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STRUCTURE AND STRATEGY IN
PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATING POLITICS SINCE 1960

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My wife, Joan, accepted the hours consumed by this work with patience and understanding. My father continued to show (misplaced) faith in my educational progress. Probably neither of them will ever read a word of this thesis, and I suspect that the gain is all theirs.

The errors in what follows are all my own. That they are not more numerous is attributable to the help I received from others.

SUMMARY

This study analyses the impact of institutional change upon political behaviour. Beginning in 1968 a series of reforms transformed the American presidential nominating process, amounting to the most substantial changes since the inception of national conventions. This study seeks to comprehend the effects of this transformation upon the strategies employed by candidates and in so doing assessing the influence upon the nominating process of various actors - party leaders, voters, interest groups, campaign organisations.

The comparative method is adopted to elucidate the impact of change. The content and execution of strategy is compared across continuous periods, the nominations immediately before (1960 - 68) and after (1972 - 1980) reform.

A party function, candidate selection, is set within a theoretical discussion of party. Familiar models of party are examined and criticised for their inapplicability to the American case for their omission of an intra-party role for voters. An additional ideal type model is developed of a party dominated by voters - the application of direct democracy to intra-party affairs. This additional type is integrated into the schemes analysed earlier, increasing their relevance to American practice and providing a set of logical possibilities against which party reform can be measured.

Previous reforms of the presidential nominating process are described and recurrent trends identified. The background to the impetus for reform originating in the discontents of the McCarthy campaign to mobilise voters into the party-dominated selection process

is described. The composition and functioning of the Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection authorised in 1968 to recommend reform proposals is discussed. The implementation of reform, its unintended consequences, the work of subsequent reform commissions in the Democratic Party, change in the Republican Party and innovations in the regulation of campaign finance are detailed.

The combined impact of these reforms transformed the context of nominating campaigns. Primaries became the dominant delegate selection mechanism. The non-primary process was opened to extensive voter participation. In both processes the linkage between the candidate preferences of participating voters and the resulting delegates tightened. The size of campaign donations was limited, federal funds became available, and ceilings were placed on total expenditures for recipients of federal aid.

Having depicted the altered context of the nominating contest the study analyses the content and execution of strategy in the two periods. The basis for comparison include the choices of strategies, the form of campaign organisation and their relations with party organisations, the conditions of interest group influence, the role in strategy of the primary and non-primary processes, the content of candidates' appeals and the means employed to communicate the campaign.

The conclusion re-states the principal strategic differences between the two periods. The strategic consequences of reform are linked to the effects of previous reform efforts, and the model of parties developed earlier.

CONTENTS

	Page
Acknowledgements	i
Summary	ii
 CHAPTER	
I INTRODUCTION	1
 II MODELS OF PARTIES AND NOMINATIONS	14
Models of Party	15
Presidential Nominations and Party Models ..	24
The 1960's: The Continuing Relevance of the Conventional Wisdom	33
 III THE COURSE OF REFORM	50
Trends in Reform of the Nominating Process ..	51
Background to the Post-1968 Democratic Party Reforms	60
Reform Agencies in Action	72
The Implementation of Reform	84
Reform in the Republican Party	98
Campaign Finance Reform	106
Conclusion	109
 IV CAMPAIGN STRATEGY	118
A Typology of Strategies	119
Strategy and the Participant Bias	138
Strategy and Interest Group Mobilisation ..	145
Conclusion	153

		Page
CHAPTER		
V	CAMPAIGN ORGANISATION	161
	Campaign Personnel	162
	Party - Campaign Organisation Relations ..	168
	Fund Raising Organisation	174
	Conclusion	180
VI	THE ROLE OF PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES	186
	Primaries and Candidate Type	187
	The Role of Primaries in Campaign Strategy ..	191
	The Logic of Primary Inactivity	211
	The Effect of Primary Defeats	219
	The Contribution of Primary Victories to Improved Competitive Position	227
	Primary Sequence and Strategy	235
	Conclusion	242
VII	THE ROLE OF THE NON-PRIMARY PROCESS	253
	Candidate Strategy in the Non-Primary Process	255
	Primaries and Caucuses: The Relationship ..	262
	Strategy and Power in the Non-Primary Process	272
	Delegate Selection as a Function of Organisation: From Party to Candidate	286
	The Timing and Magnitude of Delegate Commitments	292
	Conclusion	303
VIII	THE CONTENT OF CAMPAIGNS	312
	Campaigns and the Party	316
	Issues and Ideology	329
	Personal Traits and Character	342
	Conclusion	350

	Page
CHAPTER	
IX	
COMMUNICATING THE CAMPAIGN	357
The Personalised Campaign	358
The Pre-Reform Role of Media	360
The Post-Reform Mass Media Campaign	368
Conclusion	379
X	
CONCLUSION	385
BIBLIOGRAPHY	393

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Beginning in 1968 the structure of the presidential nominating process, little changed since the inception of presidential primaries early in the twentieth century, was transformed by changes in the mechanisms of delegate selection and the laws of campaign financing. The cumulative impact of these changes - some of them unintended - was the most substantial alteration in the structure of the nominating process since national conventions were introduced in the 1830's.

Changes in structure required changes in strategy (defined as courses of action adopted to maximise advantage pursued to achieve desired goals). For structure - the rules, laws and procedures which regulate the conduct of the contest - must condition strategy for the latter to be effective. The structure defines the eligible participants, their rights and available resources, identifies the electorate and the mechanisms utilised to decide the outcome.

But strategy in presidential nominations has received little systematic study, despite the frequency of references to it in discussions of campaigns by candidates, their staffs and journalists. The existing literature takes three forms which can be labelled respectively, narrative accounts, strategic types and theoretical applications.

Narrative accounts derive from journalists, candidates and campaign staffs. They are found in either specific campaign histories or as parts of larger works of biography and autobiography. Such works provide considerable detailed information on the personnel, planning and conduct of campaigns.¹ Though useful sources of information, the scholarly value of such works is constrained by their

descriptive rather than analytical style and their focus upon a particular candidate or election year, with little attempt to generalise beyond these confines.

Strategic types are generated in the course of academic works on presidential nominations². The breakdown into types permits some rule-of-thumb means for distinguishing between candidates in their approach to the nomination and establishing links across different campaigns and election years. The word types is preferred to typologies because a deficiency of these works is a discussion of strategy which fails to specify the variables by which candidates are differentiated. Nor are the types exhaustive in their coverage of all possible strategies.

For example, Polsby and Wildavsky specified only three types writing in the early 1960's - president, front runner, dark horse - which are statements more of competitive standing than of strategy³. The category front runner is characterised by aggressive campaigning in primaries and state conventions. But such a depiction conflates activities that could be pursued independently of one another. The types are too broad which necessitate the grouping together of candidates who in many respects pursued dissimilar strategies (for example, Roosevelt in 1932 and Kefauver in 1952). This imprecision entails categorising candidates according to specifications with which their campaigns were considerably at variance. For example, in the 1952 Democratic contest major contenders Harriman, Barkley and Russell fall easily into neither of the two possible types available when the president is not a contender.

Gerald Pomper generates four types - dominant leader, popular hero, favourite son and organisation man⁴. This analysis does possess an unstated dimension for distinguishing between the candidates

- the location of their support - but it does not differentiate candidates by the degree of their campaign activity. In consequence, campaigns conducted in a markedly different manner are merged into a single type. The organisation man incorporates all candidates, except favourite sons, whose campaigns were concentrated within the party organisations irrespective of their activity level. Thus an active candidate conducting an organisation-based campaign such as Landon in 1936 would be categorised with an inactive, apparent non-candidate such as Stevenson in 1952.

Both these efforts at strategic typing also suffer from the employment of strategies that were anachronisms as plausible routes to the nomination by the time they were written. Favourite sons and dark horses were plausible nominees when availability was the paramount characteristic sought in nominees. They could be selected by autonomous conventions where the conditions for bargaining were present. The terms dark horse and favourite son appear in nineteenth century descriptions of national conventions when these conditions were present.⁵ But by the 1960's public prominence was displacing availability as the essential quality for nominees, as Pomper argued.⁶ Where prominence was required, candidates possessed of localised support or obscurity were implausible as nominees.

James Ceaser's threefold strategic types do possess a clear dimension for differentiating candidates. The inside, outside, and mixed strategies were distinguishable by the different bases of candidate support - amongst the party, the voters or the two in combination.⁷

But Ceaser's inside type is subject to the same deficiencies as Pomper's organisation man. It makes no discrimination between the levels of candidate activity thereby leading to the equation of, for

example, Humphrey in 1968 with Stevenson in 1952.

In discussing the mixed type Ceaser concedes that there is a distinction within it based upon differentiated levels of candidate activity⁸. The personally inactive Roosevelt in 1932 and Smith in 1928 are thus distinguished from Dewey in 1940 and Taft in 1952. But this distinction is not employed to generate a new type, nor is it used to make a differentiation within the two pure types.

Theoretical applications are those works which utilise either formal or empirically-derived theories to comprehend strategy. Rational choice, game and coalition theories have been used to this end⁹. These approaches provide a systematisation of the details of nomination campaigns and attempt comprehensive explanations of candidate strategy and behaviour.

The studies employing formal theory evidence the problems common to such approaches. Constructed from a series of rational standards, when applied to explain strategy and behaviour in the 'real world' they impart a degree of rationality which cannot be sustained by the empirical evidence. (These works do use the theories as explanations of 'real world' conduct. They do not seek to test such conduct against the standards of formal theory).

'Real world' strategies may be based upon misperceptions - Johnson's 1960 campaign assumed that members of Congress were powers in their state parties; McCarthy's campaign in 1968 concentrated on the primary states although they provided only a minority of the total delegates; Muskie's 1972 candidacy sought support amongst party leaders in a process requiring the mobilisation of voters.¹⁰ Secondly, rational strategies may be devised but prove impracticable. Constraints are imposed by campaign staffs, loyal supporters, contributors and sheer accidents. One of the editors of the first Harvard University

Institute of Politics election post-mortem recognised the intrusion of irrational features in campaigns' treatment of issues -

"positions on issues may reflect neither principle nor calculation but (may) be products instead of problems within the campaign organisation or accidental results of the way the organisation works, the prearranged schedule, or sheer coincidence. A speech taking a particular line on a particular subject may seem necessary from the manager's standpoint in order to appease some factions in headquarters that do not necessarily have any large counterpart in the electorate. The speech may have a certain character because some ghostwriters happen to be on the scene when others are not; the pressure of time permits their text to be used without clearance at headquarters; and the candidate becomes committed to a posture that he might otherwise not have adopted." ¹¹

Internal pressures, organisational deficiencies, coincidences and accidents are regular hazards of campaigns. Attempts to explain them as guided by rational standards are inevitably a distortion.

A second distortion in formal theoretical applications derives from their employment of assumptions and propositions which are contradicted by the available evidence, thereby reducing their value as explanations of actual campaigns. For example, John Aldrich's treatment of issue discussion in the 1976 Democratic contest contains the assertions that the vote-maximising strategy of fuzziness used by Carter did not prove damaging because only Republicans charged him with ambiguity. ¹² Yet Witcover reports the use of fuzziness against Carter by his Democratic opponents including Udall's incorporation of the charge into his advertising in the Michigan primary campaign. ¹³ Aldrich maintains that the substantial shifts in candidates' poll standings were attributable to the importance of electability in winning the nomination - as Carter emerged as the most electable candidate so voters shifted towards him. ¹⁴ But surveys of those voters who participated in primaries indicated that electability had low priority for Democratic voters in 1976. ¹⁵

In his chapter-length application of game theory to the nominating process Steven Brams states that: no candidate defeated in primaries is ever likely to reach the national convention; issues take precedence over alternative voter cues, and issues are of more importance in primaries than in general elections¹⁶. The evidence contradicts all three propositions. It is untrue, and, for a book published after 1976, bizarre to argue that candidates defeated in primaries fail to reach the convention (no special definition of defeat is offered). In 1976 Ford lost ten preference primaries and Carter nine yet both were nominated. Voting studies show that candidate factors usually outweigh issues in deciding candidate preference in the primaries.¹⁷ The incidence of issue voting in the 1976 primaries attained the general election level only on the Republican side, and this was a year in which issue voting fell in the presidential election from that obtaining in the preceding elections.¹⁸

Though based on an empirical rather than formal theory, John Kessel's coalitional approach betrays deficiencies common to the latter type. The author's discussion of Republican strategies in 1964 defines proto-coalitions for each candidate based on shared attitudes - of ideology, regional interest, perception of a likely winner.¹⁹

But no evidence is adduced to show that the campaign organisations perceived their potential support in these terms and confirmation of this approach in other sources is available only for Goldwater. The author thus imposes his own modes of thinking and logic on candidate organisations in what is intended as an empirical discussion of their strategies.

Secondly, though Kessel attempts some systematic understanding

of candidates' potential constituencies, his treatment of the means to mobilising them has no theoretical basis. Rather, the execution of strategies is based upon familiar assumptions such as the need for primary victories for Rockefeller because he lacked support in the party; Nixon's necessary inactivity and withholding from criticism of other candidates to enable him to capitalise on deadlock; Goldwater's reliance on his conservatism and diligence on the party's behalf as sources of support. Kessel's discussion of the execution of strategy is a narrative account.

Common to all three categories of literature is the discussion of strategy within a single structural context (Ceaser excepted). They deal either with a single election year or a longer period in which the structure remained stable.

This study is concerned with the responses in candidate strategy to structural change. It focuses upon the nominations on either side of the reforms commenced in 1968, the national conventions of 1960 - 1968, 1972 - 1980. Studying contiguous periods facilitates an assessment of the impact of structural change whilst as far as possible holding constant all other sources of change which impinge upon the nominating process.

The impact of structural reform is assessed in relation to the types of strategy adopted, and its execution is then related to the forms of campaign organisation, the role of primary and non-primary delegate selection mechanisms, the content of candidates' appeals, the role of political actors such as party leaders, voters, interest groups and the mass media in deciding the nomination.

Candidate selection is one of the principal functions of political parties. Chapter Two thus seeks to set American presidential nominations within a general understanding of parties. Typologies of party are examined for their relevance to the American party. Deficiencies are identified and a typology elaborated better equipped to incorporate the American case.

The literature on pre-reform nominations, termed the conventional wisdom, is surveyed. The attributes of nominations depicted in this literature are then utilised to locate national convention decision-making within the typology fashioned earlier.

The explanatory value of the conventional wisdom for understanding pre-reform nominations is then assessed. Cases which deviate from its generalisations are identified, and reasons for these deficiencies specified. The characteristics of nominating politics in the immediate pre-reform period are described and the argument is made that most cases conform to the propositions of the conventional wisdom. As generalisations, the conventional wisdom retained its validity into the 1960's.

Chapter Three covers the history of reform of the presidential nominating process. The major shifts in the development of the nominating process from the introduction of national conventions to 1960 are described. The pressures and rationales for each change are specified and trends common in the course of reform are defined. This is followed by an extensive discussion of the post-1968 reforms. Explanations for the nature and magnitude of the reform effort are provided. The principal changes in structure between the pre- and post-reform periods are summarised.

Chapter Four characterises the strategies adopted by candidates in the two periods. A systematic and exhaustive typology of strategy

is developed for the pre-reform period. Major candidates are categorised by strategic type and the execution of their strategies described. The effects of structural reform upon strategy are demonstrated by using the pre-reform classification scheme to type post-reform candidates' strategies. This registers the shift in choice of strategies, and modifications in the way they were executed after reform are noted.

Influential actors in the two nominating systems are identified. In the pre-reform period the locus of power was the party leaders. In the voter-dominated system the locus shifted to high turnout elements amongst the electorate. The role of interest groups in the nominating process is described and the conditions for group influence under each system defined. The effects of reform upon group influence is demonstrated by an analysis of the role of two groups which possessed veto power over pre-reform nominations, a position which has since eroded. Explanations for this decline are offered.

The fifth chapter compares campaign organisations in the two periods. The bases for comparison are campaign personnel, relations with state and local parties, and fund raising organisation.

Chapters Six and Seven define the changed roles of the primary and non-primary processes after reform. Primaries evince contrasts between the periods in the range of candidates employing them, the rationale for doing so, and the extent of their use. The increased impact of the post-reform primaries is elaborated and explanations provided for the changes in emphasis assigned to the various state contests by the candidate organisations.

Chapter Seven registers the impact in the shift from caucuses controlled by party leaders to ones dominated by voters. The candidates' relationship to the party organisations ceased to be the pivot

upon which success in non-primary processes hinged. Open caucuses facilitated delegate recruitment in non-primary states by insurgent candidates mobilising voter support where formerly they had been excluded. The linkage between primary and non-primary processes in the two periods is defined.

Campaign content in the two periods is described in Chapter Eight. The dimensions for comparison are the candidates' presentations of themselves in relation to their parties, issues and ideology, their traits and characters. Changes in emphasis over the two periods are related to shifts in the composition of the nominating electorate and the participant bias.

The communication of the campaign is analysed in Chapter Nine. The pre- and post-reform periods provide contrasts between personalised and mediated campaigns. Reform inspired shifts in influence upon the nomination from the prestige press to the popular media; and an increased dependence upon news reportage when spending limitations curbed the use of media advertising. The increased dependence upon reportage encouraged news-generating strategies and a responsiveness to the foci of media attention to obtain coverage.

The final chapter seeks to draw the preceding bases of comparison together. The principal differences between the two periods are restated. The characteristics of reformed structure are located within the party models discussed earlier, and within the history of nominating process reform.

NOTES

1. The commercial market for such works was first demonstrated by Theodore H. White, The Making of the President 1960 (London: Cape, 1962). Other works of this genre outstanding for the specification of strategic premises and the details of their execution include Lewis Chester, Godfrey Hodgson and Bruce Page, An American Melodrama: The Presidential Campaign of 1968 (New York: Viking, 1969); Gary Warren Hart, Right From the Start: A Chronicle of the McGovern Campaign (New York: Quadrangle, 1973); Jules Witcover, Marathon: The Pursuit of the Presidency, 1972 - 1976 (New York: Viking, 1977). Beginning in 1972 the Institute of Politics at Harvard University initiated roundtable discussions of the year's nominations and elections between campaign personnel and political reporters. Edited versions of the discussion have subsequently been published. The first and most illuminating of the series is Ernest R. May and Janet Fraser, eds., Campaign '72: The Managers Speak (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973).
2. Examples of such works include Nelson W. Polsby and Aaron B. Wildavsky, "Uncertainty and Decision-Making at the National Conventions", in Nelson W. Polsby, Robert A. Dentler and Paul A. Smith, eds., Politics and Social Life (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963), 370-89; Gerald M. Pomper, Nominating the President: The Politics of Convention Choice (New York: Norton, 1966); James W. Ceaser, Presidential Selection: Theory and Development (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979).
3. Polsby and Wildavsky, op. cit., pp. 381-86.
4. Pomper, op. cit., pp. 115-20.

5. James Bryce, The American Commonwealth (London: Macmillan, 1888), Vol. II, pp. 551-54; M. Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Organisation of Political Parties (New York: Macmillan, 1902), Vol. II, pp. 251-52.
6. Pomper, op. cit., pp. 129-33.
7. Ceaser, op. cit., 228-30.
8. Ibid., pp. 228-29.
9. Examples of each theory are John M. Aldrich, Before the Convention: Strategies and Choices in Presidential Nomination Campaigns (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1980); Steven J. Brams, The Presidential Election Game (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1978); John H. Kessel, The Goldwater Coalition: Republican Strategies in 1964 (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968).
10. White, op. cit., pp. 134-35, 142-43; Richard T. Stout, People (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), pp. 290-91; Theodore H. White, The Making of the President 1972 (London: Cape, 1974), pp.78-80.
11. Ernest R. May, "Introduction", in May and Fraser, op. cit., p.26.
12. Aldrich, op. cit., p.171.
13. Witcover, op. cit., pp. 337-39.
14. Aldrich, op. cit., 172-73.
15. James David Gopoian, "Issue Voting in Presidential Primary Elections: A Comparative State Analysis of the 1976 Presidential Primaries" (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1980), chap. 5.
16. Brams, op. cit., pp.3-4.
17. Gopoian, op. cit., chap. 5; James Edward Campbell, "A Causal Analysis of Voting Behavior in Presidential Primary Elections" (Ph.D. diss., Syracuse University, 1980), chap. 2; Daniel C. Williams, Stephen J. Weber, Gordon A. Haaland,* Ronald M. Mueller and Robert E. Craig, "Voter Decisionmaking in a Primary Election: An Evaluation of Three Models of Choice", American Journal of

Political Science, 20 (February 1976), 37-49; Mark J. Wattier,

"The Simple Act of Voting in 1980 Democratic Presidential Primaries."

American Politics Quarterly, 11 (July 1983), 267-92.

18. Gopoian, op. cit., chap. 6

19. Kessel, op. cit., chap. 2.

CHAPTER TWO

MODELS OF PARTIES AND NOMINATIONS

This chapter seeks to provide a theoretical framework in which to comprehend the pre-reform presidential nominating process. The first section relates familiar typologies of party to the American case. Pre-reform conventions were populated by party organisations so a knowledge of the structural and operational variants of party contributes to an understanding of the process and outcomes of conventions.

The analysis of party types leads to the conclusion that they are of limited utility for comprehending the American variant. In no typology is a role assigned to voters in intra-party affairs which is a distinctive characteristic of American parties. A revision is offered to the theories of party elaborating an additional type which specifies an extensive role for voters in party affairs. American parties are then located on a continuum bounded by this new construct (the Voter Dominated type) and the Cadre/Rational Efficient models generated by Duverger and William E. Wright respectively.

This modified model of parties is utilised in the second section of the chapter to comprehend descriptions of the presidential nominating process to 1960. These descriptions are collectively referred to as the conventional wisdom or the traditional model. (The latter term is used loosely for the original authors did not claim theoretical sophistication for their work). The traditional model defined the characteristics of national conventions and sought to explain process and outcomes in relation to them. However, the conventional wisdom is deficient in producing explanations of some convention processes and outcomes. Most nominations are comprehensible within

its propositions but there are inexplicable exceptions. Suggestions are offered for modifications of the conventional wisdom in order to accommodate this minority of cases.

The third section considers the applicability of the conventional wisdom to the nominations of the 1960's, the immediate pre-reform period. By the 1960's the political, international, social and technological environment of presidential nominations had altered so rapidly since the New Deal that some writers argued that the context of nominating politics had been transformed so as to render the conventional wisdom an anachronism. An examination of the 1960's nominations, however, rejects this proposition. The conventional wisdom retained its explanatory power for most cases. Exceptions to the traditional model are identified but they betray characteristics similar to earlier conventions that, as discussed in the preceding section, were not comprehensible within the conventional wisdom. If the suggested modifications to the model are incorporated the validity of the conventional wisdom persisted for all cases into the 1960's.

Models of Party

Two theories of parties are particularly pertinent to an attempt to comprehend the American example, and in particular the making of nominations by such parties. Maurice Duverger's structural differentiation of party according to styles of membership is well-known, its concepts widely used and an explicit attempt is made to subsume American nominating practices within the typology¹. William E. Wright's differentiation of parties according to their primary goals is a synthesis of several writers (including Duverger) in their attempts to define types of party. Wright provides a detailed exposition of

variables, and delineates internal party processes including the selection of candidates². Furthermore, several of the original authors from which Wright's typology is derived are specialists in the American party system³. They are, therefore, familiar with its peculiarities and their general typologies should thus be sensitive to the American case.

For Duverger, Cadre and Mass parties are distinguishable by the criterion of membership. In the former there is no formal membership. The party's activities, including candidate selection, are controlled by a small number of notables⁴. Selection criteria are loose, permitting the choice of independents without previous attachment to the party⁵. Mass parties, in contrast, provide for formal membership. Candidate selection is a process open to member participation⁶. Selection criteria are strict, often restricting eligibility to party members with a specified period of service⁷.

Wright's distinction of alternative ideal type parties rests on their principal objectives. Parties of the Rational Efficient type emphasise electoral victory. Structurally they resemble Duverger's Cadre type with no formal membership and control by leaders⁸. The pattern of leadership recruitment is pluralistic, being either self-recruited or introduced from outside the party organisation⁹. Little attention is devoted to policy making or intra-party democracy. The latter is considered dysfunctional to the primary objective of winning elections¹⁰. The incentives to involvement in the party are material, and the prime beneficiaries of party activity are its elected officials.¹¹

The Party Democracy model emphasises ideological goals. Elections are won to implement policies rather than policies being devised to maximise votes. Structurally the party is equivalent to Duverger's Mass type¹². There is a formal membership and strong grass-roots

organisation. There is an institutionalised career pattern of leaders recruited from within the party.¹³ Great attention is devoted to policy making and intra-party democracy is encouraged.¹⁴ The incentives to involvement in party affairs are purposive, and the party's members are the prime beneficiaries of its activities.¹⁵

Both Duverger and Wright's formulations can be faulted for their inapplicability to American parties. In both theories the significant political actors are confined to party leaders and members. Yet a distinctive feature of American parties is the role exercised by voters in party affairs. Voters select candidates for many public offices, and local party officials are also often selected in primaries and caucuses open to voters who are not formally party members. Through caucuses and primaries voters have been assigned prominence in American intra-party decision-making which is without parallel in other western party systems.¹⁶

Whilst the day-to-day running of American parties may be conducted by a handful of leaders, some decisions are removed from their control. Responsibility is thus divided between notables (the locus of authority in Cadre and Rational Efficient parties), and the voters who are not assigned a direct role in any of the four party types generated by Duverger and Wright. In American parties, if no others, the alternative source of authority to leaders are the voters.

Duverger seeks an accommodation of some American parties to his typology by regarding voters in 'closed' primary states as equivalent to party members. Registration of voters by party identification is equated with formal membership. The resultant parties are regarded as variants of the Mass type, awkwardly labelled "Semi-Mass".¹⁷

This adjustment to incorporate American parties can be questioned on three counts. First, it makes no reference to parties in states

holding 'open' primaries. Though Duverger describes the open primary method he is silent on its relationship to his typology of parties. In 'open' primary states there is no party registration, therefore there is no approximation to party membership. Parties in these states thus cannot be of the Mass or Semi-Mass type. Yet nor do they conform to the Cadre type because a major decision, candidate selection, is outside the leadership's control. This inconsistency between the Cadre type and voter participation limits the applicability of the Cadre model to American parties to which many subsequent writers have argued that they conform.¹⁸

Secondly, members and 'closed' primary registrants are not equal in their commitments to the party. Membership entails obligations. Members may be required to commit themselves to a body of principles as a pre-condition of entry. Membership dues have to be paid. Services such as canvassing, selling party literature etc. may be expected to be performed. In contrast, the registrant has no obligations. In some states the statement of a party preference is the only qualification necessary for party registration. Even the most demanding state laws require only an affirmation of past support for the party or contemporary sympathy with its candidates and principles (of which there is no official definition). Distinctions in commitment are also likely to appear in differing degrees of loyalty to the party in elections.¹⁹

Thirdly, Duverger's equation of party registrants with members is defective in that it exaggerates the degree to which 'closed' primaries restrict participation to party adherents. As already noted, the qualifications for registration are meagre. The laxity of eligibility for registration has inspired Austin Ramey to question the distinction in practice between the 'open' and 'closed' primary. He concludes that "so-called 'closed' primaries are just a hair more closed than

so-called 'open' primaries"²⁰. Studies of primary participants show that the closed primary type does curb voting by non-partisans in comparison with the open primary but their numbers are still substantial in the former.²¹ Thus in all American states the electorate - including but not restricted to loyal partisans - performs a role in party affairs which is not incorporated within Duverger's typology.

Neither can American voters be equated with members in Wright's Party Democracy model because the role performed by the former is inconsistent with the latter. In American parties voters control the selection of personnel. Members perform this function in the Party Democracy type but their principal task is policy formulation. In the American party case policy has not achieved major importance, and its formulation has resided with a few notables. Thus this major membership role in the Party Democracy type finds no equivalent voter responsibility in American party practice.

The equation of party voters with party members introduces a further discrepancy for Wright's formulation. Wright regards American parties as tending towards the Rational Efficient pole. Yet if voters are equated with members American parties obtain a characteristic (membership) which is contrary to the Rational Efficient model to which Wright assigns them. Either American parties have members or, alternatively, they are of the Rational Efficient type. By definition they cannot possess the former characteristic whilst corresponding to the latter type.

The principal deficiency in both Duverger and Wright's formulations which limits their relevance to the American party system is in a too restrictive conception of political actors and party goals. A theory of parties incorporating the American case must distinguish voters as political actors in intra-party affairs. It must also accommodate voter-determined objectives as the party's goals distinguishable from

the ends pursued by parties controlled by election-conscious notables and policy-oriented members respectively.

To establish a theoretical framework which comprehends the American case a third ideal type of party is proposed for incorporation into the scheme provided by Wright (the more detailed of the two typologies considered). This additional construct, the Voter Dominated model, seeks to define a party in which the influence of voters is at a maximum. It is the application of direct democracy to intra-party affairs.

In the Voter Dominated party all major decisions are determined by voters, the discretionary authority of party and public officials is minimal. Candidates for public and party office are determined through mechanisms accessible to voters such as primaries or open caucuses. Public officials are mandated to advance the party programme and subject to a constant stream of instructions as new issues arise. They are removable from office by party recall procedures. Party officialdom is minimal. They too are subject to instructions from voters and recallable. The party programme is derived from the voters through initiatives and referenda. The primary goal of the party is procedural rather than substantive - the preservation of the mechanisms within the party that facilitate voter control. The incentives to involvement in the party's affairs are provided by the 'ethic' of participation. The voters (precisely, the voters who participate) are the principal beneficiaries of the party's activities.

CHARACTERISTICS OF IDEAL TYPE PARTIES

Characteristics	Rational Efficient	Type of Party	Voter Dominated
STRUCTURAL:		Party Democracy	
Membership	Informal	Formal	Open
Basic organisational form	Cadre	Mass membership	Direct democracy
Allocation of authority	Autonomous sub-units; hierarchical control within sub-units	Centralised control; diffusion of control within sub-units	Centralised control through majority vote; diffusion of control within sub-units
FUNCTIONAL:			
Manifest functions	Electoral primarily	Range of functions: electoral, ideological, governing; ideological paramount	Participatory
Activities	Limited and intermittent; geared to electoral cycle	Extensive and continuous	Continuous, devoted to ascertaining voter preferences
Prime beneficiary	Elected officials	Members	Voters
Organisational incentives	Material	Purposive	Participatory 'ethic'
Operational style	Pragmatic	Ideological	Anti-organisational
Characteristics		Type of Party	
	Rational Efficient	Party Democracy	Voter Dominated
PROCESS:			
Policy making	Largely ignored	Central	Major importance, continuous.
Intra-party democracy	Little emphasis; member participation dysfunctional	Strong emphasis; member participation functional for elections and governing	Maximum emphasis; voter participation functional for democratic polity
Relation of party organisation to government party	Autonomy of government party; organisation has service functions only	Interdependence in policy making; norm of strong influence of party organisation on government party	Complete control of party in-government policy by voters

The utility of the Voter Dominated model derives from its contribution to a tri-polar scheme (in association with Wright's typology) to which American parties can be related with greater precision than is facilitated by Wright's continuum. The Voter Dominated pole also provides a standard against which the intentions and effects of participatory reform can be measured. And participation by voters in intra-party affairs is a recurring theme of American party reform efforts. The most successful reform efforts facilitated voter control of personnel. The adoption of conventions in the Jacksonian era permitted indirect voter control of candidate selection. The succession of conventions by primaries converted indirect to direct voter control. In many states direct voter control was also achieved over the selection of the lowest tier of party officials, the precinct committeemen.

Attempts to provide voters with leverage over programmes have been less prominent in American party reform history than those devoted to personnel. Though less successful than personnel control there have been numerous efforts, particularly in the Progressive era, to transplant control over platforms from the party organisation to the voters. Indirect control over policy may flow from platforms composed by convention delegates or nominees whose election is attributable to their policy stances. Particularly in the Progressive period there were efforts to make the voter-platform link a direct one. Robert La Follette, Sr., called for platforms formulated by committees elected "by and for the voters of each party"²². He argued that elected representatives possessed no right of independent judgement on those matters covered by the party platform that had been submitted to the electorate. The two La Follette proposals combined would result in elected representatives mandated to policies composed by

elected committees. The so-called Richards primary law in South Dakota required each grouping proposing candidates from the pre-primary convention to list a paramount issue, "a well-defined and definite proposal for public policy", the winning candidate and issue being placed automatically on the general election ballot.²³ The Richards law also permitted a party recall of elected officeholders for, inter alia, failure to adhere to party principles (although a successful recall only initiated an investigation by the party organisation, displacement was not automatic). A bill introduced into the Texas legislature in 1919 forbade parties from including in their state election platforms demands for specific legislation without prior ratification of a majority vote in a primary. In addition, convention delegates could be mandated on issues.²⁴

This brief survey reveals the variety of proposals designed to expand voter control of American parties. This is not to say that reformers operated with the Voter Dominated model as a guiding ideal but it provides a codification of the logical possibilities for reform against which actual proposals can be measured and 'real world' parties evaluated.

American parties have been characterised by organisational diversity including urban machines, amateur clubs, citizen parties and virtual disorganisation in many areas. But most of the legal party organisational forms (this excludes the extra-legal amateur clubs) can be located along a continuum between Rational Efficient and Voter Dominated types. Precinct committeemen and candidates for public office are now usually chosen by voters whilst other activities are conducted by the party cadre. The absence of formal membership and the relative inattention to policy remove the Mass Democracy model from relevance to American parties.

Presidential Nominations and Party Models

The preceding section located American party practice along a Rational Efficient - Voter Dominated continuum. In this section an attempt is made to locate a single component of that practice, the making of pre-reform presidential nominations, within that framework. The picture of pre-reform nominations derives from a summary of the 'conventional wisdom' drawn from standard texts on parties and nominations published by 1960²⁵.

Difficulties in characterising convention behaviour might have been encountered in their constituent nature: they consisted of state and local parties diverse in goals, structure and operating style. However, this complexity is not prominent in the conventional wisdom. For the limited purpose of making presidential nominations, political scientists appear to have ignored the diversity of American state and local parties or considered their variety irrelevant in understanding their behaviour in national conventions.

Into the 1960's the conventional wisdom on presidential nominations, like that on American parties in general, was consistent with the Rational Efficient party model. Decisions were controlled by a small number of leaders, the primary objective of the convention was to secure a winning ticket, the leaders' incentives were predominantly material.

However, as with American parties in general, there were elements of the Voter Dominated model in the presidential nominating process. The convention-caucus method of selecting delegates was adopted in many states from the inception of national conventions and often the first tier of this pyramidal process was open to voters. The introduction of presidential primaries early in the twentieth century tightened the linkage between voters and national convention dele-

gates in some states by removing the intermediary tiers of the caucus process which were immune from voter participation. Thus by the early twentieth century millions of voters participated in the various processes of selecting national convention delegates.

In comparison with other American party nominations those for the presidency created only a muted role for voters. The twentieth century diffusion of the primary was not as far-reaching for presidential nominations as for lower level offices. Presidential primaries were grafted on to national conventions, they did not replace them. In consequence, presidential primaries are not direct in that unlike state and local primaries they do not formally determine the nominee. Furthermore, several constraints operated to restrict the potential of these 'indirect' primaries to influence national convention decisions. Many states did not adopt presidential primaries, not all of those that were statutorily permissible were utilised and their number diminished after the waning of the Progressive surge. In those states where primaries were used the delegates emanating from them often retained their independence on the nominating decision. Either explicit mandates from voters were absent or advisory. Alternatively, the party organisations adapted to the intrusion of voters by adopting holding operations such as favourite son candidacies or organisation slates which deferred decisions on the major contenders until the convention.

The non-primary states (the majority) were even more unamenable to direct voter influence than the primaries. The vast majority of voters never utilised the opportunity to participate in caucuses. In addition, voter participation was confined to the lowest tier of the selection sequence. There was no provision for mandating first-tier delegates, their candidate preferences were rarely explicit and

their accountability to the electorate was elusive.

Surveying the presidential nominating process in the 1950's Ranney and Kendall rightly concluded :

"Party voters, it would seem, have less formal direct influence upon the choice of presidential candidates than that of candidates for most other offices in the United States."²⁶

This distinctive immunity of nominations at presidential level from direct voter influence renders them more than any other American party nomination intelligible within the Rational Efficient model. The 'fit' is an imperfect one for the model precludes voters from any direct influence on or participation in party affairs. However, because the degree and effect of direct voter involvement was modest the independence of the cadre was largely preserved, a condition of Rational Efficient decision-making.

The principal themes of the conventional wisdom on presidential nominations were leadership control, the primary goal of electoral victory and material incentives. Interwoven with these features were lesser themes of pragmatic decision-making and career pluralism in the recruitment of candidates.

Leadership Control

Though national conventions consisted of large numbers of delegates the distribution of power between them was unequal. Control within conventions was oligarchic. Blocs of delegates were controlled by leaders. Writing in 1960, Nelson Polsby noted, "A relatively few party leaders control the decisions of a large proportion of delegates to conventions."²⁸ Edward Flynn, a former national party chairman, estimated that considerably less than a hundred men dictated what occurred at national conventions.²⁸ Provided leaders

and bosses controlled votes it was not essential that they even be members of the convention to exercise a decisive influence over its deliberations. If they controlled votes, they possessed power.

Leadership control derived from the nature of the state parties represented in the convention. In most states the party organisations controlled the delegate selection process. Within the organisations power was distributed hierarchically ("centralization within decentralization"). Public office holders, particularly chief executives, and organisation leaders formed the apex of the party exercising control through patronage, favours and personal popularity. Party organisation control of delegate selection allied with a pyramidal distribution of influence within the parties meant that "such hierarchical controls as exist on the state and local levels ... assert themselves in the national convention"²⁹ (In fact, the hierarchical controls were probably exaggerated in conventions: factionalised state party conflicts could result in one group triumphing in delegate selection, and also the incentives to bloc voting encouraged centralised leadership).

The Primary Goal of Electoral Victory

The priority of general election victory in deciding between rival contenders for the nomination is encapsulated in Bryce's dictum that, "What the party wants is not a good president but a good candidate"³⁰. Seventy years after Bryce wrote, Polsby identified the same goal being pursued by party leaders, "The most important consideration for a politician in choosing a presidential nominee is the expectation that he will win election".³¹ An assumed precondition of electoral victory was party unity secured through the selection of candidates popular with or at least acceptable to every major faction.

In the absence of precise measures of electability potential candidates were assessed in terms of their 'availability'. In its idiomatic use the word bore no relation to the candidates' willingness to run but provided a codification of "the qualities the parties believe makes a politically appealing and acceptable - and thus winning - candidate."³² The criteria of availability required post-Civil War candidates to be to white, male, Anglo-Saxon, non-southern Protestants. Beyond these baseline requirements candidates from electorally pivotal states - ones both marginal and with a large bloc of Electoral College votes - were preferred. A candidate who could deliver a substantial base of home state votes had a high potential for winning the election. Thus populous swing states such as New York and Ohio were persistent suppliers of presidential nominees.³³

The priority of victory resulted in an absence of an institutionalised career structure because none could guarantee electoral popularity. In order to win elections candidates could be recruited from outside partisan politics. War heroes, administrators, judges and lawyers were recruited to enable the party to secure its objective. Lack of political experience was not a disqualification provided the candidate "had developed that intangible quality known as 'availability'."³⁴

The Material Incentive

Electoral victory was a means to an end. Only a winning candidate could satisfy the parties' needs for access to 'federal patronage and favours, and local election successes (providing their own access to rewards) generated by presidential candidates with vote-pulling power, the coat-tail effect. Patronage provided largesse for the leaders themselves and distributable rewards for the party faithful vital to

the maintenance of the organisation.

Federal patronage acted as an adhesive force in a decentralised party system. Access to the benefits of office were dependent upon victory which in turn was dependent upon unity. Thus the desire for patronage stimulated heterogeneous state and local parties to stay together.

Though party leaders co-operated to produce convention majorities they also competed to establish claims on the nominee. Through devices such as providing early support, making nominating speeches or switching support at a crucial juncture, the leaders sought to establish credit with the candidates. If elected, an appreciative candidate could be expected to reciprocate with rewards thereby enhancing the power of favoured leaders in their bailiwicks. Leaders' failures to deliver support could be punished by exclusion from rewards, thus explaining the leaders' desire to join a developing bandwagon.

The conventional wisdom summarised above was designed to explain the process and outcomes of national conventions. All processes and outcomes should be comprehensible within the propositions presented. Either all activity must be consistent with the propositions or exceptions must be explicable by reference to the operation of specified variables. However, the conventional wisdom failed to meet these tests. In general conventions were characterised by leadership control, the primary goal of electoral victory and material incentives, but there were exceptions in which these attributes were either absent or constrained in their impact. The conventional wisdom offered no explanation for the absence of these attributes or the configuration of nominating contests where they were lacking. Either they were overlooked or forced, Procrustes-like, into conformity with the conventional propositions.

Several characteristics inconsistent with the conventional wisdom which exemplified the Rational Efficient mode of organisation and decision-making are evident in some nominations. These exceptional characteristics can be summarised as:

1. The inability of leaders to control a nomination.
2. The triumph of purism over pragmatism.
3. The conflict between demands for organisational maintenance and for electoral victory.

The hierarchical model of state and local party power stressed the downward flow of authority in the convention. But the leaders were too deficient in sanctions to enforce compliance on rebellious delegates. Their position as leaders was dependent upon support from below. In the absence of sanctions this support was sustained by responsiveness to pressure. Where the pressure was intense the leaders had either to acquiesce to it or imperil their own positions. In these circumstances leadership was preserved by following.

Writing in the 1920's, Merriam and Gosnell noted the reluctant acquiescence of leaders in several conventions. Nominees such as Bryan and Wilson had been "opposed by powerful forces, usually dominating and actually holding the necessary votes to defeat them but not daring to act against the evident demand of the party."³⁵ This indicates that voter preferences could be a significant impact on convention decisions. The autonomy of the party leaders was a regular but not invariable feature of the nominating process. On occasions leaders were compelled to acquiesce to the pressure of their followers.

Secondly, the conventional wisdom emphasised the rational calculation of electoral chances as the yardstick for discriminating between the contending candidates. Intense candidate and issue commitments were not given prominence in accounting for convention

decisions. Polsby and Wildavsky noted in the early 1970's the purism of many delegates but regarded it as a recent development.³⁶ However, purist attributes are identifiable amongst the supporters of Bryan, and Theodore Roosevelt in 1912, for example.³⁷ Bryan's nominations betray little concern for electoral calculation. His 1896 nomination resulted from intense pressure from below upon the leaders. His two subsequent nominations occurred despite the decisive defeat of 1896 which produced a realignment ending the post-Civil War generation of closely contested presidential elections. Despite his evident 'unavailability' Bryan was renominated in 1900 and 1908 with little opposition.

Thirdly, the necessity of electoral victory flowed from the demand for access to patronage and favours. In the traditional formulations these demands for victory and maintenance are treated as consistent with one another. However, party organisations consist of individuals who seek to preserve their own positions and access to benefits. Yet for a president there is no necessity to preserve the existing party structure. The party cadre is replaceable. A president might distribute rewards outside the party or seek to re-order the distribution of influence within it. Where such a possibility arises for the existing party leadership the goals of electoral victory and preserving the party's structure of influence are antagonistic. Victory could lead to the displacement of existing leaders or a diminution of their influence. A defeat could preserve their positions.

James Q. Wilson in his characterisation of the professional (i.e. non-purist) orientation to politics identified many of the characteristics of party leaders evident in traditional descriptions of presidential nominations.³⁸ Wilson too placed great emphasis on

the pursuit of victory and patronage. But he also correctly recognised that the quest for these objectives was conditional :

"The professional, for whom politics primarily has extrinsic rewards, is preoccupied with maintaining his position in party and elective offices. Winning is essential, although sometimes electoral victory must be subordinated to maintaining the party organisation!"³⁹

The antagonism between victory and maintenance is evident in several nominating contests, egregiously so in the Republican Party in 1912.⁴⁰ President Taft, an unpopular incumbent, was challenged by Theodore Roosevelt, the most popular political figure of his generation. Taft commanded the loyalty of the party organisations whilst Roosevelt's greater popularity amongst the electorate was repeatedly demonstrated in primaries. The nomination, under organisation control, was won by Taft to the exclusion of the independent-minded and non-incumbent Roosevelt.

To survive in confrontation with the exceptional cases cited above, the conventional wisdom should be regarded as a series of generalisations. Leaders usually controlled conventions. But where they were subject to the pressure of intense opinion from below they could acquiesce to it or risk their own positions. In most instances opinion from below was uncommitted, divided or lacked intensity if it was united.

The pursuit of the electoral goal was conditional. Intense issue or candidate commitments could overwhelm the customary rational search for a vote-maximising candidate. Alternatively, the electoral goal could be displaced by the need to preserve the internal distribution of influence within the party. Whilst political neophytes were sometimes essential to win elections, the self-interest of the leaders demanded resistance to mavericks threatening a restructuring of the party.

The 1960's: The Continuing Relevance
of the Conventional Wisdom

By the 1960's the social, technological, international and political environment of national conventions had changed markedly since World War Two. Improved communications facilitated active nationwide campaigns. Opinion polls providing objective tests of electability proliferated and grew in sophistication. The spread of television ownership increased the potential for generating national recognition and popularity. America's assumption of a world role and the onset of the Cold War heightened the importance of familiarity with foreign affairs for potential presidents. The enhanced importance of foreign affairs allied with the growth of the federal government following from the New Deal and a managed economy increased the centralisation of government. Media attention followed a similar trend focusing increasingly upon Washington.

Changes affecting the party organisations were also in train. Patronage appointments declined in number and in value amidst post-war prosperity and the extension of the welfare state. Parties attenuated as organisations when patronage diminished as an incentive to involvement, and the mass media became an alternative means of mobilising voters.

These developments were impinging on the presidential nominating process and modifying their nature and outcomes. The 'nationalisation' of American society through improved communications, the Washington focus of the mass media and an enhanced concern with national and foreign affairs promoted vice-presidents and U.S. senators as presidential contenders. Developments in transport facilitated active pre-convention campaigns. The decline of localism and the growth of objective tests of electability diminished the importance of

satisfying the traditional standards of availability as a precondition for receiving the nomination.

Though these developments affected the nominating process they did not erode the explanatory value of the conventional wisdom as a series of generalisations. The process continued, in general, to be characterised by leadership control, the priority of electoral victory and material incentives. These characteristics followed from continued party organisation dominance of the nominating process.

In inter-party competition the party organisations declined as mobilisers of votes and objects of loyalty. But in the intra-party presidential nominating contests the organisations remained largely insulated from challenge. No major structural changes to the nominating process occurred before 1968 to diminish organisation control. The caucus-convention mode of delegate selection continued to predominate. In 1968 as few states possessed presidential primary laws as at any time in the previous sixty years.⁴¹ Furthermore, the vast majority of primary state delegates were not committed to major candidates when selected.⁴²

The insulation of the nominating process from extra-party challenge facilitated the persistence of leadership control, the priority of electability and material incentives. Leadership control persisted, in part, because patronage continued to be available particularly at state and local level. Whilst the diminution of patronage may have reduced the number of party workers it could still sustain the receptivity to leadership of those who remained. Within national conventions patronage continued as an important instrument of control because its survival on a substantial scale was concentrated in large state delegations such as Pennsylvania and Illinois which could play a pivotal role in deciding nominations.⁴³

Leadership control also persisted because it was always based on more than patronage alone. First, the personal popularity of leaders was a source of deference. Whilst no claim can be made for the enhanced popularity of leaders in the 1960's the calibre of state governors, it has been argued, improved in this period.⁴⁴ If this is the case then governors might have been recipients of enhanced respect within their parties particularly amongst the non-patronage seekers. Secondly, unity around the leadership was a means to maximising a state's influence over the nomination. Cohesion around a leader to decide the nominee could stimulate state pride in addition to enhancing access to thankful presidents.

The decline of federal job patronage diminished only one form of material incentive to party leaders. Others persisted or increased. As the financial role of the federal government expanded in inter-governmental relations under the New Frontier and Great Society so the potential benefits of access to federal grants grew. Between the 1950's and 1960's federal grants increased from one-fifth to one-third of general state revenues as state services expanded without a corresponding growth in fiscal capacity.⁴⁵ By the 1960's state dependence on federal funding was at an unprecedentedly high level. As dependence grew so access to influence in Washington increased as a factor conditioning the quality and costs to local taxpayers of state services. Concomitantly, access in Washington expanded as a factor in the electoral fortunes of state office holders.

The continuing belief in presidential coat-tails acted as a further incentive to party leaders to involve themselves in deciding nominations. Though increased split-ticket voting was emblematic of the declining party loyalty of the electorate in the 1960's the straight ticket continued to be the norm.⁴⁶ Some shift in state

election dates disaggregated gubernatorial from presidential elections but as late as 1968 half of all the former coincided with the latter.⁴⁷

The decline of the Democratic Solid South stimulated a concern with coat-tail effects in a formerly one-party region. Republican inroads in presidential elections in the South created the potential for further incursions at sub-presidential level. In consequence, for both parties in the South by the 1960's the coat-tail effect became a potentially decisive factor in state elections for the first time in the twentieth century.

The persistence of patronage at state and local level (as already noted) continued to provide incentives for party leaders to seek to influence presidential nominations in the quest for a coat-tail effect. Federal patronage appointments dwindled in number but this did not preclude them from continuing to act as an incentive to involvement in party affairs. As a representative of the New Jersey Republican state committee observed following Nixon's 1968 victory: "We are most pleased when we receive federal appointments which in many instances help build the morale of the organisation and give the workers a goal upon which they may set their sights."⁴⁸

Continued party organisation control of the nomination (and the persistence of incentives to exert that control) preserved the characteristic features of the nominating process as portrayed in the conventional wisdom. Both popular and academic discussions of the process, in addition to the behaviour of participants, subscribed to the continuation of leadership control, the primary goal of electoral victory and the dominance of material incentives.

The persistence of leadership control was described by V.O. Key in the last edition of his standard work on American parties. Con-vention pageants and demonstrations provided an outlet for delegates,

Key wrote, "while their leaders are negotiating behind the scenes."⁴⁹

In 1968 political scientist and New York reform Democrat Edward Costikyan observed that leaders rather than the delegates control each state's bloc of convention votes:

"The first thing presidential candidates should realise is that delegates are not free agents subject to persuasion. A delegate is the property of his leader."⁵⁰

In the same year Time magazine's preview of the conventions recognised that delegate status was conferred rather than won. It was bestowed by leaders as a reward for loyal party service which included the susceptibility to leadership direction:

"Whatever the mechanics (of selection), unless the delegate is an insurgent, it is highly likely that he goes to the convention as a payoff for his loyal activism - and that hardly presages independence."⁵¹

Theodore White compared a governor endorsing John Kennedy who expressed the belief that he spoke for a majority of his delegation to "Mr. Krushev's belief that he speaks for a majority of the Supreme Soviet."⁵²

The persistence of the party leaders' electoral orientation was also recognised by Key. The platform and the nomination, he argued, "represent an attempt to unite the party and present to the country a ticket that will win the election."⁵³ Surveying the last pre-reform presidential nominations Scammon and Wattenberg concluded that national conventions had psephological characteristics - they made election-oriented decisions.⁵⁴

Candidates' strategies recognised the leaders' primary objective of electoral victory. Kennedy in 1960, according to Sorensen, "had to prove to them (the leaders) that he could win."⁵⁵ Even so unconventional a presidential aspirant as Eugene McCarthy perceived that his prospects of the winning the nomination were premised on his electoral potential. He would be nominated, he averred, when the delegates decided "that they have to have me to win."⁵⁶

Electoral victory provided the leaders with access to material benefits to sustain the party organisation. Into the 1960's leaders continued to seek preferential treatment and candidates continued to promise it. In Kennedy's 1960 campaign, for example, "Few promises of future patronage were asked and none were given, although it was made clear that, if Kennedy were elected, he would be looking for talented people whom he knew, trusted and could work with."⁵⁷ Following Nixon's election to the presidency twenty-two appointments were made from amongst friends and associates of Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina, the pivot of Nixon's support amongst southern Republican delegations.⁵⁸ In contrast, in retaliation for the failure of Ohio's governor to deliver his delegation to Nixon the state was overlooked in the appointment of major administration officials.⁵⁹

Leadership control, the primary goal of electoral victory and the incentive of material benefits therefore retained their utility in explaining the presidential nominating process in the 1960's. However, as in earlier years there were exceptions for which these generalisations were inapplicable.

The nominations of John Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon (in both 1960 and 1968) correspond closely to the traditional model. In each case the eventual nominee appeared to be the most electable of their parties' major candidates on the evidence of primaries, and polls of party identifiers and the electorate in general. Most or all of the major party leaders supported the nominees or found them acceptable. Where there were contests, as in the Democratic Party in 1960 and the Republicans in 1968, access to material benefits was employed by candidates as an inducement and leaders sought it to sustain their parties. The absence of contests in the Republican Party in 1960 and the Democratic Party in 1964 derives, in part, from the debts incurred

in the past amongst party leaders by, respectively, the Vice President and the President.

However, the 1964 Republican and 1968 Democratic contests exhibit discrepancies with the traditional model. The former contest evidences a disruption of leadership control, and the displacement of the priority of victory and material incentives by purism. In 1968 the electoral goal was displaced by the leaders' priority of preserving the existing distribution of power in the party against insurgents.

The deficiencies of the traditional model in comprehending several nominations before 1960 were again evident on these two subsequent occasions. In 1964, as in 1896, the convention was extricated from leadership control. In part, this resulted from the contraction of the party's leadership group owing to the paucity of state governorships under party control that year⁶⁰. More importantly, the Draft Goldwater campaign from 1961 onwards had inserted committed conservatives into determinative positions in the delegate selection process. Committed conservatives either moved into the vacuum resulting from the absence of leaders or were unamenable to leadership direction where it was asserted. The hierarchical convention model was inapplicable in 1964. Republican leaders were overwhelmingly opposed to Goldwater's nomination but were powerless to resist it.

Two further attributes of the traditional model were lacking in 1964: conventions possessed of decision-making autonomy, and thus the convention as the determinative stage in the nominating process. As noted above, the 1964 nomination was bounded by the activities of the Draft Goldwater movement prior to the election year. Restructuring the influence within the delegate selection process in the preceding three years guaranteed its outcome in 1964 - large numbers of committed Goldwater delegates. The convention registered these commitments

rather than exercising discretion over alternatives.

For many 1964 Republican delegates, commitments to Goldwater was not conditional upon his potential to win the election. He was valued for his personal rather than instrumental qualities. Thus evidence of his unelectability in primaries and polls could not deflect the delegates from their allegiance to him.

The 1968 Democratic nomination was comparable to the 1912 Republican contest in that on both normally mutually consistent occasions the objectives of the leaders - electoral victory and party maintenance - were in conflict. The 1968 contest was distinguished by attempts to inject large numbers of voters into the delegate selection process, both primary and caucus. The consequence was both a division over candidates (Humphrey and McCarthy) and an additional antagonism between the party's regular activists, and the insurgents.

The evidence of electability was ambiguous. Humphrey entered no primaries. McCarthy won several but was also defeated in others by Robert Kennedy. Humphrey was the preferred candidate in polls of Democratic identifiers; McCarthy was the stronger amongst Republicans and independents. Trial heat polls of strength against prospective Republican opponents produced oscillating results through the year. But by the time of the Democratic convention both candidates trailed Nixon, McCarthy's deficit was only 5 per cent to Humphrey's sixteen.

Humphrey's nomination is explicable not by the electability criterion but by his location on the side of the regulars in their conflict against the insurgents. (Scammon and Wattenberg preserve their argument for psephological conventions by the disingenuous device of employing the evidence of polls at the time of the Republican convention to distinguish the strongest Democratic contender. By the time of the Democratic nomination - the point nearer to the

election and to the time when the candidate was selected - McCarthy was the stronger contender by eleven percentage points. Moreover, this is above the authors' 10 per cent 'Line of Clear Blue Water' threshold required for poll evidence to be regarded as uncontradictable and a basis for action.⁶²⁾ The insurgents threatened the regulars' control of the party organisations. To the extent that McCarthy supporters and insurgents coincided, a victory for the former would promote the status of the latter within the party. A McCarthy electoral victory threatened a restructuring of the party. Such a transformation would be to the detriment of the incumbents. Electoral victory for the party potentially could result in an intra-party defeat for the regulars. Winning confronted preserving influence within the party as mutually exclusive alternatives in 1968:

"McCarthy's ascendancy in the polls did not, however, impair the resolve of most delegates to reject him. In a curious way it may have increased their determination. For they were operating under a compunction as powerful as the instinct for a winner: the instinct for their own survival. In this instance, it might be better served by going with a loser. Thus the real explanation of Chicago is psychological rather than political."⁶³

In 1968, as in 1964, the priority of winning was displaced. Unlike 1964, its displacement followed not from purism but from professionalism - preservation of the party and position within it.

On two occasions in the 1960's, as in the past, the explanatory power of the conventional wisdom was deficient because its central features were not constants. But in four of the six conventions of the 1960's the usual major forces operated powerfully to render them explicable by the conventional wisdom.

However, during the 1960's some authors challenged the validity of the traditional models, arguing that they were anachronistic. William Carleton maintained that convention autonomy was at an end.⁶⁴

Nominations were plebiscitary in character as conventions ratified the results of polls and primaries in choosing the voters' national favourites. James Davis advanced similar arguments in his thesis that, for the out-party, presidential primaries were the pivotal stage in the nominating process.⁶⁵

Such arguments exaggerated the impact of changed circumstances on the nominating process. Election-oriented party leaders' attention to the public popularity of the various candidates was not a new development. From the 1930's onwards most nominees were also the preferred candidates of their party's rank-and-file voters as measured in Gallup polls.⁶⁶ But the process was still not plebiscitary because the evidence of polls and primaries could be disregarded in determining nominations. In 1952 Kefauver's strength in primaries and polls was insufficient to prevent the nomination of the nationally unknown Adlai Stevenson. In 1964 Goldwater's performance in primaries, and polls (of Republican voters and the electorate in general) indicated that of the major Republican contenders his electoral prospects were amongst the weakest. His performance in primaries was so meagre that far from guaranteeing his nomination they instead demonstrated his implausibility as a vote-getting candidate for the election. As Converse and his associates commented,

"...there is room to wonder whether any presidential aspirant has ever contested so many primaries with as disastrous a showing, and still captured the nomination of his party's convention."⁶⁷

The autonomy of the 1964 Republican convention was circumscribed by the activities of the Draft Goldwater movement in the preceding three years, not by the weight of public opinion.

