pollution occurred in the southern part of the lake, including Primorskii Range and Khamar-Daban Range where highly polluted cities were located along the river Angara (Usol'e-Sibirskoe, Angarsk, and Shelekhov in Irkutsk oblast), the river Selenga (Ulan-Ude and Seleginsk in Buriatia), and Baikalsk.⁷⁶

Many other rivers and reservoirs in the area were also polluted by similar sources as the Lake Baikal case suggested. For instance, the river Ob', which runs through Tiumen oilfields, were polluted with oil sediment. Oil leakage from frequent ruptures of oil pipelines worsened the situation.⁷⁷ Water reservoirs, which were constructed since 1960 in a massive number all over the former Soviet Union, suffered from another source of pollution. Because of their size, they buried a wide expanse of land and taiga forest, and thus a couple of millions cubic metres of timbers rotted in the water, causing a high concentration of phenols.⁷⁸ These huge reservoirs not only altered the climates of surrounding areas, but also increased respiratory diseases in neighbouring areas.

Thirdly, radioactive contamination also resulted in serious environmental problems in the area. Despite the Chernobyl' accident, information on nuclear materials was seldom open to the public. However, *glasnost*' brought the issue into the public eye, and concerns about the radioactive contamination appeared sporadically in the Russian press. In the SIBFE, the effect of nuclear tests in Sakha which had taken place during the Soviet period, nuclear facilities in the 'closed cities,' and disposal of nuclear wastes from various sources became an acute problems not only for the local population, but also for neighbouring countries.

During the Soviet period, twelve of the 120 nuclear tests 'for peaceful purposes' had carried out in Sakha. Among them, eleven tests including those with the code names 'Kraton-3,' 'Sheksana,' and 'Neva' were performed along the Viliui river basin. Some environmentalists estimated that contamination must have affected a wide area, although comprehensive research had not yet been undertaken. For instance, radioactive clouds resulted from 'Kraton-3'—which contained a high level of plutonium 239 and 240 that is close to the extent of contamination on soils of Belarus and Ukraine caused by the Chernobyl' incident—could have had reached Krasnoiarsk krai and Irkutsk oblast.⁷⁹ In 1974, another nuclear explosion, code name 'Kristall,' was made to build a dam near Udachnii-2, which contaminated near-by lakes.⁸⁰

Nuclear facilities such as nuclear power stations and nuclear material processing plants also caused radioactive contamination. A nuclear power station in Tomsk that was operating in 1990 had been shut down, because of its radioactive emissions, particularly into the Tom river.⁸¹ Apart from nuclear power stations, radioactive material-related activities in the 'closed cities' also caused contamination with their radioactive materials and wastes. According to Feshbach, twelve 'closed cities' were located in the SIBFE, mainly in Krasnoiarsk and Tomsk.⁸²

Nuclear facilities inevitably produced radioactive wastes. However, these wastes were not properly treated and caused serious contamination. For instance, the Enisei river near 'Krasnoiarsk-26' is now highly contaminated. In some places the contamination reached 40 curies per square kilometre, which is the highest since the Chernobyl' accident.⁸³ Although there existed a huge radioactive waste storage facility in Krasnoiarsk (closed city of "Site-27"), which consisted of tunnels ten times longer than the Moscow underground system, radioactive wastes were dumped in 'normal' places without proper treatment on many occasions. For instance, in Irkutsk, a radioactive waste container was discovered only 20-30 metres from Irkutsk Polytechnic Institute.⁸⁴ In Tomsk, a huge amount of radioactive waste was also found

in the artificial reservoirs.⁸⁵ Another critical case was reported in Balei in Chita oblast. 'Government Enterprise 1084,' a mining enterprise for 'product 17' (thorium) and 'product 18' (uranium) which remained in secret until 1992, caused serious contamination in Balei which was claimed to be worse than Chernobyl'. In the town, buildings had been constructed using the white sand from the uranium pits which emitted more than 10 to 40 times the level that was officially regarded as 'safe.'⁸⁶

Conversion programmes also worsened the situation when radioactive reactors from decommissioned nuclear-powered vessels and military radioactive wastes were not treated properly. According to the Russian government's official report which appeared in April 1993, the former Soviet Union's Navy fleets dumped radioactive waste into the sea during 1959-1991.⁸⁷ In fact, a couple of nuclear waste storage facilities had been planned during the Soviet period. However, they had never been commissioned, because they failed to meet the safety standard and had not been sufficiently financed.⁸⁸ The problem remained acute when the Northern and Pacific Fleet decommissioned 140 nuclear-powered submarines by 1996, and twenty more by 2000.⁸⁹

III. 2 (4) Problems of Small Nations

The problems of small nations might not be a major source of the development of regionalism in the SIBFE, perhaps except in Tyva.⁹⁰ However, it is noteworthy since the problems of small nations were a cross-section of the socio-economic problem of the area as a whole. Furthermore, the problems not only supported the criticism of regional authorities on the 'colonial policies' of the centre, but also provided regions with the 'legacy' of their demands for rights to natural resources.

According to official census data in 1989, more than thirty indigenous peoples live in the SIBFE, including the nations of the North.⁹¹ The size of these groups varied from about 40,000 to less than 200. The total population of indigenous people has accounted for about 5 per cent of the total population in the SIBFE since the 1930s.⁹² Even in the titular republics, the population size of titular nations often ranged between 64.3 per cent of the total in the Republic of Tyva to less than 1.4 per cent in the Khanty-Mansi autonomous okrug.⁹³

<Table 3.2.7> Indigenous Peoples in the SIBFE (1970-1989)

	Population			Indigenous Language User (%)			Main Inhabitant Areas (Administrative Units)
	1970	1979	1989	1970	1979	1989	
<Indigenous Peoples with Titular Republic Status>							
Buriaty	312847	349760	417425	92.8	90.4	86.6	Buriatiia, Irkutsk, Chita
Iakuty	295223	326531	380242	96.4	95.5	94.0	Sakha, Evreisk, Taimyr, Magadan
Tuvintsy	139013	165426	206160	98.8	98.8	98.6	Tyva, Ust-Ordynsk
Khakasy	65368	69247	78500	84.2	810.7	76.6	Kakhasia, Tyva
Altaitsy	54614	58879	69409	88.1	87.1	85.1	Altai
<Other Indigenous Peoples>							
Nenets	28487	29487	34190	83.7	80.9	77.7	Iamalo-Nenets
Evenki	25051	27041	29901	51.3	42.5	30.4	Sakha, Evenki, Buriatiia, Khabarovsk
Khanty	21007	20743	22283	69.1	68.1	60.8	Khanty-Mansi
Eveny	11819	12452	17055	55.5	57.0	43.8	Iamalo-Nenets, Sakha, Kamchatka
Shortsy	16000	15000	16000	-	62.8 ¹⁾	59.4 ¹⁾	Kemerovo, Krasnoiarsk
Chukchi	13500	13937	15107	82.8	78.3	70.4	Chukchi, Koirak, Sakha, Magadan
Nanaitsy	9911	10357	11883	69.3	55.9	44.1	Khabarovsk, Primorskii
Koriak	7367	7637	8942	81.6	69.6	52.4	Koriak, Magadan
Mansi	7609	7434	8279	52.2	49.7	36.7	Khanty-Mansi aok
Dolgany	4718	4911	6584	90.2	90.6	84.0	Taimyr
Nivkhi	4356	4366	4631	49.0	30.4	23.3	Sakhalin, Khabarovsk
Sel'kupy	4249	3518	3564	51.0	56.5	47.7	Khanty-Mansi, Evreisk, Tomsk
Ul'chi	2410	2494	3173	60.9	37.9	30.7	Khabarovsk
Itel'meny	1255	1335	2429	34.6	23.2	18.8	Koriak, Magadan
Udegeitsy	1396	1775	1835	54.4	22.2	25.2	Primorskii, Khabarovsk
Saamy	1836	1775	1835	56.3	51.8	42.0	(Murmansk)
Eskimosy	1265	1460	1704	61.1	60.2	51.6	Chukchi SSR
Teleuty	-	-	1700	-	-	-	Altai mountains
Chuvantsy	-	-	1384	-	-	18.5	Magadan, Sakha
Nganasany	823	842	1262	74.5	90.3	83.4	Krasnoiarsk, Taimyr
Iukagiry	593	801	1112	46.2	36.8	32.0	Sakha, Magadan
Kety	1161	1072	1084	74.9	60.2	48.8	Krasnoiarsk, Taimyr, Evenki
Orochi	1037	1040	883	47.3	33.2	17.8	Khabarovsk, Sakhalin
Tofalary	570	576	722	55.1	54.0	42.8	Irkutsk
Aleuty	410	489	644	18.5	11.5	25.3	Kamchatka
Negidal'ty	495	477	586	52.1	43.4	26.6	Khabarovsk, Kamchatka
Entsy	-	-	198	-	-	46.5	Taimyr, Iamalo-Nenets
Oroki	-	-	179	-	-	44.7	Amur & Sakhalin basin

¹⁾ among those in Kemerovo oblast (12,767 in 1979, 12,585 in 1989) only.

* Komi, mainly distributed in Komi republic, are excluded in the table.

Sources: Goskomstat RSFSR, *Natsional'nyi sostav naseleniia RSFSR: po dannym vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1989 g.*, pp. 8-10, 44-47; Goskomstat, *Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik 1994*, pp. 30-32; and "Chuzhie na svoi zemle," *Sibirskaiia gazeta*, no. 4 (29 January 1990), p. 10.

As suggested by socio-economic conditions in the SIBFE in general, these small nations, particularly those who lived in an area that was remote from regional centres and without titular national administrative units, had fallen victim to central policies. These small nations suffered severe threats from the assimilation policies that were conducted during the Soviet period. Russification policy, for instance the abolition of the Roman alphabet and introduction of Cyrillic for all indigenous languages in 1939, severely damaged indigenous languages which, in some cases, did not have their own alphabet system.⁹⁴ Despite the 1959 law that allowed parents to choose between Russian and a native language in their children's education, proper opportunities had not been given to those small number of people, particularly in small towns.⁹⁵

More closely related to regionalism, the harsh living conditions of small nations became a good example of the 'colonial' approach of departmentalism in the SIBFE. The areas of settlement of these small nations often did not have schools, hospitals, running waters, sewerage system, or electricity. Furthermore their average wages were 10-15 times lower than those of oil workers in neighbouring settlements.⁹⁶ In particular, 'departmental invasion' in the area often resulted in severe environmental problems, causing damage to the health of the native population.⁹⁷ It also made it impossible for indigenous people to continue their traditional economic activities such as hunting, fishing, and reindeer herding.⁹⁸

These problems in turn raised the question of property rights, particularly of reindeer herding people in oil and gas extracting areas such as the Khanty-Mansi and Iamalo-Nenets autonomous okrugs. In the region, according to Stewart, three-quarters of the land in these okrugs became useless for 'traditional economic activities' because of aggressive industrial activities and subsequent pollution. Furthermore, in this century, reindeer herding land had decreased by about 22 million hectares, more than the size of England, in the North.⁹⁹ The issue constituted a main demand of the small nations which developed into more organised forms.¹⁰⁰

III. 3. Evaporation of the Centripetal Structure

During the Soviet period a highly centralised economic and political structure, based on one-party rule, had deterred long-lasting and widespread discontent in the peripheries from developing into a more organised and institutionalised regionalism. However, the political context had changed since Gorbachev's reform. In the process of reform, four main changes are noteworthy in relation with the development of regionalism. First, 'democratisation' transferred power from the CPSU and Union ministries to the Soviets under the slogan of "all power to the Soviets." Second, *glasnost* accommodated open discussions of the defects of central policies and of regional socio-economic circumstances. Third, the collapse of the Soviet Union raised the question of the federal system in Russia. Finally, power struggles at the centre in the process of reform weakened centripetal forces and thus created a more favourable environment for regional initiatives.

III. 3 (1) 'Democratisation' and 'All Power to the Soviets'

At the beginning of *perestroika*, Gorbachev did not mention political reform. However, the need for political reform emerged, as economic reform was faced with the resistance of an 'ossified' system. The first hint of political reform appeared at the 27th Party Congress in February 1986 and accelerated until the Soviet Union collapsed, introducing fundamental changes in the state structure.

The main logic of political reform was based on three points: control over the Party apparatus, 'socialist pluralism,' and the 'rule of law.' First of all, Gorbachev regarded it as the most urgent matter to rebuild a 'socialist democracy,' which had been deformed by the Party apparatus. In his political report to the Congress, Gorbachev emphasised that the development of society was "unthinkable and impossible" without the further development of 'socialist democracy,' and criticised the Party and administrative apparatus for their 'departmentalism,' 'parochialism,' 'irresponsibility,' 'red tape' and 'bureaucratic indifference.'¹⁰¹ The attack on the apparatus had been intensified during the period between the 27th Party Congress in February 1986 and the 28th Party Congress in July 1990.¹⁰²

Based on these perceptions of the Party apparatus, Gorbachev declared it urgent to supervise the work of the Party at all levels by the Soviets, social organisations, and the general public, suggesting that they maximise the 'direct participation of the masses.'¹⁰³ He criticised the Party for its encroachment on the functions of the Soviets, which had caused "a fault in the functioning of the democratic machinery," and thus the Soviets must be "fully in charge of their respective territories in all issues concerning development and should meet the everyday needs of the people."¹⁰⁴

Since 1987, more detailed measures had been taken to 'normalise' the Soviets' function and supervision of the Party by the 'mass participation' through competitive elections. Accordingly, the January 1987 Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU decided to hold experimental local elections in June 1987.¹⁰⁵ A more comprehensive reform had been discussed at the 19th Party Conference in June-July 1988, including the role of the Party, a comprehensive electoral reform and new Soviet legislative bodies. The new election law was adopted on 1 December 1988, and accordingly, elections to the USSR and Russian CPDs were held in March 1989 and March 1990 respectively.¹⁰⁶

Apart from electoral reform, the role of the party itself became a thorny issue of debate during this period. Despite the considerable restructuring during the early stage of political reform, reform in the Party turned out to be slow,¹⁰⁷ and the Party remained a bulwark of the conservatives.¹⁰⁸ Since the 19th Party Conference, the question of a new Party programme was open to public discussion. In February 1990 the Central Committee Plenum decided to abolish the Party's political monopoly, which was followed by the constitutional amendment of Article 6 at the Third CPD of the USSR in March 1990.¹⁰⁹ In fact, the Party's 'leading role' had ceased to exist in practice by 1989, and the Party was drifting away from the public at the final stage of Gorbachev's reform.¹¹⁰

Political reforms affected the development of regionalist tendencies not only in the Union republics such as the Baltic republics, but also in lower administrative units. First of all, criticism of the Party apparatus had significantly damaged the authority of the central government. In particular, the blame on the Party apparatus and bureaucratic decision-making style fell on Moscow authorities in general not only in the former Soviet, but also in the Russian context.¹¹¹

Secondly, the decline in the Party's leading role had resulted in the expansion of the Soviets' power. This occurred not only because of the devolution of power to the

Soviets, but also because of the absence of a 'new' mechanism of control over the Soviets. When the slogan of "all power to the Soviets" was launched, it was meant to be controlled by the Party members who successfully competed for power, and thus participated in the Soviets.¹¹² However, despite the 'successful' representation of the Party in the Soviets, party discipline hardly bound its members in the representative bodies, and thus the Party was unable to control the activities of the Soviets.¹¹³

Furthermore, the collapse of the Party also caused a stalemate in upward communication and interest representation 'from below' through the Party, and thus through the Soviets as well.¹¹⁴ When an 'explosion' of participation and interest articulation was witnessed, the only nationwide political party failed to coordinate demands 'from below.' The results were obvious: another explosive increase in the numbers of 'parties' including those based on regional interests in the peripheries, only to be frustrated at higher levels of the Soviets.¹¹⁵ In this regard, the law on the local Soviet of April 1990, which provided substantially expanded competence of the Soviets—particularly, of the Union republics and autonomous republics—had facilitated declarations of sovereignty and the development of regional associations.

Thirdly, a series of elections brought regionalists into the power circle. Although old elites had some success in the elections with "new tricks,"¹¹⁶ regionalists also secured seats in the Soviets at all levels. For instance, Baltic deputies who were mostly elected with the support of the people's fronts in the republics clearly supported the sovereignty of their republics. The establishment of the Interregional Deputies' group in the USSR CPD also clearly showed that this unexpected effect of electoral reform. In the SIBFE, one of the ardent separatists, Aman-Geldy Tuleev, won the election to the CPD of Russia with the support of miners, and was then elected as chairman of the *oblsövet*.¹¹⁷ The emergence of Vitalii Mukha as governor of Novosibirsk oblast, who became the chairman of Siberian Agreement, also appeared to be a result of an emphasis on the accountability of regional leaders to the local population.¹¹⁸

Finally, *glasnost*' revealed not only the faults of the Party apparatus, but of almost every aspect of Soviet society, including the problems of regional disparities. Although Gorbachev encouraged *glasnost*' to go further than criticising the Party apparatus, it developed even further than that: *glasnost*' covered all aspects of the society such as environmental, historical, cultural, ethno-national situations as well as socio-economic situations, as Nove put it a "cultural renaissance in Russia."¹¹⁹ In particular, the mass media had gone beyond the censorship even before it was

eventually abolished in 1990, often causing conflict between mass media and political authorities including Gorbachev.¹²⁰ In conjunction with existing regional disparities, *glasnost*' spread regionalist sentiments in the SIBFE.¹²¹ Furthermore, election campaigns also supported these revelations, performing a political education function at the grassroots.

III. 3 (2) Collapse of the Soviet Union

The growing power of the Soviets and their antagonism towards the centre, the decreasing control of the centre over the peripheries, and the deteriorating socio-economic situation was culminated in the failed military coup of August 1991. After the failed coup, the collapse of the Union, one of the most important events in the Soviet history, took place. The event imposed on Russia the new task of state building, because of the asymmetrical federal structure of the USSR. It led to a discussion of possible changes in centre-periphery relations, spreading expectations for the devolution of power in the Russian peripheries.

Unlike other former Union republics, Russia lacked its own state structure such as its own party organisation (up to 1990) and Academy of Sciences during the Soviet period, although some efforts had already begun after the declaration of sovereignty of June 1990. Furthermore, another inherited asymmetrical aspect within the RSFSR—the unequal status of autonomous republics and ordinary administrative units—caused a serious threat to state-building efforts in Russia, when autonomous republics in Russia upgraded their status to that of republics and joined the march of declarations of sovereignty. As Kempton put it, the situation developed into a 'status game' between the centre and all the subjects, and a 'resource game' between the centre and individual regions and republics based on bilateral negotiations.¹²²

Despite the view that the proliferation of bilateral negotiations encouraged other regions to articulate their demands,¹²³ the more profound reason for such a development should be found in the favoured status of the republics, which was inherited from the old Constitution. When republics which had the right of secession sought a more favoured status than ordinary subjects in the process of state-building, other options excluding separate negotiations did not seem to be practical. In fact, the centre was too weak to contain republics in a 'federal' system. Therefore, the question of amending the old Constitution, and then adopting a new Constitution, emerged as a thorny but urgent task.

As a basis of a new federal structure, Eltsin himself tended to support the development of regional associations, presumably hoping to counterbalance the separatist threat of republics, at least before regional associations became politicised in the middle of 1992. In his election campaign for a seat on the CPD of Russia in February 1990, he suggested rebuilding the federal system on the basis of 8 to 10 ethnically neutral *zemli*.¹²⁴ Despite the opposition of republics, the idea of *zemli* appeared in his draft Constitution in November 1990 and October 1992.¹²⁵ In his discussion of the draft Constitution of the CPD of Russia in November 1991, Eltsin revealed his *de facto* recognition of existing regional associations:

Many questions arise from the term *zemli*. People regard it as a foreign borrowing, although it comes from the ancient Russia. *Zemli* are intended to be formed on the basis of existing kraia and oblasts or through unifying them. It is to enshrine the regional consolidation in the Constitution which is taking place in practice. ... Currently, such a consolidation is becoming a reality in the boundaries of the Far East, Siberia, the Urals, Central Russia, the Northwest and so on.¹²⁶

In fact, his attitude towards regional associations went further than *de facto* recognition. Paying attention to the oppositions of republics, he suggested that republics were to be recognised as subjects of the Russian Federation 'by right,' and the creation of *zemli* would not be enforced. Instead, he claimed that the process of the creation of *zemli* was to provide existing regional associations with legal status:

Furthermore, the establishment of *zemli* creates the requisite material and organisational basis which will provide them [regional associations] with appropriate organisational and legal status.

At the same time, the present draft Constitution does not propose an artificial enforcement of this process. Above all, it is intended to put it in order with legal regulation. The draft Constitution carries it clear that regions can acquire the status of *zemli* only if they can fully carry out their duties as federal subjects.¹²⁷

Although his concept of *zemli* failed to survive the opposition, the concept showed his intention to provide regional associations with not only *de facto* but also *de jure* recognition and support their organisational expansion, which might have eventually absorbed republics within their boundaries.¹²⁸ Although he withdrew the concept of *zemli*, the Siberian Agreement attained legal status in January 1993. Whatever the fate of Eltsin's draft Constitution, he seemed to support the development of regional associations—at least, before regional associations became politicised—for his own purposes, which accommodated the development of inter-regional coordination mechanisms in the periphery.

III. 3 (3) Persisting Power Struggle at the Centre

In the process of political and economic changes on an enormous scale, clashes of different ideas seemed to be unavoidable. However, the power struggle at the centre had often made the resources of power that could be employed to control the regions more limited. As McAuley observed, the centre had lost almost every control over the political and economic resources of power by August 1991, except the means of coercion such as the armed forces, police and the security forces.¹²⁹ The situation, thus became more favourable to the peripheries in their relations with the centre.

During the transition period of 1988-1993, the power struggle had a couple of features that were almost unprecedented during the Soviet period. First of all, the scale of the power struggle was larger than in earlier reforms of the Soviet regime. Since the changes were introduced in almost every sector of the Soviet society, clashes of different ideas were not limited to a sector or two. Therefore, power struggles often cannot be simplified as conflicts between anti-reform and pro-reform groups. The picture was more complicated and multi-layered: anti-reform versus pro-reform, centralism versus federalism, and presidentialism and parliamentarism. In this structure of conflicts, for instance, either parliamentarism led by Khasbulatov¹³⁰ or centralism, did not necessarily mean anti-reform.¹³¹

Secondly, because of the multi-layered nature of the conflicts, it appeared that no one alone could control the situation. As for Gorbachev, facing opposition from both conservatives and radicals, he tried to maintain a balance of power between these two blocs. As Hough observes, Gorbachev needed radicals such as Eltsin not only for a counterbalance against the conservatives, but also as a scapegoat for the negative results of reform policies.¹³² In this regard, for Gorbachev, it would have been better to maintain a balance of power between two extremes—conservatives and radicals—because it would be not only difficult but also undesirable to get rid of either side of the opposition. As for Eltsin, the situation was almost the same when Russia achieved its sovereignty in June 1990. He was also facing with a decentralisation drive by the peripheries and parliamentarism led by Khasbulatov when he tried to build a strong presidency for his reform. Furthermore, in the main arena of power struggle—the CPD of Russia—neither side controlled the parliament.¹³³

Thirdly, the tug-of-war at the centre often led Eltsin and his opposition blocs to search for an alignment with third parties such as peripheries or the grassroots. For

instance, the referendum, a populist method, had been quite frequently employed to achieve a breakthrough in situations of stalemate, particularly in the CPD.¹³⁴ Gorbachev put the question of the preservation of the USSR to a referendum on 17 March 1991, to which Eltsin attached his own question of the introduction of a Russian presidency to consolidate his power base. Eltsin also put four questions—confidence in the president and the socio-economic policy of the government, and early election of the president and the CPD—to a referendum on 25 April 1993, in order to bloc the anti-government drive of the parliament. Again on 12 December 1993, he held another referendum to adopt the new Constitution.

As these events suggest, a bid for the support of regions also featured power struggles at the centre, particularly when they were divided on the question of government structure, presidentialism and parliamentarism, rather than a federal structure. This tendency was clearly revealed in 1990 when the sovereignty of the RSFSR became a critical matter to the future of the Union. In 1990, Gorbachev launched an appeasement gesture towards the autonomous formations of the former Soviet Union, recognising them as 'federal subjects,'¹³⁵ which Eltsin was reluctant to accept as he regarded it a threat to his power base in Russia.¹³⁶ In response to such initiatives, Eltsin shifted his position and went further than Gorbachev in autumn 1990, urging the regions to "swallow as much power as possible."¹³⁷

In particular, when the CPD was acting as a stalemate in 1992, Eltsin and Khasbulatov had tried to gain every possible segment of support of the regional groups, as well as groups of economic sectors such as entrepreneurs and farmers, which increased sectoral and regional lobbies.¹³⁸ According to the Ministry of Economy, 31 presidential decrees and 39 government decrees had provided 49 regions, including 19 republics, with special terms during 1992-1993.¹³⁹ For instance, decrees to establish an FEZ were mainly issued before the presidential election on 12 June 1991. Other concessions were made after the Sixth Congress when the question of power balance between legislative and executive branches became a hot issue in the second half of 1992.¹⁴⁰ In particular, after the Sixth Congress, Eltsin tried to postpone the Seventh Congress, in which the one-year emergency power of the president was due to expire, even showing an intention to share power with the heads of republics.¹⁴¹

<Table 3.3.1> Decisions on Central Support for the Regions (1991-1993)

Date	Decrees / Resolutions
1991	
May-June	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • on the FEZ in Altai krai (25 May), Chita (25 May), Sakhalin (27 May), Kaliningrad (3 June), Evreiskii (3 June), Kemerovo (7 June), and Novgorod (7 June) • on the socio-economic development in the Northern regions (28 May), Murmansk (28 May), Kareliia (29 May), and the Komi SSR (11 June) • on the inter-regional association of the Central Chernozem regions (31 May), the Urals (9 June) and the "Great Volga" (10 June) • on the development of agro-industrial complex (6 June)
July-December	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • on the inter-regional association of the Siberian Agreement (11 July) • on the development of the Siberian branch of the <i>Akademnauk</i> (2 August) • on the development of Tiumen (19 September) and Sakha (11 December)
1992	
January-March	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • on the socio-economic development in Komi (24 January), Chita (3 February), Kemerovo (on the budget resources, 7 March), Taimyr aok (30 March) • on the social support for small nations or poor population in <i>Evenkii aok</i> (12 & 30 March), <i>Taimyr aok</i> (12 March), <i>Murmansk</i> (21 March), <i>Buriatiia</i> (25 March), <i>Bashkortostan</i>, <i>Pechorsk raion in Komi</i>, <i>Marii-El</i>, <i>Chuvash</i>, <i>Sakha</i>, <i>Khabarovsk</i>, <i>Turukhansk raion in Krasnoiarsk</i>, <i>Rostov</i>, <i>Nizhneudinsk raion in Irkutsk</i>, <i>Cheliabinsk</i>, <i>Chita</i>, and <i>Nenets aok</i> (30 March)
April-June	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • on the social support for small nations or poor population in <i>Kareliia</i>, <i>Kolpashevsk raion in Tomsk</i>, <i>Chukot aok</i> (4 April), <i>Again-Buriat aok</i> (10 April), <i>raions in the Far North regions</i> (21 April & 22 June) • on the economic activities of the small nations in the North (22 April) • on the development of the FEZs (4 June) • on the socio-economic development in Dagestan (5 June), Ingush (resolution of the Soviet of Nationalities, 10 June), North-Ossetiia, <i>Buriatiia</i> (30 June)
July-September	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • on the development of Iamal, Bering Sea, and Sakhalin shelf (1 July). • on the socio-economic development in <i>Chukot aok</i> (15 July), <i>Marii-El</i> (24 August), <i>Tyva</i> (2 September), <i>Chuvash</i> (11 September), <i>Khakassia</i>, <i>Komi-Permiak aok</i> (16 September), the Far East and Zabaikalia (22 September) • on the housing construction in the Far North (23 September) • on the delivery of products to the Far North (resolution of the Soviet of Nationalities on 7 July & 13 July)
October-December	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • on the socio-economic development in <i>Kabardino-Balkarsk</i> (14 October), the Kuril Islands (26 October & 8 December), <i>Caspian Sea</i> (31 October), <i>Mordavia</i> (4 December), <i>Kaliningrad</i> (23 December), <i>Karachay-Cherkessk</i> (24 December) • on the support for mercantile navy float in the Caspian Sea (21 October) • on the Free Trade Zone in Moscow city • on measures to realisation of the Federal Agreement with Komi (23 December) • on the ecological-economic zone of "Gorno-Altai" (12 October) • on the socio-economic development in <i>Primorskii krai</i> (10 November), <i>Mordavia</i> (23 November)
1993	
January-March	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • on the socio-economic development in <i>Cheliabinsk</i> (8 February) • on financing <i>fuel-energy complex</i> (12 February) • on the preservation of natural complex in <i>Pozharsk raion of Primorskii</i> (24 February) and <i>Okhotsk Sea</i> (1 March)

Resolutions of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in italic. Others are presidential decrees.

Sources: *Vedomosti s'ezda narodnykh deputatov RSFSR i Verkhovnogo Sovet RSFSR, 1990-1992*; and *Vedomosti s'ezda narodnykh deputatov Rossiiskoi Federatsii i Verkhovnogo Sovet Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 1992-1993*.

Furthermore, Eltsin established the Council of Heads of Administrations in 1992 in order to gain the support of regional leaders, accepting it as an advisory body of the CPD.¹⁴² After the Sixth CPD of Russia, he also proposed to establish a Federal Council consisting of two representatives from each federal subject, which eventually developed into the upper house in the Constitution of 1993.¹⁴³

In this regard, Teague has claimed that Eltsin's policy was a "Russian version of 'don't ask, don't tell,'" which was based on the premise that as long as "the centre does not try to curb the provinces' accumulation of economic and political power, the republics and regions will have little incentive to try to leave the Russian Federation."¹⁴⁴ As Teague suggested, the power struggle led Eltsin to a 'minimalist' approach, which encouraged the demands of the regions.

III. 4. Agenda of the SIBFE Regionalism: 'Decolonisation'

Although a relatively increasing proportion of investment had been allocated to the social sphere, the decreasing capital investment, failure of delivery, and deteriorating living conditions had been witnessed in the late 1980s. The general economic decline experienced during the reform made situation worse. As a way to survive the chaotic situation, the SIBFE demanded more investment for the production and non-production sectors to avoid a sharp economic decline and enhance the material well-being of the population. However, the possible intensification of 'colonial relations' was also forecast when the state delivery system failed to meet demands, and the hope of central support was fading away as the central budget deficit increased.

This situation led the SIBFE to formulate various ways to keep its own wealth in order to finance self-assistance measures by denying existing 'colonial relations.' First, in the short term, the failed state delivery system had to be replaced by a mutual delivery agreement between the SIBFE regions, and then a barter system. Second, the right to their own natural resources, development projects and profits had to be expanded. Third, the need to adjust the economic structure of the area was raised in order to keep added value in the regions and to guarantee deliveries of manufactured goods. Fourth, the SIBFE regions demanded more rights to conduct foreign economic activities including foreign investment and foreign trade. In particular, foreign economic activities had a growing importance for the SIBFE since they would be another source of necessary goods, capital and technologies, as well as more a lucrative market for natural resources through which an 'absurd' price system could be avoided. Finally, these procedures also demanded the development of coordination in the SIBFE and the decentralisation of economic management. Discussions on these matters soon escalated to a thorny debate on the question of creating a single market, and the economic and political sovereignty of the SIBFE regions, although the regions failed to reach an agreement.

III. 4 (1) Rebuilding a Regional Delivery System: An Urgent Task

The main focus of the demands of the SIBFE regions seemed to be simple: to increase investment in the productive and non-productive sectors, and thus to enhance the material well-being of the population. However, when the discussion of economic reform reached two pivots of marketisation, self-accounting and price liberalisation, the expectation of price rises began to undermine the state order and delivery system. The immediate impact of those reform measures was devastating, forcing the regions to formulate their own barter system to replace the cracking state mechanism, and to develop regional autarchy based on expanding rights to the resources at their disposal.

In the SIBFE, the situation was critical: the increasing need of capital goods only met with sharply decreasing deliveries and a worsening of the absurd prices of natural resources compared with those of manufactured goods and machinery. For the SIBFE regions, such a development meant growing difficulties in procuring the necessary goods through state deliveries or on the market. The problem hit resource-rich regions such as Tiumen and Krasnoiarsk, as well as agriculture-oriented regions such as Altai and Tyva. Such problems were clearly revealed in the discussion organised by the local newspaper *Sibirskaiia gazeta*. At the meeting, G. A. Pavlov, Mayor of Omsk city and President of the Association of Cities of Siberia and Far East, complained about the situation in Omsk:

Omsk city needs trolley buses. For each we paid 85 thousand rubles this year [1991], but will pay 290 thousand rubles [next year]. ... What we can do about it? ... We have no petroleum, no metal. ... If this peculiarity of a Siberian oblast is not reflected in legislation, we simply cannot survive.¹⁴⁵

V. Nesterov, the General Director of the Siberian Agreement, also complained about the absurd price system and unilateral state orders in Krasnoiarsk and Irkutsk:

Direct goods exchange between cities or regions must be carried out in accordance with economic rules. For some, they are advantageous, while for others, they are a sharp knife. ... We had government orders for forest products which increased to 250 per cent. About this all in Krasnoiarsk and in Moscow know that more than 80 per cent of timber enterprises cannot carry them out. ... How is it possible to administer the economy as a whole under the current absurd prices? The price of consumer goods are rising without limits, while the prices of forest products, coal, crude oil, and gas are fixed by the government. ... In Irkutsk or in Krasnoiarsk, timber costs 80-100 rubles per cubic metre and is exported to Caucasus and the Ukraine where timber is resold at 600-700 rubles per cubic metre.¹⁴⁶

Increasing needs and declining material support were also reported in Tiumen oblast. For instance, Andrei Konoplianik, Deputy Minister of Fuel and Energy, expressed his worries about the situation in Tiumen, blaming 'systematic under-supplies' causing a 'marked decline' in oil and gas production in the region:

There is an acute need for highly productive extracting and drilling machinery and equipment. The major part of technical facilities has wear and tear of more than 50 per cent. Only 14 per cent of machinery and equipment conform to world standard, while 70 per cent of all drilling machines are obsolete and require replacement. The break-up of the Soviet Union has exacerbated the situation with the supply of oil extraction equipment from CIS countries: prices are being raised while deliveries of equipment to Russia are on the decline.

... Due to the systematic under-supply of material and technical resources to oil-producing enterprises, the exploitation of oil producing wells has sharply deteriorated in recent years.¹⁴⁷

In fact, state deliveries in Tiumen oblast had fallen by 70 per cent in 1989, compared with those of the previous year, and the rest was to be supplied by monopolistic enterprises at 'negotiated' prices. However, the prices of nearly all oil and gas output remained fixed from 1982 to 1991, and thus the region simply was not able to afford the cost. As a consequence, deliveries of equipment were reduced to almost one-tenth.¹⁴⁸

In such a situation, there emerged the need to coordinate rebuilding regional delivery and barter systems to cope with 'alarming tendencies of regional isolation,' as Potapov, First Secretary of Irkutsk *obkompartii*, put it.¹⁴⁹ Despite the marketisation measures, the importance of barter was growing because of absurd prices, shortage of liquidity and the collapse of state coordination.¹⁵⁰ In such a context, enforcement became critical, particularly in multilateral barter and delivery contracts. As a rather natural consequence, inter-regional coordination bodies were bound to develop. By 1990, regional associations were established in almost every planning region, which culminated in the middle of 1992.¹⁵¹ For instance, the main goals of the Siberian Agreement in the initial stage of its development were to guarantee mutual deliveries and coordinate own economic potential.¹⁵²

III. 4 (2) Expanding Control over Resources and Wealth

If an effort to create a regional delivery and barter system was a passive and immediate response by regions facing price liberalisation and self-accounting, the demand for expanding control over resources constituted a more active and essential

part of SIBFE regionalism.¹⁵³ The question highlighted a key point of 'colonial' relations and a 'paradoxical situation' as Shafranik, governor of Tiumen oblast, put it:

A region [Tiumen] where enterprises of federal property accounted for 92 per cent of industrial output is tied hand and foot. We see a paradoxical situation: this property is governed by federal authorities, while responsibility for the state of affairs and living standards lies at the door of the regional management.¹⁵⁴

In the same context, Tomsk *oblsovet* sent an ultimatum to Gorbachev in April 1991, urging him to take urgent measures to alter the situation caused by the 'exploitation' of the central authorities:

Tomsk oblast delivers 15 million tons of oil and 7 million cubic metres of timber as its state orders, and is exploited to the extreme by the central authorities. The oblast has nothing left with which to support its own social programme and is on the verge of a social explosion. If the government fails to adopt urgent measures to provide vital support to the oblast, the oblast Soviet reserves the right to adopt counter-measures to protect the interests of the population resident on its territory, up to and including the most extreme measures.¹⁵⁵

The issue was clearly stated in a draft platform of SIBFE deputies of the USSR CPD. A initiative group of deputies of the USSR CPD from the SIBFE regions gathered in January 1990 in Novosibirsk and worked out a draft platform, which included their evaluation of the general socio-economic situation in the area and necessary measures to be taken. In the draft platform, deputies urged a change in the relationship between centre and regions regarding the exploitation of resources.¹⁵⁶

Furthermore, the demand was supported by the development of the situation itself. First of all, the centre was creating a more lucrative 'market,' which increased a gap between state orders and deliveries, fuelling the feeling of being exploited in the regions. Such a development forced regions to be less dependent on the state mechanism of deliveries and investment, and to claim their own shares of products at their disposal to increase access to a newly developing demand-supply mechanism, including foreign markets.

Secondly, the demand of rights to resources was highly supported by increasing concerns about the environment and small nations in the area. Despite the observation that the demands were mainly raised by regional leaders, the same demands were heard from deputies of indigenous peoples and environmentalists, as already noted. Although these parties might have a different priorities regarding the issues,¹⁵⁷ and thus could be problematic in the long run, the question provided regional actors with a

cause to form a common front in their fight against the central authorities, at least in the early stages of the conflict between centre and regions.

In fact, the question of rights to natural resources was raised when a constitutional amendment to Article 11 was discussed in the Second Congress of Russia. Despite the constitutional amendment which acknowledged the rights of republics, the rights of ordinary administrative units remained unresolved. Furthermore, the article was nothing but a vague declaration of basic principle.¹⁵⁸ The exact boundaries of rights were decided by a series of bilateral agreements, and thus continued to be a critical issue between centre and regions.¹⁵⁹

III. 4 (3) Structural Changes and Building a Common Market

Another attempt to keep wealth in the regions appeared in the form of the adjustment of economic structure. Structural adjustment was also demanded by the collapse of the Soviet Union, conversion, privatisation and increasing environmental concerns.¹⁶⁰ However, the difference in price between raw materials and manufactured goods had also encouraged regions to develop processing industries in order to keep added value within their territory and to enhance regional self-sufficiency.

For instance, Tiumen oblast, the largest crude oil producing region, lacked processing facilities, and thus had to import refined petroleum from outside the region. Western Siberia produced 72.7 per cent of Russia's crude oil, but it refined only 8.6 per cent (in Omsk) of petroleum produced in Russia in 1990, which even fell short of regional needs. By contrast, nearly 30 per cent of petroleum was refined in non-oil producing areas in the European part of Russia such as Central, Volgo-Viatka and Northwest.

<Table 3.4.1> Production and Consumption of Crude Oil and Refined Petroleum (1990-1993)

	Oil Production		Petroleum Production		Petroleum Consumption		Net Balance ¹⁾	
	1990	1993	1990	1993	1990	1993	1990	1993
North	3.1	3.5	1.9	1.7	6.5	0.9	-10.6	-7.9
Northwest	0.0	0.0	6.5	6.9	6.2	5.8	3.8	5.0
Central	0.0	0.0	15.3	16.0	15.3	17.4	6.8	4.8
Volgo-Viatka	0.0	0.0	7.0	8.9	5.4	5.6	7.1	9.7
Central Chernozem	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.3	3.8	-10.6	-6.5
Volga	10.6	11.8	18.9	17.1	12.4	10.7	24.7	18.8
North Caucasus	1.7	1.7	7.0	3.2	9.4	7.0	-2.8	-5.1
Urals	11.2	13.3	22.5	21.6	11.8	11.1	36.6	27.8

West Siberia	72.7	69.0	8.6	8.8	12.4	10.4	-5.5	1.3
East Siberia ²⁾	0.001	0.0003	10.1	10.7	7.2	7.1	11.5	10.9
Far East	0.4	0.5	3.4	3.6	10.0	7.9	-15.0	-5.8
RF TOTAL ¹⁾	516.8	353.9	292.1	217.5	247.3	172.3	44.8	45.2

¹⁾ Net Balance and RF Total in million tonnes, other figures in percentage to RF total. Percentages are calculated based on the amounts given.

²⁾ Krasnoiarsk began to produce oil in 1990 (7,000t) which expanded to 25,000t in 1995.

Sources: Goskomstat, *Promyshlennost' 1996*, p. 283; and OECD, *Energy Policies of the Russian Federation: 1995 Survey* (Paris: OECD, 1995), pp. 144-145.

The question of adjusting industrial structure in Tiumen had already been included in the 13th and 14th FYP (1991-2000). According to Egor Gaidar, the Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted a resolution in 1989 to create five hydrocarbon-fed chemical plants—Surgut, Tobolsk, Nizhneartovsk, Novy Urengoi, and Uvat—in Tiumen oblast.¹⁶¹ Although the plan had perished with the demise of the Union, it was shifted the accent from the extractive to the processing branches in Tiumen oblast.

The Republic of Sakha, another resource-rich region, also initiated a change in the structure of its diamond industry, which was quite successful. In addition to the right to sell 10 per cent of diamonds independently (December 1991),¹⁶² and then to 20 per cent of profits gaining from gem diamonds and all from industrial diamonds (March 1992),¹⁶³ Sakha also persuaded Moscow to establish a joint enterprise, *Almazy Rossii-Sakha*. With the share of *Almazy Rossii-Sakha*, which was established in July 1992, Sakha was also allowed to claim 32 per cent of its profits, which, according to Kempton, constituted about half Sakha's budget by 1994.¹⁶⁴ Furthermore, Sakha showed its interest in establishing a diamond processing complex on its territory when it initiated a joint venture, *Tiumaada Diamond*, in March 1991. The joint venture would allow Sakha more independence from Moscow and De Beers, which had the right to 95 per cent of uncut diamonds produced in Sakha in accordance with the agreement of 1990.¹⁶⁵

Such attempts were witnessed not only in industrially developed regions, but also in regions where the industrial base was relatively weak, although their immediate impact seemed to be less evident than in Sakha's case. For instance, the Buriat authorities also showed their interest in the processing industries. According to Oleg Khomutov, department head of the Soviet of Ministers of Buriatia, the possibility of linking Buriat raw materials and technology to 'Krasnoiarsk-26' to produce finished goods was being reviewed.¹⁶⁶ The Buriat case could be an example of conflicting interests between centre and regions. As Anatoli Ivanov, section chief of the Central

Economic Research Institute of the Ministry of Economy, suggested, the centre insisted the economy of Buriatiia should be based on resource extracting sectors.¹⁶⁷

The adjustment of economic structure was also discussed at the inter-regional level. According to Valery Kuleshov, Director of the Institute of Economy and Organisation of Industrial Production of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Siberian Agreement expressed the need to manufacture finished products via setting up financial groups on the basis of privatised enterprises of Siberian regions.¹⁶⁸ The Far Eastern regions were also interested in the development of processing industries in the area. In particular, a working group of the Association of Far Eastern Congress of People's Deputies expressed their concerns about economic structure of the regions, blaming it for the low profitability of economic activities in the area.¹⁶⁹

Despite the interest of the SIBFE regions in the processing industries, however, most regions did not seem to have visible success. For instance, raw material processing industries such as the paper industries appeared to decline in the Far Eastern regions. Furthermore, the economic structure tended to be more specialised when construction material production, machine building, and domestic electronic industries had almost collapsed.

<Table 3.4.2> Some Indicators of Changing Industrial Structure in the SIBFE (1990-1995)

	1985	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Domestic Electronics							
<i>Freezers & Fridges (1000)</i>							
Khabarovsk krai	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.0	0.0	0.1
Primorskii krai	130.4	151.5	148.6	65.4	104.8	23.2	0.2
<i>Washing Machines (1000)</i>							
Novosibirsk ob	0.0	0.0	5.0	4.0	6.3	5.4	10.5
Tomsk ob	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.02	0.0	0.0
Rep Buriatiia	227.5	238	240.5	83.8	64	16.4	2.7
Khabarovsk krai	91.4	75.6	68.4	17.4	42.9	9.7	0.6
<i>Television Sets (1000)</i>							
Altai kr	0.0	0.0	0.0	18.2	43.7	37.2	16.3
Kemerovo ob	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1	15.8	7.9
Tomsk ob	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	3.0	2.3
Rep Buriat	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.7	2.3	0.5
Irkutsk ob	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.2	1.0
Khabarovsk kr	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	13.5	8.1	0.0
Novosibirsk ob	253.2	101.0	139.2	149.4	124.1	43.6	14.1
Omsk ob	186.0	251.5	263.3	216.7	114.4	28.2	14.8
Krasnoiarsk kr	365.3	327.3	305.5	157.7	163.3	59.1	15.8

Machine Building**Automobile Cranes (1000)**

Krasnoïarsk kr	0.0	0.0	0.0	32.0	17.0	5.0	0.0
Rep Khakasiia	266.0	355.0	360.0	396.0	349.0	73.0	7.0
Amur ob	280.0	275.0	300.0	280.0	236.0	24.0	52.0

Forestry (light Industry)**Cellulose (1000 t)**

Khabarovsk kr	250.3	264.2	240.0	206.8	105.6	29.2	27.4
Sakhalin ob	323.2	275.7	244.8	193.5	57.7	18.3	32.6

Paper (1000 t)

Evereisk AO	0.0	8.5	4.9	1.9	1.4	0.3	0.0
Khabarovsk kr	9.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.03	0.1
Amur ob	3.5	3.1	2.9	2.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Sakhalin ob	215.6	203.9	199.9	146.8	60.9	11.0	14.0

Construction Materials (light Industry)**Cement (1000 t)**

Altai kr	0.0	0.0	0.0	.00	27.0	0.0	0.0
Kamchatka ob	0.0	0.0	0.0	53.4	72.0	24.2	18.0
Magadan ob	0.0	0.0	0.0	80.0	26.5	23.7	16.7
Primorskii kr	3537.0	3337.0	3404.0	1939.0	940.0	619.5	557.0
Sakhalin ob	68.8	94.2	89.7	33.9	37.2	10.1	0.0

Source: Goskomstat, *Promyshlennost' 1996*, various pages.

In the SIBFE, only small numbers of regions—for instance, Altai krai, Tomsk, Kemerovo and Novosibirsk oblasts, and Buriatiia—had a limited success in the domestic electronics sector. In this sector, newly emerging regions were replacing traditionally dominating regions. However, changes in these regions did not seem to alter the existing resource-oriented economic structure in general.

III. 4 (4) More rights for Foreign Economic Activities

In a situation of declining investment and delivery of goods and ever increasing demands in the regions, foreign economic activities—foreign investment and foreign trade—mattered much more than before.¹⁷⁰ They were regarded as a main source of capital, investment, capital goods and technology, all of which were crucial to economic development. During the transition period, the right to control over resource development projects, and necessary regulations which would create a favourable environment for foreign investment, emerged as main points of disputes between the centre and regions in relation to foreign investment. Regarding foreign trade, export quotas and licensing systems, share of hard currency revenue, and necessary supporting mechanisms such as information on the foreign market, grew to be crucial factors.

As for foreign investment, who should take the initiative in these activities became a thorny matter, since it invited disputes between centre and peripheries in the right to resources and profit distribution. It was still more so because foreign investment involved tens of billion dollars, and thus a large sum of profits from taxes and semi-taxes such as contribution to the funds for regional social development and compensation for the environmental contamination resulting from exploitation of resources.¹⁷¹ Although Viktor Chernomyrdin recognised the need of regional initiatives in resource development projects including the decision on foreign tenders,¹⁷² it remained only in principle.

In this regard, Viacheslav Novikov, the Chairman of Krasnoiarsk *kraisovet* and the Coordinating Council of the Siberian Agreement for Foreign Economic Activities, emphasised regional initiatives for resource development projects. He urged Moscow to set up a Siberian Tender Committee on a permanent basis "to which central bodies on their behalf would grant the right to make final decisions on determining the winners of tenders held in Siberia."¹⁷³ Although regional centres of the State Committee on Economic Cooperation in the Pacific were set up in Novosibirsk and Khabarovsk in 1992,¹⁷⁴ more specific issues regarding foreign investment such as taxation and distribution of profits remained in dispute between Moscow and regions, placing a major obstacle on foreign investment.

Another dispute between the centre and the SIBFE regions in foreign economic activities stemmed from the state control of foreign trade with the license and quota system. Despite changing circumstances, resources remained the main item of exports both at Russian and the SIBFE levels.¹⁷⁵ However, the export of resources was restricted under the law "On the Procedure for Registering Entities and Enterprises Entitled to Export Strategic Raw Materials," adopted on 26 June 1992, in which fossil fuels, electricity, some non-ferrous and ferrous metals, chemicals, wood products, furs and grains were included.¹⁷⁶ For the SIBFE regions, these arrangements were placing obstacles to their access to a more profitable world market, despite the abolition of the state monopoly of foreign trade.

In this regard, Mikhail Semiunov, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Buriatia, complained that they could not sell timber in a way they see fit, because of negligible sales quota.¹⁷⁷ At the Tomsk meeting of February 1993 where Viktor Chernomyrdin took part with his ministers, the question of export quotas was raised by Viacheslav Novikov who demanded that the quota system controlled by Moscow should be abolished.¹⁷⁸

On this issue, the centre's position was quite clear, as Chernomyrdin stated. He rejected the idea of abolishing the export quota system, claiming that the system was not for the centre, but for the efficiency of foreign trade, though he reluctantly accepted regional participation in the regulation of export quotas.¹⁷⁹ Considering that revenues from the export of raw materials—particularly oil and gas—had financed the import of capital goods that were required for manufacturing industries in the European part of Russia, the question of distribution of revenue earned from foreign economic activities and export quotas has remain a contended issue between centre and regions.¹⁸⁰

III. 4 (5) Political Agenda: Mere 'Antithesis to Centralism'?

In the process of growing decentralisation, the need of inter-regional coordination emerged in the SIBFE on the basis of a widespread perception of being exploited, geographical vicinity, complementary economic structure, and reasonably recognised efficiency to form a common front in their negotiations with the centre. From an economic point of view, restoring the barter system¹⁸¹ and adjustment of economic structure,¹⁸² foreign economic activities¹⁸³ invited certain form of inter-regional coordination in these spheres. However, decentralisation in these fields can hardly be conceivable out of the context of the federal system, which linked the issue of inter-regional coordination with political issues. Furthermore, expanding spheres of coordination, a growing need to lobby, a deteriorating economic situation because of 'shock therapy,' and slow modification of the federal system raised the question of how far these coordination activities should go and what shape they should take, particularly after 1992.

However, the question of the future shape of inter-regional coordination was rather a delicate and challenging matter, and thus continued to be a core of thorny debate in the SIBFE. At the initial stage, the demands for 'decentralisation' were limited to the socio-economic sphere, as the Association of Cities of Siberia and the Far East,¹⁸⁴ the Far Eastern Association of Economic Co-operation,¹⁸⁵ and the Siberian Agreement¹⁸⁶ suggested. However, as Hughes has observed, the establishment of inter-regional associations itself had political meanings.¹⁸⁷

A more detailed discussion of the mechanism for inter-regional coordination began in 1990. In January 1990, an initiative group of deputies of the CPD of the USSR from Siberia and the Russian Far East claimed the establishment of the

'Siberian market' and a territorial governing mechanism as their prime task. The group also declared that it would work out a structure and mechanism of regional autonomy in their draft platform, although they failed to finalise it.¹⁸⁸

In 1991, the debate on the level of inter-regional coordination acquired a new momentum, when the debates on the new constitutional drafts echoed in the SIBFE. In particular, Eltsin's concept of *zemli* encouraged debates on the possible political integration of the SIBFE.¹⁸⁹ Discussions of the issue appeared in the local newspapers, which showed a wide range of opinions. For instance, *Sibirskaiia gazeta* organised a discussion in which participated leading regional political figures such as A. V. Nesterov, General Director of the Siberian Agreement, G. A. Pavlov, Mayor of Omsk city and President of the Association of Cities of Siberia and the Russian Far East, and K. E. Lebedev, member of the Presidium of Tomsk *oblsoret*. In the discussion, Nesterov maintained that the desire of political independence follows economic self-accountancy. He also observed that, under the current situation, many things depended on the personal quality of political leaders, suggesting that opinions of the inter-regional coordinations in the political issues were divided.¹⁹⁰

Politicisation of the Siberian Agreement was clearly revealed in the First Congress of People's Deputies of Siberia held in Krasnoiarsk in March 1992. It was supposed to establish a close linkage between the deputies of the CPD from the area and inter-regional associations. The resolution of the Congress made an important step in the development of the inter-regional coordination with its demands to remove the President's additional power and to abolish 'unnecessary and even harmful' presidential representatives at the local level.¹⁹¹

Despite the increasing political influence of the association and the expansion of its organisational structure,¹⁹² the perception of regional leaders of the political status of Siberia as a single entity in the federation and thus that of the association, remained in dispute and rather passive.¹⁹³ The disagreement among regional leaders was highlighted in their response to Eltsin's decision to dissolve the CPD in September 1993 and the dismissal of Vitalii Mukha as governor of Novosibirsk oblast in October 1993.¹⁹⁴ A further discussion of the discord among regional leaders will be presented in Chapter 6.

III. 5. Regional Differentiation

As the development of inter-regional associations that were mostly based on geographical vicinity, levels of economic development and living standards were varied within these associations. In this part of analysis, I will explore the levels of economic performance, living standards, and socio-economic in the regions. These different features could result in different attitudes of the regions towards reforms and the centre.

Many Russian and Western scholars, as well as Russian central authorities, have been engaged in the task of identifying regional differentiation. For instance, the Centre for Economic Competition and Forecasting of the Russian Ministry of Economy identified 'rich' and 'poor' regions in 1992.¹⁹⁵ In the same year, Petrov, Mikheev and Smirniagin of the Centre for Geographic Research, which was established by Eltsin's personal staff to provide him with information for policy making, worked out an index of social tension in 1992.¹⁹⁶ Another study was published in 1992 by Dmitrieva. With an intention to identify regions similar to each other as measured by selected indicators, rather than to seek the exact position of regions, she set out two criteria—living standards and economic development—for the classification.¹⁹⁷ A more recent study by Aleksei Savin was published in *Izvestiia* in 1997 based on indicators of nominal income, minimum living expenditure, and budgetary income levels.¹⁹⁸ Western scholars also noted regional differentiation in the Russian Federation in economic structure and economic performance,¹⁹⁹ living conditions,²⁰⁰ fiscal relations,²⁰¹ and the speed of reform.²⁰²

In particular, Hanson noted the economic structure affected the adaptability of regions to changing economic circumstances, and thus developed regional differentiation.²⁰³ He worked out categories of regions based on two criteria: "the categories of economic structure that are likely to loom large in their adaptation to the market: and each group should form, with respect to that particular feature, a cluster that is reasonably distinct from other regions."²⁰⁴ He suggested five groups of regions: rural, natural resources, and commercial hub/gateway, high-technology, and ordinary regions.²⁰⁵

Although they reached an agreement that there were significant regional disparities in Russia, these works demonstrate the complexity of drawing a regional

differentiation map. Their identifications were varied to some extent, because of data sets and methodologies employed, and different periods covered by the research. Most importantly, however, different purposes, and thus different emphases seem to be a main reason for the variance in their clusters of regions.

In the context of this research, the following two purposes will be the main concerns in identifying regional groups. First, the analysis will verify the claims of exploitation which formed the economic background of regionalism such as regional disparities between the SIBFE and the European part of Russia, and between the contribution of the SIBFE to the Russian economy and their living standards. Another concern is to identify the possible contribution of socio-economic features to the activation of regionalism—in both economic and political senses—which would affect the regional voting patterns of deputies in the CPDs and the grassroots in referenda and elections.

In this regard, three main criteria are formulated: economic performance and living standards, and the socio-economic stress levels of 76 regions.²⁰⁶ In order to create an economic performance indicator, variables such as industrial production, capital investment, and basic fund share are employed. Although the output aspect of industrial activities is related to the contribution of regions to the national economy, and the input aspect to benefits from the centre, these variables are put together as they are correlated.

As for a living standards indicator, two aspects—urbanicity and income-consumption levels—are considered. The level of urbanisation is employed on the assumption that urban areas are 'better off' than rural areas, and thus the degree of urbanisation could be an indicator of the living standards.

Finally, a socio-economic stress indicator is intended in order to take into account socio-economic fluctuation and political atmosphere, particularly caused by the growing ethno-national identities which are clearly demonstrated in the republics. However, because of technical difficulties in formulating an indicator, only two variables—the declining rate of industrial production since 1989 and the proportion of non-Russian population—are considered, with a view to reflecting the different impact of economic development and awakening ethnic identities in a region (for scores and methodology, see Appendices 1.1 and 1.2).

<Table 3.5.1> Composition of Regional Differentiation Indicators

Indicator	Variables Employed	
Economic Performance	<i>A. Input aspect</i>	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capital investment in total & per capita (1990-1993) • Basic fund share in total & per capita (1991-1993) 	
	<i>B. Output aspect</i>	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Industrial production in total & per capita (1991-1993) 	
Living Standards	<i>A. Urbanicity</i>	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proportion of urban population (1989) • Proportion of people who completed higher level of education (1989) 	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Numbers of telephones (1990-1993) 	
	<i>B. Income and consumption level</i>	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Average real income (in terms of shopping basket units, 1993) • Average real expenditure (in terms of shopping basket units, 1993) • Average housing space per habitant (1990-1993) • Per capita electricity consumption (1994) 	
	Socio-economic Stress	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Declining rate of physical industrial production (1989-1993)
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proportion of non-Russian population (1989)

Based on these three criteria, five clusters of regions are identified: highly adapted region (Moscow city), adapted regions, stagnated regions, stagnated republics, and adapted republics. However, considering the general economic crisis in Russia, it should be noted that these categories are relative terms and are employed to distinguish features of one region from another. Therefore, adapted regions did not necessarily mean that those regions achieved an absolute sense of successful adaptation.

First of all, the cluster groups showed a clear difference between republics and non-republics. Although the socio-economic stress indicator was expected to reflect the privileged status of republics, it is rather surprising that the variable of the proportion of non-Russian population seemed to dominate the other variables. Although these clusters still identified differences between relatively successful regions and stagnated regions in the transition period, we can also identify regional groups with two indicators excluding the socio-economic stress indicator.

<Table 3.5.2> Differentiation of Regions in their Economic Performance, Living Standards, and Socio-economic Stress (1990-1993)

		Socio-economic Performance and Stress (Cluster 1)			
		(with lower level of socio-economic stress)		(with higher level of socio-economic stress)	
		highly- adapted	adapted	stagnated	stagnated republics
		Moscow city	Murmansk, Tiumen St Petersburg	Nizhegorod Cheliabinsk	Rep Tatarstan Rep Bashkortostan Rep Sakha
			Moscow ob, Samara Sverdlovsk, Magadan Kemerovo, Irkutsk Krasnoirsksk, Perm	Rep Kareliia, Vologda, Tula Iaroslavl, Belgorod, Lipetsk Ul'ianovsk, Kamchatka	Rep Komi
				Arkhangelsk, Leningrad, Orel Novgorod, Briansk, Pskov Vladimir, Ivanovo, Kaluga Kostroma, Rjazan, Smolensk Tver, Kirov, Kursk, Voronezh Volograd, Saratov, Orenburg Novosibirsk, Omsk, Tomsk Sakhalin, Rep Khakasia Primorskii, Khabarovsk Kaliningrad	Udmurtskaia Rep
				Tambov, Astrakhan, Penza Krasnodar, Stavropol, Rostov Kurgan, Altai kr, Rep Buriatia, Chita, Amur	Rep Marii-El, Rep Mordoviia Chuvash Rep, Rep Kamykia Rep Adygeia, Rep Dagestan Kabardino-Balkarsk Rep Karachaevo-Cherkeskaia Rep Rep North Osetiia Rep Altai, Rep Tyva
highly developed					
well developed					
moderately developed					
under-developed					
poorly developed					

The SIBFE regions in bold.

Among 76 regions considered in the analysis, Moscow is classified as the most successful region scoring 100 out of 100 in terms of living standards, 84 in economic performance, and 21 in socio-economic stress. Eleven regions including St Petersburg, Tiumen, Murmansk, Magadan, Krasnoiarsk, and Irkutsk are categorised as adapted regions with higher levels of economic performance (Mean score, henceforth reduced to $M = 60$), living standards ($M = 45$) and a low level of socio-economic stress ($M = 24$). However, as already mentioned, a 'higher' level does not mean an absolute sense of 'high,' but relative to other regions.²⁰⁷ The cluster also identified five republics including the republics of Sakha and Tatarstan which distinguished themselves from other successful ordinary administrative units with their high levels of socio-economic stress ($M = 71$), and from other republics with their relative success in economic performance ($M = 56$), and moderate living standards ($M = 30$). Eleven other republics including Altai, Tyva, and Dagestan are grouped into stagnated republics because of their low levels of economic performance ($M = 8$), living standards ($M = 12$), and high levels of socio-economic stress ($M = 68$). The remaining regions are classified as stagnated regions which had an average level of development, although there were some differences in their economic capacity and living standards (for one-way anova descriptives, see Appendix 1.3).

However, these clusters of regions tend to draw a rather static map of regional differentiation. In the context of the research—to find some linkage between regional socio-economic features and active regionalism—dynamic aspects of development also need to be taken into consideration since the expectation for future development must be based on the development of regionalism. With the clusters based on regions' economic structure that Hanson suggested,²⁰⁸ we can make a cross-tabulation which shows two aspects—economic structure and performance—of a region. Roughly speaking, resource and hub/gate regions tended to experience a more successful transition than other regions, particularly than rural regions in general, although not every resource and hub/gate region was highly successful, as Table 3.5.3 suggests.

<Table 3.5.3> Differentiation of Regions in their Economic Structure, Economic Performance and Living Standards (1990-1993)

Economic Structure (Cluster 3) ¹⁾					
	Rural Regions	Resource Regions	Hub/gateway Regions	Residual Regions	
Socio-economic Performance (Cluster 2)	highly developed	Tiumen	Murmansk, St Petersburg Moscow city		
	well developed	Krasnoirsks, Irkutsk Rep Sakha, Magadan	Moscow ob, Samara Sverdlovsk	Nizhegorod, Rep Tatarstan Rep Bashkortostan, Perm, Cheliabinsk, Kemerovo	
	moderately developed	Rep Kareliia, Rep Komi Kamchatka		Vologda, Tula, Iaroslavl Belgorod Lipetsk, Ulianovsk	
	under-developed	Leningrad ob	Arkhangelsk, Novgorod Kaluga Tver, Voronezh, Rostov Novosibirsk, Primorskii Khabarovsk, Kaliningrad	Pskov, Briansk, Vladimir Ivanovo, Kostroma, Orel Riazan, Smolensk, Kirov, Kursk Volograd, Saratov Udmurtskaia Rep, Orenburg Omsk, Tomsk Rep Khakasia, Sakhalin	
	poorly developed	Rep Adygeia, Rep Dagestan Karachaevo-Cherkeskaia Rep, Krasnodar Stavropol, Kurgan Rep Altai, Altai kr Rep Tyva			Kabardino-Balkarsk Rep Rep Marii-El, Rep Mordovia Chuvash Rep, Tambov, Rep Kalmykia, Astrakhan, Penza, Rep North Osetiia Rep Buriatia, Chita, Amur


The SIBFE regions in bold.

¹⁾ Economic structure of the regions based on Hanson's work. For details, see Philip Hanson, "Russia's Regions, or the Mysterious of the 89 Organisms," unpublished paper presented at the Annual Conference of the BASEES, 30 March-1 April 1996, in Cambridge.

In relation with the regionalism in the SIBFE, we can draw the following observations. Firstly, regionalism in the SIBFE was based not only on the prevailing sentiment of being exploited in 'donor' regions, but also on poor conditions in 'recipient' regions which made a smaller contribution to the whole Russian economy. Such sentiment constituted the basis of SIBFE regionalism.

Secondly, the sentiment of being exploited could be a matter of point of view. For instance, when we noted economic performance in terms of total amount—in other words, an absolute contribution to the state—most the SIBFE regions seemed to be quite fairly treated (see Figure 3.1).

<Figure 3.1> Disparities between Living Standards and Economic Performance




In this case, only a couple of resource regions such as Tiumen, Kemerovo, Krasnoiarsk, and Irkutsk are regarded as 'exploited' regions. Similar conclusions can be drawn when the industrial production in total amount and living standards which were more relevant in the discussion of exploitation are considered.

However, such a conclusion can be controversial. For instance, Aganbegian and his 'Novosibirsk group' insisted that the perception could be "illusory and stemmed mostly from improper under-pricing of Siberian natural resources."²⁰⁹ Even when we accept improper prices, per capita industrial production in the regions clearly

demonstrates that almost every region in the SIBFE does not seem to be properly treated (see Figure 3.2).

<Figure 3.2> Disparities between Living Standards and Per Capita Industrial Production



Finally, there existed regional disparities not only in Russia as a whole but also in the SIBFE regions.²¹⁰ Regional disparities in the SIBFE existed not only in their economic structure, but also in their economic performance and living standards (see Table 3.5.2 and Table 3.5.3). The differentials between the regions in the SIBFE may cause diversities in their perception of the reasons of being exploited, and thus the way to solve the situation. Simply poor living standards could only be enhanced by a more active engagement of the centre (e.g. central financial support). On the contrary, 'real' exploitation could be removed by the disengagement of the centre (e.g. freedom of economic activities and expanded rights of regional authorities to natural resources).

The questions remaining unsolved are to what degree the SIBFE regions were united with the consensus of being exploited and being a resource appendage of the European part of Russia, and in what degree regional disparities within the SIBFE regions hampered regional coordination in the transition period. These questions will be discussed in the following chapters, mainly in a 'new' central decision-making body, the Congress of People's Deputies.

¹) For more details on the development of Siberian regionalism in the late nineteenth century, see Stephen Digby Watrous, *Russia's Land of the Future: Regionalism and Awakening of Siberia*, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1970.

²) Anthony P. Allison, "Siberian Regionalism in Revolution and Civil War, 1917-1920," *Siberica: A Journal of North Pacific Studies*, vol. 1, no. 1 (Summer 1990), p. 80.

³) Igor' Aristov, "Chto takoe Sibirskii separatizm?" *Sibirskaiia gazeta*, no. 17 (17 April 1992), p. 12.

⁴) Ibid., p. 13.

⁵) For the full text of the resolution, see "Postanovlenie Sibirskoi konferentsii obshchestvennykh organizatsii po voprosu ob avtonomnom ustroistve Sibiri," *Sibirskaiia gazeta*, no. 32 (August 1992), pp. 6-7. In particular, Siberian regionalists demanded that the Siberian Duma should be given a broad jurisdiction over the following questions: legislation for Siberia, the choice of the executive power that would be responsible to the Siberian Duma, the use and disposal of all the land of the region, questions of industrial and agricultural development, defining the extent and methods of colonisation, full administration of public education, participation in the fixing of Russian tariffs, Zemstvo, legislation concerning national minorities, and supervising the regional budget. *Novoe Vremia*, no. 14745 (7 April 1917), p. 7, in Robert Paul Browder and Alexander F. Kerenskii (eds.), *The Russian Provisional Government 1917: Documents*, vol. 1 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), p. 431.

⁶) N. G. O. Pereira, "The Idea of Siberian Regionalism in Late Imperial and Revolutionary Russia," *Russian History*, vol. 20, nos. 1-4 (1993), pp. 170-172.

⁷) Under Brezhnev, the Association of Siberian Cities was formed to oppose the Siberian water diversion scheme. Andrew R. Bond, et al., "Panel on Siberia: Economic and Territorial Issues," *Soviet Geography*, vol. XXXII, no. 6 (June 1991), p. 370.

⁸) Their demands are similar to those of early regionalists. Perhaps, ecological issues were added in place of the prisoner exile system. Alan Wood, "Siberian Regionalism Resurgent?" *Siberica*, vol. 1, no. 1 (1993/94), p. 71.

⁹) *Izvestiia*, 30 March 1992, p. 2.

¹⁰) *Izvestiia*, 30 March 1992, p. 2.

¹¹) Although Far Eastern Republic was created not by the regionalists' demand but by the Bolsheviks' need, a buffer state to defend the Revolution from the intervention forces in the Far East, its historical existence was used to strengthen the legacy Far Eastern regionalism. For the Far Eastern republic, see Henry Kettredge Norton, *The Far Eastern Republic of Siberia* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1923); Alexander Azarenkov and Ernst Shchagin, "Some Pages from the History of the Far Eastern Republic," *Far Eastern Affairs*, vol. 81, no. 1 (1992), pp. 117-129; and John J. Stephan, *The Russian Far East: A History* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1994), pp. 141-155.

¹²) A. P. Okladnikov, V. I. Shunkov (eds.), *Istoriia Sibiri: s drevneishikh vremen do nashikh dnei*, vol. 3 (Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo NAUKA, 1968), p. 43.

¹³) *Aziatskaya Rossiia*, vol. 2 (originally printed in St Petersburg in 1914; reprint published in 1974 by Oriental Research Partners, Cambridge, Mass.), pp. 186-187, cited in Gary Hausladen, "Settling the Far East: Russian Conquest and Consolidation," in Allen Rogers (ed.), *The Soviet Far East: Geographical Perspectives on Development* (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 17.

¹⁴) Okladnikov and Shunkov (eds.), *Istoriia Sibiri*, vol. 3, p. 318.

¹⁵) *Ibid.*, p. 321.

¹⁶) Pavel Minakir, *The Russian Far East: An Economic Survey* (Khabarovsk: RIOTIP, 1996), pp. 62-63, 65. For more details on strategic-military concerns in the development of the SIBFE economy during the Soviet period, see Harry Gelman, "The Siberian Military Build-up and the Sino-Soviet-U.S. Triangle," in Rodger Swearingen (ed.), *Siberia and the Soviet Far East: Strategic Dimensions in Multinational Perspective* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1987), pp. 179-225; and Swearingen, "The Soviet Far East, East Asia, and the Pacific: Strategic Dimension," in *ibid.*, pp. 226-272.

¹⁷) For a discussion of conversion of the military industrial complex in the Russian Far East, see Y. Gudkova, "Conversion in the Defence Industry of Russia's Far East," *Far Eastern Affairs*, no. 5 (1995), pp. 29-38.

¹⁸) For instance, 90 per cent of ferrous metallurgy, about 85 per cent of industrial engineering, and more than 70 per cent of construction material industries are located in the European part of Russia. RAU Corporation, *RAU Business Book: Russia Today, Part I* (Moscow: Obozrevatel', 1993), p. 24.

¹⁹) Theodor Shabad, "The Gorbachev Economic Policy: Is the USSR Turning away from Siberian Development?" in Alan Wood and R. A. French (eds.), *The Development of Siberia: People and Resources* (London: Macmillan, 1989), p. 256.

²⁰) Jan Åke Dellenbrant, *The Soviet Regional Dilemma: Planning, People, and Natural Resources* (London: M. E. Sharpe, 1986), p. 14.

²¹) Russian Academy of Sciences (Dept. of Economics) and Reform International Foundation, *On the Strategy of Socio-Economic Reforms in Russia (Joint Report)* (Moscow, December 1992), p. 2.

²²) Dienes observed that economic decline appeared to "further narrow Siberia's economic profile and foreclose any hope for self-sustained growth," and that the development will be "even more selective and restricted to a few regional export commodities, such as Tiumen's gas and oil, more than ever." Leslie Dienes, "The Development of Siberia: Regional Priorities and Economic Strategy," in George J. Demko and Roland J. Fuchs (eds.), *Geographical Studies on the Soviet Union* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 213.

²³) According to Dienes, investment for oil and gas industries peaked in 1988. In 1989, capital investment in the gas industry sector had decreased by 7 per cent. He observed that the shifting investment priority to the social sphere resulted in the decline of investment. Leslie Dienes, "Siberia: Perestroika and Economic Development," *Soviet Geography*, vol. 32, no. 7 (September 1991), p. 452.

²⁴) For instance, the North regions produced 11 per cent of bread, 55 per cent of meat, 60 per cent of milk, 33 per cent of vegetables that were consumed in the region. The Russian Far East could only produce about 29 per cent of grain and 52 per cent of vegetables for its own consumption. RAU

Corporation, *RAU Business Book*, Part 1, pp. 28, 62. Bulldozers used in gold mines in Magadan has been mainly produced in Cheliabinsk, and oil drilling equipment wanted by Tiumen oil fields has been delivered by the former Union republics.

²⁵) Abel Aganbegian, *Inside Perestroika: The Future of the Soviet Economy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1989), p. 23.

²⁶) *Ibid.*, pp. 24-25.

²⁷) In 1992, for instance, the prices of agricultural products had increased 9.4 times comparing to those of previous year, while the prices of commodity goods had risen by 26.1 times, industrial goods by 20.5 times, civil service tariff by 20.5 times. Goskomstat, *Rossiiskii statisticheskiĭ ezhegodnik 1996* (Moscow: Goskomstat Rossii, 1996), p. 376.

²⁸) Bond also observes that the question of pricing had "heightened resentment that Siberia is being exploited as a resource colony of the centre." Despite the substantial rise of resource prices in January 1992, he emphasised, regional leaders felt the price yet to be increased to make regions economically self-sufficient. Bond, et al., "Panel on Siberia," p. 365.

²⁹) In order to meet the socio-economic and political goals of the Soviet system such as stabilising labour forces in naturally harsh regions and equity between various regions, special measures have been taken for the Far Northern and SIBFE regions—though some administrative units are overlapping in these grouping—since the end of 1920s. For instance, high wages in the regions had been introduced in May 1932 which had expanded to workers in almost all socio-economic branches including education, health services, municipal and housing, science, and cultural sectors at the 24th Party Congress in 1971. The privileged measures included additional paid holidays, early retirement, improved pension rights, housing privileges, support for migration and travel costs and so on. For more details, see Peter de Souza, "The Nature of the Manpower Problems in the Development of Siberia," *Soviet Geography*, vol. XXVII, no. 10 (December 1986), pp. 701-702. In the 1980s, the concerns continued to be discussed. At the 26th Congress of the CPSU in 1981, Brezhnev urged to improve living standards in order to create normal working conditions. Accordingly, the CPSU issued a decree to improve housing and living conditions in February 1983, in which special attention was paid to Siberia and the Soviet Far East. "V Tsental'nom Komitete KPSS: Tsental'nyi Komitet KPSS prinial postanovleniu o merakh po obespecheniiu vypolneniia planov stroitel'stva zhilykh domov i sotsial'no-bytovykh ob'ektov," *Pravda*, 26 February 1983, p. 1. For decisions made at the centre in this context since Khrushchev, see Swearingen, "The Russian Far East, East Asia, and the Pacific," in Swearingen (ed.), *Siberia and the Soviet Far East*, pp. 231-233.

³⁰) "Proekt platforma narodnykh deputatov SSSR ot Sibiri i Dal'nego Vostoka," *Sibirskaiā gazeta*, no. 5 (5 February 1990), p. 6.

³¹) He argues that the living standard in the area was lower than in the European part of Russia by 47 per cent, citing the collective index prepared by the Siberian Branches of Academy Sciences. "Eshche odno preduprezhdenie tsentru," *Krasnoiarskaia gazeta*, no. 39 (2 April 1992), p. 2.

³²) F. M. Borodkin, "Sotsial'nye problemy Sibiri v usloviakh ekonomicheskoi reformy," *Region: ekonomika i sotsiologiya*, nos. 2-3 (May-December 1993), p. 40.

³³) During the Soviet period, many Soviet and Western writers observed that that substantial wage increments—for instance, more than 35–40 per cent or over the USSR average—and the development of infrastructure should be necessary to stabilise labour forces in the SIBFE. D. V. Belorusov, “The Effectiveness of Integrated Development of Productive Forces in the New Pioneering Areas of Western Siberia,” *Soviet Geography*, vol. XIII, no. 10 (December 1972), p. 688; V. Mote, “Environmental Constrains to the Economic Development of Siberia,” in Robert G. Jensen, Theodore Shabad, and Arthur W. Wright (eds.), *Soviet Natural Resources in the World Economy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), p. 182; and Souza, “The Nature of the Manpower Problems in the Development of Siberia,” p. 713.

³⁴) Borodkin argues that real income in Siberia decreased by half in 1992 after the price liberalisation in December 1991. Borodkin, “Sotsial’nye problemy Sibiri v usloviakh ekonomicheskoi reformy,” p. 39. Also in the Far East, per capita real income in the first half of 1992 fell by 40 per cent, compared to the same period in 1991 because of inflation. Minakir, *The Russian Far East*, p. 162.

³⁵) According to Minakir, the main source of income in Russia has always been wages, despite the smaller portions of incomes comes from personal plots, pensions, and public subsidies. *Ibid.*, p. 167.

³⁶) Another possible of defect of these indicators is that the prices were not based on the average prices of a region as a whole, but of a regional centre. However, supposing that the price could be highest in the regional centres, it could give a rough idea of regional income and consumption levels, though it may not be the best option.

³⁷) According to Borodkin, for instance, consumption of meat, milk, fish, and any industrial products has been reduced to that of 1950–60s level in Siberia. Borodkin, “Sotsial’nye problemy Sibiri v usloviakh ekonomicheskoi reformy,” p. 39.

³⁸) For instance, during 1990–1993, retail trade in the Far East had decreased by 13 per cent annually, which more than six times higher than average decline in Russia. State deliveries had also declined in the Far East in 1991 compared to 1990: meat and meat products by 16 per cent, animal fat by 10 per cent, cheese by 29 per cent, fish by 19 per cent, and sugar by 21 per cent. At the same time, the production of consumer goods had fell by 4.7 per cent in 1991. Minakir, *The Russian Far East*, p. 171.

³⁹) D. E. Pinski, *Industrial Development of Siberia and the Soviet Far East* (A Rand Note, 1984), p. 43.

⁴⁰) Minakir also observes that the proportion of savings against income level is higher in the Far East than the Russian average, although the rate of growth of deposits is actually low. Minakir, *The Russian Far East*, p. 163. However, a high level of inflation can easily drain savings. In this respect, Borodkin argues that more than 90 per cent of population in Siberia had practically no savings. Borodkin, “Sotsial’nye problemy Sibiri v usloviakh ekonomicheskoi reformy,” p. 39.

⁴¹) R. A. Lewis, “Regional Manpower Resources and Resource Development in the USSR, 1970–1990,” in Jensen, Shabad, and Wright (eds.), *Soviet Natural Resources in the World Economy*, p. 89; Abel Aganbegian, “Effektivnost’ Sibiri,” in *Zadachi stavit Sibir’* (Moscow: Sovetskaia Rossiia, 1982), pp. 59–60; and T. I. Zaslavskaiia, V. A. Kalmyk, and L. A. Khakhulina, “Social Development of Siberia: Problems and Possible Solutions,” in Wood and French (eds.), *The Development of Siberia*, p. 179.

⁴²) According to Dienes, total investment in infrastructure was lower in Siberia than in the USSR as a whole during 1960-1975. Leslie Dienes, "Regional Economic Development," in Abram Bergson and Herbert S. Levine (eds.), *The Soviet Economy: Toward the Year 2000* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), p. 246.

⁴³) Initial demands of Kemerovo miners were rather primitive: quality of food in the miners' cafeteria, meat and sausage, padded jackets in the winter, and soaps and towels. *Pravda*, 13 July 1989, p. 6.

⁴⁴) In his political report at the 27th Party Congress on 26 February 1986, Gorbachev urged the need to change the structural and investment policy, and underlined the development of social-infrastructure. "Doklad General'nogo sekretaria TsK KPSS tovarishcha Gorbacheva M. S.," *Pravda*, 26 February 1986, pp. 6-7.

⁴⁵) Goskomstat, *Kapital'noe stroitel'stvo v Rossiiskoi Federatsii* (Moscow: Goskomstat Rossii, 1994), p. 10. On this point, Minakir insisted that share had been increased from 28 per cent to 39 per cent by 1993, a bit lower than *Goskomstat* data, nonetheless the figure also suggests considerable changes. Minakir, *The Russian Far East*, p. 175.

⁴⁶) According to Minakir, nearly a quarter of families and single individuals were on the waiting lists for a new and improved housing in the Russian Far East, while one-fifth in Russia as a whole. The problem was more distressing in the northern area where the figure went up to one-third. He insisted the gap between the Russian Far East and the European part of Russia in per capita housing space, for instance, remained virtually the same in 1993. *Ibid.*, p. 176.

⁴⁷) Minakir observes that higher level of per unit investment in the Russian Far East was, to a large degree, due to the distribution of population in the area and the high cost of building social infrastructure. *Ibid.*, p. 175.

⁴⁸) Sarah Ashwin, "'There's No Joy Any More': The Experience of Reform in a Kuzbass Mining Settlement," *Europe Asia Studies*, vol. 47, no. 8 (1995), pp. 1374-1375.

⁴⁹) In its report, the USSR *Goskomstat* admitted that the target of housing construction had not been met "for the first time" in the 12th Five-Year Plan (1986-1990), because of difficulties in obtaining loans and acquiring building materials. "Soobshchenie Goskomstata SSSR uskorit' ozdorovlenie ekonomiki: sotsial'no-ekonomikoe razvitie SSSR v 1989 godu," *Pravda*, 30 January 1990, pp. 1-3. V. I. Bakulin, head of a fitters brigade and deputy of the CPD of the USSR from Ivanovo oblast, also complained about the shortage of construction materials, underlining the importance of the development of construction industry to solve the housing and other problems. V. I. Bakulin's speech at the First CPD of the USSR on 31 May 1989, in *Verkhovnyi Sovet SSSR, Pervyi s'ezd narodnykh deputatov SSSR 25 maia-9 iyunia 1989 g.: stenograficheskii otchet*, vol. II (Moscow: Izdanie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, 1989), p. 61.

⁵⁰) V. V. Gustov, oil and gas production foreman and deputy of the CPD of the USSR from Tiumen oblast, addressed this problem clearly. Complaining about the undeveloped social sphere in the northern part of Tiumen oblast, he expressed his concern about the situation in Nefteugansk, which had no construction industry base of its own. While thousands of oil workers lived in temporary structures,

the construction units of the Ministry of Power and Electrification left the city and the region. *Ibid.*, p. 235.

⁵¹) Minakir, *The Russian Far East*, p. 177.

⁵²) Pinski, *Industrial Development of Siberia in the Soviet Far East*, p. 44. Whiting observes that shortages of heat and hot water supply 'nullifies' well-built houses in Siberia. A. S. Whiting, *Siberian Development and East Asia: Threat or Promise* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981), pp. 38-39.

⁵³) For instance, V. M. Gvozdev, mine brigade leader and deputy of the CPD of the USSR, expressed his concern about heat and water supplies in some mining villages and settlements where water was distributed by rationing, urging to change the priority of investment policy for the development of social sphere. *Pervyi s'ezd narodnykh deputatov SSSR 25 maia-9 iunია 1989 g.*, vol. III, p. 118. I. A. Nazarov, *raikom* first secretary and deputy of the CPD of the USSR from Omsk oblast, also reported the lack of heat and fuel supply in the Siberian rural area where people used firewood to heat their houses while natural gas was simply burned off in the neighbouring Tiumen oblast. *Ibid.*, p. 65.

⁵⁴) The authorities were fully aware of the need to increase energy supplies in the area. For instance, N. Tsvetkov, economist at the Economic Research Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences Far Eastern Division, urged to increase power-generating capacity by five-fold to meet the economic and social needs in the area. *Izvestia*, 27 January 1989, p. 2. Furthermore, in relation with Sakhalin off-shore gas project, a commission of Academy of Sciences of the USSR, led by M. Styrikovich and Iu. Rudenko, suggested that the power generating capacities should be increased by constructing nuclear power stations. However, local opposition for environmental reasons delayed the plan. *Pravda*, 13 July 1990, p. 4.

⁵⁵) For the development of transportation system in the SIBFE, see R. V. Vakhnenko, "Problems of Passenger Mobility and Road Transport in the Southern Far East Region," *Soviet Geography*, vol. XXXI, no. 1 (January 1990), pp. 61-64.

⁵⁶) Egorova, surgeon of Altai krai Clinical Hospital and deputy of the CPD of the USSR, insisted that 88 per cent of the rural hospitals in Altai krai had outdated facilities and were housed in make-shift buildings without water supply or sewerage lines, not to mention hot water. *Pervyi s'ezd narodnykh deputatov SSSR 25 maia-9 iunია 1989 g.*, vol. III, pp. 73-74.

⁵⁷) According to Minakir, the shutdown of state medical facilities was mainly because of the shift of medical personnel in the state sector to private, contracting and insurance companies. Minakir, *The Russian Far East*, p. 177.

⁵⁸) Pryde has observed that at least four types 'environmental enactment' can be identified during the Soviet period: Union republics' comprehensive conservation laws; several pieces of national legislation on land (1968), water (1970), minerals (1975), forestry (1977), air quality (1980), and wildlife (1980); the guidelines for each FYP; and special declarations of the CPSU, the Council of Ministers, and the Supreme Soviet on a particular type of pollution or a specific problems in certain geographic area. Philip R. Pryde, *Environmental Management in the Soviet Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 6-8. For more examples of the legislation on the environmental issues during the Soviet period, see Marshall I. Goldman, *Environmental Pollution in the Soviet Union: The Spoils of Progress* (Massachusetts: The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1972), pp. 293-299 (Appendix A).

⁵⁹) DeBardeleben has observed that the environmental policies before Gorbachev was similar to other domestic problems; the inter-linking political and economic concerns; the flexibility of the system in allowing policy debate which did not undermine basic ideological principles, system stability, or major economic priorities; the minimal role of the mass public as political actor; and the generally centralised nature of decision-making. Joan DeBardeleben, "The New Policies in the USSR: the Case of Environment," in John Massey Stewart (ed.), *The Soviet Environment: Problems, Policies, and Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 65. For a further discussion of the Soviet environmental policy, see Charles E. Ziegler, *Environmental Policy in the USSR* (London: Frances Pinter, 1987).

⁶⁰) A draft Guideline of the 12th FYP spared a separate section for the environmental issues such as water, air, and land pollution, and the question of establishing natural reserves, parks and preservation areas. It also urged the expanded participation of public organisation in protection of environment. "Proekt osnovnye napravleniia ekonomicheskogo i sotsial'nogo razvitiia SSSR na 1986-1990 gody i na period do 2000 goda," *Izvestiia*, 9 November 1985, pp. 1-6, 5. Pryde noted that the USSR did not lack environmental legislation and that environmental guidelines became qualitative in nature. Pryde, *Environmental Management in the Soviet Union*, pp. 7-8. In Russia, a more comprehensive law, the Environmental Protection Law, had been adopted in February 1992. For details, see Andrew R. Bond and Matthew J. Sagers, "Some Observations on the Russian Federation Environmental Protection Law," *Post-Soviet Geography*, vol. XXXIII, no. 7 (September 1992), pp. 463-474.

⁶¹) DeBardeleben, "The New Policies in the USSR," in Stewart (ed.), *The Soviet Environment*, pp. 66-67. According to the data compiled by the Conservation Foundation's London Initiative on the Russian Environment, the situation does not seem to have changed during the 1990s. The Conservation Foundation's London Initiative on the Russian Environment, *International Environmental Collaboration, Russia: A Case Study* (London: The Conservation Foundation's London Initiative on the Russian Environment, 1998), p. 3.

⁶²) Ziegler, *Environmental Policy in the USSR*, p. 53.

⁶³) Yanitsky Oleg, *Russian Environmentalism: Leading Figures, Facts, and Opinions* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodyje Otnosheniia, 1993), p. 222.

⁶⁴) For more about the "Village Prose School," see Douglas R. Weiner, *A Little Corner of Freedom: Russian Nature Protection from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Berkeley, California: California University Press, 1999), pp. 395-399, 420-421.

⁶⁵) For instance, about 40.4 per cent of hydrocarbon emissions, half the phenol-formaldehyde tars, and one-third of caprolactam were reported to be produced in Western Siberia. Goskompriroda, *Gosudarstvennyi doklad: sostianie prirodnoi sredy prirodookhrannaiia deiatel'nost v SSSR v 1989 godu* (Moscow: Goskompriroda, 1989), in Ruben A. Mnatsakanian, *Environmental Legacy of the Former Soviet Republics* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1992), pp. 167, 170, 175, 178, 184. For a further discussion, see "Panel on Nationalism in the USSR: Environmental and Territorial Aspects," *Soviet Geography*, vol. XXX, no. 6 (June 1989), pp. 441-509; and Bond, et al., "Panel on Siberia," pp. 403-412.

⁶⁶) The list included seven cities in Western Siberia (Kemerovo, Novokuznetsk, Novosibirsk, Omsk, Prokop'evsk, Tiumen, and Barnaul), fourteen cities in Eastern Siberia (Abakan, Angarsk, Bratsk,

Irkutsk, Krasnoiarsk, Ulan-Ude, Usol'e-Sibirskoe, Chita, Shelekhov, Noril'sk, Selenginsk, Achinsk, Zima, and Nazarovo), and five cities in the Russian Far East (Komsomolsk-na-Amure, Khabarovsk, Iuzno-Sakhalinsk, Vlagoveshensk, and Dal'nogorsk). Goskompriroda, *Gosudarstvennyi doklad*, pp. 20-22; and *Obzor sostiania okhruzhaiushchei prirodnoi sredy v SSSR: po materialalm nabludenii 1988-1989 godov* (Moscow: State Committee on Hydrometrology, 1990), in Mnatsakanian, *Environmental Legacy of the Former Soviet Republics*, pp. 167, 170, 175, 178, 184.

⁶⁷) Among 26 cities, following cities were excluded in the list of '99 highly polluted cities of Russia in 1989': Tiumen, Bratsk, Selenginsk, Achinsk, Zima, Nazarovo, Komsomolsk-na-Amure, Vladivostok, and Dal'nogorsk. Goskompriroda, *Gosudarstvennyi doklad*, pp. 20-22, in Pryde, *Environmental Management in the Soviet Union*, pp. 21-22.

⁶⁸) Goskomstat, *Okhrana okhruzhaiushchei sredy i ratsional'noe ispol'zovanie prirodnykh resursov v SSSR: statisticheskii sbornik* (Moscow: Goskomstat, 1989), pp. 22-24.

⁶⁹) Sulphur oxide from metal smelting consisted most of noxious emissions in the city. In 1990, sulphur oxide emission amounted 2.2 million tons. Goskomstat RSFSR, *Narodnoe khazaistvo RSFSR, 1990: statisticheskii ezhegodnik* (Moscow: Goskomstat, 1991), p. 309. This amount was large enough to "kill the rivers and trees within 100 to 200 kilometres of the city." *Guardian*, 29 February 1992, p. 40.

⁷⁰) The amount reached 12-14 billion cubic metres per year during the period, which was 82.2 per cent of the total amount wasted in the USSR. Mnatsakanian, *Environmental Legacy of the Former Soviet Republics*, p. 170.

⁷¹) The gas explosion and fire occurred in extracting fields which continued a year or more, in some cases, burning up to three million cubic metres of gas daily. Zeev Wolfson, "Siberian Gas in Europe: Environmental Implications," *Environmental Policy Review*, vol. 10, no. 1 (Summer 1996), pp. 35-36, 40. According to A. Iablokov, Chairman of the Centre for Russian Environmental Policy and formerly Eltsin's advisor on environmental issues, 10-12 per cent of the extracted gas was involved in such accidents, and sixty to seventy billion cubic metres of gas, or 70-80 million tons, were emitted in the atmosphere annually. "A Step toward Environmental Safety (an Interview with A. Iablokov)," *Energiia*, no. 8 (1995), p. 36.

⁷²) "Kuzbass: ekologicheskii portret," *Vsia nasha zhizn'* (1991), pp. 46-50; Murray Feshbach and Alfred Friendly, Jr., *Ecocide in the USSR: Health and Nature Under Siege* (London: Aurum Press, 1991), p. 10.

⁷³) Charles E. Ziegler, "Political Participation, Nationalism and Environmental Politics in the USSR," in Stewart (ed.), *The Soviet Environment*, p. 32.

⁷⁴) Lake Baikal is about 650 km long and 50-70 km wide, and covers 31,500 square kilometres. As the largest fresh-water lake in the world, it holds 23,600 cubic metres of water or one-fifth of fresh water in the world, and about 80 per cent in the former Soviet Union. The lake is the most ancient (aged more than 25 million years) and deepest (1,637 metres) lake in the earth. It is also home of about 2,400 species, which include about 1,500 endemic species including Baikal seal (*nerpa*). Don Belt, "Russia's Lake Baikal: The World's Great Lake," *National Geographic*, vol. 181, no. 6 (June 1992), pp. 2, 38; and D. J. Peterson, "Baikal: A Status Report," *Radio Liberty Report on the USSR*, vol. 2, no. 2 (1990), p. 1.

⁷⁵) According to Ziegler, twelve official decrees reported to be issued during Brezhnev period. Ziegler, "Political Participation, Nationalism and Environmental Politics in the USSR," pp. 30-31. In April 1987, Coastal Protection Zone was established along the coastline of the lake, and by 1992, three national preserves (Baikal-Lena, Barguzin, Baikal) and two national parks (Khuzhir and Transbaikal) were designated in the area. Belt, "Russia's Lake Baikal," p. 38.

⁷⁶) According to Peterson's report, the Baikal Cellulose-Paper Plants, the city of Ulan-Ude, and the Selenga Cellulose-Paperboard Plants were responsible for 40 per cent, 30 per cent, and 6 per cent of polluted water dumped into the lake respectively in 1988. Peterson, "Baikal," p. 2. For more detailed figures of pollutants dumped into the lake, see Feshbach and Friendly, *Ecocide in the USSR*, pp. 98, 118-120.

⁷⁷) According to Golubchikov, in Tiumen oblast alone, about 12 million tons of oil spills occurred annually. As a result, 100 grams of soil at the bottom of some parts of the River Ob' contained 10 grams of oil sediment. Iurii Golubchikov, "Will Russia Relinquish Iamal?" *Environment Policy Review*, vol. 10, no. 2 (Winter 1996), p. 54.

⁷⁸) For instance, three reservoirs on Angara river (Bratsk, Krasnoiarsk, and Ust-Ilimsk) estimated to contain about 3.6 million cubic metres of timbers. Mnatsakanian, *Environmental Legacy of the Former Soviet Republics*, p. 179. The Viliui reservoir in Sakha also demanded 1,200 square kilometres of forest and approximately 7 million cubic metres of decaying wood. Andrei Iablokov, "Notes on the Environmental Situation in Russia," *Environment Policy Review*, vol. 6, no. 2 (Summer 1992), p. 9.

⁷⁹) Ibid., p. 11. According to Egorova, a medical survey of the health of local population showed a high level of child death of cancer, congenital heart disease, chronic gastritis, and osteoarthritis. Svetlana Egorova, "Iakutia: Siberia's Chernobyl," *Sibirica*, vol. 1, no. 2 (1994/95), p. 36.

⁸⁰) Iablokov, "Notes on the Environmental Situation in Russia," p. 11.

⁸¹) *Report on the USSR, Radio Liberty* (31 August 1990), in John Massey Stewart, "Air and Water Problems beyond the Urals," in Stewart (ed.), *The Soviet Environment*, p. 229. According to an IAEA report on Russia's nuclear energy facilities published in 1995, none of nuclear power stations were operating in the SIBFE by 1995. However, nine nuclear power plants—two in Tomsk, Vladivostok, and Khabarovsk respectively, and three more in the Russian Far East—were planned to be built by 2009. IEA (IAEA), *Energy Policies of the Russian Federation: 1995 Survey* (Paris: OECD/IEA(IAEA), 1995), pp. 234-245 (Annex 1 and 2). The plans were delayed because of local opposition. *Izvestiia*, 27 January 1989, p. 2; *Pravda*, 13 July 1990, p. 4. Concerns about radioactive contamination were also demonstrated when the authorities in the ports of Magadan, Nakhodka, and Petrovlovsk-Kamchatka decided not to allow the nuclear powered ships of the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESCO) to berth. Stewart, "Air and Water Problems beyond the Urals," p. 229.

⁸²) The twelve 'closed cities' are as follows: Krasnoiarsk-25, 26, 35, 45, 66, 95; Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskii-35, 50; Shkotovo-17, 22, 26 (Primorskii krai); and Tomsk-7. Murray Feshbach, *Russia in Transition: Ecological Disaster: Cleaning Up the Hidden Legacy of the Soviet Regime* (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund Report, 1995), pp. 110-111 (Appendix A).

⁸³) Iablokov, "Notes on the Environmental Situation in Russian," p. 5. Vachnadze observes that the level of contamination on Enisei river (160 curies per square kilometre) is higher than that of the area

around 30 kilometres of radius from Chernobyl'. George N. Vachnadze, *Russia's Hotbeds of Tension* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1993), p. 45. In the city, the plan to build international nuclear processing and waste storage facility had been considered, but was failed to be embodied. An offer had been made by the Republic of Korea for the construction of nuclear waste storage facility in the city, which had also not been fulfilled. *Izvestiia*, 1 July 1992, p. 2.

⁸⁴) *Sotsialisticheskaia industriia* (13 May 1989), p. 2, in Stewart, "Air and Water Problems beyond the Urals," p. 229.

⁸⁵) Iablokov, "Notes on the Environmental Situation in Russia," p. 4.

⁸⁶) According a report of the Academy Sciences Siberian Branch, more than 95 per cent of children in the town are mentally deficient and Down's syndrome cases are four times higher than the Russian average. "Radioactive Cement Mutating Siberian Town," *The St. Petersburg Times*, 29 July 1997, p. 6.

⁸⁷) For instance, according to Iablokov's report, the Northern Fleet and the Murmansk Shipping Line had dumped "some 2.5 million curies of liquid and solid radioactive waste—including 16 discharged nuclear reactors, six with spent nuclear fuel still board—into the Arctic Ocean between 1959 and 1991." The Pacific Fleet also had dumped radioactive wastes into the Pacific Ocean during the same period, though the amount was "smaller" than in the Arctic Ocean. Robert G. Darst, "Bribery and Blackmail in East-West Environmental Politics," *Post Soviet Affairs*, vol. 13, no. 1 (January-March 1997), pp. 67-68. For more details, see U. S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, *Nuclear Waste in the Arctic: An Analysis of Arctic and Other Regional Impacts from Soviet Nuclear Contamination* (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1995); Jopshua Handler, "TNT-5 Radioactive Waste Tanker and Naval Nuclear Waste Crisis in Far East," *Greenpeace Nuclear Campaign Report* (May 1994); and C. Escalona, "Russia's Far East and Northern Waters: Nuclear Waste Bins?" *CIS Environmental Watch*, no. 5 (Fall 1993), pp. 16-39.

⁸⁸) Yosef and Il'ia Shuster, "What does the West Know of the Nuclear Waste Problem in the Russian Navy?: A Subjective Angle," *Environmental Policy Review*, vol. 8, no. 1 (Spring 1994), p. 3.

⁸⁹) *Nezavisimaa gazeta*, 30 May 1996, p. 5 (supplement).

⁹⁰) In Tyva, growing enmities towards the central policies during the early 1990 accompanied by ethnic conflicts. For ethnic conflicts in Tyva, see Ann Sheehy, "Russians the Target of Interethnic Violence in Tuva," *Radio Liberty Report*, vol. 381, no. 90 (1 September 1990), pp. 13-17; and Toomas Alatalu, "Tuva: A State Reawakens," *Soviet Studies*, vol. 44, no. 5 (November 1992), pp. 881-895.

⁹¹) Goskomstat RSFSR, *Natsional'nyi sostav naseleniia RSFSR: po dannym vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1989 g.* (Moscow: Republikanskii informatsionno-izdatel'skii tsentr, 1990), pp. 8-10, 44-47. Although published in 1956, Levin and Potapov's work seems to be the most comprehensive on small nations in Siberia. The work covered 30 small nations' traditional ways of life and changes after the October Revolution. M. G. Levin and L. P. Potapov, *Narody sibiri* (Moscow: Akademi nauk, 1956); English translation edited by Stephen Dunn, *The Peoples of Siberia* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964).

⁹²) James Forsyth, *A History of Siberia: Russia's North Asian Colony 1581-1990* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 405 (Table 6).

⁹³) In the titular republics and autonomous administrative units, Russians are outnumbered titular nations. Among indigenous peoples, Buriaty (Republic of Buriatia (24 per cent), Again-Buriat (55 per cent) and Ust-Ordynsk (36 per cent) autonomous okrugs), Iakuty (Republic of Sakha, 33 per cent), and Ataitsy (Altai Republic, 31 per cent) maintained relatively high proportion in their titular administrative units. However, titular peoples accounted less than 10 per cent in Chukchi SSR (7.3 per cent), Jewish autonomous oblast (4.2 per cent), and Nenets autonomous okrug (4.2 per cent). Goskomstat RSFSR, *Natsional'nyi sostav naseleniia RSFSR: po dannym vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1989 g.* (Moscow: Republikanskii informatsionno-izdatel'skii tsentr, 1990), pp. 527-736.

⁹⁴) James Forsyth, "The Indigenous Peoples of Siberia in the Twentieth Century," in Wood and French (eds.), *The Development of Siberia*, p. 91.

⁹⁵) Forsyth has observed that, despite some exceptions such as Dolgany and Nganasany who are also small numbered but still more than 80 per cent of people claimed their indigenous language as native tongue, the proportions among young children showed a sharp decline, partly because of the compulsory boarding school system. Forsyth, *A History of Siberia*, pp. 406-407.

⁹⁶) A. Pika and B. Prokhorov, "Bol'shie problemy malykh narodov," *Kommunist*, no. 16 (1988), p. 77.

⁹⁷) For instance, a report showed the critical health conditions of Chukchi people who lived in Chukotka peninsula that radioactive contamination had caused: 10-20 times the amount of lead-210 and 137 times the amount of caesium in their bone tissue than non-reindeer eaters; 2-3 times higher cancer incidence and 10 times higher liver cancer cases than the Russian average rate; tuberculosis among almost 100 per cent of Chukchi population and so on. *Moscow News*, no. 34 (27 August/3 September 1989), p. 5.

⁹⁸) E. A. Gaer, deputy of the CPD of the USSR, emphasised that 'departmental invasion' was the most terrible thing for the native people in the Russian Far East. As a result of 'economic development,' he continued, "around 50 settlements are destroyed among the banks of Amur river, where native people of the Far East had lived." *Pervyi s'ezd narodnykh deputatov SSSR 25 maia-9 iunia 1989 g.*, vol. III, pp. 86-87. For more details, see Aleksei Iu. Roginko, "Environmental Issues in the Soviet Arctic and the Fate of Northern Natives," in Stewart (ed.), *The Soviet Environment*, pp. 213-232.

⁹⁹) John Massey Stewart, "The Khanty: Oil, Gas, and the Environment," *Sibirica*, vol. 1, no. 2 (1994/95), pp. 27-28.

¹⁰⁰) For instance, a Khanty intelligentsia group established the Association for Ugrian Salvation in 1989 and declared the preservation of Iugra river basin as their urgent task. In 1990, the first Congress of the Association of the Small People of the North was held in Vladivostok. In the Congress, leaders of small nations demanded establishment of autonomous administrative units for the small nations, changing priorities for the traditional ways in the utilisation of natural resources, and so on. For more details of their demands, see Institut etnologii i antropologii im. N. N. Miklukho-Maklaia Rossiiskoi Akademii Nauk, *Demograficheskie, ekonomicheskie, sotsial'nye i kul'turnye problemy razvitiia narodov dal'nego vostoka v usloviakh ekonomicheskikh reform i demokraticeskikh preobrazovanii* (Moscow: Akademii Nauk, 1994), pp. 99-110. In accordance with those demands, the State Committee for the Peoples of the

North was founded in Moscow in 1990. The rights of indigenous people had also been recognised in the presidential decree of April 1992, which prevented "sale or transfer of 'traditional lands' without the consent of relevant native user groups." However, the demands for the property rights had not been settled. Gail Osherenko, "Property Rights and Transformation in Russia: Institutional Change in the Far North," *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 47, no. 7 (November 1995), pp. 1101-1102.

¹⁰¹) "Doklad General'nogo sekretaria TsK KPSS tovarishcha Gorbacheva M. S.," *Pravda*, 26 February 1986, pp. 2-10, 7.

¹⁰²) For a further discussion, see Michael E. Urban, *More Power to the Soviets: the Democratic Revolution in the USSR* (Vermont: Edward Elgar, 1991), pp. 19-26.

