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EDWARD I IN SCOTLAND: 1296-1305

by

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the University of  
Glasgow, July 1991

This research was conducted in the Department of Scottish History, University of Glasgow.

(c) Fiona Jane Watson, 1991

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## ABSTRACT

This thesis sets out to investigate the activities of Edward I and his officials in Scotland during the period from the conquest of 1296 up until the settlement of September/October 1305. To this end, the administration established by the English king in 1296 is discussed to provide a starting-point from which to assess the events of the following decade. Following the renewal of the war in 1297, the investigation centres primarily on the activities of the English garrisons in Scotland in order to establish where, and to what extent, Edward could describe himself as ruler of Scotland. The campaigns of 1297, 1298, 1300, 1301 and 1303-4 form a necessary part of that investigation as the English sought to expand and consolidate their hold in south-west Scotland particularly. As a complement to the above, the administration of Scotland outwith English control - for which there is very little direct evidence - is also considered, as is the role of the fleet, vital to the survival of Edward's garrisons. The role of these garrisons - which defined the limit and extent of the English administration - is of such importance that an account is then given of the history of each castle held for Edward, however briefly.

The final section of the thesis describes Edward's second settlement of Scotland. Between the submission of the Guardian in February 1304 and the ordinances of September 1305, the king devoted much time and energy to his Scottish subjects: a large number of disputes resulting from the war, largely concerned with lands and property, required to be decided and a new administrative system palatable both to Edward and the Scottish nobility to be worked out. This activity thus reflects the problems of the previous decade and the lessons learned from them.

The final assessment of the period 1296 to 1305 is concerned with placing the English administration in its proper context, gauging its successes and failures according not only to what was expected of it in 1296, but through a comparison with what little is known of the administration of the Guardians. Thus, it is hoped, we have come to a better understanding of what it meant to have Edward I in Scotland.

## CONTENTS

	Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . .	i
ABSTRACT . . . . .	ii
CONTENTS . . . . .	1
LIST OF TABLES . . . . .	14
ABBREVIATIONS . . . . .	16
INTRODUCTION	
Background . . . . .	20
Methodology . . . . .	22
Terminology . . . . .	23
CHAPTER ONE CONTINUITY AND CHANGE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ENGLISH ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM IN SCOTLAND 1296	
Introduction: . . . . .	25
Establishing the administration: . . . . .	25
Major offices: . . . . .	25
Sheriffs and keepers of royal castles: . . . . .	28
Continuity and change: . . . . .	32
Private castles: . . . . .	33
Total number of English garrisons: . . . . .	34
Custos v. Constabularius: . . . . .	34
Comparison with the government of Ireland: . . . . .	36
Wages: . . . . .	37
Problems of time and distance: . . . . .	39
Problems from the beginning: . . . . .	39
Conclusions: . . . . .	45
PART ONE: 1297-8 . . . . .	47
CHAPTER TWO DISINTEGRATION AND DEFEAT, 1297-8	
Revolt: . . . . .	48

English defensive action: . . . . .	53
English success against the Scots by August 1297: . . . . .	54
The battle of Stirling Bridge: . . . . .	55
The Scottish nobility: playing a double game or sitting on the fence?: . . . . .	56
The remains of the English administration: . . . . .	58
1297-8 Success, legitimacy and support - Wallace the Guardian: . . . . .	59
The winter campaign of 1297-8: . . . . .	61
Purveyance: . . . . .	63
The receivers' accounts: . . . . .	65
Letters patent and the tally system: . . . . .	65

### CHAPTER THREE 'VICTORY' AND RE-ESTABLISHMENT, 1298

Preparations for the Falkirk Campaign: . . . . .	68
The English army: . . . . .	68
Purveyance: . . . . .	69
Further preparations: . . . . .	72
The importance of victuals - the difference between victory and defeat: . . . . .	73
The Falkirk campaign: . . . . .	73
The battle of Falkirk: . . . . .	75
The aftermath of the battle - the English reassert control: . . . . .	76
Withdrawal to Carlisle; the granting of rebel lands: . . . . .	78
The organisation of the south-eastern English garrisons: . . . . .	79
The organisation of the south-western English garrisons: . . . . .	82
Northern England: . . . . .	83

Expedition to Stirling: . . . . .	.84
The cost of the campaign: . . . . .	.86
Evidence for a Scottish administration: . . . . .	.86
Conclusions: . . . . .	.87
PART TWO: 1299 . . . . .	90
CHAPTER FOUR FRUSTRATION, 1299	
Urgent need for money: . . . . .	.91
Purveyance: . . . . .	.91
The plight of Stirling castle: . . . . .	.92
The growing Scottish threat: . . . . .	.93
Changes of personnel: . . . . .	.95
Increasing pressure on the English garrisons: . . . . .	.97
Lochmaben: . . . . .	104
The administration at Berwick: . . . . .	107
Carlisle and the administration of the south-west: . . . . .	109
Edward's expedition to Scotland: . . . . .	114
Organisation of the march and the garrisons: . . . . .	115
The fall of Stirling castle: . . . . .	117
Conclusions: . . . . .	119
PART THREE: 1300 . . . . .	121
CHAPTER FIVE EXPANSION, PART 1, 1300	
The Scottish siege of Bothwell castle: . . . . .	122
The wardenship of the western march: . . . . .	122
Military preparations: . . . . .	125
An English offensive in the west: . . . . .	125
Lack of supplies on the western march: . . . . .	126
The eastern march - lack of supplies,	

change of personnel and another expedition: . . . . .	127
Scottish activities: . . . . .	127
The campaign of 1300: . . . . .	129
Purveyance: . . . . .	129
The army: . . . . .	132
Participation of garrison members in campaign: . . . . .	133
The siege of Caerlaverock: . . . . .	136
The south-west: . . . . .	136
The south-east: . . . . .	139
Bremesgrave's account: . . . . .	141
The receivers at Carlisle: . . . . .	144
The cost of the war: . . . . .	150
Truce with the Scots: . . . . .	150
Garrison stores: . . . . .	153
Supplying of the south-eastern garrisons: . . . . .	156
Evidence for successful administration: . . . . .	157
Sir Ralph Manton - Treasurer of Scotland?: . . . . .	158
Other personnel at Berwick: . . . . .	160
Conclusion: . . . . .	161
PART FOUR: 1301 . . . . .	163
CHAPTER SIX EXPANSION, PART 2, 1301	
The Truce: . . . . .	164
Renewal of St. John's contract as warden, the "middle men" of Scotland to be received to Edward's peace: . . . . .	165
Campaign preparations: . . . . .	166
Re-arrangements for the campaign: . . . . .	167
The campaign of 1301: . . . . .	168
The prince of Wales' army in the west: . . . . .	169



<b>The siege of Bothwell:</b> . . . . .	171
<b>The Scottish garrisons of Bothwell, Turnberry and Dalswinton:</b> . . . . .	171
<b>Scottish and English activities in the south-west in the summer of 1301:</b> . . . . .	171
<b>The south-east:</b> . . . . .	174
<b>Preparing for a winter in Scotland:</b> . . . . .	176
<b>Financial problems:</b> . . . . .	176
<b>Inverkip and Stirling:</b> . . . . .	180
<b>Retreat:</b> . . . . .	180
<b>The south-west:</b> . . . . .	184
<b>Deterioration:</b> . . . . .	184
<b>Scottish activities in the autumn/winter of 1301:</b> . . . . .	185
<b>Arrangements made for keeping the garrisons:</b> . . . . .	186
<b>New English garrisons:</b> . . . . .	188
<b>Evidence for general English administration:</b> . . . . .	189
<b>Developments in the Scottish administration:</b> . . . . .	190
<b>Conclusions:</b> . . . . .	190
<b>PART FIVE: 1302</b> . . . . .	192
<b>CHAPTER SEVEN THE TURNING POINT, 1302</b>	
<b>The Truce of Asnières:</b> . . . . .	193
<b>The submission of the earl of Carrick:</b> . . . . .	195
<b>Organisation of the garrisons during the truce:</b> . . . . .	198
<b>Building works:</b> . . . . .	200
<b>The breaking of the truce:</b> . . . . .	200
<b>The English garrisons during the truce:</b> . . . . .	201
<b>Provisions for the garrisons:</b> . . . . .	202
<b>Payment for Welsh troops:</b> . . . . .	203

Scottish activities: . . . . .	203
Berwick: . . . . .	204
Agreements made with the English garrison commanders at the end of the truce: . . . . .	205
Death of Sir John de St. John: . . . . .	208
Return to concern for winning the war: . . . . .	210
The Treaty of Amiens: . . . . .	212
Evidence for some English administrative success: . . . . .	212
Conclusions: . . . . .	217
 PART SIX: 1303-5 . . . . .	 219
 CHAPTER EIGHT WINNING THE WAR, 1303-5	
Scottish activities and English counter- measures in early 1303: . . . . .	221
English activities after Roslyn: . . . . .	225
Preparations for the campaign of 1303: . . . . .	225
The campaign itself: . . . . .	227
Sir Aymer de Valence, Inverkip and tentative offers of peace: . . . . .	232
Final stages of the campaign; winter at Dunfermline: . . . . .	233
Expeditions against the rebels: . . . . .	234
Submissions of the Scots: . . . . .	234
Expeditions against the remaining rebels: . . . . .	234
Linlithgow, Dundee and Tulliallan: . . . . .	235
Parliament at St. Andrews; preparations for the siege of Stirling: . . . . .	236
The siege of Stirling and its aftermath: . . . . .	238
The English garrisons in Scotland: . . . . .	238
New castles and other works: . . . . .	239
A final settlement?: . . . . .	240

## PART SEVEN:

<b>THE HIDDEN STORY: SCOTLAND OUTWITH ENGLISH CONTROL . . . . .</b>	<b>241</b>
---	------------

**CHAPTER NINE NORTH-EAST SCOTLAND AND THE  
HIGHLANDS AND ISLANDS 1296-1305**

<b>The north-west Highlands and Islands: . . . . .</b>	<b>243</b>
<b>The north-east: . . . . .</b>	<b>245</b>
<b>1297 - revolt and civil war: . . . . .</b>	<b>245</b>
<b>Conclusions 1296-7: . . . . .</b>	<b>252</b>
<b>The north-east: . . . . .</b>	<b>252</b>
<b>The north-west: . . . . .</b>	<b>255</b>
<b>The restoration of English authority in the north-east: . . . . .</b>	<b>257</b>
<b>Problems with funding: . . . . .</b>	<b>258</b>
<b>Evidence for the authority of the Guardians: . . . . .</b>	<b>259</b>
<b>The war in the north: . . . . .</b>	<b>262</b>
<b>Conclusions: . . . . .</b>	<b>262</b>

## PART EIGHT:

<b>THE FLEET - 1296-1304 . . . . .</b>	<b>264</b>
--	------------

**CHAPTER TEN THE ROLE OF SHIPPING AND SAILORS IN  
MAINTAINING THE ENGLISH IN SCOTLAND**

<b>Composition of the Fleet: . . . . .</b>	<b>265</b>
<b>Service of the fleet, 1296-1303: . . . . .</b>	<b>266</b>
<b>Important ports of origin: . . . . .</b>	<b>268</b>
<b>Need for shipping within Scotland itself: . . . . .</b>	<b>270</b>
<b>A direct role for the fleet: . . . . .</b>	<b>271</b>
<b>Scottish shipping: . . . . .</b>	<b>271</b>
<b>Problems and difficulties: . . . . .</b>	<b>272</b>
<b>Conclusions: . . . . .</b>	<b>275</b>

## PART NINE:

## EDWARDIAN CASTLES AND GARRISONS IN SCOTLAND . . . . . 277

CHAPTER ELEVEN THE SOUTH-WEST: CAERLAVEROCK,  
LOCHMABEN, DUMFRIES, TIBBERS  
AND DALSWINTON

## CAERLAVEROCK

Early history: . . . . . 282

Caerlaverock during the first War  
of Independence: . . . . . 283

## LOCHMABEN

Early history: . . . . . 284

Lochmaben during the first War  
of Independence: . . . . . 285

## DUMFRIES

Early history: . . . . . 288

Dumfries during the first War  
of Independence: . . . . . 289

## TIBBERS

Early history: . . . . . 291

Tibbers during the first War  
of Independence: . . . . . 292

## DALSWINTON

Early history: . . . . . 292

Dalswinton during the first War  
of Independence: . . . . . 293CHAPTER TWELVE THE CENTRAL WEST: TURNBERRY, AYR,  
INVERKIP, DUMBARTON, BOTHWELL,  
CARSTAIRS and LANARK, KIRKINTILLOCH  
AND STIRLING

## TURNBERRY

Early history: . . . . . 294

Turnberry during the first War  
of Independence: . . . . . 294

AYR	
<b>Early history:</b> . . . . .	294
<b>Ayr during the first War of Independence:</b> . . . . .	295
INVERKIP (and the lands of Strathgryfe)	
<b>Early history:</b> . . . . .	296
<b>Inverkip and Strathgryfe during the first War of Independence:</b> . . . . .	297
DUMBARTON	
<b>Early history:</b> . . . . .	298
<b>Dumbarton during the first War of Independence:</b> . . . . .	298
BOTHWELL	
<b>Early history:</b> . . . . .	299
<b>Bothwell during the first War of Independence:</b> . . . . .	300
CARSTAIRS and LANARK	
<b>Early history:</b> . . . . .	300
<b>Carstairs and Lanark during the first War of Independence:</b> . . . . .	301
KIRKINTILLOCH	
<b>Early history:</b> . . . . .	301
<b>Kirkintilloch during the first War of Independence:</b> . . . . .	302
STIRLING	
<b>Early history:</b> . . . . .	302
<b>Stirling during the first War of Independence:</b> . . . . .	303
CHAPTER THIRTEEN THE CENTRAL EAST: LINLITHGOW, EDINBURGH, LUFFNESS, DIRLETON, DUNBAR, HAILES and YESTER	
LINLITHGOW	
<b>Early history:</b> . . . . .	305

<b>Linlithgow during the first War of Independence:</b> . . . . .	305
<b>EDINBURGH</b>	
<b>Early history:</b> . . . . .	308
<b>Edinburgh during the first War of Independence:</b> . . . . .	308
<b>LUFFNESS</b>	
<b>Early history:</b> . . . . .	311
<b>Luffness during the first War of Independence:</b> . . . . .	311
<b>DIRLETON</b>	
<b>Early history:</b> . . . . .	312
<b>Dirleton during the first War of Independence:</b> . . . . .	313
<b>DUNBAR</b>	
<b>Its history:</b> . . . . .	313
<b>HAILES</b>	
<b>Its history:</b> . . . . .	314
<b>YESTER</b>	
<b>Early history:</b> . . . . .	314
<b>Yester during the first War of Independence:</b> . . . . .	315
<b>CHAPTER FOURTEEN THE SOUTH-EAST: ROXBURGH, JEDBURGH, SELKIRK CASTLE and FOREST, PEEBLES, HERMITAGE and LIDDEL, BERWICK</b>	
<b>ROXBURGH</b>	
<b>Early history:</b> . . . . .	316
<b>Roxburgh during the first War of Independence:</b> . . . . .	317
<b>JEDBURGH</b>	
<b>Early history:</b> . . . . .	318

<b>Jedburgh during the first War of Independence: . . . . .</b>	<b>318</b>
<b>SELKIRK CASTLE and FOREST</b>	
<b>Early history: . . . . .</b>	<b>320</b>
<b>Selkirk during the first War of Independence: . . . . .</b>	<b>320</b>
<b>PEEBLES</b>	
<b>Early history: . . . . .</b>	<b>323</b>
<b>Peebles during the first War of Independence: . . . . .</b>	<b>323</b>
<b>HERMITAGE and LIDDEL</b>	
<b>Early history: . . . . .</b>	<b>324</b>
<b>Hermitage and Liddel during the first War of Independence: . . . . .</b>	<b>325</b>
<b>BERWICK</b>	
<b>Defensive improvements: . . . . .</b>	<b>325</b>
<b>Planning Berwick town: . . . . .</b>	<b>327</b>
<b>The Berwick garrisons: . . . . .</b>	<b>328</b>
<b>1302 - further town-planning: . . . . .</b>	<b>331</b>
<b>CHAPTER FIFTEEN SUBMISSION</b>	
<b>Introduction: . . . . .</b>	<b>334</b>
<b>The preliminary offer from the Scots: . . . . .</b>	<b>335</b>
<b>The king's reply: . . . . .</b>	<b>337</b>
<b>English negotiators sent to Strathord to discuss a definitive settlement: . . . . .</b>	<b>337</b>
<b>Edward's response: . . . . .</b>	<b>340</b>
<b>The conclusion of negotiations: . . . . .</b>	<b>341</b>
<b>Conclusions: . . . . .</b>	<b>342</b>
<b>The Guardian's Council: . . . . .</b>	<b>343</b>
<b>The final phase of the conquest: . . . . .</b>	<b>343</b>

October 1305 - the final peace settlement: . . . . .	344
Conclusions: . . . . .	346

## CHAPTER SIXTEEN THE ENGLISH JUSTINIAN IN SCOTLAND, 1303-5

Introduction: . . . . .	347
The meaning of success: . . . . .	348
<i>Evidence for increasing English administrative involvement:</i>	
The holding of inquests: . . . . .	349
Disputed land cases: . . . . .	355
Treatment of rebels who were slow to submit: . . . . .	363
Cases brought after February 1304: . . . . .	364
Scottish laws and customs: . . . . .	367
The parliament of February 1305: . . . . .	370
Cases outstanding from the pre-1296 period: . . . . .	371
Petitions from towns: . . . . .	372
Petition of the king's husbandmen: . . . . .	373
The new attraction of offices in Scotland: . . . . .	374
Complaints against Edward's officials: . . . . .	375
Cases involving the Scottish church: . . . . .	378
'Colonialism': . . . . .	380
Sir William Wallace: . . . . .	381
The cost of the war south of the border: . . . . .	384
Conclusions: . . . . .	385

## CHAPTER SEVENTEEN NEW BEGINNINGS?: THE SETTLEMENT OF SCOTLAND 1304-5

Introduction: . . . . .	387
The formulation of a new constitution: . . . . .	387
Personnel: . . . . .	387
Amendment of Scottish law: . . . . .	395



<b>Conclusions:</b> . . . . .	395
<b>Looking to the future:</b> . . . . .	397

## **CONCLUSION**

<b>The where and how much of English control, 1297-1303</b> . . . . .	400
<b>Some conclusions about the English administration, 1297-1303</b> . . . . .	407
<b>Reflections on the Scottish government</b> . . . . .	409
<b>APPENDIX A</b> . . . . .	410
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY</b> . . . . .	421

## TABLES and GRAPHS

	Page
<b>Table 1:</b> Keepers of Scottish royal castles, 1291 . . . . .	28
<b>Table 2:</b> Scottish sheriffdoms before 1296 . . . . .	29
<b>Table 3:</b> Daily Wages Table . . . . .	38
<b>Table 4:</b> Purveyance - a comparison between what was ordered and what actually arrived . . . . .	130
<b>Table 5:</b> Purveyance of carts, horses and equipment . . . . .	132
<b>Table 6.1:</b> Bremesgrave's issues - wheat, flour, barley and oats . . . . .	142
<b>Table 6.2:</b> Bremesgrave's issues - wheat, beans and peas, wine, meat . . . . .	143
<b>Table 6.3:</b> Bremesgrave's issues - fish, salt, charcoal, equipment . . . . .	144
<b>Table 7.1:</b> Abingdon's issues - wheat, flour, oats, malt and wine . . . . .	146
<b>Table 7.2:</b> Abingdon's issues - meat, salt, fish, iron . . . . .	147
<b>Table 8.1:</b> Dalilegh's issues - flour, oats, malt, wine, beans and peas . . . . .	149
<b>Table 8.2:</b> Dalilegh's issues - ale, meat, salt . . . . .	149
<b>Table 8.3:</b> Dalilegh's issues - carts, horses, horseshoes, nails, cart clouts, nails . . . . .	150
<b>Table 9:</b> Sheriffs in 1304 . . . . .	390
<b>Table 10:</b> Sheriffs of the ordinances of 1305 . . . . .	391
<b>Graph 1:</b> Caerlaverock men-at-arms . . . . .	410
<b>Graph 2.1:</b> Lochmaben men-at-arms . . . . .	411
<b>Graph 2.2:</b> Lochmaben footsoldiers . . . . .	411
<b>Graph 3.1:</b> Dumfries men-at-arms . . . . .	412
<b>Graph 3.2:</b> Dumfries footsoldiers . . . . .	412
<b>Graph 4:</b> Ayr men-at-arms . . . . .	413
<b>Graph 5.1:</b> Carstairs men-at-arms . . . . .	414

<b>Graph 5.2:</b>	Carstairs footsoldiers . . . . .	414
<b>Graph 6.1:</b>	Kirkintilloch men-at-arms . . . . .	415
<b>Graph 6.2:</b>	Kirkintilloch footsoldiers . . . . .	415
<b>Graph 7:</b>	Linlithgow men-at-arms . . . . .	416
<b>Graph 8.1:</b>	Edinburgh men-at-arms . . . . .	417
<b>Graph 8.2:</b>	Edinburgh footsoldiers . . . . .	417
<b>Graph 9.1:</b>	Roxburgh men-at-arms . . . . .	418
<b>Graph 9.2:</b>	Roxburgh footsoldiers . . . . .	418
<b>Graph 10.1:</b>	Jedburgh men-at-arms . . . . .	419
<b>Graph 10.2:</b>	Jedburgh footsoldiers . . . . .	419
<b>Graph 11.1:</b>	Berwick men-at-arms . . . . .	420
<b>Graph 11.2:</b>	Berwick men-at-arms . . . . .	420

## ABBREVIATIONS

- A.P.S.* - *The Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland*, edd. T. Thomson and C. Innes (Edinburgh, 1814-75).
- Arbroath Liber* - *Liber S. Thome de Aberbrothoc*, (Bannatyne Club, 1848-56)
- Barbour, *Bruce* - J. Barbour, *The Bruce*, ed. Rev. W. Skeat, i, (S.T.S., 1894)
- Barrow, *Bruce* - G.W.S. Barrow, *Robert Bruce and the Community of the Realm of Scotland*, (Edinburgh, 1988)
- Bateson, 'The Scottish King's Household' - 'The Scottish King's Household' in *Miscellany of the Scottish History Society*, ii (Edinburgh, 1904)
- Blind Harry, *Wallace* - *Hary's Wallace*, ed. M.P. McDiarmid, vol. i, (S.T.S., 1968)
- Bower* - *Johannis de Fordun Scotichronicon cum Supplementis et Continuatione Walteri Boweri*, ed. W. Goodall, (Edinburgh, 1759)
- B.L. - British Library
- C.C.R.* - *Calendar of Close Rolls, 1296-1302*, ed. H.C. Maxwell-Lyte, (London, 1906); *1302-1307*, ed. H.C. Maxwell-lyte, (London, 1908)
- C.D.I.* - *Calendar of Documents relating to Ireland*, ed. H.E. Sweetman, (London, 1881)
- C.D.S.* - *Calendar of Documents relating to Scotland*, ed. J. Bain (Edinburgh, 1881-2)
- C.F.R.* - *Calendar of Fine Rolls*, ed. H.C. Maxwell-lyte, (London, 1911)
- C.P.R.* - *Calendar of Patent Rolls, 1292-1301*, ed. H.C. Maxwell-Lyte, (London, 1895); *1301-1307*, ed. H.C. Maxwell-Lyte, (London, 1898)
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## INTRODUCTION

### Background:

The history of the struggle between Edward I and the Scots is well-known both at an academic and a popular level. After all, this period produced two of Scotland's greatest heroes - William Wallace and Robert Bruce - and also earned King Edward the soubriquet of 'Hammer of the Scots'<sup>1</sup>.

From an academic point of view - and for the purposes of this thesis - the activities of the Scots, both at home and abroad, in resisting Edward's claims to feudal overlordship of the Scottish kingdom have been thoroughly investigated, most notably in Professor Barrow's invaluable *Robert Bruce and the Community of the Realm of Scotland*. In addition, the recent biography of Edward I by Professor Prestwich, together with the latter's previous works on the English administrative/war machine, provide much of the background for discussing the **how** of any question related to the English presence in Scotland during this reign.

The fact that the history of this period has to be constructed almost entirely from English sources - primarily official government records and English chroniclers - has given undue emphasis to Edward's administration of Scotland, since there is so little information available to describe the administrative capabilities of the loyalist government.

However, despite this wealth of evidence from English sources, historians have generally been interested either in extracting information which might shed light on the activities of the Scots, or, when describing English activities, have concentrated on the 'highlights', namely, the campaigns when Edward was himself present in Scotland with an army.

Such an interest is natural; after all, there were campaigns every year during the period 1296-1304, with the exceptions of 1299 and 1302. But what happened in Scotland when these armies went home? What is meant by 'the English administration of Scotland'?

To answer these questions - which is the primary aim of this thesis - it is necessary to concentrate on the English-held garrisons in Scotland. Although castles were always an important feature of Medieval society, performing various functions as centres of administration and defence, the few Scottish castles remaining in English hands took on an even more vital role after 1297, when it became clear that the administrative system established in the previous year had broken down almost completely.

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<sup>1</sup> From the sixteenth-century painted inscription on Edward's tomb in Westminster Abbey (R.C.A.H.M. (London), i, Westminster Abbey, 29).



In the following years, the limited administrative system that remained was concerned only to maintain these garrisons. The form of this administration was thus rather different from that envisaged in 1296, although some of the personnel remained the same. The success of the Scots in preventing the English from living off Scotland's resources entailed that all supplies had to be provided from south of the border and thus the organisation of supply lines to the garrisons is the basic description of the English administration in the years 1297-1300.

Although it is not the intention to examine the campaigns in great detail, the activities of Edward and his armies are still of interest. By 1300, the main aim of these expeditions had become the recapture of castles, rather than the fighting of battles, primarily because the Scots had realised that it was not in their interests to engage the English. After 1300, success brought several more castles in central and south-western Scotland under English control. In addition, expeditions undertaken by the south-eastern garrisons consolidated their hold in Lothian and the borders. As the English extended their hold through the south-west (though they never succeeded in subduing Galloway completely) and made their authority more effective in the south-east, references to Edward's officials engaging in what might be termed 'normal peacetime administration' become more frequent.

The post-1300 period also saw the resurrection of one office of state. The English chancellorship of Scotland, held by sir Walter Amersham, had never officially disappeared, but references to Amersham's activities in that office - rather than his other office of receiver - do not exist between 1297 and 1300.

However, it was not English success in Scotland that brought about the downfall of the loyalist government in 1303-4. Initially, diplomatic efforts on the continent had gone in favour of the Scots. Pope Boniface VIII took Edward to task for invading a daughter of the church and King Philip of France succeeded in arranging two truces between the Scots and the English. This reached a climax in the second of these truces - the Truce of Asnières - when it was agreed that the French should occupy certain Scottish garrisons in the south-west and even Edward admitted privately that there was a distinct possibility that the restoration of Scotland to King John was imminent.

However, the defeat of the French by the Flemings at Courtrai in 1302, which resulted in an Anglo-French treaty in the following year, together, no doubt, with the realisation that King John himself had little interest in returning to his kingdom, meant that Edward could, once again, conquer Scotland in one campaign. The years 1303-5 were then spent in a spate of administrative activity as the English king sought to deal with the judicial problems caused by seven years of war and to work out a new administration for Scotland that would be acceptable both to the conquered and the conqueror.

### Methodology:

The primary aim of this thesis is to examine the organisation and activities of the English garrisons in Scotland during the period 1296-1304. However, since many of these garrisons, particularly those on the frontier of the English zone of occupation, changed hands more than once during this period, and there are also often gaps when it is not possible to ascertain whether they were held, left unoccupied or in the hands of the Scots, the most effective way of discussing their history is through a narrative account, year by year.

Thereafter, two aspects of the period 1296 to 1303 are dealt with separately. Scotland north of the Forth and the Tay is only rarely referred to in English documentation, simply because this area was outwith English control after 1297. The history of the north right through this period, which includes references to the loyalist government which controlled the north-east, is therefore dealt with in a chapter on its own. Secondly, the role of shipping, which was vital to the maintenance of the English garrisons and the success of Edward's campaigns, merits another chapter.

To compensate for the reduction of coherence which narration naturally entails, four chapters giving brief histories of each garrison known to have been in English hands, even for a short time, have been included. These castles have been divided into four geographical areas: the south-west, the central west, the central east and the south-east.

The final section deals with the period 1303-5 and is concerned primarily with the way in which Edward managed the settlement of Scotland for the second time. The submissions of the Scots in February 1304, led by the Guardian, Sir John Comyn, are therefore of importance in setting the tone for this settlement. The adjudication of land disputes, caused by the forfeiture of Scottish 'rebels', and the re-granting of their property to Edward's supporters, were also of vital importance for the future of relations between the Scots and their feudal overlord. Finally, the ordinances of October 1305, which laid out the way in which Scotland was to be governed, concludes this discussion of events from 1303 to 1305. The importance of the ordinances is not discussed in the context of the rebellion of Robert Bruce five months later, but as a comparison with the arrangements made in 1296. What had Edward learned in the interim period, and how did his behaviour influence the Scottish reaction to the conquest, their ideals of kingship and independence?

In the conclusion itself, an attempt has been made to bring together all the evidence from the previous chapters in order to assess how much control the English exerted, and in exactly which areas. Conversely, therefore, it can be stated with more certainty where and to what degree the loyalist government exercised power. Lastly, an

answer will be given to this important, and undervalued, question: was there an English administration of Scotland in the years 1297 to 1303?

### Terminology:

During this thesis a number of terms are used which require either explanation or clarification.

#### *'rebels'*

There is a problem inherent in describing those Scots who did not accept Edward's rule during this period. The term *the Scots*, though used, quickly becomes repetitious and is not always useful since there were many Scots in Edward's service. The term 'rebels', in which the inverted commas play an integral part, has therefore been employed to acknowledge the Scottish dedication to independence and Edward's dedication to his rights.

#### *'English'*

In a similar vein, those Scots who held office under Edward I have been described as 'English', to distinguish them from their colleagues who were imported from south of the border.

#### *Guardian vs. lieutenant/warden/captain*

The word *Guardian* is used throughout this thesis only with reference to the Scottish office translated from the Latin *custos* and the French *gardein*. The equivalent translation for those operating within the English administration is three-fold: *lieutenant* (used originally to describe an English officer with overall command in Scotland); *warden* (usually applied to an English officer with administrative authority over a particular area of Scotland, eg. the western march); and *captain* (the same as *warden*, but implying a more military than administrative orientation). After the outbreak of war in 1297, these three terms are used interchangeably, reflecting the fact that the English administration of Scotland was still seeking to define itself.

#### *The march*

Although *the march* usually describes a stretch of land encompassing the sheriffdoms immediately on either side of the Scottish/English border, this term has been used here only to refer to those sheriffdoms lying within Scotland itself. Under the English administration, *the march* was usually divided into two parts, east and west, the western border of the sheriffdom of Roxburgh forming the boundary between the two.

*Seisin vs. sasine; farms vs. fermes*

Since English records are the primary sources for descriptions of land transactions and disputes, the English terms *seisin* and *farms* have been used throughout in place of the Scottish *sasine* and *fermes*.

*Proper names*

With regard to the surnames of Edward's officers, the most common form found in English records has generally been used in each case, e.g. Sir Robert Hastings, Sir Edmund Hastings, Sir John Burdon, Sir Walter Burghdon.

## CHAPTER ONE

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ENGLISH  
ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM IN SCOTLAND

1296-7

**Introduction:**

The collapse of the government of John Balliol on 7 July 1296<sup>1</sup>, less than two months after the defeat at Dunbar, brought Scotland under King Edward's direct control. Since King John's authority had already been restricted to a largely nominal role<sup>2</sup> and he was not himself present at Dunbar, the events of April to July 1296 must be seen as a defeat of the Scottish political community as a whole.

The reticence of the Scottish nobility in the following two years, which contrasts sharply with their assurance and assertiveness in 1295, signifies a crisis of confidence caused by the ease with which the English king had brought about their defeat and submission. Unfortunately for Edward, however, this was only a temporary state of affairs.

**Establishing the administration:**

At a parliament held at Berwick in August 1296, Edward laid down ordinances for the future government of the conquered kingdom. The records bear out the assertion of Walter of Guisborough that the king ordained a new treasurer, seal and chancellor, appointed justices and commanded all to do homage to him<sup>3</sup>. Though sufficient to provide for the establishment of the new government, this was not a 'paper constitution': ".. the kingdom was not abolished but remained in abeyance"<sup>4</sup>.

**Major offices: *The royal lieutenant***

The most senior member of the new Scottish administration was the royal lieutenant, John of Warenne, earl of Surrey. He was appointed to this office on 26 September 1296<sup>5</sup>. As Edward's immediate representative, his duties were almost as varied as those of the king himself. Apart from his military role, he was responsible for justice. Petitions from Scots to the king could either be dealt with by Surrey himself, or,

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1 C.D.S., ii, p.194.

2 The exasperation of his own nobility with King John's conciliatory attitude towards Edward's aggression had resulted in the appointment of twelve Guardians to govern the kingdom in 1295 [Guisborough, 264; Lanercost, 161-2; Fordun, i, 327]. The Franco-Scottish treaty of 23 October 1295 was concluded as a result [A.P.S., i, 451-3; see R. Nicholson, 'The Franco-Scottish and Franco-Norwegian Treaties of 1295, S.H.R., 114-132].

3 Guisborough, 284; Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 31-2.

4 Barrow, *Bruce*, 75.

5 *Foedera*, i, 731.

if submitted to Edward (in parliament), judgement was still reached after investigation by the lieutenant<sup>6</sup>. The temporalities of vacant sees were also in his hands<sup>7</sup>, as was patronage of benefices up to the value of forty marks, which would have included most Scottish parishes in royal patronage<sup>8</sup>.

### *The chancellor*

The new chancellor was Walter Amersham<sup>9</sup>, a royal clerk who had previous experience of Scottish affairs, having served as an associate of Bishop Alan of Caithness as chancellor in 1292. His primary responsibility was to oversee the issuing of royal writs.

### *The keeper of the seal*

The other important official at the chancery was William Bevercotes, appointed on 5 October 1296 "to keep, collect and deliver writs sealed with the seal used by the king in Scotland." This was a separate seal, struck in 1296: its obverse showed Edward:

"... seated in majesty, robed and crowned. In his right hand he holds a sceptre with floriated top and his left hand is on his breast."<sup>10</sup>

Bevercotes was to be answerable for the issues of the seal at the exchequer at Berwick. He became chancellor of Scotland himself in 1304<sup>11</sup>.

### *The treasurer*

The treasurer of Scotland was named as Hugh Cressingham<sup>12</sup>, who, until then, had been a justice in various English counties, including Yorkshire, most recently. In September 1296 the early rolls of the Scottish exchequer had been found in Edinburgh castle and delivered to the treasurer<sup>13</sup>. However, in March 1297 the barons of the exchequer in London sent Cressingham a transcript of the regulations for the establishment of the Berwick exchequer, which was to be run along the same lines as the one at Westminster. Various rolls from the early years of Edward's reign and a bundle of writs from the reign of Henry III were also sent up to Scotland, presumably as examples of correct procedure. Thus, despite sufficient documentation from the Scottish departments of state to provide examples of form, the intention was clearly to use English practice. These were all returned to the Westminster exchequer the following

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6 *Rot. Scot.*, i, 35.

7 *C.D.S.*, ii, no.928.

8 *C.P.R.*, 1292-1301, 205.

9 *Rot. Scot.*, i, 35.

10 C. Hunter Blair, 'Durham Seals vi', *Archaeologia Aeliana*, xiii, no.3028, p.129.

11 *C.P.R.* 1292-1301, 206; *C.D.S.*, ii, no.1611.

12 *C.D.S.*, ii, no.853.

13 *C.D.S.*, ii, no.835.

November<sup>14</sup>, only two months after the treasurer had been killed at Stirling Bridge, suggesting that there was no further need for them, because the Scottish administration had collapsed.

### *The justiciars*

On 24 November 1296 three justiciars were appointed, conforming to the traditional Scottish format of "a justiciar of Lothian, a justiciar beyond the Sea of Scotland and a justiciar of Galloway"<sup>15</sup>. These were William of Ormesby, William Mortimer and Roger Skoter respectively<sup>16</sup>, all Englishmen who cannot have been well-versed in Scots' Law or the Scottish legal system. Nevertheless, the office of justiciar was obsolete in England but not in Scotland<sup>17</sup> and thus Edward was prepared to provide some continuity in his administration of the northern kingdom.

It was presumably in his capacity as justiciar that notification was made, in June 1297, to William Mortimer, that Sir Simon Lindsay had entered the manor of 'Tuthebotheville' [Tullyboyle] by the king's command<sup>18</sup>.

### *The escheators*

Two Englishmen were also appointed as escheators in 1296: Henry Rithre was to be escheator north of the Forth, and also keeper of the castles of Elgin and Forres; Peter Dunwich was his colleague south of the Forth and keeper of Yester castle<sup>19</sup>. In this case, Edward was conforming to English custom, however, since escheators were normally associated with the office of sheriff in Scotland<sup>20</sup>.

### *The 'civil service'*

The only indication of the size of the 'civil service' at Berwick comes from the number of safe-conducts granted to the newly-appointed officials and those going north with them. Four of Surrey's retinue were granted such conducts, though this cannot have

14 C.D.S., ii, no.876.

15 Bateson, 'The Scottish King's Household', 18-19. Though this document is undated, it is most likely to have been written in the reign of King Robert I, probably after his first parliament in March 1309 [A.P.S., i, 459]. The reference to the Knights Templar precludes the document being written any later, since that order was proscribed in 1309 [Foedera, ii, 94]. Since Robert I had re-established the Scottish kingship after a gap of ten years, it is entirely understandable that he would wish to be familiarised with Scottish governmental procedure.

16 Rot. Scot., i, 37.

17 The office of justiciar was revived in England in 1258, at the instigation of the Monfortians, after a lapse of twenty-four years. However, this was not a permanent revival and the main officers of royal justice in the reign of Edward I were the justices [Prestwich, *Edward I*, 25; 289-92].

18 C.P.R., 1292-1301, 250.

19 C.D.S., ii, no.853; see below, p.30.

20 Bateson, 'The Scottish King's Household', 42.

been the full complement. Sir Brian fitz Alan, who succeeded Surrey as lieutenant briefly in 1297, was required to have a retinue of fifty men-at-arms and Sir John of Brittany, who was appointed to the office in 1305, was to retain sixty men-at-arms. Surrey no doubt retained a similar number, to be paid for out of his annual *certum*<sup>21</sup>.

Cressingham had thirteen men with him, including Sir Robert Joneby, a Cumberland knight and the new sheriff of Dumfries. Amersham had only two, including William Bevercotes. Peter Dunwich had four, who included Sir Robert Hastings, appointed keeper of the castle and sheriffdom of Roxburgh on 8 September 1296. Henry Rithre, on the other hand, had none, while William of Ormesby was accompanied by two sons and three others<sup>22</sup>. This totalled thirty-four, including the officials themselves, out of which sixteen<sup>23</sup> probably resided permanently in Berwick in a purely administrative capacity. The lieutenant and his retinue were also based there.

### Sheriffs and keepers of royal castles:

The keepers of royal castles, who often also held the office of sheriff, were of great importance to the new administration. As the king's officers in the localities, they were the most widespread and obvious representatives of the new regime. This was naturally of greater moment if the new appointees were English.

### *Scottish royal castles and sheriffdoms*

To put any discussion of Edward's sheriffs in perspective, it is necessary to establish which Scottish castles were royal ones. On 12 June 1291, the following Scottish royal keepers handed over their castles to Edward and the Competitors, in anticipation of the choosing of a new king of Scots.

**Table 1: keepers of Scottish royal castles, 1291<sup>24</sup>**

Sir William Soules	:	Roxburgh, Inverness
Sir William Sinclair	:	Edinburgh, Dumfries
Sir Patrick Graham	:	Stirling
Sir John Soules	:	Berwick
Sir Alexander Comyn	:	Dingwall
Sir John Comyn (of Badenoch)	:	Jedburgh, Cluny
James the Steward	:	Dumbarton, Ayr
earl of Buchan	:	Wigtown 'in Galloway', Aberdeen, Kirkcudbright, Banff
earl of Angus	:	Forfar, Dundee

21 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 225; Palgrave, *Documents*, i, 292; see below, p.37.

22 C.D.S., ii, no.853; *Rot. Scot.*, i, 32-3.

23 That is, the chancellor and treasurer, together with their retinues, excluding those, such as Sir Robert Joneby, the sheriff of Dumfries, who were obviously not going to stay at Berwick.

24 Stones and Simpson, *Edward 1 and the throne of Scotland*, ii, 100-1.



earl of Mar	: Aboyne
Sir Reginald Cheyne, senior	: Elgin
Sir William Dolays	: Forres
Sir Reginald Cheyne, junior	: Nairn
Sir William Mowat	: Cromarty

Thirty-one Scottish sheriffdoms are reckoned to have been in existence prior to 1296.

Table 2: *Scottish sheriffdoms before 1296*<sup>25</sup>

<i>south-east</i>	<i>central</i>
Berwick	Stirling
Roxburgh	Clackmannan
Selkirk	Fife
Peebles	Kinross
Edinburgh <sup>26</sup>	Auchterarder
Haddington	
Linlithgow	
<i>north-east</i>	<i>north-west</i>
Perth	Skye <sup>27</sup>
Forfar	Lorne
Kincardine/Mearns	Kintyre
Aberdeen	
Banff	
Nairn	<i>south-west</i>
Elgin	Lanark
Forres	Dumbarton
Inverness	Ayr
Cromarty	Dumfries
Dingwall	Wigtown

After the conquest of 1296 there were thirty. Two of the new west Highland sheriffdoms, Skye and Lorne, had disappeared; Rutherglen appears to have taken on shrieval status independent of Lanark<sup>28</sup>, although there is only one piece of evidence for this arrangement, suggesting that it was short-lived.

#### *Roxburgh, Ayr, Berwick, Jedburgh, Selkirk Forest*

Several appointments were made in May 1296, while the conquest of Scotland was still underway. Sir Walter Touk was given the keepership of the castle and sheriffdom of Roxburgh; Sir Reginald Crawford, a Scot, the keepership of the castle and sheriffdom of Ayr; Osbert Spaldington, the keepership of the castle, town and sheriffdom

<sup>25</sup> *Fife Court Bk.*, Appendix D, 349-367.

<sup>26</sup> In 1296 the sheriffdoms of Edinburgh, Haddington and Linlithgow all came under one sheriff [*Fife Court Bk.*, Appendix D, 354].

<sup>27</sup> Skye, Lorne and Kintyre were created sheriffdoms by King John Balliol in 1293 [A.P.S., i, 447b].

<sup>28</sup> *Rot. Scot.*, i, 24-28.

of Berwick; and Sir Thomas Burnham, the keepership of Jedburgh castle and Selkirk forest<sup>29</sup>.

### *Elgin, Forres*

The other appointments were made after Edward's return from his progress through Scotland. On 3 September Henry Rye, the newly-appointed escheator north of the Forth, was granted custody of the castles of Elgin and Forres. The Scot, Sir Reginald Cheyne, who had held Elgin in 1291, was ordered to hand over the two castles to Rye<sup>30</sup>. Cheyne had presumably held them under King John.

### *Roxburgh, Stirling, Yester*

Several appointments were made on 8 September 1296. The sheriffdom of Roxburgh, with its castle, was granted to Sir Robert Hastangs, junior and Sir Walter Touk was duly ordered to give the castle up. No reason is given for this reappointment. Stirling Castle and sheriffdom were committed to Sir Richard Waldegrave. David le Graunt, previously appointed by Edward, was ordered to hand it over. Yester castle<sup>31</sup> in East Lothian was granted to Peter Dunwich, the new escheator south of the Forth. Henry Greenford, the previous keeper appointed by Edward, was now required to give it up<sup>32</sup>.

### *Warden of Galloway and Ayr; Ayr, Wigtown, Cruggleton, Buittle*

The most important office, after that of Surrey as lieutenant of Scotland, was the wardenship of the land of Galloway and of the county [comitatum] of Ayr, awarded to Sir Henry Percy, also on 8 September 1296. The castles of Ayr, Wigtown, Cruggleton and Buittle were also committed to his custody. The first two were traditional royal castles, controlling sheriffdoms. Buittle was part of the Balliol family lands and was thus forfeited by King John<sup>33</sup>. Cruggleton belonged to Comyn of Buchan<sup>34</sup>.

It is not clear, however, whether or not Sir Henry Percy was now sheriff of Ayr and Wigtown. Sir Reginald Crawford had been appointed to that office on 14 May 1296 and was still acting as such in August 1296<sup>35</sup>. Sir Walter Twynham, a local man like Crawford, was described as "the keeper of the sheriffdom of Wigtown" in the same month<sup>36</sup>. They are therefore the only two Scots to occupy office in the administration instituted in Scotland by King Edward in 1296. Sir Reginald appears to have had strong

29 *Rot Scot*, i, 23.

30 *Rot. Scot.*, i, 27.

31 See below, p.34, for a discussion of Yester, a private castle, the inclusion of which in a list of royal castles is therefore interesting.

32 *C.D.S.*, ii, p.264; *Rot. Scot.*, i, 30.

33 *Rot. Scot.*, i, 31.

34 See below, pp.32-3.

35 See above, p.29; *C.D.S.*, ii, no.824 (6).

36 *C.D.S.*, ii, no.824 (1).

ties with the young earl of Carrick in 1306<sup>37</sup> and he perhaps joined the English side with the Bruces before the outbreak of war in 1296. There is certainly no record of his receiving back his lands, suggesting that he was never regarded as a rebel, for the above reason. The office of sheriff of Ayr, awarded to him three months before the Berwick parliament and on the same day that Robert Bruce and his son were empowered to receive Scots to Edward's peace<sup>38</sup>, was therefore a reward for his 'loyalty' to Edward. Sir Walter Twynham, on the other hand, did receive back his lands in September 1296<sup>39</sup> and his connection was with the Balliol family<sup>40</sup>. Wigtown was part of the Balliol family lands and the appointment of Twynham suggests some degree of leniency towards supporters of the late royal family on Edward's part.

It is possible that Percy's appointment in September removed Crawford and Twynham from these offices. There are certainly no references to the two Scots as sheriff after August 1296. It would seem likely, however, that Crawford, at least, continued to perform the functions of sheriff, under Percy's jurisdiction.

#### *Jedburgh, Edinburgh, Dumbarton*

On 3 October 1296, Sir Thomas Burnham was relieved of the keepership of Jedburgh castle and Selkirk Forest, which was now granted to Sir Hugh Elaund. Sir Walter Huntercumbe was to hold the keepership of Edinburgh castle and the three sheriffdoms of Edinburgh, Haddington and Linlithgow. Dumbarton castle and sheriffdom were given to the custody of Sir Alexander Leeds. James the Steward, who had held Dumbarton in 1291, was again required to give it up<sup>41</sup>.

#### *Dumfries, Lanark and Bothwell*

There are a variety of appointments for which records do not survive, but which, nevertheless, can be inferred from other evidence. Thus Sir Robert Joneby, a member of Cressingham's retinue, was sheriff of Dumfries and keeper of the royal castle there by August 1296<sup>42</sup>; William Hesilrig was almost certainly given the office of sheriff of Lanark<sup>43</sup>; and the castle of Bothwell, forfeited from Sir William Murray, was installed with an English garrison under Stephen Brampton<sup>44</sup>.

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37 Barrow, *Bruce*, 146.

38 *Rot. Scot.*, i, 23.

39 *C.D.S.*, ii, no.832.

40 Twynham was co-heir to Helewisa Levintone, wife of Eustace Balliol [*C.D.S.*, ii, no.35].

41 *Rot. Scot.*, i, 36.

42 See above, p.28; *C.D.S.*, ii, no.824 (4).

43 Barrow, *Bruce*, 83.

44 *C.D.S.*, ii, no.1867.

It should be noted that this is not a full list of the appointments made by Edward in 1296. Unfortunately, since none appear to have been enrolled in either the Close or the Patent Rolls, our knowledge is more restricted than usual by which records survived and which did not.

### **Continuity and change:**

The royal castles and sheriffdoms of the medieval kings of Scots thus largely explain the corresponding geographical positioning of English sheriffs and royal garrisons. In 1296, Edward generally retained the existing system. There were some changes, however.

#### *The sheriffdom of Selkirk*

The sheriffdom of Selkirk was a heritable one, belonging to the Sinton family. However, Andrew Sinton, the incumbent in 1296, was captured at Dunbar and imprisoned in Fotheringay castle<sup>45</sup>. In May 1296 it was ordained that the keeper of Jedburgh castle and its forest was also to be sheriff of Selkirk<sup>46</sup>, despite the fact that Jedburgh was not even in the sheriffdom of Selkirk. It was perhaps considered that there was no fortress of sufficient size any nearer than Jedburgh to be the caput of the sheriffdom of Selkirk. Work began on a pele at Selkirk in 1302, but there does not appear to have been an English sheriff either there, or at Jedburgh, between 1296 and 1305, when Selkirk was once more described as a heritable sheriffdom<sup>47</sup>.

#### *Buittle and Cruggleton*

The forfeiture of King John - the only Scot permanently forfeited in 1296 - brought large parts of the south-west into Edward's hands. The castles of Buittle and Cruggleton formed part of this Balliol inheritance.

Cruggleton, unlike Buittle, had originally belonged to the de Quincy family, which, like the Balliols, had succeeded to lands in Galloway through marriage to a daughter of Alan, lord of Galloway<sup>48</sup>.

However, the de Quincy line died out in 1264 with the death of Roger de Quincy, earl of Winchester and constable of Scotland. Alexander Comyn, earl of Buchan, who had married de Quincy's third daughter, became constable of Scotland through the

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45 C.D.S., ii, no.1681.

46 See above, p.30.

47 C.D.S., ii, no.1288; see Chapter Sixteen, p.368; C.D.S., ii, no.1691.

48 G. Simpson and B. Webster, 'Charter evidence and the Distribution of Mottes in Scotland', *Château Gaillard*, v, 179.

resignation of the office to him by de Quincy's eldest daughter. The Comyns of Buchan also received Cruggleton castle at some point before 1292<sup>49</sup>.

A petition to Edward in 1304 from John, earl of Buchan, Alexander's son, shows that the Comyns resigned certain lands in Galloway to John Balliol in return for lands in the north-east<sup>50</sup>. It would seem likely that it was the Galloway lands of the de Quincys which were in question (or at least part of them). The reuniting of two-parts of the inheritance of Alan of Galloway would have gone a long way in an attempt to create a large royal demesne in the south-west. Thus Cruggleton also escheated to Edward with the forfeiture of King John in 1296.

However, there are no references to any English garrison residing in either castle. Rather, Lochmaben, which belonged to Bruce of Annandale, became the centre of the English administration of the south-west from 1298<sup>51</sup>.

### **Private castles:**

At no point during Edward's administration of Scotland does the number of castles mentioned in official records provide a complete guide to the number of castles occupied by an English garrison since private castles did not usually appear in these records. It was the responsibility of the owner, not the king, to provide wages and victuals for their garrisons and thus they do not appear in royal accounts. With the exception of John Balliol, there were no permanent forfeitures in 1296 and thus the Scottish nobility should have been allowed to retain possession of their castles.

### *Private becomes royal - Lochmaben*

In 1298 Bruce of Annandale's castle of Lochmaben was recaptured by Edward, having most probably been held for the Scots up until then by Bruce's son, the earl of Carrick<sup>52</sup>. It was thereafter garrisoned by English troops, perhaps partly as a reaction to Carrick's rebellion.

Lochmaben was treated in exactly the same way as a royal castle and thus its garrison appeared in both English chancery rolls and wardrobe accounts. It is not difficult to understand why Lochmaben was appropriated in this way. The castle was of major strategic importance to the English administration. Served by the wharf at Annan, it was easily reached from Carlisle and thus was ideal, from the English point of view, for controlling the south-west.

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49 S.P., ii, 254-5; Stevenson, *Documents*, i, 329; R.C. Reid, 'Cruggleton Castle', *T.D.G.A.S.*, xxxi, 153-4.

50 C.D.S., ii, no.1541.

51 Chapter Eleven, p.286.

52 C.D.S., iv, Appendix I, no.7; Barrow, *Bruce*, 104, n.78.

### *Private castles requiring public resources*

After the outbreak of war in 1297 there are also references in royal records to private castles in the hands of Edward's supporters. Yester castle, which belonged to the Gifford family, was granted to Peter Dunwich, the new escheator, in 1296 and by 1301 (but probably from 1298) it was granted by Edward to Sir Adam Welle<sup>53</sup>. However, there is no evidence for the forfeiture of its owner. Sir John Gifford of the sheriffdom of Edinburgh appears on the Ragman roll and is certainly not described there as a minor, which would have justified placing the castle in Dunwich's hands. In 1305, Isabella, widow of John Gifford, "who died in the king's peace", sought her dower of lands and property belonging to her late husband in Yester<sup>54</sup>.

Sir Robert Maudley became lord of Dirleton after its re-capture by the English in July 1298<sup>55</sup>, Sir John Vaux, the castle's Scottish owner, having joined the rebels. In 1301 the castles of Bothwell and Kirkintilloch were captured by the English and granted to Sir Aymer de Valence and Sir Hugh Despenser respectively<sup>56</sup>, since their Scottish owners were both forfeited. What is unusual is the fact that, although each grantee had to provide a certain number of troops for the castles as service for these grants, both English garrisons were treated as royal in the records thereafter. The castles were probably regarded as too important - and, perhaps, too vulnerable - to be left entirely to the resources of their new English owners.

The most important point to be deduced from these examples, which do not correspond to the general policy of maintaining the status quo pursued by Edward in 1296, is that expediency dictated what arrangements were to be made in each case.

### **Total number of English garrisons:**

The total number of castles in English hands at any given time throughout the period 1296-1304 can therefore only be estimated. In Chapters Two to Twelve, those castles in Edward's hands are discussed in the context of the events of 1297 to 1304. Each castle is then given a much more detailed examination in Chapters Thirteen to Sixteen.

### **Custos v. Constabularius:**

It should be noted that there is a distinction, not always remarked by medieval clerks, between the keeper of a castle [*custos*] and its constable [*constabularius*]. The keeper was often non-resident<sup>57</sup>, especially if he were a high-ranking noble, and thus

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53 See Chapter Thirteen, p.315; E101/359/5.

54 C.D.S., ii, p.207; *Memo. de Parl.*, no.330.

55 See Chapter Four, p.117.

56 See Chapter Six, p.171; Chapter Twelve, p.302.

57 The basic definition of non-resident has been taken to mean rarely, or never, appearing in accounts referring to the castle in question.

entrusted the castle entirely to a constable. This was particularly true of private castles, but can also refer to royal ones. For example, Sir John de St. John, the warden of Galloway from 1300 to 1302, was keeper of the castles of Dumfries and Lochmaben, both of which had royal garrisons. He usually resided at Lochmaben and thus Dumfries, though subject to his jurisdiction, was run by its constable. Sir Hugh Despenser was keeper of the private castle of Kirkintilloch and perhaps visited there when on campaign, but he could be regarded as non-resident since he is only once mentioned in records relating to the castle<sup>58</sup>. The constable, Sir William Fraunceys, was responsible for the day-to-day running of Kirkintilloch and its safe-keeping.

In cases where the keeper was normally resident, he seems to have had more wide-ranging administrative duties than a constable, whose jurisdiction was merely that of the castle itself. Sir John de St. John's primary task, in the insecure south-west, was to ensure the safety of the area under his authority, which often meant organising expeditions against the Scots. The earl of Carrick was granted the keepership of the royal castle of Ayr in March 1303 and was often in residence in the castle. However, there was also a constable there, thus allowing the earl to undertake his other responsibilities as a great magnate, such as attending the royal court or raising revenues from his estates or the sheriffdom of Lanark, another of his offices<sup>59</sup>.

Although those appointed in 1296 are described as keepers, the records show clearly that the men with whom indentures were made for the keeping of castles containing royal garrisons throughout the next decade were usually constables. The exceptions were Lochmaben and Dumfries, which came under the keepership of the warden of Galloway, and Ayr, the keepership of which was given first to the earl of March and then the earl of Carrick. Indentures in these cases were made with the keepers, not the constables, of these castles.

It should be noted, however, that royal clerks described Sir John Kingston, for example, as both *custos* and *constabularius* of the royal castle at Edinburgh during his eight years in office and thus the terminology used by contemporaries should not be accepted unquestioningly.

Taking this into account, it would appear that constables alone were usually appointed to royal castles; except if the appointee was of sufficiently high rank - for example, an earl - or in charge of more than one castle, in which cases there would be both a keeper and a constable. These constables of royal castles could also be sheriffs of the surrounding areas, as was the case at Roxburgh, Edinburgh and Berwick. In private

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58 E101/9/13, m.4. Unless otherwise stated, all manuscript references come from the Public Record Office.

59 E101/11/19, m.5 dorso; see Chapter Sixteen, p.350.

castles, such as Kirkintilloch, there was usually both a keeper (the owner), normally non-resident, and a constable.

It is very difficult to make a general rule on the subject of keepers and constables and apply it in every case throughout the period 1296-1305. This is probably symptomatic of the pragmatic nature of Edward's arrangements for his garrisons. If there was a good reason for having a keeper and a constable in a royal castle, then the king would have both. If not, he was unlikely to pay two people for a job that could be done just as effectively by one.

### **Comparison with the government of Ireland:**

In order to place these developments in context, a comparison with the English administration in Ireland is useful. Here, too, an English system with some deference to local custom was introduced. This imposed far greater changes on the native community than in Scotland since there were fewer similarities between the original and the new method of government.

The king's immediate representative in Ireland, corresponding to the lieutenant in Scotland, was the justiciar, currently John Wogan. Beneath him, as in Scotland was the chancellor and the treasurer. The exchequer, like its English counterpart, was a fixed body of officials comprising two chamberlains, the chancellor, barons of exchequer (responsible for auditing the accounts and hearing pleas at the exchequer court), two remembrancers (in charge of the memoranda rolls), an usher or door-keeper, engrossers (for writing the great rolls) and clerks. The Irish exchequer was kept particularly busy during the 1290's carrying out Edward's frequent demands for money and purveyance for his French and Scottish campaigns.

A separate great seal and chancery had been introduced to Ireland in 1232 and writs in the king's name were thenceforth issued under it. Local government was also remodelled on English lines, with the introduction of shires as the main unit of administration, headed by a sheriff appointed by the government. There was also a separate Irish parliament, based, as in England, on the royal council and by now a judicial and legislative, as well as consultative, body.

However, the real basis of English control of Ireland was the common law system, in the form of royal courts and justices, which was also introduced. English statutes could then be sent from Westminster and enforced through the Irish courts<sup>60</sup>.

It is clear, therefore, that an administrative structure very similar to that already in operation in Ireland was envisaged for Scotland. Obviously, the fact that there was no longer a king resident in the realm necessitated changes but Edward was willing, to a certain extent, to retain parts of the Scottish system, such as the justiciars.

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60 J. Lydon, *Ireland in the Later Middle Ages*, 28-43.



It was perhaps at a local level that any changes were most noticeable, particularly with regard to the office of sheriff. The new sheriffs of 1296 for whom records survive were all English, with the exception of Sir Reginald Crawford at Ayr and Sir Walter Twynham at Wigtown.

At a higher level, the treasurer was a glaring innovation since the Scottish administrative system used a chamberlain as the main financial officer of state. Perhaps part of the odium directed at sir Hugh Cressingham, the treasurer, stemmed from the imposition of his distinctively English office.

In Ireland not only was a new administrative structure established over a period of time from the 1170's, but English kings also managed to milk the province of large sums of money and goods. Neither case appears to have been true in Scotland. Perhaps, also, those Scots who would naturally be involved in the administration of the kingdom felt that anglicisation was occurring for its own sake, with a resulting awareness of the "Scottishness" of the original system.

#### **Wages:**

Arrangements for the payment of all the above officials were made between September and November 1296. Surrey was to receive 2000 marks a year; Sir Henry Percy, the warden of Galloway, 1000 marks; Amersham, 200 marks; the three justiciars, 60 marks or £40. There is no mention of Cressingham's fee as treasurer, or that of the two escheators, presumably because records of them have not survived. Amersham was also presented to the church of Kinross on 6 September 1296<sup>61</sup>, which would have provided him with an income in addition to the above fee.

Unfortunately, only one ordinance remains as evidence for the payments to be made to the keepers of royal castles. Sir Walter Huntercumbe, the keeper of Edinburgh castle and of the three sheriffdoms of Edinburgh, Haddington and Linlithgow, was to receive 100 marks per annum<sup>62</sup>. Presumably the other keepers of castles received similar amounts, corresponding to the size of the castle and whether or not their duties included those of sheriff.

This system, whereby the keeper of a castle (or sheriff or officer of state) was paid a fixed annual fee, known as a *certum*, for himself and an agreed number of men-at-arms, was used frequently. An indenture was drawn up between the king (or whoever was acting for him in Scotland itself) and the person to receive the *certum*, showing the amount, the number of men-at-arms for whom this amount was to pay and the times of the year at which it was to be paid by the king.

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61 C.P.R., 1292-1301, 198.

62 Rot. Scot., i, 36.

Payment was not always made this way, however. Men-at-arms in addition to the numbers engaged with the keeper could be contracted to stay in garrisons at the king's wages. Footsoldiers were always at wages, as were the various tradesmen and officers usually present in a garrison, such as masons, carpenters or watchmen.

Sometimes the king preferred to pay wages to the whole garrison, including the keeper and his men-at-arms, probably because the numbers of men-at-arms fluctuated too often to justify a fixed payment. The daily wages of each member of the garrison varied according to status and are shown in the table below. Wages were the same in a garrison as they were in the royal army.

**Table 3: Daily Wages Table**<sup>63</sup>

<u>Mounted</u>	<u>Unmounted</u>
Earl: 4s.	Vintenarius: 6d.
Banneret: 4s.	(crossbowmen)
Knight: 2s.	Vintenarius: 4d.
Esquire: 12d.	(archers)
Serjeant-at-arms: 12d.	Crossbowman: 4d.
Hobelar: 6d.	Archer: 2d.
Constable: 6d.	Clerk: 6d.
(uncovered horse)	Chaplain: 6d.
	Smith: 4d.
	Carpenter: 4d.
	Engineer: 4d.
	Mason: 4d.
	Carter: 4d.
	Watchman: 3d.
	Janitor: 3d.

These were the most usual wages paid in each category, although there were slight variations in the amounts paid to unmounted troops, presumably depending on the quality and experience of those involved. Master craftsmen received 2d. more per day than the usual rate for their trade.

All stipends and *certa* were to be paid in two annual instalments in the Trinity (eighth Sunday after Easter - 8 July) and Michaelmas (6 October - 25 November) terms, supposedly from the issues of Scotland at the Berwick exchequer. The evidence suggests, however, that the issues of Scotland were not proving sufficient to make these payments. By June 1297 supplies of cash were already making their way from the English to the Scottish exchequer to fund the administration north of the border<sup>64</sup>.

<sup>63</sup> *Lib. Quot.*, 145, 258.

<sup>64</sup> *Rot. Scot.*, i, 34, 36, 37; see Chapter Two, p.48; Prestwich, *Documents Illustrating the Crisis of 1297-8 in England*, 100.

### Problems of time and distance:

It is worth considering the problems involved in administering Scotland even partly from Westminster at a time when a return journey from Berwick to London took at least fifteen days<sup>65</sup>. Shipping was used most frequently to and from Berwick, although boats often continued up the Forth in order to supply English garrisons at Edinburgh, Linlithgow and Stirling. The garrisons in the south-west could be supplied by sea at the ports at Annan, Dumfries and Ayr, but the rest of Scotland in English hands had to be reached by land.

Instructions from both the Scottish chancery at Berwick and the English chancery itself had to be delivered to all Edward's officers throughout Scotland. Since there were English officials as far north as Cromarty, such orders could take as long as a month to reach them. Some effort was made to deal with this problem in 1298, when the English exchequer was moved to York<sup>66</sup>.

### Problems from the beginning:

Despite all the careful ordinances made for their safe-keeping, the English garrisons in Scotland soon found themselves living a fairly hand-to-mouth existence. Within a very short time after the conquest of 1296, wages fell into arrears. By June 1297, Sir Henry Percy, the warden of Galloway must have complained to the king that he had not received what was due to him, since a writ dated the 4th of that month was sent to Cressingham, the Scottish treasurer, firmly ordering him to pay Percy 500 marks for the Trinity term<sup>67</sup>.

It is unlikely that Percy received anything from the issues of Scotland, which were supposed to provide the money for his *certum*. Presumably the £2000 which Cressingham received from the English exchequer in June 1297 went largely to pay already overdue wages<sup>68</sup>.

Such problems were not restricted to those holding office in the more outlying areas of Scotland. Even those at Berwick were finding it difficult to establish their authority.

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65 On 26 September 1297, fifteen days after the defeat at Stirling Bridge, the English regency government in London issued writs ordering an expedition against the Scots. It can be presumed, on this occasion, that this action was taken immediately on receipt of the news of the battle [see Chapter Two, p.56].

66 See Chapter Three, p.72.

67 *Rot. Scot.*, i, 4.

68 Prestwich, *Documents Illustrating the Crisis of 1297-8 in England*, 100.

### *The chancellor*

On 3 July 1297 Surrey was ordered that Amersham, the chancellor, was to be presented to a living in Scotland or Galloway, even though he had been given the church of Kinross the previous September. Presumably no-one would pay the teinds owed to the benefice and Amersham was thus gaining no profit from it.

On the 12th of the same month, Amersham was appointed receiver of royal revenues in Northumberland, though it seems likely that he did not take up the office until November<sup>69</sup>. No doubt it was intended that he should combine the two offices of chancellor and receiver. In August 1297 a writ empowered Sir Brian fitz Alan, the newly-appointed lieutenant, to present to benefices with the advice of the treasurer and the chancellor<sup>70</sup>. This is the last official reference to a treasurer in Scotland and there are very few references to Amersham as chancellor in the years following 1297, although he is frequently mentioned as receiver. Nevertheless he was paid as chancellor until 1303 and therefore officially occupied the office until his death in 1304<sup>71</sup>.

Whether or not Amersham was able to fulfil his duties as chancellor is another matter. A writ from the Scottish chancery was sent some time in 1297 to the sheriff of Fife concerning the rights of certain burgesses of Inverkeithing to the custom of the fishery of Crail. Apparently, the sheriff, "not wishing to execute it, threw it out of his hand"<sup>72</sup>. This example certainly does not say much for the authority of such writs. Unfortunately there is so little evidence for the activities of Amersham's chancery that further comment cannot be made.

Thus, from late 1297, Amersham was described as receiver more often than he was as chancellor. However, the infrequent references to this last office mean that it should not be assumed that there was no chancellor of Scotland until the ordinances of 1305. It is tempting to suggest that most of the chancellor's duties which could still be performed were effected by Bevercotes, the keeper of the seal. However, references to Bevercotes disappear completely between 1296 and 1304, when he became chancellor<sup>73</sup>. The "seal used by the king in Scotland" also seems to have fallen into disuse until 1304<sup>74</sup>. Thus the office of chancellor, even though it still retained an incumbent, was little more than an empty title, creating the illusion that a civilian administration still operated from Berwick.

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69 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 195-6.; Chapter Two, pp.58-9.

70 *Rot. Scot.*, i, 47.

71 See Chapter Seventeen, p.389.

72 *C.D.S.*, ii, no.880. The first named reference to an 'English' sheriff of Fife is in 1303, when Sir Richard Siward is described as such [*C.D.S.*, ii, no.1350].

73 *C.D.S.*, iv, p.464.

74 *C.D.S.*, iv, p.484.

### *The treasurer*

The treasurer's function should have been to receive and audit the issues of Scotland, through the exchequer at Berwick, and to oversee their disbursement. Initially, Cressingham and his officers appear to have been successful in raising revenue - in June 1297 £5188 of the Scottish revenues was used to pay a subsidy to the Count of Bar<sup>75</sup>. But the fundamental problem, explaining many of the difficulties which Edward faced in trying to govern Scotland, was that the English soon found that the revenues of Scotland were uncollectable.

The treasurer's function was therefore transformed into that of receiver of large sums of money from the English exchequer. In July 1297 Cressingham wrote to sir Philip Willoughby at the exchequer in London, having recently received £2000 from the latter which was to be repaid from the issues of Scotland by 1 August. The treasurer explained that this would not be possible since the king had ordered him to give any money which he received to Surrey, the lieutenant<sup>76</sup>.

Although this still suggests that revenue could be raised in Scotland, the flow of cash to the Berwick exchequer from north of the Border soon came to a halt. At the end of July 1297, Cressingham wrote to the king stating that:

"from the time when I left you, not a penny could be raised in your [realm of Scotland by any means] until my lord the earl of Warenne [Surrey] shall enter your land and compel the people of the country by force and sentences of law..."

Cressingham also mentioned that he had been ordered to extract rents and other dues again from those who had paid them to the rebel Scots.

If anyone could have extracted money from the people of Scotland, one feels sure that sir Hugh Cressingham would have been the man to do it! There can be little doubt that much of the odium attached to the ebullient treasurer<sup>77</sup> stemmed from his initial success in raising revenue.

Cressingham was killed by the Scots at Stirling Bridge in September 1297. The evidence suggests that there was little need for a treasurer thereafter. Control of Scottish finances was taken over by two receivers, one at Berwick and the other at Carlisle, whose main task was to supervise the receipt and disbursement of funds from England.

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75 Prestwich, *Documents Illustrating the Crisis of 1297-8 in England*, 23.

76 Prestwich, *Documents Illustrating the Crisis of 1297-8 in England*, 104.

77 *Guisborough*, 294.

### *Escheators and justiciars*

References to the escheators and justiciars also peter out in 1297. William of Ormesby, perhaps as a result of his close encounter with William Wallace in June of that year, was transferred to England in August 1297 on the king's business. William Mortimer and Henry Rithre both came with the king on campaign in the summer of 1298. Roger Skoter was still in Scotland in July 1297, but there is no further mention of him thereafter. By December 1297 Peter Dunwich had given up his office of escheator and was sent, instead, to Lancashire with William Dacre to choose footsoldiers for the forthcoming expedition. This was his last appearance in official records before he was released from Scottish prison in April 1299<sup>78</sup>. Dunwich was presumably captured during the winter expedition since he would otherwise undoubtedly have been involved in the preparations for the campaign of the following summer.

### *The lieutenant*

The most illuminating illustration of the instability of the Scottish administration, however, is Surrey, the royal lieutenant, and it is worth spending some time examining his career in that office.

Soon after his appointment in September 1296, there were doubts about his commitment. Walter of Guisborough says that:

"The earl of Warenne, to whom our king committed the care and custody of the kingdom of Scotland, because of the awful weather, said that he could not stay there and keep his health. He stayed in England, but in the northern part and sluggishly pursued the exiling [of the] enemy, which was the root of our later difficulty."<sup>79</sup>

This accusation appears to have been largely true. In June 1297, during the uprising of Wishart, the Steward and the earl of Carrick, the earl wrote a letter to the king; attributing the delay in his arrival in Scotland to the need for more troops<sup>80</sup> and promising that the delay would cause no harm. Nevertheless, the earl's absence meant that when news of the rebels' submission to Sir Henry Percy and Sir Robert Clifford was conveyed by these same nobles to Cressingham and his force gathered at Roxburgh, a decision as to whether or not they should make a further attack upon "the enemies on the other side of the Scottish sea" or upon Wallace in Selkirk forest had to be postponed until his arrival. "And thus", as Cressingham so eloquently described it to his master, "matters have gone to sleep"<sup>81</sup>. Surrey returned south immediately after the battle of Stirling Bridge in

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78 See Chapter Two, p.49; *Rot. Scot.*, i, 42; Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 222, 226; *C.C.R.*, 1296-1302, 42; Gough, *Scotland in 1298*, 55; Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 369-70.

79 *Guisborough*, 294.

80 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 183-4.

81 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 200-203; see Chapter Two, p.54.

September 1297 and did not reach Newcastle again until February 1298, en route for the north with an army.

The guardianship seems to have become an issue within a year of Surrey's appointment. On 4 August 1297 a letter was sent to Edward from Berwick, perhaps from Osbert Spaldington, the sheriff there. In it the writer states that Surrey had offered the guardianship to someone else<sup>82</sup>, as the king had ordered.

The importance of firm government on the part of the lieutenant (and perhaps an indication that Surrey had indeed been remiss in his duties) is illustrated by the writer's advice that the Scots, whose rebellion had been quashed only in the previous month, would "be obedient ... if the guardian frequently oversees that no-one does harm to them or mistreats them"<sup>83</sup>.

Surrey himself had probably petitioned the king to be relieved of his duties in the north; the writer certainly states that the earl, with Sir Henry Percy, intended to cross with the king to Flanders. Such activity must have been more to his taste. Surrey was a soldier, an army commander<sup>84</sup>, perhaps with little inclination for the more general administrative position of guardian.

The guardianship was, in fact, offered to Sir Brian fitz Alan, who wrote a letter to the king on 5 August 1297<sup>85</sup>. Fitz Alan, a Yorkshireman, had previously held the position of joint-Guardian with four Scots as part of the English administration of Scotland during the interregnum. In July 1297 he had been appointed captain of royal fortifications in Northumberland and was to supervise royal expenditure in that area<sup>86</sup>. He was therefore a suitable choice.

In his letter, Fitz Alan states that Surrey and his council at Berwick had asked him to take on the guardianship on 29 July 1297, but he wished to decline:

"due to insufficient skill and ability to taken on such a great thing, unless I had the wherewithal to support it to your honour... My resources, however stretched, are too small to sustain the land to your honour (they do not extend to more than £1000) and to keep fifty armed horses. Thus I would not be able to keep the land in peace to your honour when such a nobleman as the earl cannot well keep it in peace from what he received from you. Nor do I know how I could do it with less than he receives."<sup>87</sup>

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82 The manuscript is torn at this point, but the offer was presumably made to Sir Brian fitz Alan.

83 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 221-2.

84 However, Surrey's performance at Stirling Bridge does lead us to question the validity of his military reputation.

85 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 222-4.

86 *C.D.S.*, ii, no.499; Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 194-5.

87 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 222-4.

This letter shows clearly the resourcing difficulties faced by the English administration only a year after the conquest. The costs of maintaining fifty armed men as a standing army were considerable and therefore required a large private income. Using the wages table given above (Table 3), the lowest rate calculates at £2 10s. per day, or over £900 a year. The upper rate was double this amount and this was only part of the total outlay. At a time when the king's attention was directed mainly towards Flanders and despite the fact that the administrative machinery had been set up to provide the necessary revenue to establish and maintain a firm peace in Scotland, it is clear that royal officers on the spot were often left literally to their own resources to fulfil their duties.

This is further illustrated by a letter written by Cressingham on the same date [5 August 1297], in which he states the terms on which Fitz Alan had been offered "supreme custody of the land and realm of Scotland". The latter was to receive £1128<sup>88</sup> each year for the maintenance of himself and a retinue of nine other bachelors and fifty armed horsemen. The contract was to last, initially at least, for six months, to be begun once the earl had brought the country to a peaceful state.

Fitz Alan seems to have had a far more realistic grasp of the situation than the English government, asserting that he required the same resources as Surrey had received (or was supposed to have received). He presumably realised that even if the earl brought about the desired state of peace, it would not long remain that way. Cressingham therefore went on to urge the necessity of choosing a lieutenant as quickly as possible.

By 18 August 1297 the English government obviously regarded the matter as settled since on that date the chancellor was ordered to issue letters patent to Fitz Alan as lieutenant similar to those previously issued to Surrey<sup>89</sup>. Ten days later custody of Galloway was entrusted to Sir John Hoddleston, in place of Sir Henry Percy<sup>90</sup>, who was presumably now intending to set off for Flanders. On the same date writs were sent out to all sheriffs north of the Trent, ordering them to help "Brian fitz Alan, keeper of the realm and land of Scotland, whom the king is sending to the parts of Scotland to do justice on the rebels who are wandering about there committing murders and other crimes and to repress their malice"<sup>91</sup>.

On 25 September 1297, Fitz Alan was issued a letter of respite of debts for his impending trip to Scotland. He appears to have undertaken some of the responsibilities of his office, since £200 was issued to Robert Beaufey, the receiver in the north of England prior to Amersham and Abingdon, "according to the mandate and ordinance of Brian fitz Alan, keeper of said kingdom"<sup>92</sup>. This reference is unfortunately undated.

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88 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 225-6. Surrey received 2000 marks, or £1333 13s.4d. [see above, p.37].

89 *C.D.S.*, ii, no.941.

90 *Foedera*, i, 793.

91 *C.P.R.*, 1292-1301, 306-7.

92 *C.D.S.*, v, no.1168; E159/71, m.102.



In reality Surrey was unable either to join the king in Flanders or to relinquish his position as lieutenant. On 12 September 1297, shortly after Edward's arrival in the Netherlands, rumours of continuing and increasing unrest in Scotland had reached the king and he ordered the earl to remain in the north until the country was pacified<sup>93</sup>.

On 1 November 1297 various northern nobles, including Fitz Alan, were all sent special letters of thanks from the regency government for their efforts to protect the north of England against forays made by the Scots after Stirling Bridge<sup>94</sup>. Thus Fitz Alan was again, or perhaps still, holding his post as captain of royal fortifications in Northumberland and he remained as such throughout 1297 and 1298. He did come to Scotland with the king in the campaign of the following year and fought at Falkirk, but he was not one of those summoned from Berwick to come to a secret meeting at York on Scottish affairs in April 1298<sup>95</sup>. He may well have been there, but not in the capacity of guardian of Scotland.

The office of lieutenant of Scotland thus fell into abeyance after the battle of Stirling Bridge. Surrey was given charge of the army which came up to Scotland during the winter of 1297-8 but he no longer made any pretence of involvement with the Scottish administration on a permanent basis.

### Conclusions:

Within a year of the conquest, therefore, the English administration of Scotland was already experiencing widespread difficulties. At the top level, Surrey appears either to have faced too many difficulties or to have made insufficient effort to render himself an efficient and effective lieutenant. At a more basic level, the inability of the treasurer to collect revenues, through the sheriffs, rendered the administration ineffective from both a financial and a political point of view.

The shortage of money, of which Edward was always most aware when he had to pay for an army, was of vital importance, since it primarily affected his garrisons, the permanent instruments of government. The irregularity of wage payments, caused partly by difficulties in finding the large sums involved and also the logistics of transporting cash from England, affected both the numbers and the reliability of those stationed in Scottish garrisons. This obviously had some bearing on the effectiveness of their defences. As the main support behind Edward's administrative structure, the outward symbols of his authority, the history of the English garrisons in Scotland is central to our understanding of the period 1296-1303.

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93 *C.D.S.*, ii, no.945.

94 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 240-1.

95 Gough, *Scotland in 1298*, 137; 95-6.

Lastly, the fact that many of the offices instituted in 1296 appear to have fallen into abeyance in 1297 would seem to be a very good indication of the state of the Scottish administration. Conversely, the re-emergence of these offices as more than passing references from 1303 onwards suggests that the English hold on Scotland had been primarily military in nature up until then, precluding, except on rare occasions and in very specific areas, the successful operation of a long-term administrative system.

## PART ONE

Chapter One provided a description of the administrative system set up in Scotland by Edward 1 after the conquest of 1296. By late 1297, however, this system had largely broken down. All the more minor offices of state<sup>1</sup> had fallen into abeyance and two out of three of the chief officers of state - the lieutenant and the treasurer - were not replaced when their incumbents vacated these positions<sup>2</sup>. The chancellor, Master Walter Amersham, was paid for that office until 1303 but his activities as part of the Scottish administration in the following years were concerned primarily with his duties as receiver, rather than as chancellor.

The garrisons experienced similar problems. The Scots under Wallace managed to recapture most Scottish castles, so that only Roxburgh, Edinburgh and Berwick remained in English hands by late 1297. It was vital to the future of the English administration of Scotland that as many castles as possible were brought back under the authority of English officials, in order to gain control of the surrounding areas.

Edward's campaign of 1298 was indeed intended to reassert English control and to re-establish an effective administration. Three private castles in the south-east were captured even before the victory at Falkirk. Thereafter, expeditions to Fife and the south-west and the final reassertion of control over the south-east with the reduction of Jedburgh castle certainly went some way to achieving this aim. However, the only English castle established in the south-west - Lochmaben - remained isolated and vulnerable to Scottish attacks right through 1299.

It comes as no surprise, therefore, to find that the history of the English garrisons in the period following the outbreak of war in 1297 consists primarily of defensive measures taken to ensure their very survival. As well as combating Scottish attacks, there was also the problem of maintaining supply lines in the face of this enemy activity. This was primarily a war of attrition.

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<sup>1</sup> That is, the justiciars and escheators.

<sup>2</sup> Cressingham, the treasurer, was killed at Stirling Bridge on 11 September 1297; Surrey seems to have effectively relinquished his office after the battle of Stirling Bridge, returning north only on campaign [see Chapter One, pp.55-61].

## CHAPTER TWO

## DISINTEGRATION AND DEFEAT

1297-8

**Revolt:**

The inability of the Berwick administration, within a few months of the conquest, to provide sufficient financial support for the English garrisons was compounded in 1297 by the growing threat of patriotic activity throughout almost the whole of Scotland. By 24 July 1297, Cressingham, the treasurer, had to inform the king that:

".. by far the greater part of your counties of the realm of Scotland are still unprovided with keepers, as well by death, sieges or imprisonment; and some have given up their bailiwicks and others neither will nor dare return; and in some counties the Scots have established and placed bailiffs and ministers so that no county is in its proper order excepting Berwick and Roxburgh, and this only lately."<sup>1</sup>

It is clear that Scottish activities were forcing the English administration of Scotland to revert to that of a military occupation, almost entirely defensive in nature, only a year after the conquest. In addition - and perhaps more importantly - the Scots themselves were able to set up and operate their own administrative system.

*The north-west*

The first revolt to break out in Scotland occurred in the north-west Highlands and islands as early as March 1297. A full discussion of the events surrounding this revolt, which was primarily a civil war, is given in Chapter Nine.

*Wallace - the south-west, Perthshire and Selkirk Forest*

It was some time in May 1297, according to the English chronicler, Walter of Guisborough, that the Scots began their 'perfidious' rebellion<sup>2</sup>. However, in response to a writ to the sheriff of Westmorland, dated 26th April 1297, ordering an assessment for the lay twelfth in that county to be carried out by twelve suitable men, the sheriff wrote back that the writ could not be executed at present because "all the knights and free tenants are in Cumberland to defend the march between England and Scotland against the coming of

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<sup>1</sup> Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 206-7.

<sup>2</sup> Guisborough, 294.

the Scots"<sup>3</sup>. Thus, by late April, the Scots on the western March, probably led by Wallace, were already in revolt.

Wallace's revolt begins, traditionally, with the murder of the English sheriff at Lanark. He then raised the men of Clydesdale, including Robert Boyd and Adam Wallace of Richardstoun<sup>4</sup>. Thereafter, Wallace, now joined by Sir William Douglas, moved on to Scone, where the English justiciar, William of Ormesby, was holding a court<sup>5</sup>. The presence of Sir William Douglas suggests that Wallace's trip to Perthshire occurred before the rebellion of Wishart, Carrick and the Steward, which began after 24 May, since Douglas then joined his fellow nobles in the west<sup>6</sup>.

Ormesby managed to escape but was forced to leave his baggage behind. Guisborough also states that Wallace received certain messengers, who arrived at Perth around this time "in very great haste on behalf of certain magnates of the kingdom of Scotland". Since the Hebridean magnates would not be so described, this is perhaps evidence of collaboration offered by the aristocratic uprising which was about to commence, or had recently begun, in the west<sup>7</sup>. Douglas presumably left Wallace at this point.

Thereafter, Wallace and his men reputedly killed many Englishmen north of the Forth and besieged various castles on their way to the safety of Selkirk Forest<sup>8</sup>. There were quite a few royal castles reasonably close to Perth, such as Forfar, Clunie and Kinclaven, which Wallace could have attacked, as well as the major royal castles of the south-east, which he certainly besieged later in 1297. Certainly the castle of Cupar in Fife was in Scottish hands by the summer of 1298<sup>9</sup> and it is quite possible that Wallace captured it while en route from Perthshire to the south-east.