The 1968 Democratic contest also evidenced the survival of autonomous conventions. Several objective indicators suggested that

McCarthy would be the stronger candidate. Yet the party's leaders were able to exercise their discretion in deciding the nomination to select Humphrey indicating their freedom from plebiscitary constraints.

By the 1960's candidates were devoting unprecedented amounts of time and money to demonstrate their public appeal but determinative influence over the nomination remained within the party. In determining nominations public appeal was an influence on party leaders' decisions but not the only or necessarily the paramount influence. In the last pre-reform Democratic contest Humphrey's nomination was attributable to what Theodore White described as "the old structured vote" - delegates delivered by governors, mayors and organised labour⁶⁸. Humphrey's victory, according to Richard Rubin, marked "both the high point and the end of clear labor/organisation dominance within the Democratic party."⁶⁹ On the Republican side that year Nixon's strength White located in "a solid buttress of committed votes in primaries and ... months of painstaking work on state party leaders around the country."⁷⁰

As late as 1968 therefore, the conventional wisdom (with modifications that were necessary before the 1960's) continued to comprehend the presidential nominating process. The death-knell of its validity was not the transformation of the environment in which the process took place in the post-war period. Rather, the conventional wisdom lost its utility only after 1968 when reform transformed the process itself. It is to the circumstances and effects of reform that the analysis now turns.

NOTES

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CHAPTER THREE

THE COURSE OF REFORM

The years after 1968 saw a transformation in the means by which the parties nominated their presidential candidates. The change was propelled initially from within the parties, particularly the Democrats, but acquired impetus subsequently from state legislatures, Congress and the courts. The consequence of this transformation was that the conventional wisdom defined in the previous chapter lost its explanatory value in accounting for the behaviour of actors in the nominating process and the power relations between them. The effects (not always intended) were to alter the rules under which the process was conducted, ^{and} the structure and locus of power within it. As the structure of the nomination altered so candidates developed new strategic and tactical responses to it.

This chapter seeks to describe and account for the restructuring of the nominating process after 1968. These changes in the institutional context in which nominating campaigns took place must be appreciated to comprehend the rationale for different strategies before and after reform presented in subsequent chapters. The changes are of interest for additional reasons. Change of this magnitude is unusual. Change effected largely through party commissions and committees is even more uncommon. Furthermore, the changes wrought by the parties exemplifies a degree of independence for self-definition often overlooked in depictions of parties as products of particular social, economic, constitutional and geographic circumstances.

The early sections of the chapter seek to locate the post-1968 reforms within a historical context. First, previous reforms of the presidential nominating process are described. In so doing the con-

cerns and objectives of earlier party reformers whose interests included the presidential nominating process are identified. This survey establishes two trends recurrent in the course of nominating process reform - towards participation and nationalisation - evident again after 1968. Secondly, the events of 1968 which propelled reform of the nominating process onto the Democratic Party's agenda are detailed. The influences that conditioned the work of the subsequent reform commission (the Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection, more commonly known after its successive chairmen as McGovern-Fraser) are identified. The proposals for reform are then analysed and related to previous reform exercises.

Later sections of the chapter deal with the subsequent development of reform beginning with the implementation of McGovern-Fraser and its effects (both intended and unintended). The work of the successors to McGovern-Fraser within the Democratic Party and the process of implementation are described. Democratic reform activity is then contrasted with the more cautious approach of the Republican Party. The content of Republican reform is analysed and reasons advanced for the party's restraint relative to the Democrats. Reforms in campaign finance regulations are then detailed. By altering the rules relating to the raising and spending of the strategic resource of money, campaign finance reforms added to the structural changes originating from within the parties to transform the structural framework in which nominating politics was conducted.

Trends in Reform of the Nominating Process

Two goals recur in the successive drives to reform the presidential nominating process. The participatory goal is the oldest and the

most persistent. Existing practices have been criticised for being exclusionary, dominated by unrepresentative and even corrupt minorities.. The second goal, of more recent origin, is the demand for nationalisation. This entails criticism of diversity, irregularity, unethical or detrimental (to the party's unity or electoral strength) practices or the tolerance of regional veto groups. The recommended cure is a set of regulations to which all state parties must conform and the removal of regional vetoes.

Participatory criticisms were applied to the congressional caucus, the principal nominating device of the early party system, from its inception. The caucus was regarded as a denial of popular sovereignty enfranchising only members of Congress to the exclusion of the mass electorate and on occasions over-riding the apparent popular choice. An image of secrecy and dealing also contributed to the anti-democratic image of the caucus. According to Richard McCormick, before its demise the caucus "had long been an object of popular suspicion in many states, and the operations of the Republican congressional caucus in 1816 [which overlooked Crawford] as well as in 1824 [when Jackson was overlooked] had further weakened respect for the device."¹

Conventions, in contrast to the congressional caucus, carried the legitimacy of popular sovereignty. Delegates to them would be selected by mass participation, they would be conducted in the open and responsive to public sentiment. As democratisation proceeded through the adoption of direct election of governors, other state officials and presidential electors so the pressure for a method of similar legitimacy extended to presidential selection.² Contemplating an appropriate nominating device for 1828, the great architect of early party organisation, Martin Van Buren, observed that a convention would be "more in unison with the spirit of the times."³

Whilst the inception of major party national conventions in 1831 was associated with the strategic advantages sought by groups competing for the nomination, its long-term legitimacy derived from its amenability to popular control. It thereby satisfied the "great political touchstone of Jacksonian democracy - popular sovereignty."⁴

The second phase of participatory reform of the presidential nominating process occurred during the Progressive era early in the twentieth century. For progressives, presidential primaries were the means to circumscribe the influence of party organisations and business interests (the latter often working through the former) over the nomination. For progressives such as La Follette the process of delegate selection through caucuses and nominations by delegate conventions operated to frustrate the popular will. Their abolition and the substitution of primaries were designed to restore democratic control. The caucus and the convention, La Follette wrote, were "prostituted to the service of corrupt organisation. They answer no further purpose than to give respectable form to political robbery. Abolish the caucus and the convention. Go back to the first principles of democracy, go back to the people."⁵

At the state level the progressive reform drive entailed the adoption of presidential primaries facilitating expressions of preference between contending candidates or the election of delegates to the national convention, or both. At national level progressives sought to substitute a national primary for the convention, a measure embraced by the Progressive Party platform in 1912 and by President Wilson in his first message to Congress.

The short-term stimulus to the adoption of presidential primaries was the Taft-Roosevelt contest of 1912. For Roosevelt to defeat the incumbent president, Taft's support amongst the party organisations

had to be circumvented and Roosevelt's public appeal exploited. Thus Roosevelt's supporters worked through state legislatures to enact presidential primary laws.⁶ Roosevelt's eventual defeat amidst charges of a steal perpetrated by the Old Guard of the party gave added impetus to^{the} drive for presidential primaries after 1912. By 1916 they were required or permitted in twenty-six states.⁷

The third phase of participatory reform is represented by the anti-racial discrimination provisions written by the Democratic Party in the 1960's. By seeking the removal of barriers to participation by the application of national party rules the anti-discrimination provisions combine both participatory and nationalisation themes.

The issue of racial discrimination emerged at the 1964 national convention where the regular Mississippi party, using procedures in conformity with party rules and state law, had selected an all-white delegation. The credentials of the regular party delegation were challenged by the racially integrated Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party. The regular party claimed the legitimacy of law, the challengers of morality.⁸ For 1964 a compromise solution confirmed the regulars as the Mississippi delegation but for the future incorporated the moral stance of the challengers into party rules. In resolving the Mississippi dispute the convention's Credentials Committee instructed the national committee to include in the call to the 1968 convention a specification that:

"a State Democratic Party in selecting and certifying delegates to the Democratic National Convention thereby undertakes to assure that voters in the State, regardless of race, color, creed or national origin, will have the opportunity to participate fully in party affairs ... " ⁹

The implication of this instruction, similar to that of the Fifteenth Amendment, is that anti-discrimination guarantees had to be provided to ensure for blacks the same treatment as whites. Such thinking

entailed the assumption that for whites there were no obstacles to the opportunity to participate fully in party affairs. It was the undermining of this assumption in 1968 that led to the fourth phase of participatory reform thereafter.

To effect the Convention's instruction a Special Equal Rights Committee was subsequently established to aid the state parties in meeting the requirements of the Call. Chaired successively by Governors David Lawrence and Richard Hughes, the Committee held public hearings and consulted with the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. In 1966 the Committee propounded six anti-discrimination standards, the so-called six basic elements. These standards were adopted by the national committee and written into the Call to the 1968 convention. They aimed to bar racial discrimination in the party's affairs and encourage participation in them by blacks. The national committee also adopted the recommendation that a commission on Party Structure be established to study the relationship between the national and state parties in order that full participation regardless of race, colour, creed or national origin should be facilitated by "uniform standards for structure and operation."¹⁰

Nationalisation is a twentieth century trend in reform of the nominating process. It is also one which faces greater principled opposition than the participatory goal for it conflicts with American traditions of federalism, states' rights and party decentralisation. Hostility towards centralisation was one source of antagonism towards the congressional caucus for it located control over presidential selection in national party leaders. As Schattschneider noted, the demise of the congressional caucus marked the collapse of the authority of this central party group.¹¹

An attempt to nationalise the party is evident in the overthrow

of the two-thirds rule in Democratic conventions. The rule enabled a substantial minority to resist simple majority preferences. In practice this facilitated a southern veto over the party's nominees. The overthrow of the rule in 1936 removed this regional obstacle to nominations supported by a national delegate majority.

In the post-war period nationalisation entailed the application of universal rules for delegate selection with which all constituent state parties had to comply. The first application of such standards emerged in the loyalty controversy in the Democratic Party. The issue originated from the 1948 election when several southern parties adopted the Dixiecrat candidates as the nominees of the Democratic Party. Thenceforward northern liberals sought to ensure that delegates to Democratic conventions should work to provide their electorates with the opportunity to vote for the party's officially-designated nominees.

At the 1952 convention an attempt was made to require of delegates a commitment to work for this objective as a condition of their being seated. Senator Moody of Michigan proposed that

"No delegate shall be seated unless he give an assurance to the Credentials Committee that he will exert every honorable means available to him in any capacity he may have, to provide that the nominees of this convention for President and Vice President, through their names or those of electors pledged to them, appear on the election ballot under the heading, name or designation of the Democratic Party."¹²

On the recommendation of the Credentials Committee the impact of this resolution was modified, seeking rather to avoid commitments "in contravention of the existing law of the State, or of the previous instructions of State Democratic governing bodies."¹³

Attempts to define a position on loyalty acceptable to all elements within the party continued after 1952. In 1954 the national party chairman appointed a Special Advisory Committee on Rules and Procedure.

The Committee was enjoined to study, review and make appropriate recommendations on all rules "specifically, but not exclusively, the subject of the so-called or miscalled Loyalty Pledge Resolution adopted at the 1952 convention ..."¹⁴ The Committee's deliberations evinced an attempt to secure loyalty whilst eschewing the controversies aroused by compulsory pledges. The Committee stated the "understanding" that state parties in selecting national convention delegates undertake to ensure that voters have the opportunity to vote for the nominees of that convention. It was "understood" that delegates certified by state parties have the "interests, welfare and success of the Democratic party at heart, and will participate in the convention in good faith and therefore no additional assurances shall be required."¹⁵ It was made incumbent upon national committee members (convention delegates ex officio) to declare affirmatively for the party's nominees, failure to do so resulting in removal. The Committee's understandings and recommendations were incorporated into the Call to the 1956 convention.

The resolution of the loyalty controversy marks a significant shift in the balance of power between national and state parties. It also constituted an innovation in the responsibilities assumed by the former. As Austin Ranney has observed:

"It established the centralising principle that henceforth the national party agencies will not only decide how many votes each state delegation gets at the national convention but will also impose national rules on what kinds of persons can be selected."¹⁶

Post-war nationalisation in the Republican Party originated from the controversies arising from the Eisenhower-Taft contest in 1952. In that year disputes arose over the conduct of some delegate selection meetings and the rules of eligibility to participate. Though the party had established the precedent for a convention to enact rules

binding on its successor this right had not been exercised for the subjects under dispute. Regulation derived from the laws or party rules of each state which allowed diversity of practice and the absence of appropriate guidelines where the states or parties failed to provide them. The solution to this problem adopted at the 1956 convention was the prescription of national delegate selection rules applicable for the next convention. These rules specified acceptable selection devices for state convention delegates - primary, caucus, convention or mass meeting. They opened participation to loyal and qualified voters. Selection devices for national convention delegates were specified as primaries, state or district conventions or state committees¹⁷. State parties were allowed to provide further rules within these parameters.

Nationalisation in the early 1960's was pursued in the Democratic Party's anti-discrimination standards discussed above. These standards built on the precedents established in the loyalty controversy for circumscribing states' rights in delegate selection. The loyalty provisions restricted states' rights by defining who could be selected as delegates; the anti-discrimination standards provided further restrictions by specifying conditions as to how they would be selected.

The instances of nominating process reform share several common features. Those within the participatory trend are characterised by attempts to widen public involvement in the nominating process and control over it whilst diluting the influence of the party organisation and its leaders. These reforms are thus consistent with the movement towards a Voter Dominated party as elaborated in the preceding chapter.

The reforms are also illustrative of the permeation of broader political changes contributing to redefinitions of desirable means of

making presidential nominations. Heightened participation resulting from the establishment of national conventions and presidential primaries were consistent with the democratising drive of the Jacksonian and Progressive periods. Party nationalisation accompanied governmental centralisation. Demands for black voting rights in the 1960's occurred within both the party and governmental systems.

The timing of the adoption of reforms can be attributed to short-term pragmatic responses to egregious problems. This is not to discount the role of ideas, for the reform drives were greatly strengthened by the conformity of proposals for change with emerging new standards of political legitimacy, but it is to locate the trigger for the adoption of reform in short-term political considerations. For President Jackson, a national convention depriving congressional leaders of influence facilitated the displacement of their favourite Calhoun as Vice President. For the opposition National Republicans a convention was a means for uniting the disparate opponents of Jackson behind a single candidate. Presidential primaries were a device for Roosevelt's supporters to circumvent Taft's control of the party organisations in 1912. Loyalty oaths were sought by liberal Democrats in 1952 in the wake of the nomination of Eisenhower who threatened to be an untypically appealing Republican in the South. The Mississippi compromise in 1964 attempted to hold a segregationist delegation within the party whilst undertaking reforms for the future appealing to blacks.

The reform impetus tends to be concentrated in the majority party. The size, heterogeneity, and stakes of victory (i.e. the likelihood that the party will win office) are greater in the majority party making it the natural territory for conflict. For groups in the electorate seeking change through the parties the majority is the most

direct route to success. The history of nominating process reform substantiates Lubell's contention that the political conflicts of each era take place within the majority party.¹⁸

Background to Post-1968 Democratic Party Reform

The Democrats' post-1968 reforms combined the two goals recurrent in the history of reform of the nominating process. The revelation of obstacles to participation, the absence or manipulability of procedural rules were countered by reforms which used national guidelines to guarantee voters the right of access to the delegate selection process.

Discontent with existing procedures was triggered by the unprecedentedly widespread attempts to mobilise opponents of the administration's Vietnam war policy within the Democratic Party's presidential nominating process in 1968. Anti-war activists sought to use the nominating process to demonstrate the breadth of opposition to the war, encouraging a change of policy or, more ambitiously, the withdrawal of President Johnson. The opposition to Johnson was personalised in the candidacy of Senator Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota.

McCarthy's unexpectedly substantial vote (42 per cent) in the first primary in New Hampshire was followed by the entry of Senator Robert Kennedy as a candidate and then Johnson's withdrawal. Vice President Hubert Humphrey subsequently declared his candidacy retaining a supporter of administration policy in the contest for the nomination. McCarthy's candidacy continued with the new objective of winning the nomination. This transition in objectives necessitated an organisation designed to elicit a majority of national convention delegates in contrast to demonstrating popular opposition to the war. In particular,

the McCarthy campaign was compelled to focus on the non-primary states which provided a majority of the delegates.

Previous insurgent campaigns for the nomination sought to use the candidate's public popularity to persuade delegates already selected rather than mobilising support to participate in their selection. (Eisenhower's supporters did pursue this latter strategy in some states in 1952 but it was not applied universally). In contrast, the McCarthy insurgency attempted to insert its supporters into the party organisation - controlled processes of non-primary delegate selection. It was the impediments encountered in translating McCarthy's public support into delegates which evoked discontent and provided the future agenda of reform.

McCarthy's supporters were largely mobilised from outside the party organisations, they were mobilised in the election year, committed to a candidate and an issue and numerically a minority in most areas. They encountered processes characterised by informality, dominated by party officials, commencing before the election year, largely abstracted from candidate and issue concerns and often operating on winner-take-all principles. Rules relating to the holding and conduct of caucuses in twenty states were absent, insubstantial or unobtainable, enabling party officials to schedule and manage them at their discretion to the exclusion or disadvantage of insurgents. Approximately a quarter of all delegates were chosen by processes originating before 1968 which precluded supporters of McCarthy (whose candidacy was announced November 30, 1967) from participating in their selection. The criteria for selection as a delegate were often premised on party service, precluding insurgents and candidate supporters. Where candidate preferences were recognised they were not necessarily translated into delegates proportionately. In fifteen states the

operation of the unit rule at various stages of selection phased out minority representation.

The impediments to representation encountered by McCarthy supporters produced two responses from within the campaign which contributed to the drive for reform at the 1968 convention. First, a commission was established to investigate the mechanisms used to select delegates. Secondly, the perceived injustices and irregularities encountered by its supporters were utilised by the McCarthy campaign as a basis for complaint in disputing the credentials of several state delegations with a view to denying them seating at the convention.

The Ad Hoc commission originated from the discontents of the McCarthy organisation in Connecticut which had experienced the unit rule and numerical under-representation. A plan to document the problems encountered in Connecticut expanded to become a national review of the convention, and of delegate selection procedures. Called into existence by sympathisers on the convention's Rules and Credentials Committees respectively, the Commission was designed to be impartial between the various candidates. Impartiality contributed to the Commission's legitimacy as did the prestige of its six members who included Governor Harold Hughes of Iowa as chairman, Representative Donald Fraser of Minnesota and Professor Alexander Bickel of Yale Law School. The Commission's sponsorship by members of convention committees allowed Hughes to claim official sanction for its work.¹⁹ Assisted by researchers, the commission provided an extensive review of the American party system including the first documentation by a party of its own selection procedures.

The significance of the Commission in the development of reform resides in the substantiation by an independent, semi-official body of complaints emerging from the McCarthy campaign, in identifying where

change was needed and in proposing possible corrections. The Commission report was utilised by the convention and its committees to justify reform, define objectives to be attained in the future and indicate subjects requiring further study.

Reviewing delegate selection in 1968 and national convention procedures the Commission concluded that they "display considerably less fidelity to basic democratic principles than a nation which claims to govern itself can safely tolerate."²⁰ This assessment derived from a cumulation of deficiencies which exhibited at least one of four properties:

1. Lack of public participation: some delegates were appointed by party officials. The Commission recommended the abolition of appointed delegates, and the provision of meaningful popular participation in the selection process.
2. Lack of timeliness: some delegates were selected by processes initiated two or more years before the election year. The commission proposed that all delegates be selected by a process beginning not more than six months before the convention, and that for 1968 the incoming rather than outgoing members of the national committee would be ex-officio delegates.
3. Lack of minority representation: employment of the unit rule penalised minorities. The Commission recommended abolition of the unit rule for convention delegations in 1968 and its elimination throughout the selection sequence in subsequent years.
4. Malapportionment: the principle of one-man one-vote was contradicted both within and between the states. The Commission proposed adoption of fair apportionment within states, the abolition of bonus votes in allocating convention delegates (i.e. a reward to states which supported the party ticket in previous elections)

and, in 1972, the elimination of the uniform number of national committee delegates for every state.

Disputing the credentials of the opposition delegates is a standard tactic adopted by candidates trailing in support. In this respect the McCarthy campaign was unexceptional but it provided disputes unprecedented in their number and diversity of grounds for complaint. In earlier Democratic conventions the principal basis for dispute had been the suspect loyalty of some southern delegations. Loyalty did generate some challenges in 1968, as did the new anti-discrimination standards, but some disputes were based upon the informal obstacles encountered by the McCarthy campaign, such as the impropriety and irregularity of procedures and under-representation. Such novel bases for dispute were not founded on law or party rules but from standards of fairness, openness, and proportionality derived from the American democratic creed or Supreme Court definitions of democratic standards.

Specific complaints related to the permissibility of ex-officio delegates, intra-state malapportionment, the justifiability of the unit rule, under-representation of racial minorities and candidate supporters. Fifteen state delegations were disputed in whole or in part before the Credentials Committee. Unusually they included northern delegations such as New York, Michigan and Minnesota in addition to the perennial southern disputants.

In resolving the disputes the Credentials Committee, dominated by Humphrey supporters, was forced to confront a conflict between often undemocratic procedures and laws, and party rules which did not preclude them. The Committee's decisions were generally consistent with precedent in validating legally-permissible procedures. In all but two instances the selected delegates were sustained in their positions.

However, the two exceptions evidenced a new assertiveness by the national party in prescribing the standards to which state parties should conform in selecting delegates. Though meagre measured against the challengers' demands the two cases represented an erosion of states' rights in delegate selection. In the Mississippi case the Committee utilised the anti-discrimination provisions of the 1968 Call to unseat a lilywhite delegation. For the first time a national party agency enforced restrictions on how parties were to choose delegates.

The Georgia challenge was resolved by an even greater incursion into states' rights. The Committee unseated delegates because of the way they had been selected although the device used was in conformity with state party rules and not proscribed by national party regulations. Delegates in Georgia were selected in accordance with state party Rule 55 which located selection in the governor in consultation with the state party chairman, a gubernatorial appointee. Both took office two years prior to the national convention. Challenges to the delegation were mounted on its racial imbalance, loyalty and preferential unrepresentativeness. Rival delegates presented themselves selected through a state convention, racially integrated and committed to national party nominees.

The Committee resolved the dispute through the compromise of seating half of each of the two rival delegations. Though a compromise the Committee's rationale for unseating half the regular delegation does reflect an emerging concern that selection procedures should be open to public participation. The regular delegates were not unseated on grounds of racial discrimination as some authorities have claimed.²¹ Had discrimination been proven it was open to the Committee to proceed as it had in the Mississippi case by displacing the entire delegation.

Rather, the Committee's objection to the delegation was that it was selected by a process which discriminated against all citizens subsequent to the Democratic gubernatorial primary in 1966. The explanation for the Committee's action was provided by its chairman Governor Richard Hughes in his presentation to the convention where he argued that the Georgia regular delegation was "subject to some infirmity, the dictator-like procedure of Rule 55."²²

The Committee's concern over exclusionary practices stimulated advocacy of future reform. In his speech to the convention Richard Hughes expressed the continuing commitment to an inclusive party which thus required "even fuller participation by the people" in its processes.²³ The Committee's deliberations suggested that "we can and should encourage appropriate revisions in the delegate selection process to assure the fullest possible participation and to make the Democratic Party completely representative of grass root sentiment."²⁴ To achieve this objective the Committee proposed that the national party chairman establish a special committee to :

1. Study delegate selection procedures.
2. Recommend to the national committee "such improvement as can assure even broader citizen participation in the delegate selection process."²⁵
3. Aid state parties in changing laws and party rules.
4. Report to the national committee and make available to the 1972 convention its findings and recommendations.

Subjects specified for particular attention reiterated some of the areas targeted by the earlier Ad Hoc Commission: the timing of delegate selection, the opportunities for public participation and the use of the unit rule.

The Committee offered its own prescriptions on timing and parti-

icipation in advocating an elaboration of national party guidelines on delegate selection. Future convention Calls, the Committee recommended, should include the injunction that in state party delegate selection "all democrats of the state have meaningful and timely opportunities to participate fully in the election or selection of ... delegates and alternates."²⁶ The Committee proposed a special committee to assist the state parties to meet this requirement.²⁷ The phraseology of the Committee's recommendations evinces the influence of the Ad Hoc Commission which had advanced the principles of "meaningful access" and "timely selection".

A further stimulus to reform emanated from the convention Rules Committee. The right to a hearing before the Committee was exercised by McCarthy supporters and other reform advocates to publicise existing deficiencies and propose remedies. Harold Hughes used the hearings to present the findings of the Ad Hoc Commission. The focus of immediate efforts for change was the unit rule which, if permitted at the convention, would continue to filter out minority representation as had occurred at earlier stages of the selection sequence providing a major source of discontent amongst McCarthy supporters. But repeal of the unit rule had support beyond the McCarthyites. Few states still used the rule at the convention and those that did were predominantly southern. Before the Committee Humphrey declared his opposition to the rule removing the issue from the contest between the candidates and widening the coalition in favour of repeal. The Committee's deliberations eventually extended beyond the unit rule to incorporate all winner-take-all rules including binding primaries (of which McCarthy was the principal beneficiary).

The Committee report subsequently proposed that the convention would not enforce on any delegate on any issue "any duty or obligation

which said delegate would coincide to violate his individual conscience."²⁸ Committee chairman Governor Samuel Shapiro commended the move as another step in democratising the party.²⁹

It was evident that the Committee's hearings and the Ad Hoc Commission report had aroused members' concern over the adequacy of existing convention rules in the recommendation that they be systematically reviewed. The objects of a review by a Rules Commission were defined as :

1. The study, evaluation and codification of the rules of past Democratic conventions.
2. Investigation of the advisability of changes in the rules.
3. Submission of findings to the national committee for transmission to the Rules Committee of the 1972 convention for acceptance, rejection, modification or amendment.
4. Establishment of permanent rules for the convention and its committees and other matters "that may be appropriate."³⁰

Ardent reformers within the Rules Committee found the proposals for a commission a long-winded and uncertain mechanism for producing change. A minority advocated that the convention should assume the initiative and legislate reforms. To this end a minority report was submitted to the convention proposing that state parties ensure that delegate selection take place through a process "in which all democratic voters had a full and timely opportunity to participate"³¹

In evaluating compliance with his objective the convention should require that:

1. The unit rule shall not be employed at any stage of the selection process.
2. "All feasible efforts have been made to assure that delegates are elected through party, primary, convention or committee procedures, open to public participation within the calendar year of the

National Convention."³²

Both the foci of the minority's concerns, and the wording of proposed correctives, indicate the influence of the Ad Hoc Commission.

For recommendations of committees to take effect they must be endorsed by the full convention. Thus the impetus for reform emerging in the Committees had to be sustained on the convention floor to have binding effect. The convention proceeded to endorse the proposals of both committees for study commissions to prepare reform proposals, and the Rules Committee's recommendation that the unit rule be abolished for the 1968 convention. Support for the commission idea was unsurprising. In neither case were the proposals the subject of debate or recorded votes. The proposals were propounded by committees dominated by Humphrey supporters (like the convention as a whole), they dealt with arcane subjects and commissions probably appeared as rather abstract, dilatory and uncontroversial means for providing further consideration for complex subjects.

The "freedom of conscience" provision recommended by Rules excited more controversy but was still sustained by voice vote. The convention's deference here is explicable on similar grounds to those which stimulated the Committee to make its recommendation initially. Humphrey had publicly endorsed repeal, few states employed the devices (unit rule, binding primaries) and the principal users were southern.

The convention's adoption of the Rules Committee minority report was unexpected. It provides the only instance of a rejection of a committee majority report at the convention. It was also the only vote at the convention in which McCarthy's supporters were in the majority.

An explanation of the success of the minority report is heavily dependent upon the circumstances in which the vote took place. The

ballot occurred the day after the acceptance of the Rules Committee's "freedom of conscience" proposal for the 1968 convention. Though the minority report had two components, the unit rule and timeliness, the former appeared first on the agenda and was more easily comprehended than the latter. Within the convention the distinction between the two components appears to have been lost so that the vote was understood as being on the unit rule³³. This was also the second vote relevant to the unit rule at the convention and it is not clear that the different implications of the two votes were appreciated by many delegates. For those who did recognise the distinction, the second vote (rejecting the unit rule at the next convention and at earlier stages of the selection process) could be seen as an extension of the defence of minority preference and freedom of conscience entailed by the first vote which abrogated the unit rule and other binding commitments at the 1968 convention. In the debate on the minority report the unit rule was defended in principle. No speaker sought to construct a defence for its use at a future convention and at earlier stages of the selection process whilst conceding its rejection at the current convention. Thus the vote on the minority report (understood as a vote on the unit rule) was preceded by a debate on the principle of a rule which had been repudiated the previous day.

The vote took place amidst considerable confusion³⁴. The debate and the vote were interposed by a debate on another matter and there was misunderstanding as to which issue was being voted upon. Excerpts from the debate illustrate the confusion:

Indiana: "Is this the previous motion or the previous motion?"

Convention Secretary: "This is on the previous motion, sir."³⁵

Virginia: "Virginia is ready to vote on the addition to the National Committee of Young Democrats ..."

Convention Secretary: "No, we are still waiting for the finish of the unit rule vote."³⁶

Even so astute an observer as Theodore White, writing after the convention, misinterpreted the vote as the abolition of the unit rule "for ever" when its effect was to insert a preclusion of the rule into the Call for the 1972 convention only.³⁷

Support for the minority report was generated by the similarity of its concerns to those of the Ad Hoc Commission. According to one set of writers the Commission's report had influenced many delegates.³⁸ The minority report provided the opportunity to act upon the egregious deficiencies of the unit rule and timeliness identified by the Ad Hoc Commission in time to affect the next nominating process. The majority position, in contrast, would result in a report to the Rules Committee of the 1972 convention, i.e. after that year's delegate selection process had been completed.

The vote on the minority report was divorced from the immediate interests of the rival candidates. The absence of candidate interests were particularly pertinent for the Humphrey delegates who were dis-united about the merits of party reform. Whilst McCarthy's delegates were predominantly amateurs (characterised by a commitment to intra-party democracy, principles and policies given priority over compromise and winning) there were also many amateur Humphrey supporters, in addition to his many professional supporters.³⁹ In the absence of a unifying candidate interest, Humphrey supporters could vote according to their individual styles dividing amateurs from professionals aligning the former with the McCarthy delegates on party reform. Humphrey supporters could also derive approval for the minority report from their candidate who had publicly supported ending the unit rule at the 1968 convention and inserting its preclusion into the 1972 Call.⁴⁰

The 1968 convention stumbled into the initiatives for future reform. The proposals for the establishment of commissions were accepted without evidence of critical appraisal. The debate on the minority report took place amidst confusion. The debate between the minority and majority reports posed immediate specific change against a longer process designed to produce an agenda for change of an unspecified nature. There was no dispute between the relative merits of stability and change.

The critique of existing practices proceeded from the McCarthy campaign to the Ad Hoc Commission which added recommendations for change. The critique and recommendations were embraced by members of the Credentials and Rules Committees. The Committees then transmitted the impulse for reform to an acquiescent and possibly uncomprehending convention.

Reform Agencies in Action

Several events between the convention's imprimatur for reform and the creation of the agencies for its realisation enhanced the impetus for change. The convention itself was characterised by disharmony, oppressive security and the domineering assertiveness of the pro-administration leadership. On the Chicago streets the confrontation between anti-war protesters and the police disintegrated into bloody riot. A divided party entered the election with the McCarthy supporters unreconciled and the right of its traditional constituency corroded by George Wallace's third party candidacy. Though voters rallied to Humphrey in the campaign's closing stages the election was lost and the Democrats' arch foe Richard Nixon installed as president. The absence of a Democratic president from 1969 thereby

removed the traditionally dominant influence over national party activities capable of obstructing or shaping a reform effort.

Two reform commissions authorised by the 1968 convention were established in January 1969 by party chairman Senator Fred Harris with prior authorisation by the party's national committee. A Rules Commission chaired by Representative James O'Hara was entrusted with the responsibility for studying national convention rules. Study of the pre-convention delegate selection process was located in the Commission on Delegate Selection and Party Structure headed by Senator George McGovern of South Dakota. The composition of both commissions, selected by Harris after consultations with party leaders, reflected a desire to include all the party's disparate elements - blacks, state officials, women, congressmen, Chicanos, labour officials, academics, party officials, youth and southerners.

Because the Delegate Selection Commission (McGovern-Fraser) subsequently monopolised the early effectuation of reform, its activities are emphasised in this study. Though broadly representative of the party in a demographic sense, Byron Shafer in his exhaustive study of the Commission, posits that its members' preferences were biased towards reform.⁴¹ This followed from a deliberate strategy by Harris, seeking to build a personal constituency within the party through an association with the cause of reform. Thus representatives of urban parties, the apogee of American party organisation, were lacking. The one Chicagoan, Louis Martin, was a newspaper publisher not a member of the Daley machine. Organised labour had two representatives on the Commission, but the traditionalist AFL-CIO provided only one, balanced by a Commissioner from the reform-oriented UAW.

A pressure group for reform was incorporated into the Commission through the inclusion of three members of the Ad Hoc Commission -

Harold Hughes, Donald Fraser and Fred Dutton, a former aide to Robert Kennedy. David Mixner, a non-primary state organiser for McCarthy in 1968, and Aaron Henry, a black veteran of wars amongst Mississippi Democrats, were also members.

A strong predisposition to reform was identifiable amongst the Commission's staff. Chief Counsel Eli Segal had been a McCarthy organiser in California. Research Director Kenneth Bode had supported McGovern's belated anti-war candidacy. A Consultant Committee of three included Anne Wexler, the Connecticut originator of the idea of the Ad Hoc Commission, and Professor Alexander Bickel who had served upon it. The inclusion of Bickel integrated a fourth member of the Ad Hoc Commission into McGovern-Fraser's operations.

The Commissioners defined their tasks as a cumulation of four separate assignments. From the Credentials Committee the Commission assumed the responsibility assigned to "a Special Committee" to review the delegate selection process, make recommendations to the national committee for enhancing participation and aid the state parties in effecting changes in state law and party rules. The Credentials Committee report also authorised "a Special Committee", apparently distinct from the first, to aid state parties in complying with the provisions of the Call to the 1972 Convention. To this latter responsibility the Commission conjoined the authority derived from the minority Rules Committee report recommendation that delegate selection for 1972 be confined to the election year and that the unit rule be prohibited from all stages of selection. From the Special Equal Rights Committee recommendation adopted by the national committee in 1968, the Commission derived responsibility for studying the party structure as it related to guaranteeing full participation in party affairs regardless of race, colour, creed or national origin.

The Commission acquired information through public hearings, written submissions and staff research. At the Commission's inaugural meeting McGovern had announced that, "The convention has told us something is fundamentally wrong with our party."⁴² Witnesses to the seventeen regional public hearings proceeded to substantiate McGovern's assessment. Obstructions and hindrances to participation were described frequently.

The criticisms and commitment to change extended into the party hierarchy, thereby enhancing the legitimacy of reform and the pressure upon the Commission to respond. Describing delegate selection in 1968 Senator Edward Kennedy, then favourite for the 1972 nomination, observed :

"New resources and energies and people flowed into the party's nominating process. They came with a drive and dedication and a will to use the existing party machinery. Yet what they encountered was a system which seemed to discourage their participation. They frequently found their efforts rebuffed or diluted or ignored. Encrusted practices, inflexible rules and obsolete laws sometimes rendered their work entirely extraneous."⁴³

Hubert Humphrey espoused criticisms of the system through which he had been nominated in 1968. He perceived a gap between the party organisation and the people :

"I come here with a very simple message. There are two Democratic parties in this country. One is the Democratic Party of the people: the people who work and vote and sacrifice for it, the people who look to it for leadership and assistance, the people who decide whether it will sit in the seats of power. The other Democratic Party is a collection of offices and machinery, with fancy titles ... It was, in 1968, completely and thoroughly separated from the people of the real Democratic Party. It is still separate today. It is your job to return the machinery to the control of those who are its rightful owners."⁴⁴

The liberals' bete-noire of 1968, Mayor Daley, proposed that all states hold binding presidential primaries. Candidates for the nomination would be required to enter at least a third of them.⁴⁵

Though the hearings produced few specific proposals for change they provided ammunition to the reformers. They provided factual documentation substantiating the complaints of the McCarthy campaign and the limited research effort of the Ad Hoc Commission. They also revealed the hostility that unjust practices evoked.⁴⁶ The hearings added to the momentum for reform by publicising the party's procedural deficiencies. After such revelations failure to respond would have been disastrous for public relations. As Crotty has noted,

"If there ever had been a road back from significant change, the regional hearings virtually assured that the party could not take it."⁴⁷

The information acquired by the Commission enabled existing practices to be measured against the objectives set by the 1968 convention. From the minority Rules Committee report this entailed the provision of "full and timely opportunity to participate"; and assuring "even broader citizen participation in the delegate selection process" (derived from the Credentials Committee). The perceived discrepancies between these objectives and practice generated topics for reform.

The Commission report, Mandate for Reform, was drafted by the staff. It summarised the procedures employed by each state in 1968, cumulated their deficiencies and made proposals for change. Meetings of the full Commission or the smaller executive committee provided little discussion and few amendments to the staff's work.

Assessing the procedures in use in 1968 the Commission concluded that,

"meaningful participation of Democratic voters in the choice of their presidential nominee was often difficult or costly, sometimes completely illusory, and, in not a few instances, impossible."⁴⁸

This conclusion was founded on six inter-related deficiencies :

1. Rules were absent or inadequate.
2. Selection commenced before the election year.

3. Unrestrained majority rule denied representation to minority preferences and required delegates to vote contrary to their own preferences.
4. Procedural irregularities (secret caucuses, misuse of proxies, etc.) were rife.
5. Participation as a delegate was expensive.
6. Convention delegates were demographically unrepresentative of the electorate.⁴⁹

In framing recommendations the Commission was confined by few constraints. The 1968 convention supplied broad objectives but specified only eradication of the unit rule and the concentration of delegate selection within the convention year as the means to secure them. In the absence of instructions from outside, the Commission's proposals were conditioned by standards derived from the American democratic creed - equal protection, equality of opportunity and due process. These standards were applied to a nominating system which preserved the national convention as not inherently undemocratic.⁵⁰ The standards were applied to a system in which diversity of state delegate selection mechanisms persisted. The Commissioners opposed a national presidential primary and any increase in the state primaries, believing that a participatory process was consistent with the retention of the convention-caucus mechanism as the dominant mode of selection. Participatory caucuses were viewed as a block to the demand for primaries to produce a democratized nomination.⁵¹

The Commission's eighteen guidelines were aimed at three categories of problems. First, there were rules or practices inhibiting participation which included discrimination by race, age or sex; onerous voter registration requirements; the expense of participation; and the absence or inadequacy of rules. Secondly, there were rules or

practices which diluted participants' influence including proxy voting; inadequate quorum provisions for selection by committees; the unit rule and other depressants of minority preference; malapportionment; unorthodox means of selecting alternates and filling vacancies; and the integration of delegate selection into regular party business. The third category consisted of rules and practices combining the attributes of the two previous categories. Rules and practices thus defined as inhibiting access and diluting participant influence included inadequate public notice of selection meetings; ex officio delegates; obstacles to enrolment as a Democrat; selection before the election year; selection by committee or inaccessible slate-making meetings.

Procedural safeguards to assure access and influence, and positive discrimination to guarantee participation by specific groups were adopted to correct the deficiencies. Inhibitions on access were attacked by measures designed to widen eligibility for participation, increase knowledge of procedures and discriminate in favour of certain groups. Each state party was required to produce written rules defining delegate selection procedures including the provisions of dates, times and locations of meetings. Costs and fees for delegates were recommended (i.e. not required) for abolition, and where retained were required to be below \$10. Petition requirements to qualify for delegate status in excess of 1 per cent of the standard used to measure Democratic strength were mandated for removal. Onerous voter registration requirements were recommended for appeal. To preclude racial discrimination the six basic elements operative for 1968 were reiterated. In addition, discrimination by race, as well as age and sex, was attacked by the requirement that minorities, women and young people (aged under thirty) be represented on national convention delegations

"in reasonable relationship to their presence in the population of the State."⁵² This recommendation for race (and by extrapolation for age and sex also) was qualified by the statement that it was the Commission's understanding "that this not be accomplished by the mandatory imposition of quotas."⁵³

To preclude dilution of influence, measures effecting the 'one man, one vote' principle in the presidential nominating process were devised. The unit rule was outlawed at all stages of selection whilst representation of minority presidential preferences throughout was recommended. Proxy voting was outlawed. In non-primary states a minimum of three-quarters of the delegates were required to be chosen in geographical units comprised of congressional districts or smaller. The apportionment formula for the intra-state allocation of delegates was required to be based upon population and/or some measure of Democratic voting strength. Further measures under this category included the clear designation of meetings concerned with delegate section; 40 per cent quorums for selection by committees; alternates selected by the same range of devices acceptable for delegate selection - primary, convention or committee; delegate vacancies to be filled by decision of a committee, the original selection mechanism or the rest of the delegation.

Measures deemed to alleviate the combination of obstacles to both access and influence were principally devices for enhancing participation in delegate selection. Ex officio delegates were outlawed, meetings to select delegates and draw up slates were required to be publicised in advance. Selection by committee was restricted to 10 per cent of state delegations. Selection was required to commence in the calendar year of the convention. Eligibility to participate in Democratic processes was designed to be widened by the recommendation facilitating easy and frequent opportunity to enroll as a

Democrat. Enhanced influence was promoted by the requirement that delegate candidates specify either a presidential preference or uncommitted status on ballot papers, increasing the information available to voters necessary to use their votes to maximum effect.

Issued in autumn 1969, Mandate for Reform pursued trends recurrent in reform of the nominating process. In this instance participation was sought through nationalisation. Widened public involvement in delegate selection was pursued through the introduction of nationally-imposed standards.

The recurrent themes were enunciated in the introductory section of the report. The Commission goal in providing the guidelines was defined as "to stimulate the participation of all Democrats in the nominating process and to re-establish public confidence in the National Convention."⁵⁴ Nationalisation was the means to the participatory end, "In order to ensure the democratic selection of delegates, the Commission has adopted 18 Guidelines binding on all state Parties."⁵⁵

The Commissioners drew upon the traditions of party reform to legitimise their proposals. They noted the growing democratisation of the presidential nominating process from the inception of national conventions, marking the 1968 reform commitment as an acceleration of the trend towards popular participation. The participatory trend was located in the party's tradition,

"Since its inception, our Party has been an open party - open to new ideas and new people. From the days of Jefferson and Jackson, the new Democratic Party has been committed to broad participation of rank-and-file members in all of its major decision-making.

"In the American two-party system no decision is more important to the rank-and-file member than the choice of the party's presidential nominee. For this reason, popular control over the nominating process has been a principle of the Democratic Party since the birth of the National Convention 140 years ago."⁵⁷

The 1968 convention's response to the revelations of the failings of participation was also located in the reform tradition that the ills of democracy are curable by more democracy.⁵⁸

Party commissions are unlikely sources of radical change so McGovern-Fraser's adventurousness in pursuing reform requires explanation. Some change was inevitable given the consensus within the party that a repeat of the 1968 abuses must be avoided. The hearings advertised these abuses enhancing pressure on the party to rectify its deficiencies to restore its image.

That the degree of change was so extensive is attributable to factors internal to the Commission - biases in its composition, participation, staffing and mode of operation. As already suggested, the membership of the commission was biased towards reform by the selection policy of chairman Harris. Spokesmen for a professional style of party - represented by urban parties or in the AFL-CIO unions - were few. The biases in composition were reinforced by those in participation. Supporters of reform tended to be active in the Commission's work whilst its opponents or more cautious reformers were under-represented. For example, the AFL-CIO ignored the Commission's work and in consequence its one representative opted out of its proceedings. The Commission staff were committed reformers who utilised their positions to secure their objectives. Full-time employees, they were able to devote attention to the Commission's activities and develop expertise in its subject-matter that the part-time Commission members never equalled. The staff set the agenda for meetings, and drafted the reform guidelines. They liaised with sympathetic Commissioners in developing proposals, lobbied their support and encouraged them to participate. The staff thus provided an organisational locus for reform which its opponents never developed.

Several members of the Commission subsequently admitted that its activities had been a "runaway staff operation."⁵⁹

The Commission's mode of operation of identifying specific abuses and matching remedies contributed to an adventurous product. This compartmentalised approach discouraged an appreciation of the cumulative impact of the reform proposals. Their implications as a package were not discussed in Commission meetings and probably not widely recognised (except by the staff).

Like previous reform efforts, the outputs of the McGovern-Fraser Commission were conditioned by the political pressures and values of the period in which it operated. Demands for participation were prolific in American society in the 1960's. It was exemplified within the governmental system in the civil rights campaign, and outside it in student demands for democratisation of the institutions of higher education. The legitimacy of participation was evinced and enhanced by its incorporation into government programmes such as community action and model cities.⁶⁰

The reform measures sought to respond to the emergence of newly active and assertive groups in the electorate - issue activists, blacks, women and the young. Issue activists were viewed as the principal victims of the 1968 process.⁶¹ Their activism and their numbers elevated them into a potent political force. Granting them access to the party would contribute to its internal debates and reach out for their electoral allegiance. Continued exclusion wasted potential support but also threatened the party's survival. Designating the party as the principal vehicle for progressive peaceful change the Commissioners asserted :

"If we are not an open party; if we do not represent the demands of change, then the danger is not that people will go to the Republican Party; it is that there will

no longer be a way for people committed to orderly change to fulfill their needs and desires within our traditional political system. It is that they will turn to third and fourth party politics or the anti-politics of the street." 62

The Wallace candidacy and the disorder in Chicago gave plausibility to both threats.

Blacks had previously been excluded from party affairs in the South but no evidence of discrimination against women and the young was produced. Rather, the incentive to guaranteeing representation to these probably derived from the evidence of their increasing activism and, ostensibly, of cohesive group interests. Following the Civil Rights Acts and the Twenty-Fourth Amendment blacks were voting in increasing numbers. The emergence of the women's movement mobilised women into politics with specific group interests. Vietnam and other issues activated the young whilst the projected lowering of the voting age to eighteen heralded enhanced influence. Each of these groups, all with representatives on the Commission, were potentially important recruits to the Democratic coalition. Incentives were needed to attract their support, a pressing demand for the party whose traditional constituents had deserted in large numbers at the previous election. Commissioner Dutton provided the electoral rationalisation for guarantees of participation, "we're talking about winning elections, we've got to provide the symbols." 63

Positive discrimination, the chosen method for providing symbols, was consistent with the evolution of liberal ideas in the 1960's. Government programmes registered a shift from attempts to provide equality of opportunity to equality of result. This entailed guarantees of minority representation in the distribution of government contracts, jobs and places in higher education. 64

The Implementation of Reform

The Commission's proposals promised the most extensive changes to the presidential nominating process since the inception of national conventions. Unlike previous revisions in delegate selection procedures the Commission's proposals had implications universally where earlier reforms were pertinent principally to the South.

There were two possible obstacles to the implementation of reform. The first hinged on whether the Commission possessed the authority to require conformity with its measures. The 1968 convention mandate establishing the Commission derived from the Credentials Committee requirement that a Special Committee report its findings to the national committee and make them available to the 1972 convention. In addition, the mandate authorised apparently a second Special Committee to aid the state parties in meeting the requirements of the 1972 Call and report its efforts and findings to the convention and its committees. This wording intimated that the Commission lacked independent authority. Rather it was subordinate to, variously, the national committee, the 1972 convention and its committees. Moreover, the wording implied that there would be two committees, one to devise proposals and a second to assist the state parties in conforming to the 1972 Call. On this interpretation, McGovern-Fraser would have no role in securing implementation.

The second obstacle to implementation was the weak authority of national party organs in a federalised party system. State parties are traditionally depicted as autonomous units, free from nationally-imposed discipline. If the party's national organs propounded reforms could they impose it on state parties and what penalties were available to punish non-compliance?

The Commissioners sought to vault these obstacles by an assertion of authority. They claimed independent authority to devise reform proposals, monitor their implementation and place the Credentials Committee of the 1972 convention under obligation to penalise defaulting state parties by refusing to seat them. In Mandate for Reform the argument was presented that the Commission was a creation of the 1968 national convention, the party's governing body. The Commission was subordinate to nobody but the national convention. As the 1968 convention was no longer in existence only its successor was competent to review the Commission's actions. Unless reviewed by the 1972 convention (i.e. after the completion of that year's delegate selection), the Commissioners argued that their guidelines were binding on the state parties.⁶⁵ The Commission also appropriated to itself responsibility for supervising implementation arguing, "Our mandate is to work with state parties ..."⁶⁶ In dealing with cases of default, the Commissioners argued that they possessed the same legal status and options as the Special Equal Rights Committee which had devised the anti-discrimination rules after 1964. In issuing its regulations that committee threatened that its response to non-compliance would be a recommendation to the Credentials Committee that defaulting delegations be denied seating.⁶⁷

The Commissioners advanced bold, probably specious claims but they gained acceptance. The national committee acquiesced in the Commission's assertion of independence, and the state parties implemented the guidelines. The national committee's acquiescence probably pivoted on an interpretation of the Commission's authority by the party's legal counsel, Joseph Califano, which endorsed its claims to independence.⁶⁸ National party chairman Lawrence O'Brien appointed a screening committee on delegate selection but, pressurised by

McGovern, defined its role as to assist in implementing the guidelines not to evaluate their legality.⁶⁹ In February 1971 the national committee incorporated the guidelines without amendment into the preliminary Call to the 1972 convention.

When the Commission first issued its guidelines no state party's existing procedures satisfied all requirements. Several states were out of compliance with most of the fifteen compulsory guidelines. Yet by the time the 1972 convention assembled most states were in full conformity, a minority in "substantial conformity."⁷⁰

State party obedience followed in part from the Commission's assertiveness. The guidelines were claimed to be party law revocable only by the 1972 convention. They were communicated to each state party by Commission staff and the areas in need of remedy specified. The staff lobbied state party leaders for change and offered guidance on which procedures remained out of conformity with Commission norms. The pressure to reform was enhanced by the Commission's threat that non-compliance would lead to exclusion from the convention.

National party leaders' support for reform added weight to the pressure upon state parties to conform. Party chairman Lawrence O'Brien embraced the reforms. His prestige amongst the professionals gave the reforms credibility to suspicious state party leaders. Humphrey, Edward Kennedy, Muskie and McCarthy also endorsed reform. A further assist to the implementation effort derived from the desire of some state leaders, particularly amongst the crop of governors elected in 1970, either for reform or the consolidation of their support amongst reformers in their parties.⁷¹

Acceptance of reform was also eased because state leaders were not necessarily committed to the old procedures although they utilised them. Power, rather than procedural forms, was their priority. Prob-

ably some leaders misperceived the extent to which changes in the latter could reallocate the former. Mark Siegal's research uncovered such an example in Pennsylvania where a party leader commented, "We let them change the damned rules because we're going to work it our way anyway."⁷² The widespread expectation that Muskie would be the next nominee eased acceptance of reform. Acceptable to the professionals, Muskie was regarded as the inevitable nominee irrespective of the rules.⁷³ For party leaders who recognised the impact of the reforms their acceptance was consistent with the traditional professional strategy of inclusion. Elements had been excluded in 1968 to the party's detriment. To open the party in the future would strengthen it in manpower and electoral support.

An unintended accompaniment to the implementation of reform was the proliferation of presidential primaries. Resisting the demand for more primaries had been a goal of the Commissioners yet between 1968 and 1972 a further six states adopted them. In 1972 primaries were used in twenty-three states and two-thirds of all national convention delegates were selected in or bound by primaries, an 18 per cent increase on 1968.

Reform was a substantial contributor to the increase in primaries, though not its single cause. Reform repudiated some selection mechanisms that had been employed in 1968, compelling state parties to find alternatives. Maryland and Rhode Island in 1968 selected by state committee, a mechanism limited to a maximum of 10 per cent of the delegation for 1972. Tennessee and Michigan selected all or most of their delegates in an "untimely" manner. All four states opted for primaries in 1972. The appeal of primaries after reform was to offer a selection mechanism consistent with the Commission's objectives of timely and participatory procedures whilst avoiding the complex reform

rules which applied principally to the non-primary process, any contravention of which risked exclusion from the national convention.

Factors unrelated to reform contributed to the attractiveness of primaries. They brought media attention to states holding them, as exemplified in 1968. They were also a means of separating state from national politics. National candidate and issue preferences generated intra-party divisions in 1968 to the Democrats' detriment in state and local contests. Presidential primaries offered a means of removing divisive national concerns to the party's electoral benefit.

The 1972 Democratic nominating process demonstrated the realization of many reformers' goals. Public participation in all delegate selection more than doubled over 1968 and trebled in the non-primary states although they had declined in numbers from four years earlier.⁷⁴ Amongst national convention delegates the numbers of women and young people were close to their proportions in the population whilst blacks were over-represented by this standard. For all three groups representation increased substantially over 1968.⁷⁵

The convention continued the process of applying the reform rules. Decisions in the Credentials Committee and on the convention floor evidenced a willingness of the party's national organs to demand adherence to the reform guidelines from its constituent state parties. Given that the vast majority of guidelines had been adopted by the state parties the Credentials Committee's role in disposing of challenges was "not so much in enforcing the national requirement ... but in whether a state abided by its own rules in its selection procedures."⁷⁶

In the two most controversial challenges which reached the convention floor national party requirements were upheld, in one instance

state law notwithstanding. The Credentials Committee unseated delegates elected in primaries in Illinois and California for non-compliance with a national party requirement in the first instance and a recommendation in the second. The unseated delegates had recourse to the courts, eventually reaching the Supreme Court. The Court declined to rule for shortage of time before the convention assembled but intimated its reluctance to insert the judiciary into the political process, citing the national convention as the proper forum for deciding such intra-party disputes.⁷⁷

On the convention floor Illinois delegates slated by a closed meeting and demographically unrepresentative were unseated. The Illinois party was in transgression of national party rules but not state law. In the California case delegates selected in a winner-take-all primary - compulsory under state law but recommended (though not required) for abolition by McGovern-Fraser - were sustained in their seats.

The import of these two convention decisions was to institute priorities between various types of rules and laws. National party rules took precedence over state laws. (A ranking subsequently endorsed by the Supreme Court in its disposition of the Illinois case in 1975.⁷⁸) State laws took priority over national party non-compulsory rules where state party rules did not require them.

Though the convention was supportive of reform, deficiencies in the new system were recognised. The Rules Committee report recommended three specific reforms for 1976 and a general review of procedures. The three problems specified for reform were winner-take-all primaries, participation by non-Democrats and delegates disobeying binding primary mandates. Delegates were to be selected in a manner which provided a fair reflection of the division of preferences of those participating in the selection process. This ruled out winner-take-all primaries

(as in California), and required that minorities should not be represented simply in principle but also in numbers approximating the proportions of participants in the selection process. Primary participation was to be confined to registered Democrats proscribing crossover primaries such as Wisconsin's which allowed Republicans to participate in Democratic Party processes and vice versa. Candidates were given the right to approve delegates running on their behalf to provide a check on their loyalty.

A new commission was proposed charged with three tasks:

1. To review the 1972 guidelines "for the purpose of making appropriate revisions of such guidelines after due consideration of their operation."⁷⁹
2. Adopt guidelines necessary to implement the Call to the 1976 convention (i.e. including the three reforms specified above).
3. Give attention through monitoring and compliance review to the requirement that the state and national parties "take affirmative action to achieve full participation of minorities, youth, and women in the delegate selection process and all party affairs."⁸⁰

These convention decisions failed to reflect the widespread hostility within the party engendered by the reform rules in operation. Traditional power-wielders in Democratic conventions - elected officeholders, party officials, AFL-CIO leaders - were less numerous and less influential than in the past. Their favoured candidates failed whilst McGovern triumphed despite their hostility. Though their unenthusiasm for McGovern could not prevent his nomination it proved a major obstacle to his election. The unenthusiasm of the party's leaders was replicated by many of its voters. The consequence was the severest defeat suffered by a Democratic presidential candidate.

But discontent with the 1972 process and its outcome did not

develop into a wholesale reaction against reform on the new commission (the Commission on Delegate Selection and Party Structure, known after its chairwoman Mikulski). Particular components of the reformed process were targeted for revision but the commitment to a participatory system was preserved.

Three reasons can be adduced for the continued support for a participatory process. First, the principal target for revision, the (in effect) quotas for representation of women, minorities and the young acted as a lightning rod for discontent. The deficiencies of 1972 - the exclusion of party leaders, the nomination of McGovern (who had appealed to the quota groups), the party's radical image - were attributed to the quotas rather than to the reforms as a whole. Thus the quotas were sacrificed whilst most of the reformed system survived unscathed. Secondly, there had been a consensus within the party for a more participatory system and in 1972 this objective had been secured. Thirdly, any attempted closing of the process would have met resistance. Pro-reform elements were a force within the party who would have to be overcome to curb participation. Even if their opposition was surmountable the costs for party unity would have been substantial. Cutting back would also have been a thorny public relations problem. The party would be seen to be revoking its commitments to participation which had emerged as responses to the deficiencies of 1968 aired in public hearings. Even for those opposed to participation there were pragmatic rationales for its retention.