¹⁰³) *Pravda*, 26 February 1986, p. 7. In this regard, Zaslavskaya, Gorbachev's advisor, insisted that the CPSU should give up its 'leading' role, and that it should be reduced in size and reorganised through 'democratic elections.' She also recommended that primary party organisations should be freed from guidance 'from above,' and that the holding of elective party office should be limited to certain term. Tatyana Zaslavskaya, *The Second Socialist Revolution: An Alternative Soviet Strategy* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1990), pp. 208-210.

¹⁰⁴) M. S. Gorbachev, *Perestroika i novoe myshlenie dlia nashei strany i dlia vsego mira* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1987), p. 111. According to Gorbachev's perception, the Soviets should serve as the basis of the genuine 'socialist democracy' and genuine centre for the elaboration and adoption of all major state decision in the field of legislation and administration. *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, no. 5 (1988), p. 11, in Stephen White, *After Gorbachev* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 35-36. For a further discussion of the Soviets' function and newly established parliament, see Victor Segeev and Nikolai Biriukov, *Russia's Road to Democracy: Parliament, Communism, and Traditional Culture* (London: Edward Elgar, 1993).

¹⁰⁵) For more discussions of the 1987 local elections, see Stephen White, "Reforming the Election System," *The Journal of Communist Studies*, vol. 4, no. 4 (December 1988), pp. 1-7; and Jeffrey Hahn, "An Experiment in Competition: The 1987 Elections to the Local Soviets," *Slavic Review*, vol. 47, no. 3 (Fall 1988), pp. 434-447.

¹⁰⁶) For more details on electoral reform, see Stephen White, Graeme Gill, and Darrell Slider, *The Politics of Transition: Shaping a Post-Soviet Future* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 39-59; Urban, *More Power to the Soviets*, pp. 35-58; and Guilietto Chiesa, *Transition to Democracy: Political Change in the Soviet Union 1987-1991* (London: University Press of New England, 1993), pp. 14-26. For the election to the USSR CPD, see and V. A. Kolosov, "The Geography of Elections of USSR People's Deputies by National-Territorial Districts and the Nationalities Issue," *Soviet Geography*, vol. XXXI, no. 10 (December 1990), pp. 753-766; and A. V. Berezkin, V. A. Kolosov, M. E. Pavlovskaya, N. V. Petrov, and L. V. Smirniagin, "The Geography of the USSR Elections of People's Deputies of the USSR (Preliminary Results)," *Soviet Geography*, vol. XXX, no. 8 (October 1989), pp. 607-634.

¹⁰⁷) After the 19th Party Conference, the Central Committee had been reduced in its size and scope, and competitive election was applied to the first secretaryship. Furthermore, six commissions (party affairs, ideology, social and economic policy, agriculture, international affairs, and law reform) were established for further reforms. However, White has observed that the Party was "restructuring itself

rather more slowly than other public institutions." Stephen White, "Rethinking the CPSU," *Soviet Studies*, vol. 43, no. 3 (1991), p. 408.

¹⁰⁸) For instance, Andreeva's article appeared on *Sovetskaia Russiia* and indicated that high circles supported her views. Urban, *More Power to the Soviets*, pp. 24-25. For Andreeva's article, see N. Andreeva, "Ne mogu postupat'sia printsipami," *Sovetskaia Russiia*, 13 March 1988, p. 3. A similar article was also published under the anonymity of 'Z' in *Daedalus*. Z, "To the Stalin Mausoleum," *Daedalus*, vol. 119, no. 1 (Winter 1990), pp. 295-344. For discussion of its aftermath, see Eric F. Green, *The 19th Party Conference of the CPSU: Politics and Policy* (Washington, D. C.: American Committee on US-Soviet Relations, 1988), pp. 5-7; and Nikolai Shishlin, "Perestroika and the Party," in Robert J. Kinston (ed.), *Perestroika Papers* (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendal/Hunt, 1988), pp. 40-45.

¹⁰⁹) Despite the decision, the question evoked heated debate at the 28th Party Congress. Radicals urged that the Party should be transformed into a 'parliamentary party,' but conservatives insisted the Party should remain as a 'vanguard party.' Stephen White, "The Politics of the XXVIII Congress," in E. A. Rees, *The Soviet Communist Party in Disarray: The XXVIII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (London: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 35-36.

¹¹⁰) For instance, the main bodies of the Party such as the Politburo, Secretariat, and Central Committee did not seem to be properly working by 1989. White, Gill, and Slider, *The Politics of Transition*, pp. 127-128. The Party was even failed to work out a new Party's programme after the 28th Party Congress. Neil Robinson, "Gorbachev and the Place of the Party in Soviet Reform, 1985-1991," *Soviet Studies*, vol. 44, no. 3 (1992), pp. 437-438. Furthermore, the Party began to lose members. In 1989, the Party membership was actually fallen for the first time since 1954. Over 3 million members left the Party in 1990 alone. White, "Rethinking the CPSU," pp. 408-409. For the changing attitude towards the Party in the Soviet society, see Graeme Gill, *The Collapse of a Single-Party System: The Disintegration of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 98-111.

¹¹¹) Discussing the changing nature of the federal system in the Soviet Union, Goldman, Lapidus, and Zaslavski note that the discontent of peripheries on deteriorating socio-economic situation directed to the centre "because of political monopoly of the CPSU" which also meant "responsibility." Philip Goldman, Gail Lapidus and Victor Zaslavsky, "Introduction: Soviet Federalism: Its Origins, Evolution, and Demise," in Gail Lapidus, Victor Zaslavsky, and Philip Goldman (eds.), *From Union to Commonwealth: Nationalism and Separatism in the Soviet Republics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 5.

¹¹²) At the February 1990 Plenum of the CPSU, Gorbachev could continue its 'vanguard role,' not by constitutional legitimacy, but by fighting for the position in a 'democratic way.' "O proekte platformy TsK KPSS k XXVIII s'ezdu partii: doklad M. S. Gorbacheva na Plenum Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS 5 fevralia 1990 goda," *Pravda*, 6 February 1990, pp. 1-2.

¹¹³) White, Gill, and Slider, *The Politics of Transition*, p. 105.

¹¹⁴) The fading role of the Party meant, as Hughes noted, "the disappearance of the official and informal linkages of coordination, the structure for incorporating regional representatives and the

procedure for aggregating and integrating regional demands." James Hughes, "Regionalism in Russia: The Rise and Fall of Siberian Agreement," *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 46, no. 7 (1994), pp. 1133-1134.

¹¹⁵) For instance, deputies of the Baltic republics decided to be observers in the CPD of the USSR, refraining from taking party in the vote, when their demands for 'strong republics' failed to be supported.

¹¹⁶) As for the 'new tricks,' see Gavin Helf and Jeffrey W. Hahn, "Old Dogs and New Tricks: Party Elites in the Russian Regional Elections of 1990," *Slavic Review*, vol. 55, no. 3 (Fall 1992), pp. 511-530.

¹¹⁷) Although Tuleev was defeated in the election to the CPD of the USSR, he had wide basis of public support, particularly from miner workers, rural populations and pensioners in his oblast. In this regard, Ferguson claims that his apparent independence from any political blocs made it possible for him to "remain relatively untarnished by the politicking of the centre" and "to concentrate all his fire on Eltsin administration and the widely detested regional governor, Mikhail Kisiuk." Rob Ferguson, "Will Democracy Strike Back?: Workers and Politics in the Kuzbass," unpublished paper (Centre for Comparative Labour Studies, University of Warwick, 11 April 1997), p. 6.

¹¹⁸) Mukha was the director of the Siberian Agricultural Machine-Building Factory in Novosibirsk and became first secretary of Novosibirsk *obkompartii*. According to Hughes, he was reborn as populist and regionalist. He was appointed as governor, although it was rumoured that Eltsin did so reluctantly. James Hughes, "Eltsin's Siberian Opposition," *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol. 2, no. 50 (17 December 1993), p. 31.

¹¹⁹) Alec Nove, *Glasnost' in Action: Cultural Renaissance in Russia* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), p. ix. Tolz also notes that the public's perception of *glasnost'* became "greatly different from the initial concept elaborated by the leadership from 1988 onward." Vera Tolz, "The Impact of Glasnost'," in Vera Tolz and Iain Elliot (eds.), *The Demise of the USSR: From Communism to Independence* (London: Macmillan, 1995), p. 97.

¹²⁰) For more detail on the conflicts, see Mary Buckley, *Redefining Russian Society and Polity* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 51-55. For the changing features of the Soviet media in their coverage in the late 1980s, see David Wedgwood Benn, *From Glasnost to Freedom of Speech: Soviet Openness and International Relations* (London: Pinter, 1992); and David Lane, *Soviet Society under Perestroika* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990), pp. 276-293.

¹²¹) It was clearly demonstrated when the Association of Cities of Siberia and the Russian Far East issued a new paper, *Sibirskaiia gazeta*. The newspaper covered not only current debates on regional issues such as regional economic situations, environment, small nations, and interviews of regional leaders, but also the history of Siberian regionalism such as the resolution of Siberian conference in August 1917 (no. 32 (August 1992), pp. 6-7), Siberian deputies of the 1906 State Duma (no. 7 (19 February 1990), p. 10); no. 9 (5-11 March 1990), p. 5), forefathers of Siberian regionalism (no. 10 (12-18 March 1990), p. 6), and White Army in Siberia during the Civil War (nos. 3-7 (January-February 1992), in various pages). As for the development of journalism in the SIBFE, see Fedor Okladnikov, "V bredu gazet: o fizionomii sibirskoi obshchestvennosti," *Severo-vostok*, no. 1 (1992), pp. 14-15.

¹²²) 'Status game' means regions' attempts to upgrade their status as republics, and 'resource game' epitomises individual regions' efforts to "minimise their financial contribution to the centre, while

maximising the subsidies they received in return." Daniel R. Kempton, "The Republic of Sakha: The Evolution of Centre-Periphery Relations in the Russian Federation," unpublished paper presented to the annual meeting of the International Studies Association in Chicago on 22-25 February 1995, p. 14, in John Slocum, *Disintegration and Consolidation: National Separatism and the Evolution of Centre-Periphery Relations in the Russian Federation* (Cornell University Peace Studies Programme Occasional Paper, no. 19, July 1995), p. 31. For more discussion of these 'games,' see Vera Tolz, "Thorny Road toward Federalism in Russia," *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol. 2, no. 48 (3 December 1993), pp. 1-8. For the budget crisis, see Philip Hanson, "The Russian Budget Crisis," *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol. 1, no. 14 (3 April 1992), pp. 39-42; and Erik Whitlock, "The Russian State Budget," *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol. 2, no. 17 (23 April 1993), pp. 32-36.

¹²³) For instance, Wallich criticises bilateral negotiations for its 'ad hocery' and non-transparency which made regions perceive that other regions were "striking better deals with the centre," regarding bilateral negotiations as a destabilising factor. Christine I. Wallich, "Russia's Dilemma," in Wallich (ed.), *Russia and the Challenge of Fiscal Federation* (Washington, D. C.: World Bank, 1994), pp. 4, 14. Solnick also share the similar view with Wallich when he regards bilateral negotiations as a destabilising factor which led 'copycat' demands. Steven L. Solnick, "Political Consolidation or Disintegration: Can Russia's Centre Hold?" unpublished paper presented to the Sixth Annual Conference on the Post-Soviet Nations, the Harriman Institute, on 29 April 1994, in Slocum, *Disintegration and Consolidation*, p. 32.

¹²⁴) In his electoral platform, he proposed to form autonomous territories and regions such as Central, North, South, the Urals, Siberia and the Far East. *Sovetskaia molodez'*, 6 February 1990, p. 2. For Eltsin's comment on his draft Constitution, see his speech at the Fifth CPD of Russia on 2 November 1991. Verkhovny Sovet Rossiiskoi Federatsii, *Piatyi (vneocherednoi) s'ezd narodnykh deputatov RSFSR, 10-17 iuliia, 28 oktiabria-2 noiabria 1991 goda: stenograficheskii otchet*, vol. III (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo 'Respublika,' 1992), pp. 144-152.

¹²⁵) These drafts were elaborated by the Constitutional Commission of the Supreme Soviet, led by Oleg Rumiantsev. For more details on *zemli*, see *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 18 March 1992, p. 2; Robert J. Osborn, "Russia: Federalism, Regionalism, and Nationality Claims," in George Ginsburg, Alvin Z. Rubinstein, and Oles M. Smolanski (eds.), *Russia and America: from Rivalry to Reconciliation* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1993), pp. 63-81; Elizabeth Teague, "Centre-Periphery Relations in the Russian Federation," in Roman Szporluk (ed.), *National Identity and Ethnicity in Russian and the New States of Eurasia* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), pp. 30-33; and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, "Federalism and Regionalism," in Stephen White, Alex Pravda, Zvi Gitelman (eds.), *Developments in Russian Politics 4* (London: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 234-235.

¹²⁶) *Piatyi (vneocherednoi) s'ezd narodnykh deputatov RSFSR*, vol. III, p. 148. Italics added.

¹²⁷) Ibid. Italics added.

¹²⁸) In his draft Constitution, he supported equal rights between two subjects of a new federation: republics and *zemli*. Ibid., pp. 147-148. Although he claimed that the draft Constitution did not propose "artificial acceleration" of the creation of *zemli*, or abolishment of republics, his concept showed his reluctance to build a federation on the basis of republics. In this regard, Teague observes that inter-regional resentments and turmoil could have been avoided if non-ethnically based German style 'länder'

had been accepted when it was first proposed. Teague, "Centre-Periphery Relations in the Russian Federation," p. 49.

¹²⁹) Mary McAuley, *Soviet Politics 1917-1991* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 111.

¹³⁰) As for Khasbulatov's parliamentarism, see Ruslan Khabulatov (ed. by Richard Sakwa), *The Struggle for Russia: Power and Change in the Democratic Revolution* (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 226-246; and Doklad Predsedatelia Verkhovnogo Soveta Rossiiskoi Federatsii Khasbulatova R. I. "O proekte Konstitutsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii," in Verkhovnyi Sovet Rossiiskoi Federatsii, *Shestoi s'ezd narodnykh deputatov RSFSR, 6-21 aprelia 1992 goda: stenograficheskiĭ otchet*, vol. IV (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Respublika", 1992), pp. 293-309.

¹³¹) For instance, based on a survey among 4,000 respondents in four Russian oblasts such as Nizhnii Novgorod, Saratov, Tiumen, and Iaroslvi in 1993, Andrews and Stoner-Weiss concluded that anti-Moscow did not mean anti-reform. Joseph Andrews and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, "Regionalism and Reform in Provincial Russia," *Post-Soviet Affairs*, vol. 11, no. 4 (October-December 1995), p. 404.

¹³²) The threat of conservatives seems to be tangible. For instance, the General Secretary of the CPSU could be removed by the majority of the Central Committee as was the case of Khrushchev in 1964. More about this point, see White, Gill, and Slider, *The Politics of Transition*, pp. 72-73. Therefore, Gorbachev had made considerable efforts to consolidate his position in advance of the 27th Party Congress in 1986, where political reform was unveiled. By the time of the Congress, more than 30 heads of ministries and state committees, four politburo members, two Party Secretariat members, four Party leaders of the Union republics, and a third of the regional Party secretaries were newly appointed. In particular, 119 of 307 members of the Central Committee who had voting rights were replaced. Joan DeBardleben, *Soviet Politics in Transition* (Toronto: D. C. and Company, 1992), p. 57. In this regard, Hough argues that a series of political reforms was not based on the imperatives of the economic reform, as reformers claimed, but on consideration of political control. Jerry F. Hough, "Gorbachev's Endgame," in Alexander Dallin and Gail W. Lapidus (eds.), *The Soviet System in Crisis: A Reader of Western and Soviet View* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p. 236. He also maintains that Eltsin was right when he said "if Eltsin did not exist, Gorbachev would have invented him" for Gorbachev wanted the public "to perceive that others are responsible for the problems created by economic policy. *Ibid.*, p. 244.

¹³³) For instance, Sobyenin observes that the independent position of deputies had made the parliament "politically ill-organised, unpredictable, and unstable." Alexander Sobyenin, "The Current Crisis," in Thomas F. Remington (ed.), *Parliament in Transition: The New Legislative Politics in the Former USSR and Eastern Europe* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 202.

¹³⁴) For a discussion of referenda in the Soviet and Russian context, see Stephen White, Richard Rose, and Ian McAllister, *How Russia Votes* (New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, 1997), pp. 69-86.

¹³⁵) The changes were introduced by the Law of the USSR on the Demarcation of the Powers between the USSR and the Subjects of the Federation. *Zakon Soiuz Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik "O razgranicheskii polnomochii mezhdu Soiuzom SSR i sub''ektami federatsii,"* in *Izvestia*, 3 May 1990, p. 1-2. In fact, such an idea had appeared in a draft Platform of Nationalities Policy of the CPSU which published in August 1989, which acknowledged the restoration of legitimate rights of

autonomous republics, krajs and oblasts in full. It also stipulated substantial expansion of rights of autonomous administrative units. *Izvestiia*, 17 August 1989, pp. 1-2.

¹³⁶) The Russian leadership opposed the law of the USSR on the Demarcation of the Powers between the USSR and the Subjects of the Federation, as it could provoke the declaration of sovereignty by autonomous republics in Russia such as Tatarstan and Sakha, which turned out to be quite right. Ann Sheehy, "Russia's Republics: A Threat to Its Territorial Integrity?" *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol. 2, no. 20 (14 May 1993), p. 34.

¹³⁷) *New York Times*, 2 September 1990. In his Tatarstan visit as a part of his Russian tour in August 1990, Eltsin supported the sovereignty of Tatarstan and the form of power sharing must happen from below. TASS, 7 August 1990, in *FBIS SOV 90-153* (8 August 1990), pp. 69-70.

¹³⁸) Atta observes that industrial and agricultural managers 'successfully' opposed any basic changes in the CPD of Russia in 1992 and forced Eltsin to call the referendum. In this regard, Khasbulatov declared that he would never abandon 'his friends,' appealing these deputies for support in his struggle with Eltsin. Don Van Atta, "The Second Congress of the Russian Agrarian Union," *RFE/RF Research Report*, vol. 2, no. 31 (30 July 1993), pp. 47-48. In response to Eltsin's bilateral negotiations with the regions, Khasbulatov also showed his reconciling gesture to regional leaders. For instance, when Eltsin and Nikolaev reached an agreement on Sakha's diamonds, Khasbulatov, also sought to convince Sakha's leader that the parliament too endorsed Sakha's right to profit from its resources and its economic sovereignty. TASS, 28 January 1992, in *FBIS SOV 92-020* (30 January 1992), p. 46; and TASS, 27 January 1992, in *FBIS SOV 92-018* (28 January 1992), p. 54. Eltsin also sought alignments with economic sectors. He raised energy prices in 1992-1993 which had long been demanded by energy industries, when the conflict in the Congress were culminating. Eltsin also provided entrepreneurs with special treatment when he issued a decree on measures to implement industrial policy during the privatisation at state enterprises, stating that the state would retain only a controlling amount of share for up to three years only in a limited part of economy. *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 18 November 1992, p. 1.

¹³⁹) Leksin and Shvetsov, "Regional'naya politika Rossii (stat'ia chetvertaya)," *Rossiiskii ekonomicheskii zhurnal*, no. 8 (August 1994), p. 42.

¹⁴⁰) During the second half of 1992, the question of Federal Treaty also could be an important issues, particularly for the Sakha case in December 1991. The second half of 1993 also constituted another critical period for the centre-periphery relations. After the dissolution of the Congress in September 1993, the president employed 'stick and carrot' policy by replacing the regional leaders and offering regions more concessions.

¹⁴¹) *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 16 October 1992, p. 1.

¹⁴²) Tamara Troiakova, "Regional Policy in the Russian Far East and the Rise of Localism in Primorie," *The Journal of East Asian Affairs*, vol. XI, no. 2 (Summer/Fall 1995), p. 435.

¹⁴³) *Rossiiskie vesti*, 14 August 1993, p. 1. Khabulatov rejected the proposal to create the Federal Council, which made regions that had been loyal to him to turn their back from him. *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 27 August 1993, p. 3.

¹⁴⁴) Teague, "Centre-Periphery Relations in the Russian Federation," p. 50.

¹⁴⁵) V. Aleshin, "Kak i komu upravliat' sibirii?" *Sibirskaiia gazeta*, nos. 43-44 (November 1991), p. 10.

¹⁴⁶) Ibid.

¹⁴⁷) Andrei Konoplianiuk, "Investment in West Siberian Oil: A Key to Success," *International Affairs* (November 1992), pp. 36-37.

¹⁴⁸) *Nefitiiianik*, no. 2 (1990), p. 12, in Dienes, "Siberia," p. 452.

¹⁴⁹) *Izvestiia*, 18 December 1990, pp. 10-11.

¹⁵⁰) According to Ickes and his colleagues' survey of 150 Russian firms in 1994, barter transaction increased from 5 per cent of the transaction value in 1992 to 40 per cent in 1994. Ickes added that sellers preferred barter because of its tax-evasive feature. Barry W. Ickes, Peter Murrell, and Randi Ryterman, "End of the Tunnel?: The Effects of Financial Stabilisation in Russia," *Post-Soviet Affairs*, vol. 13, no. 2 (April-June 1997), p. 121.

¹⁵¹) N. V. Perov, S. S. Mikheev, and L. V. Smirniagin, "Russia's Regional Associations in Decline," *Post-Soviet Geography*, vol. 34, no. 1 (January 1993), pp. 59-66.

¹⁵²) Article 1 of the charter requested member regions to fulfil delivery contracts for the fourth quarter of 1990 as agreed, and deliver necessary products in 1991 in accordance with 1989 delivery contracts. The regions also agreed to formulate bilateral contracts after 1991. "Sibirskoe soglashenie," *Zemlia sibir'*, no. 0 (1991), p. 19. Perov and his colleagues also observed that the goals were specified as creation of an integrated economic structure; unification of the regions natural-resource, industrial, labour, and scientific potential; coordination of efforts to stabilise the economy; preservation and expansion of economic and cultural ties; and mutual deliveries. Perov, Mikheev, and Smirniagin, "Russia's Regional Associations in Decline," p. 61. Hughes also maintained that the association was based on quadripartite political and economic structure in the area, identifying four main structural features of the regions: the military industrial complex of Novosibirsk and Tomsk; the agriculture of Altai and Novosibirsk; the energy industry of Krasnoiarsk and Irkutsk; and the extractive industries of Tiumen and Kemerovo. Hughes, "Eltsin's Siberian Opposition," p. 30.

¹⁵³) Siberian regionalism was based on their confidence that they would be better off once they could use their wealth for themselves. This confidence was clearly demonstrated by separatists. For instance, V. Sterligov, Deputy Chairman of Kemerovo *oblsoret*, stated "Siberia can survive without Russia, while Russia cannot survive without Siberia," in Krasnoiarsk meeting of the Siberian Agreement in March 1992. *Izvestiia*, 30 March 1992, p. 2. Boris Perov, leader of the Siberian Independence Party, also advocated that Siberia could solve its problems with own wealth. In his interview with *Sibirskaiia gazeta*, he insisted that the GNP of Siberia (about \$250 billion in 1990, according to his calculation) was much larger than the sum needed to solve social problems in Siberia (about \$40 billion a year, again in his calculation). Boris Perov, "Sibirskaiia ekonomika gosloset za sibirskuiu nezavisimost'," *Sibirskaiia gazeta*, no. 1 (January 1993), p. 4.

¹⁵⁴) Iuri Shafranik, "Strong Regions Make Strong Russia," *International Affairs*, no. 11 (November 1992), p. 32.

¹⁵⁵) Moscow All-Union Radio Maiak Network (8 April 1991), in *FBIS SOV 91-068* (8 April 1991), p. 44.

¹⁵⁶) "Proekt platforma narodnykh deputatov SSSR ot Sibiri i Dal'nego Vostoka," *Sibirskaiia gazeta*, no. 5 (5 February 1990), p. 6.

¹⁵⁷) The regional authorities and environmentalists, for instance, allied to criticise the central department for their ignorance of environmental consequence of the 'colonial' economic activities. However, regional authorities often found themselves in a dilemma between economic efficiency and environmental protection as the forestry industry in the Russian Far East suggested. DeBardeleben, "The New Policies in the USSR," in Stewart (ed.), *The Soviet Environment*, p. 69.

¹⁵⁸) When Article 11 of the Constitution was amended in the Second CPD in December 1990 in order to support the privatisation process by recognising various forms of land ownership, the federal subjects' jurisdiction on natural wealth became a focus of debates. Although deputies basically agreed that natural resources were to be regulated by the law of the federation, they failed to reach an agreement on the point that republics or other federal subjects were to be listed in the article. Verkhovnyi Sovet Rossiiskoi Federatsii, *Vtoroi (vneochednoi) s'ezd narodnykh deputatov RSFSR: stenograficheskil otchet*, vol. V (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo 'Respublika', 1992), pp. 138-141. After the debate, Article 11 recognised that "ownership, use and disposal of natural wealth are regulated by the laws of the RSFSR and republics which form part of the structure of the RSFSR, and acts of local soviets within the limits of their jurisdiction." *Ibid.*, pp. 140-141. However, the 'limits' of administrative units other than republics had not been clearly stated.

¹⁵⁹) According Vorontsov and Muradian, the idea of granting 15-20 per cent of products at the regions' disposal has long been supported in the area. V. Vorontsov and A. Muradian, "Far Eastern Regionalism," *Far Eastern Affairs*, vol. 81, no. 1 (1992), p. 29.

¹⁶⁰) For instance, Valery Kuleshov, Director of the Institute of Economy and Organisation of Industrial Production of the Russian Academy of Sciences Siberian Branch, pointed out that a radical change was witnessed in "the geopolitical, economic and geographic situation" of Siberia, in which not only suppliers but also consumers of Siberian industrial products became foreign countries. According to him, there emerged problems in iron and steel industry in Kemerovo oblast, aluminium plants, and Barnaul and Kansk mills where raw materials were provided by Kazakhstan and Central Asia. He also maintained that such Siberian primary goods as timber and lead-and-zinc concentrate had no consumers. Valery Kuleshov, "The Region of Russia's Constant Interests," *International Affairs*, no. 4 (April 1993), p. 45.

¹⁶¹) The Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR "On Measures to Create a Petroleum-Gas-Chemical Complex in Tiumen Oblast on the Basis of Hydrocarbon-Fed Stocks from Deposits in Western Siberia" in 1989. E. Gaidar, "Khoziaistvennaia reforma, pervyi god: ekonomicheskoe obozrenie," *Kommunist*, no. 2 (January 1989), pp. 30-31.

¹⁶²) Ukaz prezidenta Rossiiskoi Sovetskoi Federativnoi Sotsialisticheskoi Respubliki "O polnomochiiakh Iakutskoi-Sakha SSR v rasporiashenii prirodnyimi rezursami respublik," *Vedmosti s'ezda narodnykh deputatov RSFRS i VS RSFSR*, no. 51 (19 December 1991), pp. 2070-2071.

¹⁶³) "Soglashenie o vzaimootnosheniakh mezhdru Pravitel'stvami Rossiiskoi Federatsii i Respubliki Sakha (Iakutiia) po ekonomicheskim voprosam," *Iakutiia*, 4 April 1992, p. 1.

¹⁶⁴) Another 32 per cent were assigned to Moscow. The remaining share was allocated to workers' groups (23 per cent), retirement fund (5 per cent) and eight local governments (1 per cent each). Daniel R. Kempton, "The Republic of Sakha (Iakutia): The Evolution of Centre-Periphery Relations in the Russian Federation," *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 48, no. 4 (1996), pp. 592-593.

¹⁶⁵) *Ekonomika i zhizn'*, no. 12 (March 1994), p. 17, in *ibid.*, pp. 593-594.

¹⁶⁶) "Forum Ulan-Ude: Reform Priorities," *International Affairs*, no. 5 (May 1993), p. 12.

¹⁶⁷) Although he noted that it was necessary to develop engineering and metal working branches in the republic and limit the growth rate of resource extracting sector, he claimed that the economic potential of Buriatiia should be boosted "at the expense of processing facilities." Anatoli Ivanov, "Buriatiia: Development Prospects," *International Affairs*, no. 5 (May 1993), pp. 28-29.

¹⁶⁸) Kuleshov, "The Region of Russia's Constant Interests," p. 45.

¹⁶⁹) In its draft "Concept of Resolving the Crisis and Stimulating the Social and Economic Development of the Russian Far East and Trans-Baikal Regions until 2000," the working group noted the problems of economic structure of the Russian Far East: a loss of potential added values by exporting raw materials to other regions for their process, and then bring them back as finished or semi-finished products which caused high costs of production and low profitability. Vorontsov and Muradian, "Far Eastern Regionalism," p. 31. The Development Task Force created by the city of Vladivostok and Primorskii krai in 1992 unveiled the "Vladivostok concept" which also recognised the need of structural changes of economy in the region. Robert B. Krueger and Leon A. Polott, "Greater Vladivostok: A Concept for the Economic Development of South Primorie (Appendix 2)," in Mark J. Valencia, *The Russian Far East in Transition: Opportunities for Regional Economic Co-operation* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 200-202.

¹⁷⁰) In this regard, the SIBFE regions, particularly the Russian Far East, are interested in establishing close economic tie with Asia-Pacific countries. Gorbachev emphasised the importance of 'Pacific partners' in his Vladivostok speech in July 1986. See M. S. Gorbachev, "Rech' na torzhestvennom sobranii, posviashchennom brucheniiu Vladivostoku ordena Lenina (28 iuliia 2986 goda)," in Institut Markizma-Leninizma pri Tsk KPSS, *M. S. Gobachev: izbrannye, rechi i stat'i*, vol. IV (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury 1987), pp. 19-34, 24-25. Eltsin also noted the importance of foreign investment in solving socio-economic problems in the area during his Vladivostok visit in August 1990. TASS, 21 August 1990, in *FBIS SOV 90-163* (22 August 1990), p. 68. Primorskii kraisolet also underlined the importance of foreign economic activities as a measure of enhancing independence. "Primor'e: put' k samostoiatel'nosti," *Krasnoe znamia*, 20 April 1990, p. 2. In this context, Vladivostok was declared an open city in September 1990. *Izvestiia*, 25 September 1990, p. 2.

¹⁷¹) For instance, in relation to the Sakhalin-2 project, one of Sakhalin off-shore oil and gas development projects which is expected to produce \$25 billion of profits during 25 year duration, the Western consortium was to contribute \$100 million to the Sakhalin Development Fund. Already the '3-M' consortium had paid \$15 million worthy 'bonus' to Russia, of which \$7 million was to be handed over to Sakhalin oblast. Matthew J. Sagers, "Prospects for Oil and Gas Development in Russia's Sakhalin

Obalst," *Post-Soviet Geography*, vol. 36, no. 5 (May 1995), p. 282. According to Dienes, Sakhalin oblast demanded 15 items including \$1 billion for a development fund for the oblast, \$5 million 'bonus' for the right to develop oil/gas deposits, and 32 per cent of tax for Sakhalin alone. Leslie Dines, "Economic Geographic Relations in the Post-Soviet Republics," *Post-Soviet Geography*, vol. 34, no. 8 (October 1993), p. 505.

¹⁷²) Viktor Chernomyrdin, "Russian Reforms and Siberia," *International Affairs*, no. 4 (April 1993), p. 9.

¹⁷³) Viacheslav Novikov, "On the World Market," *International Affairs*, no. 4 (April 1993), p. 9.

¹⁷⁴) Nikolai Solovev, "Siberia and the APR," *International Affairs*, no. 4 (April 1993), p. 28. In fact, the Siberian Agreement and the Far Eastern Association for Economic Activity were founders of the Committee which was mainly aimed at creating a mechanism for external integration. For detailed programme of the Committee, see Marina Fuchs, "Regional Separatism in Russia: Siberia 1992-1994," *Russia and the Successor State Briefing Service*, vol. 3, no. 3 (June 1995), pp. 7-8.

¹⁷⁵) Rolf J. Langhammer, Matthew J. Sagers, and Matthias Lücke, "Regional Distribution of the Russian Federation's Export Earnings Outside the Former Soviet Union and Its Implication for Regional Economic Autonomy," *Post-Soviet Geography*, vol. 33, no. 10 (December 1992), p. 619. For the structure of foreign trade in the SIBFE, see Tsuneo Akaha Tsuneo Akaha, Pavel A. Minakir and Kunio Khada, "Economic Challenge in the Russian Far East," Tsuneo Akaha (ed.), *Politics and Economics in the Russian Far East* (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 49-69.

¹⁷⁶) The appendix of the law listed following items under its control: oil products (crude oil, petroleum products), gas (natural gas, oil and other hydrocarbon gases), electric energy, coal (including sinter burden, coke, and semi-coke), wood products (timber, lumber, cellulose, and cardboard), non-ferrous metals and rare metals (including alloys powders and semi-finished products, rolled non-ferrous metals, scraps, and by-products), some ferrous metals (cast iron, rolled ferrous metals, steel tubes, ferroalloys, scraps and by-products of ferrous metals), some chemical products (mineral fertilisers, ammonia, methanol, and non-organic acids), furs, and grains. "Statute On the Procedure for Registering Entities and Enterprises Entitled to Export Strategic Raw Materials," in RAU Corporation, *RAU Business Book*, Part III, pp. 237-239.

¹⁷⁷) "Forum Ulan-Ude," p. 11.

¹⁷⁸) "Reshenie Sibirskogo Soglasheniia," no. 1 (8 February 1992), typescript, chancellery of the Directorate of the Siberian Agreement (Novosibirsk), in Vladimir A. Zhdanov, "Contemporary Siberian Regionalism," in Stephen Kotkin and David Wolff (eds.), *Rediscovering Russia in Asia: Siberia and the Russian Far East* (London: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), p. 125. However, for some reason, he changed his position in his article appeared in *International Affairs* after the meeting, demanding "no less than 20 per cent of goods produced on the territory of the Siberian Agreement at its disposal without discussing the issue with the central ministries." Novikov, "On the World Market," pp. 19-20.

¹⁷⁹) In his article appeared in the special issue of *International Affairs*, he justified the system with a couple of examples of negative impact of uncontrolled exports such as higher price targeted export drive at the expense of domestic consumption. He called attention to the fact that domestic consumption of mineral fertiliser was limited to a minimum level, despite the 6 million tons of surplus in 1992. He also

cited the case of Vostochny harbour where 300 thousand tons metal was lying idle, paralysing the harbour. However, he underlined that "this kind of market and foreign economic initiatives" must be avoided, "with the participation of local bodies." Chernomyrdin, "Russian Reforms and Siberia," p. 8.

¹⁸⁰) Michael Bradshaw, *Regional Patterns of Foreign Investment in Russia* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995), p. 30. Against alleged efficiency of quota and license system, Boris Shaigulin, the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Economic Relations of the Tomsk oblast administration, criticised that central policies failed to create a single mechanism which determined effectiveness and resulted in profitability of different regions. "Kommentarii: ukaz, kotoryi likvidiruet l'goty, no ne likvidiruet problemu," *Sibirskaiia gazeta*, no. 14 (April 1993), p. 5.

¹⁸¹) Carrying out a delivery contract was often facing complicated administrative obstacles. For instance, Tomsk *khlebprodukt* experienced an odd situation when it tried to transfer its oil to *Khleb Rossii* in 1992. Despite of *Khleb Rossii's* declaration, Tomsk Custom House levied duty regarding oil transfer as supplementary quota in order to keep the 40 per cent regional share of duty from 305 million-ruble worthy transaction. Anatolii Zakharov, "Kto zamaran tomskoi neft'iu," *Sibirskaiia gazeta*, no. 2 (2 January 1993), p. 4.

¹⁸²) Valery Kuleshov, Director of the Institute of Economy and Organisation of Industrial Production of the Russian Academy of Sciences Siberian Branch, has observed that the mutually complementary cooperation between groups of regions can help individual regions to cope with own problems. He has identified a couple of possible inter-regional cooperations such as Tiumen-Omsk-Tomsk, Krasnoiarsk-Irkutsk, and Evnkiia-Khakassia-Krasnoiarsk. Kuleshov, "The Region of Russia's Constant Interests," p. 49. The needs of coordination between regions rise not only in an active cooperation of merging industrial capacities, but also in a passive cooperation in order to avoid unnecessary competition with neighbouring regions in the same sector. In their work on industrial restructuring in the Tomsk oblast, Hanson and Kirkow suggests that the oblast should find its own landmark "between oil and gas rich Tiumen and the financial, transport and distributional centre of Novosibirsk." They also maintain that the oblast may remain in the shadow of Novosibirsk, but not necessarily compete in the same areas such as international airport. Philip Hanson and Peter Kirkow, "In the Tomsk Oblast: Federal-Regional Issue," OECD Centre for Co-operation with Non-members, *A Regional Approach to Industrial Restructuring in the Tomsk Region, Russian Federation* (Paris: OECD, 1998), p. 142.

¹⁸³) The need was widely shared by regional leaders. For instance, G. Shaman, the Chairman of Tomsk *oblsovet*, admitted that regional authorities were not competent enough to carry out regional foreign economic policy. "Tomsk Forum," *International Affairs*, no. 4 (April 1993), p. 13. Viacheslav Novikov, the Chairman of Krasnoiarsk *kratsovet* and Chairman of the Coordinating Council of the Siberian Agreement for Foreign Economic Activities, also raised the questions of strengthening influence over decision-making authorities in the sphere of foreign economic activities, representation of regions abroad, ignorance of staffs in this field, and the need of an "integrated and efficient" network of foreign economic information. Novikov, "On the World Market," pp. 17-19.

¹⁸⁴) In his interview with *Sibirskaiia gazeta* in December 1989, Ivan Indiniuk, the Chairman of Novosibirsk *gorsovet* and President of the Association of Cities of Siberia and the Far East, emphasised the importance of informal meeting of *gorispolkoms*, insisting that they could help solving the most

common and acute problems such as housing, maintenance, development of energy and other communal economy more swiftly. Ivan Indiniuk, "My postavili vsekh v ochered' i skazali zhdite," *Sibirskaiia gazeta*, no. 0 (4 December 1989), p. 3.

¹⁸⁵) Far Eastern regional leaders gathered in Khabarovsk in August 1990 to sign an agreement "On the Basic Principles of Economic and Social Cooperation between the Yakut Autonomous Socialist Republic, Primorskii krai, Khabarovsk krai, Amur Oblast, Jewish Autonomous oblast, Kamchatka oblast, Magadan oblast and Sakhalin oblast of the Far Eastern Economic Area of the RSFSR." *Izvestiia*, 30 March 1992, p. 2; and *Rossiskaia gazeta*, 2 April 1992, p. 2. The agreement stipulated that enhancing the economic independence of the Far Eastern Regions would be their main goal. "Far Easterners Pool Efforts," *Far Eastern Affairs*, no. 1 (1991), pp. 13-15.

¹⁸⁶) The charter of the Siberian Agreement also articulated the spheres of coordination where coordination were needed. The spheres of coordination listed in the charter reflected their economic concerns: delivery agreements, single system of management in energy security, ecology, forest and water economy and others, single information system. However, the association did not excluded the need of cooperation in 'political issues.' Articles 6 and 7 of the charter recognised the need of consultation between members in political issues, as well as economic ones, and cooperation between soviets of member regions. "Sibirskoe soglashenie," *Zemlia sibir'*, no. 0 (1991), p. 19.

¹⁸⁷) Hughes, "Eltsin's Siberian Opposition," p. 30. Zhdanov also notes that "simply by gathering together into an inter-regional association," regional leaders strengthen their political status. Zhdanov, "Contemporary Siberian Regionalism," p. 124.

¹⁸⁸) For the draft platform, see "Proekt platforma narodnykh deputatov SSSR ot Sibiri i Dal'nego Vostoka," *Sibirskaiia gazeta*, no. 5 (5 February 1990), p. 6. After the meeting in January, they continued their meeting in Moscow and Khabarovsk. Despite their agreement on the necessity of economic independence in the SIBFE, only 26 per cent of deputies supported the draft platform in their third meeting in Moscow on 12-13 March 1990. Viktor Iukechev, "Sibirskoe deputaty: nakanune rossiiskogo s'ezda," *Sibirskaiia gazeta*, no. 20 (21-27 March 1990), p. 13.

¹⁸⁹) Of course, even before Eltsin's draft Constitution was unveiled, proposals on the political status of the SIBFE regions had appeared. For instance, in November 1990, there appeared a proposal of Ivan Popov, Deputy Director of Krasnoiarsk *kraigosarkhiv*, to divide the RSFSR into four republics: the RSFSR, Western Siberian, Eastern Siberian and Far Eastern Republics. Ivan Popov, "Tri respubliki," *Sibirskaiia gazeta*, no. 3 (22 January 1990), p. 4. Some more details for the political developments, see Vera Tolz, "Regionalism in Russia: The Case of Siberia," *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol. 2, no. 9 (26 February 1993), pp. 1-8.

¹⁹⁰) In the discussion, A. A. Zabolognyi, an economist, opposed the politicisation of the Siberian Agreement. Another participant D. V. Chnykh also opposed the concept of *zemli*, claiming that there already existed far much autonomous entities in the area such as Free Economic Zones and republics. Aleshin, "Kak I komu upravliat' sibir'iu?" pp. 10-11. Similar discussions also appeared in "Kak upravliat' Sibir'iu, ili o novoi kormushke dlia partapparata," *Sibirskaiia gazeta*, no. 35 (September 1991), pp. 1, 5; Pavel Barsagaev, "Subernnaia Sibir': bez svobod?" and Vladimir Iurinskii, "Sibir' dolzhna byt' ekonomicheskoi respublikoi," *Sibirskaiia gazeta*, no. 9 (March 1992), p. 4; and "Nuzhna li Sibirskaiia respublika?" *Tiumenskaia pravda*, 6 December 1991, p. 1.

¹⁹¹) In the Congress, separatist's views also heard, though they failed to be support by the majority of deputies. For instance, V. Sterligov, Deputy Chairman of Kemerovo *oblast*, warned that the Congress could be converted into a Siberian Parliament, insisting that "we can get along without Russia, but Russia can not get along without us." *Izvestiia*, 30 March 1992, p. 2.

¹⁹²) The changing feature of inter-regional coordination was clearly reflected in the organisational changes of the Siberian Agreement. In addition to the two main bodies—the Council of the Association as the supreme executive body consisted of governors and chairmen of regional soviets, and the Executive Directorate as a standing executive apparatus with representative of member regions. James Hughes, "Regionalism in Russia: The Rise and Fall of Siberian Agreement," *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 46, no. 7 (1994), pp. 1137-1138. It also had the Coordinating Councils for specific needs which counted more than ten by February 1993. According to Vladimir Ivankov, General Director of the Executive Directorate of the Siberian Agreement, the Coordinating Councils in operating in the early 1993 were as follows: Councils for Foreign Economic Activities (Viacheslav Novikov, Chairman of Krasnoiarsk *kraisovet*), Utilising Mineral Resources (Iurii Nozhikov, governor of Irkutsk *oblast*), Transportation (A. Tuleev, Chairman of Kemerovo *oblast*), Crime Control (Mikhail Kisliuk, governor of Kemerovo *oblast*), Agricultural Policy (Aleksandr Nazarchuk, President of *Agrosib* and deputy of CPD of the RF), Ecology, Western Siberia, Oil and Gas Complex and Oil Refining. He also acknowledged a working group for information technology and tele-communication. In relation with the politicisation, it is noteworthy that the Coordinating Council for Law-Making and the Implementation of the Federal Treaty, led by Victor Ignatenko, the Chairman of Irkutsk *oblast*, were established. "Tomsk Forum," p. 11.

¹⁹³) For instance, the Political Council, which was decided at the association's meeting in February 1991, was abolished in the next meeting in Ulan-Ude in July 1992, because "the time was not ripe for such open political discussions, and the creating was found inconsistent with the charter of the association." Zhdanov, "Contemporary Siberian Regionalism," p. 124. Viktor Ignatenko, the Chairman of Irkutsk *oblast* and Coordinating Council for Law-Making and the Implementation of the Federal Treaty, also maintained that he regarded the Siberian Agreement as a "concrete political factor for the formation of Russian Federalism." However, he insisted that the association was "functioning on a principle that was the antithesis to those of centralism." "Tomsk Forum," pp. 13-14.

¹⁹⁴) For instance, at extraordinary meetings, leaders of the Siberian Agreement failed to reach an agreement on the political status of Siberia including declaration of independence of Siberia and establishment of single budget. For opinions of regional authorities on those issues, see *Sibirskaiia gazeta*, no. 39 (October 1993), pp. 1-2, 5; no. 41 (October 1993), pp. 1, 5; Hughes, "Eltsin's Siberian Opposition," pp. 32-34; and Fuchs, "Regional Separatism in Russia," pp. 12-21.

¹⁹⁵) Surinov of the Centre for Economic Competition and Forecasting observes regional differences in income levels. He concluded that 56 of 89 regions recorded lower level of income than the Russian Federation average, particularly in Chechnia, Ingushetiia, Marii-El, Dagestan, North Ossetiia, Kabardino-Balkariia, Mordoviia, Moscow *oblast*, and Penza *oblast*. According to his observation, income levels were higher in Sakha, Komi, Kamchatka, Magadan, Murmansk, Sakhalin, Tiumen, and Moscow city. Aleksandr Surinov, "Rossiia razdelilas' na 'bogatye' i 'bednye'," *Izvestiia*, 13 February 1993, p. 4.

¹⁹⁶) They employed two ways of data collecting: 'subjective' data based on surveys of presidential representatives and 'objective' data based on experts' observation and statistical data on a five-point scale.

They worked out two categories: social tension and level of 'misery.' The 'social tension' category was mainly to identify the level of socio-political turbulence, using data on the numbers of participants of 'political meetings,' strikes, out-migration, ethnic conflicts and so on. For the 'misery' category, they identified levels of living standards in the regions, using statistical data on income and expenditure, medical care, crime, infant mortality, and environmental distress. However, Sagers raised questions on the methods of collecting data sets and presenting the results, and lack of explanation on the variables. N. P. Petrov, S. S. Mikheev, and L. V. Smimiagin (summarised and annotated by Matthew J. Sagers), "Regional Differences in the Russian Federation: Social Tensions and Quality of Life," *Post-Soviet Geography*, vol. 34, no. 1 (January 1993), pp. 52-59, 55.

¹⁹⁷) For indicators used for these criteria, see Oksana Dmitrieva, *Regional Development: The USSR and After* (London: UCL Press, 1996), pp. 81, 88.

¹⁹⁸) *Izvestiia*, 25 October 1997, p. 5.

¹⁹⁹) Philip Hanson, "Russia's Regions, or the Mysteries of the 89 Organisms," unpublished paper presented at the Annual Conference of BASEES, 30 March-1 April 1996, in Cambridge. Regarding this article, I would like to acknowledge with deep gratitude the permission of Professor Philip Hanson, University of Birmingham, to use his regional categories for the analysis of the voting patterns of deputies in the Congresses.

²⁰⁰) Matthew Wyman, Stephen White, and Sarah Oates (eds.), *Elections and Voters in Post-Communist Russia* (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 1998); and Sarah Oates, "Electoral Cleavages and Constituencies: Mapping Party Success and Failure Across Russia," unpublished paper presented at the Annual Conference of BASEES, April 1998, in Cambridge.

²⁰¹) Alister McAuley, "The Determination of Russian Federal-Regional Fiscal Relations: Equity or Political Influence?" *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 49, no. 3 (1997), pp. 431-444.

²⁰²) Peter R. Craumer, "Regional Patterns of Agricultural Reform in Russia," *Post-Soviet Geography*, vol. 35, no. 6 (June 1994), pp. 329-351; and Michael Bradshaw, *Regional Patterns of Foreign Investment in Russia* (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995).

²⁰³) Douglas Sutherland and Philip Hanson, "Structural Change in the Economics of Russia's Region," *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 48, no. 3 (1996), p. 367.

²⁰⁴) Hanson, "Russia's Regions, or the Mysteries of the 89 Organisms," p. 5.

²⁰⁵) Rural regions include regions with more than 45 per cent of rural population in at 1 January 1995. Natural resource regions indicate regions in which industrial products of 'resource sector' such as fuel-energy, non-ferrous metals, and timber and woodworking sectors accounted more than half the total industrial products. Regions which were possessing foreign economic bourse in 1994, and major maritime port facilities are categories as hub/gateway regions. High-technology regions include top ten regions when regions are ranked by number of identified work places in the military industrial complexes such as aerospace, radio, communication equipment, and electronics. *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

²⁰⁶) Because of availability of data, Chukot SSR, Jewish autonomous oblast, Chechnia, Ingushetia, and other nine autonomous okrugs are excluded.

²⁰⁷) Despite the unstable socio-economic of Kemerovo oblast as miners' strikes in the region suggested, its relatively high level of economic performance (M=62) seems to classify the region into an 'adapted' group. It would be a good example of relative meaning of 'being adapted' in this context.

²⁰⁸) However, a minimum level of revision is required, because of overlapping categories. Here in the analysis, high-technology regions are merged into hub/gate regions.

²⁰⁹) M. Bakhrakh and G. Mil'ner, "Proizvodstvo chistogo produkta i ispol'zovanie natsional'nogo dokhoda po regionam v RSFSR," *Vestnik statistiki*, no. 6 (1984), pp. 20. 22-23.

²¹⁰) The Russian Economic Ministry's Centre for Economic Competition and Forecasting also acknowledged that large differentials between the highest and lowest income levels were found in North Caucasus, and to a lesser extent, in North, Siberia and the Russian Far East. Denis J. B. Shaw, "Russia's Division into "Rich" and "Poor" Regions," *Post-Soviet Geography*, vol. 35, no. 5 (May 1993), p. 324.

CHAPTER IV

Growing Representation of the SIBFE Regional Interests In the CPDs

In the course of the democratisation process, the working patterns of the Soviet parliament had changed. Despite the spreading discord among deputies regarding the function of the Congress of People's Deputies (CPD) itself,¹ the CPD of the USSR convened more frequently and longer than its predecessors, paving the way for 'democratic' decision-making.² These changes had provided various social groups and regions with more opportunities to articulate their interests in the central decision-making bodies.

In particular, new parliamentary working patterns such as roll-call votes encouraged the regions to form coalitions to increase their influence upon the decision-making process. The establishment of inter-regional deputy groups clearly showed the development of a new interest articulation style in the Soviet system. Furthermore, such a move turned out to be an efficient way to achieve regional goals as the success of the Baltic republics suggested. The need for coordination in their regional interest articulation in the CPDs was also acknowledged not only by deputies, but also by the leaders of the SIBFE regions.³

Changing parliamentary working patterns in the CPDs appeared to support the idea of applying hypotheses that are employed to analyse the development of regionalism in Western countries to the Soviet case. In this regard, the following assumptions need to be recalled. First, the more deputies from a region are represented in the central decision-making process, the more opportunities are given to the region to articulate its regional interests. Second, the more opportunities are given to deputies of a region, the more possibilities exist for regional goals to be fulfilled. Third, the more deputies from a region represent regional interests, the more likely the regional goals are to be accomplished. However, the experiences of Western countries showed that deputies' interest articulation based on their personal (gender, generation, and

cross-regional ethno-national origin⁴) and functional (profession, 'class,'⁵ and political affiliation) backgrounds, and urban-rural cleavages overshadowed regional interest articulation.⁶

Accordingly, in this chapter, the number of SIBFE deputies and their composition, and opportunities of interest articulation in terms of frequency and content of speeches will be analysed. In relation to the composition of SIBFE deputies, regional diversities in deputies' composition that may be caused by different economic structures, and levels of economic performance and living standards in the SIBFE regions will also be discussed. In the content analysis, the changing features of interest articulation patterns and deputies' perception of problems and solutions will constitute a main focus to examine deputies' attitude towards regional interests in the CPD. The content analysis covers the speeches made in the First Congress of the USSR where an 'explosion of participation' had been witnessed. Although only fifteen speeches of SIBFE deputies were included in the analysis, they showed the main concerns of the regions, as they were made by deputies from various regions and diverse social backgrounds. Further analysis of the coalition of SIBFE deputies will be continued in Chapters 5 and 6 with some results of roll-call votes in which opportunities were open to all deputies in the USSR and Russian CPDs.

The analysis suggests that there were significant changes in the policy-making process during the transition period, although some continuities were also apparent. Firstly, the working patterns of the CPDs became more institutionalised in terms of frequencies and duration of meetings, and ways of discussing issues. Secondly, the socio-economic features of a region resulted in regional variations in the composition of deputies. In particular, among the SIBFE deputies, heterogeneity in their composition had increased in the Russian CPD than in the USSR CPD. This trend suggests the growing difficulties in coordinating their activities in the central legislature. Thirdly, opportunities for interest articulation had been open to deputies from the peripheries in both geographical and functional senses. Fourthly, interest articulation patterns of deputies became more straightforward, clearly mentioning regional interests rather than using a circumlocution. Finally, the content analysis suggests the possibility of differentiation of interests among SIBFE deputies, despite their common concerns about deteriorating socio-economic situations in the SIBFE regions and criticism on departmentalism.

IV. 1. From 'Ratification of the Party List' to 'Selection'

During the Soviet period, an election served the political purposes of the Soviet regime rather than a rather genuine purpose of electing personnel to a post, as Western scholars have noted.⁷ However, elections were endowed with a changing goal in the process of *perestroika*—control over the party apparatus by providing the grassroots with an opportunity of participation—as Gorbachev mentioned in his speech to the 27th Party Congress in February 1986.⁸ Accordingly, changes were introduced in the new election law of December 1988, although it still contained some flaws.⁹ In particular, a new principle of competition had changed the behaviour of voters and candidates, which soon developed into a more genuine sense of competition in the elections. In the process, not only the personal backgrounds of individual voters and candidates, but also the general socio-economic features of a region began to play a major role in the elections.¹⁰

Firstly, the new election law allowed an unlimited numbers of candidates for each seat (Arts. 38 and 39).¹¹ As a result, multi-candidates were registered in 1,100 of 1,499 electoral districts, or 73.3 per cent, in the election to the CPD of the USSR in March 1989, although single candidacies still prevailed in Central Asia and the Caucasus.¹²

The trend of multi-candidacies also found in the elections to the CPD of Russia, and regional and local Soviets.¹³ For instance, in Tiumen oblast, single-candidates were registered in 51 of 190 electoral districts, or 26.8 per cent, in the election to the *gorsovet*. However, the proportion of single candidacies had significantly decreased in the elections to the *oblsovet* and the CPD of Russia. In the elections, average numbers of candidates were 2.4 for the *gorsovet* and 8.3 for the CPD of Russia in Tiumen oblast.

<Table 4.1.1> Numbers of Candidates in the Elections in Tiumen oblast (1990)

	single candidate	2-4 candidates	5-7 candidates	8 or more candidates	total	largest number of candidates	average number of candidates
<i>City Soviet</i>							
electoral district candidates	51 (26.8) 51	131 (68.9) 354	8 (4.2) 33	0 (0.0) 0	190 (100.0) 448	6 in 3 districts	2.4

<u>Oblast Soviet</u>							
electoral	3	30	14	5	52 ¹⁾	11 in	4.4
district	(5.8)	(57.7)	(26.9)	(9.6)	(100.0)	1 district	
candidates	3	99	83	44	229		
<u>CPD of Russia</u>							
electoral	0	0	9	11	20	20 in	8.3
district	(0.0)	(0.0)	(45.0)	(55.0)	(100.0)	1 district	
candidates	0	0	52	114	166		

¹⁾Data for 8 of 60 electoral districts are unavailable.

Figures in bracket indicate percentage to the total numbers of electoral districts.

Sources: *Tiumenskaia pravda*, 24 January 1990, p. 1; 25 January 1990, pp. 1-3; 26 January 1990, pp. 2-3.

Secondly, the election law stipulated candidates' right to conduct election campaigns (Article 38) and address to the public via mass media and public meetings (Article 44). The law also provided candidates with the rights to have up to ten election campaign assistants (Article 46) and free travel for electoral meetings (Article 49).¹⁴ With the development of 'socialist pluralism' and *glasnost*, these legal guarantees brought significant changes in election campaigns in two aspects: coverage of the platforms of candidates and emerging coalitions of deputies based on their platforms.

During election campaigns, candidates gave their opinions about questions at various levels—from Union to district—and various aspects—from 'high' politics to 'low' politics—although not all these platforms were practical and sensible.¹⁵ For instance, in Primorskii krai, the platforms of candidates included questions of 'high' politics at the federal level such as the sovereignty of the RSFSR,¹⁶ a multi-party system,¹⁷ and market relations,¹⁸ as well as 'low' politics at the regional level such as housing and hospital constructions in a district.¹⁹ However, this does not necessarily mean that the platform of a candidate itself played a decisive role in his or her success in the election, considering that a significant difference in the platforms was hardly discernible on some occasions.²⁰

Another significant change was found in the emerging coalitions of candidates based on platforms which soon developed into a primitive form of party politics. Although the efficiency of these coalitions varied region by region, and coalition by coalition (as will be discussed in Chapter 7.3), it certainly changed Soviet election patterns, as the success of the People's Front in the Baltic republics suggested.²¹

Thirdly, the electorate was no longer an object of mobilisation, but emerged as a subject of participation when an increasing proportion of voters ceased to be a rubber stamp for approving a party list of candidates. Hahn's survey in 1990 in Iaroslavl

suggests that the grassroots regarded elections and their participation in these elections as important.²² Other surveys conducted during the period of election campaigns also showed that voters began to select candidates based on their own preference, whether rational or not. For instance, Levanskii, Obolenskii and Tokarevskii suggest that about two-thirds of voters had own criteria in their selection of candidates.²³ A survey conducted by the Social Group of 'Elections-90' (Vybory-90) in the city of Tobol'sk in Tiumen oblast also showed that voters regarded the personal qualities—accord of speech and deed, ability to work with other people, and anti-bureaucratic attitude—of a candidate as the most important factor. The survey also suggested that respondents preferred a candidate from an industrial sector (35.1 per cent) and aged less than 50 years old (95.5 per cent).²⁴ The changing features of electorates were clearly demonstrated in the electoral meetings,²⁵ emerging informal organisations,²⁶ decreasing turnout compared to the previous Soviet elections,²⁷ and defeats of first secretaries in many electoral districts.²⁸

Finally, the socio-economic features of a region affected these changing features in the elections. For instance, according to Berezkin and his colleagues, the larger the size of urban populations, employees in the science sector, and the highly educated, the lower the voter turnout and the more numbers of candidates per seat. By contrast, voter turnout was higher in areas where the proportion of the agricultural population was high.²⁹

IV. 2. Composition of the CPDs of the USSR and Russia

The electoral reform had changed the representation patterns in the CPDs, as many have already discussed. In relation with the development of regionalism, this analysis also shows that the regional socio-economic features influenced the composition of the deputies. For instance, indigenisation of deputies from titular republics was evident in the both CPDs. Furthermore, socio-economic features of a region affected the composition of deputies. As far as SIBFE deputies were concerned, heterogeneity within the deputy group appeared to grow in the Russian CPD than in the USSR CPD, which accordingly increased difficulties in coordinating SIBFE deputies' parliamentary activities.

IV. 2 (1) Composition of the CPD of the USSR

The election to the CPD of the USSR in March 1989 was distinguished by changes not only in the election procedures and in candidates' and voters' behaviour, but also in the composition of deputies. In general, women, workers, and rural regions were significantly underrepresented in the 1989 CPD compared to the previous Supreme Soviet of the USSR, though the proportion of party members had increased. More importantly, the indigenisation of deputies from titular autonomous administrative units was evident.

Changes in representation in the USSR CPD were apparent in many aspects. For instance, candidates of 'unusual' occupational background such as priest and pensioners were elected to the CPD. Furthermore, there was a decreasing representation of women and workers in the CPD, as well as in the Supreme Soviet, compared to Soviet representation patterns. Under the Soviet system, representation was intended to demonstrate the equity of the socialist country as a state of workers, boosting the representation of workers, women and youth.³⁰ However, the proportion of women showed a sharp decrease from 32.8 per cent in the Supreme Soviet of 1984 to 15.6 per cent (or 355 deputies) in the new CPD, and 18.5 per cent (or 100 deputies) in the Supreme Soviet of 1989.³¹ The proportion of workers also decreased from 49.5 per cent in the Supreme Soviet of 1984 to 23.1 per cent in the CPD and 18.3 per cent in the Supreme Soviet of 1989.

<Table 4.2.1> Composition of the Supreme Soviets (1984, 1989) and the USSR CPD

	Supreme Soviet (1984)		CPD (1989)		Supreme Soviet (1989)	
	deputy size	%	deputy size	%	deputy size	%
Top leadership	23	1.5	15	0.7	1	0.2
Upper/middle adm ¹⁾	255	40.0	813	39.8	178	32.8
Lower adm ²⁾	99	6.6	504	24.7	191	35.3
Workers	688	49.5	473	23.1	99	18.3
Highly skilled labourers	90	6.0	197	9.7	68	12.5
Priests	0	0.0	5	0.2	0	0.0
Pensioners	0	0.0	37	1.8	5	0.9
Total	1499	100.0	2044	100.0	542	100.0

¹⁾ Upper and middle echelons of administration: first and second secretaries of union republics; first secretaries of the *kraikom*, *obkom* and *gorkom* of the CPSU; CPSU CC officials; executives of the USSR union republic Supreme Soviets; USSR ministers and deputy ministers; union republic ministers and deputy ministers; high ranking military leaders; KGB and procurators; high trade union executives; and executives of the Academy of Sciences, research institutes and officers universities.

²⁾ Lower echelon of administration: collective farm chairmen and chiefs of specialisation; and state farm directors, deputy directors and chief specialists.

Sources: *Izvestia*, 28 April 1988, pp. 1-2; and *Moskovskie novosti*, no. 24 (1989), p. 8.

Furthermore, rural areas and small-numbered nations without autonomous status were clearly underrepresented in the CPD of the USSR. According the 1989 census, the rural population accounted for 34.1 per cent of the total population of the USSR, and 26.4 per cent of the RSFSR population. However, they accounted for 20 per cent of deputies in the USSR CPD, and 20.5 per cent in the Supreme Soviet of 1989.

Apart from this general alteration, two important features are noteworthy in relation to the development of regionalist tendencies in the autonomous administrative units. Firstly, administrative status had been taken into account in representation, with one-third of the seats in the CPD allocated to autonomous administrative units.³² As a result, autonomous administrative units with small populations such as the Baltic republics were overrepresented in the CPD and the Supreme Soviet. By contrast, those of large population such as RSFSR, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, were underrepresented. The gap between those republics was still larger in the Supreme Soviet. The lower levels of autonomous administrative units were also overrepresented,³³ which increased their influence on the central decision-making.

<Table 4.2.2> Representation of the Union Republics in the USSR CPD

	Population (%)	CPD	Supreme Soviet			Cms	Cmt
			total	SN	SU		
Total	286731	2250 seats	542 seats	271 seats	271 seats	321 seats	605 seats
RSFSR	51.4	-5.8	-6.9	-16.2	2.5	0.6	0.0
Ukraine	18.0	-6.5	-6.5	-13.3	1.2	-8.3	-7.9
Belarus	3.6	0.6	0.3	0.5	0.1	1.4	-0.1
Estonia	0.5	1.3	1.9	3.6	0.2	1.7	2.6
Latvia	0.9	1.1	1.7	3.2	0.2	1.3	1.2
Lithuania	1.3	1.0	1.5	2.8	0.2	0.9	1.3
Armenia	1.1	1.6	1.5	3.0	0.0	1.1	1.0
Azerbaijan	2.5	0.2	1.6	3.8	-0.7	0.9	1.1
Georgia	1.9	1.3	2.9	5.9	-0.1	1.5	1.1
Kazakhstan	5.8	-3.4	-1.2	-1.7	-0.6	-2.1	-1.7
Kirgizstan	1.5	0.1	1.1	2.6	-0.4	1.0	0.8
Tajikistan	1.8	0.2	1.2	3.0	-0.7	1.0	1.5
Turkmenistan	1.2	0.6	1.4	2.9	-0.1	0.7	0.5
Uzbekistan	6.9	-3.0	-1.5	-1.3	-1.7	-1.9	-2.8
Moldavia	1.5	0.4	1.3	2.6	0.0	0.4	1.3

Population total (1,000); SN (Soviet of Nationalities); SU (Soviet of the Union); Cms (Standing Commissions of the Supreme Soviet); Cmt (Committees of the Supreme Soviet); + and - values indicate over- and under-representation compared to the per cent of titular population in each republic
Source: Figures derived from Verkhovnyi Sovet SSSR, *Narodnye deputaty SSSR*.

Secondly, a growing degree of indigenisation of deputies was evident in most republic deputy groups.³⁴ Titular nations were particularly overrepresented in the Baltic republics, not only because of growing national assertiveness, but also because

of gerrymandering.³⁵ Despite these trends, titular nations were underrepresented in the RSFSR, Ukraine, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. In particular, Russians in the RSFSR were considerably underrepresented when they consisted 74.3 per cent of the RSFSR deputies in the CPD, and 67.2 per cent in the Supreme Soviet.³⁶ By contrast, Russians who lived in other union republics, except in the Baltic republics, Kazakhstan, and Georgia, were overrepresented. The trend of indigenisation was also found at the lower levels of autonomous administrative units, which will be discussed later.

<Table 4.2.3> Representation of Titular Nations in the USSR CPD

	Titular Nation (%)	Representation of Titular Nation		Russian Population (%)	Representation of Russian Population	
		CPD	Supreme Soviet		CPD	Supreme Soviet
RSFSR	81.5	-7.2	-14.3	-	-	-
Ukraine	72.7	-3.8	-1.7	22.1	4.1	3.7
Belarus	77.9	1.0	7.8	13.2	2.6	1.1
Estonia	61.5	21.8	23.1	30.3	-22.0	-30.3
Latvia	52.0	28.8	19.4	34.0	-20.5	-12.6
Lithuania	79.6	10.1	13.7	9.4	-6.0	-2.7
Armenia	93.3	-2.7	6.7	1.6	7.8	-1.6
Azerbaijan	82.7	-2.1	8.2	5.6	4.1	-1.1
Georgia	70.1	6.8	6.8	6.3	-1.9	-6.3
Kazakhstan	39.7	7.2	8.3	37.8	-4.5	-13.8
Kirgizstan	52.4	12.4	19.0	21.5	2.6	7.1
Tajikistan	62.3	11.4	19.0	7.6	11.7	4.9
Turkmenistan	72.0	4.6	13.7	9.5	5.4	-2.4
Uzbekistan	71.4	0.4	-16.2	8.3	3.5	5.5
Moldavia	64.5	8.2	2.2	13.8	4.4	-0.5

+ and - values indicate over- and under-representation compared to the per cent of titular population in each republic.

Source: Figures derived from Verkhovnyi Sovet SSSR, *Narodnye deputaty SSSR*.

Thirdly, the composition of regional deputy groups in the CPD varied in their social strata, or 'class,' reflecting socio-economic and political features of an electoral district or a region.³⁷ For instance, nomenklaturists and the intelligentsia were elected mainly in large cities, while managers and workers, particularly of agricultural sectors, were successful in rural areas ($X^2=903.8$, $df=18$, $p<0.001$).³⁸ The composition of deputies from the union republic groups also suggests that regional socio-economic features affected representational patterns. For instance, a large proportion of nomenklaturists (21.1 per cent) was represented among deputies from agricultural republics such as Central Asian republics, while intellectuals were numerous among Baltic (41.1 per cent) and Moscow (47.9 per cent) deputies.³⁹ However, a large number

of nomenklaturists (17.6 per cent) was elected in Moscow, perhaps because its status as the capital city ($X^2=364.0$, $df=24$, $p<0.001$).

<Table 4.2.4> 'Class' Composition in the USSR CPD (%)

	Nom	Cad	Mil	Man	Int	Tec	Wor	Total ¹⁾
Urbanisation ($X^2=903.8$, $df=18$, $p<0.001$)								
Large cities	22.6	7.3	5.8	7.9	35.1	11.1	10.3	895
Medium-sized cities	19.3	6.2	2.2	15.1	11.6	23.3	22.2	450
Small cities	3.9	12.4	0.8	18.2	4.4	30.6	29.8	363
Rural areas	0.0	4.0	0.0	41.6	1.1	9.9	43.4	454
Total	14.0	7.2	3.0	18.2	17.9	16.7	23.0	2162
Republic Groups ($X^2=364$, $df=24$, $p<0.001$)								
Slavic	11.5	7.5	4.4	22.4	11.8	18.9	23.6	1239
Moscow	17.6	7.4	7.4	7.4	47.9	9.6	2.7	188
Baltic	12.7	9.5	1.3	13.9	41.1	17.7	3.8	158
Caucasus	13.7	6.6	2.8	9.4	22.2	8.0	37.3	212
Central Asia	21.1	4.2	3.3	14.4	10.3	15.8	30.8	360
Total ²⁾	13.9	7.0	4.1	17.8	17.8	16.4	22.9	2157

Nom (nomenklaturists), Cad (Cadres), Mil (military personnel including KGB), Man (managers), Int (intelligentsia), Tec (technicians), and Wor (workers); large cities (cities with more than 500,000 population), medium-sized cities (cities between 100,000 and 500,000 population), and small cities (cities less than 100,000 population and urban settlements). Military districts are excluded.

¹⁾ Deputies in total number including those who joined the CPD after 1989.

²⁾ Deputies from Moldavia excluded.

Source: Figures derived from Verkhovnyi Sovet SSSR, *Narodnye deputaty SSSR*.

IV. 2 (2) Composition of the CPD of Russia

The election to the CPD of Russia on 4 March 1990 for 1068 seats also showed clear changes in the character of Soviet elections.⁴⁰ In the election, district pre-election meetings and the representation of social organisations had been abolished. Although the principle of national representation was still maintained, the proportion of deputies from national-territorial districts had fallen from 21.8 per cent among deputies of the RSFSR in the USSR CPD to 16.0 per cent in the CPD of Russia. At the same time the changes in the representation patterns that were apparent in the election of 1989 seemed to be intensified in the 1990 election. Furthermore, the development of informal organisations and political groups was also reflected in the CPD, although many of these political groups in the CPD were formed after the election, and were far from stable in their membership.⁴¹

First of all, the Soviet style of equal representation of women and workers had clearly lost its significance, with female deputies, workers, and deputies from rural

areas accounting for less than 10 per cent respectively in the CPD and the Supreme Soviet of Russia.⁴² In particular, the representation of *kolkhoz* and *sovkhos* workers had decreased from 13.9 per cent in the Supreme Soviet of 1985 and 6.2 per cent in the CPD of 1989 (among RSFSR deputies) to a negligible proportion of 0.7 per cent in 1990. By contrast, the proportion of middle-level governing echelons had nearly tripled, and non-party (CPSU) members had doubled in the CPD and the Supreme Soviet of Russia.⁴³

Secondly, the indigenisation of deputies from the titular autonomous administrative units was also found in the CPD of Russia, although the degrees of indigenisation varied region by region. In fourteen autonomous administrative units that were represented by more than two deputies, titular nations were represented by more than half the numbers of deputies from each republic and autonomous region. As a result, titular nations were overrepresented in most autonomous administrative units.

<Table 4.2.5> Indigenisation of Deputies in the CPD of Russia (1990)

	Population Composition			Deputy Composition in the CPD				
	Russian	Titular Nation		Total	Russian		Titular Nation	
	(%)	Nation	(%)	Deputy	(%)	C-A	D	D-B
	A	B		C				
Chechnia & Ingushetia	23.1	Chechentsy, Ingushi	57.8	10	10.0	-13.1	90.0	32.2
Kabardino-Balkar	32.0	Kabardintsy	48.2	8	12.5	-19.5	87.5	39.3
Tyva	32.0	Tuvintsy	64.3	7	14.3	-17.7	85.7	21.4
Dagestan	9.2	Dagintsy	15.6	12	16.7	7.5	75.0	59.4
Karachaevo-Cherkessk	42.4	Karachevtsy	31.2	4	25.0	-17.4	75.0	43.8
Iamalo-Nenets	59.2	Nentsy	4.1	4	25.0	-34.2	75.0	70.9
Chuvash Rep	49.8	Chuvashi	67.8	11	18.2	-31.6	72.7	4.9
Evreisk Ao	83.2	Evrei	4.2	6	33.3	-49.9	66.7	62.5
Bashkortostan	39.3	Bashkiriy	21.9	28	25.0	-14.3	60.7	38.8
Sakha	50.3	Iakuty	33.4	10	30.0	-20.3	60.0	26.6
North Ossetiia	29.9	Osetiny	53.0	9	22.2	-7.7	55.6	2.6
Buriatiia	70.0	Buriaty	24.0	9	44.4	-25.6	55.6	31.6
Rep Komi	57.7	Komi	23.3	10	50.0	-7.7	50.0	26.7
Mordoviia	60.8	Mordva	32.5	10	50.0	-10.8	50.0	17.5
Kalmykiia	37.7	Kalmyki	45.4	12	8.3	-29.4	41.7	-3.7
Tatarstan	43.3	Tartary	48.5	24	54.2	10.9	41.7	-6.8
Marii-El	47.5	Marritsy	43.4	8	62.5	15.0	37.5	-5.9
Rep Altai	60.4	Altaitsy	31.0	3	66.7	6.3	33.3	2.3
Kareliia	73.6	Karely	10.0	9	66.7	-6.9	22.2	12.2
Adygeia	68.0	Adygeitsy	22.1	6	66.7	-1.3	16.7	-5.4
Kakhasiia	79.5	Khakasy	11.1	6	83.3	3.8	16.7	5.6
Khanty-Mansi	66.3	Khanty	0.9	7	57.1	-9.2	14.3	13.4
Udmurt Rep	58.9	Udmurty	30.9	13	92.3	33.4	7.7	-23.2
Other aoks ¹⁾	-	-	-	15	26.7	-	73.3	-
Total	-	-	-	241	38.6	-	53.1	-

¹⁾ Eight autonomous okrugs that were represented by two deputies or less.

+ and - values indicate over- and under-representation.

Komi nationality included in Nenets aok, Tatars in Bashkortostan, Jamalo-Nenets, and Udmurtia. Small nations such as Avarsy, Darginsy, Kumyky, Lesginy, Nogaitsy regarded as titular nation in Dagestan.

Sources: Goskomstat RSFSR, *Natsional'nyi sostav naseleniia RSFSR: po dannym vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1989 g.* (Moscow: Respublikanskii informatsionno-izdatel'skii tsentr, 1990), pp. 102-153; and Verkhovnyi Sovet RSFSR, *Spisok narodnykh deputatov RSFSR na 12 febraliia 1991 g.* (Moscow: Izdanie Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR, 1991).

In general, the higher the proportion of titular population in a region, the more indigenous deputies were elected. As in Chechnia/Ingushetiia and Tyva, a clearly activated nationalist sentiment also seemed to intensify a degree of indigenisation of deputies, though it was not always the case. For instance, Tatars in Tatarstan were underrepresented, despite the noticeable development of nationalist sentiment in the republic.

Thirdly, socio-economic features of regions again affected the composition of deputies of the Russian CPD. In particular, the results of cross-tabulation analyses suggest that the composition of deputies was different in accordance with the socio-economic features of regions where they were elected. For instance, the higher the living standards, the less opportunities tended to be given to the nomenklaturists,⁴⁴ but the more opportunities for non-CPSU members⁴⁵ and the younger generation⁴⁶ to be elected to the CPD.

<Table 4.2.6> Regional Differentiation of Composition of Deputies in the CPD of Russia (%)

	N	Nom	Cad	Mil	Man	Int	Tec	Wor	Other
<i>Socio-economic Conditions and Federal Status (X²=160.3, df=28, p<0.001)</i>									
Highly adapted region	65	3.1	10.9	1.6	3.1	46.9	7.8	0.0	26.6
Adapted regions	238	5.9	23.1	4.2	18.5	10.5	10.5	7.6	19.7
Stagnated regions	553	12.8	18.9	5.4	22.5	8.5	14.6	5.4	12.1
Stagnated republics	76	23.7	23.7	2.6	22.4	13.2	5.3	5.3	3.9
Adapted republics	84	6.0	23.8	1.2	21.4	7.1	15.5	13.1	11.9
Total	1016	10.8	20.1	4.3	20.2	11.6	12.6	6.2	14.1
<i>Economic Structure (X²=78.5, df=21, p<0.001)</i>									
Rural regions	109	14.7	22.9	2.8	20.2	9.2	13.8	6.4	10.1
Resource regions	91	7.7	20.9	5.5	23.1	8.8	16.5	7.7	9.9
Hub/gate regions	360	5.6	18.1	5.3	14.5	17.3	13.9	3.9	21.4
Residual regions	501	15.3	21.4	4.0	23.0	8.1	10.7	7.5	9.9
Total	1061	11.3	20.4	4.4	19.8	11.4	12.6	6.2	13.8

Sources: Figures derived from Verkhovnyi Sovet SSSR, *Narodnye deputaty SSSR*; and Verkhovnyi Sovet RSFSR, *Spisok narodnykh deputatov RSFSR na 12 febraliia 1991 g.*

The composition of deputies also varied in regional deputy groups dependent on the regional economic structure. For instance, nomenklaturists accounted for a smaller

proportion among deputies from hub/gate (5.6 per cent) and resource (7.7 per cent) regions than among deputies from rural regions (14.7 per cent). Non-CPSU members also were more successfully represented in hub/gate (39.3 per cent) and resource regions (23.1 per cent) than in rural (10.1 per cent) and residual regions (15.9 per cent, $X^2=76.2$, $df=3$, $p<0.001$). In particular, as the term hub/gate suggests, nearly three-quarters (72.5 per cent) of deputies from hub/gate regions were elected from large cities, while the proportion accounted for about half the deputies from other types of regions ($X^2=62.1$, $df=9$, $p<0.001$).

Finally, the emergence of political factions in the Congress is noteworthy. Unlike the establishment of coalition blocs in the USSR Congress that were based on regions, political orientations formed a basis of coalitions in the CPD of Russia, particularly when leading figures from the inter-regional group preferred to run for the local Soviets.⁴⁷ In the CPD of Russia, 17 political factions were operating by the Second Congress in November 1990, which were reduced to fifteen by the Seventh Congress in December 1992. More than three-quarters of deputies participated in the political factions. Among the factions, the Agrarian Union was the largest with 127 members. Other factions had around 50 members, though numbers fluctuated.⁴⁸ By the end of 1992, these factions formed political blocs to increase their influence in the Congress. Among the political blocs, the Coalition of Reform, a main political bloc of supporters of reform, included 149 deputies or 14.7 per cent, while its main counterpart, Russian Unity, had 302 members or 29.8 per cent of deputies. However, about 20 per cent of deputies remained outside these political factions.

IV. 2 (3) Composition of SIBFE Deputies in the CPDs

In the context of regional interest articulation in the central legislature, the size of a regional deputy group has considerable significance, particularly in a vote. In the CPD of USSR, the SIBFE was represented by 217 deputies or 9.6 per cent, including 32 deputies from social organisations. The number was larger than that of Baltic deputies (158 deputies or 7.0 per cent), and about the same number of Caucasian deputies (216 deputies or 9.6 per cent). The SIBFE delegation also had 10.4 per cent of the Supreme Soviet seats with 11.2 per cent of the USSR population. Among the RSFSR delegation elected in the territorial and national-territorial districts to the USSR CPD, SIBFE deputies accounted for 150 deputies or 23.1 per cent with 21.8 per cent of the RSFSR population. Although the SIBFE regions as a whole were somewhat

underrepresented in the Congress, this was mainly caused by the allocation of seats to social organisations and a relatively higher level of under-representation of Western Siberia.

The new CPD of Russia turned out to be favourable to the SIBFE in general, particularly for Western Siberia, in terms of representation. For instance, the share of the SIBFE regions had increased from 19.7 per cent among the RSFSR delegation to the USSR CPD to 22 per cent, or 235 deputies, in the CPD of Russia. An increasing proportion of SIBFE deputies (by 2.1 per cent) was also returned to the Supreme Soviet.

<Table 4.2.7> Representation of the SIBFE in the CPDs of the USSR and Russia

	Population (1989)	RSFSR Delegation in the USSR CPD		RSFSR CPD	Degree of Over- & Under-Representation		
		CPD	N & N-T		B-A	C-A	D-A
	A	B	C	D	B-A	C-A	D-A
<i>West Siberia</i>	10.2	7.2	8.0	9.2	-3.0	-2.2	-1.0
Altai Krai	1.8	1.3	1.5	1.7	-0.5	-0.3	-0.1
Kemerovo oblast	2.2	1.3	1.4	1.9	-0.9	-0.8	-0.3
Novosibirsk oblast	1.9	1.4	1.4	1.7	-0.5	-0.5	-0.2
Omsk oblast	1.5	1.0	1.1	1.2	-0.5	-0.4	-0.2
Khanty-Mansi aok	0.9	0.1	0.2	0.4	-0.8	-0.7	-0.5
<i>East Siberia</i>	6.2	7.2	9.0	6.9	1.0	2.7	0.7
Rep Tyva	0.2	1.2	1.9	0.6	1.0	1.7	0.4
Rep Buriat	0.7	1.4	2.2	0.9	0.7	1.5	0.2
<i>Far East</i>	5.4	5.3	6.2	5.9	-0.1	0.8	0.5
Rep Sakha	0.7	1.4	2.2	0.9	0.7	1.5	0.2
Evereiskii ao	0.1	0.5	0.8	0.3	0.4	0.7	0.1
Primorskii kraï	1.5	1.0	1.1	1.5	-0.5	-0.4	0.0
<i>SIBFE Total</i>	21.8	19.7	23.1	22.0	-2.1	1.4	0.2

Regions represented by more than five deputies are listed.

Sources: Figures derived from Verkhovnyi Sovet SSSR, *Narodnye deputaty SSSR*; and Verkhovnyi Sovet RSFSR, *Spisok narodnykh deputatov RSFSR na 12 febraliia 1991 g.*

Among SIBFE deputies in the USSR CPD, 14.7 per cent of deputies were females, 47.5 per cent young deputies of less than 45 years old, 68.8 per cent Russians, and 30.9 per cent of the deputies were from autonomous administrative units. As for their 'class' backgrounds, managers accounted for the highest proportion (24.9 per cent), followed by workers (19.8 per cent), technicians (16.6 per cent), the intelligentsia (13.8 per cent), and cadres (10.6 per cent). In their composition, the SIBFE delegation to the USSR CPD distinguished themselves with smaller proportions of deputies from the older generation (more than 45 years old),⁴⁹ large cities,⁵⁰ and nomenklaturist background.⁵¹

However, these features had changed in the CPD of Russia. Firstly, the deputy group was dominated by male deputies (95.3 per cent). Secondly, the proportion of young deputies had decreased among SIBFE deputies, against a general increase of the young generation in the Congress as a whole. Thirdly, despite growing nationalist tendencies, the proportion of Russians increased to 73.1 per cent among SIBFE deputies. Fourthly, an increasing share of deputies was elected from large cities (31.6 per cent in the USSR CPD to 54.5 per cent), and therefore rural areas were significantly underrepresented (19.0 per cent in the USSR CPD to 8.2 per cent). Finally, the composition of deputies in terms of 'class' background had significantly altered when nomenklaturists and cadres had made a success in the elections, while workers experienced a severe defeat. However, all these changes—except the decreasing percentage of young deputies—were generally observed in the Russian CPD as a whole.

As a result, the changes overshadowed features of the SIBFE delegation, compared to the delegation of the European part of Russia in terms of its composition, which witnessed in the USSR CPD. In the Russian CPD, no significant differences between deputies from the SIBFE and from the other Russian regions were found in the variables tested such as gender, generation, 'class' background, CPSU membership, urban-rural origin, and ethnic background.

By contrast, the regional differentiation in the composition of deputies among SIBFE deputies seemed to grow. As already discussed in Chapter 3, the SIBFE includes various types of regions in terms of their economic structure and levels of economic performance and living standards. In the election of 1989, the differences between these regional groups were mainly revealed in the proportion of deputies from urban or rural areas. For instance, a larger proportion of rural deputies was elected from rural regions,⁵² and stagnated republics and regions.⁵³

In the SIBFE delegation to the Russian CPD, the intra-regional difference was mainly apparent in deputies' social strata. For instance, cadres (27.7 per cent) and managers (26.5 per cent) constituted a larger proportion among deputies from Western Siberia, managers (27.7 per cent) and workers (11.9 per cent) from Eastern Siberia, and cadres (25.9 per cent) and technicians (33.3 per cent) from the Russian Far East ($X^2=18.6$, $df=10$, $p<0.05$). Nomenklaturists were mainly elected in the republics, particularly in stagnated republics (44.4 per cent), while they accounted only for 6.8 per cent of deputies from adapted regions ($X^2=24.8$, $df=15$, $p<0.05$).⁵⁴

In general, the SIBFE had been rather fairly represented in the CPDs, considering its population size. However, differences between SIBFE deputies and the delegations from the European part of Russia in the composition of deputies had decreased. By contrast, heterogeneity in the SIBFE delegation had increased in the Russian CPD as compared with the USSR CPD. Therefore, despite the increasing proportion of SIBFE deputies in the Russian CPD than in the USSR CPD, difficulties in coordinating the interest of deputies also seemed to be growing, particularly when the issues in question at the CPD became more specific and complicated with the acceleration of reform.

IV. 3. Changing Interest Articulation Patterns of SIBFE Deputies

Another changing feature of the newly elected CPD was evident in deputies' interest articulation patterns. In this part of analysis, frequencies of speeches, fields of interests, types of interest articulation, and levels of demands in the speeches made at the First CPD of the USSR will be investigated. The interest articulation patterns of speakers at the CPD of the USSR suggest that deputies were attentive to functional and regional interests. For instance, fields of interests varied depending on speakers' social and regional origins. An increasing numbers of speakers including those from the SIBFE regions also took part in the discussion of various questions from the regional point of view.

IV. 3 (1) Frequency of Speeches in the CPD

The performance of the USSR CPD was outstanding in the frequency of speeches made in its sessions (average 1,024.0 speeches a year) which was nine times more than in the eleventh Supreme Soviet (1984-1989) and fourteen times more than in the first Supreme Soviet (1938-1946).⁵⁵ Despite the increasing frequency of speeches, however, only a small number of deputies among those who wanted were able to address to the Congress.⁵⁶ Considering the competition for an opportunity for the podium, obtaining an opportunity to address to the Congress could show the influence of a deputy, as well as that of the regional group to which the speaker belonged.

In analysing frequency, speeches will be categorised into three groups, based on their length recorded in the stenographic records published by the Supreme Soviet.⁵⁷ Category A speeches which appeared on three or more pages that were mainly made by

approved speakers. A speech belong to this category is normally long enough to carry the opinions of a speaker on the issues of his concern. Speeches of more than a page but less than three pages are grouped into category B, and short speeches of less than a page into category C. In general, category B speeches included discussions on a category A speech, and short speeches were mainly on procedural questions such as recommendation of the deputies to the elections in the CPD bodies and short comments on the discussions.⁵⁸ However, speeches made by the presiding deputy of a session will not be considered, regardless of the length of speeches.

During the four Congresses, 2,785 speeches were made excluding presiding speeches. Among them 583 speeches belonged to category A, 330 to category B, and 1,872 to category C. In terms of speakers, a total of 867 speakers were took part in the discussions in the Congresses. Among them, 401 deputies made category A speeches. SIBFE deputies had made 258 speeches (by 93 of 217 deputies or 42.9 per cent), including 57 of category A speeches (by 44 deputies or 20.3 per cent).

Despite the complaint of V. P. Khmel from Irkutsk oblast that Siberian deputies seemed to be a gallery in the Congress,⁵⁹ SIBFE deputies were more successful in taking opportunities to address their interests than Caucasian, Central Asian, and Moldavian deputies. In particular, a more active participating of SIBFE deputies was witnessed in the Fourth Congress, when draft resolutions "on the situation in the country and measures to overcome the crisis," and "on the general concept of the new Union Treaty and the procedures for concluding the Treaty" were discussed. By contrast, they did not actively take part in the discussion in the Third Congress, where mainly political issues such as the new post of president and subsequent constitutional amendments were mainly discussed.

<Table 4.3.1> Average Frequency of the Speeches made in the USSR CPD

	N	1st CPD		2nd CPD		3rd CPD		4th CPD		CPD Total
		A	A-C	A	A-C	A	A-C	A	A-C	
Slavic	1249	0.07	0.35	0.12	0.45	0.02	0.02	0.07	0.47	1.49
Baltic	158	0.08	0.36	0.09	0.47	0.02	0.11	0.05	0.24	1.19
Caucasus	216	0.06	0.23	0.06	0.23	0.01	0.10	0.02	0.09	0.65
Central Asia	364	0.05	0.15	0.10	0.21	0.02	0.12	0.05	0.33	0.81
Moldavia	55	0.05	0.15	0.0	0.36	0.04	0.13	0.04	0.38	1.02
SIBFE	217	0.07	0.22	0.08	0.29	0.01	0.11	0.10	0.57	1.19
Average	2259	0.07	0.29	0.11	0.37	0.02	0.17	0.06	0.40	1.24

Sources: Numbers of speeches are counted based on *Pervyi s'ezd narodnykh deputatov SSSR*, 6 vols.; *Vtoroi s'ezd narodnykh deputatov SSSR*, 5 vols.; *Vneocherednoi tretii s'ezd narodnykh deputatov SSSR*, 3 vols.; and *Chetvertyi s'ezd narodnykh deputatov SSSR*, 4 vols.

Apart from an increasing numbers of speeches and participants in the discussion, the analysis suggests a couple of changing participation patterns. Firstly, a sharp increase in the number of participants from cultural and scientific sectors including educational and medical branches in the discussions was apparent. In the USSR CPD, an average of 35.5 speakers or 35.4 per cent of the total from the cultural and scientific sectors took part in the debates. By contrast, nomenklaturist participants decreased from an average of 77.6 per cent in the sessions of the previous Party Congresses to an average of 20.9 per cent of total participants in the Congress. Furthermore, a growing proportion of deputies from production sectors also took the podium at sessions, although they had still less opportunities than nomenklaturists in category A speeches.

Secondly, despite the general trend in the CPD as a whole, the composition of speakers varied region by region. For instance, a large proportion of nomenklaturists was included among speakers from Central Asian republics. By contrast, deputies from cultural and scientific, and production sectors outnumbered among the Slavic deputies. Differences were also found within the RSFSR and SIBFE delegations (see Table 4.3.2). In particular, deputies from production sectors tended to come forward more frequently than nomenklaturists. Supposing the competition for the podium might exist possibly even in a delegation of a region, the changes suggest that the authority that nomenklaturists had traditionally commanded was being encroached upon in the Congress.

<Table 4.3.2> Composition of Speakers in the USSR CPD (1989-1990)

	Party & State leaders	Cultural & Scientific represent.	Mass Orgs. represent.	Local Productive represent.	Other (pensioners, law, KGB, military)	Total Number of Speaker
CPSU Congresses (1966-1981)						
23 rd Congress	51	5	2	6	-	64
24 th Congress	46	3	2	9	-	60
25 th Congress	45	4	2	12	-	63
26 th Congress	38	3	2	2	-	45
Average numbers of Speakers	45.0	3.8	2.0	7.3	-	58.0
Average (%)	77.6	6.5	3.4	12.5	-	100.0
CPD of the USSR						
<i><u>A Level of Speeches</u></i>						
1st CPD	34	59	3	27	10	133
2nd CPD	78	68	9	48	15	218
3rd CPD	19	14	1	6	2	42
4th CPD	42	43	4	25	9	123
Average numbers of Speakers	30.8	35.5	3.5	23.5	7.0	100.3
Average (%)	30.7	35.4	3.5	23.4	7.0	100.0

All (A, B, and C) Levels of Speeches

1st-4th CPD	181	319	32	272	63	867
Average numbers of Speakers	45.3	79.8	8.0	68.0	15.8	216.8
Average (%)	20.9	36.8	3.7	31.4	7.3	100.0

A-Level Speeches by Union Republics (the CPD of the USSR)

Slavic	72	103	12	74	22	283
RSFSR	56	90	8	54	20	228
Moscow	16	38	6	6	7	73
RSFSR Other	29	37	2	32	11	111
SIBFE	11	15	0	16	2	44
(Western Siberia)	4	9	0	6	1	20
(Eastern Siberia)	4	3	0	5	1	13
(Russian Far East)	3	3	0	5	0	11
Other Slavic republics	16	13	4	20	2	55
Baltic	9	12	0	4	2	27
Caucasus	9	12	0	2	2	25
Central Asia	28	11	2	12	2	55
Moldavia	5	4	0	2	0	11
CPD Total	123	142	14	94	28	401

Sources: Party Congress data calculated based on Biddulph's work in Howard Biddulph, "Local Interest Articulation at CPSU Congresses," *World Politics*, vol. XXXVI, no. 1 (October 1983), p. 30. Numbers of speakers at the USSR CPD are counted based on *Pervyi s'ezd narodnykh deputatov SSSR; Vtoroi s'ezd narodnykh deputatov SSSR; Vnecherednoi tretii s'ezd narodnykh deputatov SSSR; and Chetvertyi s'ezd narodnykh deputatov SSSR*.

Finally, in terms of frequencies of speeches, male and senior deputies, nomenklaturists and the intelligentsia, deputies of higher education, deputies from large cities, and ethnic Russians tended to appear on the podium more frequently than other deputies in the CPD as a whole. Among the SIBFE deputies, similar trends were apparent although there were no significant differences between male and female deputies, junior and senior deputies, and ethnic Russians and others. However, those with a higher education and from large cities tended to speak more frequently than others. In particular, SIBFE deputies of intelligentsia origin had double the opportunities to make category A speeches ($N=30$, $M=0.8$) than nomenklaturists ($N=15$, $M=0.4$, $F=4.0$, $p<0.001$) (see Appendix 2.2).

IV. 3 (2) Interest Field of the Speeches

As suggested in the assumptions, an increasing participation in the discussion should in principle have significant implications for the successful articulation of regional interests when deputies of a region raise regional problems. Therefore, deputies' concerns that appeared in their speeches need to be examined as a first step to verify whether deputies were representing regional interests in the Congress.

In the analysis, category A speeches made in the First CPD of the USSR in May-June 1989 constitute a main concern, since important issues such as the structure of the Congress including the election of the president, the "Basic Guidelines for the Domestic and Foreign Policy of the USSR," the question of the Constitutional Control Committee (*Komitet konstitutsionnogo nadzora*, KKN), and the government economic policy were discussed. The speeches of the 142 deputies are considered in this analysis, including those of fifteen SIBFE deputies.

For the analysis, speeches will be categorised into seven groups in accordance with the concerns that were articulated in each speech: political, economic, social, cultural, ethnic-national, environmental and other questions. Political fields of interest include discussions of the federal system, constitutional control, the status of the CPD itself, the Tbilisi incident of 1989, the Soviet-German Treaty of 1939 and so on. The economic field contains mentions of investment policy, economic system including price reform, cost accounting and the general economic situation. Remarks on the housing problem, food supply, medical service, education facilities, pension and other issues related to living standards are regarded as within the social interest field. Cultural interests are strongly related to the ethnic-national field, since they include arguments on the development of indigenous languages as well as general comments on the situation of cultural and educational sectors. Statements on the status of minor ethnic groups, and inter-ethnic relations including the dispute on the status of the Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous okrug (NKAO) between Armenia and Azerbaijan are also categorised as ethnic-national issues. Another issue that was frequently mentioned in the CPD was the environmental problem, so it has been separately categorised. The seventh group includes the comments on the procedural matters that were occasionally included in the category A speeches.

First of all, the analysis suggests that different priorities on political and socio-economic problems reflected speakers' regional or social backgrounds. Although attention had been paid quite evenly to political, economic, social, ethnic and environmental problems, the priority of concerns tended to be different between regional groups. For instance, deputies from the Baltic republics were mainly concerned about political issues and economic relations with central government. They paid little attention to social issues, reflecting relatively high living standards and nationalist sentiment in the republics. Caucasian deputies also spent more time in mentioning political issues, together with ethnic problems, perhaps because of the NKAO issue. By contrast, SIBFE deputies were more attentive to social and

environmental problems rather than political issues. For instance, twelve out of the 15 SIBFE deputies included in the analysis addressed socio-economic problems of the regions, and nine deputies mentioned environmental situations, while only four deputies touched political issues in their speeches.

<Table 4.3.3> Interest Field of Speeches in the First CPD of the USSR (1989)

	Political issues	Eco. issues	Social issues	Cultural issues	Ethnic issues	Environ. issues	Other issues	Total
<i>Deputies in the CPD total</i>								
Slavic	37	45	68	10	18	29	8	203
Baltic	11	5	0	2	5	1	0	24
Caucasus	10	2	1	2	10	2	0	27
Central Asia	12	11	9	2	8	8	2	52
Moldavia	2	1	0	1	2	1	0	7
Total	72	64	68	17	43	41	10	315
<i>Deputies from the European part of Russia</i>								
Nomenklaturists	8	6	9	0	2	4	1	30
Cadres	1	4	5	0	2	2	0	14
Managers	1	7	8	1	1	5	0	23
Intelligentsia	7	5	7	5	7	8	1	40
Technicians	4	4	5	0	1	2	1	17
Workers	2	7	7	0	0	3	0	19
Total	23	33	41	6	13	24	3	143
<i>SIBFE Deputies</i>								
Nomenklaturists	2	2	2	0	1	1	0	8
Cadres	0	2	3	0	1	1	0	7
Managers	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	3
Intelligentsia	2	1	3	1	2	2	1	12
Technicians	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	3
Workers	0	2	2	0	0	2	0	6
Total	4	8	12	1	4	9	1	39

Sources: Figures calculated based on the text of speeches in *Pervyi s'ezd narodnykh deputatov SSSR*, 6 vols.; and Patrick J. Rollins (ed.), *First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, 25 May-9 June 1989: The Stenographic Record*, 2 vols. (Gulf Breeze, FL.: Academic International Press, 1993).

The content of speeches of SIBFE deputies also suggests that SIBFE speakers were addressing deteriorating socio-economic conditions in the SIBFE regions. Many SIBFE deputies regarded the SIBFE as a "colony" and a "raw-material appendage."⁶⁰ A. P. Ianenko, a rector of the Novosibirsk Engineering and Construction Institute, complained about the uneven distribution of medical services and foodstuffs in favour of Moscow.⁶¹ V. V. Kazarezov, the First Secretary of Novosibirsk oblast, requested investment to solve social problems such as shortages of electricity and housing in the oblast.⁶² V. V. Gustav, an oil and gas production foreman from Tiumen oblast, appealed to solve housing problems of the Tiumen oil workers.⁶³ SIBFE speakers also agreed that disastrous environmental problems were caused by "departmentalism" and "industrial invasion" by the department such as *Minvostokstroy* (Ministry of

Construction in the Eastern Regions of the USSR), and other *bums* (paper-making industry) and *proms* (industrial administrations) required immediate handing.⁶⁴

However, the analysis also suggests that deputies' concerns might vary dependent on their social origins. For instance, political issues were more often discussed by nomenklaturists and the intelligentsia—although their speeches also covered social and economic issues—than other categories of deputies. By contrast, cadres, managers, and workers were more attentive to economic, social and environmental conditions than other issues. The trend was also apparent among SIBFE deputies.

IV. 3 (3) Types of Interest Articulation

A common field of interest, obviously, does not necessarily mean that regions were uniform in their priorities and recommendations. In particular, a policy might have different implications for discussants, dependent on the point of view. For instance, many construction projects that were demanded at the national level were often opposed at the regional level.⁶⁵ The priority of investment could also vary dependent on the regional economic background.⁶⁶ Furthermore, there could also be a conflict between different sectors such as agriculture and industry, and between diverse social strata which could overshadow regional interest articulation.

Therefore, as a second step in the analysis, demands included in the speeches will be categorised based on two variables such as territorial and functional aspects. First, territorial aspects of interest articulation are divided into four levels: union, republic, region, and urban-rural levels. In the territorial variable, only the levels at which speakers are dealing with the issues of their concerns are considered, ignoring deputies' territorial origins. However, the urban-rural type of interest articulation is particularly concerned with the rural interests made by deputies from rural areas, and thus a speech contained an opinion in favour of rural interests articulated by deputies from urban areas is excluded.

Second, functional aspects of interest articulation are categorised into five types: bureaucratic, occupational, ethnic, gender, and general interest articulation. In this category, a demand is compared with the speaker's functional origin. For instance, a speech is regarded as containing a reference to occupational interests when interests are directly related to the speaker's occupation. Ethnic interest articulation is also marked

when a speech contains reference to the interests of particular ethnic groups made by deputies of the same ethnic origin, at least in a wide sense such as small-numbered nations in the Far North. Bureaucratic interest articulation is mainly for the remarks made by the party apparatus, which supported the apparatus' position by criticising attacks on the party apparatus and advocating their role in the reforms.⁶⁷ However, the gender factor is considered only for a speech in favour of women's interests made by a female deputy. Other speeches that contain interests that do not match with speakers' functional origins are regarded as articulating a general type of interest. In this regard, speeches made by politicians—nomenklaturists and cadres—are often categorised as general types. In each variable, maximum two different types of interest articulation are identified when a speech stipulates more than two different types of interests.

In the analysis, three findings are noteworthy: regional interest articulation of nomenklaturists and cadres in terms of their territorial dimension, occupational interest articulation by managers and workers, and regional differences in interest articulation types.

First of all, nomenklaturists and cadres tended to be more attentive to the problems of their own republics and regions, although still nearly half of them tended to deal with the questions at the Union level. According to Biddulph's work, this trend had already become apparent in the Party Congresses during Brezhnev's period.⁶⁸ In the USSR CPD, nomenklaturists seemed to be more attentive to the union level, together with the intelligentsia. Two groups contributed nearly half the total of union-level speeches. However, at the same time, still more than half the deputies in each group had been preoccupied with republic or regional interests. The tendencies are clearer when Moscow deputies, who contributed 30 union-level speeches, are excluded.

<Table 4.3.4> Type of Speeches by 'Class' in the First Congress of the USSR

	Union Level	Republic Level	Regional Level	Urban- Rural	Total
Nomenklatura	18	15	5	0	38
Cadre	3	1	5	0	9
Military	4	0	0	0	4
Manager	6	2	7	2	17
Intelligentsia	30	22	12	0	64
Technician	10	2	4	0	16
Worker	8	2	4	2	16
Total	79	44	37	4	164 ¹⁾

¹⁾Two speeches made by other category of deputies are excluded.

Occupational and ethnic interests were also represented in the Congress. Although more than half the speeches considered pursued general of interests (99 of 166 speeches), 36 speeches or more than 20 per cent of speeches articulated occupational interests. In particular, deputies from production sectors, particularly workers, were more attentive to the interests of their own sectors. For instance, 17 of 30 speeches addressed by deputies from production sectors—more overwhelmingly, 8 of 9 speeches of workers—contained reference to their sectoral interests.

Finally, regional differences were clearly revealed in the deputies' speeches. In general, deputies from the Slavic republics tended to discuss matters at the union level, while deputies from other republic groups concentrated on the republic or regional level. A combination of territorial and functional dimensions of speeches suggests a clearer picture of regional differences in types of interest articulation.

<Table 4.3.5> Territorial and Functional Dimensions of Interest Articulation Patterns in the USSR CPD

	Union Level				Republic Level					Regional Level				Urban Rural		Total
	A	B	D	E	A	B	C	D	E	B	C	D	E	B	E	
RSFSR ¹⁾	4	7	1	8	0	0	0	0	1	3	5	1	4	1	1	36
Moscow	0	7	1	22	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	32
Slavic ²⁾	0	5	0	9	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	2	1	0	20
Baltic	0	0	0	3	0	1	0	0	10	0	1	0	0	0	0	15
Caucasus	1	1	0	0	1	1	3	0	6	0	4	0	0	0	0	17
Cen. Asia	2	3	0	2	0	1	2	1	13	1	0	0	0	0	0	25
Moldavia	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
SIBFE	0	0	1	2	0	0	1	0	0	2	2	0	11	0	0	19
Total	7	23	3	47	1	4	6	1	33	7	12	1	18	2	1	166

¹⁾ excluding deputies from Moscow and the SIBFE regions. ²⁾ excluding deputies from RSFSR
Functional dimension: bureaucratic (A), occupational (B), ethnic (C), gender (D), and general (E).

As Table 4.3.5 suggests, deputies from Moscow and the Slavic republics excluding the RSFSR were overwhelmingly preoccupied with the union-general type of interests. By contrast, speakers from most of other union republics tended to articulate republic or regional interests when they were given an opportunity to address the Congress. For instance, 10 of 14 Baltic deputies dedicated themselves to making republic-general type of speeches. Most of the Baltic deputies were eager to express the Baltic republics' sovereign rights, although other ethnic minorities among Baltic deputies such as Russians and Ukrainians criticised such initiatives, as will be discussed later. A large proportion of republic level speeches were also heard from Caucasian deputies, mainly because they more actively participated in the discussion of NKAO question to support their own republic's interests in the question.