The capture of Cupar castle may have been connected with the rebellion of MacDuff of Fife, who seems to have joined Wallace around this time. This MacDuff had appealed to Edward during the reign of King John when the latter had judged against him in a land dispute. However, he had now joined the patriotic side and on 25 June 1297 his manor of Struthers near Ceres in Fife was granted to Andrew Fraser<sup>10</sup>.

MacDuff's rebellion was short-lived. He and his sons were captured by the earl of Strathearn and were expected to arrive in Berwick on 9 August 1297. Surrey promised that Macduff would "be treated as one ought to treat false traitors". However, he must

<sup>3</sup> Prestwich, *Documents Illustrating the Crisis of 1297-8 in England*, 73.

<sup>4</sup> *Wyntoun*, ii, 342 ; *C.D.S.*, ii, no.1597, p.418; *Blind Harry, Wallace*, 34, 39.

<sup>5</sup> Scone had been a sheriffdom separate from Perth under Alexander II but was probably now part of the sheriffdom of Perth. There is certainly no reference to it as a sheriffdom in 1296.

<sup>6</sup> See below, p.53.

<sup>7</sup> *Guisborough*, 295-6; *Stevenson, Documents*, ii, 192.

<sup>8</sup> *Guisborough*, 294.

<sup>9</sup> See Chapter Three, p.77.

<sup>10</sup> *Rot. Scot.*, i, 42; *S.P.*, iv, 10.

have been released or escaped soon after since he was killed at Falkirk fighting in Wallace's army<sup>11</sup>.

Having built up his strength in Selkirk Forest, where he remained until at least 23 July, Wallace and his army then went north again in the following month to lay siege to Dundee castle<sup>12</sup>.

*Wishart, the Steward and Carrick - the south-west*

The aristocratic rebellion came about, according to the surrender negotiations, because of the fear of the levying of military service overseas on the Scots. On 24 May 1297 writs were indeed sent to fifty-seven Scottish nobles, summoning them to Portsmouth by 7 July to take part in Edward's intended campaign to Flanders<sup>13</sup>. In addition, any Scot still imprisoned in England could go with Edward in return for his freedom.

The fifty-seven summoned included the earls of Carrick, March, Lennox, Strathearn and Sutherland, Sir Ingram d'Umfraville and Sir William Douglas. Interestingly, the Steward is not mentioned, though his brother, John, is. This may have been because Edward had been informed that James the Steward was already in revolt in the north-west<sup>14</sup>.

Very few Scots actually went overseas and all who did travelled straight from English prisons, including Gilbert, son of the earl of Strathearn, Alan and Peter, the sons of the earl of Menteith, Sir Edmund Comyn of Kilbride, Sir John Menteith, Sir Simon Fraser, Sir John Clocstone, Sir William Hay<sup>15</sup>, Sir Laurence Strathbogy, Sir Henry Inchmartin, Sir Walter Berkeley, Sir John Cambron, Sir William Olifard, Sir Edmund Ramsay and Sir William Murray<sup>16</sup>. None of those summoned appear to have gone with Edward.

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11 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 217; *Wyntoun*, ii, 347.

12 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 202; *Bower*, ii, 171

13 *Parl. Writs*, i, 284-5.

14 See Chapter Nine, pp.247-8.

15 There were two Scottish William Hays. This one was captured at Dunbar and imprisoned in Berkhamstead castle. He went with Edward to Flanders and was set free in return [*C.D.S.*, ii, nos. 742, 875, 942]. The other William Hay was summoned as a Scottish noble from north of the Forth [*C.D.S.*, ii, no.884] and was probably Edward's keeper of Ross [*Rot. Scot.*, i, 32; see Chapter Thirteen, p.?).

16 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 134-141; *C.D.S.*, ii, no.942. Unfortunately it is not stated which Sir William Murray this was. There would appear to have been four Sir William Murray's in Scotland at this time. The Sir William Murray's of Drumsergard and Tullibardine were both summoned [*C.D.S.*, ii, no.884] and are therefore unlikely to have gone, since no-one else who was summoned did. Sir William Murray of Bothwell also does not appear to have gone to Flanders, though he remained in exile in England after 1296 [*C.D.S.*, v, no.343]. Another Sir William Murray, son of Sir John Murray of Fife [*C.D.S.*, ii, p.209], was imprisoned after Dunbar [*C.D.S.*, ii, p.177] and is most likely to have gone abroad.

Scotland was also not exempted from the compulsory seizure and sale of wool which Edward had ordered in a desperate attempt to raise money for his continental ventures. This was no empty threat. In 1305 Sweetheart Abbey petitioned the king for payment for eight and a half sacks of wool, "taken by sir Hasculph de Cleseby and his other officials outside a grange of Holmcoltram or else they were carried out of Galloway and put by to save for what was owed by the Scots in year 25 [20 November 1296 - 19 November 1297]". Melrose Abbey, Scotland's greatest wool producer, also sought recompense in 1305 for fourteen sacks of wool and a last of hide "carried to Berwick for the king's work by reason of certain proclamations made by Osbert Spaldington, then sheriff of Berwick, which was such that all wool and hides of the land of Scotland were to be taken to the nearest port and issued there for the king's work"<sup>17</sup>.

Both these issues - the demands for service abroad and the wool prise - were causing aristocratic hackles to rise in England and it is not hard to imagine that the Scottish nobility were at least as outraged.

The presence of the earl of Carrick on the rebel side is somewhat surprising. As Barrow points out, "... young Bruce had everything to gain by loyalty to Edward."<sup>18</sup> Nevertheless, at some point early in 1297, according to Guisborough, the bishop of Carlisle, suspecting Carrick's loyalty, made him come to Carlisle to take another oath of allegiance. It was this oath which Bruce then claimed had been extorted and was therefore invalid<sup>19</sup>.

It is not clear exactly when Wishart, the Steward and the young earl came together in open rebellion. According to Alexander MacDonald of Islay, Edward's officer in the north-west, James the Steward was already in revolt in April 1297. Given that the king had been informed by 13 June that the rebels had caused considerable damage, the revolt must have begun no later than the end of May. There could not, therefore, have been enough time for the writs of service, issued at Portsmouth on 24 May, to have reached the Scots nobles before the uprising, though the Scots were obviously correct in anticipating their arrival<sup>20</sup>.

On 13 June 1297 Edward wrote to Sir Donald MacCan, Gillemichael MacGeche, Maurice Stubhille and others in the company of Sir Thomas Staunford to thank them "for their late ready and willing service in repelling disturbers of the peace and recapturing for the king castles which had been taken by those in those parts"<sup>21</sup>. Certainly, according to the surrender agreement, the rebels were accused of having "burnt and destroyed towns

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17 *Rot. Scot.*, i, 40; *Prestwich, Edward I*, 418-9; *Memo. de Parl.*, no.280, no.302.

18 Barrow, *Bruce*, 84.

19 *Guisborough*, 295.

20 See Chapter Nine, pp.247-8; *C.C.R., 1296-1302*, 108. Edward was at Canterbury between 1 and 10 June and at Leeds, Kent on 13 June [*Itin.*, 106-7].

21 *C.D.S.*, ii, pp.198, 210; *Rot. Scot.*, i, 32; *C.D.S.*, ii, no.894.

and castles"<sup>22</sup> and it is more likely to have been these nobles, rather than Wallace, who succeeded in capturing castles, however briefly, in the south-west.

From the Ragman Roll, we discover that MacCan, MacGeche and Stubhille all held land in the sheriffdom of Dumfries. Sir Thomas Staunford was one of Sir Henry Percy's retinue and must thus have been operating on behalf of the warden of Galloway<sup>23</sup>. An attack on Dumfriesshire corresponds with Guisborough's story that Bruce broke off his allegiance to Edward in front of the knights of Annandale, presumably at Lochmaben, the caput of the lordship, which is only about seven miles from Dumfries itself<sup>24</sup>. It is unfortunate that the castles captured by the Scots are not named, though presumably Dumfries was one of them. Sir Robert Joneby, who had been appointed sheriff of Dumfries in 1296, was to be found in the garrison of Carlisle castle by December 1297<sup>25</sup>, presumably as a result of this rebel activity.

Despite the "ready and willing service" of Staunford and his company, the rebellion in the west was not yet over. On 24 June 1297 Sir Henry Percy and Sir Robert Clifford were given powers to "arrest, imprison and otherwise do justice on persons making meetings, conventicles and conspiracies against the king's peace in divers parts of Scotland". Dumfries and Nithsdale were mentioned specifically, as well as the north-western English counties which were to provide aid, so that this must refer primarily to the aristocratic rebellion in the south-west. The danger was sufficient for the people of Cumberland and Westmorland to make a 'voluntary' offer of service on an expedition against the Scots, though they required reassurance that this would not be used as a precedent in the future<sup>26</sup>.

Clifford and Percy entered into negotiations with Wishart, the Steward and Carrick soon thereafter and the rebellion came to an end at Irvine on 7 July 1297. However, according to Guisborough, these Scottish nobles, who demanded a return to the ancient laws and customs of their land, "took so long in discussing the concessions with frivolous points, so that Wallace could gather more people to him"<sup>27</sup>. Though the ignominy of 1296 was still too fresh in the memories of the Scottish nobility to allow them to take up arms openly against King Edward in defence of the liberty of Scotland, there can be no doubt that they did all they could, without actually committing themselves, to support Wallace's endeavours.

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22 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 192.

23 *C.D.S.*, ii, pp.198, 210; *Rot. Scot.*, i, 32.

24 *Guisborough*, 297-8.

25 See Chapter One, p.31; E101/6/30, m.1.

26 *C.P.R.*, 1292-1301, 251; *C.D.S.*, ii, p.235. Wallace was in the east by this time [see above, p.49].

27 *Guisborough*, 299.



### English defensive action:

In July 1297 Edward was on the point of departing for Flanders. Though he either could not, or would not, believe that the Scots posed a sufficient threat to postpone or cancel his departure abroad, he did order measures to be taken to provide for the safety of the Border. On 12 July Sir Ralph fitz William and Sir Brian fitz Alan were appointed captains of fortifications in Northumberland and Sir Robert Clifford in Cumberland<sup>28</sup>.

The English officials in Scotland certainly did not take the threat posed by the Scots lightly. Cressingham, the treasurer, went personally to Northumberland to raise troops against the insurrection of Carrick, Wishart and the Steward. A muster was organised for 17 July at Roxburgh and a considerable force of 300 covered horse and 10,000 foot arrived there on that date. Since the source for these figures is a private letter written by Cressingham to the king, there is little reason to doubt them. The treasurer and his army had intended to set out on the following day [Thursday, 18 July] but the arrival from Irvine of Sir Henry Percy and Sir Robert Clifford in Berwick on the Wednesday evening forestalled this action.

The two knights brought news of the surrender of the Scottish nobles on 7 July and the assurance that "all the enemies on this side of the Scottish sea" had returned to Edward's peace<sup>29</sup>. They also had with them in their company Sir William Douglas and Sir Alexander Lindsay.

Douglas was immediately imprisoned in Berwick castle, because, according to Surrey, "he did not produce his hostages on the day appointed for him, as the others did". It is likely that one of these hostages was supposed to have been his son, James, which would explain why Barbour says that the young James Douglas spent the following years in Paris, his father's lands having been given to Sir Robert Clifford. Sir William himself was removed to the Tower of London on 12 October 1297 and was dead, still a prisoner, by January 1299<sup>30</sup>.

The earl of Carrick was also required to hand over his daughter, Marjorie, and though Surrey stated on 1 August that the others had given up their hostages, it seems very unlikely that Bruce, who had not yet even formally submitted, had handed over his daughter<sup>31</sup>.

Those at Berwick were still keen to mount an attack on the Scots, recognising that there were rebels to be dealt with north of the Forth and, somewhat nearer, in Selkirk Forest. However, it was agreed to await the arrival of Surrey, the royal lieutenant, who

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28 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 195-6.

29 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 201-2.

30 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 218.; Barbour, *Bruce*, 14-15; C.C.R., 1296-1302, 67; C.D.S., ii, nos.1054-5.

31 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 218. See below, p.57.

was making his way north. This does not appear to have met with the approval of Cressingham, never one to advocate delay, who asserted testily that "thus matters have gone to sleep and each of us returned to his own residence." The treasurer was also "much annoyed" that he could not inform the king of better news<sup>32</sup>.

A few days later, on 21 July, Percy was in Alnwick, writing to the king to confirm that he was accompanying Surrey to Berwick the next day<sup>33</sup>. Only three days later - several weeks after the capitulation at Irvine - Cressingham wrote the description of the sorry state of the English administration given on the first page of this chapter. If the troops at Berwick did make an expedition under Surrey's leadership, there is certainly no evidence for it. Instead, the earl spent the month of August trying, ultimately unsuccessfully, to persuade Sir Brian fitz Alan to take over his position as lieutenant so that he could accompany the king to Flanders<sup>34</sup>.

### English success against the Scots by August 1297:

By mid-August 1297, therefore, the English had achieved only qualified success against the rebels. MacDuff and his sons had been captured and what would no doubt at the time have been regarded as the most dangerous rebellion, that of Wishart, the Steward and the earl of Carrick representing 'the community of the realm of Scotland'<sup>35</sup>, had been brought to an end by negotiation. Those at Berwick (with the exception of Cressingham presumably) therefore convinced themselves that their "enemies of Scotland were dispersed and frightened from their foolish enterprise"<sup>36</sup>.

However, the north-east was now largely outwith English control, due primarily to the activities of Andrew Murray and his followers<sup>37</sup>. In addition, Wallace was also active in the east, supposedly besieging Dundee castle immediately before the battle of Stirling Bridge. A petition submitted to Edward in 1305 by one William Doddingstone, a burgess of Dundee, seeking recompense for twelve sacks of wool stolen by William Wallace "by force of arms during the war"<sup>38</sup>, perhaps refers to this siege.

Originally a private castle belonging to the inheritance of Earl David of Huntingdon, Dundee had become a royal castle by the late thirteenth century<sup>39</sup>. Having handed the castles of Dundee and Forfar over to Edward in 1291, Gilbert d'Umfraville,

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32 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 201-3. It was Cressingham who, at Stirling Bridge two months later, chastised the lieutenant for wasting time, thereby causing the English army to begin the disastrous crossing of the bridge instead of looking for a ford [Guisborough, 301]. Perhaps Surrey's tardiness in July gave the treasurer good reason to doubt the wisdom of delay.

33 C.D.S., ii, no.913.

34 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 221-2; Chapter One, pp.43-4.

35 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 193.

36 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 221.

37 See Chapter Thirteen, pp.249-51.

38 *Memo. de Parl.*, no.356.

39 See **Table 1**.

the pro-English earl of Angus, was immediately regranted custody of these castles and the lands of Angus by Edward's commission<sup>40</sup>. This Umfraville connection with Dundee was continued in 1304 when Angus's son, Thomas, was granted the constablership of the castle, again by Edward<sup>41</sup>. It is likely, therefore, that the Umfravilles were holding Dundee before Wallace recaptured it in 1297. In addition, Dundee was a suitable place for a rendezvous with the men of Moray.

On hearing that Cressingham had brought in a fresh army from England, Wallace left Dundee, ordering the burgesses to "kepe that castell ryght stratly", and went southwest to Stirling<sup>42</sup>. At some point around this time (c. August 1297), he and Andrew Murray joined forces.

### **The battle of Stirling Bridge:**

On 7 September 1297 Surrey, the reluctant lieutenant, was ordered to remain in Scotland to deal with the continuing unrest. Impending civil war in England, however, soon overshadowed even the threat of the Scottish rebels and he was recalled to London to have talks with Prince Edward a week later<sup>43</sup>.

### *The comparative sizes of the English and Scottish forces*

By then, however, Surrey was already on his way to Stirling with an army: according to Guisborough, he had 1000 cavalry and 50,000 foot, while Wallace and Murray were waiting there with 180 horse and 40,000 foot<sup>44</sup>.

These figures are clearly exaggerated. There is no evidence to suggest that the English raised any more troops beyond the 300 horse and 10,000 foot mustered by Cressingham in mid-July and it is highly likely that many of these had already returned home. The numbers of the Scottish army could therefore be adjusted to around 60 horse and 8,000 foot at most. Certainly there is no reason to doubt that the Scots lacked cavalry compared with footsoldiers since, although the nobility may have given covert support to Wallace and Murray in raising the 'Scottish army', most would not have taken part themselves<sup>45</sup>.

### *The battle itself*

Wallace, Murray and their men had established themselves on the Abbey Craig north of Stirling, while the English remained on the south side of the river Forth. Negotiations, apparently conducted for the English by James the Steward and the earl of

40 *Rot. Scot.*, i, 9.

41 See Chapter Eight, p.236.

42 *Wyntoun*, ii, 343-4.

43 *C.C.R.*, 1296-1302, 63.

44 *Guisborough*, 301.

45 See Barrow, *Bruce*, 86.

Lennox, brought nothing more than the determined avowal of the rebels to fight for the liberty of their country<sup>46</sup>. Cressingham, in the interests of haste, urged an immediate advance over the narrow bridge on the morning of 11 September 1297. The resulting 'battle' was little short of a massacre of the English, earning Wallace and Murray a place in Scottish history for all time.

The news of the English army's defeat at the hands of the Scots had reached London by 26 September 1297, two weeks after the battle. The only fortunate outcome for the English government was that the crisis in the north after Stirling Bridge united the discontented English nobility.

Writs were immediately directed to the sheriff of York, fifteen northern lords and thirteen Scottish magnates, who included John Comyn of Badenoch, the earls of Dunbar, Angus, Strathearn, Menteith, Lennox, Buchan and Sutherland and Sir Ingram d'Umfraville, ordering them to go with Sir Brian fitz Alan against the rebel Scots with as much force as they could muster. Clifford and Percy were naturally included. These twenty-eight men had already been ordered to join Surrey prior to Stirling Bridge, when there were only "rumours about the state of Scotland"<sup>47</sup>, but they were presumably believed not to have done so. The earl himself was to report personally to the regency government in London on the events of the past weeks.

### **The Scottish nobility: playing a double game or sitting on the fence?:**

The earl of Carrick was not one of those Scots required to assist Fitz Alan, even though the Steward, who had also been prominent in the revolt of July, was summoned. Despite surrendering on 7 July, both these Scottish nobles had still not come to Berwick to confirm the peace by 5 August 1297. Cressingham was expecting them there on 15 August but he was not at all convinced that they would come. The Steward certainly played a very dubious role just prior to the battle of Stirling Bridge, offering to go to Wallace to persuade him to surrender. He was presumably trying to win favour and better terms from the English. When the English were seen to be losing, he reaffirmed his commitment to the rebel cause by ambushing those fleeing from the battle<sup>48</sup>.

It is indeed highly unlikely that a man "possessed of a recognisably 'Stewart' canniness"<sup>49</sup>, would turn to Edward after such a spectacular victory for the Scots. Though the summons to assist Fitz Alan suggests that he had submitted, this really only

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46 *Guisborough*, 300.

47 *Rot. Scot.*, i, 49-50; *C.C.R.*, 1296-1302, 132.

48 *Guisborough*, 299-300. Wishart had been imprisoned in Roxburgh castle by the end of July [Barrow, *Bruce*, 84-5; *Guisborough*, 299].

49 Barrow, *Bruce*, 81.

proves that those in London who sent the summons believed that the Steward was at Edward's peace in late September.

On 14 November 1297, John, bishop of Carlisle and Sir Robert Clifford were empowered to receive the earl of Carrick and his household to the king's peace, indicating that the younger Bruce had also not submitted by the autumn of that year<sup>50</sup>. However, this does not prove that he submitted then.

There is therefore considerable evidence for duplicity on the part of the Scottish signatories of the Irvine agreement, which supports Barrow's contention that the nobles involved were aware of "a country-wide sabotage of the occupation regime and a methodical attempt to restore the independent administration of the realm"<sup>51</sup>. Carrick most probably never fulfilled the conditions agreed at Irvine<sup>52</sup>, nor formally surrendered. Douglas also broke the hostage agreement and was duly imprisoned. The Steward spent most of July, August and September prevaricating and though the summons to assist Fitz Alan suggests that he was once more at Edward's peace in September 1297, this is the only evidence that he had submitted. The bishop of Glasgow was imprisoned at Roxburgh, according to the charges laid against him in 1306, because he was standing as a hostage for the earl of Carrick and William Wallace, who were still waging war in contravention of the agreement made at Irvine. Although William Wallace was not involved in that agreement, the bishop could certainly have been taken hostage for the earl of Carrick and William Douglas<sup>53</sup>.

The Scottish nobility have not been given a very good press for the part that they played in the events of 1297. Certainly they capitulated almost immediately in the face of the English force mobilised by Clifford and Percy, no doubt because many of them had so recently endured the military humiliation of Dunbar. Various members of the nobility also played a prominent role in the counter-measures taken by the English administration against the Scottish rebels. We have already noted the part played by the three men of Dumfries and the earl of Strathearn in Fife. In the north-east, the countess of Ross, the bishop of Aberdeen, Gartnait, son of the earl of Mar, and the earl of Buchan were all involved in assisting Edward's officers to put down rebellion<sup>54</sup>.

However, with regard to these last three, there is good reason to suggest that they, at least, were of questionable loyalty and use to the English king. Certainly Cressingham was most suspicious of the account of their activities during June and July which they sent to the king by the hand of Sir Andrew Rait, a Scottish knight belonging to Edward's

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50 *C.P.R.*, 1292-1301, 315.

51 Barrow, *Bruce*, 85.

52 That is, the surrender of Marjorie Bruce as a hostage.

53 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 193; Palgrave, *Documents*, i, 344.

54 See above, pp.51-2; see Chapter Nine, p.250.

household. Indeed, the treasurer went so far as to say that the credence was "false in many points, and deceitful" and asking the king to "give little weight to it"<sup>55</sup>.

It is probably true that Andrew Murray found little more than token resistance to his army from these nobles. However, if they had come out overtly against Edward, they risked the possibility of direct English action. By supposedly dealing with the situation themselves, they gave the rebels time to consolidate their position.

However, it was only in the next year - 1298 - that many resumed their natural positions in Scottish society, as sheriffs and castle keepers under the Guardians, thus performing many of the functions which Edward had intended for those based in his own garrisons. Much of this activity can only be inferred from English records but it is of great importance in any assessment of the English garrisons in Scotland.

### **The remains of the English administration: *The receivers***

In the immediate aftermath of Stirling Bridge, the most important members of what was left of the English administration were Master Richard Abingdon, the receiver of Cumberland, at Carlisle and Master Walter Amersham, the receiver of Northumberland, at Berwick. They were appointed to these offices, replacing a single receiver, Robert Beaufey, on 12 July 1297, by which time it had become obvious that Scotland herself could not, or would not, support Edward's officials<sup>56</sup>. It is significant, also, that there should now be two receivers instead of one, attesting again to the increased flow of resources from England to Scotland. Each was assigned a keeper of the counter-roll - Master Robert Heron, who had also been keeper of the new customs at Berwick since 1296, was to work with Amersham and Robert Barton with Abingdon<sup>57</sup>.

It should be noted that, even though Amersham resided at Berwick, he was, in fact, appointed as receiver in Northumberland. He would, ordinarily, have been based at Newcastle. Obviously, as chancellor of Scotland, he needed to reside at its administrative centre but the more important implication here is that his primary duty was to organise the transportation of the issues of Northumberland to Berwick to be distributed to Edward's officers in eastern Scotland.

Abingdon was appointed receiver in Cumberland. Carlisle was presumably used in the west partly because of its proximity to southern Galloway and Annandale and partly because it was not safe for a receiver to reside in western Scotland.

A letter dated 12 November 1297 from the king to the sheriffs of the northern English counties makes it clear that Amersham and Abingdon had only recently taken up

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55 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 227.

56 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 195-6.

57 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 102, 195-6.

their offices. This letter was an order to assign the issues of revenues, such as the ninth and the customs, from these counties to the new receivers<sup>58</sup>.

The role of these receivers should not be taken for granted since their rise to prominence is one of the most fundamental indications of the difficulties faced by the English administration of Scotland.

### **Success, legitimacy and support - Wallace, the Guardian:**

The Scots were clearly eager to re-establish control over castles manned by English garrisons. They had some temporary success in the south-east over the winter of 1297/8 and more permanent success in parts of the south-west. In addition, Scotland north of the Forth was cleared of all English officials - with the doubtful exception of Sir Alexander Comyn - and remained under the authority of the Scottish government from 1297 until 1303<sup>59</sup>.

Wallace, now operating as the representative of King John and 'the Community of the Realm', rather than as an unknown member of the lesser nobility with a dubious reputation, had far more resources at his disposal. He thus achieved greater success in one of the more conventional aspects of warfare outwith the battlefield - besieging castles.

### *Roxburgh and Berwick*

In the months following the battle of Stirling Bridge, Roxburgh was besieged by the Scots. It did not fall, but only because of the arrival of an army under Surrey in February 1298. Wallace and his men managed to recapture Berwick town although the castle resisted until also relieved by Surrey. The town was then restored to English control<sup>60</sup>.

### *Jedburgh*

It may also have been at this time that Jedburgh castle was successfully reduced and received a Scottish garrison under John Pencaitland. Edward spent sixteen days in October 1298 besieging the castle<sup>61</sup>, whereafter its constable was Sir Richard Hastings, brother of the sheriff of Roxburgh.

Sir Hugh Elaund, the English keeper of Jedburgh appointed in 1296 was certainly no longer in the castle by late 1297 and was indeed probably in Surrey's army since he received protections for himself and his company to go with the earl in December

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58 E159/71, m.108. That is, Northumberland, Cumberland, Westmorland, Lancashire and Yorkshire.

59 See Chapter Nine, pp.252-4.

60 Prestwich, *Edward I*, 479; see below, p.63.

61 See Chapter Three, p.79.

1297<sup>62</sup>. Though this is by no means conclusive evidence for the reduction of the castle by the Scots before December (there is quite often no record of a change of keepers), this would seem the most likely time for it to have occurred.

### *Stirling, Dumbarton and the south-west*

The Scots did not confine their activities to the south-east, however. A notable success for the Scots in 1297 was the capture of Stirling Castle. As the 'gateway to the north', commanding the western end of the Forth, this castle was of great strategic importance and was thus a valuable prize.

The original English constable of Stirling, Sir Richard Waldegrave, and other members of the garrison, had been killed at the battle of Stirling Bridge and, in order to save the castle from the Scots, Sir William fitz Warin, Sir Marmaduke Tweng and Sir William Ros "threw [themselves] into the castle" at Surrey's command. However, lack of victuals forced them to surrender not long after. Sir William Ros (and most probably the other two as well) was imprisoned in Dumbarton castle, presumably also recently captured by the Scots, "where he lay in irons and hunger and danger of death"<sup>63</sup>.

Given this evidence, the lack of references in the records to English garrisons and Edward's activities after the battle of Falkirk in 1298, it would seem likely that the Scots secured control of Scotland west of Edinburgh in the aftermath of Stirling Bridge.

### *Carlisle*

Scottish attacks were not confined to Scotland. On 11 December 1297 Sir Robert Clifford, captain of the garrison at Carlisle, along with other knights of the area and the bishop of Carlisle, who was keeper of the castle, decreed that thirty covered horses and one hundred footsoldiers were required to defend the town<sup>64</sup>.

In fact, the records of payment made by the receiver at Carlisle, Master Richard Abingdon, show that the actual number of men in the garrison did not quite reach the stipulated figure. From 17 to 26 December 1297, six knights, nineteen esquires and seventy-eight footsoldiers were paid and an average of six knights, twenty-three esquires and sixty-five footsoldiers were present throughout January 1298.

On 3 February 1298, three knights and their esquires left the garrison, two of whom went to join the force going from Cumberland to join Surrey's army en route for Berwick and the south-east. The number of footsoldiers in the garrison rose considerably, however, to 339, though this number had dropped again to 114 by 25 April. Clifford's own retinue, from 11 to 24 December 1297, comprised five knights and nine esquires, but

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62 See Chapter One, p.31; Gough, *Scotland in 1298*, 16.

63 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 232; *C.D.S.*, iv., no.1835; see Chapter Twelve, p.303.

64 E101/6/30, m.3.



from then until 19 January 1298 it reached a total of seven knights and sixteen esquires<sup>65</sup>.

The stipulation as to the composition of the garrison presumably came in response to Scottish forays across the border after Stirling Bridge, which seriously threatened both Newcastle and Carlisle: Guisborough states that Wallace and his men attacked Carlisle "from the Feast of St. Luke [18 October] to the Feast of St. Martin [11 November]"<sup>66</sup>. There is some suggestion that Wallace's force was composed not merely of those "wanderers, fugitives and exiles"<sup>67</sup> who had joined him since May 1297. According to the anonymous chronicle of Bury St. Edmunds, the Scottish force which invaded Northumberland in 1297 was led by "a certain Maleis along with William Wallace". Professor Barrow has argued convincingly that this 'Maleis' was most probably the earl of Strathearn, whose family "had considerable interests in north Northumberland". It is also likely to have been at this time that Aymer, laird of Hadden, and Mary, widow of William Melville, made a raid into the bishop of Durham's lands at Norham<sup>68</sup>.

Those who were responsible for defending the northern counties, had to be very careful when they were dividing their manpower between the garrisons and expeditionary forces against the Scots, so that neither was left short and thus vulnerable to attack. This was a problem faced by the English garrisons within Scotland also.

One such expedition left at Christmas for Annandale, led by Clifford and including others from the garrison. This meant that a force which totalled 460 footsoldiers under five constables, as well as Clifford's own retinue, was withdrawn from the defence of Carlisle. It was presumably the return of this expedition, or part of it, which occasioned the rise in the numbers of footsoldiers in the garrison in early February. A group of one hundred footsoldiers under William Hardegil were left north of the Solway on 11 and 12 January 1298, "as they believed the Scots were coming"<sup>69</sup>. The latter were obviously extremely active throughout the winter of 1297-8, both north and south of the border.

### **The winter campaign of 1297/8: *The army***

As an indication of the seriousness of the situation, a campaign for the winter of 1297/8 was organised soon after Stirling Bridge, to be led initially by prince Edward himself and then Surrey. Writs for service on the expedition were issued on 26 October 1297 for the muster at Newcastle on 6 December. The numbers summoned, which totalled nearly 30,000, bore little relation to the numbers which actually arrived and

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65 E101/6/30, m.1.

66 Guisborough, 304-7.

67 Guisborough, 294.

68 Barrow, *Bruce*, 93.

69 E101/6/30, m.1.

although nearly 20,000 of these were supposed to come from the northern counties, Wales provided the greatest proportion of men in reality. This Welsh contingent, totalling a maximum of 5157, was paid from 8 December 1297 to 29 January 1298 and reached its greatest numbers between 18 December and 9 January. 2000 had been summoned from North Wales and 1939 actually turned up<sup>70</sup>. The near-fulfillment of the quota was extremely unusual in this campaign.

By 24 December 20 constables and 1900 men had arrived from various counties in England. A note attached to the wages account for this army states that Sir Ralph Fitz William, the captain of the Newcastle garrison, was captain of the king's army, presumably until the arrival of the earl of Surrey, the leader of the expedition. Another note attached to the payment made to Fitz William and his retinue for the period 18 December to 31 January, states that they were - typically - waiting for the earl, which explains the lengthy stay south of the border<sup>71</sup>.

Since so few had accompanied Edward to Flanders<sup>72</sup>, this at least meant that the English nobility was available for the campaign against the Scots. Payment for their services came primarily from the archbishop and clergy of Canterbury, who granted £7691 16s.8d., payable in two instalments, for the wages of five hundred horsemen for three months. These were divided into six groups, ranging in size from thirty to one hundred and thirty, and were led by the earls of Surrey, Norfolk, Gloucester, Hereford, Warwick and Sir Henry Percy. Payment, as usual, was through the receivers, sir Walter Amersham and sir Richard Abingdon<sup>73</sup>.

By 21 March 1298, Abingdon had in his possession 3500 marks for the payment of the second instalment of these wages. An additional 538 marks 20d. was required from the clerical tenth in the bishopric of Lincoln to make up the full amount, and a writ was directed to the sheriff of Lincoln, ordering the sum to be conveyed to Abingdon, at Newcastle. The sheriff of Northumberland had been ordered on 4 March to prepare for the arrival of the receiver, so that both he and the large sum of money which he was bringing with him could remain safely in Newcastle castle. Surrey and Percy, the two most heavily involved in Scottish affairs, had not, in fact, been paid yet, which is why the remaining money was so urgently required<sup>74</sup>.

The archbishop of York and his clergy also contributed to the war effort, as would be expected, given their proximity to the border, with a grant of a fifteenth of clerical property in November 1297. This was to be used "... when necessary for the defence of

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70 C.P.R., 1292-1301, 314; see also Chapter Three, p.68.

71 E101/6/35, m.11; m.4.

72 Prestwich, *Edward I*, 424.

73 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 255-6; Gough, *Scotland in 1298*, 64-6.

74 E159/71, m.24; Gough, *Scotland in 1298*, 79, 82.

the kingdom against our enemies and for the sustenance of Brian fitz Alan, captain of our garrisons of Northumberland and the same garrisons against the Scots rebels"<sup>75</sup>.

One of the most interesting contingents in Surrey's army was that of Sir John Seton, father of the earl of Carrick's brother-in-law, Sir Christopher, five other unnamed knights from Annandale and their ten valets. These were Bruce of Annandale's men, whom Carrick had asked to go with him when he joined the rebel side in 1297<sup>76</sup>. They preferred to stay loyal to their lord, who remained at Edward's peace.

On 12 February 1298, the first payment to this army was recorded at Roxburgh, where the garrison was relieved from a Scottish siege. Surrey and his men did not remain there for long, however, since payments at Berwick began on 15 February<sup>77</sup>. Wallace and his army, who had succeeded in capturing the town but not the castle, soon departed at the news of the approach of this large English army. Some English contingents did arrive at Berwick and the army reached its largest size there [c. 16,000 men], but a month later, around 14 March 1298, the numbers had dropped dramatically to just over 3000 men<sup>78</sup>.

While the army was at Berwick, fresh orders from the king reached Surrey. These orders commanded the earl to postpone the campaign until Edward returned from Flanders to lead the army personally. The king's decision is not surprising: campaigning during the winter season was unlikely to be very successful, victuals were low and Surrey's qualities of leadership were distinctly questionable<sup>79</sup>.

### **Purveyance:**

Given that most, if not all, of the victuals required both by the permanent administration in Scotland and the troops engaged for campaigns had to come from either England or Ireland, purveyance - that is, the pre-emption of goods as a royal prerogative - obviously played an important role in the success or failure of the English administration of Scotland.

On 26 October 1297 orders were sent to various towns, including York and Newcastle, ordering proclamations to be made stating that those with victuals for sale for the forthcoming expedition should have them carried by land or sea to Holy Island or Newcastle, where they would be bought. With an eye to the grievances concerning prise, aired earlier in the year<sup>80</sup>, prompt payment was promised. On 5 November 1297

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75 E159/71, m.108.

76 C.D.S., ii, no.1091; E101/6/35, mm.11-16; *Guisborough*, 295-6.

77 E101/6/35, m.7.

78 E101/6/35, m.9.

79 *Guisborough*, 313-5; *Prestwich, Edward I*, 479.

80 *Prestwich, Edward I*, 421-2.

purveyance was also ordered in Lincolnshire, Yorkshire, Cambridge and Huntingdon and Nottingham<sup>81</sup>.

### *Yorkshire purveyance*

The evidence for purveyance and the purchase and collection of supplies in general for regnal year 26 [20 November 1297 - 19 November 1298] is incomplete and it is therefore impossible to calculate exactly how much was sent north and from where. Nevertheless, the accounts for purveyance in Yorkshire by the clerks John Sheffield and Ralph Dalton remain intact and it seems likely that it provided a large percentage of the total purveyance, since this was a north-eastern county greatly affected by events in Scotland, but perhaps not as subject to the full impact of Wallace's devastating raids as those counties immediately south of the border.

Sheffield was involved in organising purveyance in Yorkshire from 20 November 1297 to 30 May 1298. The mandate for this purveyance was dated 5 November 1297 and the victuals thus acquired were intended specifically for the expedition to be led by prince Edward in December 1297<sup>82</sup>. Neither the expedition nor the purveyance occurred on time.

In keeping with the order of 26 October, the victuals were gathered from various places in the county and taken to the port at Hull between 20 November 1297 and 18 February 1298. The operation did not go completely smoothly, however, since one William Fraunk of Grimsby was appointed early in December to hurry the proceedings up. Since the army reached Roxburgh on 12 February 1298, it would seem that its members faced a dearth of supplies for at least two weeks, until the arrival of the Yorkshire purveyance at Berwick around 1 March. Provisions were sold from the store there from then until 29 May to those who had joined Surrey's expedition<sup>83</sup>.

The provisions collected by Ralph Dalton followed a similar path to Berwick<sup>84</sup>. Supplies arriving during the spring campaign amounted to 1376 quarters of wheat, 379 quarters of oats and 270 quarters of peas in total.

### *Accounting for the issue of these supplies*

Peter Dunwich's account, giving details of the issue of these provisions, also survives. The Berwick castle garrison received 94 quarters of wheat and 1 last<sup>85</sup> of herring and the Roxburgh garrison, 96 quarters of wheat. The earl of Gloucester was issued 20 quarters of wheat. Eight captains received a total of 191.5 quarters of wheat

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81 Prestwich, *Edward I*, 427; C.C.R., 1296-1302, 77; Parl. Writs, i, 306.

82 E101/6/30, m.1.

83 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 239; E101/6/35, m.7; see above, p.63.

84 Gough, *Scotland in 1298*, 1-5.

85 1 last = 10,000 fish

and 99 quarters of oats as wages for themselves and the 750 men under their command for the period 11-21 March 1298<sup>86</sup>. This accounted for 402 quarters of wheat and all the oats.

### **The receivers' accounts:**

Abingdon and Amersham's accounts still survive for regnal year 26 [20 November 1297 - 19 November 1298] and detail both the sources of income and what the money was spent on. In both cases these expenses revolve almost solely round the winter/spring expedition led by Surrey and the defence of the march.

#### *Abingdon*

Abingdon's account for regnal year 26 is not very large, involving a total of just over £900. His sources of revenue were the issues from the sheriffs and collectors of the lay ninth in Cumberland, Lancashire and Westmorland. His greatest expense in this year was the wages for the garrison at Carlisle which totalled around £400<sup>87</sup>.

#### *Amersham*

Amersham was responsible for over ten times the amount of money which passed through the hands of his colleague in the west. As with Abingdon, the main sources of income were the various taxes - the clerical fifth and the lay ninth - granted to the king in response to the threat to the kingdom, primarily from Yorkshire, but also from Northumberland, Staffordshire, Derbyshire and Warwickshire. On this occasion Amersham also received the weighty sum of £252 from the customs at Berwick and, in contrast, the pathetic figure of £17 from the rest of its issues<sup>88</sup>.

It is clear, therefore, that almost all the king's revenue in the north of England was required either for the defence of these areas or to support operations within Scotland itself.

### **Letters patent and the tally system:**

In every letter directed to the various officials ordering them to send money to either Amersham or Abingdon, they were strictly enjoined to receive a letter patent, or letter of acquittance, from the receiver to prove that the sum had been paid<sup>89</sup>. When these officials came to have their accounts audited at the exchequer, they could show exactly where the money had gone. Letters patent appear to have been used every time

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86 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 127-30.

87 E159/71, m.108; E101/6/30, m.3.

88 E159/71, m.108. E101/6/35, m.2. This suggests that in 1297, at any rate, trade was still playing a large part in Berwick's economy.

89 For example, E159/71, m.107.

money actually actually changed hands, rather than the tally system which recorded money still to be received or used as credit.

"The development of the tally system enabled the king to get hold of, or anticipate, his revenue at an earlier date than was possible through the cumbrous machinery of payment from the revenue officer into the exchequer and its subsequent disbursement from the exchequer in obedience to writs of *liberate* from the chancery".

A tally stick was broken in two and made out to indicate the amount owed by the sheriff, or any other royal official expected to bring money into the exchequer.

"The notched and dated stick was delivered not to the sheriff, who as yet had no claim upon it, but to any person authorised to demand from the exchequer the payment of any debt due from the crown. As soon as the sheriff paid the money, the tally passed into his hands. Thus the receipt made out in advance became a real receipt ... and the sum mentioned upon it was duly credited to the sheriff, when he produced the tally in the exchequer at the time of his next account."

This simple system allowed "the limited supply of specie in the country" to be made available for the king's most pressing needs, such as financing his campaigns<sup>90</sup>. The system's major drawback was that it often led to extortion since the royal officer was allowed to retain as profit the difference between the amount that it had been agreed that he should produce and the amount that he actually brought in.

The problem for those officials dealing with Scotland was simply that of raising enough issues to cancel out the large sums of money sent north. Food and equipment were supposed to be paid for by those receiving them - generally either garrison members or soldiers in the army - from their wages. However, since wages were so often in arrears, credit was allowed for the purchase of supplies. In addition, the *certums* and wages paid to garrison commanders were usually written off, except for amounts deducted for victuals, since there was little chance of collecting the issues of their bailiwicks which ordinarily would have gone at least some way to covering them.

Amersham's account already showed a deficit by regnal year 26 [20 November 1297 - 19 November 1298]. His expenses were primarily the wages of those earls, barons, knights and other men-at-arms entitled to such payments during the winter/spring campaign. This account was not actually heard until 1302 and the difference between issues and receipts, which totalled £108 16s.8d. owed to the English exchequer, was taken from Amersham's fee as chancellor in the next year<sup>91</sup>.

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90 T.F. Tout, *Chapters in the Administrative History of Medieval England. The Wardrobe, the Chamber and the Small Seals*, 99-101.

91 E101/6/35, m.17.

The success or failure of English activities in Scotland depended ultimately on the efficiency of Amersham, Abingdon and their subordinates. There is no doubt that their task was a difficult one, with resources, and credit, often being stretched to the limit. For example, while Surrey's army was staying in Berwick from mid-February 1298, the earls and barons on campaign informed the lieutenant that they could not remain any longer unless the footsoldiers were paid their wages, without which they could not buy food. Peter Dunwich, a royal clerk, and Robert Heron, Amersham's controller, therefore purveyed victuals and other merchandise from English merchants to the value of 1000 marks. Amersham himself oversaw the making of the indentures between the merchants and the clerks and thereafter retained them for safe keeping.

Soon, however, Dunwich and Heron were being sued by the merchants for payment for these goods and were urgently seeking satisfaction from the king. This was eventually accomplished, but the incident illustrates how hand-to-mouth life was, not only for the troops themselves, but also for those running the Scottish administration<sup>92</sup>.

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<sup>92</sup> Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 260.

## CHAPTER THREE

## 'VICTORY' AND RE-ESTABLISHMENT

1298

**Preparations for the Falkirk Campaign:**

Both sides seem to have done very little between Surrey's aborted winter campaign and the arrival of Edward and his army in June 1298. No doubt the relieved English garrisons of the south-east made good use of this period to restock their supplies and check their defences. Certainly Amersham's accounts show that the Berwick castle garrison received 94 quarters of wheat and 1 last of herring and the Roxburgh garrison 96 quarters of wheat from the purveyance brought to Berwick for Surrey's army<sup>1</sup>.

The south-eastern English garrisons were safe from attack for the moment because the earls of Surrey, Norfolk, Gloucester, Hereford and Angus had remained at Berwick with their companies after the rest of the army had been disbanded in March 1298. On 8 April 1298 Edward, who returned from Flanders on 14 March 1298, summoned them to a royal council to be held in York on 24 May. They were, however, to come from Berwick as secretly as possible, leaving behind sufficient numbers of men to defend the town<sup>2</sup>, which strongly suggests that the Scots still posed a threat to the area.

**The English army:**

The writs of summons for the summer campaign went out on 8 April 1298. A total of 12,600 Welsh footsoldiers, along with 1000 from Lancashire, were ordered to come to Carlisle by 17 June, which was later postponed to 25 June<sup>3</sup>. The northern counties were undoubtedly still suffering from their experiences at the hands of the Scots over the past nine months, which left them largely unable to contribute any further. However, since several other English counties did contribute men to the army, it is likely that not all these writs of summons were enrolled.

According to the exchequer accounts recording the payment of these troops, the actual total numbers of Welsh came to 12,779, with 4747 coming from Ireland, Shropshire and Staffordshire, which were grouped together under Sir John Segrave, 2757 from various counties, 1227 from the Berwick garrison and 29 crossbowmen from all over the country. This totalled 21,539 footsoldiers alone, sixty percent of which were Welsh<sup>4</sup>.

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1 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 127-30.

2 E101/6/30, m.1; *Itin.*, 119; *C.C.R.*, 1296-1302, 201.

3 *Parl. Writs*, i, 312-6.

4 E101/12/17; C47/2/20.



A total of 293 summonses to serve in the army were issued to the nobility, though in many cases there is no evidence, either from safe-conducts or horse-evaluation rolls, for their having served. From these last two forms of evidence, as well as the Falkirk Roll of Arms, which lists the knights and bannerets in the four battalions at the battle, a total of just over 1500 men-at-arms is reached. In addition to the footsoldiers and cavalry, Edward also ordered twenty or thirty carpenters and around two hundred of the best diggers to come to him at Alnwick. It is unclear what these men were intended for, unless they were perhaps to be sent to Berwick to help with the rebuilding of the town<sup>5</sup>.

Almost all of those with Edward in Flanders, who included Sir Aymer de Valence with the largest retinue, Guy of Warwick, about to succeed to the earldom on the death of his father, the Scot, Sir Alexander Balliol of Cavers and the bishop of Durham, continued in the king's service over the summer. Of the 293 whose summonses were enrolled for the summer campaign, there is evidence for the participation of only 111. On the other hand, a further 145, whose summonses were not enrolled, had protections granted to them or their horses valued<sup>6</sup>.

The North Welsh did far more than their fair share of fighting for Edward in 1297-8. Gruffydd ap Rhys, their captain, served under Surrey from 8 December 1297 until 29 January 1298. He then seems to have gone with a Welsh contingent to Flanders since a safe-conduct was issued to him and his Welshmen on their return from the continent on 15 March. Gruffydd ap Rhys did not himself serve on the Falkirk campaign, though five constables from North Wales who had been with Surrey in December 1297 returned to Scotland in July 1298. The other Welsh contingents do not seem to have served quite so devotedly, though a further thirteen Welsh constables were present on campaign in both winter and summer<sup>7</sup>.

### **Purveyance: Yorkshire**

John Sheffield, who had been in charge of collecting victuals in Yorkshire during the winter campaign of 1297/8, continued to be responsible for purveyance for the rest of the regnal year, which, of course, entailed supplying provisions for the Falkirk campaign. On 25 April 1298 he received a writ from the king allowing him to receive £50 from the sheriff of York, or, if he was unable, from John Lithgrenis, the escheator north of the Trent. This was approximately the amount by which his expenses exceeded his receipts. The king also strictly enjoined him to promise payment for this purveyance as soon as the receivers were in possession of it and Edward himself had arrived in the area<sup>8</sup>.

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<sup>5</sup> *Parl. Writs*, i, 309-312; Gough, *Scotland in 1298*, 124-5; see Chapter Fourteen, pp.327-8.

<sup>6</sup> This study of the winter campaign of 1297-8 highlights the danger of relying on enrolled summonses as the complete evidence for those who were supposed to turn up on campaign, since it is clear that not every summons made its way onto the rolls.

<sup>7</sup> *C.P.R.*, 1292-1301, 335.

<sup>8</sup> E101/6/33, m.5.

### *From other English counties*

On 5 November 1297 also, a total of 4500 quarters of wheat and 9550 quarters of oats were ordered to be purveyed from the counties of Cambridge and Huntingdon, Nottingham and Lincoln. Operations were obviously not proceeding fast enough in Yorkshire and Lincolnshire, however, since, a month later, William Fraunk of Grimsby, who was involved in the transportation of these goods to Scotland, was appointed "to go from port to port in those counties to induce and hasten all persons who have victuals to sell, to cause such victuals to be carried and brought by land and sea as quickly as possible to the parts of Scotland"<sup>9</sup>.

The counties of Lancashire, Cornwall, Devon, Gloucester, Somerset and Dorset, as well as Ireland, had also been ordered to purvey victuals and send them to Carlisle, where the Welsh footsoldiers were assembling, but there is unfortunately no evidence for their arrival, except for sixty barrels of wine which came from Bristol in July. Perhaps this was the wine which supposedly caused disorderly behaviour among the Welsh later in the campaign<sup>10</sup>.

Goods also came from the very south of England, as illustrated by a writ dated 4 March 1298, ordering payment of freightage on 40 tonnes of wine sent from Southampton to Berwick to be taken from the customs there<sup>11</sup>. However, the practical difficulties encountered in transporting goods such a distance generally meant that very little was sent from these areas. It is also likely that, as with the provision of men, the southern counties had far less interest in these expeditions to Scotland than the northern counties which had every reason to be involved.

Purveyance was not confined to foodstuffs. On 12 June 1298 the sheriff of Northumberland was ordered to buy as many horses and carts as possible to be sent to Newcastle by 17 June. Iron was also to be acquired for shoes and nails for the king's horses<sup>12</sup>. Carts were an extremely valuable commodity, for the obvious reason that food and equipment could not be moved on land without them.

### *Ireland*

Scotland was easily accessible from the ports on the east coast of Ireland and thus large amounts of purveyance were demanded from the lordship in every year of Edward's Scottish wars. On 15 April 1298 the request for purveyance did not even specify the exact amounts: as much as possible was to be sent to Carlisle. The Irish treasurer paid out

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<sup>9</sup> *Parl. Writs*, i, 314; *C.P.R.*, 1292-1301, 325.

<sup>10</sup> See below, p.74.

<sup>11</sup> E159/71, m.114.

<sup>12</sup> Gough, *Scotland in 1298*, 124.

more than £4000 for the goods thus purveyed, an incredible sum considering that the total receipts at the Irish exchequer amounted to only £5,671<sup>13</sup>.

### *Discontent with purveyance*

A letter was sent to the sheriff of Gloucester from the king on 30 May, in response to a previous letter from the former in which Edward was told that the men of the county were worried that they would not be paid for what was taken from them. The king wrote that purveyance would be made "in the best way and to the least grievance" of those from whom it was exacted. However, payment was not to be made until the goods had actually been received by the king. This reassurance must have sufficed since, as we have seen, sixty barrels of wine duly arrived from Southampton in Carlisle on 3 July 1298<sup>14</sup>.

### *Accusations of incompetence against royal officials*

Complaints against royal officials responsible for purveyance were not made just by those from whom goods were demanded. Edward himself was not at all happy with the conduct of some of his officials, as illustrated by a string of writs directed towards Peter Draycote, the sheriff of Lincoln, and the clerk assigned to help him collect victuals, Peter Mollington.

On 15 April 1298, along with all other sheriffs and clerks involved in purveyance, these two were ordered to send victuals to Berwick by 17 June. On 5 June this deadline was put back to 24 June and meantime the malt and wheat were to be ground into flour<sup>15</sup>.

On 30 June a writ was sent to Mollington and Draycote, ordering them to release three ships from Sandwich, en route to Berwick laden with corn, which they had detained, somewhat curiously, since the ships' masters all had royal protections. On 7 July the king was writing to the treasurer, complaining about the negligence of the sheriffs and other officials in Yorkshire and Lincolnshire in sending victuals to Berwick. They were to be punished as an example and because of the harm their inactivity was in danger of causing to the king and his army. A week later Edward wrote directly to Peter Mollington, complaining of the delay and ordering him to send the grain northwards immediately, on pain of the utmost penalties<sup>16</sup>.

On 21 July 1298 a ship containing 106 quarters of wheat and 89 quarters of malt at last arrived in Berwick from Lincolnshire, albeit too late to provision the army prior to the battle of Falkirk. The next recorded arrivals were not until September, however, when

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13 J. Lydon, 'The Years of Crisis, 1254-1315', *A New History of Ireland*, ii, 199.

14 E101/552/2.

15 C.P.R., 1292-1301, 344; E159/71, m.117, dorso.

16 Gough, *Scotland in 1298*, 125-6; E159/71, m.46.

two ships reached Berwick on the 2nd and the 11th respectively<sup>17</sup>. The total purveyance in these three ships amounted to 151 quarters of wheat, 177 quarters of oats and 224 quarters of malt.

### *The role of merchants*

Merchants followed the army, bringing their goods with them to sell in this somewhat captive market. According to Guisborough, as the army prepared to march to meet the Scots immediately prior to the battle of Falkirk, the king, "... with his own mouth spoke to those who sold merchandise so that they should carefully bring their bundles and follow him without fear". It would appear from the surnames of Robert Fostone and John Tikehull, who provided the army with flour at Abercorn and fish at Stirling respectively in September 1298<sup>18</sup>, that these were mostly English, rather than local merchants.

### **Further preparations:**

On the occasion of the holding of the royal council on 24 May 1298, the exchequer and the common law courts were also transferred to York, where they remained for the next six years<sup>19</sup>. There is thus no doubt as to the importance which Edward attached to the complete subjugation of Scotland and also to the fact that he did not believe that this had been achieved until 1304, when London again became the English administrative centre.

Each English shire and burgh was also ordered to send two representatives to the gathering at York. The Scottish nobility were summoned on pain of outlawry<sup>20</sup> - though there is no official record of these summonses - but none are known to have appeared. The sentence of forfeiture was then passed on them, paving the way for the granting of Scottish 'rebel' lands after the campaign<sup>21</sup>. The army then set off and Edward arrived in Scotland for the second time on 3 July 1298<sup>22</sup>.

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17 C47/2/117; see below, p.74..

18 Guisborough, 326; Gough, *Scotland in 1298*, 25.

19 Gough, *Scotland in 1298*, 102; 107.

20 There is, in fact, no evidence to show that the Scottish nobility were summoned at this time. Even Bruce of Annandale, who had not returned to Scotland since 1296 and had become, to all intents and purposes, an English noble, was not included among the enrolled writs [*Parl. Writs*, i, 310-1].

21 Guisborough, 323; see below, pp.78-9.

22 *Itin.*, 123.

## **The importance of victuals - the difference between victory and defeat: *The amount needed to feed an army***

In the summer of 1298, 1 quarter of wheat cost around 2s.4d. when purveyed and was sold again to Amersham at Berwick for a staggering 15s. per quarter<sup>23</sup>. This seven-fold price increase, which was passed on from one government department to another, was presumably made in order to recoup high transport costs.

Given that the lowest wage paid to those in the king's service was 2d. per day, and if we presume that 1d. of this was spent on bread, which constituted a large part of the staple diet of most of the medieval population, and that the wheat was sold to the English soldiers at the same price that it was bought [ie. 15s. per quarter], to balance the books, it is possible to calculate approximately how much was needed to feed such large numbers of men. Since there are 180 pennies in 15 shillings, 180 footsoldiers would therefore consume one quarter of wheat. 112 quarters of wheat per day were therefore required, approximately, to feed 20,000 footsoldiers.

This figure is corroborated by the provisioning arrangements made for Dumfries castle in November 1298. Three bushels<sup>24</sup> of wheat were intended to feed 76 men for one day and it would therefore require approximately 100 quarters per day to feed 20,000 men. These are only rough estimates - and admittedly these footsoldiers would have supplemented their diet with other grains, such as beans and peas, barley and oats - but they serve to place the amounts of foodstuffs transported to Scotland in some sort of context. Wheat was certainly consistently requested in the largest amounts and although oats often came a close second, this grain was largely used to feed the horses of the men-at-arms<sup>25</sup>.

### **The Falkirk campaign:**

Victuals, or the lack of them, played an important part in the initial stages of the Falkirk campaign, according to the chroniclers. William Rishanger writes that the king camped with his army at Kirkliston (15-20 July), just south of the river Forth, in order to receive provisions from ships coming upriver from Berwick. At the same time, a group under the bishop of Durham was sent to recapture Dirleton and two other castles in east Lothian<sup>26</sup>. Unfortunately, contrary winds prevented the arrival of these ships and many in the army died of starvation.

Guisborough relates a similar story, stating that the bishop of Durham was able to win the siege of Dirleton because "three ships came laden with victuals ... While these things were going on, for almost a month the king's supplies failed. Ships had not come

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23 E101/6/33, m.1.

24 8 bushels = 1 quarter

25 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 334; see Table 4, p.130.

26 These two other castles were probably Yester and Hailes.

by the 'eastern sea' (as the king had fore-ordained), because of contrary winds, but some came with 200 barrels of wine and a few provisions." The Welsh apparently then got drunk and, in an ensuing brawl, eighty of them were killed.

According to Guisborough, the possibility of Welsh disloyalty during any coming skirmish with the Scots did not greatly bother Edward, who declared that he did not care if they joined the Scots, he would beat them all. The lack of victuals, however, did cause him much concern and he intended to return to Edinburgh to get supplies by the 'eastern sea', until he discovered that the Scots' army was not far away at Falkirk. He then called everyone to arms and they marched towards the rebel army, stopping overnight at Linlithgow.

It should be noted that, since the Welsh in the English army numbered nearly 11,000 (out of a total of around 26,000), Edward should have been somewhat perturbed by the possibility of their rebellion. Indeed, this disparaging story is somewhat ungrateful, considering the service performed by the Welsh in English armies, particularly in 1297 and 1298<sup>27</sup>.

#### *Indications of famine - the evidence of food supplies*

The evidence for food supplies supports the assertion that the army suffered from an acute lack of provisions as they marched across Lothian. July certainly saw the greatest number of ships reaching Berwick, but of the seventeen recorded, only five arrived in time to supply the army before the battle<sup>28</sup>, even without the possibility of adverse winds preventing a trip up the Forth.

These five ships brought, between them, only 63 quarters of malt, 7 meat carcasses, 250 quarters of oats and 725 quarters of wheat, enough victuals to supply 20,000 footsoldiers for about a week. This evidence comes, of course, only from the Yorkshire accounts, but, as we have seen, the purveyance ordered from Lincolnshire did not arrive in time for the battle<sup>29</sup>.

#### *Indications of famine - decreasing numbers in the wages' lists*

There is no direct evidence for the trouble with the Welsh reported by Guisborough, but a comparison of numbers for the Welsh contingents given in the wages' lists for the period up to 20 July, which includes the time when the army was waiting at Kirkliston, with the numbers given for the period from 21 July shows that though there was an overall increase in numbers from 10,260 to 10,584, six contingents actually lost a total of 195 men over that same period. Whether this was from starvation or from a disturbance within the army, or even both, is, of course, impossible to ascertain.

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<sup>27</sup> Guisborough, 326; see below, p.69; Prestwich, 'Edward I, 478.

<sup>28</sup> E101/14/12/17; E101/7/9; C47/2/17; E101/ 597/3.

<sup>29</sup> Gough, *Scotland in 1298*, 98-99; see above, pp.71-2.

Far more astounding, however, is the general decrease in men throughout the ranks of the English contingents. The total number of footsoldiers (English and Welsh) during the period up to 20 July, immediately prior to the battle on 22 July, was the highest reached throughout the campaign at 25,781. For the next period, covering the battle, the total number of footsoldiers reached only 22,497, a decrease of over 3000<sup>30</sup>. It should be noted that these wages lists do not record losses during the fighting since they begin on 21 July, the day before the battle.

If this is a true indication of the extent of the famine throughout the army, then the problem was desperate in the extreme, though desertions in the face of this lack of victuals can no doubt account for a high proportion of this figure. This situation had been exacerbated by the fact that the English had no idea of the whereabouts of the Scots or their intentions. This state of famine is perhaps also circumstantial evidence for the 'scorched earth policy' in Lothian which was attributed to Wallace at this time<sup>31</sup>.

On 19 July, only three days before the battle, the treasurer's lieutenant at York wrote to the sheriffs of the northern counties, ordering them to investigate, "as secretly and circumspectly as possible", whether or not the Scots were planning an expedition across the border. If such an expedition seemed imminent, the sheriffs were to send a messenger, "riding day and night", to the Exchequer, where orders would be given to resist the invaders. On sight of these letters, the sheriffs were also to call up men of their counties to be ready with horses and arms. Wood and turf were to be prepared for beacon fires and all Scotsmen living in these counties were to be imprisoned<sup>32</sup>. The battle of Falkirk came just in time, both for those starving in the royal army and those preparing to resist Wallace's raiders south of the border.

### **The battle of Falkirk:**

The Scots, no doubted heartened by news of the famine sweeping through the English army, decided to seize the opportunity to defeat Edward and expel him from the country once and for all. Wallace's decision to risk his troops in battle against a very large English army led by the king himself therefore becomes quite understandable. However, English supply ships arrived with victuals and Edward, having been informed of his enemies' whereabouts by the pro-English earls of Dunbar and Angus, decided to march overnight to Falkirk. The next day, 22 July 1298, the English re-established their military supremacy over the Scots, which had been so shockingly challenged at Stirling Bridge.

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30 E101/12/17; C47/2/20.

31 *Lanercost*, 191.

32 Gough, *Scotland in 1298*, 129.

Wallace, a conservative tactician, pinned his success on the *schiltroms*, groups of unmounted pikemen who were placed at the front of the Scottish line. This was, according to the Lanercost chronicler, the customary method of fighting in Scotland. Unfortunately, the English cavalry were able to outflank the schiltroms, quickly putting to flight the Scottish cavalry, who were supposed to protect the spearmen. The role of the English longbowmen, whose volleys of arrows perplexed not only the Scots, but the mighty armies of France, was also crucial in inflicting large numbers of casualties on the defenceless footsoldiers, whose bravery in standing their ground contrasts sharply with the cowardliness exhibited by the Scottish nobility<sup>33</sup>.

There is little evidence to show which of the Scottish nobility were present at Falkirk. The chroniclers state that <sup>it was</sup> members of the Comyn faction who deserted Wallace at Falkirk. Certainly Sir Edmund Comyn of Kilbride, who was a member of Sir John Comyn of Badenoch's council in 1304, had been forfeited for his "evildoings and rebellion" by 5 May 1298, but this is one of only three references in English records to forfeiture for rebellion between 1297 and the battle of Falkirk in 1298<sup>34</sup>. This evidence does suggest that the Comyns, at least, were present at Falkirk, though the earls of Atholl, Carrick, Lennox, Menteith and Strathearn undoubtedly helped to raise the Scottish army. James the Steward, whose brother, Sir John Stewart, died in the battle along with his archers, was also probably present, since a grant was made of his lands in August 1298. It is, unfortunately, not possible to say whether or not the young earl of Carrick took part, though he was certainly still not at Edward's peace<sup>35</sup>.

### **The aftermath of the battle - the English reassert control:**

After the battle of Falkirk on 22 July 1298, the footsoldiers were sent to wait at Carlisle while the cavalry remained with the king in Scotland. Edward regarded it as a matter of priority to re-establish control over the south-west and also to make sure that all his castles were in a fit state to defend themselves against any future attacks.

### *The recovery of Stirling castle*

On 26 July 1298, four days after the battle, Edward arrived at Stirling. The castle, which had been in Scottish hands since late 1297, surrendered at some point between 26 July and 8 August 1298, when the king left. On 8 August also, the castle was supplied with various foodstuffs, weaponry and furnishings for the chapel<sup>36</sup>.

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33 *Lanercost*, 191; *Guisborough*, 325-8.

34 *C.D.S.*, ii, no.1741; no.982, no.992. Sir William Douglas's lands in Essex and Northumberland were seized in June 1297 [*C.F.R.*, 1272-1307, 386]. Henry Charteris was declared forfeit by 26 June 1298 [*C.D.S.*, ii, no.992].

35 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 306; Barrow, *Bruce*, 101.

36 *Itin.*, 125.



However, the Stirling garrison could not survive indefinitely on the 67 quarters of wheat flour, 46 quarters of wheat, 51 quarters of beans, 81 quarters of barley, 143 quarters of malt, 100 large cattle, 217 sheep and one box of almonds which were delivered on 8 August 1298<sup>37</sup>, if further supplies could not reach them.

*English activities in the south-west, Perth and St. Andrews*

There are various accounts of the activities of Edward and his cavalry after the battle of Falkirk. According to Rishanger, St. Andrews was laid waste without resistance, presumably by a force detached from the remaining men-at-arms.

The rest of Edward's force went to Ayr castle, which the earl of Carrick had apparently set alight and left empty. Rishanger states that the English then travelled across Annandale and recaptured Lochmaben castle, all of which probably took place. Lochmaben had most likely been held by the earl of Carrick, despite being part of the lordship of Annandale and therefore his father's castle<sup>38</sup>.

Guisborough, like Rishanger, asserts that the English laid waste to St. Andrews and also Perth, meeting no resistance from the Scots. They then came west through the Forest of Selkirk to Ayr castle, which Guisborough also asserts had been set alight by the earl of Carrick. The king then wished to continue into Galloway although the army was lacking food supplies since no ships had arrived to support their activities. After fifteen days of severe famine [*fames valida*], they turned back through Annandale and reduced Lochmaben castle, granting life and limb to the Scots holding it<sup>39</sup>.

The two chroniclers are therefore in agreement over the main events after Falkirk. The Itinerary suggests that Edward did not go to Perth or St. Andrews himself, but a group of men-at-arms certainly went to Fife in July 1298. According to the *Liber Quotidianus Garderobae* for year 28 [20 November 1299 - 19 November 1300], when William Ramsay, a Scot, was admitted to royal wages, Ramsay had been "one of the keepers of Cupar castle in Fife, at the time when the castle surrendered to the earl of Lincoln at the end of July 1298"<sup>40</sup>.

It would appear, therefore, that the chroniclers are correct in asserting that Perth and St. Andrews were "laid waste", even though there is no record evidence for this and no obvious reason as to why these towns deserved such punishment<sup>41</sup>. An undated gift from this regnal year [26: 20 November 1297-19 November 1298] of two barrels of wine "to be divided among the sailors of seven ships sailing from Newcastle to the River Tay

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37 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 301-4.

38 Rishanger, 188; *Itin.*, 126; *C.D.S.*, iv., Appendix 1, no.7.

39 Guisborough, 328-9. Another manuscript of the chronicle substitutes the Forest of Falkirk for the forest of Selkirk. This may have been the Torwood near Stirling.

40 *Lib. Quot.*, 101.

41 Some would say that Edward was still looking for the Stone of Destiny.

in Scotland" perhaps also refers to this period after the battle<sup>42</sup>. Lincoln's force presumably rejoined the main army on the way to Ayr.

### *Tibbers*

En route through the south-west, Edward and his army arrived at Tibbers, seventeen miles north-west of Dumfries. There the king inspected a 'stone' house being constructed by Sir Richard Siward. Edward was sufficiently impressed with what he saw to involve Siward in his works at Lochmaben in the following year<sup>43</sup>.

### **Withdrawal to Carlisle; the granting of rebel lands: *Arran***

On 8 September Edward and his men-at-arms rejoined the rest of his army at Carlisle. According to Guisborough, the earls of Hereford and Norfolk and their retinues then left the army because they were upset at the granting of Arran to Sir Hugh<sup>44</sup> Bisset of Antrim. This Irish opportunist had supposedly landed on the island with a large force in support of the Scots, but then offered his allegiance, and his conquest, to Edward after the English victory at Falkirk. He was then officially granted the island. The earls took exception to this because the king had promised not to make any grants without their advice<sup>45</sup>.

Sir Hugh did serve Edward very usefully thereafter. On 14 October 1298 he was ordered to "harass the king's Scottish enemies by sea". His four ships, each manned with a crew of forty, were presumably based at Arran to patrol along the west coast of Scotland<sup>46</sup>.

### *Other grants*

Certainly Edward made extensive grants of lands forfeited by Scotsmen to his followers for the first time in September 1298. On 22 September the lands of John Montgomery were granted to Adam Swinburne. Three days later, the earl of Lincoln was granted the Steward's barony of Renfrew, the earl of Warwick was given possession of the lands belonging to Sir Geoffrey Moubray, John Stirling and Andrew Charteris and Sir Robert Tony received certain lands belonging to Sir William Hay of Lochwarret, the

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42 C47/2/17.

43 See Chapter Four, p.106.

44 Guisborough mistakenly attributes these actions to Sir Thomas, rather than Sir Hugh, Bisset. No Thomas Bisset appears in official records for this period, but Hugh Bisset was certainly active in Edward's service in the following years.

45 *Guisborough*, 329.

46 *C.D.I.*, 1293-1301, i, no.555.

young Andrew Moray, posthumous son of Wallace's companion at Stirling Bridge, and William Ramsay of Dalhousie<sup>47</sup>.

### The organisation of the south-eastern English garrisons: *Jedburgh*

Edward had not yet finished all his business in Scotland. Jedburgh castle, still in Scottish hands, was therefore a threat to the security of the south-east, where the English once more held all the other royal castles. Thus the remainder of the army (for which, unfortunately, there are no records to calculate size since wage-payments ceased when the footsoldiers reached Carlisle) crossed over the border once more. The very fact that the English headed straight for Jedburgh is an indication of a specific purpose, namely the reduction of the castle.

They arrived around 1 October 1298 and stayed, according to the wages record for one Audouen Goghi, until 18 October, "when the king left besieging Jedburgh castle". On 5 October the sheriff of Berwick was commanded to send two carts full of coal, iron and steel to the king<sup>48</sup>. Such supplies were required for the siege-engines. The Scots did perhaps make some attempt to save the garrison since one of the company of Sir Simon Fraser, the 'English' warden of Selkirk Forest, lost a horse in Edward's service in Selkirk Forest on 3 October<sup>49</sup>.

Edward must have done a deal with the Scottish constable to bring about the castle's capitulation since there is record of a payment of 100s. to "John Pencaitland, late constable of Jedburgh"<sup>50</sup>. Pencaitland proved to be a good investment, serving his new master faithfully in the Berwick garrison throughout the following years.

On 18 October provisions and equipment were issued from the Berwick store, to last until 7 June 1299. The constable of Jedburgh was Sir Richard Hastings, brother of the keeper of Roxburgh. As stated above<sup>51</sup>, it is impossible to ascertain whether or not he was constable prior to the capture of the castle by the Scots.

The garrison itself was to consist of twelve men-at-arms, forty crossbowmen, twenty archers, four miners, four carpenters, two masons, two smiths, four diggers and one engineer. The constable was to be paid £130 for the period up to 7 June 1299 for costs pertaining to the upkeep of the castle and the wages of its garrison<sup>52</sup>. On 7 November 1298 Edward ordered the sheriff of Cumberland to send a 'great engine' from

47 Prestwich, 'Colonial Scotland: The English in Scotland under Edward I', *Scotland and England 1286-1815*, 8; *C.D.S.*, ii, no.1009; Barrow, *Bruce*, 104. This was presumably the same William Ramsay captured in Cupar castle by the earl of Lincoln [see above, p.77].

48 E101/355/7; Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 307-8.

49 Gough, *Scotland in 1298*, 173. See Chapter Four, pp.98-9 for Sir Simon Fraser.

50 E101/354/31/2.

51 See p.?

52 Or £1 6s. 4d. per day.

Carlisle castle to Jedburgh, presumably as a precaution against further attacks from the Scots<sup>53</sup>.

A general organisation or re-organisation of the garrisons in both the east and the west took place in October and November, following Edward's return to England. Edinburgh, Berwick and Roxburgh castles were revictualled and, in the latter two cases, an enumeration of the numbers assigned to the garrisons was given.

### *Roxburgh*

On 22 October 1298 a group of eighty archers was transferred from Berwick to Roxburgh. This last garrison was ordered to comprise forty-four men-at-arms, twenty crossbowmen, ninety-two archers, four carpenters, two smiths and one engineer at a cost of £500 up until 7 June 1299. It was therefore much bigger than the one at Jedburgh. However, if Roxburgh had contained only twelve archers<sup>54</sup> before the arrival of those from Berwick, then it had indeed been vulnerable to Scottish attacks.

### *Edinburgh*

Though there is no ordinance like the ones for Jedburgh, Roxburgh and Berwick, on 22 November 1298 eight knights, fifty men-at-arms, twelve serjeants, twenty-four crossbowmen from Berwick, thirty footsoldiers, one artillery maker, four smiths, three carpenters, one mason, one baker and houndsman and two brothers of the Carmelite order were noted as belonging to the Edinburgh garrison<sup>55</sup>.

Three days later, on 25 November, Sir Walter Huntercumbe was ordered to hand over the castle and sheriffdom of Edinburgh to Sir John Kingston<sup>56</sup>. Kingston was, in fact, named as the constable of Edinburgh as early as August 1298 but was presumably only now ready to take over command. Huntercumbe was appointed captain in Northumberland at the same time<sup>57</sup>. Though the latter had certainly been described as keeper of the castle and sheriffdom of Edinburgh, Kingston was thereafter always called constable and sheriff.

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53 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 313-4; E101/554/8/23.

54 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 314-6. That is, the difference between the ninety-two archers ordained to stay there and the eighty archers brought from Berwick, presumably to make up numbers, which suggests that there were only twelve previously in the garrison.

55 E101/7/24, m.1-2.

56 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 338.

57 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii 301; see below, p.84.

### *Berwick castle*

On 22 October, the garrison in Berwick castle totalled only five men-at-arms and sixty footsoldiers. Their wages would have totalled around 18s. 4d. per day. Sir Hugh Audley was described as constable of the castle, taking over from Sir John Poitou, although Sir John Burdon was keeper of the castle and sheriff of Berwick<sup>58</sup>. Presumably Amersham, the Scottish chancellor, and any other administrators with him, also resided in Berwick castle.

### *Berwick town*

The main garrison at Berwick was placed in the town. This garrison was ordered to be exceptionally large - sixty men-at-arms and one thousand footsoldiers, one hundred of whom were to be crossbowmen. On 22 October 1298, Sir Walter Beauchamp, Edward's steward, certified that 38 men-at-arms, 100 crossbowmen and 7 constables with 625 footsoldiers from the old garrison and a further 18 men-at-arms and two constables with 245 footsoldiers from the new garrison were present at Berwick. Twenty footsoldiers were also there "for keeping the town"<sup>59</sup>. The garrison was thus short of the quota by only ten footsoldiers. Edward undoubtedly intended that the security of the south-east should be dependant on this small standing army.

The men of the Berwick town garrison were to receive the king's wages, "as the sheriff of Roxburgh, the sheriff of Jedburgh and Sir Simon Fraser have awarded". Those in the town were also strictly ordered not to engage the enemy without the reinforcement of thirty men-at-arms and five hundred footsoldiers from the garrison<sup>60</sup>. The keeper of Berwick town, Sir Philip Vernay, and the constable of Berwick castle, Sir John Burdon, were to alternate as leaders of these expeditions so that one was always left in charge of Berwick itself. Such precautions prove yet again that defeating the Scots in battle did not mean that the war was won.

Patrick, earl of Dunbar, captain of the Berwick town garrison since 28 May 1298<sup>61</sup>, was appointed captain of all fortifications and troops in the eastern march on 19 November 1298. This office of captain seems to have come into existence through the vacuum created by the falling into disuse of the office of lieutenant of Scotland. In theory there was a captain or warden of both the eastern march and the western march, although the offices were not always filled. It was very much a military position, involving control over all English troops in each march and their deployment. Earl Patrick had surrendered

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58 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 317-25.

59 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 332; E101/7/1, m.6.

60 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 332. This is a mistake for constable of Jedburgh since there was no sheriff there.

61 *C.P.R.*, 1292-1301, 351.

immediately to Edward in 1296, despite the fact that King John had entrusted him with the keepership of Berwick castle<sup>62</sup>.

The new captain was also given further instructions regarding expeditions against the Scots. He was naturally to have overall command of such expeditions but each constable was to captain his own men. Again it was strictly ordered that any such forays were to be made only with sufficient English forces to overcome the Scots. There was to be no opportunity for the rebels to capture castles through the defeat of the troops from their garrisons. When a communal expedition was not taking place, each warden was to "harass the enemy at their discretion"<sup>63</sup>.

### **The organisation of the south-western English garrisons:**

Similar ordinances were made for the organisation of English garrisons in the south-west.

#### *Captain of the western march*

On 25 November 1298 Sir Robert Clifford was appointed captain of the western march, corresponding to the appointment of the earl of Dunbar as captain of the eastern march six days previously. In this office Clifford was ordered to receive the men of Nithsdale to the king's peace<sup>64</sup>.

#### *Captain of the Esk Valley*

On 20 November, Sir Simon Lindsay, a Scot, was made captain in the Esk valley. Sir Ingram de Guines, Sir Walter Teye and other English officials already holding positions there were ordered to be obedient to him<sup>65</sup>. Unfortunately, it is not stated what offices they held.

#### *Dumfries*

On the same date orders were given for the garrisoning of Dumfries castle, under the jurisdiction of Sir Robert Clifford as warden of Galloway. Twenty crossbowmen from Berwick, six crossbowmen from Lochmaben and six of Clifford's own footsoldiers were

62 Langtoft, 235; Rot. Scot., i, 37. Although earl Patrick was keeper, the constable of Berwick castle who surrendered it to Edward in 1296 was Sir William Douglas.

63 Stevenson, Documents, ii, 329-30.

64 C.P.R., 1292-1301, 387; see above, p.81; Stevenson, Documents, ii, 336.

65 Stevenson, Documents, ii, 331; C.D.S., ii, 263. The fief of Guines was a feudal dependency of Flanders and thus had trading links with England. Sir Ingram de Guines was nephew to Queen Marie de Couci, wife of Alexander II, and therefore cousin to Alexander III. He had come to Scotland to make his fortune in the 1240's, marrying Christian Lindsay, an heiress to large estates in southern Scotland and also in England. Though he was thus technically a Scottish noble, his background led him to support Edward [Barrow, Bruce, 12-13].

to form the garrison there as well as a master engineer, four carpenters, a smith and his boy, an engineer and two masons. Provisions were supplied to last until 30 June 1299 and various pieces of defensive weaponry, some coming from the bishop of Carlisle, were also to be placed there. As yet there is no mention of a constable, suggesting that the castle had only recently been retaken. Certainly Edward's army was in the area in September 1298, capturing nearby Lochmaben castle in that month<sup>66</sup>.

### *Lochmaben*

Lochmaben castle, recaptured by Edward and his army in early September, was given a new keeper, Sir Robert Cantilupe, on 25 December 1298. Cantilupe was also made warden of Annandale and was empowered to hold courts and pleas with the assistance of the bishop of Carlisle and Master Richard Abingdon under him. As keeper of Lochmaben castle, Cantilupe was subject to Clifford's authority with regard to the defence of that area<sup>67</sup>.

### *Caerlaverock*

A company detached from the army was sent to recapture nearby Caerlaverock castle but the Scots managed to resist, causing the Lochmaben garrison much trouble in the following year<sup>68</sup>.

### **Northern England:**

The northern counties of England still suffered from Scottish attacks even after the battle of Falkirk. On 30 October 1298 Sir Michael Harcla, late sheriff of Cumberland, and Sir William Mulcastre, the new sheriff, had been ordered to appear at the exchequer in York to render their accounts for that part of regnal year 26 [20 November 1297 - 19 November 1298] that each was in office. Sir William, however, did not appear in York because:

"during the present war between the king and the Scots, who lately invaded the said parts and caused much damage and put them in much danger so that the county could not be without its sheriff, and so he could not come to render his account."

Mulcastre was ordered to come when he could, which he did on 16 November 1298, "and returned to those parts to save them from damage or danger from the Scots"<sup>69</sup>. This threat perhaps prompted similar appointments to be made in the northern English counties as those in both the south-east and the south-west of Scotland. Sir Walter

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<sup>66</sup> Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 333-5; *Itin.*, 126; see above, p.77.

<sup>67</sup> *Guisborough*, 329; *Itin.*, 126; Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 357.

<sup>68</sup> Gough, *Scotland in 1298*, 234; Chapter Four, pp.105-6.

<sup>69</sup> E159/72, m.12.

Huntercumbe was appointed captain in Northumberland, Sir Ralph fitz William in Yorkshire and Sir Thomas Furnivall in Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire. Sir William Latimer was made captain-general of all the above counties.

All these captains were to assemble the men-at-arms throughout northern England and the western marches of Scotland at Carlisle. Those owning land worth £30 were to provide one "barded"<sup>70</sup> horse, those having £60 worth of land to provide two and so on. A roll containing the names of persons and horses in each wapentake was to be sent to the chancery<sup>71</sup>.

An undated petition from Huntercumbe when he was a captain of the march, and therefore from this period, sheds light, yet again, on the desperate situation with regard to victuals prevalent not only in Scotland itself but also in the north of England. Huntercumbe was seeking an allowance for the corn and cattle which he had been forced to take for his men-at-arms and footsoldiers as captain of the march, "as Northumberland was in the greatest danger from the Scots, for his own means were exhausted, and if he had left his ward the county would have been ruined." The king, with no reason given, would not do what was asked<sup>72</sup>. Huntercumbe was not alone in finding the burden of his responsibilities as one of Edward's officers in the north too heavy. This incident again makes it clear that those intending to take up high office - for example, lieutenant of a county or march - required a private income.

Those in the north of England may have feared Scottish attacks more than the reality of the threat actually warranted. However, the evidence for rebel activities after Falkirk shows that there was, if anything, an increase in their use of less traditional warfare - that is, attacking supply lines and cross-border raids.

### **Expedition to Stirling:**

On 25 November 1298, Sir Simon Fraser, at Selkirk, was ordered by the king, who was at Newcastle, to join an expedition organised by Sir John Kingston, constable and sheriff of Edinburgh. The latter did not have sufficient numbers and required the services of Fraser and twenty extra armed horsemen. Edward was particularly keen for this raid to be a success<sup>73</sup>.

Five days later the remaining garrisons of the south-east were also brought in. The planned expedition was, in fact, to Stirling, now seriously under threat from the Scots, who were attacking the castle's supply lines. At a meeting held at Berwick, Sir Walter

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70 A barded, or covered, horse was one which wore a covering or light armour which was more expensive to maintain. Consequently men-at-arms with covered horses were paid more than those with uncovered horses [see Table 3].

71 *C.P.R.*, 1292-1301, 387.

72 *C.D.S.*, iv, no.1773, p.361.

73 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 337.



Huntercumbe, the captain of the Northumberland garrisons, Sir Simon Fraser, Sir Robert Hastings and Sir Philip Vernay, agreed to send information to Kingston so that he could decide by 14 December 1298 whether or not they should come to Edinburgh castle. A total of 190 horsemen were to be gathered from the garrisons of Jedburgh, Roxburgh, Berwick town, Edinburgh, Northumberland and even Norham Castle, as well as quotas from Sir Simon Fraser, Sir Alexander Balliol of Cavers and, as a request, the earl of March<sup>74</sup>.

On 2 December 1298 a clerk, William Rue, was assigned to reside at Berwick to ensure that the provisions for men and horses ordered by Sir John Kingston were sent to Edinburgh. Sir Philip Vernay, keeper of Berwick town, was to help procure these goods and to pay the 'small expenses' from the issues of his bailiwick. If supplies could not be got in Berwick, the king was to be informed immediately so that they could be sent from England.

In addition, a ship was to be kept ready at all times to carry goods exclusively to Edinburgh until the following Easter [9 April 1299]. Sir Philip was also to pay the wages of these sailors from Christmas. The very next day a letter of acquittance to the value of £17 14s.9d. was made out to Vernay for goods taken in Berwick and Tweedmouth and sent to Kingston at Edinburgh. Sixty quarters of wheat, sixty quarters of barley and sixty quarters of oats were set aside in the same boat as that bringing provisions to Edinburgh castle on 3 December 1298 to be taken on to Stirling castle in conjunction with the expedition<sup>75</sup>.

By the end of December preparations were in full swing. Sir Alexander Convers, a royal clerk responsible for provisioning in the south-east, was sent instructions from the king. Six hundred men-at-arms were being sent to the Edinburgh garrison and Convers was to go with them with money from the wardrobe for the payment of their wages, "for it seems to us that the money can be best kept in Edinburgh castle as anywhere else in these parts." Convers was not allowed to return south until the expedition to Stirling had been accomplished, "which expedition is to be done as hastily as you can but in such a good way and surely." Edward also wished to be kept informed of the numbers going to Stirling<sup>76</sup>.