Published in 1973, the Commission's report gave prominence to the continued commitment to participation. The preamble to the revised rules stated that their objects included that they should be "inclusive of all elements of the Democratic constituency and fair to all those who seek to influence the Presidential nominating process."⁸¹

A strong, united and electorally successful party was sought through "two overriding principles ... fairness and openness."⁸² Like its predecessor, the Commission located the commitment to participation in the Democratic Party's tradition,

"As long as the Democratic Party has been in existence, it has been dedicated to easing barriers to citizen participation in the political decision-making process and, especially economic and other unreasonable barriers to holding elective office."⁸³

Much of the Commission's report was a reiteration of the McGovern-Fraser rules. The principal revisions were the abolition of quotas and an increase in the proportions of delegates that could be selected at-large in each state. Quotas were replaced by affirmative action programmes designed to encourage participation with particular concern for minority groups, Native Americans, women and youth. All state programmes were to be vetted by a specially created Compliance Review Commission. In contrast to the quota provisions, the composition of national convention delegation was not, of itself, proof of discrimination.

Selection by state committees or by publicly elected delegates was increased to facilitate the representation of public officials, party officials and members of traditional under-represented groups. Whilst guaranteeing larger representation of the officialdom conspicuously absent in 1972 they were denied the right to vote their own candidate preferences. Rather, they were to reflect the division of preferences of the publicly elected delegates. The Commissioners thus sought to combine leadership inclusion with rank-and-file determination of the nomination.

Other Mikulski reforms pursued the McGovern-Fraser goal of prohibiting rules or practices diluting influence. Fair reflection of participants' presidential preferences in delegates was advanced by the institution of proportional representation. At all levels of

the selection process delegates were to be distributed in proportion to the preferences of participants although a threshold of 10 per cent of the total vote (later revised to 15 per cent) could be imposed. All candidates for delegate were to identify their presidential preference or declare their uncommitted status. To ensure that delegates remained faithful to their pledges they were subject to approval by the relevant candidate. Proxy voting was reintroduced. Where a participant had to leave a meeting before its conclusion he was allowed to leave his vote with another individual. Participation was restricted to Democratic identifiers.

The Commission's recommendations were approved by the national committee with minor modifications (including the heightened threshold for representation). It thereupon disbanded. The responsibility for implementation was entrusted to a specially created Compliance Review Commission.

Because it built on the foundations of its predecessor, compliance with the Mikulski guidelines was a less arduous task for state parties than four years earlier. Neither the scope nor number of changes were as great. In most states only minor changes were necessary. The greatest controversy arose over the Democrats-only provision which disbarred crossover primaries from a role in delegate selection. In one such state, Wisconsin, attempts to institute a closed primary were defeated in the state legislature. Wisconsin had proved hospitable territory to liberals in the past and for 1976 was a key state for Morris Udall's campaign. Preserving the Wisconsin primary in delegate selection became vital to Udall's strategy. His supporters lobbied the Compliance Review Commission for its retention and ultimately succeeded.⁸⁴

The survival of the reformed process added to the incentives for

the adoption of primaries. By 1976 a further seven states had added primaries to produce a total of thirty generating three-quarters of the delegate total. Primaries offered a means for overcoming the activist minorities who dominated some caucuses in 1972. For example, McGovern showed impressive strength in southern caucuses despite his meagre support amongst the electorate there. Primaries, by mobilising larger numbers into delegate selection, enabled the influence of activist minorities to be depressed. Four of the new primary states were in the South. McGovern's success in the primaries in 1972 demonstrated their potential for transforming a little-known candidate into the nominee. Some of his subsequent imitators sought the adoption of primaries in favourable territory, seeking to maximise the impact of localised support. The passage of primary law in Georgia, designed to aid the candidacy of Jimmy Carter, is such an example.

Forces other than reform, such as the desire to attract media attention to state's delegate selection, continued to inspire the adoption of primaries but they gained in strength in the context of the reformed system. Multiple candidacies, delegates won through public mandates and proportional representation promising a return in delegates without the pre-condition of victory all worked to guarantee that any primaries that were instituted would be contested. The influx of candidates would be accompanied by money and publicity. Prior to reform, primaries frequently failed to attract candidates (and thus the corollaries of their entry) diminishing their attractiveness as selection devices.

Concern over the growth of primaries stimulated the party chairman Robert Strauss in 1975 to establish a commission designed to find ways to curb their number and influence. Chaired by Michigan party chairman Morley Winograd, the group was designated as the Commission on the Role and Future of Presidential Primaries. At the 1976 convention

the group's remit was widened to incorporate a general revision of delegate selection rules and retitled the commission on Presidential Nomination and Party Structure. The convention voted to end loophole primaries (those where the plurality winner in each district won all the delegates facilitating a winner-take-all system for the state as a whole). Like its predecessors, the Commission was assigned the responsibility for implementing the convention's instruction.

The context in which the Winograd Commission worked differed from that of its predecessors. The party had won the 1976 presidential election. Party leaders had found Carter acceptable if not their first preference. The 1976 nominating contest aroused little controversy, and the party entered the election united.

Commission activities were thus conditioned by the party's control of the presidency, usually the dominating influence in national party affairs. Presidential interests were built into the Commission after the election, with the addition of several Carter representatives, including three White House aides.

The intrusion of the president's interests generated controversies in the Commission's work extending beyond the completion of its report. In consequence, the national committee was required to exert greater initiative than formerly in seeking to resolve disputes conclusively where the commission failed. Heightened conflict characterised the Winograd Commission compared with its predecessors because to a greater extent than formerly party factions adopted distinctive stances on procedure.

The commitment to participation of the earlier commissions was preserved as reflected in the title of its report, Openness, Participation and Party Building Reforms for a Stronger Democratic Party.⁸⁵

But the president's interests were translated into constrictions on candidate entry and delegate representation. Critics interpreted

these changes as means to diluting opposition to Carter's re-nomination. Administration spokesmen justified them as measures promoting consensus, eliminating marginal candidates and assuring a nominee with broad support.

Under the Winograd guidelines the delegate selection process was to be concentrated within a three month period (known as the "window concept"). Filing deadlines for entering primaries were set two to three months prior to the vote. Proportional representation thresholds were phased according to when selection began (the "sliding window"). In the first month the threshold was set at 15 per cent rising to 20 per cent in the second and 25 per cent in the third. Following the convention's mandate, loophole primaries were prohibited. Each state delegation was to be enlarged by 10 per cent, the supplement to consist of party leaders and elected officials mandated to vote in the same proportions as the elected delegates. Crossover primaries were outlawed without exception.

Though the administration forged a majority on the Commission, the defeated minority remained unreconciled. The national committee's review of the Commission's product was characterised by an endeavour to compromise disagreements and heal the divisions that they had aroused. The two most contentious issues, primary filing deadlines and proportional representation thresholds, were both resolved through compromise solutions. The deadlines guideline aroused opposition from the states because many laws required amendment to enforce it. In response the national committee widened the period for filing. For delegate allocation the "sliding window" was scrapped. For the final stage of the caucus process and the selection of at-large primary delegates the threshold for representation was set at a minimum of 15 per cent and a maximum of 20 per cent. At earlier stages of caucus

selection lower thresholds were permissible. For primary delegates elected by district the maximum threshold was set at 25 per cent. On the less contentious issues the committee ratified the commission proposals.

Crossover primaries proved the principal obstruction to the implementation of Winograd. Most states holding such primaries for delegate selection responded to the Commission's report by shifting to a caucus process although some retained a primary for the expression of presidential preference only (i.e. a "beauty contest" having no bearing on the selection of delegates). In Wisconsin, however, the state party insisted upon using its crossover primary for delegate selection. The state party took its case to the state court which ruled in favour of the Wisconsin party and ordered the national party to give official recognition to the results of the primary.⁸⁶ No appeal to the Supreme Court was possible before the convention, so Wisconsin preserved its primary against national party rules.

Initially established to check the growth of primaries, the aftermath of the Winograd report was their continuing proliferation (see Table 3.1). The Commission had taken some steps to discourage primaries such as the proscription of the crossover type, and the window designed to cluster selection processes thereby reducing the visibility of any one state. But the Commissioners declined to assert themselves further. Only half the members desired a greater preponderance of caucuses and, like their forerunners on McGovern-Fraser, the commissioners opposed a national party rule prescribing a single selection mechanism.⁸⁷

The proliferation of primaries after 1976 was a response to the pressures generated by the reformed process in general rather than to the Winograd rules specifically. Primaries continued to be the

principal recipients of candidate and media attention, particularly those early in the sequence. Unsurprisingly, most of the new primary states scheduled their elections early. Primaries were also established to suit the strategies of individual candidates, on this occasion in the multi-candidate Republican contest.

Reform in the Republican Party

Continuing debate in the Democratic Party over reform of the nominating process after 1968 stands beside over a decade of Republican tranquility. One observer of the Republicans has commented that, "There is not, in fact, a whole lot to say with respect to substantive party change."⁸⁸ But tranquility has not been inactivity. Like the Democrats, the Republicans from 1968 established a series of bodies to propose changes in party practice including the rules of delegate selection. Some of the resulting proposals paralleled those in the Democratic Party. The Republicans too sought to increase participation and achieve greater demographic representativeness. Where the parties diverged was over the magnitude of change and nationalisation as the means to attain it.

As in the Democratic Party, reform of the Republican nominating process in the 1960's initially focused upon the prohibition of racial discrimination in delegate selection. In 1968 the party's national convention endorsed the report of its Rules Committee prohibiting discrimination in party affairs, including delegate selection, on grounds of race, religion, colour or national origin (the same four categories defined in the Democratic Party's anti-discrimination rules adopted four years earlier). To achieve this objective state committees were required to take "positive action". In addition, the convention

TABLE 3.1

STATES HOLDING PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES, 1960-1980

	<u>1960</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1980</u>
<u>Democrats</u>						
No. of states	18	18	17	23	30	35
% Delegates selected in or bound by primaries	43.3	42.0	40.4	63.4	74.0	71.8
<u>Republicans</u>						
No. of states	17	16	16	22	29	36
% Delegates selected in or bound by primaries	45.4	45.3	42.8	56.6	68.8	76.0

Includes D.C. as a state.

authorised the national committee to establish a group to review and study a range of subjects including convention rules and the implementation of the anti-discrimination rule.

The focus upon racial discrimination proceeded from the party's meagre support amongst blacks in the electorate. Party liberals sought an inclusive strategy, reacting against charges that the party had become lilywhite.⁸⁹ Moreover, charges of racial discrimination in delegate selection had been levelled at various southern parties dominated by Goldwater supporters in 1964 which broke with a tradition of integrated delegations.

The body authorised by the convention, the Delegates and Organisation Committee (commonly abbreviated to DO), was appointed by the party chairman in 1969. Its membership of eighteen consisted of national committee members. Evidence was obtained through a questionnaire sent to party officials, written and verbal submissions. There were no public hearings and submissions were overwhelmingly provided by party officials.

Published in 1971, the Committee's report pursued a participatory goal. Its foreword expressed the Committee's desire "that the door is open in every state for those who wish to participate in the procedures that lead to the selection of an individual for President."⁹⁰ The Committee's proposals were designed, inter alia, to "encourage greater involvement in the Republican Party on the part of all citizens, regardless of sex, age, race, religion, color or national origin."⁹¹ Several specific DO proposals were identical to the McGovern-Fraser report: the demand for publicised, open caucuses; and prohibitions on fees, proxy voting and ex officio delegates.

To implement the anti-discrimination provision the Committee advocated that each state designate one man, one woman, one person aged under

twenty-five and one member of a minority ethnic group to each convention committee. Each state was urged to provide delegations evenly balanced between the sexes. Persons aged under twenty-five were recommended for inclusion on delegations proportionate to their numbers in each state's electorate.

Unlike McGovern-Fraser, the DO Committee neither possessed nor claimed independent authority. Its recommendations were transmitted through a multi-tier process consisting of the Rules Committee of the national committee, the full national committee, the Rules Committee of the national convention, and the national convention proper which retained final authority to decide upon rules changes. This hierarchical structure erected several potential blocking points for reform. Moreover, the location of final authority in the national convention introduced a time lag between recommendation and implementation, i.e. DO proposals approved by the 1972 convention were first effective for the 1976 nomination.

The Committee's participatory proposals proved uncontroversial. They were consistent with the participatory ethos of the period but they were probably less contentious in the Republican Party where fewer of the proscribed practices had been shown to be prevalent in the party's nominating process than on the Democratic side.

Moves towards demographic representation evoked greater hostility. Guaranteed representation for some groups was regarded as a potential source of antagonism amongst those not so recognised. Critics outside the Committee condemned attempts to "McGovernise the Republican Party."⁹² The convention Rules Committee disapproved required representation of the young on delegations, and of the young and minorities on convention committees. Both revisions were endorsed by the 1972 convention.

Though avoiding guarantees of representation the party continued to proclaim its commitment to inclusiveness. The convention endorsed a national committee commitment to extend involvement in the party by "positive action to achieve the broadest possible participation by women, young people, minority and heritage groups and senior citizens in the delegate selection process."⁹³ To secure this mandate a new committee was authorised.

Consisting of national committee members and other party officials the resulting Rule 29 Committee (after the convention rule which authorised it) was established in 1973. Responsibility for delegate selection was assigned to a sub-committee headed by former national party chairman Ray Bliss. The sub-committee recommended measures for adoption by state parties to generate participation. Times and places of caucuses were to be publicised; information meetings held and publications produced to increase public understanding of the selection process; and special emphasis placed on the recruitment of the groups targeted by the 1972 convention.

In full committee the wording of these proposals was modified to remove the implication that any specific activity was required of state parties. Examples of state party positive action programmes were to be submitted to the national committee for review and comment. However, non-compliance with Rule 29 proposals were not automatic grounds for a credentials challenge, though the formulation and implementation of a positive action programme was taken as presumptive evidence of a good faith attempt to comply with the rules.

Despite the full Rule 29 Committee's concessions to party federalism, the proposals encountered opposition to incipient centralisation amongst national committee members. Conservative critics defended state party independence against the national controls conveyed in the proposed

national committee right of review of state positive action programmes. By a narrow margin the national committee disapproved the right of review. It was replaced by a more permissive, federal orientation by which state parties could submit their positive action programmes if they chose, and could invite the national committee to review and comment upon them. Such submissions and requests were to be voluntary, no standards to which programmes should conform were specified and no penalties for non-compliance defined.

The amended version of ^{the} Rule 29 recommendation was approved by the 1976 convention. The convention further institutionalised evaluation of delegate selection procedures by the authorisation of a standing rules review committee under national committee aegis. The committee was charged to "receive, review and offer recommendations on rules changes made to the committee". The location of rules review within a unit of the national committee was regarded as a victory for conservatives eager to restrain the initiative of reform-oriented ad hoc groups.⁹⁵

The early years of the new rules review committee were notably passive. Its chairman, Perry Hooper of Alabama espoused a laissez faire policy towards party rules observing, "The rules say we are to receive. We are not going out to find."⁹⁶ Its major recommendation to the 1980 convention was the repeal of the "justice resolution" enacted at the closely contested 1976 convention which bound primary delegates to particular candidates irrespective of their own preferences. The convention endorsed the proposal, moving the party in the opposite direction to the Democrats in dealing with the problem of "unfaithful" delegates.

The modesty of the Republican reform effort is attributable to the party's electoral success at presidential level, the nature of Republican partisans and the structure of the party's reform process.⁹⁷ Unlike

the Democrats, the Republicans were not propelled into reform by active discontent and electoral failure. The party's minority status amongst the electorate proved no major obstacle to the winning of presidential elections, suggesting that the process by which its nominees were selected was an effective one. In contrast, continued minority status at sub-presidential level promoted a more vigorous reform effort devoted to strengthening the party for congressional, state and local elections⁹⁸.

As the in-party at presidential level between 1969 and 1977 the incentives to change were small. Moreover, the potential for change was depressed by the party's control of the White House which dominates the parties' national affairs. Neither Nixon nor Ford were committed to substantial change which conditioned the work of the national party organs.

The legitimacy of the existing selection mechanisms derived also from the absence of obvious anti-democratic features. There was no modern Republican equivalent to the McCarthy campaign to generate a critique of the nominating process. Eisenhower insurgents had proved able to exert influence in caucus states in 1952. In 1964 the party's conservative activist wing had won the nomination by mobilising early and occupying positions of influence within the party.

Republican activists are supportive of states rights in party affairs. Those reform efforts that the party undertook were constrained by the support for a decentralised party system and opposition to nationalisation. In consequence, the definition and enforcement of national standards were either absent or encountered insurmountable opposition. As the Republicans have become the party of governmental states rights so they have become the more committed of the two parties to federalism in intra-party affairs. Thus Republican reform statements

defined objectives but failed to provide the mechanisms to guarantee their attainment that enforcement by national party organs could have provided.

Republican activists are less committed to intra-party democracy than their Democratic counterparts. The evidence on this subject is fragmentary but consistent.⁹⁹ This suggests that James Q. Wilson was incorrect to equate the amateur Democrat with the Republican equivalent.¹⁰⁰ Both are committed to issue espousal but faith in intra-party democracy is more prominent amongst the Democrats. Whilst there may be parallels between the two groups about the desired style of party there is divergence over the desired form of party organisation.

The structure of the Republican reform process served to constrain the magnitude of change. Prior restraints on the reform bodies' assertiveness were imposed by their membership. They were composed exclusively or largely of national committee members, a group of party leaders unlikely to support disruption of the status quo. This tendency was strengthened after 1976 when rules review ceased to be assigned to ad hoc groups and instead was placed permanently in a unit of the national committee. Subsequent restraints followed from the dependence of the reform committees upon the approval of four other bodies to take effect. In each, groups supportive of the status quo were entrenched. The national committee provided for representation of the state parties, giving supporters of a decentralised party a veto over reform. Moreover, the final authority over rules changes rested in the grouping who would be most affected by reform - and therefore likely to be sceptical of it - the national convention delegates.

Though Republican reform accomplishments were dwarfed by those on the Democratic side the trend towards participation was consistent with the reform tradition. The second reform trend, nationalisation, was

resisted. Its absence allied with that of any alternative enforcement mechanism thus muted the impact of the commitment to participation.

Despite the party's own caution, the Republican nominating process was transformed though, to a greater degree than on the Democratic side, from without. The proliferation of primaries, prescribed by state laws, applied to both parties, stimulating participation in the nominating processes of both. The reforms of campaign finance (described below) also applied to both parties, re-ordering candidates' money raising and spending strategies. The effect of these two sets of changes was to retain substantial congruity between the nominating campaigns of the two parties.

Campaign Finance Reform

Reform of campaign finance proceeded from a recognition by political leaders of public dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of existing controls. In the early 1970's the principal focus of reform was the rising cost of campaigns, particularly growing media expenditures, and campaign donations as a source of corruption in government. Federal campaign regulation was located in the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 which was widely ignored and unenforced. Proponents of reform in principle included congressmen of both parties, the Nixon administration and interest groups such as the National Committee for an Effective Congress.

The resulting reform legislation, the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, sought to remove the principal discontents. Contributions of over \$100 were required to be disclosed, though no limits on donations were applied. Spending on media advertising was confined to 10 cents per eligible voter or \$150,000, whichever sum was the larger. Supported

by the administration and large majorities of Congress the law came into effect in April 1972 - during that year's presidential primaries. (An informal agreement amongst the Democratic candidates imposed curbs on media spending before the law took effect.¹⁰¹)

The Watergate revelations generated a new commitment to further regulation of campaign finance which was exploited by reformers in Congress and groups such as Common Cause. Watergate exposed the deficiencies of existing controls on overall spending, the misappropriation of funds for illegal purposes and the use of campaign donations to secure political influence.

The legislative response was a limitation on contributions and overall spending, and public funding of presidential elections (wholly) and nominations (partially). The 1974 Federal Election Campaign Act applied to presidential nominations through its limitation on individual contributions of \$1,000, \$5,000 for groups and \$50,000 for candidates and their families; limits on independent (i.e. on behalf of candidate but not controlled by his campaign organisation) expenditure of \$1,000 per candidate; a ceiling of \$10 million for each candidate's primary campaign. Half of this expenditure on primaries could be funded by the federal government. In order to qualify for federal funds candidates had first to raise a total of \$100,000 sub-divided into \$5,000 raised in twenty different states through individual contributions of \$250 or less. Only contributions of \$250 or less were matched from federal funds. The law was to be administered by a bipartisan Federal Election Commission (FEC) consisting of six voting members (two selected by the House Speaker, two by the President of the Senate and two by the President).

Watergate notwithstanding, the law evoked considerable opposition. Constitutionalists charged that limitations on contributions and expenditures were invasions of the First Amendment protection of freedom of

expression. Conservatives criticised public financing as an unwarranted federal government activity. Opposition continued after passage of the Act in a court challenge filed by a diverse grouping including James Buckley, Eugene McCarthy and the New York Civil Liberties Union.

The case was decided by the Supreme Court in January 1976. In an unsigned decision the court found restrictions on spending by candidates of their own monies and by groups independent of candidates to be breaches of First Amendment rights,

"A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration and the size of the audience reached. This is because virtually every means of communicating ideas in today's society requires the expenditure of money."¹⁰²

Public financing was upheld as were limits on contributions. Limits on expenditure were permissible only for the candidates who accepted federal funding. The FEC, a body with executive functions in part chosen by members of Congress, was held to contravene the separation of powers.

Congress enacted amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act, adjusting the law to come into conformity with the Court's rulings. Amendments enacted in 1976 facilitated unlimited expenditure by candidates where public funds were not obtained, and by independent groups and individuals. Candidates obtaining matching funds were restricted to spending only \$50,000 of their own or their family's money. The FEC was re-established, selected by the traditional mechanism of presidential nomination and Senatorial confirmation.

A further amendment to the Act was a response to the proliferation of candidates and the large-scale drain on public resources that their eligibility for matching funds threatened. To curb such outlays the conditions of eligibility were tightened. Candidates obtaining less than 10 per cent of the vote in two consecutive primaries were deprived

of public funding.

The disruption resulting from the Buckley decision combined with Congress's delay in passing the necessary amendments prevented the FEC from authorising matching funds in early 1976 for 61 days. During this period candidates were dependent upon private contributions and loans.

Conclusion

Reform transformed the rules by which presidential nominations were conducted. Primaries became the predominant delegate selection device. Caucuses were opened to voter participation. The selection process was confined to the election year. Participation by specific demographic groups was encouraged by positive discrimination (the Democrats in 1972) and affirmative action programmes thereafter. Ex officio delegates were outlawed. On the Democratic side participants were able to register their candidate preferences and the adoption of proportional representation enabled minorities to win delegates. For the Democrats, the selection process came to be regulated by published rules. Federal matching funds were available to candidates. The size of donations were limited. Expenditure limits applied to candidates accepting matching funds. (Table 3.2 provides a compilation of the principal differences in rules before and after reform.)

The cumulative impact of the reforms was consistent with those in the Jacksonian and Progressive eras in pushing the parties towards the Voter Dominated pole. Voters' participation expanded and their influence over convention nominating decisions tightened. This resulted from the increase in primaries, the opening up of the caucus process, increased opportunities for the expression of candidate preference and, particularly on the Democratic side where it was mandatory, proportional representation

in translating voter preferences into delegates. Characteristics of a Rational Efficient party were attenuated. Leadership control over nominations eroded as curbs were placed on their discretion in the conduct of the selection process, the increased participation by voters and the linkage between voter and delegate preferences tightened.

TABLE 3.2

MAJOR CHANGES IN RULES EFFECTED BY REFORM

<u>PRE-REFORM</u>	<u>POST-REFORM</u>
Majority of delegates selected through non-primary process.	Majority of delegates selected in or bound by primaries.
In some states non-primary process confined to party officials.	Non-primary process open to voters.
Delegate selection process spread over several years.	Delegate selection process confined to the election year. ₁
Racial discrimination in selection; under-representation of women and the young.	Positive discrimination/affirmation action programmes to increase participation of racial minorities, women, the young etc.
Ex officio delegates permitted.	Ex officio delegates prohibited.
Participants unable to express candidate preferences in many states.	Participants able to express candidate preferences. ₁
Winner-take-all primaries; unit rule in Democratic Party.	Proportional representation in distribution of delegates. ₂
Rules often absent; party officials exercise discretion.	Rules provided. ₁
Campaigns financed from private sources.	Federal matching funds available.
No limits on size of donations.	Limits on size of donations.
No federal limits on expenditures.	Federal limits on expenditure for candidates accepting matching funds.

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1. Not required by Republican Party rules but generally accurate as a description of its selection process in practice.
 2. Not required by Republican Party rules and not observed in practice in many states.

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CHAPTER FOUR

CAMPAIGN STRATEGY

This chapter seeks to relate the strategies pursued by candidates for the nomination to the environment in which the contest took place. Change in the structure resulting from reform produced transformations in strategy. The contrasts between the two periods developed in this chapter demonstrates the responsiveness of strategy to the dominant actors controlling the nomination, their selection criteria and the preferences of interest groups which were entrenched in the nominating process or could be mobilised into it.

The opening section provides a typology of campaign strategies utilised by major candidates in the immediate pre-reform period.¹ Unlike the discussion of strategies provided by other scholars the typology is systematic, exhaustive in its coverage of all candidates and pertinent to the strategies adopted in the period. The rationales for each strategy are defined and their application described. Strategies for the post-reform period are then analysed. This analysis charts the adaptations in strategy stimulated by reform. The components of some strategies were adjusted whilst others tended towards obsolescence. Post-reform choice of strategy showed a pronounced trend towards a single type replacing the variety of the earlier period.

In the second section strategy is related to the participant bias: the distortions injected into a selection system by uneven distributions of influence or rates of turnout amongst participants. Before reform the bias emanated from the influence over the nomination exerted by party leaders. Their selection criteria reflected the demands of professional politicians and campaigns were keyed to their concerns. When reform

established a participatory system the bias shifted towards the parties' high turnout elements in which one ideological wing from each party is disproportionately represented. This bias encouraged candidates to compete who appealed to the activist wings. It also conditioned the appeals fashioned by all candidates inspiring attempts to co-opt or assuage the activists.

In the third section campaign strategy is related to the participation of interest groups². Before reform a small range of groups entrenched in the party organisations exercised veto power over the nomination. To win the nomination the support or acquiescence of these groups had to be obtained. Groups lacking anchorage within the parties generally lacked leverage within the nominating process, restricting the value of their support as a strategic resource. By ending party organisation control of the nomination, reform divested the entrenched groups of their veto power. A participatory system became accessible to groups outside the party structures. Candidates mobilising the support of such groups gained the strategic resources of cohesive voting blocs, organisation and finance.

A Typology of Strategies

The most salient feature of the pre-reform environment was the control exercised over the nomination by party leaders. Their preferences were restricted by few formal curbs. Reflecting the professional orientation, their decisions were conditioned by the desire to win the election, maintain the party organisations and their own places of power within them. In consequence, all strategies adjusted to this environment seeking to fulfil the leaders' demands of a nominee.

The typology of strategies provided below seeks to discriminate

different emphases in campaigns. It does not claim rigid separations between strategies although any exercise in categorisation tends to suggest this. The typology is designed to cover the immediate pre-reform period. It seeks to overcome the deficiencies of earlier discussions of the subject identified in Chapter One. Thus it seeks to be systematic, exhaustive and relevant to the particular period. It is systematic in defining the variables on which the various types are constructed. It is exhaustive in covering every major candidate of the period. It is historically relevant in dispensing with strategies that by the 1960's were an anachronism.

An analysis of strategies employed in this period generates two variables for distinguishing the candidates. The first is the base of support. Candidates sought to develop support either within the party structure or amongst voters. Candidates such as Symington and Johnson in 1960, Humphrey in 1968, concentrated on the former making little effort to prove or generate support amongst voters. John and Robert Kennedy, Nixon in 1968, recognised that party leaders controlled the nomination but sought to exert pressure upon them through demonstrations of support amongst voters which provided the focus of their campaigns.

Some candidates drew widespread support from both bases. Johnson in 1964 (the incumbent president) and Nixon in 1960 (the president's heir apparent) were supported both within the party and by the voters. The effect of predominance in both spheres was to preclude a challenge for the nomination.

The second variable is the degree of candidate activity. Some candidacies were publicly avowed early in the election year and denoted by strenuous campaigns for support amongst voters or party leaders. John Kennedy, Goldwater and McCarthy provide examples of active campaigns. Alternatively, inactive campaigns consisted of a delayed admission of

candidacy where one was made at all. The candidate refrained from overt campaign activity though efforts could be mounted on his behalf by others. The principal focus of activity was the national convention. Symington, Nixon in 1964 and Reagan in 1968 pursued inactive candidacies.

The dimensions of bases of support and activity are utilised in Fig. 4.1 to distinguish the range of campaign strategies used in the pre-reform period. The five types consist of the following inter-relationship of variables:

1. VOTER support, ACTIVE campaign = POPULAR FAVOURITE.
2. VOTER support, INACTIVE campaign = COMPROMISE - POPULAR.
3. PARTY + VOTER support, INACTIVE campaign = DOMINANT LEADER.
4. PARTY support, ACTIVE campaign = ORGANISATION FAVOURITE.
5. PARTY support, INACTIVE campaign = COMPROMISE - UNITY.

Table 4.1 uses the five types generated above to distinguish the strategies employed by the major candidates in the period 1960 - 68.

FIGURE 4.1

A TYPOLOGY OF CANDIDATE STRATEGY




TABLE 4.1

CANDIDATE STRATEGIES, 1960-68

YEAR	STRATEGY					
	Popular Favourite	Compromise-Popular	Dominant Leader	Organisation Favourite	Compromise-Unity	
1960 (R)			Nixon			
1960 (D)	Humphrey J. Kennedy	Stevenson			Johnson Symington	
1964 (R)	Lodge Rockefeller Scranton	Nixon		Goldwater		
1964 (D)			Johnson			
1968 (R)	Nixon Rockefeller	Reagan				
1968 (D)	R. Kennedy McCarthy		Johnson	Humphrey		

Popular favourites based their claim to the nomination on their proficiency as vote-getters. They appealed to the party's desire for an electable candidate. Active campaigns were undertaken using instruments of mass appeal such as polls and primaries to demonstrate support amongst voters.

In a party-dominated process the attempt to pressurise leaders from below was undertaken only by candidates compelled to resort to the electorate to stake a claim to the nomination. Either they were seeking to overcome a candidate with greater intra-party support (as used by Scranton and Robert Kennedy) or they possessed some form of political handicap which disqualified them as nominees unless they could adduce contrary evidence in their favour. They lacked national prominence (Humphrey in 1960), they were 'unavailable' (John Kennedy a Catholic, Nixon a loser) or they were mavericks or in some other way aroused the leaders' hostility (Rockefeller, McCarthy).

John Kennedy's campaign planning for 1960 recognised that "he couldn't negotiate it [the nomination]. If the Convention ever went into the back rooms, he'd never emerge from those back rooms."³ Similarly, Nelson Rockefeller in 1964 realised that the Republican Party had little sympathy with his independence and liberalism, "since it was obvious that the politicians did not want him, he must, as Kennedy had done, show them his muscle at the polls, in the primaries."⁴ In 1968 Richard Nixon was acceptable to the party professionals but they were sceptical of his electability. Proving his strength amongst voters would provide the "leverage to pry open the hidden loyalties that remained his among the major delegate-brokers of the Republican Party"⁵

Establishing the candidate's credentials as a vote-getter of presidential potential preceded the election year. A substantial victory in a mid-term senate or gubernatorial election of a large state promoted

the candidate's credibility as a presidential prospect whose intentions then became a source of media speculation.

Seeking re-election to the Senate in 1958, John Kennedy's campaign aimed "to produce a massive record-breaking victory that would gain national attention and thus help move him towards the 1960 presidential nomination."⁶ His overwhelming victory - accompanied by the election of the first Democratic state legislature in Massachusetts history - contributed to the presidential campaign's objective of diminishing his religion and his youth as apparent obstacles to his election as president.

Campaigning on behalf of other candidates for office facilitated political contacts and obligations. In addition, by demonstrating an ability to attract votes for others it provided presumptive evidence of a potential coat-tail effect. Like Kennedy, Nixon's participation in mid-term elections contributed to the goal of overcoming the handicap perceived as precluding his nomination. The Republican resurgence of 1966 assisted by Nixon's campaigning diminished his reputation as a loser. According to his 1968 deputy campaign manager, the mid-term elections marked the transformation of Nixon's presidential prospects -

"I suppose we all would have said at the beginning [before the mid-term elections], it'd be nice - but he can't be elected. And then gradually it passed over into something else like ... maybe he can be elected. And then the night of the election in '66, with those telephone calls coming in from all over the country - we knew we were in business."⁷

Since Theodore Roosevelt primaries have been a vehicle for candidates seeking to win the nomination on the basis of their popularity with voters. For John Kennedy they were a means of pressurising "the big-state professionals [who] would expose themselves to the charge of anti-Catholic prejudice (although most of them were Catholic) if they still turned thumbs down on his nomination."⁸ Primary victories had to be obtained, Robert Kennedy concluded, "to show the pols" that he would be a stronger candidate than Humphrey for the Democrats in 1968.⁹

For late-starting candidates opinion polls provided a post-primary measure of popular appeal. In 1968 Nelson Rockefeller's expensive media campaign was followed by conducting polls to demonstrate his electability and the likelihood of a Nixon defeat. The aim of what one writer called the search for "the Holy Grail of the Nixon can't-win opinion poll" was to show the professionals that their preferences for both Nixon and electoral victory were exclusive.¹⁰ The belated leader of the Republican moderates in 1964, William Scranton, sought to expose the electoral disaster latent in a Goldwater nomination. Based on poll findings, Scranton argued that the consequence of Goldwater's candidacy for other Republicans would be to "doom them to undeserved defeat."¹¹

To persuade the professionals of their appeal various other mechanisms were employed to register candidates' breadth of support. For Robert Kennedy the intensity of the reaction he generated on the streets was designed to demonstrate demand for his nomination which would be irresistible for the professionals. "Our strategy", observed a Kennedy aide, "is to change the rules of nominating a President. We're going to do it in a new way. In the streets."¹² The 1968 Rockefeller campaign organised the People's Postcard Campaign encouraging written statements of support which were then delivered to the leaders of state delegations.¹³ Kennedy for President Clubs were established in 1960 designed to convert grass-roots enthusiasm for his candidacy into influence upon delegates not subject to leadership control.

Compromise-Popular strategies were dependent for success upon the failure of active candidates to win convention majorities and unite the party. Compromise-Popular strategies offered the party unity around an electable candidate.

Candidates offering a compromise between rival factions are recurrent in the history of national conventions but this study posits that

there are two distinctive types of compromise candidates in this period. They are distinguished by the attributes of the candidates and the focus of their campaigns. Compromise-Popular candidates enjoyed public prominence - two were ex-nominees, and the other was the Governor of California. Prominence was part of their appeal in contrast to the relative obscurity and availability of the Compromise-Unity candidates who resembled the "dark horses" of the past.

The salient appeal of the Compromise-Popular candidate was vote-getting ability and this was reflected in the campaigns conducted on their behalf. In 1960 citizens formed Stevenson for President clubs to press for his nomination, telegrams were sent to delegates, demonstrations were mounted outside the convention hall and the galleries packed with his vocal supporters. These activities were directed to establishing a public demand for Stevenson's nomination.

For Nixon in 1964 and Reagan in 1968 evidence of electability was sought in write-in campaigns in primaries. By this means the candidate's name was kept in contention and sizeable vote totals employed to demonstrate a breadth of support evoked without personal campaigning. Such results insinuated that latent support existed which would be manifested by a personal campaign. Favourable comparisons with the active contenders were also facilitated for they could make no convincing claim to support still untapped.

Like the other compromise type, Compromise-Popular candidates were dependent upon deadlock to succeed. Their strategies thus entailed precluding victory by other candidates without overtly challenging them (for they hoped to inherit their support). Invitations to other candidates to compete were made to fragment delegate support and existing contenders solicited to remain active. Thus, after Rockefeller's defeat in the California primary, Nixon urged Romney to lead the moderate

opposition to Goldwater, a move interpreted as aimed at producing deadlock from which Nixon would benefit.¹⁴ Stevenson operatives in 1960 urged uncommitted leaders and favourite sons to retain their positions to insulate their delegations from incursions by the front-runner Kennedy.¹⁵

Dominant leader strategies were available only to those in established positions of power such as the incumbent president or his perceived heir. For such candidates the task, according to Pomper, was not to win a contest for the nomination but to prevent a contest from developing.¹⁶ Loyalty within the party organisation and a popular appeal outside of it rendered both party and primary processes unpromising ground for challengers. Lack of financial support and the desire of organisation loyalists for a united party to contest the election provided further disincentives to potential challengers.

Successful performance in office was the incumbent president's surest means to the nomination. A good president was a good candidate. President Johnson's early months in office won widespread popular approval. His diligence in pursuit of civil rights legislation conciliated the liberal wing of the party who had opposed him in 1960. Supported both within and without the party organisation there was no challenge to Johnson's nomination in 1964 beyond the efforts of George Wallace to demonstrate the magnitude of white backlash in three northern primaries.

In 1960 Vice President Nixon's strength within the Republican organisation originated from his diligence for the party whilst President Eisenhower remained aloof from partisan politics. His efforts for the party during the eight years of the Eisenhower presidency earned Nixon "enormous equity with the regulars."¹⁷ He thus attracted the loyalty of the party professionals normally reserved for a party-oriented

president. His visibility in national and international affairs such as the "Kitchen debate" and his role in the steel settlement generated the support of voters providing him with a clear majority amongst Republican identifiers.

Exploring the potential for a campaign for the 1960 nomination, Nelson Rockefeller found the party leaders and Republican financial powers united in their support for Nixon. Declining to campaign, Rockefeller stated that "the great majority of those who will control the Republican convention stand opposed to any contest for the nomination."¹⁸ (Originally the statement had cited the opposition of "the men who control the convention and the financial powers behind them ..."¹⁹) Contrary to Pomper, the Nixon campaign would have welcomed a contest for the nomination to prepare their election organisation and to deny the Democrats a monopoly of pre-convention publicity.²⁰ Nixon's position, however, was so dominant and the party so intent on preserving its unity that the resources for a challenge were unavailable.

In 1968 President Johnson was unable to preclude a challenge to his nomination as discontent over the conduct of the Vietnam war increased. Unlike 1948, the dissidents were able to find a candidate to oppose the President's renomination. Johnson won the first primary in New Hampshire but the narrowness of his victory exposed his electoral vulnerability. Robert Kennedy's subsequent entry heralded a fierce contest for the nomination against a more potent primary opponent than McCarthy. Despite these setbacks, state party leaders estimated that Johnson could still rely on winning two-thirds of the convention delegates.²¹ However, he had failed to prevent a contest from developing and had he persisted with his candidacy it would have replicated Taft in 1912 as an incumbent president forced to run as an organisation favourite.

The organisation favourite concentrated on soliciting support within the party to win the nomination. Primaries and other instruments of mass appeal were eschewed or of secondary importance to the campaign's success.

In a party-dominated process the organisation favourite strategy was the directest route to the nomination and it had been frequently utilised in earlier conventions. However, by the 1960's when some voter-orientation was a feature of many campaigns there were additional rationales for organisation favourite strategies. They were adopted by candidates for whom evidence of mass appeal was unnecessary but also unfavourable if pursued. Goldwater (as his primary performances showed) had greater appeal in the Republican Party than outside it. Humphrey risked unfavourable comparison with Robert Kennedy in any attempt to demonstrate voter support.

The organisation favourite's appeal was to the party's demands other than electability. They were committed to party maintenance, the established power structure, loyal to its leaders, consonant with its ideological disposition.

In 1968 Humphrey's appeal was his commitment to party maintenance, the existing power structure in state and local parties and his loyalty to the President. As Vice President he had assumed many of the responsibilities towards the Democratic Party organisations that Johnson neglected. This established an indebtedness for his services amongst party leaders and built a base of support with them independent of the President. Humphrey was also a loyal supporter of the President and his policies whilst McCarthy and Robert Kennedy had deserted him, widening divisions within the party. Insurgents threatening the local leadership's power position also tied the party to Humphrey. McCarthy's nomination threatened the established leadership whilst Humphrey's

promised to preserve it. Supporting Humphrey was the leaders' counter-insurgency strategy.

Ideological affinity provided the base of Goldwater's appeal to the Republican Party's activists who were demarcated from the party's identifiers in the electorate by their conservatism.²² For a committed conservative, such as Goldwater, there was potential for an ideological appeal within the party which could not be replicated amongst its voters.

Goldwater's support was concentrated below the party's top leadership positions in which moderates were preponderant. From 1961 onwards the Draft Goldwater movement insinuated its supporters into state and local parties bolstering their receptivity to a conservative appeal. Particular emphasis was placed on gaining control of those offices which conferred influence in the delegate selection process.²³ Building low-level conservative strength increased the resistance to assertions of influence by the leadership which had previously ensured the nomination of moderates. This task was facilitated after 1962 by the depletion of Republican-controlled governorships. When Goldwater became an active candidate in 1964 he confronted a Republican Party disposed towards his conservatism to an unusual degree.

Compromise-Unity candidates sought to reconcile a divided party around a candidate acceptable to all factions. Compromise-Unity strategies were adopted by candidates lacking public prominence and first ballot strength but 'available', and a potential second choice of many. Their campaigns were concentrated within the party eschewing attempts to generate a public demand for their candidacies.

In 1960 Symington's inclusive appeal was counterposed to the exclusivity of that of his rivals. Their exclusivity was their handicap on which Symington could capitalise. According to the campaign's executive director,

"This was Clark Clifford's theme song in planning the strategy that, you know, all the other candidates couldn't make it for reasons A, B, C, and that Symington had none of these problems that they all had. Lyndon Johnson, too far south, Jack Kennedy, too young and religion of course; and Hubert Humphrey, too liberal and so forth." ²⁴

Symington's appeal would extend to the supporters of the leading candidates after they had failed,

"It would be broken up, divided and ... all the followers of all the other candidates could unite on Symington where they might not be able to unite on any other candidate." ²⁵

Johnson sought to fulfil the criteria of availability by defining himself as a western rather than southern candidate ²⁶. In other respects his claims to unite the party were not based on electoral considerations. Rather, they were premised upon his control of the Senate which had created an indebtedness amongst congressmen, whom the campaign assumed were powers in their state and local parties. The IOU's accumulated in Congress gave Johnson's campaign national potential enabling it to extend beyond its southern bases if Kennedy could be blocked. Then the party's congressional wing, asserting itself through the party organisations, would unite around Johnson's leadership.

Dependent upon deadlock for success, the Compromise-Unity candidates sought to ensure its occurrence. Thus both Johnson and Symington worked to block Kennedy. To deny Kennedy a victory in the pivotal West Virginia primary funds were channelled from both candidates to Humphrey, Kennedy's opponent in the primary ²⁷. Robert Byrd, one of the state's U.S. Senators and a Johnson sympathiser, exhorted supporters of all the inactive candidates to vote for Humphrey as a means of promoting their favourite's prospects for the nomination ²⁸. After Kennedy's victory attempts to halt a bandwagon in his favour included an endorsement of Symington by Harry Truman, the ex-president held in esteem by party professionals. In a televised address shortly before the convention

Truman spoke approvingly of ten Democrats, omitting Kennedy from the list.²⁹

The shift in influence over the nomination from party leaders to voters resulting from reform produced substantial alterations in the plausibility of the various strategies as routes to the nomination. A participatory process with results firmly linked to delegate commitments compelled candidates towards voter-oriented strategies. Party leaders were so reduced in influence that campaigns could feasibly focus on voters exclusively.

After reform the popular favourite strategy became the norm (see Tables 4.2 and 4.3). In contrast to the pre-reform period, the popular favourite strategy could deliver delegates directly through campaigns in primaries and caucuses. Formerly mechanisms of popular appeal (including some devices outside the formal nominating process such as opinion polls) delivered few delegates directly. Rather, they were designed to persuade the party leaders who controlled delegates. After reform all popular favourite strategies were concentrated within the formal nominating process where intensive campaigns were mounted to win delegates in primaries and caucuses.

Pre-reform popular favourite strategies were the preserve of candidates compelled to demonstrate a popular appeal to become serious contenders for the nomination. Either they were trailing a party-supported candidate or were in some other way handicapped which precluded their nominations unless effective vote-getting could be demonstrated.

In the post-reform environment there is little plausible alternative to the popular favourite strategy even for candidates supported by party leaders and without electoral handicaps. Insurgency, Pomper has commented, is "no longer the crusade of the political Don Quixotes; it is the path to the political kingdom."³⁰

The possibilities for accumulating delegate majorities in the pre-convention period increased substantially diminishing the feasibility of inactive strategies dependent upon divided conventions. Where active candidates competed for delegates an inactive strategy risked conceding a convention majority to one of the other contenders. In consequence, compromise strategies of both types declined.

No post-reform candidate adopted a Compromise-Popular strategy in the form that it assumed earlier. The closest approximation was Brown in 1976 which was a late-starting rather than inactive campaign. But the premises on which it was based resembled the pre-reform Compromise-Popular type. It assumed no first ballot victory, a convention divided between the active candidates reconciled by a candidate of proven vote-getting ability.³¹

Ford was the potential beneficiary of a divided party in 1980. But when he declined to become an active candidate to block the front runner Reagan his prospects for the nomination were dismissed.

Dominant leader strategies diminished when the shift to a voter-dominated process increased the potential for mobilising public discontent with an incumbent president into the delegate selection process to deny him the nomination. Only Nixon of the three post-reform presidents enjoyed sufficient approval amongst his party's voters to deter major challengers.

Formerly challenges were unlikely because the party leaders' fidelity to the president and the limited opportunities for injecting voter discontent into the process made their prospects of success meagre.

After reform a candidate mobilising opposition to the president in primaries and caucuses stood to win the nomination. To resist such challenges presidents were propelled into active candidacy, dependent for success upon mobilising voter support. Two of the three post-reform

presidents, Ford and Carter, were thus forced into popular favourite strategies having failed to foreclose opposition. Ford entered twenty-seven preference primaries and Carter thirty-four. Their nominations were attributable to their success in mobilising voter support - the only two instances of incumbent presidents needing to generate such support to win the nomination.

Organisation favourite strategies were the definitive casualties of reform. Party leader influence over the nomination was so attenuated that exclusive reliance upon their support ceased to be a feasible strategy for winning the nomination. Candidates supported by party leaders, such as Muskie in 1972, were required to adopt popular favourite strategies. Where previously the leaders' endorsements would have delivered blocs of delegates, after reform they provided only potential leverage amongst the voters.

Reform not only forced campaigns outside the party organisations, they also facilitated strategies which broke down party lines. Textbooks distinguish 'open' from 'closed' primaries but studies of voting in them demonstrates that both types allow substantial participation by independents and crossovers from the other party.³² Exponents of popular favourite strategies such as Wallace, Reagan and Anderson utilised these opportunities in attempting to construct ideological coalitions of voters across party lines. These candidates sought to shift the balance of preferences in the nominating process in their favour by enlarging its electorate.

Compromise-Unity strategies confronted the contradiction of candidates lacking in public prominence seeking nomination through a voter-dominated process and conventions of candidate supporters lacking the professionals' concern for party unity.

In that he was inactive and projected as a unifier, Humphrey in

1976 bore some resemblance to the Compromise-Unity type. But he was dismissed as a contender for the nomination when he declined to become an active candidate (i.e. adhering to the Compromise-Unity strategy was regarded as an implausible route to the nomination).

CANDIDATE STRATEGIES, 1972-80

TABLE 4.2

YEAR	Popular Favourite	Compromise Popular	Dominant Leader	Organisation Favourite	Compromise Unity
1972 (R)			Nixon		
1972 (D)	Humphrey Jackson Lindsay McCarthy McGovern Muskie Wallace				
1976 (R)	Ford Reagan				
1976 (D)	Bayh Carter Church Harris Jackson Shriver Udall Wallace	Brown			Humphrey
1980 (R)	Anderson Baker Bush Connally Crane Dole Reagan	Ford			
1980 (D)	Brown Carter E.Kennedy				

TABLE 4.3

CANDIDATE STRATEGIES, 1960-80

Period	STRATEGY						Total
	Popular Favourite	Compromise Popular	Dominant Leader	Organisation Favourite	Compromise Unity		
Pre-Reform							
N	9	2	3	2	3	9	
%	47.4	10.5	15.8	10.5	15.8	100	
Post-Reform							
N	27	2	1	0	1	31	
%	87.1	6.5	3.2	0	3.2	100	

Strategy and the Participant Bias

Pre-reform strategies were conditioned by the party leaders' dominance of the nominating process. Their selection criteria provided the grounds for discriminating between the contenders. Reflecting the professional style, their objectives in selecting a candidate were the winning of the election, the maintenance of the party organisations and their positions within them. Candidates fashioned their strategies to demonstrate their ability to meet the leaders' specifications - seeking, with varying emphases, to demonstrate their electability, party loyalty, deference to the established leadership and willingness to distribute patronage to strengthen the party (see Chapter Eight).

The leaders' criteria, with some variations in the priorities assigned between them, were persistent influences on nominations. Nominees, in consequence, conformed to a type reflecting these criteria. Democratic nominees were party regulars designed to stand for and appeal to the New Deal coalition. Republican nominees, reflecting the party's minority status, were less persistently party regulars but also included political neophytes (Willkie, Eisenhower). Nominees were chosen to appeal to the party's more homogeneous identifiers, its business financiers and also the independents and Democrats necessary to win elections. Thus a party dominated by conservative activists selected a succession of moderate, "me-too" Republicans as presidential candidates every election year from 1940 to 1968, except 1964 when leadership control was disrupted.

Reform shifted the participant bias away from party leaders. When a participatory system was established the customary bias was established: advantaging high turnout elements. Intra-party differentials in turnout are relevant to nomination outcomes because they also convey an ideological bias. The activists in both parties are ideologically

unrepresentative of their identifiers in general. Democratic activists are preponderately liberals. Amongst the party's voters moderates are the dominant bloc and conservatives nearly as numerous as the liberals. In the Republican Party the voters' bias towards the conservative pole is exaggerated amongst the activists (see Table 4.4).

TABLE 4.4

LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES AMONGST PARTY VOTERS AND ACTIVISTS, 1972

<u>Participant Group</u>	<u>Ideology</u>		
	<u>Conser- vatives</u>	<u>Liberals</u>	<u>Difference</u>
Democrats:			
Voters	17%	26%	9%
Activists	13	43	30
Republicans:			
Voters	23	11	12
Activists	32	8	24

Source: Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba and John R. Petrocik, The Changing American Voter (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 197, 203.

The unrepresentativeness of the activists derives from two reinforcing sources, demography and issue commitment. Participation in America, as elsewhere, varies by socio-economic status.³³ High status coincides with high levels of participation. As both American parties are demographically heterogeneous at their electoral bases socio-economic differences in turnout are evident in contests within them as well as between them.³⁴

High status Democrats are disproportionately liberals representing what Ladd has characterised as an inversion of the original New Deal Coalition where liberalism's greatest strength in the party was concentrated at the bottom of the socio-economic scale.³⁵ High status Demo-

crats are distinguishable from their lower status Democrats by their liberalism on social issues³⁶. In the Republican Party high status is associated with attachment to conservative principles³⁷.

Some issue commitments provide a stimulus to participation independent of socio-economic status. Liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans of all status levels turn out at higher rates than voters from the parties' other ideological sections of the same socio-economic rank³⁸. The corollary of ideological incentives to participation is that even a demographically representative nominating electorate would be biased towards the parties' activist wings.

The impact of turnout rates is exaggerated by the variations in voting cues employed by the different ideological sections within the parties. Liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans tend to be more disposed to issue voting than other sections of the parties' electorates³⁹. This tendency enhances the potential advantages accruing to candidates appealing to the parties' activist wings.

McGovern's campaign planning first appreciated the resources available to candidates able to co-opt committed support. According to campaign manager Hart:

"The nomination in an open process will go to those who work hardest for it, and people are not motivated to work who have no strong convictions."⁴⁰

In the context of the Democratic Party this translated into an attempt to co-opt the left because "who-ever becomes the leader of the traditional liberal wing will have a natural advantage because it is a broader, more effective base than its conservative counterpart."⁴¹ Co-opting the left before the delegate selection process commenced was designed to pre-empt the entry of other liberals. Monopolising liberal support provided the money and manpower to create an effective organisation. In turn, organisational strength produced successes in the early

caucuses and primaries which, as the campaign planners anticipated, expanded McGovern's appeal beyond the liberal wing.⁴²

McGovern's success in converting co-option of the left into the nomination stimulated imitation in 1976. Amongst conservative Republicans there was a similar contest to determine activist wing leadership in 1980. In both years the "invisible primary" witnessed the competition to generate organisation strength and eliminate opponents before the selection process commenced.⁴³

Candidates outside the activist wings are compelled to develop strategies adapting to the participant bias. Activist opposition must be neutralised or alternative sources of support generated. To mollify the liberals for 1976, Jackson spent the years preceding softening his hawkish image. In 1974 he campaigned for prominent anti-war Democrats, Allard Lowenstein and Robert Drinan, and in San Diego campaigned for the same candidate as Jane Fonda.⁴⁴ In 1975 he reversed his long-term support for aid to the South Vietnamese government on the grounds that the Thieu regime was repressive.⁴⁵ In addition, an offer of the vice-presidential nomination to Muskie at the start of the campaign was designed to produce a balanced ticket to run in the primaries.⁴⁶

Carter's extensive personal campaigning amongst the voters of the early primary and caucus states established a band of dedicated supporters committed to the candidate, not to the issues he espoused.⁴⁷ For the later states where voters had not been cultivated extensively by the candidate greater issue definition was required. Greater substance was designed to verify Carter's seriousness as a candidate to the press and public but also, according to the campaign's pollster Caddell, "to send 'signal' to interested groups and particularly to the suspicious but open liberals ..."⁴⁸

Despite the altered distribution of advantages resulting from

reform, the participant bias has not been consistent in producing activist wing nominees. Only two of the five contested nominations have been won by the candidate of the activist wing (McGovern, and Reagan in 1980). In the immediate pre-reform period only 1964 provides an exception to the dominance of the participant bias.

Several factors, beyond those of chance and error, account for the reduced potency of the bias in determining outcomes. First, in a voter-dominated process the problems of securing unity around a single candidate are greater than previously. Before reform the concentration of power in a small number of party leaders facilitated co-ordination and eased the establishment of consensus about a candidate. A united leadership controlling the nomination promoted the party unity regarded as a pre-condition of electoral success. For the professionals incentives existed to co-ordination and control.

When reform multiplied the number of actors in the nominating process the possibility of achieving co-ordination receded. Concomitantly, the connective link of attachment to a continuing party organisation weakened thereby diminishing the mutuality of interests. The influx of political amateurs also reduced the priority of electability and unity in determining the nominee.

The proliferation of candidates stimulated by reform and the provision of federal matching funds hindered the emergence of a single representative of the activist wing. Where no leader emerged activist influence was dissipated between several candidates creating opportunities for the parties' other factions to capitalise on the divisions to win plurality victories. In the 1976 Democratic contest, unlike 1972, the winnowing process extended into the early caucuses and primaries splintering the liberal vote between several candidates allowing Carter to record victories in New Hampshire and Wisconsin. In southern primaries

liberal abstinence (unlike McGovern's participation in the region's caucuses in 1972) enabled Carter to capture the vote of the Democratic left against Wallace. Carter's early victories projected him into the leadership for the nomination. When Udall eventually emerged from the liberal elimination contest its value was depreciated by the series of Carter-inflicted defeats incurred in the process. By winning primaries Carter demonstrated the strength to generate an appeal outside his natural base of support. In the later primaries, Brown and Church, untainted by defeat and challenging Carter alternately, consolidated liberal support to inflict seven defeats on a front runner who possessed an ostensibly insurmountable lead in delegates.

Two of the three examples of successful resistance to the working of the participant bias involve incumbent presidents. Compared with the pre-reform era incumbents are more vulnerable to defeat for the nomination in the post-reform era. In consequence, challenges are more likely. Yet presidents still retain substantial resources despite the erosion of influence of party organisations loyal to them.

The conduct of presidential office generates publicity and voter recognition. Timely announcements of federal projects benefiting thousands of voters are a persuasive resource in particular state contests. Crisis-laden events such as the invasion of Afghanistan and the seizure of American Embassy personnel in Iran stimulated unity around the president and pressure for stability.

The incumbent's resources may deflect the activists from their ideological alignments or confine them to minority status by capturing the support of less committed voters. In focused contests of two or three candidates majority victories are likely. The activist wing (particularly in the Democratic Party) is too narrow to win unaided, and the president's advantages are substantial in attempting to extend

beyond his natural allies to produce majorities.

In the light of the president's campaign resources, the challenges in 1976 and 1980 were notable for their magnitude. The convention votes for Reagan and Kennedy were the largest and second largest respectively recorded against an incumbent since Arthur was denied re-nomination in 1884.

The appreciation of the working of the post-reform participant bias is reflected in the changed disposition of contenders for the nomination. Post-reform candidates clustered around the activist poles. In 1976 Udall, Brown, Church, Harris and Bayh all sought the support of Democratic social issue liberals (the New Politics elements). Attempted mobilisers of the New Deal coalition's combination of economic liberals and social conservatives were confined to Jackson and Shriver. (Presumably an active Humphrey campaign would also have focused on these groups.)

Clustering around the Democratic activist pole occurred despite first, a continued faith in mobilising the New Deal coalition as the party's most viable electoral strategy. Secondly, it was not deterred by a preponderance of moderates amongst the party's identifiers (41 per cent in 1976) where liberals were no more numerous than conservatives (29 per cent each).⁴⁹ Thirdly, activist-oriented strategies persisted despite McGovern's disastrous electoral performance four years earlier following a nomination campaign based on the party's New Politics elements.

In 1980 of the seven major candidates for the Republican nomination Reagan, Connally, Crane and Dole appealed to its conservative elements espousing, for example, supply side economic programmes. Anderson, Baker and Bush sought to cultivate the party's moderates. Yet the Republicans remain the minority party in an electorate in which

Republican conservatives are few. Goldwater's landslide defeat in 1964 provided pointers to the election chances of a conservative Republican.

Strategy and Interest Group Mobilisation

Before reform interest group influence in the nominating process was exerted through the party organisations. Influence derived from four sources - organisational overlap, personnel overlap, finance, electoral strength.