By contrast to deputies from the European part of Russia, a clear tendency of regional interest articulation was also apparent among SIBFE deputies, when 15 speeches discussed issues at the regional level. Among the SIBFE speakers, only two deputies discussed issues at the union level.⁶⁹ Considering the functional dimension, a majority of speeches delivered by SIBFE deputies were categorised as of general interest. The analysis also showed that SIBFE deputies articulated ethnic and occupational interests.⁷⁰ However, it is still difficult to maintain that these forms of functional interest articulation were overshadowing regional interest articulation, since only a limited numbers of speeches were at the union or republic level. Therefore, despite the possible conflicts of functional interests, regionalist tendencies seemed to be maintained, particularly in issues in which functional interests may not be engaged.

IV. 3 (4) Level of Demands

As many Western scholars suggest, regional interest articulation had been witnessed during the Soviet period. For instance, Breslauer's work has suggested that regional first secretaries of the post-Stalin generation tended to be more assertive of regional interests with more political 'impatience,' although other factors such as a patron-client linkage could also be an important factor.⁷¹ However, the demands of peripheries after *perestroika* became more threatening to the central authorities, when they began to raise the question of the federal system itself.

In order to examine changes in the levels of demands, speeches were categorised into five groups based on Breslauer's categories: traditional, regional policy, national policy demands, devolution of authority, and demands for independence.⁷² Traditional demands are identified when a speech contains a demand for more supplies for a given project, implementation of promised deliveries in the case of already adopted programmes, a minor adjustment in ministerial behaviour in regard to the regional needs, and similar demands. Regional-policy demands embrace the speeches that request changes in central policies towards a region or a social group as a whole, but not so far-reaching as to request a revision of all-union investment priorities, central administrative relations, or centrally defined social policies. Speeches that contain requests for changes in all-union investment priorities and revision of central administrative relations or centrally defined social policies are recognised as articulating national-policy demands. Speeches that demand devolution of authority at the republic or regional level constituted the fourth group. However, a new category

has to be added in order to identify demands for political and economic sovereignty and significant changes in the existing federal system as the strongest form of regionalist demand.⁷³ In the categorisation, only the highest level of demand in a speech is considered, if it contains more than two types of demands.

Supposing that the levels of demand reflect a degree of regionalist tendencies, a score ranged from -10 to +10 on a five-point scale is given to each speech depending on the level of demands for a clearer picture: -10 for a traditional demand, -5 for a regional-policy demand, 0 for a national-policy demand, +5 for a demand for devolution, and +10 for a demand for independence.

As expected, demands of deputies in the Congress grew stronger than they had been in the previous Party Congresses in the discussion of central economic policies, although there appeared regional and 'class' differences. In general, an absolute majority of deputies demanded an alteration of central policies at the national level, devolution of power to the local authorities, and economic and political independence at their extreme. Only a handful of deputies articulated their interests in a traditional way. In this regard, a limit on the interest articulation placed by 'bureaucratic centralism' during the Soviet period ceased to function in the CPD.⁷⁴

<Table 4.3.6> Level of Demands in the First CPD of the USSR

	Tradi- tional (-10)	regional policy (-5)	national policy (0)	devolu- tion (5)	indep- dence (10)	Total	Average Score
Slavic republics							
Moscow	0	3	11	12	2	28	2.3
European Russia	1	2	11	11	1	26	1.7
SIBFE	0	1	3	9	0	13	3.1
Slavic other	1	2	4	4	1	12	0.8
Baltic	0	0	2	3	9	14	7.5
Caucasus	0	0	3	6	2	11	4.5
Central Asia	0	6	8	2	0	16	-1.3
Moldavia	0	0	0	1	0	1	5.0
Total	2	14	42	48	15	121	2.5

In particular, most Baltic speakers asserted independence of the republics, while Central Asian deputies focused on changes of regional or national policies ($F=7.0$, $p<0.001$). As K. D. P. Prunskiene, a rector of the Institute for Advanced Training of Specialists in the National Economy under the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers who became Lithuanian Prime Minister, stated, the speeches of Baltic deputies supported the "principle of localising the solution of problems":

The Baltic conception of economic reform is based on the principle of localising the solution of problems. ... We view the economic independence of the republics as the primary and necessary condition for reorganising the economic management of individual republics as well as the Soviet Union as a whole.⁷⁵

Considering speakers' social strata, a large proportion of nomenklaturists (M=3.4), cadres (M=3.3), and intellectuals (M=3.4) more strongly asserted fundamental changes than workers (M=-0.8) and military personnel (M=-1.7, F=2.4, p<0.05). Speakers from large cities (M=3.3) were also more in favour of changes of policies at the national levels than speakers from rural areas (M=-0.5, F=3.3, p<0.05).

In the First CPD of the USSR, nearly 70 per cent SIBFE speakers supported devolution of power and the principle of "localising the solution of problems," rather than appealing for adjustments of regional policies or investment priorities. For instance, most of the SIBFE deputies who made a speech agreed that central importance should be attached to the Law on Local Self-Government and Local Economy as a real path to the solution of local problems.⁷⁶ Devolution of authority to the national-territorial formations was also suggested as a means of solving socio-economic and environmental problems, and enhancing the living standards of small-numbered nations in the SIBFE.⁷⁷ The demand for devolution was based on the widely shared perception that the problems were mainly caused by the 'departmentalism' already mentioned. Considering the demands, at least SIBFE deputies who took the podium seemed to be united in conveying regional interests to the Congress.

IV. 4. Attitudes towards Union-Level Issues

In general, a relatively high level of unity was apparent among SIBFE speakers in their articulation of regional interests at the First Congress of USSR. SIBFE speakers were ready to talk about their deteriorating socio-economic situation as a raw material appendage to the centre. However, as far as union-level issues were concerned, regional solidarity among 217 SIBFE deputies, nearly ten per cent of the total CPD deputies, remained uncertain. In the following analysis, SIBFE deputies' views are considered on two key questions—cost accounting as a problem and new federal relations as a solution—both which had been main concerns of the SIBFE regions. The analysis suggests the possible differentiation of common interests among SIBFE deputies in the union level of questions.

IV. 4 (1) Attitudes towards Cost Accounting

The question of cost accounting and price liberalisation which would have a negative impact on the SIBFE economy, as discussed in Chapter 3, caused impassioned debates at the regional and union levels. The Congress became an arena for the debate, since the policy had a significant but varying impact even before its implementation, not only at the union republic level, but also at lower levels.

In general, Moscow and the Baltic republics supported the idea of cost accounting. However, deputies from other republics where agriculture and raw material production sectors predominated, opposed, or reluctantly accepted the idea with conditions. For instance, K. Makhkamov, the First Secretary of Tajikistan, asserted that regional cost accounting should be accompanied by three conditions:

These and many other official discussions quite clearly reveal the thought that the so-called 'raw-material' republics are silently boycotting the application of the principles of territorial cost accounting. ... This is not true. We as a whole support concepts of self-financing and self-management of the republics, nonetheless their implementation must meet three mandatory conditions. First, reform of wholesale and retail prices. Second, conversion to the principle of cost accounting only on a nation-wide basis. ... Third, the creation of a legal foundation on economic relations among territories within the system of the state federation.⁷⁸

Makhkamov's conditions for cost accounting were echoed in the speeches of many other deputies. For instance, Kh. Atdaev, a blacksmith from Turkmenia, also argued that cost accounting should be accompanied by price reform, particularly for raw materials such as oil, gas, and cotton.⁷⁹ Many others supported this view by insisting that unequal prices of raw materials and agricultural products should be adjusted in advance of the implementation of cost accounting.⁸⁰

Resistance to the idea came not only from economic sectors, but also from social and cultural sectors. For instance, D. S. Likhachev, a section chief of the Russian Literature Institute (Pushkin House) of the USSR Academy of Sciences and chairman of the board of the Soviet Cultural Foundation, insisted that the idea should not be applied to the cultural sector.⁸¹ B. S. Mitin, a rector of an aviation engineering institution from Moscow, also demanded that the education sector should be provided with legal measures for normal development under cost accounting.⁸² Although Prime Minister Ryzhkov admitted the need for a series of price adjustments, particularly for agricultural products and raw materials, his conciliatory gesture seemed to be far from persuasive.

By contrast, Baltic deputies were strongly in favour of the concept, since it would provide republics with more power on the economic activities performed on their territory. In fact, regional cost accounting was scheduled to start as of 1 January 1990 in the Baltic republics, and thus Baltic deputies sought a solid legal basis for their decision.⁸³ They argued that cost accounting was not "economic isolation," but a way "to form a right price formation and an all-union market, and to the search for the effective forms of all union division of labour."⁸⁴

Among the SIBFE speakers, cost accounting was regarded as a problematic and destabilising factor for the SIBFE regions. For instance, V. I. Sergienko, the Chairman of Krasnoiarsk *kraiispolkom*, claimed that the initiative was aggravating regional socio-economic problems:

It was thought that transition to full cost accounting and self-financing would automatically solve all problems stemming from the implementation of current plans. However, in practice, the experience has shown that it did not happen yet. On the contrary, administration of regional economy is getting more difficult. ... Because there is no unified integral concept, no legal normative base for territorial cost-accounting and regional administration of the economy.⁸⁵

V. V. Kazarezov, the First Secretary of the Novosibirsk oblast, went even further when he called for the establishment of a region-based administrative system. He suggested five regional groups, i.e. Central Russia, the Urals, Western Siberia, Eastern Siberia, and the Russian Far East, and urged to endow them with rights equal to those of republics in economic respects, as a pre-condition for the introduction of cost accounting.⁸⁶

The economic features of a region also affected the attitude of SIBFE deputies towards cost accounting. For instance, a deputy from Tiumen oblast insisted that cost accounting should be reviewed in the resource regions in which so-called strategic sectors such as oil and gas predominated.⁸⁷ A more strong opposition was asserted by deputies from rural area such as I. A. Nazarov, the *raikom* First Secretary from Omsk oblast. He pointed out that the transition of *sovkhozy* and *kolkhozy* to self-financing would only lead them to a "false self-financing," without an improvement in price formation and adjustment in their relations with cities.⁸⁸

By contrast, a deputy from Sakha supported the realisation of regional cost accounting at all levels, as a means of achieving the economic independence of republics and territories, although he pointed out the problematic nature of the price system.⁸⁹ Another deputy, V. A. Ostroukhov, the secretary of the Party committee of a production association in Tomsk oblast, also supported the switch to cost accounting, but mainly because his collectives was planning to establish a lease-based cooperative association that would be assisted by it.⁹⁰

According to these speeches, a common perception of cost accounting prevailed among SIBFE deputies when they regarded it as unacceptable under the existing price structure, on the one hand. However, on the other hand, as the diversity of claimed preconditions for cost accounting suggests, a common front of SIBFE deputies could be vulnerable to a separate deal which might satisfy the preconditions of particular sectors or regions, leaving others unattended.

IV. 4 (2) Attitudes towards the Federal System

Another major issue of the Congress that had great significance for the SIBFE regions was federal relations between centre and peripheries. Separatist tendencies had already appeared in the union republics and the increasing demands of lower-level regions had echoed in the Congress, causing a vigorous debate when changes and

amendments to the Constitution were being discussed. In particular, the question of a new federal treaty and the KKN evoked bitter controversy, setting nationalists on one extreme and federalists on the other.

Here again, a striking difference between Baltic and Central Asian deputies showed two main extremes: a majority of Baltic deputies advocated a "strong republic, and strong union" approach, but the latter supported a "strong union, and strong republic." Among Baltic deputies, even nomenklaturists such as Gorbunov, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Latvia, and A. K. Brazauskas, the First Secretary of Lithuania, supported the economic and political autonomy of republics.⁹¹ By contrast, deputies from Central Asian republics such as A. N. Mutalibov, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Azerbaijan, P. A. Azizbekova, the director of the Museum of the History of Azerbaijan, and N. A. Nazarbaev, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Kazakhstan, asserted that there could be "no strong republic without a strong centre."⁹²

A striking difference again appeared in the discussion of the KKN question. Baltic deputies insisted that the KKN would infringe the sovereign right of republics and their parliaments.⁹³ However, those who supported the federal system regarded this matter as "an element of the rule-of-law state," and a basic component of the separation of powers which would protect republics' sovereign rights from departmental law-making.⁹⁴ In particular, Gorbachev was eager to adopt a resolution on the KKN in the Congress where he could earn support. He emphasised positive effects of the KKN as a means of defending the law from departmental encroachment, hoping to evade nationalists' resistance on the issue:

The departments have created many instructions for interpreting the application of a law, by which they have even more greatly limited the essence of the law. Thus, the defence of such a judicial organ is a very important instrument enabling us to stand strictly in defence of laws. This is very necessary, because the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, despite all its capacities and all of its authority, simply does not always encompass the entire set of problems for the purpose of working out these questions in detail. In this regard, the question of the committee has emerged.⁹⁵

The question of the KKN was adopted at the First Congress on 8 June 1989, while 50 Lithuanian deputies boycotted the vote in protest.

Although an absolute majority of the Baltic delegation supported the right of self-determination, ethnic minorities among Baltic deputies did not seem to agree. For

instance, V. I. Iaroboi, an Ukrainian from Estonia, emphasised the need to protect the Union from "possible division into individual, isolated national states."⁹⁶ A Russian deputy from Estonia also supported the establishment of the KKN "to protect the rights of everyone living in the country," and urged the KKN "to begin its work with the Baltic republics."⁹⁷

The attitude of SIBFE deputies on this issue was quite similar to that of Slavic deputies. In general, they seemed to agree with the need to revise the federal system, providing the republics with more economic sovereignty. However, they opposed the possible dissolution of the Union by following the Baltic way. Regarding the KKN, Gorbachev's appeal turned out to be quite effective in persuading SIBFE deputies who complained about the "departmental invasion" in the regions. For instance, Iu. V. Golik, the dean of the juridical faculty at Kemerovo State University, insisted that the KKN was "just as necessary as air" since they were suffocating from "departmental standard-setting."⁹⁸ However, there was another type of speech which claimed political as well as economic autonomy in the form of national-administrative status as a means of solving the problems of the small people in the northern area.⁹⁹ The demand insinuated the possibility of conflicts on the issue mainly between Russians and other national or ethnic minority groups in the regions.

According to these observations, some provisional conclusions can be drawn. First, the SIBFE regions constituted quite a large proportion of the CPDs of the USSR and Russia which in turn accommodated more genuine parliamentary working patterns than their precedents. Secondly, in terms of the composition of deputies, two features—an increasing level of indigenisation of deputies and a diminishing trend of nominal representation—that were often regarded as supporting regional interest articulation were apparent. Thirdly, in terms of interest articulation, a majority of SIBFE speakers were more attentive to the socio-economic situation of SIBFE regions, demanding the devolution of power that was often discussed in the regions. In particular, nomenklaturists also joined other deputies in articulating regional interests.

However, regional differentiation was also evident in the composition and interest articulation of SIBFE deputies. In this regard, the analysis suggests that regional differences in socio-economic situation and economic structure resulted not only in the differentiated composition of deputies, but also the possible diversification of common regional interests. Furthermore, functional interest articulation was also

witnessed in the First Congress of the USSR, although most SIBFE speakers were still discussing issues at the regional, rather than at the Union or RSFSR level.

As this content analysis covered only a limited number of deputies and sessions of the Congress, and equally a limited period, further discussion of regionalism in the central legislature will be presented in the following chapters.

¹) Sergeev and Biriukov assert that still many deputies regarded the CPD as a *Sobor*, a representative institution of the sixteenth and seventeenth century Russia. The main function of the *Sobor* is said to maintain an increasing degree of unity rather than a genuine parliamentary function. Victor Sergeev and Nikolai Biriukov, *Russia's Road to Democracy: Parliament, Communes and Traditional Culture* (Vermont: Edward Elgar, 1993), pp. 32-33.

²) According to the newly revised Constitution of the Soviet Union, the CPD was to meet at least once a year (Article 110), less than the 1977 Constitution which specified that the Supreme Soviet should meet twice a year (Article 112). In reality, the CPD convened twice a year in 1989 and 1990, and once in 1991 for a final session. Furthermore, the committees and commissions attached to the Supreme Soviet held 1,250 formal sessions during 1989-1990, while the former Supreme Soviet had held only about twenty meetings a year. *Izvestiia*, 3 June 1991, p. 3. As far as duration of sessions were concerned, the CPD lasted on average 19.0 days a year, twice as long as those of the former Supreme Soviet of 1954-1958 which was held the longest sessions of the previous Supreme Soviets with an average of 9.8 days a year. Stephen White, "The USSR Supreme Soviet: A Developmental Perspective," in Daniel Nelson and Stephen White (eds.), *Communist Legislatures in Comparative Perspective* (London: Macmillan, 1982), p. 135 (Table 6.4); and Stephen White, Graeme Gill, and Darrell Slider, *The Politics of Transition: Shaping a Post-Soviet Future* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 52 (Table 3.3).

³) For instance, the Congress of Siberian and Far Eastern Deputies of the USSR CPD was convened in January 1990 in Novosibirsk as already mentioned. Siberian deputies in the CPD of Russia also organised the First Congress of People's Deputies of Siberia in March 1992 in Krasnoiarsk. The endeavour of regions to increase their influence was clearly shown in the comment of Lebedev, Tomsk *oblsoret* Presidium member on Political Lobby at the Parliament, in his interview with *Sibirskaiia gazeta*. Noting the proportion of Siberian deputies in the Congress, he emphasised that the influence of Siberia in the work of the government must be increased. "Kak i komu upravliat' sibir'iu?" *Sibirskaiia gazeta*, no. 43-44 (November 1991), p. 11.

⁴) Ethno-national interest does not always compete with regional interest articulation. When ethno-national interests emerge in the boundary of a region, they will constitute a strong basis for regional interest articulation as the Baltic case suggested. However, cross-regional ethno-nationalism—for instance, Russian nationalism in the USSR and RSFSR context—will hinder the development of regionalism.

⁵) As it is difficult to identify class in accordance with Western concepts, I will employ the term pseudo-class, that is, only considering occupational background of a deputy as Chiesa employed in his

analysis on the CPD of the USSR. In the analysis, nomenklaturists include high party and governmental officials, and cadres include lower levels of officials. All deputies in uniform are categorised as military personnel. Directors of industrial and agricultural production sectors such as production complex, co-operatives, *kolkhozy* and *sovkhozy* are categorised as managers. All 'creative' workers including writers, actors, artists, professors, academicians, researchers, and journalists are grouped as intelligentsia. Technicians include those employed highly qualified professions such as engineers, teachers, doctors, procurators, and lawyers. Employees of material producers in industrial and agricultural, and service sectors constitute the working class. Giuletto Chiesa, *Transition to Democracy: Political Change in the Soviet Union 1987-1991* (Hanover: University of New England Press, 1993), pp. 38-39.

⁶) Mark O. Rousseau and Raphael Zariski, *Regionalism and Regional Development in Comparative Perspective* (New York: Praeger, 1987), pp. 24-25; Sidney Tarrow, Peter J. Katzenstein, and Luigi Graziano, *Territorial Politics in Industrial Nations* (New York: Praeger, 1978), pp. 2-23; and Sidney Tarrow, *Between Centre and Periphery: Grassroots and Politicians in Italy and France* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 47-75. In particular, Berezkin and his colleagues regarded urban-rural cleavages as 'azonal' factor, noting its cross-regional impact. A. V. Berezkin, V. A. Kolosov, M. E. Pavlovskaja, N. V. Petrov, and L. V. Smirniagin, "The Geography of the 1989 Elections of People's Deputies of the USSR (Preliminary Results)," *Soviet Geography*, vol. 30, no. 8 (October 1989), pp. 628-629. Solnick also categorises ethnic/ religious and urban-rural factors as "trans-regional" factors. Steven L. Solnick, "Russia's Asymmetric Federation: Are All Differences Alike?" unpublished paper presented at the ESRC research seminar Russia's Regional Transformation on 31 January 2000 in London, pp. 14-15.

⁷) According to Shapiro, a Soviet general election provided the regime with an opportunity to demonstrate the legitimacy of the regime, to exercise an invaluable political education and propaganda, and to check the control system of the regime. Leonard Shapiro, *The Government and Politics of the Soviet Union*, 6th ed. (London: Hutchinson, 1977), p. 108. Zaslavsky and Brym also enumerate six functions of an election in the Soviet regime: an opportunity for electorates to extract minor concessions from the regime by the threat of withholding the vote; screening candidates for the party and rewarding them for their faithful state service; serving the interests of the canvassers; social control functions for authorities; training ground for the implementation of Soviet development policy; and demonstration of adjustment of the citizen to the fiction of democracy. Victor Zaslavsky and Robert J. Brym, "The Functions of Elections in the USSR," *Soviet Studies*, vol. XXX, no. 3 (July 1978), pp. 367-371.

⁸) "Doklad general'nogo sekretaria TsK KPSS tovarishcha Gorbacheva M. S.," *Pravda*, 26 February 1986, p. 7.

⁹) The law stipulated a district electoral meeting, which provided the authorities with an opportunity to manipulate a nomination process. Furthermore, two-thirds of seats were allocated to the social organisations and autonomous administrative units in the CPD of the USSR. Although allocation of seats to the social organisations was abolished in the election to the CPD of Russia, the share of autonomous administrative units—a total 168 of 1068 seats, or 15.7 per cent—was still recognised. For a more detailed discussion of the continuous features of the Soviet style election, see White, Gill, and Slider, *The Politics of Transition*, pp. 34-38; and Stephen L. White, "Soviet Elections: From Acclamation to Limited Choice," *Coexistence*, vol. 28, no. 4 (December 1991), pp. 513-539.

¹⁰) Berezkin, Kolosov, Pavlovskaja, Petrov, and Smirniagin, "The Geography of the 1989 Elections of People's Deputies of the USSR," pp. 616-620.

¹¹) "Zakon Soiuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik o vyborakh narodnykh deputatov SSSR," *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta Soiuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskii Respublik*, no. 49 (7 December 1988), pp. 831-857, 846-847.

¹²) Total 9,950 candidates ran for the election to the CPD of the USSR in the initial stage of nomination. After the pre-election district meetings, 2,195 candidates for the territorial districts, 1,967 for the national-territorial districts and 912 for social organisations were finally enrolled as candidates. *Pravda*, 6 October 1989, p. 8. Single candidacies were registered in 19 of 40 electoral districts in Armenia, 15 of 43 in Moldavia, 35 of 73 in Kazakhstan, while three of 36 in Estonia, seven of 40 in Latvia, and none in Moscow and Lithuania. Chiesa, *Transition to Democracy*, p. 230 (Table 4).

¹³) In the election to the CPD of Russia, total 7,017 candidates were registered for 1,068 seats. Among them, 1,314 candidates, or 18.7 per cent, were registered in Siberia, and 411 candidates, or 5.9 per cent in the Russian Far East. "Vybory-90: tol'ko tsifry," *Sibirskaja gazeta*, no. 9 (5-11 March 1990), p. 6.

¹⁴) "Zakon Soiuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik o vyborakh narodnykh deputatov SSSR," pp. 846, 849.

¹⁵) For instance, A. Ugumnova, a candidate for the CPD of Russia in Tiumen oblast, proposed that the capital of Russia should move to a geographically central city, suggesting Sverdlovsk as a possible option. *Tiumenskaia pravda*, 2 February 1990, p. 3. According to a survey of the Scientific Research Institute of the Academy Social Sciences, 60 per cent of constituents showed their scepticism on the electoral platforms of candidates, regarding them as unrealistic. *Izvestia*, 12 May 1989, p. 3.

¹⁶) See the electoral platform of Ia. N. Tikhonova, inspector of *railispolkom*, who had been elected at the territorial district no. 219 in Primorskii krai. *Krasnoe znamia*, 9 February 1990, p. 2.

¹⁷) See the electoral platform of V. E. Nikitich, deputy head doctor of oblast clinical hospital from Primorskii krai. *Krasnoe znamia*, 25 January 1990, p. 2.

¹⁸) See the electoral platforms of E. V. Nazdratenko and Iu. S. Sergeev. *Krasnoe znamia*, 1 February 1990, p. 2.

¹⁹) U. I. Gavrilovich, the head of Nakhodka port, even went further than 'low' politics when he proposed to create a regional deputy group of the Far Eastern regions to protect regional interests. *Krasnoe znamia*, 23 February 1990, p. 2. For more broad examples of the platforms of deputies of the CPD of Russia, see Martin McCauley (ed.), *Directory of Russian MPs: People's Deputies of the Supreme Soviet of Russia-Russian Federation* (London: Longman, 1992).

²⁰) For instance, in Primorskii krai, electoral platforms of candidates often contained similar perceptions on the situation and suggestions. For the platforms of candidates for each electoral district in Primorskii krai, see *Krasnoe znamia*, 25 January 1990, p. 2; 26 January 1990, p. 2; 30 January 1990, p. 1; 1 February 1990, p. 2; 2 January 1990, p. 2; 8 February 1990, p. 2; 9 February 1990, p. 2; 14 February 1990, p. 2; and 23 February 1990, p. 2.

²¹) The People's Front won 36 of 42 seats in Lithuania, 16 of 36 seats in Estonia, and 11 of 40 seats in Latvia.

²²) For instance, 82.5 per cent of respondents (N=967) answered that elections at many levels are important. For more details, see Jeffrey W. Hahn, "Continuity and Changes in Russian Political Culture," *British Journal of Political Science*, vol. 21, part 4 (December 1991), p. 413.

²³) According to the survey, two-thirds of voters regarded the personal qualities of a candidate as the most important factor, and concerned more about local problems than a national policy, although still 34 per cent of voters answered that they would vote for the candidates in accordance with authorities' instruction. V. Levanskii, A. Obolonskii and G. Tokarevskii, "Chto dumaiut liudi o vyborakh?" *Argumenty i fakty*, no. 10 (1-17 March 1989), p. 2. Popov's survey in the cities such as Moscow, Novosibirsk, and Vil'nius suggests similar tendencies. *Izvestiia*, 22 April 1989, p. 6. For a further discussion, see Peter Lentini, "Reforming the Electoral System: the 1989 Elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies," *The Journal of Communist Studies*, vol. 7, no. 1 (March 1991), pp. 79-86.

²⁴) The result was one of ten cities where surveys were conducted on the sample of 656 people. Among the respondents, women constituted 67 per cent, the highly educated 60.2 per cent, and CPSU members 15.6 percent. B. Gavriiliuk, "Kakoi byt' nashei vlasti?" *Tiumenskaia gazeta*, 21 February 1990, p. 3. In fact, V. V. Iudin, the general director of an oil complex who was born in 1940, was elected to the CPD of Russia in Tobol'sk.

²⁵) For instance, in a electoral meeting in Ulan-Ude, a Buriat candidate was asked a question in the Buriat language which featured that national sentiments clearly played a major role in politics not only in the union republics, but also at the lower level of autonomous regions. *Pravda*, 20 February 1989, p. 2. A report from Siberia also commentated that they never had an election campaign like this before when a debate on nomination lasted until the morning. *Pravda*, 15 February 1989, p. 1.

²⁶) As for the development of informal organisations during 1988-1992, see V. N. Berezovskii, N. I. Krotov, and V. V. Cherviakov, *Rossii: partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby: sbornik dokumentov i materialov*, 10 vols. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo RAU-Press, 1991-1993); Vladimir Pribylovskii, *Slovar' oppozitsii: novye politicheskie partii i organisatsii Rossii* (Moscow: Postfactum, 1991); Vneshtorgizdat Deita-Press, *Samodeiatel'nye obshchestvennye politicheskie organisatsii i dvizheniia v SSSR: spravochnik serii "Kto est' kto"* (Moscow: VTI Deita-Press, 1992); Peter J. S. Duncan, et al., *The Road to Post-Communism: Independent Political Movements in the Soviet Union 1985-1991* (London: Pinter, 1992); and Michael McFaul and Sergei Markov, *The Troubled Birth of Russian Democracy: Parties, Personalities, and Programmes* (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1993). For a further discussion, see Chapter 6.3.

²⁷) For instance, voter turnout in the previous Supreme Soviet election in 1984 reached 99.9 per cent in each union republic, demonstrating a successful mobilisation rather than participation. However, turnout of voters in the election to the CPD of the USSR as a whole showed quite a drop (89.8 per cent). In particular, it was lower than the USSR average in Armenia (71.9 per cent), Lithuania (82.5 per cent), Latvia (86.0 per cent), RSFSR (87.0 per cent), and Estonia (87.1 per cent). *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, no. 11 (1984), p. 19; and *Izvestiia*, 5 April 1989, p. 1.

²⁸) For a further discussion, see Chiesa, *Transition to Democracy*, pp. 27-39.

²⁹) Berezkin, Kolosov, Pavlovskaja, Petrov, and Smirniagin, "The Geography of the 1989 Elections of People's Deputies of the USSR," pp. 618-619 (Table 3).

³⁰) For a further discussion see, White, "The USSR Supreme Soviet: A Developmental Perspective," in Nelson and White (eds.), *Communist Legislatures in Comparative Perspective*, pp. 125-159; and Ronald J. Hill, "Continuity and Change in USSR Supreme Soviet Elections," *British Journal of Political Science*, vol. 2, part 1 (January 1972), pp. 47-67.

³¹) Among the 173 women deputies who were elected from the territorial and national territorial electoral districts, 110 were from production sectors. Only 24 women deputies were from education sector where females accounted two-thirds of the total employees.

³²) According to the election law of 1988, one-third of seats were allocated to autonomous administrative units in accordance with the following quota: 32 seats to each union republic, 11 seats to each autonomous republic, five seats to each autonomous oblast, and one seat to each autonomous okrug (Article 17).

³³) For instance, the proportion of Ossetians accounted for 0.6 per cent in the CPD and 1.1 per cent in the Supreme Soviet, which was nearly three to five times the size of Ossetian population (0.21 per cent). By contrast, Poles were represented by only half the numbers of Ossetians with more than double the size of Ossetian population (0.43 per cent). In sum, 32 autonomous regions including autonomous republics were represented by 16.7 per cent of deputies with 8.42 per cent of the USSR population.

³⁴) According to Kaiser, the trend of indigenisation was observed not only in the USSR CPD, but also in the Supreme Soviets of the union republics. Robert John Kaiser, *The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 349 (Table 7.2).

³⁵) Kolosov asserts that gerrymandering played a significant role in minimising the representation of ethnic minorities (including Russians in this context) in the elective bodies of the Baltic republics. V. A. Kolosov, "The Geography of Elections of USSR People's Deputies by National-Territorial Districts and the Nationalities Issue," *Soviet Geography*, vol. XXXI, no. 10 (December 1990), p. 756.

³⁶) The same trend was witnessed among SIBFE deputies, although Russians formed a majority even in most of the autonomous administrative units. This unequal representation provided the minor nationality groups with a more solid ground to claim autonomous status, and at the same time, made Russians think that they were also the victims of the current electoral system.

³⁷) Berezkin and his colleagues also assert that a 'zonal' factor such as levels of economic development and 'azonal' factor such as levels of urbanisation may affect voters' preference on first secretaries, though he adds that more detailed study is required to find the reason for such a tendency. Berezkin, Kolosov, Pavlovskaja, Petrov, and Smirniagin, "The Geography of the 1989 Elections of People's Deputies of the USSR," pp. 628-629.

³⁸) Among 454 deputies from rural areas, managers and workers accounted for 41.6 per cent and 43.4 per cent respectively, while intellectuals accounted for the largest proportion (35.1 per cent) among 895 deputies from large cities that had more than 500,000 population in 1989. A higher proportion of nomenklaturists was also apparent among deputies from large and medium-sized cities (with a population

size larger than 100,000 but less than 500,000)—22.6 per cent and 19.3 per cent respectively—mainly because of their administrative status as regional centres.

³⁹) The seat allocation to the social organisations contributed to the increasing representation of intellectuals. The measure provided an opportunity for the reformers who might have had difficulty in acquiring nominations in the territorial or national-territorial districts not only because of the obstacles posed by the conservatives in the process of the nomination, but also because of their unpopularity. Among them, reformers accounted roughly 50, including Andrei Sakharov, Tatiana Zaslavskaia, Georgii Arbatov, and Egor Iakovlev. Chiesa, *Transition to Democracy*, pp. 29-30.

⁴⁰) Numbers of deputies may vary because some deputies joined the CPD after the elections, while others left the Congress in order to take governmental positions.

⁴¹) Sobyenin asserts that deputies often joined more than two political factions at the same time and shifted from one faction to another. Alexander Sobyenin, "Political Cleavages among the Russian Deputies," Thomas F. Remington (ed.), *Parliaments in Transition: the New Legislative Politics in the Former USSR and Eastern Europe* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 191, 201.

⁴²) The proportion of female deputies had fallen from 13.8 per cent and 16.2 per cent among RSFSR deputies in the CPD and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, to 5.2 per cent and 8.0 per cent in the CPD and the Supreme Soviet of Russia respectively. Workers accounted 6.2 per cent and 7.2 per cent in the CPD and the Supreme Soviet of Russia, falling by more than 8 per cent than they were represented in 1989 election. Representation of rural areas showed a sharper decrease when the proportion of deputies from rural area dropped from 17.5 per cent and 23.9 per cent among RSFSR deputies in the CPD and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to 7.3 per cent and 3.0 per cent in the CPD and the Supreme Soviet of Russia respectively.

⁴³) Regina A. Smith, "Ideological vs. Regional Cleavage: Do the Radicals Control the RSFSR Parliament?" *Journal of Soviet Nationalities*, vol. 1, no. 3 (1990), p. 119 (Table 1).

⁴⁴) The proportion of nomenklaturists was higher in stagnated regions (12.8 per cent) and stagnated republics (23.7 per cent) than the average (11.3 per cent), while a larger proportion of the intelligentsia (49.9 per cent, the Russian average is 11.4 per cent) was elected from Moscow, highly adapted region ($X^2=160.3$, $df=28$, $p<0.001$).

⁴⁵) Non-CPSU members accounted for a considerably large proportion of deputies from Moscow (73.4 per cent), and 31.5 per cent of deputies from adapted regions ($M=24.3$ per cent, $X^2=112.4$, $df=4$, $p<0.001$).

⁴⁶) For instance, 54.8 per cent of deputies from adopted republics were less than 45 years old, while 28.0 per cent from stagnated republics ($X^2=14.2$, $df=4$, $p<0.01$).

⁴⁷) According to Sobyenin, only five members—Eltsin, Mikhail Bocharov, Nikolai Travkin, Galina Starovoitova and Iurii Afanasev—reappeared in the CPD of Russia. Other leading figures such as Gavriil Popov, Anatolii Sobchak, Sergei Stankevich, Gennadii Burbulis, and Ilia Zaslavskii ran for the local Soviets. Sobyenin, "The Current Crisis," in Remington (ed.), *Parliaments in Transition*, p. 184.

⁴⁸) Membership of the factions is based on the work of Gleisner and his colleagues. See Jeff Gleisner, Andrei Belaev, Nikolai Biriukov, Iakov Dranev, Victor Sergeev, *Voting in the Russian Parliament, 1990-93: Database* (Leeds: Centre for Democratisation Studies, University of Leeds, 1996).

⁴⁹) Among SIBFE deputies, the old generation constituted 52.5 per cent, while 63.1 percent among deputies from the European part of Russia ($X^2=8.2$, $df=1$, $p<0.01$).

⁵⁰) Although deputies came from large cities constituted nearly half the numbers of deputies from Western Siberia (46.2 per cent), a smaller proportion of deputies was elected from large cities in the SIBFE regions as a whole (31.6 per cent) than in the European part of Russia (45.1 percent, $X^2=18.2$, $df=3$, $p<0.001$).

⁵¹) Although it is not significant at the 0.05 level, the SIBFE delegation also had a smaller proportion of nomenklaturists than their Russian colleagues (11.4 per cent, $X^2=11.2$, $df=6$, $p=0.08$). By contrast, cadres constituted a larger proportion among SIBFE deputies (10.8 per cent) than other RSFSR deputies (6.8 per cent).

⁵²) For instance, deputies of hub/gate regions mainly originated from large cities (58.1 per cent), and deputies of resource regions from medium and small cities (31.9 and 29.2 per cent respectively). Quite naturally, deputies were mainly elected from large cities (32.3 per cent) and rural areas (38.7 per cent) in rural regions ($X^2=30.1$, $df=9$, $p<0.001$). Similar differences were also found when deputies were divided based on planning regions such as Western Siberia, Eastern Siberia, and the Far East. Nearly half the deputies from Western Siberia (46.2 per cent) were elected from large cities, while more than half the deputies from the Russian Far East from medium-sized cities (32.1 and 33.9 per cent respectively, $X^2=16.8$, $df=6$, $p<0.01$).

⁵³) Deputies from rural areas accounted for 41.2 per cent of deputies from stagnated republics and 21.4 per cent of deputies from stagnated regions ($X^2=22.2$ $df=9$, $p<0.05$).

⁵⁴) Although they were not significant at the 0.05 levels, the Far Eastern deputy group included a higher proportion of female deputies than the Siberian deputy group (9.5 per cent, $X^2=5.2$, $df=1$, $p=0.07$). The young generation was better represented from highly developed regions (62.5 per cent) than poorly developed regions (29.4 per cent, $X^2=9.0$, $df=4$, $p=0.06$).

⁵⁵) White, Gill, and Slider, *The Politics of Transition*, p. 52.

⁵⁶) In the Second Congress, for instance, only 461 deputies were allowed to take the podium out of 2,083 deputies who wanted to speak. This situation caused the increasing complains of favouritism in the selection of speakers. *Pravovedenie*, no. 5 (1991), p.15, in *ibid.*, p. 57.

⁵⁷) Verkhovnyi Sovet SSSR, *Pervyi s'ezd narodnykh deputatov SSSR, 25 maia-9 liunia 1989 g.: stenograficheskii otchet*, 6 vols. (Moscow: Izdanie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, 1989); *Vtoroi s'ezd narodnykh deputatov SSSR, 12-24 dekabria 1989 g.: stenograficheskii otchet*, 5 vols. (Moscow: Izdanie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, 1989); *Vneocherednoi tretii s'ezd narodnykh deputatov SSSR, 12-15 marta 1990 g.: stenograficheskii otchet*, 3 vols. (1990); and *Chetvertyi s'ezd narodnykh deputatov SSSR, 17-27 dekabria 1990 g.: stenograficheskii otchet*, 4 vols. (1991).

⁵⁸) These categories were based on time limits set by the Provisional Standing Orders for the Sessions of the CPD. According to Article 13 of the Orders, a maximum one and half hour will be

allowed for reports, thirty minutes for co-reports (category A speech), fifteen minutes for the debates on reports and co-reports (category B speech). Speakers will be allowed seven minutes for further contribution in debates, also five minutes for speeches about candidates (category C speech). "Vremennyi regulament zasedanii s'ezda narodnykh deputatov SSSR," in *Pervyi s'ezd narodnykh deputatov SSSR*, vol. III, p. 339.

⁵⁹) V. P. Khmel, a construction team leader from Angarsk City of Irkutsk oblast, complained that Siberian deputies had been silent for three days, while Moscow and Leningrad deputies kept coming forward. *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 63.

⁶⁰) See the speech of V. I. Sergienko, the Chairman of Krasnoiarsk *kraispolkom*, in *ibid.*, vol. II, p. 298; also see the speech of A. I. Ostroukhov, a secretary of the party committee of the *Sibkabel* Production Association from Tomsk oblast, in *ibid.*, vol. III, pp. 226-227.

⁶¹) Ianenko's speech, in *ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 494-495.

⁶²) Kazarezov's speech, in *ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 64-65.

⁶³) *Ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 231-232.

⁶⁴) See the speech of M. I. Mongo, the director of the Department for the Affairs of the Peoples of the North and Arctic of the Eastern Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences, from Vladivostok, in *ibid.*, vol. II, p. 420; the speech of E. A. Gaer, a Scientific Associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences Far East Department Institute of History, Archaeology and Ethnography, also from Vladivostok, in *ibid.*, vol. III, pp. 85-86; and the speech of Sergienko, the Chairman of Krasnoiarsk *kraispolkom*, in *ibid.*, vol. II, p. 300.

⁶⁵) Gustav criticised the decision to build petrochemical industry in Tiumen oblast. *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 232; I. A. Egorova, section chief of the Altai Clinical Hospital, opposed the construction of a nitrogen material fertiliser plant which was to be built in Altai in exchange of gas offer, the Katun hydropower station project, and the nuclear test site in Semipalatinsk. *Ibid.*, vol. III, p. 76.

⁶⁶) Kazarezov insisted that investment in science would yield the greatest effect and would provide the funds which enable them to resolve local social problems. *Ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 66-67. By contrast, I. A. Nazarov, the First Secretary of the Russko-Poliansk *Raikom partii* in Omsk oblast, underlined the need of the capital investment in Siberia's agrarian sector, "primarily in the social development, road construction, and water and heat supplies." *Ibid.*, vol. III, p. 65.

⁶⁷) For instance, A. A. Sokolov, the Chairman of Gorkii *oblispolkom*, insisted that the current attacks on the CPSU were "aimed not at rectifying mistakes, but at pooling forces to undermine confidence in the party and its organs and to break its ties with the people." *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 411.

⁶⁸) Biddulph asserted that local leaders were "overwhelmingly preoccupied with purely local issues in their proposal to the Congresses of the Brezhnev era." Howard L. Biddulph, "Local Interest Articulation at CPSU Congresses," *World Politics*, vol. XXXVI, no. 1 (October 1983), p. 39.

⁶⁹) One of union-level speech was made by Iu. V. Golik, from Kemerovo University, when he supported the idea of establishing the KKN. *Pervyi s'ezd narodnykh deputatov SSSR*, vol. II, pp. 141-142. A. P. Ianenko, a rector of the Novosibirsk Engineering and Construction Institute, also made a union-general type of speech by suggesting that state budget should be approved in the CPD, criticising

the USSR Council of Ministers for its ineffectiveness in the process of budget planning. *Ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 492-493.

⁷⁰) For instance, Gustav complained that there left nothing for workers although they had produced 149 billion foreign currency rubles' worth of oil for export. *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 232. Although this type of speeches accounted for only a small proportion, it is still note worthy since managers and workers had less opportunity to articulate their opinions than nomenklaturists and the intelligentsia in the First Congress of the USSR.

⁷¹) George W. Breslauer, "Is there A Generation Gap in the Soviet Political Establishment?: Demand Articulation by RSFSR Provincial Party First Secretaries," *Soviet Studies*, vol. XXXVI, no. 1 (January 1984), p. 20. In his further studies, he asserts that high political position is "almost a necessary condition, but is certainly not a sufficient condition," for publishing impatient demands, suggesting the importance of patron-client linkage. George W. Breslauer, "Provisional Party Leaders' Demand Articulation and the Nature of Centre-Periphery Relations in the USSR," *Slavic Review*, vol. 45, no. 4 (Winter 1986), p. 667.

⁷²) In fact, Breslauer divided the demand types of political elites into the first four groups excluding demands for independence. Although it was certainly out of the question at the moment of Breslauer's analysis, demands for independence were clearly heard in the CPD. For his categories, see Breslauer, "Provisional Party Leaders' Demand Articulation," p. 650; and Breslauer, "Is There a Generation Gap in the Soviet Political Establishment?" pp. 5-8.

⁷³) The main difference between demands for devolution and independence lies whether a demand includes the changes of existing political and economic system at the union level.

⁷⁴) Breslauer asserted "the structure and norms of bureaucratic centralism" continued to pose strict limits on the extent of the middle-level party officials' articulation during the Brezhnev period. Breslauer, "Provisional Party Leaders' Demand Articulation," pp. 652-653.

⁷⁵) Prunskene's speech, in *Pervyi s'ezd narodnykh deputatov SSSR*, vol. III, pp. 57-63, 58.

⁷⁶) For instance, see the remarks of V. P. Larianov, a deputy chairman of the Presidium of the Yakutsk Scientific Centre under the Siberian Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences and director of the Institute for Physical-Technical Problems of the North. *Ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 166-167.

⁷⁷) See the speech of Sergienko, in *ibid.*, vol. II, p. 298. Also see Mongo's speech, in *ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 422-423.

⁷⁸) *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 97.

⁷⁹) *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 359.

⁸⁰) See the speeches made by N. A. Nazarbaev, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Kazakhstan, in *ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 496-497; and by A. M. Masaliev, the First Secretary of Kyrgyzstan, in *ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 85-86. V. V. Diusembaev, a mine foreman in the Tishinskii Mine form Kazakhstan, also asserted that the transition to regional cost accounting "definitely needs to be preceded by a reform of prices on raw materials." *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 281.

⁸¹) *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 489.

⁸²) Ibid., vol. II, pp. 133-134.

⁸³) For instance, I. Kh. Toome, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Estonia, proposed a draft USSR law "On the Conversion of the Estonian SSR to Republic Cost Accounting." Ibid., vol. II, p. 104.

⁸⁴) See the speech of V. E. Bressis, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Latvia, in *ibid.*, vol. III, p. 234.

⁸⁵) He argued that conversion to full cost accounting and self-finance failed to solve the problems because there was no integral, unified concept and legal normative basis for territorial cost accounting and regional administration of the economy. Ibid., vol. II, p. 299.

⁸⁶) Ibid., vol. II, p. 66.

⁸⁷) Gustav insisted that cost accounting in Tiumen oblast was problematic when the region received drilling rigs and equipment from Sverdlovsk and Volgograd, pipes from the Ukraine, oil field equipment from Azerbaijan, and rotating brigade from Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Belarus, and other republics. In his conclusion, he proposed to create "consortium-type economic association" in the strategic sector before implementation of cost accounting. Ibid., vol. II, p. 235.

⁸⁸) Nazarov's speech, in *ibid.*, vol. III, p. 63.

⁸⁹) See the speech of L. P. Larionov, a deputy chairman of the Presidium of the Scientific Centre of the USSR Academy Sciences Siberian Branch from Sakha. Ibid., vol. II, p. 166.

⁹⁰) Ibid., vol. III, p. 224.

⁹¹) See Gorbunov's speech, in *ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 23-28. Braszaukas even advocated the republics must participate in shaping and exercising foreign policy of the Union. Ibid., vol. II, p. 76.

⁹²) Mutalibov's speech, in *ibid.*, vol. II, p. 30; Azizbekova's speech, in *ibid.*, vol. II, p. 228; and Nazarbaev's speech, in *ibid.*, vol. I, p. 500.

⁹³) A. A. Plotnieks, a professor at the Latvian P. Stuck State University at Riga, for instance, criticised that "to give even the most competent federal organ the right to stop its action [i. e. the adoption of republican constitution and introduction of amendment to it] meant to deprive the republic of its sovereignty with a single stroke of the pen." Ibid., vol. III, p. 140.

⁹⁴) See the speech of V. N. Kudriavtsev, a deputy president of the USSR Academy of Sciences in Moscow. Ibid., vol. III, pp. 157-158.

⁹⁵) Ibid., vol. III, p. 159.

⁹⁶) A regional-ethnic type speech is worth mentioning as it showed existing ethnic conflict within the Baltic deputies regarding the issue of sovereignty. V. I. Iarvoi, the director of a production association, criticised that "recent legislative activity had begun bearing an more illegal nature, and the republic violated the USSR Constitution when a session of the Estonian Supreme Soviet adopted the amendment to the Constitution and the Declaration on Sovereignty on 16 November last year." He also complained that majority of the non-Estonian population, which does not support the cult of priority of ethnic group, "finds itself without a place." Ibid., vol. II, pp. 462-463.

⁹⁷) K. V. Kogan, the chief of thermo-technical laboratory in Tallinn, an ethnic Russian, also demanded to create a committee for constitutional control to review the constitutional amendments adopted in Baltic republics, particularly in Estonia. *Ibid.*, vol. III, pp. 137-138.

⁹⁸) *Ibid.*, vol. III, pp. 141-142.

⁹⁹) See the speech of Gaer from Vladivostok, in *ibid.*, vol. III, pp. 84-91; and the speech of Mongo, also from Vladivostok, in *ibid.*, vol. II, p. 423.

CHAPTER V

Regionalism in the CPD of the USSR

By the time the Congress of the People's Deputies (CPD) of the USSR convened, cleavages in the attitude of the grassroots towards political change had emerged. According to a survey carried out during November-December 1989, ethnicity, age, CPSU membership, education and income level, gender, urbanisation and life satisfaction were reported to affect the respondents' attitude towards reform.¹ As noted in the content analysis, "socialist pluralism" in Soviet society was also reflected in the Congress in terms of the interests of the various socio-economic sectors that constituted its membership.

In the Congress, another crucial factor, regional groups, emerged, as the formation of the Interregional Deputies' Group suggested. Given that reform measures had a different impact on the regions, emerging regional groups in the Congress could make it more difficult to adjust conflicting interests in a decision-making process that had already become more complicated than before. Such difficulties hampered the central authorities' efforts to identify clear guidelines for regulating reform in the peripheries, which in turn facilitated an intensification of regionalisation of reform in the implementation process.

In this chapter, the influence of regional factors upon the decision-making process at the centre that was reflected in the voting patterns of deputies will constitute a main focus. Supposing that cleavages at the grassroots level could also emerge among deputies, the influence of the variables mentioned above will be examined together with the regional factor. For the analysis, 17 of the 63 roll-call votes that were taken place during the Second to Fourth Congresses of the USSR were selected. The analysis will be carried out in two stages: firstly each of the variables will be discussed separately, then the overall influence of these variables will be examined.

The analysis suggests that deputies in the Congress as a whole were divided by regional factors (e.g. the Union republic deputy groups), as well as by 'class' background, CPSU membership, and personal factors such as generation and gender. Similar cleavages also emerged among the SIBFE deputies in many votes, except in votes on federal issues. Among SIBFE deputies, the diverse socio-economic situation of an individual region, as well as 'class' and generation factors weakened unity. Among the regional variables tested in this chapter, conflicts emerged among the regional groups based on economic structure, economic performance, and federal status depending on the feature of votes in question, suggesting a low level of coordination among SIBFE deputies. Although the influence of these factors depended on the question that was put to the vote, this regional cleavage suggests that SIBFE deputies were more attentive to the interests of their own administrative unit rather than those of the SIBFE as a whole.

V. 1. The Agenda Discussed in the CPD of the USSR

V. 1 (1) The Agenda of the Second Congress

After the First Congress, two main issues were given priority in the following Congress: constitutional amendments that were to enshrine economic and political reform of the old Soviet Constitution, and the economic programme for the 13th Five-Year Plan (FYP). The agenda for the Second Congress that opened on 12 December 1989 was adopted by the eighty-member commission that consisted of the members of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and representatives from the political groups within the Congress.² Although a majority approved the agenda, there were sharp differences of views on the issues of the leading role of the CPSU in Soviet society, the question of transition to a "socialist market," the election system, and the Constitutional Control Committee (*Komitet konstitutsionnogo nadzora*: KKN).

First of all, a striking difference was evident between conservatives and reformers in their views on Article 6 of the Constitution. Even before the Congress convened, the left wing organised a general strike, demanding the abolition of Article 6, although they failed to receive nationwide support. As the session opened, Mariu Lauristin from Estonia, raised the question of Article 6, claiming that it could be discussed together with the electoral reform issue.³ Although conservatives supported Article 6, it had already been an empty concept.⁴ While recognising the legitimacy of

the issue and considering that the Party was not yet ready for the changes, Gorbachev opposed immediate discussion of the matter. Eventually, the question was put to a vote, giving a short-lived victory to conservatives which lasted until February 1990 when the Central Committee of the Party decided to change Article 6.

The government economic programme, called "Ryzhkov's plan," was the second issue discussed in the Second Congress. The Ryzhkov plan was based on the idea that a six-year transition period was required to establish a "socialist market." The plan was generally accepted by conservatives and realistic radicals, but for different reasons. As for the conservatives, the plan was basically acceptable, mainly because it left the existing administrative-command economic system untouched. Relatively moderate reform supporters also generally agreed that an immediate and radical path to the fully-fledged market economy was impossible. However, the plan failed to reassure many deputies who regarded it as containing impractical and vague methods for the establishment of a "socialist market."⁵ Further discussions took place in three working groups,⁶ and finally, the government economic programme was adopted by a majority.

Conflicts between conservatives and reformers continued on the question of electoral procedures. Since the adoption of the Law on the Election of People's Deputies of the USSR on 1 December 1988, several questions had been raised such as unequal representation in national-territorial and territorial districts, the selection of deputies from all-union public organisations, district nomination conferences, and so on.⁷ In particular, debates took place on Articles 95 and 109 of the Constitution and Article 18 of the Law on the Election of People's Deputies of the USSR, which stipulated the selection of 750 deputies from all-union public organisations. Discussion of the question became controversial, particularly when the RSFSR and Baltic republics adopted election laws for establishing the republican parliaments which were in conflict with the Union Constitution.⁸

At the Congress, a commission, headed by Iurii Manaenkov, proposed a compromise so that a portion of the deputies could be selected from all-union public organisations "if so specified by the Constitution of the republic."⁹ Despite public support for the changes,¹⁰ neither conservatives nor reformers gained the two-thirds support that was necessary for any changes in the Constitution, although the issue was put to the vote twice at the Second Congress. In the end, republic elections began to proceed from 7 January 1990 in Turkmenia until 28 October 1990 in Georgia under their own version of the election law.

Among the agenda items, Article 125 of the Constitution of the USSR, which granted the KKN the right to nullify any law contradicting the Constitution, was the most controversial. At least on the surface, the KKN could be a symbol of the rule of law. However, the KKN was a double-edged sword that had the authority not only to nullify the acts promulgated by the Council of Ministers when they were in contradiction to the Constitution and laws, but also to suppress separatist movements in the republics. In this regard, deputies, particularly from the Baltic republics, regarded the KKN as an encroachment on the republics' sovereign rights and refused to take part in discussion of the matter.¹¹ Despite the resistance in the Congress, the issue was finally settled when the Congress adopted the law on the KKN, and elected S. S. Alekseev as the chairman of the Committee on 23 December 1989.¹²

V. 1 (2) The Agenda of the Third CPD

Although the KKN question had been settled in the Second Congress, the KKN was not sufficient authority for Moscow to cope with the separatist tendencies that were already gaining a momentum.¹³ Furthermore, growing opposition to his policies within the CPSU forced Gorbachev to create a new power base, the post of president of the USSR.¹⁴ An extraordinary Congress was called in March 1990, and lasted only three days mainly to adopt the law "On Establishing a Presidency of the USSR."

In the Congress, the power of the president of the USSR and the procedures to elect the president became the main focus of debate. According to the draft law "On Establishing a Presidency of the USSR," the president was to be provided with the important power to nominate and to propose the resignation of the main posts in state bodies. The law also granted the president a veto over the decisions of the Supreme Soviet and the right to issue presidential decrees, although the decrees of the president could be nullified by the decision of the CPD if they violated the Constitution and laws of the USSR.¹⁵

The proposal to establish a strong presidency of this kind gave rise to a vigorous debate in the Congress. As for the conservatives, a strong presidency could be a threat to their monopoly of power. However, at the same time, it could be used to strengthen their authority, which was anyway diminishing. As for the moderate reformers, particularly those who had a centrist orientation, the post of president was regarded as a way to achieve the integrity of the Union and stability of the society.¹⁶

However, radicals argued that establishing a strong presidency could lead to another dictatorship.¹⁷ In particular, radicals tried to block the possibility that the president's authority could be used to strengthen the conservatives' position. As a result, the question of combining the post of President and General Secretary of the CPSU caused a conflict between conservatives and radicals. In this context, V. I Prokushev proposed to amend point 1 of Article 127 of the Constitution of the USSR, adding that "the president of the USSR may not be a People's Deputy or a member of leadership bodies of any political parties or any other political public organisations."¹⁸ Prokushev's amendment won the support of 1,303 deputies, but failed to earn the two-thirds support that would have been necessary to secure its adoption.

As for the union republics that showed separatist tendencies, the power of the president was regarded as another double-edged sword, as was the KKN.¹⁹ In this regard, Iu. Afanas'ev's remark clearly showed the perception of separatist union republics and reformist blocs on the post of president. On behalf of the Interregional Deputies' Group, he expressed worries about "emerging dictatorship," insisting that the five pre-conditions should be satisfied in advance of establishing a presidency.²⁰ In order to minimise these worries about excessive centralisation, Gorbachev maintained that the prime task of the president would be the establishment of a new federation "in the interests of all people."²¹ However, for the Baltic nationalists, his remark only reinforced their scepticism that the strong presidency was a symbol of unity rather than of a new federation.

The procedure to elect a president was also controversial, when Part III of the draft law on the post of president that stipulated the first president should be elected by the CPD was discussed. Deputies such as Afanas'ev preferred a general election to elect the president of the USSR. However, others including Anatolii Sobchak, member of the Supreme Soviet, and A. N. Iakovlev, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, regarded it as a practical option to elect the president by the CPD.²² In the end, the Congress adopted each section of the draft law separately, and elected Gorbachev as the first president of the USSR on an exceptional basis.

V. 1 (3) The Agenda of the Fourth Congress of People's Deputies

After the Third Congress, the conflicts between 'sovereign republics' and strong president, and deteriorating economic situation became critical issues. The Fourth Congress that convened in December 1990 discussed three main questions: the state

administrative system, a new Union Treaty, and measures to overcome the continuing economic crisis.²³

The constitutional amendments to improve the state administrative system covered the powers of the Supreme Soviet, President and Vice President, the Federal Council, the Council of Ministers, Arbitration Court, and procurators, and were intended to provide "more clear-cut demarcation of the powers of the state organs." However, the discussion of the procedures to annul decrees of the president and resolutions of the Council of Ministers resulted in a struggle between executive and legislative bodies. V. N. Kudriavtsev, Chairman of the Editorial Commission, proposed that the right to annul the decrees of the president of the USSR should not be given to the Supreme Soviet but to the CPD.²⁴ On the contrary, A. I. Kazannik, head of the department of Constitutional Law, Administration and Soviet Development at Omsk State University, opposed Kudriavtsev's proposal, mainly because the Congress only convened once a year. He insisted that "presidential decrees should be annulled by a continuously operating body of state power, the USSR Supreme Soviet."²⁵ Gorbachev supported Kazannik's position, maintaining it would be better to leave everything as it was, since he had to adopt decrees almost "every day."²⁶ Finally, an amendment to the point 18 of Article 113 was passed, providing the Supreme Soviet with the right to annul the resolutions of the Council of Ministers.²⁷

The Congress also discussed a draft resolution on measures to overcome the crisis point by point. The draft stipulated the need to accelerate work on preparing and signing a Union Treaty (Article 1), and guarantee the delivery of necessary goods. According to the draft, all parties engaged in economic management were to sign delivery contracts before the end of 1990. The draft also specified that each party should provide the same amount of output that they had delivered in the previous year during the first quarter of 1991.²⁸ Eltsin made it clear that the way out of this crisis was only possible through discussion between centre and republics, urging that the Union leadership should recognise the sovereignty of the republics and "decisively and permanently relinquish interference in the internal affairs of the republics without their consent."²⁹ The final draft was approved by 1,868 deputies and only eight deputies voted against it.

After adoption of the resolution on measures to overcome the crisis, the Congress began to discuss a draft resolution on the concept of a new Union Treaty. For the discussion, fourteen drafts were drawn up including the draft prepared by the Supreme Soviet commission.³⁰ The Congress basically agreed to speed up the process

of concluding the Union Treaty (Article 1). In the discussion, the *Soiuz* Group supported Gorbachev's proposal, but the Interregional Deputies' Group was divided.³¹ There were also several amendments to the draft. For instance, Anatolii Sobchak proposed an amendment to Article 3 of the draft that emergency measures, which were mentioned only for the first quarter of 1991, should be extended to the end of the year. He also proposed a rewording of Article 4 concerning the abolition of barriers to the transfer of products across the country. Both proposals were turned down. As the Congress adopted the draft by 1,616 against 181, a preparatory committee was to start work in January 1991.³²

V. 1 (4) Roll-call Votes Analysed

Since the first roll-call vote at the Second Congress, 63 issues or proposals were decided by roll-call vote (24 votes at the Second, 28 at the Third, and 11 at the Fourth CPD), giving a good basis for analysing the voting patterns of deputies. For the analysis, 17 votes were selected based on the following three principles. First, votes were categorised into four categories—federal, presidential, economic and other political issues—depending on the political and economic meanings of issues that were in question, and about the same number of votes were selected from each category of questions. Second, about the same number of votes were selected from each Congress. And finally, a vote that had been adopted or rejected by an absolute majority was avoided (for the list of votes included in the analysis, see Appendix 3.1).

Among the votes selected for the analysis, four votes were related to the federal structure, four to the post of the president, three to the economic situation, and six to other political issues. The first category of votes includes the votes on the proposal to include the draft law on the constitutional supervision of the USSR on the agenda (X2),³³ and the proposal that the law on the constitutional supervision should first be discussed in the Supreme Soviet (X7),³⁴ which were both put to the vote at the Second Congress. Votes on the retention of the name of the USSR (Z2)³⁵ and E. G. Kozin's proposal to recognise the declaration of sovereignty by union republic parliaments as an expression of the people's will (Z5)³⁶ also belong to this category.

Secondly, four votes on the presidency were selected. Among the amendments raised when the draft law "On Establishing a Presidency of the USSR" was discussed at the Third Congress, votes on V. I. Prokushev's amendment to Article 127 point 1 of the Constitution (Y2),³⁷ I. O. Bisers's proposal (Y3),³⁸ and A. A. Zakharenko's

amendment to Article 127 point 17 (Y4)³⁹ are considered. The proposal to adopt Section III of the draft law, stipulating that the first President should be elected by the CPD for a five-year term (Y5),⁴⁰ is also included in this category.

Concerning the economic issues, votes on the Ryzhkov plan (X5),⁴¹ and G. N. Podberezskii's amendment (Z3)⁴² and A. K. Miloserdy's amendment to Article 3 of the draft resolution of the Fourth CPD "On Measures to overcome the Crisis" (Z4)⁴³ will be analysed.

Other categories of issues includes two votes on Article 6 (X1 and Y1),⁴⁴ two on the selection of deputies from social organisations (X3 and X4),⁴⁵ and the amendment to Article 96 of the Constitution (X6).⁴⁶ Sazhi Umalatova's proposal for including a vote of no confidence in the president of the USSR on the agenda, made at the Fourth Congress, also belongs to this group.⁴⁷

The analysis of these votes is expected to show deputies' general attitude towards political and economic reform. In this case, we can use the term conservative and reformers. However, the matter is not that simple when federal and presidential issues are concerned, as the demarcation between centrists and federalists does not necessarily coincide with conservatives and reformers respectively. Furthermore, deputies regarded constitutional supervision as not only a matter of the federal system, but also a matter of blocking ministerial encroachment on local authority. Votes on the issue of the presidency may have more complex aspects. They may reflect the struggle not only between parliament and president but also between centrists and separatists, similar to the KKN question.

However, in this analysis, conservative voting patterns generally overlapped with centrist voting patterns, as both supported the existing federal order. In the same context, the term 'conservative' refers to voting patterns that supported a strong presidency. The term 'liberal' generally referred to reformist, federalist, and anti-strong presidential tendencies. In accordance with this simplification, votes are recoded on a three-point scale (+10 for a liberal vote, -10 for a conservative vote, and 0 for abstention) for anova and T-test, and on a binary coding (1 for a liberal vote and 0 for other votes) for logistic regression (for the coding, see Appendix 3.2).

V. 2. Cleavages among Deputies in the CPD of the USSR

A striking feature of the working patterns of the CPD was the segmentation of its deputies. As already discussed, the CPSU was losing its binding force even for its member deputies. Furthermore, the absence of a mechanism for recalling deputies left deputies to take part in debates and votes based on their personal preferences.

Despite the segmentation of deputies, however, a sign of emerging voting blocs based on regional, ideological, and functional interests was witnessed in the CPD.⁴⁸ Although a deputy could enrol him or herself in more than one bloc and although his or her commitment to a bloc did not necessarily affect voting patterns, the formation of deputy groups in the Congress suggests that an alignment among deputies was taking place on various bases.

V. 2 (1) Regional Cleavages

As discussed in the previous chapter, deputies' explicit commitment to the interests of the regions they represented emerged as one of the most conspicuous changes in parliamentary working patterns. First of all, clear differences were revealed among the republican deputy groups, particularly between Baltic and Central Asian deputies in their voting patterns in all votes that included in the analysis. In general, deputies from the Central Asian republics showed conservative voting patterns on most questions such as federal system issues, economic questions, Article 6, and the selection of deputies from social organisations. Although Slavic and Caucasian deputies showed similar voting patterns at the beginning, Caucasian deputies tended to be more united when they decided not to take part in the vote, copying Baltic deputies.

In particular, deputies from the Baltic republics, particularly from Estonia and Lithuania, and deputies from Armenia (at the Fourth CPD), were so strongly united in the vote that other factors hardly seemed to have significant influence on their voting patterns. After the Second Congress, deputies from Estonia and Lithuania decided not to participate in the vote, demonstrating their unity in the CPD. The tendencies were followed by Armenian deputies and in a less degree by Latvian and Georgian deputies at the Fourth Congress.

<Table 5.2.1> An Indicator of the Unity of Baltic and Caucasian Deputy Groups

	Estonian group (N=48)	Latvian group (N=52)	Lithuanian group (N=58)	Armenian group (N=53)	Georgian group (N=91)
Y1	37.5	19.2	98.3	11.3	24.2
Y2	66.7	21.2	98.3	9.4	30.8
Y3	68.8	28.8	98.3	20.8	25.3
Y4	71.1	32.7	94.8	18.9	30.8
Y5	70.8	26.9	93.1	5.7	20.0
Z1	47.9	15.4	96.6	90.6	76.9
Z2	87.5	71.2	94.8	94.3	54.9
Z3	83.3	61.5	94.8	94.3	63.7
Z4	83.3	67.3	96.6	94.3	63.7
Z5	85.4	51.9	96.6	94.3	45.1

Figures indicate percentage of deputies who refrained from voting in the Congress.
Y: votes in the Third Congress; Z: votes in the Fourth Congress (see Appendix 3.1)

A high level of unity was also apparent among Central Asian deputies. More than 80 per cent or roughly 360 Central Asian deputies voted to support the existing federal relations and the government economic programme, although they were divided on other issues.⁴⁹ By contrast, Slavic and Moldavian deputies were divided on most votes.

In the Congress, deputies were also broken down by their urban-rural origin. As the voting patterns of Central Asian deputies suggested, rural deputies tended to be more conservative in their votes than urban deputies, revealing differences in 15 of the 17 votes analysed (see Appendix 4.1). In particular, a majority of rural deputies voted for Gorbachev's position on the federal system issue⁵⁰ and Ryzhkov's plan.⁵¹ However, the level of urbanisation in an electoral district did not always positively correlate with the level of deputies' support for the reform. For instance, deputies from small cities showed more liberal voting patterns than those from the large cities, particularly in the votes on Article 6⁵² and the selection of deputies from social organisations.⁵³

One of the reasons for this trend could be found in the different composition of urban-rural deputy groups. For instance, a relatively small proportion of deputies (23.2 per cent) from small cities was elected from social organisations, and therefore a smaller proportion of them might be interested in preserving the existing election system. Secondly, only a small proportion of nomenklaturists (3.8 per cent) and the intelligentsia (4.4 per cent) was elected from small cities. By contrast, both groups accounted for more than half the deputies from large cities (21.8 per cent and 33.8 per cent respectively). As a result, deputies from small cities were less exposed to the conflicts between these 'classes' than those from large cities.

V. 2 (2) Cleavages between 'Class' Groups

In association with the development of regional interest articulation in the central parliament, functional cleavages have particular importance because of their cross-regional features. In the Congress, the diminishing importance of an arbitrary representation of particular social sectors or 'classes' resulted in an increasing representation of creative and production sectors, and thus increased possibility of conflicts between diverse 'class' groups. Although it is difficult to maintain that 'class' identity was fully fledged, 'class' groups showed different political and economic orientations in the vote.⁵⁴

As suggested in Appendix 4.1, 'class' cleavages were found in 16 of the 17 votes included in the analysis. In general, nomenklaturists and military personnel formed a conservative bloc, and the intelligentsia and technicians constituted a liberal bloc in the CPD. While both camps showed a relatively consistent political orientation, other 'classes' such as cadres, workers, and managers showed different voting patterns, depending on the issue in question. A majority of workers, for instance, tended to strongly support the existing Union system and the government economic programme that had been proposed at the Second Congress. However, they showed rather similar voting patterns to relatively liberal groups such as the intelligentsia and technicians in the vote on the post of the president. Furthermore, workers as a whole opposed the allocation of seats to social organisations (M=4.1) at the Second Congress and the leading role of the CPSU (M=1.2) at the Third Congress.

Despite the 'class' cleavages, however, each 'class' group was divided in many votes, suggesting that 'class' identity had not been fully developed and had not yet been developed into a particular political and economic orientation. In terms of level of unity, nomenklaturists maintained a relatively higher level of unity than other 'class' groups. For instance, sectoral interests, particularly those of agricultural and industrial sectors, seemed to divide managers and workers in the vote. In general, deputies from the industrial sector were more liberal or less conservative than those from the agricultural sector. This trend was more apparent among workers than managers.⁵⁵ For instance, more than 40 per cent of industrial workers (M=-0.9) supported a proposal to discuss Article 6 at the Second Congress, while only 19.2 per cent of agricultural workers (M=-5.0) supported it (T=-4.7, p<0.001). Another clear cleavage was apparent in the vote on Ryzhkov's plan, when industrial workers (M=-5.8) were less supportive than agricultural workers (M=-8.4, T=-4.1, p<0.001). A more

conspicuous difference between two groups appeared when the proposal to declare a moratorium on strikes was put to a vote at the Fourth Congress. In the vote, a majority of industrial workers (58.6 per cent, $M=3.7$) rejected the proposal, while nearly half the agricultural workers (48.6 per cent, $M=-2.2$) supported it ($T=-7.4$, $p<0.001$).

In connection with regionalism, the voting patterns of cadres are also noteworthy, since critical changes were taking place in local leaderships at the end of the 1980s and in the early 1990s. In the Congress, a large proportion of cadres appeared to keep a distance from nomenklaturists, showing significantly different voting patterns in thirteen of the 17 votes. In the votes, cadres were less supportive of the leading role of the CPSU, of a strong presidency, and of the existing federal system, showing their readiness to accept political changes.⁵⁶

A clear difference between cadres and nomenklaturists was also revealed in the vote on a moratorium on strikes. In the vote, about 45 per cent of cadres ($M=2.3$) rejected the proposal, while 47.2 per cent of nomenklaturists ($M=-2.5$) supported it ($T=-6.2$, $p<0.001$), although about 30 per cent of each group abstained. Given that the question of strikes could be a major concern,⁵⁷ particularly in mining regions where strikes had been launched or were being prepared, the voting patterns of cadres suggest that a growing number of low ranking regional political leaders were loyal to regional interests.

V. 2 (3) Other Cleavages

Apart from regional and 'class' cleavages, cleavages based on personal factors such as gender, generation, educational level, ethnic origin and CPSU membership also emerged among deputies in the Congress (see Appendix 4.1). In general, male deputies, the younger generation, and non-CPSU members tended to vote in a more liberal or less conservative way than female deputies, the older generation, and CPSU members.

<Table 5.2.2> Number of Votes Revealing Differences Among the Gender, Generation, Education, and Party Groups in the USSR CPD

	Federal Issues (4 votes)	Presidency Issues (4 votes)	Economic Issues (3 votes)	Other Issues (6 votes)	Total (17 votes)
Gender	2 (1)	2 (1)	2 (1)	5 (2)	11 (5)
Generation	2 (1)	4 (3)	2 (2)	5 (5)	13 (11)
Education level	4 (3)	4 (3)	3 (1)	2 (1)	13 (8)
Ethnic origin	4 (3)	4 (2)	3 (2)	2 (0)	12 (7)
CPSU membership	4 (4)	3 (3)	3 (1)	5 (3)	15 (11)

Significance at the 0.05 level (0.001 level).

In the USSR CPD, however, it is difficult to say that the higher the level of education a deputy attained, the more likely he or she would vote in a liberal way. Although the higher the level of education, the less likely a deputy was to support the existing federal system and Ryzhkov's plan, it did not necessarily guarantee liberal voting on other issues.⁵⁸

It is also problematic to interpret ethnic cleavages between Russian and non-Russian deputy groups that appeared in twelve votes, since both groups tended to be divided. Furthermore, ethnic cleavages were often closely linked with cleavages between the union republic groups. For instance, significant differences were found between Russians from the Central Asian and Caucasian republics in the vote on the proposal to prohibit the president from joining any political parties.⁵⁹ Differences were also found between non-Russian deputies from both republic deputy groups in economic issues.⁶⁰ Accordingly, ethnic cleavages are more appropriately discussed at the union republic level, rather than in the CPD as a whole.

Among these personal factors, CPSU membership and generation seemed to have a strong influence on deputies' voting patterns. In particular, non-CPSU members often voted in a more liberal or less conservative way than party members in the Congress, revealing significant differences in 15 votes at the 0.05 level. For instance, non-CPSU members were less supportive of the CPSU's leading role, Ryzhkov's plan and the existing federal system.⁶¹ However, both deputy groups were divided on most votes, and only in a limited number of votes, more than 60 per cent of deputies in each group voted the same way.

Together with CPSU membership, the generation gap was also evident, revealing differences in thirteen votes. In the vote, the younger generation more supportive of political and economic changes than the older generation. For instance,

younger deputies were more supportive of the abolition of the selections of deputies from social organisations and of the CPSU's leading role.⁶² They again showed their liberal orientation when nearly 47 per cent of them ($M=1.8$) rejected the proposal to declare a moratorium on strikes ($T=5.5$, $p<0.001$).

Finally, the gender factor also divided deputies in the Congress, revealing differences in eleven votes. In particular, female deputies were more supportive of the existing federal system and of Ryzhkov's plan than male deputies.⁶³ Although 65 per cent of female deputies were either workers or technicians, the gender gap appeared in the Congress did not seem to be solely caused by the 'class' composition, since the gender gap also emerged among technicians and workers (in eleven and ten votes respectively).

V. 3. SIBFE Deputies in the CPD of the USSR

In the CPD of the USSR, it was regarded as necessary for SIBFE deputies to form a common front to defend regional interests in the CPD, as changing parliamentary working patterns had provided regions with better opportunities to articulate their interests. Furthermore, SIBFE deputies shared the perception of the 'colonial relationship' between centre and SIBFE regions and the need to collaborate in their competition for investment with other administrative units. As a consequence, deputies from the SIBFE regions held a series of meetings to coordinate their activities, in order to increase their influence in the Congress.⁶⁴

However, it turned out to be a thorny path to work out the common interests of the regions. Despite a general consensus in favour of cooperation, their priorities in measures for solving the regional problems varied because of the different socio-economic conditions of each of the SIBFE regions. This hampered deputies' efforts to define common interests in a series of meetings, let alone formulate a binding resolution for their coordination or general reform measures that would affect regional interests.⁶⁵

As a result, deputies from the SIBFE regions as a whole were rather divided in their votes, excluding votes on federal system issues (see Appendix 4.3). This trend is also observed when SIBFE deputies were divided into two groups—the Siberian and Far Eastern deputy groups—considering the possible linkage between the emerging

regional associations in the SIBFE regions, the Siberian Agreement and Far Eastern Economic Association, and their deputy groups (see Appendices 4.4 and 4.5).

V. 3 (1) The General Voting Patterns of SIBFE Deputies

In the Congress, SIBFE deputies tended to show rather moderate voting patterns in general. They were less supportive of political reform including changes in the leading role of the CPSU and the selection of deputies from social organisations than Baltic deputies, but more supportive than Central Asian deputies. As far as federal system issues were concerned, SIBFE deputies were more supportive of the existing federal system than Baltic deputies, but less supportive than Central Asian deputies as a whole. However, SIBFE deputies were less supportive of the government economic plan, the establishment of the presidency,⁶⁶ the leading role of the CPSU,⁶⁷ and the selection of deputies from social organisations⁶⁸ than deputies from the European part of Russia.

Despite these relatively moderate voting patterns of SIBFE deputies, they appeared to represent regional interests in their votes. For instance, SIBFE deputies expressed their dissatisfaction with government economic policies in the votes on Ryzhkov's plan and on the proposal to include the question of no confidence in the president on the agenda of the Fourth Congress.⁶⁹ These voting patterns suggest that SIBFE deputies shared worries about changing economic policy and investment priorities for the 12th and 13th FYP with regional leaders.⁷⁰

However, specific interests of smaller deputy groups often threatened the unity of SIBFE deputies that were based on these general concerns. For instance, cleavages between Siberian and Far Eastern deputies emerged in the vote on the Podberezskii's proposal on the political and economic crisis that suggested an extreme measure, legal action in the event of a failure to deliver goods. Although a majority of Siberian and Far Eastern deputies rejected the proposal, a larger proportion of deputies from the Far Eastern regions (23.7 per cent, $M=-3.1$) voted for it, while only 13.5 per cent of Siberian deputies ($M=-5.4$) supported it ($T=-2.0$, $p<0.05$). In the vote, the difficulties of procurement of necessary goods in the remote Far Eastern regions that were recipients rather than donors seemed to affect the voting patterns of their deputies.

Considering the size of the SIBFE deputy group—about a tenth of the entire CPD—and absence of binding core unlike Baltic deputies, it would not difficult to

imagine that cleavages among deputies that were observed in the Congress as a whole again appeared among the SIBFE deputies. As suggested in Table 5.3.1, the socio-economic features of a region including economic structure, living standards, and the federal status of a region, 'class,' and personal factors such as generation seemed to divide the SIBFE deputy group. As a result, SIBFE deputies often failed to maintain a moderate level of unity in more than half the votes analysed. Although economic structure and the federal status of a region seldom affected the voting patterns of Far Eastern deputies, neither Siberian nor Far Eastern deputies appeared to be strongly united.

<Table 5.3.1> Cleavages among SIBFE Deputies in the CPD of the USSR

	Federal Issues (4 votes)	Presidential Issues (4 votes)	Economic Issues (4 votes)	Other Issues (6 votes)	Total (17 votes)
SIBFE Deputies					
<i><u>Regional Factors</u></i>					
Siberia vs. Far East	0 (0)	1 (1)	1 (0)	1 (0)	3 (1)
Economic structure	4 (3)	2 (1)	1 (0)	2 (0)	9 (4)
Living conditions	4 (2)	3 (3)	3 (1)	3 (2)	13 (8)
Living conditions & Federal status	4 (2)	2 (2)	2 (0)	1 (0)	9 (4)
Urban vs. rural areas	0 (0)	1 (0)	2 (0)	0 (0)	3 (0)
Federal status	1 (0)	2 (1)	1 (0)	1 (0)	5 (1)
<i><u>Functional Factor</u></i>					
'Class'	2 (1)	2 (1)	2 (1)	3 (2)	9 (5)
CPSU membership	1 (0)	1 (0)	0 (0)	2 (0)	4 (0)
<i><u>Personal Factors</u></i>					
Gender	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (0)	1 (0)	2 (0)
Generation	2 (1)	3 (1)	2 (0)	4 (3)	11 (5)
Education level	1 (0)	2 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	3 (0)
Ethnic origin	0 (0)	1 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (0)
Siberian Deputies					
<i><u>Regional Factors</u></i>					
Economic structure	4 (2)	2 (1)	2 (0)	3 (0)	11 (3)
Living conditions	4 (2)	4 (4)	3 (1)	4 (0)	15 (7)
Living conditions & Federal status	3 (2)	3 (2)	2 (0)	1 (0)	9 (4)
Urban vs. rural areas	0 (0)	1 (0)	1 (0)	1 (0)	3 (0)
Federal status	2 (1)	3 (1)	2 (0)	1 (0)	8 (2)
<i><u>Functional Factor</u></i>					
'Class'	1 (0)	1 (1)	1 (0)	3 (2)	6 (3)
CPSU membership	0 (0)	1 (0)	0 (0)	2 (0)	3 (0)
<i><u>Personal Factors</u></i>					
Gender	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (0)	1 (0)	2 (0)
Generation	1 (0)	3 (1)	2 (0)	4 (1)	10 (2)
Education level	2 (0)	1 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	3 (0)
Ethnic origin	1 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (0)
Far Eastern Deputies					
<i><u>Regional Factors</u></i>					
Economic structure	1 (0)	0 (0)	1 (0)	0 (0)	2 (0)

Living conditions (1)	0 (0)	3 (0)	2 (1)	2 (0)	7 (1)
Living conditions (2)	0 (0)	2 (0)	1 (1)	2 (1)	5 (2)
Living conditions & Federal status	1 (0)	0 (0)	1 (0)	0 (0)	2 (0)
Urban vs. rural areas	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
Federal status	1 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (0)
<i>Functional Factors</i>					
'Class'	0 (0)	1 (0)	1 (0)	3 (1)	5 (1)
CPSU membership	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
<i>Personal Factors</i>					
Gender	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
Generation	2 (0)	1 (0)	0 (0)	2 (1)	5 (1)
Education level	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
Ethnic origin	0 (0)	1 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (0)

Significance at the 0.05 level (0.01 level).

V. 3 (2) Regional Cleavages among SIBFE Deputies

In addition to cleavages among urban and rural deputies that have already been discussed at the Union level, the differences between Siberian and Far Eastern deputies suggest that the socio-economic conditions of a region also affected the voting patterns of deputies. Therefore, the regional variables that were already discussed in Chapter 3 are included in the analysis to examine the influence of the socio-economic features of a region on the voting patterns of its deputies in the Congress. Furthermore, growing ethno-nationalist sentiment also increased differences between the deputy groups of autonomous and ordinary administrative units in their voting patterns.⁷¹

Firstly, among SIBFE deputies, rural deputies showed more conservative voting patterns than urban deputies as in the CPD as a whole.⁷² However, deputies from large cities often showed more conservative voting patterns than deputies from medium-sized and small cities among the SIBFE deputies.⁷³ Furthermore, differences between the urban and rural deputy groups in their voting patterns were less frequent among SIBFE deputies than among deputies from other Russian regions. In particular, no differences between urban and rural deputies emerged among Far Eastern deputies.

Among the regional factors tested, economic features such as economic structure and the socio-economic performance of the regions seemed to have more influence on voting patterns among SIBFE deputies. Considering the economic structure of regions, deputies from rural regions showed relatively conservative voting patterns as compared with those from resource and hub/gate regions, revealing differences in nine of the 17 votes. In particular, differences between these regional groups were revealed in the

vote on political issues⁷⁴ including federal system issues,⁷⁵ as well as on economic issues.⁷⁶

Despite the general assumption that differences in economic structure may have modified the impact of reform at the regional level, the level of economic performance and living conditions varied even among the regions that had a similar economic structure, as discussed in Chapter 3. In the vote, clearer cleavages emerged when the economic performance and living conditions of each region are considered, revealing significant difference in the voting patterns of deputies from each regional group in thirteen of the 17 votes.⁷⁷

In general, the higher the level of economic performance and living standards, the more likely its deputies voted in a liberal or less conservative way, although deputies from well-developed and under-developed regions showed similar voting patterns in half the number of votes. For instance, half the deputies from highly developed regions (50 per cent, $M=0.8$) opposed the proposal to maintain the name of the union. By contrast, 55.2 per cent, 77.0 per cent, and 89.7 per cent of deputies from well-developed ($M=-4.2$), under-developed ($M=-6.6$) and poorly developed ($M=-8.8$) regions respectively supported the proposal ($F=10.0$, $p<0.001$). Significant differences were again revealed in votes on economic issues such as Ryzhkov's plan,⁷⁸ presidential issues such as the proposal to prohibit the president from joining any political parties,⁷⁹ and other political issues such as Article 6 and the selection of deputies from social organisations.⁸⁰

The cleavages between regions at various levels of development were more clearly revealed among Siberian deputies than Far Eastern deputies. The Far Eastern regions were relatively more homogeneous in their socio-economic conditions, and thus in the composition of their deputy groups than Siberian regions.⁸¹ Furthermore, deputies from under-developed regions in the Russian Far East showed somewhat more liberal voting patterns than those from the same category of regions in Siberia,⁸² reducing the gap between two main—deputies from well-developed and under-developed regions—Far Eastern deputy groups.

The federal status of a region also seemed to affect the voting patterns of SIBFE deputies (in five votes), particularly of Siberian deputies (in eight votes). However, socio-economic situation also divided deputies from autonomous administrative units. The tendencies become clearer when the socio-economic performance and status of a region in the federal system are considered in combination. For instance, economic

features were rather more important in the vote on federal issues such as retention of the name of the Union ($F=6.3$, $p<0.001$) and the recognition of a declaration of sovereignty as an expression of the people's will ($F=10.8$, $p<0.001$), and economic issues such as Ryzhkov's plan ($F=4.2$, $p<0.001$). In those votes, difference emerged between adapted and stagnated administrative units, regardless of their federal status.

<Table 5.3.2> Influence of Socio-economic Features and Federal Status of a Region

	N	Mean	Std. Dev.		df	Mean Sq.	F	P
<u>Include the KKN Question on the Agenda of the Second Congress (X2)</u>								
Adapted regions	64	-6.3	7.2	Between Group	3	283.6	3.4	0.019
Stagnated regions	107	-7.0	6.8	Within Group	200	83.1		
Stagnated republics	17	-10.0	0.0					
Adapted republics	16	-2.5	10.0					
<u>Law on the Constitutional Supervision must be discussed in the Supreme Soviet First (X7)</u>								
Adapted regions	64	-4.8	7.8	Between Group	3	175.4	3.6	0.014
Stagnated regions	107	-7.0	6.6	Within Group	200	48.1		
Stagnated republics	17	-10.0	0.0					
Adapted republics	16	-3.8	8.9					
<u>Retention of the Name of the Union (Z2)</u>								
Adapted regions	63	-3.3	7.8	Between Group	3	277.2	6.3	0.000
Stagnated regions	106	-7.3	5.9	Within Group	198	43.7		
Stagnated republics	17	-8.8	3.3					
Adapted republics	16	-3.8	8.1					
<u>Recognise the Declaration of Sovereignty as an Expression of the People's Will (Z5)</u>								
Adapted regions	63	-1.1	7.9	Between Group	3	506.4	10.8	0.000
Stagnated regions	106	-5.9	6.7	Within Group	198	46.7		
Stagnated republics	17	-9.4	2.4					
Adapted republics	16	-1.3	6.2					
<u>Merging the Federal Council and the Presidential Council (Y3)</u>								
Adapted regions	64	-0.9	9.2	Between Group	3	596.6	7.3	0.000
Stagnated regions	107	-0.7	9.5	Within Group	200	81.3		
Stagnated republics	17	7.1	6.9					
Adapted republics	16	7.5	5.8					
<u>Ryzhkov's Plan (X5)</u>								
Adapted regions	64	-0.9	9.5	Between Group	3	314.7	4.2	0.007
Stagnated regions	107	-5.0	8.3	Within Group	200	75.1		
Stagnated republics	17	-7.6	6.6					
Adapted republics	16	-2.5	9.3					

According to these observations, the voting patterns of deputies were more significantly affected by the socio-economic conditions of regions than the status of the region they represented. Of course, it does not necessarily mean that the federal status

of a region could be ignored. On the contrary, the observation rather suggests that deputies were considering economic and political features of their regions. As the votes on the questions of KKN (X2) and the Federal Council (Y3) in Table 5.3.2 suggest, it is the political and economic feature of an issue in question that decided which factor should be put forward.

V. 3 (3) 'Class' Cleavages among SIBFE Deputies

Another factor that threatened the unity of the SIBFE deputy groups was the 'class' cleavage that has revealed in nine of the 17 votes. In general, nomenklaturists and military personnel formed a conservative bloc, and the intelligentsia and technicians formed a reformist group as in the CPD as a whole.

However, the voting patterns of cadres and workers from the SIBFE regions are noteworthy, as they were rather different from those of other Russian cadres and workers respectively. For instance, cadres from the SIBFE regions were less supportive of Gorbachev than cadres from other parts of Russia in the votes on Ryzhkov's plan, and the question of a strong presidency.⁸³ Furthermore, almost half the cadres from the SIBFE regions supported the proposal to include the question of no confidence in the president on the agenda of the Fourth Congress,⁸⁴ showing increasing dissatisfaction with the deteriorating economic situation in the regions. As already discussed at the Union level, the voting patterns of SIBFE cadres were quite different from those of nomenklaturists. SIBFE cadres were more supportive of the changes in the CPSU's leading role and federal system, and more strongly opposed to a strong presidency than nomenklaturists.⁸⁵ The voting patterns of SIBFE cadres suggest not only the diminishing influence of nomenklaturists on their deputies but also the possible intensifying of anti-centre tendencies in the regional leadership, as cadres often replaced old nomenklaturists in the course of reform.

Together with cadres, SIBFE workers also showed quite different voting patterns from workers from the European part of Russia, when the former voted in a more liberal way than the latter in every category of votes.⁸⁶ For instance, slightly more than half the SIBFE workers (55.8 per cent or $M=-1.9$) supported Ryzhkov's plan, while nearly 80 per cent of workers from the other part of Russia supported it. The voting patterns suggest that workers from the SIBFE regions were articulating their dissatisfaction with the central economic policy, reflecting deteriorating socio-economic conditions in the SIBFE regions. As a result of the rather liberal voting

patterns of SIBFE workers, compared to those of workers from other Russian regions, differences between workers and managers seldom appeared among the SIBFE deputy group.

Despite the similarity between managers and workers in the vote, however, managers were more attentive to the interests of their own regions, rather than those of the SIBFE regions as a whole. For instance, SIBFE managers showed rather similar voting patterns to managers from other Russian regions, although they were divided in terms of the regional economic feature of regions they represented.⁸⁷ By contrast, cadres and workers among SIBFE deputies were more attentive to the general interests of the SIBFE regions, rather than specific economic features of their own administrative units.⁸⁸ The voting patterns of cadres and workers showed that the coalition of some 'class' groups had been broken down by the regional factor, and thus had not always emerged on a cross-regional basis.

V. 3 (4) Other Cleavages among SIBFE Deputies

As suggested in Table 5.3.1, the influence of other factors was less important among SIBFE deputies. For instance, cleavages were seldom found when the gender factor, CPSU membership, educational level, ethnic origin of SIBFE deputies were considered. Among SIBFE deputies, the generation gap appeared relatively more frequently. The younger generation of deputies voted in a rather more liberal or less conservative way than the older generation in eleven votes: two votes on federal questions, three on presidential issues, two on economic issues and four on other political issues such as Article 6 and the selection of deputies from social organisations.⁸⁹

However, despite these general tendencies, it is noteworthy that a regional variation of the generation gap was also strongly revealed. First of all, deputies belonged to the older generation group from the SIBFE regions showed a rather more liberal or less conservative voting patterns than older deputies from the European part of Russia. Differences between them were revealed in seven votes: three votes on presidential issues,⁹⁰ one on economic issues,⁹¹ and three on other political issues.⁹² As a result, a generation gap less frequently emerged among the SIBFE deputies than among RSFSR deputies in the USSR CPD.

These regional variations of the generation gap were also evident among SIBFE deputies. For instance, the younger generation from rural and hub/gate regions showed rather similar voting patterns to older deputies from the same type of regions, particularly on federal issues.⁹³ As a result the generation gap almost disappeared in the rural and hub/gate deputy groups, making itself apparent in only two votes respectively. By contrast, the generation gap was found in six votes among deputies from resource regions. Despite the general assumption that the younger generation would show more liberal voting patterns than the older generation, the evidence suggests that the generation gap was powerfully affected by regional variations, depending on the issues that were put to the vote and the economic features of the region that deputies were represented.

V. 4. The Overall Effect of Regional Factors in the USSR CPD

According to the above analysis, deputies in the USSR CPD could be broken down by a number of factors. However, their influence on deputies' voting patterns overlapped. In order to identify individual variables that had a significant influence and the overall effect of regional factors, all variables were put into a model for each vote, employing logistic regression. For the analysis, the variables available are categorised into three groups: personal, functional, and regional factors.⁹⁴ The effect of regional factors on deputies' voting patterns will be examined by investigating the changes in the log likelihood when regional factors are added into a model in which other variables have already been included. Individual factors that turned out to have a significant impact on deputies' preference in each vote will be also discussed in order to identify the most important factors.

In the analysis, data availability and multicollinearity between variables caused a couple of practical problems. First, data for membership of parliamentary factions that had formed in the USSR CPD were not available. Thus, a factor that seemed to be significant could not be included in the analysis. Second, it is difficult to identify the regional origins of deputies representing social organisations. Furthermore, the economic features of regions in Union republics other than the RSFSR have been excluded, as regionalism in the Russian Federation constitutes the main focus of this analysis. Therefore, the Union republic groups and the autonomous status of a lower administrative unit are considered as regional factors in the analysis at the USSR Congress level. For the RSFSR deputy group, alternative regional deputy groups—

Siberian, Far Eastern, and other RSFSR deputies—are included in place of the Union republic groups. The economic features of regions are only considered when the voting patterns of SIBFE deputies are discussed (see Appendix 3.2).

The analysis shows that regional factors had a significant effect on deputies' voting patterns in some votes. However, the impact of regional factors on voting patterns varied from deputy group to deputy group, since different regional variables are considered. For instance, at the Congress level, regional factors influenced deputies' voting patterns particularly when federal questions and Ryzhkov's plan were put to the vote. By contrast, regional factors such as the SIBFE regional origin and the autonomous status of a region had little influence on the voting of RSFSR deputies on federal questions and on Article 6.

As far as SIBFE regionalism was concerned, the effect of regional factors were limited to a relatively small number of votes that might be related to common concerns—e.g. votes on Ryzhkov's plan and a Russian presidency—of the SIBFE regions (see Appendix 5.2). However, the analysis suggests that SIBFE deputies were also divided by gender, age, 'class' background, and the level of economic performance of the administrative unit they represented, as these factors more frequently appeared in models at a significance level of 0.05.

V. 4 (1) The Overall Influence of Regional Factors

In the USSR Congress, most of the factors included in the analysis had a significant influence, suggesting that deputies' voting patterns were personalised. In our models, almost every variable was of significance even when all the variables were added to a model. For instance, 'class' and Union republic group turned out to be meaningful in all the votes analysed. The analysis also shows that age and gender factors divided deputies in 16 and in 15 of the 17 votes respectively. The level of urbanisation of an electoral district where deputies had been elected, and CPSU membership also had significant explanatory power in thirteen and eleven votes respectively. Ethnic origin, on the other hand, had only a limited impact in seven votes.

Although almost every variable seemed to have a significant influence, the changes in the chi-square suggest that regional factors had a stronger effect than other variable groups in the Second Congress. For instance, the chi-square nearly doubled

after regional factors were added to the models for the vote on the KKN questions, on Ryzhkov's plan, and on Article 6. However, their influence decreased in the following Congresses, mainly because the Union republic groups such as the Baltic group abstained from voting after the Third Congress (see Appendix 5.1).

With regard to RSFSR deputies, a relatively low level of the correct expectation of votes suggests that models could be improved by adding faction membership and more specified regional factors. When we limit the discussion to the given factors, 'class' background, gender, age, and urban-rural origin had a significant effect in the vote.⁹⁵

Despite the influence of personal and functional factors, regional factors such as the federal status of a region and SIBFE regional origin still affected deputies' voting patterns, as they appeared in the final model of ten and six votes respectively. In particular, these regional factors improved the model fit by more than 10 per cent when they were added to models for the vote on economic, presidential and other issues. However, their influence was limited in more than half the votes analysed.

Although the overall effect of regional factors was relatively strong in votes that are included in Appendix 5.2, compared to other votes, it does not necessarily mean that SIBFE deputies were united in those votes. Among the votes listed in Appendix 5.2, SIBFE deputies were united in the vote on the proposal to abolish the selection of deputies representing social organisations. In the vote, 161 of 217 SIBFE deputies, or 74.2 per cent, voted in favour of the proposal (M=6.0). A model for this vote was considerably improved when regional variables were added. However, SIBFE deputies were divided when Zakharenko's amendment was put to the vote at the Third Congress. In the vote, 104 deputies, or 47.9 per cent, supported the amendment, while 88 deputies, or 40.6 per cent, voted against it (M=0.7).

V. 4 (2) Source of Weak Unity of SIBFE Deputies in the USSR CPD

The split among SIBFE deputies decreased their influence and thus that of the SIBFE regions over the decision-making process, despite their effort to coordinate activities in the Congress. In the USSR CPD, SIBFE deputies were divided by gender, age, 'class,' and the socio-economic conditions of a region that they represented,⁹⁶ although their influence varied depending on the vote. For instance, gender and 'class' factors had little impact on the vote on presidential and federal questions respectively.

<Table 5.4.1> Numbers of Votes in which Factors had Significant Overall Influence Among SIBFE Deputies in the USSR CPD

	Federal Issues (4 votes)	Presidential Issues (4 votes)	Economic Issues (3 votes)	Other Issues (6 votes)	Total (17 votes)
Personal & 'Azonal' Factors					
Gender	2 (1)	0 (0)	2 (0)	2 (1)	6 (2)
Age	2 (0)	2 (0)	2 (0)	3 (1)	9 (1)
Ethnic origin	0 (0)	0 (1)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (1)
Urbanity	0 (1)	0 (0)	2 (0)	0 (0)	2 (1)
Functional Factors					
'Class'	0 (0)	2 (0)	2 (0)	2 (0)	6 (0)
CPSU membership	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (0)	1 (0)
Regional Factors					
Siberia vs. FE	0 (0)	1 (0)	1 (0)	0 (0)	2 (0)
Economic structure ¹⁾	1 (0)	1 (1)	0 (0)	2 (0)	4 (1)
Economic performance ²⁾	1 (0)	3 (0)	1 (1)	1 (2)	6 (3)
Autonomous status ³⁾	0 (1)	1 (0)	0 (0)	1 (0)	2 (1)
Economic performance + Autonomous status ⁴⁾	n/a	1 (0)	1 (0)	1 (0)	3 (0)

¹⁾ excluded from three votes (one each on federal, presidential, and economic issue)

²⁾ excluded from six votes (three on federal issues and one each on other categories of votes)

³⁾ excluded from three votes (one each on presidential, economic and other issues)

⁴⁾ added to three votes in place two separate variables, economic performance & the autonomous status
Significance at the 0.05 (0.10 level).

Considering regional factors, the analysis leads us to a couple of conclusions. Firstly, an investigation of the changes in the chi-square of a model for each vote suggests that regional factors affected deputies' voting patterns in all categories of votes. In particular, regional factors brought about a significant improvement in the model for the vote on federal and presidential issues. Secondly, different regional features such as economic performance and structure, and federal status of a region affected deputies' voting patterns depending on the vote (see Appendix 5.3). It suggests that it would be difficult for SIBFE deputies to form a 'stable' voting bloc in the Congress. Finally, among regional factors, the level of economic performance of a region tended to have a considerable importance in nearly half the votes analysed, although it was combined with the federal status of a region (in three votes), because of multicollinearity.

Although details are not included in Table 5.4.1, functional variables as a whole had little effect on the deputies' voting patterns in votes in which the influence of regional factors was relatively strong.⁹⁷ In other votes, three variable groups appeared to have a similar degree of influence over deputies' votes.

All these results lead us to the following conclusions regarding the influence of regional factors on voting patterns in the USSR Congress. First of all, regional factors certainly made decision-making process more complicated, causing difficulties in adopting reform policies in the Congress. A clear example could be found in the regionalised voting patterns of Baltic and Central Asian deputies.⁹⁸ Regionally differentiated attitudes towards reform could be found also among the RSFSR deputies group, as the voting patterns of SIBFE deputies suggested. However, it is difficult to establish a direct linkage between regional interests and each vote included in the analysis.

Secondly, SIBFE deputies were segmented into smaller groups, although their voting patterns were different from those of other RSFSR deputies in some votes, for instance on Ryzhkov's plan and on Article 6. In particular, they were divided by features such as economic structure, the level of economic development or the living standards of the region they represented. Thus, we may conclude that SIBFE deputies were more loyal to the interests of their own regions than to those of the SIBFE region as a whole, particularly when those interests were in conflict.

Finally, the analysis suggests that SIBFE regionalism could be attributed to a couple of smaller regional groups sharing similar economic features. This does not necessarily mean that SIBFE regionalism based on planning regions—for instance, the Siberian Agreement and the Far Eastern Economic Coordination—had little meaning. Smaller regional groups had common problems and goals simply because of the Siberian or Far Eastern socio-economic setting, which sometimes united them in their votes. However, if we look at each of the smaller regional groups, SIBFE regionalism was operating even when SIBFE regionalism on a broad scale seemed to lose its influence. In the following chapter, a further examination of attitudes of smaller regional groups towards reform will be undertaken at the Russian Federation level as well as the SIBFE regional level.

¹) Ada W. Finifter and Ellen Mickiewicz, "Redefining the Political System of the USSR: Mass Support for Political Change," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 86, no. 4 (December 1992), pp. 857-874.

²) The agenda adopted by the Supreme Soviet included measures to improve the economic situation and the report of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, changes in the election system and a

necessary constitutional amendment, a draft law on the Constitutional Control in the USSR, and the question of organised crime. *Izvestia*, 14 November 1989, p. 1. However, the commission decided to exclude issues such as ownership, land, local autonomy, the press, and pensions which had already been approved by the Supreme Soviet, insisting that discussions of such issues in haste would result in serious mistakes.

³) Verkhovnyi Sovet SSSR, *Vtoroi s'ezd narodnykh deputatov SSSR, 12-24 dekabria 1989 g.: stenograficheskii otchet*, vol. I (Moscow: Izdanie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, 1989), pp. 22-23.

⁴) As already discussed, the CPSU was exposed to criticism, and Party membership had decreased in 1989 for the first time since 1954. Philip Hanson and Elizabeth Teague, "Soviet Communist Party Loses Members," *Report on the USSR*, vol. 2, no. 20 (18 May 1990), pp. 1-3. Furthermore, about 11,000 'independent' associations had already been established, and about 20 nationwide associations described themselves as 'political parties' by the late 1980s. *Glasnost*, no. 21 (1990), p. 3.

⁵) For instance, Mikhail Bronshtein, an economist from Estonia, criticised the government's agricultural programme, in which 0.8 per cent of increase in investment was proposed to increase every 1 per cent of agricultural production "without explaining the source of a sudden increase of agricultural productivity." See Mikhail Bronshtein's speech, in *Vtoroi s'ezd narodnykh deputatov SSSR*, vol. II, p. 272. Gennadi Filshin, department chief of the Institute of Economics and Organisation of Industrial Production, the USSR Academy of Sciences Siberian Department, raised another question. He suggested that investment in the consumer goods sector should be expanded from 4.3 per cent in the 12th FYP to at least 10-12 per cent in the 13th FYP to supply consumer goods properly. He also urged increasing the investment in social spending, criticising that the government plan to invest 35 per cent of government expenditure on the social sector was nothing but a return to the level of 1960s. For Filshin's speech, see *ibid.*, vol. III, p. 302.

⁶) Each group was responsible for following three topics: "Measures for the Recovery of the Soviet Economy," "Stages of the Reform," and "Fundamental Guidelines for Drafting the 13th FYP."

⁷) On the issue of electoral reforms, see Stephen White, Graeme Gill, and Darrell Slider, *The Politics of Transition: Shaping a Post-Soviet Future* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 34-38.

⁸) Similar laws were in preparation in Moldova, Belarus, and Ukraine. Only Kazakhstan adopted a law on elections in accordance with the Constitution of the USSR.

⁹) Giulietto Chiesa, *Transition to Democracy: Political Change in the Soviet Union 1987-1991* (Hanover and London: University Press of New England, 1992), p. 143.

¹⁰) According to a nationwide poll conducted by the All-Union Centre for the Study of Public Opinion, an absolute majority supported the changes, while far fewer favoured the guaranteed nomination. In particular, only 17.2 per cent of respondents in the RSFSR supported the existing selection procedure. *Obshchestvennoe mnenie v tsifrah*, no. 2 (September 1989), pp. 4-8, in Stephen White, *After Gorbachev* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 57.

¹¹) On behalf of Baltic deputies in the Congress and the Supreme Soviets of the Baltic republics, K. V. Moteka from Lithuania announced to the Congress that Baltic deputies were not in a position to take part in the discussion of the KKN question. *Vtoroi s'ezd narodnykh deputatov SSSR*, vol. III, p. 456.

¹²) Although Baltic deputies did not take part in the vote, the draft law was adopted with the support of 1,639 deputies while 137 deputies voted against. As for the law, see Zakon SSSR "O konstitutsionnom nadzore v SSSR," in *ibid.*, vol. IV, pp. 589-601.

¹³) For instance, the Lithuanian Communist Party declared its separation from the CPSU on December 1989, which soon followed by Estonian, Latvian, Armenian, and Georgian Communist Parties. Furthermore, the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania declared independence in March 1990, which soon followed by other Baltic republics. *Pravda*, 12 March 1990, p. 2.

¹⁴) Gorbachev might have a good reason to create the post of president as a leading state organ that was independent from the Communist Party, as there was a possibility that he could be removed from the General Secretaryship as Khrushchev had been. White, Gill and Slider, *The Politics of Transition*, p. 72.