From the tone of the royal letters it is easy to imagine the king at Newcastle, angry and frustrated at his inability to involve himself personally in English activities in Scotland, because of the dissolution of his army, and worried that the effects of the 1298 campaign in general, and the battle of Falkirk in particular, would come to nothing.

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74 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 339; *C.D.S.*, ii, 266.

75 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 343-9.

76 E101/7/9. It is not stated from where they were to come, but this is considerably more than the total number of men-at-arms in the garrisons of the south-east, which came to 179. They must therefore have come from south of the border for the Stirling expedition.

### The cost of the campaign:

According to the account of the keeper of the wardrobe for regnal year 26 [20 November 1297 - 19 November 1298], the total expenditure for this year was £76,549 4s.6d., most of which was spent on the Scottish war. The only income associated with Scotland which the English government received in that year was the proceeds, amounting to £61 4s. 9d., from the goods of Scotsmen arrested at Sluys and sold by John le Pere, bailiff of the town of Dam in Flanders<sup>77</sup>. It is to be questioned whether the expense of selling these Scottish goods, together with the cost of transporting the proceeds home and any payment made to the Flemish authorities, made such activities worthwhile.

### Evidence for a Scottish administration: *Letter to the mayors and communes of Lubeck and Hamburg*

According to one of the charges laid against Wallace at his trial, one of his crimes had been to issue writs, in the name of King John, which carried sovereign authority. This indictment included the letter written by both Wallace and Andrew Murray on 11 October 1297 to the mayors and communes of Lubeck and Hamburg, re-establishing trading links between these ports and the newly-liberated kingdom of Scotland. The confidence exhibited by Wallace<sup>78</sup> and the inference that an administrative structure, which included the re-institution of a chancery, had been revived under him shortly after the battle of Stirling Bridge<sup>79</sup>, attests not only to the new Guardian's success, but also to his far-sightedness, though doubtless he was ably advised by men such as Bishop Wishart of Glasgow.

### Dundee

The clerks in the Guardian's service also produced charters, although only one survived. On 29 March 1298, Wallace and his army were at Torphichen since on that date Alexander Scrymgeour was granted the constablership of the castle of Dundee and lands nearby. The siege which Wallace had urged the burgesses of the town to 'kepe ... rycht strately' on his departure for Stirling in August/September 1297<sup>80</sup>, had obviously been successful.

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77 C.D.S., ii, 265.

78 Stevenson, *Wallace Docs.*, no.xv; Barrow, *Bruce*, 91. Though Murray was probably not killed at Stirling Bridge, he was dead within a matter of months thereafter and was thus unlikely to have been an active partner in the joint-guardianship after September 1297 [Barrow, *Bruce*, 90, n.1].

79 The sending of any letter, like the issuing of writs, required the facilities of a chancery or at least of clerks who were familiar with chancery procedure [Barrow, *Bruce*, 91].

80 *Nat. Mss. Scotland*, part 1, p.xiv; see Chapter Two, p.55.

This charter was confirmed at Gowrie on 5 December 1298 by Robert Bruce, earl of Carrick, now joint-Guardian with John Comyn the younger. It is likely, therefore, that Scrymgeour held Dundee castle until its recapture by the English in 1303<sup>81</sup>. This precept, which was directed to the - unnamed - Scottish sheriff of Forfar and his baillies, provides more evidence for an administrative structure operating for the Scots in areas not controlled by the English by late 1298.

### Conclusions:

Some considerable time has been spent in detailing the events of 1297 and 1298. This has been considered necessary because it highlights the situation faced by the permanent English officers in Scotland, whether they were 'civil servants' or soldiers. When Edward appointed his sheriffs and garrison commanders in 1296, he had envisaged the role of the Scottish castle as that of the backbone of his administrative system, fulfilling the needs of both the royal officers and the local community in such areas as justice and defence, as well as symbolising his own authority.

The English administrative system set up by Edward in 1296 was in complete disarray by 1298 and the two receivers, who formed the basis of the administrative structure that still operated, were concerned almost entirely with organising for campaigns. This naturally also meant that the few Scottish castles still in English hands also received supplies. By the winter of 1297 there is conclusive evidence for English garrisons only at Berwick, Edinburgh and Roxburgh. These castles were largely isolated from the local communities of which they were supposed to be the very heart. The garrisons were constantly under threat from the enemy, whilst they also had to contend with shortages of food and equipment which ensued from their dependence on supplies from south of the border.

From the evidence for English activities throughout 1297 and 1298, therefore, it is clear that the Scots had been extremely successful in overturning the effects of the conquest of 1296. Wallace was able to capture and keep castles, which was the key to re-establishing a stable alternative administration. The battle of Stirling Bridge gave him the mandate he needed to lead the Scottish people in name as well as deed, providing him, as Guardian, with the resources - ranging from the Scottish army to the Scottish chancery - required for continuing success. Although there is so little record evidence for the activities of the Scots, what does remain shows clearly that the Guardian was able to re-institute an administrative system. The lack of evidence does, unfortunately, mean that it is not possible to gauge how effective it was. Nevertheless, there was far more to Sir William Wallace than the violent brigand that the English chroniclers portray and his grasp of administrative affairs, which included the re-establishment of trading links with

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<sup>81</sup> *Highland Papers*, ii, 131; see Chapter Twelve, p.236.

foreign ports, is impressive for one whose destiny should have been far removed from such matters. His example certainly puts Surrey's efforts to govern Scotland to shame.

Correspondingly, the remaining English garrisons must have found it extremely difficult to retain morale, with their king devoting his attentions to overseas interests, a regency government forced to attend to a domestic crisis and pay and supplies dwindling, without much hope of relief.

The north of Scotland was already beyond English control. After Stirling Bridge all the castles of the south-west seem to have fallen to the Scots, as did Stirling itself. In the south-east, the Scottish Guardian also captured Berwick town and Jedburgh castle, though the castles of Berwick and Roxburgh were besieged but did not fall.

Surrey's winter campaign of 1297/8 did save Berwick and Roxburgh but the lieutenant's lack of drive prevented the restoration of English control in any areas of Scotland other than parts of the south-east during the first half of 1298. In addition, though the battle of Falkirk was an English victory, the weaknesses inherent in Edward's army, which had proved disastrous at Stirling Bridge, were again in evidence. There were many lessons to be learned from English military activity in Scotland in these years:

"The rout of Stirling Bridge ... proves the inability of the English to rally and restore a fight in spite of numbers still superior to the enemy; the defeat of part of an army led to panic and panic ... led to the evacuation of almost the whole of Scotland. Even the first charge at Falkirk was unsuccessful, and Falkirk might have been a previous Bannockburn if Edward's skill had not turned the battle. The conclusion is that without an able commander-in-chief the cavalry of the close of the thirteenth century were disorganised, personal bravery never compensating for lack of organised skill"<sup>82</sup>.

Unfortunately, this last statement is equally an indictment of William Wallace as of the earl of Surrey. The battle of Falkirk on 22 July 1298 did as much to expose and break the uneasy relationship between the Scottish nobility and the Guardian as it did to restore English morale. It must have been glaringly obvious to the Scots by now that pitched battles with superior enemy numbers - so long as Edward himself was in command - were not the way to conduct their war, since they could not hope to match English resources. Ironically, Wallace - the supposedly lowly freebooter - was responsible for making the conservative mistake of engaging Edward's army at Falkirk, thereby teaching his aristocratic successors in the office of Guardian to rely instead on harrying tactics and guerrilla warfare. Wallace's political career ended as abruptly as it had begun. According to Wyntoun, he:

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82 J.E. Morris, *The Welsh Wars of Edward I*, 66.

"Persawyd, how he wes in gret leth  
 Had wyth the Cwymunys, in thare wreth,  
 And in dowl off tresown stad,  
 Be swylk taknys as he had.  
 Besyd the wattyre off Forth he  
 Forsuk Wardane evyr to be,  
 Or swylk state in Scotland hold"<sup>83</sup>

If Wyntoun is correct, then Sir William Wallace is the only Guardian known to have resigned, though it is also clear that the Scottish nobility, particularly the Comyns, would not have allowed him the chance to remedy his mistake. Although not even Wyntoun ascribes a date to Wallace's resignation, by 5 December 1298 a representative of each of Scotland's two greatest families - namely, Robert Bruce, earl of Carrick and Sir John Comyn, junior, of Badenoch - had taken on the office of Guardian<sup>84</sup>.

However, the Scots had some reason for optimism in the aftermath of Falkirk. English resources, after the withdrawal of an invading army, were stretched to their limits when dealing with an enemy who could strike anywhere, in more than one place and at any time.

It is no surprise, therefore, to find that 1299, the only year in which there was no English campaign in Scotland, was not an easy one for the English garrisons. The 'rebels' sensibly concentrated their efforts on disrupting supply lines to the southern garrisons, culminating in the successful reduction of Stirling castle early in 1300.

Nevertheless, the Scots never again succeeded in expelling the English from as many parts of Scotland as they did in late 1297 and early 1298. Instead, it would seem that both administrations now had fairly fixed spheres of influence - the English in the south-east and areas of the south-west and the Scots north of the Tay and parts of Galloway. The areas of friction were now where both sides sought to extend the limits of their authority.

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83 Wyntoun, 348.

84 *Highland Papers*, ii, 131.

## PART TWO

In contrast to 1298, 1299 is particularly important in the study of the English administration of Scotland since it is one of only two years in which there was no campaign between 1296 and 1304. It is therefore far easier to ascertain exactly what form this administration took when it was not engaged in sustaining a campaign. Such an investigation is further aided by the survival of a complete and full set of accounts made with Master Richard Abington, the royal receiver at Carlisle, for regnal year 27 [20 November 1298- 19 November 1299].

The Scots were also active in both military and administrative affairs in 1299 and they achieved a degree of success in both areas. In general terms, however, both Edward I and the Guardians were seeking to define the structure of their separate administrative systems and the geographical extent of their influence. Though the English undoubtedly managed to extend their authority in the south-west in 1300-1, there was little change in the boundary dividing areas under English and Scottish control between the battle of Falkirk and the re-conquest of 1303-4. This boundary can be delineated by a very rough line stretching from east to west just north of the Forth and dropping down, around Stirling, through Kyle and Carrick to Dumfries and Galloway.

## CHAPTER FOUR

## FRUSTRATION

1299

**Urgent need for money:**

Edward's first priority after the campaign of 1298 was to refill his treasury. On 27 December 1298 he sent an urgent message to his sheriffs requiring money from any possible source - arrears, issues - except for that put by for the "purveyance recently made for Scotland"<sup>1</sup>.

After his first campaign in Scotland since the conquest, and still a considerable way from achieving the kingdom's effective submission, Edward was already feeling the pinch. On 25 May 1299 he granted the citizens of Bayonne, in order to pay of the debts that he owed to them, the customs on wool, hides and woolfells in England, Ireland and Scotland "after that land is in good peace"<sup>2</sup>. Although, in Edward's eyes, it was definitely a case of 'after' rather than 'if', the king was well aware that a great effort was required.

**Purveyance:**

On 12 December 1298 instructions for purveyance had been sent out to seven English sheriffs and the sheriff of Berwick, and various English bailiffs and keepers, ordering the acquisition of 6000 quarters of wheat, 5500 quarters of oats, 4500 quarters of barley, 500 ox carcasses, 300 hog carcasses, 5000 quarters of beans and peas and 1000 quarters of Poitou salt to be transported to Berwick by 6 June 1299. Unfortunately, unlike the victuals purveyed in Ireland, there is no remaining account to give details of how much actually arrived.

Large amounts of purveyance were of little use, however, if the victuals were in no fit state to be eaten and detailed instructions were given as to how the wheat was to be packed:

"And said wheat is to be ground and well sifted so that no bran remains and the flour thereof is to be put into good casks, strong and clean, so that said flour can be closely packed therein and well-pressed down and in each cask to prevent flour from going bad. And this to be done by good people, loyal and prudent, so that the article may last for a year or two without damage, if necessary."<sup>3</sup>

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1 E101/362/18/64. Edward always intended to bring another army to Scotland throughout 1299.

2 C.P.R., 1292-1301, 418.

3 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 350-55.

This last stipulation was presumably made in order to try to counteract, as far as possible, the terrible difficulties inherent in resupplying.

In the above orders for purveyance, there is perhaps evidence of lessons being learned from the previous year. The amounts ordered were certainly greater, although more in terms of the variety of goods requested. Provision was made so that when these supplies arrived, they would be in a fit state to be consumed. In addition, Edward appears to have thought more deeply about the organisation of his fleet after the non-appearance of ships carrying victuals had almost brought disaster immediately prior to the battle of Falkirk. This led to more clear-cut definitions of what service was owed and from whom<sup>4</sup>.

### The plight of Stirling castle:

At the end of 1298 the south-eastern garrisons were on the point of setting out on an expedition to revictual Stirling castle, which was again under threat from the Scots<sup>5</sup>. However, there is no evidence to show that this expedition actually took place, perhaps because Scottish activities in the Stirling area made it impossible to get supplies to the castle via the Forth.

The rebels were certainly besieging Stirling castle in earnest<sup>6</sup> before April 1299. The evidence for this comes from an incident involving Joan de Clare, widow of Duncan (IV), earl of Fife, a former Guardian, and Sir Herbert Morham, a Scot whose family held land in East Lothian. Sir Herbert's father, Sir Thomas Morham, had fought on Edward's side at Falkirk and was currently serving in the garrison of Edinburgh castle. Sir Herbert himself was part of the Scottish army besieging the castle and indeed may have been in command of this army since it was he who arranged a truce with the garrison at an, unfortunately, unnamed date<sup>7</sup>.

Joan de Clare had taken refuge in Stirling castle, presumably from her terce of Fife lands, but obviously decided that it was no longer safe to stay there. She therefore endeavoured to return with her household and belongings to England, "so as to escape without loss from the hands of the Scots". En route to Edinburgh, she was captured by Sir Herbert, who tried, unsuccessfully, to force her to marry him, enriching himself with her property in the process.

However, Morham was then himself captured<sup>8</sup> and, on 22 April 1299, Patrick, earl of March, still captain of the eastern garrisons, and Sir John Kingston, constable of

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4 See Chapter Ten, p.265.

5 See Chapter Three, pp.84-5.

6 As opposed to merely attacking those attempting to bring supplies.

7 Barrow, *Bruce*, 105; E101/7/24, m.1; C.D.S., ii, no.1949.

8 There are, unfortunately, no details as to when, or where, or by whom, Sir Herbert was captured, though it was probably at his brother Thomas's house at Castlerankine in East Lothian where he had taken Lady Joan [Barrow, *Bruce*, 105].



Edinburgh castle where Sir Herbert was imprisoned, were ordered to hold an assize into the case, with the aid of a jury drawn from the sheriffdoms of Berwick, Roxburgh and Edinburgh. The prisoner was then to be returned to the castle<sup>9</sup>. Sir Herbert could not, therefore, have taken part in the siege of Stirling castle any later than the beginning of April 1299.

### **The growing Scottish threat:**

There is further evidence for the increasing pressure put on the English garrisons by the Scots early in 1299.

#### *Berwick*

On 28 January 1299, the sheriff of Northumberland was ordered to take a sum of money without delay to Berwick "safely and securely, taking heed of the danger"<sup>10</sup>. The Scots were presumably active near the town.

At some point in February 1299<sup>11</sup> an ordinance was made, perhaps by members of the royal council at York, for the security of Berwick. The town's defences were to be checked for any weaknesses and the cavalry and footsoldiers garrisoned within the walls to be inspected to see that they were properly equipped and 'sufficient' to take the king's wages. If they were not, others were to be found to take their places. The footsoldiers were to be quartered near their guard. The walls were to be checked twice a week for damage and, if there was any, it was to be repaired immediately. If anything strange was found, the sheriff of Northumberland was to be told so that he could inform the king's council. There was obviously concern about the state of the town's defences, both in terms of the walls themselves, which were probably made only of timber, and of those manning them<sup>12</sup>.

#### *Roxburgh*

The defence of Roxburgh was also a matter of concern. Sir Robert Hastings, the constable, had begun the construction of walls there<sup>13</sup> and he therefore required reinforcement of his garrison to man them and also to defend the town.

9 C.P.R., 1292-1301, 466.

10 E152/72, m.8.

11 The suggested date can be deduced from the references to the issue of sums of money. Along with the ordinance, a sum was delivered to sir John Weston, the receiver at Berwick, and Sir Philip Vernay, the keeper of Berwick town. There was, however, to be no further issue until 5 April. Amersham did indeed receive £1000 in April 1299 and since the previous delivery had been made in February [E159/73, m.15], the ordinance was probably issued then.

12 E159/72, m.21; *Guisborough*, 294.

13 Whether of stone or of timber is not stated but it was most likely to be timber since stone was much more expensive and a stone wall had not even been built at Berwick [see above, p.93].

According to an ordinance from the treasurer on 11 June 1299, Hastings was to be sent 100 footsoldiers from the Berwick garrison, if they were available and "provided that the enemy attack" (*e ceo si les enemys avalont*). Hastings was to request these extra men from sir Robert Heron and sir John Weston, who were to pay these men "for two weeks or three according to what is needed and what he tells you..."<sup>14</sup>.

The danger at both Berwick and Roxburgh was thus regarded as a very real one since every effort had to be made to ensure the safety of each English garrison. The borrowing of men from one garrison to another shows clearly that there were not enough men to do defend them adequately. The danger was even greater in the west, where the castles tended to be more isolated and were thus less able to move men to where the danger was greatest.

### *Lochmaben*

Work had begun on a pele<sup>15</sup> at Lochmaben in December 1298, when 48 workmen were engaged on its construction. A vintenarius and 26 crossbowmen were also employed until the end of regnal year 27 [19 November 1299] to defend the carpenters working there.

However, they were immediately faced with a lack of supplies. On 2 February Sir Robert Clifford wrote to Master Richard Abingdon, the receiver at Carlisle, to tell him that since he had ordered these crossbowmen to stay in the castle under the command of its constable, he required to pay them fifteen days' wages in advance, to be brought by their companions coming from Carlisle, because "... at present no supplies can be got here"<sup>16</sup>.

### *Dumfries*

The royal records for 1299 make no mention at all of any English garrison at Dumfries, even though wages had been paid and supplies provided for those in the castle for the period from 20 November 1298 to 30 June 1299<sup>17</sup>. However, if there had been a garrison at Dumfries, some of the purveyance from Ireland which arrived at Carlisle in May 1299 would certainly have been taken to replenish supplies there.

Also, at the end of 1298, eight crossbowmen from Lochmaben had been removed to Carlisle, along with eighteen crossbowmen and their vintenarius from elsewhere. They were to remain at Carlisle until ordered to go to Dumfries or another garrison<sup>18</sup>.

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<sup>14</sup> Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 375-6.

<sup>15</sup> For a description of the pele at Lochmaben, see Chapter Eleven, pp.285-6..

<sup>16</sup> C.D.S., ii, no.1057.

<sup>17</sup> See Chapter Three, p.73.

<sup>18</sup> E101/7/20, m.4.

By February 1299, however, these crossbowmen were back in Lochmaben again, defending the carpenters building the new pele. It may well have been felt that Lochmaben was in greater need of men due to the construction of the pele. This evidence does suggest, however, that Dumfries fell temporarily into Scottish hands - perhaps those in neighbouring Caerlaverock castle - in 1299<sup>19</sup>.

### Changes of personnel: *Berwick*

On 19 November 1298 the pro-English earl of Dunbar had been appointed captain of the eastern garrisons, one of the few Scots in a position of note in the government of their country. On 25 May 1299, however, Sir William Latimer, previously captain-general of the garrisons of Westmorland, Yorkshire, Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire was travelling up to Berwick with 100 men-at-arms to take over as captain of the eastern garrisons<sup>20</sup>.

In contrast with the west, the captaincy of the south-eastern Scottish garrisons was separate from the keepership of the march. This was presumably because the English were able to exert active control over the south-east - and thus required more personnel to administer it - whereas the west was still far from subjugated to English rule.

Sir Robert fitz Roger appears to have voluntarily offered to take on the keepership of the eastern march around the same time. On 14 May 1299 the king ordered that he should be granted respite from distraint for debts similar to that recently allowed to Latimer. Two days previously protections had been issued to Fitz Roger and his five knights (including his two sons, Alexander and John) and three esquires<sup>21</sup>, in preparation for their trip north.

### *The wardenship of the western march*

For eight months after his appointment on 25 November 1298<sup>22</sup>, Sir Robert Clifford discharged his duties as warden over an area which included the counties of Lancashire, Westmorland and Cumberland south of the border and Annandale "right across to the [western] boundary of Roxburghshire in Scotland itself".

He was supported by Sir Simon Lindsay, as captain in the Esk Valley, and, after 23 April 1299, in an appointment which Clifford himself was allowed to make for his [Clifford's] "faith, circumspection and daring diligence", Sir Richard Siward, as warden of Nithsdale<sup>23</sup>. Both Siward and Lindsay were Scots.

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19 See below, p.105.

20 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 329-30; see Chapter Three, p.81; *C.P.R.*, 1292-1301, 387; Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 365-6.

21 E159/72, m.4; *C.P.R.*, 1292-1301, 413.

22 *C.P.R.*, 1292-1301, 387.

23 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 331, see Chapter Two, p.82; *C.D.S.*, ii, 263; *C.P.R.*, 1292-1301, 409.

Clifford's job was by no means an easy one. As early as February 1299 victuals were in extremely short supply in the Lochmaben area and, as a result, it was imperative that wages be paid to the garrison so that the troops could afford to buy any food that was available<sup>24</sup>.

The gravity of this situation is further illustrated by a letter from Clifford to the receiver and keeper of royal stores at Carlisle, Richard Abingdon, on 31 July 1299. The former requested payment in money or victuals for Richard le Bret, an Irish hobelar in the Lochmaben garrison, employed to spy on the Scots "by night and day, who has been on duty for six weeks and three days, lest he takes himself off for lack of sustenance"<sup>25</sup>. It must have been around this time that Clifford wrote to the king asking to be relieved of his wardenship.

On 14 August 1299 Clifford wrote to Abingdon again, being in some doubt as to what was happening about a replacement warden. In the meantime he had organised the extra defence of Lochmaben against the expected attack from the earl of Carrick. The warden again ordered the receiver "to pay them [the garrison] their wages fully, so that they won't leave to the danger of the castle"<sup>26</sup>.

A few days later the chancellor of England also wrote to Abingdon, explaining the reason for the confusion. This had been caused primarily by the fact that the king was making his way north and no other warden was to be appointed until he arrived. In the meantime, Sir Robert Felton, the constable of Lochmaben, Sir Richard Siward, the warden of Nithsdale and the other knights of Annandale were to remain on duty as at present. Abingdon was again called upon to ensure that Lochmaben was adequately supplied and that wages were paid<sup>27</sup>.

On 19 August the king himself wrote to the receiver to clarify the situation, stating that Clifford, "for certain reasons cannot apply himself to the said custody these days and the same Robert is restoring said custody to us"<sup>28</sup>. The impetus for the change of wardens probably came from Clifford, just as Surrey had asked to be relieved of the office of lieutenant of Scotland. Perhaps, like Surrey, Clifford preferred the life of a soldier to that of an administrator. He may also have found the cost of his office too burdensome.

Edward had ordered the bishop of Durham, the treasurer of England and Sir Henry Lacy, earl of Lincoln, or any two of them, to appoint a new warden as quickly as possible and Sir Ralph fitz William, currently the captain of the Yorkshire garrisons was given the job. Sir John Crepping was appointed captain in Yorkshire in his place<sup>29</sup>.

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24 C.D.S., ii, no.1057; see above, p.94.

25 C.D.S., ii, no.1084.

26 E101/7/23/19; see below, pp.104-5.

27 C.D.S., ii, no.1088.

28 E159/72, m.102.

29 C.P.R., 1292-1301, 387; E159/72, m.102.

Fitz William had recently been in Scotland as part of Sir William Latimer's expedition to Galloway in mid-July 1299. He arrived in Carlisle to take up his position as warden of the western march on 30 August with his knights, Sir William Basset and Sir John Landplou and ten esquires, a clerk and nine footsoldiers<sup>30</sup>.

The only evidence for his activities as warden was another planned expedition to Galloway which mustered in Carlisle on 7-8 September 1299. Again there is no further mention of this expedition. On 12 November 1299, however, Fitz William was ordered by the king to leave Carlisle and another warden does not seem to have been appointed until 5 January 1300 when Sir John de St. John took up the position<sup>31</sup>.

At a time when there was no lieutenant of Scotland as a whole, the two wardens of the eastern and western marches, the former based at Berwick and the latter at Carlisle or Lochmaben, in conjunction with the receivers, were responsible for the English administration of Scotland. Sir Robert Clifford, despite his commitment to Scottish affairs, both up till then and in the future, obviously did not relish this responsibility. However, his resignation in August 1299 and the uncertainty which this caused in a month when the Scots were beginning an offensive in the west was badly-timed. Sir Ralph fitz William lasted just over two months in the job. Edward required a soldier with a taste and ability for administration to be his warden. It was not until the return from French prison of Sir John de St. John, the late steward of Aquitaine, that he got one.

#### **Increasing pressure on the English garrisons:**

Scottish attacks had intensified by mid-1299. On 8 July letters were sent from Sir William Latimer, captain of the eastern garrisons, to the treasurer at York "for the coming of the Scots"<sup>32</sup>. Since Latimer was based at Berwick, he was presumably expecting a Scottish attack on the south-east.

Around mid-July, however, Latimer organised a large expedition to Galloway, perhaps in response to a Scottish attack on Dumfries. Eleven knights, including three bannerets - Sir Ralph fitz William, Sir John Lancaster and Sir John Hoddleston - thirty-two esquires, sixteen vintenarii and three hundred and six footsoldiers had arrived in Carlisle by 18 July<sup>33</sup>. However, this is the last date of payment to these troops, which suggests that the expedition did not actually take place. There is certainly no further record of its activities.

The involvement of Sir William Latimer, captain of the eastern garrisons, in the defence of the western march presumably indicates that Clifford was elsewhere, perhaps petitioning the king personally to be relieved of his office of warden.

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30 E101/7/20, m.3; see below, p.97.

31 C.P.R., 1292-1301, 484.

32 E101/7/20, m.8.

33 E101/7/20, m.3; See above p.97.

*A meeting to discuss the state of the march*

The state of the garrisons and the border defences, presumably as a result of Scottish activities, was causing sufficient concern to the English government by the summer of 1299 for the king to order a meeting to be held at York for 1 August 1299. A committee, comprising the bishop of Durham, Sir Henry Percy and the earl of Lincoln, was to discuss the situation with the treasurer, the archbishop of York, all those involved in defending the march on both sides of the border<sup>34</sup> and the commanders of the south-eastern garrisons<sup>35</sup>.

*Kingston's letter; Scottish activities*

It would seem unlikely, considering the contents of a letter sent to the treasurer by Sir John Kingston, constable of Edinburgh castle, on 9 August 1299, that this meeting ever took place. The increased threat to the security of the south-east and the northern English counties from the Scots required the presence of those responsible for the defence of these areas at their posts. This letter is one of the most informative sources of evidence for the state of southern Scotland at this time.

Kingston's letter begins with a request for robes and shoes on behalf of various members of the Edinburgh garrison. The constable asked Langton to think on this "since I cannot come to you", clearly a reference to the difficult situation currently sustained by the garrisons. He then went on to inform the treasurer of the activities of the Scots.

"... the earl of Buchan, the bishop of St. Andrews and other earls and great lords who were on the other side of the Scottish sea, have come to this side, and were at Glasgow on the day on which this letter was made<sup>36</sup>; and .... they intend to go towards the Border, as is reported among them and their people who are in the Forest."

Kingston's letter then goes on to describe the treacherous behaviour of Sir Simon Fraser, Edward's keeper of Selkirk Forest. Fraser, a Scotsman, was lord of Oliver Castle (by Tweedsmuir) in Tweeddale. His father had held the office of sheriff of Traquair and

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34 That is, the earl of March, the earl of Angus, Sir John Wake, Sir Robert fitz Roger, Sir William Latimer, Sir Robert Clifford, Sir Ralph fitz William and Sir Simon Fraser (who was instructed to come personally).

35 That is, Sir John Kingston, Sir Robert Hastings, Sir Richard Hastings, Sir John Burdon and Sir Philip Vernay, constables of Edinburgh, Roxburgh, Jedburgh, Berwick castle and Berwick town respectively [Stevenson, *Documents*, ii 380-1].

36 The letter referred to must be a previous one to Kingston from the treasurer at York, presumably requesting news of the whereabouts and intentions of the Scots. Presuming that Kingston replied almost immediately, a suitable date for Langton's letter to have been written was around 1 August.

had also been keeper of Selkirk Forest. Fraser's mother's second husband was Sir Richard Siward, Edward's warden of Nithsdale<sup>37</sup>.

According to Kingston, Sir Simon was already on his way to York to inform the treasurer personally of the imminent approach of the 'rebels'. This, asserted the sheriff of Edinburgh, was quite unnecessary since the Scots were few enough in number to have been stopped by the south-eastern garrisons, if Fraser had warned them in time. Kingston himself had informed the other garrison commanders eight days previously of the imminent arrival of the Scots, before the latter had reached the Forest.

Such irresponsible behaviour was explained by the fact that "it was reported that there was a treaty between them and Sir Simon, and that they had a conference together and ate and drank and were on the best of terms." Kingston could only warn: "... wherefore, sir, it were well that you should be very cautious as to the advice which he shall give you."

If this were not enough, the constable then states that Sir Simon had sent him a letter around the time of Fraser's departure from Selkirk Forest, (but presumably before he went south to York, around 31 July), asking Kingston to go to him. Sir John initially refused, but after several more requests in the same vein, he eventually did go to Fraser "... on the day on which our enemies came suddenly before our castle [Edinburgh] and on which Sir Thomas Ardene was taken; wherefore I fear that he [Fraser] is not of such good faith as he ought to be"<sup>38</sup>.

Sir Simon certainly seems to have been playing a double game at this time. He had even taken the precaution of procuring a letter dated 31 July 1299 from an official at Berwick, vouching for his diligence and loyalty in the discharge of his duty<sup>39</sup>. There is no doubt, however, that the evidence which Kingston presented is proof of Fraser's leanings towards the Scots as early as mid-1299. Although there was no question as yet of his joining the Scots openly, just doing nothing was enough to give them unimpeded access to Selkirk Forest.

The rest of Kingston's news was equally full of evidence that the English grip on Lothian and the Borders was being prised loose once more.

"I have to inform you, sir, that they of the Forest have surrendered themselves to the Scots; and intelligence has come to me that the lady of Penicuik (which is ten leagues from our castle) has received her son, who is against the peace, and that other ill-doers were there harboured and received; wherefore I caused all the beasts of the said town [Penicuik] to

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37 The sheriffdom of Traquair (sometimes also described as Tweeddale) appears to have corresponded to the sheriffdom of Peebles before the English occupation [*Fife Court Bk.*, Appendix D, 357-8; Barrow, *Bruce*, 106]. *S.P.*, vii, 420-2.

38 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 301-3.

39 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 302, footnote 1.

be sought for [and brought] to our castle, and part of them I have delivered to the poor people to whom they belonged, who say that they are at peace with us, and I have retained the remainder until the approach of our troops and the withdrawal of the Scots, so that if we have need, we may take some of them for the king's funds. Wherefore I pray you ... that you send me your pleasure whether I shall keep the beasts in the way I inform you, or whether I shall deliver them. And I beg you, sir, to give advice concerning Stirling castle that it be victualled. And if it pleases you, send your decision as to these matters"<sup>40</sup>.

The support of the local populace must have been of great importance to the English garrisons. However, this support would have been largely dependent on the latter's effectiveness in keeping the Scots at bay. It is not very surprising to find the people of Selkirk Forest supporting the Scots since the Forest had long provided a safe haven for the rebels - Sir John Stewart of Jedburgh had led the archers of Selkirk Forest against Edward at Falkirk<sup>41</sup> - and Edward's keeper was clearly unreliable. However, if the rebels were finding support in Penicuik, only eight miles from Edinburgh, then their threat to the whole of the south-east was clearly increasing. It is also clear that Stirling castle was still in great danger through lack of victuals.

#### *Hastangs' letter; Scottish activities*

Another letter from an English garrison commander, this time Sir Robert Hastangs at Roxburgh on 20 August 1299, describes the activities of the Scots in even greater detail. On 13 August<sup>42</sup> Sir Ingram d'Umfraville, Sir William Balliol and others harried Fraser in Selkirk Forest. Sir Simon must therefore have returned from his trip to York, if he went at all.

The Scottish leaders then waited on the arrival of "the great lords of Scotland", namely the bishop of St. Andrews, the earl of Carrick, the earl of Buchan, the earl of Atholl<sup>43</sup>, the earl of Menteith, Sir John Comyn, 'the son', and the Steward of Scotland<sup>44</sup>.

This ties in with Kingston's report of "the earl of Buchan, the bishop of St. Andrews and other earls and great lords" coming south of the Forth around 1 August. It should also be noted that the English in the south-west were preparing for a raid by the earl of Carrick around this time. The garrison of Lochmaben castle was reinforced

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40 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 303-4.

41 *Wyntoun*, 347.

42 The document, which is faded in several parts, reads "on Thursday next .... past", which has to be "on Thursday next before the assumption of our Lady past", that is, 13 August, otherwise the events which Hastangs goes on to describe [see p101] would have taken place after his letter was written.

43 Again the manuscript is faded, but the visible letters - 'le' - could refer to only one Scottish earl, Atholl [see Barrow, *Bruce*, 106, n.99].

44 *Nat. Mss. of Scotland*, ii, no. viii.



between 1 and 25 August in anticipation of the earl's arrival<sup>45</sup>. Since Carrick was in Selkirk Forest towards the end of the month, he presumably either spent a very brief period attacking Lochmaben or postponed his attack until after the trip to the south-east.

Once the magnates of Scotland had all arrived in Selkirk Forest, it had been intended that they should launch an attack on Roxburgh. However, they were informed that the town was well enough guarded, "so that they could make no exploit without great loss of their troops." Hastings had presumably made use of the ordinance of 11 June to strengthen his garrison with 100 men from the Berwick garrison<sup>46</sup>.

The Scots then 'kept quiet' until the following Wednesday [19 August], when they held a meeting at Peebles, by which time Hastings had a spy among them. There is also some degree of uncertainty as when this meeting occurred, since the date falls on a faded patch and only the words "mercredi prochein ..... dame" are visible. However, the crucial missing word has to be *apres* since the Wednesday *before* the Assumption was 12 August, the day before the harrying of Sir Simon Fraser.

Hastings then goes on to relate the astonishing events which took place at this council meeting. Sir David Graham, a Comyn man, demanded the forfeiture of Wallace's lands and property since the latter was intending to leave the country without the permission of the guardians. Sir Malcolm Wallace, in Carrick's retinue, defended his brother and the two knights drew their daggers.

"And the earl of Buchan and Sir John Comyn thought that because Sir David Graham is with Sir John Comyn and Sir Malcolm Wallace with the earl of Carrick, that some quarrel was begun with the intention of deceiving them, and Sir John Comyn leaped on the earl of Carrick and took him by the throat, and the earl of Buchan upon the bishop of St. Andrews, and they held them fast, because treason or treachery was planned, until the Steward and others went to stop this scuffle."

Order was restored when news came that Sir Alexander Comyn, brother of the earl of Buchan, who remained in Edward's allegiance throughout the period from 1296 to 1304<sup>47</sup> was devastating the north of Scotland with Lachlan MacRuarie. It was quickly decided "that the bishop of St. Andrews should have in his hand all the castles, as principal leader [*chevetein*], and the earl of Carrick and Sir John Comyn, the son, were joined to him as Guardians of the kingdom".

Despite this deep split, capable of dividing and paralysing the Scottish nobility, the confidence of those holding the Peebles council is illustrated by the ordinances made there. Sir Ingram d'Umfraville was appointed sheriff of Roxburgh and Sir Robert Keith warden of Selkirk Forest, offices currently held for Edward by Sir Robert Hastings and

45 C.D.S., ii, no.1115, p.283; E101/7/23/19.

46 See above, p.94.

47 See Chapter Nine, pp.252-4.

Sir Simon Fraser respectively. Keith and Umfraville were to have command of a force numbering 100 men-at-arms and 1500 footsoldiers, excluding the men of the Forest, to do their worst upon the marches. Hastings assured the king that this was a serious threat "because each great lord has left a part of his troops [*gentz*] in the company of the said Sir Ingram"<sup>48</sup>.

Keith had lands in East Lothian but, perhaps more importantly, his younger brother, Edward, was married to Isabella, heiress of Sinton, whose inheritance included the heritable office of sheriff of Selkirk. This presumably justified the appointment of Sir Robert Keith as warden of Selkirk Forest in 1299. Edward and Isabella petitioned King Edward for her inheritance in 1305<sup>49</sup>.

It is also clear, therefore, that Sir Simon Fraser was not yet willing to leave the English camp, perhaps because, up till now, adherence to Edward seemed to ensure the retention of his family possessions and offices. Sir Robert Keith was not, however, a merely token keeper of Selkirk Forest for the Scots and the success of his activities can be gauged by the fact that Sir Simon Fraser was a captive in a Scottish prison from 4 September 1299 until 12 June 1300<sup>50</sup>. Unfortunately, no details are known as to how or where he was captured.

After the council meeting the rest of the nobility split up, returning to their own parts of the country on the same day. The earl of Buchan and Sir John Comyn went back north of the Forth, the Steward and the earl of Menteith to Clydesdale, the bishop of St. Andrews remained at his house at Stobo near Peebles and the earl of Carrick and Sir David Brechin returned towards Annandale "and from there towards Galloway with others of the Galwegians"<sup>51</sup>. The English clearly did not control the south-west much beyond Lochmaben and even in the south-east, the bishop of Glasgow clearly felt quite safe only 30 miles from the English garrison at Jedburgh.

### *The Scottish army*

Hastings' letter also provides information on a subject which is of great relevance to any assessment of the strength of the Scottish position: namely, what kind of a force was the Scottish army during this period when there was no king in Scotland to lead his people? The Guardians occupied an ambiguous constitutional position which did not give them any clear-cut authority to call out the Scottish host, which was the personal prerogative of the kings of Scots.

The traditional Scottish army, in the time of King Alexander III, was a mixture of men-at-arms performing their feudal service owed for their lands and "the 'common

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48 *Nat. Mss. of Scotland*, ii, no.viii.

49 *S.P.*, vi, 30, 33; *Memo. de Parl.*, no.268.

50 *Lib. Quot.*, 190.

51 *Nat. Mss. of Scotland*, ii, no.vii.

army' of the realm consisting of quotas of able-bodied men who were mustered compulsorily from the country as a whole, or from particular regions ...". This system produced a much smaller body of infantry than could be raised in England, for example<sup>52</sup>.

The force of 1500 footsoldiers ordered to remain in Selkirk Forest was clearly made up of contingents from various lords. It would appear, therefore, that the Guardians were successful in raising the traditional Scottish host: the feudal levies were present with the nobility themselves, albeit reduced in number with the exclusion of those, like earl Patrick of Dunbar and the knights of Bruce of Annandale, who performed their service in Edward's armies; the 'common army' was also raised by the nobility, whose officers raised quotas from their lands to form the 'army' of Carrick or of Buchan, for example. The Guardians were also able to raise a force for extraordinary occasions. Thus, in 1298, the earl of Strathearn agreed that the service provided by his vassal, Sir William Murray of Tullibardine, "for the defence of the realm had been offered voluntarily and was in addition to the 'Scottish service' which was all that Sir William strictly owed in respect of the lands he held of the earl"<sup>53</sup>. If the Scots could afford to leave 1500 footsoldiers in Selkirk Forest in 1299 - a force larger than that which had been installed at Berwick in 1298 as a small English army for the defence of the south-eastern garrisons - then we have little reason to presume that the Scottish host was not an effective force of some size.

Lastly, this ability to call out a 'national' army presupposes the sending of summonses to each Scottish sheriff, a clear indication that the majority of Scottish sheriffdoms were under the control of the Guardians. In addition, the right to purveyance which accrued to the king of Scots, just as it did to the king of England, must also have been successfully implemented by the Scottish leaders.

#### *A separate rebel attack?*

A letter dated 19 August from the treasurer at York to Sir Ralph fitz William, keeper of the western march, the constables of Roxburgh and Jedburgh, the keeper of Berwick town, the constable of Lochmaben and the sheriffs of Berwick, Northumberland, Cumberland and Westmorland makes it abundantly clear that the English felt far from confident of their own abilities to deal with the Scottish offensive. The treasurer had been informed that the Scots were going to attack, but did not know where exactly. He thus warned the above officials that the 'rebels' were:

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52 G.W.S. Barrow, 'The Army of Alexander III's Scotland', *Scotland in the Reign of Alexander III, 1249-1286*, 133.

53 Barrow, *Bruce*, 98.

"... coming to your parts<sup>54</sup> and hostilely taking grain and other victuals and in places totally burning and destroying it so that by this our people cannot resist since they have nothing to eat ... We command you ... that each and everyone from your bailiwick who has grain that has not been destroyed, to have it reaped and collected and taken to the castle and forcelette within your bailiwick and put there safely."<sup>55</sup>

Given those to whom it was addressed, the treasurer must have been informed that the Scots were operating right across the Scottish march and even in England, though those involved were presumably not just those at the Peebles council<sup>56</sup>.

This could, of course, have been a force operating under Sir William Wallace, who was not present at Peebles. According to an account made with John Sampson in 1307, which included expenses incurred during the time when he was constable of Stirling castle, he lost a horse "on a St. Bartholomew's day [21 August], when William Wallace came to take away our supplies". This is most likely to be 21 August 1299, since Stirling castle had been victualled on 8 August 1298<sup>57</sup> and would surely not have been revictualled again later in the same month.

In addition, according to a roll listing the numbers of horses belonging to members of the Roxburgh garrisons, Sir Robert Hastings and Ivo Aldeburgh each lost a horse "when Stirling castle was victualled". Though no date is given, these losses may also have occurred during the attempted revictualling of Stirling in August 1299. Although ships were used to transport goods to Stirling<sup>58</sup>, they may well have been taken overland on occasions, perhaps because of contrary winds.

It is not at all clear whether William Wallace was operating in conjunction with the Scottish government, or independently. The events of the Peebles council suggest that he did not quite fit in with the established Scottish administration and perhaps continued his guerrilla activities alone.

### **Lochmaben:**

The newly-constructed pele of Lochmaben was considered to be particularly vulnerable to Scottish attack. A garrison of 140 footsoldiers had been placed in the pele from 1 July 1299. In addition, a total of 10 hobelars, 18 men-at-arms and 96 footsoldiers were sent to Lochmaben by Clifford specifically for its defence against the earl of Carrick during the period 1-25 August. The constable of Lochmaben could presumably also count on the help of the "knights of Annandale" - Sir Humphrey Gardinis, Sir Hugh

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54 That is, anywhere in southern Scotland and northern England.

55 E159/72, m.102.

56 Langton, at York, would probably have received Sir John Hastings letter of 9 August by the date of his own letter.

57 *C.D.S.*, ii, no.1949; see Chapter Three, p.76.

58 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 266-9; See Chapter Three, p.85.

Mauleverer, Sir William Herries and Sir Thomas Torthorald - with their combined retinues of 15 esquires<sup>59</sup>.

On 1 August, Carrick was probably one of the 'earls and great lords' whose activities were described by Sir John Kingston<sup>60</sup>. He then travelled south-east, returning from Selkirk for Annandale and Galloway on 19 August. It seems likely, therefore, that he did not spend much, if any, time attacking Lochmaben and had probably gone much further west into Galloway by the end of the month. This perhaps explains why a two-day expedition led by Sir Ralph fitz William, now captain in the west in place of Clifford, took place there early in September<sup>61</sup>.

#### *Scottish attacks on Lochmaben from Caerlaverock*

Though the expected attack from the earl of Carrick in August 1299 probably did not materialise, Lochmaben and its pele did not get off Scot-free. Some time in October 1299, Sir Robert Felton, the constable, wrote to the king concerning the nearby Scottish garrison at Caerlaverock. For some time previously this garrison "has done and does great harm every day to the king's castle and people". These activities perhaps explain why Carrick had not felt that it was necessary to engage his own forces in attacking Lochmaben in August.

Between 11 July and 27 September 1299 there were three centenarii, fifteen vintenarii and two hundred and eighty-five footsoldiers in Lochmaben, the highest number during this year. On 4 October the castle was attacked by those in Caerlaverock. The Scottish constable of Caerlaverock was killed and his head displayed on the great tower at Lochmaben. This constable was Robert Cunningham, a relative and 'valet' of the Steward<sup>62</sup>.

Felton claimed that though there had been casualties on both sides, the English had fared much better than the Scots. However, during the period from 28 September to 19 October, the number of footsoldiers in the Lochmaben garrison dropped quite dramatically to one centenarius, seven vintenarii and one hundred and thirty-three footsoldiers, a loss of two centenarii, eight vintenarii and one hundred and fifty-two footsoldiers. The numbers dropped again, but not nearly so sharply, between 20 October and 19 November to one centenarius, five vintenarii and ninety-five footsoldiers<sup>63</sup>.

It is, as ever, difficult to ascertain the cause for a decrease in garrison numbers, but it would seem unlikely, given that the castle was under attack, that these men were

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59 E101/7/20, m.3; m.2; see Chapter Two, p.52.

60 See above, pp.98-100.

61 C.D.S., ii, no.1978; see above, p.102; E101/7/20, m.3; see above, p.97.

62 E101/7/20, m.3-4; C.D.S., ii, no.1101.

63 E101/7/20, m.4.

withdrawn. Certainly Felton, despite claiming that his garrison had the Scots under control, then went on to admit the need for an English army to subdue the area and begged Edward "to turn his face to Scotland and they will be discomfited". The constable of Lochmaben, like the members of the Edinburgh garrison, was in great need of new robes and for the same reason - he "cannot leave the castle to buy them"<sup>64</sup>.

The drop in numbers, therefore, perhaps indicates casualties. Even if a force was withdrawn to take part in a siege of Caerlaverock, these men would have featured in the wage accounts somewhere (which they do not), or else would have continued to be paid as part of the Lochmaben garrison.

#### *Engines made for Lochmaben castle*

From 25 August to 19 November 1299 (which could, of course, have extended into the new regnal year), Sir John Dolive was placed in charge of the construction of three engines, named the Berfrey, the Multon and the Cat, in the Carlisle area.

In addition to Sir John and his esquire, two sawyers were employed to cut down trees from nearby Inglewood Forest and nine carpenters were involved in the construction which was begun at Carlisle in September and was then transferred to Saltcotes in November 1299. Clearly the engines were to be taken by sea elsewhere and the payment to Robert Knipsle, a footsoldier in the Lochmaben garrison, for supervising these operations<sup>65</sup>, suggests that their destination was connected with that garrison. The reduction of Caerlaverock castle must surely have been the use intended for these engines.

#### *Further defensive measures at Lochmaben*

Although the new pele at Lochmaben withstood to Scottish attacks successfully, Sir Richard Siward, whose construction of a stone castle at Tibbers Edward had seen in the previous year, was assigned on 15 November 1299 to provide for the strengthening of the pele for fifteen days after Christmas. He was to be assisted by Master Richard Abingdon. On 16 November Abingdon was ordered to go personally to Lochmaben from Carlisle to attend to these alterations since Edward intended that Siward should be with him on his planned expedition to Scotland (which expedition did not, in fact, take place)<sup>66</sup>.

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64 C.D.S., ii, no.1101.

65 E101/7/20, m.1.

66 C.D.S., ii, no.1005; C.P.R., 1292-1301, 455; C.C.R., 1296-1302, 288.

### The administration at Berwick:

Though no account survives for Amersham at Berwick like that for Abingdon at Carlisle, it is still possible to piece together other evidence to build up a picture of the personnel based there and the work in which they were each involved.

#### *Amersham, Weston and Bremesgrave*

Money continued to be sent up to sir Walter Amersham as receiver in this year, though he was also still holding the office of chancellor of Scotland<sup>67</sup>.

Sir John Weston, another royal clerk, also resided at Berwick and was described in 1299 as a receiver<sup>68</sup>. He is mentioned far more frequently than Amersham in this year, particularly with regard to the administration of Berwick town and the paying of wages to other south-eastern garrisons. It would therefore appear that the duties which were originally undertaken by Amersham alone in 1297 had now been split up among various royal officers at Berwick.

To illustrate this more clearly, Weston and sir Robert Heron, Amersham's keeper of the counter-roll, were jointly instructed to send extra troops to Roxburgh and see that their wages were paid<sup>69</sup>. The money which they required, however, came from Amersham.

Thus Amersham received and accounted for the money coming from the exchequer at York and could perhaps be described better as treasurer of Scotland rather than chancellor. Weston, on the other hand, was in charge of the disbursement and delivery of money and goods within Scotland, with the primary responsibility for providing for the eastern garrisons which that entailed. Another royal clerk, sir Richard Bremesgrave, had charge of the royal store at Berwick.

#### *Money supplies from York*

From the account of the keeper of the wardrobe, sir John Droxford, it is possible to ascertain the amount of money sent from York for the south-eastern garrisons in this year. On 2 May 1299 £400 for the Berwick garrisons, £150 for the Roxburgh garrison and £36 13s.4d. for the Jedburgh garrison was handed over to the sheriff of York. This money was then transported to Newcastle, where it was delivered to the sheriff of Northumberland. The latter then took it to Berwick to be issued to the various constables. A further £400 for the Berwick garrisons was sent from York in the same way on 17 May<sup>70</sup>.

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67 E159/73, m.15; E159/72, m.15.

68 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 401-2.

69 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 375-6.

70 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 365-6.

*A coroner at Berwick; inquests - evidence for non-military administration*

During an inquest into a homicide committed by a member of the Berwick town garrison in self-defence, Sir Philip Vernay, the keeper of the town, is also described as its coroner. In Scotland, coroners were usually appointed by the justiciars. This is the only reference to this office before the ordinances of September 1305<sup>71</sup>.

Other inquests conducted by Edward's officers are noted in this year. In July 1299, Sir John Burdon, the sheriff of Berwick, conducted an inquiry into the lands belonging to Richard Coldingham, a 'rebel', which were to be granted to Andrew Criour. As a result, it was established how much was owed as service to be paid to the Berwick exchequer.

The sheriff of Roxburgh undertook a similar inquest into lands owned by another 'rebel', William le Procurator, in his bailiwick, to be granted again to Andrew Criour<sup>72</sup>. It would appear, therefore, that certain of the non-military duties of these officers could be carried out in these areas, although the only conclusive evidence of this would be payments of these dues at the Berwick exchequer, which, since there was no Berwick exchequer, cannot have been made. References to such payments to the exchequer at York also do not exist.

The mention of the Berwick exchequer is, therefore, somewhat misleading and perhaps serves as a warning that English documentation for this period often refers to what *should* have been happening, rather than what actually was. Fragmentary amounts from the issues of Scotland were certainly paid over to English officers at Berwick throughout this period<sup>73</sup>, but this is not sufficient evidence to suggest that a separate exchequer still existed when it is quite clear that all financial transactions were ultimately authorised and accounted for by the exchequer at York.

*Bremesgrave and the store at Berwick*

The Berwick store, under sir Richard Bremesgrave, was supplied by purveyance from English counties. It was reasonably well-stocked at the end of regnal year 27 (19 November 1299), because there had been no army to feed<sup>74</sup>. It contained 409 quarters beans, 204 barrels of wine, 192 barrels of flour. 1865 quarters 2 bushels oats, 157 quarters barley, 6 ox carcasses, 5 hog carcasses, 198 quarters salt, 377 quarters charcoal, 262 Eastland boards, 1236 quarters gunstones, 188 stones for engines, 30 steel arrows and 100 light helmets. Unfortunately, all the wheat, despite the careful instructions for its keeping, was either putrefied or desiccated<sup>75</sup>.

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71 Bateson, 'The Scottish King's Household', 37; see Chapter Seventeen, pp.393-4.

72 C.P.R., 1292-1301, 428.

73 See Conclusion.

74 However, a small force did arrive at Berwick in December 1299 [see below, pp.114-5].

75 Lib. Quot., 117-119.



There is, unfortunately, no surviving account for the Berwick store in this year like that for Carlisle. It is thus impossible to gauge how much was actually sent north from the purveyance and how much was then issued to the garrisons. However, the existence of the *Liber Quotidianus* for the following regnal year (28) will allow us to answer these questions for 1300.

### Carlisle and the administration of the south-west: *The Irish purveyance*

In December 1298 Edward wrote to his officials in Ireland, just as he had done to all the English sheriffs, ordering the purchase of 8000 quarters of wheat, 10,000 quarters of oats, 2000 quarters of 1st-grade malt, 1000 barrels of wine (which, if they could not be found in Ireland, were to be brought from Gascony), 50 carcasses of salted oxen, 1000 hog carcasses and 20,000 dried fish to be transported to Skinburness<sup>76</sup>.

This purveyance was intended primarily to support an English campaign "since the Scots continue in their rebellion", rather than for the victualling of English castles in the west of Scotland, though this would be included. It must be remembered that Edward had every intention of coming back to Scotland right through 1299.

The postponement of the campaign until 1300 therefore reversed the situation of 1298 when the English army and garrisons had the military capacity to maintain lines of supply but not enough victuals to provide for such large numbers. In 1299 there were enough supplies for the garrisons, since there was no army to feed, but without that army it was difficult to disperse the victuals safely.

Though the total purveyance was, as ever, far short of that demanded by the king, it was still a substantial amount. With the exception of the cargoes of two ships, the *Brodeship* of Furneys and the *Godyere* of Carlingford, which still had not been unloaded at Skinburness by the end of the regnal year (19 November 1299) and were therefore accounted for in the next year, these totals were as follows:

Wheat	: 3113 quarters
Flour	: 708 barrels 1 pipe
Oats	: 6964 quarters 2 bushels
Malt	: 1308 quarters 1 bushel
Beef carcasses	: 176
Hog carcasses	: 669
Hard fish in barrels	: 24 barrels, with an additional 1136 fish loose
Wine	: 551 barrels

This revictualling took place just in time, given the small amounts remaining in the store from the previous year's account. Wheat totalled only 410 quarters 2 bushels, which was nevertheless by far the highest amount of grain. There were only 84 quarters oats left and 45 quarters malt with a further 4 quarters 2 bushels which were rotten. The

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<sup>76</sup> C.P.R., 1292-1301, 389.

wine store was in slightly better condition with 112 barrels remaining. The meat supply consisted of 34 beef carcasses and 15 hog carcasses. Fish numbered 1084 hard fish and 12,800 herring.

### *Abingdon's staff*

From the account of Master Richard Abingdon, the receiver at Carlisle, covering the arrival of this large amount of victuals from purveyance in Ireland, details of the size and composition of the body of officials and others concerned with the receiving, carrying, keeping and issuing of goods and money in and around Carlisle - that is, Abingdon's staff - can be ascertained, as well as information on how this large influx of foodstuffs and other goods was dealt with.

Many of these officials were employed purely to deal with this particular consignment from Ireland and thus the size of Abingdon's staff was dependent on the flow of goods and cash. It is quite likely that much of this casual labour, such as the carters, were local men. Thus very few were employed throughout the whole year.

Apart from Abingdon himself, only two other officials were in receipt of wages for the entire regnal year [20 November 1298 - 19 November 1299]. These were Richard Mistone, who, along with the help of a servant, was responsible for grinding wheat into flour, keeping grain in Carlisle priory from the remains of the old store, receiving and keeping grain from the new store at Carlisle and having this grain issued and sold, and Robert Fikeis, who was similarly responsible for keeping the wine from the remains of the old store and receiving and keeping the wine from the new store<sup>77</sup>. There were others who received wages up to 19 November, the end of regnal year 27 [19 November 1299], but payment to them commenced from May onwards, with the arrival of the ships from Ireland.

The numbers involved in these operations were quite large. At Carlisle itself a total of fifteen men were added to the pay-roll, as well as a further four at Holmcoltram where some of the grain was kept. At Skinburness and Saltcoats, where the ships landed, there was a staff of nine. A maximum total of one master carter, ten carters and two servants were employed to convey the victuals from the coast to Carlisle between July and September.

There were also those involved in transporting goods from Carlisle to the garrison at Lochmaben, either directly by land or by sea to Annan, the nearest wharf, and from there by land to the castle. A maximum of seven carters and two servants travelled between Carlisle and Lochmaben in September. At Annan a total of six men received victuals and transported them to Lochmaben between July and September. Most of these provisions presumably came directly from the ports of Skinburness and Saltcoats. John

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<sup>77</sup> E101/7/20, m.4.

Luke was also employed to travel between Lochmaben and Carlisle on three occasions between July and September to report to Abingdon on the paying and keeping of the victuals and to describe what had been expended both in victuals and in other goods.

In addition to those involved generally in receiving, unloading, keeping, carrying and issuing these stores, and the milling of wheat, others were employed, for example, to look after the carts and carthorses, to supervise the measuring of grain, to repair the barrels containing wine and flour, to move and turn grain in its place of storage, to look after goods saved from four shipwrecks and to go in a boat from Annan to Skinburness to search for victuals and return with them.

This totals sixty-one men involved with provisioning in the west, excluding any from the garrison itself who may have been involved in transporting victuals from Annan<sup>78</sup>, the sailors who brought them in the first place and an unspecified number of people who were hired to perform a variety of tasks concerned with the care of these victuals, such as the washing and drying of meat and fish.

#### *A new store*

Abingdon's account also describes the construction of a number of houses in and around the castle bailey at Carlisle for storing wine and grain. Grain was also now to be kept in various granaries and houses belonging to citizens of Carlisle, though this may have been a temporary measure until the new houses were complete. The building of a new store suggests that the security of the old store had been in some doubt, perhaps because of Scottish raids in the area. However, it is not at all clear where the old store was situated. Mistone was paid:

"... to keep grain in Carlisle priory from that remaining in the old store and to receive and keep grain from the new store at Carlisle."

This last phrase, - "the new store at Carlisle" - perhaps suggests that the old store had been outwith the city walls.

Meat and fish were to be brought from the abbey of Holmcoltram, where they had been stored, to the castle and from there to the town. All the necessary equipment for hanging the meat had to be bought for the houses where it was to be kept. Since none of these purchases is dated, it is difficult to make out when all these various storage places were being used. It is likely, however, that, since a large consignment of goods had arrived, Abingdon and his staff had to make the best use of the available space and hence the necessity for suddenly equipping a variety of places - in the castle, the priory, private houses in the town and out at Holmcoltram<sup>79</sup>.

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78 E101/7/20, m.3-4.

79 E101/7/20, m.8.

*The state of the store at the end of the year*

At the end of this year's account, the store was generally much better supplied than it had been at the beginning, despite much of it having been sent on to those defending the western march. 1447 quarters of wheat remained, along with 657 barrels of flour. Oats amounted to 5500 quarters 7 bushels and malt to 460 quarters 8 bushels. There was again a healthy supply of wine, numbering 498 barrels. Meat totalled 61 beef carcasses and 521 hog carcasses. Since there was no import of herring from Ireland, all the previous year's supplies were used up and, despite further provisions, only 23 hard fish were left in the store. It should be noted, however, that this would not have been enough to feed an army as well.

*The recipients of these provisions*

Those who received these victuals were either issued them as a gift, in which case no money was involved, or, more usually, had to buy them. In some cases provisions were issued in lieu of wages and thus, again, no money changed hands. For example, the constables of Lochmaben castle, of which there were two in this year<sup>80</sup>, received a total of:-

195 quarters 2 bushels wheat  
27 barrels of flour  
401 quarters 2 bushels oats  
446 quarters 3 bushels malt  
61 barrels of wine  
135 beef carcasses  
157 hog carcasses  
3528 hard fish  
5500 herring  
2 barrels salt  
10 iron bars

The cost of these goods was presumably deducted from the certum which each constable received for keeping himself and the garrison.

However, the footsoldiers hired to defend the pele of Lochmaben had to buy their victuals, totalling 485 quarters 3 bushels wheat and 11 barrels of flour, themselves. The 'knights of Annandale'<sup>81</sup> bought oats in lieu of their wages on two occasions, as did Sir Ralph fitz William.

On the other hand, Sir Robert Felton, constable of Lochmaben after Cantilupe, Sir Robert Clifford, Sir William Latimer, Sir Richard Siward, Sir Richard Mareschal, the bishop of Carlisle, Sir Simon Lindsay, Sir Hugh Multon and Sir Reginald Kirkpatrick

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<sup>80</sup> These were Sir Robert Cantilupe and Sir Robert Felton.

<sup>81</sup> These were Bruce of Annandale's men, Sir Humphrey Gardinis, Sir Hugh Mauleverer, Sir William Heriz and Sir Thomas Torthorald, with their combined retinues of 15 esquires [E101/7/20, m.2].

were all issued with various supplies as a gift from the king for their own personal use, presumably as a reward for their service on the Scottish march.

There was, therefore, no clear-cut rule for the issuing of supplies. The need to conserve hard cash, however, probably meant that most provisions were issued in lieu of wages, either on an individual basis, or through an arrangement with the garrison commander for all his men.

### *Abingdon's income*

Apart from the income gained from the sale of these victuals, which totalled around £589<sup>82</sup>, Master Richard Abingdon received around £675 from the wardrobe and the sheriffs of Cumberland and Westmorland. He also received a grand total of £23 13s.4d. from the issues of Annandale.

This is the first mention of issues collected by Edward's officials since the disruption of English control in 1297. Abingdon received this sum from Sir Robert Felton, John Luke and Henry Malton. Malton, who was probably a native of Carrick, was described as the steward of Annandale<sup>83</sup>. As such, he could perhaps be regarded as the only representative in Scotland of Bruce of Annandale, whose castle of Lochmaben, although a private one, had been garrisoned with English troops since 1298. However, there is no mention here of the lord of the area and it would seem that the elder Bruce received little or nothing from his rich lordship.

Abingdon also received much of the issues of the Carlisle area, although these were also used by Sir Robert Clifford, the captain of the garrisons in the south-west. The former received £175 from this source in this regnal year and the latter around £123<sup>84</sup>. Abingdon's total receipts thus came to £1287 and he spent £1122, which left him in credit by (but owing to the exchequer) £165.

### *Abingdon and the receivership*

On 23 September 1299 sir Richard Abingdon became a baron of the exchequer concerned with the auditing of all accounts coming to York. He still continued as receiver at Carlisle, but from mid-1300 Master James Dalilegh, took on more importance in the running of the store. By August 1300, Dalilegh himself had become receiver<sup>85</sup>.

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82 Even if hard cash did not change hands, Abingdon had effectively 'made' money since he did not have to pay out these amounts in wages.

83 C.D.S., ii, no.1115. In an inquiry relating to lands held by Scotsmen in England, the sheriff of Cumberland asserted that Malton held land from the son and heir of Patrick Trumpe (another Patrick), a tenant of the earl of Carrick [C.D.S., ii, p.172; no.1302].

84 E159/72, m.16, 78, 82.

85 C.P.R., 1292-1301, 438; see Chapter Five, p.144.

### Edward's expedition to Scotland:

Immediately after Edward's marriage to Margaret of France in September 1299, summonses were issued for a winter campaign in Scotland, a clear sign of the king's impatience to cross the Border. The muster was again to be in the east, but still with the intention of relieving Stirling castle. 16,000 footsoldiers were ordered to assemble at Newcastle and those receiving an individual summons at York by 24 November 1299<sup>86</sup>.

Edward, not surprisingly, found considerable difficulty in transmitting his enthusiasm for spending the winter in Scotland to the rest of his army and the muster date was postponed to 13 December 1299 at Berwick. This summons contained the addition that "if the footmen make difficulties about coming to him ... by reason of the bad money now current in the realm and of the present winter time, which is trying, to promise the men that the king will make them such gratuity beyond their fixed wages when they come to him as should content them in reason". Men were also to be supplied, as promised, by the clergy of the archbishopric of York<sup>87</sup>.

Clerks were sent out around 18 November 1299 to the counties of Northumberland, Yorkshire, Westmorland, Cumberland, Derbyshire, county Durham, Shropshire and Staffordshire to raise the footsoldiers. The northern counties, therefore, provided the bulk of Edward's army. Payments to these clerks stopped about a month later, after they had brought these footsoldiers to Berwick. In one case, however, sir William York, the clerk appointed to choose footsoldiers in the counties of Shropshire and Staffordshire, had to escort the £115 in his custody for their wages to these counties and then all the way back to York, "because the footsoldiers did not come at the king's command"<sup>88</sup>.

Sir John Droxford, the keeper of the wardrobe, was sent from the court at Darlington to join the treasurer and justiciar of Ireland and other members of the king's council at York, "to ordain for the providing of victuals to be sent to various places in Scotland and on other business"<sup>89</sup>. On 2 December Sir Walter Beauchamp, the steward, and Sir Thomas Bikenore also left the court at Darlington to go to Berwick to make arrangements for the king's arrival.

Edward duly arrived eleven days later, on 13 December 1299. However, a mere 2500 footsoldiers arrived at Berwick and the only recorded payments to cavalry were made to a force of less than forty men serving for only nine days under Sir John de St. John. A number of esquires also came to Berwick from Yorkshire, to gather knights and other freeholders at the king's request for the keeping of the Scottish march. They remained at Berwick under the command of Sir William Latimer, still captain of the

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<sup>86</sup> *Parl. Writs*, i, 323-5; *C.D.S.*, ii, no.1092.

<sup>87</sup> *C.C.R.*, 1296-1302, 372-4.

<sup>88</sup> *Lib. Quot.*, 208.

<sup>89</sup> *Lib. Quot.*, 55.

eastern garrisons, from 20 November to 24 December 1299<sup>90</sup>. It was clearly not feasible, given this low turnout, to continue further into Scotland.

The failure of this campaign, caused partly by political dissension over the usual English baronial request for confirmation of the charters and the general unpopularity of a winter expedition, must have been extremely frustrating to the victor of Falkirk. Much work remained to be done, and Edward knew how to do it. Nevertheless, circumstances very similar to those he experienced in September 1298 prevented not only progress being made but, far more importantly, the relief of Stirling castle, which was in imminent danger of falling to the Scots<sup>91</sup>. Although it could be argued that even the small force which did muster at Berwick might have helped to save Stirling, it is likely that Edward was not prepared to risk the possibility of defeat in battle, even for the sake of such an important castle. The Welsh bowmen, who were a prime factor in Edward's victory at Falkirk, were not summoned in large numbers on this occasion, perhaps because of problems with their loyalty during the summer campaign, but more likely because they had served in all three campaigns of 1297-8.

#### **Organisation of the march and the garrisons:**

Edward re-crossed the border on 1 January 1300<sup>92</sup>. However, various officials of the wardrobe and the household remained behind at Berwick. These included sir John Droxford, keeper of the wardrobe, Sir Walter Beauchamp, steward of the household, sir John Benstede, keeper of the counter-roll in the wardrobe and sir Ralph Manton, the cofferer. They were ordered to "organise fully the garrisons on the Scottish march and Edinburgh castle" and to arrange for ships to carry victuals hastily to Edinburgh from whence they would then also be distributed to the garrisons at Roxburgh and Jedburgh. This is a rather curious arrangement since it rendered three south-western castles dependent on the unreliable shipment of victuals up the Forth, not to mention the fact that Roxburgh and Jedburgh were a considerable land journey away from Edinburgh. In practice, however, the evidence suggests that these last two castles continued to be supplied direct from Berwick.

From 8 to 20 January 1300 these royal officials travelled between Berwick and Roxburgh, hearing the accounts of the various garrison commanders and assessing the victuals in their stores.

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90 Prestwich, *Edward 1*, 183-4; *Lib. Quot.*, 114.

91 Prestwich, *Edward I*, 483-4; *Guisborough*, 324, 328-9; see below, pp.117-8.

92 *Itin.*, 149.

### *Roxburgh*

The Roxburgh garrison, under its constable Sir Robert Hastings, was manned by another knight, 62 esquires (ordered by the king to stay in the garrison) together with 40 crossbowmen and 160 archers. Sir Robert had a total of 30 barrels of flour, 37 casks of wine, 40 steers and heifers, 597 salmon, 10 quarters of salt and 20 shafts for crossbows remaining in his store at the end of year 27 [19 November 1299]. These are reasonable totals, reflecting the fact that there was no campaign to be provided for in this year<sup>93</sup>.

### *Jedburgh*

Hastings' brother, Sir Richard, the constable of Jedburgh castle, had a garrison of 21 esquires, 20 crossbowmen and 80 archers. His store contained 70 quarters rye-wheat and wheat flour, 15 barrels of flour, 114 quarters of 'dredge' (barley and oats), 136 quarters of oats, 4 quarters of beans, 16 quarters of peas, 21 quarters of salt, 120 salted salmon and 26 barrels of wine left over from regnal year 27 [20 November 1298 - 19 November 1299]<sup>94</sup>.

### *Berwick town*

The Berwick town garrison was still extremely large at the end of 1299. On 25 December 1299, while the king was still at Berwick, Sir Robert fitz Roger was appointed keeper and governor of Northumberland and Berwick town, in place of Latimer. Since Fitz Roger was previously captain of the march<sup>95</sup> and there is no mention of anyone filling his place, he presumably now united the two offices.

Sir Philip Vernay, the keeper of the Berwick town garrison, remained there, but it appears that Sir Robert fitz Roger and Sir Walter Teye both had authority over him since the payment of wages by sir John Weston to the cavalry and foot in the garrisons was made by order of these two. Sir John Cambo<sup>96</sup>, Sir Montasini de Novelliano and Sir Thomas Banbury were the other knights in the garrison.

The rest of the garrison comprised 61 esquires, 1402 archers, 500 of whom were chosen from the footsoldiers in the army, 15 constables, 21 mercenaries, 6 serjeants-at-arms, 100 crossbowmen and 5 vintenarii<sup>97</sup>. This again amounted to a small standing army, to be used to reinforce the other south-eastern garrisons when necessary and to fend off any attack from the Scots.

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93 *Lib. Quot.*, 136, 151.

94 *Lib. Quot.*, 152.

95 *Lib. Quot.*, 139; see above, p.95.

96 This was Sir John Cambo of Edinburgh, rather than Sir John Cambo of Fife [see Chapter Sixteen, p.350].

97 *Lib. Quot.*, 145-8.



### *Berwick castle*

The Berwick castle garrison, therefore, had no need to be any great size. Sir John Burdon was constable and sheriff of the county, commanding 20 crossbowmen, 40 archers and 4 vintenarii. Payments were also made to a chaplain, a carpenter, a mason, a clerk of chapel, a watchman, a laundress and one [unnamed] Scottish hostage<sup>98</sup>.

There is no reference to stores for these two garrisons, suggesting that they were supplied directly from the royal store at Berwick.

The royal officials returned south after having completed their tour of inspection and ensured that the garrisons were as secure as possible. Sir Alexander Convers and sir William Rue, who were responsible for supplying the garrisons of Edinburgh, Dirleton and Stirling, also went with them to York to render their accounts at the exchequer<sup>99</sup>.

### *Dirleton*

Though Dirleton was a private castle, probably granted to Sir Robert Maudley after its capture by the English in 1298, Maudley and his men spent from 17 June to 8 September 1299 in the garrison of Berwick town. In recompense for this, Dirleton was provisioned from the royal store. This was not normally the case with private castles<sup>100</sup>.

### **The fall of Stirling castle:**

Sir Alexander Convers was also assigned to buy and purvey goods for Stirling castle and send them to the garrison there. John fitz Walter, the master of the *Godale* of Beverly, with a crew of six, was paid from 29 November to 24 December 1299 to take these goods from Newcastle to Berwick, and from there to the castle.

The Scots besieging the castle were massed in the Torwood, just south of Stirling. From there, the Guardians<sup>101</sup> sent a letter to King Edward on 13 November 1299, stating that they would agree to a truce through the mediation of King Philip of France, an offer which the English king was not yet inclined to take up. The most interesting aspect of this letter is perhaps the fact that it is sealed not by the Guardians in whose name it runs, but by Sir John Soules. Although Sir Gilbert Malherbe, the Scottish sheriff of Stirling, ultimately received the surrender of the English garrison in Stirling castle, it would seem likely that Soules had been in command of the Scottish force which had lain before the castle for the best part of 1299. This undoubtedly provided him with the most important qualification to become sole Guardian in 1301 - military success.

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98 *Lib. Quot.*, 149. Burdon appeared to be handing over the office of constable to Sir Hugh Audley in 1298 [see Chapter Two, p.?]. However, since this is the only reference to Audley as constable, Burdon had, in fact, probably remained in office.

99 *Lib. Quot.*, 51-55.

100 See Chapter Three, p.73; Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 401-2; see Chapter One, p.34.

101 That is, the bishop of St. Andrews, the earl of Carrick and Sir John Comyn, junior.

The Scots probably encountered numerous logistical problems in maintaining the siege. The usual period for unpaid military service in Scotland, as in England, was only forty days and thus large sums of money would have been required, as the siege dragged on, to pay the wages of those remaining in the army. Provisions would also have cost a considerable amount. It is most unfortunate that no official records have survived to provide evidence for how the Scottish administration managed its war, particularly since the English administration were quite unable to provide for its soldiers from Scottish resources.

Some time in December 1299, Ralph Kirkby, a clerk in Stirling castle, came to the king at York with three valets from the same castle to "reassure him of the state of the garrison." The valets, but not the clerk, then remained at York for 46 days during December and January 1300 before returning to the castle. It was then noted that Kirkby received the goods at Berwick carried in the *Godale*.

These supplies were very varied and included large quantities of fish, various luxuries such as cheeses and spices, kitchenware, crossbows and other equipment for engines and other defensive weaponry and cloth for the robes of the members of the garrison. There was a conspicuous absence of the usual foodstuffs such as wheat, oats and malt, which suggests either that the garrison was well-stocked with these basic supplies, or else was able to procure them from elsewhere<sup>102</sup>.

In January 1300, however, Kirkby again came from Stirling castle to York to inform the king of the surrender of the castle. It seems very strange that the castle should have surrendered so soon after being resupplied, which challenges the view that the garrison was starved into submission. Indeed, this evidence gives much credence to the story concerning the recapture of Stirling by Edward in 1304, when the king pardoned the garrison with the exception of the person who had earlier betrayed the castle to the Scots. The constable, John Sampson, handed the castle over to Gilbert Malherbe, the Scottish sheriff of Stirling<sup>103</sup>. His garrison totalled sixty-three, including four valets with covered horses and fifty-two esquires, valets of household and archers. On 18 January 1300 Sampson and his men arrived at Berwick, where they remained until 26 March<sup>104</sup>.

In 1305 an interesting petition was made in parliament at Westminster by one Eva of Stirling, relating to the time of the Scottish siege of Stirling, when she had:

" ... served the men of the king of England and brought them victuals and other things which she could purchase in the surrounding area to sustain those in the castle, who were the king's archers. And the said Eva was

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102 *Lib. Quot.*, 143-4.

103 *Lib. Quot.*, 157; *Flores*, ii, 118; *Rishangèr*, 388, 402; *Flores*, ii, 321; *Prestwich, Edward I*, 502; *C.D.S.*, ii, no.1949; *Barrow, Bruce*, 105.

104 *Lib. Quot.*, 143, 148.

accused of these things by the Scots who were holding siege there, taking her and putting her in prison, and she stayed there for ten weeks and at the end of these ten weeks they took her out of prison and made her forsake the land of Scotland, since when she has not dared come back to her native land and she calls all those whom she served in the castle, that is, the archers, as witness."

She asked to be resealed in 1 messuage and 3 acres of lands which she held in the town of Stirling<sup>105</sup>. It is therefore unwise to assume that all members of the local community would desert Edward at the approach of a Scottish army.

Eva's case also shows clearly that the Scottish siege of Stirling castle was extremely loose. Supplies could get through to the garrison, thereby enabling the English to hold on. The fact that a truce was arranged between the Scottish army and the English garrison before April 1299<sup>106</sup>, also suggests that the Scots did not occupy a completely commanding position. Certainly the successful reduction of this important castle attests more to the inability of the other English garrisons in Scotland to deal effectively with the threat to Stirling, rather than to the strength of the Scottish army and their siege equipment.

### Conclusions:

By 1299, the English administration of Scotland had settled down into a system based upon a receiver at Berwick and a receiver at Carlisle. Given that there were five English-held garrisons supplied from Berwick<sup>107</sup>, compared with only one from Carlisle<sup>108</sup>, the duties of the receiver at Berwick were now divided between Amersham, who controlled the money supplied from the exchequer at York, sir John Weston, who was responsible for issuing that money to the garrisons and sir Richard Bremesgraye, who looked after the victuals in the royal store there.

There is no question, however, that these developments were anything other than a reaction to the success of the Guardians in restricting English control to the south-east and isolated areas of Annandale. Edward's officials were clearly unable to administer in any peacetime meaning of the word. They could not collect the issues of the country, except for a small amount from Annandale; there was little or no administration of justice in general and property rights in particular. Their role was therefore restricted to maintaining control of the areas still in English hands and preparing for full-scale campaigns until the country was brought back firmly under Edward's rule.

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105 *Memo. de Parl.*, no.287.

106 See above, pp.92-3.

107 These were Berwick, Jedburgh, Roxburgh, Edinburgh and Stirling.

108 This was Lochmaben. Dumfries does not seem to have received supplies in this year.

The fall of Stirling castle is the most extreme example of the impotence of English forces in Scotland. Nevertheless, there was not a single English garrison that did not experience the threat, at least, of a Scottish attack in 1299, and the year was spent primarily in strengthening defences.

However, the capture of Stirling, undoubtedly a tremendous coup, was also a most unusual success. The Scots threatened, but could not move, the English from Berwick, Roxburgh, Stirling, Edinburgh and Lochmaben. Thus, even though Sir Ingram d'Umfraville was appointed the Scottish sheriff of Roxburgh, his administrative authority, as opposed to the military threat that he undoubtedly posed to the English sheriff, was limited by the fact that Sir Robert Hastangs sat in Roxburgh castle.

In many respects 1299 was still a low-point for the English administration in Scotland. They held only one more castle in 1299 than they had done in the dark days of 1297 and early 1298, namely Lochmaben in the west, but then lost strategically-important Stirling. If the English could not break out of these narrow confines imposed upon them by the Scots, then Edward would soon have to admit that he had an administration of Scotland in name only.

### PART THREE

1300 at last saw the English making headway against the Scots, particularly in the west. Firstly, Sir John de St. John, appointed as warden of the western march in January 1300, proved to be an extremely valuable and effective officer. However, the main reason behind this English success was simply the fact that Edward managed to bring an army to Scotland. Though the reduction of Caerlaverock was its only major achievement, this campaign, coupled with the institution of a garrison at Dumfries earlier in the year and the building of a pele there in September, ended the isolation, and hence vulnerability, of the English garrison at Lochmaben. The sheriffdom of Dumfries now became truly part of the English-occupied zone, although Galloway itself remained unconquered.

The south-east also saw some action in 1300. An expedition to Selkirk Forest was a priority, since the Scots were still able to find a base there. As with Galloway, however, success was limited.

Such activities naturally meant that the primary task of Edward's administrators in Scotland was still to provide for English troops in the garrisons, and, more taxingly, to cope with the demands of an army.

With regard to the search for evidence of a more 'normal' administration, there is a reference in 1300 to a treasurer of Scotland. It would seem that sir Ralph Manton, the king's cofferer, who began to play a prominent role in Scottish affairs in this year, acted effectively, though not officially, as treasurer of Scotland and may have been regarded as such at the time.

The Scots were also primarily concerned with the south-west, particularly Galloway. However, despite their unimpressive military efforts in this year - and an indication that traditional warfare was again insufficient to bring Edward the success he desired - the English king was forced to grant the Guardians the first general truce of the war.

## CHAPTER FIVE

## EXPANSION, PART 1

1300

**The Scottish siege of Bothwell castle:**

At some point after the end of the war in 1304, Stephen Brampton, the English constable of Bothwell, sought recompense for his experiences in Edward's service during the war. According to Brampton's petition, the garrison at Bothwell were besieged by the Scots for fourteen months, whereafter the constable and his few surviving men languished for three years in a Scottish prison<sup>1</sup>.

Given that the Scots at last succeeded in reducing Stirling castle around January 1300, it seems most likely that they then continued on to Bothwell. The two sieges could have taken place concurrently, but, given the strength of these castles, it is improbable that the Scottish army was large enough to be divided into two forces of sufficient sizes to conduct both sieges. Even so, the ability of the Scottish leaders to keep together an army sufficient to reduce Stirling and then Bothwell is quite remarkable.

If the siege of Bothwell was begun in January/February of 1300, then it was over by April 1301, around the time that Edward was planning his campaign to Scotland for that year. The news of its reduction was to have a great effect on these plans since Bothwell's recapture was a major feature of that campaign.

**The wardenship of the western march: *Sir John de St. John***

On 5 January 1300 the issue of the wardenship of the western march was finally settled with the appointment of Sir John de St. John to the office. Like Clifford, the area over which his jurisdiction extended was much greater than that which had originally been granted to Sir Henry Percy<sup>2</sup>. St. John was now captain and king's lieutenant "over all the men-at-arms and all affairs of arms, both of cavalry and infantry" in the

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<sup>1</sup> C.D.S., ii, no.1867.

<sup>2</sup> See Chapter One, p.30.

sheriffdoms of Cumberland, Westmorland, and Lancaster, in Annandale itself and the whole Scottish march as far as the western boundary of the sheriffdom of Roxburgh, which marked the beginning of the jurisdiction of the warden of the eastern march, Sir Robert fitz Roger. However, it should be remembered that the western march was far from firmly controlled by the English and in 1300 there was also a Scottish keeper of the western march, Sir Adam Gordon<sup>3</sup>.

St. John was also given certain confidential instructions. On 25 September 1300, having presumably fulfilled these instructions, the new warden was paid £413 12s. for "secret expenses made by him by order of the king and council at New Minster on 5 January [1300]"<sup>4</sup>. These "secret expenses" were most likely incurred during attempts to establish English control effectively throughout the areas under St. John's jurisdiction. As with the Scots, the element of secrecy, and therefore surprise, was an extremely effective weapon in this war.

Sir John de St. John was an extremely good choice as warden of the western march. Although a soldier, like Surrey and Clifford, he was also a proven administrator. Most recently he had served as Edward's lieutenant in Aquitaine, during the period when the English king's relations with his feudal superior, the king of France, were at their worst. On the outbreak of war between England and France in 1294, St. John had been sent to the duchy at the head of the first contingents, along with the king's nephew, John of Brittany. Unfortunately, the main contingents were unable to follow, due to the outbreak of rebellion in Wales in the same year, and St. John and Brittany had to do the best they could in the circumstances. They were remarkably successful, capturing several French garrisons before the French counter-offensive reduced their control to Bourq and Blaye in the north and Bayonne in the south.

In 1296 reinforcements under Edmund of Lancaster and the earl of Lincoln at last arrived from England. Unfortunately the element of surprise which had worked to the English advantage in 1294, was no longer with them and little was achieved. Most seriously, in January 1297, the army, divided into three battalions under St. John, John of Brittany and the earl of Lincoln, was attacked by the French while engaged in a revictualling expedition. St. John and many other knights in his battalion were captured. As a result primarily of the English king's lack of credit-worthiness, Edward was unable to raise the £5000 ransom required for St. John's release until 1298. The latter, and John of Brittany, returned to England in time to join Edward for the Falkirk campaign<sup>5</sup>.

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3 *C.D.S.*, ii, no.1169.

4 *Lib. Quot.*, 183.

5 Prestwich, *Edward I*, 381-5, 533; J.E. Morris, *The Welsh Wars of Edward I*, 291.

Sir John de St. John was not only competent, however: Guisborough states that his rule of the duchy had been a popular one<sup>6</sup>. A man of this calibre was sorely needed in Scotland, where Edward's officials were often either uninterested or too efficient on behalf of their master to endear themselves to the native population. In addition, although St. John's jurisdiction only supposedly covered the western march, it is clear, in the following years, that he actually occupied the position of royal lieutenant of all of Scotland under English control.

### *Sir Robert Clifford*

Sir Robert Clifford, warden of the western march from 25 November 1298 until August 1299, remained in Edward's service in Scotland. An indenture of 2 January 1300 arranged for him to stay in St. John's company with thirty men-at-arms until 24 June 1300. He was to be paid the considerable sum of 500 marks for this period<sup>7</sup>. This suggests that he had required some persuasion to stay, perhaps because he had already spent considerable sums of his own money as warden. Clifford was also allowed to station himself and his men in the houses that he had had built in the new pele of Lochmaben "without dispute from anyone".