Organisational overlap occurred where an interest group was integrated into a party organisation. Trade unions in the Democratic Party exemplified such organisational anchorage. They were an integral part of some state and local parties, and in some areas a substitute for it.⁵⁰ Organisational anchorage provided groups with influence in the party's internal affairs. Many Democratic national convention delegations included labour representatives and they were attuned to union interests.

Personnel overlap appeared where group leaders attained positions of prominence (often of an informal nature) in the national party. Where a group was significant in party affairs its leaders' opinions carried weight in its decisions. Thus senior figures in the AFL-CIO and UAW such as Arthur Goldberg and Walter Reuther were influences in the Democratic Party. Franklin Roosevelt's injunction to "clear it with Sidney" (over the 1944 vice presidential nomination) is expressive of the degree of influence exerted by group leaders in the party's affairs despite the absence of formal status within it.

Financial influence derived from the parties' dependence upon external sources for funds. As the party's financiers, the stockholders and executives of corporate businesses thus gained influence in Repub-

lican Party affairs. According to Theodore White, describing the infrastructure of the party's 1960 nomination,

"the men who raise the money for the Republican Party control it, generally, to a far greater degree than the men who raise the money for the Democratic Party. In almost every state with a major Republican Party, except New York, if one knows the name of its Finance Chairman, one knows where the roots of power twine." 51

Influence through electoral strength derived from the indispensability of cohesive voting blocs to the task of winning elections. The demographic groups that provided voting blocs exerted influence largely through the brokerage role of party leaders. Their concern for electoral victory necessitated a sensitivity to the anticipated reactions of their coalitional blocs. For example, within the Democratic Party (the more obviously coalitional of the two) the interests of Catholics and blacks had to be accommodated through nominations and platforms. Failures of accommodation risked alienating the groups' electoral support. In a system dominated by two inclusive parties groups could opt for exit as a feasible alternative to loyalty in elections.

To win the nomination candidates were compelled either to co-opt or pre-empt the interest groups exerting influence through the parties. Describing the 1960 nominating process, Sorensen observed that it was,

"dominated and influenced by all the groups in the Democratic coalition - the farmers, labour, the South, the big city people, et cetera. These groups are more influential in a convention than they are in the country as a whole. Therefore he [Kennedy] had to prove to them that he could win" 52

Similarly, Robert Kennedy's dependence on primaries stemmed from his lack of support amongst the party's professionals and interests groups,

"Without the unions, the business community, the regular party leaders or the South he had to show the delegates that he had the people." 53

A candidate capturing the support of his party's entrenched interest groups usually possessed the resources to secure the nomination. In

1960 Nixon's dominance of the business interests in the Republican Party complemented his extensive support amongst the professionals dissipating the potential for a Rockefeller challenge. Acknowledging the dual influences in Republican politics a Rockefeller aide observed,

"Richard Nixon is a shrewd man; he spotted where control of the nomination lay seven years before. When he was traveling he wasn't just making friends with State Chairmen and the regulars; he was dining with the big interests at the same time."⁵⁴

The entrenchment of interest groups in the party organisations generally elevated them into insurmountable barriers to candidates who could neither co-opt their support nor secure their acquiescence. However, the Goldwater nomination provides a deviant case denoting the first successful resistance to the opposition of the moderate, corporate interests in the party since the New Deal.

Conservative success in 1964 followed the transformation of the Republican Party effected by the Draft Goldwater Committee in the preceding three years. Committed Goldwater supporters captured the delegate selection apparatus in many states assuring the designation of dedicated conservatives unamenable to the demand to pick an electable moderate.

The campaign's financial base was supplied from outside the traditional moderate eastern-midwestern industrialist and publisher blocs. Conservative interests in Texas and California allied with an exceptional dependence on small subscriptions provided alternative sources of funding.⁵⁵

When the Republican moderates finally united to repel Goldwater, Dewey and his "Eastern Establishment" associates comprehended the reconstruction of intra-party power achieved by the draft movement. A participant in the pro-Scranton effort quoted by Theodore White observed that, "It was as if the Goldwater people had rewired the switchboard of the party and the numbers we had were all dead."⁵⁶

Interest group influence over the nomination was exerted either by group or party leaders. For the preferences of the groups' rank-and-file to attain leverage required mediation by their leaders. Where leaders proved resistant, influence was excluded. Despite attracting majorities of working class votes in primaries Robert Kennedy's support amongst the labour hierarchy, and thus within the Democratic parties, was scarce⁵⁷. Having entered no primaries, Humphrey's predominance amongst labour leaders was not derived from evidence of blue collar support. Similarly, Kennedy's overwhelming strength amongst blacks was not reflected amongst northern party leaders, the traditional mediators of black interests⁵⁸.

The corollary of a party-dominated process with prominent interest groups entrenched in it was the exclusion from influence of groups without access to the organisations. Candidates supported by extra-party interests were unable to mobilise their mass base to construct winning coalitions. For these candidates the primaries were the principal arenas in which interests outside the parties could be activated and only a minority of delegates could be won by this means.

Interests outside the party structures were dependent upon persuading the professionals to advance their candidate's cause. Groups such as the pro-McCarthy anti-war movement in 1968 and the Stevenson clubs of 1960 thus depended for their success on access to party notables, not on their voting strength in the nominating process. However, owing to the confluence of nominating politics within the parties, candidate preference was submerged in the relations between groups and professionals by generalised conflict between regulars and insurgents over control of the party organisation.⁵⁹ The electoral incentive to accommodate extra-party interests was antithetical to the professionals' desire to preserve the existing power structure within the organisation.

Through the increased permeability of the reformed process extra-party interests mobilised behind candidates could be inserted directly into delegate selection. In consequence, the range of interests whose support could influence the nominating decision greatly expanded. Interests outside the party structure were no longer dependent upon the intercession of professionals within the organisation to secure influence. Any group, irrespective of its previous connection with the party, could participate in the nominating process in support of particular candidates and issues.

For candidates the nominating electorate ceased to be restricted to a small range of interest groups whose support or acquiescence was a pre-condition of winning the nomination. Before reform the entrenched interest groups could usually resist candidates against whom they were united in opposition. Thus labour leaders and northern party professionals, conscious of the black vote, could repel the southern challenge of Russell and Johnson. Similarly Republican corporate interests could, 1964 excepted, ensure the nomination of their preferred candidate - Willkie, Dewey and Eisenhower successively over Taft, Nixon over Rockefeller.

When reform projected the nominating decision outside the party structures, the leverage of the entrenched interests over the nomination diminished. In an open process interest group support outside the parties could be mobilised to provide alternative sources of influence to those entrenched in the organisations. In the voter-dominated process the size of the group and the distribution of candidate preferences within it conditioned its value to candidates rather than its access to the party organisations. Thus the anti-war movement was a more potent force for McGovern under reform rules in 1972 than for McCarthy under party organisation control in 1968. Recruiting mass-based interests

also simplified the task of constructing candidate organisations. For example, the anti-war movement provided McGovern with voting support but also campaign manpower in every state.⁶⁰

Post-reform campaigns sought to build majorities from voter constituencies of which interest groups became a part. In consequence, campaigns were directed towards particular groups. For example, Jackson cultivated the Jewish vote, and McGovern targeted the "New Politics" elements - youth, blacks and other minorities, the anti-war movement. The emphasis on interest mobilisation expanded their participation in nominating politics. Groups such as the Moral Majority, anti-abortionists, teachers' unions, the National Rifle Association, feminists, Chicanos, the American Conservative Union gained prominence in particular nominating contests.

Under reform rules the party-entrenched interests were no longer assured of their former pivotal influence in the nominating process. In the post-reform era their influence became dependent upon successfully mobilising their constituency behind a candidate in state contests. Compelled to compete against extra-party interests the leverage of entrenched elements was uncertain. In 1968 an alliance of labour and party leaders in Pennsylvania provided Humphrey with three-quarters of the state's delegates despite McCarthy capturing a similar proportion of the vote in the non-binding presidential primary.⁶¹ Four years later union support delivered Humphrey only a third of the delegation in a multi-candidate pledged-delegate primary.⁶²

Where pre-reform group influence flowed through leaders, after 1968 it was affected directly through the mass 'membership'. The consequent campaign focus on members was necessitated by the open nominating system but also enabled unsympathetic interest leaders to be circumvented to win the support of their constituents. Formerly leaders could deliver

delegates through their relationship with the party leaders. Subsequently interest group leaders' command of their members loyalties was often insufficient to deliver their votes in primaries and caucuses.

Wallace and Carter appealed 'over the heads' of union leaders to win primaries against candidates supported by the labour leadership, Humphrey and Jackson. Carter's victory in the pivotal Pennsylvania primary in 1976 exemplifies the triumph of candidate appeals to members over responsiveness to interest leaders. Despite the commitment of Pennsylvania labour leaders to Jackson (in the absence of an active Humphrey candidacy), Carter's vote in the primary differed by one per cent between union and non-union households whilst Jackson's support was identical between the two groups.⁶³ Commenting upon his success Carter observed, "I've demonstrated that I don't need the labour bosses."⁶⁴

Carter's support amongst black voters was similarly aimed at pre-empting the neutrality or pre-Humphrey commitments of black leaders.⁶⁵ The campaign's deputy director, Benjamin Brown, emphasised the attention devoted to the mass base,

"The significant difference [about the Carter campaign] was that there was involvement coming up from the bottom instead of just being at the top. Traditionally there have been national black leaders who could pretty much dictate the direction of the black vote in any given community. But this time around, the established black leadership didn't know what struck it."⁶⁶

After reform the entrenched interests lost their role as veto groups over the nomination. Before 1972 nominees were likely to be candidates preferred by or at least acceptable to them.⁶⁷ Conversely, candidates unacceptable to them - Johnson in 1960, Rockefeller, McCarthy - could be repelled. Reform, by necessitating extra-party support, created alternative sources of influence capable of overcoming the opposition of the entrenched interests.

Both of the Democratic Party's first two post-reform nominees

lacked the support of major union leaders, particularly those within the AFL-CIO. In fact, labour leaders were the progenitors of the unsuccessful stop-McGovern movement mounted after the California primary.⁶⁸ In 1976, though less hostile to Carter than to McGovern, labour leaders favoured Humphrey or Jackson. Yet they lacked the influence to assure their nominations.

The party leaders, the traditional mediators of the interest groups within the electoral coalitions, were similarly inconspicuous in their support of McGovern and Carter. Only three Democratic governors supported McGovern at the convention, and only six of a total of thirty-seven were committed to Carter before the conclusion of the primaries.⁶⁹ Leadership opposition to McGovern collapsed with the failure of the California credentials challenge, and four years later party and labour leaders "spent the early months of 1976 watching the Carter bandwagon roll over and around them."⁷⁰ In 1976, as in 1972, "whatever there was that called itself a party was opposed to his nomination but was powerless before his assault."⁷¹

In the Republican party corporate influence was traditionally less palpable than that of organised labour in the Democratic politics so the impact of reform is more difficult to gauge. However, it is probable that their former influence has been eroded to a greater extent than that of labour. Following the imposition of controls on campaign giving the influence that derived from business's financial resources diminished. Furthermore, the major corporate interests were never able to provide strength in numbers, a major resource in post-reform nominating politics and one which, potentially, remained in the possession of organised labour if members voted cohesively.

Fragmentary evidence suggests that in both the 1976 and 1980 Republican contests the party's corporate powers supported candidates

other than Reagan. Yet the absence of such support did not prevent the raising of funds sufficient to mount a campaign or the winning of a near-majority of delegates in 1976 and an overwhelming majority in 1980.

In 1976 contributors to Ford included many of the traditional Republican financiers such as Vincent Astor, Henry Ford II, John Paul Getty, C.V. Whitney and five members of the Rockefeller family.⁷² Donations from business and professional political action committees were far more numerous for Ford than for Reagan.⁷³ The independence of Reagan from traditional Republican financial sources is reflected both in the number of individual contributors to his campaign (double that for Ford) and the small size of the average donation - lower than that for many Democratic candidates.⁷⁴

Reagan's independence of the corporate powers persisted in 1980. A survey of corporation presidents conducted by Dun's Review found as much support for Bush as for Anderson, Connally and Reagan combined.⁷⁵

Conclusion

Candidate strategies in the pre- and post-reform periods reflected the balance of power over the nomination. In the earlier period strategies emphasised a focus on party leaders, the satisfaction of their selection criteria and winning the support of groups entrenched in the parties.

The reformed voter-dominated process necessitated voter-oriented strategies. When voters controlled the nomination the popular favourite strategy became the norm whilst those dependent upon party leaders and deadlock became anachronisms. Centrifugal drives were introduced by the post-reform participant bias advantaging the activist wings where

formerly the electoral orientation of the party leaders had inserted a centripetal impetus.

An open process encouraged the mobilisation of groups destroying the oligopoly that characterised group involvement before reform. For candidates, the groups providing strategic resources in the post-reform period were those with cohesive voting blocs, organisation and finance rather than party anchorage.

Openness characterised the post-reform process in contrast to the impermeability of its predecessor. In a closed process the forces operating on the nomination were relatively stable. This produced consistency of outcomes - New Deal Democrats and "me-too" Republicans. In a permeable process a greater range of forces could be introduced to influence the nomination and disrupt the participant bias. Inconsistency of outcomes resulted. McGovern and Carter were not only distinctive from the New Deal Democrats of the past, they were also markedly different from each other. Neither Ford nor Reagan fitted the "me-too" Republican mould. Though both were conservatives they were differentiated from each other by the degree of their conservatism and their consonance with the concerns of the New Right.

NOTES

1. Major candidates are those who in the election year or in retrospect were considered serious contenders for the nomination at the time of the New Hampshire primary or after. Pre- and post-reform major candidates are listed in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 respectively. The principal grounds for excluding candidates from major status are:
 - i) They lacked sufficient support to be considered serious contenders for the nomination.
 - ii) They dropped out of contention before the New Hampshire primary.
 - iii) Their candidacies were aimed at goals other than winning the nomination.
2. The definition of interest groups employed here follows David Truman encompassing collections of people with shared characteristics whether organised or not. David Truman, The Governmental Process, 2nd ed. (New York: Knopf, 1971), pp. 22-44.
3. Theodore Sorensen quoted in Theodore H. White, The Making of the President 1960 (London: Cape, 1962), p.54.
4. Theodore H. White, The Making of the President 1964 (London: Cape, 1965), p.83. Original emphasis.
5. Theodore H. White, The Making of the President, 1968 (London: Cape, 1970), p.127.
6. Lawrence F. O'Brien, No Final Victories: A Life in Politics from John F. Kennedy to Watergate (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1974; Ballantine Books, 1976), p.57.
7. Peter Flanigan quoted in White, The Making of the President, 1968, p.50. Original emphasis.

8. Theodore C. Sorensen, The Kennedy Legacy (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970), pp.59-60.
9. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Robert Kennedy and His Times (London: Andre Deutsch, 1978), p.865.
10. Jules Witcover, The Resurrection of Richard Nixon (New York: Putnam's 1970), p.305.
11. New York Times, June 13, 1964.
12. Adam Walinsky quoted in Schlesinger, op. cit., p.864.
13. New York Times, July 15, 1968.
14. White, The Making of the President 1964, pp.149-53.
15. White, The Making of the President 1960, pp.124-26.
16. Gerald M. Pomper, Nominating the President: The Politics of Convention Choice (New York: Norton, 1966), p.115.
17. White, The Making of the President 1960, p.63.
18. Ibid., p.76.
19. Loc. cit.
20. Ibid., p.77.
21. New York Times, March 22, 1968.
22. Herbert McCloskey, Paul J. Hoffman and Rosemary O'Hara, "Issue Conflict and Consensus among Party Leaders and Followers", American Political Science Review, 54 (June 1960), 406-27; David Nexon, "Asymmetry in the Political System: Occasional Activists in the Republican and Democratic Parties", American Political Science Review 65 (September 1971), 716-30.
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24. Stanley Fike, Oral History Interview, JFK Library, pp.26-27.
25. Ibid., p.39.

26. William R. Keech and Donald R. Matthews, The Party's Choice (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1976), p.65.
27. In his autobiography Humphrey claimed that he was assisted only by Symington. Hubert Humphrey, The Education of a Public Man (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1976), p.213. For the assertion that Johnson also provided funds though not necessarily with Humphrey's knowledge see Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, Lyndon Johnson: The Exercise of Power (London: Allen and Unwin, 1967), p.259.
28. Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1965), p.141.
29. New York Times, July 3, 1960.
30. Gerald M. Pomper, "The Decline of Partisan Politics", in Louis Maisel and Joseph Cooper, eds., The Impact of the Electoral Process (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977), p.28.
31. Jonathan Moore and Janet Fraser, eds., Campaign for President: The Manager's Look at '76 (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1977), p.107; Jules Witcover, Marathon: The Pursuit of the Presidency, 1972-1976 (New York: Viking, 1977), p.332.
32. Ronald D. Hedlund, Meredith W. Watts and David M. Hedge, "Voting in an Open Primary", American Politics Quarterly, 10 (April 1982), 197-218; James David Gopoian, "Issue-Voting in Presidential Primary Elections: A Comparative State Analysis of the 1976 Presidential Primaries", (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1980), pp.175-79.
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36. Ibid., pp.40-41.
37. Ibid., pp.66-67.
38. Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba and John R. Petrocik, The Changing American Voter (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp.206-08; Paul Allen Beck and M. Kent Jennings, "Political Periods and Political Participation" American Political Science Review, 73 (September 1979), 737-50; Stephen D. Shaffer, "The Policy Biases of Political Activists" American Politics Quarterly, 8 (January 1980), 15-33.
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42. Ibid., p.18.
43. Witcover, Marathon, pp.139-55, 187-89; Martin Schram, Running for President: A Journal of the Carter Campaign (New York: Pocket Books, 1978), pp.77-78.
44. Arthur J. Hadley, The Invisible Primary (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976), pp.93-94.
45. Witcover, Marathon, p.161, fn. 1.
46. Ibid., p.162, fn. 2.
47. Ibid., pp.197-98, 208-12.
48. Schram, op. cit., p.114. Emphasis added.

49. New York Times, March 29, 1976.
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51. White, The Making of the President 1960, p.72.
52. Ibid., p.54.
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63. Ibid., April 28, 1976.

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69. James M. Perry, Us and Them: How the Press Covered the 1972 Election (New York: Clarkson Potter, 1973), p.155; New York Times, July 7, 1976.
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CHAPTER FIVE

CAMPAIGN ORGANISATION

Changes in the targets of campaign strategy resulted in adaptations in the organisational forms through which they were effected. In the pre-reform period the campaign organisations were keyed to a party-dominated delegate selection process and funding provided by large subscriptions from a wealthy few. Subsequently the mobilisation of both political and financial support was concentrated upon the mass electorate.

This chapter seeks to identify the principal changes in the form and activity of campaign organisations in the two periods. The first section establishes the contrasts in the composition of such organisations in the two periods. Pre-reform organisations included party professionals - leaders and party operatives. They exploited their party linkages in their candidates' interests. They comprehended campaign protocol, empathised with other professionals and utilised established relationships with them. Post-reform organisation reflected the change to candidate-centred, largely extra-party nominations. The campaign hierarchy consisted of the candidate's aides lacking attachments to continuing party organisations, professional suppliers of electioneering services working under contract and volunteers.

The second section charts the altered relationships between the campaign and the party organisations. In the earlier period campaigns adapted to the various state and local parties' power configurations and organisational demands. Alliances were sought with intra-party factions and holding operations such as the favourite son device deferred to. Reform greatly reduced the incentives for adjusting to the party's

power structures and demands as they lost their control over the nomination. As delegate pledging devices multiplied so demands for delay were opposed.

The third section delineates changes in the organisation of fund raising. In the earlier period the bulk of funds derived from a small number of substantial donations. Solicitation was informal and finances were assured sufficient to mount a campaign through the convention. Reform curbs on large subscriptions allied with the attraction of a 'doubling up' of small contributions through federal funds encouraged an emphasis on modest-size donations. The need for numerous small subscriptions resulted in the use of formalised, mass-oriented fund-raising campaigns directed by specialists. Solicitation was keyed to raising sufficient funds to produce success in early contests. Success generated voter recognition and plausibility as a nominee inspiring further donations to cover the remainder of the campaign.

Campaign Personnel

In the pre-reform period nomination campaigns were largely concentrated within the party structure. Campaigning entailed meeting, cultivating and co-opting leaders whose influence within their party organisations was then exerted over the selection and candidate preferences of delegates. Symington's administrative assistant, Stanley Fike, described his candidate's objective in 1960 as "to get round, talk, make friends further, and broaden his acquaintanceship within the party."¹ Sorensen, noting the anchorage of most delegates in party organisations, stressed that for Kennedy's 1960 campaign, "It is important that contact be maintained between JFK and state organisations."² These statements evidence the significance of personal

campaigning by the candidate. The task of the campaign organisation was to prepare the way for such personal meetings, maintain contact with leaders and lobby for the candidate after his departure. (An elaboration of campaigning amongst party organisations is provided in Chapter Seven.)

From the dominance of party organisations in the nominating process followed the need to incorporate party professionals into campaign organisations. Traditionally campaign organisations had been founded on the candidate's home state party organisation. In 1960 the Humphrey, Johnson and Symington campaigns conformed to this tradition.³ It was control over their party organisations that contributed to the plausibility of the major state governors as presidential nominees. Into the 1960's governors continued to be major candidates in Republican nominations (Rockefeller, Scranton, Reagan and, prior to 1968, Romney). Though no Democratic governors were candidates in the immediate pre-reform period several were prominent in support of their state's senators for whom they mobilised the state parties.

The significance attached by the professionals to home state party backing was recognised by James Rowe in devising Humphrey's 1960 strategy. Having cautioned that, "Protocol demands that the first foot forward in a quest for the presidency must always be from and by the candidate's state", he recommended that this condition be fulfilled by Minnesota's Governor Freeman urging Humphrey to become a candidate.⁴

Though personal campaign organisations were evident in the 1960's their personnel usually included men experienced in party affairs. John Kennedy's campaign, though not based on his state party, did include many men recruited through the Massachusetts Democratic organisation.⁵ The campaign's advisers included John Bailey, the "boss" of Connecticut, and the candidate's father, Joseph Kennedy who possessed a network of

contacts into the party established from his own involvement in politics under Franklin Roosevelt. Rockefeller's delegate-hunting operations in 1968 were led by Len Hall, a former national party chairman. Whilst not based upon their respective party organisations both Rockefeller and Robert Kennedy's campaigns included individuals prominent in the New York state parties. For example, Kennedy's advisers included state party chairman John Burns and the Nashua county chairman, John English. They also organised his campaign in the state.⁶

Voters' control of the reformed nominating process encouraged the construction of campaign organisations outside the party. Campaigns came to be staffed by professional political consultants, the candidates' personal aides and volunteers. State parties ceased to provide the candidates with organisations and experience within them ceased to be a characteristic of campaign personnel.

When the nominating process became a series of election-like contests political consultants' services became relevant resources for the campaigns to acquire. Pollsters, media consultants, fund raisers, campaign managers and public relations men - the personnel of American election campaigns - were recruited into the candidate organisations. They were distinguishable from pre-reform campaign personnel by the sale of their services. In addition, they were not members of continuing party organisations. For example, President Ford's campaign director in 1976 was Stuart Spencer, a professional campaign consultant rather than a senior figure in the Republican Party.

Free from commitments to particular state parties or candidates, the skills of the campaign specialists were recruited anew for each nomination. Direct mail fund raiser Morris Dees worked for McGovern in 1972, Carter in 1976 and Edward Kennedy in 1980. The marketability of campaign skills allowed party lines to be traversed (though many

consultants do confine their work to one party). Direct mail specialist Richard Vigurie was employed by the Democrat Wallace in 1976, by Republicans Crane and Connally for the 1980 campaign.

The candidates' personal aides were experienced in their service to them, not to political parties. For example, Carter aides Hamilton Jordan and Jody Powell, Reagan's Edwin Meese and Lyn Nofziger, had associations with their state parties through their service to the candidates. They had no record of party service independent of their candidates. Carter's aides in 1973 and 1974 served at the Democratic National Committee. Whilst their formal tasks were associated with Carter's chairmanship of the congressional campaign committee, they used their travels around the country to develop contacts for the candidate's forthcoming nomination campaign.⁷

Voter-oriented campaigns necessitated extensive campaign organisations. In 1980, for example, Carter's pre-convention staff numbered 354 with a monthly payroll of \$400,000.⁸ Such numbers represent the nucleus of a larger organisation keyed to mobilising voters in every state. Limited financial resources required a reliance on volunteers to provide the manpower of campaigns.

In the years preceding the convention candidates travelled the country recruiting the volunteers to staff their campaigns. A nucleus of supporters was established in each state who then widened the organisation using contacts provided by party lists, amateur clubs, interest groups, college campuses, supporters of previous campaigns etc. Organising efforts were stimulated by return visits by the candidate and his national staff to attract new recruits and sustain morale.

The need to recruit an organisation (and money to finance it) allied with the volume of tasks to be performed encouraged early announcements of candidacy. These were designed to co-opt campaign

organisation personnel in quantity and quality to advantage the candidate's competitive position and discourage potential opponents. The elimination contests amongst liberal Democrats preceding 1972 and 1976, and those amongst conservative Republicans before 1980, were attempts to monopolise support in the party's activist wings which would provide the volunteer manpower with which to mount campaigns. McGovern's early co-option of the liberals prior to 1972 deterred potential competitors Harris, Hughes and Bayh from entering, and provided insurmountable advantages against Lindsay, his challenger for liberal support in the early primaries and caucuses.

Table 5.1 charts the trend to early announcements engendered by reform. In the pre-reform period candidates' planning usually commenced after the preceding mid-term elections. The first meeting of John Kennedy's campaign planners took place in April 1959, for example.⁹ Announcements of candidacy were delayed to the election year, until late in the pre-convention period for inactive candidates.

Post-reform campaign planning began shortly after the preceding presidential election. In fact, Hamilton Jordan wrote the first Carter strategy document three days prior to the 1972 election.¹⁰ Some 'long shots' such as Crane and Udall were announced candidates around the time of the mid-term elections. Many other candidates, including the incumbent presidents Ford and Carter, announced a year before the election.

Campaign volunteers, like the professional consultants and candidate aides, often lacked ties to the party organisations. Hart said of the McGovern campaign,

"bridges were being built to the regular Democratic Party organisation at all levels. But to the degree that we could not obtain regular party support, we were developing an insurgency campaign outside the regular structure to capture the nomination with this separate McGovern organisation."¹¹

TABLE 5.1

TIMING OF ANNOUNCEMENT STATEMENTS, 1960-1980

Timing of Announcement	No. of Candidates										Post- Reform Total			
	1960 (R)	1960 (D)	1964 (R)	1964 (D)	1968 (R)	1968 (D)	Pre- Reform Total	1972 (R)	1972 (D)	1976 (R)		1976 (D)	1980 (R)	1980 (D)
Two years before election							0			2	1			3
One year before election		1	1			1	3		4	2	5	6	3	20
Election year	1	3	2	2	3	2	11	1	3	2	2	0		6
No announcement		1	2	1	1	1	5			1	1	1		2
	1	5	5	1	3	4	19	1	7	2	10	8	3	31

Campaign organisations were also constructed across party lines. The recruitment pool for McGovern's organisation included lists of subscribers to the campaign for the McGovern-Hatfield amendment, a bipartisan effort by Senate liberals to end funding of the Vietnam war. In his organisation recruitment drives Anderson concentrated upon students, a sector of the electorate denoted by widespread partisan independence and a smaller proportion of Republican identifiers than in the electorate in general.¹²

Campaigns staffed by consultants, candidate aides and volunteers ceased to be dependent upon the backing of state parties to supply an organisation. Though governors re-emerged as nominees after reform this cannot be attributed to the organisational resources provided by their state parties. Both Reagan and Carter were former governors, not incumbents. Their state parties were conspicuously absent from their campaign organisations. No major state party figures were prominent in either campaign. Carter's candidacy lacked even formal support from the Georgia party hierarchy. After his early primary victories he still lacked the endorsement of the state's governor, two senators, nine out of ten congressmen, all senior party officers and four of the five former governors still living (excluding Carter and the senator who was a former governor).¹³

Party-Campaign Organisation Relations

To advance a candidate's interests in the pre-reform period campaigns were adapted to the circumstances of each state party. Relying on supporters within the parties the campaign organisations obtained information on the distribution of candidate preferences, the degree of commitment and the prospects for change on subsequent ballots.¹⁴

Decisions on whether to enter a primary or become involved in delegate selection were mediated through professionals in the states.¹⁵

O'Brien's Manual for the 1960 Kennedy campaign evinced this desire to integrate party leaders into campaign development,

"Every state, district, county and community leader is invited to personally participate, or recommend participants and be advised on activity."¹⁶

The integration between party and campaign organisations extended into the primary states. Successful adaptations by party organisations preserved influence over delegate selection despite the availability of a mechanism facilitating voter participation. In consequence, intra-party politics intruded into presidential primary campaigns. For example, in West Virginia in 1960 the Humphrey and Kennedy campaigns sought alliances with the strongest party faction in each area. Recognising the dependence of the Kennedy campaign upon integrating West Virginia professionals into it, O'Brien noted, "We could hold our receptions and distribute our tabloids, but we would also have to forge personal alliances with dozens of local politicians to influence thousands of voters."¹⁷

The involvement of local leaders in campaigns ensured that they were responsive to parties' organisational demands. To avoid antagonising leaders by aggravating factional divisions, candidates usually delayed the quest for commitments. Holding operations such as favourite son candidacies and uncommitted status, delaying the entry of presidential preferences into the selection process, were deferred to by the candidates. Negotiations were conducted with party leaders and delegates, seeking support when they were released from their holding position.

Challenges to favourite sons were usually reserved for states where party leaders were unfavourable towards the candidate and opportunities

were available for breaching the party leaders' control over the delegation. John Kennedy opposed favourite sons who were disposed towards other candidates (Di Salle in Ohio, Tawes in Maryland, Morse in Oregon, Hartke in Indiana, Brown in California) and where state primary laws permitted pledged delegates. Defeating favourite sons in primaries in these states would ensure their delegations for Kennedy. Defeat for the favourite sons risked loss of both local prestige and their delegations. This threat resulted in Tawes and Hartke withholding from the primary whilst Di Salle and Brown committed themselves to Kennedy on the condition that he would refrain from challenging them in the primary.

In states where mechanisms for converting popular appeal into delegate mandates were unavailable, challenges to favourite sons were normally avoided. Thus in 1960 the Kennedy campaign challenged no favourite sons where delegates were selected through the non-primary process or New Jersey where the primary was not binding. The Goldwater campaign demonstrated a means of overcoming favourite son opposition by relying on its committed supporters within the party organisations to exert influence over delegate selection. This resulted in a Kansas delegation unamenable to control by its pro-Rockefeller governor. An alternative device, as pursued by the Nixon campaign in 1968 in New Jersey, was to attempt to breach favourite son control by inducements to receptive delegates. In this instance, the lure of kingmaker status for some local party leaders in ensuring Nixon's nomination operated to loosen control over part of the delegation from its pro-Rockefeller favourite son.¹⁸

The corollary of the integration of presidential with state and local party politics was the ascendancy of parochial considerations in determining delegate preferences. Though desiring a vote-getter

nationally party leaders also wanted a strong candidate at the top of the ticket in their localities. Different candidates met this latter specification to differing degrees. For the burgeoning southern Republican parties of the early 1960's a Goldwater candidacy was a greater stimulus to continued growth than the moderate alternatives. To Illinois Democrats in 1960 Kennedy at the top of the ticket was a device for attracting votes away from the popular Catholic Republican state's attorney who had proved vigorous in pursuit of the Chicago machine.¹⁹

The customary convergence of candidate and party interests which characterised the conduct of campaigns disintegrated where party control was challenged by insurgents. Through the entrenchment of the nominating process in the party, control of the former translated into control of the latter. Insurgent candidates seeking to win party-controlled delegates posed a threat to the organisation's internal power structure. For the professionals, resisting insurgent candidates was concomitant with preserving the existing control over the party. Repelling McCarthy in 1968 thus became the means to self-preservation for the Democratic professionals exposing the incongruity, in this case, between winning the election and retaining control of the party. Pittsburgh Mayor James Barr exemplified the intersection of interests in Humphrey's nomination and the security of professional control in his comment, "I'd rather lose with my guy than win with yours."²⁰

Campaigns without anchorage in the party organisations were further disadvantaged by the absence of influential supporters to promote their cause and of accurate intelligence with which to inform a delegate-hunting operation. Thus campaigns based on volunteers outside the party structure such as the McCarthy and Lodge candidacies lacked bridgeheads into the state and local organisations. For such candidates popular

support could be mobilised in primaries but not translated into delegates.

In the post-reform era the vastly expanded opportunities for winning committed delegates through voter mobilisation diminished the deference shown to the parties' organisational demands. When delegates could be won by by-passing the parties the need to compromise the campaign's conduct with the demands of party leaders receded.

Evidence of the attenuation of party-imposed constraints on the conduct of campaigns was evidenced in the erosion of favourite son strategies after reform. By the 1960's favourite sons had ceased to be serious contenders for the nomination.²¹ However, they persisted as vehicles for preserving party unity by precluding the involvement of major candidates and retaining flexibility for bargaining the delegation's support at an opportune moment.

The loosening of party control allied with the expanded provisions for bound delegates reduced the protection from major candidate incursion afforded by favourite son status. Despite opposition from within the parties, candidates could exploit their popular support to win delegates. Parties could be challenged with the diminished risk of foregoing the support of delegates controlled by antagonised leaders because the antagonised leaders no longer controlled them.

Recognising the altered power balance within the nominating process, few party notables were prepared to act as favourite sons after reform.²² Vulnerable to defeat by nationally-known candidates, most party leaders have resorted to uncommitted status or aligned themselves with one of the major contenders.

In a voter-dominated process party organisations lack the resources to repel challenges from major candidates. The candidates possess national recognition and popularity, and plausibility as nominees. Delayed commitments do not have the appeal to voters that they did for

party professionals. Moreover, sophisticated candidate organisations mount more effective campaigns than most modern state parties. For example, in 1976 Senator Lloyd Bentsen, backed by the Texas Democratic organisation, sought to become his state's favourite son by running in the primary. But against a Carter candidacy capitalising on a series of primary victories which promoted him into front runner for the nomination Bentsen could carry only two of the state's thirty-one senatorial districts.²³

The two states evidencing the successful exertion of favourite son holding operations in the 1976 Democratic contest (in 1980 there were none in either party) provided exceptional strategic environments for delegate selection. In the Cook County sub-division of Illinois survived one of the last party organisations capable of out-mobilising a presidential campaign. In consequence, only Wallace of the major candidates challenged for delegates there. West Virginia provided the only Democratic primary in which delegates were selected without the possibility of mandates. Recognising that the state's delegates would be won outside the primary all major candidates except Wallace refrained from entering.

The attenuation of party organisation control diminished the incentives to incorporate local leaders into campaigns, and pursue intra-party alignments with leaders and factions. Campaign organisations required information about the states' electorates which was most accurately measured through polling conducted by specialists attached to the national campaign. Advice from local professionals could be dispensed with without the pre-reform risk of being locked out of delegate allocation. Prior to 1976, for example, the party chairman in Iowa advised the Carter campaign that the state was inhospitable territory for his candidacy.²⁴ But within the campaign the belief in Carter's potential

rapport with the state's voters led to an intensive effort being mounted there.²⁵

Where local politics intruded into post-reform contests it was at the mass, extra-party level. Thus Wallace would exploit his opposition to busing amongst Michigan voters in 1972 to win a majority. Yet his stance on the issue was unsupported by any major figure in the state party.

After reform the absence of support amongst party notables ceased to be a major obstacle to winning the nomination. Formerly support within the party organisations had been essential to build a convention majority. In the immediate pre-reform period all nominees were supported by a plurality, at least, of their party's county chairmen in the pre-convention period.²⁶ In 1972, in contrast, only 8 per cent of Democratic chairmen supported McGovern from amongst several alternatives.²⁷ When the choice was narrowed to a two-man race, the chairmen preferred Humphrey by a greater than two-to-one majority.²⁸

In 1976 Carter repeated McGovern's extra-party route to the nomination. He also overturned the pre-reform rule that a candidate unsupported within the party organisations could not win the nomination. Elizabeth Drew characterised Carter's relationship to the party as follows :

"Whatever there was that called itself a party was opposed to his nomination but was powerless before his assault. And so the self-appointed candidate whom no important members of the party wanted - not elected officials, not Party officials, none of the old Party powers - captured the prize while they looked on helplessly."²⁹

Fund Raising Organisation

Pre-reform fund raising was informal, narrowly-based and usually completed in advance of the campaign's beginning. Solicitation was concentrated upon a wealthy few and the success of such efforts was

largely insulated from the campaign's record in recruiting delegate support.

Most pre-reform funds were derived from small numbers of wealthy backers. Candidates relied upon themselves, their families and/or a few outside contributors. For wealthy candidates campaigns were self-financed. Both Rockefeller's 1964 and 1968 campaigns were financed largely by the candidate and his family.³⁰ Over a fifth of the total income raised by John Kennedy's campaign derived from Kennedy and his family.³¹

Outside financial support was contributed by wealthy individuals, usually the stockholders or executives of corporate businesses, contributing substantial sums. For 1968, Clement Stone, President of Combined American Insurance, was reported to have contributed a quarter of a million dollars to Nixon's campaign; most of the \$1.5 millions raised by Rockefeller outside the family was supplied by two dozen subscribers and McCarthy had at least five contributors who donated over a hundred thousand dollars each including Stewart Mott, whose family control stock in General Motors.³²

Outside fund raising was conducted by informal, personal solicitation. Fund raising organisation was headed by a wealthy supporter who exploited his own and the candidate's network of contacts to generate the contributions to fund the campaign. For example, McCarthy's principal fund-raiser was Howard Stein, president of the Dreyfus Fund and investment banker Maurice Stans occupied a similar role for Nixon in 1968. Backers of the candidates' previous campaigns were relied upon providing a local financial base for the nomination effort. Over half of all John Kennedy's outside contributions derived from Massachusetts.³³

Voter-oriented fund raising efforts were the exception. Goldwater

and McCarthy provide the principal immediate pre-reform instances, both generating over a quarter of a million individual subscriptions.³⁴

But for both campaigns voter-oriented fund-raising was a complement to the solicitation of wealthy contributors, not an alternative to it.

Campaigns funded by candidates and their families were assured of sufficient funds for their duration. Thus fund-raising capability was immune from the progress of the campaign's delegate mobilising efforts. Rockefeller's campaigns, for example, were lucratively financed without coming within reach of the nomination.

Candidacies lacking an independent financial base and starting with few large sponsors were more dependent upon a bandwagon effect operating amongst likely contributors to fund their campaigns. For such campaigns fund-raising activity was continuous and income uneven in supply. The McCarthy, Lodge and 1960 Humphrey campaigns were constantly striving to generate the funds necessary to remain in contention. The supply of funds responded to surges and declines in the campaigns' progress, and strategy was readjusted to available resources.

Reform produced a democratisation, nationalisation and formalisation of fund raising. It also increased the responsiveness of fund-raising capability to the campaigns' political progress. Fund-raising strategies became voter-oriented, geographically diffused and commercially conducted. Campaigns started with modest financial resources seeking success in early contests to generate further contributions.

By limiting the size of outside and family contributions, and offering matching funds in return for small contributions and limitations on self-financing by candidates, campaign finance reforms shifted the focus of fund-raising activities from an elite to a mass base. Numerous small contributions were required where pre-reform candidates had relied upon large sums from a few donors.

Solicitation efforts became voter-oriented. Professional fund-raisers such as direct mail specialists were recruited by campaigns to generate a mass base of financial support. Targeted populations of potential subscribers were identified by interest group membership, magazine readership and ideological classifications widening the sources of campaign funds beyond the pre-reform corporate businessmen. McGovern's targeted groups included contributors to the campaign for the McGovern-Hatfield amendment, members of SANE and readers of the New Republic; Bayh's efforts focused on feminists, Brown's on members of the American Federation of Teachers, Jackson rented mailing lists from synagogues, Udall concentrated on environmentalists and Wallace upon members of White Citizen's Councils.³⁵ Respondents to initial solicitation efforts formed a financial base tapped regularly as the campaign proceeded. For example, Wallace relied upon a mailing list of 190,000 to elicit funds before the delegate selection process began in 1976.

From the start of the election year from 1976 matching funds became available which enabled candidates to 'double up' on individual contributions under \$250. Thus candidates proficient in generating a mass financial base had it enlarged by matching funds. In 1976 federal funding contributed \$5 million to Reagan, \$4.7 million to Ford and over three million dollars to both Carter and Wallace.

Matching funds also encouraged a nationalisation of fund-raising efforts. To qualify for matching required revenue raised in twenty states necessitating the construction of a financial constituency beyond a single state or region.

Formalisation occurred in two senses. First, it followed from the decline of informal, personal solicitation and its replacement by formal mechanisms such as mass mailings and media advertising. Formal-

isation was also entailed by the increased regulation of campaign revenue raising and expenditure. All donations had to be recorded and disclosed, matching fund applications documented and expenditures reported.

Formalisation in both senses entailed professionalisation. Voter-oriented solicitation needed commercial fund raisers and increased regulation required specialist administrators skilled in techniques of financial control and familiar with the relevant legislation. By 1980 between 5 and 7 per cent of pre-convention budgets were expended on professionals of the latter type.³⁶

Post-reform fund raising campaigns increased in responsiveness to the surges and declines in vote-winning efforts. No candidate entered the selection sequences assured of funds to mount an entire nomination campaign and available resources were expended disproportionately in the early state contests (see Chapters Six and Seven). All campaigns were premised on the assumption that success in early contests would generate sufficient additional income to finance the rest of the campaign.

Contributions flow to candidates who win contests and gain in plausibility as nominees. Table 5.2 demonstrates the linkage of success in delegate selection contests to success in the campaigns' fund-raising capabilities using the example of Carter and his competitors in 1976. (The nearest competitor is defined as the candidate second in share of delegates.)

As Carter won contests and acquired the delegates which moved him towards a convention majority, he was the beneficiary of an upsurge in contributions. His contributions showed a lineal increase whilst that of his opponents underwent lineal decline, remained constant and low or rose after early success and declined after later failure.³⁷

TABLE 5.2

FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND CAMPAIGN SUCCESS, CARTER AND HIS COMPETITORS IN 1976

Month	Events	Carter's lead over Nearest Competitor
		In Pledged Selected Delegates (% of total) In Monthly Individual Contributions (x \$ totals)
January	Carter ran ahead of other candidates in Iowa caucuses	
February	Carter won N.H. primary	
March	Jackson won Mass. primary; Bayh withdrew; Carter won Ill., Fla. primaries; Shriver withdrew; Carter won N.C. primary	4 3.45
April	Carter won Wisc., Penna. primaries; Humphrey declined active candidacy	6 0.62
May	Jackson withdrew; Church won Neb. primary; Brown won Md. primary; Carter won Mich. primary	23 1.70
June	Carter won Ohio primary; Other candidates, except Brown, conceded nomination to Carter	25 3.75
July		* 7.06

Sources: Donald R. Matthews, "Winnowing: The News Media and the 1976 Nominations", in James David Barber, ed., Race for the Presidency (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1978), p.72; John H. Aldrich, Before the Convention: Strategies and Choices in Presidential Nomination Campaigns (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1980), p.234.

* After the Ohio primary the shift of delegates pledged to other candidates to Carter plus his own delegates assured him of a convention majority.

Conclusion

Campaign organisations registered the change from a party- to a voter-dominated nomination. Pre-reform organisations included experienced party professionals keyed to fostering relations with their counterparts in the states from which candidates sought support. Recognising the locus of power within the nominating process, campaigns were deferential to party leaders and attuned to party organisational demands.

For many pre-reform campaigns fund raising posed but slight demands upon the organisation. Candidates or their families funded some campaigns, a few wealthy backers accounted for most others. Reliable sources of funds divorced the recruitment of political support from its financial counterpart.

Post-1968 candidate organisations reflected the effects of reform in propelling both control over the nomination and sources of funds into the electorate. Organisations adapted to the election-like tasks involved in mobilising voters. Political consultants were recruited to provide campaign specialisms and volunteers were generated to provide organisational manpower necessary for voter-mobilisation efforts. As party leaders declined in influence so their support diminished as a resource and the necessity for establishing relations with them declined. In consequence, party professionals diminished in numbers amongst campaign personnel as their specialist skills became redundant.

Continuous and extensive fund raising operations to supply campaigns dependent upon small contributions (and, in turn, matching funds), followed reform. Specialist fund raisers were recruited who solicited finance from national voter constituencies. Beyond this base candidates were dependent upon achieving success in recruiting political support to attract the finances necessary to sustain an effective

campaign through the convention. Thus the linkage between political and financial mobilisation tightened. Campaigns failing politically struggled to find the funds to stage a recovery whilst those enjoying political success obtained increased resources enabling them to maximise their advantage.

NOTES

1. Stanley Fike, Oral History Interview, JFK Library, p.30.
2. Theodore C. Sorensen, Memorandum, n.d., Theodore C. Sorensen Papers, JFK Library (hereinafter TCS Papers), Box 25. Sorensen shared the common misperception that most delegates had attended previous conventions. For contrary evidence see Loch H. Johnson and Harlan Hahn, "Delegate Turnover at National Party Conventions 1944-68", in Donald R. Matthews, ed, Perspectives on Presidential Selection (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1973), pp.143-71.
3. Theodore H. White, The Making of the President 1960 (London: Cape, 1962), pp.36-46.
4. James Rowe, The Strategy of Hubert Humphrey, n.d., p.17 Hubert Humphrey Papers, Minnesota State Historical Society, (hereinafter HHH Papers), Box 583.
5. White, op. cit., p.136, fn.5.
6. Jules Witcover, 85 Days: The Last Campaign of Robert Kennedy (New York: Putnam's, 1969), p.75.
7. Idem, Marathon: The Pursuit of the Presidency, 1972-1976 (New York: Viking, 1977), pp.117-18; Martin Schram, Running for President: A Journal of the Carter Campaign (New York: Pocket Books, 1978), pp.69-70.
8. Larry J. Sabato, The Rise of Political Consultants (New York: Basic Books, 1981), p.199.
9. Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1965), p.119.
10. Witcover, Marathon, p.110.
11. Gary Warren Hart, Right from the Start: A Chronicle of the McGovern Campaign (New York: Quadrangle, 1973), p.77.
12. In 1974 14 per cent of students were Republican identifiers compared

with 49 per cent who were independents and 37 per cent Democrats. Everett Carll Ladd, Jr., "Liberalism Upside Down: The Inversion of the New Deal Order", Political Science Quarterly, 91 (Winter 1976-77), 583-84.

13. Betty Glad, Jimmy Carter: In Search of the Great White House (New York: Norton, 1980), p.253.
14. Nelson W. Polsby and Aaron B. Wildavsky, "Uncertainty and Decision-Making at the National Conventions", in Robert A. Dentler, Nelson W. Polsby and Robert A. Smith, eds., Politics and Social Life (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963), p.383.
15. Nelson W. Polsby and Aaron Wildavsky, Presidential Elections: Strategies of American Electoral Politics 4th ed. (New York: Scribner's, 1976), p.115.
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CHAPTER SIX

THE ROLE OF PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES

Presidential primaries have been the most conspicuous feature of the pre-convention nominating process for most of the twentieth century. Though a consistent feature of the modern nominating process the functions of primaries altered after reform. This followed, first, from an unintended consequence of reform - the proliferation of primaries so that they became the predominant selection mechanism and provided a substantial majority of the total national convention delegates. Secondly, as reformers intended, the linkage between the preferences of voters participating in the primaries and the delegates derived from them was tightened. This combination of changes created the potential - which candidates proceeded to realise - for the primaries to determine national convention decisions where formerly they had been no more than influences on those decisions.

In this chapter the argument for the altered role of presidential primaries is developed by examining the strategic responses adopted towards them by candidate organisations, and their impact upon convention decisions. A comparison of the pre- and post-reform periods is provided contrasting the type of candidates entering the primaries, the role of primaries in campaign strategy, the effects of defeat and victory in them upon the competitive standing of the contenders, and the distribution of influence between the states in the primary system.

Before reform primaries were employed by a restricted range of candidates. They were used to demonstrate electability. Primary defeats were usually fatal to prospects of winning the nomination. Victories in them rarely altered the relative standing of the contenders. Potentially the most influential primaries were those few that provided

contests between major candidates.

Since reform virtually all candidates conduct active campaigns and all active campaigners enter primaries. They are used to win large numbers of pledged delegates. Defeats can be withstood if the performance exceeds expectations or if it occurs late in the sequence when delegates have been accumulated even if the result confounded expectations. Primary victories have produced dramatic improvements in the competitive standing of winning candidates. Primaries scheduled early in the sequence carry the greatest impact on the nominating contest. In consequence, they receive disproportionately large allocations of the candidates' resources measured against the number of delegates at stake.

Primaries and Candidate Type

When primaries supplied only a minority of national convention delegates they were not a part of all candidates' strategies. A candidate "theoretically at least, could sweep all the primaries and lose the nomination".¹ Theodore Roosevelt (in 1912) and Kefauver in 1952 came close to translating this theoretical possibility into practice.

Though not mathematically necessary for a convention majority the primaries did attract some entrants. A listing of those who concentrated their campaigns on the primaries prior to 1960 is instructive as an indicator of a type of candidate. They included Robert La Follette, Theodore Roosevelt, Leonard Wood, Hiram Johnson, William Borah, Harold Stassen, Estes Kefauver and Dwight Eisenhower.² The list is a roll call of insurgents. Several candidates were notable for opposing their own parties. Roosevelt challenged the incumbent president of his own party. As governor of California, Johnson created

lasting impediments to effective party organisation. In 1912 he ran with Roosevelt on the third party Progressive ticket when the opposition to President Taft extended from an intra-party challenge into electoral opposition. Kefauver rose to prominence through a Senate committee investigation of organised crime which revealed the close links of some local party figures with the underworld. Eisenhower, in contrast, was a political neophyte whose partisan allegiance was unknown until the start of the election year. When his candidacy was made public his campaign manager had to announce that, "General Eisenhower has assured me that he is a Republican."³

Apart from their lack of entre with their party organisations, a characteristic shared by all of these candidates, except Eisenhower, was their failure to obtain the nomination. The emphasis upon primaries was necessitated because no other plausible route to the nomination existed. Because they lacked any alternative, the primary participant was frequently viewed as a weak candidate -

"primary activity is often (though by no means always) a sign that a candidate has great obstacles to overcome and must win many primaries in order to be considered for the nomination at all. The image communicated by a few primary victories, unless they are overwhelming, may be less of a conquering hero than of the drowning man clutching at the last straw."⁴

Several of the candidates who emphasised primaries in the campaigns between 1960 and 1968 were, like their predecessors, lacking support within the party organisations. Humphrey (in 1960) was considered too liberal to be electable. Rockefeller's liberalism and independence antagonised Republicans in 1964. McCarthy was regarded as a rebel for challenging Johnson's renomination. Similarly Robert Kennedy had challenged Johnson and then Humphrey behind whom the party organisations consolidated after the President's withdrawal.

Though the primary entrants were predominantly insurgents, they

were not exclusively so. Candidates such as Robert Taft, Dewey (in 1948) and Stevenson (in 1956) entered primaries although they possessed substantial support within the party. John Kennedy and Nixon (in 1968) were both the favourites in the polls of their parties' county chairmen. Nixon had been the party's unopposed nominee in 1960. Kennedy had narrowly missed the vice presidential nomination in 1956 when the decision had been made on the convention floor. Both, however, faced obstacles precluding their support in the parties from being translated into the nomination automatically. Nixon had been defeated in his two previous elections - for the presidency in 1960 and for governor of California two years later. Kennedy's religion evoked memories of the bigotry and the sizeable defeat suffered in 1928 by Al Smith, the only previous Catholic nominee.

In all the four contested nominations between 1960 and 1968 at least one major candidate did not enter the primaries. None of Kennedy's three principal opponents - Symington, Johnson and Stevenson - campaigned for votes in primary states. In 1968 Humphrey was situated in a different position towards the party organisation to what he had been eight years earlier. When Johnson withdrew, Humphrey inherited his support amongst the party organisations upon whom he relied for the nomination without entering primaries. Though seeking strong showings in primaries, Rockefeller and Reagan in 1968, like Lodge and Nixon four years earlier, did not campaign in person.

Between 1960 and 1968 more than half of all major candidates for the nomination were not active in primaries (see Table 4.1). Five candidates did not even enter their names on primary ballots. Although one of the five, Scranton, did not become a candidate until after the primaries were completed the remaining four - Johnson, Symington, Stevenson and Humphrey - chose to rely on other means to obtain the nomination.

Before reform candidate organisations could choose whether or not to contest the primaries. The scope for choice depended upon the candidate's relations with the party organisations and his status measured against the criteria of availability. For some candidates entering or avoiding the primaries were genuine alternatives. For example, Goldwater's support amongst Republican cadres was sufficiently widespread to make him a credible contender for the nomination without campaigning in the primaries as he did.

In the post-reform period the range of choice for candidates regarding the primaries disappeared: to win the nomination they had to be entered in substantial numbers. This stricture applies to all candidates irrespective of their relationship to the party organisations. President Nixon entered seventeen of the twenty-one preference primaries when he sought renomination in 1972. Eight years earlier, prior to reform, President Johnson's name appeared on three of the sixteen primary ballots it was possible to enter. Whilst the insurgents - Wallace, Carter, McGovern - continued to utilise primaries, candidates with greater equity within the parties also conducted extensive primary campaigns. Humphrey, the party nominee in 1968 without entering primaries, recognised four years later that, "Whoever gets the nomination will have to be in primaries - a representative sampling of them."⁵

Before the start of the 1972 primaries Muskie had been endorsed by eight governors and twelve senators which formerly would have guaranteed substantial numbers of delegates reducing the need for widespread primary activity. Yet Muskie committed himself to running in every primary.

The concentration of the candidates in the primaries shown in Table 6.1 evidences their recognition as the nucleus of the nominating process since reform. Of all the major candidates since 1968 only Humphrey

and Ford - factors in most speculation about the 1976 Democratic and 1980 Republican nominations respectively but never announced candidates - refrained from entering primaries.⁶

The Role of Primaries in Campaign Strategy

Prior to reform the significance of victories in primaries did not derive from the delegates that they conferred but as a means of influencing uncommitted delegates or those who controlled them. The primaries provided a source of evidence for those deciding the nomination in conformity with the party's imperative of electability. According to Polsby and Wildavsky, primaries were important "largely because the results represent an ostensibly objective indication of whether a candidate can win the election."⁷ In conventions dominated by party professionals the desire to win the election, both nationally and locally, was usually a major influence in deciding the nominee. Only victory could enhance the professionals' access to power. In the absence of primaries the professionals either employed other measures of popularity to make their decision or relied upon intuition.

The primaries provided both 'hard' evidence and pressure from voters circumscribing the professionals' freedom of choice. James Rowe, Humphrey's campaign manager in 1960, delineated the dependent status of the professional and the pressure that could be exerted upon them by primaries -

"These men [the professionals] do not operate as individuals. They are essentially catalysts - catalysts who remain in power by reflecting accurately the moods and desires of their constituents. Their constituents happen to be minor organization politicians but these in turn reflect accurately the mood of the voters. These moods are, in turn, affected by the actions of the candidates. So the 'professionals' - like other politicians - are subject to political pressures from below."⁸

ACTIVITY OF MAJOR CANDIDATES IN PRIMARIES, CONTESTED NOMINATIONS 1960-1980

TABLE 6.1

Year	Level of Candidate Activity		
	Active Campaigns	Primaries Entered/Candidate Inactive	Primaries not entered
1960	J. Kennedy Humphrey		Johnson Stevenson Symington
1964	Goldwater Rockefeller	Lodge Nixon	Scranton
1968	R. Kennedy McCarthy Nixon	Johnson Reagan Rockefeller	Humphrey
1960-68	7	5	5
1972	Humphrey Jackson Lindsay McCarthy McGovern Muskie Wallace		
1976	Bayh Brown Carter Church Jackson Ford Reagan	Shriver Udall Wallace Harris	Humphrey
1980	Brown Carter E. Kennedy Baker Bush Connally Crane Dole Reagan		Ford
1972-80	27	0	2

The appeal of the pre-reform primaries to the insurgents or candidates with political handicaps was that they provided a means of influencing the professionals who would otherwise be unwilling to nominate them.

Reflecting after his nomination appeared assured, John Kennedy recognised the necessity of his primary victories to assuaging doubts about his religion as a barrier to electability,

"Could you imagine me, having entered no primaries, trying to tell the leaders that being a Catholic was no handicap? In the same way, when Lyndon [Johnson] said he could win in the North, but could offer no concrete evidence, his claim couldn't be taken seriously ... For some men such as Lyndon and myself primaries are not only good, they are absolutely vital." ⁹

Once Kennedy had demonstrated vote-getting power in the primaries his religion became an asset in pressurising the professionals to accept him. In a party dependent for its electoral successes upon substantial Catholic support "he was aware that, if he swept the primaries and led the polls and had most of the delegates, he could be denied the nomination only by a few party leaders saying 'We won't take him because he's a Catholic' - and this, he knew, they would find politically difficult to do." ¹⁰

The primaries were particularly pertinent to the professionals in the large urban states whose electoral votes were frequently crucial in presidential elections. It was in these states that party competition was often closest, party organisation most developed and patronage often extensive. In such states the need for an effective vote-getter at the top of the ticket was particularly intense because it would benefit the party's candidates for lower-level offices which provided access to the rewards necessary to preserve the party machine's effectiveness.