¹⁵) Points 3 and 8 of Article 127 that included in Part II of the law on the President which added Chapter 15.1 to the Constitution. Zakon Soiuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik "Ob uchrezhenii posta prezidenta SSSR i vnesenii izmenenii i dopolnenii v konstitutsiiu (osnovnoi zakon) SSSR," in Verkhovnyi Sovet SSSR, *Vneocherednoi tretii s'ezd narodnykh deputatov SSSR, 12-15 marta 1990 g.: stenograficheskii otchet*, vol. III (Moscow: Izdanie Verkhovnogo Soveta, 1990), pp. 192-207.

¹⁶) A. I. Luk'ianov's speech at the Third Congress on 13 March 1990. *Ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 157-160.

¹⁷) In his interview with *Argumenty i fakty*, Eltsin suggested "strong republics" as a counterbalance to the presidency. *Argumenty i fakty*, no. 9 (3-9 March 1990), pp. 4-5. A. N. Iakovlev also did not oppose establishing a presidency, but advocated a strong Supreme Soviet as a counterbalance. *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, 13 March 1990, p. 3.

¹⁸) *Vneocherednoi tretii s'ezd narodnykh deputatov SSSR*, vol. I, pp. 391-392, 396-416.

¹⁹) In this context, V. V. Antanytis from Lithuania declared that they would not participate in the discussion or votes, speaking on behalf of Lithuania deputies and the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania. *Ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 120-122.

²⁰) He proposed following five pre-conditions for a new presidency: a new federal treaty that would guarantee sovereign rights of the union republics; the strong Supreme Soviet that would constitute a 'real' counter-balance against the power of the president, a multi-party system that would allow a competition for the post of the president; separation between the president and old nomenklatura that would prevent the CPSU and party conservatives from exerting influence on the president; and election of the president on the basis of direct, equal, and universal suffrage. *Ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 45-46.

²¹) In order to minimise such worries, the draft law clearly stated that the establishment of the post of president would not change the legal position of the Union republics and autonomous republics in its first section. Zakon Soiuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik "Ob uchrezhenii posta prezidenta SSSR," in *ibid.*, vol. III, pp. 192-193.

²²) Iakovlev insisted that a nationwide election would not only make the CPD "unnecessary" and "ineffective," but also hamper the CPD's power of a counterbalance to the President. *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 384. For Sobchak's speech, see *ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 376-378.

²³) *Postanovlenie s'ezda narodnykh deputatov Soiuz Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik "O povestke dnia chetvertogo s'ezda narodnykh deputatov SSSR," in Verkhovnyi Sovet SSSR, Chetvertyi s'ezd narodnykh deputatov SSSR, 17-27 dekabria 1990 g.: stenograficheskii otchet*, vol. III (Moscow: Izdanie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, 1991), pp. 303-304.

²⁴) He pointed out that a law adopted by the Supreme Soviet did not automatically annul a presidential decree, calling it "war of laws." *Ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 409-416, 411, 450.

²⁵) *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 452.

²⁶) *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 455.

²⁷) After a recess, the Editorial Commission decided to accept Kazannik's proposal. *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 477. The Congress adopted a revised version with the support of 1,543 deputies, while only 131 opposed it.

²⁸) The draft fixed a date for signing an interim agreement on economic questions for 1991, making it possible to draw up budgets of the Union and republics. *Postanovlenie s'ezda narodnogo deputatov Soiuz Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik "O polozhenii strany i pervoocherdnykh merakh po predoleniiu slozhivsheisia krizisnoi sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi i politicheskoi situatsii," in ibid.*, vol. III, pp. 307-311, 308.

²⁹) Eltsin's speech at the Fourth Congress on 19 December 1990, in *ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 294-298.

³⁰) Seven drafts were independently prepared by Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Kirgizstan, Turkmenia, and Tajikistan, two by the Institute of the State and Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences, three by the Interregional Group, and one by representatives of a group of political parties. See the speech of R. N. Nishanov, the Chairman of the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet, in *ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 340-341.

³¹) Iurii Afanas'ev, leader of the Interregional Deputies' Group, opposed the discussion of the draft. TASS, 15 December 1990, in *FBIS SOV 90-242* (17 December 1990), pp. 35-36.

³²) The committee consisted of the USSR President, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet, and the highest officials of the Union republics and autonomous entities. For the full text of the resolution, see *Postanovlenie s'ezda narodnogo deputatov Soiuz Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik "Ob obshchei kontseptsii novogo Soiuznogo Dogovora i poriadke ego zakliucheniia," in Chetvertyi s'ezd narodnykh deputatov SSSR*, vol. III, pp. 311-313.

³³) *Vtoroi s'ezd narodnykh deputatov SSSR*, vol. I, pp. 107-130.

³⁴) *Ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 136-186.

³⁵) *Chetvertyi s'ezd narodnykh deputatov SSSR*, vol. II, pp. 167-187.

³⁶) *Ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 386-407.

³⁷) The proposal was intended to prohibit the president from being a People's Deputy or a member of the leadership bodies of any political parties or public organisations, *Vneocherednoi tretii s'ezd narodnykh deputatov SSSR*, vol. I, pp. 395-416.

³⁸) Biser, Deputy Chairman of the Council of the Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet, proposed that the Council of Federation and the Presidential Council should be merged. *Ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 174-195.

³⁹) The amendment was to grant the CPD the right to appraise the activity of the president. *Ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 152-174.

⁴⁰) *Ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 387-408.

⁴¹) *Vtoroi s'ezd narodnykh deputatov SSSR*, vol. II, pp. 594-616.

⁴²) He urged all entities in economic management to sign contract for the delivery of output in the first six months of 1991. He also proposed that those who deny to sign contracts "be removed from their posts and that criminal charges be brought against them." *Chetvertyi s'ezd narodnykh deputatov SSSR*, vol. II, pp. 271-295.

⁴³) He proposed to add the following phrase to Article 3 of the resolution: "in order to avoid a further drop in production and a further decline in the people's standard of living, a moratorium on resolving collective labour disputes by means of strikes or refusals to work is to be declared for 1991." *Ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 316-337.

⁴⁴) One of the votes was on the question whether the issue should be included on the agenda of the Second Congress. *Vtoroi s'ezd narodnykh deputatov SSSR*, vol. I, pp. 40-63. The question of Article 6 was raised again when the Third Congress discussed part II of the draft law on Establishing a Presidency of the USSR. In the discussion, P. A. Akunov proposed to rephrase the words "the Communist Party of the USSR, and other political parties" by "all political parties," which failed to earn the two-thirds of support. *Vneocherednoi tretii s'ezd narodnykh deputatov SSSR*, vol. I, pp. 237-257.

⁴⁵) Firstly, the proposal to abolish the selection of deputies from social organisations was put to a vote. *Vtoroi s'ezd narodnykh deputatov SSSR*, vol. II, pp. 499-522. However, after the vote, another proposal, this time to maintain the representation of social organisations, was also raised and again put to the vote. *Ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 526-548. Both proposals were abandoned.

⁴⁶) Including the following phrase in Article 96 of the Constitution: "a person to whom applied forced medical treatment according to the law and a person who is recognised as incapacity by the court." *Vtoroi s'ezd narodnykh deputatov SSSR*, vol. III, pp. 182-204.

⁴⁷) *Chetvertyi s'ezd narodnykh deputatov SSSR*, vol. I, pp. 34-51.

⁴⁸) For instance, at the Fourth Congress in December 1990, deputies demanded to register deputy groups before the voting. In accordance with the demand, there were registered regional groups (the Interregional Deputies' group (229 deputies), and deputies from autonomous formations (229 deputies)), ideological groups (the Communists' group (730 deputies), the Social Democrats (19 deputies), the *Soiuz* group (561 deputies), the ecological deputies' group (220 deputies) and the Civic Society group (38 deputies)), functional groups (workers' group (more than 400 deputies) and the group of agrarian deputies

(431 deputies)), and other groups (the group of young deputies (125 deputies) and women deputies (*Zhizn'*, 216 deputies)). *Chetvertyi s'ezd narodnykh deputatov SSSR*, vol. II, pp. 421-422.

⁴⁹) Roughly ± 5.5 , ± 6.0 , and ± 7.0 points of mean score (M) appeared in Appendix tables indicate about 65 per cent, 75 per cent and more than 80 per cent of deputies in a particular group voted for or against respectively, although the proportion of deputies who abstained from voting may increase an error level in this way of reading. In general, a high level of unity in the thesis refer to a mean score of higher than 6 points in an absolute value ($M > |\pm 6.0|$). When a deputy group is described as "divided," it normally means its mean score is lower than 2 points in an absolute value ($M < |\pm 2.0|$). However, the reading is not relevant to describe the unity level of Baltic and Armenian deputies who did not take part in the vote and thus appeared to be divided, but were in fact strongly united.

⁵⁰) Deputies from rural area voted for the proposal to include the KKN question on the agenda ($M = -7.8$, $F = 25.3$, $p < 0.001$), and rejected the proposal to discussed the KKN question in the Supreme Soviet first ($M = -7.3$, $F = 16.7$, $p < 0.001$). A majority of rural deputies were again supported retention of the name of the Union ($M = -7.3$, $F = 21.5$, $p < 0.001$). In the votes, deputies from large cities scored -3.9, -5.2, and -4.3 respectively.

⁵¹) In the vote on Ryzhkov's plan, deputies from rural areas ($M = -7.7$) strongly supported the plan, while deputies from large ($M = -4.2$), medium-sized ($M = -4.1$), and small ($M = -4.5$) cities moderately supported it ($F = 24.3$, $p < 0.001$).

⁵²) For instance, in the vote on Akhunov's rewording on Article 6, deputies from small cities ($M = 2.9$) weakly supported the changes, while deputies from large ($M = 0.6$) and medium-sized ($M = 0.8$) cities were divided. In the vote, rural deputies ($M = -0.9$) were also divided, although they rejected the proposal ($F = 11.5$, $p < 0.001$).

⁵³) For instance, in the vote on the proposal to maintain the selection of deputies from social organisations, deputies from large cities ($M = 0.2$) and rural areas ($M = 0.6$) were divided, showing rather similar voting patterns, while deputies from medium-sized ($M = 2.1$) and small ($M = 3.3$) cities were moderately rejected it ($F = 12.8$, $p < 0.001$).

⁵⁴) For details, see Chiesa, *Transition to Democracy*, pp. 246-247 (Table 26-28).

⁵⁵) Sectoral differences among managers were observed in eight of 17 votes at the significant level of 0.05. However, among workers, sectoral differences were revealed in thirteen of 17 votes at the 0.05 level. In particular, significant differences at the 0.001 level were observed between industrial and agricultural workers in six votes (the two votes on Article 6, two on economic issues, and one on presidential issue and the electoral system respectively).

⁵⁶) For instance, a larger proportion of cadres (30.8 per cent, $M = -2.8$) supported the discussion of Article 6 at the Second Congress, while only 8.2 per cent of nomenklaturists ($M = -7.8$) supported it ($T = -7.2$, $p < 0.001$). In the vote on Prokhushev's proposal to prohibit the president from joining any political parties at the Third Congress, the former supported the proposal ($M = 2.8$), while the latter ($M = -4.3$) rejected it ($T = -8.5$, $p < 0.001$). At the Fourth Congress, cadres ($M = -5.9$) moderately supported retention of the name of the Union, while nomenklaturists ($M = -7.3$) strongly supported it ($T = -2.8$, $p < 0.01$).

⁵⁷) The question of strike could be a sensitive issue of a particular sector rather than a particular region. However, considering the 'socialist division of labour,' sectoral interests could easily developed into regional interests when the economic structure of a region was heavily dominated by a particular economic sector, as coal miners' strike in Kemerovo oblast suggests. In the vote, ten of fourteen deputies from Tiumen oblast including autonomous okrugs in the oblast, and eleven of fourteen deputies from Kemerovo oblast rejected the proposal to declare a moratorium on strikes.

⁵⁸) For instance, a large proportion of deputies who had completed a doctoral course ($M=-2.8$) were less supportive of retaining the name of the Union than those who had completed a candidate of science ($M=-4.2$), undergraduate ($M=-5.2$), or middle level ($M=-6.6$) of education ($F=19.5$, $p<0.001$). In the vote on Ryzhkov's plan, doctoral degree holders ($M=-2.8$) were less supportive of the plan than other deputy groups ($M=-3.5$, -4.9 , and -6.5 for those completed a candidate of science, undergraduate, or middle level of education respectively, $F=14.4$, $p<0.001$). However, in the vote on Article 6, differences in the voting patterns were more evident between doctoral degree holders ($M=2.1$) and those who completed a candidate of science ($M=-0.2$) than between the former and others of lower educational level ($F=2.8$, $p<0.05$).

⁵⁹) When deputies were divided into four groups such as Russians and non-Russians from Caucasus and Central Asian republics, Russian deputies from Caucasus voted in favour of the vote ($N=75$, $M=3.3$), while Russians from Central Asian republic ($N=16$, $M=-3.8$) opposed the proposal ($F=3.9$, $p<0.01$).

⁶⁰) For instance, a large proportion of non-Russian deputies from Central Asian republics ($N=286$, $M=-8.5$) voted in favour of Ryzhkov's plan than non-Russians from Caucasus ($N=200$, $M=-5.4$, $F=12.6$, $p<0.01$).

⁶¹) Nearly 60 per cent of non-CPSU members ($M=2.8$) supported the proposal to include the question of Article 6 on the agenda of the Second Congress, while only 35.7 per cent of party members ($M=-2.0$) supported the proposal ($T=-7.8$, $p<0.001$). In the vote on the Ryzhkov plan, only about the half the non-party members ($M=-2.3$) supported it, while more than 70 per cent of non-party members ($M=-5.3$) voted for the proposal ($T=-5.7$, $p<0.001$). Again less than half the non-CPSU members ($M=-2.6$) voted for the proposal to retain the name of the Union, while nearly 64 per cent of party members ($M=-5.6$) supported it ($T=-6.9$, $p<0.001$).

⁶²) More than 70 per cent of younger deputies ($M=5.5$) opposed the selection of deputies from social organisations, while 50.1 per cent of deputies more than 45 years old ($M=2.7$) supported it ($T=8.1$, $p<0.001$). Again when the Third Congress discussed Article 6, more than half the deputies of the younger generation ($M=2.8$) supported the changes in the leading role of the CPSU, while only 40.2 per cent of the older generation ($M=-0.5$) supported it ($T=8.2$, $p<0.001$).

⁶³) For instance, 281 female deputies or 80.1 per cent ($M=-6.9$) supported the proposal to include the question of the KKN on the agenda of the Second Congress, while 1318 male deputies or 69.7 per cent ($M=-4.9$) supported the proposal ($T=4.5$, $p<0.001$). The most striking difference between male and female deputies was revealed in the vote on Ryzhkov's plan. In the vote, 287 female deputies or 81.8 per cent ($M=-7.3$) supported the government programme, while only 66.1 per cent of male deputies ($M=-4.5$) favoured it ($T=6.1$, $p<0.001$).

⁶⁴) Viktor Iukechev, "Sibirskie deputaty: nakanune rossiiskogo s'ezda," *Sibirskaiia gazeta*, no. 20 (21-27 March 1990), p. 13.

⁶⁵) Such an effort had a limited success when Siberian deputies in the CPD of Russia adopted a resolution at the First Congress of the People's Deputies of Siberia in Krasnoiarsk in March 1992.

⁶⁶) SIBFE deputies were significantly different from deputies from the European part of Russia in their voting patterns in ten of the 17 votes. For instance, 75.1 per cent of SIBFE deputies ($M=5.7$) supported the proposal to prohibit the president from joining any political parties, while 63.4 per cent of other RSFSR deputies ($M=3.6$) supported it ($T=3.3$, $p<0.001$). In the vote on the proposal to merge the Federal Council and the Presidential Council, SIBFE deputies ($M=0.7$) supported the proposal, while 52.5 per cent of other deputies ($M=2.1$) opposed it ($T=4.2$, $p<0.001$).

⁶⁷) For instance, a larger proportion of SIBFE deputies (64.1 per cent, $M=3.4$) than deputies from the European part of Russia (52.3 per cent, $M=1.2$) supported the re-wording of Article 6 proposed by Prokushev at the Third Congress ($T=3.0$, $p<0.01$).

⁶⁸) Again 74.2 per cent of SIBFE deputies ($M=6.0$) supported the proposal to abolish the selection of deputies from social organisations, while 62.2 per cent of deputies from the European part of Russia ($M=3.9$) supported it ($T=3.4$, $p<0.001$).

⁶⁹) For instance, a larger proportion of SIBFE deputies (28.6 per cent, $M=3.5$) voted against the Ryzhkov plan than other RSFSR deputies (19.1 per cent, $M=5.1$, $T=2.6$, $p<0.01$). SIBFE deputies were again less supportive of Gorbachev in the vote on the proposal to include the question of no confidence in the president on the agenda of the Fourth Congress. In the vote, nearly 30 per cent of SIBFE deputies ($M=2.5$) supported the proposal, while 22.9 per cent of deputies from the European part of Russia ($M=3.8$) supported it ($T=2.1$, $p<0.05$).

⁷⁰) As already discussed in Chapter 2, Gorbachev's economic policy that emphasised the efficient use of resources and industrial capital was often regarded as a sign of a shift of investment priority from the eastern region to the European part of Russia. Theodore Shabad, "The Gorbachev Economic Policy: Is the USSR Turning Away from Siberian Development?" in Alan Wood and R. F. French (eds.), *The Development of Siberia: People and Resources* (London: Macmillan, 1989), pp. 256-260.

⁷¹) For instance, 110 deputies from autonomous republics and lower level of autonomous regions made a statement at the Third Congress, showing their own interests in the question of a new federal treaty and a new Constitution. In the statement, which delivered by S. N. Khadzhiev from Chechen-Ingushetiia, they demanded that a new Constitution should guarantee the right of self-determination and that the first president must express his opinion about the question of the right of people in autonomous formations to determine their political status.

⁷²) For instance, in the vote on Ryzhkov's plan, an absolute majority of deputies from rural area (33 deputies or 80.5 per cent, $M=6.8$) supported it. By contrast, a larger proportion of deputies from medium-sized (17 deputies or 36.2 per cent, $M=1.5$) and small cities (21 deputies or 36.8 per cent, $M=2.1$) rejected it ($F=3.2$, $p<0.05$).

⁷³) In the vote on the proposal to introduce a legal measure to accelerate the implementation of delivery of goods, deputies from large cities showed strong support for it (50 deputies or 75.8 per cent,

M=-7.0), while others from medium-sized (59.6 per cent, M=-4.5) and small cities (56.1 per cent, M=-3.0), and rural areas (57.5 per cent, M=-3.5) showed a relatively weak support ($F=3.3$, $p<0.05$).

⁷⁴) For instance, when the proposal to rephrase Article 6 was put to the vote at the Third Congress, deputies from rural regions (M=-1.3) as a whole opposed the proposal, while deputies from resource (M=4.6) and hub/gate (M=5.3) regions supported it (M=3.8, $p<0.05$).

⁷⁵) Deputies from resource regions (M=-2.8) were less supportive of retaining the name of the Union than deputies from other regions such as rural regions (M=-9.0), and hub/gate regions (M=-7.6, $F=8.7$, $p<0.001$). A larger proportion of the former deputy group (M=-1.4) also supported the proposal to recognise the declaration of sovereignty of republics as an expression of the people's will, than deputies from rural (M=-9.0), hub/gate (M=-5.3), and residual (M=-4.9) regions ($F=9.4$, $p<0.001$).

⁷⁶) For instance, in the vote on Ryzhkov's plan, a majority of deputies from rural (27 deputies or 87.1 per cent, M=-7.4), hub/gate regions (26 deputies or 76.2 per cent, M=-5.6), and residual (50 deputies or 62.5 per cent, M=-3.5 per cent) supported the plan. By contrast, only 34 deputies or 47.2 per cent of deputies from resource regions (M=-0.7) voted for it ($F=5.2$, $p<0.01$).

⁷⁷) In the analysis at the SIBFE level, four deputies from Kamchatka (which is categorised as a moderately developed region) are excluded, and therefore differences were examined among four regional groups: highly developed, well-developed, under-developed, and poorly developed regions. The regional groups showed similar voting patterns in only four votes: three votes on other political issues and one on the proposal to merge the Federal Council and the Presidential Council.

⁷⁸) In the vote, 90.7 per cent of deputies from highly developed regions (M=9.2) rejected the programme, while a majority of deputies from well-developed (60.3 per cent, M=-3.1), under-developed (70.5 per cent, M=-4.4), and poorly developed (81.4 per cent, M=-6.9) regions supported it ($F=13.5$, $p<0.001$).

⁷⁹) Again deputies from highly developed regions (100 per cent, M=10.0) strongly supported the proposal, while only 55.9 per cent of deputies from poorly developed regions (M=1.5) voted for the proposal ($F=8.3$, $p<0.001$). In the vote, deputies from well-developed (80.9 per cent, M=7.1) and under-developed (80.3 per cent, M=6.7) regions showed a rather similar voting patterns.

⁸⁰) For instance, in the vote on Akhunov's proposal to rephrase Article 6, deputies from highly developed regions again unanimously supported it (100 per cent, M=10.0). By contrast, deputies from poorly developed regions (M=-0.5) voted against the proposal ($F=5.9$, $p<0.001$). Again, in the vote on the proposal to maintain the selection of deputies from social organisations, the former (83.3 per cent, M=8.3) rejected it, while the latter (M=-0.3) were divided ($F=6.3$, $p<0.001$).

⁸¹) For instance, deputies from highly and poorly developed regions that would show conflicting attitudes towards reform, consisted 42.8 per cent (12 deputies from or 7.9 per cent from highly developed region (Tiumen oblast), and 53 deputies or 34.9 per cent from poorly developed regions) of Siberian deputies. However, no regions in the Russian Far East were categorised as highly developed regions, although deputies from poorly developed regions accounted for 11.5 per cent of Far Eastern deputies. Cross-tabulation analysis suggests that the Siberian and Far Eastern deputy groups were significantly different in their composition in this aspect ($X^2=28.1$, $df=4$, $p<0.001$).

⁸²) In five votes, deputies from under-developed regions in the Russian Far East voted in a different way from those from under-developed regions in Siberia. For instance, in the vote on Akhunov's proposal on Article 6, the former group (M=8.3) strongly supported the proposal, while the latter (M=2.1) weakly supported it (T=-2.8, p<0.01). More striking differences were revealed in the vote on the proposal to merge the Federal Council and the Presidential Council when the former group (M=4.8) voted for it, while the latter group (M=-2.9) voted against it (T=-3.2, p<0.01). Again in the Fourth Congress, deputies from under-developed regions in the Far East (M=0.9) were divided, but rejected the proposal to declare a moratorium on strikes, while Siberian deputies from the same category of regions (M=-6.3) strongly supported the idea (T=-3.8, p<0.001).

⁸³) In the vote on Ryzhkov's plan, a larger proportion of SIBFE cadres (21.7 per cent or M=-4.3) voted against the plan than cadres from the other part of Russia (8.6 per cent or M=-7.8, T=-2.1, p<0.05). At the Third Congress, SIBFE cadres (M=-0.9) were divided in the vote on the proposal to appraise the activities of the president annually. By contrast, cadres from the European part of Russian (M=-6.9) voted against the proposal (T=-3.1, p<0.01).

⁸⁴) In the vote, almost half the cadres from the SIBFE regions (47.8 per cent or M=-2.2) supported proposal, while a majority of cadres from the European part of Russia (78.9 per cent or M=6.7) rejected it (T=4.8, p<0.001).

⁸⁵) For instance, a larger proportion of cadres supported the abolition of the CPSU's leading role (56.5 per cent or M=1.3), while nomenklaturists (73.3 per cent or M=-6.0) still wanted to maintain the role (T=-2.4, p<0.05). In the vote on the proposal to accept the declaration of sovereignty of the union republics as an expression of the people's will, a smaller proportion of cadres (56.5 per cent or M=-3.5) rejected the proposal than nomenklaturists (86.7 per cent or M=-8.7, T=-2.3, p<0.05). A striking difference was also revealed in the vote on the proposal to prohibit the president from joining any political party. In the vote, a majority of cadres (78.3 per cent or M=5.7) supported the proposal, while a majority of nomenklaturists (73.3 per cent or M=-6.7) rejected it (T=-4.9, p<0.001).

⁸⁶) Differences between SIBFE workers and those from the European part of Russia in their voting patterns were revealed in six votes: 2 votes on federal and presidential issues respectively, and one on economic and other political issues respectively.

⁸⁷) Differences among manager groups from rural, resource, hub/gate and residual regions were revealed among nine votes. For instance, managers from resource regions were more supportive of the changes in the union system when they were divided (M=-0.7) in the vote on the proposal to retain the name of the union. By contrast, managers from other category of regions—rural (M=-8.6), hub/gate (M=-7.5), and resource (M=-8.5) regions—strongly supported it (F=6.0, p<0.001). In the vote on the proposal to introduce legal measure against the failure of agreed deliveries, a relatively larger numbers of hub/gate managers (M=-0.4) supported the proposal, while managers from rural (M=-8.2), resources (M=-6.1) and residual (M=-7.7) regions strongly opposed it (F=3.3, p<0.05).

⁸⁸) For instance, the voting patterns of SIBFE workers were different from the same categories of deputies from outside of the SIBFE regions in half the votes analysed as discussed. However, differences were not revealed among SIBFE workers when they were categorised into rural, resource, hub/gate, and residual regional groups.

⁸⁹) For instance, the younger generation were less supportive of the proposal to retain the name of the Union ($M=-4.2$, $T=2.6$, $p<0.001$), Ryzhkov's plan ($M=-1.7$, $T=2.7$, $p<0.01$), and the leading role of the CPSU ($M=2.2$ and 5.4 , $T=3.8$ and 3.2 , $p<0.001$ respectively) than the older generation ($M=-7.1$, -5.0 , -2.6 and 1.5 respectively).

⁹⁰) For instance, the younger generation of deputies from the SIBFE regions ($M=4.4$) were more supportive of the proposal to prohibit the president to join a political party than those from the European part of Russia ($M=1.9$, $T=-2.6$, $p<0.01$).

⁹¹) In the vote on the proposal to declare a moratorium on strikes, SIBFE deputies who were older than 45 years ($M=1.2$) voted for the proposal while the same category of deputies from the European part of Russia ($M=1.2$) rejected it ($T=2.7$, $p<0.01$).

⁹²) The older generation of deputies from SIBFE regions ($M=4.6$) were more supportive of changes in the deputy selection procedures than those from the European part of Russia ($M=2.4$, $T=2.5$, $p<0.05$). In the vote on the proposal to include the question of no confidence in the president on the agenda of the Fourth Congress, they ($M=2.9$) showed rather similar voting patterns to those of younger deputies from the SIBFE regions ($M=2.0$), and thus less supportive of Gorbachev's position than the older generation from the European part of Russia ($M=5.3$, $T=3.0$, $p<0.01$).

⁹³) Difference among younger deputies from rural, resource, hub/gate and residual regions were revealed in seven votes: four votes on federal issues, each one vote on presidential, economic, and other political issues. For instance, younger deputies from resource regions ($M=-1.1$) were divided in the vote on the proposal to retain the name of the Union, while a majority of younger deputies from rural ($M=-8.6$) and hub/gate ($M=-6.2$) regions supported it ($F=4.3$, $p<0.01$). Again in the vote on Ryzhkov's plan, the former group ($M=2.1$) rejected the plan, while the latter groups ($M=-5.7$ and -5.4 respectively) supported it ($F=4.0$, $p<0.01$).

⁹⁴) Personal factors include gender, age, and ethnic origin. The level of urbanisation in terms of the size of urban population, 'azonal' factor, is grouped together with personal factors, as it is regarded as a cross-regional factor. A. V. Berezkin, V. A. Kolosov, M. E. Pavlovskaja, N. V. Petrov, and L. V. Smirniagin, "The Geography of the USSR Elections of People's Deputies of the USSR (Preliminary Results)," *Soviet Geography*, vol. XXX, no. 8 (October 1989), pp. 628-629. 'Class' background and CPSU membership make up the functional variables. Finally, the Union republic groups, the autonomous status, and regional groups based on regional economic features are regarded as regional factors. Because of multicollinearity, some regional factors are removed or replaced by other regional variables. For instance, high multicollinearity is found between the regional group based on economic performance and the regional group based on economic structure in some votes. In that case, the variable which results in higher model chi-square is put to a model. A level of economic performance and the federal status of a region will be separately put to a model at the cost of the integrated variable that formed combining these two variables, unless the latter variable increases model chi-square value significantly.

⁹⁵) At the significance level of 0.05, the 'class' factor was included in the model of 16 votes, age in 15 models, gender in 14 models and urbanity in 13 models. By contrast, ethnicity had significant meanings in only two votes, and the CPSU membership in eight votes.

⁹⁶) Among these variables, the gender factor seemed to have little significance when it was separately discussed with the results of the Anova analysis as differences between male and female deputies were seldom found among SIBFE deputies.

⁹⁷) In the model for the vote on the KKN questions (X2 and X7), on Zakharenko's amendment (Y3), and on the deputy selection questions (X4), functional factors did not appear to improve the models significantly.

⁹⁸) For instance, Central Asian deputies strongly opposed the proposal to include Article 6 on the agenda of the Second Congress. In the vote, 81.9 per cent of Central Asian deputies, or 298 deputies, voted against the proposal. By contrast, 81.6 per cent of Baltic deputies, or 129 deputies, supported it.

CHAPTER VI

SIBFE Deputies in the CPD of Russia

The influence of the regions in the Congress of People's Deputies (CPD) of Russia that was operating during 1990-1993 had particular importance to the development of centre-periphery relations. During the period, the structural basis of current centre-periphery relations was formed. Furthermore, the CPD was supposed to have supreme authority in the central decision-making, although presidential decrees often bypassed the CPD in practice. Decisions of the CPD on reform measures had a different impact on regional socio-economic conditions, demarcating 'winner' and 'loser' regions. Accordingly, the regions tried to increase their influence over the decision-making process.

However, the increasing influence of the regions did not necessarily mean that the influence of regional associations had increased as much as it could have done. Although most regions were engaged in regional associations in one way or another, regional associations themselves had their own limits in coordinating the activities of their member regions. In the course of reform, the gap between regions in terms of living standards was rather wider than in the Soviet period, as Dmitrieva has observed.¹ As a result, the member regions' attitudes towards reform had been differentiated, which weakened the unity of regional associations. When we limit discussion of the question to the Congress level, only a handful of leading political figures who were more attentive to regional interests in the USSR Congress—for instance, members of the Interregional Deputies' group—reappeared in the Russian Congress.² Furthermore, 'primitive' party politics emerged in the Russian Congress in the form of political factions and blocs. Despite fluctuating membership and the lack of an agreement on critical issues among members, a cross-regional feature of political factions or blocs hampered the unity of regional deputy groups in the Congress.

In this chapter, a more detailed discussion of deputies' voting patterns will be undertaken in order to examine the influence of the regions in the central legislature.

The availability of data on faction membership and the regional origin of deputies makes it possible not only to employ new variables—political factions and regional association groups—in the analysis, but also to examine the influence of the socio-economic features of regions on the decision-making process at the federal level.

The analysis draws attention to some features that appeared in the Russian CPD in the early 1990s. In general, deputies' voting patterns were rather personalised. However, among those factors included in the analysis, political faction and bloc membership—particularly the Coalition for Reform (*Koalitsiia reform*: CR) and Russian Unity (*Rossiiskoe edinstvo*: RU)—appeared to have a strong influence on the voting patterns of deputies, after the Fifth Congress. Secondly, despite the increasing influence of political blocs, regional socio-economic features still had a significant influence over the central decision-making process, although it was rather dependent on the characteristics of the question that was put to a vote. Thirdly, the peculiar voting patterns of SIBFE deputies, particularly those of cadres, suggested that general socio-economic conditions of the SIBFE regions affected SIBFE deputies' attitudes towards reform. However, an increasing number of deputies tended to be more loyal to the interests of their own region rather than those of regional associations, particularly when the issues became more specific. These observations lead us to conclude that regional influence was more likely to be based on the smaller regional groups than on the regional associations.

VI. 1. The Political Atmosphere in the CPD of Russia

In the aftermath of the election in 1990, the CPD of Russia had been convened nine times before President Boris Eltsin dissolved it in September 1993. The period from 1990 to 1993 may best be characterised as a transition period in Russia. During the period, it was all but inevitable that there would be power struggles among political leaders, or competence struggles among state organs, since a new political and socio-economic order was being introduced in Russia.

In the Congress, deputies were divided into blocs supporting 'market' or 'socialist market' relations in discussions of the economic system. In relation to the Soviet Union, deputies were again split into the 'unionist' group who supported maintaining the Union and the Russian 'nationalist' group who supported secession from the Union. Confrontations also emerged over the issue of the separation of

powers: one group of deputies advocated a 'presidential republic' and another favoured a 'parliamentary republic.' Another issue on which deputies were divided was the relationship between centre and administrative peripheries. Deputies who favoured decentralisation hoped to secure more powers in the local authorities' domain and to give the local legislatures supremacy over the central legislature, particularly on the issue of local interests.

Based on the issues discussed at each Congress and confrontations between deputies, the transitional period can be divided into three stages: the initial confrontation stage (May 1990-May 1991), the intensified confrontation stage (June 1991-November 1992), and the paralysing stage (December 1992-September 1993).¹ The first stage covers the first four Congresses. During this stage, the Soviet Union collapsed and the law on establishing a Russian presidency was adopted. The second stage could be characterised as the 'rule of presidential decrees.' During this stage, a competence struggle broke out between legislative and executive branches. The last stage started with the Seventh Congress of December 1992 when Eltsin's emergency powers were due to expire. At this stage, the adoption of a new constitution that would change the state structure became the main issue. However, the competence struggle between legislative and executive branches reached a deadlock at the final stage of confrontation, and eventually caused the dissolution of the CPD itself. During these confrontations, both sides failed to gain enough support to dominate the Russian CPD, causing delays in adopting critical decisions and becoming a major obstacle to the political and economic reform.⁴

VI. 1 (1) The Initial Stage of Confrontation (May 1990-May 1991)

During the first stage, the confrontation of deputies was mainly related to the introduction of a 'new' political and economic system at the RSFSR level. The First Congress in May-June 1990 was devoted to organising the state structure by electing the chairman of the Supreme Soviet and the Presidium. In the Congress, the tensions between deputy blocs developed into confrontations between the right and left wings. Eltsin won the first round of confrontation, being elected as chairman of the Supreme Soviet in May 1990.

However, after the First Congress, Eltsin sought stronger powers as he was faced with a two-tier opposition: not only from the Union government led by Gorbachev but also from conservatives within Russia. He therefore proposed to reorganise the

Russian government by introducing a presidency of the RSFSR at the Second Congress in November-December 1990.

The idea of a Russian presidency was added to the referendum on the question of maintaining the Soviet Union on 17 March 1991 that had been initiated by President Gorbachev. A majority of the voters in Russia voted in favour of the presidency,⁵ and therefore it became a main issue at the Third Congress in March 1991. However, as the Third Congress decided to postpone discussing the issue to the following Congress,⁶ Eltsin pursued a strong leadership by strengthening the power of the Supreme Soviet and its chairman. He proposed that additional powers be provided to the chairman of the Supreme Soviet until the following Congress "in order to ensure conditions for implementing the Congress' decisions to overcome the socio-economic crisis."⁷ The Fourth Congress adopted a law on the presidency in May 1991, and based upon the law, Eltsin was elected president of the RSFSR in June 1991.⁸

At the Congress, deputies particularly criticised Eltsin's economic policies. During this first stage of confrontation, land reform was one of the most contentious economic issues. At the Congress, Eltsin raised the question of private land ownership, which faced strong resistance among deputies, particularly from the countryside.⁹ Expecting resistance from the conservatives, Eltsin maintained that peasants would be free to choose among five types of land ownership—collective, cooperative-collective, cooperative, state and private—and that the sale of land would be restricted.¹⁰ The Second Congress eventually adopted Sergei Shakhrai's amendment, which included private ownership and a ten-year moratorium on the purchase and sale of the land.¹¹ However, the Congress failed to adopt other amendments to Articles 11 and 12 of the Constitution, which regulated land ownership.

At the Third Congress, conservatives launched an attack on the economic performance of Eltsin's economic team, blaming Eltsin himself for the economic crisis. Reflecting growing dissatisfaction with his economic policies, M. M. Zakharov and V. V. Kalashnikov proposed that the Russian leadership's work be classified as unsatisfactory in the resolution of the Congress on the political and economic situation in the RSFSR.¹² However, the majority of deputies, including some conservatives, still supported Eltsin, and rejected the proposal.

Another issue that divided deputies in this first stage of confrontation was the relation with the Union government led by Gorbachev. At the Second Congress, the issue of the Union Treaty proposed by Gorbachev sparked a debate. Eltsin opposed a

discussion of this issue at the Congress and urged deputies to concentrate on the agricultural issue for which the Congress had been convened.¹³ Although the issue was still on the agenda in the Third and Fourth Congresses, Eltsin gained majority support for his position on the Union Treaty as it became clear that the Union would dissolve into at most a sort of weak confederation.¹⁴

VI. 1 (2) The Intensification of Confrontation (June 1991-November 1992)

During the second stage of confrontation, two main conflicting blocs were formed in line with their views on the economic system and institutional power bases. At one end, Eltsin led the reformist bloc and launched the 'Shatalin' or '500-day plan,' aiming at a rapid transition to market relations. At the other end, the opposition was led by Ruslan Khasbulatov, who had been elected chairman of the Supreme Soviet in October 1991 and was seeking to control the reform process by restricting the powers of the president and by controlling the government.¹⁵

Faced with opposition, Eltsin introduced a draft Constitution which strengthened the president's power over the government and the local authorities, establishing a streamlined executive hierarchy. However, the Fifth Congress refused to discuss the adopting of a new Constitution, regarding it as a question that could destabilise the political situation in Russia. Accordingly, Eltsin sought extra-constitutional solutions. On the one hand, he accelerated the process of concluding the Federal Treaty. On the other, he asked the Congress for broad emergency powers. Two resolutions of the Congress endowed him with powers to reorganise higher executive organs "independently" until the adoption of a law on the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR,¹⁶ and to issue presidential decrees.¹⁷

The confrontation between executive and legislative branches intensified at the Sixth Congress in April 1992. The Sixth Congress started with the proposal of a vote of no confidence in the government, although it failed to gain majority support.¹⁸ The Congress again classified the work of the Council of Ministers and the Central Bank as unsatisfactory. It also requested the government to expand expenditure in the social sector, to cut taxes, to refine price policy, and to maintain control over prices for fuel and power resources.¹⁹ Furthermore, the opposition bloc tried to limit presidential power over the government by relieving Eltsin from his duties as head of the government and removing the additional powers that had been granted by the Fifth Congress.²⁰

Despite the adoption of the resolution "On the Course of Economic Reform," Eltsin managed to include his proposal on the separation of the executive and legislative powers in the resolution, thus prohibiting the Supreme Soviet from interfering in the operational and economic activities of the government.²¹ Furthermore, the opposition bloc failed to include the resolution of the Congress, particularly on the control over the government,²² in the Constitution. However, neither side seemed to win the confrontation as the presidential decree on the right to sell land plots that was promulgated in March 1992 also failed to be endorsed.²³

The gap between Eltsin and Khasbulatov on relations between executive and legislative branches widened at the Sixth Congress. In his draft law on the government, Eltsin favoured a presidential system in which the government was accountable to the president rather than to the Congress, and was organised by the president.²⁴ However, Khasbulatov, on the other hand, emphasised that the government should have its own head who should be accountable to the parliament rather than to the president.²⁵ These differences constituted a solid basis for the confrontation between them in the following Congress.

VI. 1 (3) The Stalemate in the Congress (December 1992-September 1993)

At this stage, the differences in the positions between legislative and executive branches resulted in a deadlock at the Congress. Accordingly, the president sought a breakthrough by directly appealing to the people. Basically, he preferred to adopt a new Constitution that would strengthen presidential power. Furthermore, he began to assert that it should be prepared by authorities other than the Supreme Soviet or its commission and adopted by referendum rather than by the CPD, particularly after the Seventh Congress.²⁶

The Seventh Congress that convened on 1 December 1992 was a critical Congress for both sides. The emergency powers of the president that had been granted by the Fifth Congress would expire on 1 December 1992. Furthermore, decisions made by the Congress would affect not only the content of the new Constitution and the procedure by which it would be adopted but also the fate of the Congress itself. Recognising the importance of the Seventh Congress, Eltsin proposed to postpone it until 1 March or April 1993 at the All-Russia Conference of Heads of Representatives and Executive Bodies of Power on 11 September 1992 in Cheboksary. He insisted that it would take some time to prepare a draft Constitution since "special features of

Russia's political and socio-economic situations" should be reflected in it.²⁷ However, in fact, he hoped to save some time to shift the power balance in the Congress in a manner favourable to him.²⁸ Between the Sixth and Seventh Congresses, he employed various measures to win the support of economic and regional groups, and of political factions, for his proposal.²⁹

The Seventh Congress started with an 'agenda battle' as before, and went on to discuss economic and political issues. Regarding the economic issue, the Congress ruled that the government had implemented the resolution of the Sixth Congress unsatisfactorily. It had also instructed the government to submit a new programme within a month, giving priority to solving the fundamental social problems of citizens.³⁰ However, the Seventh Congress concentrated on the constitutional issue. It considered a total of 338 amendments of and additions to the Constitution. In particular, the amendments and additions that regulated the powers of the Supreme Soviet, the president, and the Council of Ministers became controversial. Presidential powers were critically weakened, as they would be suspended immediately if the president tried to change the national state structure or to dissolve or to suspend any legally elected bodies of state power.³¹ Regarding the government, the Congress agreed that it should be accountable not only the Congress and the president but also to the Supreme Soviet.³²

As neither side won two-thirds support on the critical points of the constitutional amendments,³³ compromises between legislative and executive power were suggested, but in vain.³⁴ In response to the opposition of Khasbulatov's bloc, Eltsin proposed to hold a referendum and early elections for the Congress, complaining that it had caused a serious danger by unleashing a "powerful attack against the course being pursued by the president and government."³⁵ Upon such criticism, Khasbulatov offered his resignation. The Congress rejected both proposals.

As the Congress faced stalemate, Valerii Zor'kin, the Chairman of the Constitutional Court, offered a compromise. Based upon Zor'kin's proposal, the Congress adopted a resolution in which a referendum was scheduled for 14 April 1993, and the constitutional amendments that the Congress had already adopted were suspended.³⁶ As a result of this compromise, Eltsin managed to escape serious damage to his powers, although the speed of economic reform might have been slowed down when he chose Viktor Chernomyrdin as Chairman of the Council of Ministers to win the support of the Congress.

However, the compromise between Khasbulatov's and Eltsin's blocs in the Seventh Congress did not last long. After the Seventh Congress, Eltsin urged the adoption of a new Constitution and the holding of a Congress to ratify it. Regarding the Constitution, Eltsin underlined a clear demarcation of powers between legislative and executive bodies. But at the same time he cast a sceptical eye on the Congress as a system of the past Soviet era, blaming it for political tensions. He therefore suggested holding early elections for the CPD and the president, and to form a Constitutional Assembly to adopt a new Constitution.³⁷

In order to discuss its countermeasures against Eltsin's move, the Eighth Congress was convened on 10 March 1993. In his report, N. Riabov, the Chairman of the Council of the Republics of the Supreme Soviet, insisted that decision of the Seventh Congress to hold a referendum was a "mistake" and urged that the resolution of the Seventh Congress "On the Stabilisation of the Constitutional System" be nullified.³⁸ Against this, Eltsin also submitted a draft resolution that would grant government the power to develop and implement an anti-crisis programme in the socio-economic sector. As a compromise, he accepted that the Central Bank and some other banks could be under the control of the Supreme Soviet. The president also proposed to declare a moratorium on the legislative activity of the Supreme Soviet, which would change relations between legislative and executive branches.³⁹ In drafting the final version of the resolution, the Congress approved the president's proposal to endow the government with expanded power, even to control the Central Bank. However, the Congress nullified the resolution of the Seventh Congress "On the Stabilisation of the Constitutional System," and thus freed the government from the president's control.⁴⁰ Furthermore, it reversed its decision to hold a referendum, reallocating the funds for the soldiers who were returning from the East European countries.⁴¹

Upon this move, Eltsin issued a decree on 24 March 1993 to the effect that a referendum would be held on 25 April 1993 on the questions of a confidence in the president, the draft Constitution and the law on the elections of the federal parliament. In his decree, he declared that decisions aimed at suspending presidential decrees and orders had, without the ruling of the Constitutional Court, no legal force.⁴² He also issued another decree to set up the vertical subordination of the local executive bodies to the president.⁴³ His aim was clearly to establish a "special form of administration," the phrase used in his expression in his televised speech on 20 March 1993.⁴⁴

The Congress hurriedly convened again to deal with the new situation. The Congress first tried to impeach the president. When the attempted failed, Zor'kin

initiated another compromise, urging the both sides to abide by the principle of the separation of powers and to declare a moratorium on changes to the Constitution at the Ninth Congress.⁴⁵ However, the Congress did not accept the compromise and adopted a resolution that blamed the president for the existing confrontation. The Congress also urged the president and chairman of the Council of Ministers to form a coalition government,⁴⁶ a sign that the confrontation was out of control. The Congress finally decided to hold a referendum scheduled on 25 April 1993.

As the result of the referendum was favourable to Eltsin,⁴⁷ he took the initiative to shift the power balance between legislative and executive branches. He made a double-tiered approach to adopt a new Constitution that would grant him more power. On one hand, Eltsin convened a Constitutional Conference in June 1993, at which he hoped to sharply reduce the influence of the Supreme Soviet over the drafting of a new Constitution.⁴⁸ On the other hand, he proposed to establish a Council of the Federation, consisting of 178 members—2 deputies from each 89 federal subject—to win support of regional leaders, particularly on the question of federal structure.⁴⁹

Despite all these moves, the Supreme Soviet still posed an obstacle to the implementation of economic reform in general and to the adoption of a new Constitution. Finally, Eltsin dissolved the parliament on 21 September 1993, moving to another stage in the prolonged confrontation between the president and the parliament.

VI. 1 (4) Roll-call votes analysed

At the Congresses, hundreds of amendments to the Constitution and proposed resolutions had been decided by roll-call votes. Of these, 22 votes were selected for the analysis of voting patterns of deputies (see Appendix 6.1). A similar number of votes was selected from each Congress: three votes from the Second to Fifth, and five from the Sixth and Seventh Congresses respectively. Again about the same numbers of votes were selected from each category: seven votes on the power balance between legislative and executive branches, six on economic issues, five on the presidency, and four on other questions.

As for the economic questions, land reform had been a particularly controversial issue. Although deputies seemed to reach an agreement on the question of private land ownership at the Second Congress, the issue of the sale of land plots remained

contentious. Prior to the Seventh Congress, the Constitution (Article 12) did not comply with a series of changes in the land code and presidential decrees on the land question.⁵⁰ For the analysis three votes were selected in this category: the votes on Shakhrai's amendment to Articles 11 and 12 (P1),⁵¹ a proposal to exclude a moratorium on land sale (T4),⁵² and I. V. Muravev's amendments (U3).⁵³

Among the resolutions adopted by the Congress, those on economic situations in Russia revealed deputies' attitudes towards economic reform and the government's social and economic policies in general, although they contained other political questions. For the analysis, three resolutions on the economic situation passed by the Third (Q2),⁵⁴ Sixth (T2)⁵⁵ and Seventh Congresses (U2)⁵⁶ were selected. As regards the resolution of the First Congress of People's Deputies from Siberia, held in Krasnoiarsk in March 1992, these votes would give a good benchmark for the evaluation of SIBFE deputies' coordination efforts in the Russian CPD.

In order to analyse deputies' attitudes towards political reform, votes on the law on the presidency, and on the question of no confidence in the president and in the government were selected. Among the votes cast on the law on the presidency, three of these were included in the analysis: the vote on the proposal to postpone adopting the law on the presidency to the Fourth Congress (Q1),⁵⁷ the vote on the adoption of the draft law on the presidency as a basis for a further discussion (R1),⁵⁸ and the vote on A. N. Belonogov's constitutional amendment (R2).⁵⁹ The votes on the question of no confidence in the government (T1)⁶⁰ and in the president (U1)⁶¹ were included in the analysis with the expectation that they would show deputies' overall satisfaction not only with economic reform but also with political changes.

The balance of power between legislative and executive branches was also one of the controversial questions of the Congress. The question of a strong presidency was an issue of concern to the regions as it was likely to bring about changes in centre-periphery relations. The question developed into a struggle between legislative and executive branches, and thus might not directly affect centre-periphery relations. However, from the point of view of the regions, they could benefit from articulating their demands as both Eltsin's and Khasbulatov's blocs sought the support of various groups including the regional ones to win the struggle. Therefore, votes on these questions revealed not only the deputies' attitudes towards the state structure but also the level of coordination.

A total of seven votes on this issue were included in the analysis. Firstly, three votes—on the right of the Supreme Soviet chairman to issue decrees (Q3),⁶² on a moratorium on local election (S2),⁶³ and on the presidential emergency powers (S3)⁶⁴—were related to a strong presidency which were put to the vote during the second stage of confrontation. Another four votes included in this category were put to the vote at the Sixth and Seventh Congresses. These four votes—on Eltsin's proposal on the resolution of the Congress on economic reform (T3),⁶⁵ on S. B. Sheboldaev's constitutional amendment on the appointment of chairman of the Council of Ministers (T5),⁶⁶ on Eltsin's constitutional amendment on the accountability of the Council of Ministers (U4),⁶⁷ and on Zor'kin's proposal for a truce between legislative and executive branches (U5)⁶⁸—were mainly concerned with the power balance between legislative and executive branches.

The analysis also covered four votes—on B. D. Babaev and Tikhanov's proposal (P2),⁶⁹ on the question of a programme for the Social development of the North (P3),⁷⁰ on Shakhrai's proposal to adopt the law on the Constitutional Court without discussion (R3),⁷¹ and on Isaev's proposal at the Fifth Congress to postpone the election of the chairman of the Supreme Soviet to the following Congress (S1)⁷²—as others.

VI. 2. Cleavages among Deputies in the Russian Congress

The Russian CPD had an enormous importance as the supreme decision-making body, particularly at a time when the political, economic and social structures of Russia were in transition. However, deputies were divided into small clusters, and often shifted their positions when political and economic questions were discussed. It was even worse when neither the reformist nor the opposition bloc fully controlled the Congress. The results were obvious: decisions on critical questions were either delayed or ended up with vague compromises that were often conflicting. For instance, a vague demarcation of authority between legislative and executive branches caused a deadlock in the Congress, inviting the president to resort on unconstitutional measures.

It is, of course, unnecessary to add that the segmentation of deputies also made it difficult for observers of Russian politics to identify factors that would bind those political groups in the Russian Congress. Sakwa has suggested that the social and occupational structure of the Congress was the key factor.⁷³ However, Lane and Ross have maintained that deputies were fundamentally divided along political and

ideological lines, even though they partly agree with Sakwa.⁷⁴ Although these observations explain much of the voting patterns of deputies in the Russian CPD, each of them seems to show only half the picture. Therefore, a more thorough analysis taking account of other factors is needed.⁷⁵

This analysis shows that membership of political blocs, 'class,' generation, and some regional factors such as regional association membership, the economic structure, and socio-economic conditions of regions all had some effect on deputies' voting patterns. By contrast, regional factors such as the autonomous status of the administrative units where deputies were elected, and personal factors such as gender and ethnic origin, were of much less influence in the Russian Congress.

<Table 6.2.1> Cleavages among Deputies in the CPD of Russia (1990-1993)

	Economic Issues		Presidential Issues		Balance of Power (7 votes)	Other Issues (4 votes)	Total (22 votes)
	land reform (3 votes)	resolutions (3 votes)	confidence (2 votes)	President (3 votes)			
Regional Factors							
Regional associations	3 (2)	3 (3)	1 (1)	3 (3)	7 (4)	4 (4)	21 (17)
Economic structure	2 (1)	3 (2)	1 (0)	3 (2)	6 (2)	4 (1)	19 (8)
Economic performance	2 (2)	2 (1)	2 (0)	3 (3)	5 (3)	3 (3)	17 (12)
Economic performance + Federal status	3 (2)	3 (1)	2 (0)	3 (3)	5 (4)	3 (3)	19 (13)
Urban vs. Rural (I)	2 (1)	3 (2)	2 (2)	3 (3)	6 (5)	4 (3)	20 (16)
Urban vs. Rural (II) ¹⁾	2 (1)	2 (2)	2 (1)	3 (2)	5 (1)	1 (0)	15 (7)
Federal status ²⁾	0 (0)	1 (1)	0 (0)	1 (0)	2 (1)	1 (0)	5 (2)
Functional Factors							
'Class'	2 (2)	3 (3)	2 (2)	3 (3)	5 (5)	3 (3)	18 (18)
Political blocs	3 (3)	3 (3)	2 (2)	3 (3)	6 (6)	4 (3)	21 (20)
CPSU membership	2 (2)	3 (3)	2 (2)	3 (3)	5 (5)	4 (3)	19 (18)
Personal Factors							
Gender	0 (0)	1 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (0)
Generation	2 (2)	3 (1)	2 (1)	3 (3)	5 (2)	4 (3)	19 (12)
Ethnic origin	1 (0)	1 (1)	0 (0)	2 (1)	2 (1)	0 (0)	6 (3)

¹⁾ Moscow deputies were excluded.

²⁾ Deputies from Moscow and St. Petersburg are included in the non-autonomous regional group. Significance at the 0.05 (0.001) level.

VI. 2 (1) Differences in Voting Patterns among Regional Groups

In the Russian Congress, regional association membership, economic features, and the level of urbanisation of the place where deputies had been elected had divided deputies. First of all, deputies from regions that joined regional associations that had formed after 1990⁷⁶ tended to have different attitudes towards questions put to the vote

in the Congress, revealing differences in 21 of the 22 votes.⁷⁷ For instance, distinctive differences were revealed between the Ural and Siberian deputies in the vote on the law on the president at the Fourth Congress.⁷⁸ Another difference was found between the Ural/Siberian deputy groups and the Central/Volga deputy groups in the vote on the resolution of the Fifth Congress "On the Legal Guarantee for Economic Reform" which introduced "rule by presidential decrees."⁷⁹ At the Seventh Congress, regional differences were revealed when deputies voted on a resolution on the course of reform, which describe the government's performance as "unsatisfactory."⁸⁰

However, a closer analysis of the regional association deputy groups suggests that the influence of regional associations over their own deputies was limited.⁸¹ A reason for the weak unity of regional association groups can be found in the different living standards and economic conditions of their member regions. As discussed in Chapter 3, regional associations were mostly based on geographic vicinity—often along the boundaries of planning regions—regardless of the socio-economic conditions of member regions. Therefore, deputies from regions that joined a regional association often had different attitudes towards specific questions, and this was reflected in their voting patterns.⁸²

Considering the economic structure of the regions, deputies from hub/gate regions tended to support Eltsin's reform policies more than other regional groups. For instance, the hub/gate deputy group was more supportive of Eltsin's position in the vote on the resolutions on economic situation and on the question of no confidence in the government and the president.⁸³ Even when the Congress became hostile to Eltsin in relations between legislative and executive branches, hub/gate deputies showed only a moderate level of opposition.⁸⁴ By contrast, deputies from rural and resource regions turned their back on Eltsin, particularly after the Fifth Congress, since their socio-economic condition had deteriorated after the "shock therapy" of 1992.⁸⁵ At the Fifth Congress, for instance, deputies from resource regions supported a rule by presidential decrees, while those from other types of regions were less keen on this issue.⁸⁶ However, they gave weaker support to Eltsin's proposals on relations between legislative and executive organs than other regional groups at the Sixth and Seventh Congresses.⁸⁷

Regional differences emerged more clearly when the socio-economic performance of regions was considered. As one might have expected, deputies from 'winner' regions showed stronger support for Eltsin's policies than those from less successful regions, although the level of performance did not always correlate with the

degree of support.⁸⁸ Differences were also revealed between deputies from autonomous and other administrative units, but only in a limited number of votes.⁸⁹

A clearer picture appears when these two factors—the socio-economic conditions and the federal status of a region—are considered in combination. Deputies' votes were broken down by the level of economic performance,⁹⁰ or by the federal status of the regions where deputies had been elected,⁹¹ or by both, depending on the issue. For instance, 64 deputies from highly adapted regions showed higher than a moderate level of unity ($M > |\pm 4|$) in 14 of 22 votes, supporting Eltsin's position in most of the votes analysed. In particular, deputies from adapted republics were more supportive of a strong presidency and a balance of power which was favourable to the president during the first stage of confrontation. However, they withdrew their support at the Sixth and Seventh Congresses, becoming less supportive of Eltsin.⁹² This change seemed to be a reflection of strained relations between centre and republics on budget relations and on the new Constitution.

Another regional factor that divided deputies in the Congress was their urban or rural origins. As in the USSR Congress, deputies from rural areas showed more conservative voting patterns than urban deputies in almost every vote that included in the analysis.⁹³ Furthermore, they maintained a high degree of unity—higher than a moderate level of unity in eight votes—compared with other groups.⁹⁴ However, differences were less obvious when Moscow and St. Petersburg deputies were excluded from the analysis. Furthermore, the level of urbanisation did not correlate with the level of support, as clear differences emerged between deputies from rural areas and small cities.

VI. 2 (2) 'Class' Cleavages

In the Russian Congress, deputies' votes could also be considered in terms of their 'class' origins. As in the CPD of the USSR, nomenklaturists often showed clearly different voting patterns from the intelligentsia and technicians, revealing differences in 18 of the 22 votes. However, the 'class' groups in the Russian Congress showed a couple of changes.

First of all, managers frequently sided with nomenklaturists, showing more conservative voting patterns than the military personnel group, one of the most conservative deputy groups in the Congress. By contrast, workers often showed rather

liberal voting patterns. Secondly, most of the 'class' groups were often divided, failing to maintain a moderate level of unity in many votes. It suggested that attitudes towards reform were differentiated even among deputies who belonged to the same category of 'class.'⁹⁵

Divisions within a 'class' were clearly found among deputies who were engaged themselves in the economic sector. For instance, differences were often found among managers, particularly between those from the agricultural and industrial sectors. In the votes, agricultural managers were more conservative than industrial managers, revealing differences in eleven votes, although both groups showed similar voting patterns in the votes on 'other' issues. In particular, industrial managers were more supportive of private land ownership,⁹⁶ and more satisfied with Eltsin's economic policies than agricultural managers,⁹⁷ although the gap between them had been significantly reduced at the Seventh Congress in the aftermath of "shock therapy."⁹⁸

Cadres also showed another clear example of division within a 'class' group. They were often divided, based on the socio-economic conditions and the federal status of the regions they represented. For instance, cadres from highly adapted and adapted regions were often more supportive of Eltsin's position, especially more than those from stagnated regions in their votes on economic and political issues, revealing differences in ten votes.⁹⁹ However, cadres from adapted republics often showed more conservative voting patterns than those from stagnated republics, although both groups were far more conservative than cadres from adapted regions.

Regional differences were also revealed among nomenklaturists. However, differences tended to emerge on the basis of the federal status of regions where they had been elected, particularly between nomenklaturists from stagnated regions and stagnated republics.¹⁰⁰ The result suggests that an increasing representation of nomenklaturists in the Russian CPD than in the USSR CPD did not necessarily mean that the conservative bloc had been bolstered in the Russian CPD. As in the CPD of the USSR, these observations show that the 'class' factor had not always a cross-regional impact on the voting patterns of deputies.

VI. 2 (3) Political Factions as 'Primitive' Party Politics

In the Russian Congress, political factions could be registered when they collected more than 50 deputies' signatures. Fourteen factions were registered in October 1991, thirteen in May 1992, and then fifteen factions in February 1993.¹⁰¹ Political factions based on sectoral interests or ideological orientation emerged as one of the most important factors in explaining the voting patterns of deputies, revealing differences in all votes analysed with one exceptional case.¹⁰²

Among the political factions in the Congress, Radical Democrats, Democratic Russia, and Consensus for the Sake of Progress tended strongly to support reform, while Fatherland, the Agrarian Union, *Rossia*, and Communists of Russia positioned themselves on the opposite side. Of course, this general picture needed to be slightly modified when the characteristics of conflicts in the Congress were taken into account. During the first stage of conflict (i.e. until the Fifth Congress), the liberal camp was bolstered by the support of the Left Centre, Free Russia, the Workers' Union, and Non-Party Deputies.

However, as the conflict in the Congress had developed into a struggle between legislative and executive branches, these factions became more conservative than before, and were inclined to lose their unity. As shown in Table 6.2.2, these tendencies were apparent among the deputies who formed Sovereignty & Equality, the Industrial Union, the Workers' Union, and *Smena*.¹⁰³

As the confrontation in the Congress intensified in 1992, the need to form a coalition had been sought not only by the regional deputy groups but also by the political factions. Just before the Sixth Congress, three political blocs formed.¹⁰⁴ Reformers grouped together in which the factions of Democratic Russia, Radical Democrats, Free Russia, the Left Centre, and Non-Party Deputies joined. As the main counterpart, an opposition bloc called Russian Unity was also established in April 1992, which included *Rossia*, Fatherland, the Agrarian Union and Communists of Russia.¹⁰⁵ In addition to these blocs, the faction leaders of the Workers' Union, the Industrial Union, and *Smena* decided to form the bloc of Creative Strength (*Sozidatel'nye sily*: CS).¹⁰⁶

<Table 6.2.2> The Voting Patterns of Political Factions in the CPD of Russia (1990-1993)

	Bloc ¹⁾		Degree of Support ²⁾				Voting Results ³⁾							Numbers of Votes divided (strong unity) ⁴⁾						
	2nd CPD (2nd)	%	7th CPD (7th)	%	N	1st	3rd	6th	7th	3rd	6th	7th	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	total	
<u>Factions firmly supporting reform</u>																				
Radical Democrats	CR	37	3.5	50	4.9	+91	+94	+89	+89	9.19	6.53	6.80	2 (1)	0 (3)	0 (1)	0 (2)	0 (3)	0 (3)	2 (12)	
Democratic Russia	CR	68	6.4	47	4.6	+91	+96	+82	+82	9.12	6.26	6.64	1 (0)	0 (3)	0 (1)	0 (3)	0 (3)	0 (3)	1 (13)	
Consensus for the Sake of Progress	CR	-	-	52	5.1	+89	+89	+78	+76	-	-	5.96	-	-	-	-	-	0 (3)	0 (3)	
<i>sub-total</i>		105	9.9	149	14.7	+90	+93	+83	+82	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
<u>Factions weakly supporting reform</u>																				
Left Centre	DC	43	4.1	60	5.9	+55	+68	+47	+24	7.44	5.77	2.63	1 (1)	0 (2)	0 (3)	0 (3)	1 (3)	3 (1)	5 (12)	
Free Russia	DC	57	5.4	54	5.3	+43	+71	+33	+5	7.37	4.53	1.96	1 (1)	0 (2)	0 (1)	0 (2)	1 (1)	2 (1)	4 (7)	
<i>sub-total</i>		100	9.5	114	11.2	+49	+70	+40	+15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
<u>Factions shifting reformists to conservatives</u>																				
Mother Land	DC	-	-	56	5.5	+42	+53	+17	-10	0.00	0.00	0.68	-	-	-	-	-	3 (1)	3 (1)	
Workers' Union	CS	37	3.5	52	5.1	+43	+39	-1	-19	6.76	2.81	0.08	0 (1)	0 (3)	0 (3)	2 (0)	2 (1)	3 (0)	7 (8)	
Change (New Policy, <i>Smena</i>)	CS	39	3.7	54	5.3	+42	+29	-29	-43	3.08	0.41	-3.19	1 (0)	1 (0)	0 (1)	2 (0)	2 (0)	1 (0)	7 (0)	
<i>sub-total</i>		76	7.2	162	16.0	+42	+40	-4	-24	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
<u>Factions weakly opposing Reform</u>																				
Sovereignty and Equality	DC	50	4.7	50	4.9	-39	-34	-29	-40	-2.27	-0.16	-1.64	1 (0)	2 (0)	2 (0)	1 (0)	2 (0)	2 (0)	10 (0)	
Industrial Union	CS	67	6.3	52	5.1	-20	-26	-44	-49	-0.15	-0.93	-1.38	0 (0)	2 (0)	2 (0)	1 (0)	3 (0)	1 (0)	9 (0)	
<i>sub-total</i>		117	11.1	102	10.0	-29	-30	-37	-45	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
<u>Factions firmly opposing reform</u>																				
Fatherland	RU	53	5.0	51	5.0	-67	-78	-61	-67	-6.54	-3.17	-4.78	0 (1)	0 (2)	0 (1)	0 (1)	2 (0)	1 (1)	2 (6)	
Agrarian Union	RU	127	12.0	130	12.8	-41	-70	-72	-73	-6.12	-5.06	-4.38	1 (1)	0 (1)	1 (0)	0 (0)	0 (2)	2 (3)	4 (7)	
<i>Rossia</i>	RU	45	4.3	54	5.3	-23	-54	-75	-76	-4.89	-3.69	-5.81	0 (1)	1 (1)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (0)	1 (3)	3 (5)	
Communists of Russia	RU	55	5.2	67	6.6	-82	-91	-89	-89	-8.79	-5.09	-5.82	0 (1)	0 (3)	0 (2)	1 (0)	0 (2)	1 (2)	2 (10)	
<i>sub-total</i>		280	26.5	302	29.8	-51	-73	-74	-76	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
<i>Deputies in Blocs as a whole</i>		678	64.1	829	81.7	+9	+5	-11	-20	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
<u>Factions outside of Political Blocs</u>																				
Non-Party Deputies	non	40	3.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	9.08	6.10	-	1 (0)	0 (3)	0 (3)	1 (1)	1 (4)	-	3 (10)	
Civic Union	non	42	4.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.68	2.00	-	1 (0)	1 (1)	1 (1)	0 (0)	2 (0)	-	5 (2)	
Deputies outside of Factions	non	297	28.1	186	18.3	-2	+2	-9	-20	0.81	1.12	-0.13	1 (0)	2 (0)	2 (0)	1 (0)	3 (0)	2 (0)	11 (0)	
<i>sub-total</i>		379	35.9	186	18.3	-2	+2	-9	-20	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
<i>CPD as a Whole</i>		1057	100.0	1015	100.0	+7	+4	-11	-20	0.87	0.59	-0.59	1 (0)	3 (0)	2 (0)	1 (0)	4 (0)	2 (0)	13 (0)	

¹⁾ Blocs: CR (Coalition for Reform), DC (Democratic Centre), CS (Creative Strength), and RU (Russian Unity)

²⁾ Scores ranged from -100 (complete opposition) to +100 (complete support). Sobyenin, "The Current Crisis," in Remington (ed.), *Parliaments in Transition*, pp. 196-197 (Table 8.1.3).

³⁾ Each faction's average score in the analysis. Scores ranged from -10 (complete opposition) to +10 (complete support).

⁴⁾ Numbers of votes in which deputies were divided ($M < \pm 2$) (and in which deputies maintained higher than strong unity ($M > \pm 6$)).

Source of faction membership: Gleisner et al., *Voting in the Russian Parliament, 1990-93: Database* (Leeds: Centre for Democratisation Studies, University of Leeds, 1996).

However, factions within these blocs tended to have slightly different political and economic orientations, which made it difficult for them to maintain a high level of unity. In particular, the Creative Strength bloc tended to be divided more often than any other bloc, particularly when the questions of land ownership ($M=0.3$) and no confidence in the government ($M=0.6$) were put to the vote at the Sixth Congress. Disagreements among deputies were also unveiled within the Coalition for Reform and Russian Unity blocs, although they were relatively united and showed a consistent attitude in the vote.

For instance, Russian Unity urged Eltsin to shuffle the government by adding representatives of entrepreneurs and to make government personnel responsible to the Congress and the Supreme Soviet. The bloc also demanded that the Congress should be in charge of economic and constitutional questions, and its members seemed to be well united on these issues.¹⁰⁷ However, Russian Unity failed to work out either its own programme for economic reform or an integrated opinion regarding a draft constitution. Mikhail Astaf'ev, the coordinator of Russian Unity, admitted that members of the bloc viewed "many things differently."¹⁰⁸ The voting patterns of the bloc members also showed that they were divided when a draft resolution on the course of economic reform was adopted as a basis for the further discussion ($M=-1.8$). They were also weakly united against Eltsin's proposal to remain the head of the government until 1 December 1992 ($M=-2.7$) at the Sixth Congress.

Admittedly, the democratic factions were not an exception as far as unity was concerned. In particular, Free Russia and the Left Centre tended to show different voting patterns unlike other relatively united factions such as Russian Democrats and Democratic Russia.¹⁰⁹ This split in the democratic factions was not a transient tendency as Free Russia ceased to be a member of the bloc in the Sixth Congress. For Eltsin, this was a setback at a critical period of reform and before another round of confrontation at the following Congress. By early 1993, reformist coalitions were reshaped under the name of the Coalition for Reform which was joined by Consensus for the Sake of Progress. In addition to existing blocs, Free Russia and Left Centre left the democratic factions and formed a new bloc, the Democratic Centre (*Demokraticheskii tsentr*: DC), together with Sovereignty & Equality and Motherland which were then weakly opposing reform. As a result, four blocs were established, and around 830 of 1040 deputies joined the bloc at the Seventh Congress as in Table 6.2.2.

At the Seventh Congress, the reformist and opposition blocs showed a high level of unity in opposing each other.¹¹⁰ However, the unity of the reformist blocs dropped somewhat in the vote on economic issues such as land ownership and economic reform. As for Russian Unity, the unity level fell even lower in a couple of votes.¹¹¹ As in the Sixth Congress, other blocs did not seem to be able to bind their members, maintaining only a weak level of unity in most of the votes analysed.

VI. 2 (4) Other Differences

Among other factors that might have had some influence on the voting patterns of deputies, gender, generation, party affiliation, and ethnic origin were examined. As shown in Table 6.2.1, it is clear that deputies of the younger generation and those who had not been affiliated with the Communist Party tended to be more supportive of reform. By contrast, the gender factor and ethnic origins had only limited influence.¹¹²

In the Russian Congress, roughly equal numbers of deputies, 477 and 585 respectively, belonged to the younger and older generation groups. As a group, younger deputies were more liberal or less conservative than the older. In particular, the younger generation tended to be more supportive of Eltsin's socio-economic policies in the first stage of confrontation,¹¹³ although their support weakened as the Congress confronted Eltsin in the later period. Despite the different voting patterns, however, both deputy groups were divided in nine to eleven votes and maintained only a weak level of unity in eight and nine votes respectively.

Another factor that influenced the deputies' voting patterns in the Congress was affiliation with the Communist Party. In the votes analysed, deputies who had not been affiliated with the CPSU—253 deputies or 23.8 per cent—showed more liberal voting patterns than those who had. It is hardly necessary to mention that the Communist Party had failed to maintain its unity, and membership as such did not have much influence on deputies' attitudes towards reform in this period. In particular, non-CPSU members showed a relatively high level of unity. They were strongly united in seven votes, providing a solid basis for Eltsin's policies at least until the Fifth Congress. However, when the confrontation became acute after the Fifth Congress, they became less supportive of Eltsin, although they still supported reform policies in general.¹¹⁴

VI. 3. SIBFE Deputies and Their Influence in the Russian Congress

In the Congress, the SIBFE regions were represented by 234 of the 1064 deputies or 22 per cent, which was a considerable proportion as key questions were often decided by a very narrow margin.¹¹⁵ In particular, the tensions between pro-Eltsin and anti-Eltsin blocs became more acute after the Fifth Congress. Accordingly, both sides were competing for a marginal number of supporters. Such a situation would accommodate the regional influence over the decision-making process, if a deputy group successfully converted its number of seats into a voting bloc.

Although it is difficult to establish a direct linkage, some questions that were put to the vote in the Congress were quite evidently related to regional interests. For instance, a social development programme for the Far Northern regions called for at the Second Congress could be directly related to many SIBFE regions, although its implication for reform in general was limited. The resolution of the Seventh Congress "On the Course of Economic Reform" could also be strongly related to the demands of the Siberian regions that were included in the resolution of the First Congress of the People's Deputies from Siberia in March 1992.

The analysis on these votes suggests that the interests of Siberian and Far Eastern regions affected the decisions of the Congress. Furthermore, their influence was found not only in the vote on specific policies,¹¹⁶ but also in the vote on key political and economic issues that had general and nationwide effects on reform. However, the unity of SIBFE deputies was vulnerable to the influence of other factors such as political bloc membership, 'class' and the generation factor. As in the USSR Congress, the socio-economic conditions of individual regions joined the list of factors that determined the voting patterns of SIBFE deputies in the Russian Congress.

VI.3 (1) Features of SIBFE Deputies in the Vote

The consistent demands of SIBFE deputies could be depicted as 'decolonisation.'¹¹⁷ Decolonisation often meant economic decentralisation of management and foreign economic activities, and special arrangements for the socio-economic development of the SIBFE regions. However, an attempt to define common

goals at the SIBFE level was less apparent than in the USSR CPD, in accordance with the intensification of reform and specification of regional initiatives.

Differences in their practical approaches to attain their goals became more evident between the two regional associations that emerged in the SIBFE regions. As for the Siberian regions, they were successful in claiming concessions from the centre, when Eltsin signed the decree "On the Issue of the Activities of the Inter-regional Association <Siberian Agreement>" in July 1991.¹¹⁸ However, the Siberian Agreement became politicised when the concessions of the centre failed to be accompanied by the necessary financial measures, because of worsening fiscal situation in Russia. In this context, the Siberian Agreement organised the First Congress of the People's Deputies of Siberia in Krasnoiarsk on 28-29 March 1992.¹¹⁹


For the Far Eastern regions, the situation was more or less the same as that of the Siberian regions, as the government programmes for the socio-economic development in the area were not properly implemented.¹²⁰ By contrast to the Siberian Agreement, however, the Far Eastern regions gave a high priority to economic measures in their initiatives.¹²¹ In general, they supported the concept of Free Economic Zone (FEZ) that would promote economic relations with the adjacent Asian-Pacific countries.¹²² Since 1990, FEZs have been established in the Far Eastern regions such as Nakhodka in Primorskii krai,¹²³ Sakhalin oblast,¹²⁴ and the Jewish Autonomous oblast.¹²⁵

These two different approaches brought about a differentiation in their attitudes towards the central authorities. The Siberian regions, particularly resource-rich ones, were primarily concerned with expanding their control over the regional wealth. This approach increased tensions between central and regional authorities. By contrast, the Far Eastern regions were relatively more dependent on central support not only for deliveries of necessary goods in the short-term but also for the development of infrastructure in the medium and long term. If a Siberian approach can be depicted as 'disengagement' of the centre, a stronger emphasis was placed on the 'engagement' aspect in the strategy of the Far Eastern regions.¹²⁶

These differences were clearly revealed in the vote on presidential and economic issues.¹²⁷ Until the Fifth Congress, SIBFE deputies were rather less supportive of Eltsin's effort to introduce a presidency in Russia and his socio-economic policies. However, after the Fifth Congress, the Siberian and Far Eastern deputy groups showed different voting patterns, when the economic situation deteriorated after the 'Shatalin plan' and the Congress became hostile to Eltsin.

SIBFE deputies in general tended to be less supportive of establishing a presidency in the first place. At the Third Congress, SIBFE deputies as a group opposed a proposal to discuss the law on the presidency after the referendum of March 1991.¹²⁸ When Eltsin chose an alternative option, strengthening his power as chairman of the Supreme Soviet, SIBFE deputies again showed the lowest support among the regional association deputy groups in the Congress.¹²⁹ These tendencies were more or less the same when the Fourth Congress adopted the law on "Establishing a Presidency."¹³⁰

<Figure 6.1> Regional Association Deputy Groups in the vote on the Presidential Issues




Q1: The question on the presidency and reforms of government power and administrative system should be discussed in the following Congress at the Third CPD (adopted); Q3: Emergency power of the chairman of the Supreme Soviet (Eltsin) at the Third CPD (rejected); R1: Law on the President at the Fourth CPD (adopted); S3: Emergency power of the President at the Fifth CPD (adopted); and U5: Zor'kin's proposal at the Seventh CPD (adopted). The Regional Association of Chemozem regions was formed after the Fifth CPD. Scores ranged from +10 (strong support for Eltsin) to -10 (strong opposition).

However, some changes began to emerge at the Fifth Congress when Eltsin sought additional powers. When the Congress adopted the resolution "On the Legal Guarantee of Economic Reform," SIBFE deputies gave stronger support for the resolution than other regional groups.¹³¹ Although no clear evidence was found, the changing voting patterns might be related to the concessions of the centre made in 1991.¹³² Furthermore, the voting patterns of SIBFE deputies seemed to be affected by differentiation of the strategies employed by the SIBFE regions. For instance, Siberian deputies were less supportive of Eltsin than Far Eastern deputies in the vote on

Zor'kin's proposal at the Seventh Congress that nullified restrictions on the presidential powers.¹³³

Similar tendencies were also found in the vote on the Congress's resolution on the economic situation in Russia. Considering two votes on Zakharov and Kalashnikov's proposal at the Third Congress and on the resolution of the Seventh Congress "On the Course of Economic Reform," changes in deputies' attitudes towards socio-economic conditions were evident.

<Figure 6.2> Regional Association Deputy Groups in the vote on the Economic Issues



Q2: Assessing the performance of the government as unsatisfactory at the Third CPD (rejected);
U2: The resolution of the Seventh CPD "On the Course of Economic Reform in the Russian Federation" (Editorial Commission version, adopted).
The Regional Association of Cherdzern regions was formed after the Fifth CPD.
Scores ranged from +10 (strong support for Eltsin) to -10 (strong opposition).

First of all, comparison of these two votes clearly showed that deputies in the Congress as a whole opposed Eltsin's socio-economic policies at the Seventh Congress. Secondly, deputy groups that were relatively more supportive of Eltsin's policies at the Third Congress shifted their positions, becoming far less supportive of them. For instance, deputies from the regions that joined the regional associations of the North Caucasus and the Great Urals had become far less supportive than other regional groups at the Seventh Congress. In particular, a wide gap again emerged between Siberian and Far Eastern deputies. In the vote, an increasing number of Siberian deputies voted in favour of the resolution. By contrast, Far Eastern deputies were divided in the vote, revealing significant differences between the two deputy groups.¹³⁴

Despite their peculiar voting patterns, however, SIBFE deputies did not seem to be united in the Congress.¹³⁵ Among the explanatory factors included in the analysis, functional factors appear to have a stronger influence than other factors. The situation was more or less the same among the Siberian and Far Eastern deputy groups, although the latter group appeared to be somewhat more united than the former. However, the reason for the division seemed to be quite different between the Siberian and Far Eastern delegations, partly because of the different composition of deputies, as already discussed in Chapter 4.

<Table 6.3.1> Cleavages among SIBFE Deputies in the CPD of Russia (1990-1993)

	Economic Issues		Presidential Issues		Balance of Power (6 votes)	Other Issues (4 votes)	Total (22 votes)
	land reform (3 votes)	resolu- tions (3 votes)	confi- dence (2votes)	Presi- dent (3 votes)			
<SIBFE Deputies>							
<i>Regional Factors</i>							
Siberia vs. Far East	1 (0)	1 (0)	0 (0)	1 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	3 (0)
Economic Structure	1 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	4 (1)	1 (0)	6 (1)
Economic conditions	1 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (0)	1 (0)	1 (0)	4 (0)
Economic conditions & Federal status	0 (0)	1 (0)	0 (0)	1 (0)	1 (0)	2 (0)	5 (0)
Urban vs. Rural	2 (0)	1 (0)	1 (0)	2 (1)	1 (0)	1 (0)	8 (1)
Federal Status	0 (0)	1 (0)	0 (0)	1 (1)	2 (0)	1 (1)	4 (2)
<i>Functional Factors</i>							
'Class'	1 (0)	3 (1)	0 (0)	2 (1)	2 (1)	3 (1)	11 (4)
CPSU membership	3 (2)	3 (3)	2 (1)	3 (3)	5 (2)	3 (3)	18 (14)
Political blocs	3 (3)	3 (3)	2 (2)	3 (3)	7 (6)	4 (3)	22 (20)
<i>Personal Factors</i>							
Gender	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
Generation	2 (1)	3 (1)	1 (0)	3 (1)	2 (1)	3 (1)	14 (5)
Ethnic origin	2 (0)	1 (0)	0 (0)	1 (0)	2 (0)	1 (0)	7 (0)
<Siberian Deputies>							
<i>Regional Factors</i>							
East & West Siberia	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (0)	1 (1)	2 (1)
Economic Structure	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (0)	0 (0)	3 (2)	1 (0)	5 (2)
Economic conditions	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (0)	2 (0)	1 (0)	4 (0)
Economic conditions & Federal status	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (0)	1 (0)	2 (0)
(Adapted vs. Stagnated regions)	0 (0)	1 (0)	0 (0)	1 (1)	1 (0)	2 (1)	5 (2)
Urban vs. Rural	2 (0)	2 (0)	2 (0)	2 (0)	0 (0)	1 (0)	9 (0)
Federal Status	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (0)	0 (0)	1 (0)	1 (0)	3 (0)
<i>Functional Factors</i>							
'Class'	1 (0)	2 (0)	0 (0)	1 (0)	1 (0)	1 (0)	6 (0)
CPSU membership	2 (2)	3 (3)	2 (2)	3 (3)	4 (2)	3 (3)	17 (15)
Political blocs	3 (2)	3 (3)	2 (2)	3 (3)	5 (4)	3 (3)	19 (17)
<i>Personal Factors</i>							
Gender	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
Generation	1 (1)	2 (0)	1 (0)	2 (1)	2 (1)	3 (0)	11 (3)
Ethnic origin	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (0)	1 (0)	0 (0)	2 (0)

<Far Eastern Deputies>

Regional Factors

Economic Structure	2 (0)	0 (0)	1 (0)	1 (0)	1 (0)	2 (0)	7 (0)
Economic conditions	2 (1)	1 (0)	1 (0)	1 (0)	1 (0)	1 (0)	7 (0)
Economic conditions ¹⁾ (Stagnated regions vs. Adapted republics) ¹⁾	2 (1)	1 (1)	0 (0)	1 (1)	2 (0)	1 (0)	7 (1)
Urban vs. Rural	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
Federal Status	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (0)	0 (0)	1 (0)

Functional Factors

'Class'	0 (0)	1 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (0)
CPSU membership	1 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (0)	1 (0)	0 (0)	3 (0)
Political blocs	3 (2)	3 (2)	2 (2)	3 (2)	7 (5)	4 (2)	22 (15)

Personal Factors

Gender	0 (0)	1 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (0)
Generation	2 (0)	1 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	3 (0)
Ethnic origin	2 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	2 (0)	2 (0)	6 (0)

¹⁾ Excluding three deputies from Kamchatka oblast
Significance at the 0.05 (0.001) level.

Table 6.3.1 shows that Siberian and Far Eastern deputies were divided by political bloc membership. The influence of the 'class' factor had decreased, compared with deputies in the Congress as a whole. However, Siberian deputies were more likely to be divided by the generation factor and CPSU membership, but Far Eastern deputies by regional factors. These cleavages placed limits on the influence of SIBFE deputies over reform policies.

VI.3 (2) Regional Differences among SIBFE Deputies

Some regional factors were noteworthy for their impact on emerging cleavages among SIBFE deputies. Among the regional factors discussed in the analysis, the level of urbanisation and the economic structure of a region appear to have had a stronger influence than other regional factors (see Table 6.3.1). As in the Congress as a whole, SIBFE deputies from large cities voted in a more liberal way than other urban or rural groups, particularly on economic issues.¹³⁶ However, they were still less supportive of Eltsin than those from large cities in the European part of Russia, reducing the gap between urban and rural groups. As a result, urban-rural differences were less obvious among SIBFE deputies than for the Congress as a whole.¹³⁷

Among the regional factors, the economic structure of the regions frequently divided SIBFE deputies. In the early stages of confrontation at the Congress, SIBFE

deputies from rural, hub/gate, and residual regions were less supportive of reform than each corresponding deputy group from the European part of Russia.¹³⁸ As a result, differences among the regional groups based on their economic structure were revealed only in the vote on the Programme of the Social Development of the North.¹³⁹ However, differences more often emerged in the votes on the balance of power between legislative and executive branches that were put to the vote after the Fifth Congress. After the Fifth Congress, rural and hub/gate deputies were more supportive of the president, while deputies from the resource and residual regions voted in less supportive ways than the same category of deputies from the European part of Russia.¹⁴⁰

At first sight, the socio-economic conditions and the federal status of the region where deputies had been elected had limited influence over SIBFE deputies' voting patterns, when these two factors were separately discussed. However, their influence became clearer when these two variables were considered in combination.¹⁴¹

These observations can be extended to analyse the voting patterns of Siberian deputies, with a few modifications. The Siberian delegation from large cities was more supportive of reform than deputies from less urbanised areas. The number of votes where differences were revealed among urban-rural groups or Hanson's regional groups was about the same as that in respect of SIBFE deputies as a whole. Furthermore, the economic features of the regions seemed to be more important than their federal status of regions, since no differences were revealed between the deputy groups of the autonomous administrative formations and ordinary regions in Siberia.

However, it is worth noting that Far Eastern deputies showed different voting patterns, being more united than the Siberian delegation. First of all, no urban-rural differences were found among Far Eastern deputies. This tendency was partly because Far Eastern deputies tended to be more homogeneous in their composition. For instance, only four of them originated from rural areas. In addition, 33 Far Eastern deputies from large cities voted in a less liberal way than the corresponding deputy groups of other regional associations.¹⁴² By contrast, deputies of medium-sized or small cities were more supportive of reform. Accordingly, the urban deputy groups revealed similar voting patterns.

The peculiarities of Far Eastern deputies surfaced again when the socio-economic differentiation among Far Eastern regions was considered. First of all, those Far Eastern deputies who originated from hub/gate regions tended to be more

supportive of Eltsin's economic policies than other types of regions.¹⁴³ By contrast, Congress members from the Far Eastern resource regions were less satisfied with the economic situation, supporting changes in the course of economic reform and a weak presidency.¹⁴⁴ Therefore, Hanson's regional groups tended to vote differently, not only in votes on political issues but also in votes on economic questions. Secondly, the regional deputy groups based on their socio-economic conditions showed different voting patterns more frequently than Siberian deputies. In general, deputies from well-developed regions—the Republic of Sakha and Magadan oblast—were more supportive of Eltsin, although they often shifted their position.¹⁴⁵ By contrast, deputies from poorly developed regions strongly opposed Eltsin in many occasions.

VI.3 (3) Cleavages in the 'Class' and Political Factions

The 'class' background of SIBFE deputies also turned out to be a main source of division within the deputy groups, revealing differences in eleven votes. However, the general picture of the 'class' cleavages among SIBFE deputies was slightly different from that of the Congress as a whole. First of all, reformist groups such as the intelligentsia and technicians voted in a less liberal way than the intelligentsia and technicians from elsewhere.¹⁴⁶ Furthermore, workers showed quite similar voting patterns to the reformist 'class' groups.

With regard to the demands of the SIBFE regions in general, it is worth noting the voting patterns of cadres from the SIBFE regions. Cadres from the SIBFE regions were inclined to be more liberal than cadres from other regions in eighteen votes, although significant differences were revealed in only three votes. However, these three votes were closely related to the demands of the SIBFE regions, suggesting that SIBFE cadres were more attentive to regional demands in the Congress.¹⁴⁷ As a result, SIBFE cadres joined the reformist camp, while nomenklaturists, managers, and military personnel remained in the conservative camp.

When we considered Siberian and Far Eastern deputies separately, 'class' cleavages emerged far less frequently. Among Siberian deputies, 'class' cleavages were evident in only six votes, as the two main reformist 'class' group—the intelligentsia and technicians—were less supportive of reform than the corresponding 'class' from other regions in about half the vote analysed.¹⁴⁸

In particular, 'class' background seldom divided Far Eastern deputies. Among them, 'class' cleavages were revealed in a single vote, because of homogeneity in their 'class' composition¹⁴⁹ and reformist voting patterns of managers¹⁵⁰ and cadres¹⁵¹ from the Far East.

Another important factor that weakened the unity of SIBFE deputies was their affiliation with political fractions in the Congress. As in Table 6.3.2, the composition of SIBFE deputies in respect to political factions or blocs was almost the same as that of the Congress as a whole.

In general, both the Coalition for Reform, a main reform supporting bloc, and Russian Unity, a main opposition bloc, maintained a high level of unity, strongly opposing each other in all votes analysed. By contrast, those political factions that constituted the Democratic Centre and Creative Strength were less united, maintaining a high level of unity in less than five votes. These tendencies are quite understandable as the Democratic Centre and Creative Strength consisted of political factions that often failed to maintain a high level of unity.¹⁵² Furthermore, these political factions often opposed one another even after they formed a political bloc in early 1992.¹⁵³ Similar trends emerge when we consider Siberian and Far Eastern deputies separately. However, Far Eastern deputies belonging to the political blocs, particularly the Coalition for Reform¹⁵⁴ and Russian Unity,¹⁵⁵ tended to be more united than Siberian deputies in the same blocs.

Considering the demands made by SIBFE deputies, those who belonged to the two opposing blocs—the Coalition for Reform and Russian Unity—seemed to vote in accordance with the general guidelines of their political blocs or fractions rather than those of the regional association. Of course, this does not mean that they did not respond to the declaration of regional associations at all.¹⁵⁶ For instance, the voting patterns of deputies belonging to the Workers' Union and Sovereignty & Equality factions showed quite a shift from reformist to conservative positions even at the same Congress.¹⁵⁷ In this regard, leaders of regional associations tended to rely on 'moderate' blocs and deputies outside political blocs.¹⁵⁸

<Table 6.3.2> Voting Patterns of Political Factions among SIBFE Deputies in the CPD of Russia (1990-1993)

	2nd Congress		7th Congress		Voting Score							Numbers of Votes Divided (M < #2)							Total
	N	%	N	%	3 votes			5 votes			3 votes			5 votes			22 votes		
					CPD	CPD	CPD	CPD	CPD	CPD	CPD	CPD	CPD	CPD	CPD	CPD			
<u>Coalition for Reform (CR)</u>																			
Democratic Russia	17	7.3	10	4.3	9.22	8.82	6.00	7.00	1(1)	0(3)	0(3)	1(1)	0(3)	0(3)	0(3)	0(3)	2(14)		
Radical Democrats	8	3.4	11	4.8	8.75	10.00	5.75	7.09	1(1)	0(3)	0(3)	0(1)	0(2)	0(4)	0(4)	1(14)			
Consensus for the Sake	-	-	13	5.7	-	-	-	6.92	-	-	-	-	-	0(4)	0(4)	0(4)			
<i>Sub-total</i>	25	10.7	34	14.8	9.07	9.20	9.87	7.00	1(1)	0(3)	0(3)	1(1)	0(3)	0(4)	0(4)	2(15)			
<u>Democratic Centre (DC)</u>																			
Free Russia	20	8.6	11	4.8	3.67	6.00	6.40	2.00	0(1)	0(0)	0(1)	1(1)	1(4)	2(1)	2(1)	4(8)			
Sovereignty & Equality	14	6.0	18	7.8	-4.05	-1.19	0.57	-1.11	0(1)	0(1)	2(0)	1(1)	2(0)	0(0)	0(0)	5(3)			
Left Centre	3	1.3	12	5.2	5.56	6.67	2.67	4.17	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-			
Motherland	-	-	6	2.6	-	-	-	3.67	-	-	-	-	-	3(2)	3(2)	3(2)			
<i>Sub-total</i>	37	15.9	47	20.4	1.11	2.35	4.94	1.57	1(0)	2(0)	2(0)	2(0)	0(1)	2(1)	2(1)	9(2)			
<u>Creative Strength (CS)</u>																			
Workers' Union	12	5.2	15	6.5	7.22	5.00	3.00	1.33	0(2)	0(3)	0(0)	0(2)	1(1)	2(0)	2(0)	3(7)			
SMENA	6	2.6	13	5.7	0.56	3.33	0.33	-2.92	2(1)	1(0)	1(0)	2(1)	1(2)	2(1)	2(1)	9(5)			
Industrial Union	18	7.7	9	3.9	0.37	2.04	-1.00	-1.33	1(1)	1(0)	2(1)	0(2)	1(0)	0(1)	0(1)	5(5)			
<i>Sub-total</i>	36	15.5	37	16.1	2.50	3.24	0.93	-0.81	1(1)	1(0)	0(0)	1(1)	2(0)	2(0)	2(0)	6(2)			
<u>Russian Unity (RU)</u>																			
Agrarian Union	23	9.9	24	10.4	-6.81	-5.22	-5.42	-4.92	1(1)	0(2)	0(1)	0(1)	0(2)	2(2)	2(2)	3(9)			
Rossia	19	8.2	26	11.3	-5.79	-3.68	-4.42	-5.00	0(1)	0(1)	0(0)	0(1)	1(1)	1(3)	1(3)	2(7)			
Communist Russia	13	5.6	13	5.7	-9.49	-8.46	-6.31	-6.15	0(3)	0(3)	0(3)	1(2)	0(2)	1(3)	1(3)	2(12)			
Fatherland	11	4.7	10	4.3	-4.55	-3.94	-3.09	-6.60	1(1)	1(1)	0(0)	1(1)	1(2)	0(3)	0(3)	4(8)			
<i>Sub-total</i>	66	28.3	73	31.7	-5.15	-5.20	-8.21	-5.40	1(1)	0(1)	0(1)	0(0)	1(2)	1(3)	1(3)	3(8)			
<u>Deputies outside of Blocs</u>																			
Civic Union	8	3.4	-	-	-1.25	-1.25	1.25	-	1(0)	0(2)	1(1)	1(1)	2(2)	-	-	5(6)			
Deputies without Party	10	4.3	-	-	9.67	8.00	6.20	-	0(2)	0(3)	0(3)	1(2)	1(3)	-	-	2(13)			
<i>Deputies out of Factions</i>	61	26.2	39	17.0	0.38	1.75	2.00	0.41	0(0)	3(0)	2(0)	1(0)	3(0)	2(1)	2(1)	11(1)			
Total	233	100	230	100	-0.04	1.04	0.47	-0.42											

Each faction's average score in the votes included in the analysis. Scores range from -10 (complete opposition) to +10 (complete support).

VI.3 (4) Other Cleavages

As in the Congress as a whole, also SIBFE deputies could be divided by age group and CPSU membership. By contrast, the ethnic origin of deputies and the gender factor had limited influence over their voting patterns. However, as in Table 6.3.1, this generalisation needs to be modified as Far Eastern deputies were more likely to be divided along ethnic lines, rather than by age group or CPSU membership.

With regard to the voting patterns of SIBFE deputies as a whole, the generation factor seemed to be as important as 'class' background. As in the Congress as a whole, the younger generation of SIBFE deputies tended to be more supportive of reform than older deputies. In particular, the generation gap was clearly revealed among Siberian deputies, revealing differences in twelve votes. By contrast, Far Eastern deputies tended to show different voting patterns from Siberian deputies as the generation gap was revealed in only three votes.¹⁵⁹ The trend was mainly caused by the older generation from the Far East, who was more supportive of reform than other senior deputies in the Congress.¹⁶⁰

SIBFE deputies were again divided by their affiliations with the CPSU. Among them, deputies who had not been affiliated with the CPSU were more supportive of reform policies than CPSU members. However, after the Fifth Congress, their unity level fell from a strong to a weak level or even lower. Furthermore, this trend can be found in all categories of votes.¹⁶¹ Therefore, distance from the Communist Party did not necessarily guarantee support for Eltsin's policies, particularly when the tensions between legislative and executive branches became acute in the Congress, although non-CPSU members in general were still slightly more supportive of Eltsin.¹⁶²

Also for CPSU membership, Far Eastern deputies differed from Siberian deputies. For instance, fourteen Far Eastern deputies who had not been affiliated with the CPSU were less supportive of Eltsin's position than 30 corresponding Siberian deputies in most of the votes analysed. By contrast, Far Eastern deputies who held membership of the CPSU were inclined to vote in more liberal or less conservative ways than their Siberian counterparts. As a result, CPSU membership accounted for different voting patterns among Far Eastern deputies in only three votes (Q1, Q3, and T4).¹⁶³ By contrast, it divided Siberian deputies in seventeen votes.

Finally, another source of division among deputies was their ethnic origin. Among SIBFE deputies, non-Russian deputies accounted for 63 or about 27 per cent. In general, non-Russian SIBFE deputies did not appear to be united, although they tended to be less supportive of reform than Russian deputies, revealing differences in seven votes. In particular, these differences were mainly caused by Far Eastern deputies.

Ethnic differences among Far Eastern deputies were mainly revealed in the votes on the questions of introducing new types of land ownership and accountability of the government, when Russian deputies were more liberal in the vote.¹⁶⁴ However, with regard to regional interests, ethnic groups seldom revealed differences in the vote on economic resolutions and other presidential issues. Furthermore, even in votes where differences were revealed, the economic features of the regions from which they were originated seemed to be more important than ethnic origin in itself. For instance, the titular ethnic groups of the republics tended to vote differently although they were still less liberal than their Russian colleagues from the same republics.¹⁶⁵

VI. 4. The Overall Influence of Regional Factors

As in the USSR CPD, deputies' voting patterns were rather personalised in the Russian Congress. However, the analysis of the overall influence of these factors suggests that conspicuous changes were developing in the Russian Congress. Firstly, bloc and regional association memberships, and regional economic features emerged as the main sources of cleavages among deputies in accordance with the acceleration of reform and the changing features of tensions in the Congress. Secondly, the influence of factors varied depending on the question. In relation with SIBFE regionalism, SIBFE deputies were relatively united in votes that were closely related to their common goals. However, their unity was brittle when other questions were put to the vote, which decreased their general influence over the decision-making process in the Congress. Finally, despite the increasing influence of blocs and regional groups, none of these groups controlled the Congress. As a result of the segmentation of deputies, changes in the electoral system had been introduced in December 1993.

VI. 4 (1) Changes in the Voting Patterns of Deputies in Terms of Time Sequence

During the first stage of the confrontation in the Congress, deputies' preferences were personalised, as many factors were involved in the votes that were taken. In the Congress as a whole, age, 'class,' CPSU and political faction membership, and some regional factors such as the economic structure of the regions and membership of regional associations turned out to have a significant influence upon deputies' voting patterns.

However, striking changes had taken place in deputies' voting patterns after the Fifth Congress as the influence of age, 'class' background, and CPSU membership decreased. Among the regional factors, membership of regional associations also seemed to lose its significance as regional associations themselves were on a down-slope by early 1993. By contrast, political bloc membership emerged as a crucial factor. In addition, the economic structure of a region consistently affected deputies' preference in the vote, regardless of tensions in the Congress.

<Table 6.4.1> Numbers of Votes in which Factors had Significant Overall Influence in the Russian CPD in Terms of Time Sequence

	CPD as a Whole			SIBFE Deputies		
	2nd - 5th CPD	6th - 7th CPD	Total	2nd - 5th CPD	6th - 7th CPD	Total
	12 votes	10 votes	22 votes	12 votes	10 votes	22 votes
<u>Personal & 'Azonal' Factors</u>						
Gender	0 (0)	4 (0)	4 (0)	2 (1)	0 (1)	2 (2)
Age	8 (0)	2 (0)	10 (0)	4 (0)	2 (2)	6 (2)
Ethnic Origin	4 (1)	1 (0)	5 (0)	2 (0)	1 (2)	3 (2)
Urban-rural	0 (0)	2 (0)	2 (0)	1 (0)	2 (0)	3 (0)
<u>Functional Factors</u>						
'Class'	9 (0)	4 (0)	13 (0)	3 (2)	1 (1)	4 (3)
CPSU Membership	8 (0)	1 (2)	9 (2)	3 (3)	1 (1)	4 (4)
Bloc Membership	12 (0)	10 (0)	22 (0)	11 (1)	10 (0)	21 (1)
<u>Regional Factors</u>						
Regional Associations	8 (0)	4 (1)	12 (1)	1 (1)	3 (1)	4 (2)
Economic Structure	5 (2)	5 (1)	10 (3)	5 (0)	5 (1)	10 (1)
Economic Performance	3 (1)	1 (1)	4 (2) ¹⁾	3 (1)	2 (0)	5 (1) ³⁾
Autonomous Status	1 (1)	3 (0)	4 (1) ¹⁾	3 (0)	2 (4)	5 (4) ⁴⁾
Economic Performance + Federal Status	2 (0)	2 (0)	4 (0) ²⁾	2 (0)	0 (0)	2 (0) ⁵⁾

¹⁾ excluded from four votes (P1, Q2, T3, and U3)

²⁾ included in four votes in place of Economic Performance and the Federal Status

³⁾ excluded from seven votes (P1, R1, R2, T2, T3, U3, and U5)

⁴⁾ excluded from three votes (P1, R2, and U3)

⁵⁾ included in three votes in place of Economic Performance and the Federal Status

Significance at the 0.05 (0.10) level.

Among SIBFE deputies, a similar tendency can be traced. However, a couple of features are noteworthy among SIBFE deputies. For instance, the influence of CPSU membership and 'class' had decreased even before the Fifth Congress among SIBFE deputies. By contrast, the economic features of the SIBFE regions consistently affected deputies' voting patterns throughout the Congresses. In particular, differences between Siberian and Far Eastern deputies became clearer after the Fifth Congress, reflecting the split between the two regional groups outside the Congress. Furthermore, the federal status and economic structure of the regions more significantly affected SIBFE deputies' voting patterns in the Russian Congress than in the USSR Congress. As a result, regional factors and political bloc membership became quite solid sources of division among SIBFE deputies, particularly after the Fifth Congress.

VI. 4 (2) The Voting Patterns of Deputies in Terms of Types of Issues

Although the influence of deputies' regional background and bloc membership upon their voting patterns increased, it was dependent on the questions that were put to the vote. For instance, bloc membership appeared to be a decisive factor in the vote on no confidence. In the vote on the resolutions on the course of reform, bloc membership and regional association membership turned out to have the dominant influence. By contrast, more factors were involved in the vote on land reform and on relations between the parliament and the president (See Table 6.4.2).

<Table 6.4.2> Numbers of Votes in which Factors had Significant Overall Influence in the Russian CPD in Terms of Topics

	Land reform	Eco. resolutions	Presi-dency	No confi-dence	Balance of power	Other	Total
	3 votes	3 votes	3 votes	2 votes	7 votes	4 votes	22 votes
CPD as a whole							
<u>Personal & Azonal Factors</u>							
Gender	2 (0)	1 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (0)	0 (0)	4 (0)
Age	2 (0)	1 (0)	2 (0)	0 (0)	4 (0)	1 (0)	10 (0)
Ethnic Origin	1 (0)	0 (0)	2 (0)	0 (0)	1 (0)	1 (0)	5 (0)
Urban-rural	1 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	2 (0)	0 (0)	2 (0)
<u>Functional Factors</u>							
'Class'	2 (0)	1 (0)	3 (0)	1 (0)	3 (0)	3 (0)	13 (0)
CPSU Membership	1 (0)	1 (0)	3 (0)	0 (0)	1 (0)	3 (0)	9 (2)
Bloc Membership	3 (0)	3 (0)	3 (0)	2 (0)	7 (0)	4 (0)	22 (0)
<u>Regional Factors</u>							
Regional Associations	2 (0)	3 (0)	1 (0)	1 (0)	2 (1)	3 (0)	12 (1)

Economic Structure	3 (0)	1 (1)	0 (0)	0 (0)	4 (1)	2 (1)	10 (3)
Economic Performance	1 (0)	0 (1)	1 (0)	0 (0)	1 (0)	1 (0)	4 (2) ¹⁾
Federal Status	0 (0)	1 (0)	0 (1)	0 (0)	3 (0)	0 (0)	4 (1) ¹⁾
Economic Performance + Federal Status	2 (0)	1 (0)	n/a	n/a	1 (0)	n/a	3 (0) ²⁾

SIBFE Deputies**Personal & Azonal Factors**

Gender	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (1)	0 (0)	1 (1)	1 (0)	2 (2)
Age	2 (0)	1 (0)	0 (0)	0 (1)	2 (1)	1 (0)	6 (1)
Ethnic Origin	1 (0)	1 (1)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (1)	0 (0)	3 (2)
Urban-rural	2 (0)	1 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	3 (0)

Functional Factors

'Class'	0 (1)	0 (1)	1 (1)	0 (0)	1 (0)	2 (0)	4 (3)
CPSU Membership	1 (0)	0 (1)	2 (0)	0 (1)	0 (0)	1 (2)	4 (4)
Bloc Membership	3 (0)	3 (0)	3 (0)	2 (0)	7 (0)	3 (1)	21 (1)

Regional Factors

Regional Associations	1 (1)	1 (0)	0 (0)	1 (0)	1 (1)	0 (0)	4 (2)
Economic Structure	2 (1)	0 (0)	1 (0)	0 (0)	6 (0)	1 (0)	10 (1)
Economic Performance	1 (0)	1 (0)	1 (0)	0 (0)	1 (1)	1 (0)	5 (1) ³⁾
Federal Status	0 (1)	2 (0)	1 (0)	0 (0)	1 (3)	1 (0)	5 (4) ⁴⁾
Economic Performance + Federal Status	1 (0)	n/a	1 (0)	n/a	n/a	n/a	2 (0) ⁵⁾

¹⁾ excluded from four votes (P1, Q2, T3, and U3)

²⁾ included in four votes in place of Economic Performance and the Federal Status

³⁾ excluded from seven votes (P1, R1, R2, T2, T3, U3, and U5)

⁴⁾ excluded from three votes (P1, R2, and U3)

⁵⁾ included in three votes in place of Economic Performance and the Federal Status

Significance at the 0.05 (0.10) level.