The defence of Lochmaben was the most important consideration, however. Clifford was allowed to go off on his own affairs:

"... if they are pressing; but this is with the permission of the captain [that is, St. John] and he is to leave his number of men-at-arms and a sufficient man with them who will be attentive and obedient to the regulations and commands of the captain."

It was also agreed that:

"... if said Robert cannot maintain his number of men until the aforesaid term, that said Robert (whenever he discovers his inability and it shall be certified by the captain) may freely depart from thence or diminish his number, provided that a corresponding deduction be made in his payment proportional to the time when he shall leave or diminish his men-at-arms."<sup>8</sup>

As far as Clifford was concerned, these were very fair terms. However, from the point of view of Edward and the new warden, the defence of the march required men-at-arms both of good quality and relative enthusiasm. There was little point in forcing service out of those whose morale was already at a low ebb. It was St. John's duty to ensure that his

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<sup>6</sup> *Guisborough*, 245.

<sup>7</sup> It should be noted that Sir Henry Percy had been awarded a total of 1000 marks per annum whilst warden of the march [see Chapter One, p.37] and presumably Clifford was paid the same in that office. The 500 marks which he was to receive for the period from 2 January to 24 June 1300 is, therefore, the same amount as he would have been paid as warden.

<sup>8</sup> Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 407-8.



company was an effective fighting force, despite the difficulties in providing both wages and food supplies.

### **Military preparations:**

Certainly the English in the west were still preparing to deal with the Scottish rebels by force of arms. At the same time as they were informed of the appointment of the new warden [5 January 1300], the men now under St. John's jurisdiction on both sides of the border were ordered "to hold themselves in readiness to be at Carlisle, properly appointed, within eight days of their summons"<sup>9</sup>.

There is, unfortunately, no direct evidence for Scottish activities at this time, although a siege of Bothwell has been inferred. On 14 February 1300 the king, at Westminster, gave offerings in the chapel "because of good" - but unfortunately undefined - "rumours in Scotland", suggesting that the English garrisons were engaged on successful expeditions against the Scots. It was most probably the activities of St. John which produced this outburst of royal piety<sup>10</sup>.

The next day, 15 February 1300, St. John was ordered to keep at the king's wages twenty or thirty men-at-arms (presumably in addition to Clifford's thirty) and as many hobelars as he thought necessary<sup>11</sup>. The use of hobelars, still an unusual occurrence outside Ireland, must have been envisaged as potentially useful in establishing English control throughout the difficult terrain of Galloway.

### **An English offensive in the west:**

On 1 March it is clear that the new warden had been ordered to begin a military offensive against the Scots in the areas of Scotland under his jurisdiction. The receiver at Carlisle, Master Richard Abingdon, was ordered to make preparations for this offensive. If St. John managed to capture any castles, or if they surrendered voluntarily, and the warden thought that it was advisable to place an English garrison in them, the receiver was to cover the costs of provisioning these castles with men, victuals and equipment<sup>12</sup>. It is not inconceivable that Bothwell castle, currently under siege by the Scottish army, was one of the targets against which St. John was directed.

The men under St. John's jurisdiction, who had been ordered on 5 January 1300 to be ready to muster at Carlisle within eight days, were presumably summoned under these orders around the beginning of March for this expedition. Certainly St. John and Abingdon were given power on 1 March "to distrain, punish and amerce all persons who

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9 C.P.R., 1292-1301, 484.

10 *Lib. Quot.*, 28; see below, pp.125-6.

11 C.P.R., 1292-1301, 490.

12 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 409-10.

do not obey the summons of the said John to come to the defence of the marches and go against the enemy"<sup>13</sup>.

### *Dumfries*

There are no records of the activities of St. John's expedition, but one success can certainly be inferred. On 11 March 1300 offerings were made in the chapel of Berwick castle, presumably by the chancellor of Scotland and other royal officials at Berwick, "because of good rumours heard from Scotland". Less than two weeks later, on 24 March 1300, the royal castle of Dumfries was granted to Sir John Dolive. It is likely that these "good rumours" referred to the capture of Dumfries. Certainly the time-scale between the news arriving at Berwick on 11 March, and the appointment of Dolive by the king at Westminster on 24 March, presumably on reception of the news, fits this scenario<sup>14</sup>.

There are very few references to St. John's activities thereafter. On 22 April, Sir Thomas Borhunte, one of the warden's knights, arrived at Westminster, having come "hastily from parts of Scotland" as a messenger from his master. There is no indication as to what news he brought, but it was presumably not good. However, a week later, on 30 April, another messenger arrived from St. John, "to reassure him [the king] of the state of the march"<sup>15</sup>. At least Edward would know that his new warden was active.

### **Lack of supplies on the western march:**

The English in the west were certainly suffering from a lack of victuals. On 2 May 1300 Edward wrote to his treasurer regarding the purveyance which had been ordered for the royal expedition. The king had heard from Sir John de St. John that the victuals in the store at Carlisle had almost gone and the treasurer was therefore to arrange immediately for the purveyance, due from Ireland by 24 June for this campaign, to be sent as quickly as possible to Carlisle<sup>16</sup>.

The Scots were also still engaged in the war of attrition against the English garrisons, attacking their lines of supply and thus aggravating the situation caused by the lack of victuals. At some point during regnal year 28 [20 November 1299 - 19 November 1300] two carts and seven horses were abducted by the Scots whilst on their way from Silloth, on the coast west of Carlisle, to Lochmaben with a consignment of wine<sup>17</sup>. This is more likely to have occurred earlier in the year, before the arrival of the king and his

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<sup>13</sup> See above, p.125; *C.P.R.*, 1292-1301, 491.

<sup>14</sup> *Lib. Quot.*, 31; Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 360-5; *Itin.*, 152.

<sup>15</sup> *Lib. Quot.*, 160, 161.

<sup>16</sup> *C.D.S.*, v, no.218. The victuals in the store had come from the Irish purveyance of the previous year [see Chapter Four, pp.109-110].

<sup>17</sup> *Lib. Quot.*, 129.

army in the west, since the large English presence would have made it more hazardous to make raids in this area.

**The eastern march - lack of supplies, change of personnel and another expedition:**

Sir Robert Fitz Roger had been appointed warden of the eastern march in place of Sir William Latimer in December 1299. Fitz Roger's position as captain and lieutenant of Northumberland and of the garrisons of Berwick and Wark was confirmed on 1 March 1300. However, supplies were also low in the east: "...since it is necessary to have come to Berwick a great store of victuals and other things needed for the support of the men who are staying there and elsewhere in our service for the keeping and defence of the said marches"<sup>18</sup>.

On 30 April Fitz Roger's contract as warden ran out and the king ordered that he was to be persuaded to stay until 23 December 1300. He was, in fact, paid as warden only up to 23 June 1300. No replacement was appointed until around 29 September 1300, when Sir William Latimer was once more described as the keeper of Berwick town and the warden of the march<sup>19</sup>.

The arrangement on the eastern march, whereby Fitz Roger, as warden, was also captain of the garrisons at Berwick and Wark, had therefore come to an end by 30 June 1300. On that date, Sir Walter Teye was made keeper of Berwick town. It is possible that Teye had been acting in this capacity for as long as Fitz Roger had been warden of the eastern march since both Teye and Fitz Roger had ordered the payment of troops in the Berwick garrisons in December 1299<sup>20</sup>. There is clearly little consistency in the arrangements made for keeping the march, caused primarily by the lack of men willing and able to serve there.

Expeditions against the Scots were also not confined to the western march. 'Rebel' forces in the south-east, perhaps under the command of Sir Ingram d'Umfraville, the Scottish sheriff of Roxburgh, and Sir Robert Keith, the Scottish warden of Selkirk forest, were still active in the area and an expedition was made against them in April 1300. A skirmish took place at Hawick, where a total of five horses belonging to various members of the south-eastern garrisons were killed<sup>21</sup>.

**Scottish activities: a parliament at Rutherglen**

However, references to the activities of the Guardians in 1300 show that the primary area of interest for the Scots was still the south-west and Galloway in particular. Sir John Kingston, the constable of Edinburgh castle, once again provided this

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18 See Chapter Four, p.116; Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 410-12.

19 E159/73, m.26; *Lib. Quot.*, 139.

20 See Chapter Four, p.116.

21 *Lib. Quot.*, 151-152, 178-179.

information, this time to sir Ralph Manton, the royal cofferer, who was becoming increasingly involved in Scottish affairs. The news was worrying for the English government. On 10 May 1300 the Scots held a parliament at Rutherglen. The ability of the Guardians to hold a parliament so far south was concrete proof to Edward that his was not the only administration in Scotland, and arguably the less successful.

However, the rest of Kingston's information contained the welcome news of yet another major argument among the Scottish nobles, springing from essentially the same cause as the one at Peebles. The bishop of St. Andrews and Sir John Comyn, both Guardians, were the protagonists in this quarrel, but it seems likely that this was another outbreak of the Bruce/Comyn feud. The bishop was supported by the Steward and the earl of Atholl, both traditionally Bruce supporters. The quarrel supposedly began because:

"Sir John Comyn said that he no longer wished to be guardian of the kingdom with the bishop and others agreed and they chose Sir Ingram d'Umfraville to be one of the guardians of the kingdom, in place of the earl of Carrick".

The resignation or exclusion of Carrick from the office of Guardian is shrouded in mystery. It is not even possible to ascertain whether Bruce was present at this parliament. In any event, Sir Ingram d'Umfraville, a strong Balliol-Comyn supporter, was instituted as Guardian, along with Bishop Lamberton and Sir John Comyn.

### *The earl of Buchan in Galloway*

Of perhaps more interest to the English, however, was the news that the earl of Buchan was not present at the parliament because "he was away in Galloway to treat with the Gallovidians". The Scottish parliament was therefore adjourned until 17 December, to be held in the same place, "on which day the earl of Buchan and all the great Scotsmen will be there with their power"<sup>22</sup>.

The Gallovidians had a tradition of antipathy towards the rest of Scotland and resisted any attempts by the kings of Scots to interfere with their separate laws and customs. Thus, though they joined Wallace during his raids on northern England, their presence was less inspired by patriotism than a traditional interest in such warfare. Edward himself had recognised the uses to which this separatism might be put and, in 1296, had released Thomas of Galloway, illegitimate son of the last Celtic lord of Galloway, issuing a charter of liberties at the same time. As a result, Galloway's important families - mainly the MacCans and the Macdoualls - could be found supporting

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<sup>22</sup> C.D.S., v, no.220; G.O. Sayles, 'The Guardians of Scotland and a Parliament at Rutherglen in 1300, S.H.R., xxiv, 246-50.

Edward in the following decade, though, as we have seen, it cannot be said that the English controlled this inaccessible part of the country.

The fight for Galloway was, therefore, equally important to the Scots as it was to the English and may perhaps have symbolised a lot more, particularly to the Comyns, since most of the Balliol demesne lands had been held there. The Bruce lands of Annandale<sup>23</sup>, together with the rest of Dumfriesshire, were now more or less under English control. The capture of Caerlaverock, which had been planned as far back as August 1299, with the making of siege-engines for that purpose, would finally secure these areas for Edward.

On the other hand, if Galloway remained outwith English control, the Scots would still have a base from which to attack the English garrisons in the rest of the south-west.

### The campaign of 1300:

With these factors in mind, and the on-going situation in the south-east, English activities in 1300 were intended to resolve problems in three main areas:

- 1) Caerlaverock
- 2) Galloway
- 3) Selkirk Forest

### Purveyance:

The existence of the *Liber Quotidianus* for regnal year 28 [20 November 1299 - 19 November 1300] means that the arrangements made both for the campaign itself and for the English garrisons in Scotland can be examined in detail. **Table 4** shows the amounts of purveyance demanded by Edward on 17 January 1300, due to arrive at Berwick by 24 June 1300. The figures shown in bold indicate the amounts which actually arrived<sup>24</sup>.

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23 Though these Bruce lands belonged to Robert Bruce, senior, and not the earl of Carrick, the latter had certainly taken an interest in them in the past few years [see Chapter Three, p.77].

24 C.D.S., ii, no.1128; *Lib. Quot.*, 106-114; 130-1.

## Victuals

**Table 4: Purveyance - a comparison between what was ordered and what actually arrived**

County	Wheat	Oats	Malt	Beans & Peas
Lincolnshire	1000 qr 981 qr 3 bz	1000 qr 1000 qr	1000 qr 1014 qr	500 qr 500 qr
Norfolk & Suffolk	1500 qr 700 qr	1200 qr 1000 qr	1000 qr 1000 qr	200 qr 200 qr
Essex & Hereford	500 qr 420 qr	500 qr 525 qr		
Nottingham & Derby	500 qr 118 qr	300 qr	300 qr	
Cambridge & Huntingdon	1000 qr 583 qr 4 bz	1000 qr 500 qr	500 qr 500 qr	
Lancaster	200 qr	1000 qr		
Bailiff of Holderness	600 qr 316 qr	500 qr 226 qr	500 qr 136 qr	63 qr.
Justice of Chester ( <i>sent to Carlisle</i> )	300 qr 265 qr 4 bz	1000 qr 692 qr 3 bz		
<b>Total</b>	5600 qr 3384 qr 2 bz	6500 qr 3943 qr 3 bz	3300 qr 2650 qr 3 bz	700 qr 763 qr

\* qr = quarters bz = bushels

In addition, the county of Westmorland was to send 300 quarters of oats to Carlisle by Christmas day and the bailiff of Yarmouth was to send 500 quarters of salt. If any purveyance was sent from Westmorland, it is not recorded in the accounts for this regnal year. However, 345 quarters of salt were indeed sent from Yarmouth.

Purveyance also came from counties which were not asked to contribute. Yorkshire collected 505 quarters of wheat, 27 quarters of malt, 35 quarters of fish and 262 quarters 4 bushels of oats. The Isle of Wight provided 365 quarters of wheat, 100 quarters of barley and 35 quarters of oats<sup>25</sup>.

<sup>25</sup> Lib Quot., 133-4.

The large-scale purveyance<sup>26</sup> of victuals was always unpopular but, after four years of war in Scotland, it was becoming extremely difficult in certain areas to collect the amounts demanded. On 2 May 1300 Edward wrote to the treasurer at York, informing the latter that the 1000 quarters of wheat, 1000 quarters of oats and 500 quarters of malt ordered from the counties of Cambridge and Huntingdon had not been collected because the sheriff of these counties "has scarcely anything in his hands with which he could make this purveyance".

The collection of these victuals was imperative, however, because a "lack of victuals on this journey that we wish to embark on in Scotland would place us in the hands of our enemies or force us to return hastily." The treasurer was therefore to make arrangements for the purveyance to be made "to the least grievance of the people". As can be seen in Table 4, the amounts which arrived from Cambridge and Huntingdon were, with the exception of the oats, only half of those demanded. This was comparatively low, giving credence to the sheriff's complaint that he had nothing to make purveyance with.

The king also informed the treasurer of the state of the store at Carlisle where the victuals "are nearly all used up", according to Sir John de St. John. Purveyance from Ireland was to be ordered immediately to remedy this situation<sup>27</sup>.

Though the amounts of purveyance collected clearly fell short of the amounts demanded, this was to be expected. They were most certainly a vast improvement on the amount of provisions on which Edward's army had to survive during the last campaign in 1298<sup>28</sup>.

### *Land transport*

Carts and cart-horses were required for the transportation of these goods from their place of collection in each county to the port from which they would be shipped to Berwick or Carlisle, and thereafter from the royal store to their final destination. Purveyance was therefore also made of carts and horses and the equipment which they required, as shown in Table 5<sup>29</sup>.

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26 That is, for feeding both the royal household and a royal army, as opposed to the small-scale purveyance for the household alone which had long been accepted as a royal right.

27 E159/73, m.16.

28 See Chapter Three, p74.

29 *Lib. Quot.*, 105-6; 127-8; 132; 135-6.

**Table 5: Purveyance of carts, horses and equipment**

County	carts	horses	horse-shoes	nails	cart-clouts	nails
Bedford & Buckingham	10	30	403 qr	4,900	97	1800
Norfolk & Suffolk	1	3	1300	10,000		
Lincoln	8	24	4000	40,000	442	2000
Yorkshire	7	21	2700	40,000		
Northampton	5	12	1600	16,100		
Total	31	101	9600 403 qr	11,000	539	3800

Most of these carts, horses and equipment were sent to Carlisle, as would be expected, given that the greater part of the purveyance also went there to feed the royal army.

#### The army:

The writs for feudal service had been sent out at the end of December 1299<sup>30</sup> although only the earl of Gloucester, Sir Hugh Despenser and Sir John Hastings actually performed this service in person: "the majority of great men appear simply to have detached some members of their retinue to do it on their behalf, even when they were themselves present on campaign". The old feudal quotas were to be added to by as many men-at-arms as the magnates could provide. This, in fact, produced between 600 and 700 men, together with some 850 men-at-arms belonging or attached to the royal household.

A total of 16,000 footsoldiers from Nottingham, Derby and 'the four most northerly counties' were summoned to the muster at Carlisle, but only about 9,000 were actually recruited by the commissioners of array. The Welsh were excused "because of all the great work which they have done in our service in the past"<sup>31</sup>. Given the evidence for that service in 1298 alone, there is no justification for believing that this was anything other than the truth. A small contingent of Irish soldiers, numbering around 360, was also present at the siege of Caerlaverock "and joined the king in his aimless marching through Galloway"<sup>32</sup>. Edward had requested the services of 300 Irish hobelars, whose

<sup>30</sup> *Parl. Writs*, i, 327.

<sup>31</sup> Prestwich, *Edward I*, 484-5.

<sup>32</sup> J. Lydon, 'The Years of Crisis, 1254-1315', in *A New History of Ireland*, ii, 199.



suitability for the Scottish terrain he had noted in 1299. However, a maximum of only fourteen hobelars actually served<sup>33</sup>.

Edward was already facing serious problems with the recruitment of footsoldiers to his Scottish armies. The men of the northern counties were extremely unwilling to serve "for they were afraid to leave their homes lest they should be devastated by retaliating raiders". The men of Durham and Yorkshire "constantly mutinied and deserted". Only the counties of Lancashire, Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire, and, to a limited extent, Chester and Shropshire "seem to have been properly organised and good fighters, and willing to keep the field for more than a few days"<sup>34</sup>.

By 1300 the role of the fleet was becoming more regular, due to the pressing need for ships to transport victuals for both the army and the garrisons. A total of fifty-three boats of varying sizes, provided primarily by the Cinque Ports, were employed in this year<sup>35</sup>.

#### **Participation of garrison members in the campaign:**

Edward arrived in Carlisle on 27 June 1300, reaching Caerlaverock on 9 July<sup>36</sup>. The *Liber Quotidianus Garderobae*, containing a complete set of wardrobe accounts for regnal year 28 [20 November 1299 - 19 November 1300], gives an exact record of the number of soldiers from garrisons who joined the army for this campaign and it is thus worth investigating this contribution in more detail.

Only four garrisons - Berwick town, Roxburgh, Jedburgh and Lochmaben - provided men for Edward's army, but the numbers involved are surprisingly large.

#### *Jedburgh*

Jedburgh, as the smallest garrison, contributed the fewest men. Six valets served in the army from 4 July to 14 November 1300, with a further five serving up to 25 September (though one of those dropped out on 20 September). This entailed a decrease in numbers from twenty-one men-at-arms to ten men-at-arms in the garrison itself<sup>37</sup>. No footsoldiers were taken from the Jedburgh garrison.

#### *Roxburgh*

On 4 July a total of thirty-one valets left the Roxburgh garrison and, on 10 July, one hundred and three archers also headed west for the army. Twenty of these valets

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33 J. Lydon, 'Irish Levies in the Scottish Wars, 1296-1302', *Irish Sword*, v, 208.

34 J.E. Morris, *The Welsh Wars of Edward I*, 296.

35 See Chapter Ten, p.265.

36 *Itin.*, 158.

37 *Lib. Quot.*, 223, 231; *C.D.S.*, v, no.272.

remained with Edward until 14 November, while the other men-at-arms left between 19 August and 5 October.

The archers, under their constable, Adam Carbonel<sup>38</sup>, were paid up to 25 August. Their numbers decreased gradually over that period from one hundred and three to ninety-three and it would seem likely, since they were a single company of archers under one constable, that such a reduction was caused by death or desertion, rather than a return to the garrison or involvement in other expeditions.

The departure of these men meant a drop in men-at-arms at Roxburgh from fifty-seven to twenty-six and in archers from one hundred and sixty to fifty-seven, a considerable reduction<sup>39</sup>. Though this implies that the English did not greatly fear a Scottish attack in the south-east, to draw attention away from the south-west, this was undoubtedly a dangerous state in which to leave any garrison since there was no guarantee in these years that the Scots would not be active in any part of southern Scotland.

### *Berwick town*

On 18 July eleven valets left Berwick, followed by nine constables with 732 archers on 23 July. This small number of men-at-arms was augmented by the departure for the army of a further nine valets throughout August and September. Thirteen out of this total of twenty valets remained until 14 November, while the rest left the army from 14 August onwards<sup>40</sup>.

The footsoldiers were paid until 10 September, by which time they had been reduced to six constables and 456 archers. The biggest reduction came on 26 August, however, when the numbers dropped from ten constables with 783 archers to five constables with 455 archers<sup>41</sup>. There was, therefore, a considerable movement of troops both to and from the army and it is most likely that these fluctuations in numbers were caused primarily by the removal of troops elsewhere, either back to Berwick, or on an expedition outwith the main army.

Berwick town's main contribution was, therefore, footsoldiers rather than men-at-arms. As a comparison of the numbers in the garrison before and after these contingents left for the army, it was recorded that, for the period up to 10 July 1300, there were 96 men-at-arms, 95 crossbowmen with 5 vintenarii and 1400 archers with 14 constables. For

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38 Carbonel left Roxburgh as one of the valets but was retained as a constable of these archers between 10 July and 25 August. His pay should thus have been halved from 12d. to 6d., however.

39 *Lib. Quot.*, 140-151; 220-223; 243.

40 *Lib. Quot.*, 221, 230, 251. It should be noted that these 9 constables should have had 900 archers with them, but in reality there were only 732 [*Lib. Quot.*, 148].

41 *Lib. Quot.*, 255, 257.

the period 11 July to 29 September, the Berwick garrison contained 5 knights, 47 esquires, 4 constables with 400 archers and 5 vintenarii with 95 crossbowmen<sup>42</sup>.

### *Lochmaben*

On 7 July four constables with 400 archers joined the king, along with five hobelars. In addition, one valet and three crossbowmen left on the same date and were assigned to the prince of Wales's company. On 10 July a total of seven valets and another hobelar also left the garrison. As with Berwick town, a second supply of men-at-arms, numbering eight valets, joined the army on 21 September.

Further contingents of footsoldiers were also sent to the army, shortly after the departure of the first 400, reaching a peak total of 5 constables and 508 archers between 16 and 22 July. By 25 August, the date of the last payment, there were still 5 constables but only 433 archers with the king<sup>43</sup>. Again, since the constables remained the same, this suggests that death or desertion had taken its toll, rather than reorganisation and redeployment.

There are, unfortunately, no records at all for the number of footsoldiers in Lochmaben during the summer of 1300 to compare the before and after figures. However, a total of six knights and fifteen esquires remained in the garrison from 8 July to 19 November under the command of Sir Roger Kirkpatrick, who was appointed keeper of Lochmaben while Sir John de St. John was absent with the king<sup>44</sup>.

### *Conclusions*

The above figures give the following **maximum** totals for the numbers from English garrisons serving in Edward's campaign of 1300:

men-at-arms (including constables)	93
hobelars	5
crossbowmen	3
archers	1394
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	1495

It is clear, therefore, that the garrisons from which these men were drawn were seriously reduced in strength. The south-eastern garrisons lost a total of 849 men from their defence. It is interesting to note the small number of crossbowmen withdrawn for the army, suggesting that these footsoldiers were regarded as vital to the defence of a castle. Conversely, the archers were important to the army.

<sup>42</sup> *Lib. Quot.*, 146-7.

<sup>43</sup> *Lib. Quot.* 231-2; 247-256.

<sup>44</sup> *Lib. Quot.*, 140.

Although the main areas of contention were currently in the south-west, there was still a threat to those in the south-east from Scots operating from Selkirk Forest and the removal of so many men, although no doubt necessary, left these garrisons much more vulnerable.

### **The siege of Caerlaverock:**

Edward and his army reached Caerlaverock on 9 July 1300<sup>45</sup>. According to the contemporary poem, *The Siege of Caerlaverock*, a total of '3000 brave men-at-arms' massed before the castle<sup>46</sup>. The army was divided into four squadrons: the first was led by the earl of Lincoln; the second by the earl of Surrey; the third by the king himself; and the fourth by the prince of Wales<sup>47</sup>. Present in the army were a number of knights, both Scottish and English, who featured prominently in Edward's administration, notably Sir Henry Percy, Sir William Ros, Sir Robert Clifford, earl Patrick of Dunbar, Sir Richard Siward, Sir Simon Fraser, Sir John de St. John, Sir William Latimer and Sir Alexander Balliol<sup>48</sup>.

The siege got underway after the arrival of the navy - 'fortunately', according to the poet - with engines and provisions, again proving that little could be done without supplies. The foot then began to advance against the castle. However, despite the stirring account of the brave exploits of these footsoldiers and the men-at-arms, it was the skill of the engineers, who bombarded the castle with a constant stream of fire, which brought about the submission of the garrison. The Scots apparently held out for a day and a night and until the following day at terce, but the mounting casualties and the fact that the roof of the castle had fallen in persuaded them to give up. Around sixty men survived the siege, to be rewarded, apparently, with a new robe each, though there is no record evidence for this<sup>49</sup>. There is a curious reference in this text to the garrison as 'the people of the lady of the castle'<sup>50</sup>, but there is no further reference to this lady, nor any clues as to her identity.

### **The south-west: Skirmishes with the Scots; capture of Sir Robert Keith and others**

The only other achievement of any note occurred during various skirmishes with the Scots along the southern Galloway coast. Between 6 and 9 August, the English at the mouth of the river Fleet, presumably foraging for food, were harassed by the Scots and a

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45 *Itin.*, 158.

46 *Roll of Caerlaverock*, 26.

47 *Roll of Caerlaverock*, 2, 6, 9, 18.

48 *Roll of Caerlaverock*, 2, 8, 11, 14-15, 18, 25.

49 *Roll of Caerlaverock*, 27-35.

50 *Roll of Caerlaverock*, 32.

number of horses, including one belonging to a member of the Berwick town garrison and one belonging to a certain Piers Gaveston, were killed<sup>51</sup>.

The Scots came off worst, however. Sir Robert Keith, Sir Thomas Soules<sup>52</sup>, Robert Baird, William Charteris and Laurence Ramsay were all captured and the king rejoiced that some of 'his worst enemies' were now in an English jail. The order for their imprisonment in Carlisle castle was given on 10 August. They arrived on 18 August and remained there until 27 September, whereafter, despite alterations to render their prison more secure, they were split up and removed to castles further south, away from the Border<sup>53</sup>.

After the skirmish involving Keith, the Scots moved further west and faced the English from the other side of the Cree. The three Scottish cavalry brigades were, according to Rishanger, commanded by Buchan, Comyn of Badenoch and d'Umfraville. In an action reminiscent of Falkirk, they fled, somewhat ignominiously, losing many horses, when the English, also in three brigades under the earl of Hereford, Edward himself, and his son, Edward of Caernarvon, eventually crossed the river. The lack of Welsh troops and hobelars, used to moving in rough terrain, prevented the English from inflicting greater damage on the Scottish forces<sup>54</sup>.

### *Galloway still not subdued*

However, despite the presence of Edward and his army in Scotland and the lack of military prowess exhibited once more by the Scottish nobility, Galloway was still not brought under English control. Edward's intention, after despatching the Scottish army, appears to have been to travel north-west, since sir Ralph Manton was sent to Carlisle to enlist more footsoldiers and find more victuals "for the passing of the king to Ayr". However, the army instead turned south, to Holmcoltram.

The lack of resources - both men and supplies - together with the problems of terrain and 'rebel' activities to be expected in Galloway probably lay behind this change of plan. The situation there is made quite clear in a grant of 11 September 1300, which gave to Sir John de St. John "lands, farms and rents in England to the value of 1000 marks a year, for life or until he can be put in seisin and enjoy the issues and profits of land to that amount in the land of Galloway heretofore granted to him, and which he cannot enjoy at present by reason of the war in that land"<sup>55</sup>. On 26 September, various lands in Cumberland, including the castles of Cockermouth and Skipton-on-Craven currently held by Sir William Mulcaster, the sheriff of Cumberland, were granted to Sir

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51 Rishanger, 440-1; *Lib. Quot.*, 175, 177-9, 186.

52 Thomas Soules was the elder brother of the Guardian.

53 *Lib. Quot.*, 76-77; *C.D.S.*, ii, nos.1147, 1148, 1159.

54 Rishanger, 442; Barrow, Bruce, 113.

55 *C.P.R.*, 1292-1301, 536; see Chapter Sixteen, p.361.

John, with the proviso that these lands should revert to the king as soon as he could gain seisin of the 1000 marks worth of land in Galloway<sup>56</sup>.

### *Financial difficulties*

St. John was also experiencing the familiar problem of trying to make ends meet in his position as warden, because his wages were so greatly in arrears. According to a letter written to Manton on 27 August 1300, he was due money both from the previous term [up to 29 May] and the current one [up to 1 November]. The money was particularly required because "he had great works to do and he is heavily indebted to the poor people of all parts, who dolefully beseech him for victuals and other things he has taken from them"<sup>57</sup>.

### *Dumfries and the construction of the pele*

On 19 October 1300, Edward arrived at Dumfries, having remained south of the border at Holmcoltram since early September<sup>58</sup>. The purpose behind his visit was to oversee the construction of a pele at Dumfries, like the one already built at Lochmaben. The first carpenters had, in fact, arrived on 5 September to begin work.

### *St. John's expedition to Galloway*

Since the rough terrain meant that the royal army was not able to march effectively through Galloway, St. John was ordered to make an expedition there, to "bring to a satisfactory conclusion his [the king's] business in these parts"<sup>59</sup>. Sir Alexander Convers, a royal clerk more usually attached to the south-eastern garrisons<sup>60</sup>, went with the warden to pay the wages of the cavalry and foot in his company. Convers was paid from 18 October until 4 November, which was presumably the duration of the expedition.

The purpose of the expedition was "to receive the men of those parts [Galloway] to the king's peace." However, it seems quite likely that the warden had been sent out in the hope, rather than the firm expectation, that the Gallovidians would submit. Since St. John had not been able to gain access to the lands in Galloway granted to him by the king, because the country was still not at peace only a month before, there is no reason to believe that this situation had changed.

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56 *C.P.R.*, 1292-1301, 537-8.

57 *C.D.S.*, ii, no.1218.

58 *Itin.*, 161-3.

59 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 296-8.

60 See Chapter Four, p.117.

### The south-east:

Although the south-west was Edward's main preoccupation in this year, the garrisons of the south-east were by no means forgotten and the English officers in the south-east were not inactive during the summer of 1300. At the end of August, William Camera, a member of the Berwick town garrison in October 1298, had a horse killed in Selkirk Forest whilst in the company of Sir Simon Fraser. This suggests that sporadic expeditions against the Scots in the forest were still being attempted, even though many of the south-eastern garrisons were seriously reduced in numbers because of their contribution to the army<sup>61</sup>.

### *Sir Simon Lindsay granted Hermitage castle*

On 20 September 1300 the lands and property of Sir John Wake, which included Hermitage castle in Liddesdale, now in the king's hands after Wake's death, were granted to Sir Simon Lindsay. Lindsay had been the royal captain in Eskdale since 1298 and was also keeper of Liddel castle in 1300<sup>62</sup>. This grant was made so that the issues of these lands could "provide supplies for himself and his men in our service in the parts of Scotland"<sup>63</sup>. Both Hermitage and Liddel had been the property of the Soules family, forfeited, presumably, by Sir Thomas Soules, the eldest surviving member of that family, and granted to Sir John Wake.

Lindsay had already taken an interest in Wake's possessions. When the inquisition into Wake's property was held on 7 July 1300, it was stated that his goods "were taken by the sub-escheator of Cumberland into the king's hands, at the instance of Sir Henry Woods, bailiff of the said Sir John, to save them, as they were much wasted and in great part removed by Sir Simon Lindsay, keeper of Liddel." Although Hermitage was a private castle, Lindsay was granted supplies from the royal store at Berwick as a gift from the king<sup>64</sup>.

### *Organisation of eastern march; expedition to Selkirk Forest*

In October 1300 two royal clerks, Henry Empingeham and John Carleton, were sent from the king at Dumfries to Berwick. They were to deliver a message from the king to Master Richard Bremesgrave, the keeper of the royal store at Berwick, who was then

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61 Sir Simon Fraser had not been at Selkirk all summer, however, since he was in Edward's army besieging Caerlaverock castle in July 1300 [*Roll of Caerlaverock*, 15], having been released from a Scottish prison on 23 June 1300 [*Lib. Quot.*, 189]. See above, p.136.

62 See Chapter Three, p.82. Wake was dead before 7 July 1300, on which date an inquest was held into his goods and chattels. Liddel castle was the caput of Liddesdale [*R.C.A.H.M., (Midlothian and West Lothian)*, 85].

63 C.D.S., ii, no.1144; Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 419.

64 C.D.S., ii, no.1144.; *Lib. Quot.* 115-119.

to pass the information on to Sir Robert Hastings at Roxburgh, Sir Richard Hastings at Jedburgh and Sir William Latimer and others at Berwick.

The south-eastern garrisons were first of all informed of what had been happening in the west. Since St. John was busy in Galloway, the king now ordered those in the south-east "to make some good expeditions upon Selkirk Forest and elsewhere where they think it good and that they exert themselves to do as well as possible so that the king can have good news of them and that they are always busy with what the king has charged them to do." Though Edward's first priority had been the south-west, he was well aware that he could not feel easy about his garrisons in the south-east unless the threat from Selkirk Forest was finally removed.

Arrangements were also made for the payment of the south-eastern garrisons. The wardrobe clerk who had already been to Roxburgh and Jedburgh to pay the wages of the men-at-arms there, was to return to these castles with £60 to pay them for a further eight or ten days. The remainder was to be given to Sir Robert Hastings and both he and his brother were to be informed that more money would be forthcoming in eight days. The wardrobe clerk and Henry Empingeham were then to return to the king, to inform Edward "how these words were told to them and how they are undertaking these matters and how they are taking them to heart after they have heard the king's will".

Finally, Richard Bremesgrave was to tell Sir William Latimer, the warden of the eastern march, "that by all means he is to stay in these parts to attend to these matters and make expeditions on the forest according to the initial plan, as often and as effectively as possible until he gets further orders from the king"<sup>65</sup>. There is a suggestion here that Latimer, like so many before him, did not relish the position of warden. However, it was very important to Edward that effective measures were taken against the Scots in Selkirk Forest and he was desperately trying to inspire his officials to do their utmost in the execution of these orders.

An expedition under Latimer did take place, between 26 and 31 October 1300. One hundred archers under one constable from the Berwick town garrison were involved<sup>66</sup>, but there is no record of the numbers of men-at-arms who were undoubtedly also present, nor of any engagement between the Scottish and English forces. Certainly the lack of references to horses requiring to be replaced suggests that the Scots avoided confrontation.

The English were able to take some action, however. On 20 November 1300 the king wrote to the treasurer asking the latter to provide Michael Whitton, the head forester at Selkirk, with "a reasonable means of livelihood" until the expiry of the truce<sup>67</sup>.

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65 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 296-8.

66 *Lib. Quot.*, 147-8.

67 This first truce between the Guardians and King Edward was to last until 21 May 1301 [see below, p.150].



Whitton had "recently burned his houses and other property in the forest of Selkirk for the king's service". This drastic action had presumably been taken on orders from those organising the expeditions in the forest in response to the king's instructions. They were perhaps trying to provide the Scots with as little cover and sustenance as possible, the beginning of an English 'scorched earth' policy<sup>68</sup>.

#### Bremesgrave's account:

As "receiver and disburser of the king's victuals at Berwick"<sup>69</sup>, sir Richard Bremesgrave received a certain amount of the purveyed foodstuffs, even though the army was operating in the west. Most of these victuals were therefore required for the garrisons of the south-east.

The total English purveyance sent to Berwick was:-

wheat	- 2314 quarters
flour	- 85 barrels (made from purveyed wheat)
oats	- 2735 quarters 6 bushels
malt	- 2407 quarters 2 bushels
beans and peas	- 296 quarters 6 bushels
salt	- 220 quarters

The total amount thereafter in Bremesgrave's keeping in the royal store at Berwick came to:-

wheat	- 2376 quarters [62 quarters on credit from earl of Lincoln]
flour	- 277 barrels [192 barrels remaining from previous year's account]
oats	- 4711 quarters [1865 quarters 2 bushels remaining from previous year's account; 110 quarters purchased by Bremesgrave at Newcastle]
malt	- 2665 quarters 2 bushels [157 quarters 4 bushels remaining from previous year's account; 100 quarters 4 bushels purchased by Bremesgrave at Newcastle]
beans and peas	- 705 quarters 6 bushels [409 quarters remaining from previous year's account]
wine	- 734 barrels [204 barrels remaining from previous year's account; 19 barrels on credit from earl of Lincoln; 511 barrels from king's butler throughout year]
meat	- 50 ox carcasses, 60 mutton carcasses, 14 salted hog carcasses [6 ox, 5 hog carcasses remaining from previous year's account; 60 mutton, 9 hog carcasses from clerk of king's provisions; 19 ox carcasses on credit from earl of Lincoln]

68 C.D.S., v, no.234. The Scots were probably already familiar with the effectiveness of a scorched-earth policy [see Chapter Three, p.75].

69 Lib. Quot., 8.

- fish** - 2 lasts<sup>70</sup> 8500 herring, 14336 hard fish  
[18,500 herring, 14,336 hard fish from clerk  
of king's provisions; 10,000 herring from store  
intended for Stirling garrison]
- salt** - 418 quarters 6 bushels [198 quarters 6  
bushels remaining from previous year's account]
- charcoal** - 377 quarters, remaining from previous  
year's account
- defensive equipment** - 262 Eastland boards, 188 gunstones, 30  
steel arrows, remaining from previous year's  
account

Throughout regnal year 28 [20 November 1299 - 19 November 1300], Bremesgrave accounted for the following goods, shown in Tables 6.1-6.3, which were issued from his store:

**Table 6.1: Bremesgrave's issues (wheat, flour, barley and oats)**

Destination	Wheat	Flour	Barley	Oats
Sir John Kingston (Edinburgh)	399 qr 6 bz	40 barrels		1209 qr 2 bz
Sir Robert Maudley - gift (Dirleton)	37 qr 3 bz	16 barrels		150 qr
Sir Simon Lindsay - gift (Hermitage)	20 qr			
Sevanni Mor - gift (Berwick)	4 qr			4 qr
Sold <sup>71</sup>	1666 qr 1 bz	178 barrels	27 qr	881 qr 1 bz
Issued to royal officials	5 qr	2 barrels		370 qr
Lost between Berwick & Leith in storm				111 qr 1 bz
Allowed as loss <sup>72</sup>	67 qr 4 bz		3 qr	133 qr
<b>Total</b>	<b>2199 qr 6 bz</b>	<b>236 barrels</b>	<b>30 qr</b>	<b>2558 qr 4 bz</b>

<sup>70</sup> 1 last = 10,000 fish.

<sup>71</sup> Most of these victuals were sold to the army which mustered at Berwick in December 1299 (which was in regnal year 28) and departed soon after.

<sup>72</sup> Each official handling perishable goods was allowed a certain amount in his account for loss through, for example, dessication, putrefication or evaporation.

**Table 6.2: *Bremesgraves issues (malt, beans & peas, wine and meat)***

Destination	Malt	Beans & Peas	Wine	Meat
Sir John Kingston (Edinburgh)	510 qr	119 qr 6 bz		23 ox 55 mutton 9 hog
Sir Robert Maudley - gift (Dirleton)	150 qr	10 qr	9 barrels	20 ox
Sir Simon Lindsay - gift (Hermitage)	20 qr			
Sold	90 qr 5 bz	679 qr	79 barrels	
Issued to royal officials	227 qr		175 barrels	
Lost between Berwick & Leith in storm	6 qr 2 bz	15 qr		0.5 ox 1 mutton
Allowed as loss	95 qr	32 qr	53 barrels	6.5 ox 5 hog 4 mutton <sup>73</sup>
<b>Total</b>	<b>1098 qr 7 bz</b>	<b>855 qr 6 bz</b>	<b>316 barrels</b>	<b>50 ox 60 mutton 14 hog</b>

<sup>73</sup> 2.5 ox carcasses, 5 hog carcasses and 4 mutton carcasses were stolen by thieves from a cellar on the quay at Berwick.

**Table 6.3: Bremesgrave's issues (fish, salt, charcoal and equipment)**

Destination	Fish	Salt	Charcoal	Equipment
Sir John Kingston (for Stirling)	16,060 herring			
Sir Robert Maudley - gift (Dirleton)	10,000 herring	10 qr	60 qr	10 gunstones
Sir John Burdon (works on Berwick castle)			46 qr	44 gunstones 190 Eastland boards
Sir Robert Hastings (Roxburgh)				
Lost between Leith & Berwick in storm	2,460 herring			
Sold		21 qr	96 qr	120 gunstones 3 steel arrows
For keeping wine cellar cool			32 qr	
<b>Total</b>	28,520 herring 1,099 hard fish	31 qr 4 bz	240 qr 4 bz	224 gunstones 190 Eastland boards 13 steel arrows

### The receivers at Carlisle:

Master Richard Abingdon, who had been receiver at Carlisle since 1297, was described in 1300 as "receiver and disburser of the king's victuals sent to Carlisle for the Scottish war"<sup>74</sup>. Sir James Dalilegh, a clerk of sir John Droxford, the keeper of the wardrobe, remained at the store at Carlisle, on the orders of the English treasurer, after having gone there with sir Walter Bedewinde to hear Abingdon's account between 27 January and 28 February 1300. He is described as "receiver and disburser of king's victuals at Carlisle after receipt from afore-mentioned Master Richard"<sup>75</sup>. Both seem to have received and issued money, victuals and equipment throughout the regnal year. However, even though there is no clear dividing line, it would appear that Dalilegh had largely taken over from Abingdon as keeper of the store by August 1300.

<sup>74</sup> *Lib. Quot.*, 9.

<sup>75</sup> *Lib. Quot.*, 12, 99.

*Abingdon's account*

At the end of regnal year 27 [19 November 1299], Abingdon had the following victuals and equipment remaining in the Carlisle store:

wheat	- 1446 quarters 6 bushels
flour	- 657 barrels, 205 quarters 4 bushels
oats	- 5509 quarters 7 bushels
malt	- 460 quarters 7 bushels
wine	- 498 barrels
ox carcasses	- 61.5
hog carcasses	- 521.5
fish	- 21 barrels
hard fish	- 23 barrels
cheeses	- 123
salt	- 16 quarters 2 bushels
strips of iron	- 4
carts	- 9
horses	- 31

In addition, Abingdon received 67 quarters 5 bushels of wheat from the Irish purveyance of regnal year 27 which did not arrive until after the end of that regnal year (that is. after 19 November 1299), 88 quarters 4 bushels of oats and 56 quarters of malt from Irish purveyance for the current regnal year [28] and 40 ox carcasses sent by the men of Moffat 'to have peace'. He also purchased 9500 herrings, 6 quarters 3 bushels of salt and 31 strips of iron<sup>76</sup>. This brought the totals to:-

wheat	- 1514 quarters 3 bushels
oats	- 5598 quarters 3 bushels
malt	- 516 quarters 7 bushels
ox carcasses	- 101.5
fish	- 91 barrels, 9500 herrings
salt	- 25 quarters 5 bushels
strips of iron	- 35

Abingdon's issues, shown in Tables 7.1-7.2, were divided between the western garrisons of Lochmaben and Dumfries and the army brought up to the south-west in the summer of 1300<sup>77</sup>.

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76 *Lib. Quot.*, 119-20.

77 *Lib. Quot.*, 120-5.

**Table 7.1: Abingdon's issues (wheat, flour, oats, malt and wine)**

Destination	wheat	flour	oats	malt	wine
Sir Robert Felton (Lochmaben)		30 lbarrels	65 qr	6 qr	
Sir Robert Cantilupe (Lochmaben) <sup>78</sup>			1 qr		5 lbarrels
Sir Robert the chaplain (Lochmaben)			62 qr		
Sir John Dolive (Dumfries)		2 lbarrels			2 lbarrels
Sir Arnald Guillaume de Podio (Dumfries)		7 lbarrels	18 qr	6 qr	8 lbarrels
Sir Simon Lindsay - gift (Hermitage)					2 lbarrels
Sir John de St. John (captain of west)				106 qr 4 bz	
Issued to royal officials	61 qr 3 bz	102 lbarrels	630 qr 4 bz		2 lsexters
Sir James Dalilegh					7 lbarrels
Sold	666 qr 4 bz	398 lbarrels 205 qr 4 bz	2210 qr 7 bz	377 qr	37 lbarrels
Sold to earls, bannerets, etc.	786 qr	113 lbarrels			212 lbarrels 2 lsexters
For cart-horses in Dalilegh's keeping			156 qr		
Allowed as loss	6 bz	5 lbarrels		23 qr	34 lbarrels 8 lsexters
<b>Total</b>	<b>1514 qr 5 bz</b>	<b>650 lbarrels</b>	<b>3143 qr 3 bz</b>	<b>508 qr 4 bz</b>	<b>307 lbarrels 12 lsexters</b>

<sup>78</sup> There were two constables of Lochmaben in this year.

Table 7.2: Abingdon's issues (meat, salt, fish and iron)

Destination	meat	salt	fish	iron
Sir Robert Felton (Lochmaben)	20 ox	4 qr 4 bz		3 strips
Sir Arnald Guillaume de Podio (Lochmaben)	30 hogs	4 qr 1 bz	9500 herring	
For making engine for Caerlaverock				29 strips 10 measures
Issued to royal officials	37 hogs		7 barrels	4 strips
Sir James Dalilegh	3 qr ox 40 ox 1 hog	6 qr 3 bz		3 strips
Sold	44 ox 353 hog		7 barrels	
Issued to earls, bannerets, etc.	23 ox 68 hog		5 barrels 240 fish minus 1 barrel	
Allowed as loss	13 qr ox 32 hog	8 qr 1 bz	1.5 barrels 20 fish	
Total	127 ox 19 qr ox 421 hog	23 qr 1 bz	20.5 barrels 9400 herring 260 fish minus 1 barrel	39 strips 10 measures

The 123 cheeses remaining from the previous year's account were also allowed as loss, having gone off.

#### *Dalilegh's account*

Since he took over from Abingdon around August, Dalilegh's account is not very large. He was naturally given control of the contents of the store, but he also had to buy considerable amounts of provisions, in addition to the victuals sent to him as purveyance.

Dalilegh received the following from purveyance, both directly and via Bremesgrave, the receiver in the east:

wheat	- 209 quarters 6 bushels [Chester]
oats	- 468 quarters 7 bushels [Chester]
wine	- 40 barrels of wine [Bremesgrave]
meat	- 3 barrels of venison [Chester]
salt	- 7 quarters 4 bushels [Ireland]
carts	- 10 [Yorkshire; Northamptonshire]
horses	- 27 [Yorkshire; Northamptonshire]
horseshoes	- 8706 [Yorkshire, Northamptonshire, Lincolnshire, Bedfordshire]
nails	- 101,000 [Yorkshire, Northamptonshire, Lincolnshire, Bedfordshire]
cart-clouts	- 497 [Lincolnshire, Bedfordshire]
nails	- 1800 <sup>79</sup>

In addition, he purchased the following:

wheat	- 143 quarters 4 bushels
flour	- 288 quarters
beans	- 46 quarters 3 bushels
oats	- 48 quarters
malt	- 268 quarters (bought from merchants of Ireland)
wine	- 67 barrels
ale	- 34 barrels
hog	- 38 carcasses
salt	- 10 quarters <sup>80</sup>

This brought the totals<sup>81</sup> to:-

wheat	- 353 quarters 2 bushels
oats	- 516 quarters 7 bushels
wine	- 107 barrels

Tables 8.1-8.3<sup>82</sup> show the destination of Dalilegh's issues from the royal store at Carlisle.

<sup>79</sup> *Lib. Quot.*, 127-129.

<sup>80</sup> *Lib. Quot.*, 126.

<sup>81</sup> These totals were in addition to the indeterminate amounts received from Abingdon. Both accounts should therefore be taken together.

<sup>82</sup> *Lib. Quot.*, 11-12; 127-9.



**Table 8.1: Dalilegh's issues (flour, oats, malt, wine, beans and peas)**

Destination	flour	oats	malt	wine	beans & peas
Dumfries and Lochmaben	21 qr 7 bz	143 qr	133 qr		
Sold to earls, bannerets, etc.	183 qr 6 bz	150 qr 4 bz		24 barrels	41 qr 2 bz
Issued to royal officials	852 qr 2 bz		102 qr		
Allowed as loss		96 qr			
<b>Total</b>	<b>1957 qr 7 bz</b>	<b>389 qr 4 bz</b>	<b>235 qr</b>	<b>24 barrels</b>	<b>41 qr 2 bz</b>

**Table 8.2: Dalilegh's issues (ale, flour, meat and salt)**

Destination	ale	flour	meat	salt
Royal officials	4 barrels	288 qr	3 barrels venison	
Dumfries and Lochmaben	4 barrels		38 hog carcasses	10 qr
Issued to magnates	2 barrels			
Sold	20 barrels			
Allowed as loss	4 barrels			
<b>Total</b>	<b>34 barrels</b>	<b>288 qr</b>	<b>3 barrels</b>	<b>10 qr</b>

**Table 8.3: Dalilegh's issues (carts, horses, horse-shoes and nails, cart-clouts and nails)**

Destination	carts	horses	horse shoes	cart nails	clouts	nails
Royal officials	10	27	6824	101,000	473	1800
Dumfries and Lochmaben			400			
Total	10	27	7224	101,000	473	1800

#### *The receivers' receipts*

Abingdon, who was still the principal receiver at Carlisle during this regnal year, saw the largest amount of money passing through his hands. In total, he sold £3247 1s.1d. worth of victuals. Dalilegh, in comparison, sold only £862 10s.4d. worth. Bremesgrave's account was also smaller than Abingdon's in this year, because the royal army was based in the west. His receipts came to £1739 2s.9d. The receivers thus brought in a combined total of £5848 14s.2d.. This compares well with the cost of the victuals themselves, which totalled £4063 2s.<sup>83</sup>

#### **The cost of the war:**

Unlike the second Welsh war, when military accounts were kept separately, it is not possible to assess the exact costs incurred by Edward during his wars in Scotland. However, the *Liber Quotidianus* makes such calculations possible for regnal year 28 [20 Nov. 1299 - 19 Nov. 1300]. The garrisons accounted for the largest part of this year's expenditure, amounting to £13,574. Victuals came to £5,063. The army which besieged and captured Caerlaverock cost £8,561 in total and a further £2000 was paid out as compensation for horses lost during the campaign. Thus, out of the total wardrobe expenditure for the year of around £64,000, two-thirds were spent on the prosecution of the war<sup>84</sup>.

#### **Truce with the Scots:**

On 30 October 1300, Edward concluded a truce with the Scots, through the mediation of Philip of France, to last until 21 May 1301. This is the first overt admission, on Edward's part, that Scotland was far from conquered. It is also generally regarded as signifying that the campaign of 1300 was a failure<sup>85</sup>. Given that the truce would have taken several months to work out, Edward must have agreed to it in principle probably no

<sup>83</sup> *Lib. Quot.*, 8-13, 136.

<sup>84</sup> Prestwich, *War, Politics and Finance*, 175.

<sup>85</sup> *Foedera*, i, 924; *C.P.R.*, 1292-1301, 541; Prestwich, *Edward I*, 489-90.

later than August 1300, around the time of the engagement with the Scots on the banks of the Cree<sup>86</sup>. The English activity in both the south-east and the south-west in the intervening months can therefore be seen as an attempt to built up as strong a position as possible before the truce came into effect on 30 October.

Even if the truce is accepted as signifying failure to deal effectively with the Scots, Edward had made some progress during the campaign of 1301. The south-western garrisons were more secure than they had been since early 1297 under the control of an active and committed warden, even though Galloway still remained effectively outwith English jurisdiction.

Though the English garrisons could not attempt to extend English authority during the period of the truce, neither would they lose much ground to the Scots, although private initiatives would have been difficult to prevent, even during a truce. Edward was always aware of the power wielded by large English armies, even if this power was largely psychological in nature. The logic of the truce must have been that the gains made in 1300 would act as a preliminary stage in the final conquest of the south-west by another English army in the summer of 1301, even if Edward had no doubt originally intended to conquer the south-west in 1300. In the meantime, Edward's officials in Dumfries and Annandale were now in a strong enough position to consolidate the gains made by the king and his army in 1300 in the areas already under English control.

#### *The organisation of the garrisons during the truce*

It only remained now for the garrisons to be paid and their accounts and stores reviewed. Between 14 and 24 November 1300, the treasurer of England, Walter Langton, and sir John Droxford, the keeper of the wardrobe, visited the garrisons at Lochmaben, Dumfries and Caerlaverock for this purpose. Sir Ralph Manton, the royal coffèrer, did the same for the garrisons of Berwick, Edinburgh and Roxburgh between 14 and 19 November<sup>87</sup>.

Since this was a period of truce, the numbers in the garrisons did not have to be as high as they had been when there was a possibility of a Scottish attack. Nevertheless, a certain level had to be maintained. Below is a list of the castles manned by royal garrisons during the truce, the person in charge of the garrison and the number of men-at-arms and footsoldiers inside them. The cost of maintaining each garrison per day is indicated in brackets, calculated from the wages table shown in Chapter One.

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86 See above, p.137.

87 *Lib. Quot.*, 73, 82.

Berwick: (town and castle)	Sir William Latimer <sup>88</sup> , captain of the march 30 men-at-arms 60 crossbowmen 160 archers [£4 5s.2d.]
Jedburgh:	Sir Richard Hastings, constable 10 men-at-arms 10 crossbowmen 30 archers [£1 1s.4d.]
Roxburgh:	Sir Robert Hastings, constable 21 men-at-arms 30 crossbowmen 70 archers [£2 9s.8d.]
Edinburgh:	Sir John Kingston, constable 30 men-at-arms 4 hobelars 20 crossbowmen 34 archers [£2 14s.4d.]
Dumfries:	Sir John de St. John, keeper Sir Arnald Guillaume de Podio, constable 10 men-at-arms 25 crossbowmen 75 archers [£1 13s.10d.]
Lochmaben:	Sir John de St. John, keeper 11 men-at-arms 25 crossbowmen 75 archers [£1 14s.10d.]

Though the garrisons were generally smaller during the truce, they were still proportionally the same. Berwick was the largest garrison. In the east, Roxburgh was the next largest, followed by Edinburgh, and Jedburgh was the smallest. Dumfries and Lochmaben, in the west, had virtually the same number in each garrison. This gives the comparatively low total of 730 men in Scottish garrisons, at a total cost of £13 5s. per day.

#### *Dirleton, Hermitage and Dunbar*

In addition to the above-mentioned royal garrisons, three other Scottish garrisons are mentioned in the records for 1300, namely, Dirleton, Hermitage and Dunbar, all of

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<sup>88</sup> The named person is counted again in the actual figures given for each garrison.

which were in private hands. Dirleton had been granted to Sir Robert Maudley in July 1298 and was granted supplies from the royal store at Berwick in 1300<sup>89</sup>.

Hermitage, as shown above, was granted earlier in 1300 to Sir Robert Lindsay, on the death of Sir John Wake, and was also supplied from the Berwick store in this year<sup>90</sup>. In 1300 also, the earl of Dunbar was granted £200 to provide money and victuals for the garrison in his castle of Dunbar. This is the first mention of Dunbar castle since it was captured, along with most of the Scottish nobility, in April 1296. Although earl Patrick was not in the castle, his wife had been responsible for holding it against the English. However, since the earl was a staunch supporter of King Edward, withdrawing his allegiance from King John on the outbreak of the war, he undoubtedly retained his castle.

### Garrison stores:

As well as the two major stores at Berwick and Carlisle, there were smaller stores in certain garrisons which also had to account for the victuals in them. The *Liber Quotidianus* gives information on only three such stores, situated in the castles of Dumfries, Roxburgh and Jedburgh.

### Dumfries

Since Dumfries was only re-established as an English garrison in March 1300, the constable, Sir John Dolive, had to begin his store from scratch. Many of the victuals in his possession, were purchased, perhaps from local merchants<sup>91</sup>:

bulls and cows	- 9
sheep	- 14
oats	- 73 quarters 4 bushels
wine	- 70 gallons
unidentified quantities of bread, ale, fish, chickens, almonds and various spices	

In addition, Dolive received the following from the store at Carlisle:

flour	- 2 barrels
wine	- 2 barrels 17 sexters
herring	- 3500
iron	- 4 strips

and the following from provisions at Lochmaben:

flour	- 10 barrels
wine	- 10 barrels
malt	- 3 quarters
hard fish	- 500
oats	- 30 quarters

<sup>89</sup> See Tables 6.1-3.

<sup>90</sup> See Tables 6.1-2, 7.1.

<sup>91</sup> Since supplies from Abingdon are mentioned separately, those victuals purchased by Dolive presumably did not come from the store at Carlisle.

1 barrel of wine was also sent from the supplies placed in the newly-recaptured castle of Caerlaverock, 50 loaves from the royal butler and 7 bulls and steers from Sir John de St. John<sup>92</sup>.

Dumfries, like Lochmaben, had two constables in this year. On 1 August 1300, Sir Arnald Guillaume de Pugeys replaced Dolive<sup>93</sup>, receiving 2 barrels of flour on his appointment.

Only half a quarter of cow, 1 quarter of sheep and 2 bushels of oats were sold by the constable to his garrison. The rest of the victuals were all issued to the household which stayed at Dumfries in October 1300<sup>94</sup>.

### *Roxburgh*

Sir Robert Hastings, the constable at Roxburgh, accounted for the following victuals and equipment remaining in his store from the previous regnal year (27):

flour	- 30 barrels
wine	- 37 barrels
steers and heifers	- 40
salmon	- 597
salt	- 10 quarters 4 bushels
crossbows	- 20

Hastings also received 2 barrels of flour during the year from his brother, Sir Richard, at Jedburgh.

Throughout the year a total of 28 barrels of flour, 9 barrels of wine, 40 steers and heifers and 3 quarters 4 bushels of salt were sold from the store to the members of the garrison for a total price of £88 3s.10d.<sup>95</sup>. 3.5 barrels of wine were also allowed in Hastings' account as loss for leakage and evaporation. This left the following in the store at the end of the regnal year:

flour	- 2 barrels
wine	- 24.5 barrels
salt	- 7 quarters
salmon	- 597
crossbows	- 20

In addition, 20 gunstones, presumably for catapults, and 4 quarters of sea coal were issued to Hastings from the store at Berwick for making repairs to the houses in Roxburgh castle<sup>96</sup>.

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92 *Lib. Quot.*, 153.

93 See Table 7.1.

94 *Lib. Quot.*, 153-4.

95 *Lib. Quot.*, 13.

96 See Table 3.3; *Lib. Quot.*, 151.

*Jedburgh*

Sir Richard Hastings, at Jedburgh, had the following stores within his castle at the beginning of regnal year 28 [19 November 1299]:

<b>rye-wheat flour</b>	- 70 quarters
<b>flour</b>	- 15 barrels
<b>dredge</b> <sup>97</sup>	- 114 quarters
<b>oats</b>	- 136 quarters
<b>beans and peas</b>	- 20 quarters
<b>salt</b>	- 21 quarters
<b>salmon</b>	- 120
<b>wine</b>	- 26 barrels

The following amounts were sold from the store:

<b>rye-wheat flour</b>	- 50 quarters
<b>flour</b>	- 5 barrels
<b>dredge</b>	- 114 quarters
<b>oats</b>	- 136 quarters
<b>beans and peas</b>	- 20 quarters
<b>salt</b>	- 21 quarters
<b>salmon</b>	- 40
<b>wine</b>	- 5 barrels

This brought in a total of £87 6s.4d.. In addition, 2 barrels of flour were issued to Sir Richard himself and 1 barrel of wine to Lady Mary Fraser, wife of Sir Simon, who was staying in the castle. 4 barrels of wine and 6 quarters of flour were allowed as loss<sup>98</sup>. The store therefore contained the following at the end of the year:

<b>rye-wheat flour</b>	- 14 quarters
<b>flour</b>	- 8 barrels
<b>salmon</b>	- 80
<b>wine</b>	- 16 barrels

Running the store was the responsibility of certain members of the garrison. Sir Richard lost three valets who had fulfilled these duties because they were "afterwards convicted of felony"<sup>99</sup>.

A comparison between the amounts sold from the store in each of these garrisons is very interesting. The Jedburgh garrison, despite being only half the size of Roxburgh<sup>100</sup>, paid out almost the same amount for victuals. The Jedburgh store had also contained considerably more than the Roxburgh one at the beginning of the regnal year, though not at the end. There does not appear to be any obvious reason why this should

97 Dredge was a mixture of barley and oats.

98 *Lib. Quot.*, 152.

99 *Lib. Quot.*, 13.

100 Between 14 January and 5 July 1300 the Roxburgh garrison contained 2 knights, 62 esquires and 200 footsoldiers. This decreased to 2 knights, 23 esquires and 130 footsoldiers between 6 July and 10 November. There was 1 knight, 21 esquires and 100 footsoldiers in the Jedburgh garrison between 25 December 1299 and 4 July 1300. This decreased to 28 knight, 9 esquires and 50 footsoldiers from then until 11 November [*Lib. Quot.*, 150-152].

have been so, unless it had something to do with the felony of those in charge of the store at Jedburgh. In any event, both stores required replenishment at the end of the regnal year and presumably - though there is no record of this - supplies were sent from the main store at Berwick once sir Ralph Manton, who was sent to account with the south-eastern garrisons in November 1300<sup>101</sup>, had assessed the amounts required.

#### **Supplying of the south-eastern garrisons:**

The store at Berwick was proving most effective in supplying the south-eastern garrisons and the stores within each garrison continued to show healthy totals.

#### *Edinburgh*

Edinburgh castle was supplied with victuals regularly by ships travelling between Berwick and Leith. As a result, on 26 November 1300, the store contained 1535 quarters 6 bushels of grain, 214 barrels of wine, 15 pigs, 15 piglets, 33 ox carcasses, 2 sheep carcasses, 21 hog carcasses, 1720 hard fish, 5 salted salmon, 2 barrels full of whale, 15 cheeses and 55 quarters of salt.

#### *Roxburgh*

Bremesgrave was still dispatching considerable amounts to Roxburgh by land from Berwick and, on 14 December 1299, the store contained 844 quarters of grain, 44 barrels of wine, 597 salted salmon, 1000 stock fish and 44 quarters of salt.

#### *Jedburgh*

Jedburgh's store was also checked on 14 December 1300 and was found to contain 448 quarters of grain, 26 barrels of wine, 80 salted salmon, 600 stockfish and 20 quarters of salt. Since Jedburgh's garrison was about half the size of Roxburgh's, these supplies now corresponded to the numbers in the castle.

#### *Berwick castle*

Supplies in the castle at Berwick amounted to 130 quarters of wheat flour, 600 quarters of oats, 500 quarters of stockfish, 20 quarters of salt and 100 barrels of wine. These victuals were presumably intended to feed not only the soldiers in the garrison but the members of the 'civil service', such as Amersham, the chancellor and Weston, the receiver.

A memorandum attached to these lists of supplies in the garrisons' stores noted that "it is ordained that the victuals remaining in Berwick town or coming there, henceforth same Richard [Bremesgrave] is to bring or have them carried to Berwick

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<sup>101</sup> See below, p.157.



castle and put there in the houses of the said castle instead of the said town"<sup>102</sup>. This suggests that victuals had previously been kept in the town wherever was suitable and that alterations taking place in the castle to provide accommodation for the store had now been completed.

**Evidence for successful administration: *The collection of royal revenues at Edinburgh***

There is, strangely, no reference in the *Liber Quotidianus* to an account being made with the constable of Edinburgh castle for the victuals in his store. Though this implies that there was no store at Edinburgh, it was noted that sir Ralph Manton went "to Edinburgh and Roxburgh to account with the garrisons of these castles and to examine what was in their stores" in November 1300<sup>103</sup>.

In this year, for the first time, there is an account of royal revenues received by an officer on behalf of King Edward. From 30 September 1300, Sir John Kingston, sheriff of Edinburgh, collected the following "receipts of the king's money":

**Farms** - North Berwick, Tynninghame, Haddington, the town of  
Edinburgh, Lasswade, Aberlady, Easter Pencaitland,  
East Niddry and Lowood

**Tolls** - Town of Edinburgh

**Tenth** - Inveresk, Lasswade, Roslyn, Aberlady, Ballencrieff  
and Carrington

Other receipts included £16 3s.4d. as part-payment of a fine owed to the king by the Abbey of Newbattle, 30s. from five men of the sheriffdom "coming to peace" and various other fines. The total received was £66 8s.3d.

Kingston collected a further £25 15s.5d. from the "issues of Scotland". These were the farms of Tranent and Seton and the sale of hides, and grain belonging to certain fugitives in Carrington.

In addition to fulfilling his duties as sheriff in collecting these issues, Kingston was also able to buy victuals and equipment for his garrison at Edinburgh from the surrounding area. The purchases were mostly of cattle and also interesting items such as "ferrets of Dirleton" and sparrows. The constable also made much use of local smiths to provide the nails and horseshoes (and also, presumably, the shoeing) required by the mounts of his knights and esquires. As with the issues, the places involved are scattered throughout the sheriffdom: Gilmerton, Musselburgh, Tranent, Seton, Liberton and Duddingston.

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<sup>102</sup> E101/9/25, m.6.

<sup>103</sup> *Lib. Quot.*, 73.

With this evidence for the effective authority of the sheriff of Edinburgh, it is not surprising to find references to "captured grain", to "hobelars and archers who were assigned to look after enemies' beasts at Lowood" and finally to men of the county returning to Edward's peace<sup>104</sup>. Even though Lothian is usually thought of as an area firmly under English control throughout the Wars of Independence, it is clear that, before 1300, Edward's officials had not been able to administer it properly. It should be noted, however, that although this sheriff was able to operate an effective administration, there is no evidence for similar activities by other sheriffs, even in the south-east.

On the back of this account, which was dated at Nettleham on 31 July 1301<sup>105</sup>, there are references to the purchase of wheat, oats and malt, which totalled £70 14s.. Kingston's total expenses amounted to £648 7s.3d.. This would include the victuals purchased both from the store at Berwick<sup>106</sup> and the surrounding district, the wages of his garrison and other items, such as the farriery expenses and coal.

Kingston's receipts, which included the £92 3s.8d. from the issues of his sheriffdom, totalled £582 6s.6d., much of which must have come from the sale of the above victuals. The sheriff therefore owed £70 4s.9d. to the exchequer as the deficit on his account<sup>107</sup>.

#### **Sir Ralph Manton - Treasurer of Scotland?:**

Since 1298 the English exchequer at York had played an extremely important role in Scottish affairs, governing all financial aspects of the administration of the northern kingdom. This role, therefore, precludes any assertion that an independent administration existed at Berwick. There is certainly no official record of the appointment of a treasurer after the death of sir Hugh Cressingham at Stirling Bridge. However, a candidate for the position can be found in the chronicle of Pierre Langtoft. In describing the victory of the Scots over the English in an ambush at Roslyn in March 1303, Langtoft writes:

"I speak for the Scot who the other day attacked  
Our English in Scotland by a sudden onset;

.....

He there slew sir Thomas Nevile, knight,  
And Ralph the cofferer, who offered much money  
To Simon Fraser that he should not die there.  
Fraser lookst at him, Fraser replies to him

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104 E101/9/3.

105 If an account was not made with Kingston (or his proxy) until early in 1301, this would explain why there was no reference to an account of the Edinburgh store in the *Liber Quotidianus* for regnal year 28.

106 See **Tables 6.1-6.3.**

107 E101/9/3 (dorso).

"You have betrayed the king who made you treasurer,  
 And me and many others, of whom not one is acquitted  
 Of the wages which thou owest by reckoning and by writing;  
 ....."

According to Guisborough, describing the same incident, sir Ralph "administered stipends on the part of the king". Wyntoun describes him as "Conifre, the Kyng off Inlandis Tresorere"<sup>108</sup>. This was clearly a man of some importance in the Scottish administration, although it cannot be said that he occupied any permanent office in it.

Official records show that, by 1300, Manton was already involved in Scottish affairs on Edward's behalf, although many of his activities were an extension of his duties as a wardrobe clerk. In January 1300 he had been sent, along with sir John Benstede and other wardrobe clerks, to account with the garrison commanders in the south-east and to check on their provisions. Between 28 July and 3 August 1300 he was in Carlisle to arrange for the despatch of victuals there to the garrison at Dumfries. At the end of August, he was again sent to Carlisle, this time from the court in Galloway, to enlist more footsoldiers "for the passing of the king to Ayr"<sup>109</sup> and to provide victuals quickly. He then returned to the court at Caerlaverock. In October he travelled all the way from Holmcoltram to York to organise the dispatch of money to Carlisle. The court, which had returned south of the border in September, had gone north again to Dumfries by his return.

Between 14 and 19 November Manton alone<sup>110</sup> was sent from Carlisle to Berwick and from there to Edinburgh and Roxburgh to account with the commanders of these castles and assess what was in their stores, although another royal clerk, Robert Woodhouse, did go to the garrisons of Roxburgh and Jedburgh in October and November to make payments to those staying at the king's wages there.

Between 13 April and 13 November 1300 Manton was paid 50 marks in addition to the fee that he normally received from sir John Droxford, the keeper of the wardrobe, for his own expenses and those of a clerk and an esquire maintained by him, because they were away from the court on royal business. Horse evaluations show that Manton's retinue actually totalled five valets and sir Alexander Convers.

The most important aspect of Manton's duties revolved around the payment of, and accounting with, those in royal garrisons. The accusation of avarice laid against him by Sir Simon Fraser, who had, after all, once been in receipt of royal wages as Edward's warden of Selkirk Forest, is very similar to the charge made against sir Hugh Cressingham<sup>111</sup>. Manton, like Cressingham, seems to have been an energetic and

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<sup>108</sup> Langtoft, ii, 344-5; Guisborough, 352; Wyntoun, ii, 359.

<sup>109</sup> The king did not, in fact, go to Ayr but turned south instead, to Holmcoltram [*Itin.*, 161].

<sup>110</sup> That is, without any other royal officials, such as sir John Benstede, the keeper of the English counter-roll.

<sup>111</sup> Guisborough, 294.

efficient minister. However, as the events surrounding the mutiny at Berwick in 1301 indicate<sup>112</sup>, it was an almost impossible task to keep the payment of wages up-to-date.

Clearly Manton was not officially treasurer of Scotland in the way that sir Hugh Cressingham had been. He was not formally appointed to the position nor did he have an exchequer at Berwick through which to operate. Nevertheless, sir Ralph spent a lot of time in Scotland, and, within the limits of the position in which the English found themselves there before 1304, performed certain of the duties associated with a treasurer. As the chronicle sources also show, he was certainly a figure of some importance in Scotland.

#### Other personnel at Berwick: *Sir John Weston*

Since sir Ralph Manton had now taken over responsibility for the financial well-being of the English garrisons in Scotland, it is necessary to examine the activities of sir John Weston, who, as we have seen, had previously issued money received by sir Walter Amersham to the south-eastern garrisons. In this regnal year (28), he is still described as the clerk responsible for "assigning the wages of the cavalry and foot staying in the garrison of Berwick town and paying other garrisons in various Scottish castles"<sup>113</sup>. There does not, therefore, appear to have been any change in his duties.

#### *Sir Walter Teye*

In addition to Weston, there is mention of another receiver at Berwick in regnal year 28. On 21 May 1300 the sheriff of York delivered £200 to the sheriff of Northumberland. The latter then took this money to Berwick and issued it to "Walter Teye and John Weston, king's receivers for the expedition to Scotland". Sir Walter Teye, a lay knight, who is first mentioned as a member of the Berwick garrison on 20 November 1299<sup>114</sup> is untypical of those named as receivers, since they were usually clerics. Since his receivership referred specifically to "the expedition to Scotland" (that is, Edward's intended campaign), it was presumably felt that the combination of a cleric with a soldier was an effective way to prepare for the arrival of an army.

Just over a month later, on 30 June 1300, Sir Walter was appointed keeper of Berwick town, in place of Sir Robert fitz Roger who had held the office since 25 December 1299<sup>115</sup>.

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112 See Chapter Six, pp.177-8.

113 *Lib. Quot.*, 145.

114 E159/73, m.61; *Lib. Quot.*, 146.

115 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 414-5; *Lib. Quot.*, 145.

### *Sir Walter Amersham*

Though sir John Weston appears to have continued to fulfil the same duties for which he had been responsible since 1299, there does seem to have been a change in the role played at Berwick by sir Walter Amersham. Amersham had been receiver of Northumberland since 1297<sup>116</sup> and is described as such rather than chancellor, his other office, from 1298. In regnal year 28 [20 November 1299 - 19 November 1300], this situation appears to have been reversed. Not only is he always referred to as chancellor, but arrangements for his payment in that office are mentioned for the first time since 1298.

At the beginning of regnal year 28 (20 November 1299), it was noted that Amersham "received £100 per annum by order of the treasurer and others of the king's council" for his own expenses as chancellor and those of the clerks working under him. He continued to receive this certum until 27 June 1300, when it was agreed by the king and his council at Carlisle that he would receive 5s. per day<sup>117</sup>. This suggests that attempts were being made to re-institute a 'centralised' administration of Scotland at Berwick.

If Amersham was now concentrating more on his office of chancellor than that of receiver, then this would also help to explain the need for another royal official - namely Manton - to take over the job of receiving the large sums of money sent from the English exchequer at York. In the following years this is exactly what Manton can be found doing<sup>118</sup>, in conjunction with Master John Weston, who was still largely responsible for issuing them. Since the number of English garrisons in Scotland also began to increase in 1300, it was useful to have one official with a responsibility for overseeing the payment of their wages and the hearing of their accounts, rather than arranging for clerks from the English exchequer or the wardrobe to be sent north to do this.

### **Conclusions:**

Although the campaign of 1300 came to an end with the first truce made with Scots since the beginning of the war in 1296<sup>119</sup>, there was some cause for optimism in the English camp. The garrisons at Berwick, Roxburgh, Jedburgh, Edinburgh, Lochmaben, Dumfries and Caerlaverock were relatively secure, primarily due to their concentration in two geographical areas, that is, Lothian and the sheriffdom of Roxburgh, and the sheriffdom of Dumfries. The truce gave the English a welcome respite from the constant war of attrition waged by the Scots and a firm base from which to commence the

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116 See Chapter Three, p.58.

117 *Lib. Quot.*, 93.

118 See Chapter Six, p.177.

119 The Scottish Guardians, Lamberton, Carrick and Comyn, had sought a truce with Edward, again through the mediation of Philip of France, on 13 November 1299, but these overtures had been rejected by the English king [*A.P.S.*, i, Appendix, 454].

much more successful campaign, in terms of castles newly-garrisoned with English troops, which took place in the summer of 1301.

The English administration at Berwick had correspondingly shown signs of development since the previous year. It still fell far short of the system envisaged by Edward in 1296, but it does indicate that the military achievements made by the king and his army in 1300 were accompanied by similar, small-scale improvements to the state of the permanent English administration of Scotland.

## PART FOUR

This year saw another campaign in the south-west, resulting in the reduction of the castles of Bothwell, Turnberry and Ayr, after which Edward and his army wintered at Linlithgow. Yet again, therefore, royal officials were primarily concerned with supplying the army and household, which became considerably more difficult when they did not return south at the end of the campaigning season. There were thus no notable developments in the administration of Scotland in 1301.

At the end of 1300 a total of seven castles were occupied by English royal garrisons. These were Berwick, Roxburgh, Jedburgh, Edinburgh, Dumfries, Lochmaben and Caerlaverock<sup>1</sup>. In addition, the private castles of Dunbar, Dirleton and the Hermitage can be added to this list since their owners actively supported the English cause.

By the end of 1301, however, there were English royal garrisons in a further five castles - Ayr, Bothwell<sup>2</sup>, Carstairs, Kirkintilloch and Linlithgow. This last castle, at least, was probably not held previously by the Scots, but had instead been considered too small to garrison. The intention was to build another pele there, and also at Selkirk, although work did not begin until February 1302. There is also mention in this year of a force in Yester castle held privately by Sir Adam Welle.

Most infuriatingly, this success could not be followed up with an early campaign in 1302 - part of the reason for wintering at Linlithgow - because supplies ran out and disease and desertion spread through the army. A second truce was, therefore, negotiated by Christmas and concluded with the French and the Scots on 26 January 1302.

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1 Something of a question mark hangs over Caerlaverock, since there are no references to any garrison there after November 1300 [see Chapter Eleven, pp.284-5].

2 Bothwell was a private castle and granted as such to Sir Aymer de Valence. However, troops receiving royal wages did form part of the garrison and thus it is counted here as a royal castle [see Chapter One, p.40].

## CHAPTER SIX

## EXPANSION, PART 2

1301

**The Truce:**

The truce with the Scots, which had begun on 31 October 1300, was due to expire on 21 May 1301. On 1 March 1301 Surrey, the earl of Warwick, Sir Aymer de Valence, Sir John de St. John and Sir Hugh Vere were appointed to "treat with the envoys of Philip, king of France, touching the rectification of the disobediences, rebellions, contempts, trespasses, injuries, excesses and losses inflicted by the Scots". The meeting was to be held at Canterbury at mid-Lent [c.8 March 1301], but it was later postponed until 16 April<sup>1</sup>.

On 26 March safe-conducts were issued to Sir Adam Gordon, Sir John Inchmartin, Master Nicholas Balmyle, the Scottish chancellor, and Master Thomas Bonkil, to be the Scottish representatives at Canterbury<sup>2</sup>. No high-ranking 'rebel' noble was therefore present, presumably because they were required at home.

On 3 April the king ordered that, "having determined not to renew the truce with the Scots", two forces would meet at Berwick and Carlisle under the command of Edward himself and his son, the prince of Wales, respectively. Edward had almost certainly never intended to renew the truce since preparations for a campaign in the summer of 1301 had begun as early as February<sup>3</sup>.

On 8 April the magnates and royal officials of Northumberland were warned to be prepared for Scottish attacks on the expiry of the truce, since the king knew "not what may result from the conference between the Scots and the French ambassadors now taking place at Canterbury". Edward knew exactly what would result. His refusal to grant an extension of the truce to the Scots and his desire for a treaty with the French alone were quite unacceptable to Balmyle and his fellow negotiators. A resumption of hostilities was inevitable. Safe-conducts for the Scottish envoys to return to Scotland were issued on the same date<sup>4</sup>.

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1 *C.P.R.*, 1292-1301, 580.

2 *C.D.S.*, ii, no.1244.

3 *C.D.S.*, ii, no.1193; *C.D.S.*, v, no.247; *C.C.R.*, 1296-1302, 480.

4 *C.D.S.*, ii, no.1194; no.1244. Edward did not achieve a solely Anglo-French treaty until December 1302 [see Chapter Seven, p.212].



Finally, on 25 April, it was announced that "... the *parlance* to have been lately held at Canterbury between his people and those of the king of France, on the affairs of Scotland is broken off to his advantage and the great loss of the French...", and preparations for the coming campaign got fully underway.

### **Renewal of St. John's contract as warden; the "middle men" of Scotland to be received to Edward's peace:**

On 12 May Sir John de St. John's appointment as captain and lieutenant of the western march was renewed at Kempsey in Worcestershire<sup>5</sup>. This was the third time since his original appointment as warden in January 1300 that such a renewal had been made. These short-term contracts - around nine months - perhaps indicate Edward's concern that important officials should be willing incumbents. By allowing St. John the option of renewing his contract at regular intervals, there was less danger of the warden wishing to be relieved of his duties at an awkward moment. It was also a useful point at which the official could negotiate for the payment of arrears of his wages and expenses.

Nine days previously, St. John had been empowered "to receive the knights and middle men of Scotland to peace, as the king enjoined him *viva voce*"<sup>6</sup>. The lieutenant had presumably received these oral instructions while in England as one of the English envoys to the peace talks at Canterbury. On various dates between 5 April and 26 May 1301, Sir John Kingston, constable of Edinburgh, Sir Robert Hastings, constable of Roxburgh and Sir Hugh Audley, perhaps already keeper of Selkirk Forest, were all ordered to admit the "middle" or "mesne" men of Scotland to the king's peace<sup>7</sup>.

This was not a usual stipulation. Certainly, every English official in Scotland was given authority on his appointment to receive any Scot to Edward's peace. This targeting of the "middle men" perhaps, therefore, indicates that the English were aware of a weariness taking root in Scotland after four years of war. These orders, issued immediately before the outset of a campaign, were presumably to be used like an amnesty to encourage these "middle men" - generally small landholders or burgesses - who played an important role in local communities but did not usually take the lead in political affairs, to adhere to the English cause. The Guardians would therefore find it more difficult to exercise their authority in military, administrative and financial matters even when the majority of the upper nobility, whose activities are more easily traced, were not at Edward's peace.

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5 C.P.R., 1292-1301, 592.

6 C.D.S., ii, no.1244.

7 Audley is first described as keeper of Selkirk Forest in August 1301 [E101/9/15, dorso]. C.D.S., ii, no.1244; C.P.R., 1292-1301, 585, 592, 595.

There is no evidence for large-scale submissions in 1301 or, indeed, in any year before 1304. However, a small number of Scots did decide that four years of war were enough. There is a reference in the account of the sheriff of Edinburgh to five men of that county coming to the king's peace at the end of 1300, a reference in the *Liber Quotidianus* to forty ox carcasses sent to the store at Carlisle by the men of Moffat 'to have peace' in the same year and the assertion of Sir Robert Tilliol, the English constable of Lochmaben, that the Scots were forcing those in the surrounding area who had come to Edward's peace to return to the Scottish fold in 1301<sup>8</sup>.

It should also be noted that the increasing revenues raised between 1300 and 1301 from the sheriffdom of Edinburgh<sup>9</sup>, could only have been achieved if exactly that section of society which Edward was targeting in these orders to St. John, Kingston, Hastings and Audley had submitted in significant numbers.

However, this applies only to one sheriffdom. It must, therefore, be said that the lack of evidence for submissions suggests that few occurred and that Edward was merely hoping, rather than expecting, to change the loyalties of "the middle men of Scotland."

#### Campaign preparations:

Summonses for a campaign to take place from Berwick immediately after the expiry of the truce [21 May 1301] were sent out on 14 February 1301<sup>10</sup>.

#### *Purveyance*

On 1 March 1301 writs for purveyance were issued. The totals demanded were as follows:

wheat - 7200 quarters  
oats - 9000 quarters  
malt - 4000 quarters  
beans & peas - 1000 quarters

The amounts demanded from the northern counties were comparatively smaller than most other counties and must again reflect not only the considerable resources which they had already contributed to the Scottish war but also the devastation caused in these areas by both the Scots and the English army<sup>11</sup>.

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<sup>8</sup> E101/9/3; see Chapter Five, p.145; see below, p.173.

<sup>9</sup> See below, p.190.

<sup>10</sup> C.C.R., 1296-1302, 480.

<sup>11</sup> C.P.R., 1292-1301, 578.

### Re-arrangements for the campaign:

On 1 March, also, writs of summons were again sent out. The king had now decided to split his army into two, as he had done the previous year, one part mustering at Carlisle by 24 June under his son, the prince of Wales, and the other at Berwick, commanded by himself<sup>12</sup>.