Theodore White noted that the principal observers of the Kennedy-Humphrey primary contests in 1960 were -

"a multiple audience - first, the folksy audience of the primary state to be won directly, along with the local delegates that could be harvested in the primary victory (this, of course, was the least of their considerations); next the national audience and, last, there were the bosses of the big Eastern states and smaller organised states who would watch the race to observe the performance of political horseflesh." 11

Although the key primaries in 1960 were held in Wisconsin and West Virginia both candidates recognised that the prize for victory would (or could) be the uncommitted blocs of the largest delegations seeking to maximise the strength of the party ticket in November. If Kennedy could win the primaries "only then could he translate his voter strength in such states as New York, Illinois and Pennsylvania into solid delegate strength." 12 Similarly the Humphrey campaign was designed to convince "a handful of professionals" that he could win the election. 13 A win in Wisconsin, survival until the convention and the absence of a clear leader might allow Humphrey to appeal to what he called "the cold-eyed boys looking for someone who is as tough and energetic and as mean - if need be - as Nixon." 14

Eight years later Nixon set himself to win every primary he entered perceiving it as the means to overcome his image as a loser. If he proved himself the most effective vote-getter he would be selected despite his previous failures -

"I [Nixon] am going to get the nomination if I prove I'm the strongest candidate. If I can't demonstrate that, nothing else I do will mean anything." 15

His campaign was particularly directed to the leaders of the growing Republican Party in the South. After Goldwater's landslide defeat four years earlier the southern leaders were prepared to support a less conservative candidate if he stood to be elected. Though ideologically closer to Reagan, they had "learned a lesson of political pragmatism. If they thought I [Nixon] was the man who could win, they

would support me."¹⁶ Elsewhere the reserve of loyalty towards Nixon within the Republican Party would be unlocked by primary victories.¹⁷

Robert Kennedy, like his brother eight years earlier, set out to win the primaries "to show the pols."¹⁸ He targeted one pol in particular. "Daley", said Kennedy, "means the ball game."¹⁹ Entering after several primaries had passed, Kennedy sought to give added emphasis to those remaining characterising the first contest in Indiana as the West Virginia of 1968.²⁰

Because the primaries were used as tests of electability they were selectively employed to demonstrate support in a regionally heterogeneous range of states. James Rowe's advice to Humphrey in 1960 recommended that "it can and should be presented that they have been selected solely on the basis of showing to the country that Humphrey can win in every section."²¹ Similarly geography was a factor in John Kennedy's selection of primaries for "a broad enough number had to be chosen to give a national cast to the campaign."²²

Primaries proved to be decisive for John Kennedy and Nixon because the party leaders were not hostile to their candidacies and were open to persuasion by a series of unequivocal primary victories. After Kennedy's victory in heavily Protestant West Virginia defused the Catholic issue, "hesitant leaders became convinced that Kennedy was their man."²³ For Pennsylvania's Governor David Lawrence, Kennedy's sweep of the primaries proved irresistible. He committed his support to Kennedy because he had "won in open primaries and received 150,000 votes in Pennsylvania's."²⁴ Despite his own enthusiasm for Stevenson, Lawrence was susceptible to pressure from below conceding that "it would be running against public sentiment in Pennsylvania if we didn't support Kennedy."²⁵ The surmounting of the religious barrier

enabled Governor Williams and the Michigan party leadership to publicise their existing preference,

"we had more or less in our own minds decided in favor of Jack [Kennedy] before Wisconsin, but we weren't in a position to move politically until about West Virginia."²⁶

In Illinois -

"What concerned delegates most was who would win in November, and more particularly, who would most help the state and county tickets in Illinois. On this question Senator Kennedy clearly had the advantage. As the mayor [Daley] emphasised, the Senator had won seven primaries ..."²⁷

Largely on the basis of his primary performances Kennedy won four-fifths of the delegates from New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois and Michigan providing more than one-third of the votes necessary to nominate.

Nixon's primary victories were the means to activate the support latent within the Republican Party. The enthusiasm for him had been restrained only by his image as a loser but after his record vote in New Hampshire "it was only necessary for Nixon's captains to shake the trees - and the delegates would fall into their baskets."²⁸ The primaries were also the key to the support of the pragmatic leaders of the South. Following his fifth successive victory in Oregon, Nixon planned to travel to Atlanta to "wrap up the whole campaign" in a meeting with southern leaders.²⁹ When his southern support fissured at the convention before a Reagan surge, Strom Thurmond rallied his South Carolina delegation to support a candidate who could be elected, "We have no choice, if we want to win, except to vote for Nixon ... Believe me, I love Reagan, but Nixon's the one."³⁰ (Theodore White maintains that the leaders in the large eastern and midwestern states "waited to see Nixon run in the primaries."³¹ On the evidence of their behaviour at the convention this seems unlikely. The hierarchy in these states either supported Rockefeller or deferred first ballot commitments to major candidates).

The 1960 Democratic and 1968 Republican nominations represent two examples of the influence of primaries upon pre-reform convention outcomes. But the evidence from the two remaining contested nominations of the immediate pre-reform period proves that primaries were not consistent in their impact.

Humphrey was nominated in 1968 without entering primaries. Robert Kennedy had won six primaries when he died but he remained substantially behind Humphrey in delegate support. Kennedy's initial objective in entering the primaries was not to win a first ballot victory but to preclude Humphrey from doing so.³² Such a plan recognised that Humphrey would have considerable first ballot support irrespective of Kennedy wins in the primaries. Though McCarthy won four preference primaries he was supported by fewer than a quarter of the delegates on the only ballot.

In 1964 there was a different winner in each of the three primaries contested between the major candidates - Lodge in New Hampshire, Rockefeller in Oregon, Goldwater in California. Goldwater was active in more primaries than any other candidate but his performances were notable for their failure to demonstrate vote-getting power. In Indiana and Illinois he won unimpressive victories against minor candidates. In Illinois over 200,000 voters in the gubernatorial primary ignored the presidential preference poll.³³ In New Hampshire Goldwater ran second behind write-in votes for Lodge and he suspended his campaign in Oregon when his prospects for victory appeared bleak. Though the only candidate on the Nebraska ballot he received only a plurality of the votes cast. His only victory against a major opponent occurred in California where he beat Rockefeller securing less than 52 per cent of the vote.

The disparity between Goldwater's primary performances and his first ballot success was delineated by Converse and associates -

"There is room to wonder whether any presidential aspirant has ever contested so many primaries with as disastrous a showing and still captured the nomination of his party's convention."³⁴

Despite the overall fragility of Goldwater's showing in the primaries several writers have asserted that his one victory over a major opponent was decisive to his nomination.³⁵ These writers argue that the California victory was crucial either by converting uncommitted delegates or by strengthening the Goldwater forces in the state conventions where delegate selection was still to be completed. But Goldwater's support within the party was so widespread that it must be doubted whether California provided the difference between a convention victory and defeat.

Anticipating the possibility that California might "go up in smoke" the Goldwater campaign had prepared a "fire escape" whereby a substantial number of delegates' commitments to Goldwater would be revealed immediately after the primary to offset the adverse publicity of a defeat.³⁶ The campaign's co-director of field operations estimated that at least one hundred votes would have been gleaned from the post-California conventions irrespective of the primary's result.³⁷ Had the states cited by Robert Novak as ones where Goldwater's support was enhanced by California provided him with no votes at all (a highly unlikely possibility) the candidate would have fallen fourteen votes short of a first ballot majority.³⁸ As the second largest delegation, California was an important addition to Goldwater's delegate total. Whether its influence upon other states decided the nomination is doubtful though it did contribute to the magnitude of the victory.

The evidence of the four contested nominations preceding reform suggests that primaries varied in their influence upon the convention outcome. For John Kennedy and Nixon the primaries provided leverage

over large numbers of delegates. Humphrey possessed no such advantage in 1968 but he won a larger proportion of the delegate total than either Kennedy or Nixon.³⁹ For Goldwater, the primaries indicated vote-getting weakness rather than strength. Yet Goldwater won the largest share of the vote on first ballot in an out-party nomination since 1944.⁴⁰

Prior to 1972, primaries were notable more for the information than the delegates they imparted. They provided a "demonstration effect" indicating electoral potential.⁴¹ But several conditions controlled their influence on the nominating outcome. First, at least one candidate had to be prepared to use primaries to increase the information available to the delegates. Where no candidate sought to alter the existing distribution of preferences within the parties - as happened in the in-party nominations of 1960 and 1964 - the primaries were of little importance. Secondly, the primaries were potentially most influential where their results were unequivocally in one candidate's favour. Nixon and John Kennedy won all the primaries they entered but no single candidate emerged as dominant in the other two contested nominations. In 1964 each of the major primaries was won by a different candidate. In 1968 Robert Kennedy won several victories over McCarthy but also lost to him in Oregon. After Kennedy's death McCarthy was the only candidate in contention who had entered the primaries but he had lost more than he had won. Thirdly, the party leaders had to be receptive to the evidence of the primaries for them to be an influence. Both Kennedy and Nixon were favoured within the party organisations. The primaries demolished the uncertainty over their electability restraining leaders from supporting them.

The susceptibility to primary evidence apparent in 1960 and 1968 was not, however, a constant feature of presidential nominating politics. Whilst no one effective vote-getter emerged from the 1964 Republican

primaries they did provide the negative lesson that Goldwater had only a narrow appeal even within his own party.

Goldwater's nomination was attributable to the effective mobilisation of committed supporters in the convention states. The Goldwater delegates were predominantly political purists according to Wildavsky's research.⁴² That is, "they cared more about maintaining their purity - 'I would rather lose and be right' - than about winning."⁴³ Their support for Goldwater was based on stylistic rather than pragmatic grounds. As purists, his supporters emphasised internal criteria for decision, what they believed "deep down inside", a rejection of compromise and a lack of orientation towards winning.⁴⁴ The delegates' enthusiasm for Goldwater was not dependent upon his electability (although they passionately hoped that he would win). His appeal was to the politics of conscience - "In Your Heart You Know He's Right" as the campaign slogan ran. Goldwater did not base his appeal on his ability to win the election, nor did the delegates support him on those grounds. They were thus unconcerned by primaries as an objective indication of election potential. As purists, the Goldwater delegates were immune to the pressure to select a winner.

In one sense the 1968 Democratic convention was the converse of its Republican counterpart four years earlier because the purist orientation was largely associated with the minority, the McCarthy delegates.⁴⁵ Yet the professionals rejected McCarthy though he had won four primaries and appeared a stronger candidate than Humphrey in trial-heat polls against Nixon. (Scammon and Wattenberg preserve their argument for "psephological" conventions by the sleight of hand of avoiding the most recent poll evidence available to the delegates. The authors argue that Humphrey was the stronger candidate - and thereby justify his selection - by employing polls taken before the Republican

convention.⁴⁶ Between the two conventions, after Nixon's nomination, McCarthy was the stronger of the two Democratic alternatives in all polls when matched against Nixon.⁴⁷) But McCarthy's apparent electoral potential did not persuade the delegates. The candidate was perceived as a party divider, his supporters as insurgents who were a threat to the existing leadership of the local parties. For the professionals the 'costs' of supporting McCarthy were prohibitive even though he appeared the stronger candidate.⁴⁸

In the early 1960's Polsby and Wildavsky asserted that "the great search at the convention is for 'The Man Who Can Win'."⁴⁹ But the evidence of the 1960's is that the quest for a winner was not as unconditional as the statement suggests. Because electability was not a consistent criterion of selection, the influence of the primaries, even where candidates have employed them, was variable. The delegates might be persuaded by primary results - as in 1960 and 1968 - but in both cases there was a reserve of support for both candidates. Though Kennedy lacked the devotion of the professionals that Nixon enjoyed, his campaign to demonstrate the electability of a Catholic was directed at leaders several of whom were themselves Catholics - Daley of Illinois, Lawrence in Pennsylvania, Brown in California, De Sapio in New York.

But the leaders were not consistently responsive to the primaries. Leadership control could be disrupted and the nomination controlled by purists who preferred to be right and lose (as in 1964) or the leaders, displaying the professional style, preferred to preserve their own positions, a course taken by the Democrats in 1968 and 1952 and the Republicans in 1912. Because the influence of the pre-reform primaries was qualified by the receptivity of leaders and delegates to them, victories in them were neither a necessary nor sufficient pre-condition to winning the nomination.

The consequence of the post-reform extension of the primary system was to transform campaign strategy. Primaries became a necessary component of every campaign. Primaries became more numerous and the linkage between their results and the preferences of the delegates derived from them tightened. These changes enabled the primaries to be employed to garner directly large numbers of delegates. Prior to reform the primaries had not presented such a possibility. They were few in number, in some states the relevant laws precluded pledged delegates and in others the primaries were co-opted by favourite sons and party organisation deterring involvement by major candidates (Table 6.2 documents the contrast in pledging provisions in primary laws in 1960 and 1976. In the latter year figures for both parties are presented because in some cases binding provisions derive from party laws which creates divergences between the two).

TABLE 6.2

PLEDGING PROVISIONS IN PRIMARY LAWS 1960 AND 1976

Status of Delegates	Party and Year					
	Democrats 1960		Democrats 1976		Republicans 1976	
	No. of Primaries	% Delegates	No. of Primaries	% Delegates	No. of Primaries	% Delegates
Bound by preference poll	7	31.4	19	57.5	18	54.1
Bound by own preference	5	28.2	9	41.0	7	27.4
No binding provision	6	40.4	1	1.5	3	18.5
Total	18	100	29*	100	28*	100

* Excludes Vermont and Montana (Republicans only) where delegates chosen in caucuses unrelated to the results of the presidential preference poll.

Accompanying the increase in primaries there has been a change in the function they perform. Entering primaries is the principal means of acquiring delegates directly. A candidate who avoided the primaries would surrender access to a large majority of the delegates to those candidates who participated in them.

In 1972, in contrast to 1968, the Humphrey campaign recognised that primaries were unavoidable. Furthermore, employing primaries for a demonstration effect was no longer a plausible avenue to the nomination as the campaign's manager appreciated -

"in 1972 more delegates than ever before were going to be selected by the primary process ... more than enough to nominate. The name of this whole game was to get delegates to get nominated, so you had to get into the primary process. The idea that you could sit back until California and all of a sudden make a big show was absolutely ridiculous. You'd flunk third-grade mathematics if you took that position."⁵⁰

Primaries gained in significance after reform because they became the major source of delegates. The rationale for entering primaries after 1968 was to win committed delegates. In the words of Jody Powell speaking on behalf of the 1976 Carter campaign, "we looked at this process [the primaries] as delegate accumulation."⁵¹ Formerly the possibility of winning delegates had been a minor consideration in the decision to enter primaries. Theodore White, in his appraisal of the 1960 primaries, described the delegates selected in them as the least of the candidates' considerations.⁵² Similarly James Rowe's counsel to Humphrey for that year observed that "while helpful in a minor sense, the number of delegates to be gathered in such primaries is not too important and really irrelevant to the problem."⁵³

Once primaries became a means of accumulating a large proportion of a convention majority, they had to be entered in large numbers. Before reform a handful of primaries were sufficient to the task of

demonstrating electability.

A measure of the increasing use of primaries is provided in Table 6.3 which reveals the multiplication in the number of contested preference primaries since 1968. A contested primary is defined as one in which:

1. At least one major candidate appeared on the ballot.
2. At least two major candidates received over 10 per cent of the vote.

The utility of this definition is that it excludes those primaries where no candidates chose to appear on the ballot but miniscule numbers of write-in votes were recorded. Such primaries rarely attracted attention and it seems a distortion to regard them as contested simply because some votes for major candidates were cast although one study has so defined them.⁵⁴ The efficacy of the above definition is evidenced by the fact that it produces results in close conformity with rule-of-thumb evaluations of what constituted contested primaries at the time, e.g. West Virginia and Wisconsin in 1960. The 10 per cent threshold is usually sufficiently high to filter out unorganised write-ins (for the objective of the analysis is to show the use of primaries by candidates); and sufficiently low to embrace at least the top two candidates in the post-reform primaries where there are numerous candidates and low pluralities.

As devices registering votes for presidential candidates the preference polls could be employed to produce a demonstration effect. Whilst the successful production of such an effect was not necessarily dependent upon the primary being contested this was normally the case. There are examples of uncontested primaries (by the above definition) proving influential - Governor Lawrence referred to Kennedy's showing in the entirely write-in Pennsylvania poll - but such instances were probably few. To be most effective the primaries had to be contested and prior to reform such primaries were a minority.

TABLE 6.3

CONTESTED PREFERENCE PRIMARIES, 1960-1980

Year	Pre-Reform		Year	Post-Reform		
	No. Preference Primaries	No. Contested		% Contested	No. Contested	% Contested
1960 (D)	15	2	1972 (D)	21	17	81.0
1964 (R)	15	4	1976 (D)	27	26	96.3
1968 (D)	15	10	1976 (R)	27	24	88.9
1968 (R)	15	4	1980 (D)	35	33	94.3
			1980 (R)	34	28	82.4
1960-1968	60	20	1972-1980	144	128	88.9

The post-reform section of Table 4.3 evidences the increasing use of primaries but not their changing function. Not all preference primaries allow the election of delegates pledged to candidates. But after reform virtually all major candidates entered a large proportion of those primaries which allowed the election of mandated delegates in contrast to their modest use before 1968 (see Table 6.4).

Until 1972 the value of primaries to candidates resided in the information they supplied to party leaders rather than in the delegates derived from them. In consequence, the preference polls were of preponderant importance for it was that component of the primary that evidenced vote-getting ability.

Some of the most notable pre-reform primary contests took place in states where the relevant laws prohibited pledged delegates. In West Virginia in 1960 all delegates were necessarily elected uncommitted. At the convention the delegates divided their votes between several candidates as the Kennedy campaign had anticipated when they first considered entering the state.⁵⁵ West Virginia proved to be the decisive primary of 1960 because it influenced leaders in other states. Its own delegates were only a miniscule contribution to Kennedy's convention majority.

Until 1968 Nebraska's primary law was similar to West Virginia's in proscribing mandated delegates yet several candidates found it an attractive state to contest. Both Goldwater and Kennedy campaigned there. It was in Nebraska that a substantial Nixon write-in effort was mounted in 1964 designed to remind Republican leaders that he retained his popularity amongst the party's voters should the convention produce a deadlock between the active contenders.⁵⁶

After reform winning substantial numbers of committed delegates became a major objective of primary strategy. This required devoting

attention to the election of pledged delegates in large numbers of primaries (see Table 6.5). The effect of this change was to guarantee the importance of primaries where formerly it had been conditional upon the attitudes of the leaders to them.

Carter was credited with a run-everywhere strategy in 1976 but his campaign was not markedly different from that of other candidates in its commitment to the primaries. Udall, Jackson and Wallace all made substantial efforts for delegates and their names appeared on more than twenty of thirty primary ballots. None of the early starting campaigns appears to have operated on the assumption that there would be a dead-locked convention which would thereby diminish the need to accumulate delegates in the primaries in order to win the nomination.⁵⁷ Neither the number of primaries entered nor the number of delegates sought suggests - contrary to one writer - that all Democratic candidates except Carter and Wallace used the 1976 primaries to produce a demonstration effect.⁵⁸

The number of primaries in which candidates appear is inflated by the increased use of Oregon-style ballots where entry is compulsory for those recognised as aspirants for the nomination.⁵⁹ However, the spread of this provision does not in itself account for the surge in primary entries since reform. Primaries in which entry was voluntary were also used extensively. Of the fifteen such primaries in 1976, Carter was entered in fourteen, Jackson in twelve, Wallace in eleven and Udall in ten. Compared with the modest use of the predominantly voluntary pre-reform primaries these figures represent a substantial increase in primary activity.

When the winning of committed convention delegates became a major objective of primary participation those states prohibiting the election of mandated delegates were relegated to an inferior status in the

TABLE 6.4

PLEDGED DELEGATE PRIMARIES ENTERED BY SELECTED MAJOR CANDIDATES, 1960-1980

Candidate	Pre-Reform			Candidate	Post-Reform		
	Total Pledged Delegate Primaries	No. Entered	% Entered		Total Pledged Delegate Primaries	No. Entered	% Entered
J. Kennedy '60	12	6*	50.0	McGovern '72	20	17	85.0
Humphrey '60	12	5	41.7	Humphrey '72	20	14	70.0
Goldwater '64	12	6	50.0	Carter '76	28	28	100.0
Rockefeller '64	12	3	25.0	Udall '76	28	25	89.3
McCarthy '68	12	11	91.7	Ford '76	25	24	96.0
Nixon '68	12	7	63.6	Reagan '76	25	23	92.0
				Carter '80	31	31	100.0
				E. Kennedy '80	31	31	100.0
				Reagan '80	31	29	93.5
				Bush '80	31	31	100.0

* Includes Ohio where favourite son ran pledged to Kennedy.

TABLE 6.5

PLEGGED DELEGATES SOUGHT IN PRIMARIES BY SELECTED MAJOR CANDIDATES, 1960-1980

Candidate	Pre-Reform			Post-Reform			
	No. Delegates Sought	% all Pledged Primary Delegates	% all Delegates	Candidate	No. Delegates Sought	% all Pledged Primary Delegates	% all Delegates
J. Kennedy '60	212*	53.9	13.9	McGovern '72	1390	86.9	46.2
Humphrey '60	93	23.7	6.1	Humphrey '72	1217	76.1	40.4
Goldwater '64	272	71.6	20.8	Carter '76	2157	96.9	71.6
Rockefeller '64	132	34.7	10.1	Udall '76	1712	78.0	56.9
McCarthy '68	638	84.2	29.4	Ford '76	1267	95.0	56.1
Nixon '68	121	32.4	9.1	Reagan '76	1223	91.7	54.1
				Carter '80	2332	100.0	70.4
				E. Kennedy '80	2332	100.0	70.4
				Reagan '80	1174	97.7	58.9
				Bush '80	1202	100.0	60.3

* Includes Ohio where favourite son ran pledged to Kennedy.

candidates' priorities. Where a primary produced only uncommitted delegates the incentives to enter it diminished after reform. West Virginia, the decisive Democratic primary of 1960, attracted only Wallace among the major candidates in 1976. On the Republican side Ford never entered the state to campaign and Reagan appeared there only briefly.⁶⁰ Vermont, which held a preference primary but selected delegates in caucuses unrelated to it, was "largely overlooked" by Democratic candidates according to Witcover's chronicle of the campaign.⁶¹ For the Republicans, only Ford's name was entered.

Both West Virginia and Vermont are small states but the lack of attention paid to them in 1976 is not explicable by their size. Under state party rules both New York and Pennsylvania Republicans were elected uncommitted. The Reagan campaign made no effort in either, his campaign manager believing that delegates could be won by negotiation after their election -

"It was our feeling that if we handled ourselves adroitly, we'd probably come out with as many delegates just by bargaining."⁶²

As the delegates were elected without pledges there was little to be gained and much money to be lost by campaigning in such primaries. Referring specifically to New York, the campaign's manager observed that -

"As long as nobody was committed on that slate and we could talk to local leaders, as we did later on, we did not feel that our chances would be hurt in the end."⁶³

Where primaries provided for both preference polls and delegate election the new priority of delegate accumulation was reflected in some candidates ignoring the popularity contest entirely. In this way a candidate could enhance his delegate total without subjecting himself to the risks of an embarrassing showing in the preference poll which, in media interpretations, was customarily regarded as the result.

The adoption of delegate election by districts facilitated localised campaigns within states to win delegates. Such efforts were of little value as a demonstration effect but they were a means of acquiring convention votes where the candidate was low in statewide popularity or his finances were in short supply. By concentrating their campaign on particular districts in 1972 the McGovern campaign emerged with delegate support from Illinois and Pennsylvania, two states where the candidate was unlikely to win a popularity contest (in Pennsylvania, where the preference poll was entered, McGovern ran third behind Humphrey and Wallace).

The consequence of extensive campaigns to win delegates in primaries was an increase in pre-convention commitments. A measure of the increased use of primaries to produce committed delegates is provided in Table 6.6. Prior to reform, primaries which permitted but did not necessitate committed delegates were frequently won by favourite sons or uncommitted slates. After reform they were dominated by major candidates. Such primaries became too valuable to candidates to be ignored in the later period.

The Logic of Primary Inactivity

Before reform primaries were only influential on the nominating outcome under particular conditions. Their influence was dependent upon them being used by a major candidate, producing unequivocal results and the party leaders being receptive to the information they conveyed. Those candidates who entered the primaries gambled that the second and third conditions would be fulfilled. Usually they entered primaries out of necessity either because they lacked support within the party organisations or because doubts existed as to their vote-getting

ability. For candidates more favourably placed with the party hierarchy and suffering no obvious impediments to their electability, primaries were inessential and avoidable.

As a result of the two different strategic responses to primaries, their legitimacy and utility became a subject of campaign debate between the candidates. Those candidates active in primaries engaged in propaganda exercises to promote them as determinative influences on the nominating decision. John Kennedy cited history in support of his argument that primary results were effective tests of electability, noting that no president had been elected in fifty years without entering and winning a contested primary.⁶⁴

The active candidates stressed the integrity of primaries, as instruments of open, democratic politics. In 1968, Nixon declared that he was testing his candidacy "in the fire of the primaries and not just in the smoke-filled rooms of Miami Beach [convention site]."⁶⁵ Similarly John Kennedy assailed the covert scheming of his opponents who hoped to gain the nomination "through manipulation of the convention."⁶⁶

To extend the influence of the primaries, the candidates active in them sought to interpret the results so as to constitute a rejection of the non-participants. Thus Robert Kennedy combined his own primary votes with McCarthy's arguing that they amounted to a repudiation of the administration's Vietnam policy and of Humphrey, one of its principal defenders.⁶⁷

The candidates who eschewed the primaries rationalised their inactivity either in terms of their unavailability to participate in them or the defects of the primary system. Symington, frequently the brunt of John Kennedy's goadings to enter the primaries, declined to do so arguing that they were held in only a few states and that only

TABLE 6.6

COMMITMENTS OF DELEGATES ELECTED IN NON-BINDING PRIMARIES PERMITTING PLEDGES, 1960-1980

Commitment	1960(D)	1964(R)	1968(D)	1968(R)	1972(D)	1976(D)	1976(R)	1980(D)	1980(R)
Major Candidate	40.8%*	45.6%*	23.6%	19.4%	77.6%	77.6%*	95.8%*	99.5%	89.7%
Minor Candidate	37.0	32.2	69.2	59.4	0	18.2	0	0.5	0
Uncommitted	<u>22.3</u>	<u>22.2</u>	<u>7.3</u>	<u>21.2</u>	<u>22.4</u>	<u>4.2</u>	<u>4.2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>10.3</u>
Total	100.1	100.0	100.1	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	184	180	331	165	621	522	311	214	232

* Includes states officially unpledged or headed by favourite sons but publicly committed to major candidates.

in a minority were delegates bound by the results.⁶⁸ He also asserted that they were not a reflection of delegate sentiment (the implication being that delegates, not voters, decide nominations). Humphrey employed a similar argument eight years later maintaining that,

"The nomination will be decided by convention delegates, and better than three fourths [sic] of these delegates are selected in non-primary states."⁶⁹

The alternative to decrying the value of primaries was to plead other commitments precluding involvement in them. In 1960 Johnson stressed that his responsibilities as Senate Majority Leader precluded an active campaign and faulted Kennedy's frequent absences while he had to "tend the store."⁷⁰ Humphrey contrived to argue both that primaries had little influence on the nominating decision and that he would have liked to have participated in them had this been possible. He claimed that President Johnson's withdrawal came too late to allow him to file in the primaries.⁷¹ Had Humphrey declared immediately after Johnson's announcement he could have filed in three primaries.⁷² By delaying his declaration of candidacy for a month the possibility of entering primaries passed.

The feasibility of avoiding the primaries derived from both their number and their utilisation by candidates who were active in them. First, only a minority of delegates were provided by primaries allowing a convention majority to be compiled without them. Secondly, because the active candidates required a few states to produce a demonstration effect many primaries produced delegates who were either uncommitted or pledged to favourite sons. In this respect many primary delegates were comparable to those from the convention states: contests over their selection were few and campaigns to win their support were conducted after they were chosen.⁷³ As a consequence of the underemployment of primaries, the differences in campaigning for delegates between them and

the non-primary states were diminished.

Primary delegations elected uncommitted or pledged to favourite sons constituted a substantial bloc of votes because they usually included some of the largest states. Eight of the ten largest states employed primaries to form at least part of their delegations but it was unusual for them to produce delegates pledged to major candidates. New York, Pennsylvania and Illinois delegates were necessarily elected uncommitted; Ohio, New Jersey, Florida and California delegates were often pledged to favourite sons; and, in Massachusetts, until a change in the primary law effective in 1968, delegations were usually chosen unpledged. In none of the contested nominations between 1960 and 1968 were a majority of more than two of these eight delegations committed to support a major candidate.

Excepting California and Florida, the large primary delegations derived from states with a history of strong party organisation. This, in turn, normally produced hierarchically controlled delegations. Thus a mechanism designed to promote popular participation in the nominating process remained, through legal provision and the strategic choices of candidates, consistent with organisation control.

For any major candidate the large state primary delegations were a necessary element in a prospective convention majority. Yet the delegates were won not by participating in their primaries but by negotiation after their election. By this means primary delegates could be won without entering primaries. Either party leaders were cultivated or individual delegates were canvassed where leaders were absent or unsympathetic.

After 1972 primaries became central to every candidate's strategy for the nomination. All candidates recognised the necessity of entering the primaries and it was there that the nomination was decided. In 1972

Gary Hart, McGovern's campaign manager, perceived that -

"The battle would go through all the primaries, and two men would emerge; and there would be a battle, not only for the California primary and not only for the nomination but for the Democratic Party."⁷⁴

Writing in 1972 Hamilton Jordan made an equally prophetic forecast in his outline of a Carter strategy for the 1976 nomination in his assumption that it was probable that "once again the Democratic nominee would be selected in state primaries ..."⁷⁵

The problem facing candidates entering the post-reform primaries was not the need to entice others into contests but to pre-empt candidacies before the primaries began. Prior to both 1972 and 1976 a process of "clearing out the left" occurred amongst the Democratic liberals as candidates sought to monopolise the votes and campaign personnel of the party's activist wing to improve their vote-winning capabilities.⁷⁶

The increase in primary delegates and the strengthened tie between voter and delegate preferences stimulated more candidates to enter more primaries. These changes combined to diminish the proportion of delegates elected either uncommitted or pledged to favourite sons. Hence the proportion of elected delegates accessible to a candidate not participating in the primaries dwindled (see Table 6.7). After 1968 the non-primary delegates combined with those primary delegates not committed to major candidates provided insufficient votes for a convention majority.

After reform it ceased to be possible for a candidate not entering the primaries to win large numbers of primary state delegates by corralling the uncommitted and those released by favourite sons. In 1968 the numbers of Democratic primary delegates without commitments at the convention were inflated by those released from their pledges to Robert Kennedy upon his death. In consequence, Humphrey, without entering primaries, was able to win more than half the total delegate votes of the primary states.⁷⁷ Other candidates who avoided the primaries

TABLE 6.7

COMMITMENT OF DELEGATES ELECTED IN PRIMARIES, 1960-1980

Year	Commitment			
	1. Major Candidate	2. Minor Candidate	3. Uncommitted	4. Not committed to Major Candidate (cols 2&3)
1960(D)	30.5%	16.7%	52.8%	69.5%
1964(R)	36.6	14.8	48.6	63.4
1968(D)	46.9	21.3	31.8	53.1
1968(R)	43.2	17.6	39.2	56.8
1960-68	40.3	18.2	41.5	59.7
1972(D)	74.8	2.4	22.9	25.3
1976(D)	81.3	5.6	13.1	18.7
1976(R)	80.7	0	19.3	19.3
1980(D)	99.5	0	0.5	0.5
1980(R)	95.9	0	4.1	4.1
1972-80	86.0	1.8	12.2	14.0

such as Scranton and Rockefeller (in 1968), though less successful than Humphrey, were also able to win substantial numbers of primary delegates' votes at the convention.

After reform the attractiveness of primaries to candidates virtually eradicated primary states' convention votes from being cast for non-participant candidates. Before reform over forty per cent of all votes from primary states were cast for candidates not entering the primaries. For example, as indicated earlier, two-fifths of the West Virginia Democratic delegation in 1960 voted for Symington, Johnson or Stevenson. In the four contested convention nomination ballots since reform seven-

teen votes out of a total of over eight thousand from primary states were recorded for candidates who did not enter primaries.

The centrality of the post-reform primaries to nominating outcomes is reflected by the participation in them of even a candidate dependent upon a convention deadlock for success. Traditionally the compromise choice strategy precluded active participation in primaries to avoid alienating those candidates who were active. By this means the candidate hoped to inherit the support of active candidates when their attempts at the nomination failed. The compromise choice candidates either eschewed primaries or relied upon write-in campaigns ostensibly conducted without their authorisation.

Since reform entering primaries has been indicative of a candidate's availability for the nomination. Brown's candidacy in 1976 was premised on the assumption that he was a plausible compromise choice because, in the words of his campaign manager, "if you're there and you have a rising popularity and you have done well in some primaries, then you are as likely to be chosen as anybody else."⁷⁸ To establish himself as a credible alternative to Carter, Brown had to defeat him in some primaries. If he succeeded he hoped to acquire sufficient delegates amongst the uncommitted delegates or those pledged to candidates who had subsequently withdrawn to preclude a Carter victory. In Maryland, Brown's first contest, only the preference poll was entered indicating the reliance on a demonstration effect to achieve the campaign's initial objective of "changing the chemistry of the race."⁷⁹

The reasons for the failure of Brown's campaign provided by Jonathan Moore are instructive evidence of the limits of a late-starting demonstration effect strategy in post-reform primaries -

"Carter's losses in the late primaries were too little and too late to hurt him, given his strong southern support and the fact that even where he lost he was accumulating more

delegates due to proportional representation. In addition, the 'winners' in this phase, Church and Brown, had started too late to accumulate real delegate strength of their own and couldn't force a brokering situation via delegates denied Carter - sufficient Jackson, Udall, Wallace and Humphrey support had not materialised, some 'favourite sons' didn't run, and not enough uncommitted delegates held firm to block Carter."⁸⁰

Carter possessed a solid base of delegate support by the time Brown entered and that base continued to grow despite defeats. By the end of the primaries Carter's accumulation of delegates compared with his opponents made him a plausible first ballot nominee.

The most-discussed compromise choice of 1976 was Humphrey. After Carter's elimination of all his early opponents speculation centred on Humphrey's intentions regarding a challenge to Carter in the New Jersey primary.⁸¹ When Humphrey clarified his position he did not state that he was unavailable for the nomination but specified he would not campaign or enter in New Jersey. In subsequent interpretations the distinction between eliminating himself from consideration and not running in New Jersey was lost -

"he clearly was not taking himself out of the running completely, simply reiterating he would not campaign. He remained available and ready if asked. Many of the headlines, however, said Humphrey was out ..."⁸²

Amidst a system dominated by primaries declining to enter them was to be invalidated as a candidate.

The Effect of Primary Defeats

Where candidates sought a demonstration effect from primaries it was usually regarded as essential to win in every state entered. Though there were examples of an impressive second-place showing proving beneficial to a candidate such instances were rare.⁸³ Where the principal objective in entering the primaries was to prove potential to win the

election, the effect of defeats were normally adverse if not disastrous to a candidate's chances of the nomination.

Success in primaries might be of value to a candidate but the consequences of defeat were more consistently damaging. In consequence, primaries gained the reputation for eliminating rather than assisting candidates. According to Adlai Stevenson, the primaries provided "a very questionable method of selecting Presidential candidates and actually it never does. All it does is destroy some candidates."⁸⁴

For most of the candidates employing primaries between 1960 and 1968 their self-defined task was to win all that they entered. John Kennedy believed that he could not survive a defeat, "It has to come up seven every time" he observed on the night of the Wisconsin primary.⁸⁵ After his victory in the state proved less than conclusive he re-emphasised that every subsequent primary had to be won,

"We have to go through every one and win every one of them - West Virginia and Maryland and Indiana and Oregon, all the way to the Convention."⁸⁶

Humphrey's refusal to withdraw despite his defeat produced a furious reaction in the Kennedy campaign where he was viewed as a spoiler who refused to play by the rules.⁸⁷

Nixon, in 1968, defined his loser image as his principal barrier to the nomination. His emphasis on his own handicap focused attention on the primaries, "more than the others, I have to win every primary", he asserted.⁸⁸ After his opponents had failed to expose his weaknesses as a vote-getter in the primaries Nixon felt he was assured of the nomination the day he won in Oregon.⁸⁹

Robert Kennedy's late entry in 1968 precluded his participation in the early primaries compelling him to accentuate the significance of those that were available to him, "If I get beaten in a primary I'm not a viable candidate."⁹⁰ After his defeat in Oregon he did not withdraw

but admitted that "I'm not the same candidate I was before ... and I can't claim that I am."⁹¹

Though other candidates were less explicit about the necessity of winning every primary most observers interpreted a single defeat as fatally damaging to their prospects of the nomination. Humphrey's defeat in Wisconsin, a state adjacent to his own, indicated that "he could not deliver his base; therefore he had been eliminated."⁹² After Lodge's write-in victory in New Hampshire in 1964, James Reston dismissed both of the defeated candidates, Goldwater and Rockefeller, as prospects for the nomination.⁹³ Having failed to detect Goldwater's strength in the convention states, one of the persistent themes of journalists in 1964 was that the poor showings of the active candidates in primaries enhanced the prospects of the inactive Scranton and Nixon. Goldwater himself initially subscribed to the view that a defeat was a decisive blow and considered withdrawing after New Hampshire until assured by his advisers that the delegate-gathering operation in non-primary states was proceeding effectively.⁹⁴ Apart from Goldwater, only McCarthy lost two primaries and refused to withdraw. As in so many matters in 1968, McCarthy simply refused to conform to the rules of the conventional wisdom. As Witcover wrote of him, "That was Gene McCarthy; he didn't know when he was licked, or wouldn't admit it."⁹⁵

The evidence of the post-reform nominations is that defeats are not necessarily the decisive setbacks to candidacies that they once were. Before reform Polsby and Wildavsky maintained that "a man would be a fool to enter a primary unless the information at his disposal led him to believe that he was reasonably certain to win."⁹⁶ In contrast, it is evident from the post-reform nominations that candidates entered primaries that they were unlikely to win nor was winning their principal objective. In post-reform primaries less than victory could be sufficient

for two purposes: to gain recognition from the media, and to win delegates.

The early multi-candidate Democratic primaries of 1972 and 1976 produced no single winner but they did clarify the alternatives. In these early events media observers interpreted the fractionised voting to differentiate serious contenders from obvious losers. Where there are both many primaries available and many candidates it is unlikely that any one contender will win every primary or avoid defeat. It is thus likely that all candidates will lose primaries, particularly the lesser known candidates, without a loss necessarily proving decisive. Where the voting is fragmented between numerous candidates the conclusive impact of the early primaries is less whether they are won or lost but how the results are perceived.

The candidates' objective in the early primaries was to be seen to have won which was not equivalent to winning a plurality. To be classed as a winner was to be regarded as a serious contender whilst losers were removed from consideration. Candidates were measured not by 'straight' criteria of winning or losing but against pre-primary expectations of their strength based on factors such as poll standings, a candidate's support from key figures or groups, the state's political complexion, its location in regard to the home states of the candidates and the investment of resources made by the candidates in preparation for the primary.⁹⁷ For the candidates, "winning" was to exceed expectations.

McGovern's purpose in running in New Hampshire in 1972 was not to win the primary but to "wound" Muskie to tarnish his image of invincibility.⁹⁸ Four years later the Carter campaign sought a "strong surprise" in the same state, defined as at least a second place finish.⁹⁹ For Harris in New Hampshire in 1976 the objective was even more modest -

"The candidate does not have to run No. 1 ... because the conventional wisdom of the national press and political

officials and observers will be that he will not make a showing there ... twenty-five per cent in New Hampshire will probably be enough in 1976. Running in the top three will probably do it."¹⁰⁰

For the little known candidates such as McGovern, Carter and Harris expectations were low and success entailed exceeding the anticipated showing. For nationally known candidates the expectations were set higher. Unlike the lesser candidates who were able to build strength as the primaries progressed, the established figures were expected to demonstrate strength from the outset. "Strength" might be proven simply by winning or, where circumstances were thought to be particularly favourable, by winning decisively.

In 1976 Jackson did not enter the New Hampshire primary as a way of avoiding losing an early primary that would have been fatal to his candidacy. His campaign manager reasoned that -

"Henry Jackson was not a new quantity in American politics and he had a very strong image of being a loser - a guy you couldn't take seriously ... Probably the worst thing Henry Jackson could have done was to start off with a loss somewhere. There were two ways not to lose New Hampshire: one was to win it and the other was not to go in. The one sure way was not to go, so we didn't."¹⁰¹

In 1972 Muskie's performance in New Hampshire was evaluated against his status as both the front-runner for the nomination and the senator from the neighbouring state. Amongst reporters a consensus formed that Muskie should win the primary with a majority of the vote.¹⁰²

Whilst Muskie did not endorse this assessment he recognised its origin,

"New Hampshire is important to me, in part, because you gentlemen of the press have undertaken to make it important ... in order to test me."¹⁰³

When Muskie obtained nine per cent more of the vote than the second-placed McGovern but less than a majority his performance was interpreted as a setback to his prospects. Judged as the front runner from a nearby state, Muskie "left the primary suffering the ill-effects of what, in any other context, could be called a clear victory."¹⁰⁴

In 1976 Reagan sought to interpret his narrow defeat by Ford in New Hampshire as a victory comparable to McGovern's four years earlier.¹⁰⁵ But Reagan, despite Ford's incumbency, has been viewed as the favourite to win.¹⁰⁶ His defeat thus contradicted expectations to Reagan's detriment for, as his campaign manager recognised, "The perception was that we were going to win, and we lost."¹⁰⁷ The surprise the result caused reporters was captured by one who told a Reagan aide, "You have just committed an unpardonable sin. You have just managed to prove us all wrong."¹⁰⁸

The evaluation of candidates' primary performances as distinct from a "straight" reading of the results was probably a feature of nominating politics since the inception of primaries. But the significance of such interpretations grew in the post-reform period. The multiplication of primaries and candidates entering them increased the number of performances that were subject to evaluation. As the nominating process lengthened and primaries proliferated, events were interpreted in terms of their effect upon subsequent events. If Muskie's victory was less than overwhelmingly in New Hampshire he was likely to be vulnerable away from his home area. If McGovern could run well in Muskie territory his prospects elsewhere were probably more promising. If Jackson began with a defeat it would reinforce his image as a loser. The increase in the number of primaries reduced the periods between them. As a result of the greater clustering of the post-reform primaries, the potential for one result to influence another was enhanced. This possibility was further increased by the constraints on the candidates' time (resulting from multiple primaries) and money (through campaign finance controls) which reduced the campaigning possible in a particular state. In consequence, the major sources of information available to voters derived from the reporting of events in earlier primaries rather

than the candidate's campaign activities in their own state. The influence of previous events not only conditioned voting intentions but also influenced the flow of resources necessary for campaigns to be effective - publicity, money and volunteers.

The post-reform shift in the functions of primaries from electoral trial heats to major supplier of delegates increased the ability of campaigns to withstand the effects of a defeat on the candidate's prospects for the nomination. Prior to reform, one test of a candidate's popularity was whether he could defeat the opposition in a primary. Whilst a plurality victory was not a sufficient condition for persuading party leaders it was usually a necessary one. Thus it was possible for a candidate to fail to benefit from a primary win (as for John Kennedy in Wisconsin); it was unusual for a loser to be cast as a winner (as Humphrey mistakenly thought he was). Losing a primary was often evidence of a candidate's deficiencies as a vote-getter.

When the rationale for entering primaries became to acquire delegates a defeat was not necessarily destructive of a candidacy (see Table 6.8). This was particularly the case in the second phase of primaries after the early results eliminated many candidates. In the latter primaries the task was to win a large bloc of delegates to build towards the total required for a convention majority. To win delegates in large numbers required entering numerous primaries although campaign finances and the candidate's time were too limited to allow an extensive effort aimed at winning a plurality. However, the provisions for proportional representation effective in many states enabled delegates to be won without pluralities in preference polls.

Carter's run-everywhere strategy in 1976 gained him pledged delegates in every primary state permitting mandates. Following the entry of Church and Brown, Carter was able to continue winning delegates

despite suffering several defeats. Of the final fifteen pledged delegate primaries, Carter headed the preference polls in only six but acquired over 450 delegates, near to one-third of the total necessary to nominate. As Hamilton Jordan perceived, the continued accumulation of delegates offset the risks to Carter's nomination posed by a series of defeats, "It worried me a little bit and scared me a little bit, but when you go back to the numbers it was there."¹⁰⁹

In 1972 six of McGovern's nine primary wins occurred in the last six contests. In the preceding fifteen primaries he headed the preference polls on only three occasions. His victory in winner-take-all California and a sweep of New York virtually unopposed, added to the delegates won in other states, enabled McGovern to emerge from the primaries with more than double the delegate total of any other candidate and as the clear front runner for the nomination. Yet earlier in the primaries, McGovern ran sixth in Florida, second in Ohio and New Hampshire, third in Maryland and Pennsylvania. Such results exposed the invalidity of Brams's post-1976 observation that -

"No candidate who has been defeated in the primaries, however, has gone on to capture his party nomination in the convention."¹¹⁰

Goldwater's nomination in 1964 indicates that primary defeats were not necessarily eliminators before reform. Since reform candidates survived numerous defeats to win the nomination. Both Carter and Ford lost more primaries than John Kennedy or Nixon engaged in. The effects of defeat since reform have been conditioned by where they appear in the sequence and how they are perceived. An early defeat interpreted as such may be a decisive setback. Later in the sequence a defeat has to be evaluated against the distribution of delegate strength between the candidates. A candidate like Carter, ahead in delegates was cushioned against the impact of defeats because his delegate total

continued to grow towards a convention majority. In the absence of any other candidate with near comparable delegate strength, Carter was the only one capable of obtaining a first ballot majority.

TABLE 6.8
PERFORMANCE OF NOMINEES IN PRIMARIES 1960-1980

Nominee	Preference Primaries		Delegates	
	No. Entered	% won	No. won	% convention majority
Kennedy	7	100.0	181	23.8
Goldwater	8	62.5	152	23.2
Nixon	6	100.0	120	18.0
<hr/>				
1960 - 1968	21	85.7	453	21.7
<hr/>				
McGovern	15	60.0	1041.5	69.0
Carter '76	26	61.5	927	61.6
Ford	27	63.0	606	53.6
Carter '80	34	70.6	1375	82.5
Reagan	32	87.5	1183	118.5
<hr/>				
1972 - 1980	135	69.6	5132.5	75.4
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Note: Excludes Humphrey who entered no primaries in 1968.

The Contribution of Primary Victories to Improved Competitive Position

The introduction of presidential primaries increased the range of possible nominees by allowing insurgents or formerly little known candidates to establish their claims for selection.¹¹¹ Though primaries

may have enhanced the chances of such candidates, in no clear instance before reform did they enable them to win the nomination. The possible exception is Eisenhower in 1952. However, the shift in delegates toward him continued after the primaries suggesting that additional influences were also pertinent.¹¹² Furthermore, Eisenhower enjoyed substantial support from leading Republican moderates rendering him a less than pure insurgent.

Systematic analyses of the relation between primaries, opinion polls of party identifiers and presidential nominations show scant influence of the primaries in altering the competitive standing of candidates prior to reform.¹¹³ Leadership of the final pre-convention poll is highly correlated with winning the nomination. (These studies imply a causal link between poll leadership and the nomination though no evidence is adduced to substantiate it.)

Between 1936 and 1968 only one pre-convention poll leader (Kefauver in 1952) was denied the nomination. During the same period - seventeen nominations for which all the necessary data is available - the same candidate who led the last poll before the primaries, retained it throughout the sequence and into the final pre-convention poll on eleven occasions. Thus in only a minority of cases did poll leadership change during the primary period - containing many events of political import besides the primaries - indicating a modest impact upon the contest.

Two of the cases in which poll changes occurred took place in the immediate pre-reform period but in neither did primary victories assist in establishing poll leadership nor in identifying the nominee. In the 1968 Democratic contest McCarthy's strong performance in New Hampshire and the anticipation of his victory in Wisconsin probably encouraged Johnson to withdraw. But McCarthy never led the polls. After announc-

ing his candidacy Humphrey became the poll leader, a position he retained without participating in primaries. In 1964, as already noted, Goldwater's primary performances were notable for their evidence of weak vote-getting ability. Though his support increased after his California victory his poll standing was only 2 per cent higher before the convention than it had been before the primaries. That Goldwater emerged as joint poll leader (with Nixon) before the convention is more a tribute to the loyalty of his support which showed less fluctuation than that of other candidates during a year in which Republican preferences were fragmented at the outset and fissured further as the year proceeded.

Where primary victories influenced the polls it was often by reinforcing the position of the poll leader. Both John Kennedy and Nixon increased their leads in the polls over their opponents during the primaries of 1960 and 1968 respectively.¹¹⁴ For those leaders sceptical about the popularity of either candidate, polls confirmed the strength demonstrated by the primaries.

Since reform the primaries have had a more substantial impact upon the competitive situation within the parties. In the Democratic nominations of 1972 and 1976 primaries both eliminated poll leaders and were instrumental in bringing the nomination to candidates who were otherwise unlikely to win.¹¹⁵ Prior to 1972 there were no instances of primaries producing either of these effects.

In 1972 the leaders of the pre-primary polls were Muskie and Humphrey. The early primary results proved so adverse to Muskie that he ceased campaigning with two-thirds of the primaries still remaining. Humphrey won only three primaries and withdrew at the convention after the failure of the attempt to deprive McGovern of part of the California delegation. Before the primaries McGovern ranked fifth in the polls

of Democratic voters with only 6 per cent of the total.¹¹⁶ Yet McGovern won nine primaries, only one less than the total won by all four candidates who led him in the pre-primary polls. Of these four, Muskie, Lindsay and Humphrey were precluded from the nomination by adverse primary results and only Wallace's name was placed in nomination.

In 1976 Carter moved from 4 to 53 per cent in polls of Democrats between January and the convention in July. Wallace, the poll leader early in the year, was eliminated by the defeats inflicted by Carter in Florida and North Carolina. The lead Humphrey established in the final pre-primary poll survived until Carter emerged from the early primaries as the front runner. Neither Wallace nor Humphrey were placed in nomination at the convention.

Where the contest was decided in the primaries, candidates were compelled to enter them in large numbers if they were to win the nomination. The consequence of many candidates attracted into numerous primaries was to ensure many contests. Where many of the primaries were actively contested the vulnerability of the front runner was enhanced.

Formerly the primaries rarely provided contests between the leading contenders. Risk-conscious candidates either avoided the primaries entirely or eschewed direct confrontation with the front runner. In 1960, for example, Kennedy's opposition in the primaries came from Humphrey, the weakest of the five major candidates. Symington, Johnson and Stevenson declined to enter the primaries enabling them to avoid defeats but also enhancing the opportunities for Kennedy to demonstrate his effectiveness as a vote-getter unhindered. By refusing to oppose him they were unable to answer his claims to be the party's most electable candidate (Kennedy believed that Johnson might have beaten him in the West Virginia primary, and Symington in Nebraska or Indiana.¹¹⁷)

After reform the necessity of primaries to nominating strategy guaranteed that the front runner would be opposed by serious challengers. As both the primaries and the challengers increased, the possibilities for upset multiplied. The financial advantages usually enjoyed by front runners were also curtailed in 1976 by the implementation of limits on campaign spending and the provision of federal finances to assist candidates in their campaigns.

In addition to the objective dangers to front runners they were vulnerable to the interpretations placed on their performances. As described earlier, the nationally known candidates faced more rigorous standards than those applied to less well-known candidates. Whilst this may have always been so, the new nominating process enhanced the interpretive assaults that the front runner had to withstand. First, the increase in the number of primaries he had to enter multiplied the performances that risked unfavourable evaluation. Secondly, the rise in the number of candidates provided several opponents in most states. In 1972, for example, Muskie faced opposition from three or more major candidates in four of the first six primaries. In contrast, John Kennedy and Nixon faced opposition from a major candidate in two, and three primaries respectively. Thirdly, the multiplicity of candidates fractionised the vote total thereby often diminishing the proportion won by the front runner.

For the candidates with little initial support the post-reform primaries offered enhanced opportunities to become serious contenders for the nomination - a development reflected by the increase in candidates active in the primaries. The expectations surrounding their early performances were low allowing modest showings to be interpreted as successes. Candidates who showed unexpectedly effective vote-getting ability (no longer equivalent to electability) were viewed as gathering strength. McGovern provided an example of this phenomenon in 1972 -

"Just as Muskie's 'decline' was measured largely against his big initial lead, so was McGovern's upsurge measured largely against his lowly position in the early polls."¹¹⁸

Where a candidate could induce the perception that he had "momentum" which, in turn, stimulated media coverage, volunteer and financial support, he was in a position to build from his early achievements into front running status in the later primaries.

After early successes it was possible for a candidate to rise to being the leading contender for the nomination during the primaries. Because primaries were so numerous and provided the preponderant form of delegate selection virtually all candidates entered them, all the candidates were subject to the winnowing effect of the interpretations of their results. Because all the candidates were involved in the primaries they produced the front runners. Unlike the pre-reform primaries, those since 1968 "made" as well as destroyed candidates.

The 1976 Democratic primaries exemplify how quickly early successes can be converted into the front running position. After several early wins against crowded fields, Carter moved on to beat Udall in Wisconsin and Jackson in Pennsylvania. After Pennsylvania all of Carter's early opponents had been eliminated from contention and only he was in a position to win the nomination. According to Time magazine, "one third of the way through the obstacle course the race was over."¹¹⁹ From that point Carter became vulnerable to the expectations placed on leading candidates. His defeat by an eleven per cent margin in Maryland against Brown, Witcover described as "devastating."¹²⁰ His narrow victory the same day over the many-times-defeated Udall the same author described as "an embarrassment of nearly equal proportions."¹²¹ One writer referred to the result as a virtual dead heat which was "even more telling than his [Carter's] loss to Brown in Maryland."¹²² After his defeat against Church in

Oregon, Carter himself described the loss as "a psychological setback in momentum."¹²³

Carter's survival despite these setbacks was attributable to the fact that more than half the delegates had been selected depriving other candidates of plausibility as first ballot nominees. Moreover, Carter was sustained by his continued victories in some primaries and his expanding delegate support. The momentum derived from beating the front runner was also dissipated between two candidates, Brown and Church, further diminishing the prospects of either as a likely nominee.

Although the in-party post-reform nominations were not characterised by multi-candidate primaries reform did enhance the vulnerability of incumbent presidents in addition to out-party front runners. The openness of the process typified by the primaries stimulated candidates to challenge for the nomination thereby increasing the likelihood of opposition to the incumbent. Both Ford and Carter were opposed in the post-reform primaries unlike Johnson (in 1964) or Nixon as the heir apparent in 1960. Like the out-party, the possibilities for scoring an upset increased. Opposition was probable and there were more primaries in which to produce a setback to the president.

The post-reform primaries possessed the potential to influence the competitive situation in the in-party beyond delivering psychological jolts to the president. Whilst Johnson's showing in New Hampshire in 1968 was interpreted as a defeat, it posed no serious threat to his renomination. A New York Times survey subsequent to the primary estimated that Johnson could still expect to obtain more than 65 per cent of the first ballot votes at the convention.¹²⁴ In contrast, in 1976 both the Reagan and Ford campaigns believed that the setback to the President of a defeat in New Hampshire would be sufficient to deprive him of the nomination.¹²⁵ A defeat in New Hampshire, the President

believed, would be a "near-fatal blow." ¹²⁶

Prior to his withdrawal, Johnson declined to contest any primary other than those where entry was compulsory (in New Hampshire Johnson's name was not on the ballot but a write-in campaign was organised on his behalf). ¹²⁷ Though a refusal to enter the primaries entailed the loss of some delegates their numbers were insufficiently large to preclude a convention majority - as Humphrey subsequently proved.

Since reform it ceased to be possible for an incumbent president to ignore the primaries and rely on the loyalty of the party organisations to guarantee a convention majority, as Johnson had intended.

When the competition for the nomination was decided in the primaries a candidate who could defeat the President in them stood to win the nomination. Though McCarthy in 1968 may have encouraged the President to withdraw after his showing in New Hampshire he, like Kefauver in 1952, was not the eventual nominee.

In both primary and non-primary states the party organisations were largely removed from control over delegate selection (especially on the Democratic side) preventing them from acting as a "safety net" for a president losing primaries. Furthermore, the non-primary states provided less than a third of the total delegates and their accessibility precluded the president from dominating them. In 1976 Reagan proved the stronger candidate in the caucus states winning more delegates there than Ford. ¹²⁸ The nomination of Ford was largely attributable to his winning more of the primaries and more of the delegates elected in them than Reagan.

Although Ford led both the pre-primary and pre-convention polls the primaries did have a substantial impact on his standing compared against Reagan. His victories in the early primaries boosted his lead to 26 per cent in early May. ¹²⁹ However, after Reagan's subsequent recovery to

win in several states Ford's lead was reduced to 10 per cent at the conclusion of the primaries.¹³⁰ Whilst Ford retained the lead throughout, its size was susceptible to the results of the primaries. Had Ford not won more primaries than Reagan it is likely that his lead would have disappeared entirely suggesting that the primaries can alter the competitive situation substantially in both the in- and out-parties.

Formerly the impact of the primaries - such as it was - was usually thought to be restricted to the out-party.¹³¹ Davis, in his study of presidential primaries, exempted the in-party from their influence noting -

"there is a striking difference between conditions favoring nomination in the in-party and the out-party Presidential primaries, it is clear, are rarely decisive in the party controlling the White House. A first-term President ... does not need a string of triumphs in the primaries to insure his renomination. Nor does a 'crown prince' successor ... have to rely heavily on the primaries when the chief executive is required to step down."¹³²

Whilst the in-party primaries since 1968 have yet to dislodge an incumbent and provide his successor the experience of 1976 suggests they have the potential to do so.