These trends were also found among SIBFE deputies. In particular, the economic structure of the regions clearly emerged as a powerful influence upon the voting patterns of SIBFE deputies, particularly in the vote on relations between the parliament and the president. In the vote, bloc membership and the economic structure of the regions that deputies were representing determined SIBFE deputies' voting patterns, as the influence of personal and functional factors decreased significantly after the Fifth Congress.

An investigation of changes in the chi-square also showed similar results. Among deputies in the Congress as a whole, regional factors seemed to play quite an important role when deputies cast their votes. As in Appendix tables 7.1 and 7.2, regional factors significantly improved the score for the the vote on land reform, the resolution on the course of reform, and on rule by presidential decree.

In particular, the regional factors included in the analysis significantly affected SIBFE deputies' voting patterns in the vote on the relationship between the president and the parliament even after the Sixth and Seventh Congress.

VI. 4 (3) Limits of Political Blocs as Voting Blocs

Among the factors discussed in this analysis, political bloc membership turned out to have a significant influence on the voting patterns of deputies. However, it is difficult to say that political faction (or bloc) membership was the most influential or 'sufficient' factor in explaining voting patterns of deputies in the Congress. It should be recalled that main political blocs were formed in April 1992, just before the Sixth Congress. Until the Sixth Congress, a 'political bloc' in the table meant a group of political factions which would join the bloc later, and the term was used to maintain the consistency of the analysis.¹⁶⁶

Even after the Sixth Congress, political factions or blocs were rather unstable in their membership. Deputies often joined more than one faction at the same time and shifted from faction to faction.¹⁶⁷ Furthermore, more than half the deputies who joined the political factions did not seem to be strongly affiliated with their factions. They often failed to work out an agreement even with other deputies who belonged to the same faction as no factions had an alternative reform policy with which members were agreed.¹⁶⁸

As in Appendix 8.1, political faction leaders in the Congress often appeared to be in dispute with their members, particularly in factions such as Left Centre, Free Russia, and the Workers' Union. Therefore, it is not strange that deputies often showed rather different voting patterns from those of their leaders in those factions. For instance, among SIBFE deputies, only those who joined five factions—Radical Democrats, Democratic Russia, Fatherland, *Rossia*, and Communists of Russia—tended to show similar voting patterns to their leading figures as compared with other deputies. This observation suggests that political bloc membership was more influential for those who joined one of two blocs—the Coalition for Reform that strongly supported reform, or the Russian Unity that strongly opposed reform—than deputies who joined other blocs.

One of the reasons for the relatively strong unity of the Coalition for Reform and Russian Unity can be found in their relatively homogeneous composition. As for the Coalition for Reform bloc, its members mainly came from the intelligentsia, cadres, and technicians, who provided 82.8 per cent of the members of the bloc. Considering the regional background of members, 89.9 per cent were from large cities and 62.4 per cent were from hub/gate regions. Russian Unity also consisted of deputies who tended

to share a common background. They were mainly nomenklaturists, managers (particularly managers in the agricultural sector), and military personnel, who together accounted for 221 members or 77.2 per cent. Furthermore, most deputies from rural areas, 72.4 per cent of them, joined Russian Unity.

By contrast, two other blocs, the Democratic Centre and Creative Strength, tended to lack homogeneity in their composition. As a result, 'class' and regional cleavages emerged among deputies who joined the factions that consisted of these two blocs in 1992. Even at the Sixth Congress when the political blocs were established, significant regional or 'class' differences were revealed particularly among the Democratic Centre, although they almost disappeared at the Seventh Congress.

<Table 6.4.3> 'Class' and Regional Cleavages within the Political Blocs in the Russian CPD

	2nd CPD	3rd CPD	4th CPD	5th CPD	6th CPD	7th CPD	Total
	3 votes	3 votes	3 votes	3 votes	5 votes	5 votes	22 votes
<u>Coalition for Reform</u>							
'Class'	2 (0)	0 (1)	0 (0)	1 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	3 (1)
Economic structure	1 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (0)	1 (0)	1 (1)	4 (1)
<u>Democratic Centre</u>							
'Class'	2 (0)	3 (0)	3 (0)	2 (0)	3 (0)	0 (0)	13 (0)
Economic structure	0 (1)	3 (0)	2 (0)	1 (0)	3 (1)	1 (0)	10 (2)
<u>Creative Strength</u>							
'Class'	2 (0)	3 (0)	2 (0)	1 (0)	2 (1)	0 (2)	10 (3)
Economic structure	0 (1)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (1)
<u>Russian Unity</u>							
'Class'	1 (0)	2 (0)	1 (0)	0 (1)	1 (1)	0 (1)	5 (3)
Economic structure	0 (0)	1 (0)	1 (0)	0 (0)	2 (0)	2 (1)	6 (1)
<u>Others</u>							
'Class'	3 (0)	3 (0)	3 (0)	1 (0)	2 (0)	0 (0)	12 (0)
Economic structure	3 (0)	3 (0)	2 (0)	1 (0)	0 (0)	0 (1)	9 (1)

Bloc membership as of 1992.

Numbers of votes in which differences were revealed at the 0.05 (0.10) level.

This trend was also found among SIBFE deputies, although the sample size is often too small to analyse possible 'class' and regional differences within the political blocs. However, it is noteworthy that the economic structure of the regions divided SIBFE deputies who joined the Russian Unity bloc. By contrast to the general trend that regional cleavages within a bloc tended to diminish among deputies in the Congress as a whole, regional cleavages among SIBFE deputies who were members of Russian Unity clearly emerged even at the Seventh Congress (see Table 6.4.4). This result suggests that the influence of the political blocs could be weaker among SIBFE deputies than among deputies in the Congress as a whole.

<Table 6.4.4> Regional Differences within 'Russian Unity' at the Seventh CPD

	N	Mean	SD		df	MS	F	sig.
<u>the Resolution on the Course of Economic Reform (U2)</u>								
Rural regions	7	4.29	7.87	between groups	3	331.28	14.81	0.000
Resource regions	26	-8.08	4.02	within groups	69	22.36		
Hub/gate regions	12	-7.50	6.22	total	72			
Residual regions	28	-8.57	3.56					
Total	73	-6.99	5.94					
<u>Muravev's constitutional amendment to Art. 12 (the right to sell land, U3)</u>								
Rural regions	7	0.00	5.77	between groups	3	141.40	3.25	0.027
Resource regions	26	-4.23	7.58	within groups	69	43.45		
Hub/gate regions	12	-4.17	7.93	total	72			
Residual regions	28	-7.86	4.99					
Total	73	-5.21	6.89					
<u>Eltsin's constitutional amendment to Art. 122 (U4)</u>								
Rural regions	7	-5.71	7.87	between groups	3	85.85	3.73	0.015
Resource regions	26	-5.77	6.43	within groups	69	23.07		
Hub/gate regions	12	-10.00	0.00	total	72			
Residual regions	28	-9.29	2.62					
Total	73	-7.81	5.07					
<u>Zor'kin's proposal on the Resolution on the stabilisation of the Structure of the RF</u>								
Rural regions	7	-1.43	6.90	between groups	3	166.52	5.22	0.003
Resource regions	26	3.08	5.49	within groups	69	31.87		
Hub/gate regions	12	-4.17	6.69	total	72			
Residual regions	28	-1.07	4.97					
Total	73	-0.14	6.12					

Mean scores range from +10 (pro-reform) to -10 (anti-reform).

Although these observations still leave a lot to be explained, they provide some clues for an understanding of general tendencies in the Congress, their implications for the question of regionalism, and further political developments in Russia. First of all, it is needless to say that any single factor cannot provide a whole picture. Even deputies' political orientation was related to other functional and regional factors. Although I suggested some combination of factors, a revised set of regional groups may produce some improvement in explanation.

Secondly, despite the development of regional associations, their influence over deputies' voting patterns was rather limited. Considering the unity level, deputies from the Urals, Siberian and Far East regions appeared to be reasonably well united only when they are compared with other deputy groups of regional associations, but not in an absolute sense. Furthermore, deputies were divided into smaller regional groups as the reform policies were specified in accordance with the acceleration of reform.

Thirdly, this vague division of deputies made it difficult for the government to adopt necessary measures. Decisions made at the Congress often end up with vague guidelines, because of conflicting interests of various political blocs, sectors, and regions. This, in turn, led to the regionalisation of reform.

Finally, the experience in the Congress encouraged Eltsin to consider changes in the political system including election procedures. In connection with the electoral system, Sobyenin suggested that changes should be introduced for new elections:

... the independent position of deputies who were elected as individuals has made parliament politically ill organised, unpredictable and unstable. As a result, it may become a hostage of the hands of a narrow group of deputies, ... This negative experience of the Russian parliament, pregnant with the constant threat of acute and profound political crises, must be considered in preparing for new elections which may occur in the near future.¹⁶⁹

Although Sobyenin did not mention specific changes, it became clear when the State Duma was elected in December 1993. The size of the parliament was reduced from 1068 seats in 1990 to 628 seats (450 seats for the Duma and 178 seats for the Council of the Federation) in 1993. Furthermore, half the Duma seats that were allocated to parties that gained more than 5 per cent of the votes across the country, which also reduced the influence of regional parties on the national decision-making.¹⁷⁰

¹) Dmitrieva has observed that an equalising policy over several decades has been less successful, resulting in an increasing degree of differentiation between regions in their living standards. She also has observed that, against a degree of growth in imbalance in economic output, an "explosive growth of differences" in living standards would emerge in a year or two. Oksana Dmitrieva, *Regional Development: The USSR and After* (London: UCL Press, 1996), p. 189.

²) According to Sobyenin, members of the Interregional Deputies' group in the USSR Congress tried to secure their seats in the local soviets rather than in the Russian Congress. Alexander Sobyenin, "The Current Crisis," Thomas F. Remington (ed.), *Parliaments in Transition: the New Legislative Politics in the Former USSR and Eastern Europe* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 184.

³) Remington and his colleagues also divided eight Congresses, from the Second to Ninth, into three stages: from the Second to Fourth, the Fifth and Sixth, and the Seventh to Ninth Congress. Thomas F. Remington, Steven S. Smith, D. Roderick, Kiewiet, and Moshe Haspel, "Transitional Institutions and Parliamentary Alignments in Russia, 1990-1993," in *ibid.*, pp. 159-180.

⁴) White and his colleagues have also observed that the conflict between legislative and executive branches became "a distinguishing feature of politics and a major source of instability." Stephen White,

Graeme Gill, and Darrell Slider, *The Politics of Transition: Shaping a Post-Soviet Future* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 116. A good example of the effect of the power struggle on reform could be seen in the revision of the Constitution. White, Rose and McAllister have noted that the Constitution of 1978 had become a "self-contradictory document," granting "conflicting authorities to both parliament and the president after being repeatedly amended." As a result, they argued, the task of governing Russia was becoming "virtually impossible." Stephen White, Richard Rose, and Ian McAllister, *How Russia Votes* (Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, 1997), p. 80. Also see John Löwenhardt, *The Reincarnation of Russia: Struggling with the Legacy of Communism, 1990-1994* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995), pp. 168-173.

⁵) 69.9 per cent of the voters supported the introduction of a Russian presidency. For a discussion of the referendum of March 1991, see White, Rose, and McAllister, *How Russia Votes*, pp. 73-77; and Ann Sheehy, "The All-Union and RSFSR Referendum," *Radio Liberty Report on the USSR*, vol. 3, no. 13 (26 March 1991), pp. 19-23. For a general discussion of the Union question, see Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, *Referendum in the Soviet Union: A Compendium of Reports on the March 17 1991 Referendum on the Future of the U.S.S.R* (Washington, D. C.: US Government Printing Office, 1991); and A. A. Sopianin, and V. G. Sukhovol'skii, *Demokratia, organichennaia fal'sifikatsiia: vybory i referendumy v Rossii v 1991-1993 gg.* (Moscow: INTU, 1995).

⁶) Eltsin failed to include the question on the agenda by a narrow margin of 13 votes. Verkhovnyi Sovet Rossiiskoi Federatsii, *Tretii (vnecherednoi) s'ezd narodnykh deputatov RSFSR, 28 marta-5 aprilia 1991 goda: stenograficheskii otchet*, vol. II (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Respublika", 1992), pp. 227, 308 (11). Then the question of presidency was postponed to the next Congress. *Ibid.*, pp. 228-229, 309 (13).

⁷) The CPD adopted the resolution "On the redistribution of authority among higher government organs of the RSFSR for the realisation of anti-crisis measures and the implementation of the decisions of the CPD of the RSFSR," which granted the chairman of the Supreme Soviet the right to issue decrees. *Ibid.*, vol. V, pp. 154-155.

⁸) For a discussion of the presidential election, see White, Rose, and McAllister, *How Russia Votes*, pp. 35-40; Stephen White, Ian McAllister and Olga Kryshstanovskaya, "El'tsin and His Voters: Popular Support in the 1991 Russian Presidential Elections and After," *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 46, no. 2 (1994), pp. 285-303; and Michael E. Urban, "Boris Eltsin, Democratic Russia and the Campaign for the Russian Presidency," *Soviet Studies*, vol. 44, no. 2 (1992), pp. 187-207.

⁹) For instance, Nikolai Grishin from Saratov oblast criticised introducing private land ownership as "it would be set up on the ruins of the state and collective farms." Verkhovnyi Sovet Rossiiskoi Federatsii, *Vtoroi (vnecherednoi) s'ezd narodnykh deputatov RSFSR, 27 noiabria-15 dekabria 1990 goda: stenograficheskii otchet*, vol. I (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Respublika", 1992), pp. 102-105. An opinion poll showed that 40 per cent of peasants and farm workers, and about the same proportion of agricultural managers and specialists opposed private ownership. Only 12 to 17 per cent of respondents in each group supported it. *Pravda*, 27 November 1990, p. 1.

¹⁰) Eltsin's news conference on 3 December 1990. Moscow Domestic Service in Russian (19:33 GMT 3 December 1990), in *FBIS SOV 90-233* (4 December 1990), p. 29. In relation with the view that the land reform would result in the collapse of the state and collective farms, Ivan Silaev also underlined

that the government supported multiple forms of land ownership and the right of the peasant to choose his own ownership type. He also unveiled the government plan to allocate about 20 billion rubbles to the collective and state farms in his speech at the seventh session. *Vtoroi (vneocherednoi) s'ezd narodnykh deputatov RSFSR*, vol. I, p. 371. For his report to the Congress, see Doklad Soveta Ministrov RSFSR "O programme vozrozhdeniia rossiiskoi derevni i razvitiia agropromyshlennogo kompleksa," in *ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 56-76.

¹¹) *Ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 344 (34), 408-428.

¹²) *Tretii (vneocherednoi) s'ezd narodnykh deputatov RSFSR*, vol. III, pp. 54, 58, 116 (38). Even Ivan Polozkov, leader of the Russian Communist Party, opposed such a move, maintaining that it was not a proper time to change the leadership. *Ibid.*, vol. III, pp. 62-63.

¹³) In his speech to the Congress, he warned that it would be a mistake to rush the concluding of the Union Treaty before the Union republics made their decisions. Eltsin's speech on 11 December 1990, in *Vtoroi (vneocherednoi) s'ezd narodnykh deputatov RSFSR*, vol. IV, pp. 224-230, 225.

¹⁴) Despite the opposition, Eltsin won the support of a majority of deputies and the Second Congress decided not to discuss the draft Union Treaty proposed by Gorbachev, but to exchange views on the principles for concluding a Union Treaty. After the discussion, the Second Congress adopted a resolution on the Union Treaty declaring the supremacy of the Russian Constitution and RSFSR law on RSFSR territories at the end of the Congress. *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, 13 December 1990, p. 1.

¹⁵) For instance, at the Fifth Congress (10-17 July and 28 October-2 November 1991), opponents gave a blow to the government by assessing its work as "unsatisfactory" in a resolution on the socio-economic situation in the RSFSR. *Postanovlenie s'ezda narodnykh deputatov Rossiiskoi Sovetskoi Federativnoi Sotsialisticheskoi Respubliki "O sotsial'no-ekonomicheskom polozhenii v RSFSR,"* in *Verkhovnyi Sovet Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Piatyi (vneocherednoi) s'ezd narodnykh deputatov RSFSR, 10-17 iulia, 28 oktiabria-2 noiabria 1991 goda: stenograficheskii otchet*, vol. III (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Respublika", 1992), pp. 263-264 (Point 2).

¹⁶) The Congress resolution also declared a moratorium on elections of the heads and executive organs at all levels until 1 December 1992 and subordinated the lower executive power to higher organs. *Postanovlenie s'ezda narodnykh deputatov Rossiskoi Sovetskoi Federativnoi Sotsialisticheskoi Respubliki "Ob organizatsii ispolnitel'noi vlasti v period radikal'noi ekonomicheskoi reformy,"* in *ibid.*, vol. III, pp. 264-265.

¹⁷) In particular, the president was endowed with powers to issue presidential decrees on almost every aspect of economic life—banking, stock exchange, monetary-financial policy, investment, customs, budget, pricing, taxation, property, land reform, employment, and foreign economic relations—and on activities of the executive organs. *Postanovlenie s'ezda narodnykh deputatov Rossiskoi Sovetskoi Federativnoi Sotsialisticheskoi Respubliki "O pravovom obespechenii ekonomicheskoi reformy,"* in *ibid.*, vol. III, pp. 265-267.

¹⁸) 412 deputies voted in favour of the proposal while 447 deputies rejected it. *Verkhovnyi Sovet Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Shestoi s'ezd narodnykh deputatov RSFSR, 6-21 apreilia 1992 goda: stenograficheskii otchet*, vol. I (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Respublika", 1992), pp. 31, 485 (6), 500-524.

¹⁹) Postanovlenie s'ezda narodnykh deputatov Rossiiskoi Federatsii "O khode ekonomicheskoi reformy v Rossiiskoi Federatsii," in *ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 289-294, 290-292. These demands were so contradictory to the content of the government plan that the cabinet submitted its resignation to the president after the resolution had been adopted. *Izvestiia*, 13 April 1992, p. 1.

²⁰) According to the resolution of the Congress "On the Course of Economic Reform," the president was instructed to submit a draft law on the government to the parliament and to present candidates for the head of the government within three months (Article 3). Initially, Eltsin proposed to present the law before 1 September and to have the Supreme Soviet adopt it before 1 December 1992, which was rejected by the Congress. *Shestoi s'ezd narodnykh deputatov RSFSR*, vol. II, pp. 245-246, 357 (123), 608-627. As a compromise, the Congress accepted N. Riabov's proposal which allowed the president three months. *Ibid.* vol. II, pp. 248, 358 (124), 608-627. The resolution also requested the president to abolish the presidential representatives in the localities (Point 2 and 6). Postanovlenie s'ezda narodnykh deputatov Rossiiskoi Federatsii "O khode ekonomicheskoi reformy v Rossiiskoi Federatsii," in *ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 293-294.

²¹) *Ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 227-228, 353 (110), 568-587.

²²) Sheboldaev's proposal to bestow the Supreme Soviet with the power to endorse the appointment of key personnel of the government fell short of the two-thirds majority that was required. Key personnel in this context included the chairman, the first deputy chairman, the deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers, the Ministers of Defence, Security, Internal Affairs, Finance, Economics, Foreign Affairs, Justice, and the Press and Media. *Ibid.*, vol. IV, pp. 522 (25), 576-598. Six other proposals on Article 109 of the Constitution were all rejected. *Ibid.*, vol. III, pp. 501 (85); and *ibid.*, vol. IV, pp. 333 (10, 13), 335 (16), 339 (28).

²³) The presidential decree "On the sale of land plots to citizens and legal entities during the privatisation of state and municipal enterprises" on 25 March 1992 allowed the sale of plots which were privatised. Ukaz prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii "O prodazhe zemel'nykh uchastkov grazhdanam i iuridicheskim litsam pri privatizatsii gosudarstvennykh i munitsipal'nykh predpriatii," *Vedomosti s'ezda narodnykh deputatov Rossiiskoi Federatsii i Verkhvnogo Soveta Rossiiskoi Federatsii*, no. 14 (2 April 1992), p. 994.

²⁴) Eltsin signed on a draft law on the government of the RSFSR when the Sixth Congress was in its session (in April 1992). The draft law stipulated that the consent of the Supreme Soviet should be required only for the appointment of chairman of the Council of Ministers. *Kuranty*, 22 April 1992, p. 1.

²⁵) His view was clearly reflected in his report on a draft Constitution. Enumerating three types of state—the parliamentary republic, the presidential republic, and the mixed republic—he preferred the parliamentary republic to the presidential one. He insisted that the president should appoint the highest officials with the consent of the parliament, and relieve ministers of their duties when the parliament requested it or that the parliament could dismiss ministers on its own authority. Doklad Predsedatelia Verkhvnogo Soveta Rossiiskoi Federatsii Khasbulatova R. I. "O proekte Konstitutsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii," in *Shestoi s'ezd narodnykh deputatov RSFSR*, vol. IV, pp. 293-309.

²⁶) The positions of both blocs were revealed at the meeting of the Constitutional Commission in July 1992. In his report to the Constitutional Commissions on the State of Constitutional Reform in the

Russian Federation, Eltsin proposed to rephrase Point 5 of Article 98 of the draft Constitution, suggesting that the president's veto would be overruled not by a majority but by two-thirds of the deputies. He also proposed that the president should be included among the bodies who could request a national referendum, and that a new Constitution should be adopted by referendum. In response to Eltsin's report, Sergei Filatov, First Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, insisted that a new Constitution should be based upon the basic concept that was approved by the Sixth Congress and should be adopted by the Congress. *Izvestiia*, 30 July 1992, p. 2.

²⁷) In return for the postponement, Eltsin maintained that he would give up the emergency powers. He also opened the possibility of adopting the Constitution at the Congress. *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 16 October 1992, p. 1.

²⁸) It was believed that a couple of practical considerations were behind his proposal. Firstly, it was thought that Eltsin expected some positive results from his economic policy including the privatisation. Secondly, the postponement would provide him with an opportunity to appease some opposition factions such as the Civic Union by adjusting the course and speed of economic reform. Thirdly, Eltsin was also intended to win support from the regional leaders by promising them more power. Finally, he could consolidate his own supporters by purging some of his cabinet members who held different views. *Ibid.*

²⁹) New energy policy was said to be introduced in 1993 and would free the price of 12 major items including oil, petroleum, and coal products. The report appeared in the newspapers even before it was fully adopted. *Izvestiia*, 10 September 1992, p. 1. In order to win the support of regional leaders, Eltsin asserted the need to guarantee the legal term of the heads of regional legislative and executive bodies which left two and a half years more even after the moratorium on elections was lifted. He also accepted various models of development, promising that the government would take account of specific features of the regions in completing investment and structural policy at the All-Union Conference of the Heads of Representatives and Executive Bodies of Power. He even mentioned that there were 40 documents granting privileges to individual regions, inviting regions to separate negotiations with the centre. *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 16 October 1992, p. 1. At a meeting with 65 enterprise directors in November 1992 in Togliatti, Egor Gaidar, acting Prime Minister, uncovered the government plan in which demands of entrepreneurs were accepted. For instance, according to the plan, VAT would be cut from 28 per cent to 20 per cent and 90 per cent of joint stock share would be allowed. *Rossiiskata gazeta*, 27 October 1992, p. 2. Furthermore, Eltsin issued a decree on 16 November 1992 which stipulated that the state would retain "a controlling block of shares for 3 years only in a limited part of the economy in the process of privatisation." Ukaz prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii "O merakh po realizatsii promyshlennoi politiki pri privatizatsii gosudarsvennykh predpriatii," *Vedomosti*, no. 47 (26 November 1992), pp. 3493-3495, 3493 (Article 2). He also adopted an appeasement policy towards centralist factions such as the Civic Union by appointing Chernomyrdin rather than Gaidar as Prime Minister.

³⁰) Postonovlenie s''ezda narodnykh deputatov Rossiiskoi Federatsii "O khode ekonomicheskoi reformy v Rossiiskoi Federatsii," in Verkhovnyi Sovet Rossiiskoi Federatsii, *Sed'moi s''ezd narodnykh deputatov RSFSR, 1-14 dekabria 1992 goda: stenograficheskii otchet*, vol. I (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Respublika", 1993), pp. 537-538 (Points 1 and 2).

³¹) The Supreme Soviet, then, acquired the power to suspend resolutions passed by the presidium of the Supreme Soviet and its presidium, and decrees of the president in accordance with the decision of the Constitutional Court. The Supreme Soviet was also given the right to suspend the president's power to overrule decisions made by the government, and the effect of presidential decrees until the decision of the Constitutional Court had ruled on their constitutionality (Point 19 of Article 109 of the Constitution). 785 deputies supported this amendment to the Constitution, while 91 voted against it. *Ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 181, 375 (57), 490-509. In a footnote to this point, however, it was made clear that the Supreme Soviet's right to suspend decrees and orders of the president did not enter into force until a referendum was held on the basis of the provisions of the Constitution. The Congress also granted the Supreme Soviet the right to share the power with the president to initiate the legislative activity of the Council of Ministers (Article 110). The question had been rejected in an open vote, before it was adopted in a secret vote. *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, 8 December 1992, p. 1.

³²) Amendment to Article 122 of the Constitution. For the result of the vote, see *Sed'moi s'ezd narodnykh deputatov RSFSR*, vol. I, p. 510.

³³) For instance, the opposition bloc failed to obstruct the president from forming the government independently. The Congress failed to pass the amendments to Point 3 of Article 109 and Point 5 of Article 121 of the Constitution to the effect that key figures of the government should be appointed to their offices and relieved of their duties with the consent of the Supreme Soviet. In the vote, these amendments were rejected by a narrow margin. For instance, the president's amendment to Point 3 of Article 109 (the Supreme Soviet forms, reorganises, and abolishes ministries, state committees and departments upon the representations of the president) was rejected by a margin of a single vote. Another president's amendment that key figures should be appointed with the consent of the Supreme Soviet could have been adopted if four more deputies supported it. *Ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 508-509.

³⁴) Ivan Rybkin, coordinator of Communist Russia, suggested to the president that deputies be granted the right to give consent to appoint heads of "power yielding ministries" such as Defence, Security, and Internal Affairs. Eltsin agreed to this proposal. *Ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 105-106.

³⁵) For Eltsin's speech at the Seventh Congress, see B. N. El'tsin "O stabilizatsii konstitutsionnogo stroia Rossiiskoi Federatsii," in A. I. Miliukov (comp.), *Sed'moi s'ezd narodnykh deputatov Rossiiskoi Federatsii: doklady, soobshcheniia, dokumenty* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Respublika", 1993), pp. 151, 153-154.

³⁶) The resolution "On the Stabilisation of Constitutional System in the Russian Federation" consisted of 9 points. According to Point 2 of the resolution, the Supreme Soviet's right to suspend presidential decrees (Point 19 of Article 109 of the Constitution) and to initiate legislation (Article 110), and the immediate suspension of the president's rights (Point 6 of Article 121) would not come into force until the referendum. Furthermore, additions to the law on referenda that prohibited the president from calling a referendum became no longer valid (Point 5). In return for these changes, the president was instructed to represent multiple candidates for the post of chairman of the Council of Ministers to the Congress, and to nominate one of three candidates who received the most votes. *Postanavlenie s'ezda narodnykh deputatov Rossiiskoi Federatsii "O stabilizatsii konstitutsionnogo stroia Rossiiskoi Federatsii,"* in *Sed'moi s'ezd narodnykh deputatov RSFSR*, vol. IV, pp. 301-303.

³⁷) *Rossiiskie vesti*, 20 February 1993, p. 1.

³⁸) See N. Riabov's report to the Congress. Doklad Zamestitelia Predesedatelia Verkhovnogo Soveta Rossiiskoi Federatsii Riabova N. T. "O postanovlenii sed'mogo s'ezda narodnykh deputatov Rossiiskoi Federatsii 'O stabilizatsii konstitutsionnogo stroia Rossiiskoi Federatsii,'" in Verkhovnyi Sovet Rossiiskoi Federatsii, *Vos'moi (vneocheranoi) s'ezd narodnykh deputatov Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 10-13 marta 1993 goda: stenograficheskiĭ otchet* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Respublika", 1993), pp. 51-67.

³⁹) The president proposed a draft resolution of the Congress "On the Cooperation among the Branches of Government in Overcoming the Crisis and Ways to Achieve Accord (On the resolution of the Seventh Congress "On the Stabilisation of the Constitutional System in the Russian Federation)." See *Rossiiskie vesti*, 12 March 1993, p. 1.

⁴⁰) Postanovlenie s'ezda narodnykh deputatov Rossiiskoi Federatsii "O merakh osushchestvleniia konstitutsionnoi reformy v Rossiiskoi Federatsii (o postanovlenii sed'mogo s'ezda narodnykh deputatov Rossiiskoi Federatsii "O stabilizatsii konstitutsionnogo stroia Rossiiskoi Federatsii")," in *Vos'moi (vneocheranoi) s'ezd narodnykh deputatov Rossiiskoi Federatsii*, pp. 415-417. The president was defeated in the vote when he proposed to remove Points 2 and 7 of the resolution which nullified the agreement of the Seventh Congress and animated the effect of Articles 109, 110, and 121.6 of the Constitution.

⁴¹) Point 2 of the resolution stipulated that 20 million rubles should be spent on accommodating returning soldiers. Postanovlenie s'ezda narodnykh deputatov Rossiiskoi Federatsii "O vserossiiskom referendume," in *Vos'moi (vneocheranoi) s'ezd narodnykh deputatov Rossiiskoi Federatsii*, pp. 418-419.

⁴²) Ukaz prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii "O deiatel'nosti ispolnitel'nykh organov do preodoleniia krizisa vlasti (24 March 1993)," *Izvestiia*, 25 March 1993, p. 1.

⁴³) Ukaz prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii "Ob otventstvennosti dolzhnostnykh lits ispolnitel'noi vlasti v Rossiiskoi Federatsii," *Rossiiskie vesti*, 24 March 1993, p. 1.

⁴⁴) "Boris El'tsin predlozhit strane mirnyi put' vykhoda iz krizisa," *Rossiiskie vesti*, 23 March 1993, pp. 1-2. However, his words of "special form of administration" disappeared in his decree.

⁴⁵) His proposal was based on the compromise of both sides, accepting the president's position on Articles 104 and 109 of the Constitution that these provisions should be in line with the principle of the separation of powers. He also proposed to hold early presidential elections and elections to the Congress in the autumn of 1993. *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, 27 March 1993, pp. 1-2.

⁴⁶) The resolution pointed out "serious violation of the Constitution" and Eltsin should take "personal responsibility" for the culmination of the confrontation. It further contained a motion to appeal to the Constitutional Court for the constitutionality of five presidential decrees. Postanovlenie s'ezda narodnykh deputatov Rossiiskoi Federatsii "O neotlozhnykh merakh po sokhraneniui konstitutsionnogo stroia Rossiiskoi Federatsii (29 marta 1993 goda)," in A. I. Miliukov (comp.), *Vos'moi i deviatyi (vneocherodnye) s'ezdy narodnykh deputatov Rossiiskoi Federatsii: dokumenty, doklady, soobshcheniia, zaiavleniia (po materialam stenogramm)* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Respublika", 1993), pp. 240-242.

⁴⁷) In the referendum, 58.7 per cent of the voters supported Eltsin while 39.2 per cent voted against him on the first question. 53.0 per cent voted in favour of his social and economic policy although

44.6 per cent voted against it. The percentage of voters supporting early elections of the Congress (43.1 per cent) was higher than those supporting early presidential elections (31.7 per cent). Only 19.3 per cent of voters were against early elections of the CPD, while 30.2 per cent rejected early presidential elections. *Izvestiia*, 6 May 1993, p. 2. For a more detailed discussion, see Ralph S. Clem and Peter R. Craumer, "The Geography of the April 25 (1993) Russian Referendum," *Post-Soviet Geography*, vol. 34, no. 8 (October 1993), pp. 481-496; White, Rose, and McAllister, *How Russia Votes*, pp. 77-86; and Richard Rose, Irina Boeva, and Viacheslav Shironin, *How Russians Are Coping with Transition: New Russia Barometer II* (Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde Studies, 1993) (Studies in Public Policy, no. 216).

⁴⁸) The Constitutional Conference was composed of representatives of the federal state bodies, the state bodies of the federal constituent, local self-government, political and public organisations, and representatives of production sectors and entrepreneurs. The representatives of the federal state bodies included members of the Constitutional Commission of the Congress, one deputy from each political faction within the Congress, and 50 presidential representatives. Ukaz prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii "O sozyve konstitutsionnogo soveshchaniia i zavershenii proekta konstitutsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii (20 May 1993)," *Izvestiia*, 22 May 1993, p. 1.

⁴⁹) The idea of creating a Federal Council was proposed at the third Conference of the Council of the Heads of the Republics in August in Petrozavodsk, in which representatives of eight inter-regional associations including the Siberian Agreement and the Far Eastern Association took part. The Federal Council was supposed to be a consultative body for the president on social and economic policies, security, and other federal issues. The heads of regional administrations supported Eltsin's proposal. *Rossiiskie vesti*, 14 August 1993, p. 1; and *Izvestiia*, 25 August 1993, p. 2.

⁵⁰) Shelia Marnie, "The Unsolved Question of Land Reform in Russia," *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol. 2, no. 7 (12 February 1993), pp. 35-37.

⁵¹) The amendment recognised multiple forms of property ownership but placed a ten-year moratorium on land sale from the time of acquiring the property rights for plots of land. *Vtoroi (vneocherednoi) s'ezd narodnykh deputatov RSFSR*, vol. II, pp. 91-92, 344 (34), 408-428.

⁵²) *Shestoi s'ezd narodnykh deputatov RSFSR*, vol. IV, pp. 133-134, 518 (14), 553-575.

⁵³) At the Seventh Congress, Muravev proposed a moratorium on the sale of land plots for ten years if the plot was distributed free of charge, and for five years if it was paid in the process of privatisation. *Sed'moi s'ezd narodnykh deputatov RSFSR*, vol. II, pp. 87, 236 (26), 288-310.

⁵⁴) In the analysis, Zakharov and Kalashnikov's proposal to insert a reference to the government's work as "unsatisfactory" constituted a main concern. *Tretii (vneocherednoi) s'ezd narodnykh deputatov RSFSR*, vol. III, pp. 116 (38), 202-226.

⁵⁵) The vote to adopt the third version of a draft resolution "On the Progress of Economic Reform in the Russian Federation" as a basis for a further discussion. The draft resolution contained an evaluation of the government's work as 'unsatisfactory' and ordered the president to submit a draft law on the government within a month. *Shestoi s'ezd narodnykh deputatov RSFSR*, vol. II, pp. 296 (2), 297-316.

⁵⁶) The vote on a resolution "On the Course of Economic Reform in the Russian Federation (Editorial Commission version)." The draft also pointed out that the government made a mistake in undertaking economic reform and instructed the government to submit an alternative economic programme within a month. *Sed'moi s'ezd narodnykh deputatov RSFSR*, vol. I, pp. 489, 636 (6), 637-661.

⁵⁷) *Tretii (vneocherednoi) s'ezd narodnykh deputatov RSFSR*, vol. II, pp. 309 (13), 336-359.

⁵⁸) Verkhovnyi Sovet Rossiiskoi Federatsii, *Chetvertyi s'ezd narodnykh deputatov RSFSR, 21-25 maia 1991 goda: stenograficheskiĭ otchet*, vol. I (Moscow: Izdanie Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR, 1991), pp. 281 (3), 284-308.

⁵⁹) Belagov's constitutional amendment to Point 3 of Article 121 prohibiting the president from being a member of any political parties, in *ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 141 (35), 238-262.

⁶⁰) V. B. Isakov's proposal to include the question of no confidence in the government on the agenda of the Sixth Congress, in *Shestoi s'ezd narodnykh deputatov RSFSR*, vol. I, pp. 31, 485 (6), 500-524.

⁶¹) G. B. Saenko's (a member of the Communists of Russia) proposal to include the question of no confidence in the president on the agenda of the Seventh Congress, in *Sed'moi s'ezd narodnykh deputatov RSFSR*, vol. I, pp. 549 (16), 571-590.

⁶²) The vote on the resolution of the Third Congress on the redistribution of authorities which granted the chairman of the Supreme Soviet the right to issue decrees, in *Tretii (vneocherednoi) s'ezd narodnykh deputatov RSFSR*, vol. V, pp. 165 (4), 286-310.

⁶³) In the Fifth Congress, Eltsin initiated a draft resolution on the organisation of the executive. A main purpose of the resolution was to introduce a moratorium on the election of all levels of heads of administrative organs until 1 December 1992. The vote included in the analysis was on a proposal to allow the president to appoint the heads of administration at the krai, oblast and lower levels of administration. *Piatyi (vneocherednoi) s'ezd narodnykh deputatov RSFSR*, vol. III, pp. 44-45, 296 (27), 359-381.

⁶⁴) The vote on the resolution of the Fifth Congress "On the Legal Guarantee for Economic Reform" that introduced a "rule by presidential decrees" in Russia, in *ibid.*, vol. III, pp. 80, 304 (56), 428-450.

⁶⁵) The resolution of the Sixth Congress instructed the president to prepare a draft law on the government within a month. In his response to the resolution, Eltsin asked the Congress to allow him to head the government until 1 December 1992, giving him six months, instead of one month, to prepare a draft law on the government. *Shestoi s'ezd narodnykh deputatov RSFSR*, vol. II, pp. 245-246, 357 (123), 608-627.

⁶⁶) Sheboldaev's constitutional amendment to Point 3 of Article 109 to grant the Supreme Soviet rights to endorse the appointment of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, in *ibid.*, vol. IV, pp. 522 (25), 576-598.

⁶⁷) In his amendment, he proposed that the Council of Ministers should be accountable to the president. *Sedmoi s'ezd narodnykh deputatov RSFSR*, vol. II, pp. 97, 239 (34), 311-333.

⁶⁸) *Ibid.*, vol. IV, pp. 191-194, 367 (1), 368-411.

⁶⁹) They proposed that economic policies of the RSFSR should be in line with those of the Soviet Union. *Vtoroi (vneocherednoi) s'ezd narodnykh deputatov RSFSR*, vol. III, pp. 91-93, 213 (11), 267-287.

⁷⁰) The vote on the proposal to instruct the government to work out a programme for the social development of the North in connection with the resolution of the Second Congress "On the Measures for Stabilisation and Transition to the Market Economy," in *ibid.*, vol. III, pp. 132, 226 (49), 331-350.

⁷¹) *Chetvertyi s'ezd narodnykh deputatov RSFSR*, vol. IV, pp. 98 (2), 103-127.

⁷²) Isaev also proposed that Khasbulatov be remain in his office as acting chairman to which Eltsin agreed. *Piatyi (vneocherednoi) s'ezd narodnykh deputatov RSFSR*, vol. I, pp. 670 (6), 671-693.

⁷³) Sakwa has maintained that "the social and occupational structure" of the Congress constituted the key factor in deputies' voting patterns. Richard Sakwa, *Russian Politics and Society* (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), p. 61.

⁷⁴) David Lane and Cameron Ross, "The Changing Composition and Structure of the Political Elites," in Lane (ed.), *Russia in Transition: Politics, Privatisation and Inequality* (London and New York: Longman, 1995), pp. 62-63.

⁷⁵) For instance, Embree employed several factors such as occupation, generation, and urban-rural factors in his analysis of deputies' voting patterns in the USSR and Russian CPD. Gregory J. Embree, "RSFSR Election Results and Roll Call Votes," *Soviet Studies*, vol. 43, no. 6 (1991), pp. 1065-1084.

⁷⁶) By early 1991, eleven regional associations, including four associations of cities, were formed in the territory of Russia. For the development of the regional associations in Russia, see N. V. Petrov, S. S. Kikheyev and L. V. Smirnyagin, "News Notes: Russia's Regional Associations in Decline," *Post-Soviet Geography*, vol. 34, no. 1 (January 1993), pp. 59-66. For a detailed discussion of the regional associations, particularly the *Bol'shaia Volga* and the *Bol'shoi Ural*, see G. V. Marchenko, *Regional'nye problemy vosstanovleniia novoi Rossiiskoi gosudarstvennosti* (Moscow: Rossiiskii nauchnyi fond, 1996), pp. 118-151.

⁷⁷) In general, deputies from the associations of the Central, Ural, and Far Eastern regions voted in support of Eltsin, scoring higher than the average in more than twelve votes. By contrast, deputies from the regions that joined the Association of Economic Cooperation of the Oblasts of the Central Chernozem Regions and the Siberian Agreement were less supportive of Eltsin, scoring less than average in most of the votes. However, their stances could be changed, depending on the question put to a vote.

⁷⁸) In the vote, the Siberian deputy group (M=2.1) scored the lowest points among the deputy groups of regional associations, while Ural deputies (M=6.0) strongly supported the adoption of the law (F=4.0, p<0.001).

⁷⁹) In the vote, Ural and Siberian deputies (M=4.8 and 4.7 respectively) moderately supported rule by presidential decrees, while deputies from the Central and Volga regions (M=1.2 respectively) were divided (F=5.8, p<0.001).

⁸⁰) As the economic situation was deteriorated in the course of reform, deputies from the Urals ($M=-5.7$), North Caucasus ($M=-6.0$) and Siberia ($M=-4.7$) strongly opposed the government's socio-economic policies. By contrast, deputies from the Central ($M=-1.0$), Northwestern ($M=-1.3$), and Far Eastern regions ($M=-1.5$) were divided ($F=4.6$, $p<0.001$).

⁸¹) Most of the regional association deputy groups maintained higher than a moderate level of unity ($M>|\pm 4|$) only in two votes. Only the Ural deputy group and deputies from regions which did not belong to any regional associations maintained higher than a moderate level of unity (in five votes for the Ural deputies, and in twelve for the latter group).

⁸²) It is needless to say that it depends on the issue in question. For instance, in the vote on the proposal to include a social development programme for the Far North in the stabilisation measures, deputies from the Northwestern and Far Eastern regions showed relatively strong support ($M=6.9$ and 4.8 respectively). However, deputies from the southern regions that might have little interests in the proposal such as the Urals and Central regions ($M=1.2$ and 1.6 respectively) were divided ($F=5.0$, $p<0.001$). In this case, regions of the Northwestern and Far Eastern Economic Cooperation were rather competing with the other regional association groups.

⁸³) In the vote on Isakov's proposal to include the question of a no confidence in the government on the agenda at the Sixth Congress, the hub/gate deputies ($M=1.4$) as a whole rejected it. By contrast, deputies from resource ($M=-0.2$) and residual regions ($M=-0.4$) supported the proposal ($F=2.7$, $p<0.05$). Although there were no significant differences at the 0.05 level, deputies from hub/gate regions ($M=0.3$) again supported Eltsin's position, rejecting the proposal to include the question of a no confidence in the president on the agenda at the Seventh Congress. In the vote, deputies from rural ($M=-1.4$), resource ($M=-1.5$), and residual regions ($M=-1.0$) voted in favour of the proposal ($F=2.4$, $p=0.06$).

⁸⁴) When Eltsin's constitutional amendment to Article 122 on the accountability of the Council of Ministers was put to the vote, deputies from hub/gate regions voted against his amendment. However, still nearly half of them supported the amendment ($M=-0.5$), while the larger proportions of deputies from residual ($M=-3.5$), resource ($M=-3.3$) and rural regions ($M=-2.5$) opposed it ($F=8.3$, $p<0.001$).

⁸⁵) It becomes clear when the two votes—the vote on the proposal to assess the government's performance as "unsatisfactory" that was put to the vote at the Third Congress and the vote on the proposal to adopt a draft resolution on economic reform at the Seventh Congress—are compared. The hub/gate regional group ($M=3.7$) supported Eltsin's economic policies at the Third Congress ($F=9.4$, $p<0.001$), and was divided at the Seventh Congress ($M=-2.0$). By contrast, deputies from rural and resources regions who supported the president's policies at the Third Congress ($M=1.1$ and 2.9 respectively) turned their back on him at the Seventh Congress ($M=-5.0$ and -4.2 respectively).

⁸⁶) For instance, deputies from resource regions ($M=5.2$) showed stronger support than those from rural ($M=2.1$), hub/gate ($M=3.1$), and residual regions ($M=2.9$) in the vote on a resolution of the Fifth Congress which introduced a rule by presidential decrees ($F=2.9$, $p<0.05$).

⁸⁷) For instance, when Eltsin asked the Sixth Congress to head the government until 1 December 1992, the resource regional group ($M=0.2$) was divided while a majority of deputies from rural ($M=2.8$), and hub/gate ($M=2.8$) regions supported Eltsin ($F=3.9$, $p<0.01$). Again, at the Seventh Congress, deputies

from resource regions ($M=-3.3$) was less supportive of Eltsin's constitutional amendment to Article 122 (accountability of the government) than those from hub/gate regions ($M=-0.5$, $F=8.3$, $p<0.001$).

⁸⁸) For instance, 113 deputies from highly developed regions showed their satisfaction with the government's performance at the Third ($M=6.8$, $F=11.8$, $p<0.001$) and Sixth Congresses ($M=5.1$, $F=2.8$, $p<0.05$). They were also the most supportive of Eltsin's position in the vote on the presidency, followed by deputies from the well-developed administrative units. In particular, they remained supportive of Eltsin on many occasions, while other regional groups in this context opposed Eltsin at the Sixth and Seventh Congresses. In particular, differences were evident in the vote on the question of no confidence in the government and in the president on the agenda, on the appointment of the chairman of the Council of Ministers (Sheboldaev's proposal), and on the accountability of the Council of Ministers.

⁸⁹) Differences between deputies from autonomous administrative regions and other deputies were apparent only in five votes. For instance, the former group ($M=-5.4$) was more strongly supported a resolution "On the Course of Economic Reform in the Russian Federation" than the latter ($M=-2.8$) at the Seventh Congress ($T=4.1$, $p<0.001$). Unfortunately, the analysis does not include the vote on the question of centre and periphery relations in which these two deputy groups might have different attitudes.

⁹⁰) Deputies from highly adapted regions ($M=6.7$) strongly opposed the proposal to postpone the discussion on the law on the president that was put to a vote in the Third Congress. By contrast, deputies from stagnated republics ($M=-5.2$) and stagnated regions ($M=-2.2$) supported it. In the vote, deputies from adapted regions ($M=0.2$) and adapted republics ($M=-1.2$) were divided ($F=19.3$, $p<0.001$).

⁹¹) Differences were evident between deputies from the republics and other regions when the Seventh Congress adopted a resolution "On the Course of Reform." In the vote, deputies from the republics ($M=-5.5$ and -5.3 for those from the adapted and stagnated republics respectively) were more strongly against the president than other deputies from non-autonomous regions ($M=-2.0$, -2.5 , and -3.2 for those from highly adapted, adapted, and stagnated regions respectively, $F=3.4$, $p<0.01$).

⁹²) Deputies from adapted republics ($M=7.3$) strongly supported a moratorium on elections of the heads of regional administrations that was put to a vote at the Fifth Congress. However, they showed a lower level of support than any other deputy groups in some other votes. For instance, at the Sixth Congress, they were divided when Eltsin asked the Congress to head the government until 1 December 1992 ($M=0.5$). They also opposed Eltsin's position when Sheboldaev proposed to grant the Supreme Soviet powers to endorse the appointment of the chairman of the Council of Ministers ($M=-3.9$). Again at the Seventh Congress, they opposed Eltsin's constitutional amendment to Article 122 (accountability of the government), scoring lower points ($M=-4.8$) than highly adapted ($M=2.1$), adapted ($M=-0.5$) and stagnated ($M=-2.9$) regions ($F=9.3$, $p<0.001$).

⁹³) 77 rural deputies showed anti-Eltsin tendencies in most categories of votes. The rural group as a whole voted against the introduction of private land ownership and showed its dissatisfaction with the government's socio-economic policies. Rural deputies also voted against the government or the president in the vote on the question of a no confidence and on the question of balance of power between legislative and executive branches.

⁹⁴) For instance, rural deputies ($M=-6.7$) strongly opposed the proposal to introduce a moratorium on the sale of land, while deputies from large cities ($M=1.3$) were divided ($F=28.5$, $p<0.01$) in the vote.

They also strongly opposed Eltsin's constitutional amendment to Article 122 at the Seventh Congress to make the government accountable to the Congress and the president ($M=-6.2$), and moderately opposed Sheboldaev's amendment to Point 3 of Article 109 of the Constitution at the Sixth Congress ($M=-4.7$). In the votes on the question of a no confidence in the government and the president, they moderately supported the proposals ($M=-5.5$, and -4.5 respectively), while other urban groups were divided or maintained only a weak level of unity.

⁹⁵) Although nomenklaturists, the intelligentsia, and technicians maintained higher than a moderate unity in more than eight votes, other 'class' groups were often divided. For instance, managers and workers were divided in nine votes, while they maintained higher than a moderate level of unity in five votes. In particular, cadres and military personnel were often divided (in eleven and ten votes respectively). By contrast, 45 deputies from the cultural sector were relatively united, showing higher than a moderate level of unity in thirteen votes.

⁹⁶) For instance, 103 agricultural managers in the Congress were divided ($M=0.1$) in the vote on Shakhrai's amendment to Article 12 at the Second Congress, and strongly rejected ($M=-6.3$) the removal of a moratorium on the sale of land plots at the Sixth Congress. By contrast, 83 industrial managers moderately supported ($M=4.0$) the introduction of private land ownership, and weakly opposed the removal of the moratorium ($T=-2.9$, $p<0.01$ in each case).

⁹⁷) In the vote on the resolution of the Sixth Congress "On the Progress of Economic Reform," agricultural managers ($M=-1.3$) as a group rejected the draft, while industrial managers ($M=1.8$) supported it ($T=-2.5$, $p<0.05$). The former, in particular, showed no confidence in the government ($M=-5.2$) and in the president ($M=-4.6$) at the Sixth and Seventh Congresses respectively, while the latter group ($M=-2.0$ and -1.9 respectively) was divided ($T=-2.6$, $p<0.01$, and $T=-2.3$, $p<0.05$ respectively).

⁹⁸) For instance, both groups showed rather similar voting patterns ($M=-6.0$ for agricultural managers and -5.1 for industrial managers) in the vote on the resolution "On the Course of Economic Reform" at the Seventh Congress in which government performance was assessed as "unsatisfactory."

⁹⁹) For instance, 55 cadres from highly adapted and adapted regions ($M=-0.5$) were divided in the vote on the proposal to label the government's performance as "unsatisfactory," showing significant differences from cadres from stagnated regions ($N=112$, $M=-5.5$), stagnated republics ($N=18$, $M=-7.8$), and adapted republics ($N=20$, $M=-6.5$, $F=6.6$, $p<0.001$). Again in the vote on the proposal to discuss the question of a no confidence in the government at the Sixth Congress, cadres from highly adapted and adapted regions ($M=2.4$) weakly opposed the proposal, while cadres from stagnated regions ($M=-2.2$) weakly supported it ($F=3.4$, $p<0.05$).

¹⁰⁰) In the Third Congress, a larger proportion of nomenklaturists from stagnated regions ($M=-5.5$) showed their dissatisfaction with the government's socio-economic policies, while those from stagnated republics ($M=0.0$) were divided ($F=2.7$, $p<0.05$). Again, when the question of no confidence in the government was put to a vote at the Sixth Congress, the former group ($M=-2.5$) voted against the government, while the latter ($M=3.8$) supported the government ($F=3.3$, $p<0.05$). Although the number of nomenklaturists within regional groups varied significantly—73 from stagnated regions, 20 from stagnated republics, 12 from adapted regions, and 5 from adapted republics—differences among these four groups were found in eight votes.

¹⁰¹) David Lane (ed.), *Russia in Transition*, p. 7. The number of deputies in factions varied from less than fifty to more than a hundred for the Agrarian Union. However, the number of deputies in each faction kept changing, partly because a deputy was allowed to join more than one faction. A restriction that prevented deputies from enrolling in more than one faction in the Congress had not been introduced until December 1992. Furthermore, deputies were shifting from one political faction to another. Inaccurate data could also be a reason. In this analysis, the data is drawn from the work of Jeff Gleisner and his colleagues. Jeff Gleisner, Andrei Belayev, Nikolai Biryukov, Yakov Dranyov, and Victor Sergeyev, *Voting in the Russian Parliament, 1990-93: Database* (Leeds: Centre for Democratisation Studies, University of Leeds, 1996).

¹⁰²) No significant differences were revealed among political factions when a programme for the social development of the Far North was put to a vote at the Second Congress.

¹⁰³) Members of the Workers' Union maintained a high degree of unity until the Fourth Congress, but were divided in most votes analysed afterwards. At least in the votes analysed, Left Centre and Free Russia were also frequently divided, particularly at the Fifth and Sixth Congresses, although they were still united in some votes. Among the political factions in the Congress, Sovereignty & Equality and the Industrial Union were most frequently divided.

¹⁰⁴) In particular, the Sixth Congress had a significant meaning not only for reformers but also for the opposition. Firstly, the need to change the course of economic reform was widely recognised. Secondly, presidential rule was due to end on 1 December 1992, which inevitably raised the question of the structure of the government. Furthermore, the Congress was expected to discuss a draft constitution. Under these circumstances, Eltsin's bloc and the opposition tried to win enough support to enforce their own position or at least to block the other side's initiatives by forming a coalition bloc with other factions.

¹⁰⁵) *ITAR-TASS*, 6 April 1992, in *FBIS SOV 92-068s* (8 April 1992), pp. 14-15.

¹⁰⁶) *Interfax*, 9 April 1992, in *FBIS SOV 92-072s* (14 April 1992), p. 12.

¹⁰⁷) For the demands, see *Post Factum*, 6 April 1992, in *FBIS SOV 92-068s* (8 April 1992), pp. 14-15. In the vote on the question of no confidence in the government, Russian Unity as a whole voted strongly against the government (M=-6.3).

¹⁰⁸) *Post Factum*, 6 April 1992, in *FBIS SOV 92-068s* (8 April 1992), p. 14.

¹⁰⁹) For instance, when Sheboldaev's constitutional amendment that the Supreme Soviet should endorse the appointment of the head of the government was put to the vote, Free Russia (M=1.6) and Left Centre (M=1.9) were divided. By contrast, other factions in the bloc were moderately united (M=5.0 for Radical Democrats and 5.2 for Democratic Russia) in rejecting the proposal.

¹¹⁰) For instance, in the vote on the question of no confidence in the president, the Coalition for Reform strongly opposed the proposal (M=7.2), while Russian Unity strongly supported it (M=-7.1).

¹¹¹) For instance, deputies belonging to Russian Unity weakly supported Muraev's amendment on the right to sell land plots (M=-3.9), and were divided in the vote on Zor'kin's proposal through which legislative and executive powers could manage to reach a compromise (M=-0.3).

¹¹²) Although there were significant differences in six votes, 229 deputies other than Russians did not seem to consider their ethnic origins in the vote. Perhaps, the vote on the resolution of the Seventh Congress on the course of economic reform could be an exception. In the vote, non-Russian deputies moderately supported changes in the course of economic reform. However, this result also seemed to be caused by other factors such as the economic situation of the regions where they had been elected or their occupations rather than their ethnic origin itself.

¹¹³) For example, they supported Shakhrai's proposal on the land question at the Second Congress (M=3.9), the adoption of a resolution on the redistribution of authority among higher organs of the RSFSR (M=4.1) at the Third Congress, and the law on the presidency at the Fourth Congress (M=4.9). In these votes, the older generation (M=0.9, 0.1, and 2.5 respectively) was divided (T=5.3, 7.8, and 4.9, $p < 0.001$ respectively). At the Third Congress, younger deputies (M=4.2) also supported Eltsin's policy in the vote on the proposal to assess the government's performance negatively, while older deputies (M=0.2) were divided (T=7.6, $p < 0.001$).

¹¹⁴) The majority of them still supported the government when they voted moderately against the question of no confidence votes at the Sixth and the Seventh Congresses. However, nearly half of them (M=0.9) shifted their attitudes towards Eltsin's reform policies when the resolution of the Seventh Congress on the course of reform was put to a vote. Again deputies who had not been affiliated with the CPSU tended to be divided, becoming less supportive of Eltsin in the vote on the accountability of the Council of Ministers and the appointment procedures of its chairman (M=2.0, and 1.3 respectively).

¹¹⁵) For instance, a draft resolution of the Fifth Congress that had introduced the rule by presidential decrees was approved by 529 supporting votes, only three votes more than required. In the Seventh Congress, Zor'kin's proposal, which turned all opposition's effort to rein the President's power in vain, was adopted with 20 more votes than required. The competition for support became intense when amendments to the Constitution were put to the vote in the Congress, as changes required the support of two-thirds of deputies. For instance, a constitutional amendment to Article 123 was turned down when it fell short of four votes. A more dramatic result occurred when the constitutional amendment to Article 109 was put to a vote at the Seventh Congress. The amendment that would grant the Supreme Soviet powers to review the president's decision on forming, reorganising and abolishing ministries, departments, and state committees was rejected when it lacked only a single vote.

¹¹⁶) For instance, Far Eastern deputies played a key role in the establishment of FEZs in Nakhodka and the Kurils. At the Seventh Congress, Valentin Fedorov, governor of Sakhalin oblast, threatened Eltsin, raising the question of a Far Eastern republic, unless he speeded up drafting the development programme for the Kuril Islands. *Interfax*, 2 December 1992, in *FBIS SOV 92-232s* (3 December 1992), p. 18. Eltsin signed a decree on the development of the Kuril Islands on 8 December 1992, while the Seventh Congress was still in session. Ukaz prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii, "O sotsial'no-ekonomicheskom razvitii Kuril'skikh ostrovov," *Vedomosti*, no 50 (17 December 1992), pp. 3719-3721. A. Dudenko, Commercial Director of the FEZ administration in Nakhodka, also regarded political lobbying through parliament as extremely important. Peter Kirkow and Philip Hanson, "The Potential For Autonomous Regional Development in Russia: The Case of Primorskiy Kray," *Post Soviet Geography*, vol. 35, no. 2 (February 1994), p. 76 (footnote 15).

¹¹⁷) At the First Congress of People's Deputies of Siberia in Krasnoiarsk in March 1992, Siberian deputies urged the Supreme Soviet and the president to take urgent measures for the de-colonisation of Siberia. *Izvestiia*, 30 March 1992, p. 2; and *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, 2 April 1992, p. 2. Far Eastern regional leaders also gathered in Khabarovsk in August 1990 to sign the Agreement on the Basic Principles of Economic and Social Cooperation between the Iakut ASSR and other regions, declaring the formation of the Far Eastern Association. The agreement stipulated that enhancing the economic independence of the Far Eastern regions would be their basic purpose. Point 2 of the agreement "On the Basic Principles of Economic and Social Cooperation between the Iakut Autonomous Socialist Republic, Primorskii Krai, Khabarovsk Krai, Amur Oblast, Evreskii Autonomous Oblast, Kamchatka Oblast, Magadan Oblast, and Sakhalin Oblast of the Far Eastern Economic Area of the RSFSR." "Far Easterners Pool Efforts," *Far Eastern Affairs*, no. 1 (1991), pp. 13-15.

¹¹⁸) For instance, Eltsin signed the decree "On the Issue of the Activities of the Inter-regional Association <Siberian Agreement>" in July 1991. It recognised the Siberian Agreement as an authority in charge of economic activities including foreign trade. It also allowed the Siberian Agreement to determine the use of 10 per cent of products produced in Siberian regions, and mining enterprises to sell 25 per cent of their output at the free price market. Eltsin also agreed to finance the development of science and technology by setting up an Innovation Fund in which he promised to invest 150 million rubles. In return for these arrangements, Siberian regions were to transfer all income from taxes to the Russian Federation. *Rasporiazhenie predsedatel'ia Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR "Vopros deiatel'nosti mezhhregional'noi assotsiatsii <Sibirskoe soglashenie>," Vedomosti*, no. 27 (4 July 1991), pp. 1065-1067; and Vera Tolz, "Regionalism in Russia: The Case of Siberia," *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol. 2, no. 9 (26 February 1993), p. 3.

¹¹⁹) At the Congress of People's Deputies of Siberia, participants demanded decentralisation of management, economic independence for geographic areas, and a single-track system for forming the budget, and freedom for foreign-economic activities. Furthermore, they made an important step when they adopted a resolution that demanded to strip the President of his additional powers and to abolish "unnecessary and even harmful" presidential representatives at the local level. *Izvestiia*, 30 March 1992, p. 2; *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, 2 April 1992, p. 2; and M. Aleksandrova, "S"ezd narodnykh deputatov Sibiri: eshche odno preduprezhdenie tsentru," *Krasnoiarskaia gazeta*, no. 39 (2 April 1992), p. 2.

¹²⁰) In fact, a blueprint for regional development up to the year 2000 was unveiled in 1987 by Gorbachev just after his Vladivostok speech in 1986. However, it failed to survive the budget deficit in 1989. The fate of the plan that was revived in 1991 and in 1992 was almost the same as that of previous ones. John J. Stephan, "The Russian Far East," *Current History*, vol. 92, no. 576 (October 1993), p. 332.

¹²¹) For instance, Primorskii *kraisovet* adopted a document on the basic concept of autonomy and economic independence of the krai in April 1990. "Primor'e: put' k samostoiatel'nosti (kontseptiia formirovaniia samoupravleniia i ekonomicheskoi samostoiatel'notsi kraia," *Krasnoe znamia*, 20 April 1990, p. 2. Far Eastern deputies worked out "A Concept of Resolving the Crisis and Stimulating the Social and Economic Development of the Far Eastern Economic Region and Trans-Baikal Region Until the Year 2000" in 1991. Again in May 1992, the Coordination Council of the Association of Far Eastern Deputies in the Congress considered a new concept of the development of the Far East, the Buriat

Republic and the Chita oblast until the Year 2000. V. Vorontsov and A. Muradyan, "Far Eastern Regionalism," *Far Eastern Affairs*, no. 1 (1992), p. 31.

¹²²) The FEZ could be an attractive alternative to a Far Eastern republic. Firstly, the geographic location with hub/gate features supported demands of the Far Eastern regions for establishing the FEZs in the area. Secondly, the FEZ would provide the regional authorities with more powers authority in their domestic and foreign economic activities including setting up a special tax and customs regime. In particular, attracting foreign investment would be of interest to the centre as well. Thirdly, it would facilitate accommodation of foreign and domestic investment. Fourthly, the FEZ concept had already gained its supporters on a nationwide basis. Furthermore, in addition to all these merits, the concept of the FEZ was more likely to avoid unnecessary confrontation with centrists than a Far Eastern republic. For further discussion see V. Savin, "Forms of Economic Cooperation," *Far Eastern Affairs*, no.4 (1991), pp. 9-17; Pyotr Baklanov, "A Concept of the Development of the Soviet Far East," *Far Eastern Affairs*, no. 4 (1991), pp. 3-8; and Pavel Minakir, "The Economy of the Soviet Far East: Challenging the Crisis," *Far Eastern Affairs*, no. 6 (1991), pp. 92-106. For the legal background of the FEZ, see V. Savin, "Free Economic Zone in Russia: The Legal Background," *Far Eastern Affairs*, no. 4-5 (1994), pp. 51-55.

¹²³) Nakhodka was declared a FEZ for the first time by the decree of the Russian Council of Ministers "On Priority Measures for the Development of a Free Economic Zone in the District of Nakhodka of Primorskii Krai" on 23 November 1990. For a brief discussion, see Denis J. B. Shaw and Michael J. Bradshaw, "Free Economic Zones in the Russian Republic," *Post-Soviet Geography*, vol. 33, no. 6 (June 1992), pp. 409-417, 413. After the declaration, Primorskii krai also considered extending FEZ under the name of "Great Vladivostok" with a view to upgrading itself to a republic. Kirkow and Hanson, "The Potential For Autonomous Regional Development in Russia," pp. 76-77; and Tamara Troyakova, "Regional Policy in the Russian Far East and the Rise of Localism in Primorye," *The Journal of East Asian Affairs*, vol. IX, no. 2 (Summer/Fall 1995), p. 429. For "Greater Vladivostok," see Robert B. Krueger and Leon A. Polott, "Greater Vladivostok: A Concept for the Economic Development of South Primorie (Appendix 2)," in Mark J. Valencia, *The Russian Far East in Transition: Opportunities for Regional Economic Cooperation* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 195-226. To facilitate a discussion of the question of turning Primorskii krai into a FEZ, the Presidium of the *kraisovet* put forward two options. "Free Enterprise Zone in the Nakhodka Area and the Maritime Territory," *Far Eastern Affairs*, no. 2 (1991), pp. 8-14.

¹²⁴) The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Russia passed a resolution that declared Sakhalin a FEZ on 27 May 1991. Sakhalin had been given tax relief and preferential tariffs. Furthermore, a simplified export and import procedure would apply to foreign economic activities in the region. Sakhalin authority could strengthen its position vis-à-vis the centre in accordance with an agreement to form a FEZ Administration Board and a State Investment Corporation that would deal with the question of exploiting natural resources in the area. Rasporiazhenie Predsedatelia Verkhvnogo Soveta RSFSR "O sozdanii svobodnoi ekonomicheskoi zony <Sakhalin> (SEZ <Sakhalin>)," *Vedomosti*, no. 22 (30 March 1991), pp. 894-896; V. Vorontsov and A. Muradyan, "Far Eastern Regionalism," p. 31; and Denis J. B. Shaw, "News Notes: Special Economic Zone," *Post-Soviet Geography*, vol. 32, no. 2 (February 1991), p. 635. For the views of the Sakhalin authorities towards the establishment of a FEZ in the oblast, see Valentin Fiodorov, "The Experiment in Sakhalin," *Far Eastern Affairs*, no. 1 (1991), pp. 16-33.

¹²⁵) The FEZ was established on 3 June 1991. *Rasporiazhenie Predsedatelia Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR "O khoziaistvenno-pravovom statuse svobodnoi ekonomicheskoi zony v Evreiskoi avtonomnoi oblasti," Vedomosti*, no. 23 (6 June 1991), p. 911.

¹²⁶) For a further discussion, see Chapter 6.1.

¹²⁷) In fact, these votes could be mainly related to the regional interests. Among seven votes in which differences were revealed between SIBFE deputies and other deputies, five votes were directly or indirectly related to the presidential powers, showing SIBFE deputies' effort to prevent the central authority from expanding its influence at the local level. By contrast, the peculiarities of SIBFE deputies were seldom revealed on other issues such as land questions, the accountability of government and other categories of votes.

¹²⁸) In the vote, 94 Siberian deputies (55 per cent, $M=-1.9$) and 35 Far Eastern deputies (55.6 per cent, $M=-2.4$) opposed the proposal together with other regional association groups. Only deputies from regions that were not affiliated with any regional associations ($M=4.3$) moderately supported it.

¹²⁹) In the vote on the draft resolution of the Third Congress "On the Redistribution of Authority among Higher Government Organs of the RF for the Realisation of Anti-crisis Measures," Siberian ($M=0.6$) and Far Eastern ($M=0.5$) deputies were divided. Again deputies from regions that were not affiliated with any regional associations ($M=6.4$) strongly supported Eltsin. Deputies from the regions that joined the regional association of the Great Urals ($M=2.4$) also showed relatively stronger support than other regional association groups. In the vote, SIBFE deputies as a whole ($M=0.6$) were less supportive of Eltsin than other deputies from the European part of Russia ($M=2.2$, $T=2.5$, $p<0.05$).

¹³⁰) In the vote Siberian deputies ($M=2.1$) again showed the lowest support, followed by Far Eastern deputies ($M=2.9$). By contrast, deputies from the regional association of the Great Urals ($M=6.0$) were strongly in favour of it. In the vote, SIBFE deputies as a whole ($M=2.3$) showed different voting patterns from deputies from the European part of Russia ($M=3.9$, $T=2.7$, $p<0.01$).

¹³¹) In the vote, Siberian ($M=4.7$) and Far Eastern ($M=4.0$) deputies moderately supported the resolution together with deputies from the regions that joined the Great Urals ($M=4.8$).

¹³²) Before and during the Fifth Congress (July and October 1991), Eltsin signed agreements with the Siberian Agreement and other regions including Tiumen oblast. Furthermore, since March 1991, FEZs were established in the SIBFE regions as already discussed.

¹³³) In the vote on Zor'kin's proposal, Far Eastern deputies ($M=5.4$) strongly voted for it, only surpassed by deputies from the regions outside the regional associations ($M=5.6$). In the vote, Siberian deputies showed a moderate level of support ($M=3.6$).

¹³⁴) In the vote, 107 Siberian deputies or 63.3 per cent ($M=-4.7$) supported the resolution, while only 29 Far Eastern deputies or 46.0 per cent ($M=-1.5$) voted in favour ($T=-2.3$, $p<0.05$).

¹³⁵) For instance, they were divided in eleven votes, including the votes on the question of no confidence in the government ($M=0.6$) and the president ($M=0.4$) while maintaining a moderate level of unity in only three votes. It means that the unity level of SIBFE deputies in each vote was very similar to that of other deputies in the Congress.

¹³⁶) Deputies from large cities ($M=4.3$) moderately supported the proposal to introduce private land ownership. By contrast, deputies from medium ($M=2.1$) and small cities ($M=1.3$) were divided and rural deputies ($M=-2.1$) moderately opposed it ($F=3.6$, $p<0.01$). This trend was revealed again when the proposal to remove a moratorium on the right to sell the land plots was put to the vote at the Sixth Congress. SIBFE deputies from large cities ($M=-0.6$) were divided, while deputies from rural areas ($M=-6.3$) strongly opposed it ($F=2.7$, $p<0.05$). Deputies from large cities also tended to evaluate economic reform more positively than other urban and rural deputies did. When the question of labelling the government's work as unsatisfactory was put to the vote at the Third Congress, deputies from large cities ($M=2.5$) weakly opposed the proposal, while other groups were divided or weakly supported it ($F=2.7$, $p<0.05$). Also in the vote on the resolution of economic reform which was adopted by the Seventh Congress, deputies from large cities ($M=-2.0$) were divided, while other groups moderately or strongly supported to introduce significant changes in economic reform ($F=4.6$, $p<0.01$).

¹³⁷) Compared to deputies in the Congress as a whole, the gap between urban-rural groups tended to be bridged as SIBFE deputies from large cities voted in a less liberal way than those from large cities in the European part of Russia.

¹³⁸) For instance, SIBFE deputies from the hub/gate region were divided ($M=0.9$) when the question of the reorganisation of higher government organ was put to the vote at the Third Congress. In the vote, other deputies from the same category of regions in the European part of Russia voted in moderate support ($M=4.5$) of the proposal ($T=2.8$, $p<0.01$).

¹³⁹) In the vote, deputies from the resource and residual regions ($M=4.8$ respectively) moderately supported the proposal while the rural ($M=-0.4$) and hub/gate groups ($M=2.0$) were divided ($F=4.9$, $p<0.01$).

¹⁴⁰) When Eltsin's proposal to allow him to head and form the government until 1 December 1992 was put to a vote at the Sixth Congress, deputies from rural ($M=4.6$) and hub/gate regions ($M=3.0$) supported for the proposal, while deputies from resource ($M=1.0$) and residual regions ($M=-0.4$) were divided ($F=3.0$, $p<0.05$). Again in the vote on Sheboldaev's constitutional amendment that the Supreme Soviet endorse the appointment of the chairman of the Council of Ministers, the former two groups ($M=0.8$ and 0.7 respectively) supported the proposal, while the latter two ($M=-1.3$ and -4.4 respectively) opposed it ($F=4.9$, $p<0.01$). This trend is quite understandable, as the rural regions were much more dependent on subsidies from the Centre. Hub/gate regions also preferred an integrated economic system to a regionalised one. By contrast, deputies from resource regions tended to believe that their socio-economic situation could be enhanced by denying 'exploitation' of resources by the centre or by other regions.

¹⁴¹) Although differences between the deputy groups from the autonomous and other administrative units were revealed in five votes (P3, R1, S2, T2, and U5), differences between the republic deputy groups (i.e. between stagnated and adapted republics) also emerged in five votes (P3, S3, T2, T5, and U5). However, this does not necessarily mean that the political status of the regions could be ignored. For instance, deputies from autonomous regions tended to defend their interest when questions related to the devolution of power were put to the vote. In the vote on the resolution of the Sixth Congress on economic reform, SIBFE deputies differed when they were grouped into an autonomous regional group ($M=6.3$) and an ordinary regional group ($M=3.4$, $T=2.6$, $p<0.01$). Differences between deputies from the

autonomous and ordinary administrative units were revealed again at the Seventh Congress when deputies from the autonomous formations ($M=6.1$) strongly supported Zor'kin's proposal while other deputies ($M=3.8$) weakly supported it ($T=2.3$, $p<0.05$). However, in these votes, deputies from the Republic of Sakha ($M=8.0$ respectively), an adapted republic, voted more in favour of Eltsin than those from the stagnated republics (the Republics of Altai and Tyva, $M=2.2$, $T=-2.9$, $p<0.01$ respectively). Different voting patterns of Sakha deputies might have been a result of their relatively good relations with Moscow, or by the better conditions of the republic, compared to other republics. By contrast, differences were seldom revealed between deputies from the Republic of Sakha and Tiumen oblast. Both regions were similar in their rich resources.

¹⁴²) Far Eastern deputies from large cities ($M=1.2$) were divided over the proposal to label the work of the government as 'unsatisfactory' in the Third Congress. In the vote, they recorded the lowest points among the corresponding groups of seven regional associations, while 31 deputies from large cities of the Northwest regions ($M=6.8$) voted strongly against the proposal. In the vote on the redistribution of authority among the higher organisations of the government, only deputies from the large cities ($M=-0.9$) voted against the proposal, although they were divided. This trend continued at the Sixth Congress when they voted for Sheboldaev's proposal to endow the Supreme Soviet with the power to endorse the appointment of the head of the government. In the vote, they again scored the lowest points ($M=-3.6$).

¹⁴³) Reformist tendencies of the Far Eastern hub/gate regions were clearly revealed when land questions were put to the vote. Deputies from the Far Eastern hub/gate regions supported Shakhrai's proposal to introduce private ownership of land almost unanimously ($M=8.2$) and the proposal to introduce right to sell land freely ($M=3.2$), while deputies from resource and residual regions were divided or opposed them ($F=6.9$, $p<0.01$, and $F=3.2$, $p<0.05$ respectively). They ($M=6.1$) also strongly rejected the proposal to include the question of no confidence in the government on the agenda of the Sixth Congress, while deputies of the residual region ($M=-3.2$) voted against the government ($F=6.6$, $p<0.01$).

¹⁴⁴) They ($M=7.5$) voted strongly in favour of the draft resolution of the Sixth Congress on economic reform was adopted as a basis for a further discussion. The draft resolution urged the government to increase expenditures for the social development and recommended the president to abolish the presidential representatives at the local level and duplicated bodies in the government such as presidential advisors.

¹⁴⁵) For instance, in the vote on Eltsin's constitutional amendment to Article 122 (accountability of the Council of Ministers) which was put to a vote at the Seventh Congress, deputies from poorly developed regions ($M=-7.1$) showed strong opposition. However, deputies from well-developed regions ($M=-4.6$) also opposed Eltsin stronger than those representing under-developed regions ($M=0.9$), and no significant differences were revealed in the vote between these deputy groups.

¹⁴⁶) The SIBFE intelligentsia was less supportive of the president than the intelligentsia from the European part of Russia in most votes, particularly on the political issue. Among technicians, SIBFE deputies showed less liberal voting patterns than other technicians, revealing significant differences in six votes. In particular, SIBFE technicians voted against introduction of a full-fledged land ownership and the strengthening of presidential powers. For instance, they ($M=-1.5$) rejected the proposal to remove a moratorium on the sale of land, while other technicians ($M=2.4$) weakly supported it ($T=2.2$, $p<0.05$).

¹⁴⁷) For instance, in the vote on a draft resolution of the Sixth Congress, SIBFE cadres (M=6.3) were more supportive of the proposal than other SIBFE 'class' groups (F=2.4, p<0.05). Furthermore, the former group more strongly supported the proposal than other cadres (M=1.3) from the European part of Russia (T=-4.0, p<0.01).

¹⁴⁸) In eleven votes, the Siberian intelligentsia scored more than two points less than the average score of the intelligentsia in the Congress as a whole, and so did technicians from Siberia in ten votes.

¹⁴⁹) For instance, only two workers, four members of the intelligentsia, and five military personnel had been elected in the Far Eastern regions.

¹⁵⁰) Far Eastern managers scored higher than other managers in thirteen votes. For instance, they were divided (M=0.0) when a resolution of the Seventh Congress was put to a vote, while managers in the Congress as a whole moderately supported the resolution (M=-5.6). In the vote, managers from Siberia (M=-8.3), and regions that joined the regional associations of the Great Urals (M=-7.8) and North Caucasus (M=-10.0) strongly supported the resolution.

¹⁵¹) In particular, the voting patterns of cadres from the Far Eastern regions are noteworthy. They recorded higher scores than average score of cadres in the Congress in twenty votes, and even higher than average by two points in fifteen votes. Among the votes, cadres from Far Eastern regions scored highest in ten votes among cadres from other regional associations. For instance, they voted in favour of introducing private land ownership at the Second Congress (M=5.7) and in favour of removing a moratorium on the right to sell land plots (M=2.9). Far Eastern cadres also voted for Eltsin in the votes on the question of no confidence in the president (M=2.9) and on Zorkin's proposal (M=7.1) at the Seventh Congress (M=2.9), while all other cadre groups were vote against Eltsin or divided. Furthermore, Far Eastern cadres were even more liberal than Far Eastern technicians in twelve votes.

¹⁵²) Among SIBFE deputies, Free Russia and the Workers' Union were possibly an exception as they attained a high level of unity in eight and seven votes respectively, and were divided in less than four votes. For example, political factions belonging to these blocs remained divided or moderately united when the constitutional amendment on Article 12 was put to a vote at the Seventh Congress.

¹⁵³) For instance, the Democratic Centre included Free Russia, Left Centre, Sovereignty & Equality, and Motherland. However, according to Sobyenin's work, the first two factions were weakly supporting reform, whereas Sovereignty & Equality was weakly opposing reform. When Eltsin asked the Congress to be allowed to head the government until 1 December 1992, SIBFE deputies who joined Free Russia and Left Centre strongly supported Eltsin (M=8.0 and 6.7 respectively), while Sovereignty & Equality members were divided (M=0.0). See Alexander Sobyenin, "The Current Crisis," in Remington (ed.), *Parliaments in Transition*, pp. 196-197.

¹⁵⁴) At the Sixth and Seventh Congresses, after blocs were formed, Far Eastern deputies who joined the Coalition for Reform bloc maintained a higher level of unity in seven of the ten votes, but were not divided in any vote. By contrast, Siberian deputies of the Coalition for Reform were strongly united in five votes, while they were divided in the vote on the proposal to remove a moratorium on the sale of land.

¹⁵⁵) Considering ten issues that were put to the vote at the Sixth and Seventh Congress, Siberian deputies who joined the Russian Unity bloc maintained strong unity in five votes and were divided in two votes. By contrast, Far Eastern deputies who joined the Russian Unity were highly united in eight votes,

but were divided in one vote. The more obvious differences were revealed when all votes analysed were taken into consideration as political factions which constituted two highly united blocs, the Coalition for Reform and the Russian Unity appeared to be consistent in their voting patterns even before they formed blocs. In this case, Siberian deputies from the Russian Unity maintained strong unity in nine votes and were divided in three votes, whereas Far Eastern deputies in the same bloc voted strongly against the reform in fourteen votes and were divided only in the vote on Zor'kin's proposal.

¹⁵⁶) For instance, SIBFE deputies belonging to Democratic Russia faction (M=9.4) almost unanimously supported the third draft resolution of the Sixth Congress on economic reform which included an item, recommending the president to abolish presidential representatives in the local administrative units. But in the vote on the proposal to remove the moratorium on the right to sell land, they (M=3.0) rendered only weak support, whereas other members from other Russian regions (M=6.3) strongly supported it. Among Russian Unity members, SIBFE deputies of the Fatherland faction (M=2.7) appeared to be more attentive to the regional goals than other factions within the Russian Unity. In the vote on a draft of economic resolution in the Sixth Congress, the former group weakly supported the draft resolution, while the latter group weakly opposed it.

¹⁵⁷) For instance, SIBFE members of the Workers' Union unanimously supported the draft resolution of the Sixth Congress (M=10.0). They also moderately supported a proposal to allow Eltsin to head the government until 1 December 1992 (M=4.2). However, they voted against the question of a moratorium on the right to sell land (M=-1.7) and Sheboldaev's Constitutional amendment to Point 3 of Article 109 which would have given the Supreme Soviet the right to endorse the appointment of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers (M=-3.3).

¹⁵⁸) In the votes on the draft resolution of the Sixth Congress and Zor'kin's proposal in the Seventh Congress, 63 Siberian deputies voted in support of both proposals, just like Vitalii Mukha, the Executive Director of the Siberian Agreement. Of a total of 63 deputies, twelve were members of Creative Strength, eleven of the Coalition for Reform, six of Democratic Centre, and only four of Russian Unity. About three-quarters of SIBFE deputies who showed the same voting patterns to those of Mukha represented either moderate blocs or no blocs at all.

¹⁵⁹) The younger generation from the Far Eastern regions more eagerly supported the introduction of a private land ownership (M=7.2) and removing the ban on the right to sell land plots (M=4.0). The older generation (M=1.8 and -2.1 respectively) was less supportive of those questions (T=2.4, p<0.05 and T=2.8, p<0.01 respectively). In the vote to label the work of the government as 'unsatisfactory' which was put to the vote at the Third Congress, the former group (M=4.4) voted in favour of the government, while the latter (M=-1.3) voted against it (T=2.5, p<0.05).

¹⁶⁰) The older generation from the Far Eastern regions recorded higher scores in about half the votes analysed than the average scores of the same category of deputies in the Congress as a whole. By contrast, older deputies from Siberia did so in only three votes. Older deputies from the Far Eastern regions (M=2.6) were more supportive of the government than older deputies from other regions as a whole (M=-0.5) when the question of a no confidence in the government was put to a vote at the Sixth Congress. In the vote, they were even more supportive of the government than younger deputies from the Far Eastern regions (M=0.8).

¹⁶¹) For instance, 53 SIBFE deputies who had not been members of the CPSU were divided over the right to sell land plots (M=1.3) and over a resolution on economic reform (M=-0.4) that were put to the vote at the Seventh Congress. They were again divided in the vote on political issues such as Sheboldaev's constitutional amendment to Article 109 point 3 at the Sixth Congress (M=0.2), and Eltsin's constitutional amendment to Article 122 at the Seventh Congress (M=2.1).

¹⁶²) In the vote on the question of no confidence in the government and the president, non-CPSU deputies were more supportive of government and Eltsin (M=3.8 in the both votes) than CPSU members from the SIBFE (M=-0.3, T=-2.9, p<0.01 and M=-0.6, T=-3.3, p<0.001 respectively).

¹⁶³) At the Third Congress, the CPSU members among Far Eastern deputies (M=-4.1) voted for the proposal to postpone the discussion of the law on the presidency to the following Congress, while other deputies (M=3.6) voted against it (T=-3.0, p<0.01). Again at the same Congress, the CPSU members (M=-1.1) voted against the proposal to adopt a resolution on the redistribution of authority among Russian higher organs, while other Far Eastern deputies (M=5.7) voted in favour of it (T=-2.4, p<0.05). At the Sixth Congress, the former group (M=-1.1) rejected the idea of removing the ban on the right to sell land, while the latter group (M=5.0) supported it (T=-2.3, p<0.05).

¹⁶⁴) In addition to this, they (M=-5.2) also supported a proposal that economic programmes should be in accordance with those of other Union republics, while the Russian deputies (M=1.1) rejected this proposal (T=2.6, p<0.05).

¹⁶⁵) For instance, each titular deputy group from the Republics of Sakha (a resource region, seven Yakut deputies) and Buriatia (a rural region, six Buriat deputies) seemed to be united, scoring higher than six points in nine and thirteen votes respectively. However, they showed different voting patterns. For instance, *Iakuty* from the Republic of Sakha (M=-5.7) voted against full-fledged land ownership including the right to sell land plots at the Sixth Congress. By contrast, *Buriaty* from the Republic of Buriatia (M=1.7) were divided in the vote.

¹⁶⁶) As there are too many factions in the Congress, they were categorised into three groups: the Coalition of Reform, Russian Unity and other. As those political factions which joined the Coalition of Reforms and Russian Unity in 1992 showed rather consistent voting patterns than other factions, they were grouped together even before they explicitly formed political blocs.

¹⁶⁷) For instance, Communists of Russia faction experienced drastic changes in their members. It had 357 members in October 1991, but was reduced to 59 in May 1992.

¹⁶⁸) Sobyenin pointed out that platforms of factions were "vague" and "occasionally indistinguishable." He also noted that, sometimes, even faction leaders failed to act in accordance with the platforms of their own factions. Sobyenin, "Political Cleavages among the Russian Deputies," in Remington (ed.), *Parliaments in Transition*, pp. 191, 201.

¹⁶⁹) Ibid., p. 202.

¹⁷⁰) For the changes in the electoral process in 1993, see Stephen White, *Russia's New Politics: The Management of a Postcommunist Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 37-39.

CHAPTER VII

Regionalism within Regionalism

The analysis of deputies' voting patterns showed that the regions' efforts to increase their influence in the Congress of People's Deputies (CPD) were less successful than they might have been. Despite the emergence of regional associations inside and outside the CPD and weakening centralising forces, the vigorous efforts of deputies and regional leaders to increase their influence in the Congress appeared to be far from satisfactory for many regional leaders.¹

As the division of deputies in the Congress on the basis of smaller regional groups suggests, the different socio-economic features of regions became a major obstacle for their coordination efforts.² In the course of reform, the different impact of reform on the regions resulted in the diversification of regional goals and development strategies. Accordingly, discord emerged among political actors in the regions not only among deputies, as already discussed, but also among regional leaderships and the grassroots. In particular, regional leaders had to be attentive to the demands of their own electorate in order to survive the elections, which also hampered their efforts to increase coordination. In this regard, the decision-making procedure of the Siberian Agreement that demanded a unanimous agreement only revealed the reluctance of regional leaders to risk their own particular needs for collective goals.

Discord among regional political actors at each level also caused problems in their vertical linkages. Although the attitudes of each political actor towards reform policies seemed to reflect regional socio-economic features in general, they lacked an institutionalised mechanism—for instance, political parties—which would link them together. In the process of democratisation, the influence of regional leaders over their deputies was much less than it used to be during the Soviet period. Against this development, the poor performance of regional parties that advocated regional goals indicated that SIBFE regionalism lacked a mechanism for the collection and

coordination of diverse regional interests, and thus failed to adapt to the changing environment.

Finally, the regional policy of the centre facilitated the diversification of regional goals. Many argued that Eltsin had no regional policy at all, and encouraged copy-cat demands which encouraged the development of regionalism as discussed in Chapter 3. However, Eltsin's separate and unsystematised negotiations with individual administrative units successfully contained regionalism within a 'federal' structure by providing separate treatments and, at the same time, 'equalising measures' through multiparty pacts or even through bilateral negotiations. The contents of bilateral negotiations showed that Eltsin had employed only a couple of types of pacts.

This chapter will consider in more detail the diverse views on the inter-regional associations and regional development strategies within the SIBFE regions, the influence of regional leaders over their deputies in the Congress, linkage between regional political actors, and Eltsin's regional policy.

VII. 1. Diversity among Regional Leaderships

The consistent demands of the SIBFE regions could be depicted as 'decolonisation,' which meant decentralisation of management and foreign economic activities, and special arrangement for the socio-economic development of the SIBFE. However, the individual administrative units in the SIBFE seemed to have different outlooks on the region's future and the role of inter-regional associations, which led them to various paths. By the end of 1993, at least three different approaches to inter-regional cooperation had emerged: political and economic independence, economic independence, and horizontal cooperation.

Furthermore, individual regions specified their own development strategies in order to make best use of their own political and socio-economic capitals in the course of reform. In general, three main strategies could be identified: 'go it alone,' 'republicanisation,' and devolution through Free Economic Zones (FEZs). These diversification of regional strategies caused discord among regional leaderships outside and inside the CPD.

VII. 1 (1) Different Levels of Inter-regional Cooperation

Regarding the inter-regional association, there was an approach for full independence which mainly aimed at the creation of a Siberian republic or a Far Eastern republic.³ In particular, some regional parties such as the Party of Siberian Independence, the Union for the Unification of Siberia, and the Far Eastern Republican Party of Freedom advocated full independence.⁴ For instance, Boris Petrov, leader of the Party of Siberian Independence and deputy of the Russian CPD from Tiumen oblast, insisted that Siberia could get out of its crisis by achieving independence as its production capacity was far greater than it was needed to resolve its own socio-economic problems.⁵

However, political leaders also used the idea of independence to strengthen their position in bargaining with Moscow. In particular, Aman Tuleev, the Chairman of Kemerovo *oblsvet*, became an ardent advocate of this position. His approach seemed to be rather a reflection of the frustrating socio-economic situation of the oblast. The industrial structure of the oblast was largely dominated by coal mining and this could hardly be a sound source of finance. Coal mines were heavily dependent on subsidies from the centre, and faced possible closure which threatened the social stability of the region.⁶ During the early 1990s, the region was a main basis of strikes of coal miners who considered politicising their organisations as one of the best options to deal with their problems.⁷ In this context, Tuleev's separatist programme had two purposes: to win grassroots support and to place extra pressure on central government.⁸

The idea of re-establishing a Far Eastern republic was also used as a bargaining card by regional leaders and the Far Eastern Association of Economic Cooperation.⁹ In particular, Valentin Fedorov, governor of Sakhalin oblast, often used his support for establishing a Far Eastern republic in his dealings with Moscow. When the question of Kuril Islands was discussed between Moscow and Japan, he denounced Moscow's position as a "national betrayal," insisting that a Far Eastern republic "must save Russia and Moscow itself from territorial repatriation of the Kuril Islands."¹⁰ Again, he warned Eltsin in December 1992 that he would raise the question of re-establishing a Far Eastern Republic, urging Eltsin to draft a government programme on the socio-economic development of the Kuril Islands. He won the bargain as the president signed a decree "On the Social and Economic Development of the Kuril Islands" which included the creation of a special economic zone in the islands.¹¹

However, the idea of creating a Siberian or Far Eastern republic was even unpopular among regional leaders.¹² For instance, Tuleev raised the issue again as a counter measure to Eltsin's dissolution of the parliament at the Extraordinary Congress of All Siberian Congress of Chairmen of the Supreme Soviet of Republics, Krai, and Oblasts in September 1993. However, only Anatoli Chaptynov, the Chairman of the Republic of Altai Soviet, joined him.¹³

At the meeting, Vitalii Mukha, governor of Novosibirsk oblast and director of the Council of the Siberian Agreement, opposed the idea of establishing a Siberian republic, depicting it as a 'maximum' programme. Instead, he took rather a moderate path, which was described as a 'minimum' programme at that moment, suggesting to turn the Siberian Agreement into an inter-regional association with a single budget:

I, as chairman of the Council of the Siberian Agreement, will not sign a document of building up a Siberian republic, even if a majority supports it. ... Create single budget first, then solve the question of federal status.¹⁴

Despite these moves, most SIBFE regions considered an inter-regional association as an organisation for accelerating horizontal cooperation in more practical terms; dealing with environmental problems, establishing business representation in foreign countries, raising an inter-regional development fund, adjusting industrial structure and so on. For instance, there was a question of coordinating foreign business representatives, which were, at that time, under the separate administration of individual regions.¹⁵ The Far Eastern Economic Association also discussed the question of establishing an inter-regional fund to support their own investment policy.¹⁶

In addition, inter-regional production was suggested as a way of adjusting industrial structures or industrial capacities to meet changing needs. For instance, Vladimir Sagonov, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Buriat Republic, maintained in an interview with *Sibirskaiia gazeta* that the inter-regional association could play a major role in the conversion of the military-industrial complex by drafting its own conversion programme in which regions launched joint ventures. He also made it clear that he opposed the idea of 'republicanisation' of inter-regional association, describing it as forming "a government within a government."¹⁷

VII. 1 (2) Variety of Regionalised Development Strategies

Although most of the SIBFE regions agreed the need of cooperation, discord among member regions of the regional associations emerged. They pursued their own regional development strategies on the basis of their own socio-economic and political needs at the cost of inter-regional unity.¹⁸

First of all, the federal republics were exploring favourable terms based on their federal status. As for republics, declaration of sovereignty and supremacy over federal law on their territories could be a powerful bargaining card.¹⁹ In particular, the process of signing the Federal Treaty provided good opportunities for republics to obtain more favourable terms than for ordinary administrative units. For instance, the Republic of Sakha, one of the resource regions, concluded a bilateral agreement on economic questions with the central government on 31 March 1992, when the republic finally signed the Federal Treaty. According to the agreement, the republic would be allocated 11.5 per cent of precious metals produced in the republic, 20 per cent of jewellery diamonds and all diamonds for the industrial use, 45 per cent of hard-currency gains from the sale of diamonds on the world market, and 25 per cent of hard-currency gains from Sakha's gold that was exported by the Russian Gold Committee. Furthermore, 75 per cent of resources excluding diamonds and gold that was exported in 1992 was to remain at the disposal of the republic as a regional fund.²⁰

Against the favoured status of republics, other ordinary administrative units, particularly economically self-sufficient regions, pursued 'republicanisation' as a strategy in their relations with the centre.²¹ This group included Krasnoiarsk and Primorskii krais, Irkutsk oblast, and autonomous okrugs such as Iamalo-Nenets in Tiumen oblast, and Chukotka in Magadan oblast. For instance, Krasnoiarsk krai demanded the same rights that had been granted to republics in October 1991.²² The attempts to acquire equal rights with those enjoyed by republics were reiterated when Mukha raised a question of consolidating a budget within Siberia. Viacheslav Novikov, the Chairman of the Krasnoiarsk *kraisovet*, observed that the krai "appears to be a self-sufficient region and deserves a republic status."²³ Irkutsk oblast also made a similar demand, insisting that the central government violated the Constitution on the territory of the oblast, which became an obstacle for the local authority to carry out their duty to protect the economic, social and legal rights of its population.²⁴

However, 'republicanisation' seemed to be rather a more complicated matter for Tiumen oblast, a more 'self-sufficient' region than Krasnoiarsk krai. In Krasnoiarsk krai, the economic role of two autonomous okrugs was marginal (see Table 7.1.1). However, two autonomous okrugs in Tiumen produced most of its natural resources, while Tiumen 'proper,' mainly an agricultural region, dominated the administration of the oblast. Therefore, the oblast authority itself became a target of challenges by autonomous okrugs.

<Table 7.1.1> Economic Profile of Autonomous Okrugs in Tiumen Oblast and Krasnoiarsk Krai (1993)

	Tiumen oblast			Krasnoiarsk krai		
	Total	Khanty-Mansi aok	Iamalo-Nenets aok	Total	Taimyr aok	Evenkii aok
Territory size	1,435.2	36.4	52.3	2,239.7	38.5	34.3
Population	3,120.0	41.7	14.9	3,048.0	1.7	0.8
Industrial production	7,577.0	71.4	19.8	4,451.0	0.14	0.03
Oil (gas condensed)	236,396.0	82.0	18.0	1.0	0.0	0.0
Natural gas	562,794.0	3.6	96.4	-	-	-
Electricity	62.3	83.3	1.8	50.5	0.2	0.2

Total in actual figures; aok figures in terms of percentage to oblast or krai total.

Sources: Territory size (1000 km²), in Goskomstat, *Rossiiskaia Federatsiia v 1992 godu: Statisticheskii ezhegodnik*, 1993, pp. 5-10; Population (1000 people), in Goskomstat, *Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik*, 1994, pp. 441-443; Industrial production (billion rubles), in Goskomstat, *Promyshlennost'*, 1996, pp. 254-256; Gas condensed oil production (1000 t), in *ibid.*, p. 283; Natural gas production (1000 m³), in *ibid.*, p. 284; and Electricity (billion kw/h), in *ibid.*, pp. 280-282.

In November 1990, Iamalo-Nenets autonomous okrug applied for republican status, though Valerii Chirlov, the Chairman of the Soviet of Khanty-Mansi autonomous okrug, declared that it would remain as a autonomous okrug as "political stability of the region is crucial" for the country's future.²⁵ Facing such challenges, Tiumen *oblsoviet* decided to ask the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR to reject the demand of Iamalo-Nenets autonomous okrug. It also asked the Supreme Soviet to elaborate principles of economic relations between all levels of administrations in the oblast.²⁶ As a result, an economic and political power-sharing agreement was concluded between the oblast and autonomous okrugs in December 1991, though it was far from a demarcation of rights to resources.²⁷

Partly because of these domestic problems, the demands of Tiumen oblast were rather moderate and emphasised economic issues, nonetheless the oblast supported a slogan of "strong regions, strong centre":

... in order to set spinning the mechanism of the use of natural wealth for the benefit of Russia and the region alike, it is necessary to draft and approve more

than 15 various normative acts, rules, instructions and provisions. ... We table a proposal in the government to allow the authorities and administrative bodies of Tiumen oblast, *in cooperation with autonomous districts*, to begin, as a trial run, to improve the mechanism of using natural wealth and to set up appropriate structures before a package of normative acts is approved at the federal level. ... I am sure that any region will find solution of its socio-economic problems more expediently and efficiently if it is *granted* a certain freedom of action *with an obligatory observance of unified state rules* established by law.²⁸

Finally, FEZ status became a useful lever in bargaining with the centre. Although the idea of FEZ began to be discussed in the late 1980s, its realisation was delayed because of the worries of conservatives and centrists who believed that FEZs could be a means of achieving regional autonomy. First of all, the FEZ granted investors favoured conditions in terms of taxation, tariffs, credits, and administrative surroundings through 'a special legal regime.'²⁹ The FEZ status also provided regions with investment from the centre, particularly on the development of infrastructure in the area.³⁰ Furthermore, the regional authorities were provided with more opportunities to expand their control over the economic activities in the zone.

Considering the rights that would be transferred to the regional authorities, the idea of the FEZ could be a variation of 'republicanisation' which was mainly concentrated on economic aspects. For instance, two proposals of the Presidium of the Primorskii *kraisovet* contained a long list of 'special rights' of the *kraisovet*, clearly showing its intention to expand its jurisdiction over economic activities and regional resources. In 'option 1,' which contained more broad rights than 'option 2,' the *kraisovet* declared that the land, subsoil thereof, the forests, inland bodies of water, and 200 mile sea zone be the property of the krai, which could constitute a 'maximum' demand. In addition, the *kraisovet* also declared itself the highest organ in the FEZ.³¹

However, economic activities in the FEZs did not seem to be satisfactory,³² which led regions to develop their own version of development programmes, clearly revealing their interests. For instance, the Nakhodka FEZ administration accused the central government of neglecting necessary investment, demanding that the central government implement investment projects and grant the FEZ authorities more rights.³³ In particular, the Primorskii *kraisovet* drafted a 'Greater Vladivostok' concept in 1992 which also recognised an FEZ model as an unsuitable option.³⁴ In the programme, the krai demanded a more detailed account of the responsibility of the federal government, and an agreement between Moscow and regional authorities demarcating rights to resources.³⁵ However, the federal government rather seemed to be interested in the Tuman River Project, which was supported by Khabarovsk krai.

One of reasons for the declaration of a republic by Primorskii krai on 8 July 1993, which was supported by the tin mining workers, entrepreneurs and directors of enterprises,³⁶ could be found in this context.

In the Russian Far East, Sakhalin oblast also followed a similar path, but with a slightly different variation on a different background. Here again, Valentin Fedorov, governor of the oblast, rejected a FEZ model originating from the centre, nonetheless he accepted the FEZ concept itself. His rejection seemed to stem from the development of Russian-Japanese relations, particularly the territorial dispute on four islands.³⁷ In particular, the development of Sakhalin offshore oil and gas projects encouraged Sakhalin oblast to strengthen their control over resources.³⁸ He claimed that the region had been "robbed" by the centre and now would declared itself "a special territory with exclusive rights of self-government":

The central authorities robbed Sakhalin of all it used to have: its people have no access to local products. ... we shall buy our freedom, but we'll pay in instalments, and thus be beneficial both for the central authorities and the so-called provinces. The first step to freedom is a region's right to manage its own resources on a commercial basis. ... Undoubtedly, Sakhalin has always been part of Russia, and now Sakhalin with all nearby islands is to be declared a special territory with exclusive rights to self-government. This means that democratically elected local governments will be free to handle at all local problems—economic, social, and political—as they see fit.³⁹

Instead of a FEZ, he suggested a 'fourth way' which supported to establish a FEZ not only on the Southern Kuril Islands but also on nearby Japanese territory to develop the region jointly.⁴⁰ The concept was developed further to form a globalised bloc, a Northeast Asia Cooperation Zone, which included Sakhalin, Republic of Korea, Hokkaido, and three provinces of Northeast China.⁴¹

VII. 2. Decreasing Role of Regional Leaders in the CPDs

The political and socio-economic diversity of regions often resulted in discord among regional leaders, which hampered inter-regional cooperation. After the political reform including changes in electoral procedures, regional leaders were forced to respond to pressures from below.⁴² Furthermore, regional leaderships were reshuffled as Eltsin began to appoint his representatives and governors. As some deputies were selected as governor or presidential representatives, regional leaderships in the Russian CPD became a mixture of 'old' and 'new' leaders who were often

opposed to each other. In particular, the new posts were accountable to different entities. Governors and presidential representatives were responsible to the president and the local soviet, while local soviet chairmen and the president of the federal republics answered to the grassroots. As a result, disputes between heads of regional administration and regional soviets or between governors and old leaders, first secretaries of the republican CPSU, were found in addition to the discord among leaders along the borders of administrative units.

Discord among regional leaders not only hampered their efforts to strengthen their position in the Congress by forming a common front against the centre, but also decreased their influence over their deputies inside the Congress. In fact, the eroding 'leading role' of regional leaders had been noticed since the late 1980s when the role of the CPSU was called into question and it began to lose popularity. The weak linkage between regional leaders and their deputies weakened the influence of inter-regional associations in the central decision-making body.

VII. 2 (1) Discord among Regional Leaders in the CPDs

Discord among regional leaders appeared even in the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, although they shared common social background as old nomenklaturists. Among ten first secretaries of the Siberian regions who were elected to the CPD of the USSR, those of Novosibirsk, Irkutsk, and Chita oblasts, and the Republic of Altai (Gorno-Altai autonomous oblast then) voted in less conservative ways. By contrast, the First Secretaries of the Republics of Tyva and Buriatia, and Altai and Krasnoiarsk krajs voted in a conservative way. In particular, V. V. Kazarezov, the First Secretary of Novosibirsk oblast where 'anti-establishment movements' were strong,⁴³ showed an example of the adaptation of a communist leader to the new situation. In addition, discord between the first secretaries and their *ispolkom* chairmen was also revealed, particularly in Altai and Krasnoiarsk krajs where comparison was possible.