### *Purveyance*

The orders for purveyance had therefore also to be changed since provisions were required in both the east and the west. The eastern counties of Essex, Norfolk and Suffolk, Cambridge, Lincoln, Nottingham and Derby, York and the town of Yarmouth were to send to Berwick:-

wheat - 6000 qrs. (1500 flour)  
oats - 5500 qrs.  
malt - 3000 qrs.  
beans & peas - 1000 qrs.  
salt - 500 qrs.  
wine - 300 casks

The following purveyance in Ireland and the county of Lancaster was to be sent to Carlisle, to supply the prince of Wales' army and the south-western garrisons:

wheat - 3200 qrs. (1500 flour)  
oats - 3000 qrs.  
malt - 2000 qrs.  
beans & peas - 500 qrs.  
new wine - 200 casks<sup>13</sup>

There were now no demands being made on the northern counties for purveyance, although, on 11 April, writs to various sheriffs concerning proclamations to merchants to bring their goods for sale included one to the sheriff of Northumberland<sup>14</sup>.

Writs for the Irish purveyance, which now included 10,000 hard fish and 5 lasts of herring in addition to the above demands, were dated 3 April 1301. Half was to be sent to Skinburness, the port near Carlisle, and half to a port on the island of Arran, held for Edward since 1298 by Sir Hugh Bisset of Antrim<sup>15</sup>.

### *Scarcity*

It was not only the northern counties which were suffering from a dearth of foodstuffs. On 18 April it was agreed that the county of Essex, which had been ordered on 1 March to produce 500 quarters of wheat, 500 quarters of oats and 200 quarters of malt, need only provide 1000 quarters of wheat, by reason of "a scarcity of oats and malt

<sup>12</sup> C.C.R., 1296-1302, 480.

<sup>13</sup> C.D.S., ii, no.1192.

<sup>14</sup> C.C.R., 1296-1302, 489-90.

<sup>15</sup> C.D.S., ii, no.1193; see Chapter Three, p.78.

in that county". It is clear, also, that the men of Essex had fallen victim to profiteering during the previous purchase of their goods since those ordered to supervise the collection of this year's quota informed the king that: "As regards payment .... [they] cannot give their goods with confidence except to persons named, who have power to tax, collect and pay when the time comes"<sup>16</sup>.

### *The size of the English army*

The king arrived at Berwick on 5 July and his army had mustered by 12 July. According to the pay roll for the period 12 July and 29 September, this army numbered around 6800 footsoldiers and the contributions from the garrisons were as follows:

Berwick	110 archers
Roxburgh and Jedburgh	100 archers 32 hobelars (foresters)
Edinburgh	20 archers
Selkirk	10 foresters
Total	272

The earl of Angus also provided 200 archers, presumably from his Northumberland lands. The total figure of 272 contrasts sharply with the 1495 men-at-arms and footsoldiers from Scottish garrisons who took part in the campaign of 1300. In 1301 there do not seem to have been any men-at-arms<sup>17</sup> involved and very few footsoldiers. This perhaps reflects a realisation of the danger of removing too many men from the south-eastern garrisons.

In addition, the king, through his justiciar, John Wogan, negotiated for the service the Irish nobility. Edward's terms were extremely generous, including the pardon of two-thirds of all debts owing at the exchequer. Nevertheless, the earl of Ulster, the most influential nobleman in Ireland, refused to go to Scotland on these terms. However, an Irish force numbering 229 men-at-arms, 305 hobelars and 1,489 footsoldiers had arrived on Arran by 15 July, joining the prince of Wales at Ayr soon thereafter. A separate force under Sir Eustace Poer and Sir Thomas Mandeville, numbering 45 men-at-arms, 86 hobelars and 128 footsoldiers and most likely sent by the earl of Ulster, reached Scotland at an unknown date and probably took part in the siege of Turnberry<sup>18</sup>.

### **The campaign of 1301:**

On 18 July 1301, while the king was still at Berwick, there is the first mention of Yester castle since 1296, although the English probably recaptured it prior to the battle of Falkirk in 1298. Although it is unlikely that the Scots had been able to keep and hold a

<sup>16</sup> C.P.R., 1292-1301, 589.

<sup>17</sup> There could, of course, have been men-at-arms from Scottish garrisons present in the army because they owed feudal service. These would not show up in wage records.

<sup>18</sup> J. Lydon, 'Irish levies in the Scottish wars, 1296-1302', *Irish Sword*, v, 209-214.

castle in the English-dominated south-east after 1298, it is almost certain that there had been no English garrison at Yester much before 18 July 1301. On that date, Sir Adam Welle, the keeper, paid the wages of six crossbowmen, sent to the castle for the next twelve days<sup>19</sup>.

The English army marched west through the borders, staying at Peebles for two weeks, and on into Lanarkshire, arriving at Glasgow on 21 August 1301. The Scots did not allow Edward and his men to pass entirely unmolested, however. Basculus the crossbowman was taken prisoner on 28 July, the day on which the king arrived at Peebles<sup>20</sup>.

### The prince of Wales' army in the west:

The prince of Wales, together with the earl of Lincoln, was sent to Carlisle from where his army marched through the south-west. The young Edward certainly did not attain "the chief honour of taming the pride of the Scots", as his father intended<sup>21</sup>. However, he did achieve the institution of a garrison at Ayr and the reduction of the earl of Carrick's castle of Turnberry and Sir John Comyn of Badenoch's castle of Dalswinton.

### *Dalswinton*

Dalswinton is mentioned only three times in English official records, but nevertheless, it is quite clear that this Comyn castle, situated six miles north-west of Dumfries, was captured during the prince of Wales' campaign in the south-west. A wage account records that four men-at-arms of Sir John Botetourt, to whom the castle must therefore have been given, were paid for their stay at Dalswinton between 5 and 25 September 1301. Botetourt was also issued with various supplies for the castle in the same year.

It is not clear, therefore, exactly when the castle was captured, since the prince and his army were at Turnberry around 5 September. It seems likely that the castle was either captured earlier, on the journey north from Carlisle, or else a separate contingent, presumably under Botetourt, besieged it in August 1302.

In any event, the latter can only have held on to Dalswinton for a very short period of time since the wage payment mentioned above was cancelled, suggesting that the four men-at-arms never got there. In addition, a letter of 10 September 1302 from Sir Robert Tilliol, the constable of Lochmaben, states that the Scots, who were attacking

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19 The *Liber Quotidianus* records payments to Sir Adam Welle for year 28 [20 Nov. 1299 - 19 Nov. 1300]. He received his wages as a member of the household personally at Beverly on 30 May 1300 [*Lib. Quot.*, 189, 192]. He and his retinue then served in the army between 7 July and 21 September. Welle does not, therefore, appear to have been keeper of Yester before that campaign [*Lib. Quot.*, 196]. E101/359/5.

20 C.D.S., ii, no.1190; *Itin.*, 177.

21 C.D.S., ii, no.1191.

Lochmaben, "went to lodge near Dalswinton". The castle was probably captured by the Scottish army soon after, if it had not already been taken.

### *Ayr*

The prince's army arrived at Ayr at some point in August. On 25 August, the king, at Glasgow, received "good rumours which he had from Sir Malcolm Drummond, a Scottish knight captured by Sir John Segrave". Sir Malcolm had been captured at Dunbar in 1296 and had remained a prisoner in Kenilworth castle until 3 February 1301, when he was delivered to Sir Thomas Paignel, a knight of Sir John de St. John. Sir Thomas was in the prince's army in the summer of 1301. It is possible that Sir Malcolm Drummond had been with Paignel in the prince's army, escaped, only to be recaptured by Sir John Segrave, who was with the king, and reported the prince's activities at Ayr to Edward<sup>22</sup>.

There is no evidence for a siege at Ayr, but presumably there was a Scottish rebel presence in the area with which the army had to deal, or at least scare off. Control of Ayr at last extended direct English control right through to the west coast.

Sir Montasini de Novelliano became the new constable of the castle at Ayr and Sir Edmund Hastings the sheriff there. Sir Montasini had already served Edward in the garrisons of Edinburgh (1298), Berwick (1299-1300) and Caerlaverock (1300). Sir Edmund had also been part of the Caerlaverock garrison in 1300<sup>23</sup>.

The keepership of the castle and the sheriffdom was granted to Patrick, earl of March. Although the latter's earldom was centred on Dunbar, on the opposite side of the country, earl Patrick also owned Cumnock castle, twenty miles east of Ayr<sup>24</sup> and thus he did have an interest in that area.

### *Turnberry*

The earl of Carrick's castle at Turnberry is some thirteen miles south along the coast from Ayr. Since the army had therefore to turn south again, the attempt to take this castle perhaps came as an afterthought, due to the success at Ayr. The first reference to any English presence at Turnberry comes on 2 September, when Sir Montasini de Novelliano was issued his fee and robes there. The king, still at Glasgow, received "good rumours" from Turnberry on the same date. News of the reduction of the castle reached Edward when he was at Bothwell, which must therefore have been on 5 September at the earliest<sup>25</sup>.

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22 *Itin.*, 178; E101/358/6; *C.D.S.*, iv, p.448; *C.D.S.*, ii, p.177; *C.D.S.*, ii, no. 1326; E101/364/13.

23 *C.D.S.*, ii, no.1236; E101/7/24, m.1; *Lib. Quot.*, 141. 145.

24 *C.D.S.*, iv, no.1829.

25 E101/364/13; E101/358/6; *C.D.S.*, iv, p.451.

### **The siege of Bothwell:**

On 5 September, the king's army arrived at Bothwell castle in Lanarkshire to begin a siege<sup>26</sup>. The barony of Bothwell, including the castle, and other lands in Scotland to the amount of £1000 had been granted, in anticipation, to Sir Aymer de Valence on 10 August 1301, while the king and his army were at Peebles. The decision to besiege Bothwell castle was not, therefore, taken on the spur of the moment, simply because the army was in the vicinity. Instead, this would seem to be part of Edward's step-by-step reconquest of Scotland and contrasts sharply with the conquest of 1296.

Sir William Murray, the original owner of Bothwell, was dead by November 1300. His nearest heir was three-year old Andrew Murray, son of the late Guardian. The young Andrew was currently living in Moray, deep in rebel territory and his inheritance had probably been declared forfeit since his father's rebellion. Certainly his lands in Crawford had been granted to Sir Robert Tony after the battle of Falkirk in 1298<sup>27</sup>. The siege was over by 22 September 1301. The first reference to the numbers of the new English garrison is an agreement made with Sir Aymer de Valence on 12 February 1302 to hold the castle with a total of 30 men-at-arms. There is no mention of any footsoldiers<sup>28</sup>.

### **The Scottish garrisons of Bothwell, Turnberry and Dalswinton:**

There is no indication as to who was holding Bothwell castle on behalf of the Scots in 1301 since there are no references to prisoners from that castle being sent to English castles. This is also true for the garrisons at Turnberry and Dalswinton. These last castles were presumably held by men of the earl of Carrick and the lord of Badenoch respectively. However, the account of the sheriff of Cumberland for year 30 [20 November 1301 - 19 November 1302] notes payments to "two knights and 32 serjeants, Scottish prisoners in Carlisle castle, and a constable and 8 warders to guard them, year 29 [20 November 1300 - 19 November 1301]"<sup>29</sup>. It is, unfortunately, not at all certain that these men came from the Scottish castles captured in 1300, but it is certainly possible.

### **Scottish and English activities in the south-west in the summer of 1301:**

From September onwards the Scots did their best to counteract English gains in the south-west. There was now only one guardian, Sir John Soules, who had taken over from Sir John Comyn and Sir Ingram d'Umfraville earlier in the year<sup>30</sup>.

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26 *Itin.*, 178.

27 *C.D.S.*, ii, no.1178; see Chapter Three, pp.78-9; British Library, Ms. Add.28024, fo.180; Barrow, *Bruce*, 104.

28 *Itin.*, 179; E101/68/1, m.21.

29 *C.D.S.*, ii, no.1304.

30 Barrow, *Bruce*, 114-5.

Sir Robert Tilliol, the keeper of Lochmaben castle, sent information on the activities of the Scots to the king early in September 1301. The rebels were drawn up in two forces, one under Soules and the earl of Buchan at Loudoun and the other under Sir Simon Fraser, Sir Alexander Abernethy and Sir Herbert Morham at Stonehouse near Strathaven. They were clearly intending to harass the king's forces which were less than twenty miles away in Glasgow, since the prince's army was much further away at the time, probably at Turnberry. Their position at Loudoun, controlling the road from Ayr to Glasgow, would also have prevented the two English armies from joining up<sup>31</sup>.

#### *Sir Simon Fraser and Sir Herbert Morham*

This is the first information on the activities of Sir Simon Fraser on the rebel side. Fraser left the English camp at some point in 1301, in dramatic fashion, stealing Sir William Durham's horse and armour from Wark castle in order to make his escape. It has been suggested that Fraser joined the rebels around the turn of 1300/1301. In fact, the last mention of Sir Simon on the English side is as late as 27 June 1301, when £40 was issued to his valet at York for the cost of two horses bought from Fraser by the treasurer. By that time the king himself was in Northumberland, en route for Berwick<sup>32</sup>.

The reason behind Fraser's desertion to the rebel cause is not too difficult to guess at. We have already seen that Sir Hugh Audley was ordered to receive the "middle men of Scotland" to the king's peace on 6 June. This suggests that he already occupied the position of keeper of Selkirk Forest which he certainly held in August 1301<sup>33</sup>. In that case, Sir Simon Fraser had been removed by the king from that office, probably because of suspicions of his loyalty, and this surely prompted him to change sides. There is no doubt that he had leanings towards the Scots since 1299. His arrival in the rebel camp must have taken place soon after this final reference to him on 27 June<sup>34</sup> if he was at Loudoun early in September.

Another recent recruit to the rebel army at Loudoun was Sir Herbert Morham. The last reference to him in English records was on 1 March 1301 when a debt of 20s. was repaid to him. Morham had been captured in 1299 while attempting to abduct the dowager countess of Fife but he was serving Edward in the Edinburgh garrison in 1300<sup>35</sup>. The arrival of both Sir Simon Fraser and Sir Herbert Morham in the Scottish camp in mid-1301 is a good indication of the strength of the Scottish position at that time

31 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 431; Barrow, *Bruce*, 121; E101/364/13; E101/358/6; C.D.S., iv, p.451.

32 C.D.S., iv, pp.450-1; C.D.S., ii, no.1317; Barrow, *Bruce*, 121, n.80; C.D.S., iv, p.454; *Itin.*, 174.

33 C.P.R., 1292-1301, 585; see above, p.165; E101/9/15, dorso.

34 See Chapter Four, p.?. Fraser did not receive this money personally at York - it was given to one of his valets. This therefore does not preclude his changing sides a little earlier than 27 June.

35 C.D.S., iv, p.454; Chapter Four, pp.92-3; E101/9/25/5.



since there is little point in changing sides during a rebellion unless that rebellion looks as if it has a good chance of success.

### *The Scots go south to Lochmaben*

When the king left Glasgow bound for Bothwell on 5 September<sup>36</sup>, it seems likely that the two Scottish contingents from Loudoun and Stonehouse joined together. Certainly a large Scottish army under Soules and Umfraville arrived outside the walls of Lochmaben on 7 September. This Scottish army numbered, according to Tilliol again, "40 bannerets, 12 score men-at-arms [and] 7000 footmen or more." Though these numbers are doubtless exaggerated, this was obviously a force of some size.

After attacking the pele for several hours, the Scots withdrew to Annan where they "burnt and pillaged the country round about." They returned to Lochmaben the next day [8 September] but the Scots seem to have come off worst since Sir David Brechin and Sir John Vaux were injured "and many others were killed and wounded". On the English side, Sir William Herries was captured and 'a man of Wintain' killed. Later that day the Scots moved west to Sir John's Comyn's castle at Dalswinton, en route for Nithsdale and Galloway "and they are causing to return to them those who came to peace<sup>37</sup> and are collecting a greater force to come to our marches". The western march was still clearly in a state of flux, with the loyalties of the native population changing at the approach of an English or a Scottish army.

Tilliol began his first letter by telling the king "... that you have rejoiced us much with the rescue which you have promised us ..." and "that your honour shall never be injured by us as long as our victuals last."<sup>38</sup> This rescue could not have been effected by the king himself, who was about to leave for Bothwell. The prince did move south from Turnberry around this time, en route for Loch Ryan near Stranraer, which was nevertheless over ninety miles from Lochmaben<sup>39</sup>. Sir John de St. John was at 'Knockedolyan en Carrigg' (Knockdolian near Ballantrae, on the coast) on 14 September. Since this was between Turnberry and Loch Ryan, it seems likely that he and his thirty men-at-arms were with the prince's army<sup>40</sup>. The withdrawal of St. John's retinue from Dumfries and Lochmaben must surely have left these castles vulnerable to attack.

However, a force was detached from the prince's army, under the command of the earl of Lincoln, and had reached the Lochmaben area by 21 September since the earl wrote to the king from "Galloway near Lochmaben" on that date. Prince Edward himself

36 *Itin.*, 178; *C.D.S.*, ii, no.1229.

37 This suggests that some of the local population of the south-west did come to Edward's peace as a result of the orders to St. John in May 1301 [see above, p.165].

38 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 431-33.

39 *C.D.S.*, ii, no.1233.

40 Sir Thomas Paiguel, one of St. John's knights, was with the prince at Ayr [see above, p.170].

was still at Loch Ryan on 22 September<sup>41</sup>. He may well have been acting on orders from his father to cut off the Scots moving west to Galloway. The presence of this English force in western Carrick and Galloway effectively forced the rebels to move east. Nevertheless, the prince of Wales had failed to conquer the south-west in any permanent way.

### *The south-east: English preparations against the coming of the Scots*

The king had not neglected to inform those on the eastern march of rebel activities in the west. Around 13 September 1301, Sir Robert Hastings wrote to Edward, having received the king's letter on that date:

"... to the effect that I should watch the return of Sir John Soules and your other enemies of Scotland towards our parts and [arrange], with the aid of Sir Alexander Balliol<sup>42</sup>, Sir Walter Huntercumbe<sup>43</sup>, Sir Hugh Audley, Sir Richard, my brother, and the sheriff of Peebles<sup>44</sup>, with the men of our bailiwicks, to do to him the worst we could."

Hastings had then arranged with his fellow officers:

"... to prepare as many troops as possible each from his bailiwick, at one day's warning and one night, to attack your enemies according to the news coming to me. And each one of us in person should be able to assemble together at a certain place in our county where my spies will come to me this Sunday, 17 September, to arrange to make all the damage we can to your enemies."<sup>45</sup>

On 18 September 1300, Sir Hugh Audley, the keeper of Selkirk Forest replied to another letter that he had received from Edward. The king was apparently 'surprised' that he had not heard earlier of the activities of those in the south-east, having requested information in the letters which had arrived on 13 September. Audley had sent a reply to this first letter "containing all we know for certain", but it had presumably not arrived before Edward wrote the second letter.

Since then, the meeting for 17 September, mentioned in Hastings' letter, should have taken place. However, on the day, only the Hastings' brothers and Audley himself turned up "and very few of the country folk, except our foresters, who came loyally, and are ready to perform all your commands". As a result, nothing was organised. Audley therefore requested the king to order "that they [the other south-eastern officers] come quickly since we have things to do."

41 C.D.S., ii, no.1224; C.D.S., iv, p.446.

42 Balliol had perhaps by now been appointed as keeper of Selkirk castle although building work had not yet begun and there are no references to a garrison.

43 Huntercumbe was still captain of Northumberland.

44 The new sheriff of Peebles was Sir William Durham.

45 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 434-5.

Edward's previous letter must have referred to the appointment of Sir Walter Burghdon to a position of command, since Audley assured the king that he would "be ready to obey the commands of Sir Walter Burghdon" and that "whenever he sends for me, I will come as quickly as I can".

Burghdon was a Scot, holding lands in Roxburghshire. In 1296 he had held the office of sheriff of Perth, presumably under King John. Having served Edward in the garrison at Berwick in 1299-1300, Sir Walter was made keeper of Carstairs and sheriff of Lanark by 21 September 1301<sup>46</sup>. From his position in the middle of the country, he had perhaps been ordered by the king to organise the defence of the eastern march against a Scottish attack from the west.

In his letter, Audley also warned the king that the sheriffdom of Peebles was not well guarded. The first reference to an English officer there appeared only a month previously, on 13 August 1301, when Sir William Durham was named as sheriff with a company of nine men-at-arms<sup>47</sup>. It is likely, therefore, that no arrangements for keeping the sheriffdom of Peebles by the English were made before that date.

This concern with Peebles, which is situated on the north edge of Selkirk Forest<sup>48</sup> and therefore on the periphery of the English-dominated south-east, perhaps indicates success in dealing with the Scots in that area. It is undoubtedly no coincidence that Peebles had come under English control only months after Sir Simon Fraser had been removed from his office of keeper of the forest.

Lastly Audley submitted a petition to the king on behalf of Michael Whitton, the head forester, who had burned his houses on English instructions in the previous year<sup>49</sup>. Whitton had been granted the tithes of the land of Bothel, in Cumberland, but had not received them and sought remedy from Edward<sup>50</sup>.

Further information was sent to the king from two other English officials in the south-east. Like Sir Robert Hastings, Sir Alexander Balliol and Sir William Durham also had spies in the rebel army. According to Sir William's spy, who came to Peebles from the rebels in Nithsdale on 21 September, "the Scots who were in Galloway had retreated towards Nithsdale and this Sunday past [20 September] were at 'les Kellys' [near Kirkconnel] and would be at Glencarn [Glencairn, in Glentrool Forest] on the Monday after, but whither or whence they would 'draw', he did not know to certify him." The spy also said that the Scots had heard that the prince of Wales was on pilgrimage to St. Ninian [Whithorn], whereupon they removed the image to New Abbey [Sweetheart].

46 C.D.S., ii, pp.199, 264; *Lib. Quot.*, 146; C.D.S., v, no.201; E101/358/6.

47 E101/9/15, dorso.

48 Peebles is some thirty miles due south of Edinburgh and twenty north-west of Selkirk.

49 See Chapter Five, pp.140-1.

50 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 417-8.

However, the English appear to have found it and taken it back<sup>51</sup>. The rebel forces and those of Prince Edward were clearly in close proximity to each other.

Sir Alexander Balliol informed the king that "the writer and fellow keepers of the march are threatened by a possible Scottish raid to destroy the writer's lands and to seize and defend the forest..." Balliol's spies were to keep those on the eastern march informed of the movements of the Scots, so that they were sufficiently prepared for such an attack. In the meantime, another meeting "to inspect forces" was arranged for 24 September<sup>52</sup>.

### Preparing for a winter in Scotland:

Remaining in Scotland naturally put a strain on the administrative machinery already stretched to provide supplies for a summer campaign. On 14 August 1301 various English sheriffs were ordered "to induce merchants and others of those counties who wish to sell victuals and other necessaries by land and sea to the king and his army in Scotland..." The sheriffs of the northern counties of Northumberland, Cumberland and Westmorland were included, illustrating the urgent need for supplies. These orders were concluded with the thinly-veiled threat that each sheriff was:

"... enjoined to conduct himself so in executing this order that the king may be able to realise that the sheriff has this matter specially at heart and that he desires its speedy and happy expedition, and so that it may not be delayed through lack of victuals and other necessities to the damage of the king, the sheriff and of all the people of the realm."

Thus, a further 5500 quarters of wheat, 2300 quarters of oats, 1000 quarters of beans and peas, 1500 quarters of malt and 1000 quarters of barley were to be purveyed in England in this year<sup>53</sup>.

### Financial problems: *Sir John de St. John*

Although credit could be used to a certain extent in paying for a campaign<sup>54</sup>, hard cash still had to be transported north. There was rarely enough, however. On 27 August 1301 Sir John de St. John was beseeching sir Ralph Manton for payment of the arrears of his wages, because "he had great works to do and is heavily indebted to the poor people of all parts, who dolefully beseech him for victuals and other things he has taken from them."<sup>55</sup> This shows, however, that St. John was in an unusual position for

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51 C.D.S., ii, no.1225.

52 Sir Alexander Balliol was lord of Cavers in the sheriffdom of Roxburgh. Sir Simon Fraser, now no longer enjoying any official position in the south-east, was perhaps behind the ravaging of lands in that area. C.D.S., v, no.257.

53 C.C.R., 1296-1302, 498.

54 The cost of victuals consumed<sup>by</sup> members of the army could be deducted from their wages.

55 C.D.S., ii, no.1218.

an English official in being able to collect supplies from the area over which he had jurisdiction.

### *Mutiny at Berwick*

In August 1301 a most extraordinary event took place in the garrison of Berwick town. The incident is related in a letter to the king, probably from sir Ralph Manton. Apparently the late arrival on 30 August of £200 ordered by the king before he left Berwick in July<sup>56</sup> provoked a mutiny on 28 August among "the foot crossbowmen and archers in the garrison, joined by some of the men-at-arms of Sir Ralph fitz Michael, who was with them in Gascony and is their leader and *mestre abettour* in all riots."

The next day, despite threats to himself and the men-at-arms with him, Manton "rode up the great street, which they were blocking to prevent the guard being mounted." Though his people were "molested ... vilely on returning", the cofferer was able to reach the castle and to place "two men-at-arms at each post". He then "consulted Sir Walter Teye (the captain of the garrison), who said that he could not blame the mutineers, for when the earls of England were in the town<sup>57</sup>, they had only got three days' pay, and were now a month in arrear."

Manton and his men therefore remained on guard at the *palis* [palisade] and were joined the next day (30 August) by Sir John Seytone and his four valets. Sir Walter was ordered to proclaim a meeting of all men-at-arms to be held in St. Nicholas's church. At the meeting, each man was asked whether or not they would mount guard. "All replied that they would willingly and that they had no concern in the mutiny of the foot". They therefore agreed to remain at their posts until the following Friday (1 September), but, fortunately, the £200 arrived the same day, Wednesday 30 August. The next morning it was counted out in front of the sheriff of Northumberland and part was set aside for the garrisons of Roxburgh and Jedburgh.

The Berwick garrison was itself paid on the Friday (1 September). Sir Walter, however, ordered Manton "to pay the whole sum to the garrison of Berwick and none other", because of the wording of the king's letter to him, which did not mention the other two garrisons. Manton's response was that "the king always treated Roxburgh, Jedburgh and Berwick as one." Sir Walter claimed ignorance without more specific instructions from the king, "he only being a lay man", and ordered the payment to go ahead at Berwick only. Manton therefore "suffered evil and annoyance through want of this, for in place of Sir Walter getting only £14 14s., he has taken £36 from him, whereby he has nothing to pay his own people"<sup>58</sup>.

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56 Edward and his army left Berwick on 18 July [*Itin.*, 176]

57 These earls were presumably with the royal army.

58 *C.D.S.*, ii, no.1223.

This mutiny, which was only prevented from becoming very serious by the arrival of the £200 before Friday 1 September, must have been extremely worrying for Edward. There was little point in organising a successful campaign if the English garrisons were in danger of disintegration due to lack of money and supplies.

### *Continuing problems*

On 25 September, about a month after the mutiny at Berwick<sup>59</sup>, an anonymous letter - probably from sir John Droxford, the keeper of the wardrobe, at the exchequer in York - was sent to the king describing the financial situation regarding the Scottish garrisons. A total of 2000 marks had been sent to Berwick around 14 September. 500 marks had also been sent to Carlisle to the prince, who "greatly needed money", bringing the total received there to 2000 marks. The writer now hoped "that by Michaelmas [29 September] there will be enough to pay both the king's army and his son's, if not otherwise disposed of by the king, and if as much as possible of the 'proffer' is taken beforehand". Without this money, it would apparently "be difficult to help the garrisons of Berwick or Lochmaben"<sup>60</sup>. The danger of mutiny or desertion from the garrisons - a most serious state of affairs for the future of the English administration of Scotland - was not over.

### *The activities of sir Ralph Manton in the south-east*

Manton remained in the south-east to organise the garrisons and collect siege-engines for the king, before returning to the court at Dunipace at the beginning of October. On 30 September, he sent another letter to the king, describing his activities. Arrangements had already been made to strengthen the English forces in Selkirk Forest, in preparation for a Scottish attack. A total of twenty men-at-arms and one hundred and twenty footsoldiers from the garrisons of Roxburgh and Berwick had been sent to Audley, along with Sir Thomas Grey and his three knights, who were "no longer at Ayr with earl Patrick"<sup>61</sup>. This brought the total of men-at-arms with Sir Hugh to fifty, in addition to a further six with the sheriff of Peebles.

Manton had also spoken with the Hastangs brothers, Sir Alexander Balliol and Audley himself, instructing them, on behalf of the king, "to send out scouts and each warn the other and also the country". Sir Alexander was still in touch with his spies and had reassured sir Ralph that "whenever the enemy issue from Galloway he will know two days before and will warn the king by two or three messengers of what road they take,

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<sup>59</sup> See above, pp.177-8.

<sup>60</sup> This proffer was the lay fifteenth and the clerical ninth agreed at the Lincoln parliament of January 1301 [Parl. Writs, i, 105]. C.D.S., ii, no.1228.

<sup>61</sup> The earl of March was granted the keeping of the castle and sheriffdom of Ayr in 1301 [see below, p.170].

and so will the others". Manton had not managed to see the sheriff of Peebles, "who neither came nor sent an excuse" but the others were to inform the sheriff of the king's commands. There is no doubt that the threat of a Scottish attack on the south-east was taken very seriously indeed, both by the king and his officials.

Fortunately Manton had also "divided £200 of the fine made by Newcastle for the fifteenth among the garrisons of Berwick, Roxburgh, Jedburgh and the Forest, to his best judgement, for their fifteen days' wages", thereby avoiding a repetition of the events of the previous month. Five days previously, a member of the Exchequer at York had written to the king informing him that money was becoming scarce<sup>62</sup>.

Sir Ralph was not at all happy about the state of the garrisons. He told the king that if he himself had not come, "all the garrisons on this side would have been scattered for want". The king's money from the exchequer came to Berwick on St. Michael's eve [28 September], but was not as much as he had expected "and should have had". He had informed sir John Droxford as to the king's provisions at Berwick, that is, how much had come from each county, and its condition and charged him to collect as much as he could everywhere, "for your business in Scotland depends much on *vivers*"<sup>63</sup>. The English garrisons in Scotland were still leading a precarious existence, caused not by lack of military strength but by an inability to secure adequate lines of payment and supply. Manton's letters indicate the state of these garrisons and if Berwick, which was the first place to which money and supplies were sent, was in such a desperate situation, others, such as Lochmaben and Dumfries, were surely in an even worse one. This is corroborated by a letter to the treasurer at York from the prince of Wales, written on 23 October 1301, in which the latter warned that he had "found the castles of Lochmaben and Dumfries feebly garrisoned with troops and lacking in victuals and other provisions"<sup>64</sup>.

It was also probably Manton who wrote a letter to the king on 1 October informing him, among other things, of the removal of John Balliol by the French king to his family estates at Ballieul in Picardy. The winter of 1301-2 saw the zenith of French support for the Balliol cause, though this had less of an effect on Edward than it did on the earl of Carrick<sup>65</sup>.

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62 C.D.S., ii, no.1230; C.D.S., ii, no.1228.

63 C.D.S., ii, no.1230.

64 C.D.S., v, no.264.

65 C.D.S., v, no.259; E.L.G. Stones, 'The Submission of Robert Bruce to Edward I, c.1301-2, S.H.R., xxxiv, 122-34; see Chapter Seven, p.195.

### Inverkip and Stirling:

Edward left Bothwell around 22 September<sup>66</sup>. His original intention seems to have been to move westwards to Inverkip. The earl of Lincoln was the English owner-in-waiting of this castle and he wrote to the king from Galloway on 21 September and 2 October, "understanding that as soon as he has taken Bothwell castle, the king will attempt that of Inverkip". The earl claimed the castle as part of a grant of the lands of Strathgryfe, which belonged to James the Steward. It is generally supposed that the prince's army was to have linked up with that of the king at Inverkip in a 'pincer movement'. This was obviously no longer intended since the prince's army had turned south from Turnberry into Galloway<sup>67</sup>.

Unknown to the earl of Lincoln, who clearly expected the king to go to Inverkip no matter what his son was doing, Edward had, in fact, gone east to Dunipace, near Stirling, by 27 September<sup>68</sup>. The intention was clearly to attempt to reduce Stirling castle, as Manton's letter on 30 September also shows. The cofferer had been busy gathering together various engines, engineers and carpenters at Berwick, to be sent west. Manton had also ordered the sheriff of Northumberland to send north 12 carpenters and 12 masons, though "he has not yet one". On 4 October, Sir John Kingston, at Edinburgh, also sent various pieces of siege equipment to the king<sup>69</sup>.

Other preparations included the building of a road and a bridge near Dunipace. Repairs were also made "on a bridge beyond a certain river ... for the passage of the king's carts there"<sup>70</sup>.

### Retreat:

Edward remained at Dunipace from 27 September throughout most of October. On 29 September, several members of the army, perhaps on a foraging trip, encountered a group of Scots at Airth, east of Stirling, and a fight ensued in which two horses on the English side were killed<sup>71</sup>.

By October 1301 the English army had spent four months in Scotland and was to remain there for a further three months. However, the state of his finances was by now causing Edward considerable concern. On 11 October he sent a peremptory letter to the exchequer, noting his 'surprise', like Manton, at how little money had been sent. Therefore, the king complained, he could not pay his men, most of whom had already left

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66 *Itin.*, 179.

67 *C.D.S.*, ii, nos.1224, 1235, 1290; E101/10/15; G. Barrow and A. Royan, *James Fifth Steward of Scotland, 1260(?)–1309, Essays on the Nobility of Scotland*, 179; Barrow, *Bruce*, 121; Prestwich, *Edward 1*, 494.

68 *Itin.*, 180.

69 *C.D.S.*, ii, nos.1230, 1237.

70 *C.D.S.*, iv, p.453. This was perhaps the Kelvin.

71 *C.D.S.*, ii, no.1190.



and he "cannot prevent the daily desertions" of those remaining with him<sup>72</sup>. Edward put the blame for this situation squarely on his officials at York, ordering them to ensure that their inefficiency did not force him to withdraw.

Much of Edward's ire stemmed from the fact that the lay and clerical taxes - the fifteenth and the tenth - and the usual issues for the Michaelmas term, should all have been collected by now.

Two days later, on 13 October, the king again wrote to sir John Droxford at the exchequer. Referring to Manton's letter to Droxford informing the latter of "the state of the king's supplies"<sup>73</sup>, Edward now required 'hasty purveyance' to be made. The prince of Wales' army was making its way to Dunipace and the queen and her household had also now joined her husband for the winter.

Droxford had, in fact, left York for London before the arrival of this letter. However, the barons of the exchequer opened it and sent word back to the king that 5600 quarters of corn and other supplies were being collected, to be sent to Berwick by Christmas. The Michaelmas issues and the proceeds of the fifteenth were being used to pay for this purveyance<sup>74</sup>.

Writs to various English sheriffs were sent out on the same date, ordering this purveyance, which totalled 5600 quarters of wheat, 5000 quarters of malt, 5600 quarters of oats and 1400 quarters of beans and peas<sup>75</sup>.

Purveyance from Ireland, totalling 2000 quarters of wheat, 2000 quarters of oats, 2000 quarters of malt, 4000 'great fish' and 20,000 herring, was ordered on 21 November. Around three-quarters was to be sent to Skinburness by 2 February 1302 for the garrisons of Dumfries and Lochmaben and the rest to Ayr for the garrison there. 200 barrels of wine and 20 casks of honey were also ordered from Ireland on 5 December<sup>76</sup>.

The problems of cash flow are clearly illustrated by the two letters of 11 and 13 October. Those in charge of purveyance and the collection of revenues due to the king obviously required the latter to pay for the former. Thus much of the taxation and other royal revenues did not even reach the border.

In Scotland itself, however, cash was desperately needed for the wages of those serving in both the garrisons and the army. Although the cost of food could be deducted, the remainder of each man's wages, for those temporarily in Scotland, had to be paid in order to persuade him to remain in the north, particularly in a year when he was being asked to stay over the winter. Desertion from the army had been a problem since 1298<sup>77</sup>.

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72 *C.D.S.*, v, no.260.

73 See above, p.179.

74 *C.D.S.*, v, no.261.

75 *C.P.R.*, 1292-1301, 608-9.

76 *C.P.R.*, 1302-7, 2.

77 See Chapter Three, p.75.

However, as the mutiny at Berwick illustrates, Edward could not now be sure that the members of his garrisons would remain at their posts either.

Edward also wrote to Richard Bremesgrave, the keeper of the royal store at Berwick on 13 October. The latter was ordered to brew up all the red wine that he could, in preparation for the winter, "so that it is so good and so strong that it can last a long time without being wasted". Flour was also to be ground "from day to day". The king, having no reason to berate Bremesgrave as he did his officials at York, was less emotional about his situation, merely commenting that "since we doubt that we will have enough victuals in the parts where we are, we order you, as hastily as you can, to have come to Blackness all the wheat flour, beer, wine and oats that you can"<sup>78</sup>. This still shows, however, that supplies were running out.

On 16 October the king sent another letter to the exchequer, in the same vein as that of 13 October. The tone was even more desperate, however. The lack of money had meant that none of his promises of payment had been kept and desertions continued. But for this, Edward complained, he would have "completed the bridge across the Forth"<sup>79</sup>. If he had managed to do so 'this season', he would have "made such exploit against the enemy" that the venture would have quickly reached "a satisfactory and honourable conclusion".

The king also ordered that all money being sent north should be sent only to himself, with the exception of that destined for those in the garrisons of Dumfries and Lochmaben and others guarding the western march - where the Scots were still active<sup>80</sup> - and the new garrison at Ayr. This again illustrates the desperation of the financial situation, since no provision appears to have been made for the payment of the eastern garrisons, which, though not yet directly threatened by the Scots, were still extremely vulnerable.

A reply to this letter was sent by the barons of the exchequer on 28 October. £1000, which had to be borrowed in York, was sent north immediately. Droxford, as stated in the previous letter from York, had gone to London in search of further funds and those remaining at York assured the king that they were constantly urging the sheriffs to expedite the raising of their revenues. They also informed the king that £9789 16s.5d. assigned from the fifteenth - including £4000 owed as wages for the Welsh soldiers with

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<sup>78</sup> E101/9/25, m.5.

<sup>79</sup> This presumably meant the re-capture and holding of the whole of Scotland south of the Forth, which would have restricted the movements of the Scots and left the way clear for the English to advance north of the Forth. The king may have seriously hoped to reduce Stirling castle in October 1301, as part of this plan, but, if so, such an idea was soon abandoned.

<sup>80</sup> See Chapter below, p.185.

the prince of Wales - were not now to be paid, "since this seems the only way to save the royal expedition"<sup>81</sup>.

Given the almost daily stream of letters sent to York by the king demanding financial relief, the cancelling of monies allocated from the fifteenth was inevitable. However, this did have some disturbing implications. On 18 December 1301, letters of credence were issued to those in charge of purveyance in the English counties. They were now ordered to explain to those who had "granted to the king last year<sup>82</sup> certain corn for his maintenance in Scotland" that they would not now be paid from the proceeds of the fifteenth as they had been promised, but would have to wait until the following Midsummer. Alternatively, if they did want payment now, "they are desired to advise and ordain how the king may be best served with the corn that he needs now for his maintenance henceforth"<sup>83</sup>. Payment for these fresh supplies would then be paid from the fifteenth at Midsummer 1302. The king did categorically promise that he "will pay for the corn that he has ordained to take or that he shall take in the respective counties readily to everyone without making prise of corn by any of his ministers" .

The mention of prise is significant. Purveyance meant that the king and his ministers purchased grain at its market value. The employment of the royal prerogative of prise - originally intended to feed the royal household, not the royal army - allowed the king to buy up supplies at a fixed - and, presumably, low - price. Edward's promises regarding payment were perhaps a veiled threat - if he did not get what he required, he would be forced to resort to the prerogative of prise. However, he had to tread carefully and indeed the letter of credence was couched in polite and persuasive terms. If this year's purveyance was not to be paid for until the following year, by which time further purveyance would have been made, it would become more and more difficult to persuade men to part with their crops.

These measures came too late to enable Edward to achieve anything further from the campaign of 1301. On 22 October the king had to inform the exchequer that he was retreating to Linlithgow for the winter, since so many of his troops, "both horse and foot" had deserted and he was "in danger of losing" what had already been won. Again he ordered that as much money as possible was to be sent north. He declared that he would not accept the 'excuse' that "it is dangerous to transport large quantities of [coin]"<sup>84</sup>, presumably responding to a worry previously voiced by those at the exchequer. There is no need to doubt that this last point was a genuine concern of those serving Edward's administration in Scotland, both north and south of the border, and illustrates once more

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81 E159/75, m.10.

82 This probably means the previous regnal year, that is, 20 November 1300 to 19 November 1301.

83 C.C.R., 1296-1302, 574-5.

84 C.D.S., v, no.263.

that, despite Edward's efforts in both 1300 and 1301, Scotland south of the Forth was still not safe for the English.

#### The south-west:

The south-western garrisons under Sir John de St. John were suffering particularly from a lack of both cash and supplies<sup>85</sup>. On 13 October it was arranged that £25 from Lancashire and £25 from Westmorland and Cumberland would be paid to St. John as part of the 200 marks owed to him. A further £100 from Lancashire was assigned to him on 20 October. On 22 November the king ordered that the proceeds of the fifteenth in Cumberland and Westmorland were to be handed over to Dalilegh at Carlisle<sup>86</sup>. There is, unfortunately, no evidence of how much was actually paid over.

In any event, these measures were not enough. On 31 December 1301, Edward himself wrote to the exchequer, explaining that, "since we have heard that Sir John de St. John and the good people who are staying in his company in the garrisons of the castles of Lochmaben and Dumfries, as you know well, have been and still are in great danger and hardship for lack of money", sufficient amounts were to be sent to St. John as soon as possible<sup>87</sup>.

Meanwhile, the prince was making his way up through Galloway, having stopped at Dumfries and Lochmaben en route. On 23 October he sent a letter to the treasurer in York, describing the dreadful state of these two garrisons. The king had already ordered all money coming to Scotland to be sent straight to him, except for that destined for the garrisons of Dumfries and Lochmaben, other officers on the march and earl Patrick at Ayr<sup>88</sup>.

#### Deterioration:

Worse was to follow, however. The decision to winter in Scotland was surely made because of the experience of previous campaigns when the Scots had managed to recover much of the ground lost to an English army during a campaign once that army had returned south. By remaining at Linlithgow, Edward no doubt hoped to protect English gains in the south-west, in preparation for building on them during the next campaigning season. However, on 26 January 1302<sup>89</sup> the treaty of Asnières between Edward of England and Philip of France, granting a truce to the Scots until 1 November 1302, was ratified by the king at Linlithgow. The English army thereafter began its return south.

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85 See above, p.184.

86 E159/75, m.68, 69.

87 E159/75, m.14.

88 C.D.S., v, no.262.

89 The treaty was ratified by the king of France on 25 December 1301.

Letters of credence on behalf of Edward's ambassadors sent to treat with the king of France, which gave them full powers to grant a truce to the Scots, had been issued as early as 24 August 1301, when the king and his army were still at Glasgow. Edward had thus already realised that his plan to conquer the south-west by means of a 'pincer movement' was not going to be successful and that he would not now be in Scotland for a campaign in the following year<sup>90</sup>. It was therefore very important to him to achieve as much as he could during this year's campaign, which explains the tone of the letters written to York from Dunipace in October. Knowing that time was running out, the king was determined to be active for as long as he could. However, this was only possible if enough cash and supplies were available to prevent his army from dwindling away.

There is also no reason to impute too much exaggeration to Edward when he described the daily flow of deserters from his army. The wages' lists for the Falkirk campaign, which provide evidence for an astonishing decrease in numbers when supplies were not reaching the army immediately prior to the battle<sup>91</sup>, prove - if proof were needed - that many footsoldiers preferred to risk the king's wrath by deserting rather than face starvation.

There was a further cause for concern. On 25 October a servant was "sent to Glasgow to learn of rumours there of the Scots"<sup>92</sup>. If the Scots were already besieging Ayr, then the entire area west of Glasgow was seriously threatened.

### Scottish activities in the autumn/winter of 1301: Ayr

When Edward had taken his army east towards Stirling and the prince was occupied making pilgrimages in Wigtownshire<sup>93</sup>, the Scots moved through Carrick and the districts of Kyle and Cunningham. John Marshall, the earl of Lincoln's baillie in the barony of Renfrew reported that the Guardian was advancing towards him with a large army<sup>94</sup>. On 3 October the newly-captured castle of Turnberry was besieged "with 400 men-at-arms and *petail* (equipment) enough to damage it as much as they could".

The constable at Ayr, Sir Montasini de Novelliano, and the sheriff, Sir Edmund Maudley, were expecting the Scottish army at Ayr within the next eight days and thus urgently required reinforcements "for the Scots are in such force that they and the other loyalists there cannot withstand them". Though no doubt these numbers are exaggerated, this force was clearly the Scottish 'host', as opposed to the followers of a very select group of Scottish nobles, which might have resulted from the guardianship being associated too closely with the Comyn family. Such a selective army could have resulted

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90 C.P.R., 1292-1301, 616.

91 See Chapter Three, pp.74-5.

92 C.D.S., iv, p.454.

93 C.D.S., ii, no.1225.

94 C.D.S., ii, no.1121.

when Comyn of Badenoch and Sir Ingram d'Umfraville were both guardians. However, this Scottish 'host' most probably included the 'army' of Carrick, under its earl, and the retinues of other Bruce supporters.

The constable and sheriff, had, as yet, heard nothing from earl Patrick, the keeper of the castle and sheriffdom, "at which they wonder much". Another letter to the king from Ralph Manton, written on 2 October, shows that earl Patrick was still at Dunbar on the previous day. The latter had informed the cofferer "from the king to wait there till he himself joined the king [at Dunipace]"<sup>95</sup>.

It is unclear exactly when earl Patrick arrived in Ayr. According to letters patent which he issued at Ayr in February 1302, the Scots besieged the garrison there "after his own arrival at the castle". Since the Scots were already active in the area early in October 1301, this suggests that the earl arrived in Ayr in that month<sup>96</sup>.

The Scots were also still active in and around Selkirk Forest. On 29 October Martin Garsie, a member of the Berwick town garrison in July 1301, was captured at Melrose<sup>97</sup>, despite the presence of the 50 men-at-arms and 120 footsoldiers under Sir Hugh Audley in the Forest itself.

Of more significance, however, was the capture, in December, of Sir Robert Hastangs, near his own castle at Roxburgh. One of his knights, Sir Robert Cleseby, also lost a horse at the same time. Hastangs was still named as the sheriff and constable of Roxburgh on 12 February 1302, however, and was, therefore, released soon after his capture on deliverance of his brother, Nicholas, as a hostage<sup>98</sup>.

#### **Arrangements made for keeping the garrisons:**

On 17 November 1301 arrangements were made for the keeping of the western march, which had already been noted as badly provisioned. Sir John de St. John was to have under his command a small standing army numbering one hundred and twenty men-at-arms "constantly arrayed to make forays on the Scots in Galloway till next Easter [22 April 1302]". Clearly the prince of Wales's army had not been effective in establishing English control throughout Galloway.

In addition, the garrisons of Lochmaben and Dumfries were each to contain ten men-at-arms and hundred footsoldiers and a clerk was to be sent "without delay to see to their weekly pay, and also to the proper munition of these castles with dead stock, corn and wine and other *vivers*, as he hears they are insufficiently provided". However, despite

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95 C.D.S., ii, nos.1234, 1236.

96 C.D.S., ii, no.1293; see Chapter Seven, p.195.

97 E101/9/18, m.2; C.D.S., ii, no.1190.

98 C.D.S., iv, p.450; E101/68/1, m.16; C.D.S., ii, no.1598; see Chapter Fourteen, p.317..

these arrangements, the king had to send further orders on 31 December for money to be sent to St. John "who is in great want of it for these garrisons"<sup>99</sup>.

On 8 October a daily rate of pay, beginning on that date, was calculated for both the royal army and the fortresses in English hands. The list of garrisons, with the numbers in them, is given below.

Carstairs castle [sheriffdom of Lanark]	Sir Walter Burghdon 30 men-at-arms [2 knights] 80 archers [£2 6s.]	
Peebles [sheriffdom]	Sir William Durham 6 men-at-arms [7s.]	
Berwick town and castle	25 men-at-arms [4 knights] 60 crossbowmen 270 archers 1 engineer 1 mason 1 bowyer [£5 1s.]	1 carpenter 1 smith 1 watchman
Roxburgh town and castle	30 men-at-arms [1 banneret; 2 knights] 26 crossbowmen 34 archers 1 carpenter 1 smith 1 watchman [£2 8s.6d.]	1 mason 1 bowyer
Jedburgh castle	10 men-at-arms [1 knight] 10 crossbowmen 20 archers 1 carpenter 1 smith 1 watchman [18s.8d.]	1 mason 1 bowyer
Selkirk Forest	Sir Hugh Audley 24 men-at-arms [2 knights] [£1 6s.]	

The amount paid out in wages for these six castles totalled £12 7s.2d. per day or £4510 1s.7d. per annum and this is by no means a full list of garrisons in English hands<sup>100</sup>.

<sup>99</sup> C.D.S., ii, no.1257.

<sup>100</sup> The western castles of Lochmaben, Dumfries, Ayr, Bothwell and Carstairs are not included.

### New English garrisons: *Linlithgow*

Building at Linlithgow began in November 1301, presumably as a result of the king's decision to make his winter headquarters there. A decision was also taken to build a pele, but it was not started until February 1302 when various ordinances were made for its construction<sup>101</sup>.

A garrison under Sir William Felton, as keeper of the castle, was instituted at an unknown date in regnal year 29 [20 November 1300 - 19 November 1301]. Eighty-five men-at-arms and one hundred footsoldiers were to reside there, though ten of the men-at-arms came under the jurisdiction of the new sheriff, Sir Archibald Livingston.

### *Carstairs and Kirkintilloch*

References to garrisons at both Carstairs and Kirkintilloch suddenly appear in the records for 1301. There is no indication as to whether they were recaptured from the Scots or whether it had been considered infeasible, previously, to place a garrison inside them. Whichever, it is most likely that the garrisons were established while the king and his army was at Glasgow, between 21 August and 4 September<sup>102</sup>. Expeditionary forces could have been sent out from Glasgow before they were required for the siege of Bothwell.

The constable of Carstairs and the sheriff of Lanark was Sir Walter Burghdon who, as we have seen, was also in command of the defensive measures being taken by the garrison commanders in the eastern Scottish march in September 1301<sup>103</sup>. The numbers under his command are given in the list of garrisons on page 187. This sheriffdom had previously been administered by the Guardians through the Scottish sheriff, Sir Walter Logan<sup>104</sup>, and it is likely that the latter's authority was not completely broken in 1301<sup>105</sup>.

Kirkintilloch was probably garrisoned around the same time as Linlithgow, since Sir William Fraunceys, the constable, chose twenty archers from the Linlithgow garrison to go to Kirkintilloch. His garrison totalled twenty-seven men-at-arms, two smiths, one nightwatchman, one artillery maker, nineteen crossbowmen and the twenty archers from Linlithgow<sup>106</sup>.

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101 See Chapter Thirteen, pp.306-7.

102 *Itin.*, 178.

103 See above, p.175.

104 *Kelso Liber*, i, no.193.

105 See Conclusion.

106 E101/9/16, m.1 dorso.



*Dirleton*

Dirleton castle, the property of Sir Robert Maudley since its capture by the English in 1298, is mentioned in 1301, for the first time since 1299. By 1301, however, the castle was again regarded as so badly supplied that Maudley was to be allowed to purchase victuals from sir Richard Bremesgrave, keeper of the royal store at Berwick. This was not usual for a private castle, which was supposed to rely on its own demesnelands for supplies<sup>107</sup>.

*Stores at Ayr and Blackness*

Despite Edward's hope to have achieved more, the military successes of this year are attested to by the fact that two more royal stores became operational in 1301. The first was at Ayr. This store came under the overall control of James Dalilegh, the receiver at Carlisle and the latter indeed made an issue of flour, oats and wine from Ayr in September. A royal clerk, John Jarum, had been appointed keeper of the store at Ayr, under Dalilegh, by December 1301<sup>108</sup>. The western campaign must therefore have been backed up successfully by ships carrying provisions. The institution of a garrison at Linlithgow also brought about the first mention of a store at Blackness. Without this store, provisions could only have been brought up the coast as far as Leith. On 7 December 1301 a ship from Northumberland arrived at Blackness with supplies of hay for the king<sup>109</sup>.

**Evidence for general English administration:**

The lack of evidence in this year for the activities of Edward's officials in a general administrative capacity may merely be chance. Alternatively, and more likely, this very lack of evidence illustrates the dire straits in which both the garrisons and the army found themselves and the effectiveness of the Scots in threatening the English garrisons - including those in the south-east - to the extent that they were concerned almost entirely with defensive measures.

*Account of the sheriff of Edinburgh*

Most of the evidence for the south-eastern garrisons - Berwick, Roxburgh, Jedburgh and Selkirk Forest - in this year concerns the measures that were taken to defend themselves against a Scottish attack<sup>110</sup>. The garrison at Edinburgh, however, does not seem to have taken part in these preparations and the surrounding area was

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107 E101/13/17, m.26. Sir Robert Maudley was issued with supplies for Dirleton in 1299 [see Chapter Four, p.117].

108 E101/364/13; E101/684/46, m.5.

109 C.D.S., ii, no.1264.

110 See above, p.174.

perhaps the most secure sheriffdom in English hands. Certainly the sheriff, Sir John Kingston, was again able to bring in the issues of his bailiwick.

The account included issues from both year 28 [20 November 1299 - 19 November 1300], which totalled £22 7s.11d., and year 29 [20 November 1300 - 19 November 1301], totalling £94 3s.9d.. It would appear, therefore, that it became easier to collect these issues in the second year. The variety of issues also indicates that the sheriff and his officers were able to enforce their authority throughout the sheriffdom. These issues included 7s.6d. from the freight passage to Fife, £6 11s. from the farms, tolls and mills of Haddington, 6s.8d. from the coal-mines of Tranent, 6s.8d. from the labour-service of three men of Balerno, a total of 50s. 8d. from the tolls of Leith and Edinburgh and £10 from "the farms of the lands of the abbey and convent of Dunfermline in Musselburgh from lands which were in the king's hands"<sup>111</sup>.

#### **Developments in the Scottish administration:**

In July 1301, Sir John Soules, the Guardian, issued letters patent confirming Alexander Scrymgeour in certain rights pertaining to his constablership of Dundee. The issuing of such letters proves that the Scottish chancery, which was revived under Wallace<sup>112</sup>, was still operational. In addition, by 31 January 1301; Master Nicholas Balmyle had been appointed as chancellor, the chief officer of the chancery. Since any revenues which found their way to the Guardian were presumably required most pressingly for prosecuting the war, it had been arranged that "the rich abbey of Arbroath was made responsible for paying Master Nicholas's fee as chancellor"<sup>113</sup>. In April 1301 Balmyle was one of the Scottish representatives at Canterbury during the - unsuccessful - negotiations to arrange the renewal of the truce<sup>114</sup>. While there may have been a marked difference between the Scottish administration under the Guardians and that existing under Alexander III, it is clear that it was at least as effective as the one at Berwick.

#### **Conclusions:**

There can be no doubt that Edward was extremely disappointed at the outcome of events of 1301. There can also be no doubt that the lack of money and supplies, together with the success of the Scots in attacking the English in the south-west, were directly responsible for the final English retreat in February 1302. Although Edward was never one to mince his words when making demands of his officials, the events of 1301 justified his fears that the need for money and supplies might threaten the success of the campaign. The retreat to Linlithgow took place earlier than he intended and therefore

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<sup>111</sup> E101/9/2.

<sup>112</sup> See Chapter Three, p.86.

<sup>113</sup> Barrow, Bruce, 119-20.

<sup>114</sup> See above, p.164.

marked failure in his eyes: he had been unable to complete "the bridge across the Forth" in order to launch an attack on Scotland north of that river in the following season.

Thus, although Edward's officials in York and also at Berwick now had five years' experience of meeting the supply demands of both the royal army and the garrisons in Scotland, 1301 saw English resources stretched to the limit. This problem, which naturally became greater as English control increased over a larger geographical area, still left the garrisons of Dumfries and Lochmaben vulnerable to Scottish attacks, since their garrisons were depleted and their supplies almost gone. Most worryingly, the mutiny at Berwick - the very centre of the Scottish administration - proved that Edward's greatest enemy was probably not the Scots, but hunger.

Nevertheless, the campaign of 1301 had created a very different picture of the distribution of English garrisons from that of 1300. This could only mean a more widespread and effective English presence over the whole of Lowland Scotland. There certainly seems to have been an awareness, on Edward's part, of the necessity of picking specific strategic areas on which to concentrate, rather than hoping that a large-scale military presence would frighten the rebels into submitting, as it had done in 1296. The new, and extremely wise, policy of not offering battle employed by the Guardians probably contributed to the 'piece-meal' method of conquest upon which Edward was now engaged. Thus advances were being made, but it was a slow and painful process and the cost was very high.

## PART FIVE

1302 was the turning point in English fortunes in Scotland, although this was not immediately obvious. The year got off to a very bad start. On 26 January 1302, Edward felt compelled to ratify yet another truce with the Scots, to last until 30 November 1302, even though he was himself still in Linlithgow and keen to renew the campaign once the winter was over.

Desertions and lack of supplies had forced the king to change his plans. If he had gone ahead, the numbers under his command would not have been sufficient to make further advances and indeed he may have risked the possibility of defeat in battle. As the battles of Stirling Bridge and Falkirk had shown, defeat was far more morale-shattering for the English than for the Scots. At this low point, Edward was even forced to make the extraordinary admission that "... [it is feared] that the kingdom of Scotland may be removed from out of the king's hands (which God forbid!) and handed over to Sir John Balliol or to his son..."<sup>1</sup>. French diplomatic efforts on behalf of the Scots now looked as though they might be translated into direct military action.

However, although Edward would undoubtedly have preferred not to have granted the Scots a truce in January 1302, it was again a blessing in disguise in many ways for the English in Scotland. The English troops in both the army and the garrisons were extremely demoralised in 1301, primarily through a lack of resources. Although the truce naturally meant that further territorial gains could not be made, at least it gave Edward's officials time to build up supplies and ensure that the garrisons, which now included Ayr, Linlithgow, Kirkintilloch, Carstairs, Selkirk and Yester, were secure.

The truce also meant that matters other than provisioning could be brought to the attention of the king and his officers. Thus it is probably no coincidence that there is more evidence for 'normal' administration occurring in a year when there was no campaign. The territorial gains of the last two years were now being followed up, slowly, with increasing administrative success.

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<sup>1</sup> Stones, *Relations*, no.32.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

## THE TURNING POINT

1302

**The Truce of Asnières:**

The truce of Asnières, negotiated in France, ratified by King Philip on 25 December 1301, sealed by King Edward at Linlithgow on 26 January 1302 and effective from that date, is extremely significant, in that the extent of the weakness of the English position within Scotland is fully revealed. Not only did Edward grant this second truce to the Scots, to last until 1 November 1302, but the French, through whom the truce was once more negotiated, were to be given certain lands in Scotland to hold for its duration. These were:

".... the lands, possessions, rents ... which the king of England or someone on his behalf has taken or acquired which the king of France says were occupied from John Balliol or from the Scots since the messengers of the king of France came to the king of England, or which will be taken before the ratification of this present treaty made by the king of England, that these shall be in the hand of the said king of France until the Feast of All Saints to come [1 November 1302]. Which lands, that is to say, those which the king of England and the earl of Lincoln hold, they have put by parole in the hands of the said king of France and will put them, in fact, in his hands within a fortnight after Candlemas next to come [16 February 1302], and the other lands held by others within the same term .... And the lands acquired in this way, the king of France can cause to be cultivated by whatever folk please him, and the fruits, rents, issues and profits of these lands he can retain or give to whomsoever he pleases, and he can do all his will during the time that he holds them, saving and excepting that the lesser folk of the land (*menu people*), cultivators of the lands, who are on their own lands, which they had before the coming of the aforesaid messengers of the king of France, by heritage, held for a certain time according to the custom of the countryside, shall not be ousted."<sup>1</sup>

On 24 August 1301, while the king and his army were at Glasgow, letters of credence were issued for Edward's ambassadors, who included the treasurer, Walter Langton, and the earl of Lincoln, giving them full power to negotiate a truce with the

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<sup>1</sup> Palgrave, *Documents*, i, 243-4.

Scots through the French. The French envoys were presumably also at Glasgow and thus this is the date referred to in the text above, when "the messengers of the king of France came to the king of England"<sup>2</sup>.

The lands referred to in the treaty probably, therefore, included all those castles captured by Edward's army during the summer campaign of 1301. Bothwell certainly fell to the English after "the messengers of the king of France came to the king of England" and it is likely that Kirkintilloch, which is first mentioned, vaguely, for regnal year 29 [20 November 1300 - 19 November 1301], and Carstairs, first referred to on 8 October 1301<sup>3</sup>, were captured after the army was at Glasgow. The earl of Lincoln did not, in fact, gain possession of his castle of Inverkip, as he expected, in 1301, but he was certainly in possession of parts of his grant of James the Steward's lands - namely, the barony of Renfrew - in that year<sup>4</sup>. Ayr castle, captured by the prince of Wales while his father was at Glasgow, may not have been included under the terms of the truce. However, the earl of Carrick's castle of Turnberry, captured in early September, most certainly should have been<sup>5</sup>. Thus, according to this extraordinary truce, an extremely large chunk of the south-west was to be handed over to the French. In the course of the events related in this chapter, we will see whether or not its terms were kept.

But why did Edward agree to such a truce in the first place? The answer is primarily to be found not in Scotland, nor even in England, but on the Continent. The Scots at the papal court - Master William Frere, archdeacon of Lothian, Master William of Eaglesham and Master Baldred Bisset - had been extremely busy at the papal court in May 1301, putting forward the Scottish counter-arguments to the case presented for Edward's claim to the overlordship of Scotland in the previous year. They could directly refute more than one of the English arguments: the Scots had never acknowledged Edward's suzerainty "by a decree of their entire nation", as the latter claimed, nor did the English king have "full possession of Scotland .... but only of certain places in the dioceses of St. Andrews and Glasgow". The Scots at Rome hoped that the pope "will pronounce judgement on this affair between them and you [King Edward] and that he [the pope] will immediately forbid you to engage in any kind of warlike acts against them".

However, of equal importance to Scottish activities at the papal court was French pressure on both the pope and the English. It should not be forgotten that the summer of 1301 saw the release of John Balliol from papal custody, whereafter he returned to his

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<sup>2</sup> *C.D.S.*, ii, no.1247; *Itin.*, 178.

<sup>3</sup> E101/9/16, m.1 dorso; *C.D.S.*, ii, no.1241.

<sup>4</sup> See Chapter Six, p.180 ; *C.D.S.*, ii, no.1121; see Chapter Twelve, p.297.

<sup>5</sup> See Chapter Six, p.170.

ancestral estates in Picardy. The imminent return of King John was expected both by the Scots and the English<sup>6</sup>.

It was against this background that the negotiations between the French and English at Asnières were conducted. Edward was undoubtedly very concerned about the weakness of his diplomatic position. Not only was it possible that the pope would explicitly prohibit him from continuing the war - a ban that would have been difficult for even the diplomatic skills of Walter Langton to have found a way round - but the likelihood of the return of King John was doing little to boost English morale in Scotland, whilst the Scots themselves must have believed that victory would soon be theirs. Thus, although the financial and supplying difficulties encountered by the English army meant that the king and his men endured a miserable winter in Scotland, it was not this situation which caused Edward to conclude the truce in January 1302, since, as we have seen, he had already agreed to it in principle in August 1301. The period between August 1301 and February 1302 was used to consolidate the English hold in Scotland, primarily through building programmes on most of the new castles in Edward's hands, in preparation for future campaigns. The purveyance ordered in October 1301 was required to feed the army until it came home at the beginning of the truce, as well as the garrisons themselves: there was no question of another campaign taking place in 1302<sup>7</sup>.

#### **The submission of the earl of Carrick:**

Probably as a direct result of the potential rise in the fortunes of the Balliol family - and therefore also of the Comyn family - which the Truce of Asnières seemed to predict, the earl of Carrick, now nearly twenty-eight years old, returned, for the first time since 1297, to Edward's peace. There has been some discussion about the precise date of Bruce's submission, which must have been before 16 February 1302<sup>8</sup>, and a few more words on the subject could perhaps be added.

We have already seen that the recently-installed English garrisons at Turnberry and Ayr were attacked by a large Scottish army in October 1301. It was also stated in letters patent of the earl of March, dated 21 February 1302, that Ayr castle was besieged by the Scots to the extent that Sir Montasini de Novelliano and Sir Edmund Maudley, the constable and sheriff respectively, "could in no way go out with safety, and lost some in their long stay"<sup>9</sup>.

It is certainly true that the earl is not specifically mentioned as taking part. The silence on Bruce's activities during 1301 indeed suggests that he was not involved with

<sup>6</sup> Barrow, *Bruce*, 116-9; Prestwich, *Edward I*, 495.

<sup>7</sup> See Chapter Six, p.181; Prestwich, *Edward I*, 494.

<sup>8</sup> See E.L.G. Stones, 'The submission of Robert Bruce to Edward 1, c.1301-2', *S.H.R.*, xxxiv, 122-34. A pardon was issued by King Edward on that date for two of Bruce's tenants at the earl's request [*C.D.S.*, ii, no.1291].

<sup>9</sup> See Chapter Six, p.185; *C.D.S.*, ii, no.1293.

the Scottish army, under the command of Sir John Soules, the earl of Buchan, Sir Simon Fraser, Sir Alexander Abernethy and Sir Herbert Morham, in this year<sup>10</sup>.

However, it should be noted that Sir John Comyn, junior, and Sir Ingram d'Umfraville, both ex-Guardians, were not named as leaders and it is thus perhaps unwise to suggest that a lack of information indicates a lack of activity. There is a considerable difference between a 'large' Scottish army capable of causing distress to an English garrison, and a 'large' Scottish army able to fight an English one. The siege of Stirling, in 1299, was conducted by a Scottish army. During that year, the majority of the Scottish nobility, with a force which could also be described as a Scottish army, moved from north of the Forth to make an attack on the south-eastern English garrisons. In addition, the English garrison at Lochmaben made preparations in September 1299 to deal with an expected assault from a force under the earl of Carrick detached from this last army. The tactics employed by the Scots after Falkirk required the use of several small armies, capable of surprise attacks and even of capturing castles, but not of pitched battle. Thus the fact that an important member of the Scottish nobility was not named as leading one particular Scottish army, merely informs us that that noble was not in a certain place at a certain time.

It is also significant that Bruce did not promise to cease annoying the monks of Melrose Abbey by marching the army of Carrick through their lands at Maybole until March 1302<sup>11</sup>, suggesting that the men of Carrick were indeed called up in the previous year. The close association of the earl of Carrick with Turnberry, the caput of his earldom and probably his birthplace, and its proximity to Ayr<sup>12</sup> suggest that Bruce was involved in these attacks. The end of the siege at Ayr would therefore provide a good indication of the earliest date that the earl could have considered making his submission.

Unfortunately, no specific date is given for the end of the siege. The earl of March's letters were dated 21 February, but this was obviously some time thereafter. However, on 23 January 1302, Walter Beauchamp, the steward of the royal household, sent a letter to Dalilegh as 'warden of the stores at Newcastle-on-Ayr', commanding him to deliver flour for Beauchamp's own use<sup>13</sup>. The steward was writing from Irvine, ten miles north of Ayr, and such a request would clearly have been infeasible if the Scots were besieging the castle as tightly as the earl of March's letters suggest they had been.

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10 A.A.M. Duncan, 'The Community of the Realm of Scotland and Robert Bruce', *S.H.R.*, xlv, 195; see Chapter Six, p.172.

11 *Melrose Liber*, i, no.351.

12 Barrow, *Bruce*, 26, n.30. Bruce was made sheriff of Ayr and keeper of the castle in March 1303 [E101/11/19, m.5 (dorso)].

13 C.D.S., ii, no.1281.



It would seem likely, therefore, that the siege of Ayr, which had begun in October 1301, was well over by 23 January 1302. Carrick may then have heard that Edward, still at Linlithgow<sup>14</sup>, was about to ratify the truce with the French and decided that the possible return of King John to the Scottish throne was more than his patriotic sympathies could endure. According to one chronicler, Bruce gave himself up to Sir John de St. John, presumably at Lochmaben<sup>15</sup>. St. John was certainly not with the court at Linlithgow, although he was imminently expected there to help to organise the planned building of a pele, according to a royal letter of 21 February<sup>16</sup>. Nevertheless, the earl of Carrick, if he did submit to Sir John, could easily have been sent on alone to perform homage to the English king.

After Edward's return south on 1 February 1302, Bruce remained behind at Linlithgow, together with Sir John Segrave, Sir John Botetourt, Sir Robert Clifford, Sir William Latimer, senior, Sir John de St. John, senior, Sir Thomas Furnivall, Sir Hugh Audley and Sir Nicholas Malemeyns, who were all issued with victuals by Ralph Benton, the keeper of the store at Linlithgow, on 4 March<sup>17</sup>. It would seem likely, given the very personal terms of Carrick's submission, that the agreement was made after face-to-face discussions between Edward and the young earl. In this case, the latter must have arrived at Linlithgow at some point around mid-January 1302.

The exact meaning of the submission terms have been examined in detail, but there is still dispute as to whether *le droit* pertaining to Bruce, should Balliol return to Scotland as king, refers to the former's claim to the throne, or merely to his Scottish estates. Indeed, as Professor Prestwich points out, the degree of speculation over a document which, by its very nature, should have been unambiguous, suggests that one or both parties involved - Edward and Carrick - wished to leave part of it vague<sup>18</sup>.

From the point of view of Edward's future intentions with regard to the northern kingdom, it is important to decide whether or not the English king envisaged himself continuing to rule Scotland as Lord Paramount, or intended Bruce to become another puppet king. It is perhaps of use to speculate what Carrick's submission terms might have been if he had submitted a year earlier, or a year later, when the imminent return of King John was not uppermost in everyone's mind. Surely he would have been confirmed in his lands and property in more or less the same terms as those granted to Sir John Comyn, on behalf of the Scottish people, in February 1304, without the penalties imposed for longer resistance? The difference between the earl of Carrick and every other Scottish noble of a similar rank and background was his claim to the throne, a claim which Edward was

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<sup>14</sup> *Itin.*, 182.

<sup>15</sup> Trivet, *Annales*, 397, n.7.

<sup>16</sup> E101/371/21/32.

<sup>17</sup> *Itin.*, 182; E101/10/18, part 2, m.170

<sup>18</sup> Barrow, *Bruce*, 122-3; Duncan, 'The Community of the Realm of Scotland and Robert Bruce', *S.H.R.*, xlv, (1966), 195-8; Prestwich, *Edward I*, 496-7.

prepared to recognise, albeit covertly, only at a time when the return of King John with the backing of a French army was a realistic possibility. If such a possibility had become reality, Edward could have attempted to divide the Scottish nobility by proclaiming a Bruce as king. There is perhaps only one thing in this difficult period about which we can be certain: if Edward gave the Bruce claim to the throne any degree of support, it was only because of the difficult circumstances in which the English king found himself in the years 1301-2. This was plan B, but plan A had not failed yet.

#### Organisation of the garrisons during the truce:

On 12 and 14 February 1302 the king and council at Roxburgh made various ordinances for the keeping of the garrisons during the truce. The numbers to stay in these castles<sup>19</sup> are given below:

Edinburgh	Sir John Kingston 30 men-at-arms 1 engineer 1 carpenter 1 smith 1 watchman 20 crossbowmen 20 archers
Roxburgh	Sir Robert Hastings 10 men-at-arms 1 engineer 1 smith 1 carpenter 1 watchman 20 crossbowmen 20 archers
Berwick town	Sir Edmund Hastings 10 men-at-arms 40 crossbowmen 140 archers
Berwick castle (till 6 May 1302)	Sir John Burdon (sheriff) 5 men-at-arms 1 engineer 1 smith 1 carpenter 1 watchman 10 crossbowmen 10 archers
Jedburgh	Sir Richard Hastings 5 men-at-arms 10 crossbowmen 10 archers
Strathgryfe (earl of Lincoln's lands) - till 22 April 1302	Sir John fitz Marmaduke 20 men-at-arms

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<sup>19</sup> Except where an alternative date is given, these arrangements covered the Easter term [i.e. up to 10 June].

Linlithgow (sheriffdom)	Sir Archibald Livingston 10 men-at-arms
Bothwell	Sir Aymer de Valence 30 men-at-arms
Ayr	earl Patrick of Dunbar 40 men-at-arms
Selkirk Forest	Sir Alexander Balliol 30 men-at-arms 600 footsoldiers at 4 days warning 1000 footsoldiers at 8 days warning
Carstairs	Sir Walter Burghdon, sheriff of Lanark 30 men-at-arms 40 footsoldiers

The numbers of footsoldiers demanded for service under Sir Alexander Balliol are quite remarkable and presumably indicate a serious attempt to prevent the Scots from using Selkirk Forest. Unfortunately it is not stated where these footsoldiers were to come from, though, given the numbers and the amount of time needed to raise them, they were no doubt to be sent from south of the Border.

It should be noted that no arrangement appears to have been made with St. John for the keeping of the western march and the garrisons of Dumfries and Lochmaben. It may be that such an agreement chanced not to survive. However, St. John was paid £150 for his service with 60 men-at-arms for the Easter term<sup>20</sup>.

As in 1300, no payment was to be given for loss of horses during the period of the truce. It was also ordained that some of the footsoldiers in the garrisons of Roxburgh, Berwick town, Jedburgh and Berwick castle were to be carpenters and masons to make repairs to the walls and houses, in the case of the castles, and to begin the construction of a pele and other defences, in the case of Berwick town. Berwick castle was apparently in great need of repair. On 17 March 1302 Edward ordered John Droxford, the keeper of the wardrobe, on the advice of Ralph Manton, the cofferer, still obviously very active in Scotland, "who has seen what is lacking in the said castle, to bring about such repairs as you see should be done"<sup>21</sup>.

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<sup>20</sup> E159/75, m.16.

<sup>21</sup> E101/68/1, m.14-25d.; E159/75, m.17.

### Building works: *Linlithgow and Selkirk*

On 12 February 1302 detailed ordinances were also made for building works to be begun at Linlithgow and Selkirk. In both cases, a pele was to be constructed round the existing structures. These building programmes are discussed in detail in Chapters Fifteen and Sixteen.

### The breaking of the truce: *The English*

The date of the above indentures [12 and 14 February 1302] is extremely significant, when it is remembered that the date set for the handing over to the French of the south-western castles of Bothwell, Carstairs, Kirkintilloch, Turnberry and probably Ayr was 16 February 1302<sup>22</sup>. Turnberry and Kirkintilloch do not feature in these indentures: the former would, no doubt, have been handed back to the earl of Carrick on his submission - contrary to the truce - and the latter does not always feature in royal records since it was a private castle. Nevertheless, it is clear from the indentures themselves that the English had no intention of giving up any of their castles.

There is no way of telling, of course, whether or not Edward ever intended to adhere to this part of the truce. Given that the English were so successful in recapturing castles in the south-west in the summer of 1301, it is unlikely that the king would have wished to give them up, since this would, yet again, have rendered the remaining English garrisons in the area extremely vulnerable to Scottish attack at the end of the truce. Presumably, as the winter progressed and there was no sign of either a French expedition to the south-west, nor even of the return of King John to Scotland, Edward felt confident enough to disregard this aspect of the truce. This policy was vindicated less than six months later when the Flemings defeated the French army at Courtrai in July 1302<sup>23</sup>, destroying all hopes that Philip IV would take direct action in Scotland on behalf of King John. Although the English king could not have predicted such a defeat, he may have been prepared to call King Philip's bluff in the shrewd suspicion that the French were rarely prepared to expend much cost and effort - as opposed to diplomatic pressure - on the Scottish cause.

### *The Scots*

However, it must be said that Edward was not alone in disregarding the terms of the treaty of Asnières. The Scots went even further. According to the anonymous Hailes chronicler:

"In the month of June (1302), the Scots broke the truce, capturing the castle of Edinburgh by force and putting all within to the sword"<sup>24</sup>.

<sup>22</sup> See above, p.193.

<sup>23</sup> See above, pp.194-5.

<sup>24</sup> British Library, Mss. Cott. Cleop. Diii, fo.52v.

The 'rebels' undoubtedly did not capture the castle - if they had, it would surely have been remarked elsewhere and the evidence for the garrison in this year gives no indication of any kind of disruption, let alone mass slaughter. However, it is quite possible that they managed to secure parts of Edinburgh town for a while. The distinction between town and castle in terms of defensive capabilities has already been remarked in 1297, when Berwick itself fell to Wallace, though its castle did not. In addition, on 7 October 1304 one William Bartholomew was granted 14s.8d. for repairing his houses in Edinburgh, burned by the Scots perhaps during this attack in 1302<sup>25</sup>.

**The English garrisons during the truce: *Second instalment of wages for the Easter term***

On 2 May 1302, sir Walter Amersham, the Scottish chancellor, and Master John Weston, the paymaster, were ordered to spend £536 13s.4d. on the second instalment of wages for the Easter term. This was divided among Sir John de St. John and his retinue (£150), the keeper of Berwick town (£20), the sheriff of Berwick (10 marks), the garrisons of Berwick, Roxburgh and Jedburgh (100 marks), the men-at-arms at Carstairs (£30), the sheriff of Edinburgh and his retinue (£15), Sir Philip Vernay and his retinue (100s.), the rest of the garrison at Edinburgh (£30) and Sir Aymer de Valence and his retinue at Bothwell (20 marks). £200 was also to be sent to Linlithgow and Selkirk for the works there. This totalled £547 1s. and the shortfall was to be met, in the case of the garrisons of Berwick, Roxburgh and Jedburgh, from the issues of these areas<sup>26</sup>.

***The earl of Lincoln's lands of Strathgryfe***

The arrangements made for paying Sir John fitz Marmaduke, the keeper of the earl of Lincoln's lands of Strathgryfe are somewhat complicated. On 15 February, Sir John was to receive a full month's wages while he was still with the king at Roxburgh. At the end of that month and each month following, the wages for the next month were to be sent to Edinburgh, from there to Carstairs and then on to Bothwell, where Sir John would collect the money<sup>27</sup>.

This complicated procedure presumably stemmed from the fact that there was no castle to act as the administrative centre of these lands. Inverkip castle would ordinarily have fulfilled that purpose. It would then have been a comparatively simple operation to provide money and supplies from the nearby store at Ayr. However, as we have already seen, the king, despite intending to besiege Inverkip, turned east to Stirling instead, in October 1301. It is not known who actually held the castle, presumably on behalf of the Steward.

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25 C.D.S., iv, p.476.

26 E159/75, m.16, m.74.

27 E101/68/1, m.19.

Thus, although the earl of Lincoln did have some access to the lands that he had been granted in Scotland, fitz Marmaduke's job was "to save this land and the surrounding area"<sup>28</sup>. He could not yet run it effectively.

### *The introduction of castle-guard*

By 1302, it had been decided that those to whom Edward had granted lands in Scotland should provide men-at-arms for duty in the garrisons there. Fifty-one individuals, who included the earls of Lincoln and Warwick and Sir William Cantilupe, Edward's steward, as well as those, like Sir John de St. John, Sir Robert Clifford, Sir Henry Percy, Sir John Kingston, Sir Robert Hastings and Sir John Burdon, who had served, or were still serving, in Scotland, were thus to provide one hundred and fifteen men-at-arms. However, it is clear from the memoranda concerning these troops that this arrangement was not successful: thirty-two were recorded as 'not yet come'. As Professor Prestwich states: "... it is not surprising that no more was heard of this particular system". However, the important point to be concluded from the failure of men such as Percy and Beauchamp, whose loyalty to the Crown is beyond question, to provide their quotas is that they did not do so simply because they were not in possession of the lands for which they were to provide this service<sup>29</sup>.

### **Provisions for the garrisons:**

Although there was to be no campaign in 1302, because of the truce, purveyance was still required for the garrisons. On 1 May it was ordered that a total of 4000 quarters of wheat, 8000 quarters of oats and 3000 quarters of malt were to be purveyed from nine English counties, the most northern of which was Yorkshire. Two-thirds of these victuals were to be delivered to Edinburgh castle and one-third to Berwick<sup>30</sup>. The advances made by the English in the last year are reflected in these arrangements - the new garrisons at Linlithgow, which included workmen building the pele, Carstairs, Bothwell and the earl of Lincoln's lands of Strathgryfe were probably all supplied from the east<sup>31</sup>, and thus Edinburgh, situated further north-west than Berwick, became more important as a store.

The western garrisons - Dumfries, Lochmaben and Ayr - were to be provided with 2000 quarters of wheat, 2000 quarters of oats, 1000 quarters of malt and 100 barrels of wine from Ireland. These supplies were to arrive at the store at Ayr by 8 July<sup>32</sup>.

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28 E101/68/1, m.19.

29 E101/10/5; E101/10/10; M.C. Prestwich, 'Colonial Scotland: The English in Scotland under Edward I', *Scotland and England 1286-1815*, 9.

30 C.P.R., 1302-1307, 35.

31 See above, p.201, for the description of the arrangements made for the payment of Sir John fitz Marmaduke, which suggests that Carstairs, Bothwell and Strathgryfe were all supplied from the east.

32 C.P.R., 1301-1307, 35.

Victuals from Ireland had also been sent earlier in the year since an order to the Irish exchequer to pay £38 to three Irish merchants, Richard Neyr, Gilbert Hoern and Stephen More, "for certain things taken from them for the work of John de St. John, the king's lieutenant, in Galloway", was written on 2 March 1302. Doubtless individual merchants were encouraged to sell supplies to those permanently stationed in Scotland in addition to the agreed purveyance. However, it is clear that St. John still had no means of paying them.

#### **Payment for Welsh troops:**

Questions of payment were not just a concern of those in Scotland itself. Having delayed all allocations of the fifteenth in 1301, due to the need for money in Scotland<sup>33</sup>, it was necessary to meet these Crown debts in 1302. This included £4000 owed to the Welsh serving with the Prince of Wales, which was to be taken from the fifteenth raised in the counties of Hereford, Gloucester, Worcester, Devon, Warwick, Leicester, Shropshire and Stafford. This did not prove to be sufficient, however, and on 13 June 1302 the exchequer was ordered to assign other counties to make the payment, "so that the king can have them [the Welsh] at other times more readily for his business"<sup>34</sup>. Expediency played a large part in deciding how quickly each royal debt was to be paid off.

#### **Scottish activities:**

1302 was not a good year for the Scots, though initially there was cause for celebration. A Scottish parliament met at Scone on 23 February 1302 and was informed of Bishop Lamberton's success in including the Scots in the Anglo-French truce of January 1302<sup>35</sup>. We have already seen that they may also have succeeded in capturing Edinburgh for a brief period during the truce.

However, there were already some worrying developments. The defection of Robert Bruce from the rebel cause may not have been as momentous an event as those with the benefit of hindsight tend to imagine, but it certainly meant that the Carrick 'army' could no longer be called out on behalf of the Guardians. This was still a minor blow to the Scots, even if it were not actually called out on behalf of Edward, since the Guardians (and even the kings of Scots) did not have the same resources for raising an army as the king of England<sup>36</sup>.

There is no doubt, however, that the most crucial event of this year, for both Edward and the Scots, was the defeat of the French by the Flemings at the battle of

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33 See Chapter Six, p.183.

34 E159/75, m.10, m.20.

35 A.P.S., i, 454.

36 See Barrow, *Bruce*, 124; *Melrose Liber*, i, no.351.

Courtrai On 11 July 1302. Though he still technically supported the Scots, Philip IV needed to be at peace with England in order to concentrate on Flanders. This effectively removed French pressure from Edward.

Papal pressure on the English king had also ceased by 1302, as Boniface VIII had quarrelled with King Philip, and indeed the pope now turned on the Scottish church, supporting Edward's claims. The Scottish bishops were encouraged to submit and the bishop of Glasgow was ordered to cease his activities on behalf of the rebels<sup>37</sup>.