In his assessment of the determinative influences on the twenty nominations from 1936 to 1972, Beniger concluded that "there is no greater advantage than strength in the early polls."¹³³ The evidence of the post-reform period indicates that, for the out-party at least, poll leadership can be a handicap. In both 1972 and 1976 the early leaders faded quickly, their positions eroded by primaries, and a new leader emerged from obscurity assisted by the primaries.

Primary Sequence and Strategy

Prior to reform primaries were used by some candidates to promote themselves for the nomination but the primaries had little impact as

a sequence. The pre-reform primaries consisted of isolated events which might influence the nomination. After reform the primaries assumed importance as a series in which one event was an influence (though not a determinative one) on its successors, the cumulative result being to decide the nomination.

Theodore White captured the changed form of the post-reform primary process -

"In 1972, however, primaries were to be different ... they were to unroll not as episodes, but as a continuum. Primaries tell a story. They last for months, spotted with drama and clash, and as they move across the nation and the front pages, the story teaches the nation about the candidates... Thus the nature of the Presidential contest slowly defines itself ..."¹³⁴

The increased importance and number of primaries both reduces the amount of campaigning possible in a particular state and increases the temporal proximity of primaries to each other. Thus a major influence on one primary are the results and interpretations of those preceding it. Formerly the few primaries that were contested were spread over a long period reducing their impact on each other and allowing sustained campaigns - normally unrestrained by legal controls on spending - by the candidate organisations. As Table 6.9 shows, the intervals between contested primaries halved after reform.

The proximity of the primaries increased their possible influence upon each other whilst diminishing the opportunities for campaigns to alter the perceptions of candidates formed by voters on the basis of information supplied in earlier contests. For example, prior to the 1972 New Hampshire primary a Boston Globe poll showed Muskie leading McGovern in Massachusetts by a margin of 33 per cent. A similar poll two months later showed Muskie trailing McGovern by eleven per cent.¹³⁵ Between the two polls Muskie scored an undistinguished victory in New Hampshire and ran fourth in Florida whilst McGovern won in Wisconsin in addition to running well in New Hampshire.

TABLE 6.9

INTERVALS BETWEEN CONTESTED PRIMARIES, 1960-1980

Year	No. days between first and last contested primary	No. days primaries contested	Av. interval between contests (in days)
1960(D)	33	2	33.0
1964(R)	82	4	27.3
1968(D)	82	8	11.7
1968(R)	54	4	18.0
<hr/>			
1960-1968	251	18	17.9
<hr/>			
1972	89	11	8.9
1976(D)	104	13	8.7
1976(R)	104	12	9.5
1980(D)	69	14	5.3
1980(R)	78	15	5.6
<hr/>			
1972-1980	444	65	7.4
<hr/>			

Reagan's campaign manager, John Sears, described a similar experience in 1976 -

"The week before the New Hampshire primary, our polling showed us ahead in Florida, then on the Saturday after the New Hampshire primary, the poll showed us eighteen points down, which gives you some idea of what momentum - or lack of it - can do." 136

As Sears' reference to momentum indicates, it is not simply that a previous result is reproduced in its successor but that results influence voters and the supply of resources - money, media attention and volunteers - which can alter or reinforce existing perceptions of the candidates amongst voters.

Given the potential of one event as an influence on its successors there was a great incentive for candidates to contest early primaries to gain impetus to their campaigns. After reform the primaries were replaced by various straw polls and precinct caucuses as the earliest

campaign events but New Hampshire and other early primaries continued to attract a disproportionately large degree of media attention (see Chapter Nine).

As Hamilton Jordan's planning for the Carter campaign envisaged, "a strong surprise in New Hampshire should be our goal, which would have tremendous impact on successive primaries."¹³⁷ Between New Hampshire and the eighth primary in Pennsylvania Carter received close to half of the coverage on television network news compared with less than one-fifth for Jackson, the next most publicised candidate.¹³⁸

The quest for impetus from early contests led candidates to devote exaggerated amounts of attention to the states early in the sequence. In 1972 McGovern spent more than three-quarters of the first three months of the year campaigning in New Hampshire, Florida, Illinois and Wisconsin - the four earliest primaries.¹³⁹ In both 1972 and 1976 five of the major Democratic candidates expended more money per voter in their first primary state than in any other.¹⁴⁰

The concentration of campaign resources in the early states invested them with overriding influence on the candidates' long-term prospects. The absorption of large quantities of time, money and effort increased the urgency of obtaining a return on the early investments. As Hart's planning for the McGovern campaign acknowledged, "without respectable showings or victories in early primaries, such as New Hampshire and Wisconsin, there could be no campaigns in California and New York."¹⁴¹

Under the spending limitations in force in 1976 the dependence on early success to gain impetus was probably greater than four years earlier because primaries were more numerous and financial resources to develop campaign organisations in later states so circumscribed. The reliance on early momentum to compensate for lack of organisation

subsequently is encapsulated in the observation of Carter's national finance director that -

"We had no structure after Florida. After Florida it was all NBC, CBS, and the New York Times." 142

The importance of generating momentum gave the early primaries a pivotal place in the candidates' overall campaign strategies. McGovern's entry in New Hampshire derived from the objective of co-opting the left. By performing well in the first primary against Muskie, McGovern hoped to monopolise the support of the liberal-left of the Democratic Party. A similar contest took place amongst the Democratic liberals in 1976. Bayh sought to survive until New York where he was stronger than the other liberals.¹⁴³ Udall's campaign, in response, was aimed at eliminating Bayh from contention before then, "Bayh is gambling on our inability to capture the viable left-center position in the race before New York, where he could convincingly take it for himself ... [we must] prevent Bayh from surviving until New York." 144

Having won in New Hampshire, the Carter campaign sought to capitalise on their victory by intensifying their efforts in Massachusetts, the next primary, believing it possible to eliminate all major opposition in the first two primaries. By winning in Massachusetts the other candidates would be deprived of early momentum. According to Patrick Caddell, the campaign's pollster -

"The fear in Massachusetts was, 'Who could you allow to win by not going in there?' ... So Massachusetts became by definition whether you could take it to keep anybody else from getting it." 145

Owing to the emphasis placed upon gaining early momentum those candidates who failed to generate it dropped out rapidly. Though the number of candidates in primaries increased after reform few survived the entire sequence. In 1972 Muskie, Lindsay and Jackson had either

withdrawn or suspended their campaigns after the first six primaries. Four years later the attrition on the Democratic side was even greater. After the Pennsylvania primary, the eighth of the year, only Udall and Carter remained active candidates from amongst seven starters. Bayh, Shriver, Harris, Jackson and Wallace had by that time been eliminated from contention. In the 1980 Republican contest, the winnowing effects of the primaries reduced the active contenders to Reagan alone. In the later primary states he faced no active opposition.

The early primaries did not necessarily determine who the nominee would be but in multi-candidate out-party contests they decided who would be excluded from consideration. In consequence, voters in the early states possessed a greater range of alternatives to choose amongst than those in later states. In Massachusetts in 1976 there were seven active Democratic major candidates. In none of the post-Pennsylvania primaries were there more than three candidates campaigning for votes.

Defeat - or the perception of defeat - was not necessarily decisive in a later primary where the emphasis was upon winning delegates. However, defeats in the early primaries - where momentum was the principal objective - were likely to be irrevocable.

From the inception of presidential primaries those held earliest in the year, in general, generated the most interest.¹⁴⁶ Beniger's research into the relationship between primaries and polls found that those earliest in the sequence had the greatest impact on the candidates' standing in national opinion polls.¹⁴⁷

Though it occupied a first-in-the-nation position from 1920 it was not until the introduction of a presidential preference poll, effective for 1952, that New Hampshire stimulated the interest of presidential candidates. Even this development did not guarantee a contested primary.

In 1960 there was no opposition from major candidates to either Nixon or John Kennedy. Theodore White noted that any challenge to Kennedy in New England would have been "political folly."¹⁴⁸ A defeat would have been inevitable and damaging to a candidate's prospects of demonstrating electability. Twelve years later the McGovern campaign entered the state anticipating defeat against another front running senator from a neighbouring New England state but believing that an advantage could be derived there. In fact, in the attempts to promote a modest showing by McGovern into a triumph his campaign manager sought to persuade journalists that Muskie could reasonably be expected to obtain 65 per cent of the vote.¹⁴⁹ Though the press consensus set a lower target McGovern was informed by his campaign manager ten days before the primary that he was "going to be real lucky and get 25 per cent of the vote."¹⁵⁰ Where expectation rather than electability were the standard by which candidates were measured, entering a state where defeat was probable was not necessarily folly.

After the Kefauver-Truman and Eisenhower-Taft races of 1952, 1968 was the next occasion in which both parties' primaries in New Hampshire were contested. Though the state carries the reputation of having "unmade" President Johnson its significance was recognised only belatedly. Initially the media's attention focused on the Republican contest between Romney, the former front runner and a supposedly new-model Nixon.¹⁵¹ When announcing his candidacy McCarthy's opening statement listed the primaries he had definitely decided to enter, New Hampshire was not one of the four states mentioned, McCarthy believing that Massachusetts would be the crucial primary in the Northeast until persuaded otherwise by local supporters.¹⁵²

In the post-reform period New Hampshire was a particularly inviting primary for candidates to enter. As a small state, the forty-second in

population size, personal campaigning by the candidate could make his presence felt to an unusually high proportion of the electorate - in 1976 around 400,000 registered voters. Although the candidates' expenditure in the state was disproportionately large in terms of the size of the electorate it was modest when compared against the costs of an effective campaign in the largest states. Furthermore, forward shifts in the primary dates of states such as Florida, Massachusetts and Illinois increased the costs of concentrating on an early alternative to New Hampshire. From a relatively modest outlay - around 200,000 dollars for Carter in 1976 - a candidate could gain the momentum in New Hampshire to generate the resources which made possible campaigns in the larger states later in the process.

Conclusion

Unlike the primaries for many candidacies those at presidential level do not designate the nominee formally. But the contrasts between the pre- and post-reform primaries evidences that the degree of indirect influence they exert is subject to change.

Reform intensified the prevailing trend enhancing the indirect influence of the primaries. The convergence of active candidates in the primaries combined with the effects of media interpretations to elevate them into a series of eliminators reducing the range of plausible nominees. This winnowing effect reinforced the trend toward first ballot conventions and, in 1980, extending it to uncontested nominating ballots for only Reagan and Carter respectively were placed in nomination (though many of Kennedy's supporters insisted on voting for him). On the Republican side the elimination contest ended during the primaries allowing Reagan to monopolise support in the later stages.

He thus became the first nominee to accumulate a pre-convention majority from primary state pledged delegates.

In effect, the post-1968 primaries became direct. Although they occurred as a series (unlike their counterparts for lower offices) and the formality of convention balloting persisted, the primaries decided the nomination. This development brought the presidential nomination into closer conformity with practices at other levels of the American party system. By further extending the influence of voters in intra-party affairs the changes in the primary system propelled the American parties towards the Voter Dominated model defined in Chapter Two.

Polsby and Wildavsky have said that primaries have become "almost but not quite indispensable" for presidential nominations.¹⁵³ Their qualification is unwarranted by the evidence. If post-reform primaries can be dispensed with no candidate has effectively demonstrated how. The experiences of Humphrey in 1976 and Ford in 1980 indicate that the primaries can be dispensed with only at the cost of forgoing the nomination.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

THE ROLE OF THE NON-PRIMARY PROCESS

The altered balance in the numbers of primary and non-primary delegates resulting from reform required a shift in the emphasis of candidates' campaigns for the nomination. Before reform the preponderance of non-primary delegates made them the focus of campaign strategies either directly, through negotiation with party leaders, or indirectly, through the use of instruments of mass appeal such as primaries as a bargaining device. Since reform primaries have dominated campaign strategies offering a direct route to the nomination. Where pre-reform candidates concentrated upon winning delegates selected in non-primary processes, many of their successors, including the incumbent president in 1976, devoted little attention to organising in caucus states on the assumption that primaries would determine the nominee.¹

Whilst reform displaced the non-primary delegates in their significance to candidates it also transformed the process by which they were selected. Party organisations lost control over the selection of delegates and candidates engaged in active campaigns amongst voters to dominate caucuses. Two distinct selection procedures, primary and non-primary, were retained but the post-reform changes in both tended in a single direction: towards candidate-centred delegate selection and processes dominated by voters.

In this chapter the altered role and nature of the non-primary process is delineated by an analysis of the strategic responses adopted by the candidates, and the determinants of success. The first section argues that before reform the candidate's relationship to the party

structures was the central organising principle of non-primary strategy. Candidates with entree to the party leaders concentrated upon bargaining with them for support. Only candidates without direct access to the leaders sought to employ support amongst voters to influence the non-primary process.

After reform the candidate's relationship to the party organisations ceased to be the pivot of campaign strategy. To win delegates all candidates were compelled to develop voter-oriented campaigns. The increased influence of voters in caucuses also strengthened the linkage between primary and non-primary processes of selection. As argued in the second section, prior to reform only specific types of candidates - party outsiders or insiders with apparent political handicaps - adopted strategies which sought to link the two processes. For these candidates, primaries were a means to gaining otherwise unobtainable influence over party leaders. After reform delegate selection outcomes resulted from an interplay of the two processes. Early caucus successes created momentum for the primaries whose results, in turn, subsequently influenced the preferences of voters in the non-primary states. All post-reform candidates competing in caucuses sought to link their campaigns to the primaries.

The later sections of the chapter assess the consequences of the changing distribution of power in the non-primary process for the nature of the campaigns mounted by candidates. Before reform candidates operated in an environment constrained by party organisation control. Delegate selection reflected the parties' internal power relations, organisation maintenance needs and the strategies of party leaders seeking future influence. After reform parties were displaced from control of the caucus process. Candidate campaigning was conditioned by the formal rules of the caucuses and the need to mobilise supporters

in the electorate.

Candidate Strategy in the Non-Primary Process

Prior to reform non-primary mechanisms were synonymous with party processes of delegate selection. Party and public office-holders either directly appointed the national convention delegates or were a major influence in their selection. Because the organisations dominated delegate selection the determining influence upon a candidate's non-primary strategy was his relationship to the party structures. A candidate favoured within the parties, with no apparent political handicaps, sought to translate the existing sentiment into delegate support. Campaigns were unaggressive and concentrated within the organisations. Prior to 1960 such expedients were followed with success by all twentieth century incumbents seeking another term, and first-time nominees Landon and Dewey.²

Candidates without substantial approbation within the organisations sought delegates from party structures by influencing them through public popularity or supplanting their control of the selection process. Campaigns were concentrated outside the organisations though directed at them. Pre-1960 campaigns of this type were undertaken successfully by Willkie and Eisenhower (in 1952).³ That both these successes occurred in the Republican Party is indicative of the influence of an extra-party interest - corporate business - over the nomination greater than any Democratic equivalent (as discussed in Chapter Four).

In the period 1960 to 1968 four different objectives were identifiable in the strategies adopted by candidates towards the state and local parties to win delegates: cultivation, reassurance, inducement and invasion. The first three sought to influence the existing

distribution of power within the parties, the latter to reconstruct it. Cultivation was practised by candidates seeking to convert their existing popularity in the party into delegate support. Candidates with many sympathisers in the party but whose enthusiasm was restrained by apparent political handicaps engaged in strategies of reassurance demonstrating their electability to assuage the doubts of their latent supporters. Candidates lacking support within the party relied upon demonstrations of electability proving their pre-eminence as vote-getters to induce the professionals to support them. Invasion strategies sought to overcome unsympathetic professionals by displacing or diluting their influence in the selection of delegates.

Most candidates employed a mix of different strategies conditioned by their relationship to particular state and local parties, and the manner in which delegates were selected. Favourable parties could be cultivated or reassured. Those parties less sympathetic could be subjected to inducement or invasion. Where the distribution of influence over delegate selection was amenable to short-term change invasion strategies could be employed. Where change could not be effected strategies attuned to the existing structure of influence were necessary.

Strategies of cultivation were available to those candidates who, through their offices, their politics or their assiduity in the party's cause inspired the loyalty of the professionals. In an election year their objective was the utilisation of credits already established to produce delegate votes.

President Johnson and Vice Presidents Nixon and Humphrey commanded the support of the organisations through their positions as party leaders. They were also the servants of the party's needs - dispensers of patronage, raisers of funds and campaigners at election time. Both Nixon and Humphrey benefited as the deputies to presidents who largely

neglected party affairs permitting them to earn the allegiance of the professionals normally reserved for the president. Of Nixon, Theodore White wrote -

"For seven years, dry season and full season, the Vice-President had crisscrossed the country, delivering himself to regular Party organisations ... He had done their chores and their work for six years in an administration whose president was - as they put the phrase delicately but negatively - 'not politically conditioned'." ⁴

The loyalty of the party to its leaders translated into substantial and automatic delegate support. Nixon and Johnson's strength was so extensive that no contest for their party's nomination developed in 1960 and 1964 respectively. In 1968 though a challenge to Johnson was mounted he retained the loyal support of many party organisations.

Support within the party for its leaders was not necessarily dependent upon their public popularity or the issues they espoused. In 1960 Nixon was only a slightly stronger candidate than Rockefeller when matched against Kennedy in trial heat polls.⁵ In 1968 more voters disapproved than approved Johnson's conduct of office and Robert Kennedy appeared in the polls to be the more popular Democratic candidate.⁶ Yet even after the New Hampshire primary exposed Johnson's unpopularity amongst voters he appeared assured of a convention majority.⁷ Following Johnson's withdrawal the party's loyalty was transferred to Humphrey despite his adherence to an administration policy on Vietnam which many within the party questioned.⁸

Goldwater, Reagan and Johnson (in 1960) engaged the esteem of particular party organisations as advocates of issue positions favoured within them. Both Goldwater and Reagan espoused the conservative principles more widely subscribed to amongst the Republican Party's professionals than its voters. Johnson, as a southern senator, was the most cautious of the major candidates on civil rights in 1960.

In the South, where race was the paramount issue, he was the only candidate who had an acceptable position on civil rights and a plausible chance of winning the nomination. Though his position was imperfect, Johnson was the only defence against the integrationists.

Candidates whose support within the party remained latent whilst doubts existed as to their electability engaged in strategies of reassurance. Both John Kennedy and Nixon, in 1968, employed the primaries to overcome the scepticism surrounding their ability to win the election (see Chapter Six). By winning primaries they could exploit the existing sympathy within the party to produce delegate support. Kennedy had to prove that a Catholic was electable, and Nixon that he was a stronger candidate than his loser image suggested. Primary victories were the means to converting latent into manifest support.

Inducement strategies were employed by candidates lacking organisation support, aimed at altering the balance of preferences within the parties by demonstrating their appeal amongst voters. Their objective was to overturn the existing sentiment rather than to unlock it (the aim of reassurance strategies).

For those without entree to the party organisations demonstrating voter appeal was the only available means of winning non-primary votes:

"There was, for Rockefeller, no other court of appeal but the people." ⁹ (1964)

"... the only hope of Lodge leaders was to obtain such compelling evidence of public support that the politicians would have to give heed to it." ¹⁰ (1964)

"At the start he [Robert Kennedy] was trying to blitz the party from below, from outside the structure. Without the unions, the business community, the regular party leaders, or the South, he had to show the delegates he had the people." ¹¹ (1968)

"Rockefeller, like McCarthy, had to appeal to the people over the heads of the politicians." ¹² (1968)

Using primaries, polls and crowds in the streets, inducement strategies sought to elevate public popularity into the determinative influence on party processes of delegate selection. In consequence, the strategy proceeded at two levels. First, campaigns directed at the voters. Secondly, the campaigns directed at persuading the professionals capitalising on the evidence of mass appeal. One of Robert Kennedy's aides expressed the duality of the 1968 campaign: "We were playing mobs by day and trying to seduce the bosses at night." ¹³

Because inducement strategies aimed at converting support rather than activating it they contained a negative component, evincing the weaknesses of opponents closer to the party organisations. Their task was to convince the professionals that their desire for both a party regular and electoral victory were incompatible. To support the party insider would be to invite defeat. Thus Rockefeller sought to influence the opinion polls seeking to prove not only that he was more popular than Nixon but that he could win whilst Nixon could not. Employing poll evidence, Scranton argued that Goldwater's nomination would produce massive defections of Republican voters to the detriment of the party's ticket in local contests. Robert Kennedy argued that his and McCarthy's showings in the primaries constituted a repudiation of the administration of which Humphrey was a part. If Humphrey were the nominee, "the Democratic Party would be making a very bad mistake to ignore the wishes of the people ..."¹⁴

Invasion strategies were aimed at winning support from parties by redistributing the influence over delegate selection within them. This objective was pursued either by displacing the existing influentials or diluting their control of the selection process.

The displacement strategy, requiring several years to effect, was undertaken by the Draft Goldwater Committee which reconstructed state

and local Republican parties from 1961 onwards. To secure the parties for the conservative cause the Goldwater campaign progressively moved into positions of influence within the organisations -

"At first the Goldwaterites would be outsiders. Later they would be insiders. In the end they would be delegates to the National Convention." 15

By controlling the offices involved in the selection process pro-Goldwater delegates would be guaranteed -

"Our [the Goldwater campaign's] job would be to assure the selection of conservative precinct committeemen and committeewomen in 1962 and 1963 who would then have a major voice in picking delegates dedicated to our principles in 1964." 16

The shorter-term objective of mitigating the influence of party officials was adopted for the McCarthy candidacy, a campaign virtually confined to the election year. The strategy of invasion was necessitated by the solidity of support within the party for Johnson and Humphrey but facilitated by the degree of popular opposition outside of it generated by issues such as the Vietnam war. By increasing participation in those states holding open caucuses the influence of unsympathetic party officials in normally sparsely attended meetings could be overcome. By this means the insurgents could win delegates against pro-administration party organisations, as the Eisenhower forces had overcome Taft-dominated parties in the South in 1952.¹⁷

Prior to reform the candidate's relationship to the party structures was the decisive influence on both the strategy he adopted and the likelihood of its success. Candidates to whom the professionals were sympathetic exploited their insider positions through strategies of cultivation and reassurance. Those candidates without reserves of support within the party relied upon insurgent strategies of inducement and invasion.

The lack of entree with the party organisations usually proved an

insurmountable barrier to candidates seeking non-primary support. In the immediate pre-reform period it was the insider strategists - Nixon, Johnson, John Kennedy, Goldwater, Humphrey - who dominated in the preferences of delegates chosen through party processes. In contrast, those candidates dependent upon outsider strategies won meagre portions of delegates which, in a system where party processes were predominant, precluded their nominations.

Following reform the non-primary system ceased to be equivalent to a party process of delegate selection. Voter participation was encouraged and formal restrictions placed on the role of (Democratic) party officials. As a result the parties were removed from their former controlling influence. A candidate's relationship to the party structures was no longer the pivot of non-primary strategies and outcomes.

When the party organisations controlled delegate selection their support was either an advantage to be exploited or, for insurgents, an obstacle to be circumvented. After reform the task for all candidates became to mobilise their own supporters to participate in a process which was based entirely (for the Democrats) or largely (for the Republicans) upon open caucuses. In consequence, the number of a candidate's active supporters rather than their influence within the party organisation became the decisive campaign resource.

To produce the superior numbers to control caucuses post-reform non-primary campaigns were built from voters rather than party professionals. Recognising the necessity of constructing a campaign organisation outside of the power structure of state and local parties, the McGovern campaign "relied on a grassroots campaign, starting from the ground up, locating workers in every precinct and county, the leadership coming from citizens, relatively anonymous and unknown, turning out thousands

of people on caucus day."¹⁸

Whilst the McGovern campaign's objectives resembled the pre-reform invasion strategies, the context in which it was executed differed from that existing prior to 1972. First, by requiring open caucuses reform multiplied the milieus in which invasion-style strategies could be effective. Formerly many delegates had been selected in processes secured from election-year invasions of voters. Secondly, the restrictions placed on the role of party officials in delegate selection enhanced the influence that could be exerted by the 'invaders' in caucuses. Thirdly, when superior numbers became the determinant of success in the non-primary process all candidates were compelled to adopt invasion-style strategies irrespective of their relationship to the party organisations. Finally, the reforms' removal of organisation control reduced the parties' defences against insurgency. Caucuses became spaces to be occupied rather than strongholds to be captured.

Primaries and Caucuses: The Relationship

Prior to reform there was no necessary strategic link between the primary and non-primary processes. The preponderance of non-primary delegates enabled candidates to focus exclusively on party processes to construct a convention majority. In the immediate pre-reform period the majority of major candidates avoided active primary participation (as noted in the previous chapter). Primaries were considered either unnecessary or helpful - without the need for active involvement - in eliminating other candidates.

Only a minority of pre-reform major candidates participated actively in primaries seeking to use their results to persuade the

leaders to award them delegates in party processes. But for the connection between the two processes to be established depended upon the receptivity of the leaders to influence by the primaries. This, in turn, was conditioned by the clarity of the primaries' results, the leaders' attitudes towards the contestants and the degree of sentiment for non-contestants. Unless the leaders were disposed towards a clear primary winner, combined with the absence of a consensus around an inactive candidate, the primaries were unlikely to be a major influence on party processes of delegate selection. The linkage was potential and only occasionally actualised.

Reform removed many of the constraints on the relationship between primary and non-primary processes. When both processes came to be dominated by voters the gatekeeper role of party leaders in controlling access to non-primary delegates (and thereby controlling the influence of the primaries on the nomination) was largely eliminated. For one process to influence the other ceased to be dependent upon the mediation of party leaders.

After reform most candidates sought to forge the link between the two selection processes. Primaries can, mathematically, provide a convention majority but they influenced, and were influenced by, caucuses, encouraging candidates to compete in both systems.

In the post-reform nominating process success was cumulative. This was not simply the operation of bandwagon 'psychology' but because success was productive of the resources - publicity, funds, volunteers - instrumental in mobilising voters to produce later successes. As the first contests in the entire nominating process, the early caucuses created a substantial impact on the opening primaries which were decisive in narrowing the alternatives available later in the delegate selection sequence.

The quest for early success accounts for the attention devoted by candidates to the pre-primary precinct caucuses, particularly those in Iowa which often inaugurated the selection process each election year. Although the Iowa precinct caucuses represented only the base of a four-tier process culminating in the selection of a small fraction of the total delegates, their results produced an impetus which was transmitted into the early primaries. According to Carter's media adviser in 1976, Gerald Rafshoon, "Knowing the domino effect of what a win in Iowa would do to our chances in New Hampshire and then Florida ... we decided we had to win."¹⁹ Four years earlier McGovern's campaign manager perceived the repercussions of a clear Muskie victory in Iowa so that the caucuses "grew in significance with the increase in rumors that Muskie intended to wrap the state up. Such reports from an early caucus state prior to the first primary would seriously damage [McGovern campaign] morale and further hinder latent fund-raising possibilities."²⁰

Both Udall and Bayh entered Iowa in 1976 with the defensive purpose of denying the other an early victory, potentially decisive in the contest for leadership of the liberal wing of the Democratic Party. The Udall campaign concluded that an indecisive outcome would enhance the significance of the first primary where their prospects were bright, "We must ... do our part to keep Iowa muddled and make New Hampshire all the more critical."²¹ Recognising Udall strength in New Hampshire, the Bayh campaign sought to pre-empt it by defeating him in an earlier contest.²²

The priority attached to the pre-primary caucuses by the candidates was evidenced by the number of visits made to the states by candidates, an indicator of campaign activity (see Table 7.1). Candidates focused attention disproportionately on the pre-primary

caucuses. Thereafter campaign activity switched to the primaries with a corresponding decline in efforts in non-primary states. Amongst the Democratic caucuses in 1976 spending by candidates was highest in Iowa, the earliest caucus state, although six other caucus states had larger electorates.²³ Of the seven announced major candidates at the beginning of the year, five (Carter, Udall, Bayh, Wallace and Harris) expended a larger proportion of money per registered voter in a pre-primary caucus although most of the large blocs of delegates were located in caucus states whose selection processes started after the New Hampshire primary.²⁴

TABLE 7.1

DAYS SPENT IN CAUCUS STATES BY DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATES, 1976

Timing of First Caucus	No. States	% Total Caucus Delegates	Total Days Visited
Pre-primary	5	28.1	26
Post-primary	16	71.9	27
Total	21*	100.0	53

*NA: Alaska

Based on data for the Carter, Jackson, Udall and Wallace candidacies, supplied in John H. Aldrich, Before the Convention: Strategies and Choices in Presidential Nomination Campaigns (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), p.233.

The potential perceived by candidates for caucuses to influence the primaries was a post-reform development. Previously candidates either recognised no relationship between the two processes (those who eschewed the primaries) or believed that influence flowed only from the primaries to the election-oriented leaders in party processes (the necessary assumption of the candidates compelled to utilise

primaries). Because the pre-reform non-primary process was not viewed as an expression of voter sentiment it was not regarded as either an influence on, or forerunner of, the primaries. In 1968 a McCarthy invasion of the pre-primary caucuses in Minnesota evidenced substantial opposition to the Johnson administration. But the results gained little of the national attention subsequently devoted to McCarthy's showing in New Hampshire. As one Minnesota observer noted -

"The spontaneous outpouring at our caucuses had been too dramatic to deny. Yet no one outside our borders seemed to see it as a harbinger." ²⁵

After reform candidates recognised the potential repercussions of pre-primary caucus results marked either by strenuous efforts to achieve success or, as for Jackson in 1976, evading defeat by declining to enter.²⁶

When the campaign focus switched to the primaries their results became a major influence on the sequence of non-primary delegate selection. Success in primaries enhanced campaign resources and morale. Media attention concentrated on the successful primary candidates converting some voters to their side and stimulating existing supporters to participate as their preferred choice grew in plausibility as the nominee. In contrast, candidates failing in the primaries lacked finances, visibility in the media and credibility as potential nominees. Their prospects in the caucus states therefore diminished. They failed to win new converts, existing supporters lost the incentive to participate, the campaign's capacity to mobilise voters declined as resources and morale dissipated.

In the post-reform period success in primaries was a pre-condition of success in non-primary states as delegate selection proceeded. In Iowa in 1976, where selection was completed during Carter's emergence as the front-runner in the primaries, state organiser Charles Hammer

observed that "as Carter did well, our Iowa support increased."²⁷

Similarly, as Udall emerged as the survivor amongst the liberal candidates his strength in Iowa, according to state organiser Norma Matthews, "gained ... every time [he] almost won a primary."²⁸

In contrast, Carter's later setbacks against Brown and Church slowed the conversion of delegates to his side. A supporter in Virginia noted the effects of Carter's defeat in Maryland and unexpectedly narrow victory in Michigan in his state's delegate selection process, "We had a lot of people between third base and home ... but some of them scampered back to third when they saw the results from those states on television."²⁹

Prior to reform the primaries produced little impact during the selection of delegates in non-primary processes. In most states the selection of delegates was divorced from candidate preferences which were thus not susceptible to a surge or decline generated by primary results. Furthermore, the benefits derived from success in primaries were less potent when transferred to pre-reform party processes than they were in post-1968 caucuses.

The resources generated by primary successes were more effective assets for mobilising voters than for persuading the professionals. Thus in 1968, McCarthy's early primary successes produced few resources which retained their value when translated into campaigns in non-primary processes. Moreover, the insulation of party processes from participation by voters allowed the leaders to pursue their own candidate preferences largely unchallenged from outside (although such a course risked losing the election). In 1964 active campaigns in non-primary states secured the selection of dedicated Goldwater supporters whilst the primaries were evidencing the candidate's lack of appeal to Republican voters.

Traditionally, the conclusion of the primaries was the earliest

point for their results to have an impact upon party processes. In part, this followed from the chronology of delegate selection. Many state processes were completed after the primaries. Only at the time of their selection, or subsequent to it, did non-primary national convention delegates register their candidate preferences. More significantly, the influence of the primaries was normally conditional on their providing clear evidence of electability in the form of an uninterrupted series of victories by one candidate. Their potential for influence could only be realised when the series was completed. Thus it was not until after the last contested primaries, West Virginia in 1960 and Oregon in 1968, that Kennedy and Nixon respectively could employ their results to prevail upon the party leaders in non-primary states.

Before reform the conclusion of the primaries was only potentially a period in which their influence could be registered in the non-primary process, subsequently their impact at that stage was actual. As the primaries grew as a source of delegates, more candidates entered them providing them with a decisive role in winnowing the alternatives available to caucus delegates. At the conclusion of the post-reform primaries the range of candidates had narrowed substantially since New Hampshire. In the pre-reform period, in contrast, the primaries performed a smaller role in clarifying the alternatives because many candidates avoided them thereby remaining in active contention for the nomination. In 1960, for example, the range of choice amongst major candidates was wider for the delegates to the Democratic national convention than it had been for the voters in the party's primaries.

By reducing the range of plausible nominees the post-reform primaries focused the preferences of non-primary delegates. Many candidacies were defunct by the end of the primaries, not all of the

survivors had a realistic prospect of the nomination and some candidates, recognising the inevitable, released their delegates. (For example, in 1976, Harris and Shriver withdrew during the primaries. Udall remained a candidate in the convention but was no longer a plausible nominee. Wallace, Jackson and Church, recognising Carter's unsurmountable lead at the end of the primaries, released their delegates.) Thus for the uncommitted delegates or the supporters of failed candidates the choice was small at the end of the primaries. They could switch either to the 'winner' of the primaries or they could vote for a candidate unlikely to win the nomination. For all but the most cause-oriented delegates the shift was likely to be towards the primary winner. Table 7.2 evidences this trend working in favour of Carter and Ford in 1976. This trend reached its conclusion in the 1980 Republican contest. The attrition of candidates produced by the primaries left only Reagan in contention, effectively denying a choice to participants in the later stages of the caucus processes.

When reform made voters the decisive influence in both primary and non-primary processes the responsiveness of the two systems to each other increased. Formerly the relationship of the party processes to the primaries was regulated by party leaders' definitions of acceptability which (as Theodore Roosevelt, Kefauver and McCarthy exemplified) was not equivalent to a test of electability. Since reform the removal of the leaders' gatekeeper role ensured that the primaries were both receptive to influence by and an influence upon the preferences of caucus participants.

Following reform the non-primary process ceased to be the citadel of party insiders immune - if the leaders chose - to the popular pressure of the primaries. Success in the latter process was no

TABLE 7.2
SHIFT IN PREFERENCES OF NON-PRIMARY STATE
DELEGATES FOLLOWING PRIMARIES, 1976

Candidate	Delegate Preference by Stage of Nominating Process	
	Completion of Delegate Selection	National Convention Vote
Carter*	34.1%	71.0%
Udall	12.6	14.5
Brown	1.3	6.8
Others	19.3	7.6
Uncommitted	32.7	0.1 (NV)
Total	100.0	100.0
Ford*	33.1	43.6
Reagan	50.8	56.4
Uncommitted	16.1	0
Total	100.0	100.0

*Candidate winning most primary delegates.

NV = not voting.

longer dependent upon party leaders for translation into success in the former. In consequence, the pre-reform cleavage in candidates' delegate strength in the two processes narrowed and nominees tended to be favoured more by primary than non-primary delegates reversing the pre-reform pattern. (See Table 7.3.) In the post-reform period most candidates produced an integrated strategy for primary and non-primary processes.

TABLE 7.3
 NATIONAL CONVENTION VOTES FOR CANDIDATES
 BY METHOD OF DELEGATE SELECTION, 1960-1980

Year	Candidate	Delegate Selection		
		Primary*	Non-Primary	Difference, Non-Primary-Primary
1960(D)	J.Kennedy	72.0%	35.6%	-36.4%
	Johnson	5.9	46.1	+40.2
1964(R)	Goldwater	59.2	75.3	+16.1
	Scranton	22.7	9.9	-12.8
1968(D)	Humphrey	53.4	80.1	+26.7
	McCarthy	34.4	12.1	-22.3
1968(R)	Nixon	42.8	59.4	+16.6
	Rockefeller	29.1	13.3	-15.8
<hr/> Total Difference 1960 - 1968				+12.3
1972	McGovern	64.9	41.0	-23.9
	Jackson	11.5	30.0	+18.5
1976(D)	Carter	75.1	72.2	- 2.9
	Udall	10.0	13.9	+ 3.9
1976(R)	Ford	55.9	44.9	-11.0
	Reagan	43.9	55.1	+11.2
1980(D)	Carter	61.0	70.9	+ 9.9
	E.Kennedy	38.5	24.5	-14.0
<hr/> Total Difference 1972 - 1980				- 8.3

* Includes some states combining delegate selection methods with primaries providing a majority of the delegation.

Strategy and Power in the Non-Primary Process

Before reform there were different loci of power in the two delegate selection systems requiring distinct strategies to influence them. Non-primary selection was controlled by party organisations. Accordingly the candidates adapted their strategies to the functioning of the organisations they were seeking to court. Thus campaigns were conditioned by demands and influences integral to the functioning of the parties as organisations. These conditions included -

1. The distribution of power within the parties was reflected in the selection of delegates.
2. Participation in the selection process was generally limited to party professionals.
3. The award of delegate status was an incentive contributing to organisation maintenance.
4. As politicians, the delegates' behaviour was directed towards maximising their own, their party's or their leaders' influence over the nomination.

Effective campaigns for non-primary delegates before reform were dependent upon an understanding of the power relations within the party organisations controlling selection. The extensive travelling undertaken by prospective candidates and their aides prior to the election year generated a body of intelligence identifying the influentials within the parties from which delegates would be sought. For example, from 1956 onwards the Kennedys set out 'to learn who the people were - the right people.'³⁰ Establishing who the "right people" were differentiated between "those who were party leaders in name and those who actually spoke for delegates."³¹ The objective of such pre-election year preparation was to provide the answers to what Theodore White described as "the root question of American politics ... who's the Man to see?"³² Only after power had been located could

it be co-opted.

Candidates lacking current political intelligence were disadvantaged by their ignorance of the informal power structures of the organisations they were striving to influence. When the former director of the Draft Goldwater Committee assumed control of Reagan's campaign in 1968 he found that: "Power structures had changed, and in some cases the ins of 1964 had become the outs."³³ Similarly, Robert Kennedy's hurriedly-assembled campaign was compelled to rely on the Kennedy organisation established for 1960. In the interim the effectiveness within the parties of many of its members had declined.³⁴ The attempts of the Republican 'establishment' to prevent Goldwater's nomination were afflicted by the redistribution of power within the party wrought by three years of conservative invasion.³⁵ Lodge, returning from Vietnam to campaign for Scranton, perceived the party's transformation: "What in God's name has happened to the Republican Party? I hardly know any of these people!"³⁶

Johnson's 1960 campaign was based not on out-dated information but unsupported assumptions that members of Congress were influential within their state parties. On this assumption, the influence that Johnson and Rayburn, his campaign manager, exerted in Congress could be translated into convention delegates.³⁷ But their assumption was suspect for few congressmen possessed sufficient home-state influence to deliver delegates: "Reliance on the wrong political figures was endemic."³⁸

When reform facilitated increased voter participation in caucuses the significance of the internal distribution of power in the parties diminished as an influence on non-primary outcomes. Few modern party organisations were capable of generating the numbers necessary to resist the post-reform influx of candidate supporters in caucuses.

In consequence, identifying and courting party notables depreciated in value as an investment of campaign effort.

Candidate organising in caucus states could by-pass the party influentials or, at least, extend beyond them. Carter rose to national prominence in 1976 after his 'victory' (a plurality of delegates were uncommitted) in the Iowa precinct caucuses, a year after the state party chairman advised the campaign organisation to avoid the state as unfavourable territory.³⁹ Within the campaign organisation Iowa was considered propitious because its voters seemed potential Carter supporters:

"If you looked at the state - who the people are, what they do, what they think - it's not a bad state at all for a candidate like Jimmy Carter."⁴⁰

Campaigning amongst the voters the candidate himself also recognised the state's potential for a Carter victory -

"I found a lot of people who were interested in me. And we began going from one living room to another, from one labor hall to another, from one livestock feed hall to another."⁴¹

Numbers rather than notables provided power in post-reform caucuses.

As candidate organisations proved more effective mobilisers of voters than party notables so the principal question of non-primary campaigning was less "Who is the Man to see?" than "How Many?".

The pre-reform emphasis upon notables derived from the distribution of power within the party organisations which controlled the delegate selection process:

"American party organisations are centralised at state and local levels. This means that such hierarchical controls as actually exist on the state and local levels will assert themselves in the national convention."⁴²

Whilst there were disparities between the formal and informal distribution of power, elected chief executives were customarily the most powerful figures at each level of government. Through their use of

patronage and the influence derived from public popularity chief executives were often also powers within their parties. In consequence, convention delegations were often dominated by elected chief executives. Writing in the early 1960's, Polsby and Wildavsky noted:

"Since the probabilities are fairly good that both major parties at any given time will have succeeded in electing a substantial number of governors and mayors of important cities, the chances are fairly good that a substantial number of delegates will be controlled hierarchically."⁴³

Within the state party, the unit represented at the national convention, the governor was normally the major influence on the delegation. He was involved in both deciding the delegation's composition and its candidate preference. Given the prevalence of governors in state party affairs their disposition was a central strategic concern of candidates seeking delegates in non-primary processes. Detailed campaign planning generally awaited the outcome of the mid-term elections which determined many of the probable principals in the subsequent nominating contest. A prolonged campaign, such as John Kennedy's, sought to influence the balances of forces in its favour by campaigning for sympathisers amongst the gubernatorial candidates at mid-term.⁴⁴

The significance of governors to campaign planning was acknowledged, in some cases, by incorporating their number and disposition into the premises on which candidacies were based. Following Johnson's withdrawal in 1968, Humphrey delayed becoming a candidate until he had ascertained the opinions of "certain key governors and state chairmen".⁴⁵ Rockefeller's decisions not to seek the nomination in both 1960 and 1968 (the latter later revoked) were explained by reference to his lack of support amongst the party hierarchy. In 1960 "the great majority of those who control the Republican convention" were said to be opposed to a contest for the nomination.⁴⁶ In 1968

"a considerable majority of the party's leaders" were claimed to be both Nixon supporters and opponents of a divisive contest for the nomination.⁴⁷

Where a party held few state houses the incidence of hierarchical control over delegations diminished, creating opportunities for candidates with little support amongst the party leaders. The paucity of Republican chief executives at both city and state level restricted the number of hierarchically controlled delegations anticipated in 1964. Hence the prospects of nominating a conservative candidate were enhanced by the narrow base of the moderates traditionally prominent in the Republican hierarchy. As the Goldwater strategists perceived, the party was "ripe for revolt."⁴⁸

In recognition of the prevalence of hierarchical control, campaigns for non-primary delegates were leader-oriented and -directed. To win delegates candidates negotiated with leaders employing appeals, understandings and deals to secure their support.

A candidate's electability appealed to the leaders as means of enhancing the party's access to power both locally and nationally. A candidate's party regularity promised a president who would work with the leaders and protect the local parties from takeover by the supporters of an unacceptable insurgent such as McCarthy. A candidate who could effectively unite the two appeals of electability and party regularity - Nixon, John Kennedy - was persuasive amongst the leaders.

Deals and understandings were the currency used by candidates to gain the support of particular leaders. They provided the promise of mutual gain to both leader and candidate: of material or purposive benefits to the leader, of delegate votes (and potentially the nomination) for the candidate. Several Protestant midwestern governors

were reminded in 1960 by the Kennedy campaign that their support would be remembered by a candidate cognisant of the need to balance a ticket headed by an eastern Catholic.⁴⁹ Assurances on defence policy and the acceptability of the Vice Presidential nominee to the South were provided by Nixon to Strom Thurmond, the pivot of his support in the region in 1968.⁵⁰ Less specific prospects of access provided the rationale for one of Robert Kennedy's few supporters amongst the Texas notables: "if he's elected, anyone from Texas will need a pass to get into Washington, and I'm going to be the man handing out the passes."⁵¹

Where the support of party leaders could be co-opted, campaign organisation was directed from the top downwards. Sympathetic leaders assumed control of the candidate's interests in the state and sought to rally their followers to acquiesce to their preference. The description of the Humphrey campaign's efforts to mobilise support in 1968 is a descent through the party hierarchy -

"If there was a Democratic governor or lieutenant governor who might be for us, we started with him. If there was no one in the statehouse we tried the mayors, and if there was no one in City Hall, we tried union halls."⁵²

The corollary of the reliance on leaders was the relative inattention devoted to organising at lower levels of the party. John Kennedy's campaign emphases were "more on Democrats than on the general public, more on party leaders than on party members."⁵³ Nixon's southern strategy for the 1968 nomination was conducted entirely through Thurmond and the state party chairmen.⁵⁴

Enhanced voter participation in the non-primary process following reform diminished the relevance of hierarchical party power structures in determining the composition and preferences of delegations. As participation grew, stimulated by the organising efforts of candidates, the control of the leaders and their followers declined.

After reform campaigns in caucus states became both voter-directed and -oriented. Party leaders were less effective mobilisers than citizen-based campaign organisations in producing the support in numbers required to control caucuses. Those post-reform candidates who employed the traditional method of relying on the leaders - Muskie and Humphrey in 1972, Ford in 1976 - were unable to assert the control formerly guaranteed by such strategies.

Amongst voters the candidates and causes of the election years provided a stronger impetus to participate than loyalty to the party organisation. Where the test was "numbers who will come to a particular meeting rather than present party position or past service, the activist surge is bound to carry the day."⁵⁵ Formerly the party organisation's dominance derived ^{from} procedural control and low voter participation (resulting from closed processes and a lack of organised encouragement). When reform produced open publicised caucuses the parties' advantages diminished exposing their vulnerability in numbers. Richard Stearns, McGovern's caucus state organiser, noted the weakness of the resistance to invasion by candidate supporters in 1972: "we were running against an assumption that there was more party organisation than ever existed."⁵⁶

In 1976 President Ford commanded the loyalties of a Republican leadership that could not command the loyalties of a majority of caucus participants.⁵⁷ Reagan's non-primary campaign, unlike Ford's, derived its effectiveness from strength at the base. In Missouri where Ford was supported by Governor Kit Bond, "their [Reagan's] foot soldiers outhustled our generals."⁵⁸ In New Mexico both U.S. senators were Ford loyalists but, as the President later perceived, the Reagan campaign "built support from the bottom up and just wiped us out."⁵⁹

For leadership support to become a campaign deficiency, as it was

in 1976 for Ford, marks a transformation of the source of power in the non-primary process. An illustration drawn from 1968 aptly captures the magnitude of the change. Explaining the uncharacteristic defeat of the Humphrey forces in the Iowa state convention, Senator Walter Mondale, one of the campaign's national chairmen, attributed the setback to the fact that: "There wasn't a single person of any importance working for us."⁶⁰

Campaigns oriented towards party leaders followed from the assumption of widespread hierarchical control. A leader's support translated into that of all or most of his delegation. Tables 7.4 and 7.5, using governors as equivalent to party leaders, demonstrate that the validity of this assumption diminished after reform. (The tables omit the 1976 Democratic contest because a vast majority of the party's governors eventually endorsed Carter to unite the party prior to the convention.) Before reform a governor's endorsement was a major asset in winning the support of his delegation. After reform its value depreciated. McGovern's performance in states where the leaders were committed to other candidates was only slightly below his showing generally. Without the support of a single governor he won a plurality of the non-primary delegates and a larger proportion of the total than John Kennedy who received endorsements from seven governors. In 1976 Ford was marginally assisted by gubernatorial support compared with his overall performance but he was also the first nominee in the period since 1960 to fail to win a majority of the votes from states where he possessed leadership support. In retrospect Ford appreciated that "We had most of the generals on our side. But Reagan had many of the troops."⁶¹

The trend towards quadrennial mid-term gubernatorial elections may have lessened the incentives for governors to support popular

TABLE 7.4

NON-PRIMARY DELEGATIONS' SUPPORT FOR CANDIDATES

ENDORSED BY THEIR GOVERNORS, NATIONAL CONVENTIONS 1960-1980

Year	Endorsements by Governors	Majority of Delegation Followed Governor's Endorsement	
	No.	No.	%
1960(D)	13	11	84.6%
1964(R)	7	5	71.4
1968(D)	12	9	75.0
1968(R)	12	10	83.3
1972(D)	8	2	25.0
1976(R)	7	4	57.1
1980(D)	7	5	71.4

TABLE 7.5

VOTES OF NON-PRIMARY DELEGATES FOR NOMINEES,

NATIONAL CONVENTIONS 1960-1980

Year	Delegations where Governors endorsed Nominee	Delegations where Governors endorsed Other Candidates	All Non-Primary Delegates
1960 (D)	59.8%	3.5%	35.6%
1964 (R)	100.0	44.0	75.3
1968 (D)	93.7	41.4	80.1
1968 (R)	75.0	28.0	59.4
1972 (D)	*	32.7	41.0
1976 (R)	47.1	25.0	44.9
1980 (D)	78.3	50.0	70.9

* No governor of a non-primary state endorsed McGovern.

candidates to enhance their own prospects of re-election, as Polsby and Wildavsky have argued.⁶² However, this development alone does not account for the recent decline in the incidence of hierarchically controlled delegations. Rather, it is the reform-induced restrictions on party organisational control of delegate selection that has reduced the possibilities for 'bossed' delegations.

In 1976 every Republican governor of a non-primary state (and all but one from the primary states) endorsed either Ford or Reagan. Yet, according to Polsby and Wildavsky, it is in the Republican Party that changing electoral dates has most depressed the incentives for governors to make candidate commitments. The evidence of 1976 suggests no shortage of commitments but - as the tables presented above exemplify - a greatly reduced ability to deliver on them.

In the states where governors supported Ford, Reagan won a majority of the delegates. Failure to deliver support created disincentives for future governors to avoid the prospect of embarrassment by avoiding commitments. Democratic governors in 1976 evidenced considerable caution in making endorsements early in the nominating process following Muskie's defeat four years before despite extensive support amongst party leaders. Where candidate preference was the principal criterion of selection, leaders committed to candidates lacking the support of voters in caucuses risked the damage to prestige of even being defeated in their own attempts to become convention delegates.

The corollary of the decline of leadership influence in the non-primary process was a switch by candidates to voter-oriented campaigns. Owing to the complex and time-consuming nature of caucus participation campaigns concentrated upon the most committed voters. Through association with issues, interest groups or personal contact with voters candidates sought to elicit active support. For candidates

such as McGovern and Reagan, distinctive issue positions provided natural constituencies amongst liberal and conservative activists respectively. Shriver and Bayh sought to ally themselves with demographic or cause groups - blacks, Catholics, labour unions - thereby co-opting their support. Carter, a lesser known candidate, employing less emphasis on issues, engaged in extensive 'retail' campaigning creating bonds between himself and individual voters which transcended ideological divisions.⁶³ Once support has been established the campaign task immediately before the caucuses was to activate it -

"The goal of organisation in non-primary states differs from primary states in that the chief concern is not to persuade voters to accept a particular candidate, but to persuade voters to spend time and energy in supporting a candidate they probably already prefer. This means that organisations must concentrate on identifying and mobilising supporters rather than enlisting new ones."⁶⁴

Success in caucuses dominated by voters derived from the early establishment of committed support and subsequent organisational proficiency in generating turnout (the latter assisted by success in primaries). These imperatives stand in contrast to the pre-reform requirement of acceptability to party leaders. Motivated by personal and party concerns, the leaders sought an electable party regular on whom they had claims of access. Since reform voter concerns supplanted those of leaders which, in consequence, receded as influences determining candidate support in the non-primary process.

Having no attachment to the party as an organisation, voters were motivated by issue, group or personality appeals. They were less concerned with the personal or organisational interests espoused by leaders. Electability, party regularity and promise of recompense for support were, therefore, no longer guarantees of delegates since reform.⁶⁵

The significance of organisational proficiency for success in

post-reform caucuses doubly removed their results from tests of electability. Not only were voters less motivated to support candidates by their electoral potential than party professionals, but variation in the organisational skills of the campaign groups produced caucus electorates unrepresentative of the preferences of the party's identifiers. Richard Stearns, McGovern's non-primary state organiser, explained the contrast between the candidate's strength in caucuses and weakness amongst voters as a whole: "we won them by coup d'etat not popularity."⁶⁶

The disparity between the tests of electability and organisational proficiency was exemplified by McGovern's performance in the South in 1972. In three southern presidential primaries Wallace won 73 per cent of the delegates to McGovern's five per cent.⁶⁷ However, in caucuses McGovern's superiority in organisation contrasted with the Wallace campaign's incomprehension of the prerequisites of non-primary success after reform.⁶⁸ In consequence, McGovern won a plurality of the southern caucus delegates to Wallace's 15 per cent. Yet in the presidential election McGovern's weakness among southern voters was demonstrated by his securing there the lowest proportion of the popular vote of any Democratic presidential candidate in the twentieth century despite the absence of a regional third party candidate in 1972. A Texas party leader in noting McGovern's strength at the state convention, made the prescient observation: "He'd run about as well down here as Mao Tse-tung."⁶⁹

Traditionally the leaders control over non-primary delegates ensured the nomination of a party regular. Insurgents Theodore Roosevelt and Estes Kefauver were able to win primary victories but could not insinuate their popularity amongst voters into the non-primary process. In the immediate pre-reform period party outsiders like Rockefeller

(in 1964) and McCarthy were similarly unable to mount effective campaigns for delegates without leadership support.

After reform the non-primary process ceased to be a preserve of party regulars inhospitable to insurgents. In open caucuses candidate organisations capable of mobilising voters gained access to delegates irrespective of their relations with party leaders. The dissolution of the strategic advantages of party insiders in the non-primary process after reform is demonstrated in Table 7.6, comparing the vote of non-primary delegates for the principal party insider and outsider in national conventions from 1964 to 1980. Party insiders from 1964 to 1972 are defined by their leadership of polls of party chairmen.⁷⁰ (In 1972 Humphrey, the poll leader, withdrew before the nominating ballot. As Jackson inherited much of Humphrey's support and became the rallying point for leaders engaged in a stop-McGovern effort he is treated as the party insider.) In 1976 and 1980 the incumbent presidents are regarded as the insiders though party chairmen polls were unavailable. Party outsiders are distinguished by low standing in party chairmen polls supported by an impressionistic judgement of the candidate as an insurgent (rather than simply an insider with little first-choice support). The utility of the definitions applies only to the election year concerned. Where an insider-outsider distinction did not persist to the nominating ballot the year is omitted from the tabulation.

In the post-reform period the former pattern of insider-monopoly, outsider-exclusion was disrupted. Invasion-style strategies previously adopted by insurgents proved to be the most effective means of winning delegates where earlier they were employed only as a last, and usually unproductive, resort. Party insiders such as Muskie and Ford who persisted in 'lining up' the leaders found the return in delegates

TABLE 7.6

NON-PRIMARY DELEGATES' SUPPORT FOR CANDIDATES
BY THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO THE PARTY ORGANISATIONS,
NATIONAL CONVENTIONS 1964-1980

Year	Candidate's Relationship to Party Organisations			
	Insider		Outsider	
1964 (R)	Goldwater	75.3	Scranton	9.9
1968 (D)	Humphrey	80.1	McCarthy	12.1
1968 (R)	Nixon	59.4	Rockefeller	13.3
1972 (D)	Jackson	30.0	McGovern	41.0
1976 (R)	Ford	44.9	Reagan	55.1
1980 (D)	Carter	70.9	E.Kennedy	24.5

greatly diminished in comparison with the period before reform.

Exceptional for an incumbent president, Ford's nomination in 1976 was dependent upon success in primaries. This followed not only from the increase in delegates chosen in primaries but also from Ford's weakness in caucus states. In 1912 Taft was nominated through the support of party leaders immune to the influence of popular opinion expressed in primaries. (As noted in the previous chapter, prior to his withdrawal, Johnson's 1968 strategy for renomination excluded primaries.) Had Ford proved slightly less effective in the primaries, the non-primary states would have ensured his defeat whereas they protected Taft from it. In 1976 an incumbent president's delegate majority was drawn disproportionately from the selection mechanism traditionally the resort of insurgents (see Table 7.3, above).

The diminution of hierarchical control produced an atomised distribution of power in the non-primary process. Where once power was

concentrated in relatively few state and local leaders, after reform it was disseminated amongst thousands of voters. Before reform a small number of leaders, effectively, were the "electorate" in the non-primary process. Campaigns were compelled to focus on the leaders because delegate support was mediated through them.

Since reform few individuals, either party or interest group leaders, were able to deliver the voters in numbers which control caucuses. In consequence, their bargaining power diminished compared with that of pre-reform party leaders. Furthermore, their support was no longer the prerequisite of winning delegates producing a shift in the content of non-primary campaigns. Candidates worked to build a constituency amongst voters. Campaign appeals were directed towards the electorate rather than the leaders. Where non-primary support was formerly determined by candidate-leader relations, after reform it was decided by the candidate's appeal to voters.

Delegate Selection as a Function of Organisation:

From Party to Candidate

When the non-primary process was conducted within the party structures delegate selection was characteristic of a hierarchically controlled organisation with its own maintenance demands.⁷¹ Selection was marked by the absence of conflict and the use of delegate status as a reward for party service.

The lack of contests followed from the fact of party organisation control. Leaders sought to avoid divisions amongst the party loyalists, candidates sought to avoid alienating the leaders by not intervening in the selection process and participation from outside the party was low.

By delaying the entrance of candidate preference into the selection

process a possible source of conflict within the party was eschewed. Refuge was sought in holding actions either by supporting a favourite son or in adopting uncommitted status. Delay allowed the competitive situation between the candidates to clarify, increasing the opportunities for a timely commitment of support and enhancing the prospect of negotiating a consensus within the party.

Active candidate involvement attempting to influence the preference of delegates was largely delayed until after they were selected.⁷² The parties chose who the delegates would be. Then the candidate organisations sought to influence how they would vote.

The combination of closed selection systems, little publicity for those processes that were open and the candidates' sensitivity to the leaders' desire for harmony within the party discouraged voter participation in the pre-reform selection process. Voters seeking to promote the cause of particular candidates were hindered by the problems of access to the process and the lack of encouragement from campaign organisations to breach party control. In 1968 estimates of participation produce an average of three thousand citizens per Republican non-primary state and approximately 5,400 on the Democratic side, the latter notable for unusually high interest in caucus participation generated by the McCarthy campaign.⁷³

Where citizen organisations were formed to promote a candidate's interests in a non-primary state this did not necessarily entail participation in the delegate selection process. Kennedy for President clubs in 1960, for example, were employed to promote an impression of widespread public support for the candidate and lobby leaders influential in choosing delegations.⁷⁴ They were not designed to generate voter turnout in caucuses.