<Table 7.2.1> Discord among Leaders of the SIBFE Regions in the USSR CPD (1989-1990)

Administrative Units	Name	Position	Congresses					Issues			
			2nd CPD (7 votes)	3rd CPD (5 votes)	4th CPD (5 votes)	Total (17 votes)	Article 6 (2 votes)	Federal issues (4 votes)	President (4 votes)	Economic (3 vote)	Other issues (4 votes)
<u>West Siberia</u>											
Rep Altai	V. V. Gusev	1st secretary	-1.43	-2.00	0.00	-1.11	-10.00	-10.00	2.00	-3.33	10.00
Altai krai	F. V. Popov	1st secretary	-7.14	-8.00	-3.33	-6.11	-10.00	-10.00	-4.00	-10.00	0.00
	A. A. Kuleshov	<i>ispolkom</i> chair	1.43	6.00	-1.67	1.67	0.00	-10.00	10.00	-6.67	10.00
Novosibirsk oblast	V. V. Kazarezov	1st secretary	-1.43	-2.00	3.33	0.00	0.00	-7.50	-2.00	0.00	10.00
Omsk oblast	E. D. Pokhitailo	1st secretary	-2.86	-2.86	-4.00	-3.33	-10.00	-10.00	0.00	-3.33	2.50
<u>East Siberia</u>											
Rep Buriatia	A. M. Beliakov	1st secretary	-5.71	-6.00	-3.33	-5.00	-10.00	-10.00	-2.00	-6.67	0.00
Rep Tyva	G. Ch. Shirshin	1st secretary	-5.71	-6.00	-1.67	-4.44	-10.00	-10.00	-2.00	-6.67	2.50
Krasnojiarsk krai	O. S. Shenin	1st secretary	-7.14	-6.00	-3.33	-5.56	-10.00	-10.00	-2.00	-10.00	0.00
	V. I. Sergienko	<i>ispolkom</i> chair	-1.43	0.00	-1.67	-1.11	-10.00	-10.00	4.00	-6.67	10.00
Irkutsk oblast	V. I. Potapov	1st secretary	-1.43	0.00	-1.67	-1.11	-5.00	-7.50	2.00	-10.00	10.00
Chita oblast	A. P. Orekhov	<i>ispolkom</i> chair	-1.43	0.00	0.00	-0.56	10.00	-5.00	0.00	-3.33	0.00
<u>Far East</u>											
Rep Sakha	Iu. N. Prokopev	1st secretary	-2.86	-2.00	-3.33	-2.78	-10.00	-10.00	2.00	-10.00	7.50
Khabarovsk krai	N. N. Daniliuk	<i>ispolkom</i> chair, the FEA 1st dir	-4.29	0.00	-3.33	-2.78	-5.00	-10.00	2.00	-10.00	5.00
Amur oblast	L. V. Sharin	1st secretary	-2.86	-2.00	-3.33	-2.78	-10.00	-7.50	2.00	-10.00	5.00

Scores ranged from +10 (support reform) to -10 (against reform).

The gap between regional leaders became clearer in the CPD of Russia, despite the development of inter-regional cooperation. For instance, fourteen out of 38 regional leaders who constituted the Council of the Siberian Agreement were elected to the Congress of Russia. However, their voting patterns showed a wide range of differences (see Figure 7.1). At the Congress, V. F. Raifikesht, governor of Altai krai, M. B. Kisiliuk, governor of Kemerovo oblast, and Iu. A. Nozhikov, the Irkutsk *oblispolkom* Chairman, supported reform. By contrast, G. N. Maimago, the Chairman of the Soviet of Taimyr autonomous okrug, and A. M. Tuleev, the Chairman of Kemerovo *oblsovet*, showed rather anti-Eltsin tendencies. Differences among the members of the Council of Siberian Agreement in the vote were reduced as some of the conservative leaders such as V. A. Churilov, the Chairman of the Soviet of Khanty-Mansi autonomous okrug, and V. Mukha, governor of Novosibirsk oblast, shifted their positions at the Sixth and Seventh Congresses.

<Figure 7.1> Discord among the Siberian Agreement Leaders in the CPD of Russia



* Scores ranged from -10 (anti-reform) to +10 (pro-reform).

In general, the regional leaders who constituted the leadership of the Siberian Agreement were more united when political questions such as relations between legislative and executive branches and the question of no confidence in the president were put to the vote at the Sixth and Seventh Congresses. However, as far as economic issues were concerned, K. A. Bicheldei, the Chairman of the Presidium of

the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tyva, and Sh. D. Oorzhak, the Chairman of *ispolkom* of Tyva, joined a conservative bloc, leaving the gap yet to be bridged.

The differences among regional leaders were more clearly revealed when other regional leaders were taken into consideration (see Table 7.2.2). Here again, discord can be found between the leaders of the executive and legislative branches at the regional level, reflecting the struggles between two branches at the centre, or personal rivalries at the region, or both. In this regard, leaders of these two regional branches were opposing each other in most regions—Kemerovo, Novosibirsk, Chita, Amur and Primorskii—where comparisons are possible. In general, governors were more supportive of Eltsin than regional soviet leaders, as they were appointed by Eltsin, although some (e.g. Shichkin of Chita oblast) were less supportive than other governors.

<Table 7.2.2> Regional Leaders in the Russian CPD (1990-1993)

Administrative Units	Regional Leaders		average score			
	Name	Position	2nd-5th CPD 12 votes	6th-7th CPD Total 10 votes	Eco- nomic ¹⁾ 5 votes	Pol- itical ²⁾ 5 votes
<u>West Siberia</u>						
Rep Altai	V. I. Chaptynov*	1st secretary/rep sov chair	-9.17	2.00	0.00	4.00
	V. I. Petrov*	rep government head	-7.50	2.00	0.00	4.00
Altai kr	V. F. Raifikesht*	governor/sov chair (1991)	7.50	8.00	6.00	10.00
	I. I. Zhiltsov	<i>ispolkom</i> chair	0.00	5.00	4.00	6.00
Kemerovo ob	M. B. Kisliuk*	governor/sov chair (1991)	7.50	6.00	4.00	8.00
	A. M. Tulcev*	sov chair/'Fatherland' head	-0.83	-10.00	-10.00	-10.00
Novosibirsk ob	V. P. Mukha*	sov chair/'SA' executive dir	-5.00	3.00	0.00	6.00
	V. A. Bokov	<i>ispolkom</i> chair	-5.00	-5.00	-4.00	-6.00
Omsk ob	A. P. Leontsev*	1st secretary	0.00	-2.00	-4.00	0.00
Tomsk ob	V. N. Egor	<i>ispolkom</i> deputy chair	-5.83	-6.00	-10.00	-2.00
Khanty-Mansi	V. A. Churilov*	soviet chair	-3.33	6.00	4.00	8.00
<u>East Siberia</u>						
Rep Buriatiia	S. N. Buldaev	soviet chair	-3.33	0.00	2.00	-2.00
Rep Tyva	Ch. B. Ondar	soviet chair	-3.33	-1.00	0.00	-2.00
	K. A. Bicheldei*	VS presidium chair (1991)	5.00	-1.00	-4.00	2.00
	Sh. D. Oorzhak*	<i>ispolkom</i> chair	1.67	1.00	-4.00	6.00
Rep Khakassiiia	V.N. Shtygashev*	soviet chair	-5.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
Krasnoiarsk kr	Iu. N. Moskovich	presidential representative	5.00	9.00	8.00	10.00
	V. S. Sokolov	2nd secretary	-0.83	-7.00	-8.00	-6.00
	V. V. Uvachan	1st secretary	-7.50	-8.00	-8.00	-8.00
Taimyr aok	G. N. Maimago*	soviet chair	-5.00	-5.00	-4.00	-6.00
Irkutsk ob	Iu. A. Nozhikov*	<i>ispolkom</i> chair/governor	5.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
Chita ob	V. A. Shishkin	governor	-3.33	1.00	-4.00	6.00
	N. I. Malkov	soviet chair	-3.33	-8.00	-8.00	-8.00
Agin-Buriat aok	B. V. Aiushivev*	soviet chair	-1.67	-1.00	0.00	-2.00
<u>Far East</u>						
Rep Sakha	M. E. Nikolaiev	governor/president	0.00	4.00	2.00	6.00
	V. P. Shamshin	Council of Ministers chair	0.00	-5.00	-6.00	-4.00

Evreiskii ao	M. M. Kaufman	<i>ispolkom</i> chair	-4.17	0.00	2.00	-2.00
Primorskii kr	E. I. Nazdratenko	governor (1993-)	6.67	8.00	8.00	8.00
	A. A. Volyntev	soviet chair	-5.00	-7.00	-10.00	-4.00
Khabarovsk kr	A. I. Vialkov	<i>ispolkom</i> deputy chair	3.33	6.00	6.00	6.00
Amur ob	A. A. Kirvchenko	governor (-1993)	8.33	8.00	6.00	10.00
	A. N. Belonogov	soviet chair	-7.50	-9.00	-10.00	-8.00
Sakhalin ob	V. P. Fedorov	governor	0.83	3.00	6.00	0.00
	V. N. Zhigailo	1st secretary	-4.17	-6.00	-6.00	-6.00

¹⁾ Economic issues included votes on T1, T2, T4, U2 and U3 questions in Appendix 6.1.

²⁾ Political issues included votes on T3, T5, U1, U4, and U5 questions in Appendix 6.1.

* Members of the Council of the Siberian Agreement in "Council of the Siberian Agreement Association," *International Affairs*, no. 4 (April 1993), pp. 70-86.

Scores ranged from -10 (anti-reform) to +10 (pro-reform).

Among the regional deputy groups in which first secretaries and newly appointed governors represented, the two leaders were also opposed to each other. For instance, among Sakhalin deputies, differences were quite evident between V. P. Fedorov, governor, and V. N. Zhigailo, the former First Secretary of the CPSU, in their voting patterns, as the latter had anti-reform tendencies. Although it may not have been a conflict between 'old' and 'new' leaders, a similar conflict was found within the Sakha leadership in the Congress.

Furthermore, leaders' voting patterns shifted depending on the questions, resulting in more diverse voting patterns. For instance, V. A. Shashkin, governor of Chita oblast, supported the president when political issues were put to the vote, while he voted against on economic reform policies. By contrast, Fedorov and S. N. Buldaev, the Chairman of the Buriat Republic Soviet, supported economic reform, but refused to support the president when political issues were put to the vote.

Considering all these observations, regional leaders were rather individualistic in the congress in their votes, failing to form a coherent basis for regional and inter-regional interest articulation.

VII. 2 (2) Limited influence of regional leaders over their deputies in the CPDs

The linkage between the Siberian Agreement and Siberian deputies to the Russian CPD were officially established when they organised the First Congress of People's Deputies of Siberia in Krasnoiarsk in March 1992. However, we may presume that a *de facto* inter-linkage existed already as leading figures of the Siberian Agreement were represented at the central level of the CPD. To examine regional

leaders' influence over deputies elected from their own regions, regional leaders' voting patterns are compared with those of deputies from the same region.⁴⁴

In the Congress of the USSR, the influence of regional leaders, mostly first secretaries of the CPSU at that time, over 'their' deputies was obviously decreased. As in Table 7.2.3, deputies showed rather similar voting patterns to those of their regional leaders' when federal issues were put to the vote. However, the influence of regional leaders was less in most regional deputy groups when Article 6 and presidential issues were put to the vote. In particular, deputies from the republics of Sakha and Buriatiia, Krasnoiarsk and Khabarovsk kraia, Novosibirsk oblast, and Jewish autonomous oblast were alienated from their leaders in relative terms. Perhaps among the regional groups included in the Table 7.2.3, deputies from the Republics of Altai and Tyva, Altai krai, Irkutsk and Amur oblasts—mostly conservative regions—tended to have similar voting patterns to those of their political leaders.

<Table 7.2.3> Distance of SIBFE Deputies from their Leaders in the USSR CPD

Administrative Units	Leaders	Position	N	Art. 6	Feder-	Presi-	Eco-	Other	Total
				2	ation	dent	nomy	4	17
				votes	votes	votes	votes	votes	votes
<u>West Siberia</u>									
Rep Altai	V. V. Gusev	1st secretary	4	5.00	10.00	5.00	1.67	8.75	6.19
Altai kr	F. V. Popov	1st secretary	14	0.00	10.00	4.49	6.41	2.44	4.99
Novosibirsk ob	V. V. Kazarezov	1st secretary	15	1.33	7.56	1.33	5.33	4.22	3.64
Omsk ob	E. D. Pokhitailo	1st secretary	11	0.91	4.85	2.42	10.00	10.00	4.26
<u>East Siberia</u>									
Rep Buriatiia	A. M. Beliakov	1st secretary	15	1.33	8.11	2.27	6.43	-2.11	3.22
Rep Tyva	G. Ch. Shirshin	1st secretary	13	3.08	10.00	3.74	6.92	2.05	5.39
Krasnoiarsk kr	O. S. Shenin	1st secretary	22	0.91	5.83	2.20	3.02	0.76	2.95
Irkutsk ob	V. I. Potapov	1st secretary	13	0.00	5.83	10.00	4.87	6.67	5.91
Chita ob	A. P. Orekhov	<i>ispolkom</i> chair	7	3.33	4.72	5.83	5.00	0.00	4.21
<u>Far East</u>									
Rep Sakha	Iu. N. Prokopev	1st secretary	16	-3.13	2.50	1.88	4.17	5.63	2.39
Evreiskii ao	Iu. N. Prokopev	1st secretary	5	-6.00	4.00	10.00	-0.67	4.00	2.62
Khabarovsk kr	N. N. Daniliuk	<i>ispolkom</i> chair	8	-7.50	8.75	7.14	0.42	3.75	3.85
Amur ob	L. V. Sharin	1st secretary	6	5.00	10.00	6.67	8.89	5.56	7.21

Scores ranged from -10 (totally different from regional leaders' voting patterns) to +10 (identical voting patterns).

It is more difficult to examine the influence of regional leaders in the Russian CPD.⁴⁵ Despite the possible methodological limits, the analysis suggests that the role of regional leaders was less in the Russian CPD than in the USSR CPD. In the Russian CPD, only a few leaders—N. I. Malkov, the Chairman of Chita *oblsov*, S. N. Buldaev, the Chairman of the soviet of the Republic of Buriatiia, and Belonogov, the

Chairman of Amur *oblsovets*—showed a high level of similarity in their voting patterns with deputies from the same administrative units. By contrast, most regional leaders who constituted the Council of the Siberian Agreement such as Mukha, Tuleev, Oorzhak, Moskovich, and Nozhikov did not seem to have strong influence over the deputies from their own regions (see Table 7.2.4).

<Table 7.2.4> Distance of SIBFE Deputies from their Leaders in the Russian CPD

Administrative Units	Regional Leaders	Position	N	2nd-5th	6th-7th CPD			Total
				CPD	total	eco ¹⁾	pol ²⁾	
				12	10	5	5	22
				votes	votes	votes	votes	votes
<i>West Siberia</i>								
Altai kr	V. F. Raifikesht*	governor/sov chair	17	4.31	2.35	2.94	1.88	2.99
Kemerovo ob	M. B. Kisliuk*	governor (1991-)	20	3.40	0.68	2.75	-1.42	2.20
	A. M. Tuleev*	soviet chair		0.61	0.04	0.00	0.10	0.31
Novosibirsk ob	V. P. Mukha*	soviet chair	18	1.50	2.89	4.17	2.04	1.96
Omsk ob	A. P. Leontsev*	1st secretary	13	2.60	5.05	5.19	4.62	3.63
Tomsk ob	V. N. Egor	<i>ispolkom</i> dep chair	7	-0.20	0.42	-0.67	2.22	0.17
Khanty-Mansi	V. A. Churilov*	soviet chair	7	-0.54	5.00	6.43	4.29	1.84
<i>East Siberia</i>								
Rep Buriatia	S. N. Buldaev	soviet chair	10	4.00	7.83	7.33	8.33	5.64
Rep Tyva	Ch. B. Ondar	soviet chair	6	1.83	4.77	4.69	5.00	4.12
	Sh. D. Oorzhak*	<i>ispolkom</i> chair		-0.28	2.02	5.21	-2.22	0.96
Rep Khakassia	V. N. Shtygashev*	soviet chair	6	1.00	6.67	6.67	6.67	3.25
Krasnoiarsk kr	Iu. N. Moskovich*	presidential rep	19	0.22	-1.41	-2.54	0.05	-5.70
Irkutsk ob	Iu. A. Nozhikov*	gov/ <i>ispolkom</i> chair	18	0.97	1.94	1.94	1.94	1.46
Chita ob	V. A. Shishkin	governor	8	6.28	1.67	2.71	-2.50	4.56
	N. I. Malkov	soviet chair		5.63	4.22	4.38	4.06	5.06
<i>Far East</i>								
Rep Sakha	M. E. Nikolaiev	governor	10	3.70	3.25	5.67	1.80	3.50
	V. S. Shamshin	chair, Council of Ministers		1.98	2.65	2.89	2.40	2.20
Primorskii kr	E. I. Nazdratenko	governor (1993-)	16	3.69	4.77	4.69	5.00	4.12
	A. A. Volyntev	soviet chair		-2.29	-3.06	-3.88	-2.03	-2.62
Khabarovsk kr	A. I. Vialkov	<i>ispolkom</i> dep chair	12	1.98	2.08	1.50	2.67	2.04
Amur ob	A. A. Kirvchenko	governor (-1993)	7	-3.21	-3.25	-2.00	-4.86	-3.24
	A. N. Belonogov	soviet chair		5.06	4.76	4.86	4.64	4.93
Sakhalin ob	V. P. Fedorov	governor	5	3.43	2.86	2.67	3.00	3.14

¹⁾ Economic issues included votes on T1, T2, T4, U2 and U3 questions in Appendix 6.1.

²⁾ Political issues included votes on T3, T5, U1, U4, and U5 questions in Appendix 6.1.

* Members of the Council of the Siberian Agreement, in "Council of the Siberian Agreement Association," pp. 70-86.


Scores ranged from -10 (totally different from regional leaders' voting patterns) to +10 (identical voting patterns).

VII. 2 (3) Weak Linkage between Leaders of Inter-regional Bodies and Deputies

Considering the situation in which regional leaders were losing their influence even over deputies of their own regions, it is not difficult to imagine that the role of inter-regional leaders could also be very limited in the CPD. In order to examine the possible linkage between inter-regional association leaders and SIBFE deputies, three leaders are selected. Firstly, N. N. Daniliuk, the Chairman of Khabarovsk *kraispolkom* and the First Director of the Far Eastern Association for the Economic Cooperation, had been elected to the USSR CPD. His voting patterns are compared with those of Far Eastern deputies in the USSR CPD. Secondly, V. Mukha, the Executive Director of the Siberian Agreement, and A. Tuleev, the Chairman of Kemerovo *oblsoviet*, who advocated rather a radical programme, are selected to compare their voting patterns with Siberian deputies in the Russian CPD.

As for Daniliuk, his voting patterns in general were quite similar to those of deputies from Primorskii krai and Amur oblast as in Figure 7.2. However, the picture is not that simple as deputies' voting patterns shifted depending on the questions.

<Figure 7.2> Distance of Far Eastern Deputies from N. N. Daniliuk in the USSR CPD



Scores ranged from -10 (totally opposite vote) to +10 (totally identical vote).
Numbers of deputies in each deputy groups in the bracket.
For the categories of votes, see Appendix 3.1.

For instance, Far Eastern deputies in the USSR Congress tended showed similar voting patterns when federal issues were put to the vote. However, regional groups

distanced themselves from Daniliuk as far as economic issues and Article 6 were concerned. Let alone other deputies, he even failed to mobilise deputies from own region. In the vote on economic issues, about half the Khabarovsk deputies did not follow his voting patterns. Furthermore, in the vote on Article 6, most of them voted in the opposite way to Daniliuk, supporting the changes in the Article.

The weak influence of inter-regional association leaders continued in the Russian CPD although inter-regional associations had reached their peak point of cooperation. As for Mukha, his attitude towards Eltsin's reform policies shifted from anti-Eltsin tendencies during the Second to Fifth Congresses ($M=-5.0$) to pro-reform tendencies during the Sixth and Seventh Congresses ($M=3.0$). Mukha's changing voting patterns could be a reflection of changing relations with Eltsin or pressures from him.⁴⁶

First of all, Mukha's influence over regional leaderships was rather limited. As discussed before, regional leaders were rather segmented, and only three—Chaptynov, Petrov, and Churilov—of fourteen members of the Council of the Siberian Agreement who had been elected to the Russian Congress followed Mukha's voting patterns, shifting their positions after the Fifth Congress (see Table 7.2.2).

Mukha's influence over Siberian deputies also appeared to be very marginal. Most Siberian regional deputy groups became more conservative—for instance, Kemerovo, Omsk, Tiumen, Krasnoiarsk and Chita deputies—or held more or less the same position throughout the Congresses. Perhaps, only Altai deputies as a group became somewhat more supportive of Eltsin's position during the Sixth and Seventh Congresses than before (see Table 7.2.5).

Considering individual Siberian deputies, about 40 deputies showed identical voting patterns in more than 70 per cent of the votes included in the analysis. However, among 38 deputies whose voting patterns were identical to those of Mukha during the Second and Fifth Congresses, about half of them or 18 deputies showed totally different voting patterns from those of Mukha during the Sixth and Seventh Congresses. This suggests that about half the deputies who showed identical voting patterns during the Second and Fifth CPD had escaped from Mukha's control and during the Sixth and Seventh Congresses.

<Table 7.2.5> Distance of Siberian Deputies from Mukha and Tuleev in the Russian CPD

Administrative Units ¹⁾	N	Attitudes towards Reform ²⁾				Distance from Mukha ³⁾				Distance from Tuleev ⁴⁾				
		2nd-5th		6th-7th		2nd-5th		6th-7th		2nd-5th		6th-7th		
		CPD	(12 votes)	CPD	(10 votes)	Total	(22 votes)	CPD	(10 votes)	Total	(15 votes)	CPD	(9 votes)	Total
<u>West Siberia</u>														
Altai krai	17	0.23	1.82	0.84	0.51	2.82	1.56	-2.03	-1.82	-1.92	0.31	0.04	0.61	0.31
Kemerovo oblast	20	3.00	-0.05	1.61	-1.10	1.00	-0.40	0.61	0.04	0.31	0.04	0.04	0.61	0.31
Novosibirsk oblast	18	0.23	0.17	0.20	1.50	2.89	1.96	-0.06	-0.21	-0.13	-0.13	-0.21	-0.06	-0.13
Omsk oblast	13	-1.54	-4.31	-2.80	1.69	-2.08	0.44	-0.68	4.29	1.94	4.29	4.29	-0.68	1.94
Tomsk oblast	7	1.48	1.17	1.06	-0.41	1.33	0.16	-0.08	-1.17	-0.94	-1.17	-1.17	-0.08	-0.94
Tiumen oblast	8	2.50	-1.25	0.80	-0.50	1.50	0.17	-1.53	1.25	-0.07	1.25	1.25	-1.53	-0.07
Khanty-Mansi aok	7	2.98	2.71	2.86	-2.00	4.29	0.10	0.32	-2.71	-1.28	-2.71	-2.71	0.32	-1.28
<u>East Siberia</u>														
Rep Buriatia	10	0.33	0.50	0.41	0.90	2.20	1.33	0.56	-0.50	0.00	0.56	-0.50	0.56	0.00
Rep Tyva	6	1.25	-1.50	0.00	0.50	1.67	0.89	-0.56	1.52	0.53	-0.56	1.52	-0.56	0.53
Krasnoirsksk krai	19	2.46	-0.47	1.14	0.84	2.05	1.23	-0.53	0.47	0.02	-0.53	0.47	-0.53	0.02
Rep Khakassia	6	2.64	1.50	2.12	-1.67	0.00	-1.11	0.39	-1.50	-0.60	0.39	-1.50	0.39	-0.60
Irkutsk oblast	18	0.97	-0.28	0.40	0.67	3.56	1.63	-0.68	0.28	-0.18	-0.68	0.28	-0.68	-0.18
Chita oblast	8	-1.04	-3.13	-1.99	4.38	0.25	3.00	-0.56	3.13	1.38	-0.56	3.13	-0.56	1.38

¹⁾ Regional deputy groups less than 5 members were excluded.

²⁾ Scores ranged from -10 (anti-reform) to +10 (pro-reform).

³⁾ Scores ranged from -10 (totally opposite) to +10 (totally identical with Mukha's vote). Votes on Q3, S3, T1, U1, U2, U3, and U4 questions are excluded in the analysis.

⁴⁾ Scores ranged from -10 (totally opposite) to +10 (totally identical with Tuleev's vote). Votes on R1, R2, and S3 questions are excluded.

The situation was more or less the same with Tuleev, although an increasing number of deputies had identical voting patterns to his own as the tensions between Eltsin and Khasbulatov intensified.⁴⁷ His position was rather unpopular among SIBFE deputies including those from Kemerovo oblast as well as among the leaders of the Siberian Agreement. Considering his anti-Eltsin voting patterns, his possible supporters could be found among deputies from Omsk and Chita oblast, and perhaps Amur oblast in the Russian Far East, nonetheless anti-Eltsin tendencies could not necessarily be regarded as separatist tendencies in themselves.

In this regard, SIBFE regional leaders in general failed to mobilise deputies from the regions at the CPD. Even after the 'politicisation' of the Siberian Agreement, more than the half the Siberian regional deputy groups—seven out of thirteen—kept a distance from their leaders such as governors, chairmen of the soviets or *ispolkoms*, and leaders of the inter-regional association such as Mukha and Tuleev—at the Congress. This alienation of regional leaders from their deputies critically weakened their bargaining power with the centre.

VII. 3. Lack of Linkages between Regional Leaderships and the Grassroots

During 1989-1993, the political participation of the grassroots had an increasing importance. In particular, Eltsin often appealed to the grassroots, facing growing opposition in the Congress. During 1991-1993, one presidential election (June 1991) and three referendums (March 1991, April 1993, and December 1993) were held at the Federation level, as well as elections at the lower levels of the state system.⁴⁸ As tensions in the Congress intensified, Eltsin launched appeasement policies towards the regions in order to win those referendums. Under these circumstances, it would have been easier for the regions to achieve their goals if the grassroots and regional leaders had been horizontally and vertically linked.

However, as the discord among regional leaders suggested, lack of a coordination mechanism between regional political actors critically damaged the influence of regional associations over the centre. Despite the re-emergence of 'independent' political parties, associations, movements, and political clubs since the late 1980s, such a development did not seem to enhance a vertical linkage between regional political leaders and the grassroots.⁴⁹ In particular, those regional organisations that advocated regionalist programmes and inter-regional collaboration failed to coordinate their activities with those organisations of similar political orientation in neighbouring regions, let alone playing a major role in the mobilising the grassroots.⁵⁰

As a result, signs of failed mobilisation of the grassroots were clearly revealed in these election and referendums. The grassroots were divided on the basis of the socio-economic conditions of their regions in general, more or less the same as their political leaders and deputies in the Congress.⁵¹ Furthermore, regional leaderships did not seem to control the grassroots in their regions in general, although the grassroots were also attentive to regional socio-economic conditions.

VII. 3 (1) Poor Performance of Regional Parties in the SIBFE Regions

After democratisation had been initiated, 'independent' political organisations began to emerge in Russia. Since 1985, awakening concerns on human rights and ecological conditions, and growing ethnic identities began to be accommodated in

more organised forms.⁵² Furthermore, when a competitive election procedure was introduced, electoral groups and 'historical parties' such as the Social-Democratic, Christian-Democratic and Anarcho-Syndicalist Parties, revived on the surface of the political arena. In particular, *perestroika* supporters' groups were formed 'from above' in many regions to assist those candidates who supported reforms under the auspices of regional branches of the CPSU. As a result, as many as 1,200 political parties were operating in Russia by the end of 1992.⁵³

Although exact numbers are not available, more than 250 political parties, associations, movements, and clubs were also established in major cities of the SIBFE regions.⁵⁴ Despite the development of regional 'political parties' and their coalition efforts, however, their performance was rather limited. In particular, regional parties, which are noteworthy in connection with SIBFE regionalism, were rather close to a 'cadet' party, and thus alienated from the grassroots. The situation was more or less the same in the coalition bodies of political parties including the People's Fronts as their member organisations had different ideological orientations. Furthermore, the performance of these People's Fronts in the elections varied region by region.

For instance, a People's Front had not been formed at all in Altai krai. In the krai, four major 'parties'—the Agrarian Party, New Will, the City Party, and Democratic Russia—were actively operating in the early 1990s. Among them, the Agrarian Party, led by Aleksei Kuleshov who became the First Secretary of the *kraikom* in 1990 and Aleksandr Nazarchuk, the Chairman of the *Agroprom* Union, was the largest party in the krai, reflecting the socio-economic situation of the krai as an agricultural region. The Agrarian Party supported the *sovkhos* and *kolkhos* system, which had a great appeal to a rural population, and controlled two-thirds of 230 *kraisovet* deputies. By contrast, the City Party led by Iurii Zhitel'tsov, the Chairman of the *kraispolkom*, advocated the idea of creating a FEZ in the krai, which was largely supported by the industrial sector. It gained control over about one-fourth of the *kraisovet* deputies. Democratic Russia started to operate in the krai in September 1990, and its influence began to expand in 1991. By July 1991, it controlled one deputy to the CPD of the USSR, six deputies to the Russian CPD, and had twenty branches in the cities and raions of the krai. Although the Agrarian Party maintained a majority in the *kraisovet*, the influence of 'Democratic Russia' increased, particularly in the major cities of the krai such as Barnaul, Biisk, and Slavgorodsk in the middle of 1991.⁵⁵

Among the People's Fronts operating in the SIBFE regions, those in Tomsk, Krasnoiarsk and Sakhalin seemed to be relatively more successful than those in other SIBFE regions. For instance, democratic blocs under the People's Front in Tomsk oblast controlled about 50 per cent of the *gorsovet* seats, and slightly less than 50 per cent of the *oblsovet* seats.⁵⁶ In Krasnoiarsk, the People's Front also made quite a success when it gained about 40 per cent of *gorsovet* and about 30 per cent of the *kraisovet* seats.⁵⁷ Another outstanding performance of the People's Front was seen in Sakhalin oblast. The Democratic Movement for *Perestroika* in Sakhalin oblast, which became a main body of the Sakhalin People's Front, supported V. V. Guliia in the election to the CPD of the USSR as an alternative to the *obkom* first secretary in 1989. It also supported V. P. Fedorov as *oblispolkom* chairman who eventually became governor of the oblast in 1991.⁵⁸

However, in Tiumen and Omsk oblasts, the People's Front seemed to be somewhat weaker. In Tiumen oblast, the People's Front was established in 1988 in Tiumen City, which expanded to an oblast level of organisation by December 1990. Although its programme supported democratisation and regional economic development, it won limited support from the grassroots in the elections in 1990. In the election to the Russian CPD, three of its eight candidates won the election. Furthermore, the People's Front nominated only 13 candidates for the *oblsovet*, and sixteen candidates for the *gorsovet* of Tiumen City.⁵⁹ The influence of Omsk People's Front was also limited to the major cities of the oblast, and its activities eventually faded at the end of 1990.⁶⁰

However, regardless of their performance in the short term, People's Fronts had potential obstacles to further development within themselves. First of all, the People's Fronts included various political groups of all ranges of ideological orientations, from right to left wing (see Table 7.3.1),⁶¹ whose common goals could be depicted as 'anti-establishment.'⁶² In particular, a nationalist platform which formed the main basis of the People's Front in the Baltic States was not available to the People's Fronts in Russia,⁶³ which reduced the possibilities of horizontal co-operation among the People's Fronts in the regions. Furthermore, when the electoral system favoured Moscow-based large parties with a party-list vote system, the influence of small parties including regional parties was seriously weakened.⁶⁴

<Table 7.3.1> Examples of the Composition of Coalition Bodies in the SIBFE Regions (1988-1992)

Regions	Organisations	Founding Date	Platforms / Activities	Member Organisations
<u>West Siberia</u> Omsk oblast	Omsk People's Front (Omskii narodnyi front)	May 1988	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "power to democratically elected soviets, factory to workers, lands to peasants" • ideological pluralism • actual control over the elections • democratisation of the society on the basis of multiparty system 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Democratic Union (centre) • 'Memorial' (centre) • Dialogue (left: Social-Democrats) • Social Democrats of Russia (left) • City Club of Electorate (n/a) • Social Ecological Union (ecology)
	Omsk Confederation of Democratic Movement (Omskaia konfederatsiia demokraticheskikh dvizhenii)	May 1990	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "victory against communists" 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Democratic Union (centre) • Komitet 'Sibir'' (regionalist) • Dialog (left: Social-Democrats) • Social-ecological Union (ecological) • City Electorate's Club of Omsk (n/a)
<u>Tomsk oblast</u>	Tomsk People's Movement (Tomskoe narodnoe dvizhenie)	December 1989	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • coordination of activities of democratic organisations • to support a multiparty system & political pluralism • to solve ecological problems in the oblast • to protect socio-economic rights of workers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Club of Electorates (centre) • Memorial (centre) • Ecological Initiatives (ecology) • Others: Club of People's Deputies; Soviet of Self-government; CAS (right) & Komitet Sibir' (regionalist) also took part in the meetings organised by the Movement)
<u>East Siberia</u> Krasnoarsk krai	People's Front of Krasnoarsk (Krasnoarsk narodnyi front)	October 1989	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • to wage a fight for <i>perestroika</i> and social justice • democratisation of society • to eradicate Stalinism 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 'Rus' (right: local org of the Christian-Democrats) • Vesna-89 (centre) • Democratic Association (left: initiated by Krasnoarsk Social-Democrats Club)

(cont.)

Regions	Organisations	Founding Date	Platforms / Activities	Member Organisations
Irkutsk oblast	Baikal People's Front (Baikal'skii narodnyi front)	November 1988	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consolidation of democratic organisations • to support democratic candidates • to support Gorbachev's policy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Vemost (right: national-patriotic) • Memorial (centre: Democratic) • Socialist Club (left: anarcho-syndicalist) • Business Club under 'East-Siberian Truth' (Delovoi klub pod 'Vostochno-Sibirskoi pravde, regionalist) • Movement for the Preservation of Baikal (ecological) • Angarsk Ecology Movement (ecological) • Other: Club of Civic Initiative; Trezvennicheskii klub 'Bereg'; Union of 'Lad'; Gruppya 'Sobranie'; Political Club of Democracy
Far East				
Khabarovsk krai	Khabarovsk People's Front (Khabarovsk narodnyi front)	September 1989	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • initiated a conference on autonomous organisations of the Far East (23-24/9/1989) • organised a meeting to oppose the construction of AES (about 600 participants) • held a meeting to support E. Gaer in the election to the CPD of the USSR (300-400 participants) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Democratic Party of Russia (centre) • Democratic Russia (centre) • Social Democratic Party of Russia (left) • Republican Party of Russia (left)

Sources: V. N. Berezovskii, N. I. Krotov, and V. V. Cherviakov, *Rossia: partii, assotsiatsii, soiuzy, kluby* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Rau-Press, 1991); Vladimir Pribylovskii, *Slovar' oppositsii: novye politicheskie partii i organisatsii Rossii* (Moscow: Postfactum, 1991); and *Samodeiatel'nye obshchestvennye i politicheskie organisatsii i dvizheniia v SSSR: spravocchnik serii "Kto est' kto"* (Moscow: VTI Deita-Press, 1992).

The regionalist or separatist organisations, which amounted to as many as fifteen out of 250 political organisations operating in the SIBFE regions in the early 1990s, also suffered similar problems. First of all, only a few regionalist organisations seemed to be able to mobilise a significant number of the population as they lacked close relations with the general public. In particular, many of them seemed to be nothing more than a 'cadet party' with their members being largely recruited from the higher echelons of administrative bodies or enterprises who became a main support group for a regionalist or separatist platform.⁶⁵ For instance, the Association of Siberian Cities, although its platform was far from a separatist one, consisted of heads of enterprises and organisations from 90 cities of Siberia.⁶⁶ The Party of Siberian Independence also seemed to be mainly based on the support of officials from administrative organs and entrepreneurs.⁶⁷

In particular, support for the separatist idea had begun to wane as suggested in the self-dissolution of the Party of Siberian Independence in 1993. In an interview with the correspondent of *Sibirskaja gazeta*, Boris Perov, the leader of the party, mentioned that the question of self-dissolution had arisen in the party when many of the entrepreneurs and officials of administrative organisations expressed their worries that 'independence' no longer served their interests.⁶⁸

Those regionalist or separatist 'parties' also sought to enhance their influence by joining coalition bodies. In this regard, three organisations were notable: the Siberian Democratic Union, the Union of Unification of Siberia, and the Far Eastern Association of Democratic Movements.

The Siberian Democratic Union, which was established at the Siberian Conference of the regional branches of the Democratic Union in April 1990 in Novosibirsk, advocated 'decolonialisation' of Siberia as a part of its goal.⁶⁹ In July 1990, branches of the Siberian Democratic Union in Krasnoiarsk and Achinsk, and other separatist organisations also agreed to form the Union of Unification of Siberia, aimed at eliminating colonial conditions in political, economic, and cultural relations between Moscow and Siberia. The Union also urged the creation of all-Siberian self-government and the revival of the white-green Siberian flag.⁷⁰ In the Far East, democratic blocs from twelve Far Eastern cities, initiated by the Khabarovsk People's Front, decided to form the confederation of the Far Eastern Association of Democratic Movements in September 1989. As the name suggested, the Association was rather close to a confederation of democratic blocs in the Far East.⁷¹

<Table 7.3.2> Regionalist Parties in the SIBFE Regions (1988-1992)

Region	Organisation	Year (Leader)	Membership / Platforms / Activities
West Siberia			
Altai krai	Altai-Russia (Altai-Rossiiia)	November 1989 (V. Simakin)	• 30 members
Novosibirsk oblast	Association of Siberian Cities (Assotsiatsiia sibirskikh gorodov)	early 1989 (I. Indinok, F. Borodikin, S. Iakushin)	• heads of enterprises & organisations of 90 Siberian cities • promote active barter relations between Siberian cities; establish a modern infrastructure in the Siberian region; organise production of natural resources of national need; promote foreign economic relations
	Siberian Democratic Union (Sibirskii demokraticheskii soiuiz)	7-8 April 1990 (O. Sadovskii I. Batenev A. Vishniakov)	• Student Club Supporting Perestroika; Siberian DU of Youth; CAS; Union of Workers; Social Democratic Party of Russia; branch of Russian PF • created at the Siberian Conference of the DU (7-8 Apr 1990, chairmen of 10 Siberian cities • protect rights & interests of Siberian people; fight for the political, economic, and cultural sovereignty, & rebirth of Siberia; organised a rally in May 1990 (3,000 participants)
Kemerovo oblast	Initiative Groups of Unification of Siberia (Initsiativaia gruppy ob'edineniia Sibiri)	n/a	• join the Union of Unification of Siberia (Tomsk)
Omsk oblast	Committee of Siberia Obshchetvennyi komitet Sibir'	4 June 1989 (O. Tomilov)	• realisation of autonomy of Siberia and regional economy • took part in the confederation of the DM (related with the Omsk People's Front); 11 members established the branch of the DU in Omsk city; at the end of 1990, activities faded
Tomsk oblast	Movement for Independence of Siberia (Dvizhenie za nezavisimost' Sibiri) Committee of Siberia Komitet Sibir'	n/a end of 1989 (n/a)	• n/a • held the conference on independence of Siberia on 1 July 1990 (Komitet Sibir', local org of CAS, delegations from Altai, Krasnoarsk, Irkutsk, Kemerovo, Kurgan, Novosibirsk, Omsk, Tiumen, Chita); political and economic sovereignty of Siberia
	Union of Unification of Siberia (Soiuz ob'edineniia Sibir')	1 July 1990 (T. Frolova, Tomsk gorsovet)	• Chairmen of organisations in Tomsk, Novosibirsk, Tiumen & Kuzbass • Komitet sibir' (Tomsk); Co-ordinating Soviet of Tomsk PF; CAS (in Tomsk & Kemerovo); Tomsk Club of Electorate; Social Democratic Party of Russia (Novosibirsk ob branch); RPF (Novosibirsk ob branch); Scientist Club (Novosibirsk; Freedom (Vol'nost', Novosibirsk); Initiative Group of Unification of Siberia (Kemerovo); Movement of People's Power (Kemerovo); Workers' Union (Novokuznetsk branch); Social Democratic Association (Tiumen); Siberian DU (Achinsk, Krasnoarsk); Org Committee of the Creation of Siberian Party (Krasnoarsk); Org Committee of Siberian People's Party • to eliminate colonial conditions in political, economic and cultural relations; sovereignty of Siberia; to create an all-Siberian self-government on the basis of territorial parliament, local soviet and real pluralistic party; to form an all-Siberian market on the basis of privatised enterprises; restoration of culture of the native Siberian People; preservation of natural environment; white-green flag

(cont.)

Region	Organisation	Year (Leader)	Membership / Platforms / Activities
East Siberia			
Irkutsk oblast	Business Club under "East-Siberia Pravda" (Delovoi klub pod 'Vostochno-Sibirskoi pravde)	n/a	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • economists who supported regional economy • worked with the Baikal People's Front (Irkutsk)
Krasnoïarsk krai	Siberian Party of Independence (Sibirskaiia partiia nezavisimosti)	April 1990 (V. N. Romanov)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • former the Siberian People's Party • formed at the Conference of Siberian Separatists and Autonomy-advocates in Tomsk (1/7/1990) • joined the Union of Unification of Siberia
Far East			
Primorskii krai	Org Committee on the Creation of the Siberian Party (Orgkomitet po sozdaniiu Sibirskoi partii)	n/a	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • n/a
Magadan oblast	Far Eastern Republic Party of Freedom (Dal'nevostochnaia respublikanskaia partiia svobody)	8-9 Sep 1990 (A. Zabolonitkov)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 60 members (mainly from Vladivostok DU, including A Zabolonitkov, <i>kraisovet</i> deputy) • sovereignty of Primorskii krai and restoration of a Far Eastern Republic within a confederation
	Far Eastern Republic Party (Dal'nevostochnaia respublikanskaia partiia)	13 July 1990 (I. Cherevkov)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • about 10 members, created as a branch of the Russian People's Front • re-establishment of a Far Eastern Republic
Khabarovsk krai	Seichansk People's Front (Seimchanskii narodnyi front)	February 1989 (V. Iakyshevich)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 30-35 active members • support the process of democratisation; economic independence of the region; demanded the restoration of the Far Eastern Republic; worked with the Far Eastern People's Front
	Committee of the Far Eastern Republic (Komitet po Dal'nevostochnoi respublike)	middle of 1989 (n/a)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • re-establishment of a Far Eastern Republic as a subject of the RSFSR as a sovereign state with own government, citizenship, right to resources
Khabarovsk krai	Far Eastern Association of Democratic Movements (Dal'nevostochnaia assotsiatsiia demokraticheskikh dvizhenii)	23-24 Sep 1989 (n/a)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 36 organisations from 12 cities: regional branch of 'Memorial' (Khabarovks); Democratic Movement for Perestroika (Iuzno-Sakhalinsk); Club 'Democrats,' & Emancipation of Workers (Vladivostok); Committee in Support of Perestroika (Komsomolsk-na-Amur); Civic Initiative (Blagoveshchensk, Amur ob); Democratic Initiative (Magadan); Independent Union (Amursk); Khabarovsk PF, Independent Union of Student, Workday, Far Eastern CAS (Vladivostok, Khabarovsk)
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • formed at the Conference on Autonomous Organisations of the Far East (23-24 September 1989) initiated by the Khabarovsk People's Front • Confederation of Organisations (questions were decided with two-thirds support) • put to an end to ecological disasters and the monopoly of the CPSU; full political and economic autonomy of the Far East and the status of a Far Eastern SSR

Sources: Bertzovskii, Krotov, and Cherviakov, *Rossia; Pribylovskii, Slovar' oppositsii; and Samodeiatel'nye obshchestvennye i politicheskie organizatsii i dvizheniia v SSSR.*

Considering the composition of member organisations of these coalition bodies, however, little difference were found between regionalist/separatist coalition bodies and other People's Fronts which did not advocate sovereignty of Siberia or the Far East. Therefore, the sovereignty of Siberia or the Far East did not seem to be the prime goal of these organisations, as their member organisations were rather close to an 'anti-establishment' type and more faithful to their own goals. Among these three organisations, the Union of Unification of Siberia was to some extent more homogeneous than other organisations in its composition, presenting more detailed proposals to achieve the sovereignty of Siberia.⁷² However, in general, their activities to mobilise the general public were even less successful than other organisations such as ecological groups.⁷³

VII. 3. (2) The Grassroots in the Presidential Election and Referendums

In the course of democratisation, Gorbachev and Eltsin often employed a populist approach in order to overcome opposition from conservative blocs. In particular, key questions such as the presidency, confidence in the president and his socio-economic policies, and the new Constitution had been settled by referendums in Russia. Those occasions provided regional leaders with opportunities to strengthen their positions in bargains with the centre, if they could influence the voting patterns of the grassroots. However, as recent research suggests, most regional leaders were not able to mobilise the grassroots, but only to attend to existing divisions at the grassroots level in order to win the electoral success.⁷⁴

An analysis on the regional voting patterns of the grassroots showed that they had rather 'consistent' voting patterns in a series of elections and referendums during 1991-1993, reflecting their socio-economic conditions. As in Table 7.3.3, the living standard and economic performance of a region that discussed in Chapter 2 were positively correlated to the level of support for Eltsin.⁷⁵ However, the regression analysis showed that proportion of non-Russian population and change in industrial productions during 1989-1993 at the regional level (social stress indicator in this analysis) did not seem to be significant at the 0.05 level.

<Table 7.3> Result of Regression Analysis: Support for Eltsin and Socio-economic Conditions (1991-1993)

	R Square	Economic Performance		Living Standards		Socio-economic Stress		Constant	
		B	T-Score	B	T-Score	B	T-Score	B	T-Score
		T-Score		T-Score		T-Score		Score***	
March 1991 Referendum (RSFSR question)	0.32	0.12	2.87**	0.06	1.04	-0.07	-2.19*	64.32	32.83
June 1991 Presidential Elections (support for Eltsin)	0.24	0.20	2.64**	0.08	0.74	-0.08	-1.45	46.48	12.49
March 1993 Referendum									
Q1: confidence in the president	0.34	0.19	2.51*	0.25	2.37**	-0.04	-0.68	43.73	12.03
Q2: socio-economic policy	0.35	0.16	2.41*	0.24	2.58*	-0.02	-0.51	39.14	12.27
Q3: early elections to the president	0.37	-0.11	-2.46*	-0.19	-3.06**	-0.01	-0.37	61.30	28.11
Q4: early elections to the parliament	0.42	0.09	2.09*	0.21	3.37**	-0.04	-1.43	57.38	26.70
Support for Eltsin (y-y-n-y)	0.33	0.01	2.19*	0.19	2.95**	0.04	1.16	29.94	13.67
Support for Khasbulatov (n-n-y-n)	0.40	-0.12	-2.54*	-0.18	-2.80**	0.04	1.36	40.30	17.96
December 1993 Referendum	0.31	0.19	2.53*	0.19	1.88	-0.05	-1.00	45.17	12.70

N=77

* Significance at the 0.05 level


** Significance at the 0.01 level

*** Significance at the 0.001 level

Despite the regression result, however, it does not exclude any possible influence of regional leaderships and other factors over voters in the presidential election and referendums in question. Although the level of voters' support for Eltsin was closely related to socio-economic indicators, some variations could be found as the voting patterns of the grassroots in some regions changed after 1992.⁷⁶

Among 84 regions included in this part of analysis,⁷⁷ about half the regions showed rather stable voting patterns, while the other half revealed shifting voting patterns, either becoming more supportive of Eltsin or less. However, decreasing or sharply decreasing support for Eltsin throughout 1991-1993 at the regional level also appeared to reflect poor economic performance and low living standards in the regions.

<Figure 7.3> Changing Support of the Grassroots in the Presidential Election and Referendums at the Regional Level (1991-1993)



Figures in bracket indicated numbers of regions included in the category. For detailed description, see Appendix 8.2.

In combination with the regional clusters based on socio-economic conditions, we can locate regions that showed relatively more support for Eltsin or less, compared to their economic conditions. As in Table 7.3.4, voters in Tiumen, Bashkortostan, Belgorod, Lipetsk, and Ulianovsk seemed to be relatively less supportive of Eltsin, independent of their socio-economic conditions. By contrast, voters were more supportive of Eltsin in Arkhangelsk, Vladimir, Tomsk, Primorskii, Khabarovsk,

Astrakhan, and the Republic of Kalmykia, having taking account of their economic conditions.

Although the reasons for 'higher' or 'lower' levels of support for Eltsin in this context have yet to be analysed, it is obvious that most of SIBFE regional leaders failed to mobilise voters in their regions in order to strengthen their bargaining power with the centre. For instance, despite the strained relationship between the centre and Primorskii leadership, voters in the krai showed a relatively high level of support for Eltsin during 1991-1993. The situation was more or less the same in Krasnoiarsk, Irkutsk, and Kemerovo. In particular, despite his ardent regionalist tendencies, Tuleev did not seem to mobilise the grassroots, as the grassroots in Kemerovo showed the national average level of support for Eltsin in the referendums.⁷⁸

By contrast, some strong linkages between regional leaders and the grassroots could be found in the Republic of Sakha. Voters in Sakha were less supportive of Eltsin in 1991 than other voters (59.8 per cent in March 1991, and 44.9 per cent in June 1991). However, after the concessions of the centre in 1992, the support increased to 68.1 per cent in April 1993. Their support fell to below the national average in December 1993 (52.1 per cent compared with 56.6 per cent, including invalid votes), possibly because the new Constitution deprived the republics of the right to secede from the Federation. Another strong linkage between regional leaderships and the grassroots can be found in the republics of Tatarstan and Tyva when they boycotted the referendum on the RSFSR question in March 1991. In these two republics, political movements on the basis of national sentiments were at their peak, particularly in the early 1990. However, in these cases, it is not clear whether regional leaders were mobilising the grassroots or they were merely responding to anti-Moscow tendencies at the grassroots level.⁷⁹ In any case, this radical approach also revealed difficulties for regional leaderships to infuse the grassroots with inter-regional goals at the cost of peculiar regional demands.

<Table 7.3.4> Differentiation of Regional Support in the Presidential Election and Referendums (1991-1993)

		Level of Support for Eltsin in the Referendums and Presidential Elections during 1991-1993							
		higher level	high level	average level	low level	decreasing	sharply decreasing	increasing	
Economic Performance & Living Standards	highly developed	Moscow city St. Petersburg	Murmansk	<u>Tiumen</u>					
	well developed	Sverdlovsk Perm Cheliabinsk	Moscow ob Samara, Magadan Krasnoirsksk Nizhegorod	Kemerovo Irkutsk Rep Sakha		<u>Bashkortostan</u>		(Rep Tatarstan)	
	moderately developed		Rep Kareliia Tula, Iaroslavl Kamchatka	Vologoda Rep Komi		<u>Belgorod</u> , <u>Lipetsk</u> <u>Ulianovsk</u>			
	under-developed		<i>Arkhangelsk</i> <i>Vladimir</i> <i>Tomsk</i> <i>Primorskii</i> <i>Khabarovsk</i>	Leningrad, Novgorod Ivanovo, Kostroma Kirov, Omsk, Sakhalin Kaliningrad, Rep Udmurt Rep Khakasiia	Pskov	Orel, Briansk, Kaluga Riazan, Smolensk, Tver Kursk, Voronezh Vogograd, Saratov Orenburg, Novosibirsk			
	poorly developed			<i>Astrakhan</i> <i>Rep Kalmykiia</i>	Rep Buriatiia Chita, Amur Rep Altai (Rep Tyva)	Tambov, Penza, Krasnodar Stavropol, Rostov, Kurgan Altai Rep, Mari-El Rep Mordoviia Rep Adygeiia, Kabardino-Balkarsk Rep	Rep Dagestan Karachaev- Cherkeskaia Rep	(Rep North Ossetiia)	
	others ¹⁾	Khanty-Mansi aok Iamal-Nenets aok	Chukchi SAR	Nenets aok, Koriak aok Komi-Permiak aok Ust-Ordinsk Buriat aok Evreiskii ao	(Rep Chechen- Ingushetiia)				Agin-Buriat aok

Four republics in bracket boycotted the March 1991 referendum on the Russian question (establishing a Russian presidency).
Regions that were less (underlined) or more supportive (in italic) of Eltsin than expected considering socio-economic conditions.
1) Other regions that were excluded from the regional cluster based on socio-economic conditions (see Chapter 2).

VII. 4. Regional Policy of the Centre

The Eltsin administration has been often criticised for lack of clear principles in its regional policy in the early 1990s.⁸⁰ However, it is worth noting that the context of a regional policy had been altered by the demise of the Soviet Union, before any evaluation of regional policies in the early 1990s can be made. First of all, a new regional policy in the early 1990s had broader dimensions, including the question of re-establishing a federal system. After the declaration of sovereignty by the RSFSR, the regional self-accountancy drive and declaration of sovereignty by federal subjects threatened to establish a single political and economic unit. In this context, a regional policy was no longer only a series of location or distribution policies, but a part of a state-building process.

Secondly, there was a major shift in power relations between centre and regions, in a direction that was favourable to the regions. As a result, the maximisation of national efficiencies, which was a major concern of the centre, was no longer able to prevail over regional demands. Such a development limited the ability of the centre to take initiatives to work out and implement an integrated and 'consistent' regional policy.

In this situation, Eltsin's 'regional policy' seemed to concentrate more on political than economic aspects. First of all, top priority was given to the question of re-establishing single political and economic units in the form of a federation,⁸¹ which was to be based on a territorial and functional principle, minimising the principle of nationality.⁸² The goal was supported by Eltsin's drive for a strong presidency and the development of local self-government, which squeezed the regional authorities from above and below. Meanwhile, Eltsin accommodated regional demands which were based on regional peculiarities with *ad hoc* bilateral negotiations, although their effectiveness is still open to question.

Considering these features, Eltsin's strategy towards the regions had a certain degree of consistency, though tactics had been altered in response to the development of the situation. In the process, the centre managed to establish a 'safety net' under these changes in centre-periphery relations, placing limits on the political and economic drives of the periphery.

VII. 4 (1) A 'Strong Presidency'

The idea of creating the post of president in Russia had appeared even before the Soviet Union had collapsed. As did Gorbachev,⁸³ Eltsin also sought to secure his leadership, which was vulnerable to opposition in the Congress, by establishing a republican presidency. After the referendum of March 1991, Eltsin was elected as the president of the RSFSR in June 1991. His presidential power was expanded at the Fifth Congress in October 1991.

In connection with centre-periphery relations, two presidential powers are noteworthy. Firstly, the president was endowed with emergency powers to issue presidential decrees which could be at variance with laws of the USSR and the RSFSR in practice.⁸⁴ This emergency power provided Eltsin with more flexibility to respond to the regional demands, particularly when the Congress rejected to discuss the question of a federal treaty in 1991. In the process of signing the Federal Treaty, for instance, Eltsin issued presidential decrees in return for the support of the regions. Furthermore, a concession granted to a region by a presidential decree did not change the legal framework of the federal system itself, and thus could be overridden by another decree or a law. In this regard, Eltsin tended to respond to regional demands on a temporary basis which could be re-adjusted when the centre became strong enough to force its will upon the regions. Despite the disadvantage of 'temporary' concessions such as regionalisation of reform and the possibility of deepening regional disparities, this strategy seemed to be successful in encouraging regions to reach a separate bargain with the president rather than stick to inter-regional cooperation.

Secondly, the president was endowed with executive powers that increased his influence over regional political leaders.⁸⁵ In order to increase his influence over regional authorities, Eltsin intended to nominate regional leaders and have his nominees run for the elections which were scheduled for December 1991.⁸⁶ However, regional political elites tended to be more attentive to regional goals in order to win local elections. Therefore, Eltsin withdrew himself and imposed a moratorium on local elections until December 1992 and called for the subordination of lower executive organs to those of higher organs, establishing the accountability of executive powers to the president.⁸⁷

The expanded presidential right to appoint and dismiss regional leaders such

as governors became an obstacle to the development of regionalism. Although the function of governorship and presidential representatives was rather unclear, and different from region to region, the new post increased 'heterogeneity' among regional leaders in regard to their accountability and attitude towards reform as suggested in the analysis of their voting patterns in the Congress.

In general, the new posts—governorship and presidential representatives—provided Eltsin with more places for his supporters, and thus more opportunities to counterbalance regional leaders of anti-president or anti-reform orientation. By appointing his supporters to the head of regional executives, Eltsin had amplified the discord of regional leaders.⁸⁸ Furthermore, the threat of removing regional leaders who were defiant to the president from their positions turned out to be an effective way of blocking regional interest articulation. Although Slider has observed that Eltsin made relatively little use of his power to remove governors,⁸⁹ his power seemed to have an impact on the development of regionalism. For instance, Eltsin's threat to relieve Mukha of his position as governor of Novosibirsk in March 1992 changed his voting patterns in the CPD as already discussed.⁹⁰ He was finally removed from his post in October 1993 after the dissolution of the CPD, which put an end to the discussion of countermeasures to Eltsin's move among leaders of the Siberian Agreement.

VII. 4 (2) A New Constitution on a Territorial-Functional Principle

As already discussed, the asymmetrical structure of the federal system became a major obstacle to re-establishing a new one in its place. In particular, the republics' inherited right of secession became a major threat to the stability of the federation. Therefore, Eltsin's primary attention was devoted to the republics in order to bind them to a new federation and reduce their influence. Eltsin suggested forming a federation with two categories of subjects—republics and *zemli*—of equal rights,⁹¹ though his idea of creating *zemli* had failed to survive the opposition, as already discussed in Chapter 2.

However, despite the general observation that disparities of rights between republics and ordinary federal subjects had increased, two 'equalisation' measures were approved at the end of 1993. First of all, the Constitution of 1993 deprived republics of their rights of secession which the Federal Treaty confirmed, nonetheless

republics still maintained favourable terms in their relations with the centre. Secondly, Eltsin introduced equal representation in the central parliament, replacing a national-territorial principle with a territorial-functional principle for the new parliament which would reduce the influence of republics, nonetheless an analysis in depth is still required.

Eltsin's move to change the representation system appeared to be a compromise between a manageable size of legislature and a need to win support from regional leaders. For the 1993 elections, Eltsin introduced critical changes in the parliamentary system. The parliament had been reduced to less than half its size as compared with the CPD and was to consist of two chambers, the Duma and the Council of the Federation. As for the Duma, half of the 450 seats were allocated to party lists, removing national electoral districts which provided republics with more representation than ordinary administrative units. Furthermore, as no regional parties seemed to wage a successful campaign in the elections during 1989-1993, functional representation based on the party system tended to reduce the possibility of regional representation in the parliament.

In particular, the idea of establishing an institution of regional leaders had appeared in April 1992 when heads of regional administrations held a meeting during the Sixth Congress on their own initiative. In August 1992, the Union of Leaders of Executive Powers of Territorial Organs had been established, which gained a legal status in November 1992 when the Russian Union of Governors (*Soiuz gubernatorov Rossii*) had established.⁹² At the same time, Eltsin called republic leaders to form the Council of Republics (*Sovet glav respublik*) in October 1992 under his administration as a consultative body. In March 1993, the Council of Heads of Administrations was established, which developed into a constitutionalised body—the Council of the Federation—in December 1993, despite opposition led by Khasbulatov.⁹³ The Council, consisted of two deputies from each of the 89 federal subjects, became an institutional arena for regional interest articulation.

Although Eltsin's initiative still accommodated regional interest articulation in the central legislature, it achieved equal representation between republics and ordinary federal subjects, and thus reduced the influence of the republics. It also prevented an eruption of regional demands in a more chaotic way by inviting regional leaders into the decision-making process, which affected the question of federation or federal relations.

VII. 4 (3) Development of Local Self-Government

If the concept of *zemli* was designed to counterbalance regional authorities, particularly the republics' sovereignisation, from the upper tier of administrative units, the development of local self-government eroded regional authorities from below. Although both the centre and regions supported the development of local self-government, they had rather conflicting expectations. As for the regions, local self-government was sought to increase their competence to implement and determine policies that affected daily lives. However, the centre supported the development of local self-government to increase their control over regional authorities.⁹⁴

In the process of legislation on local self-government and economic reform, some powers and responsibilities were transferred to regional authorities. However, the transfer was not associated with the necessary financial measures and a clear demarcation of power at various levels of regional government.⁹⁵ According to the law "On the Basic Principles of Taxation" adopted in December 1991, only twenty-one minor taxes were assigned to raion governments,⁹⁶ while value-added tax was assigned to the federal government and personal and corporate income taxes were assigned to sub-national governments. Furthermore, tax rate-setting, tax assignment and collection remained a federal responsibility which undermined the financial independence of local self-governments, as well as regional authorities.⁹⁷

The situation became even worse when public services which were normally provided by enterprises (*sotskul'tbyt*) were transferred to sub-national governments in the process of marketisation.⁹⁸ Under the Soviet economic system, state enterprises had financed expenditures for public services such as schools and kindergartens, hospitals, holiday camps, roads, and sanitation which were normally recognised as local responsibilities. However, under the economic reform, neither the local self-governments nor enterprises were able to finance such services. A case study in Kemerovo oblast showed that responsibility for public services became a hot potato for enterprises and local authorities:

First, local services which are part of the *sotskul'tbyt* (public service of enterprises' responsibility) complexes of the local enterprises—the kindergartens, house of culture, prophylactic care facility and holiday camps—face an uncertain future. According to the 1994 Privatisation Law, *sotskul'tbyt* is supposed to be handed over to the local authorities. So far the mine

management, the trade union and local authority have been resisting pressure for its transfer and only one kindergarten has been handed over.

... in the past a variety of local services, such as street lighting, road building and maintenance were delegated to local enterprises. Now that enterprises, which themselves are under severe financial pressure, claim that they are no longer maintain the local fabric. Instead, they pay a local tax, but the head of Vishnovka's local administration claims that the portion of this that they receive is not enough to cover the cost of local services previously provided by the enterprises.⁹⁹

A conflict over transferring responsibilities without the necessary funding inevitably spilled over into a conflict over financial sources such as central subsidies between regional and local governments, and over property rights among central, regional and local governments. In particular, local governments that were more dependent on central support often competed with upper echelons of administrative units, becoming a lever for the central government to erode the power of regional authorities.¹⁰⁰

The power struggle between regional authorities and local governments under their jurisdiction could be found in the SIBFE regions, as in other regions of the Russian Federation. For instance, a 'public forum,' in which deputies of all levels who elected in Irkutsk oblast, and representatives of public organisations, movements, and political parties took part, adopted a resolution asking the Supreme Soviet to recognise the equal status of Irkutsk oblast to republics. However, at a session of the *oblsovnet* in November 1991, deputies from Angarsk city in Irkutsk expressed their worries about the recognition of 'Irkutsk State' as it would be another 'centre' for okrugs and cities. They also threatened regional authorities by declaring that they would try to put the city under the jurisdiction of the Federation.¹⁰¹

Regional authorities were still further undermined when they found themselves in a conflict with the municipal authorities of the regional centre. In Omsk oblast, the conflict between municipal and oblast administrations became acute over the property rights in the process of privatisation in late 1991 and 1992.¹⁰² The conflict between two administrations showed a more dramatic development in Primorskii krai when Evgenii Nazdratenko, governor of the krai, resorted to violent measures in order to suspend Viktor Cherepkov, mayor of Vladivostok city.¹⁰³

VII. 4 (4) Eltsin's Non-systematised Bilateral Negotiations with Regions

Eltsin's tactics to encourage regions to conclude an agreement separately with Moscow constituted a basic feature of his regional policy of 'divide and rule.'¹⁰⁴ In general, Eltsin's bilateral negotiations with the regions had two main effects on centre-periphery relations. First of all, it encouraged regions to maintain their contact with the centre. For the regions, it appeared more promising to have an agreement with the centre rather than to seek a 'systematic' guarantee that would take more time to satisfy regions of different expectations or to wage a 'total war' with the centre following Chechnia. In particular, it would be acceptable for politically or economically 'strong regions,' as the process would provide them with opportunities to become 'more equal' than other regions. In this regard, Eltsin made it clear that any concessions to a region would not lead to changes in the system itself.¹⁰⁵ Therefore, despite the observation that any preferential terms agreed with a region might become a standard for the rest, and thus reduce the influence of the centre over the regions, 'non-systematic' bilateral negotiation prevented 'maximum' concessions to 'strong regions' from being applicable to 'weak regions' as well. It rather provided the centre with more flexibility in its response to the demands of 'strong regions.'¹⁰⁶

Secondly, bilateral negotiations diversified the sources of financial support. Although they often failed to be fully implemented when based on the central budget because of chronic budget deficits, they included specific terms that reflected regional socio-economic peculiarities such as regional needs and possible fund generating sources. As a result, the measures often diverted regional lobbies to different directions or financial sources on the basis of their peculiarities, which undermined regional unity.

In the reform process, various financial sources emerged in addition to traditional centralised sources such as subsidies and investment for the centre.¹⁰⁷ For instance, the role of federal or sub-federal level of budget/off-budget funds was expanded. A region was also endowed with rights to attract direct or indirect foreign investment or foreign credits, which were supposed to be a main goal of the FEZs. Furthermore, a region also financed its own socio-economic development by holding the wealth produced on its own territory at its disposal by expanding assigned and

regulatory budget revenue and by establishing regional credit or material-technological funds.

Distribution of or access to such financial sources was made to four types of possible beneficiaries: a group of regions, an individual region, economic sectors, and the general public. For instance, a programme to deal with the Chernobyl' incident affected 21 regions and a support programme for the Far North included 19 administrative units. In addition, bilateral agreements between centre and inter-regional associations of Central Chernozem regions,¹⁰⁸ the Ural regions,¹⁰⁹ Great Volga,¹¹⁰ and the Siberian Agreement¹¹¹ included a group of regions. Support for a particular sector also became a source of finance for a region of specialised economic structure such as agriculture/agro-industry, fuel-energy industry, and military-industrial complex. Social funds such as the Fund for Pensioners, the Social Insurance Fund, and the Fund of the Supreme Soviet on Social Support for Population (Fund of Development of Kino/TV for Children and Youth) were also available for regions to meet their particular socio-economic needs. These financial sources were often open to negotiation between centre and regions.

In the process of negotiations between Moscow and regions, two main features are noteworthy in relations with the development of inter-regional associations. Firstly, concessions were made when power struggles were acute in the centre as discussed in Chapter 3, which widened the gap between regional political leaders on the issues in question.

Another feature that are closely related with the development of inter-regional unity is that the economic structure of a region and the status of a region in the federal system turned out to be a critical factor in the process of bilateral negotiations. In general, federal republics tended to attract more attention from the centre than ordinary administrative units. However, at the same time, administrative units featured as natural resource bases were more interested in expanding their control over resources in their territories, while others with poor natural resources were more concerned to secure central subsidies. Therefore, inter-regional associations such as the Siberian Agreement and the Great Urals tended to be endowed with economic rights over their natural resources which were greater than those of other inter-regional associations such as the 'Central Chernozem' regions and other republics which had a weaker basis of natural resources (see Table 7.4.1).

<Table 7.4.1> Moscow's Selective Concessions to the Various Type of Beneficiaries

Regions	Economic Competence (Natural Resources etc.)	Foreign Economic Activities	Central Support
<u>Inter-regional Association</u>			
Central Chernozem (31 March 1991)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • maximum delegation of the Association's right of economic regulation to balance influx and outlet of products, and goods • right to form financial, credit, goods-material funds • standard territorial fund / Innovation Fund 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • standard licensing • open the FTB branches in the oblasts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 80% of profit tax to enterprises • compensate tariff on transportation to the 'Far North' • Innovation Fund: 100 mil rubs from SMRF, credit from the CB, FTB • SMRF guarantee the implementation of the CPD's resolution on land reform
Siberian Agreement (1 July 1992)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • permission to create enterprises/organisations • full right on profit tax (1991-1993) • direct food delivery among participating regions freely • right on delegation in legislative acts • levying natural resources exploitation fees • SMRF examine possibility of liberalisation of fuel-energy, raw material price in 1992 and 25% of products from 09/1991 • standard territorial fund / Innovation Fund 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • standard licensing • standard registration • SMRF, Cmt, Cms of VS & the Association work out a mechanism to decide export quota 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SMRF provide 150 mil rubs for the Innovation Fund
Far East / Zabaikalia (incl. Rep of Buriatia, 1 October 1992)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gnt RF and FE work out a gnt programme for 'Far East' in the first half of 1992 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gnt RF with the FE work out a mechanism to guarantee and privileged foreign investment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CB provide privileged credit to ago-industrial complex, comic firms, individual house construction • gnt support for economic structural reconstruction • form state programme • subsidies to compensate budget deficit
<u>Republics</u>			
Republic of Marii-El (24 August 1992) (a residual region in Volga Viatka)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (include republic share of equipment purchase, conducted with 15 million dollar of Italian credit) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 250 mil rubs for house construction (Min Eco) • provide 36.1 mil rubs for gasification of rural areas from July 1992 (Min Fin, Min Agr) • 85,000 tones of concentrated <i>kormov</i> (Min Agr) • Min Top distribute electricity with the cooperation of SM of Marii El, Chuvash, and Nizhegorod oblast • create International Tourist Centre • 200 mil rubs to create a diagnosis centre (Min Zda) 	

(cont.)

Regions	Economic Competence (Natural Resources etc)	Foreign Economic Activities	Central Support
<p>Republic of Tyva (2 September 1992) (a rural region in East Siberia)</p>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • standard licensing • the government Cmt of customs open customs in the republic • two passenger/cargo points on the Russian-Mongol boarder 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • a draft of development programme • Min Eco, Min Fin, Min Agr work out an investment programme and the RF budget of 1993-1995 to provide central capital investment • Min Fin subsidise social development in the republic • Min Eco, Federal Contract Coop, Min Ind deliver material-technological materials in 1993-1995 no less than 1991 volume • (Min Eco, BFT consider the republic's proposal when they decide the question of \$50 mil of foreign investment credit)
<p>Republic of Sakha (decree of 11 December 1991 & the agreement of April 1992) (a resource region in the Far East)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • geological search and exploitation of natural resources are implemented only with the permission of SM of Sakha • decision on the delivery for the need of the RSFSR must be made with the participation of SM of Sakha • 10% precious metal, jewellery diamonds are redeemed by the SM Sakha (increased to 11.5% of precious metal and 20% of diamonds under the agreement of 1992) • extraction of diamonds for technical use out of quota and its realisation is to be carried out on a direct agreement through <i>Golbrun</i> RSFSR • until the coordinated legislation, SM Sakha determine procedure of levying payment for the use of natural resources; fines and compensations for the environmental damages • Government of RF and SM Sakha create a joint venture <Almaz' Rossij> • SM Sakha credit fund with 20% of profit from sales of diamonds and coal • consider to create a Fund for military personnel 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • diamond export on quota through BO FK <i>Almaziubelireksport</i> • SM Sakha set procedures and quota on realisation of forest/useful fossils for export, determined by Min Eco, Min Fin, and participation of foreign partner in diamond processing • (45% of currency profits gained from the export of diamonds and 'brillianty' under the agreement of 1992) 	

(cont.)

Regions	Economic Competence (Natural Resources etc)	Foreign Economic Activities	Central Support
<u>Ordinary Administrative Units</u>			
Tiumen oblast (19 September 1992) (a resource region in West Siberia)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • right of the enterprises to use 30% products (10% for oil/gas, 50% for the enterprises based on market mechanism) to solve socio-economic problems • draft a programme for the development of oil/gas complex • Programme Administration (SMRF, oblast's, okrugs' authorities) confirm resource search & exploitation, and 'effective' measures of exploitation • establish coordination group <Territorial Funds>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SMRF decide export quota of oil/gas and forest products with the consent of the Programme Administration and executive powers of Tiumen oblast and okrugs' Soviet. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Programme Administration work out budget measures • scientific-technological centre in Tiumen city • SMRF on credit measure to solve socio-economic problems during the fourth quarter of 1992 • SMRF create necessary conditions for workers and populations of the oblast in accordance with the draft law on Far North
Kuril Islands, Sakhalin (8 December 1992) (a residual region in the Far East)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • standard territorial fund / fund for the Programme • transfer taxes on profit, VAT, excise duty, and payments for the use of natural resources to local budget • (recognise the Islands as a part of Sakhalin oblast) <Territorial Funds>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the FEZ 'Sakhalin' • standard licensing • right to let land to foreign investors for 99 years 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Min Fin, under the state programme for 1993-1995, finance construction, reconstruction of airport, road etc • Min Def support military personnel and their family with the RF budget 1993-1995

Standard Concessions for foreign economic activities

- 'standard licensing': licence import and export quota within established quota

- 'standard registration': register enterprises or organisations which take part in the foreign economic activities independently

Standard Concessions to form Territorial Funds: 10% of products produced in the regions, 5% are at the disposal of enterprises or organisations contributing the fund for the procurement of material-technical resources

Acronyms: SMRF: the Soviet Ministers of the RF; Min Eco: Ministry of Economy; Min Fin: Ministry of Finance; Min Agr: Ministry of Agriculture; Min Top: Ministry of Fuel and Energy; Min Zda: Ministry of Health; Min Ind: Ministry of Industry; Min Def: Ministry of Defence; CB: the Central Bank; FTB: the Bank of Foreign Trade.

Sources: *Vedomosti s 'ezda narodnykh deputatov RSFSR i Verkhovnogo Sovet RSFSR, 1990-1992; Vedomosti s 'ezda narodnykh deputatov Rossiiskoi Federatsii i Verkhovnogo Sovet Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 1992-1993; and Soglasenie "O vzaimootnosheniakh mezhdru pravitel'stvami Rossiiskoi Federatsii i Respublikoi Sakha (Iakutiia) po ekonomicheskim voprosam," in Iakutiia, 4 April 1992, p. 1.*

However, considering the concessions made to inter-regional associations with those to 'strong regions' such as Sakha and Tiumen, 'strong regions' were more successful in their bilateral negotiations with Moscow. As a result, inter-regional associations seemed to be a secondary way to extend their economic rights for 'strong regions' which were rather keen to find their own way of development rather than remain as a part of inter-regional association. Such a development reduced the coordinated activities of inter-regional associations and eroded inter-regional unity.¹¹² Furthermore, the Siberian Agreement seemed to fail to satisfy the peculiar interests of some member regions in its negotiations with the centre. For instance, the negotiation between the two parties did not include any specific measures to assist the agricultural sector in Altai krai, coal mines in Kemerovo oblast, military-industrial complexes in Omsk, Tomsk and other regions, environmental problems of Baikal regions and so on. It forced those regions to shift from collective bargains to individual ones to finance their specific needs.¹¹³

In this part of analysis, I have discussed a couple of limits that revealed in the development of regionalism in the SIBFE regions during 1990-1993. Firstly, the analysis showed that leaders of the SIBFE regions failed to reach an agreement on the future federal relations and the role of the inter-regional associations. Diversified regional goals and probably personal ambition of regional leaders—e.g. rivalry between Kisliuk and Tuleev—amplified discord among regional leaders. Secondly, the influence of regional leaders over their deputies turned out to be limited. It weakened their bargaining power in their negotiation with the centre. Thirdly, regionalism in question was not supported by a mechanism such as regional political parties that would establish a horizontal and vertical linkage between regional political actors. Finally, regional policy of the centre also placed obstacles on the development of regionalism. Eltsin squeezed regional leaders not only with the presidential power but also with demands for local self-government. His bilateral negotiations also separated republics and resource-rich regions from inter-regional associations, leading them to employ a go-it-alone strategy.

What would be the implications of these features of regionalism for the future of Russia? The question will be discussed in the conclusion.

¹) For instance, in his discussion of political lobby at the Congress, K. E. Lebedev, member of the Tomsk *oblsoret* Presidium, complained that poor performance of SIBFE deputies in the Congress hampered SIBFE regions' effort to increase their influence over the government. "Kak i komu upravliat' sibir'iu?" *Sibirskaiia gazeta*, no. 43-44 (November 1991), p. 11.

²) Sergei Pavlenko, "Centre and the Regions: a Tug-of-War," *International Affairs*, no. 4 (April 1993), pp. 92-93.

³) Another extreme approach was articulated in the form of 'Balkanisation' which included the idea of dividing the Russia into four federations: RSFSR, West Siberian SFSR, East Siberian SFSR, and Far Eastern SFSR. Ivan Popov, "Tri respubliki," *Sibirskaiia gazeta*, no. 3 (January 1990), p. 4.

⁴) For instance, the Far Eastern Republican Party of Freedom held its founding congress on 9 September 1990, declaring the creation of Far Eastern Republic as its goal, and called a referendum on the re-establishment of the Far Eastern Republic. Tamara Tryakova, "Regional Policy in the Russian Far East and the Rise of Localism in Primorye," *The Journal of East Asian Affairs*, vol. IX, no. 2 (Summer/Fall 1995), p. 429. For a further discussion of these 'parties,' see Chapter 6.3.

⁵) Boris Petrov, "Sibirskaiia ekonomika gosuet za sibirskuiu nezavisimost'," *Sibirskaiia gazeta*, no. 1 (January 1993), p. 4.

⁶) The Kemerovo *oblsoret* adopted a resolution to support Eltsin on industrial jurisdiction on 27 February 1991. *Pravda*, 5 March 1991, p. 2. Furthermore, the representative of Kuznetsk Basin Workers' Committee also promised their support for the political position of Eltsin. *Izvestiia*, 12 March 1991, p. 3. A main interest of the coal mining workers in this context seemed to be in the right to decide their future to continue coal extracting, facing with the USSR Coal Ministry's plan to closing down old mines.

⁷) The Council of Kuznetsk Basin Workers' Committee urged labour collectives to prepare for a Kuznetsk Basin-wide strike, mentioning that they failed to achieve nothing by economic demand and thus need to hold a political strike. *Izvestiia*, 18 June 1990, p. 2. Also at the session of the Kemerovo *oblsoret* on 27 February 1991, the Kuznetsk Basin Workers' Committee presented their political demands including the resignation of the President and central government and de-politicisation of army, KGB, and public education. *Pravda*, 5 March 1991, p. 2.

⁸) Tuleev's intention was clearly revealed when he addressed to the Sixth Congress on 8 April 1992. In his discussion on Eltsin-Gaidar team's economic policies, he urged the government to submit programmes on following three criteria: strengthening Russia's integrity, stabilisation of production, and decentralisation of economic powers including tax policy, privatisation, and budget formation. See Tuleev's speech in Verkhovnyi Sovet Rossiiskoi Federatsii, *Shestoi s'ezd narodnykh deputatov Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 6-21 apreliia 1992 goda: stenograficheskil otchet*, vol. 1 (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Respublika", 1992), pp. 269-274, 274.

⁹) John J. Stephen, "The Russian Far East," *Current History*, vol. 92, no. 576 (October 1993), p. 334.

¹⁰) See his speech at a session of the Association of the Far East Association of Soviets of People's Deputies in Khabarovsk in October 1991. TASS, 21 October 1991, in *FBIS SOV 91-203* (21 October 1991), pp. 74-75.

¹¹) At that moment, as discussed already, Eltsin was facing with growing opposition at the Seventh CPD and sought for support of deputies. After Eltsin signed the decree on 8 December 1992, Fedorov maintained that a Far Eastern republic was no longer on the agenda. Interfax, 2 December 1992, in *FBIS SOV 92-232s* (3 December 1992), p. 18.

¹²) Hughes also has noted that the idea of a Siberian republic has frequently raised but rejected by regional leaders. For the opinions of regional leaders on this matter, see James Hughes, "Regionalism in Russia: the Rise and Fall of Siberian Agreement," *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 46, no. 7 (1994), pp. 1146-1149.

¹³) Chaptynov called a referendum on the question of establishing a Siberian Republic as a countermeasure of Eltsin's decree on dissolving the parliament. "Put' k ultimatumu: programma-minimum Vitaliia Mukhi i programma-maksimum Amana Tulceva," *Sibirskaya gazeta*, no. 39 (October 1993), pp. 1-2.

¹⁴) *Ibid.*, p. 2.

¹⁵) For instance, at the Tomsk conference of the Siberian Agreement in February 1993, a speaker from Krasnoyarsk krai invited other regions to use their representatives in China free of charge, but urged the elaboration of a mechanism to guarantee the representation of entire regions by jointly financing the offices. "The View from Siberia: the Siberians Abroad," *International Affairs*, no. 4 (April 1993), pp. 109-110.

¹⁶) *Lesnaya gazeta*, 22 November 1990, p. 1.

¹⁷) He criticised that a Siberian republic would only make regional problems more complex and unclear. He also raised his doubt that whose interests the republic would represent. His doubt appeared to represent reactions of other 'weak' regions towards a Siberian republic. Aleksandr Butukhanov, "Sibirskaya respublika-novyi monstr: a po gorizonta'nym sviaziam est' konkurentnye predlozheniia," *Sibirskaya gazeta*, no. 9 (March 1992), p. 4.

¹⁸) Nikolai Daniliuk, the Chairman of the Khabarovsk *kraisovet*, deputy of the USSR Congress, and Director of the Far Eastern Regional Association of Economic Cooperation, complained that the regions' following their interests rather than joint forces was the main problems. *Russian Far East Update* (March 1993), p. 10, in Stephen, "The Russian Far East," p. 334.

¹⁹) Daniel Treisman, "The Politics of Intergovernmental Transfer in Post-Soviet Russia," *British Journal of Political Science*, vol. 26, part 3 (July 1996), p. 327. Of course, not every republic can enjoy the same opportunities. For instance, when the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Buriatia, Buriat autonomous republic at that moment, adopted a declaration of sovereignty in October 1990, there occurred a debate over the wording 'economic independence' as the economy of the republic was heavily dependent on subsidies from the centre. *Izvestia*, 9 October 1990, p. 2. For separatist activism in each republic, see Daniel S. Treisman, "Russia's "Ethnic Revival": The Separatist Activism of

Regional Leaders in a Postcommunist Order," *World Politics*, vol. 49, no. 2 (January 1997), pp. 223-229.

²⁰) "Soglashenie o vzaimootnosheniakh mezhdu Pravitel'stvami Rossiiskii Federatsii i Respublikoi Sakha (Iakutiia) po ekonomicheskim voprosam," *Iakutiia*, 4 April 1992, p. 1. In January 1992, K. E. Ivanov, the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Sakha, made a report on the measures to strengthen sovereignty of the republic, claiming the republic's right to natural resources. Doklad predsedatelia Verkhovnogo Soveta Respubliki Sakha (Iakutiia) K. E. Ivanova "O merakh po ukrepleniiu gosudarstvennogo suvereniteta Respubliki Sakha (Iakutiia)," *Iakutiia*, 30 January 1992, p. 2. For relations between Moscow and the Republic of Sakha in the early 1990s, see Mary McAuley, *Russia's Politics of Uncertainty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 64-71.

²¹) 'Republicanisation' also provided regions with possible political and economic merits such as more representation to the central level of the CPD and subsidies. Campell has observed that, because of that reason, regions such as Vologda, Chita, Sverdlovsk, and Primorskii declared themselves as republics between April and July 1993. Adrian Campbell, "Regional Power in the Russian Federation," in Andrew Coulson (ed.), *Local Government in Eastern Europe* (Vermont: Edward Elgar, 1995), p. 155. Also see Treisman, "The Politics of Intergovernmental Transfer in Post-Soviet Russia," pp. 328-329.

²²) *Izvestiia*, 22 November 1991, p. 2.

²³) "Put' k ultimatumu," *Sibirskaiia gazeta*, no. 39 (October 1993), p. 1.

²⁴) In Irkutsk, a public forum was held in November 1991 in which deputies at all levels elected in Irkutsk Oblast, representatives of public organisations, movements and parties were participated. At the forum, deputies adopted a resolution which asked the Supreme Soviet to recognise the oblast as a republic. *Izvestiia*, 18 November 1991, p. 2. Furthermore, the idea of establishing a East Siberian Republic which combined Krasnoiarsk krai and Irkutsk oblast was considered in 1991. Elizabeth Teague, "Centre-Periphery Relations in the Russian Federation," in Roman Szporluk (ed.), *National Identity and Ethnicity in Russia and the New States of Eurasia* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), p. 45.

²⁵) However, Churilov made it clear that the okrug authority was responsible for the well-being and cultural rebirth of the Khanty and Mansi people. He also stated that the only interest of the local authorities was to ensure nature-friendly conditions for oil extraction. *Izvestiia*, 23 November 1990, p. 2. This view continued in 1992 when he emphasised that main concern of the okrug authority should be the demographic security of small people and ecological security. Vladimir Churilov, "Russia's Northern Strategy," *International Affairs*, no. 11 (November 1992), pp. 44-45.

²⁶) The overwhelming majority of deputies of the Tiumen *oblsoret*, 199 out of 207, supported their appeal to the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. In particular, they agreed that priority should be given to not only the industrial complex (the oil and gas industries), but also the agricultural sector which mainly located in Tiumen proper. *Izvestiia*, 24 November 1990, p. 2.

²⁷) "Soglashenie o razgranichenii polnomochii mezhdu Tiumenskimi oblastnymi, Khanty-Mansiiskim i Iamalo-Nenetskim okruzhnymi organami predstavitel'noi i ispolnitel'noi vlasti v sfere ekonomicheskikh otnoshenii," *Tiumenskaia pravda*, 17 December 1991, p. 1.

²⁸) Iuri Shafranik, "Strong Regions Make Strong Russia," *International Affairs*, no. 11 (November 1992), p. 33. Italics added.

²⁹) V. Savin, "Free Economic Zones in Russia: the Legal Backgrounds," *Far Eastern Affairs*, nos. 4-5 (1994), pp. 51-55; and M. M. Boguslavskii, "O provovom statusse svobodnykh ekonomicheskikh zon v SSSR," *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, no. 12 (1989), pp. 18-26.

³⁰) For instance, the Ministry of Finance agreed to grant a budget credit of 2.2 billion rubles in 1992 and 20,125 billion rubles to the Nakhodka FEZ in accordance with the decree of the president, issued on 4 June 1992. See Article 3 of the decree in Ukaz prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii, "O nekotorykh merakh po razvitiu svobodnykh ekonomicheskikh zon (SEZ) na territorii Rossiiskoi Federatsii," *Vedomosti*, no. 24 (18 June 1992), pp. 1672-1673. Furthermore, the State Committee for Federal Property Control decided to transfer 100 per cent of earnings from privatised federal property which was to be contributed by the federal budget to the Nakhodka FEZ as development, tax, and insurance funds. Anatoly Ukrayinchenko, "Going Through A Formative Stage," *International Affairs*, no. 11 (November 1993), p. 21.

³¹) "Free Enterprise Zone in the Nakhodka Area and the Maritime Territory," *Far Eastern Affairs*, no. 2 (1991), pp. 9-10. For a discussion of the demands of the krai administration during 1992-1995, see Peter Kirkow, *Russia's Provinces: Authoritarian Transformation versus Local Autonomy?* (London: Macmillan, 1998), pp.126-132.

³²) Although the production of joint ventures in the FEZ more than doubled during 1990-1993, the volume of industrial production, capital investment, foreign trade, and paid services decreased during the same period. Pavel A. Minakir, *The Russian Far East: An Economic Survey* (Khabarovsk: RIOTIP, 1996), p. 258.

³³) Anatoly Ukrayinchenko, the First Deputy Head of the Nakhodka City Administration, urged the central government to support the Zone to carry out investment projects. Ukrayinchenko, "Going Through a Formative Stage," p. 21. Valentin Zavadnikov, the Financial Director of the Nakhodka FEZ Administration, also demanded that the government must grant more rights to the administration. He warned that the FEZ should not be the object of 'a political game,' and that Nakhodka would not handle freight for the rest of Russia if they were not granted more rights. Valentin Zavadnikov, "The Hard Road to Success," *International Affairs*, no. 11 (November 1993), p. 28.

³⁴) The programme emphasised that an FEZ model was not recommendable as the feasibility of fiscal support of the federal government was very low. Robert B. Krueger and Leon A. Palott, "Appendix 2: Greater Vladivostok: A Concept for the Economic Development of South Primorie," in Mark J. Valencia (ed.), *The Russian Far East in Transition: Opportunities for Regional Economic Co-operation* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), p. 219. However, there were worries that the concept was too much dependent on the foreign capital investment and technological support. I. Boiko, "Programma 'Bol'shoi Vladivostok': avantiurizm," *Krasnoe znamia*, no. 69 (9 June 1992), p. 2

³⁵) Krueger and Palott, "Appendix 2: Greater Vladivostok," pp. 220-221.

³⁶) Troyakova, "Regional Policy in the Russian Far East," pp. 438-439. The move seemed to gain rather more economic independence and subsidies from Moscow. In early 1994, heads of urban

and district administrations of Primorskii krai also demanded that the krai should be included on the list of 'Far North' for which special subsidies were allocated in the central budget. *Ibid.*, p. 447.

³⁷) He insisted the efficient development should rely on own potentialities, which remained 'unused' under the bureaucratic-command system, rather than foreign capital. He warned that the free flow of foreign capital and labour would turn the region into a colony. His comments were rather aimed at the negotiation between Moscow and Tokyo on the four islands, as he kept emphasising that any territorial claims were far from "timely" or "constructive." Valentine Fyodorov, "The Experiment in Sakhalin," *Far Eastern Affairs*, no. 1 (1991), pp. 29-30. Brown also pointed to two factors—Eltsin's foreign policy, particularly the negotiation with Japan on territorial disputes, and exploitation of offshore resources—which broke an alignment between Eltsin and Fedorov. Kathryn Brown, "Sakhalin's Valentin Fedorov Makes Nationalist Allies," *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol. 1, no. 38 (25 September 1992), p. 33.

³⁸) For instance, Sakhalin-2 project was initiated by under the former Soviet government. At the beginning, the oblast authorities were given a significant decision-making role. However, after the demise of the Union, the Russian government sought to control the project, resulting in several tenders under the central and oblast jurisdiction. Such a development led to a conflict between Moscow and local authorities. Matthew J. Sagers, "Prospects for Oil and Gas Development in Russia's Sakhalin Oblast," *Post-Soviet Geography*, vol. 36, no. 5 (May 1995), p. 280.

³⁹) Fyodorov, "The Experiment in Sakhalin," pp. 19-20.

⁴⁰) *Ibid.*, p. 31.

⁴¹) *Sovetskii sakhalin*, 20 June 1991, in V. Vorongtsov, A. Muradyan, "Far Eastern Regionalism," *Far Eastern Affairs*, vol. 81, no. 1 (1992), pp. 34, 39.

⁴²) Moses has noted that during the period from 1989 to August 1991, powers were passed from the party-state establishment to anti-establishment movements, parties, and leaders. In particular, local communist officials were under the attack of anti-establishment movements, parties and leaders who demanded their retirement. Joel C. Moses, "Soviet Provincial Politics in an Era of Transition and Revolution, 1989-1991," *Soviet Studies*, vol. 44, no. 3 (1992), pp. 479-480.

⁴³) According to Moses, a majority or at least a sizeable number of seats in the regional soviets or the soviets of the regional capital cities was taken by anti-establishment movements in Novosibirsk, Tomsk, Volgograd, Perm, Iavroslavl, Kemerovo, Kharkov, and Lvov. *Ibid.*, p. 480.

⁴⁴) For the analysis, +10 points are given for the identical votes of a deputy to his or her regional leaders and -10 points for the opposite vote. If a deputy voted in abstention in a vote in which his or her leader voted in favour or against the question, 0 point is given. If a regional leader voted in abstention, the case will be dropped. In the analysis, a deputy group that had less than five deputies were excluded.

⁴⁵) First of all, more regional leaders were elected to the CPD of Russia than to the CPD of the USSR. Accordingly, difficulties arose in choosing the right leader to compare his or her voting patterns with those of other deputies. In the analysis, deputies' voting patterns are compared with those of

governors and the regional soviet chairmen. If both leaders remained out of the Congress, the voting patterns of *ispolkom* chairmen or first secretaries of the CPSU are used for comparison.

⁴⁶) Eltsin tried to dismiss Mukha and other regional leaders in March 1992, a month before the Sixth Congress, though he cancelled his decision in the face of resistance from the Siberian Agreement. Hughes, "Eltsin's Siberian Opposition," p. 32. However, after the incident, Mukha's voting patterns were changed, becoming supportive of Eltsin's position, though it is quite difficult to find a clear relationship between the incident and his changing voting patterns. Perhaps considering his relationship with Eltsin, he voted in abstention in the vote on rather subtle questions such as emergence powers of the president (Q3), and no confidence in the government (T1). Furthermore, among the five votes that were selected for the analysis of the voting patterns at the Seventh Congress, he abstained from voting in four questions, and supported Eltsin's position in the vote on Zor'kin's compromises.

⁴⁷) During the Second and Fifth Congresses, none of Siberian deputies followed Tuleev's voting patterns in more than seven of nine votes. However, during the Sixth and Seventh Congresses, 44 deputies showed identical voting patterns with those of Tuleev in more than seven of ten votes.

⁴⁸) For a general overview of these election and referendums, see A. A. Sopianin and V. G. Sukhvol'skii, *Demokratiia, organichennaia fal'sifikatsiia: vybory i referendumy v Rossii v 1991-1993 gg.* (Moscow: INTU, 1995); and Aleksandr Sopianin and Vladislav G. Sukhvol'skii, *Kak organizovat' kontrol' na vyborakh* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Evraziia", 1995).

⁴⁹) Gel'man and Golosov argue that the organisations of political activists failed to attract new members, while old activists became politically inactive, weakening the linkage between 'parties' and the grassroots. Vladimir Gel'man and Grigorii V. Golosov, "Regional Party System Formation in Russia: The Deviant Case of Sverdlovsk Oblast," in John Löwenhardt (ed.), *Party Politics in Post-Communist Russia* (London: Frank Cass, 1998), pp. 33, 43. Golosov also mentioned that the performance of political parties was rather miserable when he examined 708 candidates who had run for 1994 local elections in Novosibirsk, Omsk and Tiumen oblasts and Altai krai. Grigorii V. Golosov, "Russian Political Parties and the 'Bosses': Evidence from the 1994 Provincial Elections in Western Siberia," *Party Politics*, vol. 3, no. 1 (1997), p. 9. White also examined degree of identification of voters with the party that they voted for. His argument showed that the party did not play a great role in the election to the Federal Council in 1993. As a consequence, candidates preferred to run the elections independently rather than identify themselves with Moscow-based parties. Stephen White, Richard Rose, and Ian McAllister, *How Russia Votes* (Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, 1997), p. 139. Sakwa also observed that the relationship between leadership and organisations turned out to be problematical. Richard Sakwa, "Parties and the Multiparty System in Russia," *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol. 2, no. 31 (30 July 1993), p. 11.

⁵⁰) The workers' movements in Kemerovo oblast which co-operated with the coal miners of other regions and ecological movements in *Zabaikalia* was a possible exception. In particular, the idea of establishing a Siberian republic failed to be supported by the grassroots. For instance, a survey in Novosibirsk in September 1992 showed that only 35 per cent of respondents supported the idea, while 47 per cent rejected even the idea of autonomy, although regionalist tendencies were at a peak at that moment. Grigorii Golosov, *Political Parties in Western Siberia, August 1991-October 1993: A*

Comparative Analysis (Occasional Paper) (Washington, D. C.: Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, 1994), p. 12.

⁵¹) For instance, Clem and Craumer has argued that voter turnout was linked to both institutional and socio-economic factors. Ralph S. Clem and Peter R. Craumer, "Regional Patterns of Voter Turnout in Russian Elections, 1993-1996," in Matthew Wyman, Stephen White, and Sarah Oates (eds.), *Elections and Voters in Post-communist Russia* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998), p. 67. For detailed analysis on the regionalised voting patterns of the grassroots, see Ralph S. Clem and Peter R. Craumer. "The Geography of the April 25 (1993) Russian Referendum," *Post-Soviet Geography*, vol. 34, no. 8 (October 1993), pp. 481-496; "The Politics of Russia's Regions: A Geographical Analysis of the Russian Election and Constitutional Plebiscite of December 1993," *Post-Soviet Geography*, vol. 36, no. 10 (December 1995), pp. 67-86; "The Geography of the Russian 1995 Parliamentary Election: Continuity, Change, and Correlates," *Post-Soviet Geography*, vol. 36, no. 10 (December 1995), pp. 587-616; "Roadmap to Victory: Boris Yeltsin and the Russian Presidential elections of 1996," *Post-Soviet Geography*, vol. 347, no. 6 (June 1996), pp. 335-354; and Sarah Oates, "Electoral Cleavages and Constituencies: Mapping Party Success and Failure Across Russia," unpublished paper presented at the BASEES Annual Conference in Cambridge in April 1998.

⁵²) For instance, Helsinki watch groups had already been set up in numbers of republics of the USSR after the Helsinki Agreement of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in 1975. Geoffrey A. Hosking, Jonathan Aves, and Peter J. S. Duncan, *The Road to Post-Communism: Independent Political Movements in the Soviet Union 1985-1991* (London: Pinter, 1992), p. 2. In addition, *Pamiat'* was established in the late 1970s and early 1980s. For details on *Pamiat'*, see Michael McFaul and Sergei Markov, *The Troubled Birth of Russian Democracy: Parties, Personalities, and Programmes* (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1993), pp. 44-60.

⁵³) In the USSR as a whole, numbers of 'informal' groups were estimated to be 30,000 in February 1988 which had grown to by 60,000. *Pravda*, 5 February 1988, p. 3; and *Izvestiia*, 11 June 1992, p. 2.

⁵⁴) Numbers of political organisations were mainly based on following works: V. N. Berezovskii, N. I. Krotov, and V. V. Cherviakov, *Rossia: partii, assotsiatsii, soluz, kluby* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Rau-Press, 1991); Vladimir Pribylovskii, *Slovar' oppositsii: novye politicheskie partii i organisatsii Rossii* (Moscow: Postfactum, 1991); and *Samodeiatel'nye obshchestvennye i politicheskie organisatsii i dvizheniia v SSSR: spravochnik serii "Kto est' kto"* (Moscow: VTI Deita-Press, 1992). Despite the possible omission of numbers of political movements, 'independent' political organisations were established in most of the Western Siberian regions, Krasnoiarsk krai and Irkutsk oblast in Eastern Siberia, and Republic of Sakha, Primorskii and Khabarovsk kraia in the Far East. In particular, according to observation of a regional newspaper, *Sibirskala gazeta*, political 'parties' were particularly active in Novosibirsk oblast. "V mire soiuz, assotsiatsii i frontov," *Sibirskala gazeta*, 4 December 1989, p. 10.

⁵⁵) "Liki sibirskoi provintsii: tri partii Altaia," *Sibirskala gazeta*, no. 25 (July 1991), p. 4. Another sign of growing influence of the movement was showed when the *kraisovet* elected V. Raifikesht, *sovkhos* director from Novoaltaisk, turning down Iu. Zhil'tsov and A. Nazrachuk. Peter

Kirkow, "Regional Politics and Market Reform in Russia: the Case of the Altai," *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 46, no. 7 (1994), p. 1179; and Kirkow, *Russia's Provinces*, pp. 101-103.

⁵⁶) Pribylovskii, *Slovar' oppositsii*, p. 47.

⁵⁷) *Samodelatel'nye obshchestvennye i politicheskie organizatsii i dvizheniia v SSSR*, p. 532.

⁵⁸) The Democratic Movement for Perestroika in Sakhalin oblast claimed 4-5 thousand members including 200 active members with four local branches in Timovsk, Noglinsk, Severo-Kurilsk, and Iuzno-Kurilsk. *Ibid.*, p. 526.

⁵⁹) The People's Front advocated a platform which included the proposal to forbid the incumbent First Secretary of the CPSU being a member of People's Deputies or chairman of the Soviet, to increase the duration of Soviet sessions, to establish a commission to control the activities of organs of MVD, KGB and Army under the oblast soviet, and to introduce alternative election procedures of the *oblsoviet* chairman and deputy chairman, and editors of the newspaper *Tiumenskaia pravda*. Furthermore, the Front considered claiming up to ten per cent of income from the delivery of petroleum and gas to meet the need of producers. "Rezoliutsiia sobraniia kandidatov v narodnye deputaty organisovannogo po initsiative koordinatsionnogo soveta Narodnogo Fronta Tiumeni," *Tiumenskaia pravda*, 7 February 1990, p. 2.

⁶⁰) Omsk People' Front was quite successful when they supported three candidates who were elected to the CPD of Russia—S. Nosovets, B. Lotkov, and S. Baburin—and gained control of roughly 50 per cent of the *gorsoviet* candidates. However, it only managed to control over 10-15 per cent of the *oblsoviet* deputies, which was regarded as a crisis of the Front. *Samodelatel'nye obshchestvennye i politicheskie organizatsii i dvizheniia v SSSR*, p. 357.

⁶¹) White and McAllister categorised political parties in the Russian Federation into three—right, centre, and left—categories. On the right included business parties including the Conservative Party (October 1990), the Party of Economic Freedom (Konstantin Borovoi), the Order of Orthodox Monarchists, the Christian Democratic Parties, the Liberal Democratic Party, a variety of groupings of a radical nationalist character including *Pamiat'*, the National Republican Parties of Russia, the Russian National *Sobor* (1992, a coalition of communists and nationalists), the Russian People's Union (late 1992, Sergei Baburin), the National Salvation front (October 1992, a national-patriotic coalition of forces), and the Liberal Democratic Party (Summer 1989, Vladimir Zhirinovskii). Five political parties such as the Agrarian Party, the Constitutional Democratic Party, the Democratic Party of Russia, the Democratic Party (May 1990, Nikolai Travkin), and the Democratic Russia are placed in the centre. Finally, the Republican Party of Russian Federation (former 'Democratic Platform' within the CPSU), the Russian Party of Communists (the former Marxist Platform within the CPSU), the Socialist Workers' Party (Roy Medvedev), the Communist Party of Bolsheviks, a re-established *Menshevik* Party, and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (February 1993) were categorised as left wing. Ian McAllister and Stephen White, "Democracy, Political Parties and Party Formation in Postcommunist Russia," *Party Politics*, vol. 1, no. 1 (January 1995), pp. 52-53.

⁶²) Moses used the term 'anti-establishment' to depict the movement led by new-leadership that consisted of non-communist intellectuals, former political dissidents, nationalist, and reformist

communists who defied the 'party-state establishment.' Moses, "Soviet Provincial Politics in an Era of Transition and Revolution," pp. 479-480. In the same context, Gel'man and Golosov described activities of these newly emerged political parties as 'anti-regime' political mobilisation. Gel'man and Golosov, "Regional Party System Formation in Russia," p. 33.

⁶³) Possibly, the People's Front of Tuva ASSR (Narodnyi front Tuvinskoi ASSR, former Tuvan Democratic International Movement) and the *Tun* of Khakasiia tended to be strong basis of its own nation. However, even in Tyva where nationalist movements were quite strong, the organisation had changed into inter-national movements, opening its membership to Russian-speaking population, when the Tuvan Democratic International Movement was changed to Tuvan People's Front in March 1990. *Samodeiatel'nye obshchestvennye i politicheskie organisatsii i dvizheniia v SSSR*, p. 423.

⁶⁴) According to Golosov's observation, local party organisations in the Western Siberia lost their ground of existence in the local elections of 1994. For instance, the Democratic Russia in Novosibirsk lost most of their members, only retaining its executive committee. Small Moscow-based parties such as the Republican Party of the Russian Federation also had lost almost 90 per cent of its members in Novosibirsk. *Vechernii Novosibirsk*, 31 March 1995, p. 2, in Golosov, "Russian Political Parties and the 'Bosses'," p. 14.

⁶⁵) A survey conducted by Krasnoiarsk and Altai Universities in the late of 1992 also supported the observation that the separatist movement was supported among a majority of officials and managers of enterprises. *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, 17 November 1992, p. 2.

⁶⁶) The Association of Siberian Cities was formed at the beginning of 1989, aimed at promoting active barter relations between Siberian cities, establishing a modern infrastructure in the Siberian regions, organising production of natural resources, and promoting foreign economic relations. *Samodeiatel'nye obshchestvennye i politicheskie organisatsii i dvizheniia v SSSR*, p. 27.

⁶⁷) Boris Perov, "Sibirskaiia ekonomika golosuet za sibirskuiu nezavisimost'," *Sibirskaiia gazeta*, no. 1 (January 1993), p. 4.

⁶⁸) Ibid.

⁶⁹) *Samodeiatel'nye obshchestvennye i politicheskie organisatsii i dvizheniia v SSSR*, p. 456.

⁷⁰) Berezovskii, Krotov, and Cherviakov, *Rossia*, p. 124.

⁷¹) Though the Association advocated the full political and economic autonomy of the Far East and the restoration of the Far Eastern Republic, it also declared to concentrate their efforts to put to an end to the monopoly of the CPSU and ecological disasters. As a confederation, any decision was to be decided by the two-thirds of majority which had no binding force upon those who disagree. *Samodeiatel'nye obshchestvennye i politicheskie organisatsii i dvizheniia v SSSR*, pp. 523-524.

⁷²) For instance, Viktor Shmurygin, the Deputy Chairman of the Duma of the Union, proposed more detailed programme for the independent of Siberia in October 1992, aiming at the establishment of a Siberian Confederation. He proposed that republics, krais, and oblasts in Siberia constituted a Siberian Confederation with no central structure, which would be joined a Commonwealth of Republics and Regions in Russia that would be established by 1995, abolishing the central administrative structures in

Moscow. *Sibirskaiia gazeta*, no. 41 (24 October 1992), in Vera Tolz, "Regionalism in Russia: The Case of Siberia," *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol. 2, no. 9 (26 February 1993), p. 6; and "Nuzhna li Sibirskaiia respublika?" *Tiumenskaia pravda*, 6 December 1991, p. 1.

⁷³) The Siberian Democratic Union, for example, organised a rally in May 1990 in which about 3 thousand people took part. By contrast, a couple of ecology movements in the SIBFE regions demonstrated more successful activities. For instance, the Committee for the Support of *Perestroika* in Komsomolsk-na-Amure collected about 18 thousand signatures on the question of the Far Eastern AES construction. *Samodeiatel'nye obshchestvennye i politicheskie organizatsii i dvizheniia v SSSR*, p. 364. The Movement for the Preservation of Baikal also organised a rally against the construction of the pipeline in June 1988, and collected 107 thousand signatures which seemed to be quite a success. Berezovskii, Krotov, and Cherviakov, *Rossia*, pp. 129-130.