### *Scottish raiding south of the border*

There are several instances in 1302 of allowances being made to inhabitants of the northern counties of England because of the destruction caused by the Scots in their areas. On 14 August, the sheriff of Northumberland was to cause a coroner to be elected in place of one Nicholas Middleton "whom the king has caused to be removed from the office as it is testified before the king that Nicholas's lands have been much destroyed and wasted by the Scots..."<sup>38</sup>.

On 24 August, the chancellor was informed that the king, "having compassion for the state of his people of Northumberland, destroyed by the Scots' enemies", were released from holding the castleward of the castle at Newcastle for this year<sup>39</sup>.

In October, the sheriff of Cumberland, Sir William Mulcastre, sought respite of £121 out of the £222 9s.11d. which he owed to the exchequer, claiming that he had not been able to levy this money "as the county was so wasted and destroyed by the Scottish war"<sup>40</sup>.

It is, of course, possible that the destruction referred to in these cases was caused by the Scots four or five years previously, in 1297 or 1298, when William Wallace, particularly, was known to be making raids on these counties. However, it is far more likely that such allowances had to be made because the Scots had waged a war of destruction over the border continuously since 1297 (except, perhaps, during periods of truce).

### **Berwick:**

On 5 August Sir John Segrave was appointed keeper of Berwick castle. He was quite often resident in the castle since he was also charged with making expeditions in Scotland<sup>41</sup>. However, the daily running of the castle was still the responsibility of the

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37 C.D.S., v, no.287.

38 C.C.R., 1296-1302, 548.

39 C.D.S., ii, no.1319.

40 C.D.S., ii, no.1229.

41 C.P.R., 1292-1301, 60-61.



constable, Sir John Burdon, who was also the sheriff of Berwick. Segrave, as keeper, was answerable to the exchequer for any issues pertaining to the castle<sup>42</sup>.

#### Agreements made with the English garrison commanders at the end of the truce:

Between mid-August and 3 September 1302 another set of indentures was made with the garrison commanders in Scotland to establish the numbers in each garrison from 1 September until Christmas. The numbers are given below and include the certum paid to each commander, if such an arrangement was used for the paying of wages to the garrison<sup>43</sup>:

Ayr castle and sheriffdom	earl Patrick of Dunbar (£100) 20 men-at-arms
Kirkintilloch <sup>44</sup>	Sir William Frauncey 27 men-at-arms
Sheriffdom of Linlithgow	Sir Archibald Livingston (£30) 10 men-at-arms (Livingston was also to remain as keeper of the king's works at Linlithgow.)
Linlithgow castle and town	Sir William Felton (at wages) 84 men-at-arms (including 11 for service for lands) 40 crossbowmen 60 archers
Edinburgh castle and sheriffdom	Sir John Kingston (£60) 38 men-at-arms (including 14 for service for lands) 1 engineer 1 carpenter 1 smith 1 watchman 20 crossbowmen 20 archers
Carstairs castle and sheriffdom of Lanark	Sir Walter Burghdon (at wages) 40 men-at-arms (including 10 for service for lands) 40 footsoldiers
Sheriffdom of Peebles	Sir William Durham (£16) 4 men-at-arms

<sup>42</sup> See Chapter Fourteen, p.330.

<sup>43</sup> E101/9/30, mm.16-29.

<sup>44</sup> No formal arrangement seems to have been made with the constable of Kirkintilloch, Sir William Fraunceys, as with the other garrison commanders. The numbers were listed on the back of the indenture made with earl Patrick for the castle and sheriffdom of Ayr.

Selkirk castle and forest	Sir Alexander Balliol (£50) 30 men-at-arms <sup>45</sup>
Jedburgh castle	Sir Richard Hastings (£20) 5 men-at-arms 1 engineer 1 carpenter 1 smith 1 watchman 10 crossbowmen 10 archers
Roxburgh castle and sheriffdom	Sir Robert Hastings (£40) 10 men-at-arms 1 engineer 1 carpenter 1 smith 1 watchman 10 crossbowmen 10 archers
For expeditions, based at Roxburgh	Sir William Latimer 38 men-at-arms (including 18 for service for lands)
Berwick castle and sheriffdom	Sir John Burdon (£20) 5 men-at-arms
Berwick town	Sir Edmund Hastings (50 marks) 16 men-at-arms 40 crossbowmen 140 archers
For expeditions, based at Berwick	Sir John Segrave 53 men-at-arms (including 5 with Sir John Burdon, already counted, and 7 owed for land)

The indentures were made on three separate occasions. The first group met at Lochmaben on 15 August. Sir John de St. John, described as "the king's lieutenant in Scotland", and sir Ralph Manton stood in for the king in making these arrangements with the keeper of the castle and sheriffdom of Ayr, the sheriff of Linlithgow, the sheriff and constable of Edinburgh, the sheriff of Lanark and keeper of Carstairs, the constable of Jedburgh, the sheriff and constable of Roxburgh, the sheriff of Berwick and the keeper of Berwick town.

On 1 September, at Roxburgh, sir Ralph Manton again, Sir Richard Siward and other (unnamed) members of the king's council made indentures with the keeper of Linlithgow castle, the sheriff of Peebles and the keeper of Selkirk castle and forest. Sir William Latimer made his arrangements with the wardrobe (presumably sir Ralph Manton again) on the same date. On 3 September Sir John Segrave made similar arrangements with the wardrobe.

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<sup>45</sup> The arrangement made in February for the call-up of large numbers of footsoldiers had obviously proved to be infeasible and there is certainly no reference to its implementation.

Though there is again no indenture surviving for Sir John de St. John, he was paid £268 8s. for himself and seventy-one other men-at-arms for the period 1 September to 31 October 1302 "to make mounted expeditions and to stay in the garrisons of the castles of Dumfries and Lochmaben". Sir James Dalilegh also paid £100 for the wages of the footsoldiers, tradesmen and craftsmen in these castles<sup>46</sup> for the same period. Also, Sir Aymer de Valence retained thirty men-at-arms in his castle at Bothwell<sup>47</sup>.

Since the truce ended on 30 November, these arrangements extended into the period when hostilities formally resumed. The indentures reflect this and show that Edward intended that the duty of those garrisoned in Scotland included making expeditions against the Scots. The keepers of the castles of Linlithgow, Edinburgh, Jedburgh, Roxburgh and Berwick town were all to be allowed full wages while engaged on chevauchees outside their own bailiwicks, to be deducted from their certums. In addition, Sir William Latimer and Sir John Segrave, based at Roxburgh and Berwick respectively, were appointed specifically "to make horsed expeditions in various parts of Scotland as necessary" with a total of ninety-one men-at-arms between them. Since they were based in the south-east, they were clearly to concentrate on that area<sup>48</sup>.

Safe-conducts were issued on 15 August, the same day as the first of these indentures was made, to six Scots to allow them to meet two envoys of Philip of France, presumably in an attempt to obtain an extension of the truce. The above arrangements, however, suggest that Edward, once again, had no intention of extending the truce and had only agreed to one out of temporary necessity.

On 11 September, more than a month and a half away from the end of the truce, Sir John Segrave, Sir Alexander Balliol, Sir Edmund Hastings, Sir William Latimer, senior, Sir Walter Huntercumbe (captain of Northumberland) and Sir Robert Clifford (keeper of the bishopric of Durham) were informed that, despite recent orders to these six to come to a parliament in London (to be held on 14 October), they should not "in any way depart from Scotland or its marches.." It was thus expected that the Scots would resume hostilities immediately after the expiry of the truce<sup>49</sup>.

### *Further arrangements*

Between 5 and 20 September, still during the truce, accounts were made "respecting the garrisons and keepers of fortresses in Scotland." On 5 September various crossbows and lances were bought in Newcastle for the garrisons of Linlithgow and Kirkintilloch. Food and equipment, including 20 crossbows and 5000 quarrels, was ordered for Selkirk from the store at Berwick.

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46 In 1301 there were 100 footsoldiers in each of the garrisons [E101/13/34, m.18].

47 E101/9/13, mm.1-2; E101/10/15.

48 E101/9/30, mm.16-29.

49 C.C.R., 1296-1302, 599.

Victuals were to be sent from Berwick to Linlithgow, via Blackness. Sir Archibald Livingston, the sheriff, was to provide carriage for these goods "at the king's cost but without hindrance to the works at Linlithgow. The victuals are to be stored within the great church there." Carstairs was also to receive victuals from the store at Berwick, to be collected from the port of Leith.

The individual accounts made with each garrison commander provide an interesting comparison, since a note was made of any men that were missing, with the numbers which were supposed to be in each garrison, given above on p.205. It should be noted that the number of men-at-arms found in September totals 497 and the number of footsoldiers 596. In the list of garrisons given on p.205 there were 375 men-at-arms and 400 footsoldiers, but this list does not include St. John's contingent, the garrisons of Dumfries and Lochmaben, nor Sir Aymer de Valence's force at Bothwell. If the numbers given in September for these two groups are added, the men-at-arms then total 499 and the footsoldiers 500. Thus there are two men-at-arms less and 100 more footsoldiers on 26 September than was anticipated when the indentures were made on 15 August and 1 September<sup>50</sup>.

Edward seems to have been extremely concerned about the state of his garrisons in Scotland. On 24 September he wrote to the treasurer, concerning 'our affairs of Scotland', ordering him to be:-

"... attentive in such manner that our affairs should prosper, that the wages be well and promptly paid to our people who stay in these parts; and that you have well overlooked the castles of Scotland, the fortresses and other places which concern us there and that they be well provisioned, so that there will be no want (and that the new castles which we are having made there have all that they need for the completion of their works<sup>51</sup>. For if they are well provisioned everywhere, this will be a great security to the whole of our business there. And if our business goes well there, we hope that they will go well everywhere)<sup>52</sup>.

#### **Death of Sir John de St. John:**

On 14 September 1302 Edward heard the news of the death of Sir John de St. John, his lieutenant in Scotland and warden of the western march, to whom the king was 'much bound'.

With regard to his private estate, St. John was owed so much from the crown for his services that writs had to be sent to the escheators and other royal officials, ordering

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50 C.D.S., ii, no.1324; E101/10/5.

51 These must be the works in process at Linlithgow and Selkirk since there do not appear to be any other major building works going on in this year.

52 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 446-7.

them "to take nothing" until the king spoke to them at the parliament of 14 October. St. John's office of warden was to be held by his son, another Sir John, "as sufficiently and surely as possible, as it was held by John, until further orders."<sup>53</sup>

As some indication of the debts owed to St. John and his men-at-arms, £100 was still in arrears for their wages from 10 June - 31 August 1302. Sir James Dalilegh, the receiver at Carlisle, was ordered to pay this sum to Sir Thomas Paignel from the issues of Scotland on 25 October. The first instalment of 60 marks was not received by Paignel at Buittle until 12 June 1303. £40 was then paid at Berwick on 20 January 1304. This was presumably not the total amount of the arrears owed to St. John and his retinue since on 2 November St. John, junior, presumably acting as warden, acknowledged a debt of £154 to the executors of his father's will<sup>54</sup>.

However, it appears that, immediately upon St. John's death, Sir Richard Siward took over as warden of Galloway and Annandale. On 29 September, since "the king lately ordered otherwise"<sup>55</sup>, the executors of St. John's will (which included Sir Thomas Paignel, also at Lochmaben), were commanded to pay Siward a prest of £20 'over his wages' until 1 November, 'that the district be not left unprovided'<sup>56</sup>.

On 25 September the king wrote to the treasurer. The escheators were to be ordered once more "not to touch the lands and wardships assigned to John de St. John for his lifetime." Edward also proposed that Sir John Botetourt should succeed to St. John's office in Scotland. Finally, on 4 November, St. John's executors were given free administration of his affairs and his debts at the exchequer were discharged<sup>57</sup>. Though this might appear to be the least that Edward could have done for such a faithful and efficient servant, this was an unusual allowance and perhaps reflects the degree of personal financial commitment under which St. John had been put in the execution of his duty, rather than the service that he had performed.

Despite the arrangements made after St. John's death, the situation in the south-west was becoming difficult and starvation again posed a serious threat. The king received a message from Siward at the end of October, delivered by 'his dear friend', sir Ralph Manton, the energetic cofferer. Manton had apparently recently visited Lochmaben, but since his departure the situation there and at Dumfries had deteriorated. Siward supposedly had "not above 10 men-at-arms there [at Lochmaben] or at Dumfries ... As to sustenance, he has received nothing since he left them except £10 then paid to

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53 *C.D.S.*, v, no.292.

54 *C.D.S.*, v, no.301; *C.C.R.*, 1296-1302, 608.

55 This presumably refers to the appointment of Sir John de St. John, junior, to this office on 14 September.

56 *C.D.S.*, ii, no.1325.

57 *C.D.S.*, v, no.296; *C.D.S.*, ii, no.1331.

him...". Siward also reported that "the country is quiet" and that "the earl of Carrick went to parliament on Sunday 21 October<sup>58</sup>."

### **Return to concern for winning the war: *securing the garrisons***

From September 1302, the primary concern of Edward and his officials reverted once more to that of the prosecution of the war. On 24 September that concern led the king to order his treasurer, the bishop of Chester, to remain in York despite a recent order to be present at a parliament to be held at Westminster on 19 March 1303. Edward also gave the bishop strict orders with regard to Scotland. He was to make sure that:

"the wages be well and promptly paid to our people who stay in these parts; and that you have well overlooked the castles of Scotland, the fortresses and other places which concern us there and that they be well provisioned, so that there be no want [and that new castles which we are having made there<sup>59</sup> have all that they need for the completion of their works. For if they are well provisioned everywhere, this will be a great security to the whole of our business there. And if our business goes well there, we hope that it will go well everywhere]<sup>60</sup>.

It is clear that, given his experiences during the previous year's campaign, Edward was attempting to deal effectively with the problems of provisioning, recognising it as the key to his success or failure. However, these arrangements could only work if there were sufficient resources available: the situation faced by Edward and his army during the autumn/winter of 1301 suggests that there were not.

### ***An English expedition***

Before the expiry of the truce on 1 November 1302, the English required to find out exactly the state of the country west of Stirling. On 29 September Edward wrote to Sir John Segrave, ordering:

"that the expedition lately arranged between you and Ralph Manton, our cofferer, should be done with all haste and in the best manner that you can, so that you go by Stirling and ... the ... by Kirkintilloch, as near as you can by our enemies in the lands which are in our hands, so that it can be done in safety ... and the foray being thus done, (inform us by your letters), send a special man to tell us, the manner in which it was done,

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58 Although the earl was leaving rather late, he was obviously en route to the parliament of 14 October. This parliament was intending 'to treat concerning Scotland' [C.D.S., v, no.297], and even if Carrick was not summoned to, or did not wish to attend, the rest of the business, his presence was presumably required at the discussions on the affairs of his own country.

59 Again, this must refer to the construction of the peles at Selkirk and Linlithgow.

60 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 446-7.

together with the condition and news from parts of Scotland with all possible haste<sup>61</sup>."

The enemy would appear to have been largely concentrated north of Glasgow. Segrave and Manton could certainly have gone west in safety along the southern banks of the Forth, via Linlithgow to Kirkintilloch. The mention of Stirling suggests that the king was still preoccupied with 'the gateway to the north'. Without control of Stirling castle, the English were restricted to the region south of the Forth while the Scots could remain in comparative safety as far south as Lennox and Menteith.

### *Summonses for the campaign of 1303*

On 7 November the first summonses went out for a campaign planned for 26 May 1303. The muster point was again Berwick, but the summonses to the fleet, which was to arrive at Ayr by 16 May, indicate that the west of Scotland was not to be neglected. A request for service was also issued to "the magnates and commonalty of the land of Ireland", under the inducement of a reduction or remittance of their debts to the king<sup>62</sup>.

### *Purveyance*

Orders for purveyance were sent out to seven English counties. These were the same counties as those who had been ordered to provide victuals on 1 May 1302, excluding Sussex, Berkshire and Middlesex<sup>63</sup>. A total of 5000 quarters of wheat, 7000 quarters of oats, 3800 quarters of malt, 700 quarters of beans and peas and 2500 quarters of corn were to be sent to Berwick before 26 May 1303.

The king ordered that "all purchases are to be paid for", presumably in order to help persuade those who had already contributed on several occasions and were probably still waiting for payment for their last contribution<sup>64</sup>, to continue to sell their goods. In order to make these payments, royal officials were to make sure that "no debts are to remain owing to the king, either of the issues of [their bailiwicks] or of the moneys which are leviabie and for which [they are] answerable at the exchequer, or of the aid granted to the king for marrying his eldest daughter"<sup>65</sup>. Although such strict accounting was ostensibly in the interests of those providing supplies, there can be no doubt that the pressure on royal officials to exact every last penny owed to the Crown made them unpopular.

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61 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 448.

62 C.C.R., 1296-1302, 611-2; C.P.R., 1301-1307, 74-5.

63 C.P.R., 1301-1307, 35.

64 See Chapter Six, p.183.

65 C.P.R., 1301-1307, 98.

### The Treaty of Amiens:

On 2 December 1302, the treaty of Amiens between France and England, excluding Scotland, was ordered to be proclaimed by all English sheriffs. This was a considerable boost to Edward's war-effort.

Walter Amersham, the English chancellor of Scotland, was also commanded "to issue orders to all the sheriffs of that land to cause the like proclamation to be made"<sup>66</sup>. Though there was a large degree of wishful thinking in this statement, which belies the fact that the English still had not achieved any control over the land beyond the Forth, the confidence displayed here suggests that the English administration, based at Berwick, was taking shape again.

### Evidence for some English administrative success: *Berwick*

In August 1302 Edward at last, and despite having made efforts to replan Berwick from as early as 1296, formally constituted the town as a free burgh. The keeper of Berwick town, Sir Edmund Hastings, was to ascertain that the new mayor had sworn fealty and then he was "... not to intermeddle further in the custody of the town, but to permit them to use the liberties and customs contained in the late charter granting that the town shall henceforth be a free borough." Since the burgesses now had the right to elect a coroner and the keeper of the town had probably been performing this function up until now (Sir Philip Vernay, then keeper of Berwick, was certainly described as coroner in 1299)<sup>67</sup>, this office was presumably taken out of the hands of Edward's representative and given back to the representatives of the local community<sup>68</sup>.

### *Restoration of lands in the sheriffdom of Roxburgh*

In 1302 there is more than one example of English royal officials providing the services expected of them as part of a 'normal' peacetime administration. This is a good indication of success, although the very fact that such evidence is unusual also indicates the more general state of the English administration of Scotland.

On 15 August 1302 Sir John de St. John, "supplying the king's place in Scotland", was ordered to restore to one Thomas Fishburn "20 marks of yearly rent in Edenham in the shrievalty of Roxburgh". Fishburn, a keeper of the Rolls of Scotland in 1291, had

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<sup>66</sup> C.C.R., 1302-1307, 65-6.

<sup>67</sup> See Chapter Four, p.108.

<sup>68</sup> Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 443-4; C.P.R., 1301-1307, 60-61; C.D.S., ii, no.1314.



been made this grant by King John Balliol but it had been taken into Edward's hands at the beginning of the war, along with the rest of the town. Shortly thereafter - presumably as a result of the general restoration of lands permitted in September 1296 - the earl of Surrey, 'then keeper of Scotland' had been ordered "to restore to Thomas the said rent"<sup>69</sup>. This had not happened, however.

This writ is interesting for two reasons. First of all, since the extent of St. John's jurisdiction was usually 'captain and lieutenant in Annandale and the marches as far as the county of Roxburgh'<sup>70</sup>, it would appear that he was now effectively the king's lieutenant throughout all of Scotland under English control, not just in the western march.

Secondly, the fact that Fishburn thought it worthwhile in 1302 to petition the king for the restitution of lands which he should have received back almost six years previously, suggests that there was now a greater acceptance, in the south-east at least, of the English administration and a belief in its effectiveness. Whether or not this latter belief was justified unfortunately cannot be assessed since it is not known if St. John was more successful than his predecessor, the earl of Surrey, in implementing the terms of the writ.

#### *Sir James Dalilegh as escheator*

On 15 August 1302, in the indenture setting out the arrangements made with Sir Walter Burghdon for the keeping of the sheriffdom of Lanark, it was stated that "sir James Dalilegh, the escheator there, is to inquire and certify ... what sum Sir Walter has received in his bailliary, and deduct the same"<sup>71</sup>. Dalilegh, the receiver at Carlisle, had probably been appointed escheator in 1301, when the English grip on the south-west was extended into Lanarkshire and Ayrshire. However, the mere fact that, as escheator, he was supposed to account for the issues of lands in English hands does not mean that Edward's officers were actually in receipt of much revenue. Professor Barrow has suggested that the orderly set of accounts produced by Dalilegh in his office as escheator for regnal years 31 and 32 [20 November 1302 - 29 November 1304] shows that "whenever the English won any Scottish territory they were able to use an established revenue-collecting and accounting system"<sup>72</sup>. However, this set of accounts - the first of

69 C.D.S., ii, nos.526, 832, 853; C.C.R., 1296-1302, 545.

70 C.D.S., ii, no.1126.

71 C.D.S., ii, no.1321 (6).

72 Barrow, *Bruce*, 105; C.D.S., ii, no.1608.

its kind during this period - began only in the Martinmas term [c.11 November] of 1303, when the conquest of Scotland was once more within Edward's grasp. It was noted in a number of cases that lands, even in Lanarkshire, were unable to be accounted for in the previous term [Pentecost], because they were "in the hands of the Scots". It is, therefore, quite clear that Edward's officials, with the exception of the sheriff of Edinburgh<sup>73</sup>, had not been able to make a full account for the issues of their bailiwicks prior to late 1303, although small amounts were undoubtedly collected. However, Professor Barrow is no doubt correct to conclude that "the Scots ... must have been able to keep this system in operation"<sup>74</sup>, though to what degree is, of course, impossible to ascertain.

#### *Prosecution of robbers in the sheriffdom of Roxburgh*

In September 1302, Edward received two letters, one from Sir Robert Hastings, the sheriff of Roxburgh, and one from Sir Hugh Audley, the keeper of Selkirk Forest, on the same subject, namely the pursuit of robbers in the sheriffdom of Roxburgh.

The king received Audley's letter first and was told about an arrangement made between Audley himself, the sheriff of Roxburgh, his brother, Sir Richard, and Sir Alexander Balliol "that they should attack at three points the moor of Alkirk (near Selkirk), in which some robbers infesting the county of Roxburgh had taken refuge." Audley and his foresters "found them in a house" and captured them all when they fled, returning to the house to collect the stolen cattle. The sheriff of Roxburgh then demanded that Audley hand them over. "As he [Audley] wished to avoid strife, he gave up the beasts but kept the prisoners till he knew the king's will. The foresters pray the king for the goods of the resetter, as others have what they can gain on the enemy". Audley thought that Edward should grant this, "as they have aided him loyally and will be encouraged to do so again"<sup>75</sup>.

Hastings' version of these events is basically the same, with the addition that the twelve thieves which Sir Hugh and his men came across in "one of their greatest retreats" had already been indicted before him as sheriff of Roxburgh. Though Audley gave up "a part of the bestial", the thieves had been sent "to the prison of Berwick or Bamburgh, he does not know which."

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<sup>73</sup> See Chapter Five, p.157; Chapter Six, pp.189-90.

<sup>74</sup> Barrow, *Bruce*, 105.

<sup>75</sup> *C.D.S.*, ii, no.1226.

Clearly, as Hastings himself says, Sir Hugh "claims them and their ransom as prisoners of war, under the king's grant of what he can gain upon the enemy." The sheriff, however, states that "they are common and notorious thieves and have made such riot in the county that the people told him that they expected him to clear them out." Hastings wanted them returned to prison at Roxburgh "or he will find no man in the county willing to obey him after his authority has been defied"<sup>76</sup>.

The ongoing military situation was obviously causing problems for Edward's own officials, let alone the native population. Hastings would appear to have had some success in administering his sheriffdom but he realised, as most medieval officials would have done, that his position was largely dependent on his success in dealing with those who threatened the lives and property of his people.

Audley, on the other hand, as keeper of Selkirk Forest, was in the middle of a war zone and was thus much more aware of the political aspects of capturing Scots. As prisoners of war, these twelve thieves were much more valuable to Sir Hugh and the foresters, who would undoubtedly have suffered greatly from the guerrilla warfare practised by the rebels, and any retaliatory measures taken by the English<sup>77</sup>. Though, unfortunately, Edward's judgement on the case has not survived, it was certainly a problem that needed to be resolved.

#### *Court at Linlithgow:*

Between 8 October and 5 November 1302 the only court held by Edward's officials for which there is a surviving record - and the earliest court record for Scotland - was held at Linlithgow, in the presence of Master James de St. George, the lieutenant of the keeper of the town and master of the works there, and Sir William Felton, constable of the castle. This was presumably a burgh court, not a sheriff one, since the only royal officer in the town not present was the sheriff, Sir Archibald Livingston.

A variety of crimes and misdemeanours were brought before the court, including a plea of trespass involving the seizure of goods belonging to "certain men of Lennox", at the instigation of Sir Archibald Livingston himself.

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<sup>76</sup> C.D.S., ii, no.1227.

<sup>77</sup> For example, see Chapter Six, p.140.

The most interesting case held at this court, however, concerned an action against a member of the Linlithgow garrison. Christina of Edinburgh accused Master Adam Glasham, one of the master carpenters of the works in the town<sup>78</sup>, of "unjustly keeping from her a piece of lead, to her damage. And said Adam came and said that said lead was his own ..."

Christiana had as her pledges two other members of the garrison, Master Thomas Houghton, the other master carpenter, and Adam Tyndale. The court decided "that said Christina should recover her piece of lead and that said Adam and his pledges should be fined."

The matter did not rest there, however. Christina then brought another action against Glasham, maintaining that:

"in the castle of Linlithgow on Thursday 18 October 1302 [he] attacked her and beat her and treated her terribly, to the injury of said Christina of half a mark."

Glasham came to court again on 22 October and strongly denied the charge. Two other garrison members, Adam the Diker and Nicholas Derby, stood as his pledges. At the next court, held on 30 October 1302, Glasham made a plea of *essoin* (excuse) against Christina.

"And afterwards came same Christina and challenged this *essoin* and said that according to the law of Scotland, after the law had given bail, *essoin* should not be allowed."

It was therefore judged that Adam's pledges should again be amerced and that he himself should be at the next court "to hear justice on this." However, on Monday 5 November, Glasham did not appear and was again ordered to be poinded to attend the next court. However, he then pleaded that he was ill and there are no records of any further proceedings<sup>79</sup>.

Firstly, the fact that this court sat at all suggests that Edward's administration did attempt to run normally when it was at all possible. It would be naive to believe that this court at Linlithgow was the only one to have taken place in the period from 1296 to 1303,

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<sup>78</sup> See Chapter Thirteen, p.306.

<sup>79</sup> Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 393-8.

just because it is the only one for which evidence survives. Secondly, it appears that the English officials running the court were impartial, as witnessed by the fact that in a case involving a fellow garrison-member, not only did they judge against him, but they adhered to Scottish laws and traditions in their judgement. Though Edward's administration was not always effective or popular, its intentions were clearly to govern Scotland efficiently and in a manner in keeping with its laws and customs.

### Conclusions:

1302 is largely characterised by the truce, which ruled out a campaign by the king and expeditions by the garrisons. However, more pacific activities, such as building works, could and did take place, notably at Linlithgow and Selkirk.

Once again, it is naive to suggest that Edward got little out of the truces and that the Scots alone benefited. The rebels could not do much to prepare for the next, inevitable, English campaign and the area over which the Guardians ruled effectively was dictated more and more by the activities of Edward's officials. The building programme, though admittedly far less impressive, and therefore extravagant, than the one in Wales - most of the work was done in wood rather than stone - was nonetheless visible proof of Edward's presence in Scotland and an indication that the English might well be there to stay.

Both the court held at Linlithgow and the prosecution of robbers in Roxburghshire provide evidence of 'peacetime' activities in which we have not seen English officers involved previously. Thus 1302 was far more encouraging for the English than 1301. It is possible that this success - which implied the support of the local population - persuaded Edward that the final conquest of Scotland was within sight. Certainly the campaign of 1303, which concentrated on the north-east, despite the failure of the campaign of 1301 to secure the south-west, indicates a degree of confidence which had not been evident eighteen months earlier. The war could never be won by military might - the Scots had proved that they could hold their own with guerrilla tactics in the last six years. Instead, the need to go about their daily business had persuaded many of the Scots in the south-east, who had lived with a continual English presence since 1296, to accept the English administration.

The campaign of 1303, which brought Scots north of the Forth face to face with an English army for the first time since 1298, was not memorable for any conflict except Roslyn, where an English force was defeated. It made no difference. The submission of the Scottish nobility to Edward, which had begun with Bruce in 1302, became a steady stream throughout 1303, culminating with the submission of the Guardian, Sir John Comyn, in February 1304<sup>80</sup>. Thereafter Edward could return to statecraft to work out the best way to settle Scotland. It took a lot longer than it had done in 1296.

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<sup>80</sup> Those, like Wallace, Fraser and Soules, who did not submit then either did so later in the year, did not return to Scotland or were dealt with by Edward.

## PART SIX

Having spent two campaigning seasons in the south-west, re-establishing English control, and using the truces of 1300-1 and 1302 to build up defences and establish securely the growing network of English garrisons in the Lowlands, Edward considered that he could at last launch the final stages of the conquest of Scotland by 1303.

However, it should not be forgotten that there is some degree of hindsight in these statements, which perhaps endows Edward with too much control over the events of 1300-2. He would certainly not have envisaged that the conquest of Scotland would take so long. Nor would either of the truces have been granted if he could have avoided it. Nevertheless, a certain amount of planning went into the campaigns of 1300 and 1301 and, even if all did not go according to plan, Edward made the most of his successes.

The plan in 1303 was to ignore Stirling for the moment and march up the east coast in the first major royal progress through Scotland since 1296. Having then re-established English control throughout the rest of the country, an attempt on Stirling could be made.

Although Edward's campaign of 1303 was a prelude to the submission of the majority of the rebels early in 1304, the Scots did not give up without a fight. The beginning of 1303 saw a resurgence of Scottish activity in the south and also over the border, with the name of William Wallace featuring prominently once more. Those English officials remaining in the Lowlands, particularly in the south-west, were by no means confident of their ability to contain the Scots.

The campaign of 1303, therefore, provides yet another example of both the ease with which an English army could intimidate the Scots into surrendering and, conversely, the difficulties facing any English administration of the northern kingdom. The overall picture conveyed is very similar to that of 1296 - a large English army crossing the Forth brought about the collapse of the Scottish government. In 1303, however, this collapse is rendered even more equivocal by the fact that resistance was successful up until and beyond the submission of the Guardian in February 1304.

English administrative activities supporting military operations have dominated the study of the occupying regime up till now. From 1303, however, evidence for the involvement of English officials in 'normal' administrative procedures, such as the

holding of inquests, increases dramatically. In addition, the settlement of Scotland naturally generated a large amount of administrative activity concerned primarily with settling questions of land ownership, an issue very close to the hearts of the medieval nobility. Thus members of the English administration in Scotland, many of whom were newly-appointed, were kept very busy indeed.

By 1304, the conquest of Scotland, therefore, seemed to be within Edward's grasp, although there were still various loose ends to be tied up. In the first months of the year, various magnates were busy at Perth negotiating for the submission of the majority of the rebels, led by the Guardian, Sir John Comyn. Others were sent on expeditions against the remaining rebels - Sir William Wallace and Sir Simon Fraser in particular. A parliament was held at St. Andrews, where a number of Scottish nobles again performed homage and fealty to King Edward. Finally, the siege of Stirling castle, still bravely defended by Sir William Oliphant on behalf of King John, was to occupy the English army from May to July 1304. Edward, now sixty-five years old, was once more Lord Paramount of Scotland in deed as well as name.



## CHAPTER EIGHT

## WINNING THE WAR

1303-5

**Scottish activities and English counter-measures in early 1303:**

The security of the marches during the winter of 1302-3 was causing grave concern, as the Scots went on the offensive after the expiry of the Truce of Asnières on 31 November 1302<sup>1</sup>. On 4 January 1303 Sir John Segrave and Sir John Botetourt were appointed captain of Northumberland and captain of Cumberland, Westmorland, Lancaster and Annandale to the western boundary of the sheriffdom of Roxburgh respectively in order to defend the marches. Both were ordered to assemble the men-at-arms of these counties within eight days of their appointment, as had been agreed with the inhabitants of these counties on 27 December 1302<sup>2</sup>.

*English expedition from Lochmaben*

An expedition under the command of Sir John Botetourt, the new warden of the western march, was held early in the year. The numbers involved were quite substantial. The expedition seems to have been planned originally for December 1302, but the majority of the men-at-arms were paid from 5-28 January 1303. This army reached a peak total of men-at-arms between 15 and 16 January (119), of footsoldiers between 12 and 13 January (2067) and hobelars between 14 and 16 January (12)<sup>3</sup>.

According to the references to the footsoldiers, over 1000 of whom came from the counties of Cumberland and Westmorland, they were "going with the army to Scotland" or "following Botetourt and the army in Scotland", presumably in response to the eight-days' muster ordered on 4 January. This army was surely recruited by the warden in order to deal with a specific threat. The last English expedition to Galloway had been in November 1300, under Sir John de St. John, as a follow-up to the campaign undertaken by the king in the south-west earlier in the year<sup>4</sup>. In organising this expedition, Botetourt appears to have been taking over where St. John left off and it is therefore clear that Galloway was still not subdued early in 1303.

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<sup>1</sup> See Chapter Seven, p.207.

<sup>2</sup> *Parl. Writs*, i, 368-9.

<sup>3</sup> E101/11/19, m.3. Sir Robert Clifford and his retinue of 9 men-at-arms were paid from 13 December 1302 as part of the expedition, but his was the only group paid in that month.

<sup>4</sup> See Chapter Five, p.138.

The garrison of Dumfries was also strengthened by the addition of between 21 and 84 footsoldiers during the period between 1 and 17 January. A further 20 archers were added to that garrison during the period from 26 January to 30 April 1303 "against the coming of the Scottish army". In addition, "bretasches, barriers and a certain palisade" were made "outwith the gate of the pele of Dumfries by order of Sir John Botetourt, Sir Robert Clifford, Sir John de St. John (junior), against the coming of the Scottish army, between 6 December 1302 and 7 January 1303". Repairs were also carried out on both the castle and the pele at Lochmaben in December 1302 and January 1303<sup>5</sup>. The south-west border garrisons were clearly expecting an attack from a rebel force of some size and presumably led by the Guardian, Sir John Comyn, junior, since this was 'the Scottish army'.

### *The south-east*

In fact, the Scots appear to have been active in the south-east, rather than the south-west. On 7 January Sir William Latimer, who had been based at Roxburgh with an expeditionary force of thirty-eight men-at-arms since August 1302, informed the king that "we are daily in peril of our lives"<sup>6</sup>.

On 13 January, sir Ralph Manton was in the northern English counties, having been "sent there to advise touching the protection of those parts and of divers lands in Scotland in the king's hands"<sup>7</sup>. A week later, he was ordered back to Scotland in order to arrange the payment of wages to the men-at-arms being sent north. On 20 January the archbishop of York was ordered to supply men, horses and arms and twenty-five magnates, mostly northerners with long experience in border warfare, were summoned:

"to go in person to John Segrave ... with horses and arms and all his power ... until the king's Scottish enemies have been repelled, who, as the king learns from John for certain, have invaded the land in those parts that are in the king's hands and it is feared that they may invade England..

Edward himself intended to go to Scotland sooner than planned, "by reason of the aforesaid news"<sup>8</sup>.

Although it is not clear exactly who these 'Scottish enemies' were, the following evidence for the activities of the Scots, led by the Guardian, Sir John Comyn, junior, leading up to the battle of Roslyn on 24 February 1303 suggests that the 'Scottish army' did in fact go east rather than west. Latimer's force at Roxburgh was therefore under attack by more than just a raiding party.

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<sup>5</sup> E101/11/19, mm.3, 4, 6.

<sup>6</sup> C.D.S., ii, no.1341.

<sup>7</sup> C.P.R., 1301-1307, 105.

<sup>8</sup> C.C.R., 1302-1307, 71.

*Selkirk*

Despite the precautions of 20 January, Segrave and his company, based at Berwick, were unable to prevent Edward's newly-constructed fortress at Selkirk from falling into enemy, and most particularly Sir Simon Fraser's, hands. The castle must have fallen early in January 1303 since orders to arrest its keeper, Sir Alexander Balliol, and bring him to the king were issued on 3 February. Balliol was freed by 14 March, having promised to "serve the king well and safely in time of peace and war with all his power.." and given up his son Thomas as a hostage. It was not until March 1305, however, that Edward actually forgave Sir Alexander "for the loss of the pele of Selkirk" and restored his lands to him<sup>9</sup>.

There is no reason to impute any disloyalty to Balliol - he had served Edward faithfully since 1296 and continued to do so. He may have been negligent, but the harsh measures taken against him probably reflect less on his own conduct than on Edward's determination to bring about the final conquest of Scotland and his growing frustration at events, and people, which thwarted that intention.

*Linlithgow*

Having achieved success at Selkirk, the Scots then turned their attentions to Edward's other new construction in the south-east, the fortress at Linlithgow. The castle was besieged in February 1303, but its defences proved secure enough to resist the attack<sup>10</sup>. Perhaps the twenty-four royal bowmen with their twelve grooms, granted safe-conducts on 30 January<sup>11</sup>, were sent to Linlithgow as a precautionary measure, though they presumably did not arrive before the assault began. It is likely, given the presence of the master architect, Master James de St. George, during the building operations at Linlithgow, that the pele built there was a much grander affair than that at Selkirk, although stone was only used on the latter<sup>12</sup>. The siege of Linlithgow was over by 24 February, since on that date the Scots, under Sir John Comyn and Sir Simon Fraser, had moved east to surprise Segrave's force at Roslyn.

*Roslyn*

Sir John Segrave, appointed keeper of Berwick castle on 5 August 1302, resided there with fifty-three men-at-arms to make expeditions, as necessary, throughout the south-east. Sir William Latimer, at Roxburgh, had thirty-eight men-at-arms with him for the same purpose<sup>13</sup>.

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9 C.P.R., 1301-1307, 111; C.C.R., 1302-1307, 71, 20; C.D.S., ii, no.1649.

10 C.D.S., iv, p.456.

11 C.P.R., 1301-1307, 109.

12 See Chapter Fourteen, p.322.

13 See above, p.222.

According to Guisborough, Sir John Segrave, "being near to Edinburgh at the beginning of Lent [20 February 1303]" and not knowing "about the Scottish ambush", divided his men "into three troops and were distanced from each other by about two leagues". He then heard from 'a boy', on 24 February, that the Scottish army was nearby and decided not to retreat, despite being separated from the other two troops. His own troop supposedly numbered three hundred men, although the combined retinues of Sir John Segrave and Sir William Latimer, 'for making expeditions', numbered only ninety-one. However, the presence in one of the troops of Sir Robert Neville, suggests that the northern army, who have served under Sir John Botetourt briefly in January, had now been sent to the south-east, since that was where the Scottish army were operating<sup>14</sup>. Wyntoun says that the 'Treasurer', sir Ralph Manton, brought an army of 20,000 horsemen north before the battle, which may, in fact, be a grossly exaggerated description of Botetourt's army. The Scottish army reputedly numbered seven thousand. Wyntoun describes the battle itself with glee:

"And wyth thai [the English] the Scottis men  
 Than fersly fawcht, and layid on then,  
 Quhere mony dyntis dowre ware sene,  
 Mony thare ded lay on the grene:  
 The Scottis men thame cwnrayid swa,  
 That thai gert mony on bak there ga:  
 Enpresoneis thai tuk mony;  
 And partyd amang thame wyllfully  
 The armowris, and other gere,  
 That thai wan fra thame thare off were;  
 And wend, that thai had bene all qwyt,  
 Fra thai that a weyng discumfyte"<sup>15</sup>

Though this battle was certainly not on the same scale as Falkirk, or even Stirling Bridge, Roslyn was clearly seen by the Scots as revenge for the military humiliations of the previous five years.

Out of Segrave's own personal retinue, five of his valets lost horses at Roslyn<sup>16</sup>. The warden was himself badly injured and taken prisoner, but among the dead was sir Ralph Manton, providing another parallel with the career of sir Hugh Cressingham. Complete disaster was avoided when a second brigade of English troops managed to rescue some of the prisoners, including Segrave<sup>17</sup>, but there is no doubt that the defeat

<sup>14</sup> Guisborough, 351-2. This may be referring to Sir Ralph Neville, who was ordered to raise the men of the bishopric of Durham on 8 January 1303 [C.P.R., 1303-1307, 106-7].

<sup>15</sup> Wyntoun, ii, 354-5.

<sup>16</sup> E101/11/16.

<sup>17</sup> Guisborough, 352.

left the English in Scotland dispirited and unenthusiastic, a situation further compounded by a lack of money.

### English activities after Roslyn:

On 2 March 1303, eight of those assigned to help Sir John Segrave on 20 January were summoned to attend a meeting at York with the treasurer, barons of the exchequer, certain members of the king's council and others on 15 March to discuss "the state of the magnates and others in the army against our enemies"<sup>18</sup>.

At the end of the same month Segrave was writing to the exchequer complaining that the attack on the Scots on the march "cannot be accomplished unless the sheriff of the said county (Northumberland) does as he has been charged to do". The sheriff had presumably been ordered to raise money, or perhaps men, since Segrave also referred to the respite of debts until Easter promised to those of the county who served with him, which had been confirmed on the arrival in Scotland of sir Ralph Manton. £1000 or 1000 marks was ordered to be taken to Roxburgh on 26 March to pay for the expedition. This money came from the collection of the fifteenth, granted to the king in the parliament of October 1302. Further supplies of money from the relaxing of service to Scotland to ecclesiastics was to be at the exchequer by 2 June<sup>19</sup>.

### Preparations for the campaign of 1303: *Purveyance*

Initial orders for purveyance for the summer campaign had been sent out on 10 December 1302<sup>20</sup>. On 22 March 1303 writs were issued ordering the proclamation of the extension of the Truce of Amiens between England and France until 26 May 1303. The mayor and bailiffs of Berwick were again included in the list of those to whom writs were sent<sup>21</sup>.

By the end of March Edward was expressing concern about the state of purveyance and on 26 March various royal clerks were sent to the counties where purveyance was supposedly taking place, to inquire "touching the diligence" of those who were entrusted with it<sup>22</sup>.

Preparations for the main summer campaign had been stepped up by April 1303. The muster-point was now Roxburgh. On 9 April writs were sent out to various clerks to choose footsoldiers in each county<sup>23</sup>. Writs of summons were also sent out to Ireland, seeking 500 men-at-arms, 1000 hobelars and 10,000 footsoldiers. Altogether the army from Ireland numbered over 3,400, and, unlike 1301, the earl of Ulster did sail to

<sup>18</sup> E159/76, m.68.

<sup>19</sup> E159/76, m.12; *Parl. Writs*, i, 132; E159/76, m.15.

<sup>20</sup> See Chapter Seven, p.211.

<sup>21</sup> *C.C.R.*, 1302-1307, 80; see Chapter Seven, p.212.

<sup>22</sup> *C.D.S.*, v, no.321; *C.P.R.*, 1301-1307, 129.

<sup>23</sup> *Parl. Writs*, i, 370-1.

Scotland, having demanded and received the pardon of all his debts, which amounted to more than £16,600, at the Irish exchequer<sup>24</sup>.

Preparations for the campaign began long before the king arrived at Roxburgh on 16 May. On 19 April, sir Peter Chichester, the royal pantler and butler, was sent from York to Berwick and then on to Roxburgh to make arrangements. He was also responsible throughout the campaign for bringing red wine to the king, wherever he happened to be, from the store at Berwick<sup>25</sup>. Many royal clerks were busy during the month of May in ensuring that adequate supplies reached Scotland in time for Edward's arrival. Sixteen ships' masters were paid wages for themselves and their crews in May, presumably for having brought supplies<sup>26</sup>.

Arrows for crossbows and spears for the footsoldiers were also brought up to Berwick, presumably to be distributed among those arriving at Roxburgh. Purveyance in Northumberland provided the spears in this case, as well as horseshoes and nails. Large amounts of hard cash were also brought up in lump sums<sup>27</sup>. These sums were generally paid into the wardrobe, to be used for the immediate expenses of the household. It is significant, however, that there are many instances of arrears of wages paid out in May to members of various garrisons who joined the royal army in that month<sup>28</sup>. For those who resided permanently in Scotland, the outset of a campaign, promising a flow of hard cash to the north, entailed the increased possibility that payment for their services would be brought up to date.

10,300 footsoldiers had been requested to arrive at Roxburgh by 12 May and, at its peak in early June, this army totalled around 7500<sup>29</sup>. By June there were also some 450 men-at-arms at wages in the king's household and 180 in that of the prince<sup>30</sup>.

### *Scottish levies*

Writs were also issued for the first time for levies to be made in Scotland itself. The earl of Carrick was ordered "to come with all the men-at-arms he can", in addition to 1000 men (footsoldiers) from Carrick and Galloway. Sir Richard Siward was also to bring "300 chosen foot of Nithsdale", the earl of Angus was "to be asked to send his men-at-arms<sup>31</sup> and at least 300 foot and the earl of March was also to bring "as many men-at-arms as he can". There is no indication as to how many, if any, of these Scottish contingents actually served. The earl of Carrick, and probably Sir Richard Siward also,

24 J. Lydon, 'The Years of Crisis, 1254-1315', *A New History of Ireland*, ii, 200.

25 E101.364/13, m.4, m.6.

26 E101/364/13, mm.4-22, mm.99-100.

27 E101/365/6, m.2, m.17.

28 E101/684/53/mm.11-13; E101/11/20, m.10; E101/13/36, part 3, m.187; E101/364/13, m.32.

29 Prestwich, *Edward 1*, 498; Prestwich, *War, Politics and Finance*, 80, 97-8.

30 E101/612/11; Prestwich, *Edward 1*, 498.

31 These were again presumably not Sir Gilbert d'Umfraville's men from Angus, but from his Northumberland lands [see Chapter 6, p.166]

were with Sir John Botetourt over the summer and presumably their men went with them. Botetourt left the south-west for the army on 1 May<sup>32</sup>.

### The campaign itself:

Edward proceeded along the southern banks of the Forth to Linlithgow at the beginning of June and then crossed the river by means of a specially-constructed pontoon bridge, which had also been brought up to Berwick from Lynn<sup>33</sup>. The army then continued up to Perth, where it remained for over a month. This seems to have been, in effect, a second mustering-point. From the references to household payments, a considerable number of men (132 in total) joined the army at this stage. An examination of the horse evaluation rolls, a reliable indication of recent arrival, corroborates this. On 9 July alone, when many of the newcomers were paid, thirty-four men had horses valued<sup>34</sup>. Presumably there had been an initial horse evaluation at the first muster at Roxburgh, but it has not survived.

Not surprisingly, supplies of food and wine had to be transported along the Tay. Twenty-one ships are recorded as arriving at Perth. Various merchants sold these goods to royal officers and their names indicate that they were English rather than Scottish<sup>35</sup>, though some purchasing was done from local merchants. 160 lagens of red wine were bought from various men of Perth for the king and the prince of Wales. The payments were made in October, but it is most likely that the actual purchasing was done when the army was in the town in June and July<sup>36</sup>.

### *Scottish activities in the Borders*

By 14 June, while Edward was only as far as Clackmannan, en route to Perth<sup>37</sup>, the Scots were already resuming their attacks on the marches. According to a letter on that date to the bishop of Durham, they had "entered Annandale and Liddesdale and elsewhere within the marches in the county of Cumberland with a great multitude of armed men.."38.

Sir Thomas Multon of Egremont and Sir John Hoddleston, both of whom had previously been ordered to help Segrave, were therefore appointed to assemble the footmen and men-at-arms of Cumberland and Westmorland and the other areas over which Sir John Botetourt had command, because the latter was away with the king.

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32 *C.D.S.*, ii, no.1356, no.1385; Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 178-9 [wrongly calendared under 1297]; E101/11/19, m.5.

33 *C.D.S.*, ii, no.1375.

34 E101/364/13, mm.65-102.

35 They included men such as Thomas Pody of Ravensere and William of Alnmouth.

36 E101/364/13, m.5.

37 *Itin.*, 210.

38 *C.C.R.*, 1302-1307, 91.

Similarly, Sir Walter Huntercumbe was to take over from Sir John Segrave in Northumberland. Sir Aymer de Valence, now the king's lieutenant in the south of Scotland, was still at Berwick and was ordered to hold a council there to plan action for the defence of the march with the help of Multon, Hoddleston and Huntercumbe<sup>39</sup>.

However, sir James Dalilegh, the receiver at Carlisle, was already finding himself in difficulty regarding supplies, primarily because Edward's first priority was to feed his army, which was provisioned from the east. Nevertheless, supplies were sent to Carlisle. There is record of the arrival at Skinburness, the port for Carlisle, of six ships from Ireland carrying a total of 390 quarters 5 bushels of wheat, 427 quarters 5 bushels of oats and 12 3/4 casks of wine between 18 April and 28 June<sup>40</sup>.

By 17 June 1303, at the same time as the Scots were beginning their offensive in the south-west, Dalilegh had already written to sir John Droxford, at the exchequer, requesting more funds. An official at York<sup>41</sup> wrote back on 17 June, explaining that all the money at the exchequer had been sent to the king, who was now at Perth. Since Dalilegh had already been sent money after Sir John Botetourt's departure for the army on 1 May, the writer questioned his need for more. Nevertheless, to safeguard the garrisons at Dumfries and Lochmaben, the collectors of the fifteenth in Cumberland were ordered to send the receiver any money that they had in hand<sup>42</sup>.

The situation on the march was deteriorating rapidly. A letter from the bishop of Carlisle, Multon and Hoddleston on 23 June informed the exchequer at York that the Scots, under Sir Simon Fraser and Sir Edmund Comyn of Kilbride, had crossed the English border on 18 June with a large force and destroyed areas around Carlisle.

Another contingent of Scots, this time under Sir John Moubray and Sir William Wallace, had marched through Galloway "and have attracted to them most of the Galwegians.." They then 'harassed' the countryside around Caerlaverock<sup>43</sup> and Dumfries on 23 June, the day on which this letter was written, and "are coming to destroy Annandale and to join Sir Simon Fraser and his company". This combined force was again threatening the north of England and thus the bishop and the two knights urgently required advice and assistance "because almost all the men-at-arms and footmen are with the king." In addition, those whom they had managed to assemble at Carlisle, as

39 C.P.R., 1301-1307, 146-7.

40 C.D.S., ii, nos.1353, 1369-72, 1377.

41 Both sir John Droxford, the keeper of the wardrobe, and the treasurer, Walter Langton, were with the king.

42 C.D.S., v, no.331.

43 This is the first mention of Caerlaverock since 1300, although, unfortunately, it is not possible to draw any conclusions from this evidence as to whether or not there had been an English garrison resident in the castle since 1300.



previously ordered by the king, required provisions. The exchequer responded immediately, ordering sir James Dalilegh to provide 'sufficient victuals' for those left defending the march<sup>44</sup>. This was easy enough to order, but much more difficult to execute.

*The effect of this lack of provisions on the defence of the march*

By July 1303 it was clear that the arrangements made to provide Dalilegh with sufficient supplies were not enough. On 16 July Sir Thomas Multon and Sir John Hoddleston wrote again to the exchequer, explaining that the defence of the western march was being undertaken at their own expense and that they were unable to recruit men into their service to cross the border unless king's wages were paid. They urgently requested money for equipment so that retaliatory measures could be taken against the Scots and also that payment be made to them and their men because of their own indebtedness. They mentioned that Dalilegh had been trying to provide for them, but he had informed them that there was hardly enough to sustain the garrisons in the area.

A similar story was told by Sir John le Moigne, keeper of Galloway and Nithsdale in Botetourt's absence. The Scots were posing a serious threat to the garrisons at Dumfries and Lochmaben by preventing supplies from arriving from Carlisle and the English remaining there required urgent relief and supplies "before it is too late". The writer stated that "in the two garrisons there are neither enough knights nor esquires nor crossbowmen to mount guard nor to go to the king, if you do not command that their wages and arrears be paid by the bearer of this letter"<sup>45</sup>. The loss of these castles, as the Scots were doubtless aware, would have made it extremely difficult for the English to retain control of the south-west of Scotland and would have gone a long way to compensate for any success which Edward might achieve in the north-east.

For the royal officials at Berwick, Carlisle and York, failure due to the scale of the campaign was not sufficient excuse to save them from blame by their royal master. On 14 August, Dalilegh was requested to pay Sir John Botetourt for the service which he and his large force of, on average, thirty-two men-at-arms were performing in Scotland. The payment was to be made from the [unspecified] lands which the king had given Botetourt in ward. In November, however, Edward was 'expressing his surprise' that this order had not been executed, thus preventing Sir John from making a foray through lack of funds<sup>46</sup>. Given Dalilegh's extreme lack of money, it is not difficult to imagine how difficult it would have been to spare any sum, however justified the cause, if it was not required for the direct assistance of the western garrisons.

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44 E159/76, m.18.

45 E159/76, m.20.

46 C.D.S., ii, no.1389.

### *Edward's financial problems*

The problem of providing sufficient money for wages (which were then spent on food) and the victuals themselves was not just a problem for those remaining in the south. Even while the army was organising itself at Perth for the long journey north, the situation regarding money and victuals was already causing concern. On 15 June the treasurer's lieutenant at York, sir Philip Willoughby, wrote to Richard Bremesgrave, the receiver at Berwick, ordering him, at the king's request, to send all money received from the exchequer to Edward as quickly as possible, by land or sea, so long as it was safe to do so. Even if it were not possible to deliver the money, the king was to be informed as to how much Richard had received, and when, "so that said Philip will not be blamed for negligence if the king is lacking"<sup>47</sup>. As a result, about £1000 was received at Berwick in the next week, £300 of which was recorded as being paid into the wardrobe at Perth on 24 June. Doubtless this was far from enough.

It was a similar story with regard to victuals. On 20 June Sir Nicholas Fermbaud, the constable of Bristol castle, was ordered to arrest ships and their crews so that grain purveyed in Somerset and Dorset could be taken safely and quickly to Berwick since it was urgently required to feed the army and household. Ships did arrive at Perth with victuals. Nevertheless, on 30 June, William Burgh, a royal clerk, was sent from Perth to York to hasten the despatch of money needed by the royal cooks<sup>48</sup>.

### *Siege of Brechin; continued progress north*

Edward's immediate plan was to capture Brechin castle. Preparations for the siege were made during the month that the army remained at Perth. On 15 July orders were sent to Sir Ebulo Mountz, the constable of Edinburgh castle, to send a siege engine from both the castles of Edinburgh and Jedburgh to Montrose by sea as soon as possible<sup>49</sup>. Presumably others were ordered to do the same.

The army set off from Perth around 17 July. They were now entering enemy territory. On 19 July prayers were said at Coupar [Angus] abbey for William Redinsle, a valet of Sir Hugh Bardolf, 'killed by the Scots'. On 29 July "the goods of Scottish enemies found in Coupar abbey, after a search by Sir Walter Teye and Sir Matthew Montemartin" were sold<sup>50</sup>.

The English continued round the coast to Arbroath and then Montrose, where the siege engines and more victuals were picked up from waiting ships. They then cut inland to Brechin. Provision for further supplies of money and victuals was also made. On 28

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47 E159/76, m.74.

48 E159/76, m.70; see above, p.227; E101/364/13; m.12.

49 C.D.S. ii, no.1386.

50 E101/364/13, m.93; E101/365/6, m.3.

July orders were sent to each county to send the proceeds from the fifteenth to the exchequer. On 7 August further demands for purveyance were made in six counties<sup>51</sup>.

The actual siege lasted around five days until 9 August, when Sir Thomas Maule, the Scottish constable of the castle, was killed on the battlements and the rest of the garrison capitulated<sup>52</sup>. The king and the army remained there for another week, presumably organising the installation of a garrison and the provision of victuals, before moving on up to Aberdeen.

The army reached Aberdeen on 24 August and even though five ships did arrive with supplies<sup>53</sup>, there was still a desperate need for more money and foodstuffs. On 28 August, the very day that these ships arrived, Edward wrote to Philip Willoughby complaining that even though his previous letters had commanded the former to send up immediately all the money that he could for those at royal wages, the money had been very slow in arriving and "we owe treble the sum that you have sent." The king went on to say: "If we cannot make these payments, we cannot hold this part in peace and they will go back to their own parts, as they are already doing from day to day, because of the lack." In addition, the store at Berwick had not fully received the goods which had been acquired by purveyance. Again Willoughby was to be held responsible for this and was to "hasten the said purveyance to us so that we can leave where we are", as well as despatching further supplies of money.

Doubtless there was a degree of exaggeration in Edward's harassed demands for money and supplies. However, he had been forced to call off more than one campaign<sup>54</sup> because of a lack of provisions, and therefore had some justification for believing that he would not achieve the final conquest of Scotland without adequate supplies.

Edward also mentioned the Irish, who, he says, "do not wish to serve without pay nor to suffer greatly as our other people of England have done". These Irish are presumably the great Anglo-Irish magnates, such as Richard de Burgh, the earl of Ulster, who had been persuaded to take part in this campaign only on the condition of the waiving of all, or part, of their debts to the Crown<sup>55</sup>.

The army moved on from Aberdeen on the same day, 28 August, reaching Kinloss Abbey on 12 September. Urquhart and Cromarty castles were reputedly captured, presumably during this period, despite Scottish resistance<sup>56</sup>, though there is no direct evidence for this. However, two ships are recorded as arriving at Aberdeen with royal

51 E101/364/13, m.100; E159/76, m.74.

52 Barrow, *Bruce*, 127.

53 E101/364/13, m.49.

54 The campaign of 1301, when the king wintered at Linlithgow with the intention of continuing the campaign in the next season, but had to abandon this plan, due to starvation and desertion, must have been fairly fresh in Edward's memory.

55 E159/76, m.21; see above, pp.225-6.

56 Barron, *The Scottish War of Independence*, 193.

engineers, which, since the siege of Brechin was now over, suggests that a further need for siege equipment was envisaged<sup>57</sup>.

From Kinloss the army returned south over the Mounth, a difficult, but direct, route, reaching Dundee on 16 October. Twenty-four men-at-arms received first-time payments there, suggesting that fresh recruits joined Edward at this point.

#### **Sir Aymer de Valence, Inverkip and tentative offers of peace:**

The situation in the south-west, fortunately, does not seem to have deteriorated much since July 1303. Around the middle of that month, Sir Aymer de Valence was making preparations for an expedition, presumably against the Scots in the west, which the king had ordered him to make. A number of men-at-arms from the army had been sent south to join Valence, including Sir John Botetourt and the earl of Carrick<sup>58</sup>. This force had reached as far west as Inverkip by the end of August<sup>59</sup>, remaining there from 24 August to 4 September. Since this is the first mention of an English presence at Inverkip, which had been granted to the earl of Lincoln as part of the lands of Strathgryfe, the castle was presumably taken by Valence's force.

On 2 September, while still at Inverkip, Valence ordered John Weston, the paymaster at Berwick, to account with those in his company. Deductions were to be made for victuals issued to them by Ralph Benton and bills were to be made for the remainder, as well as for sums due for the restoration of horses<sup>60</sup>. The lieutenant then began to move eastward again, reaching Glasgow by 9 September. On 26 September, Valence was at Linlithgow, from where he wrote to the chancellor that he had been "treating with the great lords of Scotland to bring them to the king's will and hopes to be successful by God's help; but cannot say for certain"<sup>61</sup>.

Valence was also having problems with desertions. Two clerks were sent to Richard Bremesgrave and Alexander Convers at Berwick on 28 September to tell them:

"that the Scots have openly gathered with all their force in the lands and the Irish troops, who are at their wages for nine or more weeks, have heard it said that money has come to Berwick, and are staying in the country around Linlithgow where they can have nothing to live on except ready money, unless they rob the people who have sworn allegiance to the king; and they see clearly that no man cares for them or their lives, so they have packed their baggage to go home. And Sir John of Menteith and Sir Alexander Menzies, who had come to treat in good form for peace, broke

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57 E101/364/13, m.100.

58 E101/11/21, mm.55-59.

59 C.D.S., ii, no.1390.

60 C.D.S., v, no.336.

61 C.D.S., ii, no.1392, no.1393.

off their business by reason of the scarcity that they saw among the said people."<sup>62</sup>

This strongly suggests that the Scots who had come to discuss the possibility of submission to Edward with Valence at Linlithgow, decided to continue the fight when they saw how discontented and ill-provisioned Valence's troops were. As a result, Margaret, countess of Lennox, had to send to the king for help against Comyn and his followers, who came north over the Forth "as far as Drymen" at the end of September<sup>63</sup>.

The Irish army serving under Valence had reached a dreadful state by August 1303. It is clear from the above report that many of the footsoldiers were deserting because of a lack of pay. The rest mostly returned home "the minute their hundred days' service was complete". Although the earl of Ulster remained in Scotland over the winter, he was owed nearly £6000 when he finally returned home "and other leaders were owed sums in proportion to the retinues they brought with them"<sup>64</sup>. The earl's caution in 1301 was proved to have been justified.

#### **Final stages of the campaign; winter at Dunfermline:**

Although Edward eventually spent the winter in Dunfermline, he initially led his army south from Dundee to Cambuskenneth, via Dunblane. Stirling castle was obviously the object of his interest in the area. On 24 October, while at Tippermore, near Stirling, he wrote that "we do not wish to leave there until we have made headway in the best way we can." The pontoon bridge, which had been used earlier in the campaign for crossing the Forth, was to be taken to Blackness, along with six engines from Berwick and further supplies of victuals, and then shipped to the king. Richard Bremesgrave and sir John Swonland, the clerk who had originally been in charge of building the bridge, were to arrange this and also to requisition as many ships as necessary<sup>65</sup>.

However, Edward had to wait until the following year to achieve success against the Scottish garrison at Stirling. His army seems to have remained a reasonable size throughout the winter of 1303-4. Out of a total of 363 men-at-arms at royal wages throughout the campaign, 218 received payment at Dunfermline. Although many of those left in the south during the summer rejoined the king for the winter, the prince of Wales with his household left the king at Dunfermline on 25 November, to form a separate court at Perth<sup>66</sup>. By the end of December messengers were travelling between the prince and his father with letters concerning demands made by the Scots for their submission<sup>67</sup>.

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62 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 482-4.

63 C.D.S., ii, no.1405.

64 J. Lydon, 'The Years of Crisis, 1254-1315', *A New History of Ireland*, ii, 200-1.

65 E101/10/18, m.1, m.193.

66 C.D.S., ii, pp.392-3.

67 C47/22/3, m.33.

### Expeditions against the rebels:

However, the 'rebels' had not submitted yet, and Edward intended to keep up the pressure on them even through the winter. Sir John Segrave, Sir Robert Clifford and Sir William Latimer were placed in charge of a company chosen to make chevauchees and detailed instructions were given to ensure secrecy. Only those whose names appeared on an indenture were to go with them:

"on pain of losing horses and arms and imprisonment. And when these officers come to the water of Forth, they are to search strictly their followers and if they find any strangers, to arrest them with horses and harness and send them after the king.... And after these officers pass the Forth, the king will that in some convenient place on this side of 'les Torres' [the Torwood, near Stirling], they again search their company and send all found beyond their proper number, with horses and harness, to the castles of Edinburgh or Berwick, whichever is nearest, and guard them till the king signifies his pleasure."<sup>68</sup>

The possibility of spies, whom the English also relied on, informing the enemy of the destination of these chevauchees was thus to be eliminated. The final phase of the conquest - the recapture of Stirling castle - would take place in the following summer. In the meantime, negotiations with the Guardian, Sir John Comyn of Badenoch, to be conducted by the earl of Ulster and Sir Aymer de Valence at Perth, were about to begin in earnest.

### Submissions of the Scots:

By 9 February 1304 agreement had been reached between Sir Aymer de Valence and the earl of Ulster, on behalf of King Edward, and Sir John Comyn, the Guardian, and his council, on behalf of the Scots. The exact terms of the submission agreement and a detailed discussion of the negotiations and subsequent events are given in Chapter Fourteen. For the purposes of this chapter, it is enough to say that only a hard-core of Scots still wished to continue their rebellion through the summer of 1304.

### Expeditions against the remaining rebels:

Edward was determined to bring all the rebels to heel as soon as possible, by negotiation or military action. To this last end, various expeditions against the Scots were organised around the turn of the year, even though negotiations with the Guardian were underway<sup>69</sup>. On 9 January, Sir John Botetourt wrote to sir James Dalilegh, informing the receiver of the number of men which he was retaining, because "he intends to make a

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<sup>68</sup> C.D.S., ii, no.1432.

<sup>69</sup> See Chapter Fifteen, pp.335-6.

foray on the enemy". The warden's force numbered 124 men-at-arms, including Sir Robert Clifford and his retinue, 19 hobelars and 2736 footsoldiers from the counties of Cumberland, Westmorland and Lancaster<sup>70</sup>.

Botetourt and his men then joined the main company under Sir John Segrave. Other members of this force included Sir William Latimer, senior, Sir John de St. John, junior, Sir Hugh Audley and the earl of Carrick, all extremely experienced in Scottish affairs. Certain Scots were still on the offensive. On 25 February 1304 two messengers were attacked while coming to the king with letters from the earl of Carrick<sup>71</sup>.

On 3 March the king wrote to Segrave and the other nobles, applauding "their diligence in his affairs" and begging "them to complete the business which they have begun so well, and to bring matters to a close before they leave the parts on that side [of the Forth]. The king urged them earnestly, "as the cloak is well made, to make the hood"<sup>72</sup>.

Not all Edward's officials received praise, however. The earl of March, presumably at his castle of Dunbar now that he was no longer keeper of Ayr, received a reproving letter from his royal master. Edward expressed 'much surprise that he [March] let the enemy go' and instructed the earl to keep watch on the Scottish garrison of Stirling "and cut them off if they sally"<sup>73</sup>. The rebels were probably in Lothian, therefore.

Just over a year after Roslyn, Segrave had his revenge. Around 10 March Sir John and his company 'discomfited' Sir Simon Fraser and Sir William Wallace at Happlew near Peebles. The greatest barrier to success before that date seems to have been, as usual, the fundamental problem of finding the Scots. This was overcome by the use of a local spy since a payment of 10s. was made on 15 March 'by the king's gift', to one John of Musselburgh, for "leading Sir John Segrave, Sir Robert Clifford and other magnates in their company, assigned to a certain horsed expedition over Sir Simon Fraser, William Wallace and other Scottish enemies of the king, then being in parts of Lothian"<sup>74</sup>. Unfortunately for the English, however, Wallace and Fraser were neither captured nor killed.

### **Linlithgow, Dundee and Tulliallan:**

The English garrisons now had little to fear from rebel attacks. At Linlithgow, however, the weather caused almost as much damage. A total of £4 9s.10d. was paid to various carpenters and other workmen "for mending a certain part of the pele and the

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70 C.D.S., ii, no.1437.

71 C.D.S., iv, p.481.

72 C.D.S., ii, no.1465.

73 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 467-70.

74 C.D.S., iv, p.475.

ditch broken by a great tempest of wind there" between 15 January and 15 February 1304<sup>75</sup>.

1304 contains the first reference since 1297 to a royal castle manned by an English garrison north of the Tay. Thomas Umfraville, son of the earl of Angus, received a certum of £40 for the custody of Dundee castle with 24 men-at-arms from 10 February to 5 April 1304. From then until 6 August 1304 the garrison contained 16 men-at-arms, 12 crossbowmen and 16 archers, receiving royal wages. The numbers were thereafter reduced to 6 men-at-arms, 6 crossbowmen and 6 archers, to be paid from a certum of £40<sup>76</sup>. Dundee was therefore similar in size to Jedburgh castle.

The new sheriff of Clackmannan, William Biset, who resided at Tulliallan castle, was also experiencing trouble that had nothing to do with the Scots. On 17 April Edward had to write to Sir Henry Percy, having heard that the latter's "people have come there [Tulliallan] and wish to eject him [Biset]". Percy was ordered "for his love to allow Biset to remain and attend to his duties". The reason for the former's interest in the area is not clear.

Biset had already "spent money and made provision", strengthening the walls at Tulliallan, but he was also involved in harassing those in Stirling castle. By 17 April, he and his brother had managed to capture boats belonging to the garrison. These were presumably not large, but would have been useful for bringing supplies to the castle. Biset was eventually rewarded with the keepership of the castle and sheriffdom of Stirling for his services, relinquishing the sheriffdom of Clackmannan<sup>77</sup>.

### **Parliament at St. Andrews; preparations for the siege of Stirling:**

In March 1304 a parliament was held at St. Andrews, the first to be held by Edward in Scotland since 1296. It has been stated that:

"practically every man of note in Scotland seems to have been present, except the irreconcilables and those excused attendance for reason of ill-health or because their services were required elsewhere".

They heard, among other things, Wallace, Fraser and the garrison at Stirling declared outlaws *secundum iuris processum et leges Scoticanas*<sup>78</sup>. Already Edward was being seen to act with due concern for legality. In addition, a total of 129 landowners, who included Malcolm, earl of Lennox, Sir William Murray of Drumsergard, Sir William Ramsay and sir Ralph Dundee, performed homage to the king of England at St. Andrews on either 14 or 15 March 1304<sup>79</sup>. The bishop of Glasgow also swore fealty there<sup>80</sup>. The

75 C.D.S., iv, p.459.

76 C.D.S., iv, p.470.

77 C.D.S., ii, no.1515, no.1561.

78 H.G. Richardson and G. Sayles, 'The Scottish Parliaments of Edward I', S.H.R., xxv, 311.

79 Palgrave, *Documents*, i, 194-7; 299-301.

80 Palgrave, *Documents*, i, 345-6.



newly-reconciled Scottish nobility were no doubt to be closely watched for good behaviour during the forthcoming campaign against Stirling castle.

The net around the Stirling garrison was being drawn tight. On 1 March, the earls of Menteith, Lennox and Strathearn were to prove their loyalty to Edward by deploying both horse and foot "so that the enemy on the other side cannot injure the people on this at the king's peace"<sup>81</sup>. This would also prevent any relief for those at Stirling coming from the north.

Both the native nobility in the areas surrounding Stirling, which included the above earls and the earl of Carrick, and Edward's officials, both English and Scottish, were now being called upon to prepare for the siege. On 20 March, the sheriff of Stirling, Sir Alexander Livingston<sup>82</sup>, was ordered to muster "all the forces, both horse and foot, of his bailiwick, including baronies in it, but excluding any part of the Lennox .. to come without delay before Sir Thomas Morham and Alwyn Calendar, to whom they are to be obedient". The exclusion of the men of the Lennox is perhaps an indication of their dubious loyalty. On 1 April the earls of Strathearn, Menteith and Lennox were all ordered to prevent their people from attempting to provision the Stirling garrison<sup>83</sup>.

At the beginning of April also, the garrison at Linlithgow was intending to harass the Scots but required thirty men-at-arms from the king. Unfortunately "the king's men were dispersed foraging and before they could be assembled the time would come for the king to move near Stirling, which he intends shortly to do." Edward therefore ordered the constable at Linlithgow to inform Sir John Comyn "and other good men in those parts" of his information on the 'enemy's plans'. Comyn and the other Scots, together with the garrison at Kirkintilloch "and any others whom they can hire are to do the best they can until the king's arrival"<sup>84</sup>. Engines and their equipment were also to be sent to Stirling.

A similar order for engines and equipment had also been issued to Sir Robert Leybourne, warden of the earl of Lincoln's lands and constable of Inverkip. However, on 21 April, "learning that his bailiffs and people there are neglecting the commands of the king's officers in regard to necessaries, and order is not taken for remedy, whereby the siege is greatly delayed", the king ordered Leybourne to forward to Stirling "all the iron and great stones of the engines" at Glasgow<sup>85</sup>.

The above orders indicate a considerable change in the English position in the last year. Edward was now coming to Stirling as the accepted ruler of Scotland, serenaded on the way by various women, "just as they used to do during the time of Alexander, late king of Scots"<sup>86</sup>.

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81 C.D.S., ii, no.1471.

82 C.D.S., ii, no.1457.

83 C.D.S., v, no.353; C.D.S., ii, no.1489.

84 C.D.S., v, no.363.

85 C.D.S., ii, no.1519.

86 C.D.S., iv, p.475.

More importantly, however, he could make preparations for the siege through his own officials and the Scottish lords in and around the Stirling area, instead of having to rely almost entirely on the army. This surely marks the transition, admittedly still incomplete, of the English presence in Scotland from a military regime to a peacetime administration.

This was reinforced, no doubt intentionally, by the parliament at St. Andrews. The measures to be taken against all who continued to rebel were therefore approved by those members of the Scottish political community who were present at St. Andrews. Even though the siege of Stirling was obviously a military operation, it seems to have been portrayed as a national effort in the interests of law and order.

### **The siege of Stirling and its aftermath:**

Edward left St. Andrews on 5 April, arriving at Stirling on 22 April<sup>87</sup>. His first action was to refuse to grant the Scottish constable, Sir William Oliphant, permission to consult with the Guardian, Sir John Soules, who had placed Stirling castle in his custody. Since Soules was currently in France, the request was presumably made primarily as a delaying tactic. The siege then began.

The use of a large number of siege-weapons, including the famous 'War Wolf', together with crossbows and ordinary bows and the throwing of 'Greek fire' into the castle, meant that the outcome was inevitable. Having been threatened with the direst punishment for their insolence, and being pounded by the mighty 'War Wolf' *after* they had offered to surrender, Sir William Oliphant and the twenty-five members of his garrison handed over the last Scottish stronghold in 'rebel' hands on 24 July 1304. They were then led off to captivity in England<sup>88</sup>. The next day William Biset, the new sheriff of Stirling and keeper of the castle received from the king's lardener 24 carcasses of salted beef from supplies found in the castle to provide for the new English garrison<sup>89</sup>. The castle had not, therefore, fallen for lack of food.

### **The English garrisons in Scotland:**

By 1304 there is mention of royal garrisons in the castles of Ayr, Berwick, Bothwell, Carstairs, Dumbarton<sup>90</sup>, Dumfries, Dundee, Edinburgh, Jedburgh, Kirkintilloch, Linlithgow, Lochmaben, Roxburgh, Selkirk and Stirling.

However, the position of English nobles holding castles privately in Scotland should now have changed<sup>91</sup>. Since the submission agreement of February 1304

<sup>87</sup> *Itin.*, 225-6.

<sup>88</sup> Prestwich, *Edward 1*, 501-2; Barrow, *Bruce*, 128-9; *Foedera*, i, 969.

<sup>89</sup> *C.D.S.*, ii, no.1564.

<sup>90</sup> The castle and sheriffdom of Dumbarton was granted to John of Menteith on 20 March 1304 [*C.D.S.*, ii, no.1474].

<sup>91</sup> See Chapter One, pp.33-4.

guaranteed the return of all lands and property belonging to rebel Scots, these castles now reverted to their original owners.

An extremely interesting petition on the subject of lands and castles belonging to private individuals at Edward's peace was sent to the king probably around 1302 and certainly by 1304. Its author was Robert Bruce of Annandale, father of the earl of Carrick. He was complaining to the king:

"that he has been kept out of his lands of Annandale and Lochmaben castle for 4 years, and still is, to his loss and great grievance and undeservedly. He begs that he may have them that he may serve the king and hold of him on this march as his neighbours do. If not better treated than hitherto, he can neither borrow nor live without making great mischief."

The king replied that when he "is free to make judgement on Scottish affairs then he will hear the reasons of said Robert and do justice to him"<sup>92</sup>.

Bruce of Annandale was dead by April 1304<sup>93</sup>, never having had Lochmaben, the caput of his lordship, restored to him. Similarly, there was, as yet, no move to hand the castle over to his son and heir, the earl of Carrick, contrary to the submission agreement of 1302, and it is, therefore, not clear how much of Annandale was likewise under direct English control<sup>94</sup>.

#### **New castles and other works:**

With the fall of Stirling castle, Edward regarded the conquest of Scotland as accomplished. In order to facilitate its settlement, some more ambitious building works were planned. At some point in regnal year 33 [20 November 1304 - 19 November 1305], the king, "having decided to build a castle at Tullibothwell<sup>95</sup>, but not having a fit site", ordered the earl of Atholl, the warden north of the Forth, and the chamberlain, Sir John Sandale, "to buy or provide one by exchange in a good place beyond the Forth". Another castle was to be built at Polmaise, near Stirling. Sir John Segrave, the warden south of the Forth, was to purchase or exchange the land there.

In addition to these new constructions, a pele with a stone gateway was to be built at Selkirk. The machinery of the bridge used by the king in 1303, which was still stored at Berwick, was to be sent there, in addition to the other materials. Repairs to the houses

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92 C.D.S., iv, p.376.

93 C.D.S., ii, no.1493.

94 See Chapter Eleven, p.288.

95 According to the *Registrum de Cambuskenneth*, "terram de Tulybethwyne ... est inter quam eiusdem terre (Collyne) et terram de Logyne" [*Registrum de Cambuskenneth*, 41]. This places it at or near Menstrie, just north of Tullibody.

and walls of the royal castles of Berwick, Roxburgh, Jedburgh, Edinburgh, Stirling, Dumfries and Ayr were also ordered<sup>96</sup>.

**A final settlement?:**

Thus, at last, Edward's officers in the royal castles could now operate as part of a peacetime administration. The exchequer and chancery at Berwick were operating once more, so that sheriffs could account for the issues of their bailiwicks and seek writs for the business of their courts.

However, the settlement of Scotland was not achieved merely by one campaign and a siege. The settlement arrangements themselves were not worked out until September 1305, some eighteen months after the majority of the Scots had submitted. In the meantime, the restoration of land proved to be a lengthy process, involving many court cases.

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96 C.D.S., ii, no.1722.

## PART SEVEN:

**THE HIDDEN STORY -  
SCOTLAND OUTWITH ENGLISH CONTROL**

Since evidence for this period of Scottish history is to be found almost entirely in English records and English chroniclers, it is not surprising that those parts of Scotland outwith English control - which, it must be remembered, was the greater part of the country - do not often feature in these sources. Thus we are only afforded occasional glimpses of events occurring beyond the Forth and the Clyde.

However, Scotland beyond that line fell into two distinct categories. The north-east, which included the important sheriffdoms of Aberdeen and Inverness, was fully integrated into the administrative structure of the kings of Scots and Edward had no reason to believe that this area would cause any more difficulties for his administration than the Lowlands. However, the north-east became the heartland of the Scottish government and the Comyns, who dominated the area, were no doubt able to exert such an influence over the Guardianship partly because of their relationship to King John and partly because English influence was felt so little in the north-east, unlike the south-west, the centre of Bruce authority. The royal castles of Dundee, Forfar, Inverness, Dingwall, Aberdeen, Banff, Aboyne, Elgin, Forres, Nairn and Cromarty were all in Scottish hands.

The western Highlands and Islands, on the other hand, had long proved a problem for the kings of Scots, the western Isles having been ceded to the Scottish crown by Norway as recently as 1266. Some of these islands had been joined administratively with the western Highlands by King John in 1293, through the creation of the three new sheriffdoms of Skye, Lorne and Kintyre. Edward intended to maintain this arrangement in 1296, appointing his own officials to these regions just as he had done for the rest of the country<sup>1</sup>.

Control of the western Isles was divided among the descendants of Somerled, king of the Isles. Lorn, Benderloch and Lismore, the Garvellachs, north Jura, Mull, Tiree, Coll and the Treshnish islands were held by clan Dougall; Islay, south Jura, Colonsay, Oronsay, part of Kintyre and probably Ardnamurchan and Morvern by clan Donald; Moidart, Arisaig, Morar and Knoydart, probably with Eigg, Rum, Barra and Uist by clan Ruari<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> *A.P.S.*, i, 447; see Table 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Acts of the Lords of the Isles*, S.H.S., vol.22, xx.

There were probably only two royal castles in the western Highlands - Dunaverty and Tarbert in Kintyre<sup>3</sup>. The MacDonalds held the MacSween castle of Skipness in Kintyre<sup>4</sup>, Ardtornish in northern Argyll, Mingary in Ardnamurchan<sup>5</sup> and Dunivaig on Islay<sup>6</sup>. The MacDougall castles were Castle Coeffin on Lismore, Dunnollie and Dunstaffnage near Oban, Innis Chonnell in Loch Awe<sup>7</sup>, Aros and Duart on Mull, Cairnburgh on the Treshnish Isles<sup>8</sup> and Dun Chonail in the Garvellachs<sup>9</sup>. The MacRuaries held Tioram castle in Morvern.

As English control of Scotland diminished rapidly in 1297, Edward's relations with the major families of the north-west (most notably the MacDonalds and the MacDougalls) were coloured very much by clan self-interest. The hope of both territorial and political aggrandisement led the MacDonalds to act as Edward's agents in an attempt to displace their rivals, the MacDougalls, who, therefore, initially supported the patriotic cause. Smaller clans, such as the MacRuaries, played the game even more openly, opposing (rather than supporting) first one side and then the other, as circumstances dictated.

It must be said that this policy of self-interest was practised also by Lowland landowners. However, since the chances of effective intervention in the Western Highlands, by the English particularly, were very slim, the opportunities were greater. The mantle of English authority assumed by the MacDonalds and also the MacRuaries could therefore be regarded as their excuse for aggression against their neighbours. In the end, it must be remembered, the MacDonalds twice chose the winning side since their political ascendancy over the MacDougalls, which began in 1296, was assured early in the next century by their support of King Robert I. For the next 200 years, the MacDonald lords of the Isles continued to use the English kings in this way, in order to resist the centralising policies of the kings of Scots, reaching the height of their success in 1462 in negotiating the treaty of Westminster-Ardtornish with Edward IV.

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3 R.C.A.H.M.S., (*Argyll*), i, 157; 182.

4 R.C.A.H.M.S., (*Argyll*), i, 178.

5 R.C.A.H.M.S., (*Argyll*), iii, 170; 209.

6 R.C.A.H.M.S., (*Argyll*), v, 268.

7 R.C.A.H.M.S., (*Argyll*), ii, 186; 196, 198; 223.

8 R.C.A.H.M.S., (*Argyll*), iii, 173; 177; 191.

9 R.C.A.H.M.S., (*Argyll*), v, 265.

## CHAPTER NINE

NORTH-EAST SCOTLAND AND THE HIGHLANDS AND ISLANDS  
1296-1305**The north-west Highlands and Islands: *Alexander MacDonald of Islay***

In order to extend English influence to the north-west of Scotland, the king enlisted the services of one clan chief in particular. Thus, on 15 April 1296<sup>1</sup> Alexander MacDonald of Islay was made baillie of Kintyre, currently under the jurisdiction of James the Steward as sheriff, and ordered to take the area into the king's hands. Five days later, MacDonald was ordered to hand over Kintyre to Malcolm le fiz l'Engleys (McQuillan), who had a long-standing, and unfulfilled, claim to the area<sup>2</sup>.

In an undated letter of 1296 to Edward, Alexander acknowledged the receipt of the above instructions to commit Kintyre to McQuillan. MacDonald had by now gained control of Kintyre from the Steward, though the latter still held its castle. It seems likely that the castle referred to here was Dunaverty, on the southern coast of Kintyre. Alexander proposed to take the castle unless the Steward immediately returned to Edward's peace. This the latter did on 13 May<sup>3</sup>, though perhaps not to the knowledge of Alexander of Islay. Dunaverty must, therefore, either have been captured or handed over shortly thereafter. Alexander's letter then relates that he had also taken over the earl of Menteith's lands in Argyll. Menteith was among those captured in Dunbar castle on 16 May 1296<sup>4</sup>.

On 9 April 1297, Alexander of Islay was also appointed as Edward's baillie in the sheriffdoms of Lorn and Ross and the Isles, created by King John Balliol in 1293. Prior to the English invasion, part of these areas had been under the control of Alexander MacDougall of Argyll, a rival of the MacDonalds<sup>5</sup>.

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1 With regard to events occurring in the Lowlands, this was between the capture of Berwick [30 March 1296] and the battle of Dunbar [27 April 1296].

2 *Rot. Scot.*, i, 22-3.

3 *C.D.S.*, ii, no.737, p.193.