The restraints on participation - both procedural and strategic -

ensured that the composition of delegations was determined within the party organisations. The award of national convention delegate status was thus available for promoting the maintenance of the party. Service to the party was rewarded by selection as a delegate. The criterion for selection therefore was party service and not candidate preference. A member of the New York Democratic state executive committee which chose one-third of the delegation specified the determinants of choice in 1968:

"By and large, the controlling factors in the selection of at large delegates have not changed. The telling factor is 'what have you done for me lately'." ⁷⁵

In consequence, the great majority of convention delegates were financial contributors to the party, party or public officials.⁷⁶ Though these characteristics were common to all delegates, the turnover between the conventions was greatest amongst those selected by party processes (where organisation control was less susceptible to insurgent disruption than primaries) indicating an attempt to circulate rewards within the party.⁷⁷ (The Democrats' fractionising individual votes between several delegates achieved the same objective of dispersing rewards widely.)

Presidential preference, prior to reform, was neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for selection as a delegate through party processes. For example, in 1960 party leaders in New Mexico selected a delegation dominated by Johnson supporters although the state convention which approved them was overwhelmingly pro-Kennedy.⁷⁸ Candidate-related criteria were subordinated to standards of party service as the Democratic state chairman of New York explained in 1968:

"If I ignored the people who have helped me with the organisation work and appointed strangers just because they're for McCarthy, I'd have a revolution on my hands." ⁷⁹

Insurgent candidates unlikely to profit from the traditional procedures of delegate allocation sought to elevate presidential preference into the determinative condition of selection. Thus the McCarthy campaign in New York argued for the distribution of at-large delegates chosen by the state committee to reflect the results of the primary election of district delegates where their supporters captured half the seats.⁸⁰ Where extra-party participation was possible the mobilisation of candidate supporters was employed to displace the selection priorities of the party organisations. In consequence, the delegates committed to an insurgent candidate were themselves likely to be insurgents. For example, the McCarthy campaign successfully challenged party organisation states in some thirty towns in Connecticut providing approximately one-third of the delegates to the state convention.⁸¹ The insurgents won nine of the forty-four places on the delegation to the national convention. Of those delegates for whom relevant information could be obtained, three-quarters were public, party or labour union officials.⁸² But the McCarthy delegates included only one local office holder in a contingent which included a theologian, writer Arthur Miller and actor Paul Newman.

Successful insurgent challenges disrupted the parties' dominance of delegate selection. But constricting the organisation's control of distributable rewards enhanced the antagonism of the professionals towards insurgent candidates. A U.S. Senator encapsulated the professionals' opposition to invasion strategies in his reproach of the McCarthy organisation in 1968: "They were squeezing off mayors with thirty years of service ... It's not right. And what's more, McCarthy himself knows it's not right."⁸³ Surrendering delegate places to candidate supporters impeded the performance of party maintenance

functions. Resisting the McCarthy campaign's claims for half the at-large delegates in New York, the state committee's law chairman observed:

"I've talked with three or four very decent McCarthy adherents. None of them have ever contributed over two hundred and fifty dollars to the party. I respect their intelligence, their sincerity, their integrity, but you can't run a campaign on that."⁸⁴

Whilst lack of entree with the leaders compelled insurgents to adopt invasion strategies, their application further enhanced the opposition within the party. Courtship of the leaders was unavailable and invasion was counter-productive. Thus the non-primary process (and therefore the nomination) was generally impermeable to insurgent candidates prior to reform.

After reform there was a marked increase in the numbers participating in the non-primary process, traditionally a connotation of an influx of candidate enthusiasts.⁸⁵ The post-reform increases were virtually universal where formerly voter involvement had been confined to the states most open procedurally and to particular years in which candidates such as McCarthy or Eisenhower were able to mobilise voter support in caucuses.

The most pronounced increases in participation occurred in those states where closed processes previously excluded direct voter participation in the election year. It was in those states that campaigns had encountered the greatest problems in injecting candidate preference into criteria of selection, and party maintenance functions were at their most salient in determining the delegation. In Louisiana in 1968, for example, the Democratic Governor - elected in 1966 - chose a delegation "rife with nepotism and patronage."⁸⁶

Where party or public officials were exclusively the participants in delegate selection their selection marked the last point directly

accessible to voters, usually two or four years previously. As presidential campaign planning generally post-dated the mid-term elections, party or public offices decided then or at the preceding general election were unlikely to be related to presidential preference. Elections for party offices such as precinct committeemen were rarely contested.⁸⁷ Where contests took place they usually involved isolated individuals rather than organised groups.⁸⁸

In those states where caucuses were formally open they were not necessarily so in fact.⁸⁹ The absence of formal rules provided considerable latitude for the party organisations to conduct the selection process as they chose. According to the National Municipal League's survey of 1964 procedures, state conventions consisted of persons "who said they had been delegated by county conventions, but the realities below the county chairmen are highly uncertain."⁹⁰

Before reform few candidates risked antagonising the leaders by engaging in the selection process and those insurgents who attempted to do so usually found procedures, formally or in fact, resistant to their efforts. The restrictions on outside participation left the organisation's selection criteria largely undisputed.

After reform candidate preference became the *raison d'être* of participation in the non-primary process. Responding to the post-reform opportunities for winning delegates in open caucuses and the diminished need for deference to the imperatives of party maintenance, candidates sought to turnout their own supporters in numbers necessary to dominate caucuses. Unlike the pre-reform party organisations, the post-reform candidate organisations concentrated upon securing the selection of committed delegates.

The contrast in the rates of participation, candidate commitments and influence of party leaders resulting from reform is illustrated by

the Louisiana Democrats experience of delegate selection in 1968 (cited earlier) and 1972. In 1968 the Governor selected the entire delegation in conformity with his personal and party priorities. In 1972 an estimated fifteen thousand voters attended the representative district caucuses.⁹¹ The forces mobilising voters included the party organisation but also numbered the McGovern and Wallace campaigns, black and women's groups.⁹² As no group was able to dominate the others, delegate selection was characterised by bargaining between them. In these negotiations the party's representatives suffered from an unaccustomed disadvantage. Unable to control the process, the organisation was handicapped by a large number of previous commitments for delegate slots which precluded compromises with other groups which thus conceded delegates to them.⁹³ The Governor secured selection as a delegate but the remainder of his slate for at-large places - the national committeemen, the state president of the AFL-CIO, the state party chairman - were defeated by three black candidates supported by McGovern and black groups.⁹⁴ At the completion of the selection process only a third of the delegates were uncommitted.

The Timing and Magnitude of Delegate Commitments

When the nominating process was dominated by party leaders they, as politicians, sought to enhance their own political power. By maximising their influence over the nominating decision leaders maximised their access to power in the future, providing their candidate won the nomination and election. Thus both sets of principals in the pre-reform nominating process - the candidates and party leaders - were engaged in a quest for political power.

Strategies for the nomination were worked out in an environment in which many of the party leaders the candidates sought to influence developed power-seeking plans of their own. Thus deals, understandings and the promise of re-election through a strong coat-tail effect were employed to induce the leaders' support.⁹⁵ Access to power was promised in order to gain power. To maximise their claims to access the leaders sought to control the size and timing of their delegations' commitment to candidates, factors in some primary states regulated by law and the party's electorate.

The timing of commitments emerged from the interplay between the objectives of leader and candidate. Active candidates, needing to demonstrate increasing support to sustain an impression of growing strength, sought to counter the leaders' desire for delay (choosing early increased the probability of choosing wrongly). In consequence, candidates emphasised the incentives to early support. Kennedy's 1960 campaign recalled Jim Farley's criteria for distributing federal patronage during the New Deal dependent upon support for Roosevelt before, at or after the convention.⁹⁶ Deferring commitments, Sorensen argued on Robert Kennedy's behalf in 1968, risked undermining the value of a delegation's support leading to a denial of future access: "Those states which try to be cute by not supporting a candidate can only come out as the tail of the dog."⁹⁷

Late-starting or inactive candidates sought to reinforce the leaders' predilection for delayed commitment. By withholding support the front-runner could be stalled and the leaders' influence, by initiating a new bandwagon rather than joining an existing one, enhanced. The night of Johnson's withdrawal in 1968, Humphrey aides urged party leaders to withstand the Kennedy surge: "We couldn't tell them we were running, but we were able to say 'Hold off a bit longer and you won't be sorry'."⁹⁸

United delegations maximised states' contributions to a nominating majority and therefore enhanced their leaders' access to subsequent influence. In consequence, bloc voting was common either through use of the unit rule or informal means of obtaining cohesion. For candidates, the translation of majority support into a bloc vote provided an economical method of acquiring support. John Kennedy's campaign outside the primaries gave highest priority to non-southern states employing the unit rule.⁹⁹ Similarly, the delegations which provided the focus of the Reagan campaign's efforts to erode Nixon's support were controlled by the unit rule.¹⁰⁰

After reform the timing and solidity of delegation commitments ceased to be subject to strategic manipulation by party leaders. Voter mobilising efforts by candidate organisations displaced the leaders from control and, therefore, the influence of their objectives over delegation behaviour. The bulk of non-primary participants were candidate supporters. They were not necessarily attached to party organisations freeing them from obligations to leaders nor, as only occasional activists, were they engaged in promoting their own future political influence. Furthermore, the (Democratic) reforms prohibiting the unit rule and mandating proportional representation in delegate selection reduced the prospects for converting majority support into a united delegation.

Prior to reform the strategic concerns of both leaders and candidates separated the selection of delegates from their expression of presidential preferences. Early leadership commitments might precede delegate selection whilst later commitments could be antecedent to it. After reform the mobilisation of candidate supporters utilising the provisions for expressions of preferences combined selection of delegates with their candidate commitment. After reform the public

registration of commitments conformed to the formal stages of the selection process, not the strategic judgement of candidates and leaders.

Following from the pyramidal nature of the non-primary process in which only participation at the base could guarantee representation at higher levels, candidate organisations were stimulated to establish a presence at first-level caucuses. Candidate commitments were thus evident from the earliest stages of the selection process where formerly they were rarely apparent until its completion. In 1976 a majority of delegates chosen at Democratic first-level caucuses registered presidential preferences. (Table 7.7 evidences this development by expressing the ratio of committed/uncommitted in each state in terms of the numbers in each delegation and totalling the results). Owing to the effects of the operation of the provisions for proportional representation the figures provided in Table 7.7 understate the true numbers expressing candidate preferences. To secure representation to next-level caucuses candidates had to exceed a specified quota of votes (established by Democratic rules at a maximum of 15 per cent in 1976). Following the initial vote of the caucus the groups failing to obtain the quota were permitted to caucus again and the allocation of delegates determined on the basis of the second vote. In such circumstances the uncommitted bloc was swollen by the accretion of supporters of candidates failing to pass the threshold on the first vote. In addition, uncommitted status could be adopted by supporters of unannounced or unpopular candidates as a means of preserving their involvement in the process without publicly declaring it. (Supporters of Hubert Humphrey employed uncommitted status in 1976 awaiting a declaration of candidacy.¹⁰¹) Thus uncommitted consisted of three groups - supporters of losing

candidates, covert supporters of other candidates and undecideds - of whom only the latter are genuinely without a presidential preference.

Continued campaigning by the candidate organisations aided by the clarification of the alternatives provided by the primaries diminished the uncommitted delegate component as the caucus process continued. When state and district conventions completed the selection process a substantial majority of delegates were already committed (precise figures for 1976 are provided in Table 7.2, above), where previously campaign efforts were only initiated after the delegations were chosen. As the uncommitted delegates switched progressively to the active candidates so the opportunities for late-starting candidates receded.

In the immediate pre-reform period several major candidates - Stevenson, Scranton, Rockefeller, Humphrey (the latter two in 1968) - were active only after the selection process had been initiated or even after it had been completed. Despite their late entry many delegates were accessible to them because commitments were deferred.

In 1968 Humphrey withheld his announcement of candidacy for four weeks after Johnson withdrew, six weeks after the New Hampshire primary. For a candidate like Humphrey, favoured within the party organisations, there was no necessity to engage in the selection of delegates to garner support. In contrast, Brown and Church declared their candidacies three weeks after the New Hampshire primary in 1976. By that stage the selection and, concomitantly, the commitment of delegates had commenced in eight caucus states representing two-fifths of the total non-primary vote in the national convention. Furthermore, operating Brown and Church campaign organisations necessary for generating caucus support were lacking in most of the remaining states.

Humphrey could depend on the existing party structures to deliver support so that four days after his announcement he was accredited with nine hundred delegates, two-thirds of a nominating majority.¹⁰² Brown and Church, on the other hand, required voter-oriented campaign organisations to achieve the control of caucuses which translated into delegates in the post-reform period. Humphrey was the overwhelming preference of non-primary delegates in 1968, Brown and Church could make only a negligible impact in 1976.

TABLE 7.7

PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE OF DELEGATES SELECTED

AT DEMOCRATIC FIRST-LEVEL CAUCUSES, 1976

Candidate	Preference		
	Presidential Candidate	Uncommitted	Total
No. of delegates	375	298	673*
Percentage delegates	55.7	44.3	100.0

*NA= 56 delegates

The earliness of commitment in the post-reform period was concomitant with an increase in the rigidity of the pledges that were made. Though not enforced by legal sanctions caucus commitments were less susceptible to conversion than formerly. First, delegates were candidate supporters participating to promote a particular candidacy. Their commitments were likely to be more intensely felt than the pragmatic choices made by politicians. Secondly, from 1976 the Democratic Party rules provided candidates with a right of veto over delegates running in their name. Defectors could be removed at the candidate's request and replaced by loyal supporters. In effect,

caucuses produced mandated delegates.

Thus after reform candidates failing to have their own supporters selected had no plausible means of access to large numbers of delegates in order to become serious contenders. Not only were a substantial majority of delegates elected in primaries but few of the minority who were not could be won without engaging in their selection. Threatened by challenges from major candidates, favourite sons virtually disappeared as a means of deferring commitment. The delegates that could be controlled by party leaders were fewer than before reform precluding them from delivering substantial support at a propitious moment. In 1972, the last year in which leaders made a major attempt to withhold delegate commitments, only a quarter of non-primary delegates were uncommitted when selected.¹⁰³ Owing to the permeation of the selection process by candidate organisations, particularly McGovern's, no state leader controlled an entire delegation. In 1976 the small number of uncommitted delegates were a pivotal influence on the Republican nomination. But no leaders could deliver their support in blocs necessitating campaigns to win individual commitments:

"over the next two months - indeed, up until the final moments of the national convention itself - I [Ford] would have to hold hands with, and consider doing favors for, every one of the delegates."¹⁰⁴

Candidates who delayed their entries in the post-reform period had no tenable means of winning large numbers of delegates. Both Humphrey, in 1976, and Ford four years later recognised the inaccessibility of many delegates in their decisions to remain inactive.¹⁰⁵ Non-primary delegates were no longer a potential reservoir of support for late-starting candidates. (See Table 7.8.)

Those candidates competing for delegates from the outset of the selection process gained in support as the caucus sequence proceeded

provided they remained active contenders. Campaign efforts continued, expanding the base of support established at first-level caucuses by winning new adherents from the uncommitteds or former supporters of candidates eliminated by defeats in the primaries. Campaigns established from the earliest stage were able to engage in enduring lobbying efforts to win new supporters. In addition, they attained a legitimacy through having competed openly for delegates from the outset. Candidates who eschewed a state's first-level caucuses failed to establish a base of support or an organization which could attract additional delegates as the process developed. In effect, they were excluded from winning substantial numbers of delegates in that state. In 1976 the only states in which the late entrants, Brown and Church, were able to make a significant impact on delegate selection were those in which first-level caucuses were held latest.

TABLE 7.8

NATIONAL CONVENTION NON-PRIMARY STATES DELEGATES
UNCOMMITTED OR SUPPORTING MINOR CANDIDATES
WHEN SELECTED, 1960-1980

Year	Delegates Uncommitted or Supporting Minor Candidates		
	Number	% Non-Primary Total*	% Convention Total
1960(D)	254	37.0	16.7
1964(R)	219	37.8	16.7
1968(D)	764.5	59.2	29.2
1968(R)	276	41.2	20.7
1960 - 1968	1513.5	46.9	22.3
1972(D)	341.45	34.4	11.3
1976(D)	229	32.8	7.6
1976(R)	109	16.1	4.8
1980(D)	100.6	11.0	3.0
1980(R)	35	7.4	1.8
1972 - 1980	817.05	21.6	6.0

*

Total based on available data.

An illustration of the subsequent convergence of support around the early, active competitors in caucus states is provided by the example of the Iowa Democrats in 1976 (see Table 7.9). As the first state in the nation to hold caucuses, Iowa was the subject of prolonged attention by candidates and the media. More candidates organised in Iowa than in any other caucus state.

At the precinct level uncommitted delegates constituted a plurality, Carter (with 29.1 per cent) was second and Bayh (11.4 per cent) was third. Harris, Udall, Shriver and Jackson, in descending order, won smaller numbers of delegates to the county conventions. Between the precinct and county meetings Carter won the New Hampshire primary and Udall ran second both there and in Massachusetts. After his failure in the two New England primaries Bayh withdrew swelling the Udall and uncommitted ranks at the county conventions.¹⁰⁶ Between the county and district conventions the primaries narrowed the active contenders to Carter, Jackson and Udall. Harris, after repeated primary defeats, withdrew. At the district meetings the uncommitted bloc diminished and Udall was the recipient of former Harris support.¹⁰⁷ Between the completion of selection and the national convention the uncommitted vote disappeared switching predominantly to Udall and, in smaller numbers, to Carter. The switch to Udall is probably indicative of a large liberal, anti-Carter, contingent amongst the uncommitted. Initially undecided between the liberal alternatives, covert Humphrey supporters or followers of defunct candidates the uncommitteds switched to Udall as the surviving liberal in the state.

The process described above differs from the pre-reform period in the pervasion of influences derived from the primaries (discussed earlier), the evidence of candidate preference from the earliest stages owing to candidate campaigns amongst voters and the near-monopoly

of support by candidates who competed at precinct level. Before reform the conclusion of the selection process, usually state conventions, marked the earliest stage at which commitments were sought. Moreover, commitments were not restricted to candidates who initiated early campaigns. In 1968 the Iowa state convention was held less than four weeks after Humphrey became an active candidate. Though regarded as a defeat within the Humphrey campaign, the state provided the Vice President with 40 per cent of its delegates.

TABLE 7.9
CANDIDATE PREFERENCES IN IOWA DEMOCRATIC
CAUCUS PROCESS IN 1976

Preference	Voting Unit			
	Precinct	County	Cong. District	National Convention
Carter	29.1%	34.2%	42.6%	53.2%
Udall	5.8	12.9	25.5	42.6
Others	24.6	11.0	4.3	4.3
Uncommitted	38.5	40.9	27.7	0

For those candidates whose strategies included the caucuses the (Democratic) requirement of substantial delegate selection^{by} districts and the use of proportional representation within them provided incentives to compete in every state. Formerly the use of state-wide and winner-take-all systems of delegate allocation discouraged candidates from seeking support in states where failure to mobilise a majority excluded them from acquiring any convention votes. Kennedy, for example, made little effort in the South in 1960 recognising that Johnson's support and the use of the unit rule eliminated the region

as a source of delegates. The power-maximising strategies of party leaders seeking united delegations compelled candidates to concentrate their campaigns either where a delegate majority (which converted into the entire delegation through the unit rule or informal means of achieving consensus) was a feasible target or where divided delegations were the norm.

After reform candidates were able to win non-primary delegates without mobilising state-wide majorities. By concentrating on hospitable areas candidates elicited delegate support where the state as a whole constituted unfavourable territory. Thus the McGovern campaign divided its caucus operations into two degrees of emphasis. Where potential strength was greatest a state-wide effort was mounted. Elsewhere, notably in the Midwest and South, the campaign was limited to campus communities or other areas which had a history of support for liberal candidates.¹⁰⁸ Whereas John Kennedy largely 'wrote off' the South as Johnson territory, McGovern refused to concede it to Wallace or other candidates with a more conservative appeal than his own. Kennedy won delegates in the only two southern states not voting as units. In contrast, McGovern won some delegates in each southern caucus state and an overall plurality in the region.

Formerly candidates adopted an 'all or nothing' approach to non-primary campaigning. States which offered the prospect of winning the entire delegation were emphasised whilst the remainder were disregarded. Post-reform strategies were not as discrete in emphasis. Kennedy's campaign virtually dismissed an entire region from their delegate projections. The McGovern campaign, in contrast, planned to mount efforts for delegates in every caucus state except Muskie's home state of Maine and South Carolina where no provisions existed for expressing candidate preferences.¹⁰⁹ The contrast in the effect of

the two strategies is illustrated in Table 7.10 showing the proportions of delegations won by McGovern in 1972 and Kennedy in 1960, the last contested Democratic nomination which permitted the unit rule at the convention. Though both candidates won a similar share of the total non-primary vote (41.7 and 34.9 per cent respectively) their performances within delegations were divergent. Kennedy's showing was polarised between united delegations supporting him in some states and complete exclusion in others. McGovern, in contrast, won some support in all but one state but only excluded other candidates in a similar number. In the caucuses, as in the primaries, reform multiplied the number of arenas in which candidate competed for delegates.

TABLE 7.10

PROPORTIONS OF NON-PRIMARY STATE DELEGATIONS
WON BY NOMINEES IN DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTIONS,
1960 AND 1972

Year	Nominee	Proportion of Delegations won by States				
		None	Minority	Majority	All	Total
1960	J.Kennedy	12(36.4%)	6(18.2%)	6(18.2%)	9(27.3%)	33(100.1%)
1972	McGovern	1(3.6)	14(50.0)	12(42.9)	1(3.6)	28(100.1)

Conclusion

Before reform party processes were the real 'road to the White House' with primaries rarely significant. Subsequently the non-primary process diminished in both its priority and independence from primaries in campaign strategies. Caucus delegates could be ignored as mathematically irrelevant to the nomination or, more commonly, they were employed principally to gain leverage in the early primaries. The early caucuses were but the first domino in strategies dominated

by the primaries. Few candidates regarded them as an independently valuable source of delegates.

Reform also transformed the content of the non-primary process. Voters determined the selection of delegates diminishing the returns of courting and deferring to party leaders. Candidates unable to mobilise voters in primaries were unlikely to do so in caucuses. Thus a modest performance by Muskie in Iowa in 1972 indicated his comparative weakness at the party's base presaging his showings in the New Hampshire and Florida primaries. For all candidates in post-reform caucuses safety resided in numbers.

NOTES

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CHAPTER EIGHT
THE CONTENT OF CAMPAIGNS

This chapter surveys the impact of structural reform on the appeals employed by candidates to win the support of the nominating electorate. The effect of the switch from a party- to a voter-dominated process is assessed by a comparison of the ways candidates defined themselves in relation to their parties, to issues and ideology, and their presentations of their own personal traits and characters.

In any intra-party contest candidates may locate themselves in support or opposition to their party's leaders, within or against its history, for or against its organisational demands. Candidates can adopt ideological or pragmatic appeals. The former features clear stances on divisive issues which maximise support in one segment of the electorate and drive away the remainder. Pragmatic appeals employ non-divisive, non-controversial stances. Positions are adapted to maximise support across the electorate. Thus two pairings are generated to define campaigns. Appeals can be of the party or non-party type (the latter incorporating appeals that are a-party, bipartisan or anti-party). Secondly, appeals can be ideological or pragmatic. These four campaign emphases can be inter-mixed to produce four possible styles of campaigning: party-pragmatic, party-ideological, non-party-pragmatic, non-party-ideological.¹

Before reform the structure of the nominating process encouraged party and pragmatic emphases. The nominating decision was controlled by party leaders. They were concerned to sustain organisations which thrived upon electoral victory which was premised upon unifying ideologically diverse parties. General elections were won by appealing to the 'critical mass' of a non-ideological electorate.

After reform the structural imperatives to party and pragmatic emphases eroded. Party leaders lost control over the nomination removing their organisational priorities - party maintenance, unity and victory - from their former position of dominance as the nominating electorate's selection criteria. Candidates were no longer compelled to demonstrate an ability to satisfy the leaders' concerns to be plausible as nominees.

The widened opportunities for influence by the parties' activist wings facilitated by reform created incentives for candidates to espouse their concerns. Furthermore, the attenuation of organisation control permitted campaigns which stressed independence from or antagonism toward the party or a bipartisan appeal.

The post-reform shift in campaign emphases is evidenced in Fig. 8.1 which employs the four possible styles developed above to characterise campaigns in contested nominations from 1960 to 1980. Before reform party-pragmatic was the dominant style reflecting a nomination controlled by party professionals keyed to winning elections. Non-party and ideological emphases were rare. Post-reform styles exhibit greater diversity than their pre-reform counterparts possibly reflecting the reduced impact of the participant bias in the later period (see Chapter Four). In a more permeable process a greater diversity of forces could be brought to bear upon the nomination rendering no one style consistently successful. But the latter period is marked by an upsurge in ideological and non-party emphases which were rare in the pre-reform years.

Pre-reform candidates' presentations of their personal traits and characters were refracted by the party leaders' organisational concerns. The criteria of availability constricted the range of ascribed characteristics for an acceptable nominee (Protestant, old stock, non-


Southern, etc.). Candidates possessing these necessary characteristics publicised them whilst those without them contested the legitimacy of the availability criteria or sought to minimise their deficiencies. Presentations of "presidential character" were designed to promise favourable working relations with the leaders. Their concern for influence in Washington, the autonomy of their party organisations and the preservation of their positions within them were accommodated by candidate presentations of a deferential and accessible president.

Post-reform presentations of personal traits and character were freed from the constraints imposed by the leaders' concerns. The criteria of availability, in decline as tests of electoral calibre before reform, were not utilised by primary and caucus participants. Similarly, in a voter-dominated process images of potential presidents deferential and receptive to leaders lost their appeal. Rather candidates could stress their independence from or hostility to the party hierarchy. In the post-Watergate era candidates distanced themselves from Washington and the political establishment. Non-political images were generated.

To keep this chapter to a manageable length in its analysis of the vast quantity of words and images campaigns produce, the survey concentrates on areas of difference between the two periods. This approach risks the implication that change has been total when, in fact, many continuities are apparent. However, the intention of this approach is to demonstrate shifts in emphasis noting the proliferation of some themes which had few earlier counterparts and the waning of others which have fewer equivalents in the later period. Figure 8.1 represents the intended balance between campaign content in the two periods: it shows that most post-reform styles had their earlier counterparts but that their relative incidence has altered.

FIGURE 8.1

CANDIDATE STYLE 1960-1980



Key: Pre-reform candidates in print; Post-reform candidates in capitals.

Campaigns and the Party

Organisational dominance of the pre-reform nominating process required candidates to establish contacts with party leaders and generate appeals which established their partisan credentials. Candidates emphasised their loyalty to the party record, their diligence in the party's behalf, their ability to satisfy the demands for victory and organisational maintenance.

Where nominations were controlled by the parties' long-term servants, attentive to the need to retain the allegiance of inveterate identifiers in the electorate, the incentives were compelling for candidates to associate themselves with the party tradition. They declared their fealty to its record, identified themselves with its heroes (and sought the support of those still alive) and berated the opposition party for its traditional failings.

Humphrey, defending the administration in 1968 against its challengers, aligned himself with thirty years of Democratic achievement, "We're not going to repudiate the past - we're going to build on it ... I don't think you can win an election by destroying a record, particularly when it's a good record."² Claiming a record of faithful support for three Democratic presidents Humphrey, by implication, suggested that McCarthy and Robert Kennedy were disloyal for challenging Johnson. He adduced the maxim that loyalty was "the least you can expect" of a major party leader.³

In 1964 the content of the Republican Party tradition was a source of conflict between candidates making rival claims to inherit its legacy. Scranton, of the party's moderate wing, argued that Goldwater was at variance with the Republicanism of Lincoln, Eisenhower and Robert Taft. The national convention would meet, he argued, to select

"the man who best squares with the enduring principles of the Republican Party" which excluded Goldwater.⁴ Claiming to defend the party's integrity, he denounced Goldwater as subscribing to views both unRepublican and unAmerican. When Eisenhower defined his criteria of "responsible Republicanism" Rockefeller adopted the characterisation and argued that Goldwater could not be encompassed within it.

For Goldwater, the moderates like Rockefeller advocated policies closer to the Democratic Party's platforms. Declining to debate with Rockefeller, Goldwater likened such an event to arguing against a representative of the New Frontier. Espousing the need for elections to provide choices rather than echoes, Goldwater equated a majority of the Republican Party with the cause of individual liberty. Thus he, not the moderates, was the representative nominee.

Candidates who demonstrated independence from or hostility to the party were charged with disloyalty. Regarded as unfaithful to the party, such candidates lacked bargaining power within it. Pre-reform challenges to incumbent presidents foundered on the unwillingness of party leaders to engage in revolts. Assessing Robert Kennedy's challenge in 1968 a Western party official observed, "I did not become state party chairman to strike a dagger into the President of the United States".⁵ In 1967, seeking to organise a challenge to Johnson, a representative of the Alternative Candidate Taskforce (then without a candidate) found willingness to oppose the President within the party as uncommon as the incidence of triplets,

"I remember asking one local official whether another local official would be a likely prospect for our cause. 'No', was the reply. 'He's a Party man'."⁶

When McCarthy became the "alternative" candidate in opposition to Johnson he antagonised party loyalists by his willingness to pursue an issue which divided the party. Further, he advertised his refusal

to compromise in the party's interest. He declined to endorse the ticket unless concessions were made on policy. He announced a prospective cabinet one third of which were Republicans and publicly gave consideration to supporting Rockefeller if he were nominated.

For McCarthy's supporters - predominantly outside the party organisations - his refusal to compromise, the antithesis of the conventional politician, was a major component of his appeal.⁷ But for the leaders, his elevation of principle over the party was instrumental in their rejection of him. As one of them observed, "I could talk for two hours as to why I prefer Humphrey, but I'll tell you something that is the deciding factor: McCarthy's disloyal because he won't support the ticket."⁸

A second form of appeal to the party was the recollection of assiduity in its cause. Travel for speech-making, fund raising and election campaigning assisted state and local parties thereby creating obligations amongst their leaders. In the years preceding 1960 John Kennedy's travels ensured that no major state or city was neglected. Trips were concentrated in the West and Midwest where his support in the 1956 balloting for vice presidential nominee had been weakest.⁹ Within states his speaking engagements were keyed to the distribution of influence over the delegate selection process. Where governors controlled selection their wishes determined the candidate's engagements within the state; where the state party was factionalised Kennedy sought association with the group likely to be in control in 1960.¹⁰

In the convention year candidates invoked their past efforts for the party to convert obligations into delegate support. Humphrey, in 1968, reminded Michigan delegates of his contribution to building the party in the state, "When you needed my help I was here in the dark

days, in the difficult days." ¹¹ Endorsing such claims an Iowa party official commented that, "In the years when we could put our caucuses and conventions in phone booths, if we wanted anyone to come and speak it was always Hubert." ¹² Observing the success of party stalwarts Nixon and Humphrey in 1968, James Reston concluded that the chicken dinners were coming home to roost. ¹³

Candidates without a record of support for the party's efforts lacked a resource which could be translated into delegates. The antipathy to Rockefeller in the Republican Party derived from his aloofness from the organisations' needs in addition to his liberalism. The response to his lack of support for Goldwater substantiated Jim Farley's maxim that the party owes nothing to a man who does not support the ticket. In 1968 one party official observed "Rockefeller dumped Nixon and me in 1964 so I just frankly don't see how any Republican can support him." ¹⁴

Candidates recognised the importance of party maintenance functions to the leaders in their commitments to strengthen the party and to assign access to supportive leaders. If elected, candidates promised to use the presidency to vitalise the party. For example, Symington's strategy involved broadening his acquaintanceships in the party and emphasising his commitment to its growth. ¹⁵ For the emerging Republican party in the South in the early 1960's, a Goldwater nomination would encourage switches away from the Democrats. Thus his appeal was organisational as well as ideological: he would stimulate participation in the party and support for it in state and local elections. ¹⁶

Candidates employed patronage as an inducement to win the support of particular leaders by providing them with career advancement and the resources with which to maintain their parties. In 1960 "both hints and frank talk flowed from the Kennedy camp to several governors about the kind of running mate and other talents needed!" ¹⁷ Subsequent

appointees, the campaign organisation made clear, would be those whom Kennedy knew, trusted and could work with.¹⁸

Whilst promise of access provided incentives to support, threats of its denial discouraged withholding commitments. Speaking to small state delegations in 1960 Sorensen reminded his audiences of Franklin Roosevelt's rules for patronage distribution. Access was assigned, in descending order, to support before, during and after the convention. Influence would be maximised by early support, minimised by late commitment.¹⁹ The same argument was evident in his speeches for Robert Kennedy eight years later, "Those states which try to be cute by not supporting a candidate can only come out as the tail of the dog."²⁰

Candidates utilised the endorsement of their state parties to substantiate their appeal to organisation professionals. By this means they verified their regularity. Humphrey's 1960 campaign, for example, stressed his contribution to the development of the Democratic Farmer Labor Party in Minnesota. The state party chairman, writing to his counterparts elsewhere, noted that "Hubert Humphrey believes in political organisation and has always supported the organisation."²¹

Deference to favourite sons advertised respect for party organisations. Challenges to them constituted a repudiation of local leaders' control over their parties. As James Rowe counselled Humphrey in 1960, it was "sound politics" to avoid challenging favourite sons.²²

In 1960 Kennedy's challenges were restricted to states where delegates could be mandated and favourite sons more sympathetic to other candidates. The threat of challenges in primaries in California and Ohio resulted in favourite sons committing their support to Kennedy.

Thereby delegates were won, the appearance of competing against the organisation avoided whilst the favourite sons retained a semblance of control over their delegations at the expense of discretion over their presidential preferences. In his one challenge to a favourite son in 1968, Robert Kennedy excused his action by defining President Johnson as his opponent, "I am not here to oppose Governor Branigan. He is in no way responsible for the policies and actions I challenge this year."²³

Recognising the leaders' demand for electoral victory candidates projected themselves as effective vote-getters. For popular favourite candidates electability was their principal source of persuasion. Primaries, polls, crowds and other expressions of mass support were utilised to demonstrate electoral potential. The evidence derived from these sources was then woven into their campaign statements. For example, John Kennedy argued in 1960 -

"During the past fifty years no President has been elected from either party without entering and winning at least one contested primary. No convention has ever nominated a man who avoided the primaries and elected that man president."²⁴

By winning contested primaries Kennedy placed himself in a line of succession to the White House established over half a century. His principal opponents, by eschewing the primaries, could not claim that legitimacy.

Strategies other than the popular favourite made electability a part of their appeal. First, non-primary forms of evidence were employed. Secondly, the credibility of the evidence adduced by popular favourites was questioned. Thirdly, the ability to unite the party, a pre-condition of winning, was claimed.

For candidates not entering primaries evidence of electability derived from polls, and projections of general election strategy.

Polls provided Scranton with evidence of his greater electoral strength compared with Goldwater and the potentially disastrous consequences for state and local Republican candidates if the latter were the nominee. He cited polls evincing his greater popularity amongst the party rank-and-file, and the likelihood of a majority deserting to Johnson in a contest against Goldwater. The long-term devastation of the party resulting from a Goldwater nomination, Scranton argued, would take it down "the low road into the dusty limbo of minority politics."²⁵

Projected general election strategies were employed by candidates to demonstrate the relevance of their popularity to the objective of winning an Electoral College majority. In 1960 Johnson's supporters argued that his strength in the Southern and Border states alone would provide close to a majority requiring little additional support to guarantee victory.²⁶ In 1964 Goldwater argued that no Republican could challenge Johnson's liberal appeal in the North therefore only an appeal to the South offered the party the chance of winning.²⁷ In 1968 Rockefeller sought to repudiate Nixon's strength in national polls maintaining that their results were inappropriate measures of electoral strength. In the major states, Rockefeller claimed, he was the stronger candidate. To carry the major states necessitated winning the big cities and this had been Nixon's failing in 1960,

"If you take the record of what happened he carried Illinois until he got to Chicago. He carried New York until he got to New York City. He carried Pennsylvania until he got to Philadelphia. And he lost all of those states because he could not carry the vote in the big cities."²⁸

Evidence of Nixon's southern strength failed to offset this deficiency, Rockefeller argued, because Wallace would win them in the election.²⁹

In response to the evidence adduced by popular favourites, candi-

didates sought to undermine their validity as representative tests of popular support. Following Kennedy's victory in West Virginia in 1960, Symington dismissed presidential primaries as divisive, ill-suited to the systematic discussion of issues and under the control of "random factions" of the electorate.³⁰ The Humphrey organisation in 1968 repudiated McCarthy's claim to be the people's candidate on the basis of his performances in primaries. In several states, according to Humphrey's advertising, McCarthy had been defeated, including New Hampshire where he had been the only candidate on the ballot. In primaries voters selected from the available alternatives. In no primary had Humphrey been an active contender so their results could not be interpreted as a referendum on his candidacy. The McCarthy campaign's claims to be the people's candidate and to primary victories were rejected as "a well-publicised myth."³¹ Had he been an announced candidate in time to enter the primaries, Humphrey averred, he would have won them.³²

Electoral victory was premised on a united party. Candidates without evidence of large-scale popular support could substantiate their claims to electability by demonstrating an ability to unify the party's heterogeneous elements. Whilst some candidates could activate intense but narrow support others (the compromise choice strategies) aimed for a broad appeal. Symington's 1960 campaign was premised on his ability to coalesce the Democratic coalition where all other contenders would divide it. Within the Symington campaign all other major contenders were viewed as unavailable on religious, regional or ideological grounds, "the thing to do was not make anybody mad... We thought everybody could unite on Symington."³³

When reform extracted the nominating process from the parties' control candidates were no longer compelled to integrate the leaders' organisational demands and allegiances into their campaign appeals.

Attachment to the party and the ability to satisfy its maintenance needs diminished as tests of the candidates' acceptability to a nominating electorate composed of voters.

Several post-reform candidates positioned themselves in opposition to their parties. This enabled them to tap the widespread disenchantment with parties evident amongst the American electorate.³⁴ Specific criticisms of the parties focused on bossism, the unrepresentativeness of their leaders and their unresponsiveness to voter concerns.

Carter frequently charged bossism in 1976 projecting an image of the candidate of the people against the pols. In New York he condemned the primary delegate selection process as an organised attempt by the bosses to frustrate the voters' will.³⁵ In Pennsylvania he described Philadelphia Mayor Rizzo as a "machine politician" and a "boss". As a boss, Rizzo's support for Jackson, Carter suggested, emanated from dishonourable motives, "I can't imagine Rizzo endorsing anyone without some sort of trade or arrangement."³⁶

Carter's advertising stressed his dependence upon the people for his success because he lacked the assistance of "political bosses, Kingmakers and Washington insiders."³⁷

The unresponsiveness of the party establishment was a frequent criticism employed by Wallace in identifying himself as the champion of the common man. He charged that the Democratic Party had become estranged from working people because it had been captured by exotic and vociferous minorities,

"Once the Democratic party reflected true expressions of the rank-and-file citizens... Long ago it became the party of the so-called intelligentsia. Where once it was the party of the people, along the way it lost contact with the working man and businessman. It has been transformed into a party controlled by intellectual snobs."³⁸

McGovern too sought to capitalise on the party's insensitivity to voters' discontents. Declining to condemn Wallace's supporters as

racists, he attributed their dissatisfaction to the party's preoccupation with devising anodyne election-winning formulas.

Wallace's victory in Florida he attributed to:

"an angry cry from the guts of ordinary Americans against a system which doesn't seem to give a damn about what's really bothering people in this country today. It was a vote to stop the whole damn Democratic party and make it listen to people for a change - instead of just to political strategists." 39

The unrepresentativeness of the party leadership has been a favourite charge of Republican conservatives. The party's alleged domination by a Northern liberal elite precluded it from appealing beyond its regional and ideological confines. When the Republican Party won the presidency this representation of minority interest extended into the administration, a charge utilised by Reagan in 1976,

"For a great many years ... the Northeast of the United States, a tiny region, has dominated the Republican Party and, when the Republicans were in power, the nation." 40

When reform projected control over the nomination into primaries and caucuses the process became accessible to independents and cross-over voters. This enhanced the incentives for candidates to avoid a partisan identification, and formulate appeals beyond their party's supporters. This was accomplished either through the use of issues or ideologies which appealed to independents and other party identifiers (see next section) or through bipartisan stances.

The bipartisan strategy was exemplified by a rejection of partisan politics as an effective means of tackling national problems. Reagan in 1976 argued, "I think the problems cross party lines and I think the people will cross party lines." 41 Similarly Robert Dole in his announcement of candidacy for 1980 stated, "I will be speaking with our friends in the Democratic party as well as Republicans and independents, believing that neither party has a corner on wisdom. We seek not a Democratic approach or a Republican approach to the nation's future, but we seek the correct approach and it will combine

the best thinking and the best efforts of all" ⁴²

A second variant of the bipartisan strategy is the exploitation of a local connection. Ford in Michigan recalled the start of his congressional career, "Now, some twenty-seven years later, I am asking for the help and assistance of all of the people of this part of Michigan and the great state of Michigan." ⁴³

The third variant of bipartisan strategy utilised by incumbent presidents was to promote the nomination as an endorsement of their conduct of office. For 1980, Carter's planning required him to act "presidential" and emphasised the experience he had acquired over four years. ⁴⁴ Ford also attempted to make the primaries into a vote on his performance in office which would therefore attract independent and crossover support, "I want every person who is registered in this state who can feel confidence in what we have done to vote for me, whether they call themselves Republicans, Independents or Democrats." ⁴⁵

The attenuation of organisation control after reform resulted in candidates' greater willingness to challenge favourite sons (whose enhanced vulnerability contributed to their decline), ^{and} oppose the party organisations and incumbent presidents. In the post-reform period charges of disloyalty no longer generated the obstacles to winning delegates erected by party leaders in the earlier period.

Electability was not the priority for voters that it is for party leaders so consequently it occupied a less prominent role in many post-reform campaigns. Those candidates who stressed their electability - Muskie, Bayh, Ford, Baker - struggled to convert this resource into support in primaries and caucuses. Other candidates, whilst not repudiating the importance of winning the election, advertised their purism (thereby appealing to purists in the nominating electorate) by rejecting the compromises and coalition-building strategies usually associated with capturing electoral majorities.

Reagan in 1976 was dismissive of ticket-balancing to produce united parties with broad appeal. "A Vice President", he argued, "should be compatible enough with the President to continue his policies if the duties fell to him, without a radical change in course."⁴⁶ Announcing his candidacy for 1972 McGovern opposed "coalitions of self-interest" and continual efforts to adjust policies and beliefs to "every seeming shift in public sentiment."⁴⁷

Thus far the analysis of campaign content has been impressionistic. Greater precision is hindered by the reliance on secondary sources: speeches are rarely reported in full, coverage is unevenly distributed between the candidates and advertising material is unobtainable. An attempt to provide some quantification to the effects of reform upon the partisan content of campaigns is made by an analysis of announcement speeches. Virtually all candidates make formal announcements of candidacy and a large number of verbatim statements have been obtained. Whilst this is an inadequate substitute for a more extensive survey, announcement statements have the advantage of being more representative of the candidate than many other speeches. They are made to national rather than special audiences. They also inaugurate the campaign so candidates strive to define themselves before the voters and their parties.

Table 8.1 quantifies references to the party, its heroes and its electoral objectives. References to the party are defined as either mentions of it by name or "my party", "our party" etc. Party heroes are defined as past or present leaders such as Lincoln, Eisenhower and Franklin Roosevelt. All mentions of the need for unity and/or victory or the candidate's proclaimed ability to secure these goals are counted as electoral objectives.

Whilst the results for the pre-reform period are distorted by

TABLE 8.1

PARTY-RELATED REFERENCES IN ANNOUNCEMENT STATEMENTS, 1960-1980

Candidate	Party-related References			Length of Statement (in sentences)
	Party name	Party heroes	Electoral Objectives	
Pre-reform				
Humphrey '60	4	2	1	52
J. Kennedy	3	0	2	21
Symington	1	0	2	18
Johnson	11	4	0	81
Rockefeller '64	4	0	0	16
Goldwater	6	0	0	32
Scranton	24	7	2	83
Rockefeller '68	2	0	0	13
McCarthy	5	0	1	25
R. Kennedy	6	1	1	41
Humphrey '68	6	6	1	101
Sub-total	72	20	10	483
Average	6	2	1	40
Post-reform				
McGovern	0	0	0	77
Carter '76	0	0	0	177
Church	0	0	0	96
Shriver	1	4	0	114
Ford	2	0	1	16
Brown '80	1	0	0	28
Baker	2	0	2	60
Connally	2	1	0	164
Crane	0	1	0	24
Dole	4	0	0	132
Reagan '80	2	0	0	167
Sub-total	14	6	3	1055
Average	1	1	0	96

Pre-reform party-related references : 21.1% of all sentences.

Post-reform " " " : 2.2% " " "

the heavily party-related statement of Scranton, the contrast between the two periods is clear. Since reform the average announcement statement has doubled in length but party mentions have diminished from six to one. References to party heroes declined more modestly but the post-reform average is attributable largely to a single candidate, Shriver claiming the Kennedy mantle in 1976. References to electoral objectives were a component of most statements before reform but they were absent from most post-reform announcements. Before reform party-related references appeared in one sentence in five. Subsequently they appeared in less than one sentence in forty. Even-tual nominees McGovern and Carter (in 1976) made no reference to the party, its heroes or its objectives.

Since reform party-related references were also more likely to be neutral, critical or qualified in their support. In 1980, attempting to demonstrate the breadth of his personal experience, Reagan noted that he had been both a Democrat and a Republican.⁴⁸ Dole, as already cited, promised to consult with both parties believing that neither had a monopoly on wisdom. Brown, in 1980, defined his candidacy as "an insurgent movement within the Democratic party."⁴⁹

Issues and Ideology

Descriptions of pre-reform nominating politics contain few references to the competing candidates' ideologies and issue positions. Rather, the emphases are placed on pragmatic appeals - electability, deals and understandings with party leaders. The scarcity of issue and ideological content has several explanations. The first follows from the nature of American parties. They are non-ideological, oriented to winning office rather than devising programmes. Thus the party leaders' criteria for evaluating potential nominees were pragmatic rather than programmatic. Divisions within the state and local parties

amongst which the candidates sought alliances were more commonly based on personal and territorial rivalries than differences over ideology or issues. Non-ideological parties were partnered by non-ideological voters. For the great majority of the electorate voting cues derived from party loyalties and candidate images.

The strategies pursued by many pre-reform candidates constrained the issue content of campaigns. Either active campaigns were eschewed or entry delayed until late in the pre-convention period. Such limitations on campaign activity restricted the potential for candidates to define their appeal in policy terms or debate their positions with their opponents.

The settings most conducive to policy definition were usually lacking in campaigns for the nomination. According to Benjamin Page's studies of presidential elections, exposure to personal questioning or responses to requests for written statements are more productive of policy content than where candidates are free to offer speeches and remarks.⁵⁰ Because so many pre-reform candidacies were undeclared or involved little public campaigning the opportunities for evoking issue responses were greatly circumscribed.

Where candidates employed issue stances in the pre-reform period they were designed to appeal to the electoral critical mass, to unite the parties' diverse components and assuage the minorities of issue-conscious groups within them, and identify themselves with the party record. The first task, an aspect of proving electability, was aimed at demonstrating a position on issues consistent with appealing to a majority of the electorate.⁵¹ The second objective was also related to electability, utilising policy appeals to unite the party.⁵² Seeking identification with the party record was the policy component of demonstrating party loyalty. Candidates attempted to portray themselves as representative spokesman for the party's heritage.

To appeal to the critical mass of the electorate candidates aligned themselves with the broad spectrum of voters accepting the New Deal state and internationalism. In domestic policy candidates, with different emphases between the parties, registered support for social security, minimum wage laws, farm subsidies and civil rights. In foreign policy candidates supported negotiations with the Soviet Union, and U.S. participation in the U.N. and N.A.T.O.

Candidates who breached the confines of this critical mass were unlikely to be electable. Thus Goldwater, the pre-reform candidate who most clearly differentiated himself from the policy 'consensus' was attacked by Republican moderates for an extremism that would produce electoral disaster. Voluntary social security (as Goldwater had suggested in New Hampshire) would bankrupt the system, according to Rockefeller. For Scranton, Goldwater's policies amounted to "dime store feudalism" that would plunge the party into "the dusty limbo of minority politics". In attacking Goldwater, Scranton wondered how the Republican Party "will make clear to the American people that it does not oppose Social Security, the United Nations, human rights and a sane nuclear policy."⁵³

Those candidates who gave issues prominence emphasised their electoral appeal. Goldwater's candidacy was premised on the potential for activating a conservative majority in the election. A "me-too" Republican could not pre-empt Johnson's liberal support. The more effective challenge could be mounted by a candidate who differentiated himself from Johnsonian liberalism and appealed to the South, Goldwater maintained.⁵⁴ Both McCarthy and Robert Kennedy provided the pragmatic justification for their nomination that an electoral majority supported their calls for an end to the Vietnam war. For example, Kennedy asserted:

"What these primaries have indicated and all party caucuses have indicated ... was that people in the Democratic Party and the people of the United States want a change. And that change can come about only if those who are delegates in Chicago recognise the importance of what has happened here in the state of California, what has happened in South Dakota, what's happened in New Hampshire, what happened across the country. The country wants to move in a different direction, we want to deal with our problems within our country and we want peace in Vietnam." 55

Most pre-reform candidates employed policy discussion for coalitional purposes. Issues were used to unite the parties. Unifying themes were sought in valence issues and areas of intra-party agreement. Sensitive issues that would divide ideologically diverse parties were avoided or finessed.

Use of a valence issue was evident in Nixon's 1968 pledge "to end the war and win the peace", by means unspecified. John Kennedy similarly depicted goals to be attained such as economic growth and rebuilding the stature of American science and education without specifying the means to these objectives or establishing their relationship to one another.

Kennedy's treatment of the potentially divisive civil rights issue in 1960 exemplified the drive to satisfy all elements of the party.⁵⁶ By the time of the convention he was acceptable to liberals, blacks and southerners. To the two former groups he expressed his commitment to civil rights and cited his support for legislation in Congress. In the South he focused on other issues such as the economy and labour reform and recalled bright passages in southern history.⁵⁷ His rear-guard position in support of civil rights in Congress also aided in defining him as a racial moderate. In 1968 Nixon's lack of specificity on the Vietnam war ensured that his stance did not divide the party and alienate support. He pre-empted discussion of the issue, beyond stating the objective of obtaining an end to the war, by a self-imposed moratorium whilst the possibility of peace talks existed.

Though policy was not the principal concern of the leaders there were issue-conscious elements within both parties which candidates sought to assuage. In the Democratic Party these groups were predominantly liberals - reform Democrats and some labour leaders. Their leverage derived from their influence within large state delegations such as California and New York. In addition, the prestige and media access of liberal commentators such as Eleanor Roosevelt elevated them into opinion leaders exercising influence disproportionate to their numbers. In the Republican Party issue-conscious groups were mainly conservative - prominent within the party in many areas and in auxiliary organisations such as the Young Republicans. Their influence was based on numerical strength because many convention delegates were conservatives.

The influence of these groups necessitated that their support be enlisted or their opposition neutralised by prospective nominees. Thus prior to 1960 John Kennedy devoted considerable attention to wooing the liberals.⁵⁸ He sought to assure them of his liberal credentials by his commitments on issues such as civil rights. For the liberal Michigan party leadership he answered a forty-one page questionnaire specifying his views on current issues.⁵⁹ Rockefeller, in both his campaigns for the nomination, sought to nullify conservative hostility by advertising his compatibility with them on some sensitive issues. Prior to 1964, lists of his business and fiscal actions as Governor were distributed exemplifying his economic conservatism.⁶⁰ In 1968 he proclaimed his commitment to fiscal responsibility and states' rights.⁶¹

Symbols were employed to demonstrate ideological and issue credibility to the attentive groups. Kennedy recruited the respected Chester Bowles to his campaign as foreign policy adviser. Though little advice was ever sought, his appointment was a favourable signal of the direction

of Kennedy's thinking to liberal Democrats.⁶² Rockefeller, in 1968, fuelled speculation that Reagan, the conservative hero, would be his vice presidential nominee.⁶³

In only one pre-reform contest, 1964, did the favourite of the issue-conscious elements win the nomination. The salience of principles and, to a lesser degree, issue stances in Goldwater's campaign were unusual amongst nominees. Furthermore, his estrangement from the policy preferences of the electoral critical mass was marked. The success of his ideological appeal in 1964 is attributable to the transformation of the party worked by the Draft movement in the years preceding. Control over the delegate selection process was wrested from professionals and moderates to be replaced by purists and conservatives. In consequence, the moderation enforced by electoral necessity that normally characterised Republican conventions was muted in 1964. Following from the pre-1964 transformation of the party, a conservative appeal found a receptive audience and won the nomination.

The defeat of McCarthy's campaign in 1968, however, exemplifies the more common modest issue orientation of party leaders. His issue appeal could not of itself generate the support within the party to win the nomination. Without a transformation of the party his insurgency guaranteed his rejection.

To illuminate their loyalty to the party, candidates located their policy positions within its tradition. Humphrey pledged in 1968 to build on thirty years of Democratic achievement. Republicans in 1964 offered conflicting claims to the party's philosophical heritage. Rockefeller claimed that establishing a "sound basis" for the party platform and victory required "following the principles and extending the policies of the 1960 and 1956 platforms and building upon the record of achievement of the Eisenhower administration."⁶⁴ Scranton

noted that Goldwater was opposed to every major proposal in the party's 1960 platform, suggesting he intended to create a new party.⁶⁵ By his opposition to legislation for civil rights - "the most important single Republican principle since Abraham Lincoln" - Goldwater demonstrated that "he is not with the Republicans", according to Scranton.⁶⁶ If Goldwater's stances were adopted, Scranton argued, it would read Lincoln, Dirksen and Eisenhower out of the Republican Party.⁶⁷

Goldwater argued that he, not the moderates, was in the mainstream of the party. Rockefeller's issue positions he regarded as more suited to the Democratic Party platform. For Goldwater, the Eisenhower administration was not the fount of Republican legitimacy having previously described it as a "dime store New Deal".

In the post-reform period issues and ideology grew in prominence in candidates' campaigns. In part this may follow from developments external to the nominating process - the increased issue sophistication and ideological constraint registered amongst the mass public from the later 1960's.⁶⁸ But developments within the nominating process were also conducive to issue definition. First, the 'changed American Voter' gained access to the nominating process in unprecedented numbers. Second, the activists in both parties, as previously noted, are skewed towards the ideological poles - conservative Republicans, liberal Democrats. Thus those elements most likely to participate in an open nominating process and exert additional influence through staffing candidate organisations, making financial contributions etc. are those most likely to respond to issue and ideological appeals.

The proliferation of candidates after reform encouraged the use of issues and ideology to differentiate their appeals from their opponents. Amidst heightened competition the need for distinctiveness was enhanced. The duration and public nature of campaigns also inspired issue and ideological definition. Because campaigns were so much longer

than previously the opportunities to develop recognition in issue-ideological terms were far greater. In the competition for media attention candidates subjected themselves to interviews and debates and responded to requests for statements of their positions - the settings conducive to policy enunciation.

This assessment of post-reform campaigns is not intended to suggest that they conform to the liberal ideal of policy-specific candidates and policy-conscious voters. Candidates focused on many matters other than policy and they rarely engaged in debates over issues in which similarities and differences were elucidated. Voters had many other tests of candidates in addition to issues, and their knowledge of the candidates' stances was often sparse. But if issue voting is an echo of candidates' issue input it is unlikely that pre-reform party leaders were subjected to extent of policy discussion of, for example, the 1976 Republican contest which produced issue voting of comparable magnitude to the succeeding general election.⁶⁹

In the post-reform period issue appeals were employed to mobilise the participant bias, construct campaign organisations, encourage independent and crossover voting and activate interest group support. The shift in the participant bias (see Chapter Four) from election-oriented professionals to the activist wings enhanced the incentives for issue-based appeals to these groups. Conservative Republicans and liberal Democrats turnout at higher rates than the other ideological components of the party. They also engage in issue voting in greater proportions than the other ideological blocs within the parties' electorates.

To appeal to the party activists candidates espoused their issue preferences. Republican conservative candidates took hawkish stands on foreign and defence policy, opposed government intervention in the

economy and business, and demanded austerity on socio-cultural issues. Liberal Democrats advocated dovish foreign and defence policies, supported government intervention in the economy and business, and favoured permissive stances on socio-cultural issues.⁷⁰

Reagan in 1976 opposed detente, the 'giveaway' of the Panama Canal and black majority rule in Rhodesia. Several Republican conservatives in 1980 opposed the pending SALT treaty and urged greater expenditure for defence. In 1976 Reagan expressed his "philosophical opposition" to TVA and he, in company with other conservatives in 1980, advocated balancing the federal budget. In the latter year most conservatives opposed abortion, ERA and gun control.

Liberal Democrats' foreign and defence policy positions included McGovern's call for an immediate end to the U.S. bombing in Vietnam and the return of all troops within ninety days. He also recommended reducing the defence budget by a third; Udall opposed foreign policy alliances with racist and military regimes; Edward Kennedy opposed draft registration and criticised the U.S.'s past record of assistance to the Shah of Iran. In economic policy, McGovern called for a guaranteed income; Harris advocated increased wealth taxes and the dissolution of monopolies; Kennedy urged gasoline rationing and wage and price controls. In socio-cultural policy, McGovern supported busing and reduced penalties for marijuana use; the liberals in 1976 (Shriver excepted) approved legalised abortion and Kennedy in 1980 supported its federal funding.