⁷⁴) Stephen Whitefield and Geoffrey Evans, "The Emerging Structure of Partisan Divisions in Russian Politics," in Wyman, White, and Oates (eds.), *Elections and Voters in Post-communist Russia*, p. 91. Mau and Stupin have also argued that regional authorities could not but attentive to the needs of the population in order to preserve the stability in the region, although voters still had a relatively weak influence over the regional authorities. Vladimir Mau and Vadim Stupin, "The Political Economy of Russian Regionalism," *Communist Economies and Economic Transformation*, vol. 9, no. 1 (1997), p. 8.

⁷⁵) In fact, voter turnout at the regional level was also strongly correlated with these indicators, although correlation between living standard indicator and voter turnout decreased in 1993. For instance, the level of economic performance had a negative association with voter turnout ($r=-0.51$ and -0.47 in March 1991 referendum on the USSR and Russian questions respectively, $r=-0.42$ in June 1991 presidential election, $r=-0.34$ in April 1993 referendum, and $r=-0.47$ in December 1993 referendum). In connection with the level of voter turnout, Clem and Craumer have observed that "very little" correlation was found between macro-economic conditions at the regional level and voter turnout. However, in this case, macro-economic conditions referred to "change in industrial and agricultural productions, change in the volume of retail sales, change in the consumer price index and the extent of housing privatisation." Clem and Craumer, "Regional Patterns of Voter Turnout in Russian Elections, 1993-1996," in *ibid.*, p. 66.

⁷⁶) Although it is rather complicated to figure out the reasons, one possible reason can be found in the economic shock therapy that launched in 1992. Its impact could have resulted in changes in the voting patterns of the grassroots.

⁷⁷) In this analysis, four regions—Republics of Tatarstan, North Ossetiia, Tuva, and Chechnia—that boycotted the referendum of March 1991 on the RSFSR question were excluded.

⁷⁸) When he ran for the presidential election in June 1991, the regions showed a quite low level of support for Eltsin (39.6 per cent), as compared with the national average (57.3 per cent). But in the referendums, voters in Kemerovo oblast showed close to the national average level of support (72.8 per cent against 69.9 per cent in March 1991, 52.5 per cent against 57.3 per cent in April 1993 (question 1), and 59.8 per cent against 58.4 per cent in December 1993).

⁷⁹) As for Tyva leadership, prevailing nationalist tendencies within the republic appeared to

limit its flexibility in their relations with Moscow. For instance, the Tuvan People's Front called a referendum on Tuvan secession from the Federation in June 1992. Accordingly, the proposal was put to the vote in the republican parliament, but was turned down. *Izvestiia*, 18 September 1992, p. 2.

⁸⁰) Steven L. Solnick, "Political Consolidation or Disintegration: Can Russia's Centre Hold?" unpublished paper presented to the Sixth Annual Conference on the Post-Soviet Nations, The Harriman Institute, 29 April 1994; Christine I. Wallich, "Russia's Dilemma," in Wallich (ed.), *Russia and the Challenge of Fiscal Federalism* (Washington, D. C.: World Bank, 1994), pp. 4, 14; S. Pavlenko, "Regiony i regional'naia politika," *Voprosy ekonomiki*, no. 9 (September 1994), pp. 14-15; and V. Leksin, B. Mil'ner, and A. Shvetsov, "Ekonomicheskie otnosheniia i upravlenie v usloviakh federalizma," *Voprosy ekonomiki*, no. 9 (September 1994), p. 23. In this regard, an effort to introduce a basis of principles had had some success in 1993 when the Ministry of Economy worked out its *Comprehensive Forecast of Development and Distribution of Russia's Productive Forces to the Year 2000 (Kompleksnyi prognoz razvitiia i razmeshcheniia proizvoditel'nykh sil Rossii na period do 2000g)* together with Russian Federation regions, ministries, and departments. The Forecast included evaluations on peculiarities in terms of socio-economic development of the federal subjects which could form a more clear basis of distribution of resources among regions as was suggested by World Bank. P. Semenov and B. Shtul'berg, "Novaia regional'naia strategiia," *Ekonomist*, no. 6 (June 1994), p. 72; and E. Lenskii, "Pravitel'stvennaia programma reformirovaniia i stabilizatsii ekonomiki: sodержanie i plan realizatsii," *Rossiiskii ekonomicheskii zhurnal*, no. 1 (January 1994), p. 14.

⁸¹) In this regard, Daniels maintains that the political aspect of Russian regionalism is directly linked with the question of federalism. Robert V. Daniels, "Democracy and Federalism in the Former Soviet Union and the Russian Federation," in Peter J. Stavrakis, Joan DeBardleben, Larry Black and Jodi Koehn (eds.), *Beyond the Monolith: the Emergence of Regionalism in Post-Soviet Russia* (Washington, D. C.: The Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 1997), p. 233. Semenov and Shtul'berg have also observed that strengthening federal relations became the most important part of regional policy during the transition period. Semenov and Shtul'berg, "Novaia regional'naia strategiia," p. 72. In practice, Eltsin issued a decree in December 1991 concerning the single economic space of the RSFSR. Ukaz prezidenta Rossiiskoi Sovetskoi Federativnoi Sotsialisticheskoi Respublik "O edinom ekonomicheskom prostranstve RSFSR," *Vedomosti*, no. 51 (19 December 1991), pp. 2072-2073. The Regional Economic Policy section of the Programme of the Council of Ministers and government of the Russian Federation for 1993-1995 also underlined the development of single economic space as a prime principle. Pavlenko, "Regiony i regional'naia politika," p. 14.

⁸²) See Eltsin's three basic concepts for a future Constitution: human rights, *zemli* as a subject of a federation, and a presidential republic, in *Piatyi (vneocherednoi) s'ezd narodnykh deputatov RSFSR, 10-17 iuliia, 28 oktiabria-2 noiabria 1991 goda: stenograficheskil otchet*, vol. III (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Respublika", 1992), pp. 147-148. For a detailed discussion, see Chapter 2.

⁸³) One of Gorbachev's aims in introducing the post of the president was to bolster his leadership which was vulnerable to a possible attempt to remove him from the post of general secretary of the CPSU. Stephen White, Graeme Gill, and Darrell Slider, *The Politics of Transition: Shaping a Post-Soviet Future* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 72-73.

⁸⁴) Initially, the emergency power of the president was granted on a temporary basis which was valid until 1 December 1992. However, the Seventh Congress failed to deprive Eltsin of his emergency power when it adopted Zor'kin's proposal which nullify the main decisions on the power relations between the executive and legislative powers made during its sessions. Postanovlenie s'ezda narodnykh deputatov Rossiiskoi Federatsii "O merakh po osushchestvleniiu konstitutsionnoi reformy v Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Postanovlenie sed'mogo s'ezda narodnykh deputatov Rossiiskoi Federatsii o stabilizatsii konstitutsionnogo stroia)," in *Sed'moi s'ezd narodnykh deputatov Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 1-14 dekabria 1992 goda: stenograficheskii otchet*, vol. IV (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Respublika", 1993), pp. 301-303.

⁸⁵) John F. Young, "At the Bottom of the Heap: Local Self-Government and Regional Politics in the Russian Federation," in Stavrakis, DeBradeleben, Black and Koehn (eds.), *Beyond the Monolith*, p. 85.

⁸⁶) Eltsin introduced the post of governor and presidential representatives in August 1991 who were scheduled to run for local elections. White, Gill, and Slider, *The Politics of Transition*, p. 113.

⁸⁷) Governors were accountable to local soviets and according to the law "On Oblast and Krai Soviets and Oblast and Krai Administration" which adopted in March 1992. Zakon Rossiiskoi Federatsii "O kraevom, oblastnom, Sovete narodnykh deputatov i kraevoi, oblastnoi, administratsii," in *Vedomosti*, no. 13 (26 March 1992), pp. 866-898. However, the resolution of the Fifth Congress on the executive branches introduced a moratorium on elections of the heads and executive organs at all levels until 1 December 1992, except elections to the local soviets and elections of presidents and the chairmen of the Supreme Soviets of the republics which were fixed on earlier date. Eltsin also gained the right to appoint or dismiss governors with the resolution. See Article 2 of Postanovlenie s'ezda narodnykh deputatov Rossiiskoi Sovetskoi Federativnoi Sotsialisticheskoi Respubliki "Ob organizatsii ispolnitel'noi vlasti v period radikal'noi ekonomicheskoi reformy," in *Piatyl (vneocherednoi) s'ezd narodnykh deputatov RSFSR*, vol. III, pp. 264-265.

⁸⁸) An example of power struggles between regional leaders can be found in Kemerovo oblast. Eltsin appointed M. B. Kisiliuk as governor of oblast who ran against A. M. Tuleev, the Chairman of *oblsovet*, in the elections. Slider also observed that conflict between executive and legislative branches, frequently emerged despite heads of administration were approved by regional soviets. For more examples of such conflicts, see Darrell Slider, "Federalism, Discord, and Accommodation: Intergovernmental Relations in Post-Soviet Russia," in Theodore H. Friedgut and Jeffrey W. Hahn (eds.), *Power and Post-Soviet Politics* (London: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), pp. 257-259. For a discussion of similar conflicts in Primorskii krai, see Kirkow, *Russia's Provinces*, pp. 119-124.

⁸⁹) *Ibid.*, p. 258.

⁹⁰) For the event, see James Hughes, "Yeltsin's Siberian Opposition," *RFE/LR Research Report*, vol. 2, no. 50 (17 December 1993), pp. 31-34. For the changing voting patterns of Mukha, see Table 7.2.2.

⁹¹) Unveiling his draft Constitution, Eltsin mentioned that equal status between republics and *zemli* could be accepted. See Eltsin's address to the Fifth Congress in *Piatyi (vneocherednoi) s'ezd narodnykh deputatov RSFSR*, vol. III, pp. 147-148.

⁹²) The Union consisted of 53 governors, headed by Anatolii Tiazhlov, governor of Moscow oblast. Slider, "Federalism, Discord, and Accommodation," in Friedgut and Hahn (eds.), *Local Power and Post-Soviet Politics*, p. 261.

⁹³) *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 27 August 1993, p. 3. For the response of Siberian regions to Eltsin's idea of establishing a Council of the Federation, see Marina Fuchs, "Regional Separatism in Russia: Siberia 1992-1994," *Russia and the Successor State Briefing Service*, vol. 3, no. 3 (June 1995), p. 13.

⁹⁴) DeBardleben has also observed that the critical objects of advocates of local government is to overcome the *diktat* of the region, while the primary objective of many regional leaders may be overcome the *diktat* of Moscow. Moscow also expected that the development of local government might erode some power of the regions. Joan DeBardleben, "The Development of Federalism in Russia," in Stavrakis, DeBardleben, Black and Koehn (eds.), *Beyond the Monolith*, pp. 82, 96.

⁹⁵) V. Leksin, E. Andreeva, A. Sitnikov, and A. Shvetsov, "Regional'naia politika Rossii: kontseptsii, problemy, resheniia (stat'ia vtoraiia: regional'nye biuzhetno-nalogovye sistemy," *Rossiiskii ekonomicheskii zhurnal*, no. 1 (January 1994), pp. 23-24; and Georgii V. Barabashev, "Main Currents in the Development of Russian Local Self-government," in Friedgut and Hahn (eds.), *Local Power and Post-Soviet Politics*, p. 187.

⁹⁶) Wallich (ed.), *Russia and the Challenge of Fiscal Federalism*, pp. 258-271 (Appendix B, translated text).

⁹⁷) *Ibid.*, p. 10. According to the estimation of Leksin and his colleges, the sum total of local taxes in the local budgets is less than 15 billion rubles and ten to fifteen times more in 1993 which was about the same amount to approximately 10 per cent of Moscow's budget alone. Leksin, Andreeva, Sitnikov, and Shvetsov, "Regional'naia politika Rossii (stat'ia vtoraiia)," p. 30. A case study on Iaroslavl local budget of 1992 also suggested that local government had "little 'formal' control over the formation of their budgets and budgetary expenditures." Beth Mitchneck, "The changing Role of the Local Budget in Russian Cities: The Case of Iaroslavl," in Friedgut and Hahn (eds.), *Local Power and Post-Soviet Politics*, p. 73.

⁹⁸) Wallich, "Russia's Dilemma," p. 7.

⁹⁹) Sarah Ashwin, "'There's No Joy Any More': The experience of Reform in a Kuzbass Mining Settlement," *Europe Asia Studies*, vol. 47, no. 8 (1995), pp. 1374-1375.

¹⁰⁰) This lever seemed to be regarded important factor even after 1993 when Sergei Shakhrai, Minister of National and Regional Policies, underlined that local self-government were to be a critical factor to solve the federal question. *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, 4 February 1995, pp. 1, 4.

¹⁰¹) *Izvestiia*, 18 November 1991, p. 2.

¹⁰²) In particular, both administrations failed to reach an agreement on the question of privatisation of housing in Omsk until the end of 1992 when the question was finally forwarded to the

Federal Court. See John F. Young, "Institutions, Elites, and Local Politics in Russia: The Case of Omsk," in Friedgut and Hahn (eds.), *Local Power and Post-Soviet Politics*, pp. 150-152.

¹⁰³) Nazdratenko dispatched armed riot police to empty the mayor's office in March 1994. Cherepkov had to wait until September 1996 when he resumed his position with the assistance of bodyguards who were provided by the Duma in Moscow. *The St. Petersburg Times*, 29 July 1997, p. 11.

¹⁰⁴) DeBardleben also pointed out that the negotiation between the centre and regions helped the centre to increase its control over the regions. DeBardleben, "The Development of Federalism in Russia," in Stavrakis, DeBardleben, Black and Koehn (eds.), *Beyond the Monolith*, p. 85.

¹⁰⁵) Eltsin's strategy was clearly revealed when he invited regional leaders to conclude an agreement with the centre at an All-Russia Conference of Leaders of Representatives and Executive Bodies of Power in Cheboksary in September 1992. At the meeting, he admitted that various models of transition to a market economy were possible as the regions were varied in their specific features of industrial production. He also suggested that the central government would give detailed consideration to the specific features of regions when implementing investment and structural policy. However, he made it clear that it was impossible to turn such considerations into a system which guaranteed privileges. *Izvestia*, 11 September 1992, pp. 1-2.

¹⁰⁶) Criticising the Solnick's view on bilateral negotiations as a destabilising factor, Slocum has argued that 'asymmetrical situation' resulted from bilateral negotiations might be more stable than Solnick's analysis suggested, since the regions and republics "vary so widely in their ability to manipulate the centre." John Slocum, *Disintegration and Consolidation: National Separatism and the Evolution of Centre-Periphery Relations in the Russian Federation*, Cornell University Peace Studies Programme Occasional Paper, no. 19 (July 1995), p. 32.

¹⁰⁷) For various financial sources available for the regions, see V. Leksin and A. Shvetsov, "Regional'naiia politika Rossii: kontseptsii, problemy, resheniia (stat'ia chetvertaia: gosudarstvennoe regulirovanie i selektivnaia podderzhka regional'nogo razvitiia)," *Rossiiskii ekonomicheskii zhurnal*, no. 7 (July 1994), pp. 40-52, and no. 8 (August 1994), pp. 37-48.

¹⁰⁸) Raspriazhenie predsedatelia Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR "O obrazovanii assotsiatsii ekonomicheskogo vzaimodeistviia oblasti Tsentral'no-Chernozemnogo regiona RSFSR i merakh po sozdaniiu uslovii dlia ikh uskorenno razvitiia (31 May 1991)," *Vedomosti*, vol. 23 (6 June 1991), pp. 907-909.

¹⁰⁹) Raspriazhenie predsedatelia Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR "Ob obrazovanii Assotsiatsii ekonomicheskogo vzaimodeistviia oblasti Ural'skogo regiona RSFSR (9 June 1991)," *Vedomosti*, vol. 24 (13 June 1991), pp. 935-937.

¹¹⁰) Raspriazhenie predsedatelia Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR "Ob obrazovanii assotsiatsii 'Vol'shaia Volga' po ekonomicheskomu vzaimodeistviuu respublik i oblasti Povolzhskogo regiona RSFSR (10 June 1991)," *ibid.*, pp. 937-939.

¹¹¹) Pasporiazhenie predsedatelia Verkhovnogo Sovet RSFSR "O voprosy deiatel'nosti mezhregional'noi assotsiatsii 'Sibirskoe soglashenie' (1 July 1991)," *Vedomosti*, vol. 27 (4 July 1991), pp. 1065-1067.

¹¹²) Without the active participation of those "strong regions" such as Tiumen oblast and the republic of Sakha, financial dependency to Moscow reduces the possibility of the development of inter-regional associations in the Siberian and Far Eastern regions. Pavlenko, "Centre and the Regions," pp. 92-93.

¹¹³) These regions were more likely to be supported by the state support through branch channels. For instance, Altai krai, a rural region, tended to be more interested in the programme of state programme to support agriculture and agro-industrial complex. As for Kemerovo oblast, the financial support for unpromising mines seemed to be a more imminent and promising financial sources. The federal budget of 1994 planned to allocate 11 trillion rubles for the agricultural sector, 775 billion rubles for the conversion funds, and 300 billion rubles for unpromising mines. Leksin and Shvetsov, "Regional'naia politika Rossii (stat'ia chetvertaia)," *Rossiiskii ekonomicheskii zhurnal*, no. 8 (August 1994), p. 44.

CHAPTER VIII

Conclusion: The Regions and the Future of Russia

The main purpose of this study has been to find answers to the following three questions: whether the regions had an influence upon the central legislative institutions in the USSR and Russia during 1989-1993; if they had, then how strong their influence was; and finally what could be the implications of the regions for the future course of reform in Russia.

In the process of democratisation and economic reform, long suppressed regional demands erupted in Russia and the Soviet style of centre-periphery relations was put to a trial. Such a tendency has been a worldwide phenomenon. Similar tendencies appeared in Spain after the Franco dictatorship in 1975. In Spain, the regions gained a momentum to increase their influence on central decision-making and federal principles were applied to its unitary structure after the adoption of the 1978 Constitution. The Spanish case of course is not a perfect transition model of incorporating regional demands into the political system as separatist bombing campaigns are still taking place. However, the transition in Spain appears to be more stable and progressive than in Russia. In this regard, we may briefly conclude that cultural background, general socio-economic conditions, or the experience of democracy of either side make a difference. However, it appears to be more complicated when such a transition is also a painstaking task in more democratised and economically stable countries. For instance, the transition process in Belgium took nearly twenty years—if we take the adoption of the 1970 Constitution as a starting point—before the throne officially recognised Belgium as a federal state in 1988, and during the transition period a couple of coalition governments had collapsed.

In Russia, however, the situation was rather more complicated. The analysis shows that regional socio-economic disparities were reflected in the composition and conduct of the Congresses of People's Deputies (CPDs) of the USSR and RSFSR, which was the same in Spain and Belgium. However, regional factors in the CPDs of

the USSR and Russia, together with some other factors (e.g. political bloc membership and age), placed obstacles in front of efforts to adopt reform policies, and thus affected the course and speed of reform by delaying or distorting reform measures.

Secondly, the case study of SIBFE regionalism showed that the influence of inter-regional coordination bodies such as the Siberian Agreement had declined in the CPD, although their influence varied with the question at issue. In accordance with the acceleration of reform, regional interests were also diversified, hampering inter-regional coordination efforts. In this context, the analysis suggested that deputies were more attentive to the socio-economic conditions and goals of their own region rather than those of inter-regional associations.

Thirdly, the analysis also suggested the possibility that the regions have continued to influence the decision-making process in the Russian Duma since 1993. Further research could look into the scope and character of this influence. Despite the decreasing influence of inter-regional associations and the emergence of a party system as a basis for Duma elections, this did not necessarily imply that the influence of the regions on the decision-making process had decreased. First of all, deputies in the CPD were rather independent of their regional or factional leaders. Therefore, we must consider the fate of regionalism operating outside (i.e. inter-regional associations as coordinating bodies of regional leaderships) and inside (i.e. regional deputy blocs) the CPD separately. Furthermore, 'class' background and political faction membership of a deputy did not always have a cross-regional impact in the CPD. Regional cleavages were also found among deputies belonging to the same 'class' group or political bloc. Accordingly, the current party-based representation to the State Duma may still allow for regional interest articulation, in addition to the influence of the regions in the Council of the Federation. In particular, regional support for political parties in the elections also suggests that the development of party politics in the Russian context can accommodate regional interest articulation.

Finally, in conjunction with current regional reform under Vladimir Putin's leadership, the level of coordination among the regions or regional political actors may need to be enhanced in order to establish a 'genuine' federal structure. This study suggests that chaotic regional interest articulation in the CPD hampered efforts to establish a legal framework for a 'genuine' federal structure. In the early 1990s, deputies in the Congress failed to reach an agreement on a future federal structure. As a result, two major legal frameworks of current federal relations—i.e. the Federal Treaty of 1992 and the Constitution of 1993—bypassed the Congress, and federal

relations developed mainly based on bilateral negotiations between Moscow and regional authorities. Devolution based on bilateral negotiations in circumstances of wide regional socio-economic disparities facilitated the regionalisation of reform, and in turn could erode the legacy of regional autonomy. Regionalisation of reform could also be a seedbed for a 'strong centre' or for even an authoritarian regime, which would affect not only the future structure of the federation but also economic and political reform in general.

Although regions failed to coordinate their activities in the 1990s, regions appear to face another round of test as Putin launched his regional reform in May 2000. Although the competence of newly established federal okrugs and their status in the federal structure have still to be settled, the importance of regional coordination appear to be growing. In this regard, the Belgian and Spanish experience suggests a couple of alternative paths to a federal state or a way of approach the question of building federal relations. However, in any case coordination between the regions in the process of negotiation with the centre remains unchanged.

Regionalism in the Congresses of the USSR and RSFSR

According to the experience of the Western countries, the existence of regional socio-economic disparities, 'isolated' ethnic groups, and direct election of deputies to the central parliament and of regional leaderships should encourage the development of regionalism. However, cross-regional factors such as 'class' cleavages and the development of a nationwide political party system tended to held back the development of regionalism. All these factors were activated or reactivated after *perestroika*, and thus are considered in this analysis.

During the period between 1989 and 1993, inter-regional coordination bodies were established and reached their peak of activity. In the course of reform, the policies of the centre had different impacts due to different circumstances at the regional level, intensifying regional socio-economic disparities. *Glasnost*' brought the legacy of existing federal relations into question, and led to open discussion of regional problems. Changing electoral procedures turned regional leaders and deputies into the agents of regional interests. In particular, the demise of the Soviet Union and the declaration of sovereignty of the RSFSR provided regions with timely opportunities to discuss federal relations in the Russian context.

Democratisation also altered political circumstances in the central political arena. Along with the changes in the electoral procedures and working patterns of the parliament, incessant power struggles also helped to erode a Soviet style of authority at the centre. As already discussed in Chapter 3, the political and economic resources of the centre were severely depleted in this transition period between 1989 and 1993. Under these circumstances, inter-regional coordination bodies were formed among regional political actors including regional leaderships, deputy groups, and political parties and movements.

This analysis showed that regional interests became a factor that helped to determine deputies' behaviour in the CPDs of the USSR and Russia during 1989-1993. Content analysis showed that increasing numbers of deputies in the USSR CPD in 1989 articulated the interests of their own region in a more direct way, using stronger terms than during the Soviet period. The Baltic deputy group is perhaps the best example of such a case.

Deputies' voting patterns in the Congresses also showed that regional factors, political faction membership, 'class,' and age were the variables most closely associated with deputies' voting behaviour. As for the regional factors, inter-regional groups—the union republic groups in the USSR CPD and inter-regional association groups in the Russian CPD—showed different voting patterns, suggesting the influence of the general political and economic conditions of each regional bloc. However, most inter-regional deputy groups, excluding the Baltic deputy group, were not strongly united, as the interests of member regions were increasingly diversified with the intensification of reform. In particular, the conflicts in the Russian Congress mainly revolved around political factions—for instance, Eltsin's and Khasbulatov's blocs—rather than between centre and regions. Partly because of these power struggles at the centre and divisions within regional groups, the regions seldom appeared to be strong enough to initiate changes in the federal structure itself.

The impact of regional factors over deputies' voting patterns, and thus upon the decision-making process, was more clearly apparent when deputies were regrouped on the basis of the socio-economic conditions of the regions where they had been elected. Although 'class' and generation factors appeared to be of some importance in the vote, their influence over deputies' voting patterns decreased as power struggles in the CPD intensified. In particular, regional cleavages were also found among deputies who belonged to the same 'class' group or to the same political bloc, suggesting that these were not always cross-regional factors in the Russian context. They also suggest that

regional influences appeared to be operating in the State Duma that formed after 1993, although deputies had partly been elected on the basis of a party list system.¹ Further work would be required in order to establish their importance in this context.

SIBFE Regionalism in the CPD

During the period 1989-1993, regionalist demands including separatist ones and inter-regional coordination efforts were developing in the SIBFE regions, and these constituted a prime concern of this thesis. In the SIBFE regions, the sentiment of being exploited by the centre was widespread, and thus efforts were made to keep wealth within their territory. Furthermore, difficulties in procuring necessary goods during the marketisation process encouraged the SIBFE regions to form a self-supporting mechanism on the basis of complementary economic structure or economic capacity as discussed in Chapter 3. As a result, inter-regional co-operation bodies emerged among the regional leaderships, deputies, and political movements in the SIBFE regions at the end of the 1980s and in the early 1990s. Their major demands could be summarised as the decentralisation of economic management, including the exploitation of natural resources and foreign economic activities. Although political demands such as establishing a Siberian or Far Eastern republic were made sporadically, they won support neither from the grassroots nor from regional leaders.

In the Congresses, SIBFE deputies were given fair opportunities to express their views, despite the complaints that they were simply 'observers.' SIBFE speakers at the sessions often advocated regional interests together with other reform-related questions. SIBFE deputies also showed distinctive voting patterns in the Congress. Despite difficulties, a relatively clear linkage can be found between voting and the interests of the SIBFE regions. For instance, questions that were included in the resolution of the Sixth Congress ("On the Course of Economic Reform in the Russian Federation") had been discussed at the First Congress of People's Deputies from Siberia in Krasnoiarsk in March 1992. In the vote on the resolution, SIBFE deputies as a group tended to respond to regional interests.

However, SIBFE deputies failed to maintain a high level of unity in their Congress votes. We may suggest a couple of reasons for the weak unity of the SIBFE regions: socio-economic disparities within the region, the lack of an institutionalised mechanism for horizontal and vertical coordination between regional political actors, and the centre's policy of 'divide and rule.' First of all, socio-economic disparities

among the SIBFE regions appeared to play a major role in their divisions. These disparities resulted in a diversification of goals among regional leaderships and deputies, particularly when the centre invited them to a series of bilateral negotiations. Accordingly, it became more difficult for the regions to coordinate their activities inside and outside the CPD. Although regional leaders established mechanisms—for instance, the Council of the Siberian Agreement—to coordinate their activities, they failed to reach an agreement on the future development of the association and to mobilise their deputies and the grassroots.

Despite the limits of SIBFE regionalism in the Congress, the analysis suggested a couple of findings which may be meaningful for the future development of economic and political changes in Russia. First of all, SIBFE deputies in the Congress were more attentive to the interests of their own regions rather than to those of inter-regional associations, although dependent on the question at issue. The analysis showed that SIBFE deputies—or Siberian and Far Eastern deputies separately—were divided not only by functional factors such as faction membership or 'class,' but also by the socio-economic conditions of the regions where they had been elected. This may lead us to the conclusion that the influence of the regions on the decision-making process mainly or more frequently came from regional groups based on similar socio-economic features than from inter-regional associations.

Secondly, despite the general observation that regionalism was mainly advocated by 'old' elites in their adaptation to changing circumstances,² the analysis suggested that this observation reveals only half the picture. According to the analysis, despite the regionalised voting patterns of deputies in the CPD, SIBFE deputies often showed rather independent voting patterns from those of their regional leaders who had also been elected to the CPD. In particular, those regional leaders who were members of the leadership bodies of inter-regional associations such as the Council of the Siberian Agreement had only a limited influence over deputies' voting patterns.

Considering these two findings, we may conclude that regional interest articulation of SIBFE deputies in the Congress was mainly carried out by the deputy groups of smaller regions with similar socio-economic conditions who were rather independent of their regional leaders. In this regard, the decreasing influence of inter-regional associations outside and inside the Congress may not necessarily mean that the influence of regions itself was also fading in the Congress. This is an issue that would require further investigation.

Regions and Future Changes in the Economic and Political System in Russia

As the logistic regression analysis showed, various factors were involved in determining deputies' attitudes towards reform, although their influence upon deputies' voting patterns was overridden by that of other factors from time to time. Furthermore, deputies' shifting positions in votes made the situation worse, as discussed in Chapter 6. Such tendencies made it difficult for any blocs to control the Congress, which affected the economic and political changes in the early 1990s.

Firstly, as a result of the confrontation of conflicting interests, decisions on key reform measures were delayed or ended up with vague and self-contradictory agreements in order to win the necessary support for their adoption. Such tendencies clearly emerged when decisions on major issues such as land ownership, privatisation, and centre-periphery relations were made. Delayed and self-contradictory decisions in the CPD added confusion and facilitated the regionalisation of reform in the policy-implementation process.

Secondly, difficulties in negotiating among the numerous factions in the Congress in order to work out an agreement encouraged Eltsin to introduce changes in the structure of the parliament.³ First of all, in December 1993, the size of the supreme decision-making body was reduced from 1,068 seats in the Russian CPD to 628 seats—450 in the State Duma and 178 in the Council of the Federation—in a bicameral parliament. The changes revealed Eltsin's intention to reduce the influence of regional forces in the parliament. The new electoral system abolished national-territorial districts, and allocated half the seats to political parties or movements. In return, administrative units were allocated seats in the newly established Council of the Federation on the basis of two deputies from each of the 89 administrative units, with equal representation from the regions and republics.

Despite these changes, the regions still have considerable importance for future changes in the Russian economic and political system, including centre-periphery relations. As Stoner-Weiss has pointed out, institutional settings—such as the party system, State Duma, Federal Council, and Constitutional Court—have yet to be developed.⁴ Governors elected by the grassroots appear to be more attentive to local interests and the influence of presidential representatives upon regional politics remains weak, despite presidential efforts to expand their responsibilities.⁵

However, the situation appears currently to have reached a stalemate in which neither the centre nor the regions can prevail, as pressures from the regions to change federal relations also do not seem to grow stronger either.⁶ Although further investigation is required, there is little sign that indicates regional disparities have decreased, partly as a result of the failure of macro-economic stabilisation measures. As suggested in this analysis, such disparities between regions make it difficult for them to form a coalition against the centre.⁷

Therefore, despite incessant demands for changes in the federal structure not only from the centre but also from the regions, only *de facto* changes—somewhere between the ‘minimum’ and ‘maximum’ concessions made by the centre—are taking place in centre-periphery relations on the basis of bilateral negotiations.⁸ In this situation, a shift in the balance of power between Moscow and regions may ignite changes in the framework of centre-periphery relations. Such changes will be mainly dependent on the development of power struggles at the centre, pressures from the regions, the attitudes of the grassroots, and general socio-economic conditions that may affect the attitudes of political actors at various levels.

Considering these factors, we may suggest four scenarios for the future development of centre-periphery relations in Russia: the *status quo*, the advent of a ‘strong centre’ or ‘strong regions,’ or a ‘fourth way.’

First, we may consider the possibility of the *status quo*. Despite *de facto* changes in federal relations, the balance of power between Moscow and the peripheries may continue without fundamental changes in their relations. However, the current situation is more likely to be a result of divisions on both sides, and thus not the result of an agreement but of discord, without institutionalised support. Therefore, the *status quo* at this moment does not appear to be stable enough to survive in the long term.⁹

Should a shift in the balance of power take place either at the centre or in the peripheries, it may change the framework of relations between the two. In this context, we may suggest two extreme scenarios: a ‘strong centre’ or ‘strong regions.’ ‘Strong’ regions may emerge when successful coordination between regions is achieved, and the centre remains weak. In its extreme case, a sort of confederation might emerge as a result of the initiatives of the regions. However, considering that a consensus for future development has yet to be established at the regional level, such a development is not likely in the near future. The discord among SIBFE regional

leaderships discussed in this analysis suggests that regional disparities will hamper such an effort.

However, despite the discord among regions, they may become stronger than the centre when it becomes weaker. For instance, a further intensification of power struggles at the centre, decreasing support of the grassroots for the central government and its policies, and weakening control of the centre over the law-enforcing institutions such as military forces will weaken the centre.¹⁰ If the centre becomes weaker, at least some 'strong' or 'winner' regions may initiate changes in federal relations which may lead to more devolution of powers to them.

This sort of go-it-alone approach pursued by 'strong' regions may face two main obstacles. Firstly, such a development is primarily caused by the weakness of the centre rather than the strength of regions. Therefore, once the centre regains its strength, its further march could be halted.¹¹ Secondly, a go-it-alone approach on the part of 'strong' regions may widen the gap between 'winner' and 'loser' regions. The wider the gap among the regions, the more difficult for the regions to coordinate their activities. In this regard, the success of 'winner' regions will of itself constrain further success.¹²

Taking such factors into account, another scenario, the advent of a 'strong centre,' appears more likely. *De facto* changes in federal relations and regional politics have produced negative effects not only in centre-periphery relations, but also in the broader programme of reform, bolstering the demands for a 'strong centre.' First of all, the legacy of regional autonomy has been eroded. In the course of devolution and marketisation, public services have deteriorated and regional barriers have been established, increasing the importance of barter systems, as mentioned in Chapter 1. In combination with democratisation and increasing public participation, regional autonomy and devolution have also led to the corruption of political leaders at the regional level,¹³ 'unconstitutional' or 'illegal' regional decisions,¹⁴ and even territorial disputes between regions.¹⁵

In this context, Evgenii Primakov's speech at the All-Russian Conference on Federal Relations on 26 January 1999 is noteworthy. In his address, he briefly mentioned seven principles of federal relations including equality between federal subjects, "vertical" executive power, improvement of treaty-based centre-periphery relations by toughening their legitimacy, and the merger of federal subjects.¹⁶

In fact, Primakov's speech seems to be a revival of Eltsin's *zemli* proposal, considering its emphasis on equal rights between federal subjects and the merger of federal subjects. In particular, some of these centrist initiatives were already in practice, though they may need more solid support. First of all, the privileges of regions benefited from bilateral negotiations with the centre are being eroded in the process of institutionalisation of bilateral agreements.¹⁷ Secondly, regarding the question of establishing a stronger executive "verticals," decrees were issued to strengthen the power of presidential representatives. Primakov went even further, proposing that gubernatorial elections should be abolished.¹⁸ Putin, acting president then, also emphasised the need to strengthen "vertical management," although he rejected the proposal that governors should be appointed by Moscow in February 2000.¹⁹ Thirdly, the question of reducing the number of federal subjects has been raised incessantly not only by the centre but also by regions.²⁰ As in the *zemli* case, strong resistance may come from the republics.²¹ However, the republics' decentralisation or defederation efforts appear weaker than in the early 1990s with some exceptions such as republics of Chechnia and Tatarstan,²² and further changes have been introduced since the creation of the federal okrugs in May 2000.

Of course, neither a 'strong' centre nor 'anti-centre' tendencies in the regions will necessarily mean 'anti-reform' tendencies.²³ In fact, Western experience has shown that the path to a welfare state has demanded a strong government, at least in the past. However, at the same time, it does not always deny the possibility that a 'strong' centre in the context of centre-periphery relations may have a passive attitude towards reforms. Even if a 'strong' centre may be regarded as "one step back for two steps forward," once it is enshrined in the Constitution it would not be easy to revise it for "two steps forward," considering the post-Soviet Russian experience.

If either the centre or the regions fails to prevail, a compromise on changes may be conceivable as a fourth way. In a compromise between centre and peripheries, the following points bear significance in the future development of federal relations: a clear demarcation of power in more 'genuine' federal relations, and a balance of power between Moscow and provinces creating 'checks and balances' until federal relations are stabilised and institutionalised.

As many have argued, legal and constitutional regulation must be one of the most important factors in the stabilisation of federal relations. In this connection, the centre has often been blamed for its negligence. However, as already discussed, a lack of consensus at the regional level and rather chaotic regional interest articulation in

central decision-making bodies must have hampered stabilisation efforts. In this context, regions should share the blame for the current situation.

In connection with this criticism, Putin's regional reform is another challenge for the regions as well as for the centre. Despite the establishment of new administrative units or federal okrugs, almost nothing has been decided regarding their status or competence. The functions of the governors of new units are still in confusion. Although many, including Putin himself, denied the need for a constitutional revision at least in the short term, it depends on what kind of the function the units may acquire and when the question will be settled.

The federalisation processes in India, Spain, and Belgium that we discussed in Chapter 2.3 suggest a couple of valuable main factors for the evolution of federal relations either in a centralised federation or in a unitary system.

First, coordination among regional political actors is very important. A low level of coordination among regional political actors not only makes the negotiation process more complicated, but also weakens regional pressure on the centre. If the newly established federal okrugs are to develop into federal subjects, members of each okrug should reach an agreement before they put forward their demands towards the centre. The federal okrugs have been established on the basis of the existing military districts (or planning regions), but the socio-economic conditions and federal status of member regions are different. Accordingly, the coordination between member regions in an okrug is likely to be a challenging task, but at the same time, it could be a valuable learning process in the construction of more genuine federal relations.

Second, interim measures may also facilitate the process of building consensus or agreements among political actors. In order to reach an agreement, a compromise between the need to meet the demands for 'separate treatment' and the need to avoid asymmetric federal status should be made. In Belgium, the asymmetry in federal relations that resulted from bilateral negotiations has been compensated by a series of multiparty pacts.

Finally, legal or constitutional guarantees for already-achieved agreements may protect the transition process from retreating. A number of bilateral and multiparty pacts had been signed between Moscow and various regions in the 1990s. However, those agreements appeared to be solely depending on the goodwill of Moscow. A series of legal or constitutional revisions that reflect agreements between centre and

regions will bind both sides. It could be difficult to reach an agreement, but it is more difficult to keep the agreement. In this respect, Russian regions appeared to have failed to reach an agreement and retain what they had gained.

We may wait long to see the advent of a 'genuine' and more stable federal system in Russia. However, it may not take long to establish at least a minimum level of legal guarantees—for instance, common concessions in existing bilateral negotiations between centre and regions—as a stepping stone to more 'genuine' federal relations on the basis of the current balance of power, of compromises between centre and regions and between the regions. A balance between centre and regions may prevent abrupt changes in their relations, and compromises will contain possible crises in governing the state. Although a minimum level of legal guarantees may not be satisfactory to both the centre and the regions, it would be a good starting point for the future evolution of federal relations.

¹) Haspel has also observed that most of the electoral organisations were "temporary alliances" that served deputies' policy needs. Moshe Haspel, "Should Party in the Parliament Be Weak or Strong?: The Rules Debate in the Russian State Duma," in John Löwenhardt (ed.), *Party Politics in Post-Communist Russia* (London: Frank Cass, 1998), p. 197. Considering this observation and regional supporting patterns of political parties in the elections, deputies' policy needs may include the interests of regions.

²) For instance, Stoner-Weiss has argued that 'old' communist bosses moved to enrich themselves and to protect their own status amplified regional demands. Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, "Federalism and Regionalism," in Stephen White, Alex Pravda, and Zvi Gitelman (eds.), *Developments in Russian Politics 4* (London: Macmillan, 1997), p. 233.

³) Eltsin's frustration in his dealing with the CPD during 1990-1993 was clearly revealed in his autobiography. See Boris Eltsin, *The View from the Kremlin* (London: Harper Collins, 1994), Chapter 7.

⁴) Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, "Central Weakness and Provincial Autonomy: Observations on the Devolution Process in Russia," *Post-Soviet Affairs*, vol. 15, no. 1 (January-March 1999), pp. 97-103.

⁵) Marc Zlotnik, "Russia's Governors: All the President's Men?" *Problems of Post-Communism*, vol. 43, no. 6 (November-December 1996), p. 30. Eltsin issued a decree on 9 July 1997 to expand the responsibilities of the presidential representatives in the regions in order to "relieve a part of the burden" of governors. Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii "O polnomochnom predstavitele Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii v regione Rossiiskoi Federatsii (9 July 1997)," *Sobranie zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii*, no. 28 (14 July 1997), pp. 5549-5556. However, the Council of the Federation opposed the decree.

⁶) S. Pavlenko, "Regiony i regional'naia politika," *Voprosy ekonomiki*, no. 9 (September 1994), p. 15.

⁷) Vera Tolz and Irina Busygina, "Regional Governors and the Kremlin: The Ongoing Battle for Power," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, vol. 30, no. 4 (December 1997), pp. 421-423; N. J. Lynn, "The Republics of the Russian Federation: National Territorial Change," in Michael J. Bradshaw (ed.), *Geography and Transition in the Post-Soviet Republics* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1997), pp. 66-68.

⁸) For a brief discussion of *de facto* changes in centre-periphery relations, see Stoner-Weiss, "Central Weakness and Provincial Autonomy," pp. 94-96.

⁹) Solnick has also argued *de facto* changes in federal relations mainly based on bilateral negotiations between the centre and regions, but "the post-Eltsin succession will test the robustness of these treaties." Stephen L. Solnick, "The Political Economy of Russian Federalism: A Framework for Analysis," *Problems of Post-Communism*, vol. 43, no. 6 (November-December 1996), p. 23.

¹⁰) In July 1997, Eltsin and Chernomyrdin, former Prime Minister, signed decrees on restructuring military branches. One of the decrees instructed the General Staff to reduce the number of military personnel by 1.5 million by the end of 1999. Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii "O pervoocherednykh merakh po reformirovaniu Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossiiskoi Federatsii i sovershenstvovaniiu ikh struktury," *Sobranie zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii*, no. 29 (21 July 1997), pp. 5724-5725 (Article 1). In August 1997, Andrei Kokoshin, former Deputy Defence Minister, unveiled a new national security concept, emphasising the need to deal with potential localised conflicts and slimming military units. For the new security concept, see Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii "Ob utverzhdenii kontseptsii natsional'noi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii," *Sobranie zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii*, no. 52 (29 December 1997), pp. 10418-10439. However, a series of current incidents suggests that relations between the central government and military forces appear to be ameliorating: an increase in the defence budget for the year 2000 despite financial difficulties and the warnings of the IMF, deployment of new nuclear warheads (Topol-M) in December 1998 and 10 more in December 1999, and hard-line policies on ethnic disputes in the republics of Dagestan and Chechnia. For the defence budget and deployment of new nuclear warheads, see ITAR-TASS, 1 October 1999, in *RFE/RL Newslines*, vol. 3, no. 193, part I (4 October 1999). A draft military doctrine, unveiled on 5 October 1999, maintained the possibility of winning a nuclear war, suggesting a shift in the strategic concept. *Krasnaya zvezda*, 9 October 1999, pp. 3-4.

¹¹) A go-it-alone approach has been and will lead the regions to an "anarchic scramble for benefits," and as Solnick has observed, Moscow "must be seeking means to regularise centre-periphery relations." Steven Solnick, "Will Russia Survive?: Centre and Periphery in the Russian Federation," in Barnett R. Rubin and Jack Snyder (eds.), *Post-Soviet Political Order: Conflict and State Building* (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 76.

¹²) For instance, the authorities of Krasnoiarsk krai and Irkutsk oblast have made it clear that they are against any form of special treatment for resource-rich regions and republics.

¹³) Åslund has observed that the enterprise subsidies are "tantamount to corruption." Anders Åslund, "Russia's Current Economic Dilemma: A Comment," *Post-Soviet Affairs*, vol. 15, no. 1 (January-March 1999), p. 84. He has also argued that the regions collected too large a proportion of the revenues

(about 15 per cent of GDP) compared to the share of the centre (about 10 per cent), which caused a deterioration of fiscal problems of the centre. Ibid.

¹⁴) At the All-Russian Conference on Federal Relations on 26 January 1999, Iurij Skuratov, Prosecutor-General, mentioned that 70 per cent of regional legislation was not in accordance with federal laws. Interfax in *RFE/RL Newslines*, vol. 3, no. 18, part I (27 January 1999).

¹⁵) *Nezavisimaja gazeta*, 29 January 1999, p. 3. According to Primakov, more than 30 regions are involved in territorial claims. The newspaper warned that border conflicts between regions, particularly between oblasts and autonomous okrugs, could develop into a more open form by the year 2000 if the centre continues to lose its influence.

¹⁶) According to him, the core aspect of federal relations is not decentralisation but integration. He also emphasised the optimal division of public properties at the various levels, and the establishment of "uniform rules" for fiscal federal relations. *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, 27 January 1999, p. 3.

¹⁷) Solnick, "The Political Economy of Russian Federalism," p. 23. For instance, President Eltsin signed a decree which withdrew from Sakha the tax privileges it had been granted during the period between 1992 and 1993. In particular, the decree denied monopoly of diamond sales that Almaz Rossii-Sakha, a joint venture established by the central and Sakha government, had sought for, and placed all diamond industry under the control of the Ministry of Finance. The decree also demanded that Sakha pay for its diamond share at world market prices, banning the transfer of diamonds at a discount. *The St Petersburg Times*, 25-32 August 1997 (internet service version). Colton and his colleagues also doubt that the privileges of republics will last in the long run. Timothy Colton, Robert Legvold, George Breslauer, Jack Matlock, Herber Levine and Victor Winston, "Five Years After the Collapse of the Soviet Union," *Post-Soviet Affairs*, vol. 13, no. 1 (January-March 1997), p. 13.

¹⁸) For a brief discussion of a series of efforts of the centre to control governors, see Tolz and Busygina, "Regional Governors and the Kremlin," pp. 421-424. An opinion poll in 1997 showed that 64 per cent of elites had sceptical view on mass participation, while only 29 per cent—including 5 per cent of strong supporters—replied that participation of the general public would be necessary. Arthur H. Miller, Vicki L. Hesli, and William M. Reisinger, "Conceptions of Democracy Among Mass and Elites in Post-Soviet Societies," *British Journal of Political Science*, vol. 27, part 2 (April 1997), p. 177. Slider has also pointed out that executive branches will easily manipulate and control the regional government structure including regional assemblies with minimal democratic supervision. He also warned that such a development would make "genuine" political and economic reforms less likely. Darrell Slider, "Elections to Russia's Regional Assemblies," *Post-Soviet Affairs*, vol. 12, no. 3 (July-September 1996), pp. 243-264.

¹⁹) Rejecting the proposal that regional governors should be appointed by Moscow, he remarked on 18 February 2000 that it was not "the only way to strengthen vertical management." *RFE/RL Newslines*, vol. 4, no. 8 (23 February 2000).

²⁰) For instance, Eltsin's concept of *zemli*, Mukha's idea of establishing a single budget among the member regions of the Siberian Agreement, and SIBFE regions' initiatives for establishing a Siberian or a Far Eastern republic would reduce the numbers of federal subjects. At the All-Russian Conference on Federal Relations in January 1999, Viktor Kress, Governor of Tomsk oblast, also proposed to reorganise the territorial-administrative system of Russia.

²¹) For instance, Farit Mukhametshin, the Chairman of the State Council of Tatarstan, rejected Primakov's proposal to reduce the numbers of federal subjects. "Tatarstan Rejects Consolidation within Russian Federation," *RFE/RL Newslines*, vol. 3, no. 18, part 1 (3 March 1999).

²²) Smith has argued that the republics' ability to follow their own paths to development is constrained by "fiscal budgetary policies, the lack of a shared conception of national self-determination, the economic cost of defederation, inter-dependent economic structure, and the centuries-long identities of being part of Russia." Considering these difficulties, he has showed his doubt that even resource-rich republics such as the republics of Sakha, Tatarstan, and Bashkortostan are likely to become 'Kuwaits of Northern Eurasia.' Graham Smith, "Federation, Defederation and Refederation: From the Soviet Union to Russian Statehood," in Graham Smith (ed.), *Federalism: the Multiethnic Challenge* (London: Longman, 1995), pp. 173-175.

²³) Josephine Andrews and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, "Regionalism and Reform in Provincial Russia," *Post-Soviet Affairs*, vol. 11, no. 4 (October-December 1995), pp. 385, 404.

Appendix 1.1 Economic Performance and Living Conditions in Russia (1990-1993)

	Economic Per- formance	Living Standards	Socio- economic Stress	Cluster 1 ¹⁾	Cluster 2 ²⁾	Cluster 3 ³⁾
North						
Rep Kareliia	23	45	42	3	3	2
Rep Komi	42	39	60	5	3	2
Arkhangelsk	24	28	9	3	4	3
Vologoda	38	37	0	3	3	4
Murmansk	39	65	22	2	1	3
Northwest						
St Petersburg	32	69	26	2	1	3
Leningrad	31	31	14	3	4	2
Novgorod	17	31	5	3	4	3
Pskov	14	33	23	3	4	4
Central						
Briansk	22	26	21	3	4	4
Vladimir	29	30	16	3	4	4
Ivanovo	30	28	22	3	4	4
Kaluga	15	29	19	3	4	3
Kostroma	18	29	17	3	4	4
Moscow city	84	100	21	1	1	3
Moscow ob	60	40	21	2	2	3
Orel	24	36	17	3	4	4
Riazan	27	26	14	3	4	4
Smolensk	23	34	7	3	4	4
Tver	24	28	18	3	4	3
Tula	41	41	10	3	3	4
Iaroslavl	34	35	13	3	3	4
Volga-Viatka						
Rep Mari-El	15	23	88	4	5	4
Rep Mordovia	17	20	70	4	5	4
Chuvash Rep	19	21	61	4	5	4
Kirov	22	25	23	3	4	4
Nizhgorod	59	31	5	3	2	4
Central Chernozem						
Belgorod	36	37	0	3	3	4
Voronezh	22	31	20	3	4	3
Kursk	24	27	6	3	4	4
Lipetsk	33	35	5	3	3	4
Tambov	18	21	3	3	5	4
Volga						
Rep Kalmykia	8	17	80	4	5	4
Rep Tatarstan	63	32	72	5	2	4
Astrakhan	14	15	30	3	5	4
Volgogra	33	31	27	3	4	4
Penza	16	20	30	3	5	4
Samara	64	41	24	2	2	3
Saratov	31	28	27	3	4	4
Ulianovsk	30	47	20	3	3	4
North Caucasus						
Rep Adygeia	9	12	57	4	5	1
Rep Dagestan	2	0	47	4	5	1
Kabardio-Bakar Rep	5	10	83	4	5	4

(cont.)

	Economic Per- formance	Living Standards	Socio- economic Stress	Cluster 1 ¹⁾	Cluster 2 ²⁾	Cluster 3 ³⁾
Karachaevo-Cherk Rep	7	13	100	4	5	1
Rep North Ossetia	5	22	86	4	5	4
Krasnodar	36	14	21	3	4	1
Stavropol	25	17	43	3	4	1
Rostov	36	24	27	3	4	3
Urals						
Rep Bashkortostan	65	28	87	5	2	4
Udmurt Rep	41	25	65	5	4	4
Kurgan	17	13	25	3	5	1
Orenburg	37	20	37	3	4	4
Perm	68	24	24	2	2	4
Sverdlovsk	68	38	26	2	2	3
Cheliabinsk	53	31	35	3	2	4
West Siberia						
Rep Altai	3	0	60	4	5	1
Altai Kr	19	13	32	3	5	1
Kemerovo	62	33	27	2	2	4
Novosibirsk	25	23	18	3	4	3
Omsk	30	28	33	3	4	4
Tomsk	33	30	6	3	4	4
Tiumen	100	58	36	2	1	2
East Siberia						
Rep Buriatia	14	18	47	3	5	4
Rep Tyva	0	3	54	4	5	1
Rep Khakasiia	25	31	13	3	4	4
Krasnoiarsk	64	37	20	2	2	2
Irkutsk	53	45	14	2	2	2
Chita	14	10	29	3	5	4
Far East						
Rep Sakha	69	30	60	5	2	2
Primorskii	31	23	22	3	4	3
Khabarovsk	32	28	34	3	4	3
Amur	19	21	31	3	5	4
Kamchatka	42	36	40	3	3	2
Magadan	51	50	32	2	2	2
Sakhalin	30	26	32	3	4	4
Kaliningrad						
Kaliningrad	15	29	46	3	4	3

¹⁾ Cluster using three indicators: highly adapted (1), adapted (2), stagnated (3) regions, stagnated republics (4), adapted republics (5)

²⁾ Cluster excluding socio-economic stress indicator: highly developed (1), well-developed (2), moderately developed (3), under-developed (4), poorly developed (5)

³⁾ Cluster based on economic structure of regions: rural (1), resource (2), hub/gate (3), residual (4);

Source: Philip Hanson, "Russia's Region, or the Mysteries of the 89 Organisations," unpublished paper presented at the BASEES annual conference, Cambridge, 30 March-1 April 1996 (overlapping regions re-categorised).

Appendix 1.2. Scale of Indicators of Socio-economic Situations in Russia (1989-1993)

In the selection of data, two main points are considered: regional differentiation in terms of socio-economic situation and its impact on regionalism. In the context, variables are collected based on Dmitrieva's indicators. However, because of technical difficulties in merging variables, irrelevance to the voting patterns, and multicollinearity, some data sets which reflected living conditions such as unemployment and environmental data are dropped. Final cluster results have been cross-examined with existing works. In order to avoid potential inaccuracy and peculiar phenomena of a particular year that may distort general picture, mean value of a variable during 1989-1994 was used, though it depended on availability.

In order to work out indicators, each variable was converted into a standard score (z score = (old value - mean value) / standard deviation). In each merging step, reliability coefficient was tested, and variables were merged when Alpha score was higher than 0.7 point. However, variables employed to create socio-economic stress indicator were merged after converted into the same type of value, % to the RF average.

Economic Performance = [(% of total industrial production (1991-93) + % of per capita industrial production (1991-93)) / 6 + (% of total foreign trade (1992-93) + % of per capita foreign trade (1992-93)) / 2 + (% of total capital investment (1990-93) + % of per capita capital investment (1990-93)) / 2 + (% of total basic fund share (1991-93) + % of per capita Basic fund share (1991-1993)) / 6] / 4 [Alpha scores: industrial production ($\alpha=0.90$), foreign trade ($\alpha=0.92$), capital investment ($\alpha=0.90$), basic fund share ($\alpha=0.82$), and Economic Performance Total ($\alpha=0.78$)]

Living Standards = [real income (1993, % to the RF average) + 'real' expenditure (1993, % to the RF average) + % of housing space (1990-93, % to the RF average) + % homes with telephone in urban area (1990-93, % to the RF average) + per capita electricity consumption (1994, % to the RF average) + % of population of higher education (1989, % to the RF average)] / 7 [Alpha scores: housing space ($\alpha=0.99$), telephone ($\alpha=0.9964$) Living Standards total ($\alpha=0.72$)]

Socio-economic Stress = [% decline of physical industrial production (1993, 1989=100, % to the RF average) + % of non-Russian population (1989, % to the RF average)]

Since it is difficult to interpret the final results in standard values (Z score), they were converted into more operable values on a 0-100 scale, so that 100 points were given to the highest scale and 0 to the lowest. The score was calculated as follows: new value = (old value - lowest score) / range.

Appendix 1.3. Regional Differentiation: Anova Analysis Descriptives

Regional Group	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Min	Max		Sum of Square	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound								
A. Cluster 1 (3 Indicators used)														
<i>Economic Performance</i>														
highly adapted region	1	84.0					84	84	Between Groups	21614.2	4	5403.6	43.5	0.000
adapted regions	11	60.1	17.7	5.3	48.2	72.0	32	100	Within Groups	8817.9	71	124.2		
stagnated regions	48	27.2	9.9	1.4	24.3	30.1	14	59	Total	30432.1	75			
stagnated republics	11	8.2	6.3	1.9	4.0	12.4	0	19						
adapted republics	5	56.0	13.4	6.0	39.3	72.7	41	69						
total	76	31.8	20.1	2.3	27.2	36.4	0	100						
<i>Living Standards</i>														
highly adapted region	1	100.0					100	100	Between Groups	10990.1	4	2747.5	33.7	0.000
adapted regions	11	45.5	13.8	4.2	36.2	54.7	24	69	Within Groups	5787.1	71	81.5		
stagnated regions	48	27.7	8.0	1.2	25.4	30.0	10	47	Total	16777.2	75			
stagnated republics	11	12.8	8.7	2.6	7.0	18.7	0	23						
adapted republics	5	30.8	5.3	2.4	24.3	37.3	25	39						
total	76	29.3	15.0	1.7	25.9	32.7	0	100						
<i>Socio-economic Stress</i>														
highly adapted region	1	21.0					21	21	Between Groups	29839.2	4	7459.8	46.4	0.000
adapted regions	11	24.7	5.9	1.8	20.8	28.7	14	38	Within Groups	10951.6	71	154.2		
stagnated regions	48	21.5	12.4	1.8	17.9	25.1	0	47	Total	40790.8	75			
stagnated republics	11	71.5	16.9	5.1	60.1	82.8	47	100						
adapted republics	5	68.8	11.3	5.1	54.8	82.8	60	87						
total	76	32.3	23.3	2.7	27.0	37.7	0	100						
B. Cluster 2 (Socio-economic Stress Indicator Ignored)														
<i>Economic Performance</i>														
highly developed	4	63.8	33.4	16.7	10.6	116.9	32	100	Between Groups	24192.4	4	6048.1	66.6	0.000
well developed	13	61.5	6.0	1.7	57.8	65.1	51	69	Within Groups	6239.7	71	87.9		
moderately developed	9	35.4	6.3	2.1	30.6	40.3	23	42	Total	30432.1	75			
under-developed	31	26.6	6.8	1.2	24.1	29.2	14	41						
poorly developed	19	11.6	6.4	1.5	8.5	14.7	0	19						
total	76	31.8	20.1	2.3	27.2	36.4	0	100						
<i>Living Standards</i>														
highly developed	4	73.0	18.8	9.3	43.5	102.5	58	100	Between Groups	13365.6	4	3341.4	69.5	0.000
well developed	13	35.4	7.3	2.0	31.0	39.8	24	50	Within Groups	3411.4	71	48		
moderately developed	9	39.1	4.4	1.5	35.8	42.5	35	47	Total	16777.2	75			
under-developed	31	27.4	4.8	0.8	25.7	29.1	14	36						
poorly developed	19	14.3	7.2	1.7	10.8	17.8	0	23						
total	76	29.3	15.0	1.7	25.9	32.7	0	100						
<i>Socio-economic Stress</i>														
highly developed	4	26.3	6.8	3.4	15.4	37.1	21	36	Between Groups	12610.9	4	3152.7	7.9	0.000
well developed	13	34.4	23.9	6.8	19.9	48.8	5	87	Within Groups	28179.9	71	396.9		
moderately developed	9	21.1	21.4	7.1	4.7	37.5	0	60	Total	40790.8	75			
under-developed	31	22.6	13.0	2.3	17.9	27.4	5	65						
poorly developed	19	53.3	26.3	6.0	40.8	66.0	3	100						
total	76	32.3	23.3	2.7	27.0	37.7	0	100						
C. Cluster 3 (Economic Structure)														
<i>Economic Performance</i>														
rural regions	9	13.1	12.1	4.0	3.8	22.4	0	36	Between Groups	7718.2	3	2572.7	8.2	0.000
resource regions	9	52.8	23.0	7.7	35.1	70.4	23	100	Within Groups	22713.9	72	315.5		
hub/gate regions	16	36.8	21.0	5.2	25.6	47.9	15	64	Total	30432.1	75			
residual regions	42	29.5	16.2	2.5	24.5	34.5	5	68						
total	76	31.8	20.1	2.3	27.2	36.4	0	100						
<i>Living Standards</i>														
rural regions	9	9.4	6.5	2.2	4.4	14.5	0	17	Between Groups	6578.5	3	2192.8	15.5	0.000
resource regions	9	41.2	9.1	3.0	34.2	48.2	30	68	Within Groups	10198.7	72	141.6		
hub/gate regions	16	39.2	21.2	5.3	27.9	50.5	23	100	Total	16777.2	75			
residual regions	42	27.2	7.7	1.2	24.8	29.6	10	47						
total	76	29.3	15.0	1.7	25.9	32.7	0	100						
<i>Socio-economic Stress</i>														
rural regions	9	48.8	23.7	7.9	30.5	67.0	21	100	Between Groups	4107.6	3	1369.2	2.7	0.050
resource regions	9	35.3	17.5	5.8	21.9	48.8	14	60	Within Groups	36683.2	72	509.5		
hub/gate regions	16	22.4	9.3	2.3	17.4	27.3	5	46	Total	40790.8	75			
residual regions	42	32.0	26.3	4.1	23.7	40.2	0	68						
total	76	32.3	23.3	2.7	27.0	37.7	0	100						

Appendix 2.1. Composition of the CPDs of the USSR and Russia

	USSR				RSFSR				SIBFE in the USSR CPD				SIBFE in the RSFSR CPD			
	CPD		VS		CPD		VS		CPD		VS		CPD		VS	
	Total	RSFSR	Total	RSFSR	Siberia	FE	SIBFE	Sib	FE	SIBFE	Sib	FE	SIBFE	Sib	FE	SIBFE
Total number	2259	1104	541	241	158	59	217	38	18	56	172	630	235	39	21	60
USSR %	100.0	48.9	100.0	44.5	7.0	2.6	9.6	7.1	3.3	10.4	-	-	-	-	-	-
RSFSR %	-	-	-	-	16.4	5.4	21.8	15.8	7.5	23.2	16.1	5.9	22.0	16.5	8.9	25.3
Gender																
male	84.4	86.2	81.5	83.8	84.8	86.4	85.3	84.2	88.9	85.7	97.1	90.5	95.3	97.4	85.7	93.3
female	15.5	13.8	18.5	16.2	15.2	13.6	14.7	15.8	11.1	14.3	2.1	9.5	4.7	2.6	14.3	6.7
Generation																
less 45	38.1	39.0	41.0	44.4	47.5	47.5	47.5	47.4	50.0	48.2	45.6	39.7	44.0	46.2	47.6	46.7
over 45	61.9	61.0	59.0	55.6	52.5	52.5	52.5	52.6	50.0	51.8	54.4	60.3	56.0	53.8	52.4	53.3
Class																
nomenklatura	13.6	10.2	11.3	5.4	7.6	5.1	6.9	0.0	11.1	3.6	12.7	12.7	12.4	23.1	0.0	15.0
cadres	7.0	7.3	7.8	7.9	9.5	13.6	10.6	15.8	5.6	12.5	21.1	22.2	21.4	15.4	28.6	20.0
military	4.0	4.3	1.8	2.5	4.4	6.8	5.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.9	7.9	4.3	0.0	4.8	1.7
manager	17.5	20.7	18.3	23.7	25.3	23.7	24.9	26.3	27.8	26.8	24.0	12.7	20.9	17.9	9.5	15.0
intelligentsia	17.4	17.0	18.5	15.8	14.6	11.9	13.8	21.1	22.2	21.4	10.5	6.3	9.4	23.1	14.3	20.0
technician	16.0	17.6	13.3	15.8	15.2	20.3	16.6	7.9	5.6	7.1	9.4	28.6	14.5	12.8	42.9	23.3
worker	22.1	19.7	27.5	26.1	21.5	15.3	19.8	21.1	27.8	23.2	8.2	3.2	6.8	7.7	0.0	5.0
other	2.2	3.1	1.5	2.9	1.9	3.4	2.3	7.9	0.0	5.4	11.7	6.3	10.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
Education																
doctoral	9.0	10.3	11.9	10.5	5.2	0.0	3.8	11.4	0.0	8.2	-	-	-	-	-	-
candidate	9.0	8.0	8.3	5.9	7.1	3.7	6.3	8.6	7.1	8.2	-	-	-	-	-	-
high	58.3	59.1	56.8	61.6	65.6	75.9	68.6	68.6	71.4	69.4	-	-	-	-	-	-
middle	23.8	22.6	23.0	21.9	22.1	20.4	21.6	11.4	21.4	14.3	-	-	-	-	-	-
Autonomous regions																
auto	-	27.9	-	38.9	27.8	39.0	30.9	39.5	50.0	42.9	24.4	27.0	25.1	43.6	38.1	41.7
non-auto	-	72.8	-	61.6	72.2	61.0	69.1	60.5	50.0	57.1	75.6	73.0	74.9	56.4	61.9	58.3
Urban-Rural																
urban 1	41.1	41.3	41.2	35.3	36.3	16.9	31.3	37.8	22.2	32.7	55.3	52.4	54.5	71.8	76.2	73.3
urban 2	20.5	20.7	21.3	20.6	18.5	30.5	21.8	8.1	22.2	12.7	14.7	22.2	16.7	7.7	9.5	8.3
urban 3	16.2	17.8	16.4	19.3	24.2	32.2	26.4	32.4	38.9	34.5	21.2	19.0	20.6	12.8	14.3	13.3
rural	20.0	17.5	20.5	23.9	20.4	15.3	19.0	21.6	16.7	20.0	8.8	6.3	8.2	7.7	0.0	5.0
other	2.3	2.6	0.6	0.9	0.6	5.1	1.9	0.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CPSU membership (include Komsomol)																
member	88.6	89.5	88.5	89.2	86.7	93.2	88.5	92.1	88.9	91.1	77.2	77.8	77.4	84.6	66.7	78.3
non-member	11.4	10.5	11.5	10.8	13.3	6.8	11.5	7.9	11.1	8.9	22.8	22.2	22.6	15.4	33.3	23.6

Appendix 2.2. Frequency of Speeches (Category A) in the First CPD of the USSR

	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Std. Err.	95% confidence interval for mean		Min.	Max.	Sum of Sq.	df	Mean Sq.	F	Sig.	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound								
A Level of Speeches (CPD total)														
Gender														
male	1894	0.3	0.8	0.0	0.2	0.3	0	14	Between Groups	7.8	1	7.8	13.1	0.000
female	351	0.1	0.4	0.0	0.1	0.2	0	2	Within Groups	1278.7	2243	0.6		
Total	2245	0.3	0.8	0.0	0.2	0.3	0	14	total	1283.1	2244			
Generation														
junior	857	0.1	0.4	0.0	0.1	0.2	0	3	Between Groups	25.0	1	25.0	44.8	0.000
senior	1388	0.3	0.9	0.0	0.3	0.4	0	14	Within Groups	1258.1	2243	0.6		
Total	2245	0.3	0.8	0.0	0.2	0.3	0	14	total	1283.1	2244			
Education level														
doctoral	198	0.7	1.3	0.1	0.5	0.9	0	11	Between Groups	89.9	3	23.3	42.3	0.000
candidat	197	0.5	0.9	0.1	0.3	0.6	0	8	Within Groups	1203.2	2188	0.6		
high	1275	0.2	0.7	0.0	0.2	0.3	0	14	total	1273.1	2189			
middle	522	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.1	0	2						
Total	2190	0.3	0.8	0.0	0.2	0.3	0	14						
Class														
nomenklatura	308	0.6	1.4	0.1	0.5	0.8	0	14	Between Groups	85.9	6	14.3	26.8	0.000
cadres	159	0.2	0.5	0.0	0.1	0.2	0	2	Within Groups	1188.1	2204	0.6		
military	91	0.2	0.4	0.0	0.1	0.3	0	2	total	1272.0	2210			
managers	398	0.2	0.6	0.0	0.1	0.2	0	4						
intelligentsia	394	0.4	0.9	0.0	0.3	0.6	0	8						
technicians	361	0.2	0.5	0.0	0.1	0.2	0	4						
workers	502	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.1	0	2						
Total	2211	0.3	0.8	0.0	0.2	0.3	0	14						
Urban-rural														
large city	928	0.4	1.0	0.0	0.4	0.5	0	14	Between Groups	59.1	3	19.7	36.2	0.000
medium-sized city	482	0.2	0.5	0.0	0.2	0.2	0	4	Within Groups	1200.9	2208	0.6		
small city	368	0.1	0.4	0.0	0.1	0.2	0	4	total	1260.0	2209			
rural	454	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.1	0	2						
Total	2210	0.3	0.8	0.0	0.2	0.3	0	14						
CPSU Membership														
member	1993	0.3	0.8	0.0	0.2	0.3	0	14	Between Groups	2.4	1	2.4	4.2	0.041
non-member	251	0.2	0.5	0.0	0.1	0.2	0	4	Within Groups	1280.7	2242	0.6		
Total	2244	0.3	0.8	0.0	0.2	0.3	0	14	total	1283.1	2243			
Ethnic (Russian vs Non-Russian)														
Russian	1020	0.3	0.8	0.0	0.2	0.3	0	14	Between Groups	2.1	1	2.1	3.8	0.053
other	1225	0.2	0.7	0.0	0.2	0.3	0	7	Within Groups	1281.0	2243	0.6		
Total	2245	0.3	0.8	0.0	0.2	0.3	0	14	total	1283.1	2244			
A Level Speeches among the SIBFE deputies														
Gender														
male	185	0.3	0.7	0.1	0.2	0.4	0	8	Between Groups	0.0	1	0.0	0.0	0.874
female	32	0.3	0.6	0.1	0.1	0.6	0	2	Within Groups	110.0	216	0.6		
Total	217	0.3	0.7	0.0	0.2	0.4	0	8	total	110.0	216			
Generation														
junior	103	0.2	0.4	0.0	0.1	0.2	0	2	Between Groups	1.8	1	1.8	3.7	0.058
senior	114	0.4	0.9	0.1	0.2	0.5	0	6	Within Groups	108.2	216	0.6		
Total	217	0.3	0.7	0.0	0.2	0.4	0	8	total	110.0	216			
Education level														
doctoral	8	0.6	0.8	0.3	-0.1	1.1	0	2	Between Groups	6.5	3	2.0	6.6	0.001
candidat	13	1.0	2.2	0.6	-0.3	2.3	0	6	Within Groups	100.0	204	0.6		
high	142	0.2	0.5	0.0	0.1	0.3	0	2	total	108.8	207			
middle	45	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.2	0	1						
Total	208	0.3	0.7	0.1	0.2	0.4	0	8						
Class														
nomenklatura	18	0.4	0.6	0.1	0.1	0.7	0	1	Between Groups	11.8	6	1.9	4.0	0.001
cadres	23	0.3	0.6	0.1	0.0	0.6	0	2	Within Groups	97.7	206	0.6		
military	11	0.1	0.3	0.1	-0.1	0.3	0	1	total	109.2	211			
managers	64	0.1	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.2	0	1						
intelligentsia	30	0.6	1.5	0.3	0.2	1.4	0	6						
technicians	36	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.2	0	1						
workers	43	0.2	0.4	0.1	0.0	0.3	0	1						
Total	212	0.3	0.7	0.0	0.2	0.4	0	8						
Urban-rural														
large city	87	0.5	1.1	0.1	0.2	0.8	0	6	Between Groups	6.8	3	1.9	4.0	0.008
medium-sized city	47	0.1	0.4	0.1	0.0	0.3	0	1	Within Groups	101.0	208	0.6		
small city	57	0.2	0.5	0.1	0.1	0.3	0	2	total	108.7	211			
rural	41	0.1	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.2	0	1						
Total	212	0.3	0.7	0.0	0.2	0.4	0	8						
CPSU Membership														
member	192	0.3	0.7	0.1	0.2	0.4	0	6	Between Groups	0.3	1	0.3	0.6	0.448
non-member	25	0.2	0.6	0.1	0.0	0.4	0	2	Within Groups	108.7	216	0.6		
Total	217	0.3	0.7	0.0	0.2	0.4	0	8	total	110.0	216			
Ethnic (Russian vs Non-Russian)														
Russian	152	0.3	0.8	0.1	0.1	0.4	0	6	Between Groups	0.6	1	0.0	0.0	0.848
other	65	0.3	0.6	0.1	0.1	0.4	0	2	Within Groups	110.0	216	0.6		
Total	217	0.3	0.7	0.0	0.2	0.4	0	8	total	110.0	216			

Appendix 3.1. List of the Votes Analysed (the USSR CPD)

Votes		Pro	Con	Abs	Score (Pro vote)	Re- sult
<u><Federal Issues></u>						
X2	Including the question of the draft law on the Constitutional Supervision of the USSR on the agenda	1601	348	42	-10	A
X7	Law on the Constitutional Supervision must be discussed in the Supreme Soviet first	308	1521	70	+10	R
Z2	Retention of the name of the USSR	1372	188	170	-10	A
Z5	E. G. Kozin's proposal to recognise the declarations of sovereignty and independence adopted by the union republics' parliaments as a result of an expression of the people's will."	419	993	266	+10	R
<u><Presidential Issues></u>						
Y2	V. I. Prokushev's amendment to Art. 127 (1): "The president of the USSR may not be a People's Deputy or member of a leadership body of any political parties or any public organisations."	1303	607	64	+10	R
Y3	Merging the Federal Council and the Presidential Council (Art. 172 (4))	871	930	160	+10	R
Y4	A. A. Zakharenko's amendment to Art. 127 (17): "The CPD appraise the activity of the president annually, proceeding from the criteria of the duration of life and condition of people's welfare, qualitative and quantitative parameters of national poverty, preserving the society for offspring, and contribution in the preservation of peace and world civilisation."	652	1153	117	+10	R
Y5	Adoption of the section III of the Law of Establishing a USSR Presidency	1542	368	76	-10	A
<u><Economic Issues></u>						
X5	Congress agree with the proposed measures in the programme of the USSR government (Ryzhkov's plan)	1532	419	44	-10	A
Z3	G. N. Podberezskii's proposal on the resolution of the CPD on the situation of the country and immediate measures to overcome the crisis to introduce legal measures to guarantee the fulfilment of delivery agreement	384	1120	261	-10	R
Z4	Proposal to declare a moratorium on strikes	716	853	215	-10	R
<u><Other Issues></u>						
X1	Including the question of Art. 6 of the USSR Constitution on the agenda of the Second Congress	868	1194	57	+10	R
Y1	P. A. Akhunov's proposal to Art. 6 to rephrase "the CPSU and other political parties" with "all political parties"	1067	906	39	+10	R
X3	Excluding the article that allows to elect deputies from social organisations	1354	510	42	+10	R
X4	Maintaining the article that allows to elect deputies from social organisations	773	1051	64	-10	R
X6	Adding the following words to the Art. 96 (those who are not allowed to vote): "A person to whom applied forced medical treatment according to the law and also a person who is recognised as incapability by the court"	520	1263	138	-10	R
Z1	Including the question of vote of no confidence in the USSR president on the agenda	423	1292	183	-10	R

X: Votes that put to the vote in the Second Congress of the USSR; Y: in the Third Congress; Z: in the Fourth Congress; A: adopted; R: rejected.

Appendix 3.2. Coding of Variables

Variables	Data	Coding 1 (Anova & T-test)	Coding 2 (Logistic Regression)	CPD
Dependent Variables				
17 votes	N	+10= pro-reform 0= abstention, not vote -10= anti-reform	1= pro-reform vote 0= others	all
22 votes	N	+10= pro-Eltsin 0= abstention, not vote -10= anti-Eltsin	1= pro-reform vote 0= others	all
Independent Variables				
<i>Personal Factors</i>				
Gender	B	1= male 2= female	1= male 0= female	all
Age (Generation)	Num	1= under 45 years 2= over 45 years		all
Ethnic Origin	N	1= Russians 2= others	1= Russians 0= others	all
Education level	O	1= PhD 2= candidate 3= high 4= middle	excluded	USSR CPD
<i>Functional Factors</i>				
CPSU membership	B	1= member 2= non-member	1= member 0= non-member	all
'Class'	N	1= nomenklaturists 2= cadres 3= military 4= managers 5= intelligentsia 6= technicians 7= workers 8= others	1= nomenklaturist + military 2= cadres 3= managers 4= intelligentsia + technicians 5= workers 6= others	all
Political blocs	N	1= CR, 2= DC, 3= CS, 4= RU 5= others	1= CR 2= RU 3= others	RF CPD
<i>Regional Factors</i>				
Urbanisation level	O	1= large cities ($p \geq 50,000$) 2= medium sized cities ($10,000 \leq p < 50,000$) 3= small cities ($p < 10,000$) 4= rural areas	1= rural areas 2= small cities 3= medium-sized cities 4= large cities	all
Federal Status	N	1= autonomous 2= others	1= autonomous 0= others	all
Hanson's (economic structure) ¹⁾	N	1= rural regions 2= resource regions 3= hub/gate regions 4= residual regions	1= rural regions 2= resource regions 3= hub/gate regions 4= residual regions	RF CPD & SIBFE
Living Standards ¹⁾	O	1= highly developed 2= well-developed 3= moderately-developed 4= under-developed (av) 5= poorly developed	1= poorly developed 2= under-developed 3= moderately developed 4= well-developed 5= highly developed	RF CPD & SIBFE

(cont.)

Variables	Data	Coding 1 (Anova & T-test)	Coding 2 (Logistic Regression)	CPD
Living Standards + Federal Status ¹⁾	N	1= highly adapted region	1= highly adapted region	RF
		2= adapted regions	2= adapted regions	CPD
		3= stagnated regions	3= stagnated regions	&
		4= stagnated republics	4= stagnated republics	SIBFE
		5= adapted republics	5= adapted republics	
Union Republic Groups	N	1= Slavic	1= Slavic	USSR
		2= Baltic	2= Baltic	CPD
		3= Caucasus	3= Caucasus	
		4= Central Asian	4= Central Asian	
Regional Associations	N	1= Northwest	1= Northwest	RF
		2= Central	2= Central	CPD
		3= Volga	3= Volga	
		4= Chernozem	4= Chernozem	
		5= North Caucasus	5= North Caucasus	
		6= the Urals	6= the Urals	
		7= Siberia	7= Siberia	
		8= Far East	8= Far East	
		9= others	9= others	
SIBFE vs. Others	N	1= SIBFE	1= SIBFE	USSR
		2= European Russia	0= Others	CPD
Siberian vs. FE	N	1= Siberian	1= Siberian	SIBFE
		2= Far Eastern	0= Far Eastern	only

Original data type: Num (numeric), O (ordinal), B (binary), and N (nominal)

¹⁾ In the analysis of the voting patterns in the CPD of the USSR, these variables are considered only when the voting patterns of SIBFE deputies are discussed.

Appendix 4.1. The Voting Patterns of Deputies in the USSR CPD

	N	Federal System				Presidential Issues				Economic Issues			Other Political Issues					
		X2	X7	Z2	Z5	Y2	Y3	Y4	Y9	X5	Z3	Z4	X1	Y1	X3	X4	X6	Z1
value of pro vote		-	+	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
<Regional Factors>																		
Republic Groups																		
Slavic	1508	-8.0	-6.2	-5.6	-2.9	3.9	-1.3	-3.1	-4.4	-5.1	-4.1	1.4	-1.3	1.7	4.3	1.9	3.8	4.0
Baltic	158	7.1	0.3	-0.8	0.0	2.3	1.8	-0.5	-2.4	4.0	-0.8	0.4	7.2	3.0	4.8	0.8	2.5	2.8
Caucasus	216	-3.2	0.3	-2.0	0.3	-0.1	3.3	0.8	-7.2	-5.8	-2.2	-0.4	0.2	-0.1	3.5	1.7	4.1	1.6
Central Asian	361	-8.4	-8.0	-7.9	-2.0	1.9	1.1	-1.1	-8.4	-8.1	-1.8	-2.2	-7.2	-3.7	1.3	-1.8	1.4	5.8
total	2241	-5.2	-5.4	-5.3	-2.3	3.1	-0.3	-2.2	-5.2	-5.0	-3.3	0.8	-1.8	0.7	3.8	1.2	3.3	3.9
F value		192.3	112.6	70.2	17.9	17.8	25.3	17.0	40.8	99.0	17.3	20.3	103.7	36.9	13.5	17.3	9.5	13.4
p value		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Urban-Rural																		
large cities	928	-3.9	-4.4	-4.3	-2.2	1.8	-0.5	-2.8	-5.4	-4.2	-3.8	1.2	-1.0	0.6	2.5	0.2	3.9	4.7
medium-sized cities	461	-4.6	-5.5	-5.4	-2.2	3.1	-0.8	-2.4	-4.2	-4.1	-3.5	0.7	-1.0	0.8	4.7	2.1	2.5	3.7
small cities	366	-5.7	-5.7	-5.2	-2.0	6.0	0.9	-1.0	-3.8	-4.5	-3.0	1.5	-0.1	2.8	5.3	3.3	3.2	2.8
rural areas	452	-7.8	-7.3	-7.3	-2.8	3.4	-0.5	-1.9	-7.3	-7.7	-2.8	-1.5	-4.2	-0.9	4.0	0.6	2.9	3.3
total	2207	-5.2	-5.4	-5.3	-2.3	3.1	-0.3	-2.2	-5.3	-5.0	-3.3	0.8	-1.5	0.7	3.7	1.2	3.3	3.9
F value		25.3	16.7	21.5	1.1	21.8	2.7	3.9	19.3	24.3	1.3	12.5	16.8	11.5	14.2	12.6	3.4	7.2
p value		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.380	0.000	0.045	0.009	0.000	0.000	0.259	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.016	0.000
<Functional Factor>																		
Class																		
nomenklatura	304	-7.7	-7.1	-7.3	-4.7	-4.3	-3.4	-4.5	-8.4	-7.7	-3.9	-2.5	-7.8	-6.0	0.4	-3.0	2.5	6.9
cadres	159	-5.7	-5.3	-5.9	-3.1	2.8	-1.3	-3.3	-6.7	-6.1	-3.2	2.3	-2.8	-0.3	1.5	0.0	3.7	3.6
military	91	-7.9	-7.9	-7.4	-4.2	0.7	-3.8	-3.7	-4.8	-6.7	-3.2	-0.9	-4.8	-3.1	3.1	-0.4	4.0	6.7
managers	393	-6.0	-6.4	-5.9	-2.4	5.5	-0.3	-2.2	-5.0	-5.8	-4.1	-0.7	-1.2	1.0	5.2	2.0	3.9	2.9
intelligentsia	388	0.7	-1.3	-1.1	0.6	3.2	1.5	-1.6	-3.5	-0.3	-3.6	1.9	3.9	4.0	4.5	2.4	3.9	4.0
technicians	361	-4.4	-5.0	-4.5	-1.5	6.1	1.1	-1.1	-2.7	-3.3	-3.5	2.5	1.2	3.4	5.9	3.7	2.5	2.8
workers	498	-7.2	-6.5	-6.6	-2.5	4.2	0.4	-1.3	-5.9	-6.6	-2.1	1.2	-2.8	1.2	4.1	1.7	3.3	3.1
total	2194	-5.1	-5.4	-5.2	-2.2	3.2	-0.2	-2.2	-5.1	-4.9	-3.3	0.7	-1.4	0.8	3.9	1.3	3.3	3.9
F value		56.1	30.1	42.7	17.7	61.0	13.8	6.7	21.0	40.1	3.2	15.7	60.8	47.5	17.8	19.4	1.8	12.9
p value		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.004	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.096	0.000
CPSU membership																		
member	1990	-5.5	-5.7	-5.6	-2.5	2.8	-0.5	-2.3	-5.5	-5.3	-3.4	0.5	-2.0	0.2	3.8	0.9	3.3	4.1
non-member	251	-2.5	-3.3	-2.8	-0.2	5.1	1.7	-1.3	-2.8	-2.3	-2.2	1.6	2.8	4.8	5.3	3.8	3.8	2.4
T value		-5.7	-5.0	-6.9	-4.7	-3.9	-3.8	-1.8	-5.3	-5.7	-2.5	-2.0	-7.8	-7.4	-3.2	-4.4	-1.0	3.2
p value		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.078	0.000	0.000	0.014	0.051	0.000	0.000	0.002	0.000	0.331	0.002
<Personal Factors>																		
Gender																		
male	1891	-4.9	-5.2	-5.1	-2.2	3.1	-0.3	-2.1	-4.9	-4.5	-3.2	0.8	-1.0	1.0	4.1	1.5	3.4	3.8
female	351	-6.9	-6.4	-6.5	-2.5	2.9	-0.1	-3.2	-6.9	-7.3	-3.6	-0.4	-4.1	-0.7	1.9	-0.1	2.8	4.5
T value		4.5	2.8	3.7	0.5	0.5	-0.4	2.2	4.8	6.1	0.8	2.5	5.7	3.0	4.5	3.1	1.3	-1.6
p value		0.000	0.005	0.000	0.623	0.639	0.656	0.028	0.000	0.000	0.397	0.014	0.000	0.003	0.000	0.002	0.195	0.104
Generation																		
under 45	856	-5.4	-5.1	-4.7	-1.5	5.4	1.1	-1.6	-3.5	-4.0	-3.4	1.9	0.3	2.8	5.5	3.6	3.3	2.6
over 45	1386	-5.1	-5.6	-5.6	-2.8	1.7	-1.2	-2.6	-6.3	-5.8	-3.3	-0.2	-2.6	-0.5	2.7	-0.3	3.3	4.7
T value		-0.8	1.4	3.3	4.0	10.1	6.0	2.6	8.6	4.6	-0.3	5.5	7.1	8.2	8.1	10.3	-0.1	-6.0
p value		0.436	0.161	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.008	0.000	0.000	0.730	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.956	0.000
Education																		
doctoral	196	-1.7	-3.1	-2.8	-0.5	1.8	-0.8	-3.2	-5.8	-2.8	-5.0	2.8	1.5	2.1	3.1	1.3	2.7	5.2
cadidate	197	-3.1	-4.2	-4.2	-2.6	0.7	-0.7	-2.4	-4.3	-3.5	-3.8	0.4	-0.5	-0.2	3.5	0.6	3.7	4.9
high	1275	-5.1	-5.5	-5.2	-2.3	3.2	-0.3	-2.4	-5.0	-4.9	-3.4	0.2	-1.7	0.5	3.8	1.2	3.4	4.0
middle	520	-7.4	-6.5	-6.6	-2.8	4.3	0.1	-1.3	-6.0	-6.5	-2.5	1.0	-2.5	1.3	3.8	1.3	3.3	3.0
total	2188	-5.1	-5.4	-5.3	-2.3	3.1	-0.3	-2.2	-5.2	-5.0	-3.4	0.6	-1.8	0.7	3.7	1.2	3.3	3.9
F value		30.9	13.1	19.5	4.2	9.8	0.7	2.8	3.7	14.4	5.8	5.2	9.7	2.8	0.4	0.4	0.5	5.4
p value		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.008	0.000	0.554	0.038	0.011	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.037	0.735	0.721	0.693	0.001
Ethnic Origin																		
Russian	1019	-5.9	-6.1	-5.8	-3.1	3.8	-1.6	-3.0	-3.9	-4.8	-4.1	2.2	-1.1	1.3	3.9	1.6	3.5	3.6
Others	1223	-4.6	-4.9	-4.9	-1.8	2.5	0.8	-1.6	-6.3	-5.3	-2.8	-0.7	-1.8	0.2	3.7	0.7	3.2	4.1
T value		-3.9	-3.8	-3.2	-4.7	3.5	-6.4	-4.0	7.5	2.3	-4.6	8.3	1.8	2.9	0.7	2.9	1.0	-1.4
p value		0.000	0.000	0.002	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.021	0.000	0.000	0.097	0.004	0.469	0.004	0.335	0.164

Appendix 4.2. The Voting Patterns of RSFSR Deputies (the USSR CPD)

	N	Federal System				Presidential Issues				Economic Issues			Other Political Issues					
		X2	X7	Z2	Z5	Y2	Y3	Y4	Y5	X9	Z3	Z4	X1	Y1	X3	X4	X6	Z1
value of pro vote		+	+	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
<Regional Factors>																		
SIBFE & Other																		
European Russia	679	-5.8	-6.1	-5.8	-2.8	3.8	-2.1	-3.4	-4.5	-5.1	-4.2	2.0	-1.4	1.2	3.9	1.5	3.8	3.8
SIBFE	217	-6.3	-6.2	-5.7	-4.4	5.7	0.7	-2.4	-0.8	-3.5	-4.7	0.5	-0.3	3.4	6.0	3.8	3.6	2.5
T value		0.8	0.2	0.2	2.8	-3.3	-4.2	-1.4	-5.8	-2.8	1.0	2.2	-1.5	-3.0	-3.4	-3.1	0.0	2.1
p value		0.405	0.850	0.853	0.005	0.001	0.000	0.150	0.000	0.010	0.300	0.027	0.138	0.003	0.001	0.002	0.982	0.035
Urban-Rural																		
large cities	456	-4.8	-5.4	-4.7	-3.1	2.1	-2.4	-3.8	-4.5	-4.2	-4.5	2.4	-1.3	0.9	2.8	0.3	4.8	5.4
medium-sized cities	229	-6.1	-6.1	-5.8	-3.2	4.6	-1.7	-3.1	-3.4	-4.8	-4.9	2.1	-1.2	1.4	5.8	3.0	2.8	3.5
small cities	197	-5.8	-6.1	-5.2	-2.8	7.0	1.2	-1.9	-0.8	-3.2	-3.8	2.1	1.8	5.0	6.2	4.5	4.0	1.5
rural areas	192	-6.6	-7.9	-6.5	-4.0	4.6	-2.5	-2.9	-5.8	-7.9	-3.9	-0.9	-3.7	-0.1	4.7	1.4	2.9	1.4
total	1074	-5.9	-6.1	-5.7	-3.2	4.0	-1.8	-3.2	-3.8	-4.8	-4.3	1.7	-1.2	1.6	4.3	1.8	3.8	3.6
F value		11.9	5.5	14.6	1.2	16.5	8.4	2.3	14.2	13.0	1.4	7.2	9.8	11.9	12.9	11.7	4.1	15.8
p value		0.000	0.001	0.000	0.320	0.000	0.000	0.080	0.000	0.000	0.238	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.007	0.000
Federal Status																		
autonomous	304	-6.3	-6.4	-6.7	-4.2	5.3	0.2	-3.8	-4.2	-6.1	-4.0	-0.3	-1.4	1.0	7.0	3.8	4.5	2.0
non-autonomous	789	-5.8	-6.0	-5.2	-2.7	3.5	-2.2	-2.9	-3.5	-4.2	-4.4	2.4	-1.1	1.9	3.3	1.2	3.5	4.2
T value		-1.0	-0.8	-3.3	-3.0	3.1	4.1	-1.6	-1.2	-3.4	0.8	-4.6	-0.8	-1.5	6.9	4.3	1.7	-3.9
p value		0.336	0.428	0.001	0.003	0.002	0.000	0.103	0.248	0.001	0.452	0.000	0.822	0.139	0.000	0.000	0.089	0.000
<Functional Factor>																		
Class																		
nomenklatura	111	-9.0	-8.7	-8.3	-6.3	-6.0	-7.0	-6.3	-6.0	-6.1	-4.5	-1.0	-6.8	-6.9	0.8	-3.4	4.5	7.9
cadres	61	-6.9	-6.0	-6.6	-4.0	3.2	-2.5	-5.2	-5.7	-6.8	-6.0	2.8	-3.8	-0.9	2.0	1.0	3.8	4.1
military	48	-7.1	-6.7	-6.5	-4.4	0.2	-4.8	-6.0	-3.3	-5.4	-3.5	-1.7	-3.8	-2.5	3.8	-1.0	5.4	6.0
managers	227	-7.0	-6.8	-6.2	-3.3	6.7	-1.1	-2.4	-3.5	-5.6	-6.0	0.3	-0.6	1.9	6.3	2.8	3.0	1.8
intelligentsia	186	-0.3	-2.8	-1.0	-0.4	3.2	0.4	-3.1	-3.0	-0.8	-6.0	2.7	2.9	4.8	4.6	2.8	4.5	4.9
technicians	194	-5.8	-5.8	-5.1	-2.3	6.4	0.3	-1.8	-0.7	-3.2	-4.9	3.5	1.5	3.9	6.6	4.2	3.1	2.6
workers	216	-7.3	-7.1	-7.2	-3.4	6.3	-1.3	-2.2	-3.9	-5.5	-2.5	3.0	-1.4	3.2	5.3	2.8	4.1	2.0
total	1063	-5.8	-6.0	-5.6	-3.0	4.1	-1.5	-3.1	-3.6	-4.6	-4.4	1.8	-1.0	1.7	4.6	2.1	3.8	3.5
F value		25.4	10.4	21.4	8.4	43.7	11.4	5.0	9.5	13.8	3.1	6.8	24.3	26.4	9.0	11.2	1.3	10.0
p value		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.005	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.252	0.000
CPSU membership																		
member	979	-6.3	-6.4	-6.0	-3.5	3.8	-1.9	-3.2	-4.0	-5.0	-4.3	1.8	-1.7	1.1	4.1	1.6	3.8	3.7
non-member	115	-2.5	-3.2	-2.1	-0.2	5.9	1.3	-2.5	-1.1	-2.4	-4.4	2.3	3.1	6.1	6.1	4.9	3.7	2.1
T value		-5.2	-4.6	-5.8	-4.5	-2.4	-3.6	-0.9	-3.4	-3.3	0.1	-0.8	-6.2	-6.3	-2.4	-3.2	0.2	1.9
p value		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.015	0.000	0.361	0.001	0.001	0.667	0.406	0.000	0.000	0.017	0.001	0.677	0.059
<Personal Factors>																		
Gender																		
male	944	-5.7	-5.8	-5.3	-3.0	3.9	-1.4	-2.9	-3.3	-4.3	-4.2	1.9	-0.7	2.0	4.6	2.2	3.6	3.4
female	151	-7.6	-7.9	-8.0	-3.9	4.6	-2.6	-4.4	-6.2	-7.5	-4.8	0.3	-4.5	-0.9	2.5	0.2	3.4	4.6
T value		3.0	3.3	4.6	1.3	-0.8	1.5	1.9	3.7	4.5	1.0	2.0	4.6	3.5	3.0	2.5	0.8	-1.6
p value		0.003	0.001	0.000	0.208	0.397	0.137	0.052	0.000	0.000	0.339	0.046	0.000	0.001	0.003	0.014	0.572	0.112
Generation																		
under 45	427	-5.5	-4.9	-4.6	-2.0	6.7	0.4	-2.5	-0.9	-2.9	-4.6	3.1	1.7	4.3	6.7	4.9	3.5	1.5
over 45	668	-6.2	-6.8	-6.3	-3.9	2.3	-2.8	-3.8	-5.5	-5.9	-4.1	0.8	-3.0	-0.1	2.8	0.0	4.0	4.9
T value		1.5	4.3	3.9	3.9	8.3	5.9	2.0	8.9	8.1	-1.0	4.2	8.2	7.7	7.9	8.1	-1.0	-6.5
p value		0.130	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.050	0.000	0.000	0.308	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.326	0.000
Education																		
doctoral	110	-3.3	-4.9	-3.0	-1.5	1.6	-2.7	-4.8	-6.0	-3.3	-6.0	3.8	0.8	2.2	1.8	0.4	3.4	6.2
candidate	85	-4.0	-4.5	-4.5	-3.3	0.6	-0.6	-3.9	-2.9	-3.4	-4.0	2.2	-0.7	0.4	3.3	0.6	3.8	4.9
high	632	-6.9	-6.0	-5.4	-3.1	3.9	-1.4	-3.2	-3.3	-4.7	-4.7	1.0	-1.3	1.2	4.8	2.1	3.9	3.6
middle	241	-6.0	-7.5	-7.7	-3.8	6.2	-1.8	-2.1	-4.2	-6.8	-3.1	2.4	-1.9	2.7	4.9	2.2	3.8	1.9
total	1068	-6.9	-6.1	-5.6	-3.2	4.0	-1.6	-3.2	-3.7	-4.7	-4.4	1.7	-1.2	1.6	4.3	1.8	3.8	3.6
F value		12.6	5.6	13.8	1.9	12.3	1.0	2.5	3.4	3.3	4.6	3.8	1.8	2.0	4.3	1.8	0.2	7.6
p value		0.000	0.001	0.000	0.127	0.000	0.410	0.067	0.017	0.020	0.003	0.011	0.166	0.110	0.005	0.191	0.928	0.000
Ethnic Origin																		
Russian	819	-5.8	-6.0	-5.5	-3.0	3.9	-1.8	-3.1	-3.4	-4.5	-4.6	2.6	-0.8	1.8	4.0	1.7	3.7	3.5
Others	276	-6.4	-6.5	-6.1	-3.6	4.5	-0.9	-3.4	-4.8	-5.6	-3.5	-0.9	-2.5	1.1	5.2	2.4	4.1	3.8
T value		1.1	1.1	1.1	1.3	-1.0	-1.3	0.5	2.0	2.0	-2.1	5.7	2.5	1.1	-2.1	-1.0	-0.8	-0.5
p value		0.263	0.263	0.255	0.205	0.310	0.192	0.618	0.047	0.042	0.034	0.000	0.011	0.256	0.036	0.316	0.410	0.625

Appendix 4.3. The Voting Patterns of SIBFE Deputies (the USSR CPD)

	N	Federal System				Presidential Issues				Economic Issues			Other Political Issues					
		X2	X7	Z2	Z5	Y2	Y3	Y4	Y8	X5	Z3	Z4	X1	Y1	X3	X4	X6	Z1
value of pro vote		-	+	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	+	-	+	+	-	-	-	-
<Regional Factors>																		
Siberia & Far East																		
Siberian	158	-6.3	-6.4	-5.8	-4.8	5.1	-0.7	-2.5	-1.3	-3.5	-5.4	0.5	-0.8	2.3	5.7	3.9	4.3	2.4
Far Eastern	59	-6.4	-5.6	-6.1	-3.9	7.3	4.6	-2.2	0.3	-3.2	-3.1	0.6	0.3	6.1	6.8	2.7	2.4	2.5
T value		0.2	-0.7	0.5	-0.8	-1.8	-3.8	-0.2	-1.1	-0.2	-2.0	0.0	-0.8	-2.7	-1.0	0.9	1.5	-0.1
p value		0.876	0.467	0.814	0.523	0.089	0.000	0.851	0.264	0.813	0.044	0.998	0.542	0.007	0.330	0.354	0.143	0.938
Economic Structure																		
rural regions	31	-10.0	-9.7	-9.0	-9.0	0.0	1.3	-5.8	-4.2	-7.4	-5.2	-3.8	-2.8	-1.3	4.8	-1.0	6.1	1.8
resource regions	72	-4.7	-4.7	-2.8	-1.4	6.9	2.2	-1.9	0.1	-0.7	-5.1	1.7	1.0	4.6	6.8	4.2	5.0	3.4
hub/gate regions	34	-9.1	-8.2	-7.8	-5.3	6.8	-0.6	-3.2	1.8	-5.6	-3.8	1.8	-1.8	5.3	5.6	3.8	1.2	3.2
residual regions	80	-5.1	-5.3	-6.2	-4.9	6.4	-0.3	-1.1	-1.5	-3.5	-4.7	0.5	0.0	3.3	5.9	4.8	2.9	1.8
total	217	-6.3	-6.2	-5.7	-4.4	5.7	0.7	-2.4	-0.8	-3.5	-4.7	0.5	-0.3	3.4	6.0	3.8	3.8	2.5
F value		5.5	5.1	5.7	9.4	7.1	1.2	2.1	2.6	5.2	0.2	2.6	1.3	3.8	0.6	3.7	2.6	0.7
p value		0.000	0.002	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.327	0.101	0.050	0.002	0.866	0.052	0.261	0.012	0.816	0.013	0.051	0.580
Living Conditions																		
highly developed	12	-2.5	-4.2	0.8	0.5	10.0	7.5	4.2	6.7	9.2	0.0	4.2	8.3	10.0	8.3	8.3	9.2	2.5
well developed	68	-6.0	-4.7	-4.2	-1.5	7.1	-0.4	-2.2	-0.3	-3.1	-6.7	1.8	-0.3	3.2	6.3	4.1	3.4	2.8
under-developed	61	-6.1	-5.2	-6.6	-4.8	6.7	0.0	-2.3	1.3	-4.4	-3.6	1.8	-1.0	4.4	6.4	5.1	3.0	3.4
poorly developed	59	-6.8	-8.0	-8.8	-8.8	1.5	1.0	-6.4	-4.9	-6.8	-5.3	-3.4	-3.1	-0.5	4.1	-0.3	5.6	0.3
total	200	-6.7	-6.4	-6.0	-4.4	5.5	0.6	-3.1	-0.8	-3.9	-4.9	0.4	-0.8	2.9	5.6	3.4	4.3	2.3
F value		3.6	4.6	10.0	14.3	8.3	2.6	6.1	7.9	13.5	3.8	5.2	4.9	5.9	1.8	6.3	2.6	1.3
p value		0.014	0.004	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.054	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.011	0.002	0.003	0.001	0.152	0.000	0.052	0.270
Living conditions & Federal status																		
adapted regions	64	-6.3	-4.8	-3.3	-1.1	7.7	-0.9	-0.8	0.8	-0.9	-5.4	2.9	0.9	4.2	6.1	5.3	3.9	3.3
stagnated regions	107	-7.0	-7.0	-7.3	-5.9	5.1	-0.7	-3.5	-1.5	-6.0	-4.7	-0.1	-1.7	3.1	5.0	2.8	3.6	2.4
stagnated republics	17	-10.0	-10.0	-8.8	-9.4	-1.8	7.1	-7.1	-2.9	-7.6	-2.4	-3.5	-2.9	-3.5	7.1	0.6	5.9	0.0
adopted republics	16	-2.5	-3.8	-3.8	-1.3	6.9	7.5	-3.1	0.8	-2.5	-6.9	-0.8	1.3	4.4	5.5	2.5	5.6	0.6
total	204	-6.7	-6.3	-5.9	-4.4	5.5	0.5	-2.9	-0.7	-3.7	-4.9	0.5	-0.7	3.0	5.8	3.3	4.1	2.3
F value		3.4	3.6	6.3	10.8	7.1	7.3	2.5	1.2	4.2	1.1	2.7	1.5	3.4	1.4	2.0	0.5	0.6
p value		0.019	0.014	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.058	0.316	0.007	0.332	0.046	0.217	0.019	0.239	0.116	0.664	0.476
Urban-Rural																		
large cities	67	-6.6	-5.8	-5.9	-3.9	4.6	-2.4	-2.8	-0.7	-3.4	-7.0	0.5	-1.0	1.8	4.5	3.4	3.1	4.5
medium-sized cities	47	-6.0	-5.1	-4.7	-3.4	5.3	1.7	-1.3	-0.2	-1.5	-4.5	0.9	0.4	3.6	6.4	3.4	3.6	2.8
small cities	57	-4.6	-7.0	-4.9	-4.2	7.5	3.3	-1.8	-0.5	-2.1	-3.0	2.3	1.9	5.6	6.8	4.9	4.6	1.4
rural areas	41	-8.3	-8.8	-8.0	-7.0	5.4	1.0	-3.7	-2.0	-6.8	-3.5	-1.8	-2.4	1.7	6.8	2.2	3.7	0.6
total	212	-6.2	-6.2	-5.8	-4.5	5.7	0.7	-2.4	-0.8	-3.3	-4.7	0.6	-0.2	3.2	6.0	3.6	3.7	2.5
F value		2.1	0.8	2.2	2.1	1.8	4.3	0.6	0.3	3.2	3.3	1.5	1.9	2.3	1.5	0.8	0.3	2.2
p value		0.098	0.515	0.087	0.102	0.199	0.006	0.601	0.839	0.025	0.020	0.215	0.132	0.082	0.223	0.480	0.838	0.089
Federal Status																		
autonomous	67	-5.2	-7.0	-6.1	-6.3	4.5	4.2	-4.3	-1.8	-4.0	-3.7	-2.1	0.0	2.4	7.5	3.7	4.6	0.7
non-autonomous	150	-6.8	-5.8	-5.5	-3.6	6.3	-0.8	-1.5	-0.4	-3.2	-6.2	1.7	-0.5	3.8	5.3	3.5	3.4	3.2
T value		1.5	-1.2	-0.6	-2.5	-1.6	3.7	-2.1	-1.0	-0.6	1.3	-2.8	0.3	-1.1	2.0	0.2	1.0	-1.9
p value		0.145	0.250	0.564	0.012	0.115	0.000	0.039	0.315	0.529	0.189	0.005	0.745	0.294	0.046	0.875	0.335	0.055
<Functional Factor>																		
Class																		
nomenklatura	15	-10.0	-9.3	-10.0	-8.7	-6.7	-2.0	-6.7	-4.7	-6.7	-6.7	-4.7	-6.7	-6.0	4.7	-0.7	7.3	9.3
cadres	23	-6.1	-3.9	-6.1	-3.5	5.7	0.9	-0.9	-2.2	-4.3	-4.3	0.0	-3.5	1.3	4.8	3.6	4.3	-2.2
military	11	-8.2	-7.3	-7.3	-5.5	0.0	-3.6	-5.5	-4.5	-10.0	-6.4	-6.4	-4.5	-1.8	2.7	1.8	8.2	4.5
managers	54	-7.8	-6.9	-7.0	-5.4	7.2	0.9	-2.8	-1.3	-4.8	-6.4	-0.2	0.4	3.5	6.9	3.1	3.3	1.3
intelligentsia	30	-2.3	-4.0	-0.7	-1.4	6.3	0.7	1.0	1.0	1.0	-6.6	2.8	4.3	6.0	6.0	4.0	2.3	5.2
technicians	36	-6.9	-5.3	-5.3	-3.6	6.9	2.5	0.0	3.1	-1.9	-5.6	4.7	3.1	6.1	7.6	6.0	1.1	0.6
workers	43	-4.7	-7.0	-5.2	-4.0	8.1	1.9	-4.4	-0.7	-1.9	-1.4	1.0	-0.5	5.3	7.2	6.6	5.3	2.8
total	212	-6.2	-6.1	-5.6	-4.3	5.7	0.9	-2.3	-0.6	-3.3	-4.8	0.7	-0.1	3.6	6.4	3.6	3.9	2.4
F value		3.1	1.8	4.5	2.0	10.9	0.9	2.4	2.1	3.9	2.1	3.6	5.0	5.3	1.3	1.3	2.0	3.7
p value		0.006	0.141	0.000	0.062	0.000	0.481	0.031	0.059	0.001	0.061	0.002	0.000	0.000	0.266	0.253	0.074	0.002
CPSU membership																		
member	192	-6.6	-6.5	-6.1	-4.6	5.6	0.3	-2.2	-1.2	-3.5	-4.6	0.4	-0.6	2.9	5.6	3.3	3.6	2.5
non-member	25	-4.4	-4.0	-2.9	-2.9	6.8	4.4	-4.0	2.0	-3.2	-4.6	1.7	1.6	7.2	6.8	6.0	5.2	2.1
T value		-1.4	-1.6	-2.2	-1.1	-0.7	-2.1	0.9	-1.6	-0.2	-0.1	-0.6	-1.0	-2.3	-2.1	-1.5	-0.8	0.2
p value		0.167	0.107	0.031	0.288	0.460	0.036	0.356	0.109	0.979	0.913	0.519	0.295	0.025	0.040	0.135	0.383	0.823
<Personal Factors>																		
Gender																		
male	185	-5.9	-5.9	-5.4	-4.2	5.6	0.9	-2.3	-0.5	-2.9	-4.4	0.6	0.3	3.4	6.2	3.8	3.6	2.2
female	32	-8.4	-7.5	-7.7	-6.7	6.6	-0.3	-3.1	-2.5	-6.9	-7.0	0.7	-4.1	3.1	4.7	2.2	3.6	4.3
T value		1.8	1.1	1.7	1.0	-0.7	0.7	0.5	1.1	2.4	1.5	-0.1	2.4	0.2	1.1	1.0	0.0	-1.2
p value		0.076	0.259	0.091	0.316	0.506	0.495	0.629	0.277	0.016	0.060	0.922	0.016	0.873	0.273	0.315	0.964	0.214
Generation																		
under 45	103	-5.4	-4.9	-4.2	-3.9	7.2	2.8	-2.4	2.0	-1.7	-4.4	2.5	2.2	5.4	7.5	5.9	4.0	2.0
over 45	114	-7.1	-7.4	-7.1	-4.9	4.4	-0.9	-2.4	-3.4	-5.0	-5.1	-1.2	-2.8	1.5	4.8	1.5	3.6	2.9
T value		1.7	2.6	3.2	1.0	2.7	2.7	0.0	4.5	2.7	0.7	3.0	3.8	3.2	2.9	3.9	0.3	-0.8
p value		0.095	0.010	0.001	0.295	0.008	0.007	0.963	0.000	0.007	0.483	0.003	0.000	0.001	0.004	0.000	0.744	0.451
Education																		
doctoral	6	-6.3	-6.3	-6.3	-2.8	-1.3	-6.6	-7.5	-5.0	-2.6	-5.8	0.0	-1.3	0.0	2.6	0.0	-1.3	3.8
candidate	13	-2.3	-0.8	-2.3	-2.3	5.4	2.3	-1.5	2.3	1.8	-5.4	2.3	2.3	2.3	3.1	1.8	4.6	3.8
high	142	-6.9	-6.5	-5.7	-4.5	5.5	1.3	-2.3	-0.8	-4.1	-5.3	0.0	-0.1	3.2	6.0	3.6	3.8	2.3
middle	45	-5.6	-6.4	-6.6	-6.7	7.8	0.7	-2.2	-1.6	-2.9	-2.5	1.6	-1.8	4.4	7.1	4.9	4.9	1.8
total	206	-6.3	-6.2	-5.7	-4.6	5.7	0.8	-2.4	-0.8	-3.4	-4.9	0.5	-0.3	3.3	5.9	3.6	3.9	2.4
F value		1.8	2.7	1.3	1.0	3.1	3.1	0.9	1.1	1.7	2.4	0.6	0.6	0.6	1.7	1.1	1.2	0.2
p value		0.156																