4 *C.D.S.*, ii, no.742, p.176; J.G. Dunbar and A.A.M. Duncan, 'Tarbert Castle: A Contribution to the history of Argyll', *S.H.R.*, 1, (1971), 1-6; appendix. Since the original letter commanding the delivery of Kintyre to MacQuillan was dated at Berwick on 20 April 1296 and the Steward submitted on 13 May, this letter was probably written some time around the middle of May.

5 *Rot. Scot.*, i, p.40; see below, p.246; Duncan and Brown, 'Argyll and the Isles in the earlier Middle Ages', *P.S.A.S.*, vol.90, 216-7.

### *The earl of Menteith*

On 10 September 1296 the earl of Menteith was granted custody of an area of the west stretching from Ross to Rutherglen. This appointment perhaps indicates that Edward had not been happy about entrusting total control of the west Highlands to MacDonald.

Menteith's commission covered a vast area. Edward presumably envisaged him as a royal lieutenant similar to Surrey and Percy. He was first of all ordered to take into his hands the lands and property of Alexander of Argyll and his son, John. Secondly, the Steward's men of Bute, Cowal and Rothesay were informed that all castles, fortresses, islands, lands and property, along with all galleys and shipping, had been committed to the earl's custody.

In addition, "all barons and loyal men" of Argyll, Nicholas (Neil) Campbell, the royal bailiff of Loch Awe and Ardscofnish and his men in those areas, William Hay, the keeper of Ross and the men of the same earldom<sup>6</sup>, as well as the men of Ayr, Irvine, Dumbarton, Renfrew, Rutherglen and Glasgow were informed that the earl had been given the same custody of their areas, as were the men of Sir John Comyn of Badenoch and Lochaber<sup>7</sup>.

It is not clear whether Campbell and Hay had been King John's officers, whom Edward allowed to remain in office in the meantime, or whether these were new appointments. Sir Neil Campbell certainly supported Edward I consistently after 1296.

William Hay is more of a mystery, since there is more than one Scottish noble of this name. However, he is almost certainly the Sir William Hay who was sheriff of Inverness at the time of the conquest and received the submission of Sir William Mowat there in July 1296<sup>8</sup>.

Since the earl of Menteith had been captured at Dunbar on 27 April 1296, this commission was quite a turn-round in his fortunes<sup>9</sup>. However, since he was not released from English prison until June 1297, the appointment was perhaps made partly to off-set the ambitions of Alexander MacDonald, about which someone - perhaps Menteith himself - had informed the king. In any event, Menteith's commission of September 1296 was purely nominal.

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<sup>6</sup> The earldom of Ross was presumably in the king's hands due to the rebellion of earl William in 1296 [C.D.S., ii, no.742, p.176]. He was not released until September 1303 [C.D.S., ii, 1395].

<sup>7</sup> Rot. Scot., i, 31-2.

<sup>8</sup> C.D.S., ii, no.1027, p.264, no.755.

<sup>9</sup> The earl was not, in fact, released from prison until July 1297 [C.D.S., ii, no.823, p.195].



### The north-east:

Though Edward certainly installed sheriffs and keepers in royal castles further north during his progress round Scotland in May-August 1296<sup>10</sup>, their appointments are not recorded and there are very few references to them. However, the evidence concerning the uprisings in the north in the next year, corroborated by English safe-conducts, make it clear that Sir Henry Lathum was sheriff of Aberdeen and Sir Reginald Cheyne, senior, a Scot, was sheriff of Inverness by 1297<sup>11</sup>.

### *Urquhart*

The only other reference to an English garrison in the north-east was at Urquhart castle, near Inverness, held by Sir William fitz Warin<sup>12</sup>. Both Lathum and Fitz Warin were Englishmen, though the latter was married, as her third husband, to Mary of Argyll, queen of Man and countess of Strathearn.

Urquhart castle probably belonged to William Soules, who certainly owned the barony there in 1304 or 1305<sup>13</sup>. Soules' father, Nicholas, had married Margaret Comyn, sister of John, earl of Buchan, and it may have been this marriage which brought Urquhart castle into the Soules' family. The author of the official guide to Urquhart certainly states that it was a Comyn castle, but does not disclose the source of this information<sup>14</sup>. The castle was granted to Sir William fitz Warin in 1296 because William Soules was then probably only five or six years old, his father having died in that year<sup>15</sup>.

The castle was very important, from a strategic point of view. From its splendid vantage point above Loch Ness and only twelve miles from the royal castle at Inverness, Urquhart guarded the top of the Great Glen, the ancient access route to Argyll and the south-west<sup>16</sup>.

### 1297 - Revolt and civil war: *The Western Highlands and Islands*

The first revolt to take place in Scotland in 1297 broke out in the islands of the north-west, as two letters to the king from Alexander of Islay illustrate. The letters are not dated, but, as we shall see, must have been written in the spring of 1297.

According to the first letter, MacDonald, presumably still occupying the office of royal baillie, had received Edward's command to subjugate the *nobiles* of Argyll and the Isles to the king. Roderick MacAlan [Ruarie MacRuarie], who had apparently tried

10 See C.D.S., ii, no.853.

11 Rot. Scot., i, p.42; Stevenson, *Documents*, 232-3. Cheyne had therefore replaced Sir William Hay as sheriff of Inverness.

12 Barron, *The Scottish War of Independence*, 35; Rot. Scot., i, 41.

13 C.D.S., v, no.366. William was nephew of the Guardian, Sir John Soules.

14 T. McMichael, 'The Feudal Family of de Soulis', *T.D.G.A.S.*, xxvi, 185; W. Douglas Simpson, *Urquhart Castle, Official Guide*, 4.

15 T. McMichael, 'The Feudal Family of de Soulis', xxvi, *T.D.G.A.S.*, 187.

16 W. Douglas Simpson, *Urquhart Castle, Official Guide*, 2-3.

previously to come to Alexander of Islay to make his peace with King Edward, but had been prevented by Alexander of Argyll, now managed to perform homage, receiving a letter patent from MacDonald as proof<sup>17</sup>.

Alexander of Argyll had himself done homage to King Edward at Elgin on 27 July 1296, yet was currently imprisoned in Berwick castle, presumably because there were serious doubts about his loyalty. Certainly the MacDougalls had family connections with King John and neither John nor Donald, Alexander's sons, had done homage to Edward<sup>18</sup>.

Despite appearances, the MacRuaries were also far from loyal subjects of King Edward. Roderick's brother, Lachlan, who also did homage, now raised his standard, going in arms against those in Edward's service, "killing several of them and despoiling their goods and ships." Lachlan and Roderick then invaded the royal lands of Skye and Lewis, killing and burning the inhabitants and also setting fire to ships in the royal service.

MacDonald wrote to the king to inform him of these events and to urge Edward to enlist the help of the *nobiles* of Argyll and Ross, of which he had great need. A writ of 9 April 1297, telling the people of Argyll and Ross to assist Alexander of Islay in putting down unrest, was presumably sent in response to this request<sup>19</sup>. This therefore helps to date MacDonald's letter, which must have been written around mid-March, given that it would have taken several weeks to reach the king at Buckfastleigh in Devon<sup>20</sup> by 9 April.

The second letter contains more information about these events and succeeding ones. It would seem that after Lachlan and Roderick had invaded Skye and Lewis, the men of these islands sent messengers to Alexander of Islay, who sent back an army. Roderick and Lachlan's men therefore promised to stand by the king's will and commands.

However, presumably when this army had left, Lachlan once more invaded the islands without permission, burning and destroying the lands, property and galleys of those living there. The islanders again sent messengers to Alexander of Islay, asking him to come personally with an army before Palm Sunday [7 April 1297]. Lachlan, knowing that resistance was impossible, had received permission to be received back into the king's will, if his son was handed over as a hostage and his castle (Tioram in Moidart) given up to Edward.

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17 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 187-8.

18 C.D.S., ii, p.195; *Rot. Scot.*, i, 31, 40; Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 190; see below, p.247.

19 *Rot. Scot.*, i, 40.

20 *Itin.*, 104.

After these terms had been agreed with Lachlan, his brother Roderick, with Lachlan's force invaded a 'certain' island (which one is, unfortunately, not stated) and killed around thirty people. Thereafter Alexander [of Islay], with all his power, went after Roderick by land and sea, so that the latter was forced to surrender and was imprisoned in chains.

So, therefore, now that Lachlan had given up his son, Ranald, and his castle, Alexander of Islay made the best arrangements he could for the king's islands and restored peace to the husbandmen and women, who, according to Alexander, "had never dared to dwell outside the sanctuary of churches for fear of the said malefactors." MacDonald then took Lachlan with him until he could be advised by the king's baillies what was to be done with such a man.

However, Lachlan, "leaving his son as a hostage and his brother imprisoned, and also leaving his galleys, secretly departed (as is believed) to molest the king's men and lands as much as he can".

Alexander of Islay sent his brothers with an army to follow Lachlan and take his lands into the king's hands and, at the time of writing, was intending to follow personally with an expedition. "The said Alexander [does not know] where the said Lachlan will be received unless in the lands of Alexander of Argyll, whose daughter he married, or in the lands of Sir John Comyn of Lochaber, since the men of the said land were sworn and bound to the said Lachlan and to Duncan, son of Alexander of Argyll against the king's peace", because there had been two great galleys, "of which there were no greater in the isles", next to John Comyn's castle in Lochaber (Inverlochy), [which the men] of Lochaber refused to hand over to Alexander of Islay, according to the tenor of the king's letters, but were prepared to take Duncan, son of Alexander of Argyll, who had still not done fealty to the king, as captain. They prepared the said galleys in haste for the sea; and the men on either side in the kingdom are opposed to the king.

The text is unclear in the above, due to the repetition of "*dictus Alexander*", and would appear to be missing certain words which have been surmised in brackets.

Alexander of Islay sent a naval force to try to bring these galleys back under his control as the king's captain of Argyll and Ross, meaning that he had received the king's writ of 9 April. However, the men in the castle (Inverlochy) refused to surrender the galleys or even to promise that they would not be used against the king and wounded with arrows and quarrels the men sent by MacDonald to get the ships. And since Alexander's men were unable to take the galleys to safety or drag them to sea, because of this attack from the castle, they set fire to them there, "so that they would not bring danger or peril to the lands or the people loyal to the king."

This was not the only rebel activity with which Alexander of Islay had to contend. Having heard that the Steward of Scotland had risen up against the king, the new captain

seized, on Edward's behalf, the castle of Glasrog [Glassary], with its barony, which the Steward held<sup>21</sup>. Alexander was now prepared to proceed to other areas at the king's command and to occupy them in the king's name, according to his commands and those of his baillies.

Alexander concluded this letter with a plea to sir John Benstede, the English keeper of the counter-roll, to communicate all this to the king immediately and to let him know as soon as possible what Edward's wishes were. Alexander also asked for some expenses for this expedition since he had received nothing of the £500 promised to him the year before, nor had he received any revenues from his baillery<sup>22</sup>.

It is clear from these letters that Alexander of Islay now effectively occupied the office which had been given to the earl of Menteith in September 1296<sup>23</sup>. It is also implied that Edward had retained the three sheriffdoms of Skye, Lorn and Kintyre created by King John and had indeed, up till now, managed to retain a few royal officials in the area.

This 'alliance' between the MacRuaries, the MacDougalls and the Comyns of Badenoch requires some comment. Both Sir John Comyn and his son were still in England, though the former certainly returned to Scotland in June 1297<sup>24</sup>. Antipathy towards the growing MacDonald power in the north-west, under the auspices of the king of England, was sufficient reason to unite against both Alexander MacDonald and King Edward.

Alexander of Argyll was ordered to be released from imprisonment in Berwick castle on 24 May 1297<sup>25</sup>. It is unclear whether or not the revolt, led by his son Duncan, according to Alexander MacDonald, was still under way but, if so, his release was presumably made on condition that he try to persuade Duncan to return to Edward's peace.

Though there is no information on subsequent events, it is highly likely that Alexander MacDougall himself joined the revolt. From 1293 until the English invasion,

21 It is not clear why James the Steward held Glassary, which should have come under the jurisdiction of Alexander of Argyll as sheriff of Lorne [A.P.S., i, 447]. Perhaps the action taken by Edward against Alexander led the Steward to assume that office, as well as trying to hold on to his own office of sheriff of Kintyre. There is only one other mention of a castle in the barony of Glassary, which was perhaps Fincharn, at the west end of Loch Awe, in a charter of 1374 [*Highland Papers*, ii, 149, n.1]. According to *The History of the MacDonalds*, one John Macdonald claimed the lands of Ardnamurchan and "Glassridh in Argyle" from his brother, Dougal, the lord of Lorne and ancestor of the MacDougalls of Argyll [*Highland Papers*, i, 12-13]. However, this John does not fit into the usual genealogical background of either the descendants of Somerled or the MacIans of Ardnamurchan [see *Acts of the Lords of the Isles, 1336-1493*, Appendix D, 279-282].

22 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 189-9.

23 See above, p.244.

24 C.D.S., ii, no.940, no.961.

25 *Rot. Scot.*, i, 40.

the sheriffdoms of Skye and Lorne had been under his control<sup>26</sup> and since the MacDougalls were rivals of the MacDonalds, Alexander of Argyll was extremely unlikely to support Alexander of Islay as the royal representative in the north-west.

MacDonald's second letter, like the previous one, was undated, but the reference to the writ of 9 April, giving him control of Argyll and Ross, suggests that it was written around mid-April. Edward would therefore have received it by mid-May.

The evidence provided by MacDonald for the rebellion of the Steward, presumably before that of Wishart and Carrick, is also extremely interesting. As sheriff of Kintyre under King John, James the Steward would seem to be standing up as a representative of the government of the deposed John Balliol. If MacDonald's second letter was written around mid-April, Edward must have known about the Steward's rebellion before the issuing of writs on 24 May 1297 for military service in Flanders, which explains why the latter was not summoned. It is tempting to suggest that MacDonald, never slow to seize an opportunity for furthering his own position, was merely taking advantage of the unstable situation in the north-west to attack the Steward. However, given that the MacRuaries had brought Ross and the western Isles to civil war, it is unlikely that MacDonald would have chosen this moment to divide his forces unless the threat was real.

Nevertheless, there is little doubt that this unrest was essentially a civil war caused by clan feuds rather than anti-English sentiment. Edward found that, without even the limited authority and power of a Scottish king in these areas, he could exert little control over the West Highlands and Islands, especially now that he had alienated the MacDougalls, in particular, and also the Steward, by denying them a part in the official administrative structure. In any event, the alliances which Edward did set up with men such as the MacDonalds tended to benefit the latter more than the English king.

### *Moray, Inverness and easter Ross*

The most significant anti-English rebellion of early 1297 - in terms of achievement - was led not by Wishart, Carrick and the Steward nor the, as yet, unknown William Wallace<sup>27</sup> but by Andrew Murray. Though his father, of the same name, still remained a prisoner in the Tower of London, the young Andrew led an insurrection in Moray, which spread throughout the north-east.

Around 26 May 1297 Murray and his forces, which included the burgesses of Inverness under Alexander Pilche, had gathered at Avoch castle on the Black Isle. On Sunday 26 May, a deputy of Sir William fitz Warin, the English constable of Urquhart castle on Loch Ness, had gone to Inverness to discuss the activities of the Scots with Sir

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<sup>26</sup> A.P.S., i, 447.

<sup>27</sup> See Chapter Two, pp. 48-52..

Reginald Cheyne, the sheriff there. On his way back to the castle, the deputy and his troop of eighteen men-at-arms were attacked by Murray and captured.

The following day, Monday 27 May, the Scots began to besiege Urquhart castle. The Countess of Ross, whose husband was also still a prisoner in the Tower, offered her assistance to Fitz Warin, but advised him to surrender, which he refused to do. She then sent an army under her son to help the English, whereupon Fitz Warin informed the rebel army of his intention to withstand the siege. The castle was reprovisioned, presumably with the help of the countess's men and, after a night assault in which several members of the garrison were killed or injured, the Scots withdrew.

On 11 June Edward, having by now been informed of the unrest in the area, ordered the bishop of Aberdeen and Gartnait, son of the earl of Mar, to go to the aid of those under attack from the Scots in Urquhart castle. This reflects the time taken for news of the siege to reach the king, and for orders to be issued, as well as a fear that the Scots had withdrawn only temporarily, since Edward ordered that the castle was to be well-provisioned with men and equipment so that no further damage or danger should come to it<sup>28</sup>.

On 11 June 1297 also, safe-conducts were written to several Scottish noblemen who had spent the period since their submissions to Edward in 1296 in England. These were Sir John Comyn of Badenoch, John Comyn, earl of Buchan, Sir Alexander Balliol of Cavers, the earl of Menteith, Sir Reginald Crawford, Master Neil Campbell and William Biset<sup>29</sup>. Buchan, at least, went straight back to the north-east and involved himself in putting down the revolt on Edward's behalf.

The letter written by the bishop of Aberdeen, the earl of Buchan<sup>30</sup> and Gartnait of Mar, describing to Edward the measures that they had taken in accordance with his orders<sup>31</sup>, and the letter containing the account of the siege sent to the king by Fitz Warin<sup>32</sup>, were both dated 25 July 1297, some two months after the events in question. They were also both written in the same hand at Inverness and therefore presumably sent together. This probably indicates that Edward's officials in the north-east were still under threat of attack between May and late July, and unable to communicate properly with the south until 25 July.

Edward's fears were justified. Though Urquhart castle was saved from the Scots for the moment, it had fallen by early September 1297. Fitz Warin either escaped or had left earlier for he fought in the English army at Stirling Bridge, joining the garrison of

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28 *Rot. Scot.*, i, 41.

29 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 175.

30 The earl perhaps delivered Edward's letter of 11 June to the bishop and Gartnait of Mar on his return to Scotland.

31 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 210.

32 See above, pp.249-50; *C.D.S.*, ii, no.922.

Stirling castle on the same day<sup>33</sup>. Buchan, Gartnait and the bishop achieved little against Murray and his army since the latter "took themselves into a very great stronghold of bog and wood, where no horseman could be of service"<sup>34</sup>.

Sir Reginald Cheyne, the sheriff of Inverness, held out against the Scots for slightly longer than Fitz Warin at Urquhart. However, by 27 September<sup>35</sup>, Surrey was writing to the chancellor of England from York stating that a writ sent to Cheyne was unable to reach him "because of the war in Scotland"<sup>36</sup>. At some point in 1305, Cheyne petitioned the king for the restoration of a yearly fee, claiming that he was "thrice burned and destroyed and thrice imprisoned for his faith to his liege lord the King of England"<sup>37</sup>. It would seem likely that one of those occasions was late in 1297.

### *Aberdeen*

The revolt had also spread eastwards to Aberdeen by late May 1297 since on 11 June Edward wrote to Sir Henry Latham, an Englishman and sheriff of Aberdeen, ordering him to arrest disturbers of the peace in his sherrifdom<sup>38</sup>. Latham himself joined the rebel side sometime during July, as a letter to Edward from the earl of Surrey, written on 1 August, reveals. Despite orders from the lieutenant for his capture, the sheriff was making "a great lord of himself" in Aberdeen castle<sup>39</sup>.

It was not, however, until 6 February 1298 that Latham's lands in Lancashire were ordered to be taken into royal hands<sup>40</sup>. This long delay suggests that Edward believed that Latham's adherence to the rebel cause was reluctant; but, voluntary or otherwise, his defection also attests to the strength of the rebel position in Aberdeenshire throughout the rest of 1297 and into 1298. There is certainly no further mention of Sir Henry Latham thereafter.

Before joining William Wallace at some undetermined point in the summer of 1297, Murray and his men had therefore recaptured all the English-held castles of the north, including Urquhart, Inverness, Banff, Elgin and Aberdeen<sup>41</sup>. As a result of this achievement, it is likely that the loyalists were able to appoint their own sheriffs to these areas as early as mid-1297.

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33 C.D.S., ii, xxx; C.D.S., iv, no.1835; see Chapter Two, p.60.

34 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 21.

35 And therefore after the battle of Stirling Bridge.

36 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 233.

37 C.D.S., ii, no.1737.

38 Rot. Scot., i, 42.

39 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 217-8.

40 C.D.S., ii, no.972.

41 Barrow, *Bruce*, 86.

### Conclusion 1296-7:

By the end of 1297, therefore, civil war in the north-west meant that there was little more than token representation of the new government, in the person of Alexander of Islay, in that area. Further east the rebellious activities of Andrew Murray brought about the collapse of the English administration in Lowland Scotland north of the Tay. As a result of this lack of English presence, any references to these areas in the following years are extremely sporadic.

### The north-east: *Sir Alexander Comyn*

The next mention of the state of the north-east of Scotland occurred in August 1299, during a council meeting held by the Guardians at Peebles. News arrived "from beyond the Scottish sea" that Sir Alexander Comyn and Lachlan MacRuarie "were burning and destroying towards these parts where they are upon the nation of Scotland"<sup>42</sup>. Comyn was brother of the earl of Buchan but, unlike the latter, who was at Peebles, Sir Alexander remained in allegiance to King Edward throughout the period 1296 to 1304. Such a division of loyalties within one family, as a deliberate insurance policy, was quite common<sup>43</sup>. Lachlan MacRuarie, now seemingly restored to Edward's allegiance, had presumably decided that, for the moment, adherence to the English cause suited his own interests.

It should be noted that, at the end of the Peebles meeting, the various members returned "to their own parts of the country". The earl of Buchan and Sir John Comyn, junior (the Guardian) therefore "went back north of the Forth"<sup>44</sup>. The onus presumably fell on them to deal with their aggressive relative.

There are no further references to Sir Alexander Comyn's activities on Edward's behalf until after peace was restored in 1304. This in itself is evidence of the beleaguered state endured by English officers in the north. In 1304, however, Sir Alexander felt it worthwhile to write to Edward requesting "reimbursement of his expenses while he was sheriff of Aberdeen, which he has held by his grant during war and peace till now"<sup>45</sup>.

This clearly implies that the important northern port of Aberdeen and its sheriffdom were not controlled by the loyalist government. However, an entry in the *Arbroath Liber* shows that in 1300 the earl of Atholl was also sheriff of Aberdeen under

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42 See Chapter Four, p.101; *Nat. Mss. of Scotland*, ii, no.viii.

43 There were, in fact, two Sir Alexander Comyns at this time - brothers of the earl of Buchan and Sir John Comyn of Badenoch, making them cousins. Since Sir Alexander Comyn of Buchan was known to have sided with the English and also because he himself admitted that his activities, ostensibly on Edward's behalf, had not made him popular with the inhabitants of the north [see below p253], there can be no doubt that he was involved in this raid with Lachlan MacRuarie.

44 *Nat. Mss. of Scotland*, ii, no.viii.

45 *C.D.S.*, ii, no.1617.



the Guardians<sup>46</sup>. Atholl had an interest in the north-east through his estates of Stratha'an and Strathbogie<sup>47</sup>. It is not at all clear, however, who occupied the all-important castle of Aberdeen.

The entry in the *Arbroath Liber* describes a case brought before John Comyn, earl of Buchan, who was described as Justiciar of Scotland, on 22 February 1300. He was "holding pleas of his office near Aberdeen castle, in the place called Castelsyd". Thus Sir John was able to fulfil his traditional role, in the Aberdeen area at least, under the Guardians.

With him on that day were a number of witnesses, including Henry Cheyne, bishop of Aberdeen, Sir John, earl of Atholl, "then sheriff of Aberdeen", Sir William Meldrum, an ex-sheriff of Aberdeen<sup>48</sup>, Sir Walter Barclay, Sir Duncan Fren draught and Sir Andrew Rait<sup>49</sup>. With regard to possession of the castle, this evidence is extremely equivocal: the holding of a court so near to the castle surely implies that Atholl had control of it; however, if he did, why was the court not held there?

It is most likely, therefore, that some kind of arrangement was made between Edward's only officer in the north-east - who was, after all, a member of its most prominent family - and the loyalist administration which controlled the area. Sir Alexander Comyn certainly seems to have been able to wield some authority since, according to another petition which he directed to the king in 1304, he was aware of considerable resentment at his activities from the local population. He explained to the king that:

"..in the discharge of his office during the war, he may have displeased some of the people of his country, to the king's benefit, and now in peace time they may impeach him."

He therefore requested letters of protection to be issued to the recently-appointed royal lieutenant in the north. The latter was ordered "to inquire and do what is fitting"<sup>50</sup>. Given that Comyn, together with Lachlan MacRuarie had been "burning and destroying ... on the 'Scottish nation'" in 1299<sup>51</sup>, there may well have been those who wished to take action against him. However, the fact Sir Alexander had not been taken to task for such actions previously suggests that he had been protected by the patriotic regime in the north-east, led by his brother. Of the Scottish nobility, Sir Alexander Comyn was perhaps the most successful at being 'all things to all men'.

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46 *Arbroath Liber*, i, no.231. The appointment of a sheriff by both Edward and the Guardians to the same sheriffdom also occurred at Roxburgh in 1299 [see Chapter Four, pp.101-2]. In that case, however, the castle was occupied by the English incumbent.

47 Barrow, *Bruce*, 156.

48 *C.D.S.*, ii, no.587.

49 *Arbroath Liber*, i, no.231.

50 *C.D.S.*, ii, no.1617.

51 *Nat. Mss. of Scotland*, ii, no.8.

The new lieutenant ordered to investigate was none other than the earl of Atholl. In appointing Comyn's late rival at Aberdeen to a superior position, Edward may have been unaware of the possible friction. On the other hand, given Sir Alexander's wild and unruly reputation, the king was perhaps employing the maxim 'divide and rule'<sup>52</sup>.

In some respects Sir Alexander had little reason to complain. His loyalty to King Edward - he was probably the only English officer in the north-east of Scotland throughout the period 1296-1303 - seems to have been rewarded. According to a letter to the king from the earl of Atholl some time in 1304, Comyn had control of "two of the strongest castles in the country" (Urquhart and Tarradale), as well as Aberdeen, where he was still sheriff. In addition, he had recently been granted Aboyne castle.

The new lieutenant was not content to allow this build-up of power in favour of a man whose family was already dominant in the north-east, particularly since Atholl sided with the Bruce faction against the Comyns<sup>53</sup>. The earl therefore requested the king to rescind his grant of Aboyne castle to Sir Alexander, asserting that "the land around it is savage and full of evil-doers, and the king has no other fortress where the country or his servants may be in safety to keep the peace".

In addition, Atholl was concerned about the activities of Lachlan MacRuarie, Comyn's one-time comrade-in-arms. According to information in 1304 from the earl and bishop of Ross, MacRuarie had recently "ordered that each davoch of land shall furnish a galley of twenty oars". It was therefore considered wise to postpone delivery of Aboyne castle to anyone "till they see what Lachlan and his friends will do, the other castles named above being enough for Sir Alexander". The king agreed with the earl that "two are enough for Sir Alexander Comyn"<sup>54</sup>.

This letter provides an interesting insight into the state of the north of Scotland. It was obviously far from settled, even in 1304, though this was largely due to traditional rivalries rather than anti-English sentiment. The submission of the Scottish nobility, and the subsequent employment of many former 'rebels' in Edward's administration was bound to produce friction when they had to work alongside those who had always remained loyal to the English king. Edward himself was probably largely unaware of potential problems, though the degree to which he had to rely on the native nobility to govern the north must have been a source of concern<sup>55</sup>.

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52 Edward has perhaps employed the same tactics in 1297 when he released Alexander MacDougall of Argyll from prison at Berwick around the time as his son, Duncan, was leading a revolt in the north-west. The king may have envisaged Argyll as a check on his own officer in that area, Alexander MacDonald of Islay, who was no friend of the MacDougalls.

53 Bruce and Atholl had been brothers-in-law, each having married a daughter of earl Donald of Mar [Barrow, *Bruce*, 156].

54 C.D.S., ii, no.1633.

55 See Chapter Seventeen, pp.388-9..

### The north-west: *The campaign of 1301*

The north-west, which had fallen into a state of civil war in 1297, is not referred to again until the campaign of 1301 which, while primarily intended to effect the restoration of full English control to the south-west, also attempted, coincidentally, to extend Edward's authority further north. To this end, the admiral and captain of the Cinque Ports [Sir Gervase Alard] was granted on 6 June:

"... full powers, to last till 1 November, to receive to our peace .... Alexander of Argyll, John and Duncan, his sons, and Lachlan, son of Alan [MacRuarie], who married Alexander's daughter, the daughter herself and all their domestics and each of them and also all other husbandmen and middle people of the Scottish isles who wish to come to our peace, except barons, bannerets and other rich and great lords"<sup>56</sup>.

Control over the western seaboard required, as it always had, the services of a fleet. The use of the men and vessels of the Cinque Ports in a direct role was a change of policy with regard to their shipping, which generally fulfilled the subsidiary role of transportation for men, supplies and equipment<sup>57</sup>.

It is most likely that the submission of the MacDougalls in 1301 was inspired by a concern about the rise of the MacDonalds in Edward's service. A fleet with a commander - a considerable diversion of English resources - had to be sent north to receive their submissions because the MacDougalls obviously would not go to Edward's permanent officer in the area, Alexander MacDonald.

Though the impetus for such English activity in the north-west probably came after overtures from the MacDougalls themselves, there is little doubt that Edward would have welcomed the opportunity to extend his authority in that area.

The exclusion of the "barons, bannerets and other rich and great lords"<sup>58</sup> of the western isles from the general admissions to Edward's peace, suggests that such men were to be allowed to submit only on terms agreed with the king himself. Edward had perhaps learned the dangers of listening too closely to these "rich and great lords", who were so willing to further their own interests at the expense of their neighbours. If the English king wished to make his authority effective throughout the north-west, he needed to ensure that the terms of submission granted to one lord did not lead another to leave Edward's peace as a result. It should also be remembered that the "rich and great lords" of the Western Highlands included men such as the earl of Menteith, James the Steward and John Comyn of Badenoch. Thus, while the north-western lords may have been somewhat

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<sup>56</sup> Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 429-30.

<sup>57</sup> See Chapter Ten, p.271.

<sup>58</sup> The terminology used here does indicate an ignorance of the organisation of Highland society.

extreme in their often cut-throat self-aggrandisement, the lessons learned from them were equally applicable to the rest of the Scottish nobility.

There is no further information on the activities of the fleet in the north-west until the end of September when letters from Sir Hugh Bisset of Antrim and Arran, Angus MacDonald of Islay<sup>59</sup> and John MacSween reached the king.

Sir Hugh Bisset seems to have been in charge of the fleet by this time. According to his letter, the fleet had been in Bute and Kintyre up until 25 September and was currently awaiting the king's commands in Bute. In order to "extend your domination", Bisset wished to know if the king's commands should be taken to Alexander of Argyll..

"...if you believe him to be in your peace, since if he is in your peace, we believe your war in the isles to be resolved, and if he is not in your peace, if you wish, send us help and advice as to what should be done so that we can destroy and vanquish him and other adversaries there<sup>60</sup>."

The letters from Angus of Islay and John MacSween (written in the same hand as the above) told the same story with regard to the activities of the fleet. Angus gives some indication of the power of Alexander of Argyll when he says that "by joining his [Alexander of Argyll's] force and yours, we can destroy your enemies so that nothing rises again."

Angus also mentioned 'the son of Roderick'. This is presumably Ranald MacRuarie, who had been given up as a hostage for his father, Roderick, in 1297. According to Angus, Ranald was "against all your adversaries and ours" and asked if he could be allowed "to dwell in his native land to serve you humbly and faithfully"<sup>61</sup>.

John MacSween had been with the king in Glasgow but had joined the fleet once the army had gone on to Bothwell [5 September]. While the fleet was away from Bute, MacSween had visited his lands in Knapdale. However, John of Argyll invaded these lands with a large force "on the part of John of Menteith and stopped me from staying in the said lands"<sup>62</sup>.

The MacSweens had held Knapdale until 1262 when the earl of Menteith gained possession<sup>63</sup>. It was thus of great importance to John MacSween that someone in authority [namely, Edward] should be able to effect his restoration to the lands of Knapdale. The earl of Menteith, and also his brother, John, were not at Edward's peace and thus MacSween's allegiance to the English king, like that of the MacDonalds, was primarily dictated by the adherence of their enemies to the rebel cause.

<sup>59</sup> This was the famous Angus Og, younger brother of Alexander of Islay [S.P., v, 35-6].

<sup>60</sup> Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 435.

<sup>61</sup> See above, p.247; Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 436.

<sup>62</sup> Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 437. John of Argyll was son and heir of Alexander of Argyll [Barrow, *Bruce*, 156].

<sup>63</sup> Barrow, *Bruce*, 58.

Unfortunately, it is not at all clear whether or not Alexander of Argyll was at Edward's peace during the summer of 1301. John MacDougall's military support of the Menteith claim to the lands in Knapdale suggests that they were not, but, as we have seen with Alexander Comyn, members of the same family could take different sides. The next reference to the MacDougalls is not until 1304, by which time they had certainly submitted<sup>64</sup>.

### *Arran*

In April 1301, prior to the campaign of that year, the writs for Irish purveyance had ordered that half of it was to be sent to a port on Arran<sup>65</sup>. This is the first mention of that island since it was granted to Sir Hugh Bisset of Antrim in 1298<sup>66</sup>. These victuals were presumably required to supply the English fleet which was sent up the west coast of Scotland in June 1301, suggesting that overtures of peace from the MacDougalls had been sent to Edward before April 1301.

Sir Hugh's presence with the English fleet and the use made of Arran in this year would suggest that Bisset had managed to hold on to the lands granted to him in 1298. There is certainly no evidence to suggest that he had only recently managed to gain possession. This is the only time that purveyance was sent to Arran, perhaps partly because this was the only occasion that the English fleet was used directly to attempt to extend Edward's authority in the north-west and also because, during 1301, a store was set up at Ayr<sup>67</sup>. Sir Hugh was captured by the Scots by August 1302<sup>68</sup>. Since a protection was issued "for himself [Bisset], his people, and his lands in Ireland", with no mention of Arran, the Scots may have been able to recapture the island in this year. Whatever happened to Bisset, this activity was in contravention of the Truce of Asnières, which ran until 1 November 1302<sup>69</sup>.

### **The restoration of English authority in the north-east:**

In 1303 Edward turned his attention away from the south-west, where he had concentrated his activities in the previous three years and made his presence felt once more in the north-east. Indeed Edward's officials - often Scots who had recently changed sides - achieved some success even before the arrival of the king and his army.

According to an account made with him in 1305, Sir Alexander Abernethy "held the sherifdoms of Kincardine, Forfar and Perth, with their clerks and constabularies and all others the king's servants there, from Candlemas in the year aforesaid (31 Ed.1; that is,

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64 C.D.S., ii, no.1480, p.439.

65 See Chapter Nine, p.167.

66 See Chapter Two, p.78.

67 See Chapter Six, p.189.

68 C.D.S., ii, no.1320.

69 See Chapter Seven, p.193.

February 1303), till now (33 Ed.1), and has thus sufficiently served the king, and answered for the issues of his bailleries"<sup>70</sup>. Abernethy had probably submitted to Edward some time in 1302 since he had been with the 'rebels' in September 1301. He became warden of the land from the Forth to the Scottish mountains with a force of 60 men-at-arms on 29 September 1303<sup>71</sup>.

On 12 April 1303, three English knights serving in the Linlithgow garrison were paid their wages at Brechin<sup>72</sup>. It would thus appear that a contingent from that garrison had been sent north before the arrival of the army in May 1303, perhaps to demand the surrender of Brechin castle, a demand which was rejected. Alternatively, they could have been part of an expedition, perhaps under Abernethy, which had been ordered to attempt a siege and only when this proved impossible did Edward decide to do it himself.

Edward's progress through the north-east of Scotland meant the reinstatement of his administration in areas which had not seen an English official - with the exception of Sir Alexander Comyn - since 1297. Though there are no references to payments made to garrisons in royal castles north of the Forth thereafter, the sheriffs installed by Edward during the campaign of 1303 must have retained men in the castles under their jurisdiction. An account made by sir James Dalilegh and sir John Weston, regarding the king's lands in Scotland in regnal year 32 [20 November 1303 - 19 November 1304], gives the names of five sheriffs and two keepers of royal castles north of the Tay<sup>73</sup>.

### Problems with funding:

Sir Alexander Comyn of Buchan was not alone in requiring reimbursement for his service to the English king. Those officials appointed after the restoration of English control in the north-east soon found that they had few resources to sustain their activities.

Around July 1305 John, earl of Atholl, "warden and Justiciar of Scotland from Forth to Orkney", petitioned the king on several points. These included a request for an alternative arrangement to be made for his "sustenance", since he had only received £540 out of his allocation of 1200 marks from certain issues of his baillery and this sum had been spent on repairing castles and retaining soldiers. The king ordered that an account should be made with the earl by the chamberlain of Scotland for his term in office from 29 March 1304<sup>74</sup> until the end of 1305 and that he be allowed a total of £800 from all the issues of his baillery for his expenses during that period<sup>75</sup>.

Sir Alexander Abernethy, the king's lieutenant from the Forth to the mountains from 1303 onwards, faced a similar problem. Around August 1305 he too was petitioning

70 C.D.S., ii, no.1694.

71 See Chapter Six, p.388.

72 E101/364/13.

73 C.D.S., ii, no.1646; See Table 9.

74 This was presumably the date on which he was appointed.

75 C.D.S., ii, no.1682.

the king for payment of an allowance for himself and his retinue of 60 men-at-arms and also the officials in various positions within his jurisdiction<sup>76</sup>.

William, earl of Ross also found it necessary to request Edward for payment for his activities on the king's behalf in the "foreign [outer] isles of Scotland" in 1304. He stated that he "had not yet had any allowance for himself or his servants". The earl of Ross returned to serve Edward in Scotland from imprisonment in England in September 1303, and thus must have remained unpaid for at least a year<sup>77</sup>.

As these cases clearly show, the situation in Scotland, even in 1305, meant that those in the king's service in the northern kingdom still had to rely on their own resources to maintain not only themselves but their retinues as well. Since these petitions were made at a time when Edward had supposedly re-established control and was now implementing an administrative system on a peacetime basis, the inability of his government to fund the activities of his officers should have been a very worrying trend.

#### **Evidence for the authority of the Guardians:**

As a result of the re-establishment of English authority throughout Scotland in 1303-4, inquests were made into a number of cases concerning events which took place in areas where there had previously been little or no English control. Three such inquests were held at Perth in the presence of the earl of Atholl, warden north of the Forth.

The Perth juries were quite large, with considerable numbers of knights serving<sup>78</sup>. Men such as Sir Alexander Abernethy, Sir Gilbert Hay, Sir David Brechin, Sir David Graham and Sir Constantine of Lochore had all been prominent on the rebel side at some time before 1304. It is thus feasible to suggest that they had served on similar juries in this area on behalf of the Guardians.

#### *Moubray v. Strathearn*

A most illuminating inquest took place before the earl of Atholl on 17 September 1304. The jury numbered nineteen and included Sir Gilbert Hay and Sir David Wemyss who had submitted only that year<sup>79</sup>. They were to investigate pleas between the earl of Strathearn and Sir John Moubray.

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<sup>76</sup> C.D.S., ii, no.1696.

<sup>77</sup> C.D.S., ii, no.1631, no.1395.

<sup>78</sup> Ten knights served on a jury totalling fourteen in May 1305 [C.D.S., ii, no.1670]; the largest jury was that of September 1305 when twenty-four served, seven of whom were knights [C.D.S., ii, no.1689].

<sup>79</sup> C.D.S., ii, no.1738, no.1538.

Strathearn, who was, in fact, Atholl's lieutenant as warden, had remained at Edward's peace since 1296. Moubray, on the other hand, had rejoined the rebel cause in 1299, when he was released from prison in England as part of the hostage-exchange of that year<sup>80</sup>.

The jury concluded that:

"Sir John Moubray sued Sir Malise, earl of Strathearn, before Sir John Comyn, the Guardian of Scotland, for ravaging his lands at Methven and taking the castle, because his father, Sir Geoffrey [Moubray], had withdrawn from the king's peace in the beginning of the war, and Sir John so conducted his case that for fear of greater damage the earl made a fine with him. They know of no other contract between them"<sup>81</sup>

Given that jurors such as Hay and Wemyss had been active on the 'rebel' side at the time of these events, they had good reason to know what had happened. It is somewhat ironic to fill a jury with men who were undoubtedly qualified to provide information because of their involvement with those who were being accused of misconduct.

The events described above took place around 1299-1300, since Sir Geoffrey Moubray was forfeited in 1299 and was dead by 30 June 1300<sup>82</sup>. Strathearn, at Edward's peace, took advantage of this forfeiture to burn the Moubray lands at Methven, near Perth, and take the castle. There is certainly no mention of this in any English records, suggesting that his possession was a short-lived piece of private enterprise.

However, the 'rebels' were clearly in control of this area since the earl had been made to account for his actions to Sir John Comyn. This proves beyond doubt that the Guardians could and did hold courts and give justice, even against an earl enjoying the protection of the English king.

It should be noted that only one Guardian is mentioned here. Sir John Comyn was joint Guardian from 1298 to 1301 and sole Guardian only from 1303 to early 1304. From the above description, the case must have come before him during the earlier period when he shared power with the earl of Carrick and the bishop of St. Andrews and then Sir Ingram d'Umfraville in place of Bruce. Since the Comyn lands were largely north of the Forth, there is perhaps nothing suspicious that he alone should have adjudicated in a case involving landholders from that area. However, considering that there was an earl and a castle involved and that the earl of Buchan, as justiciar, was also able to hear cases<sup>83</sup>, it might be argued that the Comyns wielded more than their fair share of power in the loyalist administration.

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80 C.D.S., ii, no. 1689, no.1086.

81 C.D.S., ii, no.1592.

82 C.D.S., ii, no. 1070, no.1143.

83 See above, p.253.



It is not known what remedy, if any, the king gave to Strathearn, as a result of this inquest, though it is unlikely that the earl's actions would have been upheld in 1304 since it would have contravened Edward's policy of restoring Scottish lands to their 1296 owners<sup>84</sup>.

### *Leslie v. Moubray*

Another case concerning the activities of the loyalist government was brought to the parliament of February 1305 when Sir Norman Leslie of Aberdeenshire petitioned the king against the demands of another Moubray, Sir Philip. According to the petition, Leslie:

"is obliged to Philip Moubray, to whom Sir John Comyn gave all his lands and castles of said Norman since he was in the king's faith, for 300 marks sterling"

Leslie had already paid forty marks of this sum but Moubray was still demanding the balance. Sir Norman therefore asked the king to command Sir Philip to cease his demand and return the written promise to pay the 300 marks, thereby cancelling the outstanding 260 marks and allowing Leslie to redeem his lands. The king ordered that the redemption be nullified<sup>85</sup>.

Sir John Comyn, as Guardian, had therefore been able to order the forfeiture of the lands of a Scotsman who adhered to Edward (Leslie) and, indeed, appears to have been effective in executing the order. This also meant that the Guardians were able to reward their supporters with patronage taken from those who remained at Edward's peace.

Though these two examples provide the only evidence for the activities of the rebel administration in the sphere of justice, they are certainly unequivocal in showing that the Guardians were able to exert control not only over their own supporters, but also those adhering to Edward. It is also clear that those in this last category were regarded as rebels by the Guardians and action was taken against them. The latter's ability to dispense patronage, which may have been greater than that of the English king, given that the Guardians undoubtedly controlled more of Scotland, goes a long way to explain how the patriotic administration was able to operate successfully during the years 1296 to 1304.

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84 See Chapter Sixteen, p.347.

85 *Memo. de Parl.*, no.296.

*Continued unrest:*

Though the Scottish nobility submitted early in 1304, the country was far from calm. This is illustrated most clearly through the activities of James Dalilegh and John Weston, who were engaged in "making an extent of all the king's lands in Scotland, both beyond the Scottish Sea towards Orkney and on this side in Galloway and elsewhere, in the 32nd year".

An escort of sixteen men-at-arms went with them from 1 May to 25 December 1304 "for more safely forwarding the king's business; inasmuch as during the war and the impending siege of Stirling castle, while the men of the parts beyond the Mounth and in Galloway and Carrick, had not yet fully come to the king's peace, without such safe escort they could in no way have done the work".

Additional numbers of men-at-arms joined their company at various stages. A large number of men, both on horse and foot, of Sir Reginald Cheyne escorted them from Elgin to Inverness "and there staying with them on account of the imminent peril of the enemies". While in Elgin in June, payment was made to twenty footsoldiers "watching nightly, through fear of some enemies who had not yet come to the king's peace"<sup>86</sup>.

**The war in the north:**

In 1305, Gilbert Hay of Erroll petitioned the king:

"... that he might have relief of his lands of Scotland since these lands were destroyed because of the war in Scotland, so that said Gilbert has lost nearly all his estate by reason of the destruction of these lands"<sup>87</sup>.

The majority of the Hay lands were in Perthshire<sup>88</sup>. Thus, although it might be considered that the north suffered little from this War of Independence, since the battlefields were all in the south and the English spent little time beyond the Forth or the Clyde, this is clearly not the whole story. This destruction might have had a number of causes: the opportunism of Hay's neighbours; the activities of Sir Alexander Comyn of Buchan; or merely the presence of an English army in 1303.

**Conclusions:**

During the period after the uprisings of 1297 to 1303, it is clear that any English presence in the north of Scotland was the exception rather than the rule. Even when these exceptions occurred, they were always in the person of a Scot 'loyal' to Edward.

In the western Highlands and Islands, clan warfare dominated the history of that area, interspersed by attempts at control, ostensibly on behalf of the English king, exerted by Alexander MacDonald of Islay.

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<sup>86</sup> C.D.S., ii, no.1646. p.443.

<sup>87</sup> Memo. de Parl., no.353.

<sup>88</sup> S.P., iii, 555-9.

In the north-east, the loyalist government appears to have had a firm hold with several pieces of evidence attesting to its ability not only to hold courts but to execute their decisions. The presence of Sir Alexander Comyn, who claimed to have held the sheriffdom of Aberdeen for King Edward during the war, may have been a nuisance to the Scottish government but it seems likely that his brother, the earl of Buchan, had persuaded him that the north-east was big enough for all of them.

Thus, most of Scotland had not been used to any English presence during the period 1297-1303. Even after that date, when an English-controlled administrative system was reimposed, most of Edward's officers in the north were men, such as the earl of Atholl and Sir Alexander Abernethy, who had held positions of authority in the loyalist administration. This was undoubtedly a wise policy.

## PART EIGHT:

## THE FLEET: 1296-1304

The use of ships had already proved invaluable to Edward during the conquest of Wales, helping him to capture the Isle of Anglesey and isolating Snowdon<sup>1</sup>. Their role in Edward's Scottish wars was, however, less high-profile, but perhaps even more vital to the effectiveness of the English administration of Scotland.

After 1297, roughly-speaking, English control of Scotland was limited to Lothian, Roxburghshire, Selkirkshire, Berwickshire and parts of Dumfriesshire, extending into Peeblesshire, parts of southern Stirlingshire, Lanarkshire, Ayrshire and parts of Galloway after 1300.

Nevertheless, this entailed a line of supply which stretched over hundreds of miles. With a war which dragged on from 1297 to 1304, breaking out again in 1306, Edward was faced with the continual headache of keeping both his temporary armies and his permanent garrisons provisioned with food and equipment. Sending supplies by sea, despite the vagaries of the weather and the activities of pirates (which was often another word for mariners, particularly those of the Cinque Ports), was quicker, safer and cheaper<sup>1</sup> than using overland routes in the Middle Ages, particularly during a war.

To do this, he required access to many ships, not necessarily of any great size, to provide a steady shuttle-service, primarily up and down the east and west coasts of England and Scotland, and along the rivers Forth and Clyde. The essential nature of these operations is indicated by the consequences which followed upon the breakdown of this service.

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<sup>1</sup> *A History of the Royal Navy from the Earliest Times to the Wars of the French Revolution*, i, Sir Nicholas Harris Nicolas, 245-6.

<sup>2</sup> Since vastly greater quantities of provisions could be carried more quickly by ship than by cart, the cost was ultimately less, even though ships were obviously much more expensive to build and man.

## CHAPTER TEN

**THE ROLE OF SHIPPING AND SAILORS IN ESTABLISHING  
AND MAINTAINING THE ENGLISH ADMINISTRATION  
IN SCOTLAND**

*Composition of the Fleet: The Cinque Ports*

What can be understood by 'the English fleet' at the close of the thirteenth century? One of the more important elements, though by no means the only one, was that of the Cinque Ports. These were originally a group of five ports on the south-east coast of England - Hastings, Romney, Hythe, Dover and Sandwich - which owed collectively, by this date, an annual service of ships to the Crown. There were, however, many more ports, the most important of which were Winchelsea and Rye, which were attached to the original five and which shared in both their obligations and their privileges<sup>1</sup>.

*Service and organisation*

By 1300, the Cinque Ports were obliged to provide the king with fifty-seven ships annually for a period of fifteen days at their own costs. Any further service was to be paid for by the Crown, the master and constable of each ship taking 6d. per day and the rest of the crew 3d. each. Each ship was to have aboard at least twenty men and a master, who were all to be properly armed and equipped<sup>2</sup>.

With regard to the organisation of the ships themselves, each ship had a master, who was in command. It was he who contracted with royal officials to deliver supplies and was paid for the hire of his boat and his men. It is unclear whether or not he actually owned the boat, but the use of the possessive pronoun in these contracts suggests that this was so<sup>3</sup>. In addition, there were also constables, who took the same pay as the masters. They seem to have corresponded to the military *vintenarius*, that is there was one constable for approximately every nineteen men. If there were fewer than nineteen men, then the master was the only officer on board. This organisational structure was equally true for those vessels not sailing under the auspices of the Cinque Ports.

The number of men in each ship was related to its size and the number of oars: the Cinque Port contingent for the 1299-1300 campaign consisted of ships, galleys,

<sup>1</sup> Murray, *The Constitutional History of the Cinque Ports*, 1; see *C.C.R.*, 1296-1302, 489-90, for an example of the number of ports attached to the Cinque Ports.

<sup>2</sup> Murray, *The Constitutional History of the Cinque Ports*, 242.

<sup>3</sup> For example, C47/2/17.

barges, snakes, cogs and boats and the numbers of mariners ranged from nineteen with one constable to between thirty-two and thirty-nine with two constables<sup>4</sup>.

### *The status of the fleet*

It should be noted that there was no such thing as a fleet in terms of an independent organisation in the way that 'the army' was evolving. There was thus very little distinction between the men of the fleet, of whatever rank, and those in the army. Indeed, all would be trained to fight in the field and the fleet commanders, such as Gervase Alard and Edward Charles, took their places with the king in battle with their companies of men. Nevertheless, there is evidence to suggest that mariners were a distinct group: Gervase Alard, the admiral in 1303, having ordered certain persons to join the fleet, stated that he "is as well pleased to have country men with him as mariners"<sup>5</sup>.

### *Privileges*

This service to the Crown was naturally rewarded with various privileges. The Cinque Ports and their members were granted an exemption from assessment for tallages and aids on their ships and gear in 1298 and each port was to pay an appropriate sum towards the maintenance of the fleet<sup>6</sup>. Thus the organisation retained almost complete control over its own government, in return for which it was hoped that the Crown could call upon a readily-available supply of ships at little cost to itself.

### **Service of the fleet, 1296-1303:**

The Cinque Ports were by no means alone in having to provide ships for the royal service. Indeed, as an examination of the fleet as a whole will show, the contribution of the non-Cinque Port ports was greater.

In 1296 the English fleet, totalling thirty-three vessels<sup>7</sup>, played a prominent role in the attack on Berwick, during which three ships were lost<sup>8</sup>. In the following year, Edward used the fleet heavily for his campaign to Flanders and there are no orders for mandatory quotas of ships for his campaign in Scotland in 1298, presumably because of this service to the Continent. Ships were involved in the campaign, of course, since supplies had to be taken north, but they were contracted on a private basis and paid for their services by royal officials.

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4 Nicholas, *A History of the Royal Navy*, i, 284.

5 C.D.S., ii, no.1358.

6 Murray, *The Constitutional History of the Cinque Ports*, 219.

7 Guisborough, 274.

8 Nicolas, *A History of the Royal Navy*, i, 277.

There was no campaign in 1299, though Edward tried hard to muster an army. In 1300, although there does not appear to have been any official demand for service for the campaign in that year, the royal accounts show that thirty ships from the Cinque Ports and fifty-nine ships from forty-eight non-Cinque Port ports were sent to Scotland. This is the first year in which mention is made of an admiral, in this case, Gervase Alard of Winchelsea. There were also four captains of the fleet, William Pate and Justin Alard of Winchelsea, William Charles of Sandwich and John Hall of Dover<sup>9</sup>. Thus, although the Cinque Ports did not provide the largest contingent, their mariners were given the key offices in the fleet.

In 1301, the Cinque Ports were requested to send the king twelve "good, large ships". Since their full quota was fifty-seven ships, this was obviously a large reduction of the *servitium debitum*. It was perhaps felt that large vessels of good quality were preferable to a greater number of smaller, inferior boats. In addition, the non-Cinque Port ports of Bristol and Haverford were to provide three ships between them, to go with these twelve ships to Dublin by 11 June 1301<sup>10</sup>. They would presumably then cross the Irish sea to Skinburness or Ayr to provide supplies and give aid to the prince of Wales, who was campaigning with part of the army in the west.

Additional summonses were sent to forty-four English towns, one Welsh town and six Irish towns to provide a further sixty-eight ships to join the king at Berwick by 24 June, although two ships from Bristol were included among these also<sup>11</sup>. The combined fleet therefore supposedly totalled eighty-one ships, although there is no evidence for how many actually turned up.

In 1302 the only request regarding shipping for that year's campaign was made to the Irish justiciar, sir John Wogan, who was to find out how many ships and boats could be got in Ireland and how many horses and men they could carry<sup>12</sup>.

In November 1302 summonses went out for the next year's campaign. The Cinque Ports were to provide twenty-five ships out of their quota, but these ships were to be crewed with the same number of men as if they were the full fifty-seven. These were to arrive at Ayr by 16 May 1303, along with a further twenty-five ships from the abbot of Battle, the prior of Christchurch and forty-one towns on the coasts of the counties of Sussex, Hampshire, Somerset, Dorset, Gloucester, Devon and Cornwall<sup>13</sup>. In addition, a royal clerk, Walter Bacun, was sent to the counties of Essex, Norfolk, Suffolk,

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<sup>9</sup> Nicolas, *A History of the Royal Navy*, i, 294-5.

<sup>10</sup> C.D.S., v, no.247; C.C.R., 1296-1302, 487.

<sup>11</sup> C.C.R., 1296-1302, 482-3.

<sup>12</sup> C.C.R., 1296-1302, 576.

<sup>13</sup> That is, the southern and western counties.

Cambridge, Huntingdon, Lincoln, York and Northumberland<sup>14</sup> to find a further fifty ships to go to Berwick by 26 May 1303<sup>15</sup>.

This service was a great burden for some of the smaller ports since, although the quotas were variable in size, the demand was becoming annual. All ships were to be furnished and kept for fifteen days at the expense of the towns from which they were demanded. If a ship's crew comprised a master, a constable and nineteen men [the minimum number for a Cinque Port crew], then the wages alone for fifteen days came to £4 6s.3d. for each ship, a considerable sum. Quotas of soldiers imposed a similar strain on the shires, but the masters and crews of these ships must have felt a greater burden since there were fewer of them to provide the service. It should also be remembered that even when there was no official demand for ships for a campaign, many vessels which could be used as part of the quota were already in Scotland, or had been making trips from England and back outwith the campaigning season in order to supply those permanently stationed in the north.

#### Important ports of origin: *Hull, Waynflete and Newcastle*

An examination of the ports of origin of the ships used for transporting victuals during the period 1297-8, shows, as we might expect, that the areas most often and most heavily involved were those nearest Scotland, as was also the case with military levies.

The main ports involved were the non-Cinque Port ports of Kingston-upon-Hull, Waynflete and Newcastle. Kingston-upon-Hull is of particular interest, since it was one of Edward's own recent town-planning projects in the north, perhaps created with an eye to possible future developments in Scotland<sup>16</sup>. This successful and thriving port town provided the king with a large number of ships and sailors to hire for his use and also served as a centre to which goods purveyed by the royal officers could be brought in order to be shipped to Berwick, from where they were transported by land and sea to the garrisons.

One ship of Hull, the *Plente*, and its master, Richard Potsro, made at least two voyages during this period, in December 1297 and July 1298. In accounting for the December trip, Potsro received a total of £4 10s. for the hire of his boat and the carriage of 40 quarters of wheat and 103 quarters of malt from Hull to Berwick. The trip would have taken approximately ten days<sup>17</sup>.

Whether or not these ships were contracted privately or as part of the mandatory quota, their function was basically the same - the conveyance of supplies - but during a

<sup>14</sup> That is, the east coast counties.

<sup>15</sup> C.C.R., 1296-1302, 612; C.P.R., 1301-1307, 75.

<sup>16</sup> Tout, 'Medieval Town-planning', *The Collected Papers of Thomas Frederick Tout*, ii, 80.

<sup>17</sup> C47/2/17; E101/597/3. This was calculated from a trip made by other ships in February 1298, travelling the same distance: payments were made for storage of grain in and around Hull up till 18 February and in Berwick castle from 1 March [E101/6/33, m.1]



campaign, for which service was exacted, the need for supplies, both victuals and equipment, was obviously much greater. Indeed, the success or failure of a campaign depended on whether or not enough ships could arrive in time to feed and equip Edward's armies<sup>18</sup>. The efficiency of the whole administrative system and its weakness and strengths are highlighted by this essential element.

### *Ireland*

Another area which was prominent in providing ships was Ireland. This corresponded again to the amount of purveyance which was required to come across the Irish sea. About six months before a campaign, Edward sent writs to the Exchequer in Dublin, intimating the amount of foodstuff which was to be purveyed<sup>19</sup>. The victuals were then usually shipped to the port of Skinburness, from where they were taken by land to Carlisle, which served as the store and point of distribution for the west coast, just as Berwick served for the east coast. The six ports of Ireland - Waterford, Youghall, Ross, Drogheda, Dublin and Cork - each provided one ship as their *servitium debitum*, with the exception of Cork, which supplied two. The ships of Drogheda seemed to figure most prominently in the transportation of purveyance.

### *Shipping belonging to the nobility*

Various nobles personally owned ships and galleys which they put at the king's disposal. Sir Simon Montague was one such baron, and his service was recognised in January 1307 when he was appointed governor of a fleet seeking Robert Bruce and his allies in the western isles. Montague owned two galleys or one galley and a barge, each crewed by a master, three constables and ninety-five men. They were therefore of a considerable size<sup>20</sup>. Malcolm le fiz l'Engleys (MacQuillan) was another with his own private galleys, and he was given a safe-conduct in July 1300 to allow him to harass the Scots<sup>21</sup>.

However, there were too few individuals interested in sea-power to play a significant role when Edward required his fleet - or should we say the ships at his disposal - to take an active part against his enemies. In addition, as with his armies, the king could not force the mariners to remain in his service longer than the fifteen days which they owed him if they did not wish to. In many cases, fifteen days would be enough time only to travel from their ports of origin to the muster point, particularly since many came from the southern counties. The effects of wind, or, more particularly,

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18 See Chapter Two, p.74; Chapter Six, p.183.

19 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 281.

20 C.P.R., 1301-1307, 490; Nicolas, *A History of the Royal Navy*, i, 295-6.

21 C.P.R., 1296-1302, 523.

lack of it, could make a significant difference to how quickly the fleet could travel since many of these boats relied for speed on wind power<sup>22</sup>.

Even if the mariners agreed to stay beyond fifteen days, they would now be at the king's wages and Edward found it increasingly difficult to pay them, as well as the rest of the army, for the amount of time which was required to make an impression on the areas of Scotland outwith his control.

#### Need for shipping within Scotland itself:

When victuals had been brought to centres such as Berwick or Skinburness, the need for shipping was not yet at an end. Throughout the winter, when Edward and large numbers of men were rarely present on active campaign, the garrisons of his castles required to be supplied. Though some castles, such as Roxburgh and Jedburgh, were not near the coast and were therefore served by land, others, such as Edinburgh and Lochmaben, were supplied from the nearby ports of Leith and Annan, incurring a much shorter land journey.

In December 1298, an arrangement for provisioning Edinburgh castle was made between Sir John Kingston, constable of the castle, and Sir Philip Vernay, keeper of Berwick town. A ship was being kept ready "to serve exclusively to carry goods and other necessities to the castle between now and Easter". The wages of these mariners were to be paid by the wardrobe until Christmas eve, but thereafter Sir Philip was required to find their wages<sup>23</sup>. Perhaps the latter was paid an additional sum in his own wages to cover these costs, whereby the mariners became, effectively, a part of his garrison.

In March 1300, Sir John de St. John was permitted to retain John le Skirmisher and his crew with their galley to victual the castle of Dumfries<sup>24</sup>. Lochmaben castle had its supplies shipped to Annan and brought from there overland. One ship en route to Annan, the *Holy Cross of Lyme*, did not get far out of Skinburness and was wrecked off the coast at Silloth in August 1299. Fifty-five casks of wine from its cargo were found on the shore and for twenty days two men were employed to watch over them. This delay was presumably caused by a lack of land transport, which was evident again in a delay of nearly a month, around the same time, in transporting victuals, sent from Skinburness, from Annan to Lochmaben<sup>25</sup>. This clearly demonstrates the constant need for ships and sailors, but also illustrates how the elements played a crucial part in their reliability, or lack of it<sup>26</sup>.

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22 See Chapter Three, p.73.

23 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 343-4; see Chapter Two, p.85.

24 C.C.R., 1296-1302, 334.

25 E101/356/3.

26 See below, p.272.

### A direct role for the fleet:

In 1301, Edward, through circumstances not entirely of his own making, was able to use his fleet in a direct role in the western isles. In the summer of 1301, the admiral of the fleet of the Cinque Ports and the south coast ports, with the advice of the "good men in the said fleet", was empowered to bring to the king's peace Alexander MacDougall of Argyll, John and Duncan, his sons, his daughter, and Lachlan, his grandson, as well as all the "middling people of the Scottish Isles".

By October, the fleet was still harbouring at Bute, having not yet succeeded in bringing the MacDougalls to Edward's peace. In that month Sir Hugh Bisset of the Glens of Antrim, who was perhaps in command<sup>27</sup>, Angus Mor MacDonald and Sir John MacSween, were writing to Edward seeking his instructions. Since the admiral's powers ran only until November 1st, and since winter would soon have hindered any incursion further north, it is unlikely that any further developments occurred in that year.

### Scottish shipping:

References to the activities of Scottish shipping both for the English king and on the side of the 'rebels' are fairly scarce. From 1304 onwards, vessels from Berwick, Irvine and Saltcoats were involved in the transportation of victuals, engines and prisoners from Stirling castle. William le Jettour, the master of one such ship, *Le Messenger* of Berwick, though he was himself a native of Newcastle, was described as 'the king's mariner' and received 12d. daily 'as admiral'<sup>28</sup>, suggesting that the ships of Berwick, at any rate, may have been placed under the command of English mariners.

That the Scots themselves had ships and also the use of foreign ships is most easily established by references to their capture by the English. In March 1304, John, earl of Atholl, requested the release of two burgesses of Aberdeen, William fitz Gilbert and Adam Lyder, captured two years previously in Yorkshire, in a ship carrying clothes, armour and other equipment intended for the Scottish rebels<sup>29</sup>.

On the other hand, despite, on one occasion, sending five ships from Winchelsea and Rye to intercept the Bishop of St. Andrews, the abbots of Melrose and Jedburgh and Sir John Soules, who were returning to Scotland from Flanders<sup>30</sup>, Edward had been unable to lay his hands on the Scots. This illustrates again that supreme command of the seas lay with the weather and prevailing winds, rather than with the English or the Scots.

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27 The admiral in June 1301, Gervase Alard, had presumably gone home after he had performed his service, together with those mariners who did not wish to remain in Scotland at the king's wages.

28 C.D.S., ii, no.1386; C.D.S., v, no.492.

29 C.D.S., ii, no. 1479.

30 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 373.

The rebels were also supported at various times by ships from various countries, particularly members of the Hanseatic League and Flanders, annoyed at Edward for the disruption of trading links with Scotland, and also France, on hostile terms with England for much of this period<sup>31</sup>.

### Problems and difficulties: *The vagaries of the weather*

The fundamental problem with shipping, and one which had a crucial effect on the English garrisons and armies relying on supplies sent by sea, was the unpredictable nature of this form of transport due to the vagaries of the weather. One of the best examples of weather interfering with the transport of supplies occurred in 1298. Guisborough relates how the campaign which led up to the victory at Falkirk nearly turned to disaster because the army grew weak and diseased through lack of food. The ships, which Edward had arranged to come up via the eastern sea, had not arrived in time because of contrary winds. In addition, when they eventually did come, they were carrying two hundred tuns of wine, and few victuals. The wine, according to Guisborough, inebriated the Welsh in the army, who then rioted. Eventually, as the king was on the point of ordering a retreat to Edinburgh, so that they could receive supplies from the eastern sea, spies brought news of the imminent approach of the Scots, who had heard of the English army's plight. The battle of Falkirk followed soon thereafter<sup>32</sup>.

It is clear, therefore, that the inability of the ships, due to bad weather conditions, to reach the army with sufficient supplies was of paramount importance in determining the course taken by this campaign. Although Edward enjoyed a resounding victory at Falkirk, despite the condition of his troops, he was unable to follow that victory up by reducing Galloway, as was his intention, because, again, the fleet did not arrive in the west to provide essential provisions<sup>33</sup>.

### *Piracy*

Another problem associated with the fleet was piracy. The biggest favour with which the king could win naval support was turning a blind eye to their private activities. The freedom which mariners enjoyed led to abuses about which the king could, or would, do nothing. The most spectacular outrage occurred in August 1297, shortly after Edward had arrived with his troops in Flanders. A long-standing quarrel between the men of the Cinque Ports and those of Yarmouth flared up and the former managed to burn about twenty Yarmouth vessels, slaying their crews<sup>34</sup>. If the losses were really as great as

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31 W. Stanford Reid, 'Sea-Power in the Anglo-Scottish War, 1296-1328', *The Mariner's Mirror*, vol.46, 10, 13.

32 Guisborough, 325-6; see Chapter Three, pp.73-5.

33 Trivet, *Annales*, 371-3; W. Stanford Reid, 'Sea-Power in the Anglo-Scottish War, 1296-1328', *The Mariner's Mirror*, vol.46, 8.

34 Nicolas, *A History of the Royal Navy*, i, 280.

reported, then Edward was surely placed under even greater reliance on the remaining ships, since the total fleet was usually between sixty and ninety ships.

In any event, the protagonists appear to have remained unpunished and three years later, in September 1300, attempts were still being made to resolve the quarrel by summoning both sides to a parliament in Lincoln<sup>35</sup>.

The lawlessness continued however. The danger of piracy was particularly marked after the expiry of the truce with France in May 1302. In 1305, a ship of Sandwich robbed the very merchants it was contracted to protect<sup>36</sup>.

Piracy of another kind was practised in Scotland itself, although it was by no means restricted to the northern kingdom. An important source of royal revenue came from customs dues on goods taken out of the country. In 1304, however, the merchants on board a ship at Wick refused to pay the customs and escaped by force when two burgesses were sent to arrest them<sup>37</sup>.

#### *Non-fulfillment of quotas*

The only offence which Edward was ready to punish was non-fulfillment of promised quotas. It is clear that the demands made on ships and sailors were constant, even in years when there was no campaign, simply because supplies had to be sent to Scotland all year round, to feed the royal garrisons there. Thus, by 1302, many of the ports which were required to send ships were refusing to do so.

On 10 August 1302, two royal clerks were appointed to punish the townsfolk of Seaford, Shoreham, Portsmouth, Southampton, Lymeton, Ermine, Poole, Warham, Lyme, Teignmouth, Plymouth, Fowey and Bridgewater, who had been ordered to supply a total of fourteen 'well-armed' ships<sup>38</sup> for the Scottish expedition of that year. They had, apparently, taken "no measures to do so, to the harm of that expedition"<sup>39</sup>.

At the end of that same month, an inquiry was ordered into the conduct of the men and mariners of one of the ships from Bristol, the *Michael*:

"who came in the company of the other ships towards Scotland on the king's service, and, after receiving the king's wages at Dublin, withdrew without leave."<sup>40</sup>

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35 *Parl. Writs*, i, 88.

36 Nicolas, *A History of the Royal Navy*, i, 282; Murray, *The Constitutional History of the Cinque Ports*, 211.

37 *C.D.S.*, ii, no.1646, p.441.

38 Southampton was required to send two ships.

39 *C.P.R.*, 1301-1307, 52-3.

40 *C.P.R.*, 1301-1307, 53.

On 13 November 1302, the constable of Bristol castle as ordered to release the recalcitrant sailors, because they had promised to serve the king 'faithfully' on his next expedition<sup>41</sup> As ever, Edward's need was greater than his wrath.

However, the king ran into even more difficulties in assembling a fleet in 1303. On March of that year, writs of aid were sent to the sheriffs of Essex, Norfolk, Suffolk, Cambridge, Huntingdon, Lincoln, York and Northumberland on behalf of the king's clerk, Walter Bacun, who had been appointed to select fifty ships from those counties<sup>42</sup>.

"as it appears that some men of such towns have refused to send their ships, others have refused to find security to send them, and others, though willing to grant a certain number, have refused to send them furnished at their own expenses without the aid of the men of the adjacent towns."

Sir Robert Clifford, the keeper of the liberty of the bishopric of Durham, was also ordered to make sure that the four ships chosen by Bacun from towns within his jurisdiction were sent to Berwick by inducing "the men, by all means that he shall see fit, to do this and [distraint] them, if need be", since they were "wholly contemning the king's order on this behalf". The men of Yorkshire:

"although they granted that they should send a certain number of ships to the king, are not able to send them to Berwick, thus found at their own cost, with out the aid of the men of the towns of the adjoining parts."<sup>43</sup>

On 16 April 1303 another clerk, William Walmesford, was sent to help Walter Bacun, "because the latter has been negligent in the matter"<sup>44</sup>, suggesting that the ships were still not forthcoming.

It was not just the eastern counties which were unwilling to provide their quotas. In Bristol:

"certain men of the town and the parts adjoining capable of this service [two ships], refuse to go with the ships to Scotland well-found with men at their own cost."

Again, full measures, including distraint if necessary, were ordered against them. Three Cornish towns, Loo, Polperro and Ash, claimed that they could not provide their quota of one ship, with its men and equipment, without help with the expense from four neighbouring towns. The admiral, Gervase Alard, wrote to the king, explaining that since these last four towns were not used to contributing to the fleet, the king had to send a writ ordering them to do so<sup>45</sup>.

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41 C.C.R., 1296-1302, 564.

42 See above, pp.267-8.

43 C.C.R., 1301-1307, 76.

44 C.P.R., 1301-1307, 131.

45 C.C.R., 1302-1307, 76; C.P.R., 1301-1307, 131.

It is clear from these examples that the annual burden of providing the king with ships for the Scottish war was becoming too much for many of these towns. A comparison of the quotas ordered for 1301, with those required in 1302, gives a further indication of this inability. In 1301, very few towns joined together to provide their quotas; in 1302, however, most did so.

This naturally meant that there were fewer ships. Only Bristol, Bridgewater and Lyme had to provide the same number of ships by themselves in each year. More startlingly, in 1301, Yarmouth was ordered to provide six ships. The next year, Yarmouth and Lymeton were to provide only one together. The stringent instructions that these ships were to be well-armed and provided with men at the cost of these towns explains quite clearly why some soon demanded help from neighbouring towns which did not normally contribute to the aid, and also why others refused to contribute at all<sup>46</sup>.

Admittedly, corruption and opportunism played their part. The crew of the Bristol boat mentioned above, who received wages at Dublin and then returned home, were probably guilty of opportunism more than anything else. On 10 March 1303, an inquiry was ordered on behalf of two citizens of Southampton, Walter Frest and Alice, widow of Ralph Bishop. Their ship, "with its whole gear and fittings", had been selected by the bailiffs of that town to go to Scotland and had been duly handed over to one Robert Wynton. The latter promptly sold it to a merchant of Winchelsea "and refused to restore or pay for it, to the damage of the said Walter and Alice and the harm of the Scottish expedition"<sup>47</sup>.

It is thus evident that the royal clerks faced widespread problems in persuading most ports to fulfil their quotas by 1302, though it should be quite clearly stated that the Cinque Ports seem to have been quite reliable in this respect. The repeated threats to the non-Cinque Port ports, in terms of the effects which non-fulfillment would have on his campaign, while not to be taken too seriously<sup>48</sup>, certainly seems to indicate that the king recognised the importance of shipping, and his reliance upon it. The fleet, not surprisingly, followed the trend evident among those serving in the army, namely an increasing reluctance to participate in Edward's campaigns in Scotland.

### Conclusions:

Though references to shipping involved in Edward's service in Scotland are not particularly numerous, nor normally given much attention, an examination of the role played by the fleet gives a good indication of the general trend of events and also of the degree of English control over the country. A final indication of this occurred after

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46 C.P.R., 1301-1307, 75; C.C.R., 1296-1302, 612; C.C.R., 1302-1307, 76.

47 C.P.R., 1301-1307, 187.

48 This was common treatment of anyone, including his own officials, who did not provide Edward with what he wanted [for example, see Chapter Seven, p.181].

Bruce's rising in 1306. The whole of the Scottish west coast became virtually unapproachable to the English, though admittedly only for a brief period of time. Supplies being brought from Ireland were ordered to be sent only to Skinburness, rather than Ayr and the mariners were ordered to remain on the high seas and not to approach the parts of Ayr and Galloway on any account<sup>49</sup>.

Though Bruce could not sustain this disruption, English authority would have been seriously threatened if the Scots themselves had had enough ships available to make an effective blockade of the ports which the English constantly required to supply their endeavours with men, foodstuffs and equipment.

To sum up, therefore, in the constant battle to equip and supply Edward's armies and garrisons, which was to a large extent the definition of his administration, shipping played a constant and vital role.

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49 C.C.R., 1302-1307, 374.



## PART NINE:

EDWARDIAN CASTLES AND GARRISONS  
IN SCOTLAND

Although Edward's garrisons in Scotland have featured prominently in the previous chapters, their importance in the history of this period makes it necessary to discuss them on their own. The following four chapters discuss every castle - both royal and private - held for Edward, however briefly, between 1298 and the reconquest of 1303-4. They have been divided into four geographical areas: the south-west (Caerlaverock, Lochmaben, Dumfries, Tibbers, Dalswinton); the central west (Turnberry, Ayr, Dumbarton, Carstairs and Lanark, Kirkintilloch, Stirling); the central east (Linlithgow, Edinburgh, Luffness, Dirleton, Dunbar, Hailes, Yester); and the south-east (Roxburgh, Jedburgh, Selkirk, Peebles and Berwick).

It is first of all essential to establish just what kind of a fortification existed in each case before Edward's arrival in 1296<sup>1</sup>. In Scotland, the word *castellum* was applied to a wide variety of structures, from the basic motte and bailey construction in earth and timber to large and impressive stone edifices, which, though smaller in scale, bore a striking resemblance to the elaborate thirteenth-century castles of England and France. There were any number of variations in between.

The most obvious function of a castle was as "a strong point from which territory could be controlled and invasion checked"<sup>2</sup>. However, it should be noted that the garrison of a castle could not prevent a larger hostile force from travelling through the countryside in which it was situated; in such circumstances, the castle's primary role became that of a place of safety until the danger had passed.

However, following the Norman invasion of England, the castle is more particularly associated with developments in administration.

"In Normandy, Flanders and England, the castle was at the very centre of feudalism and the development of governmental organisation"<sup>3</sup>.

In Scotland, castles were indeed to be found in areas where royal control was strong. The royal castles of the Tweed valley - Berwick, Roxburgh, Selkirk, Peebles and Jedburgh - "were regional centres, the keys to the administration of their areas, and they were placed at the vital points where also the centres of population developed".

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1 While some of the following statements are true of Scottish castles in general, the primary intention is to describe the establishment of those fortifications which Edward was to garrison during the period 1298 to 1303, all of which were situated in southern Scotland.

2 N.J.G. Pounds, *The Medieval Castle in England and Wales*, 6, 8.

3 G. Simpson and B. Webster, 'Distribution of mottes in Scotland', *Château Gaillard*, v, 176.

However, Scottish castles were to be found in even greater numbers beyond the areas of direct royal control. This is particularly true of the south-west, where a number of Anglo-Norman families were granted large landholdings. Thus, although some castles, such as Dumfries, still acted as regional centres, the majority were the centre of these great fiefs, whose lords indirectly controlled the area for the Crown. Even in Galloway, a degree of "infiltration of alien Anglo-Norman settlers" had occurred before the lordship was eventually divided up between three heiresses, each married to a powerful Anglo-Norman, in the thirteenth century<sup>4</sup>.

Thus the early mottes constructed by these Anglo-Normans were not necessarily different in *form* from previous constructions, but they most certainly differed in *function*: "the true castle was the defended focus of feudal administration"<sup>5</sup>. It is also true that this change in function was taken on board by the native Scottish nobility, who presumably used existing 'castles' as often as they built new ones<sup>6</sup>.

By the late thirteenth century, one of the more surprising aspects of even a cursory examination of Scottish castles is the fact that royal castles were generally much simpler and more basic than many private castles. However, this is not really so surprising. Only under "an intense and well-organised builder like Edward I of England", whose resources were far greater than that of a king of Scots, could a large-scale campaign of stone castle-building take place. Thus, if existing Scottish royal castles continued to fulfil the functions required of them, there was no need either for elaborate alterations (although the addition of stonework certainly did occur), or the construction of new ones.

The first rank of the Scottish nobility did not operate under the same fiscal constraints, simply because they generally only had need of one major castle as the caput of their fief. This was particularly true of the Anglo-Norman nobles of the south-west. They could thus spend more time and effort on constructing a fortification which would not only stamp their authority over the surrounding countryside, but act as a home in a way that royal castles did not, because the king was more peripatetic. It is also true that the building of large stone castles "required not only careful preparation, expense and effort, but also physical and legal security of tenure and relatively undisturbed conditions over a number of years"<sup>7</sup>. It is in this last respect that such castles can be regarded as the products of unusual circumstances.

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4 G. Simpson and B. Webster, 'Distribution of mottes in Scotland', in *Château Gaillard*, v, 177-9.

5 N.J.G. Pounds, *The Medieval Castle in England and Wales*, 11.

6 G. Simpson & B. Webster, 'Distribution of mottes in Scotland', *Château Gaillard*, v, 179.

7 G. Stell, 'The Scottish Medieval Castle: Form, Function and 'Evolution'', *Essays on the Scottish Nobility*, ed. K. Stringer, 200-201.

There is also no rule governing who produced the best results, nor their geographical location. The three most impressive examples of thirteenth-century Scottish stone castles are Bothwell in Lanarkshire, Dirleton in East Lothian and Kildrummy in Mar. The first two were built by Anglo-Normans (Walter Murray and Sir John Vaux) and the third by a native earl (Mar). The similarity in their layout is also striking and all three conform to the basic structure to be found in the great French Château de Coucy<sup>8</sup>. Since Dirleton was constructed by Sir John Vaux, steward of Marie de Coucy, Alexander II's queen, this connection is understandable. The similarity of the other two can only be explained by supposing that the nobility at the court of Alexander III shared not only ideas about castle-building, but their masons as well.

Indeed, when examining castles in general, but Scottish ones in particular, the element of continuity is far more important than discussions of slight variations in form. Indeed, as Mr Stell states:

"From the first appearance of the stone-built castle in Scotland in about 1200 through to 1500 and beyond, there is .. a conservative adherence to established principles and techniques of fortification"<sup>9</sup>.

In addition, these traditional principles and techniques "were always open to modification by local circumstance ... influenced by local terrain and geology, by labour and materials, and by the random wishes and whims of an infinite number of people"<sup>10</sup>. After all, there were only three basic categories of man-made defensive features: outworks and enclosures, "providing successive deep or tall obstacles" in the path of intruders; "a 'drop on the head' from of defence", based around the "upperworks of curtain-works and towers, ramparts or high-level platforms"; and, various 'special measures' designed to protect the weak point of any enceinte, the gateways<sup>11</sup>.

Thus, whether large or small, built of earth and timber or stone, or both, Scottish castles were a well-established feature of the administrative system used by the Scottish crown long before the conquest of 1296. If this were not so, we would surely have seen the arrival of an army of masons and carpenters in Scotland, or at least plans for their arrival, soon after Edward had made arrangements for governing the northern kingdom. Ignoring the very cogent financial reasons why there was no repetition of the great castle-building programmes which accompanied the conquest

8 W. Douglas Simpson, 'The Thirteenth Century Castle of Dirleton, *S.H.R.*, xxvii, 48.

9 G. Stell, 'The Scottish Medieval Castle: Form, Function and 'Evolution'', *Essays on the Scottish Nobility*, ed. K. Stringer, 202.

10 N.J.G. Pounds, *The Medieval Castle in England and Wales*, 15.

11 G. Stell, 'The Scottish Medieval Castle: Form, Function and 'Evolution'', *Essays on the Scottish Nobility*, ed. K. Stringer, 200.

of Wales, it is clear that there was no need for such a repetition: the facilities were already there, albeit on a much less grand scale. The English king undoubtedly found the existing structures sufficient (if not ideal) simply because he did not use those, such as the royal castles at Peebles and Selkirk, which he did not regard as acceptable. It is thus quite misleading to state that "Edward's programme in Scotland and the Borders was poorly conceived, badly executed and technically backward looking"<sup>12</sup>.

It should also be made quite clear that though 'Edwardian' castles certainly existed in Scotland, they were not built by the king whose name describes them. The Edwardian style of castle-building:

"is the climax of European military architecture in the Middle Ages. It is characterised by masterly design and masonwork and is the supreme exploitation of the gatehouse in combination with towers and curtains; and it is further characterised by the use of a system of concentric defences<sup>13</sup> which was employed in Byzantine fortifications of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries"<sup>14</sup>.

Thus, although Edward developed these techniques, presumably having brought them back from his crusade, he did not invent them. Nor was he the only western leader to appreciate their value. The existence of castles in Scotland built on concentric principles prior to 1296, of which Caerlaverock is a good example, suggests that this 'Edwardian' form of architecture was more likely to have been learned by the Scottish nobility from the French, not the English. We have already noted the connection with the Coucy family, builders of the great Château bearing their name. During the years of comparative peace under Alexander II and his son, Scottish craftsmen perhaps journeyed to France to learn techniques of stone-building, a craft which was still in its early stages in Scotland, from the Continental masters, though it is more likely that French stone-masons, perhaps connected with the family of Alexander II's queen, paid visits to Scotland. English masons undoubtedly also provided their expertise in the same way - after all, many of the Scottish nobility had estates in England. However, the great Welsh fortresses which exemplified the 'Edwardian' castle were not completed until the 1280's and thus were too late to have influenced the construction of the comparable Scottish castles of Dirleton, Bothwell, Kildrummy or Caerlaverock.

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<sup>12</sup> N.J.G. Pounds, *The Medieval Castle in England and Wales*, 182.

<sup>13</sup> The concentric principle was developed to allow all the defensive parts of a castle - eg. the rampart or the enceinte - to be used at once, by completely surrounding it with an outer ring of defensive-works so that the castle itself formed an inner line of defence [S. Cruden, *The Scottish Castle*, 65].

<sup>14</sup> S. Cruden, *The Scottish Castle*, 65.

By 1302, there were certainly English masons in Scotland. The great architects of the Welsh wars - Master James de St. George, a Savoyard, and Master Walter Hereford particularly, but also Master Adam Glasham, Master Robert Holmcultram, Master Thomas Houghton and Master Reginald the engineer - were also employed by Edward in the northern kingdom. However, the building programmes on which they embarked there were hardly comparable with the great castles that they had built in Wales. The biggest works in Scotland took place at Lochmaben, Dumfries, Linlithgow and Selkirk, where a pele was added, in all but one case, to the existing structures. However, although some stone-work was employed at Selkirk, even the gates and towers were to be made of timber at Linlithgow, where Master James de St. George was in command.