The consequence of appeals to party activists was to pull the policy emphasis in nominating campaigns away from the electoral critical mass, the magnet for pre-reform issue stances. This centrifugal force also affected those candidates for whom the activists were not natural allies. The activists possessed the influence in the post-reform

process to compel responses from other candidates to gain their support or neutrality. In office the Ford administration was constrained by the need to assuage Reagan's conservative supporters.⁷¹ Carter in 1976 was urged by his pollster Patrick Caddell to "give the appearance of substance" which, inter alia, would send signals to "suspicious but open liberals."⁷² Whilst most of Carter's resultant responses were mainly cosmetic he did endorse the Humphrey-Hawkins full employment bill, a touchstone of liberal orthodoxy in 1976.

The mid-campaign readjustments in strategy engaged in by some candidates demonstrates the recognition of the activist wings' influence. Initially Muskie's campaign, projecting him as a unifier, avoided issue discussion as a risk to his broad appeal.⁷³ Following several setbacks in primaries he moved to espouse liberal issue positions, his media adviser noting "We're going to erase the yellow stripe in the middle of the road".⁷⁴ The new style was evident in the promotion of issues into the principal basis of his appeal exemplified in a speech in Pennsylvania,

"The important question is not what a candidate is against but what he is for - and how would his election as President make a difference to you. I have proposed a freeze on food price increases. No other candidate has. I say freeze food prices now. You can say the same thing by voting for me ..."⁷⁵

A similar response to failure was evident in Reagan's 1980 campaign. Defeat in the Iowa caucuses was followed by reorganisation of the campaign staff including the dismissal of manager John Sears who had devised the candidate's election-oriented centrist strategy. Thereafter a clearer conservative identification was pursued.

Issue appeals were also employed to generate the volunteer activity necessary to mount voter-oriented campaigns. Because purposive incentives are a major stimulant to volunteer effort candidates were

encouraged to use issue appeals to recruit an organisation. In planning for the first post-reform nomination McGovern's strategists believed that in an open process the nomination would be won by the hardest workers "and people are not motivated to work who have no strong convictions."⁷⁶ Pre-empting the Democratic left for McGovern entailed monopolising the volunteer support of that wing, forestalling the entry of other liberals by denying them the necessary organisational resources.

Beginning in 1970, McGovern spoke before student audiences demanding withdrawal from Vietnam, less severe penalties for marijuana use and amnesty for war resisters. These audiences, wrote one of his aides, "would be the campaign workers and voters who would make a difference."⁷⁷ Observing the organisation at work in the Massachusetts primary Theodore White commented, "No bulletin board in any college, apparently, carried any other notices but those of McGovern volunteers or rallies."⁷⁸ Prior to 1976, several Democratic candidates sought to imitate McGovern focusing on recruiting helpers amongst reform Democratic groups.⁷⁹ In the years preceding 1980, Connolly and Reagan established political action committees which enabled them to tour the country campaigning for conservative Republicans and building contacts among the party activists.

Appeals to issue activists were also employed to generate the financial resources with which to mount extensive campaigns. Contributing to campaigns is correlated with other forms of political activism so the participant bias extends to fund raising. The reforms of campaign finance laws necessitated a mass base to pay for campaigns following the prohibitions on large donations (if federal matching funds are utilised).

Policy appeals aided fund raising efforts by providing access to

issue-based constituencies. Use of interest group membership rolls and magazine subscriber lists facilitated concentrated solicitations with a high rate of return. For example, McGovern's direct mail campaign focused on members of SANE (National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy), subscribers to New Republic and contributors to the appeal for funds to sustain the McGovern-Hatfield amendment for ending the Vietnam war.⁸⁰ Udall's efforts concentrated on environmentalists; Bayh, a sponsor of ERA, on women's activist groups and Jackson, a staunch defender of Israel, rented mailing lists from synagogues.⁸¹

For candidates who did not emphasise issue appeals potential financial constituencies were more amorphous. For this reason neither the Ford nor Carter campaigns in 1976 initially engaged in direct mailing efforts, believing that they possessed no constituencies that could be tapped economically and productively.⁸² Such candidates could compensate for the smaller number of donations by their greater size. However, the utility of larger sums in post-reform nominating politics was less than previously.

The increased permeability of the reformed nominating process to interest group participation enhanced the incentives for candidates to bid for their support by espousing their issues. Group support provided cohesive voting blocs, organisation and finance. In 1980, for example, all major Republican candidates except Anderson opposed gun control in bidding for the support of gun owner groups. In 1972 McGovern appealed to "every faction of the fragmented American left: peace groups, women's liberation, blacks, populists, and gay liberation."⁸³

In competing for group support candidates differentiated themselves from their opponents by their early commitment to group causes and the outspokenness of their positions. On Vietnam, as on other issues, McGovern's campaign proclaimed that he had been 'Right from the Start'.

McGovern had been an early critic of American involvement claiming in his announcement statement to have "stood almost alone in opposition to the sending of American troops" in the early 1960's.⁸⁴ As a sponsor of ERA, Bayh claimed the support of women's rights groups, and Jackson sought the allegiance of Jewish voters by emphasising his long-standing support for Israel.

By outspoken stances candidates sought to align themselves with group interests so closely^{as} to make their opponents seem reticent by comparison. McGovern called for a reduction in the defence budget of a third offering a challenge to other candidates who espoused new domestic priorities without specifying how increased spending would be funded.⁸⁵ In his commitment to busing in 1972 Lindsay pursued the black vote likening the compromise positions of other liberals to Wallace who made no claim to black support.⁸⁶

Incursions by independents and crossover voting was stimulated by issue and ideological appeals. Injecting non-party identifiers into primaries and caucuses could skew the issue and ideological preferences of the nominating electorate towards candidates who were advantaged compared to a purely partisan electorate. By adopting the most outspoken stances on popular causes in either party, candidates became the instrumentality for issue voters across the party divide. Wallace's opposition to busing in 1972 tapped discontent amongst Republicans and independents in addition to Democrats. McGovern on the Vietnam war, like Wallace on busing, articulated the clearest divergence from current policy on an issue which aroused widespread discontent. Reagan in 1976 espoused a hawkishness on foreign policy unrepresented by Ford or the Democratic candidates (after Wallace's demise). Anderson in 1980 offered liberal stances in all policy areas but without the character defects that constrained Kennedy's support.

Appeals for the crossover vote stressed incentives to crossing party lines. Reagan's advertising in 1976 sought to entice conservative Democrats into the Republican primaries following the collapse of Wallace's candidacy. In Texas Reagan commercials featured a Wallace supporter addressing himself to Democrats:

"I've always been a Democrat, all my life. A conservative Democrat. As much as I hate to admit it, George Wallace can't be nominated. Ronald Reagan can. He's right on the issues. So for the first time in my life I'm gonna vote for Ronald Reagan." ⁸⁷

Leaflets were distributed announcing, "Democrats: you will not be committing a major indiscretion if you vote, this year, in the Republican primary." ⁸⁸

Personal Traits and Character

Despite the prominence assigned to candidate factors in explaining voting in presidential elections they received little systematic discussion as determinants of preference in pre-reform national conventions. Where references were made to such factors they were stated at a high level of generality, as in the candidate's need to "exhibit the virtues of statesmanship in terms which have wide appeal, while giving the impression of individuality as a person." ⁸⁹ The content of such qualities, how candidates projected them, how leaders responded or discriminated between rival presentations was not disclosed.

However, there are sufficient fragmentary references to personal traits and character in pre-reform writing to give some impression of their content, presentation and reception. They can be summarised as follows: candidates' presentations were communicated to party leaders directly through personal interaction; such interactions were often private (rendering knowledge of their content elusive); public presen-

tations of ascriptive status concentrated on traits recognised as electorally desirable or supposed disqualifications were presented so as to discount them as handicaps; presentations of potential presidential character were keyed to defining co-operative working relations with party leaders.

When the nomination was controlled by small numbers of party leaders candidates sought to establish personal contacts with them. The years prior to the convention were devoted to building friendly relations with the leaders who would subsequently control delegates. Where the requisite intelligence was available candidates keyed their presentations to the idiosyncracies of individual leaders. For example, John Kennedy's informant on one Midwestern governor observed that "any approach to him which overlooks this strong religious drive - which is completely intermeshed with his personal ambition - will miss the mark."⁹⁰

The cultivation of personal relations either generated support or established the foundations on which other appeals could later be constructed. The relevance of personal familiarity to building support advantaged those candidates with extensive contacts within the party such as Nixon, Goldwater, John Kennedy and Humphrey. In contrast, candidates lacking a network of friendships in the party hierarchy were deprived of support or the relationships from which it could be generated. A Midwestern Republican state chairman illustrated Nixon's advantage in 1968 -

"I think that people who've been in the political process as I have are comfortable with Dick Nixon. I've always trusted him and felt grateful to him. I could feel that way about Rockefeller or Reagan if I knew them better, but I don't. There's the old saying here - stay with a friend."⁹¹

Candidates recognised the leaders' electoral orientation in the

presentation of their personal attributes. Characteristics conducive to election were emphasised. Attributes considered detrimental to electoral chances were overlooked or attempts made to demonstrate their surmountability as obstacles to election. For example, in 1960 Symington's appeal was premised on his satisfaction of the criteria of availability. As a Border state Protestant from British stock with a moderately liberal record he would be acceptable to all factions, and electable.

Confronted by apparent religious and regional barriers to their electability, Kennedy and Johnson respectively in 1960 sought, variously, to question the legitimacy of their disqualifications, disprove their impeditive effects and distance themselves from their negative associations. Kennedy stressed his commitment to church-state separation and noted that there had been no religious barriers to his serving his country in the armed forces or in Congress. Johnson denounced extra-constitutional qualifications for the presidency like regional specifications. To demonstrate that his religion did not deter voters Kennedy entered several primaries to prove his electability. Having shown his appeal to voters he gained the additional leverage with party leaders concerned for the electoral allegiance of Catholics risking the charge of anti-Catholic prejudice if they rejected him.⁹² To modify his southern connection Johnson referred to Texas as a Western state. He campaigned for its admission to Democratic Conference of Western states and sought delegates in the region in an attempt to offset his image as an exclusively southern candidate.

Whilst candidates sought to demonstrate their possession of the requisites of presidential calibre such as experience and leadership, their presentations were also adapted to the requirements of a nominating electorate of party leaders whose political fortunes were,

in part, dependent upon the president. This stimulated the leaders' concern for the candidates' likely conduct of presidential office in relation to them. To satisfy these concerns candidates intimated their intended methods for distributing patronage and favours, their likely responsiveness to leaders' requests and deference to their control of their own bailiwicks. Such presentations assured the leaders of access at federal level and freedom from intervention in their own domains. One of the attractions of Symington's candidacy was that he promised to be a boss's president: one who deferred to their local control.⁹³ Robert Kennedy's appeal to party leaders over McCarthy was that they knew from past experience that he could deal with them.⁹⁴

After reform expanded the nominating electorate candidate presentations of personal traits and character were communicated to voters via the mass media. Such interactions were public. Presentations were no longer refracted through leader-oriented requirements. Their definitions of electable and co-operative presidents ceased to constrain candidates in projecting their images. Character and style were defined in relation to voter demands. Further reflecting the switch from a leader- to voter-dominated electorate, candidates strove to present a non-political image and to distance themselves from Washington and the political establishment.

In a voter-dominated process candidate presentations could no longer be achieved through personal interaction. To present themselves to voters candidates were dependent upon the mass media either through paid advertising or news coverage. Thomas Patterson noted the changed means of presentation -

"Instead of seeking meetings with the party leadership the candidate now spends his time going from one media market to the next, seeking coverage through local news organisations and the national reporters accompanying him on the campaign trail."⁹⁵

The change from direct to mediated presentations increased the public content of the campaign. Conclaves could still be held with party leaders and representatives of interest groups but such interactions could not deliver delegates as earlier candidate-leader meetings could.

After reform candidates' presentations of their ascriptive status was directed at generating voter support rather than satisfying the leaders' tests of electability. In 1976 Carter's unorthodox religious and regional affiliations did not prevent him from dominating the nomination. His assurances to Jews and Catholics were aimed, not at leaders concerned for his electoral potential, but to members of those groups voting in primaries. His statements of support for Israel, and Soviet Jews, meetings and publicised endorsements from Jewish leaders were concentrated in the period prior to the primaries in California, New Jersey and Ohio in which Jews were a significant voting bloc. In the South he capitalised on his regional appeal. In the North his defeat of Wallace in the South verified his appeal to blacks and some liberals.

Two candidate images developed in the reform period which mark the switch from a leader- to a voter-controlled process are the non-politician and the Washington outsider. Both were probably fostered by post-Watergate disenchantment but they became plausible presentations when the nomination was removed from practising politicians based in or linked to Washington who, in reality or caricature, provided the stereotypes from which candidates sought to distinguish themselves.

The image of a non-politician was promoted by an emphasis on integrity and purism, references to non-political experience and personal unconventionality. Declaring his candidacy for 1972, McGovern committed himself to a campaign resting on "candor and reason ... For

my part, I make one pledge above all others - to seek and speak the truth with all the resources of mind and spirit I command."⁹⁶

Muskie's advertising proclaimed "Trusty Muskie". Carter frequently promised that he would never lie. Udall's advertising featured testimonials to his moral strength from Archibald Cox, the dismissed Watergate Special Prosecutor.

Purism was demonstrated by two means. First, candidates emphasised the boldness and clarity of their statements of policy and principle. Dismissing easy options as unrealistic, Anderson's advertising denoted his distinctiveness in presenting the electorate with the unpalatable alternatives, "I'm asking you to think about a candidate who dares to discuss them before an election."⁹⁷ McGovern, employing the slogan "Right from the Start", recalled his lonely opposition to the involvement of American troops in Vietnam. Udall's advertising noted his record of being in the vanguard in Congress in adopting stances on controversial issues before they became popular.⁹⁸

The second component of the purist appeal was a proclaimed unwillingness to compromise for political advantage. McGovern's announcement statement expressed opposition to backroom deals, coalitions of self-interest and adjusting policy stances to accord with public opinion.⁹⁹ Reagan repudiated ticket-balancing in favour of philosophical consistency. Udall's opposition to the "interests" as a member and chairman of the House Interior Committee was given prominence in his advertising.¹⁰⁰

Candidates distanced themselves from career politician stereotypes by publicising their experience outside politics. Carter frequently invoked his curriculum vitae as a farmer, engineer, planner, businessman, nuclear physicist and naval officer. Reagan's announcement for 1980 referred to his experience of America from several vantage

points - as sportscaster, actor, labour union official, soldier and public official.¹⁰¹

Personal unconventionality contributed to the non-political image and differentiated candidates from their competitors. Carter proclaimed his religious commitment and preached a gospel of love to political audiences. Harris campaigned using borrowed cars, staying in private homes and relying on volunteer campaign staff. Whilst such frugality was financially necessary it also promoted the desired image of a 'people's campaign'.¹⁰² Brown rejected the trappings of gubernatorial office and pursued idiosyncratic personal interests. He is, Elizabeth Drew wrote, "California hip - and he knows how to use it to political effect: health food, Zen, appropriate technology, quoting E.F. Schumacher's Small Is Beautiful." ¹⁰³

Some candidates continued to portray themselves as politicians. Bayh proclaimed that it took a good politician to be a good president. Baker expressed his pride in being a politician and Bush boasted that he would be a president who would not have to be trained on the job. All three failed to win the nomination. Bayh and Baker were eliminated early in the primary sequence despite substantial reputations in Washington and plausible claims of electability. Their failure was indicative of the unattractiveness of the politician's image in a process dominated by voters in the post-Watergate era.

Negative treatments of Washington were prominent in post-reform candidates' presentations. In an open process candidates were able to exploit the greater distrust of political institutions of the electorate than is prevalent amongst elites.¹⁰⁴ The federal government and Congress were condemned for unresponsiveness, lack of innovation, inefficiency, profligacy and receptivity to special interests.

Declaring his candidacy for 1972, Lindsay cast himself as the

spokesman for "the America Washington has ignored."¹⁰⁵ McGovern condemned the "establishment center" which, he claimed, Americans viewed as a decaying void commanding neither confidence nor love.¹⁰⁶ Condemning Congress for its immobility, Carter attributed its failings to its members,

"we know from bitter experience we're not going to get the changes we need by shifting around the same groups of Washington insiders. They sit up in Congress every year making the same political speeches and the same unkept promises." ¹⁰⁷

Focusing on his Congress-based opponents Carter's advertising in New Hampshire charged: "The candidates running for President are telling the people ... about the evils of the Washington bureaucracy, when they have been part of that bureaucracy all along."¹⁰⁸ Reagan's announcement for 1976 identified a "buddy system" in Washington that "functions for its own benefit - increasingly insensitive to the needs of the American worker who supports it with his taxes. Today it is difficult to find leaders who are independent of the forces that have brought us our problems - the Congress, the bureaucracy, the lobbyists, big business and big labor."¹⁰⁹ Wallace railed against the arrogance, hypocrisy and ineptitude of Washington intellectuals resulting in schemes of misplaced social engineering like busing, "the most atrocious, callous, cruel, asinine thing you can do for little children."¹¹⁰

Governors and ex-governors pledged to correct Washington's faults by injecting the virtues that characterised their state administrations. Carter promised a rationalisation of the federal bureaucracy comparable to that he promoted in Georgia. Reagan offered a repeat of the reorganisation of welfare and economy in government effected in California. Brown offered the "different approach" he utilised as governor to the president's tasks.

Conclusion

Adapted to the demands of party leaders, pre-reform candidates projected themselves as party loyalists, representatives of the electorate's policy consensus, effective (and appreciative) politician-presidents. Party-pragmatic was the modal campaign style.

The utility of party and pragmatic emphases weakened after reform. The displacement of the leaders removed their guardianship of the party's heritage and organisational demands from influence over the nomination. They were replaced by voters less sympathetic to parties and politicians, and ideologically-attuned activists. In a participatory process the party-pragmatic style risked an unintensity ineffective in mobilising support. To activate a constituency many candidates relied upon issue specificity, hostility to or independence from the party, their uncompromising distinctiveness as non-politicians.

The shift in candidate emphases between the two periods moves from elements of the professional to elements of the amateur style.¹¹¹ In a process controlled by professionals candidates appealed to their organisational, non-ideological, personal, material concerns. In a participatory process accessible to amateurs candidates projected themselves as ideological, uncompromising, anti- (professionally-led) parties.

NOTES

1. The concepts and terminology employed here are modifications of those presented in Gary R. Orren, "Candidate Style and Voter Alignment in 1976", in Seymour Martin Lipset, ed., Emerging Coalitions in American Politics (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1978), pp.127-81.
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CHAPTER NINE

COMMUNICATING THE CAMPAIGN

Reform enhanced the public nature of nomination campaigns. They came to be conducted amongst the mass electorate more than party leaders, via public communications rather than private negotiations. After reform campaigns were mediated through the means of mass communication where before they were conducted directly with the nominating electorate.

This chapter contrasts the pre-reform personalised campaign with its mediated successor. It argues that in the pre-reform period personal relations with party leaders were a necessary pre-condition of winning their support. The mass media performed three functions in the candidates' leader-oriented campaigns. The prestige press' influence upon the party leaders promoted their writers into targets of candidate efforts to win their recognition and favourable coverage. Secondly, the popular media (television, radio, provincial newspapers, popular magazines) were utilised by candidates whose strategies emphasised the mobilisation of voters. Thirdly, the media transmitted campaign advertising material, again a strategy used by the vote-mobilisers, particularly those entered in primaries.

After reform the need to reach the greatly enlarged nominating electorate enhanced the candidates' dependence upon mass media. Personalised campaigning ceased to be plausible where the nominating electorate numbered millions. Moreover, shifts occurred in the nature and functions of the media strategies of the candidates. Seeking to reach a mass audience, the popular media, particularly television, became the focus of all candidates. As campaign finance laws curbed expenditure on advertising and organisation so media reportage

grew in importance as the vehicle for reaching the electorate.

The Personalised Campaign

When the nominating electorate consisted of a few hundred party leaders it was feasible for candidates to conduct campaigns in person with individual leaders. For the majority of pre-reform candidates who eschewed cultivation of the voters, personalised campaigns amongst party leaders dominated their strategies. Even popular favourite candidates such as John Kennedy seeking to mobilise voters also recognised the need to communicate with party leaders. Their strategies recognised that public popularity in the absence of leadership support or acquiescence, as exemplified by Kefauver in 1952, would be insufficient to win the nomination. For these candidates the public and leader campaigns meshed.

Personalised campaigns resulted from a nominating electorate consisting of local notables and the individualised appeals made to them. By campaigning in person candidates demonstrated their deference to the leaders' control of their bailiwicks and signified the importance that their support carried. For the leaders such campaigns generated localised benefits. They were seen to be confidants of popular national figures gaining in prestige from such associations. Personal campaigns were also required to communicate appeals particular to each leader. Whilst the public 'face' of the campaign emphasised generalised appeals of electability, policy stances etc., the personal component of the campaign entailed offering grants of access to specific leaders in exchange for their support. Establishing the content of such exchanges took place through bargaining necessitating personal communication.

Personal interaction might alone generate bonds of friendship

which could be translated into support. As Polsby observed, "A politician will naturally favor a presidential hopeful from his own state, or an aspirant with whom he has been on close personal or professional terms."¹ Such personal relations were likely to provide fertile grounds on which access could be obtained. In accounting for Kennedy's success in 1960 Theodore White attached weight to the number of local party people that the candidate knew.² Such knowledge had been deliberately acquired from 1956 onwards. Adducing reasons for Kennedy's narrow defeat for the 1956 vice presidential nomination his 1960 campaign manager, Robert Kennedy, recalled a Maryland couple,

"They were entirely friendly. They liked us. But Kefauver had visited them in their home. He had sent them Christmas cards. We couldn't shake them. Believe me, we've sent out lots of Christmas cards since."³

The Midwestern Republican state chairman quoted in the last chapter reflected a preference based on personal rather than political grounds in explaining his support for Nixon in 1968,

"I think that people who've been in the political process as I have are comfortable with Dick Nixon. I've always trusted him and felt grateful to him. I could feel this way about Rockefeller or Reagan if I knew them better; but I don't. There's the old saying here - stay with a friend."⁴

Personal contacts were often established by candidates in their performance of party maintenance functions. By attending dinners, raising funds, making speeches and campaigning for local candidates they came into contact with local leaders. Concomitantly, they demonstrated their commitment to the welfare of the local parties, assisted them in fulfilling their objectives and so established an indebtedness amongst their leaders. Candidates solicitous of the local parties' interests in earlier years thus mounted campaigns on territory cultivated through party service. In accounting for Kennedy's popularity

amongst local party leaders in 1960 Sorensen cited his past efforts,

"He had spoken at their dinners and rallies, raised and given money for their campaigns, sought their advice and assistance, and maintained a genuine interest in them all. He never refused a phone call, ignored a letter or turned away a visitor." ⁵

An Iowa party leader in 1968 exemplified reciprocation for Humphrey's past efforts by supporting him for the nomination, "In the years when we could put our caucuses and conventions in phone booths, if we wanted anyone to come and speak it was always Hubert." ⁶

Candidates without personal connections to party leaders were disadvantaged in the quest for support. They lacked the personal relations which could provide support automatically or the base from which it could be won. The absence of personal relations indicated a previous record of unconcern for the leaders and their party organisations. The resentment of Republican professionals towards Rockefeller derived in part from the belief that he promoted himself rather than the party. ⁷ An Oregon Republican exemplified the displeasure towards a candidate with a national reputation who had not engaged in the unglamorous work of assisting local parties,

"He's coming now because he wants us. But who the Hell is he? Just a face on television. We don't know him. But we do know Nixon." ⁸

The Pre-Reform Role of Media

Some candidates in the pre-reform period relied exclusively on communication within the party organisations to win the nomination. Symington in the immediate pre-reform period typifies this intra-party communication strategy. He lacked public recognition and popularity but made no attempt to acquire it. Symington's appeal was his ability and his widespread acceptability both of which would impress party

leaders in private meetings. His strategists believed that the nomination could be won by a candidate with these assets, known and popular within the party but largely unknown outside. Cultivation of the electorate could await the election campaign after the nomination had been won.⁹

Symington's campaign was exceptional in the 1960's for its neglect of strategies aimed at generating public recognition and popularity. By the immediate pre-reform period most candidates perceived that winning the nomination depended upon attaining public prominence rather than satisfying the criteria of availability.¹⁰

Establishing prominence proceeded via the mass media through two avenues. The first was aimed at the nominating electorate through the quality media to which they were responsive. The second was aimed at the mass public directed towards generating prominence that would provide a source of leverage with party leaders.

To reach the nominating electorate necessitated use of the prestige press such as the New York Times and Time utilised by political elites. The influences of these publications had two bases. First, their news sources included political leaders. "These newspapers", according to Key, "serve a special function in communication among the major political actors and lesser activists. These people talk to each other through these papers; thus they provide, in a sense, an arena for continuing discussion of politics among those principally concerned."¹¹ The close contacts between the writers for these publications and party leaders enabled measures of the latter's presidential preferences to be registered. Such reports served to mitigate the pervasive uncertainty surrounding nominating politics.¹² Gaining knowledge of the preferences of other relevant actors had utility for party leaders assisting them in deciding the direction and timing

of their own commitments so as to maximise their own political advantage.

Secondly, the major commentators for these publications were political influentials in their own right. The work of writers such as Reston, Lawrence and Alsop conditioned the thinking of political leaders. Gaining their recognition and approval provided candidates with an indirect means of influence within the nominating electorate. In a memorandum for Nixon prior to the 1968, campaign H.R. Haldeman estimated that one important favourable Washington column was worth more than two dozen press releases or position papers.¹³

Candidates keyed their campaigns to solicit coverage by these publications and writers. John Kennedy's campaign concentrated upon Time because it was a national publication read by opinion leaders.¹⁴ He and his staff were accessible to its reporters facilitating their coverage of him. He also conducted a propaganda war with them against the magazine's traditional hostility towards liberal Democrats spurring them to zealously fair treatment.¹⁵ Johnson was similarly receptive to Time believing that coverage in its pages (like that of the New York Times) was the route to establishing a national reputation. Once each week he made himself available for interviews with the magazine's writer Hugh Sidey.¹⁶

Strategies aimed at soliciting the recognition and approval of commentators were keyed to their earnest treatment of politics. Speeches on major issues were delivered, and articles written on matters of public import. Columnists were included on the mailing list of recipients of John Kennedy's collection of speeches, The Strategy of Peace, published in the Spring of 1960.¹⁷

The influence exerted by the commentators enforced adaptations in the conduct of campaigns to attract favourable coverage. During the

1960 Wisconsin primary the Humphrey campaign strengthened its organisational activity in Marathon County in anticipation of a visit there by Joseph Alsop. On a previous visit the Alsops had noted the paucity of activity on Humphrey's behalf compared to that for Kennedy.¹⁸

The second component of media strategy was aimed at the party leaders via the voters. This required campaigns concentrated upon the popular media. The object of such strategies was to promote the candidate's public recognition and popularity which would exert pressure on the leaders from below. Seeking an electable candidate and the preservation of their own positions through responsiveness to pressure, party leaders would be influenced by mass preferences.

The most sustained cultivation of the popular media in the pre-reform period was undertaken on John Kennedy's behalf prior to 1960. Kennedy was projected into a national figure largely on a-political grounds. Rather, his youth and good looks, glamorous family, war record, prize-winning authorship and associations with the famous were utilised to earn celebrity status. His cultivation of reporters and accessibility to them eased their coverage of him. His celebrity status boosted the sales of publications in which he was featured.

Joseph Kennedy perceived the relevance of his son's a-political appeal to the task of winning the nomination,

"You advertise the fact that he will be at a dinner and you will break all records for attendance. He can draw more people to a fund-raising dinner than Cary Grant or Jimmy Stewart. Why is that? He has more universal appeal. That is why the Democratic party is going to nominate him. The party leaders around the country realise that to win they have to nominate him."¹⁹

Kennedy's prominence generated by media publicity percolated through to the party organisations because local leaders recognised it amongst their acquaintances.²⁰ The evidence of his prominence, when revealed in the media, then became an additional lever to exert against party

leaders who were "deluged ... with articles by and about Kennedy ... books by and about Kennedy and polls showing Kennedy ahead."²¹

Kennedy's employment of pollster Lou Harris - the first such engagement in a campaign for the nomination - provided a mechanism for strengthening his relations with the press and enhancing the capability for influencing the content of their stories to his own advantage. Harris polls conducted in various states showing Kennedy ahead were passed to reporters lacking in precise measures of popular preference below the national level. The poll results were then incorporated into stories reporting the strength of support for Kennedy. Both the polls and articles using them were then passed to wavering party leaders providing persuasive evidence of both Kennedy's appeal amongst the voters and its recognition by the press.

Media advertising was employed principally by campaigns seeking to mobilise voter support. Within such campaigns advertising was usually concentrated in primary states. In West Virginia in 1960 print and broadcast advertising is estimated to have accounted for 40 per cent of Kennedy's total expenditure.²² In 1964 more than \$1.5 million was expended on broadcast advertising in the nomination campaigns.²³ As the great bulk of total spending was concentrated in primary states, California pre-eminently, it can be assumed that media spending was also concentrated there.²⁴ Of Robert Kennedy's total spending in seven primary states in 1968, approximately two-fifths of expenditure was used to finance media advertising.²⁵

For candidates whose strategies were less dependent upon voter mobilisation media advertising was a smaller component of overall expenditure. Humphrey's newspaper and television commercials in 1968, for example, amounted to one-fifth of total spending.²⁶

The predominance of media spending in primary states corroborates the proposition made in Chapter Seven that efforts to mobilise

voters into the pre-reform convention-caucus process were generally eschewed. Public campaigning to win converts and generate turnout were neglected, McCarthy excepted, even by candidates pursuing popular favourite strategies. In these states popular favourites, like other candidates, sought to negotiate support through party leaders. Proof of their voter appeal derived from evidence external to the delegate selection process such as crowds in the streets and, in the form of primaries and national polls, outside the particular non-primary state.

Rockefeller's 1968 candidacy was the most intensive media campaign conducted outside the primaries. Though utilising a popular favourite strategy the campaign was inaugurated after the filing deadline for the primaries had passed. Attempts to demonstrate voter appeal were dependent upon the evidence of the polls. They also provided a device which could be used to question Nixon's vote-getting capability which appeared to have been proven in the primaries. For the Rockefeller strategists, the reliability of the polls as election indicators was posed against the primaries.

Rockefeller's claim to the nomination depended upon poll evidence that only he could win the election for the Republican Party. To promote his poll standings an extensive advertising campaign was launched in newspapers and television. The campaign focused upon media markets in large states covering half the country's population and where Rockefeller's potential support was concentrated. If the candidate's support increased in these areas its impact would register in national polls. The campaign's conclusion was timed to coincide with the interviews for the final pre-convention Gallup poll. In states where delegate preferences were regarded as fluid the Rockefeller organisation conducted its own polls to use in negotiations with party leaders. For leaders concerned about their party's local elec-

toral performance the Rockefeller organisation could provide evidence of the relative merits of Nixon and Rockefeller at the top of the ticket.

As modern presidential campaigns came to rely increasingly upon mass media to reach voters so the candidates' ability to utilise it successfully grew in influence upon election outcomes. In evaluating a candidate's electability, competence at handling the media became relevant to the assessment.

The failure of Romney, who premised his appeal to the Republican Party on his electability, to handle press questioning proved devastating to his candidacy prior to 1968. His inability to enunciate comprehensible, cliché-free programmes, particularly on Vietnam, distinguishable from the administration resulted in critical press reviews.²⁷ The climax in media depictions of the candidate as a lightweight occurred when Romney admitted in a local Detroit television interview that on his tour of Vietnam he had been "brainwashed" by American military and diplomatic representatives. Time subsequently described the statement as "so inept an explanation of shifting views that it could end his presidential ambitions."²⁸

Nixon's 1968 strategy incorporated media competence into the conception of electability which the campaign sought to project. This sensitivity to the candidate's relations with and coverage by the media followed from the perceived deficiencies in his 1960 presidential and 1962 gubernatorial campaigns.

A two-fold response emerged to rectify these past deficiencies. First, Nixon had to show improved quality in his television performances. His television adviser, Frank Shakespeare (probably the first such full-time member of a pre-convention campaign) noted the relevance of television to the goal of proving electability,

"The Party felt that Nixon was experienced, he was able, but he wasn't electable; and he wasn't electable because he couldn't handle TV. The country was moving to the right; the ablest conservative they had was obviously Nixon, but Nixon had to prove he was electable. He could win the primaries in the small states without using TV; but then that wouldn't prove anything; he had to win it, using TV, to prove to the Party chiefs that he could win a national election."²⁹

Improved television technique was achieved through the widespread use of commercially-produced mini-programmes. These commercials consisted of the candidate answering questions from panels of voters.³⁰ The appearance was that of an authentic programme but, in fact, composed of edited highlights of sessions conducted with panel members selected by the producers. In this controlled environment the candidate projected ease, informality and knowledge.

The second prong of the strategy was directed to neutralising the antagonism of reporters towards the candidate. In part this objective was secured by the television campaign which relied heavily on commercial productions. The reliance on purchased media circumvented the reporters' mediation of the campaign. Public activities were few and rigorously controlled by the campaign organisation. The paucity of such activities compelled the press to cover them but the control exerted over them excluded content unfavourable to the candidate.

Nixon limited direct contacts with the press where the former hostility might re-emerge. His formula for success, Witcover wrote, consisted of "blood, sweat and avoiding press conferences."³¹ When the press gained access to the candidate he reminded them of his previous harsh treatment blunting their scrutiny of him by provoking exaggerated attempts at fairness.

The Post-Reform Mass Media Campaign

The expansion of the nominating electorate after reform allied with the dilution of leader influence diminished the value and plausibility of personalised campaigns. Personal campaigning was confined to those pivotal early state contests, such as New Hampshire and Iowa, which received intensive coverage from the candidates enabling them to meet many voters in person. (Prior to 1980 it was said that Bush spent so much time in Iowa that he met the residence requirements to qualify to vote there.) Personal campaigning in these states was facilitated by the small electorate of New Hampshire and Iowa's use of a caucus process in which turnouts are low compared to a primary. In consequence, in both states extended campaigning enabled substantial proportions of the nominating electorate to be reached by personal solicitation by the candidate.

But these states were exceptional in the incidence of personal campaigning. In others, candidates were dependent upon the mass media to reach the enlarged nominating electorate. Voters lacked the alternative sources of information about candidates that were available to pre-reform leaders through the party as a communications network and many candidates after reform started their campaigns with low public visibility, dependent upon the media to generate their recognition by voters.

In contrast, most pre-reform candidates either were established national figures or, as in the case of Symington, regarded such status as inessential to the success of their campaigns. Post-reform nominees McGovern and Carter demonstrated that through extensive media coverage candidates could rise from public obscurity to widespread voter recognition and support to the nomination. In February 1976 only 20 per cent of the public knew something about Carter.

Two months later the total had risen to 77 per cent.³²

Whilst candidates' dependence on the media in general grew, news coverage (as opposed to advertising) gained in emphasis as finance law reform curbed expenditures on media commercials.

The 1970's witnessed a further shift towards television as the most potent medium for candidates to reach the electorate through the news. In that period television provided three-quarters of the population with most of their news; half the population with all of their news.³³

In the post-reform period candidates were thus heavily dependent upon the quantity, emphases and interpretations of their candidacies by media, particularly television, news coverage. Anticipating the 1980 contest, John Connally defined the media's significance, "On a scale of ten the importance of media is at least eight and everything else is two."³⁴ Media supplanted organisation as the means to reach the electorate when the proliferation of contests and spending curbs diminished the capabilities of the latter as a campaign resource. Carter's 1976 finance director recognised the dependence on media to compensate for the absence of organisation,

"We had no structure after Florida; we had planned only for the short haul. After Florida it was all NBC, CBS, and the New York Times." ³⁵

The recognition of media's indispensability produced strategies by candidate organisations designed to evoke extensive and favourable coverage. More precisely the goals of such strategies were: to obtain more coverage than any opponent, to maximise favourable interpretations of the candidate; to meet or exceed media-imposed expectations. To accomplish these objectives campaigns converged on those events which were most heavily covered. They sought to win contests that received extensive coverage or at least exceed expectations. Events and incidents were stimulated to capture media attention.

The candidate and his staff made themselves accessible to media personnel. The staff promoted their interpretation of events amongst newsmen - seeking to encourage favourable interpretations.

The candidates' concentration upon the early contests followed from the disproportionate media coverage devoted to them. Hamilton Jordan's 1976 Carter strategy observed that,

"The press shows an exaggerated interest in the early primaries as they represent the first confrontation between candidates, their contrasting strategies and styles, which the press has been writing and speculating about for two years." ³⁶

The media focus on these states afforded extensive opportunities for candidates to generate recognition and favourable coverage. Thus they received disproportionately large allocations of the candidates' time, finance and organisation. (See Chapters Six and Seven.) To eschew these contests was to forgo the benefits of momentum they conferred and bequeath them to others - deferred assets which could not be retrieved. The Udall campaign's eventual decision to compete in Iowa in 1976 followed from a belated recognition that the press would cover the contest thoroughly, and that the benefits accruing to Bayh, their principal liberal competitor, if he won were too great to risk.³⁷ Reflecting on the momentum Carter gathered from New Hampshire that year, Jackson retrospectively concluded that staying out of the state conceded benefits which no other state could deliver.³⁸

Subsequent studies have confirmed the preponderance of coverage devoted to New Hampshire even within a general weighting toward the early contests.³⁹ Thus greater opportunities for developing recognition and favourable coverage were available there than elsewhere.

The early weighting in media coverage is a post-reform phenomenon. In both the pre- and post-reform periods primaries dominated coverage. For example, in both the 1964 and 1976 Republican contests primaries

accounted for over 80 per cent of the total number of New York Times stories devoted to state delegate selection processes.⁴⁰ In the pre-reform period it was the few contested primaries which dominated coverage, 58 per cent of the paper's state coverage in 1964. In the post-reform period the cue for allocating coverage between primaries shifted from contests (virtually all post-reform primaries met this specification) to chronology. Coverage of the early primaries outweighed that devoted to states later in the sequence. In the 1976 Republican contest the first ten primaries of a total of twenty-nine accounted for a majority of New York Times stories.

In the pre-reform period the media concentration on primaries magnified their significance in relation to the proportion of convention delegates they provided. After reform the preponderance of primary coverage approximated to the proportion of delegates they supplied. But within the primary coverage the early states received an over-representation of attention. Under-representation characterised the coverage devoted to states later in the sequence which included those heavy with delegates such as California and Ohio (see Table 9.1).

The media's post-reform early emphasis encouraged manipulation of the selection sequence for candidate advantage and a concentration on events prior to the beginning of formal delegate selection. To exploit the coverage of the early phase candidates sought to inject the states in which their strength was greatest into the initial stages of the selection sequence. Jordan's definition of Carter's 1980 strategy sought to promote Carter's Southern strongholds into the earliest phase for maximum advantage or, more defensively, to synchronise them with states where defeats were anticipated to offset them as obstacles to momentum,

"The easiest way to establish early momentum ... is to win southern delegates by encouraging southern states to hold

early caucuses and primaries ... It is in our interest to have states that we are likely to win scheduled on the same day with states we might do poorly in." ⁴¹

In the quest to assess the relative strengths of the candidates prior to delegate selection, reporters utilised such objective indicators as they could discover. Devices such as straw polls at party functions and the returns from fund-raising efforts were used to fill the evidentiary vacuum. Candidates sought to demonstrate their strength where media attention was focused and attract coverage to those indicators most favourable to them.

In October 1979 the Florida "battle of the buses" consumed a quarter of a million dollars of expenditure by the Carter campaign and \$175,000 spent on behalf of Edward Kennedy (not then a declared candidate) designed to turnout supporters for caucuses to supply members of a state convention unrelated to national convention delegate selection. ⁴² Carter declared the caucuses in advance to be "significant". ⁴³ After a press-declared Carter victory, Kennedy responded, seeking to minimise its impact by defining the Iowa caucuses as the first test of the 1980 campaign. ⁴⁴

Four years earlier the Carter campaign organised its supporters to attend a Jefferson-Jackson dinner in Iowa in anticipation of it receiving national media attention. Supporters were advised of the event's potential significance, transport provided and Carter regalia distributed. ⁴⁵ Reporters conducted a presidential preference poll amongst 1094 attenders at the dinner which produced a Carter plurality. The New York Times article reporting the event was headlined "Carter Appears to Hold Solid Lead as the Campaign's First Test Approaches." ⁴⁶ A concurrent Gallup poll registered Carter's national support at 4 per cent.

The interaction of the norms of media coverage with the candidates' quest for momentum effectively precluded the operation of the Democrats' timeliness regulation. Formal delegate selection was deferred

TABLE 9.1

NEW YORK TIMES COVERAGE OF REPUBLICAN PRIMARIES, 1964 AND 1976

Primary Phase	Year		Difference (% Stories- % Delegates)	Difference (% Stories- % Delegates)
	1964	1976		
First Third	38.6	33.8	+4.8	44.3
Second Third	17.9	23.8	-5.9	31.1
Final Third	43.5	42.4	+1.1	24.5
Total	100	100		99.9
N	286	593		294

until the election year but the dynamics which informed it predated its opening.

Candidates sought success in early contests to generate the momentum to carry into later contests. One component of momentum is dominance in media coverage. It is devoted disproportionately to contest winners and theirs is largely favourable in content.⁴⁷ The media benefits of victory supply a multiplier effect for subsequent contests. Voter recognition is enhanced and the candidate is known in positive terms. A successful candidate attracts volunteer and financial support. In subsequent contests the candidate with momentum has advantages over his competitors. He is widely and favourably known, appears a plausible contender for the nomination and is possessed of enhanced organisational resources.

Where voters possessed information about only one candidate there was a high probability that they voted for him.⁴⁸ The route to the commanding position was by winning contests which elevated a previously obscure candidate above the competition (Carter in 1976) or reinforced the advantages of a candidate who began with a national reputation (Reagan in 1980).

Campaign organisations sought media attention by generating newsworthy activities. This was accomplished by engaging in activities conforming to media definitions of news - the dramatic, controversial, unusual, visually arresting, matters of national importance. Lindsay waded into the sea to dramatise pollution; Bush went early-morning jogging showing his fitness and giving the issue of Reagan's age a pictorial dimension; Reagan utilised his two-man debate with Bush in New Hampshire to characterise the latter as an opponent of free speech for excluding the other contenders.

Conventional campaigning by the candidate was designed to meet

the media's need for activities to report upon more than as a plausible means for reaching large numbers of voters directly. Morning campaign locations were selected for their visual appeal to attract television coverage and allow sufficient time for film to be processed for the evening news shows.

A distinctive candidate elicited media attention through his conformity with the news value of novelty. Distinctiveness resided in personal characteristics, campaign style, issue positions. Carter's emergence as a major candidate in 1976 generated interest in his background as a southerner and born-again Christian. News stories were produced covering his home town, his business, his family and his religion. Anderson's 1980 campaign was premised on demonstrating his differentness to generate support. He was forthright. He was a liberal in a conservative party. On issues such as taxation, government spending and the Soviet grain embargo his positions separated him from all the other Republican candidates. In the opening phase of the primaries Anderson was the subject of the same number of CBS news stories as Bush without winning a primary whilst the latter won several.⁴⁹ His campaign was interpreted as a success and his personal qualities were reviewed favourably, the only candidate of either party to receive this two-fold advantageous coverage.⁵⁰

Incumbent presidents seeking the nomination were assured of extensive media coverage. Their activities were of national importance, on occasions dramatic and/or controversial. The guarantee of coverage enabled voter-oriented campaigns to be conducted without active campaigning amongst the public by the president, the Rose Garden strategy. The presidents' domination of the news freed them from the pressure of generating it through campaign activities in competition with other candidates. In the early months of 1980 campaign CBS news devoted 176

stories to the campaign activities of the various Democratic candidates whilst the activities of Carter as president generated 300 stories.⁵¹

The presidents' domination of the news conferred both qualitative and quantitative benefits. Presidents enjoyed greater voter recognition than other contenders though against the nationally prominent Reagan and Edward Kennedy the advantages were small. But the imbalance of qualitative advantages was more substantial. The performance of presidential duties conferred the prestige of office on the performer. Their performance facilitated demonstrations of competence, problem-solving, leadership, pursuit of the national interest and crisis management - the virtues Americans seek in presidents.⁵²

The resources of presidential office were utilised with attendant publicity to confer benefits on pivotal constituencies. In both 1976 and 1980 announcements of federal grants were timed to coincide with delegate selection contests in the states designated for aid.

Campaigns sought favourable qualitative treatment of their activities. Strategic responses to the quality of coverage entailed attempts to influence the standards of evaluation employed by reporters and then efforts to meet or exceed the standards after they had been defined.

In evaluating candidate performance reporters had available some independent measures but they also relied on indicators emanating from the campaign organisations. The independent measures - polls, investments of time, money and effort - were open to interpretation and differential emphases could be assigned between them. Campaign organisations proffered their own analyses of these measures to reporters. In addition, they supplied them with other sources of information by which to judge performance - private polls, moods of optimism or pessimism amongst the campaign organisations, disclosures of money expended.

The typical campaign organisation overture to reporters in seeking to influence their interpretations was to understate the candidate's prospects. By this method a subsequent defeat or low percentage of the vote appeared predictable, unexceptional and therefore worthy of little comment. A plurality or large share of the vote was unexpected and therefore newsworthy.

Because understatement was the standard tactic, campaigns sought to gain credence for their interpretations by locating them on some objective foundations. In New Hampshire in 1972 McGovern's campaign manager sought to establish 65 per cent as Muskie's target because an opinion poll had registered this level of support for him in the state.⁵³ In 1980 the Kennedy organisation offered 50 per cent of the vote as a reasonable standard for Carter in Iowa given an international situation which favoured the President and his past history of support in the state.⁵⁴ Discounting Ford's narrow victory in New Hampshire in 1976, Reagan offered the performances of McCarthy and McGovern in the state in previous years as a baseline against which to measure his share of the vote, "If those were victories for them then this is a victory for me."⁵⁵

Where information emanating from a campaign proved consistently accurate relations with the press were strengthened. Accuracy assisted journalists in their task and exemplified a general level of proficiency within the campaign. Such co-operation established between press and campaign organisation was also translated into other mutual advantages. Journalists gained access to the candidate who in turn gained in coverage.

The standards of evaluation set by the media were used to determine the quality of coverage candidates received in subsequent discussions of their performance. Candidates falling below expectations received

negative treatment whilst those who exceeded them were discussed in positive terms. The negative interpretation of Muskie's victory in New Hampshire in 1972 provides an egregious example of a plurality victor "losing" the media interpretation. Though winning by a clear margin he fell below the media-imposed target of 50 per cent. Measured against that target Muskie was deemed to have failed. Network television was "unanimous in proclaiming Muskie's 48% a disappointing performance."⁵⁶ The Washington Post concluded that the failure to reach the target deprived Muskie of momentum for his nomination drive.⁵⁷ (In subsequent years, partially at least in response to criticism of Muskie's coverage, media interpretation treated contest winners in positive terms.⁵⁸ Discriminating winners from losers persisted in interpretations of candidates below first place.)

A performance below the media-imposed standard implies a failure to attain expected strength. Subsequent coverage sought to explain a failure rather than a defeat. The latter could be attributed to the strength of the opposition; the former, because it was measured against a standard which incorporated opposition strength, could not. Subsequent reports focused on the deficiencies of the candidate, his organisation, his strategy etc.

Media emphasis upon candidate failings are exemplified in the New York Times' coverage of the 1980 Iowa caucuses.⁵⁹ The contest produced a surprise loser (Reagan) and a surprisingly large margin of defeat for Kennedy, both regarded as serious contenders. Reagan's strategy had been "above the battle". He devoted sparse attention to meeting voters. Coverage of the other losing Republicans was also negative. Baker's third place was described as insufficient and Connally's "a disappointing fourth". Crane was observed to be under pressure from conservatives to withdraw to release support to Reagan.

Pressure from Kansas upon Dole was anticipated urging him to concentrate on winning re-election to the Senate. Kennedy's performance was described as a setback sufficient to stagger some supporters, raise doubts about his electability amongst uncommitted politicians and probably heralded a decline in contributions.

Coverage of the victors was couched in positive terms. Bush's victory on the Republican side was described as an organisational and personal success. His frequent visits to the state and protracted construction of a campaign organisation were referred to. His victory narrowed the Republican contest towards a two-man race and established him as Reagan's principal rival. Carter's success was attributed to the international crisis but also to a strong organisation and "sharp" advertising.

Conclusion

Pre-reform candidates relied largely on personalised campaigns to reach the nominating electorate. The size of the electorate facilitated, and the local influence of its constituents and the content of campaigns demanded that candidates employ personal contacts. The influence of the media was restricted largely to a few prestige publications and an elite band of commentators.

Communicating with the mass electorate through the popular media was a concern principally of the popular favourite candidates for whom voter mobilisation was a component of strategy. In the absence of spending controls these candidates could utilise extensive media advertising campaigns providing a device for reaching voters independent of reporters.

Candidates' dependence on the press greatly increased after reform.

The expansion of the nominating electorate rendered reliance on personalised campaigning implausible and limits on spending foreclosed a means for circumventing the mediation of journalists to reach the electorate.

Increased dependence upon media enhanced candidates' sensitivity to the standards employed by journalists in reporting the contest. Prominent features of candidate behaviour under reform rules - the intense preoccupation in pre-election years with informal indicators of support, the concentration of resources in early contests, the attempt to generate momentum - follow, at least in part, from the manner in which the press covers the nomination. These phenomena exemplify ways in which the nominating process gained in susceptibility to the influence of actors outside its formal structure after reform.

NOTES

1. Nelson W. Polsby, "Decision-Making at the National Conventions", Western Political Quarterly 13 (September 1960) 613.
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4. Time, August 2, 1968.
5. Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1965), pp.124-25.
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CHAPTER TEN

CONCLUSION

Transformation in structure generated a similar degree of change in strategy. As the rules, laws and procedures regulating the contest altered so did the approaches adopted by candidates to accomplish the objective of winning the nomination. A re-statement of the principal differences in campaigns before and after reform exemplifies the magnitude of change.

Pre-reform strategies were aimed at the party leaders. Candidates sought to satisfy the leaders' selection criteria of electability, maintaining the party organisations and the leaders' positions within them. Candidates sought the support or acquiescence of the interest groups which possessed veto power over the nomination. These groups derived their influence from their relation to the parties through organisation overlap, personnel overlap, finance and electoral strength. Party professionals were prominent in campaign organisations utilising their contacts and familiarity with the conventions of campaigning on behalf of the candidates. Candidates developed personal relations with party leaders, integrated them into their campaign organisations and deferred to their local control. Finance derived from the candidate, his family or a few wealthy backers. For most campaigns the linkage between success in recruiting political, and financial support was weak.

Primaries were employed by candidates lacking support amongst party leaders. This position derived either from their possession of political handicaps rendering them unavailable or because they were insurgents. Primaries were used to demonstrate electability thereby satisfying a demand of the leaders. Defeats in primaries proved lack of vote-getting

power usually dooming efforts to activate support amongst the party organisations. Primaries had little impact in re-ordering the relative standing of candidates. On occasions they reinforced the position of the existing leader but where a new leader emerged, in the immediate pre-reform period, primaries were not responsible for his elevation. The primaries which offered the greatest potential for influencing the nomination were those providing contests between major candidates as they were an approximation to an electoral test.

In non-primary states candidates' strategy pivoted on their relations with the party organisations. Candidates with potential support amongst the existing party leadership sought to activate it through strategies of cultivation and reassurance. Candidates lacking sympathisers engaged in strategies of inducement and invasion. The persuasive power of the primaries upon the non-primary process depended upon the disposition of party leaders. Where they were sympathetic or unopposed to a clear primary winner and not united around a primary non-contestant their results could provide the leverage to win the nomination. Delegate status was awarded on the basis of party service rather than candidate preference in the non-primary process. Commitments to candidates came after selection was completed. Commitments were delayed and delivered in blocs to maximise the influence of the state party and its leaders over the nominating decision.

In a party-dominated process candidates emphasised loyalty to the party, deference to its leadership, ^{and} ability to satisfy their demands for electability and party maintenance. Issue and ideological definition was muted. Where it was employed candidates sought to locate themselves within the post-New Deal consensus to demonstrate their capacity to appeal to the electoral 'critical mass'. Presentations of personal traits and character were keyed to evincing the

candidate's potential for effective working relations as president with the party leaders.

The principal means for communicating the campaign was personal contacts with party leaders. Such methods were feasible with a small nominating electorate, and necessary to facilitate the bargaining by which appeals to individual leaders were defined. The major media influences upon the leaders, which the candidates sought to cultivate, were the prestige press and its political commentators. Strategies aimed at the popular media were the preserve of candidates seeking to demonstrate their support amongst the electorate.

Post-reform strategies focused upon securing the support of voters. Active, election-style campaigns were conducted in primaries and caucuses. Candidates sought either to mobilise or depress the participant bias deriving from the high turnout rates of the party's activist wings. In the post-reform context interest groups' most valued attributes for candidates were not their anchorage in the party but as providers of votes, organisation and individual campaign contributions. Campaign organisations were staffed by political consultants, candidate aides and volunteers, none of whom were necessarily connected with party organisations. The state and local party leaders were largely neglected in the formulation of strategies and organisation. Finance derived from mass solicitation and federal matching funds. Individual contributions responded to changes in the campaign's political fortunes providing one component of momentum for successful candidates.

Primaries were utilised by all active candidates irrespective of their relations with party leaders. They were entered to win large numbers of mandated delegates. They also produced substantial reorderings of candidates' relative standings. Victories in primaries

enabled a candidate to move from obscurity to widespread public recognition and win the nomination deposing front runners in the process. Primaries early in the selection sequence received disproportionate investments of campaign resources. These early contests offered the greatest returns on investment in momentum - media coverage, money, volunteers. Actual or media-defined defeats in these contests were usually irrevocable.

Strategy and success in the post-reform non-primary process ceased to pivot upon the candidate's relationships with the party organisations. Rather, voter mobilisation was the focus of strategy and the route to success. The linkage between primary and non-primary processes tightened after reform when party leaders lost their gatekeeping role over the latter, and both came to be dominated by voters. Early caucus results generated momentum which carried into the first primaries. The momentum generated in the primaries, in turn, was translated into the later caucuses as successful candidates gained in resources and plausibility as the nominee whilst others dropped from contention. Candidate commitments were evident from the earliest stages of the caucus process and increased at each successive stage of the hierarchical selection sequence. Increased candidate competition allied with proportional representation fragmented delegations where bloc voting had formerly been common.

In a voter-dominated process candidates distanced themselves from the parties in their appeals. Anti-party, neutral or bipartisan stances were adopted. Issue and ideological definition increased as candidates sought to mobilise the participant bias or encourage cross-over voting. The portrayal of personal traits and character sought to cultivate the image of a non-politician.

The popular media became the principal vehicle for reaching the

expanded nominating electorate. News reportage grew in importance when spending curbs limited expenditures on advertising and organisation. To generate coverage campaigns adapted to the media's practices and norms for allocating coverage in quantity and favourable quality.

The transformation of structure incurred by reform was the most substantial in the presidential nominating process since the institution of national conventions in the 1830's. Transformations in strategy were similarly the greatest since the demise of the congressional caucus. For the first time since that period party organisations ceased to provide the context in which nominations were conducted and party leaders ceased to exercise control over it. The focus of mobilising efforts shifted outside the parties displacing their leaders' selection criteria. The changed and enlarged nominating electorate resulted in transformations in candidates' appeals, organisation and communication mechanisms.

The post-1968 structural reforms followed a course familiar in the history of party reform. The consequences for strategy also had resonances in earlier exercises in reform of the nominating process at presidential level and below.

The inception of presidential primaries had lengthened campaigns and encouraged a more open style of campaigning.¹ A participant bias favouring high turnout elements was recognised by Ostrogorski in accounting for the ability of politicians to control open caucuses, and by Key, revealing the unrepresentativeness of primary electorates.² The latter spelled out the strategic possibilities of such biases:

"The effective primary constituency ... may come to consist predominantly of persons chiefly of specified national origin or religious affiliation, of people especially responsive to certain styles of political leadership or shades of ideology ..."³

The primary system encouraged ideological appeals by changing the nature of intra-party competition. Conflicts between ins and outs were supplanted by ideological factionalism when participation widened to include voters removing subjects such as patronage distributions from the debate.⁴

Reform also followed the route towards a Voter Dominated party developed in Chapter Two. Post-reform strategies conformed to those likely to follow in campaigns within such parties. Candidates focused on mobilising voter support and adapted their campaign organisations to this task. Appeals were based upon traits and character, issues and ideology, and anti-organisational themes. The prominence of issue discussion encouraged nominees to claim mandates for their policies. In addition, voters as delegates gained access to the platform-writing process in national convention committees, and on the convention floor.

The structural and strategic consequences of reform generated a growth industry of criticism from politicians and the American political science profession.⁵ The parties engaged in recurrent modifications of their delegate selection process and for 1984 the Democrats enacted a modest revision of the participatory system by insulating a minority of delegates from voter mandates. But so far (September 1983) the structural revision has produced little change in the manner in which candidates mount their campaigns.

Like other much-criticised reforms such as the direct primary and the non-partisan election, the participatory system is likely to endure. Retreats from open, anti-organisational processes are difficult to justify in the American context. A movement to formally voter-controlled nominations through a national primary perennially meets resistance. Given the likely survival of the present system political scientists

would do well to remember that their task is to understand the world,
not to change it.

- 392 -

NOTES

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3. Key, op. cit., p.153.
4. David P. Thelen, "Discussion", in Patricia Bonomi, James MacGregor Burns and Austin Ranney, eds., The American Constitutional System Under Strong and Weak Parties (New York: Praeger, 1981), p.72.
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