Appendix 4.4. The Voting Patterns of Siberian Deputies (the USSR CPD)

	N	Federal System				Presidential issues				Economic issues			Other Political issues					
		X2	X7	Z2	Z5	Y2	Y3	Y4	Y5	X9	Z3	Z4	X1	Y1	X3	X4	X6	Z1
value of pro vote		-	+	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
<Regional Factors>																		
Economic Structure																		
rural regions	31	-10.0	-9.7	-9.0	-9.0	0.0	1.3	-5.8	-4.2	-7.4	-8.2	-3.5	-2.9	-1.3	4.8	-1.0	0.1	1.8
resource regions	49	-4.9	-4.9	-2.1	-1.0	6.9	1.2	-1.8	0.2	-0.8	-4.4	1.9	1.0	4.8	6.3	6.1	6.3	3.8
hub/gate regions	15	-8.0	-7.3	-8.0	-4.7	4.0	-7.3	-1.3	-0.7	-5.3	-8.0	3.3	-2.7	0.7	3.3	2.7	1.3	7.3
residual regions	63	-5.1	-5.7	-8.5	-5.2	6.5	-1.8	-1.8	-1.1	-3.3	-8.8	0.8	-0.2	2.9	6.2	6.7	3.3	0.8
total	158	-6.3	-6.4	-5.8	-4.8	5.1	-0.7	-2.5	-1.3	-3.5	-5.4	0.5	-0.6	2.3	5.7	3.9	4.3	2.4
F value		4.4	3.5	7.9	8.9	8.1	4.1	1.7	1.5	3.9	1.0	3.0	1.3	2.7	0.9	5.1	1.8	2.9
p value		0.005	0.017	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.008	0.165	0.230	0.010	0.392	0.034	0.267	0.050	0.457	0.002	0.181	0.035
Living Conditions																		
highly developed	12	-2.5	-4.2	0.8	0.8	10.0	7.5	4.2	6.7	9.2	0.0	4.2	6.3	10.0	6.3	6.3	9.2	2.8
well developed	49	-8.9	-4.7	-4.0	-1.0	6.9	-2.9	-1.4	-0.4	-3.7	-8.5	2.3	-0.6	2.9	5.7	4.7	2.2	3.1
under-developed	38	-4.7	-6.1	-6.3	-5.3	5.3	-2.9	-1.8	-0.3	-4.2	-6.3	1.6	-1.8	2.1	6.1	5.3	5.3	4.8
poorly developed	53	-8.7	-9.1	-8.7	-8.5	1.7	0.8	-6.0	-4.3	-6.6	-4.8	-3.1	-2.3	-0.6	4.5	0.8	6.1	0.2
total	152	-6.6	-6.5	-5.8	-4.5	4.9	-0.8	-2.7	-1.2	-3.8	-5.3	0.4	-0.8	2.0	5.6	3.8	4.5	2.4
F value		4.1	4.3	8.9	13.4	5.6	5.5	5.5	5.4	12.9	2.9	4.2	4.4	4.8	1.0	4.1	2.8	1.9
p value		0.008	0.006	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.035	0.007	0.005	0.004	0.415	0.008	0.044	0.137
Living conditions & Federal status																		
adapted regions	61	-6.1	-4.6	-3.0	-0.7	7.5	-0.8	-0.3	1.0	-1.1	-5.2	2.7	1.1	4.3	6.2	5.4	3.6	3.0
stagnated regions	74	-6.4	-7.3	-7.4	-6.8	4.3	-2.6	-3.8	-2.6	-5.1	-6.2	-0.5	-1.9	1.5	4.7	3.1	5.0	2.8
stagnated republics	17	-10.0	-10.0	-8.8	-9.4	-1.8	7.1	-7.1	-2.9	-7.6	-2.4	-3.5	-2.9	-3.5	7.1	0.8	5.9	0.0
total	152	-6.6	-6.5	-5.8	-4.5	4.9	-0.8	-2.7	-1.2	-3.8	-5.3	0.4	-0.8	2.0	5.6	3.8	4.5	2.4
F value		2.3	5.3	9.3	18.1	9.8	7.9	4.6	2.8	5.5	1.9	3.9	2.2	4.9	1.1	2.8	0.7	0.7
p value		0.107	0.006	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.011	0.066	0.005	0.149	0.023	0.119	0.008	0.351	0.082	0.468	0.476
Urban-Rural																		
large cities	57	-6.0	-5.3	-5.4	-3.8	3.9	-3.7	-2.6	-1.4	-3.3	-7.3	0.5	-1.8	1.2	4.4	3.3	4.0	5.2
medium-sized cities	29	-6.6	-6.6	-5.2	-3.8	4.8	1.4	-2.1	0.0	-1.4	-4.5	-0.3	1.0	3.8	6.6	4.8	4.5	1.4
small cities	38	-4.5	-7.4	-5.0	-4.7	7.4	2.4	-1.8	-0.8	-2.1	-3.7	2.4	1.8	4.8	6.8	6.3	5.3	0.8
rural areas	32	-8.4	-7.2	-7.7	-7.4	4.7	-0.3	-3.8	-2.2	-7.2	-4.8	-1.3	-2.8	0.0	5.9	2.2	3.8	0.3
total	156	-6.2	-6.4	-5.7	-4.7	5.1	-0.8	-2.5	-1.2	-3.5	-5.4	0.5	-0.8	2.2	5.6	3.8	4.4	2.4
F value		1.8	0.9	1.2	2.0	1.4	4.0	0.3	0.3	2.8	2.3	1.0	1.7	1.8	0.9	0.9	0.2	3.1
p value		0.154	0.452	0.327	0.122	0.233	0.009	0.793	0.822	0.043	0.080	0.402	0.169	0.149	0.434	0.419	0.874	0.030
Federal Status																		
autonomous	44	-6.4	-6.6	-7.0	-6.4	3.0	2.7	-6.6	-2.7	-5.0	-3.4	-2.7	-1.6	0.7	6.6	3.4	5.0	0.0
non-autonomous	114	-6.2	-5.5	-5.0	-3.1	6.0	-2.0	-0.9	-0.7	-3.0	-6.2	1.8	-0.2	3.0	5.3	4.1	4.0	3.4
T value		-0.1	-2.6	-1.7	-4.3	-2.1	2.9	-3.6	-1.2	-1.3	2.2	-2.8	-0.8	-1.4	1.2	-0.5	0.6	-2.2
p value		0.917	0.012	0.097	0.000	0.038	0.004	0.000	0.224	0.202	0.032	0.006	0.411	0.171	0.234	0.638	0.519	0.030
<Functional Factor>																		
Class																		
nomenklatura	12	-10.0	-10.0	-10.0	-8.3	-6.7	-4.2	-6.7	-4.2	-8.3	-5.8	-3.3	-6.3	-5.6	3.3	-0.8	6.3	9.2
cadres	15	-6.7	-4.0	-6.0	-2.7	4.7	0.7	-1.3	-1.3	-3.3	-6.7	-2.0	-2.7	3.3	6.7	5.3	4.0	-4.7
military	7	-10.0	-10.0	-7.1	-5.7	-1.4	-10.0	-5.7	-6.6	-10.0	-4.3	-7.1	-4.3	-7.1	4.3	4.3	7.1	7.1
managers	40	-7.0	-6.3	-7.0	-6.0	6.8	0.0	-2.3	-1.0	-4.0	-7.0	0.3	1.0	2.3	5.8	2.5	3.8	0.8
intelligentsia	23	-3.5	-4.8	-0.9	-1.4	5.2	-1.3	0.0	-0.9	0.0	-6.4	1.8	2.6	4.8	5.2	4.3	3.0	6.9
technicians	24	-6.7	-5.0	-5.0	-3.8	6.3	0.8	-0.4	2.5	-3.8	-6.7	4.6	1.7	4.6	7.1	4.2	1.7	0.8
workers	34	-4.4	-7.4	-4.8	-4.5	8.2	0.8	-4.1	-1.2	-2.1	-1.8	1.5	-0.9	4.7	7.1	6.8	6.2	2.7
total	155	-6.2	-6.3	-5.5	-4.5	5.2	-0.6	-2.5	-1.1	-3.9	-5.5	0.6	-0.4	2.8	6.0	4.1	4.4	2.4
F value		1.9	1.8	3.1	1.8	7.7	1.8	1.3	1.8	2.0	2.1	2.4	2.5	4.0	0.8	1.8	1.4	4.6
p value		0.086	0.143	0.007	0.108	0.000	0.104	0.274	0.154	0.064	0.057	0.031	0.023	0.001	0.696	0.155	0.213	0.000
CPSU membership																		
member	137	-6.4	-6.6	-6.0	-4.8	5.0	-1.3	-2.0	-1.7	-3.5	-6.6	0.4	-0.8	1.7	5.3	3.4	4.2	2.3
non-member	21	-5.2	-4.8	-3.0	-3.5	6.2	3.3	-5.2	1.4	-3.8	-4.0	1.0	1.0	6.7	6.6	7.6	5.2	3.5
T value		-0.7	-1.2	-1.8	-0.7	-0.6	-2.1	1.5	-1.4	0.1	-0.9	-0.3	-0.8	-2.3	-1.9	-2.2	-0.5	-0.8
p value		0.488	0.251	0.075	0.467	0.525	0.034	0.140	0.157	0.664	0.360	0.601	0.440	0.024	0.054	0.032	0.585	0.565
<Personal Factors>																		
Gender																		
male	134	-6.0	-6.1	-5.2	-4.5	4.7	-0.7	-2.2	-1.1	-2.7	-6.0	0.4	0.1	2.3	6.0	4.1	4.3	2.2
female	24	-7.9	-7.9	-7.7	-5.5	7.5	-0.4	-3.8	-2.1	-6.3	-7.7	0.9	-4.8	2.5	4.2	2.9	4.2	4.1
T value		1.2	1.2	1.8	0.6	-1.5	-0.2	0.7	0.5	2.9	1.7	-0.2	2.2	-0.1	1.1	0.8	0.1	-0.9
p value		0.228	0.246	0.117	0.563	0.124	0.875	0.461	0.644	0.004	0.101	0.829	0.027	0.929	0.289	0.531	0.931	0.344
Generation																		
under 45	75	-6.0	-5.6	-4.0	-4.5	6.8	1.1	-2.6	1.3	-2.0	-4.9	2.6	1.3	4.3	7.6	6.5	4.7	1.8
over 45	83	-6.5	-7.1	-7.0	-4.7	3.6	-2.3	-2.2	-3.6	-4.9	-5.6	-1.3	-2.3	0.8	4.0	1.8	4.0	3.1
T value		0.4	1.4	2.8	0.2	2.5	2.3	-0.4	3.4	2.1	0.7	2.7	2.4	2.5	3.2	3.8	0.5	-1.1
p value		0.664	0.176	0.006	0.880	0.014	0.024	0.869	0.001	0.036	0.464	0.007	0.018	0.018	0.002	0.000	0.607	0.295
Education																		
doctoral	6	-6.3	-6.3	-6.3	-2.5	-1.3	-6.8	-7.8	-5.0	-2.5	-6.8	0.0	-1.3	0.0	2.6	0.0	-1.3	3.8
candidate	11	-0.9	0.0	-1.8	-1.8	6.4	0.9	-1.8	2.7	1.8	-5.5	3.6	2.7	2.7	2.7	1.8	4.5	4.8
high	101	-7.2	-7.1	-6.8	-5.0	4.4	0.0	-2.2	-1.3	-4.5	-5.9	-0.8	-0.6	1.9	5.6	3.8	4.4	2.1
middle	34	-5.0	-6.2	-6.1	-4.6	6.2	-0.8	-2.4	-1.5	-2.6	-3.3	3.0	-0.9	4.1	7.6	6.5	5.0	2.1
total	154	-6.2	-6.4	-5.6	-4.6	5.1	-0.5	-2.5	-1.2	-3.5	-5.5	0.5	-0.5	2.3	6.7	4.0	4.2	2.4
F value		3.0	3.6	1.2	0.8	3.8	2.3	0.8	1.1	1.9	1.7	1.8	0.4	0.6	2.0	1.9	1.2	0.3
p value		0.033	0.015	0.319	0.469	0.012	0.082	0.473	0.304	0.137	0.175	0.155	0.724	0.590	0.122	0.137	0.301	0.608
Ethnic Origin																		
Russian	119	-6.5	-6.0	-5.6	-3.8	6.8	-1.4	-2.1	-1.1	-3.5	-6.9	1.1	-0.3	2.6	6.6	3.7	4.3	2.7
Others	39	-5.6	-7.7	-5.6	-6.9	3.1	1.5	-3.6	-1.8	-3.6	-3.8	-1.3	-1.5	1.5	6.4	4.8	4.4	1.5
T value		-0.6	1.9	0.1	2.3	1.8	-1.7	0.9	0.4	0.0	-1.5	1.4	0.7	0.8	-0.7	-0.6	0.0	0.7
p value		0.538	0.181	0.947	0.022	0.072	0.067	0.363	0.665	0.871	0.125	0.161	0.472	0.543	0.460	0.690	0.962	0.465

Appendix 4.5. The Voting Patterns of Far Eastern Deputies (the USSR CPD)

	N	Federal System				Presidential Issue				Economic Issues			Other Political Issues					
		X2	X7	Z2	Z5	Y2	Y3	Y4	Y5	X9	Z3	Z4	X1	Y1	X3	X4	X6	Z1
value of pro vote		-	+	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	-	-	-
<Regional Factors>																		
Economic Structure*																		
resource regions	23	-4.3	-4.3	-4.3	-2.2	7.0	4.3	-2.2	0.0	-0.4	-8.5	1.3	0.9	4.8	7.8	2.2	4.3	2.8
hub/gate regions	19	-10.0	-8.9	-8.9	-5.8	8.9	4.7	-4.7	3.7	-5.8	-0.5	0.5	-0.8	8.9	7.4	4.7	1.1	0.0
residual regions	17	-5.3	-3.5	-5.3	-4.1	5.9	4.7	0.6	-2.9	-4.1	-1.2	-0.8	0.8	4.7	4.7	1.2	1.2	5.3
total	59	-6.4	-5.6	-6.1	-3.9	7.3	4.6	-2.2	0.3	-3.2	-3.1	0.5	0.3	6.1	6.8	2.7	2.4	2.8
F value		3.4	2.9	3.0	1.3	1.1	0.0	1.5	2.3	1.9	3.6	0.2	0.1	2.0	1.1	0.8	0.9	1.8
p value		0.040	0.085	0.058	0.294	0.344	0.986	0.233	0.107	0.162	0.035	0.830	0.900	0.145	0.355	0.444	0.423	0.216
Living Conditions (I)																		
well developed	19	-3.7	-4.7	-4.7	-2.6	7.4	5.8	-4.2	0.0	-1.8	-7.4	0.5	0.5	4.2	7.9	2.8	6.3	2.1
moderately developed	4	-7.5	-2.5	-2.5	0.0	5.0	-2.5	7.5	0.0	5.0	-2.5	5.0	2.5	7.5	7.5	0.0	-5.0	5.0
under-developed	23	-8.3	-6.5	-7.0	-3.9	9.1	4.8	-3.0	3.9	-4.8	0.9	2.2	0.4	8.3	7.0	4.8	-0.9	1.7
poorly developed	6	-10.0	-8.3	-10.0	-10.0	0.0	3.3	-10.0	-10.0	-10.0	-10.0	-6.7	-10.0	0.0	0.0	-10.0	10.0	1.7
total	52	-6.7	-5.8	-6.2	-3.8	7.1	4.4	-3.5	0.8	-3.5	-3.7	0.8	-0.8	5.8	6.5	1.9	2.7	2.1
F value		1.9	0.7	1.5	2.2	3.8	1.1	3.5	3.8	3.0	7.0	1.7	2.2	2.2	1.9	5.8	5.6	0.1
p value		0.136	0.574	0.216	0.103	0.020	0.358	0.022	0.016	0.042	0.001	0.170	0.099	0.096	0.137	0.002	0.002	0.934
Living Conditions (II)																		
well developed	19	-3.7	-4.7	-4.7	-2.6	7.4	5.8	-4.2	0.0	-1.8	-7.4	0.5	0.5	4.2	7.9	2.8	6.3	2.1
under-developed	23	-8.3	-6.5	-7.0	-3.9	9.1	4.8	-3.0	3.9	-4.8	0.9	2.2	0.4	8.3	7.0	4.8	-0.9	1.7
poorly developed	6	-10.0	-8.3	-10.0	-10.0	0.0	3.3	-10.0	-10.0	-10.0	-10.0	-6.7	-10.0	0.0	0.0	-10.0	10.0	1.7
total	48	-6.7	-6.0	-6.5	-4.2	7.3	5.0	-4.4	0.8	-4.2	-3.8	0.4	-0.8	5.6	6.6	2.1	3.3	1.9
F value		2.8	0.6	1.6	2.4	5.1	0.2	1.6	5.8	2.2	10.2	2.1	3.1	3.1	2.8	8.8	6.3	0.0
p value		0.072	0.538	0.218	0.099	0.010	0.811	0.223	0.007	0.119	0.000	0.136	0.055	0.054	0.074	0.001	0.004	0.991
Living Conditions (III)**																		
well developed	19	-3.7	-4.7	-4.7	-2.6	7.4	5.8	-4.2	0.0	-1.8	-7.4	0.5	0.5	4.2	7.9	2.8	6.3	2.1
under-developed	23	-8.3	-6.5	-7.0	-3.9	9.1	4.8	-3.0	3.9	-4.8	0.9	2.2	0.4	8.3	7.0	4.8	-0.9	1.7
T value		1.9	0.7	1.0	0.5	-1.1	0.4	-0.4	-1.3	1.1	-3.6	-0.6	0.0	-1.8	0.6	-0.8	2.7	0.1
p value		0.062	0.481	0.313	0.590	0.296	0.691	0.683	0.200	0.271	0.001	0.563	0.977	0.065	0.655	0.407	0.011	0.902
Living conditions & Federal status																		
adapted regions	3	-10.0	-10.0	-10.0	-10.0	10.0	-3.3	-10.0	-3.3	3.3	-10.0	8.7	-3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	10.0	10.0
stagnated regions	33	-8.5	-6.4	-7.0	-4.5	7.0	3.6	-3.0	0.9	-4.5	-1.5	0.9	-1.2	6.7	6.8	1.5	0.6	2.1
adapted republics	16	-2.5	-3.8	-3.8	-1.3	6.9	7.5	-3.1	0.6	-2.5	-6.9	-0.6	1.3	4.4	6.8	2.5	5.6	0.6
total	52	-6.7	-5.8	-6.2	-3.8	7.1	4.4	-3.5	0.9	-3.5	-3.7	0.8	-0.8	5.8	6.6	1.9	2.7	2.1
F value		4.4	1.2	1.9	2.4	0.3	2.6	0.8	0.3	1.2	3.9	0.8	0.4	0.8	1.2	0.1	2.9	1.3
p value		0.017	0.319	0.164	0.098	0.749	0.085	0.444	0.779	0.316	0.027	0.477	0.647	0.564	0.311	0.902	0.067	0.270
Urban-Rural																		
large cities	10	-10.0	-9.0	-9.0	-5.0	9.0	5.0	-4.0	3.0	-4.0	-5.0	0.0	2.0	5.0	5.0	4.0	-2.0	1.0
medium-sized cities	18	-5.0	-2.8	-3.9	-2.5	6.1	2.2	0.0	-0.8	-1.7	-4.4	2.8	-0.8	3.3	6.1	1.1	2.2	5.0
small cities	19	-4.7	-6.3	-4.7	-3.2	7.9	5.3	-2.1	0.0	-2.1	-1.8	2.1	2.8	7.9	7.4	4.2	3.2	2.6
rural areas	9	-7.8	-5.6	-5.9	-5.6	7.8	5.6	-3.3	-1.1	-5.6	1.1	-3.3	-1.1	7.8	10.0	2.2	3.3	1.1
total	56	-6.3	-5.5	-5.9	-3.8	7.5	4.3	-2.0	0.2	-2.9	-2.7	1.1	0.9	5.9	7.0	2.9	2.0	2.9
F value		1.3	1.5	2.3	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.4	1.3	1.0	0.8	1.3	1.0	0.5	0.6	0.6
p value		0.280	0.227	0.089	0.760	0.663	0.674	0.707	0.768	0.732	0.301	0.419	0.705	0.264	0.411	0.714	0.609	0.617
Federal Status																		
autonomous	23	-3.0	-3.9	-4.3	-2.2	7.4	7.0	0.0	0.0	-2.2	-4.3	-0.9	3.0	5.7	6.7	4.3	3.9	2.2
non-autonomous	36	-8.8	-6.7	-7.2	-5.0	7.2	3.1	-3.8	0.6	-3.9	-2.2	1.4	-1.4	6.4	5.6	1.7	1.4	2.8
T value		2.9	1.3	1.7	1.4	0.1	1.8	1.5	-0.2	0.7	-1.0	-0.9	1.7	-0.4	1.7	1.2	1.0	-0.2
p value		0.005	0.184	0.095	0.158	0.922	0.061	0.147	0.628	0.489	0.345	0.380	0.097	0.722	0.099	0.250	0.306	0.904
<Functional Factor>																		
Class																		
nomenklatura	3	-10.0	-8.7	-10.0	-10.0	-6.7	6.7	-6.7	-6.7	-10.0	-10.0	-10.0	-10.0	-6.7	10.0	0.0	3.3	10.0
cadres	8	-5.0	-3.8	-6.3	-5.0	7.5	1.3	0.0	-3.8	-6.3	0.0	3.8	-5.0	-2.5	1.3	1.3	5.0	2.5
military	4	-5.0	-2.5	-7.5	-5.0	2.5	7.5	-5.0	2.5	-10.0	-10.0	-5.0	-5.0	7.5	0.0	-2.5	10.0	0.0
managers	14	-10.0	-6.6	-7.1	-3.6	6.6	3.6	-4.3	-2.1	-6.4	-0.7	-1.4	-1.4	7.1	10.0	5.0	2.1	2.9
intelligentsia	7	1.4	-1.4	0.0	-1.4	10.0	7.1	4.3	7.1	4.3	-7.1	8.7	10.0	10.0	6.6	2.9	0.0	2.9
technicians	12	-7.5	-5.8	-5.8	-3.3	8.3	5.8	0.8	4.2	1.7	-3.3	5.0	5.8	9.2	9.2	6.7	0.0	0.8
workers	9	-5.6	-5.6	-6.7	-2.2	7.8	6.7	-6.6	1.1	-1.1	0.0	-1.1	1.1	7.8	7.8	1.1	2.2	2.2
total	57	-6.3	-5.4	-6.0	-3.7	7.2	5.1	-1.9	0.7	-3.0	-3.0	0.9	0.7	6.0	7.4	3.2	2.5	2.8
F value		2.2	0.6	1.4	0.6	4.0	0.6	1.4	1.8	3.0	1.7	2.1	3.7	5.8	3.8	1.0	0.8	0.4
p value		0.059	0.542	0.250	0.760	0.002	0.737	0.242	0.118	0.015	0.131	0.064	0.004	0.000	0.006	0.455	0.590	0.653
CPSU membership																		
member	55	-6.9	-6.0	-6.4	-4.2	7.1	4.2	-2.5	0.0	-3.5	-2.7	0.2	0.0	5.8	5.5	3.1	2.2	3.1
non-member	4	0.0	0.0	-2.5	0.0	10.0	10.0	2.5	5.0	0.0	-7.5	5.0	5.0	10.0	10.0	-2.5	5.0	-5.0
T value		-1.8	-1.5	-1.2	-1.1	-0.9	-1.4	-1.0	-1.0	-0.7	1.1	-1.0	-1.0	-1.1	-0.9	1.3	-0.6	1.6
p value		0.079	0.135	0.250	0.261	0.384	0.182	0.299	0.312	0.472	0.274	0.334	0.336	0.296	0.349	0.216	0.557	0.063
<Personal Factors>																		
Gender																		
male	51	-5.9	-5.5	-5.9	-3.5	7.8	5.3	-2.4	1.0	-3.3	-2.7	0.6	0.6	6.3	6.9	3.1	2.4	2.2
female	8	-10.0	-6.3	-7.5	-6.3	3.8	0.0	-1.3	-3.8	-2.5	-5.0	0.0	-2.5	5.0	6.3	0.0	2.5	5.0
T value		1.4	0.3	0.7	1.0	1.7	1.7	-0.3	1.3	-0.2	0.7	0.2	0.9	0.4	0.2	1.0	0.0	-0.8
p value		0.155	0.798	0.513	0.340	0.092	0.097	0.758	0.191	0.814	0.483	0.873	0.302	0.606	0.822	0.346	0.967	0.412
Generation																		
under 45	28	-3.9	-2.9	-4.8	-2.1	6.2	5.4	-1.4	3.9	-1.1	-2.9	2.1	4.8	6.6	7.1	4.3	2.1	2.9
over 45	31	-6.7	-6.1	-7.4	-5.5	6.5	2.9	-2.9	-2.9	-6.2	-3.2	-1.0	-3.5	3.9	6.5	1.3	2.8	2.3
T value		2.5	2.7	1.7	1.8	1.1	1.8	0.6	2.9	1.7	0.2	1.3	3.4	2.5	0.4	1.3	-0.2	0.3
p value		0.015	0.008	0.096	0.065	0.294	0.107	0.548	0.005	0.068	0.867	0.214	0.001	0.017	0.711	0.188	0.856	0.601
Education***																		
high	41	-6.1	-5.1	-5.6	-3.4	6.3	4.4	-2.4	1.2	-3.2	-3.9	1.5	1.2	6.6	6.6	3.2	2.4	2.9
middle	11	-7.3	-7.3	-6.2	-6.2	5.5	4.5	-1.8	-1.8	-3.6	0.0	-1.8	-3.6					

Appendix 5.1. Logistic Regression Descriptives: the USSR CPD

	df	Federal Questions				Presidential Issues				Economic Issues				Other Issues			
		X2 (N=1957)		Z5 (N=1276)		Y3 (N=1716)		Y5 (N=1826)		X5 (N=1882)		X1 (N=1968)		Y1 (N=1884)			
		N	B	S.E.	Sig.	N	B	S.E.	Sig.	N	B	S.E.	Sig.	N	B	S.E.	Sig.
Personal and Axonal Factors																	
Gender (female)	1	314	1.00	0.22	0.000	212	0.58	0.19	0.003	279	0.36	0.15	0.017	300	1.15	0.22	0.000
Age	1		-0.03	0.01	0.000		-0.05	0.01	0.000		-0.03	0.01	0.000		-0.09	0.01	0.000
Ethnic (non-rus)	1	1062	-0.13	0.15	0.383	630	-0.43	0.15	0.005	896	-0.37	0.12	0.002	959	0.82	0.15	0.000
Urbanicity	1		0.49	0.08	0.000		0.23	0.07	0.001		0.22	0.06	0.000		0.27	0.07	0.000
Functional Factors																	
Class	4				0.000				0.000				0.000				0.000
cadres	1	136	0.93	0.36	0.011	88	0.60	0.34	0.076	124	0.72	0.24	0.003	140	1.00	0.42	0.017
managers	1	360	1.55	0.30	0.000	254	1.38	0.28	0.000	320	1.22	0.20	0.000	347	1.87	0.36	0.000
intelligentsia+technician	1	653	2.25	0.28	0.000	394	1.80	0.23	0.000	533	1.44	0.17	0.000	563	2.11	0.34	0.000
workers	1	463	0.86	0.31	0.005	294	0.60	0.27	0.024	422	0.86	0.20	0.000	457	1.17	0.36	0.001
CPSU (non-party)	1	212	-0.67	0.20	0.001	128	-0.64	0.21	0.003	177	-0.38	0.18	0.033	188	-0.72	0.20	0.000
Regional Factors																	
Republic groups	3				0.000				0.000				0.000				0.000
Slavic	1	1311	1.36	0.29	0.000	931	-0.33	0.18	0.070	1200	-0.68	0.15	0.000	1279	1.59	0.28	0.000
Baltic	1	142	5.13	0.40	0.000	28	0.41	0.46	0.373	48	1.13	0.39	0.004	47	1.17	0.58	0.043
Caucasus	1	172	2.45	0.33	0.000	68	0.98	0.30	0.001	158	0.68	0.22	0.004	168	0.36	0.46	0.429
Ordinary Ads (RSFSR)	1	1631	-0.05	0.19	0.802	1065	-1.28	0.22	0.000	1412	0.38	0.14	0.007	1058	0.12	0.18	0.492
Constant	1		-4.57	0.56	0.000		0.35	0.50	0.486		0.62	0.40	0.123		-1.91	0.59	0.001
			Chi-sq.	%	Sig.		Chi-sq.	%	Sig.		Chi-sq.	%	Sig.		Chi-sq.	%	Sig.
Step 1	4		116.53	78.03	0.000		51.43	69.04	0.000		81.75	58.16	0.000		262.62	81.71	0.000
Step 2	5		197.14	79.68	0.000		98.08	70.77	0.000		85.01	62.30	0.000		113.04	81.93	0.000
Step 3	4		316.08	84.67	0.000		70.29	73.99	0.000		76.77	64.89	0.000		52.30	82.26	0.000
Model	13		629.75		0.000		219.80		0.000		243.53		0.000		427.96		0.000
			Chi-sq.	%	Sig.		Chi-sq.	%	Sig.		Chi-sq.	%	Sig.		Chi-sq.	%	Sig.
			155.46	64.08	0.000		165.18	79.54	0.000		155.46	64.08	0.000		122.44	59.55	0.000
			387.60	72.68	0.000		182.01	80.82	0.000		387.60	72.68	0.000		328.68	68.31	0.000
			290.95	77.49	0.000		214.95	83.37	0.000		290.95	77.49	0.000		105.88	71.87	0.000
			844.01		0.000		572.14		0.000		844.01		0.000		556.98		0.000

Appendix 6.1. List of the Votes Analysed (the CPD of Russia)

Votes		Pro	Con	Abs	Score (Pro vote)	Re- sult
<u><Economic Issue I: Land Reform></u>						
P1	Shakhrai's amendment on Land Reform	602	369	40	+10	A
T4	Excluding a moratorium on the sale of land (Art. 12)	377	428	43	+10	R
U3	Muravev's amendment to Art. 12 (land sale right)	413	342	46	-10	R
<u><Economic Issues II: Resolutions on Economic Situation></u>						
Q2	Zakharov & Kalashnikov's proposal to insert the phrase that "the Russian leadership's performance be assessed as unsatisfactory" in the resolution on political and economic condition and for a way out of the crisis	320	527	79	-10	R
T2	A draft resolution "On the Progress of Economic Reform in the Russian Federation" as a basis of further discussion	536	217	82	+10	A
U2	A resolution "On the Course of Economic Reform in the Russian Federation (Editorial Commission version)	588	238	23	-10	A
<u><Issues on the President and Government I: the law on the Presidency></u>						
Q1	The question on the presidency and reforms of government power and administrative system to be reviewed in the following Congress	541	411	38	-10	A
R1	Adoption of the law on the Presidency as a basis of further discussion	615	235	66	+10	A
R2	Belonogov's proposal against the President's party membership (Art. 121 point 3)	421	486	40	-10	R
<u><Issues on the President and Government II: no-confidence vote></u>						
T1	Isakov's proposal to discuss the question of a no-confidence vote in the government	412	447	70	-10	R
U1	Saenko's proposal to include the question of no-confidence in the president on the agenda	423	357	54	-10	R
<u><Balance of Power between the Legislative and Executive Branches></u>						
Q3	Adoption of a resolution "On the Redistribution of Authority among Higher Government Organs of the RF for Realisation of Anti-crisis Measures" as a basis of further discussion	511	316	72	+10	R
S2	Adoption of a resolution "On the Organisation of Executive Power in the Period of Radical Economic Reforms" (a moratorium on local elections)	618	127	100	+10	A
S3	Adoption of a draft resolution "On the Legal Guarantee for Economic Reform" (Editorial Commission version)	529	206	53	+10	A
T3	Eltsin's amendment to a draft resolution "On the Progress of Economic Reform": to be allowed to head and form government until 1 December 1992	429	313	64	+10	R
T5	Sheboldaev's Constitutional amendment to Art. 109 point 3: "The Supreme Soviet endorses the appointment of the chairman of the Council of Ministers."	510	333	40	-10	R

(cont.)

		Votes	Pro	Con	Abs	Score (Pro vote)	Re- sult
U4	Eltsin's Constitutional amendment to Art. 122: "The Council of Ministers is a body of executive power that is accountable to the Congress and the President of the RF." (excluding the Supreme Soviet)		309	522	36	+10	R
U5	Zor'kin's proposal on the resolution "On the Stabilisation of the Structure of the RF"		541	98	67	+10	A
<u><Other Issues></u>							
P2	Babaev & Tikhomirov's proposal on the measures for stabilisation of economy and transition to the market relations in the RSFSR: "the measures be in accordance with those measures adopted in other republics."		498	369	23	-10	R
P3	A proposal to include a social development programme for the North in the measures for the stabilisation and the transition to the market relations		556	220	27	+10	A
R3	Shakhrai's proposal to adopt the law on the Constitutional Court without discussion		498	343	59	+10	R
S1	Isaev's proposal on the election of the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet: "to ask Khasbulatov to stay in office and to postpone the election until the following CPD"		462	422	38	+10	R

P: Votes in the First CPD of the RF; Q: the Second CPD; R: the Fourth CPD; S: the Fifth CPD; T: the Sixth CPD; U: the Seventh CPD; A: adopted; R: rejected

Appendix 6.2. The Voting Patterns of Deputies in the Russian CPD

	N	Land Reform			Eco Situation			Confidence		Presidency			Balance of Power					Other Issues					
		P1	T4	U3	Q2	T2	U2	T1	U1	Q1	R1	R2	Q3	S2	S3	T3	T5	U4	U5	P2	P3	R3	S1
		+	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	-	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	+
<Regional Factors>																							
Regional Associations																							
Northwest	89	2.0	-1.1	0.4	2.2	2.7	-1.3	1.3	-0.4	-2.1	2.7	-0.1	1.2	4.8	3.2	0.9	-1.1	-3.1	3.5	-2.4	6.9	-0.7	-0.2
Central	83	3.0	-0.2	-2.0	1.7	2.5	-1.0	-0.8	-1.3	-1.3	3.9	0.8	1.8	5.5	1.2	2.6	-0.2	-1.7	4.1	-0.5	1.8	1.6	0.9
Chernozem	43		-3.3	3.1		-0.7	-3.4	-1.9	-1.1							-1.2	-3.3	-2.6	1.7				
Volga	300	4.1	0.7	-1.6	1.0	2.5	-2.8	-0.5	-2.4	-2.1	3.3	0.8	1.3	5.9	1.2	1.8	0.7	-2.8	3.2	-2.1	2.6	0.5	0.5
Northern Cau	120	0.3	-2.4	-0.8	2.2	3.8	-0.0	0.0	-0.4	-2.0	2.6	-0.8	1.0	3.7	2.4	1.8	-2.4	-4.3	4.9	-2.4	3.7	3.4	-2.8
Urals	111	3.1	-1.4	1.3	2.2	2.1	-3.7	-0.1	-0.4	-1.7	8.0	0.2	2.4	5.2	4.8	0.7	-1.4	-4.2	3.8	0.4	1.2	1.4	0.6
Siberia	171	2.2	-0.1	-0.8	1.2	3.8	-4.7	-0.2	0.1	-1.9	2.1	-0.9	0.6	3.5	4.7	0.9	-2.1	-3.1	3.6	-2.3	3.2	0.3	-0.8
Far East	63	4.0	2.3	-2.1	1.0	4.0	-1.5	1.9	0.5	-2.4	2.9	1.9	0.5	3.8	4.0	2.4	0.3	-1.8	5.4	-0.6	4.8	2.2	0.3
Others	125	-2.8	0.3	-2.1	5.3	4.0	-1.5	1.9	0.5	4.3	5.7	4.1	5.4	3.6	4.3	2.4	-3.0	-1.6	5.4	2.2	3.4	4.9	4.3
total	1062	2.2	4.0	-0.9	1.9	5.4	-3.1	3.8	-0.3	-1.2	3.6	0.6	1.9	4.7	3.1	4.8	1.0	-0.8	5.6	-1.2	3.2	1.5	0.4
F value		8.00	6.59	2.79	3.51	3.40	4.58	3.33	1.22	7.46	4.01	3.97	6.33	3.03	5.84	3.23	2.46	2.56	3.33	4.53	5.01	5.59	5.92
p value		0.000	0.000	0.005	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.284	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.004	0.000	0.001	0.012	0.009	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Regional Associations II (excl. Others)																							
total	937	2.8	-1.0	-0.6	1.5	2.8	-3.5	-0.1	-0.8	-2.0	3.3	0.1	1.3	4.8	2.9	1.5	-1.0	-3.0	3.8	-1.7	3.1	1.0	-0.1
F value		2.9	2.5	3.1	0.6	2.1	5.2	2.1	1.3	0.1	2.9	1.2	0.6	3.0	6.1	2.5	1.1	1.1	1.4	1.9	5.8	2.7	2.4
p value		0.008	0.016	0.003	0.758	0.037	0.000	0.037	0.236	0.993	0.008	0.315	0.704	0.006	0.000	0.016	0.349	0.368	0.183	0.086	0.000	0.013	0.024
Economic Structures																							
rural regions	109	1.8	-0.9	0.3	1.1	4.4	-5.0	0.5	-1.4	-3.0	2.5	-1.1	0.3	4.8	2.1	2.8	-1.2	-2.5	4.9	-3.5	2.6	2.8	-2.5
resource regions	91	3.6	-2.2	-1.7	2.9	5.4	-4.2	-0.2	-1.5	-2.2	2.5	-0.5	1.0	5.3	5.2	0.2	-1.4	-3.3	4.7	-3.0	5.9	0.2	1.5
hub/gate regions	359	1.0	1.3	-0.6	3.7	2.9	-2.0	1.4	0.3	1.1	4.8	2.6	4.0	3.7	3.1	2.8	-0.9	-0.5	4.9	0.9	3.0	2.5	1.1
residual regions	503	2.9	-1.3	-0.7	0.7	2.4	-3.9	-0.4	-1.0	-2.3	3.1	-0.2	0.6	5.3	2.9	1.2	-2.4	-3.5	3.6	-1.9	2.9	0.7	0.3
F value		3.5	7.7	0.9	9.4	4.8	5.6	2.7	2.4	12.0	4.8	5.6	11.9	3.7	2.9	3.9	2.0	6.3	3.5	11.2	4.2	4.3	4.9
p value		0.014	0.000	0.449	0.000	0.002	0.001	0.042	0.085	0.000	0.003	0.000	0.000	0.012	0.036	0.009	0.106	0.000	0.015	0.000	0.006	0.005	0.002
Living Conditions																							
highly developed	113	-3.9	3.9	0.7	6.8	5.1	-2.1	2.9	2.1	5.6	6.7	4.7	6.9	3.8	4.6	4.5	0.8	2.4	6.6	3.7	4.2	4.8	3.9
well developed	295	4.1	-0.2	-1.3	2.2	2.3	-3.5	0.2	-0.6	-0.9	4.4	1.4	2.8	4.8	3.2	1.4	-2.2	-2.7	4.0	-0.4	2.4	1.8	1.9
moderately developed	85	3.2	-0.7	0.2	0.0	2.2	-2.4	-1.9	-2.8	-2.5	1.2	-1.2	1.1	4.7	1.8	0.5	-1.8	-3.0	2.9	-2.7	4.6	0.9	1.8
under-developed	373	2.2	-1.2	-1.0	1.3	2.8	-3.3	0.0	-1.0	-2.0	2.8	0.1	0.9	5.1	3.0	2.0	-1.7	-2.8	4.0	-2.1	3.0	0.8	-1.2
poorly developed	157	2.1	-1.8	0.0	0.8	3.2	-4.4	0.5	-0.6	-4.8	2.7	-1.7	-0.4	4.1	3.2	1.4	-2.5	-3.7	3.9	-3.7	2.7	1.2	-1.3
total	1023	2.1	-0.4	-0.7	2.0	2.9	-3.3	0.3	-0.7	-1.3	3.6	0.6	1.9	4.7	3.2	1.9	-1.7	-2.3	4.2	-1.3	3.0	1.5	0.5
F value		16.4	6.7	1.8	11.8	2.5	1.5	3.7	4.2	23.4	8.1	9.9	15.4	1.0	1.7	3.8	2.8	9.5	4.8	14.3	1.8	4.8	10.8
p value		0.000	0.000	0.119	0.000	0.023	0.201	0.005	0.002	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.389	0.152	0.006	0.024	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.119	0.001	0.000
Living conditions & Federal status																							
highly adapted region	64	-7.2	4.3	0.3	8.3	6.2	-2.0	3.0	2.1	6.7	7.8	5.2	8.4	2.5	4.1	4.1	0.5	2.1	7.5	6.3	3.6	6.0	5.2
adapted regions	214	3.6	0.2	0.4	3.4	2.4	-2.5	1.1	0.4	0.2	4.8	2.2	3.5	5.0	3.4	2.7	-1.2	-0.5	4.0	-0.2	3.1	1.7	1.5
stagnated regions	579	2.3	-0.8	-1.0	0.8	2.9	-3.2	-0.3	-1.1	-2.2	2.4	-0.2	0.9	4.4	2.8	1.8	-1.8	-2.9	4.1	-2.2	2.8	0.9	-0.2
stagnated republics	82	2.0	-2.3	0.1	2.4	3.5	-5.3	1.6	-2.3	-5.2	3.6	-1.5	0.7	4.8	3.3	1.8	-1.8	-4.0	3.3	-3.0	3.5	1.1	-2.1
adapted republics	84	4.9	-1.3	-2.9	1.2	1.7	-5.5	-1.0	-1.3	-1.2	5.1	0.7	1.3	7.3	3.8	0.5	-3.9	-4.8	3.8	-1.3	3.7	2.5	1.6
total	1023	2.1	-0.4	-0.7	2.0	2.9	-3.3	0.3	-0.7	-1.3	3.6	0.6	1.9	4.7	3.2	1.9	-1.7	-2.3	4.2	-1.3	3.0	1.5	0.5
F value		20.8	6.0	2.8	13.4	3.8	3.4	3.1	3.5	19.3	9.2	8.0	14.1	4.7	0.7	2.3	2.5	9.3	4.5	15.3	0.4	5.2	8.0
p value		0.000	0.000	0.024	0.000	0.007	0.008	0.014	0.008	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.589	0.059	0.043	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.801	0.000	0.000
Urban-rural																							
large cities	603	2.4	1.3	-0.5	3.7	3.7	-2.6	1.6	0.4	1.0	4.5	2.5	3.4	4.2	3.3	2.8	-1.1	-1.4	4.8	0.6	2.8	2.8	1.7
midium-sized cities	187	2.2	-3.0	-0.9	-1.1	2.3	-4.1	-0.6	-1.6	-5.2	2.5	-2.8	-0.7	5.3	3.4	0.5	-3.0	-3.1	4.1	-4.1	4.5	-0.6	-1.9
small cities	192	2.6	-1.1	0.0	1.8	3.5	-4.0	-0.2	-1.6	-2.3	3.3	-0.1	1.6	5.8	2.0	2.2	-1.0	-2.9	3.9	-2.5	3.3	0.2	-0.5
rural areas	77	-0.1	-6.7	-3.4	-3.0	-1.3	-5.7	-5.5	-4.5	-6.0	-0.5	-3.9	-2.9	4.8	3.1	-2.0	-4.7	-6.2	1.3	-4.9	3.6	-0.5	-2.1
total	1059	2.2	-0.5	-0.7	2.0	3.0	-3.4	0.3	-0.7	-1.2	3.6	0.6	1.9	4.7	3.1	1.8	-1.7	-2.3	4.3	-1.2	3.2	1.5	0.4
F value		1.8	28.5	3.2	25.9	9.9	4.3	15.7	9.8	32.7	10.4	25.6	20.7	2.7	1.4	8.1	5.7	6.1	8.9	21.9	2.9	11.5	11.1
p value		0.139	0.000	0.021	0.000	0.000	0.005	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.047	0.242	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.034	0.000	0.000
Federal Status																							
autonomous	226	3.2	-1.3	-0.8	1.9	3.7	-5.4	0.5	-0.7	-2.3	4.2	-0.5	1.0	4.9	3.8	1.1	-2.9	-4.2	4.2	-1.8	4.5	1.6	-0.4
non-autonomous	836	1.9	-0.3	-0.8	2.0	2.9	-2.8	0.3	-0.6	-0.9	3.4	0.9	2.1	4.6	3.0	2.0	-1.3	-1.8	4.3	-1.1	2.8	1.4	0.6
T value		1.8	-1.5	-0.3	-0.1	1.3	-4.1	0.4	-0.1	-2.0	1.3	-2.0	-1.7	0.5	0.9	-1.4	-2.4	-3.7	-0.1	-0.8	2.9	0.3	-1.4
p value		0.074	0.141	0.759	0.931	0.195	0.000	0.681	0.891	0.052	0.208	0.044	0.082	0.636	0.358	0.173	0.016	0.000	0.992	0.424	0.004	0.751	0.170
<Functional Factors>																							
Political Blocs																							
Coalition for Reform	105	1.8	5.3	4.8	9.1	6.7	4.4	7.2	7.2	8.8	9.0	8.6	9.7	4.7	3.0	7.5	5.1	7.3	8.7	6.0	1.0	8.7	7.2
Democratic Centre	150	5.4	2.0	0.0	5.3	5.7	-2.7	4.8	2.3	1.7	7.1	3.9	5.5	6.0	2.6	4.2	-0.1	-1.8	7.0	-0.1	3.0	4.3	1.8
Creative Strength	143	5.7	0.3	-1.4	3.8	4.3	-4.7	0.6	-1.5	0.3	4.6	3.1	3.6	4.4	3.9	0.1	-3.1	-3.5	3.4	-0.3	3.7	2.4	-0.2
Russian Unity	280	-1.7																					

Appendix 6.3. The Voting Patterns of SIBFE Deputies (the Russian CPD)

	N	Land Reform			Eco Situation			Confidence		Presidency			Balance of Power					Other Issues					
		P1	T4	U3	Q2	T2	U2	T1	U1	Q1	R1	R2	Q3	S2	S3	T3	T5	U4	U5	P2	P3	R3	91
		+	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	+
<Regional Factors>																							
Economic Structure																							
rural regions	26	4.2	-0.8	1.2	0.4	3.8	-3.5	1.2	0.8	-4.2	1.9	0.0	0.0	4.8	-0.4	4.8	0.8	0.0	3.8	-3.8	-0.4	1.2	-1.8
resource regions	61	3.1	-2.1	-3.2	2.1	5.1	-4.0	-0.7	-1.3	-2.0	3.3	-0.5	1.3	6.6	4.6	1.0	-1.3	-3.2	5.5	-2.0	4.8	0.7	2.3
hub/gate regions	46	4.6	0.9	1.1	1.7	4.1	-2.2	3.5	1.1	-2.4	3.5	1.5	0.9	3.9	5.0	3.0	0.7	-0.4	5.0	0.0	2.0	2.2	-1.1
residual regions	101	1.2	-2.8	-0.8	0.5	3.8	-4.4	-0.1	1.1	-1.3	1.3	-0.7	0.2	1.5	5.0	-0.4	-4.4	-3.4	3.8	-2.2	4.8	0.2	-1.3
total	234	2.7	-1.7	-0.8	1.2	4.1	-3.8	0.6	0.4	-2.0	2.3	-0.1	0.6	3.7	4.3	1.2	-2.0	-2.4	4.4	-1.9	3.8	0.8	-0.3
F value		1.9	2.0	2.9	0.6	0.5	0.8	2.1	1.2	0.7	1.0	0.7	0.3	6.2	3.9	3.0	4.9	2.0	1.2	1.2	4.9	0.5	2.3
p value		0.135	0.113	0.034	0.630	0.669	0.485	0.103	0.322	0.540	0.376	0.583	0.860	0.000	0.010	0.030	0.003	0.117	0.299	0.318	0.003	0.668	0.075
Living Conditions (excl. 3 deputies from Kamchatka)																							
well developed	8	6.3	-1.3	-1.3	5.0	2.5	-6.3	-3.8	-3.8	0.0	6.3	0.0	-2.5	7.5	7.5	-1.3	-1.3	-2.5	6.3	-2.5	2.5	-1.3	1.3
moderately developed	70	2.9	-3.4	-2.5	2.3	5.0	-3.3	0.9	0.1	-1.0	2.6	0.0	2.6	5.1	4.9	1.3	-2.4	-2.5	4.2	-1.4	5.1	1.3	2.7
under-developed	77	4.2	0.3	-0.4	1.7	3.4	-3.6	2.0	0.9	-1.7	1.8	-0.1	0.8	2.4	5.0	1.4	-2.2	-2.0	3.9	-1.0	2.2	1.3	-1.7
poorly developed	51	-0.2	-2.2	0.2	-1.4	3.3	-5.1	-0.6	1.0	-5.5	1.8	-1.0	-1.6	2.2	4.0	2.4	-2.5	-3.7	3.9	-4.1	3.3	1.0	-2.7
total	206	2.7	-1.7	-1.0	1.3	3.9	-4.0	0.7	0.5	-2.3	2.2	-0.3	0.7	3.5	4.8	1.5	-2.3	-2.8	4.1	-2.0	3.5	1.1	-0.3
F value		2.8	2.3	1.2	2.4	0.8	0.7	1.4	0.8	2.8	0.7	0.1	2.6	2.8	0.6	0.4	0.1	0.4	0.3	1.4	2.0	0.2	4.8
p value		0.039	0.081	0.327	0.066	0.491	0.537	0.249	0.498	0.039	0.544	0.943	0.056	0.042	0.608	0.739	0.963	0.747	0.830	0.242	0.114	0.697	0.004
Living conditions & Federal status																							
adapted regions	50	4.6	-3.2	-0.4	4.0	3.8	-3.5	-0.2	0.6	0.8	3.8	0.6	2.0	6.4	5.4	1.4	-3.4	-0.8	3.1	-1.4	6.2	1.0	3.0
stagnated regions	140	2.8	-0.6	-0.7	0.8	3.8	-3.9	0.6	0.4	-2.9	1.4	-0.9	0.8	2.8	4.3	1.4	-1.9	-2.9	4.4	-1.9	2.5	1.2	-1.7
stagnated republics	9	-2.2	-1.1	-4.4	0.0	2.2	-5.8	2.2	-1.1	-4.4	2.2	0.0	-2.2	1.1	3.3	4.4	3.3	-2.2	2.2	-2.2	2.2	1.1	0.0
adapted republics	10	-2.0	-6.0	-6.0	-3.0	6.0	-3.0	3.0	1.0	-6.0	6.0	4.0	-2.0	2.0	6.0	0.0	-7.0	-7.0	6.0	-6.0	10.0	1.0	3.0
total	209	2.8	-1.5	-1.1	1.2	3.9	-3.9	0.6	0.4	-2.2	2.2	-0.2	0.7	3.6	4.7	1.4	-2.3	-2.8	4.2	-2.0	3.5	1.1	-0.3
F value		2.5	2.0	1.8	2.8	1.2	0.2	0.4	0.1	2.6	1.6	1.1	1.0	3.1	1.1	0.4	2.5	1.6	1.8	0.8	4.8	0.0	3.8
p value		0.059	0.109	0.147	0.043	0.306	0.900	0.738	0.950	0.039	0.193	0.364	0.397	0.027	0.342	0.736	0.058	0.196	0.144	0.509	0.004	0.999	0.011
Siberia vs Far East																							
Siberia	171	2.2	-2.4	-0.3	1.2	4.2	-4.5	0.1	0.5	-1.9	2.1	-0.9	0.8	3.8	4.4	0.8	-1.6	-2.5	4.0	-2.3	3.2	0.3	-0.8
Far East	63	4.0	0.3	-2.2	1.0	4.0	-1.7	1.9	0.2	-2.4	2.9	1.9	0.5	3.8	4.0	2.4	-3.0	-1.9	5.6	-0.6	4.8	2.2	0.3
T value		-1.3	-2.1	1.8	0.2	0.2	-2.3	-1.3	0.3	0.4	-0.6	-2.1	0.1	-0.2	0.4	-1.2	1.0	-0.5	-1.6	-1.3	-1.4	-1.5	-0.7
p value		0.195	0.035	0.119	0.631	0.849	0.021	0.194	0.787	0.711	0.553	0.040	0.899	0.859	0.671	0.225	0.303	0.626	0.103	0.169	0.154	0.147	0.505
Tiumen vs Sakha																							
Tiumen	8	6.3	-1.3	-1.3	5.0	2.5	-6.3	-3.8	-3.8	0.0	6.3	0.0	-2.5	7.5	7.5	-1.3	-1.3	-2.5	6.3	-2.5	2.5	-1.3	1.3
Sakha	10	-2.0	-6.0	-6.0	-3.0	6.0	-3.0	3.0	1.0	-6.0	6.0	4.0	-2.0	2.0	6.0	0.0	-7.0	-7.0	6.0	-6.0	10.0	1.0	3.0
T value		2.1	1.5	1.2	1.9	-2.1	-0.8	-1.5	-1.4	1.4	0.1	-0.9	-0.1	2.1	-0.2	-0.3	1.5	1.2	-0.8	0.9	-3.4	-0.5	-0.4
p value		0.057	0.157	0.250	0.070	0.057	0.440	0.147	0.195	0.170	0.942	0.387	0.915	0.057	0.854	0.766	0.163	0.238	0.337	0.405	0.004	0.616	0.687
Urban-rural																							
large cities	127	4.3	-0.8	-1.0	2.5	4.2	-2.0	1.4	1.2	-0.4	2.4	1.3	1.4	3.6	4.4	2.1	-1.9	-1.8	4.4	-0.6	2.7	1.6	1.2
midium-sized cities	39	2.1	-2.8	-2.1	-0.3	5.1	-5.8	0.3	0.8	-5.8	3.1	-2.1	-0.8	4.1	5.1	0.3	-4.1	-2.8	5.6	-2.8	5.9	1.0	-1.3
small cities	46	1.3	-1.7	1.0	0.2	4.4	-5.8	1.3	-0.4	-1.3	2.5	-0.8	0.6	4.2	3.5	1.0	0.6	-2.5	4.0	-2.9	4.8	-0.6	-2.3
rural areas	19	-2.1	-6.3	-2.1	-2.1	0.0	-6.8	-5.3	-3.7	-6.8	-0.5	-3.7	-2.1	2.1	4.2	-3.2	-4.7	-5.3	2.6	-5.8	2.1	-0.5	-3.2
total	233	2.7	-1.8	-0.8	1.2	4.1	-3.8	0.6	0.4	-2.0	2.3	-0.1	0.6	3.7	4.3	1.1	-2.0	-2.4	4.4	-1.8	3.6	0.9	-0.3
F value		3.6	2.7	1.2	2.5	2.3	4.8	3.0	2.0	5.4	0.8	2.7	1.2	0.4	0.3	2.0	2.7	2.0	1.2	1.2	4.9	0.5	2.3
p value		0.015	0.046	0.294	0.061	0.081	0.004	0.031	0.112	0.001	0.490	0.044	0.327	0.770	0.805	0.108	0.046	0.117	0.299	0.318	0.003	0.568	0.075
Federal Status																							
autonomous	59	1.2	-1.5	-0.8	0.7	6.3	-5.1	1.7	2.0	-2.0	4.2	-0.2	-0.2	1.2	4.2	1.7	-3.1	-3.9	6.1	-2.0	6.3	0.7	-0.2
non-autonomous	175	3.2	-1.7	-0.8	1.3	3.4	-3.3	0.2	-0.1	-2.0	1.7	-0.1	0.9	4.5	4.3	1.0	-1.7	-1.8	3.8	-1.8	2.7	0.9	-0.4
T value		-1.5	0.2	0.0	-0.5	2.8	-1.5	1.0	1.7	0.0	2.0	0.0	-0.8	-2.9	-0.1	0.8	-1.0	-1.5	2.3	-0.2	3.3	-0.1	0.2
p value		0.143	0.881	0.976	0.630	0.009	0.144	0.297	0.094	0.981	0.046	0.988	0.443	0.004	0.931	0.628	0.308	0.128	0.022	0.577	0.001	0.995	0.868
<Functional Factors>																							
Political Blocs																							
Coalition for Reform	25	6.4	3.6	6.2	9.2	6.0	4.1	7.2	7.6	8.4	10.0	6.4	9.6	4.8	-0.8	7.2	3.8	6.2	8.8	4.4	0.0	10.0	6.0
Democratic Centre	27	1.8	3.0	-1.1	1.1	6.7	-3.2	4.8	5.1	-2.8	3.7	1.9	1.1	1.9	4.4	4.1	-3.7	-0.2	7.2	-3.7	4.8	3.7	0.0
Creative Strength	36	7.2	-1.1	-0.5	4.7	4.7	-4.3	3.3	0.5	0.8	5.0	2.2	2.5	5.4	7.1	-0.6	-3.6	-3.2	3.5	1.7	5.0	5.0	0.9
Russian Unity	66	-1.5	-7.5	-5.2	-5.9	-1.0	-7.0	-7.0	-6.8	-6.9	-4.5	-6.1	-5.2	1.2	6.0	-3.7	-5.4	-7.8	-0.1	-7.0	5.0	-4.8	-6.9
Dep. not in the blocs	79	3.5	-0.1	1.5	3.0	6.2	-4.4	2.5	1.5	-0.5	4.1	0.5	1.6	5.1	3.2	3.6	0.3	-2.8	6.2	-0.6	2.6	4.1	1.7
total	233	2.7	-1.8	-0.8	1.2	4.1	-3.7	0.6	0.3	-2.0	2.4	-0.1	0.6	3.6	4.3	1.3	-2.1	-2.3	4.3	-1.9	3.7	2.4	-0.3
F value		7.9	15.0	14.5	26.8	15.4	13.4	24.3	38.3	26.4	24.6	16.9	18.3	3.5	5.9	12.0	7.3	29.8	20.6	13.1	3.0	16.6	19.3
p value		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.009	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.020	0.000	0.000
Class																							
nomenklatura	29	-2.8	-3.8	-3.2	-5.2	2.1	-4.8	-0.3	-1.1	-7.6	-2.1	-4.8	-4.8	3.1	5.9	0.7	-1.7	-5.4	2.9	-7.9	3.4	-5.5	-4.5
cadres	50	3.0	-0.4	-1.8	1.6	6.3	-3.7	0.2	1.4	-2.8	3.2	-0.4	-0.2	4.5	4.3	1.6	-1.6	-1.6	5.7	-2.6	3.6	2.6	0.2
military	10	2.0	-2.0	-4.0	-6.0	5.0	-7.0	-2.0	-2.0	-6.0	-2.0	-6.0	-7.0	5.0	4.0	0.0	-3.0	-6.0</					

Appendix 6.4. The Voting Patterns of Siberian Deputies (the Russian CPD)

	N	Land Reform			Eco Situation			Confidence		Presidency			Balance of Power						Other Issues				
		P1	T4	U3	Q2	T2	U2	T1	U1	Q1	R1	R2	Q3	S2	S3	T3	T5	U4	U5	P2	P3	R3	S1
		+	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	-	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	+
<Regional Factors>																							
Economic Structure																							
rural regions	26	4.2	-0.8	1.2	0.4	3.8	-3.5	1.2	0.8	-4.2	1.9	0.0	0.0	4.8	-0.4	4.8	0.8	0.0	3.8	-3.8	-0.4	1.2	-1.8
resource regions	45	4.2	-2.7	-2.3	2.9	4.2	-4.5	-1.1	-2.3	-1.8	2.2	-2.2	1.6	7.1	4.9	0.9	0.0	-3.0	5.0	-1.8	3.6	-0.2	2.0
hub/gate regions	18	-1.1	-2.8	2.2	0.8	5.6	-4.4	-0.6	-0.6	-2.8	2.6	-1.1	-0.8	2.8	7.2	0.0	3.3	-3.9	2.8	-3.9	2.8	-1.1	-2.8
residual regions	82	1.2	-2.7	-0.2	0.7	4.0	-4.8	0.6	2.2	-1.0	2.0	-0.4	0.8	1.5	5.1	-0.4	-4.4	-2.8	3.7	-1.8	4.3	0.6	-1.2
total	171	2.2	-2.4	-0.3	1.2	4.2	-4.5	0.1	0.5	-1.9	2.1	-0.9	0.6	3.6	4.4	0.8	-1.8	-2.5	4.0	-2.3	3.2	0.3	-0.6
F value		2.3	0.4	1.7	0.8	0.3	0.2	0.5	2.9	0.9	0.1	0.5	0.3	6.0	5.3	2.0	6.1	0.9	0.6	0.6	3.0	0.3	1.8
p value		0.080	0.775	0.160	0.509	0.843	0.901	0.695	0.035	0.468	0.985	0.679	0.804	0.001	0.002	0.113	0.001	0.422	0.625	0.608	0.032	0.621	0.144
Living Conditions																							
highly developed	8	6.3	-1.3	-1.3	5.0	2.5	-6.3	-3.8	-3.8	0.0	6.3	0.0	-2.5	7.5	7.5	-1.3	-1.3	-2.5	6.3	-2.5	2.5	-1.3	1.3
well developed	57	3.3	-3.5	-1.8	2.8	4.2	-3.0	0.5	-0.4	-0.4	1.8	-1.1	3.2	5.4	4.7	1.1	-1.8	-2.0	3.8	-1.2	4.2	0.9	2.8
under-developed	44	1.6	-0.9	-0.9	1.4	3.3	-6.0	0.0	0.5	-0.9	0.7	-1.8	0.0	0.5	6.3	-0.9	-2.3	-4.2	3.0	-3.0	2.0	-0.7	-3.0
poorly developed	44	0.5	-1.4	0.9	-0.9	4.5	-5.2	0.0	1.8	-5.5	3.0	-0.5	-1.1	3.3	3.3	3.2	-2.3	-3.2	4.1	-3.9	2.5	1.8	-2.5
total	153	2.2	-2.0	-0.7	1.4	3.9	-4.7	0.0	0.3	-2.0	2.0	-1.0	0.7	3.5	4.9	1.0	-2.0	-3.0	3.7	-2.5	3.0	0.6	-0.5
F value		1.4	0.9	0.9	2.1	0.4	1.4	0.5	1.2	3.0	1.2	0.2	2.7	4.3	1.8	1.7	0.1	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.9	0.7	4.3
p value		0.247	0.453	0.433	0.107	0.767	0.247	0.698	0.316	0.032	0.317	0.893	0.046	0.006	0.151	0.177	0.964	0.642	0.637	0.467	0.451	0.569	0.006
Living conditions & Federal status (no adapted repa)																							
adapted regions	47	4.3	-3.8	-0.2	3.6	3.2	-3.0	-0.2	0.2	0.6	3.4	0.2	1.7	6.2	6.0	0.9	-3.4	-1.1	3.0	-2.1	5.1	0.4	3.0
stagnated regions	97	1.5	-1.3	-0.8	0.5	4.5	-5.4	-0.1	0.5	-3.0	1.2	-1.8	0.5	2.4	4.5	0.7	-1.8	-4.0	4.2	-2.8	2.1	0.6	-2.3
stagnated republics	9	-2.2	-1.1	-4.4	0.0	2.2	-5.8	2.2	-1.1	-4.4	2.2	0.0	-2.2	1.1	3.3	4.4	3.3	-2.2	2.2	-2.2	2.2	1.1	0.0
total	153	2.2	-2.0	-0.7	1.4	3.9	-4.7	0.0	0.3	-2.0	2.0	-1.0	0.7	3.5	4.9	1.0	-2.0	-3.0	3.7	-2.5	3.0	0.6	-0.5
F value		2.5	1.4	1.0	2.2	0.8	1.4	0.3	0.2	2.5	1.0	0.8	0.8	4.2	0.9	0.7	2.3	1.8	0.7	0.1	3.0	0.0	5.5
p value		0.087	0.239	0.380	0.112	0.443	0.241	0.787	0.858	0.067	0.379	0.441	0.431	0.017	0.402	0.504	0.108	0.187	0.523	0.907	0.053	0.978	0.005
Adap. vs Stagn. regions																							
adapted regions	47	4.3	-3.8	-0.2	3.6	3.2	-3.0	-0.2	0.2	0.6	3.4	0.2	1.7	6.2	6.0	0.9	-3.4	-1.1	3.0	-2.1	5.1	0.4	3.0
stagnated regions	97	1.5	-1.3	-0.8	0.5	4.5	-5.4	-0.1	0.5	-3.0	1.2	-1.8	0.5	2.4	4.5	0.7	-1.8	-4.0	4.2	-2.8	2.1	0.6	-2.3
T value		1.7	-1.7	0.3	2.1	-1.0	1.6	-0.1	-0.2	2.2	1.4	1.2	0.8	2.7	1.1	0.1	-1.0	1.9	-0.9	0.4	2.5	-0.1	3.3
p value		0.087	0.096	0.785	0.041	0.313	0.104	0.949	0.848	0.030	0.162	0.225	0.444	0.007	0.254	0.941	0.302	0.062	0.367	0.672	0.014	0.908	0.001
East and West Sib																							
Eastern	97	3.0	-2.6	0.6	1.3	4.2	-3.8	0.4	0.9	-0.8	2.0	0.2	0.9	3.4	3.9	0.4	-0.7	-0.8	3.8	-2.4	1.8	-0.2	-0.6
Western	74	1.2	-2.2	-1.5	1.1	4.2	-5.8	-0.3	0.0	-3.2	2.3	-2.3	0.3	3.9	5.1	1.2	-2.8	-4.8	4.2	-2.3	5.3	0.9	-0.5
T value		1.3	-0.3	1.7	0.2	0.0	1.6	0.5	0.7	1.7	-0.3	1.6	0.5	-0.5	-1.1	-0.6	1.5	3.0	-0.5	-0.1	-3.4	-0.8	-0.1
p value		0.212	0.741	0.091	0.845	0.984	0.107	0.632	0.474	0.095	0.800	0.071	0.623	0.645	0.269	0.574	0.131	0.003	0.632	0.956	0.001	0.407	0.958
Urban-rural																							
large cities	94	4.0	-1.0	-0.3	3.0	4.5	-2.6	1.2	1.9	-0.2	2.6	1.1	2.2	3.4	4.9	1.6	-1.3	-1.5	4.1	-1.0	2.2	1.7	1.3
midium-sized cities	25	0.8	-4.0	-1.2	0.0	4.8	-7.2	-0.4	-0.8	-5.8	2.8	-4.0	-1.6	4.8	4.8	-0.4	-4.0	-2.8	5.8	-2.8	6.0	0.4	-2.0
small cities	36	0.8	-2.5	1.4	-0.6	4.4	-5.8	0.8	0.0	-0.8	1.9	-1.9	-0.3	3.9	2.8	1.1	0.6	-3.3	3.3	-3.8	3.9	-2.2	-2.6
rural areas	15	-2.7	-8.0	-2.7	-2.7	0.0	-8.7	-8.7	-4.7	-8.0	-1.3	-4.7	-2.7	2.7	5.3	-4.7	-4.7	-6.7	2.0	-6.7	2.7	-2.0	-4.0
total	170	2.3	-2.4	-0.3	1.3	4.1	-4.6	0.2	0.5	-1.8	2.1	-0.8	0.7	3.6	4.5	0.7	-1.8	-2.6	4.0	-2.3	3.2	0.4	-0.5
F value		3.3	3.4	1.1	3.2	1.9	4.8	3.3	3.0	4.9	0.9	3.7	2.6	0.3	0.8	2.2	1.9	1.6	1.0	2.4	2.1	2.1	3.0
p value		0.023	0.020	0.371	0.026	0.128	0.003	0.021	0.031	0.003	0.427	0.013	0.055	0.814	0.471	0.088	0.131	0.180	0.373	0.070	0.107	0.104	0.030
Federal Status																							
autonomous	42	1.4	-1.2	1.0	1.2	6.0	-5.7	1.9	3.3	-1.9	4.3	-1.4	0.5	0.5	3.6	2.4	-2.4	-2.9	5.5	-1.2	5.7	1.0	-1.0
non-autonomous	129	2.5	-2.6	-0.7	1.2	3.6	-4.1	-0.5	-0.4	-1.9	1.4	-0.7	0.7	4.6	4.7	0.2	-1.4	-2.4	3.5	-2.7	2.4	0.1	-0.5
T value		-0.6	1.1	1.1	0.0	1.9	-1.2	1.5	2.5	0.0	1.9	-0.5	-0.1	-3.1	-0.9	1.3	-0.6	-0.3	1.7	1.0	2.7	0.5	-0.3
p value		0.521	0.290	0.252	0.974	0.059	0.248	0.149	0.012	0.979	0.059	0.649	0.885	0.002	0.372	0.189	0.545	0.790	0.090	0.322	0.006	0.585	0.763
<Functional Factors>																							
Political Blocs																							
Coalition for Reform	16	5.6	1.9	5.7	10.0	6.8	4.3	8.8	7.1	7.8	10.0	8.8	9.4	1.9	1.3	5.6	3.8	9.0	8.1	4.4	1.3	6.6	6.9
Democratic Centre	16	1.3	4.4	0.3	-0.6	4.4	-3.5	2.5	4.8	-3.8	3.1	-1.3	0.6	1.3	1.3	5.0	-4.4	-0.6	6.1	-5.0	4.4	1.9	-1.9
Creative Strength	24	7.1	-2.5	0.0	5.0	5.4	-5.2	3.3	1.4	4.2	5.0	2.9	2.9	5.4	6.3	-1.7	-3.8	-3.4	3.1	0.6	5.4	1.7	3.3
Russian Unity	50	-1.2	-7.5	-4.1	-4.8	0.0	-7.2	-7.3	-6.0	-8.8	-4.4	-6.4	-4.2	2.2	8.4	-3.9	-4.1	-7.2	0.0	-6.4	3.6	-5.6	-6.4
Dep. not in the blocs	84	2.7	-1.0	2.5	3.0	6.0	-5.4	2.3	2.9	-0.5	4.1	-0.2	1.6	5.0	4.5	3.4	0.3	-2.1	7.1	-1.4	2.5	2.0	0.9
total	170	2.3	-2.4	-0.2	1.3	4.2	-4.4	0.2	0.4	-1.8	2.2	-0.8	0.7	3.6	4.4	0.8	-1.7	-2.5	3.9	-2.4	3.3	0.4	-0.6
F value		4.4	10.1	8.2	17.3	8.7	10.5	19.4	22.5	19.9	16.8	13.6	10.7	1.9	2.2	8.2	4.1	20.3	12.3	7.8	1.2	12.5	11.9
p value		0.002	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.116	0.070	0.000	0.003	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.307	0.000	0.000
Class																							
nomenklatura	21	-2.4	-3.8	-2.0	-4.3	1.9	-5.5	0.6	0.0	-6.7	-2.4	-5.2	-4.8	3.3	5.7	1.0	-1.0	-4.0	2.0	-7.6	1.4	-5.2	-4.8
cadree	36	1.9	-1.7	-1.4	0.3	5.4	-4.0	-0.3	0.9	-3.1	1.9	-1.1	-0.3	4.8	3.7	1.7	-1.7	-2.6	5.1	-3.9	3.6	1.7	-0.6
military	5	-2.0	-8.0	-4.0	-6.0	6.0	-8.0	-8.0	0.0	-10.0	0.0	-8.0	-8.0	4.0	6.0	-2.0	-2.0	-8.0	2.0	-6.0	8.0	-6.0	-10.0
managers	41	0.7	-3.9	0.0	0.0	2.2	-6.3	-2.2	-2.0	-2.9	2.7	-2.0	0.0	4.9	4.6	-2.7	-2.2	-4.6	3.7	-4.6	4.1		

Appendix 6.5. The Voting Patterns of Far Eastern Deputies (the Russian CPD)

	N	Land Reform			Eco Situation			Confidence		Presidency			Balance of Power						Other Issues				
		P1	T4	U3	Q2	T2	U2	T1	U1	Q1	R1	R2	Q3	S2	S3	T3	T5	U4	U5	P2	P3	R3	S1
		+	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
<Regional Factors>																							
Economic Structure (no rural regions)																							
resource regions	18	0.0	-0.6	-5.6	0.0	7.5	-2.5	0.6	1.3	-2.6	6.3	4.4	0.6	5.0	3.8	1.3	-6.0	-3.8	6.9	-2.6	6.1	3.1	3.1
hub/gate regions	28	8.2	3.2	0.4	2.5	3.2	-0.7	6.1	2.1	-2.1	3.9	3.2	1.8	4.8	3.6	5.0	-1.1	1.8	6.4	2.5	1.4	4.3	0.0
residual regions	19	1.1	-3.2	-3.2	-0.5	2.1	-2.6	-3.2	-3.7	-2.6	-1.6	-2.1	-1.6	1.8	4.7	-0.5	-4.2	-6.6	3.2	-3.7	6.8	-1.6	-1.6
total	63	4.0	0.3	-2.2	1.0	4.0	-1.7	1.9	0.2	-2.4	2.9	1.9	0.5	3.6	4.0	2.4	-3.0	-1.9	5.6	-0.6	4.8	2.2	0.3
F value		8.9	3.2	2.8	0.7	2.1	0.4	6.6	2.7	0.0	4.3	2.6	0.7	1.2	0.1	2.7	1.2	4.7	2.0	3.3	5.1	2.6	1.1
p value		0.002	0.049	0.084	0.497	0.132	0.698	0.003	0.073	0.963	0.015	0.079	0.503	0.301	0.887	0.076	0.296	0.013	0.147	0.046	0.009	0.082	0.341
Living Conditions (no highly developed)																							
well developed	13	0.8	-3.1	-5.4	0.0	6.5	-4.6	2.3	2.3	-3.6	6.9	4.6	0.0	3.8	5.4	2.3	-6.2	-4.6	6.9	-2.3	9.2	3.1	3.1
moderately developed	3	-3.3	10.0	-6.7	0.0	3.3	6.7	-6.7	-3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	10.0	-3.3	-3.3	0.0	0.0	6.7	-3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3
under-developed	33	7.8	1.8	0.3	2.1	3.6	-0.3	4.5	1.5	-2.7	3.3	2.1	1.8	4.8	3.3	4.5	-2.1	0.9	5.2	1.5	2.4	3.9	0.0
poorly developed	7	-4.3	-7.1	-4.3	-4.3	-4.3	-4.3	-4.3	-4.3	-5.7	-5.7	-4.3	-4.3	-4.3	6.6	-2.9	-4.3	-7.1	2.9	-5.7	6.6	-4.3	-4.3
total	56	3.9	0.0	-2.0	0.7	3.8	-1.4	2.3	0.7	-3.0	3.0	2.0	0.7	3.8	4.1	2.7	-3.2	-1.4	5.4	-0.5	4.8	2.7	0.4
F value		6.6	4.4	1.7	1.0	4.1	2.0	3.0	1.2	0.6	3.9	1.4	0.9	3.9	1.9	2.2	0.8	2.2	0.6	1.7	3.3	1.7	1.0
p value		0.001	0.008	0.172	0.422	0.012	0.122	0.038	0.327	0.523	0.013	0.246	0.453	0.014	0.146	0.099	0.466	0.101	0.606	0.166	0.026	0.165	0.391
Living Conditions (no highly developed, excluding 3 Kamchatka deputies)																							
well developed	13	0.8	-3.1	-5.4	0.0	6.5	-4.6	2.3	2.3	-3.6	6.9	4.6	0.0	3.8	5.4	2.3	-6.2	-4.6	6.9	-2.3	9.2	3.1	3.1
under-developed	33	7.8	1.8	0.3	2.1	3.6	-0.3	4.5	1.5	-2.7	3.3	2.1	1.8	4.8	3.3	4.5	-2.1	0.9	5.2	1.5	2.4	3.9	0.0
poorly developed	7	-4.3	-7.1	-4.3	-4.3	-4.3	-4.3	-4.3	-4.3	-5.7	-5.7	-4.3	-4.3	-4.3	6.6	-2.9	-4.3	-7.1	2.9	-5.7	6.6	-4.3	-4.3
total	53	4.3	-0.6	-1.7	0.8	3.8	-1.9	2.8	0.9	-3.4	3.0	1.9	0.6	3.4	4.5	3.0	-3.4	-1.6	5.3	-0.4	4.9	2.6	0.2
F value		9.0	4.1	2.1	1.4	6.0	1.5	2.8	1.4	0.3	6.2	2.2	1.2	4.5	1.5	2.5	1.0	3.3	0.9	2.3	4.9	2.6	1.4
p value		0.000	0.023	0.131	0.249	0.005	0.226	0.069	0.255	0.707	0.004	0.127	0.299	0.016	0.243	0.068	0.364	0.046	0.431	0.114	0.012	0.067	0.256
Living conditions & Federal status (no stagnated repa)																							
adapted regions	3	10.0	8.7	-3.3	10.0	10.0	-10.0	0.0	6.7	3.3	10.0	6.7	6.7	10.0	-3.3	10.0	-3.3	3.3	3.3	10.0	6.7	10.0	3.3
stagnated regions	43	4.9	0.9	-0.9	0.9	2.3	-0.5	2.3	0.2	-2.8	1.9	1.2	0.9	3.7	3.7	2.8	-2.3	-0.5	4.9	0.0	3.5	2.6	-0.8
adapted republics	10	-2.0	-6.0	-6.0	-3.0	6.0	-3.0	3.0	1.0	-6.0	6.0	4.0	-2.0	2.0	6.0	0.0	-7.0	-7.0	6.0	-6.0	10.0	1.0	3.0
total	56	3.9	0.0	-2.0	0.7	3.8	-1.4	2.3	0.7	-3.0	3.0	2.0	0.7	3.8	4.1	2.7	-3.2	-1.4	5.4	-0.5	4.8	2.7	0.4
F value		3.5	3.6	1.3	2.4	2.9	2.0	0.1	0.7	1.3	2.1	0.8	1.0	1.2	2.7	1.7	1.2	2.5	1.1	4.4	3.1	1.2	0.7
p value		0.039	0.033	0.289	0.099	0.064	0.147	0.891	0.467	0.269	0.132	0.475	0.372	0.298	0.079	0.195	0.321	0.093	0.355	0.016	0.054	0.319	0.509
Stag/rep vs Adap/rep																							
stagnated regions	43	4.9	0.9	-0.9	0.9	2.3	-0.5	2.3	0.2	-2.8	1.9	1.2	0.9	3.7	3.7	2.8	-2.3	-0.5	4.9	0.0	3.5	2.6	-0.8
adapted republics	10	-2.0	-6.0	-6.0	-3.0	6.0	-3.0	3.0	1.0	-6.0	6.0	4.0	-2.0	2.0	6.0	0.0	-7.0	-7.0	6.0	-6.0	10.0	1.0	3.0
T value		2.3	2.3	1.6	1.2	-1.9	0.8	-0.2	-0.2	1.0	-1.4	-0.8	0.9	0.6	-1.6	0.9	1.5	2.1	-1.4	2.0	-2.4	0.8	-1.0
p value		0.028	0.026	0.118	0.232	0.057	0.407	0.840	0.810	0.301	0.172	0.403	0.390	0.537	0.116	0.353	0.128	0.048	0.166	0.054	0.019	0.631	0.304
Urban-rural																							
large cities	33	4.8	0.6	-2.7	1.2	3.6	-0.3	2.1	-0.6	-0.9	2.1	2.1	-0.9	4.2	3.0	3.3	-3.6	-2.4	5.5	0.6	3.9	1.2	0.9
midium-sized cities	14	4.3	-0.7	-3.6	-0.7	5.7	-2.9	1.4	3.6	-6.7	3.6	1.4	1.4	2.9	6.7	1.4	-4.3	-2.9	6.7	-2.9	6.7	2.1	0.0
small cities	12	2.5	0.6	0.0	2.5	4.2	-5.0	2.5	-1.7	-2.5	4.2	2.5	3.3	6.0	6.6	0.6	0.6	0.0	6.6	-0.6	7.5	4.2	-0.6
rural areas	4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-2.5	2.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.5	-5.0	0.0	5.0	-2.5	0.0	5.0	0.0
total	63	4.0	0.3	-2.2	1.0	4.0	-1.7	1.9	0.2	-2.4	2.9	1.9	0.5	3.6	4.0	2.4	-3.0	-1.9	5.6	-0.6	4.8	2.2	0.3
F value		0.5	0.1	0.5	0.3	0.5	1.0	0.1	0.9	0.9	0.2	0.1	0.6	0.5	0.9	0.3	1.0	0.3	0.0	0.5	1.1	0.4	0.1
p value		0.701	0.968	0.708	0.844	0.674	0.384	0.969	0.429	0.442	0.893	0.969	0.802	0.854	0.455	0.615	0.419	0.826	0.996	0.667	0.346	0.729	0.958
Federal Status																							
autonomous	17	0.6	-2.4	-5.3	-0.6	7.1	-3.5	1.2	-1.2	-2.4	4.1	2.9	-1.8	2.9	5.9	0.0	-4.7	-6.5	7.6	-4.1	7.6	0.0	1.6
non-autonomous	46	5.2	1.3	-1.1	1.5	2.8	-1.1	2.2	0.7	-2.4	2.4	1.5	1.3	4.1	3.3	3.3	-2.4	-0.2	4.8	0.7	3.7	3.0	-0.2
T value		-1.9	-1.4	-1.7	-0.8	1.8	-1.0	-0.4	-0.7	0.0	0.7	0.5	-1.1	-0.6	1.1	-1.4	-0.9	-2.5	1.6	-1.9	1.8	-1.2	0.7
p value		0.066	0.153	0.095	0.428	0.073	0.317	0.714	0.473	0.966	0.479	0.602	0.262	0.560	0.260	0.162	0.365	0.017	0.117	0.065	0.082	0.240	0.467
<Functional Factors>																							
Political Blocs																							
Coalition for Reform	9	7.5	6.7	6.9	7.8	6.7	6.6	4.4	6.5	10.0	10.0	7.8	10.0	10.0	-4.4	10.0	3.3	6.9	10.0	4.4	-2.2	10.0	10.0
Democratic Centre	11	1.8	0.9	-3.8	3.6	10.0	-2.5	6.2	5.8	-0.9	4.5	6.4	1.8	2.7	9.1	2.7	-2.7	0.6	9.4	-1.8	5.5	0.9	2.7
Creative Strength	12	7.5	1.7	-2.5	4.2	3.3	-10.0	3.3	-2.5	-6.6	5.0	0.8	1.7	5.5	9.1	1.7	-3.3	-2.5	5.0	3.3	4.2	4.2	-4.5
Russian Unity	16	-2.5	-7.5	-9.3	-9.4	-4.4	-1.8	-6.3	-10.0	-9.4	-5.0	-5.0	-8.1	-2.0	6.0	-3.1	-9.4	-10.0	-0.7	-6.6	9.4	-3.1	-8.7
Dep. not in the blocs	15	7.3	3.3	-0.9	3.3	7.3	0.2	3.3	-1.8	-0.7	4.0	3.3	2.0	5.3	-1.8	4.0	0.0	-4.5	3.8	2.7	4.0	2.7	4.7
total	63	4.0	0.3	-2.2	1.0	4.0	-1.7	1.9	0.2	-2.4	2.9	1.9	0.5	3.6	4.0	2.4	-3.0	-1.9	5.6	-0.6	4.8	2.2	0.3
F value		4.5	6.2	9.2	12.0	10.0	2.6	5.9	23.3	12.4	7.7	4.6	6.3	5.3	14.0	4.4	4.4	9.9	11.2	6.6	3.6	3.9	13.6
p value		0.003	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.044	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.003	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.004	0.004	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.010	0.006	0.000
Class																							
nomenklatura	8	-3.8	-3.8	-6.3	-7.5	2.5	-2.5	-2.5	-3.8	-10.0	-1.3	-3.8	-5.0	2.5	6.3	0.0	-3.8	-6.6	5.0	-6.6	6.6	-6.3	-3.8
cadres	14	5.7	2.9	-2.9	5.7	6.6	-2.9	1.4	2.9	-1.4	6.4	1.4	0.0	4.3	6.7	2.1	-2.1	0.7	7.1	0.7	3.6	5.0	2.1
military	5	6.0	4.0	-4.0	-4.0	4.0	-6.0	2.0	-4.0	-6.0	-4.0	-4.0	-6.0	6.0	0.0	2.0	-						

Appendix 7.2. Logistic Regression Descriptives: SIBFE Deputies (the Russian CPD)

	df	Land Reform						Resolutions of the Congresses on Economic Reform						Balance of Power between the Legislative & Executive Branches						Other Issue						
		P1 (N=187)		U3 (N=147)		T2 (N=163)		U2 (N=166)		S2 (N=151)		S3 (N=151)		P3 (N=136)		N	B	S.E	Sig.							
		N	B	S.E	Sig.	N	B	S.E	Sig.	N	B	S.E	Sig.	N	B					S.E	Sig.					
Personal & Axonal Factors																										
Gender (female)	1	8	0.41	1.01	0.687	6	2.94	2.06	0.153	8	0.79	1.13	0.481	7	-7.08	25.33	0.780	7	2.68	1.34	0.048	7	0.30	1.08	0.782	
Age	1	41	-0.18	0.04	0.000	32	0.003	0.04	0.941	35	-0.04	0.03	0.209	32	0.10	0.04	0.012	35	0.05	0.04	0.197	34	0.006	0.04	0.890	
Ethnic Origin (non-rus)	1	41	0.69	0.51	0.171	32	-0.03	0.62	0.968	44	1.31	0.77	0.092	35	-0.51	0.68	0.457	35	1.42	0.72	0.049	34	-0.65	0.75	0.389	
Urbanity	1	41	0.63	0.25	0.011	32	-0.83	0.31	0.009	44	-0.19	0.31	0.534	35	-0.18	0.31	0.565	35	0.42	0.33	0.203	34	0.40	0.31	0.195	
Functional Factors I																										
Class	5	34	-0.09	0.73	0.900	28	-0.63	1.04	0.547	34	1.55	1.11	0.163	28	0.19	0.90	0.834	28	0.55	1.23	0.651	21	1.34	0.97	0.169	
cadres	1	45	0.25	0.73	0.735	39	-0.48	1.09	0.663	31	-0.87	0.93	0.345	32	-0.21	0.90	0.812	34	1.01	1.27	0.424	25	2.11	1.19	0.077	
managers	1	47	-0.25	0.66	0.700	32	0.15	1.05	0.886	42	-1.06	0.87	0.224	39	-0.52	0.84	0.499	37	0.57	0.84	0.537	40	0.32	0.81	0.695	
intelligentsia/technician	1	12	-0.34	1.20	0.779	11	-0.12	1.23	0.922	13	-0.97	1.33	0.465	11	-1.58	1.15	0.168	11	2.81	1.84	0.128	10	0.77	1.18	0.514	
workers	1	20	0.26	0.99	0.790	19	1.38	1.27	0.277	19	0.86	1.53	0.573	18	-1.23	1.02	0.225	16	0.57	1.53	0.707	15	1.22	1.16	0.295	
others	1	47	-0.11	0.61	0.863	35	0.68	0.77	0.379	45	-1.69	0.90	0.060	38	-0.39	0.57	0.491	41	-0.72	0.73	0.326	35	1.17	0.71	0.097	
CPSU (non-party)	1	47	-0.11	0.61	0.863	35	0.68	0.77	0.379	45	-1.69	0.90	0.060	38	-0.39	0.57	0.491	41	-0.72	0.73	0.326	35	1.17	0.71	0.097	
Functional Factor II																										
Political Bloc	2	22	-0.63	0.72	0.391	22	4.53	1.50	0.003	20	7.05	19.96	0.724	26	-0.76	0.83	0.359	22	-0.76	0.83	0.359	10	-2.56	1.18	0.029	
CR	1	55	-1.57	0.50	0.002	51	-2.67	0.68	0.000	47	-2.28	0.61	0.000	58	-1.11	0.63	0.060	58	-1.11	0.63	0.060	47	1.61	0.76	0.033	
RU	1	52	-1.33	0.63	0.034	49	1.58	0.81	0.051	52	0.55	0.61	0.371	41	0.31	0.68	0.649	41	0.31	0.68	0.649	44	1.38	0.81	0.089	
Regional Factors																										
Sib vs. FE (Far Eastern)	3	23	3.69	1.38	0.007	12	2.90	1.57	0.065	11	0.86	1.36	0.527	18	2.13	1.02	0.037	16	2.13	1.02	0.037	13	-3.89	1.38	0.005	
Economic Structure	1	52	1.04	0.58	0.072	47	-0.42	0.61	0.499	38	1.44	0.78	0.065	51	-0.26	0.80	0.743	45	3.18	1.00	0.002	48	-1.57	1.16	0.176	
rural regions	1	45	0.94	0.60	0.115	39	1.22	0.79	0.124	41	1.19	0.71	0.093	36	-0.08	0.71	0.908	32	0.50	0.68	0.459	35	0.55	0.95	0.565	
resource regions	1	45	0.94	0.60	0.115	39	1.22	0.79	0.124	41	1.19	0.71	0.093	36	-0.08	0.71	0.908	32	0.50	0.68	0.459	35	0.55	0.95	0.565	
sub/gale regions	1	45	0.94	0.60	0.115	39	1.22	0.79	0.124	41	1.19	0.71	0.093	36	-0.08	0.71	0.908	32	0.50	0.68	0.459	35	0.55	0.95	0.565	
Economic Performance	1	45	0.94	0.60	0.115	39	1.22	0.79	0.124	41	1.19	0.71	0.093	36	-0.08	0.71	0.908	32	0.50	0.68	0.459	35	0.55	0.95	0.565	
Federal Status (non-auto)	1	45	0.94	0.60	0.115	39	1.22	0.79	0.124	41	1.19	0.71	0.093	36	-0.08	0.71	0.908	32	0.50	0.68	0.459	35	0.55	0.95	0.565	
Eco perform+fed status	3	45	2.99	1.20	0.012	36	1.83	1.63	0.261	122	3.23	1.15	0.005	141	-2.51	1.16	0.030	135	-3.31	1.02	0.001	130	11.48	29.55	0.698	
adapted regions	1	128	2.04	1.20	0.090	39	0.85	1.62	0.601	36	1.44	0.78	0.065	51	-0.26	0.80	0.743	45	3.18	1.00	0.002	48	-1.57	1.16	0.176	
stagnated regions	1	8	-2.78	2.00	0.166	4	-0.48	17.52	0.589	4	-0.27	2.72	0.922	4	5.55	25.47	0.828	4	5.55	25.47	0.828	4	-6.50	3.36	0.053	
stagnated republics	1	8	-2.78	2.00	0.166	4	-0.48	17.52	0.589	4	-0.27	2.72	0.922	4	5.55	25.47	0.828	4	5.55	25.47	0.828	4	-6.50	3.36	0.053	
Constant	1	19	83.57	2.59	0.049	19	84.82	2.59	0.049	17	73.16	2.59	0.049	18	65.42	2.59	0.049	18	65.42	2.59	0.049	18	55.23	2.59	0.049	
Step 1		4	45.49	70.90	0.000	4	4.88	59.86	0.300	4	5.82	78.53	0.213	4	7.84	74.17	0.088	4	6.03	80.79	0.197	4	2.57	76.47	0.632	
Step 2		6	3.81	70.59	0.729	6	18.75	67.35	0.005	6	16.91	77.30	0.010	6	7.25	73.51	0.298	6	3.54	81.46	0.739	6	7.56	75.00	0.272	
Step 3		2	7.22	77.54	0.027	2	40.00	76.87	0.000	2	36.80	84.66	0.000	2	8.09	79.47	0.018	2	13.77	83.44	0.001	2	6.81	78.68	0.033	
Step 4		7	27.25	81.28	0.000	7	21.19	77.55	0.004	5	13.63	87.73	0.018	6	42.25	85.43	0.000	6	32.90	86.09	0.000	6	24.57	83.82	0.000	
Model		19	83.57	2.59	0.049	19	84.82	2.59	0.049	17	73.16	2.59	0.049	18	65.42	2.59	0.049	18	55.23	2.59	0.049	18	41.51	2.59	0.049	

Appendix 8.1. Discord between Factional Leaders and SIBFE Deputies in the Russian CPD

Political Factions	Leading Figures	Within the Leadership			SIBFE Deputies				
		2nd- 5th CPD	6th CPD	7th CPD	2nd- 5th CPD	6th CPD	7th CPD		
		(12)	(5)	(5)	N	M	M	N	M
GROUP 1 (CR)									
Radical Democrats	S. N. Iushenkov*	(11)	(2)	(4)	8	6.1	5.6	11	7.3
	V. K. Varov	7.3	0.0	7.5					
	B. A. Denisenko	8.2	5.0	10.0					
	S. F. Zasukin	6.4	5.0	7.5					
Democratic Russia	V. V. Volkov*	(10)	(4)	(4)	17	6.9	10.0	10	7.5
	G. P. Iakumin	6.0	7.5	10.0					
	L.A. Ponomariov	5.0	0.0	10.0					
Agreement for the Progress	Iu. M. Nesterov*	(10)	(5)	(3)	-	-	-	13	2.3
	V. Sheinis	5.0	6.0	3.3					
	V. Lysenko	3.0	10.0	0.0					
GROUP 2 (DC)									
Left Centre	E. V. Basin*	(9)	(4)	(5)	3	3.3	6.7	12	-0.4
	B. E. Nemtsov	2.2	2.5	-2.0					
	S. V. Stepashin	4.4	0.0	6.0					
Free Russia	I.V. Vinogradova*	(12)	(5)	(5)	10	4.0	6.0	11	4.2
	N. I. Travkin	0.0	6.0	-2.0					
	N. T. Riabov	1.7	8.0	0.0					
Motherland	V. I. Morokin*	(12)	(5)	(5)	-	-	-	6	-0.3
Sovereignty & Equality	U. E. Temirov*	(10)	(2)	(1)	14	2.6	3.6	18	5.6
	R. G. Abdulatipov	2.0	0.0	-					
GROUP 3 (CS)									
Workers' Union	V. V. Chernov*	(9)	(5)	(5)	12	5.3	4.3	15	2.4
	E. I. Ostpenko	-6.7	-2.0	0.0					
Smena	A. L. Golovin*	(7)	(3)	(4)	6	0.0	3.9	13	2.5
	S. A. Polozkov	5.7	10.0	5.0					
	I. V. Muravbirov	5.7	6.7	7.5					
Industrial Union	Iu. G. Gekht*	(8)	(3)	(5)	18	2.9	1.9	9	4.0
	V. V. Bespalov	-1.3	3.3	0.0					
GROUP 4 (RU)									
Fatherland	A. M. Tuleev*	(9)	(5)	(5)	11	0.9	3.1	10	6.6
	V. A. Achalov	2.2	8.0	6.0					
Agrarian Union	M. I. Lapshin*	(11)	(5)	(5)	23	4.7	5.7	24	4.9
Rossia	S. N. Baburin*	(7)	(2)	(2)	19	5.2	5.5	26	7.3
	N. A. Pavlov	4.3	10.0	10.0					
	S. P. Goriavcheva	7.1	10.0	10.0					
	I. V. Fedoseev	5.7	0.0	10.0					
Communists of Russia	I. P. Rybkin*	(12)	(2)	(4)	13	6.7	9.6	13	7.7
	V. V. Chikin	5.0	10.0	10.0					
	Iu. M. Voronin	3.3	-10.0	2.5					
Group 5 (Others)									
Non-Party Deputies	V.O. Ispravnikov*	(7)	(2)	-	10	7.0	2.5	-	-
Civic Union	M. G. Astafev*	(7)	(1)	-	8	-0.2	-6.3	-	-

Scores indicate distance from leading figures, ranging from +10 for the identical vote with the factional leader to -10 for the contradictory vote. If a leader abstained from voting, then the case is dropped. If an ordinary member abstained from voting, 0 point is given.

Figures in brackets indicate the valid number of votes included in the calculation.

Leading figures in V. D. Gelbras (ed.), *Kto est chto* (Moskva: Satallakhu, 1993), pp. 16-65.

Appendix 8.2. Regional Differentiation of Voters' Support for Eltsin in the Presidential Elections and Referendums (1990-1993)

Regional Groups	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Min.	Max.		Sum of Square	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound								
Referendum (March 1991, on the Russian presidency)														
Higher	7	79.99	3.02	1.14	77.19	82.78	77.10	86.00	Between Groups	2893.49	6	482.25	26.78	0.000
High	17	71.60	2.46	0.60	70.33	72.87	64.10	74.60	Within Groups	1386.84	77	18.01		
Average	24	66.48	4.95	1.01	64.39	68.56	55.70	73.90	Total	4280.32	83			
Low	5	56.56	3.03	1.35	52.80	60.32	52.40	59.90						
Decreasing	28	65.69	4.84	0.91	63.81	67.57	54.40	72.80						
Sharply dec.	2	71.65	1.48	1.05	58.31	84.99	70.60	72.70						
Increasing	1	39.80	39.80	39.80						
Total	84	67.59	7.18	0.78	66.03	69.15	39.80	86.00						
Presidential Election (June 1991)														
Higher	7	72.71	6.30	2.38	66.88	78.54	67.23	84.80	Between Groups	7834.97	6	1305.83	33.26	0.000
High	17	59.70	4.94	1.20	57.16	62.24	50.43	69.93	Within Groups	3023.17	77	39.26		
Average	24	47.04	7.29	1.49	43.97	50.12	31.05	56.41	Total	10858.14	83			
Low	5	32.99	6.13	2.74	25.38	40.61	22.39	37.72						
Decreasing	28	52.64	6.13	1.16	50.26	55.01	37.57	63.88						
Sharply dec.	2	63.82	2.88	2.04	37.90	89.74	61.78	65.86						
Increasing	1	17.45	17.45	17.45						
Total	84	52.82	11.44	1.25	50.34	55.30	17.45	84.80						
Referendum (April 1993, on the confidence in the President)														
Higher	7	78.06	5.33	2.01	73.13	82.99	71.50	84.40	Between Groups	11533.70	6	1922.28	66.52	0.000
High	17	67.94	4.67	1.13	65.53	70.34	60.80	76.80	Within Groups	2225.27	77	28.90		
Average	24	60.88	5.34	1.09	58.63	63.14	48.70	70.50	Total	13758.98	83			
Low	5	47.28	3.87	1.73	42.47	52.09	43.20	51.80						
Decreasing	28	47.05	5.84	1.10	44.79	49.32	35.80	55.50						
Sharply dec.	2	20.05	8.27	5.85	-54.28	94.38	14.20	25.90						
Increasing	1	48.90	48.90	48.90						
Total	84	57.21	12.88	1.40	54.41	60.00	14.20	84.40						
Referendum (April 1993, 'yes' for question 1, 2, and 4 & 'no' for question 3)														
Higher	7	51.26	4.76	1.80	48.85	55.66	46.20	60.40	Between Groups	2603.83	6	433.97	18.80	0.000
High	17	45.16	3.15	0.76	43.54	46.78	40.30	50.30	Within Groups	1777.10	77	23.08		
Average	24	40.05	7.31	1.49	36.97	43.14	10.25	51.60	Total	4380.94	83			
Low	5	38.28	1.61	0.72	34.28	38.28	34.40	38.30						
Decreasing	28	38.67	2.84	0.50	35.64	37.69	32.20	41.40						
Sharply dec.	2	19.35	7.42	5.25	-47.36	86.06	14.10	24.60						
Increasing	1	34.30	34.30	34.30						
Total	84	40.11	7.27	0.79	38.53	41.68	10.25	60.40						
Referendum (December 1993, on the Constitution)														
Higher	7	74.86	4.43	1.67	70.77	78.96	67.53	78.37	Between Groups	9266.33	6	1544.39	34.59	0.000
High	17	65.05	7.09	1.72	61.40	68.69	54.67	79.04	Within Groups	3438.14	77	44.65		
Average	24	63.04	7.71	1.57	59.78	66.29	48.37	79.45	Total	12704.47	83			
Low	5	53.38	3.43	1.53	49.12	57.64	47.45	55.90						
Decreasing	28	47.12	6.32	1.19	44.87	49.57	38.14	61.03						
Sharply dec.	2	23.96	4.94	3.49	-20.38	68.30	20.47	27.45						
Increasing	1	67.63	67.63	67.63						
Total	84	57.67	12.37	1.35	54.99	60.36	20.47	79.45						

* In the analysis, regions that boycotted March 1991 referendum (RSFSR question) were excluded.

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