Undoubtedly finance was a most important factor, influencing not only the quality and extent of Edward's castle-building in Scotland, but the course of the war itself. This was a direct result of the vast sums of money expended by the English king on the conquest of Wales - during the war of 1282-3 alone the total expenditure came to around £120,000, of which nearly one-third was spent on building castles. It has been estimated that "between 1277 and 1304, Edward spent some £80,000 on his works in Wales"<sup>15</sup>.

But finance alone does not explain the lack of a cohesive castle-building programme in Scotland. There were a number of castles which were defensively robust by any standards - Edinburgh and Stirling being the obvious examples. The first remained consistently in English hands, while the other was captured more than once by the Scots. Of the new peles constructed by Edward, Lochmaben, Dumfries and Linlithgow were able to withstand attacks from the Scots, while Selkirk, which is the only pele known to have parts made of stone, succumbed to such an attack in 1303. Thus, the strength of the castles held by Edward in Scotland was not the most important factor determining whether or not they would remain in English hands. The English garrisons generally had little to fear from Scottish siegecraft: most of the southern Scottish castles could and did defend themselves successfully against the limited equipment available to the Guardians, while Edward himself made short work of them. Starvation and treachery were the methods employed by the Scots to reduce castles and not even the strongest walls were sufficient protection against them.

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<sup>15</sup> Prestwich, *Edward I*, 200, 214.

## CHAPTER ELEVEN

THE SOUTH-WEST: CAERLAVEROCK, LOCHMABEN, DUMFRIES,  
TIBBERS AND DALSWINTON

## CAERLAVEROCK

## Early history:

There are, in fact, two ruined sites at Caerlaverock. The stone castle in existence in 1300, described in the contemporary poem, *The Siege of Caerlaverock*, was certainly a fortification of some strength. The very fact that the Edwardian army required the services of a team of engineers, equipped with an impressive array of siege-weapons and fire power, to reduce the castle in that year corroborates this. Indeed, since there are - unusually - no references to Edwardian building works of any kind at Caerlaverock, it would appear that the king was satisfied with the strength of the existing structure.

According to the poet, the castle was shaped like a shield:

"It had only three sides round about, and in each angle a tower; but one of these (towers) was double, so high, so long, and so large that underneath was the gate with a drawbridge well-made and strong, and other defences in sufficiency. It had good walls and good ditches, quite full to the brink with water."<sup>1</sup>

Its proximity to the Solway, separating Scotland from England, was one of its main assets, from Edward's point of view. This facilitated the transportation of victuals to the new English garrison, which could be supplied directly by sea from Skinburness, near Carlisle. Caerlaverock's defensive position was also attractive:

"... for on one side, towards the west, could be seen the Irish sea (the Solway), and to the north, a fair country surrounded by an arm of the sea, so that on two sides no creature living could approach it without putting himself in danger of the sea. Nor is it easy to the south, for the many ways are made difficult by wood, by marsh, and by trenches filled by the sea where it is wont to meet the river; and therefore, it was necessary for the army to come towards the east, where the hill slopes."<sup>2</sup>

The general assumption has been that the less-impressive earthworks nearest the Solway was the earlier construction "which is supposed to have remained intact till 1357, when it was taken down and rebuilt in the same shape in its new position". However, architectural historians are now largely agreed, both from the evidence of the poet and the fact that the impressive remains of the more northern site include some identifiably

<sup>1</sup> *The Roll of Caerlaverock*, 25.

<sup>2</sup> *The Roll of Caerlaverock*, 25-6.

thirteenth-century work, that this last castle was the one besieged by Edward in 1300<sup>3</sup>. It was probably built during the reign of Alexander II by either John Maxwell, or his son, Aymer, causing some alarm to Henry III, who regarded it as unacceptably powerful for a castle so near to the English border<sup>4</sup>.

So what are the origins of the second site? It has been suggested that this was an even earlier stone castle. However, it stands "on a defective foundation of clay", comparing most unfavourably with the obvious rocky outcrop on which the triangular castle is situated and which any engineer would have selected as a first choice. Douglas Simpson thus argues convincingly that this second site was, in fact, a *later* castle, built after the demolition of the first castle on Bruce's orders in 1313 and abandoned again in 1356 when Sir Robert Maxwell returned to the original site<sup>5</sup>.

### Caerlaverock during the first War of Independence:

In 1296, Caerlaverock belonged to Sir Herbert Maxwell, who performed homage and fealty to Edward in September of that year. There is nothing to suggest that the castle was taken out of his possession. After the outbreak of rebellion throughout the country in 1297, King Edward was able to re-establish some degree of English control over the south-west in the following year. The Bruce castle of Lochmaben, only seven miles from Caerlaverock, was successfully reduced and an English garrison installed, but Caerlaverock itself withstood attempts to capture it.

Thereafter, the English garrison at Lochmaben were subjected to attack from the Scots at Caerlaverock. Despite the death of their constable, Robert Cunningham, during one such an attack in October 1299, the Scots still resisted these English attempts. The success of their activities can be gauged by the fact that Edward's first priority, in the campaign of 1300, was the reduction of Caerlaverock<sup>6</sup>.

Thereafter, the new owner of the castle was Sir Robert Clifford; who had previously served Edward as captain of the western march, but was currently based at Lochmaben, serving under the present captain, Sir John de St. John. An English garrison, numbering eighty-four men-at-arms drawn mostly from the nearby castles of Dumfries and Lochmaben, was thereafter established at Caerlaverock. Despite being a private castle, these men were at royal wages. However, references to this garrison disappear in the following regnal year [20 November 1300 - 19 November 1301].

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<sup>3</sup> MacGibbon and Ross, i, 128, 135; W. Douglas Simpson, 'The two castles of Caerlaverock: A reconsideration of their problems', *T.D.G.A.S.*, xxi, 193-4.

<sup>4</sup> G.W.S. Barrow, 'The army of Alexander III's Scotland, *Scotland in the Reign of Alexander III, 1249-1286*, 132.

<sup>5</sup> MacGibbon and Ross, i, 135; W. Douglas Simpson, 'The two castles of Caerlaverock: A reconsideration of their problems', *T.D.G.A.S.*, xxi, 190, 195.

<sup>6</sup> Chapter Five. p.136.

It is difficult to know what became of it. It seems unlikely that the Scots were able to recover the castle, which, after all, had required the services of all the sophisticated siege equipment that the English king could muster. There is certainly no mention of any further Scottish attacks on Lochmaben. The most likely explanation is that Edward decided that he did not have sufficient manpower to garrison all three castles of Dumfries, Lochmaben and Caerlaverock. Since Dumfries was the centre of a sheriffdom and Lochmaben had served as the centre of the western march for the past two years, Caerlaverock was chosen as the one to remain empty. Nevertheless, the English must have felt very confident of their ability to control the area to abandon a castle which had so recently provided their enemies with a strong base from which to attack.

There is no further mention of Caerlaverock until 1306, when it was seized by Robert Bruce. Since the submission agreement made between the Guardian, Sir John Comyn, and King Edward guaranteed that the Scots should be allowed to retain or repossess the lands and property that they had held in 1296, the Maxwells were presumably once more in possession of the castle after February 1304.

## LOCHMABEN

### Early history:

Lochmaben was the caput of the rich lordship of Annandale and, at the outbreak of the Wars of Independence in 1296, therefore belonged to Robert Bruce (VII), father of the earl of Carrick. Annandale had been granted to the Bruces by David I soon after the latter's accession to the throne of Scotland in 1124 and the first residence of the new lord of the area was situated at Annan. However, the Bruces also built a motte at Lochmaben: both castles were held by the lord of Annandale on behalf of King William the Lion in his war against Henry II<sup>7</sup>.

The motte at Lochmaben stood on the Castle Hill, "on the neck of land between the Castle Loch and the Kirk Loch". It was thus defended by water on both the west and the east. The summit of the motte "is unusually large and oval in plan, and is partly surrounded by a ditch". The medieval church was situated near by, as was usual<sup>8</sup>.

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<sup>7</sup> G. Neilson, 'Burghs of Annandale: Annan and Lochmaben - their Burghal Origins', *T.D.G.A.S.*, iii, 58, 60, 68.

<sup>8</sup> G. Neilson, *Burghs of Annandale: Annan and Lochmaben - their Burghal Origins*, *T.D.G.A.S.*, iii, 68; G. Stell, *Exploring Scotland's Heritage: Dumfries and Galloway*, 113.



### Lochmaben during the first War of Independence:

As a private residence, Lochmaben's owner, who had joined Edward even before the outset of the campaign of 1296, undoubtedly retained possession of it, though, thereafter, the elder Bruce never again resided on his Scottish fief. After the uprisings of 1297, it seems likely that the earl of Carrick held his father's motte of Lochmaben against King Edward. Certainly the English do not appear to have held any castles in the south-west by the spring of 1298 and the earl of Carrick was known to have been at Lochmaben in May of that year<sup>9</sup>.

After the battle of Falkirk in July 1298, Edward set about recapturing castles, particularly in the south-west. Possession of Lochmaben was of great strategic value to the English: the port of Annan was only a short land journey from the castle and the garrison could thus, like the one at Caerlaverock, be supplied from the port of Skinburness. Moreover, Lochmaben was situated at an important road junction, controlling the routes into Annandale and Nithsdale. It thus covered the approaches to both Caerlaverock and the royal castle at Dumfries.

Edward and his army reached Lochmaben on 4 September 1298 and the motte was apparently 'taken'<sup>10</sup>, though from whom is far from clear. The earl of Carrick was certainly not there. Nevertheless, it was presumably the latter's activities - which included setting fire to the castle at Ayr - which gave Edward the excuse to build a new pele and institute a garrison in the centre of Carrick's father's lordship.

However, the size and condition of the accommodation offered by the Bruce motte do not seem to have met Edward's requirements. Although it is hard to imagine that a noble of Bruce's status and wealth did not construct a stone castle as the caput of his lordship, the fact that Lochmaben is described as a *manerium* in the early fourteenth century<sup>11</sup> suggests that it was probably only a rudimentary timber fortification, perhaps similar to the royal manor at Linlithgow<sup>12</sup>. The first English captain of the march to reside at Lochmaben, Sir Robert Clifford, was therefore given the responsibility for building Edward's first pele in Scotland.

During excavations conducted on an ancient Iron Age site - also the site of a late fourteenth-century stone castle - at the south end of the Castle Loch in 1968, a gully was investigated which:

"can be interpreted most reasonably as a palisade trench, probably supported by tie beams anchored by the stones behind it ... This palisade may have been furnished with a gateway ... Although no gateway was

<sup>9</sup> C.D.S., iv, Appendix, no.7.

<sup>10</sup> *Rishanger*, 188.

<sup>11</sup> See below, p.286.

<sup>12</sup> See Chapter Thirteen, p.305.

found in excavation, a heavy bronze stud, of the type used for strengthening a door or a gate, was found near the line of the palisade ... The trench .. contained early fourteenth century pottery in its infill, suggesting that the palisade putatively erected in it was not much later than 1300".

It was, therefore, concluded that ".. the first pele at Lochmaben was almost certainly constructed on the site of the later stone castle".<sup>13</sup> Defensively-speaking, this site was very attractive: a peninsula bounded by the loch on three sides<sup>14</sup>. It was not too difficult a task to render the land side equally unapproachable - probably by means of a large ditch. There is evidence, however, that the original motte was still used after the building of the pele - between 1315 and 1321 King Robert I stipulated that the *reddendo* [a pair of spurs] owed by Thomas Carruthers for the grant of the lands of Mouswald should be delivered 'apud manerium nostrum de Lochmaben'<sup>15</sup>.

The pele was begun sometime between September 1298 and the end of the year, using local labour. On 25 December, in anticipation of the completion of the castle, Sir Robert Cantilupe was appointed its constable. Three days later, forty-eight workers from Cumberland were sent to work on the pele, together with twelve other skilled craftsmen, sawyers and carpenters<sup>16</sup>.

The construction of this new castle made Lochmaben the strategic centre of the western march. Thus, in addition to the constable and the permanent garrison, the captain, or warden, of the western march was based there, together with his retinue of at least forty men-at-arms<sup>17</sup>, on whom the security of those areas of the south-west controlled by the English depended. Clifford had given up the office of warden by August 1299 but he remained in service on the march. He and his retinue were permitted to reside in the houses in the pele which Sir Robert had had built<sup>18</sup>.

In August 1299 the pele was prepared to meet its first challenge as the garrison awaited an attack by the earl of Carrick between 1 and 25 of that month. However, since the earl, one of the Guardians of Scotland, was in the south-east, at a council meeting at Peebles in mid-August, these preparations may have proved unnecessary. Carrick returned towards Annandale on 29 August, with Sir David Brechin, intending to ride on into Galloway. But, if Lochmaben escaped 'rebel' attentions in August, the new fortifications were certainly put to the test two months later by Scots operating from Caerlaverock. The pele stood up successfully to the attack and the head of the Scottish

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13 A.D.S. Macdonald and L.R. Laing, 'Excavation at Lochmaben Castle, Dumfriesshire', P.S.A.S., vol. 106, 124, 144.

14 R.C. Reid, 'Edward I's Pele at Lochmaben', T.D.G.A.S., xxxi, 61.

15 R.M.S., 1306-1424, no.92.

16 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 361.

17 For example, C.D.S., ii, no.1170.

18 See Chapter Five, p.124.

constable of Caerlaverock, Robert Cunningham, now adorned the top of its great tower. However, structural weaknesses had been revealed and Sir Richard Siward, the 'English' captain of Nithsdale, whose stone castle at Tibbers Edward had seen in 1298<sup>19</sup>, was brought in "to strengthen the palisade of the close of Lochmaben castle". In addition, Sir Ralph fitz William, Clifford's immediate successor as captain of the march, led an expedition into Galloway, presumably against the earl of Carrick, in September 1299. As with most English forays into Galloway, it does not seem to have achieved anything<sup>20</sup>.

The Scots continued to harass Lochmaben, even after the fall of Caerlaverock to Edward in July 1300. On 7 September 1301, the Scottish army under Sir John Soules, the Guardian, and Sir Ingram d'Umfraville "burned .. our town and assailed our pele"<sup>21</sup>. Sir Robert Tilliol, the constable of Lochmaben, sought relief from Edward, currently engaged in besieging Bothwell castle. The prince of Wales's army in western Galloway was therefore sent to inspect both Lochmaben and Dumfries. When the young Edward arrived on 25 September, he found both garrisons desperately short of victuals and the men demoralised<sup>22</sup>.

Lochmaben continued to be a 'royal' castle for the following three years. Bruce of Annandale did petition the king, some time before his death in 1304, for its return, since Edward had no legitimate right to hold on to Lochmaben, especially after the submission of the earl of Carrick early in 1302<sup>23</sup>. Guisborough indeed states that the elder Bruce was on his way to Annandale at the time of his death<sup>24</sup>. Perhaps the king gave, as his mandate for holding the castle, 'reasons of national security'.

Edward certainly had some justification for wishing to hold such an important strategic position since the Scots seem to have kept up an almost continuous attack on the south-western garrisons. In December 1302, Sir John Botetourt organised a horsed expedition against the 'rebels', together with the members of his council with him at Lochmaben. On 4 January 1303, Botetourt was officially appointed captain of the western march (though he was obviously occupying the position in December 1302), succeeding St. John, who had died the previous September<sup>25</sup>. The Scots, however, transferred their activities to the south-east at the beginning of 1303. Nevertheless, this was to be only a short respite for the south-west. By July 1303, while Edward and his army were in the north-east, the Scottish army was once more on the move in and around Dumfries. According to the keeper of Galloway and Nithsdale during Botetourt's absence

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19 See Chapter Three, p.78.

20 See Chapter Five, p.138.

21 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 432.

22 See Chapter Six, p.179.

23 *C.D.S.*, iv, p.376.

24 *Guisborough*, 363.

25 *C.P.R.*, 1301-1307, 103. St. John died on 6 September 1302 [*Chronicles Ed.1 and Ed.II*, i, 128].

with the king, the supply lines to the garrisons at Dumfries and Lochmaben had been cut off and they thus required immediate relief "before it is too late". This lack of supplies, together with the large sums of money owed as arrears of wages, had demoralised the garrison almost to the point of desertion. The Scots did not manage to capture these castles, but the impression given is that it was only the good will and endurance of the men inside which saved them<sup>26</sup>.

Edward was aware of the need to protect the property rights of the Scottish landowning class and generally guaranteed that those who submitted should receive back their lands<sup>27</sup>. The submission agreement made with Carrick when he returned to Edward's peace, whatever its finer points, clearly states that the former was not to be disinherited of any part of the Bruce patrimony, in England or Scotland. The earl of Carrick thus became lord of Annandale on the death of his father in April 1304, but Lochmaben was not immediately restored to him. Though Sir John Botetourt, Edward's captain of the western march, seems to have relinquished this office by 30 April 1304<sup>28</sup>, members of the English garrison at Lochmaben were paid wages for their stay there until 31 October 1304<sup>29</sup>. However, since there is no mention of Lochmaben in the ordinances of September 1305, together with the evidence of Barbour, who states that Bruce rode to Lochmaben to meet his brother Edward, immediately prior to the meeting with Comyn at Dumfries<sup>30</sup>, it can be concluded that the caput of Annandale was at last returned to its lord around 1305.

## DUMFRIES

### Early history:

Dumfries stands "at the upper tidal limit and lowest bridging point of the river Nith" - the gateway to Galloway. The royal burgh was established by William I in 1186<sup>31</sup>. The town was well-situated, protected by the Nith to the west, the Millburn on the south, the Lochar Moss - a large area of marshland - on the east. The main approach was therefore from the north.

Following the eruption of rebellion in Galloway in the 1170's, which was also the main impetus behind the erection of a castle at Ayr<sup>32</sup>, the original castle at Dumfries was "doubtless overrun". However King William reasserted control over Nithsdale and a new

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26 Chapter Eight, p.229.

27 See Chapter Fifteen, p.357.

28 C.D.S., ii, no.1659.

29 E101/13/34, m.11, m.11 (dorso).

30 J. Barbour, *The Bruce*, i, 28.

31 G. Stell, *Exploring Scotland's Heritage: Dumfries and Galloway*, 47.

32 See Chapter Twelve, p.295.

castle was constructed in 1179<sup>33</sup>. A report prepared by an English official between 1563 and 1566 describes its situation thus:

"The old castle of Dumfries, five miles and a half from the mouth of the Nith, standing upon the side of the same, very good for a fort. The plot and ground thereof in manner like to Roxburgh Castle. It may late [command] the town and the bridge of Dumfries, and receive boats of ten tons as said is furth of England".

This site is thus that described today as Castledykes, situated about half a mile downriver from Dumfries itself. From the remaining earthworks, a massive tabular mound surrounded by an open ditch on the north and east sides can be identified. This fosse extends eastwards for eighty yards, turning south in a wide curve for sixty yards, where it disappears. It presumably once completely surrounded the mound<sup>34</sup>. In addition to the strength of its size and position, the castle apparently underwent extensive rebuilding in stone in the 1260's<sup>35</sup>.

Though a sheriffdom at Dumfries may have been created by King William at the same time as the construction of the second castle, the first sheriff of Dumfries is not recorded until 1237, when Thomas Randolph was described as such<sup>36</sup>.

#### **Dumfries during the first War of Independence:**

In 1296, King Edward installed Sir Robert Joneby, a Cumberland knight, as his sheriff there<sup>37</sup>. Joneby's spell in office was probably quite short, however, due to the outbreak of revolt in May 1297. It seems likely that the bishop of Glasgow, James the Steward and the earl of Carrick managed to capture Dumfries castle for the Scots, for a short period at least<sup>38</sup>.

However, even if Sir Henry Percy, Edward's warden of the western march, did succeed in recapturing Dumfries in mid-1297, there can be little doubt that Sir William Wallace managed to bring the sheriffdom back under Scottish control by the end of the year. There is certainly no evidence for any English presence in Scotland beyond certain parts of the south-east<sup>39</sup>.

In 1298, as we have seen, the English king devoted the period after the battle of Falkirk to recovering castles in the south-west particularly. On 2 September 1298, immediately prior to his arrival at Lochmaben, Edward and his army were at Troqueer,

33 A.A.M. Duncan, *Scotland; The Making of the Kingdom*, 183.

34 J. Barbour, 'Vestiges of the Castle of Dumfries', *T.D.G.A.S.*, xvii, 362-3; R. Gourlay and A. Turner, *Historic Dumfries: the archaeological implications of development*, 2, 9.

35 *E.R.*, i, 17, 27.

36 *Melrose Liber*, no.206; *Fife Court Bk.*, Appendix D, 361-2.

37 *C.D.S.*, ii, no.824 (4).

38 Chapter Two, p.52.

39 See Chapter Two, p.60.

just outside Dumfries. Two months later, on 20 November, orders were given for the garrisoning of the castle, which was to come under the jurisdiction of Sir Robert Clifford, as captain of the western march. No constable was named as yet<sup>40</sup>.

However, a question mark then hangs over Dumfries, for there is no mention of the garrison in official records for 1299. Wages had been paid and supplies provided for the period from 20 November 1298 until 30 June 1299, but there is no mention of any further resupplying. It can therefore be concluded that there was no English garrison at Dumfries in 1299, since a full set of accounts compiled by the receiver at Carlisle, Master Richard Abingdon, exists for regnal year 27 [20 Nov. 1298 - 19 Nov. 1299].

It is more difficult to know whether the castle had fallen into Scottish hands, or whether it was decided that resources were not sufficient to garrison Dumfries while the pele was being constructed at Lochmaben. However, given that the Scots in Caerlaverock were active in 1299 and the fact that a garrison reappears, with Sir John Dolive as its constable, on 24 March 1300, just over three weeks after Sir John de St. John, the warden of the western march, had been ordered to begin an offensive against the Scots in that march, suggests that it was occupied by the 'rebels' before March 1300<sup>41</sup>. If Carrick, Wishart and the Steward had been able to capture Dumfries in June 1297, it is likely that the Scots could take it again once Edward and his army had returned home in 1298.

Although, from its general position and its renovation in stone in the 1260's, Dumfries was a castle of some strength, Edward was naturally unhappy about the state of its defences. Thus, after he had successfully reduced Caerlaverock in July 1300, he then arranged for the construction of a pele at Dumfries. This pele, which presumably surrounded the existing structure, provided a much larger area within which the garrison could assemble in safety. By October 1300, over 200 ditchers, 80 carpenters and 15 masons, under the master carpenter, Robert of Holmcultram, and an engineer, Adam Glasham, had begun work, to be joined by 76 more ditchers from Cumberland in the next month. The wood used in the construction was sent by sea from Inglewood Forest near Carlisle.

On 19 October 1300 the king himself arrived at Dumfries, to supervise 'the raising of the pele'. Thereafter, Master Adam the Fleming of Bury St. Edmunds was brought in to finish off the system of waterways to surround the pele and the castle, which were to hold water at least twenty feet wide and ten feet deep. All that then remained were a few minor additions, as well as the construction of a new gate and drawbridge on the north side of the castle, to replace the old ones, and "a strong timber building covered with boards and flat on top to serve as a gatehouse commanding the bridge". Two years later, in December 1302, when Dumfries was threatened by the imminent arrival of the

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40 See Chapter Three, pp.82-3.

41 See Chapter Four, 94-5.

Scottish army, additional defences, which included an outer pele to protect the entrance, were then added<sup>42</sup>.

As with Lochmaben, the garrison at Dumfries came under regular attack from the Scots during the period 1300-1303 and suffered from the same lack of victuals and irregular wage payments. Nevertheless, it is clear that the construction of the pele now enabled an English garrison to remain constantly at Dumfries.

The first mention of a sheriff at Dumfries - as opposed to merely a constable of the castle - does not occur until 1304, when Sir Matthew Redmayne was described as such. Sir Matthew, an Englishman, does not seem to have been a very popular sheriff, and several complaints against him were addressed to the king in April 1304<sup>43</sup>. However, these complaints seem largely to have arisen from a reluctance to pay dues to any central authority, whether English or Scottish. It is clear that the people of the sheriffdom of Dumfries had avoided paying any dues in the previous years, because neither the English nor the Scots had wielded sufficient authority in the sheriffdom to extract them. The fact that Redmayne was English would also undoubtedly have contributed to his unpopularity and in the ordinances of 1305 Edward appointed Sir Richard Siward, lord of Tibbers, as sheriff of Dumfries. Although Siward had played a prominent role in the English administration of Scotland prior to 1305, at least he was a local man.

## TIBBERS

### Early history:

Tibbers, whose ruins lie near Drumlanrig castle, stands:

"at the northern extremity of a bold headland which rises abruptly from the level haugh on the south bank of the Barn Burn, near its confluence with the river Nith. The actual site is separated from the body of the headland by a partly artificial ravine and so forms an isolated mound, which in part also seems to be artificial."

The stone castle dates from the thirteenth century, but a motte and bailey construction had been built on the site perhaps a century earlier. The later castle seems to have been:

"a rectangular building, with circular towers at each corner. Its entrance gate has been placed hard up against one of the corner towers and an extra tower built on the other side of it as an additional defence."

This gate was apparently defended by an outer drawbridge, a portcullis and an iron gate.

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<sup>42</sup> *Lib. Quot.*, 81, 120, 1278, 139-42, 165, 167, 263, 267-9; E101/67/17; E101/357/22-3.

<sup>43</sup> See Chapter Sixteen, pp.375-67.

"The approach from the south was by means of a timber staging which stopped short of the gateway, leaving a space to be spanned by a lowered drawbridge. On the level ground to the south of the ravine and facing the entrance to the castle is a low mound of earth, which seems to suggest the position of the gateway on that side."<sup>44</sup>

### Tibbers during the first War of Independence:

Tibbers was a private residence, owned, in 1296, by Sir Richard Siward. Siward, although captured at Dunbar in that year, found favour with King Edward by accompanying him to Flanders in 1297<sup>45</sup>. He returned to Scotland in the following year and served Edward loyally thereafter, holding the position of warden of Nithsdale from April 1299<sup>46</sup>.

During his progress through the south-west, after Falkirk, the king stopped at Tibbers and viewed the construction of a stone 'house' being undertaken there by Sir Richard. This 'house' was erected upon the site of the older motte and bailey castle and the 'isolated mound' was the old motte in the description above<sup>47</sup>. Edward was so impressed with Siward's construction that the latter was ordered to see to improving the new pele at Lochmaben in November 1299<sup>48</sup>. It is clear, therefore, that the assertion that Edward I introduced stone castles to Scotland is sadly erroneous.

In 1302, Siward was granted £100 from the king "for the repair of his castle of Tybres"<sup>49</sup>, perhaps after an attack by the Scots, who had been very active in the area during the previous summer. In the ordinances of September 1305, Sir Richard was appointed sheriff of Dumfries and constable of the castle<sup>50</sup>, though he was still residing at Tibbers in 1306.

## DALSWINTON

### Early history:

The castle of Dalswinton has, unfortunately, entirely disappeared and thus the size and plan of the thirteenth century fortress cannot be described<sup>51</sup>.

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44 R.C. Reid, 'Tibbers Castle', *T.D.G.A.S.*, xxi, 213-5.

45 *C.D.S.*, ii, no.940; no.989.

46 See Chapter Four, p.95.

47 *R.C.A.H.M.S.*, (*Dumfries*), 65.

48 See above, p.287.

49 *C.D.S.*, ii, no.1307.

50 See above, p.291.

51 *MacGibbon and Ross*, i, 64.



### Dalswinton during the first War of Independence:

Dalswinton deserves only a brief mention under the title of Edwardian castles and garrisons, since, for most of the period 1296-1305, it remained in the hands of its Scottish owner, Sir John Comyn of Badenoch, and his son of the same name, after the latter's death in 1303.

During the campaign of 1301, when the prince of Wales was sent into the southwest, he achieved some success by capturing the royal castle of Ayr, the Carrick castle of Turnberry and the Comyn castle of Dalswinton. This last castle was then granted to Sir John Botetourt, who was in the prince's army. Botetourt's possession of the castle was probably short-lived, however. Only one wage account refers to Dalswinton, recording payment to four men-at-arms of Sir John Botetourt from 5 to 20 September 1302. However this payment was cancelled, suggesting that the English garrison did not even have time to enter the castle before it was recaptured by the Scots<sup>52</sup>. There are no further references to Dalswinton in the next four years, although presumably Sir John Comyn of Badenoch retained possession of it, after his submission, by the conditions agreed in February 1304<sup>53</sup>.

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52 Chapter Six, p.169.

53 Chapter Fifteen, p.338.

## CHAPTER TWELVE

**THE CENTRAL WEST:  
TURNBERRY, AYR, INVERKIP, DUMBARTON, BOTHWELL, CARSTAIRS  
and LANARK, KIRKINTILLOCH AND STIRLING**

**TURNBERRY****Early history:**

Turnberry castle is situated around fifteen miles south of Ayr and came into the hands of the Bruce family, along with the earldom of Carrick, in 1271. Though very little now remains, it was once a fortress of considerable size and strength. Strategically placed on a rocky promontory surrounded by the sea on three sides, the castle could be entered by means of a sea-gate. On the landward side, the entrance, of which the only remains is a portcullis groove, was protected by a broad ditch. The keep itself, which seems to have been d-shaped, stood on the summit of the promontory, some twenty metres north-east of the landward entrance. A large curtain-wall surrounded the castle<sup>1</sup>.

**Turnberry during the first War of Independence:**

Between 1296 and 1301, no mention is made of the Bruce castle at Turnberry in English records and we can, therefore, presume that it remained in the possession of the earl of Carrick throughout. However, at the beginning of September 1301, the king, at Bothwell, heard that Turnberry had been taken by his son, the prince of Wales. The castle was given to Sir Henry Percy, captain of the western march in 1296-7. However, by 3 October the Scots were besieging it with a large force. Since Turnberry fades from English records at this point, they presumably succeeded in capturing it<sup>2</sup>. In any event, since the earl of Carrick returned to Edward's peace a few months later, his castle was certainly restored to him under the terms of his submission agreement<sup>3</sup>.

**AYR****Early history:**

The castle at Ayr, which was built in 1197 on the orders of King William the Lion, was situated between the rivers Doon and Ayr. Unfortunately, the Cromwellian fort, constructed five hundred years later, has destroyed any surviving remains.

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<sup>1</sup> *The Archaeological Sites and Monuments of Scotland*, no.17, 26; MacGibbon and Ross, iii, 110-111.

<sup>2</sup> See Chapter Six, p.185.

<sup>3</sup> See Chapter Eleven, p.288.

Like so many of the early fortifications of the south-west, the new royal castle was intended to strengthen royal authority in the area. The lordship of Galloway, of which Carrick - and Ayr - was still a part, was semi-independent and its lord, Roland, was determined to keep it that way. The latter's position was considerably strengthened in 1196 when he inherited extensive lands in Tweeddale through his wife, Elena de Moreville.

In the very next year, King William determined to counter-balance Roland's power and detached Carrick from Galloway. He then created Roland's cousin, Donald, earl of Carrick, ordering the construction of the new castle at Ayr at the same time. In 1205 the town which had grown up around the castle was made a burgh and two years later Carrick was joined with Kyle and Cunningham to form the sheriffdom of Ayr. The first recorded sheriff was Reginald Crawford of Loudoun, whose descendant and namesake occupied the same office in 1296.

The castle in existence at the end of the thirteenth century was therefore the original wooden construction. It was replaced by stone in 1307<sup>4</sup>.

#### **Ayr during the first War of Independence:**

In September 1296 Sir Henry Percy was appointed warden of Galloway and of the sheriffdom of Ayr. Sir Reginald Crawford, a local man, had been occupying this last office since May 1296 and it is likely, since Percy undoubtedly required officials under him in order to administer the south-west, that Crawford remained as sheriff of Ayr after the former's appointment.

By mid-1297, however, two largely separate rebellions - one led by William Wallace and the other by the earl of Carrick, the bishop of Glasgow and the Steward - had erupted in the south-west. Though Sir Reginald, a Scot, seems to have remained loyal to King Edward<sup>5</sup>, the sheriffdom of Ayr was not controlled by any 'English' official by the end of that year. In 1298, Edward and his army did reach as far west as Ayr, where they found the castle in flames - supposedly the work of the earl of Carrick. Although English garrisons were established elsewhere in the south-west in that year, Scotland north of Nithsdale remained outwith Edward's control<sup>6</sup>.

Unlike so many Scottish sheriffdoms subject to the authority of the 'rebel' government during the period 1297 to 1303, there is some, admittedly circumstantial, evidence which suggests that the earl of Carrick held the office of sheriff of Ayr before his submission to Edward in 1302. The evidence is two-fold: firstly, as shown above, the earldom of Carrick was an intrinsic part of the sheriffdom, together with Kyle and Cunningham and thus, as the leading landowner in the area, he would have been an

<sup>4</sup> J. Strawhorn, *The History of Ayr, Royal Burgh and County Town*, 1, 5-7.

<sup>5</sup> C.D.S., ii, no.914, no.961.

<sup>6</sup> Chapter Two, p.60.

obvious candidate<sup>7</sup>; secondly, the earl was appointed as Edward's sheriff of Ayr from 1303 and 1305.

In any event, Ayr remained outwith the sphere of English influence until 1301, when Edward embarked on a second campaign to establish control over the whole of the south-west. However, the honour of subduing the sheriffdom fell to the prince of Wales, who re-established a garrison in Ayr castle in August of that year. Sir Montasini de Novelliano was appointed constable of the castle and Sir Edmund Hastings was made sheriff. However, this was just a temporary measure, since the keepership of the castle and sheriffdom was granted by the king to Patrick, earl of Dunbar, another pro-English Scot, who had not yet arrived in the west.

By October 1301, however, the Scots had embarked on a counter-attack. Turnberry was already under siege and those at Ayr wrote hastily to Edward, now at Dunipace near Stirling, requesting relief. The garrison survived the attack, perhaps because the man most likely to have led the Scots in attempting to recover an area of Scotland so closely associated with him - namely, the earl of Carrick - made his peace with Edward only a few months later. Earl Patrick continued to hold the keepership of the castle and sheriffdom of Ayr until 2 March 1303, when Carrick himself took over. By 25 April 1305, however, the latter was no longer holding that office and in the ordinances of September of that year, Sir Godfrey Ros - a local man - was named as sheriff of Ayr<sup>8</sup>. However, in 1306 Sir Robert Leybourne, who had been constable of Inverkip for the earl of Lincoln in 1304<sup>9</sup>, stated that he "is and has long been keeper of the king's castle of Ayr in Scotland, and constable and sheriff there"<sup>10</sup>, suggesting that Sir Godfrey did not take up this last office.

## **INVERKIP (and the lands of Strathgryfe)**

### **Early history:**

Inverkip and the lands of Strathgryfe formed part of the 'empire' of the High Steward of Scotland. David I had granted the majority of these lands to Walter fitz Alan, the first High Steward, later confirmed by Malcolm IV in 1161. This bulk of this grant to Walter "consisted of the lordships of Renfrew, Mearns, Strathgryfe (including the coastal strip to the west of Strathgryfe proper), and north Kyle ('Kyle Stewart')<sup>11</sup>.

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7 Though, of course, Carrick would probably have appointed his own officials to actually fulfill the duties of the office; there would undoubtedly have been a separate constable of Ayr castle [see below, p.296].

8 Chapter Seventeen, p.391.

9 C.D.S., ii, no.1519.

10 C.D.S., ii, no.1866.

11 G.W.S. Barrow and A. Royan, 'James Fifth Stewart of Scotland, 1260(?) - 1309', *Essays on the Nobility of Medieval Scotland*, 167.

Unfortunately nothing is known about the castle at Inverkip, unless the "old square tower of great antiquity", situated within the grounds of Ardgowan house, to the north of Inverkip itself, is part of, or stands on the site of, the early castle<sup>12</sup>.

#### **Inverkip and Strathgryfe during the first War of Independence:**

After the conquest of 1296, the lands of Strathgryfe remained in the hands of its owner, James, the fifth High Steward. The latter played an interesting, if rather dubious role, in the uprisings of 1297. He may have been one of the first to rebel, if a letter to Edward from Alexander MacDonald of Islay, probably written in April 1297, reporting that the Steward had seized the castle at Glassary, can be believed. However, in May of that year the latter was certainly one of the leaders of the 'aristocratic' rebellion which took place in the south-west. Thereafter he played a much cannier game, offering to negotiate between the English commander and Wallace and Murray at Stirling Bridge, until the victory of the latter encouraged him to join the 'rebels' openly once more. The Steward was almost certainly in the Scottish army at Falkirk, as a result of which his lands were granted to Sir Alexander Lindsay on 31 August 1298<sup>13</sup>.

By 1301, the Steward's lands of Renfrew and Strathgryfe had been granted to Henry, earl of Lincoln. Although the former had undoubtedly been able to maintain control of his lands until the campaign of 1301, which concentrated on the south-west north of Nithsdale, Lincoln certainly managed to install a baillie in the barony of Renfrew in that year. This baillie was John Marshall, one of the Steward's vassals. However, around September 1301, Marshall had to request aid from the king against an army of Scots under the Guardian, Sir John Soules, who "have entered Cunningham" and were threatening Strathgryfe<sup>14</sup>.

Inverkip was not in Lincoln's hands, however, although, in September 1301 also, he was imminently awaiting news of its capture. However, the king, whose original plan had been to rendezvous with the prince of Wales' army at Inverkip, had now moved east to Dunipace<sup>15</sup>.

By August 1303 Inverkip had at last fallen to an English expeditionary force led by Sir Aymer de Valence, lord of Bothwell and royal lieutenant south of the Forth<sup>16</sup>. Unfortunately it is not known who was occupying the castle for the Steward, who was currently in France. Sir Robert Leybourne then became constable there for earl Henry<sup>17</sup>. Fortunately for the latter, the Steward did not make his 'abject' submission until

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<sup>12</sup> *The Statistical Account of Scotland, 1791-1799*, vii, Lanarkshire and Renfrewshire, ed. D.J. Withrington & Ian R. Grant, 749.

<sup>13</sup> Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 306.

<sup>14</sup> C.D.S., ii, no.1121.

<sup>15</sup> See Chapter Six, p.180.

<sup>16</sup> See Chapter Eight, p.232.

<sup>17</sup> C.D.S., ii, no.1519.

November 1305 and thus Lincoln was able to hold on to his new lands for longer than most. He was then granted them back only a year later when James the Steward was forfeited again after the rebellion of Robert Bruce<sup>18</sup>.

## DUMBARTON

### Early history:

Standing at the confluence of the rivers Leven and Clyde, Dumbarton castle "formed the natural protection for the fords across the Clyde at Dumbuck and at the foot of the Clyde itself". The castle originally belonged to the earls of Lennox, at the centre of whose earldom it is situated, but by 1222 it had been appropriated by the crown: in July of that year, Alexander II founded a burgh 'at my castle at Dumbarton'.

The establishment of the sheriffdom of Dumbarton, for which Alexander required the castle, was again intended to strengthen the grip of royal government in the west. This sheriffdom was far larger than modern Dumbartonshire, encompassing several parishes currently in Stirlingshire. The first sheriff was William Bisset, and his successors included William, earl of Mar [1264-5], Walter, earl of Menteith [1271], Duncan, earl of Fife [1288] and James the Steward [1291]. These men of substance were presumably appointed to offset the authority of the earl of Lennox in the area<sup>19</sup>.

### Dumbarton during the first War of Independence:

In October 1296, Sir Alexander Leeds, an Englishman, was granted custody of the castle and sheriffdom of Dumbarton<sup>20</sup>. Shortly after the battle of Stirling Bridge, in September 1297, Dumbarton was in the hands of the Guardian, Sir William Wallace, since Sir Robert Ros, who was captured by the latter as part of the English garrison at Stirling, was sent to prison in Dumbarton castle "where he lay in irons and hunger". Dumbarton was apparently re-captured by Edward after the battle of Falkirk in the following year<sup>21</sup>, but there is no mention of an English garrison there up until 1304. The earl of Lennox, in whose earldom Dumbarton falls, is the most likely 'rebel' to whom control of both the castle and the sheriffdom fell during these years.

On 20 March 1304, Sir John Menteith was granted custody of the castle and sheriffdom of Dumbarton<sup>22</sup>. Menteith was a cousin of James the Steward, keeper of Dumbarton in both 1291 and 1296. Sir John's father, a younger son of Alexander, the

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18 G.W.S. Barrow & A. Royan, 'James Fifth Stewart of Scotland, 1260(?) - 1309', *Essays on the Nobility of Medieval Scotland*, 180.

19 I.M.M. MacPhail, *Dumbarton Castle*, 1, 9-12; John Irving, *Dumbarton Castle: Its place in the general history of Scotland*, 3, 6.

20 Chapter One, p.31.

21 C.D.S., iv, no.1835.

22 C.D.S., ii, no.1474.

fourth High Steward, had gained the title of earl of Menteith through his marriage to the heiress to the earldom. Sir John, another younger son, had therefore come to be known as Sir John of Menteith, or just Sir John Menteith. His place in history was earned, however, by the fact that Sir William Wallace was probably captured within the bounds of Menteith's sheriffdom<sup>23</sup>, though the suggestion that the ex-Guardian was imprisoned briefly in Dumbarton castle is mere speculation<sup>24</sup>.

In any event, Menteith remained in Edward's favour, presumably because of his association with the capture of Wallace. As well as being named as one of the twenty Scots to form the council of the new royal lieutenant of Scotland, Sir John of Brittany, he was also one of the few to retain custody of his sheriffdom under the ordinances of September 1305<sup>25</sup>.

## BOTHWELL

### Early history:

Bothwell, standing, like Dumbarton, on the Clyde, is the largest of the early stone castles in Scotland and one of the finest. It is situated on a rocky promontory, steep banks on the south and west descending to the Clyde. Deep and wide ditches defended the castle on the landward side. Resembling the great castles of France and England of this period, Bothwell "consists of a great courtyard or bailey, surrounded with high enclosing walls, strengthened at the corners with round and square towers, and provided with a great round donjon dominating the whole". Exclusive of towers, the castle was about 240 feet by 200 feet within the walls, making it larger than Kildrummy [185 feet by 160 feet], which follows a similar plan. It is likely, however, that little more than the great donjon was in existence at the outbreak of the Wars of Independence. Nevertheless, Bothwell was a castle of great strength.

The lordship of Bothwell was founded when David Olifard of Huntingdon was granted a fief by King Malcolm IV. In 1242 Walter de Moravia [Murray] received the lands of Bothwell, dating a charter from his castle there in 1278<sup>26</sup>.

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23 See Chapter Sixteen, p.383.

24 I.M.M. MacPhail, *Dumbarton Castle*, 16.

25 See Table 10.

26 S. Cruden, *The Scottish Castle*, 78; MacGibbon and Ross, i, 93; v, 235-7; W. Douglas Simpson, *Bothwell Castle, Official Guide*, 5.

### **Bothwell during the first War of Independence:**

In 1296 Bothwell belonged to Sir William Murray, known as 'the rich'<sup>27</sup>. Sir William, who lived in exile in England until his death in November 1300, was allowed to retain some of his lands in Scotland but Bothwell was taken into Edward's hands<sup>28</sup>. The English constable was Stephen Brampton and, after the outbreak of revolt, he and his garrison were subjected to a Scottish siege. The castle held out for fourteen months, probably until some time in 1300. During this siege most of the garrison died:

"except himself [Brampton] and those with him who were taken by famine and by assault, and more he was kept in 'dure prison' in Scotland for three years"<sup>29</sup>.

Thus even the strongest of Scottish stone castles, of which Bothwell was undoubtedly one, were vulnerable to the persistence of the 'rebels'.

In September 1301, while the prince of Wales was occupied in capturing Ayr, Turnberry and Dalswinton, Edward took his army to besiege Bothwell, granted to Sir Aymer de Valence, 'in advance', the previous month. The siege took just over two weeks. Valence then garrisoned the castle with thirty men-at-arms of his own retinue.

After the collapse of the patriotic government in February 1304, it might be expected that Bothwell was returned to the heir of Sir William Murray. That heir was, in fact, Andrew Murray, the six-year old son of Wallace's fellow Guardian. His minority was therefore sufficient reason for the continuing presence of Sir Aymer de Valence and his garrison at Bothwell.

### **CARSTAIRS and LANARK**

#### **Early history:**

In the thirteenth century, the lands of Carstairs belonged to the bishops of Glasgow. There had been a manor there from an early date, but, shortly after the death of King Alexander III, Robert Wishart decided to build a castle. However, Edward I, in his capacity as Lord Paramount of Scotland, took the bishop to task for constructing such a building without his permission, but, on 15 July 1292, he granted Wishart permission to complete it.

This new castle was constructed in stone and lime. It was thus a fortress of greater strength than that at Lanark, the centre of the sheriffdom, five miles further west. The Castle Hill at Lanark, on the south-west side of the town, was a natural mound, "artificially scaped to provide additional defence in conjunction with a surrounding ditch". It was thus a typical early Scottish castle, presumably based around an earth and

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27 *C.D.S.*, ii, p.124.

28 See Chapter One, p.31.

29 *C.D.S.*, ii, no.1867.



timber palisade. The inadequacy of its defences, compared with Carstairs, undoubtedly prompted Edward to establish his garrison in this last castle, rather than, as one writer claims, because "Lanark was always against English rule"<sup>30</sup>.

### Carstairs and Lanark during the first War of Independence:

Though there is no record of the appointment of a sheriff of Lanark in 1296, later events - and tradition - establish that William Hesilrig occupied the office in that year. His term in office was short: around May 1297 he was murdered by William Wallace<sup>31</sup>, an action which gave the latter little choice but to continue with the task of ridding Scotland of the English.

Since the south-west beyond the sheriffdom of Dumfries remained largely outwith Edward's control until 1301, there is no reference to any English official at Lanark until that year. By 21 September 1301, however, Sir Walter Burghdon, a Scot, was installed at Carstairs with thirty men-at-arms and eighty archers to keep the sheriffdom of Lanark<sup>32</sup>. Burghdon remained as sheriff for at least another year but by 30 December 1303 the earl of Carrick had been appointed to that office<sup>33</sup>. It is not clear whether he was also given command of Carstairs, although there was certainly a garrison there until 31 October 1304<sup>34</sup>. However, an inquest held under Carrick's authority as sheriff took place at Lanark<sup>35</sup>, so the town does not seem to have lost all its status as the centre of the sheriffdom. In the ordinance of September 1305, Sir Henry Sinclair was named as sheriff of Lanark<sup>36</sup>. The bishop of Glasgow was presumably given back his castle of Carstairs after his submission in May 1304<sup>37</sup>.

## KIRKINTILLOCH

### Early history:

A Roman peel, located at the junction of the Luggie and the Kelvin, was taken over by the Comyns as the site of their castle at Kirkintilloch. It seems to have been a typical motte, with a high mound and a deep ditch, probably dating from the early half of the twelfth century<sup>38</sup>.

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30 J.A. Wilson, *A Contribution to the History of Lanarkshire*, i, 208; ii, 196; A. Simpson and S. Stevenson, *Historic Lanark: The archaeological implications of development*, 4, 29.

31 C.D.S., ii, no.1597; *Fordun*, i, 328; *Bower*, ii, 170, *Scalacronica*, 123.

32 See Chapter Six, p.187.

33 E101/10/15; C.D.S., ii, no.1420.

34 E101/13/34, m.11.

35 C.D.S., ii, no.1420.

36 See **Table 10**.

37 Palgrave, *Documents*, i, 345-6.

38 *Kirkintilloch by select contributors*, ed. J. Horne, 26, 30, 33.

### Kirkintilloch during the first War of Independence:

As a private castle, Kirkintilloch remained in the hands of Sir John Comyn of Badenoch, its owner, in 1296<sup>39</sup>. The castle appears in English records in 1301, when a garrison under Sir William Francis was established there at some point during Edward's campaign in and around Glasgow<sup>40</sup>. Since there is no reference to Kirkintilloch during the campaign itself, there is no indication as to whether the castle succumbed to a siege or Edward only now decided that it was worthwhile installing a garrison. Kirkintilloch had, in fact, been granted to Sir Hugh Despenser at an unknown date during the previous four years, although he is unlikely to have spent much time there, except perhaps when he was in Scotland on campaign with the king.

The fundamental nature of the castle's structure naturally entailed that some building work was called for. In September 1302, four carpenters and four masons were added to the garrison to repair the gate and the drawbridge. One of the carpenters working on the pele at Linlithgow was sent to take charge of these works. Between 1 September 1302 and 31 July 1303, the constable, Sir William Francis, was paid £37 for the repair of the buildings, gates and ditches and 'new making the peel'<sup>41</sup>. Lodgings for Kirkintilloch's owner, Sir Hugh Despenser, were constructed at the same time<sup>42</sup>.

The last reference to a garrison at Kirkintilloch occurs on 6 May 1304<sup>43</sup>. The castle was presumably restored to Sir John Comyn of Badenoch soon thereafter, according to the terms of the submission agreement of February 1304<sup>44</sup>.

## STIRLING

### Early history:

The burgh of Stirling was created by David I about 1124, around the same time as the sheriffdom. The settlement which undoubtedly already existed there had probably grown up because of "the proximity of Stirling Rock to an important river-crossing". In earlier times, the land immediately above the town widened into "what must formerly have been a great wilderness of moss, with no practicable crossing but the one by the Fords of Frew.." <sup>45</sup>. The western route was hemmed in between the Flanders Moss and the mountainous region to the north.

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39 This ownership is inferred from the grant to Sir Malcolm Fleming by King Robert I of the barony of Kirkintilloch "que fuit quondam Johannis Comyn militis" - presumably the John Comyn killed by Bruce at Dumfries in 1306 [R.M.S., 1306-1424, no.80].

40 E101/9/16, m.1 (dorso).

41 *The King's Works*, i, 416.

42 E101/9/13, m.4.

43 E101/12/20.

44 See Chapter Fifteen, p.338.

45 R.C.A.H.M.S., (*Stirlingshire*), i, 15; *Fife Court Bk.*, Appendix D, 350.

"Travellers, and more particularly armies, even when coming from or bound for places in the west, must generally have preferred, when possible, to make for the eastern crossing. Thus Stirling, with its bridge and castle, has always possessed outstanding strategic importance, as guarding the routes not only from north to south, but also from east to west"<sup>46</sup>.

The suitability of the Castle Rock as a defensive site is obvious. The castle is first mentioned during the reign of Alexander I, who dedicated a chapel there. Unfortunately, later work has obscured all traces of the buildings in existence in the thirteenth century<sup>47</sup>.

### **Stirling during the first War of Independence:**

On 8 September 1296, Sir Richard Waldegrave was appointed keeper of the castle and sheriffdom of Stirling. On the outbreak of rebellion in 1297, the castle remained in English hands. However, at the battle of Stirling Bridge, Sir Richard and most of his garrison were killed and Sir William fitz Warin, lately Edward's keeper of Urquhart, Sir Marmaduke Tweng and Sir Robert Ros were ordered by Surrey, the lieutenant, to 'throw themselves' into the castle to save it from the Scots. Stirling was only granted a temporary reprieve, however; a few months later they "had to surrender it from want of victuals" to Sir William Wallace, whereupon the three knights were imprisoned in Dumbarton castle<sup>48</sup>.

Stirling's strategic importance meant that Edward could not allow it to remain in Scottish hands for long and, thus, by 26 July 1298, only four days after the battle of Falkirk, he and his army had arrived before the castle. The Scottish garrison surrendered between then and 8 August, when the English army departed. The castle was put in charge of John Sampson, constable of Scarborough, until 3 October 1297<sup>49</sup>.

However, the Scots were also well aware of the advantages of holding Stirling and they were attacking the supply line to the new garrison even before Edward had left Scotland in 1298. The situation had become so difficult by late November 1298 that an expedition was organised by the south-eastern garrisons to relieve Stirling, though there is no evidence that this expedition ever took place<sup>50</sup>.

By April 1299 a Scottish army, led by Sir Herbert Morham, was besieging Stirling in earnest, although a truce was agreed between the two forces around that time. In August 1299, Sampson lost a horse during a skirmish between the English garrison

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46 *R.C.A.H.M.S., (Stirlingshire), i, 4.*

47 *R.C.A.H.M.S., (Stirlingshire), i, 179.*

48 *C.D.S., iv, no.1835 (3).*

49 *C.D.S., ii, no.1949.*

50 See Chapter Three, pp.84-5.

and the Scots, "when William Wallace came to take away our supplies". In December of the same year, a clerk and three valets from the garrison managed to get to the king at York "to reassure him of the state of the garrison". The clerk then returned to Stirling, having received victuals for the castle at Berwick. However, only a month later, he was back in York to inform Edward of the surrender of Stirling to the Scots. Sampson and his men arrived at Berwick on 18 January 1300<sup>51</sup>. There is some suggestion that the castle was, in fact, betrayed by a member of the garrison, a suggestion that tallies with the fact that supplies seem to have got through shortly before its surrender<sup>52</sup>.

The Scottish sheriff of Stirling at the time of the surrender of the English garrison was Gilbert Malherbe, a local landowner. He may have taken on custody of the castle, but at some unknown point between 1300 and 1304, Sir William Oliphant was appointed as its keeper, and probably sheriff also. Certainly, one John Caribre, a Scot, petitioned Edward in 1305 to be resealed in 10 marks worth of revenue from the farms of Stirling, "from which farms he was disseised by William Oliphant, though he was at the king's peace"<sup>53</sup>. He was, of course, disseised because he was at the king's peace and Oliphant was clearly able to exert his authority, on behalf of the Guardians, from the castle.

In 1301, after a campaign centred around Glasgow, Edward made an attempt to recapture the castle, or at least to examine the possibility of a siege, taking his army to Dunipace, just south of Stirling, in October of that year. It was far too late in the campaigning season, however, and he soon withdrew to Linlithgow<sup>54</sup>. In 1303 Edward determinedly ignored Stirling, campaigning instead in the north-east. The army traversed the Forth by means of a specially-constructed pontoon bridge, thereby avoiding any confrontation with the Scottish garrison controlling the river further upstream<sup>55</sup>.

Having secured the submission of the majority of the 'rebels' in February 1304, Edward turned his attention on Stirling, the only castle still in Scottish hands. The army arrived before the castle in April. The Scottish commander, Sir William Oliphant, requested that he be allowed to contact Sir John Soules, the Guardian, for permission to surrender the castle, but since Soules was currently in France, this request was clearly impractical. The siege then began and for three months the Scots endured a battering from every conceivable type of siege equipment before surrendering on 24 July. The new keeper of the castle and sheriffdom was William Biset, a Scot who had served in Edward's garrisons since 1298<sup>56</sup>. He was allowed to retain this office under the ordinance of September 1305<sup>57</sup>.

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51 See Chapter Four, p.118.

52 See Chapter Four, p.118.

53 *Memo. de Parl.*, no.396.

54 See Chapter Six, p.183.

55 See Chapter Eight, p.227.

56 See Chapter Eight, p.236.

57 See Table 10.

## CHAPTER THIRTEEN

**THE CENTRAL EAST:  
LINLITHGOW, EDINBURGH, LUFFNESS, DIRLETON, DUNBAR,  
HAILES and YESTER**

**LINLITHGOW****Early history:**

On the south side of Linlithgow loch, on top of an old Roman site, stood the parish church of St. Michael and the royal manor. This was "a convenient and secure position for habitation", on a promontory which rises "sharply from the landward side and more steeply from the water"<sup>1</sup>. The sheriffdom of Linlithgow dates from around 1159, but a 'castle' - better described as a manor house - existed from the reign of David I<sup>2</sup>.

**Linlithgow during the first War of Independence:**

When Edward I set up his administration of Scotland after the conquest of 1296, he allowed Linlithgow to maintain its traditional status as part of the sheriffdom of the three Lothians, together with Edinburgh and Haddington<sup>3</sup>. However, the royal manor there was clearly neither of sufficient size nor defensive capacity to warrant being garrisoned with English troops.

With the outbreak of revolt in 1297, the English were expelled from every Scottish fortification with the exception of the castles of Edinburgh, Roxburgh and Berwick. Although the English grip on the south-east was comparatively strong, it was by no means total and in the following years the south-eastern garrisons were concerned to consolidate and extend their authority. This process was accelerated by the removal of Sir Simon Fraser from the office of keeper of Selkirk Forest by June 1301. The Scottish threat from the Forest was thus largely neutralised, leading to the installation of an English sheriff at Peebles in 1301 and an English garrison in a new castle at Selkirk in 1302<sup>4</sup>.

With similar successes in the south-west, Edward could now claim to control Scotland from the east coast to the west coast. However, the English garrisons in the central Lowlands were still rather thin on the ground: indeed there was no English-held castle between Edinburgh and Carstairs, the centre of the sheriffdom of Lanark, nearly thirty miles to the south-west. In the autumn of 1301, Edward decided to remedy this

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<sup>1</sup> R.C.A.H.M.S., (*Midlothian and West Lothian*), 214.

<sup>2</sup> A.T. Simpson and S. Stevenson, *Historic Linlithgow: the archaeological implications of development*, 1.

<sup>3</sup> See Chapter One, p.31.

<sup>4</sup> See Chapter Fourteen, p.324; pp.321-2.

situation by placing a garrison at Linlithgow, where he and his army spent the following winter.

However, the existing accommodation in the royal manor house was unsuitable for the king of England and eighty-one diggers and ninety-nine carpenters began work there on 12 November 1301, though Edward himself had arrived there in late October. Cementars, scythers and coverers were also involved in making the 'king's chambers' up till 28 November. The town's defences were ordered to be strengthened with various kinds of crossbows, quarrels and bolts sent up from England.

A garrison numbering eighty-five men-at-arms (lacking twelve) and 100 footsoldiers "to work on the said castle" was supposedly in residence at Linlithgow at some point during regnal year 29 [20 November 1300 - 19 November 1301], although it is likely that there was not, as yet, sufficient accommodation to house them all adequately<sup>5</sup>.

The new constable of Linlithgow was Sir William Felton, recently the constable at Beaumaris, one of Edward's new Welsh castles<sup>6</sup>. The sheriff, whose authority was now completely separate from that of the sheriff of Edinburgh, was to be a Scot, Sir Archibald Livingston. Ten of the men-at-arms in the garrison were to be under his command for keeping the sheriffdom<sup>7</sup>.

On 12 February 1302, while the king was at Roxburgh, en route south, a detailed ordinance was set down for building works to be begun at Linlithgow. Edward had had plenty of time over the winter to work out his plans for the pele to be constructed around the existing manor house. Sir John Kingston, the sheriff of Edinburgh, and Sir Archibald Livingston, the sheriff of Linlithgow, were appointed "overseers and ordainers" of the building of a 'forcelette'. A clerk, Henry Brandeston, was appointed to pay the wages of those involved in the building work and each sheriff was to provide a clerk to act as keeper of the counter roll. The master carpenters were to be Master Thomas Houghton, who had previously resided at Edinburgh, and Master Adam Glasham, who had worked on Edward's first pele in Scotland at Lochmaben. The sheriff of York was to send as many carpenters, masons and diggers as were required by Sir John and Sir Archibald and the sheriffs of Edinburgh, Linlithgow, Stirling<sup>8</sup> and Lanark were all to provide carts and wagons. Lastly, as a measure of the importance, and, indeed, the scale, of the works envisaged at Linlithgow, the king sent for the man who had been the architect of the great Edwardian castles in Wales, Master James de St. George<sup>9</sup>. Both Master James and Master Thomas Houghton had been involved with the works at Beaumaris, where Felton

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<sup>5</sup> See Chapter Six, p.188.

<sup>6</sup> S. Cruden, *The Scottish Castle*, 70.

<sup>7</sup> See Chapter Six, p.188.

<sup>8</sup> Sir Archibald Livingston was also sheriff of Stirling, in name at least, prior to the capture of Stirling castle from the Scots in 1304 [C.D.S., ii, no.1457].

<sup>9</sup> E101/68/1, m.23.

had been constable<sup>10</sup>. These building works at Linlithgow were clearly intended to raise the status of the existing structure to that of a castle.

Master James had arrived in Scotland by the end of April 1302 and on 23 May an indenture giving exact details of the works to be undertaken was issued. It was intended that a ditch was to go right round the castle, as deep and wide as possible so that water from the loch could flow through it. A stone gate and two stone towers were originally planned, but the king changed his mind - presumably because of financial constraints - and "would have the gates and towers of timber and the peel itself to be built of untrimmed logs". The tower of the adjacent church of St. Michael and the church itself were also to be reinforced. Finally, another 'good defensible ditch' was to be made behind the castle, beyond a ridge near the lake, from one end of the pele to the other, to protect the new construction from an attack by water. Another palisade was to be constructed on top of the ridge<sup>11</sup>. Progress was swift. By 14 September 1302, it was reported that there was "nothing to do here, except fourteen perches [75 yards] of 'pele' and six brattices".<sup>12</sup>

Despite the detailed ordinances of February 1302, payments to those working at Linlithgow were soon badly in arrears. In 1303, when the king was planning works at Dunfermline, the Linlithgow workers categorically refused to be sent there, because they were owed so much<sup>13</sup>.

The actual dimensions of this Edwardian pele are unclear today, but:

"it probably included the high ground upon which the present Palace ruins and parish church are situated ..... the upper limit of the pele defences may be assumed to have run to the south approximately along the line now occupied by the main entrance to the castle erected by James V in c.1535. On either side of this gateway may be traced provisions for the gaffs of a drawbridge indicating the presence of a ditch in front"<sup>14</sup>.

A petition addressed to the king by the prior and convent of St. Andrews in 1305 shows that the parish church, which belonged to the petitioners, had been incorporated into the new castle. They requested a chapel and its adjacent land in the town itself in exchange for the appropriated church of St. Michael<sup>15</sup>.

Relations between the two master carpenters, Master Adam Glasham and Master Thomas Houghton, were seemingly far from amicable. In October 1302, while the pele was still under construction, the latter was involved in a court-case concerning the

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10 A.J. Taylor, 'Thomas de Houghton', *The Antiquaries Journal*, xxx, 31.

11 A.J. Taylor, 'Master James of St. George', *E.H.R.*, lxxv, 449-50; *The King's Works*, i, 413.

12 *C.D.S.*, ii, no.1324.

13 *C.D.S.*, ii, no.1412.

14 A.T. Simpson and S. Stevenson, *Historic Linlithgow: the archaeological implications of development*, 26-7.

15 *Memo. de Parl.*, no.284.

alleged theft by Glasham of a plumb-line belonging to one Christina of Edinburgh, for whom Houghton stood as surety. The eventual outcome of the case is, unfortunately, not known<sup>16</sup>

As with Lochmaben, the new pele did not have long to wait before its defences were put to the test. Early in 1303, the Scottish army launched an offensive in the south-east. Having captured the newly-built pele at Selkirk, the Scots turned their attention on Linlithgow. Master James's work was not in vain, however, and the castle remained secure<sup>17</sup>. More damage was caused by the weather, a year later. A total of £4 9s.10d. was paid to various carpenters and other workmen "for mending a certain part of the pele and the ditch broken by a great tempest of wind there" between 15 January and 15 February 1304<sup>18</sup>.

In the ordinances of October 1305, the three sheriffdoms of Lothian - Edinburgh, Linlithgow and Haddington - were once more united under one sheriff, Sir Ivo Aldeburgh. Aldeburgh, an Englishman, had served Edward in the garrison of Roxburgh garrison since at least 1298<sup>19</sup>.

## EDINBURGH

### Early history:

Though there has been a castle on the Maiden Rock from very early times, none of those buildings in existence there during the Edwardian period have survived, due to the very thorough dismantling operations ordered by King Robert I.

One of the most important consequences of Edward's conquest of Scotland in 1296, so far as Edinburgh was concerned, was the designation of Berwick as the English 'capital' of Scotland. Edinburgh, a major royal residence since the late eleventh century, was now neither an important centre of the English administration nor the Scottish one, and its castle, once the royal treasury and depository of the Scottish crown jewels and state papers, was relegated merely to that of another English garrison.

### Edinburgh during the first War of Independence:

In 1296, as we have seen, Edward permitted the traditional format of the sheriffdom of the three Lothians - Edinburgh, Haddington and Linlithgow - to continue.

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16 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 394-7; A.J. Taylor, 'Thomas de Houghton', *The Antiquaries Journal*, xxx, 30.

17 See Chapter Eight, p.223.

18 C.D.S., iv, p.459.

19 See Table 11.



An Englishman, Sir Walter Huntercumbe, was appointed to the office of sheriff and keeper of the Maiden castle at Edinburgh<sup>20</sup>.

During the following year of unrest, when William Wallace and his army succeeded in recapturing most castles in English hands, Edinburgh castle appears to have escaped the attentions of the Scots. No doubt the strength of its natural defences dissuaded Wallace from attempting a siege. Unlike Stirling, which occupied a similarly impregnable position, and which did fall to the Guardian, Edinburgh was close enough to Berwick and other strongly English-held castles in the south-east to at least give the impression that an attack was futile.

In September 1298, Sir John Kingston, a knight of the English treasurer, Walter Langton, was appointed sheriff of Edinburgh and constable of the castle<sup>21</sup>. Although the south-east was now the only part of Scotland which could be said to be held by the English, the authority wielded by Edward's officers there was restricted to the area immediately surrounding each English-held castle. Thus Haddington and Linlithgow are no longer mentioned in conjunction with the sheriffdom of Edinburgh.

Although Edinburgh castle had escaped attack by the Scots in 1297, it was not so fortunate in 1299. In a letter to the king written in August of that year, Kingston related that 'rebels' were finding shelter in his sheriffdom and, more worryingly, the following curious incident. It appears that Sir Simon Fraser, the keeper of Selkirk Forest, whose loyalty to Edward was questioned elsewhere in this letter, had requested Kingston to come to him with members of his garrison to deal with a Scottish force expected in the Forest. Though Sir John initially refused to comply with this request, he eventually left for Selkirk, whereat the Scottish army arrived before Edinburgh castle instead. The remaining garrison managed to get rid of the Scots, but an English knight, Sir Thomas Arderne, was captured during the fighting<sup>22</sup>.

Certainly Stirling castle probably fell to the Scots because of the treachery of one of the English garrison<sup>23</sup> and it is quite likely that the 'rebels' attempted to reduce castles, especially large and well-defended ones, by less traditional, and more underhand, methods. The Scots were far less equipped than King Edward for sieges, since not only did they have far fewer and less sophisticated pieces of siege machinery, but they could rarely spend much time in front of an English-held castle in safety in the south-east.

Minor building works at Edinburgh were intended as early as 1298, when it was ordered that the garrison should include five carpenters, three smiths and two masons under the charge of Master Thomas Houghton. Sixteen masons, who were also crossbowmen, later joined the garrison under Walter Caversham. In 1300, "brattices were

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20 See Chapter One, p.31.

21 See Chapter Three, p.80.

22 See Chapter Four, p.99.

23 See Chapter FOUR, p.118.

built, a fallen wall repaired and the king's chapel decorated, all at a cost of only £8 4d."<sup>24</sup>. The lack of major building works attests, once again, to the strength of the defences of the existing castle.

Having successfully resisted the Scots in 1299, Kingston and his men appear to have been left alone to get on with the business of running the sheriffdom in the following years. Given that Edinburgh and the surrounding area experienced comparatively little trouble between the English and the Scots, it is perhaps no surprise to discover that Sir John Kingston was the only English sheriff who made an individual account with the English exchequer for the issues of his sheriffdom from regnal year 28 [20 November 1299 - 19 November 1300] onwards. Other sheriffs did raise certain issues in that year also, but they appear as part of the account of the receiver in the south-east, sir John Weston. Kingston's account was extremely detailed and shows that, by 1301, he was able to enforce his authority for raising revenue as far as Haddington, over all kinds of people and institutions within his sheriffdom<sup>25</sup>.

Despite this degree of control, Edinburgh was not immune to Scottish attacks. In 1302 there is a veiled, and incredible, suggestion that Edinburgh castle itself was captured by the Scots. Certainly the houses of one William Bartholomew in the town of Edinburgh were burned by the Scots at an unspecified date, which may have been during an attack in 1302<sup>26</sup>. The Scottish army, under the Guardian, Sir John Comyn, and Sir Simon Fraser, was also active in the Edinburgh area early in 1303, ambushing an English force sent from Berwick at Roslyn, only eight miles from Edinburgh castle<sup>27</sup>.

There is some confusion in English records at this time, as to who was in charge at Edinburgh. On 2 February 1303 Sir John Kingston received payment for himself and his retinue of ten men-at-arms. However, on 15 July of that same year, Sir Ebulo Mountz, who had been a member of the garrison there since 1300<sup>28</sup>, was named as constable. Nevertheless, Kingston received payment for himself and his retinue for the period 2 February to 24 April 1304 and on 6 May he was again described as constable<sup>29</sup>. Sir Ebulo, on the other hand, was described as both sheriff and keeper in 1304<sup>30</sup>. There can be no doubt that both resided in Edinburgh castle during 1303 and 1304 and it seems likely that Mountz was keeper, and therefore sheriff, while Kingston's authority as constable was restricted to the castle itself. Given that the latter had served Edward continuously, and very effectively, since 1298, this change in his status is most likely to have come from Sir John himself. Perhaps he requested to be relieved of some of his

24 *The King's Works*, i, 409.

25 See Chapter Five, p.155; Chapter Six, pp.189-90.

26 See Chapter Seven, p.299-1.

27 See Chapter Eight, pp.223-5.

28 E101/9/25, m.5.

29 E101/11/20, m.21; E101/12/20.

30 E101/11/20, m.32; E101/13/36 part 2, m.126.

responsibilities, while not wishing to give up office at Edinburgh altogether. In any event, he certainly had not lost Edward's trust since he was named as one of the Guardians of Scotland, until the arrival of the royal lieutenant, John of Brittany, on 16 February 1306<sup>31</sup>.

According to the ordinances of 1305, the sheriffdom of the three Lothians was once more to be resurrected. Although most sheriffs in 1305 were to be Scots, an exception was made of the south-east, and Sir Ivo Aldeburgh, an Englishman who had resided in the garrison of Roxburgh castle since 1298, was appointed sheriff of Edinburgh, Haddington and Linlithgow<sup>32</sup>.

## LUFFNESS

### Early history:

The original fortification is now occupied by a mansion house and thus nothing can be ascertained about the early castle there. However, it certainly occupied an important strategic site, commanding the bay of Aberlady<sup>33</sup>.

### Luffness during the first War of Independence:

In 1296 John Bigerton held the castle of Luffness *in capite* from Robert Pinkeny, who owned the tenement of Ballencrieff. Pinkeny was dead by October 1296, when an inquest found that his heir was his brother, Sir Henry Pinkeny<sup>34</sup>.

Sir Henry was granted the castle of Luffness at some point in the following decade since he petitioned the king, again at an unspecified date, but probably not before 1303:

"... in respect of the heavy expenses incurred by him in fitting up Luffenoke [Luffness] castle for the king, who gave it to him, he may have the said castle, or allowance elsewhere ..."

The king ordered the chamberlain to inquire into these expenses, but stipulated that "Sir Ebulo Mountz is not to be removed from the custody"<sup>35</sup>. The castle had thus been taken into the king's hands after 1296 and held either by Sir Henry himself or Sir Ebulo, who was part of the Edinburgh garrison from 1300 onwards. Pinkeny was also a member of the Edinburgh garrison, in 1301 and 1302, but he left on 15 February 1302 with his two esquires, leaving three others behind 'to draw out his service'. By 22 September of the same year, he was to be found in the garrison at Kirkintilloch<sup>36</sup>.

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31 See Chapter Seventeen, p.394.

32 See Table 10.

33 MacGibbon and Ross, iv, 87.

34 C.D.S., ii, no.857.

35 C.D.S., ii, no.1968.

36 C.D.S., v, no.305.

Even if Luffness was not a castle of any great size or strength, it was clearly important to Edward that someone should hold it for him to prevent the Scots from using the coast at Aberlady in any attack on English shipping in the Forth or to allow these English ships to harbour there in bad weather.

## DIRLETON

### Early history:

Dirleton in east Lothian, together with two other castles of similar characteristics - Bothwell and Kildrummy - serve as proof that stone castles of 'elaborate design' and 'beautiful architecture' existed in Scotland before the Wars of Independence.

The lands of Dirleton and Gullane were given to the Vaux family around the middle of the twelfth century and their castle of Dirleton [castellum de Dyrleton] was mentioned first c.1225. Its founder was, therefore, probably Sir John Vaux, steward of Alexander II's queen, Marie de Coucy. This thirteenth-century castle has been described as follows:

"... at the south-west corner ... there stood a composite structure in the form of a cluster of towers grouped round a small central close, and communicating with the main castle court through a trance. This clustered complex comprised four towers. The central, large round one contained the lord's hall ... The whole of this clustered complex must be regarded as a composite donjon, containing the private suite of the lord and his *familia* or household ... On the west and north sides of the main courtyard a curtain wall ... ran round the castle rock. At the north-east corner was a round tower, bold and large. From this, the curtain ran south to join the south-east tower, of equal size. In this east curtain was a side-gate, defended by a portcullis. Along this side, between the two towers, with a straight frontage of some 60 feet, we may imagine the great hall of the castle to have stood."

### In addition:

".. the outline of the rock which forms the site naturally defines the shape and extent of the fortress. This rock is not high, but stands clear above the general level, while the deep moat sunk around it added considerably to its elevation, and the rocky nature of the foundations rendered the walls safe against the operations of the miner".

From the evidence of the neighbouring stone castles of Yester and Hailes, it has been concluded that Dirleton "was not many years old when in 1298 it was called upon to face the famous siege by Bishop Bek"<sup>37</sup>.

#### **Dirleton during the first War of Independence:**

Dirleton, as a private castle, is not mentioned in 1296, remaining in the hands of Sir John Vaux, its owner. Vaux died in 1300, a consistent supporter of King Edward. However, his castle of Dirleton was clearly in the hands of 'rebels' by 1298, when Edward detached a force from the main army under Bishop Bek to reduce it. Due to a lack of supplies and siege-equipment, Bek failed on the first attempt. However, by 15 July, the castle was in English hands<sup>38</sup>.

Sir Robert Maudley now became the new lord of Dirleton, holding it for Edward. In the summer of 1299, he and his retinue spent three months in the garrison of Berwick town, receiving payment in the form of provisioning for Dirleton<sup>39</sup>. It is not possible to establish whether Dirleton itself was garrisoned during these three months since the castle does not usually feature in royal records, being a private establishment. However, by 1301, the castle was so lacking in supplies that Sir Robert was again allowed to purchase victuals from the royal store at Berwick<sup>40</sup>. Dirleton then disappears completely from English records.

## **DUNBAR**

### **Its history:**

Dunbar castle occupies an exposed site on the north of the town. It stands eighty feet above the sea, cut off almost entirely from the mainland.

"On the east a large freestanding mass, naturally cleft, is made continuous by masonry and on this the castle proper stood; an isolated and precipitous rock twenty-five yards to the south-east is surmounted by a great battery and united to the castle by a massive screen wall of masonry containing a mural passage giving communication between these portions".

The ruins standing today do not quite represent the castle besieged by the English army in 1296. Nevertheless, its strategic importance, as "the most convenient landing on the coast beyond Berwick", remains unchanged.

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37 W. Douglas Simpson, 'The Thirteenth Century Castle of Dirleton, *S.H.R.*, xxvii, 48-56; *R.C.A.H.M.S.*, (*East Lothian*), 21; MacGibbon and Ross, i, 115-6.

38 See Chapter Three, p.73.

39 See Chapter Four, p.117.

40 See Chapter Six, p.189.

Dunbar was held by the earls of the same name, who were also described as the earls of March because of their landholdings in the sheriffdoms immediately north and south of the border. The earl in 1296, Patrick of Dunbar, a consistent and loyal supporter of the English king, was appointed captain of the eastern march, and, later, sheriff of Ayr, under Edward. His castle of Dunbar was, therefore, effectively English-held and, as a private castle, does not generally appear in royal records, with the exception of a grant of £200 to provide money and victuals for the garrison there in 1300<sup>41</sup>.

## HAILES

### Its history:

Hailes belonged to the Hepburns from an early period. The castle is situated on a rocky outcrop, a position further strengthened on the west by a small ravine through which runs a small burn, flowing into the Tyne. It was a fortification of some size - 240 feet long by 90 feet wide. The general plan is similar to Bothwell, but with a square, rather than round, keep<sup>42</sup>.

Though it does not feature by name during the first Edwardian occupation, the fact that Hailes is without doubt a thirteenth century castle suggests that it was one of the three castles taken by Bishop Bek in 1298, the other two being Dirleton, and probably Yester. All three castles are situated within ten miles of each other. If this conjecture is correct, then Hailes was presumably granted by Edward to one of his supporters and therefore avoided entering the records by being maintained entirely privately.

## YESTER

### Early history:

Yester belonged to the Gifford family from the reign of David I. The castle itself, constructed by Hugh Gifford who died in 1267, stands on a promontory formed at the junction of the Hopes water and another, smaller burn. On the third, landward side, a great fosse - about fifty feet wide and twenty feet deep - defends the site, which is therefore triangular in shape.

The castle was entered, via a bridge over the small burn, through the south wall of the enceinte, which seems to have been defended by two towers. The most famous feature of Yester is, however, the Goblin Ha', a subterranean cavern supposedly constructed by magic. This cavern, situated immediately outside the north wall of the

<sup>41</sup> *R.C.A.H.M.S., (East Lothian), 25.*

<sup>42</sup> *MacGibbon and Ross, i, 122-6; R.C.A.H.M.S., (East Lothian), 92.*

castle, was entered by means of a flight of steps, defended by three sets of doorways. It is 37 feet long by 13 feet wide, and divided into two stories.

"Possibly this chamber served several purposes. It has clearly been intended for a military post, where soldiers might assemble and from which they might sally out by [a secret door]. It might also be used for secretly introducing reinforcements and provisions."

Such a chamber, although unusual in Scotland, could be found in both early French and English castles<sup>43</sup>.

#### **Yester during the first War of Independence:**

In September 1296, Yester was granted to Peter Dunwich, Edward's escheator south of the Forth, despite the fact that there is no obvious reason why John Gifford, its owner, should have been deprived of his castle<sup>44</sup>. Dunwich did not occupy Yester for long: it almost certainly fell into rebel hands in the following year, whereafter it was probably one of two other castles captured by Bishop Bek along with Dirleton in 1298.

The new lord of Yester was Sir Adam Welle. He and his castle appear only twice in English records in the following five years: in November 1302, two of his men were ordered to ride with Sir John Kingston, whenever the latter commanded; in 1303, six crossbowmen were sent to Yester for twelve days from 18th July, perhaps as a precautionary measure against Scottish activities<sup>45</sup>.

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43 MacGibbon and Ross, i, 116-121; R.C.A.H.M.S., (East Lothian), xxiii, 145-6.

44 See Chapter One, p.34.

45 C.D.S., v, no.305.

## CHAPTER FOURTEEN

**THE SOUTH-EAST: ROXBURGH, JEDBURGH, SELKIRK  
CASTLE and FOREST, PEEBLES,  
HERMITAGE and LIDDEL,  
BERWICK**

**ROXBURGH****Early history:**

The ancient and important medieval burgh of Roxburgh was already established by 1120.

"From the first it was an enclosed and defensible place, occupying Kay Brae, the high west end of the lozenge-shaped haugh at the confluence of Tweed and Teviot, and it thus stood immediately north-east of the royal castle of Roxburgh .... Unlike some other burghs, Roxburgh soon became both prosperous and populous, its position on the Tweed beside the lowest bridge above Berwick ... marking it out as a convenient entrepot for the rising trade in hides and wool."<sup>1</sup>

Marchmount, the castle at Roxburgh, was the strongest fortress on the whole Border during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, though little remains today. The site is bounded on two sides by the rivers Teviot and Tweed and on the north side by a great ditch, averaging twelve feet in depth. The castle itself sits on a kaim almost eighty feet high, with a roughly triangular summit. Approach from the east was defended by a foretower protected by another ditch in front.

"At the west end of the position, a gully, which separated the mount from the ridge ending in the Gallows Knowe, has been extended, deepened and provided with a rampart on its counterscarp. Where this re-entrant dies out on the bank of the Teviot, the remains of an old dam, or "cauld", span the river ... The early castle was an enclosure containing, among other buildings, the church of St. John. Both castle and church come on record in a charter granted by David I about 1128. The only other building of importance existing at this time was the tower, or donjon."<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> R.C.A.H.M.S., (*Roxburghshire*), i, 252.

<sup>2</sup> R.C.A.H.M.S., (*Roxburghshire*), ii, 407-8.



### Roxburgh during the first War of Independence:

In September 1296, Sir Robert Hastings was appointed as keeper of the castle and sheriffdom of Roxburgh, a post he was to hold for almost ten years<sup>3</sup>. After the outbreak of rebellion, the castle was besieged by Wallace and his army during the winter of 1297/8. It did not fall due to the approach of an English army under the lieutenant, Surrey, in February 1298<sup>4</sup>.

After Edward himself had brought an army to Scotland the following summer and defeated the Scots at Falkirk, he returned to the south-east later in the year to reorganise the garrisons there. Roxburgh's garrison seems to have been extremely small - and therefore vulnerable - before this reorganisation. For example, the archers may only have numbered twelve<sup>5</sup>. As a precautionary measure against further Scottish attacks, it was arranged in June 1299 that 100 footsoldiers from the large Berwick garrison should be sent to Roxburgh, should the need arise. The security of the castle's defences was also suspect and Hastings began the construction of a wall, probably of timber<sup>6</sup>.

These measures seem to have been effective: when the Scots' army arrived in the south-east in August 1299, intending to besiege Roxburgh, their leaders changed their minds on hearing that the town was guarded so well "... that they could make no exploit without great loss of their troops"<sup>7</sup>.

In the following years, the main area of interest for both the Scots and the English was the south-west. The south-eastern garrisons were not inactive, however, making expeditions against the Scots in Selkirk Forest from time to time<sup>8</sup>. However, Hastings himself had good reason not to feel complacent: in December 1301 he and another knight from the Roxburgh garrison were captured near the castle. Although Sir Robert was released a few months later, after producing his brother Nicholas as a hostage, the experience must undoubtedly have brought home to both the sheriff and his garrison just how precarious a position all Edward's permanent troops in Scotland occupied<sup>9</sup>.

Nevertheless, there is evidence to show that Hastings, as sheriff, was able to enforce his authority within his bailiwick. In September 1302, a dispute arose between Sir Robert and Sir Hugh Audley, keeper of Selkirk Forest, over the disposal of a group of thieves and their goods, whom both English officials had been involved in catching. Both

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<sup>3</sup> See Chapter One, p.28.

<sup>4</sup> See Chapter Two, p.59.

<sup>5</sup> See Chapter Three, p.80.

<sup>6</sup> See Chapter Four, n.13.

<sup>7</sup> See Chapter Four, p.101.

<sup>8</sup> For example, see Chapter Five, p.127.

<sup>9</sup> See Chapter Six, p.186.

men petitioned the king and Hastings' petition reveals that the latter had already indicted these thieves before him as sheriff of Roxburgh. He was concerned, if these malefactors were not returned to his prison, that "... he will find no man in the country willing to obey him after his authority has been defied", suggesting that he had had some success in making his authority effective<sup>10</sup>.

There are few specific references to Hastings and his men in the years 1303-5. Sir Robert eventually left Roxburgh in 1305, when the castle and sheriffdom was placed under the jurisdiction of John of Brittany, the new lieutenant<sup>11</sup>

## JEDBURGH

### Early history:

By the year 854 two settlements had been formed on the river Jed by bishop Ecgred of Lindisfarne. Both were called 'Gedwearde' but by the reign of David I the Jedburgh which was to become a burgh by 1165 was distinguished from its neighbour by the phrase "ubi castellum est".

"... by the middle of the twelfth century, this little villa was already hemmed in on the south-east by the abbey, while on the south it was dominated by the castle, which stood on the high ground at what is now the head of Castlegate".

According to an author writing earlier in this century, this castle, whose remains are no longer visible, "had a great tower and a lesser tower between which was a granary, houses, stables and other buildings". The mention of a drawbridge suggests that a moat formed part of its defences<sup>12</sup>.

### Jedburgh during the first War of Independence:

In September 1296 Sir Hugh Elaund was appointed keeper of Jedburgh castle and Selkirk Forest<sup>13</sup>. Like Roxburgh, Jedburgh castle came under attack from the Scots late in the following year, but, unlike Roxburgh, it fell. Its retention in Scottish hands was a thorn in the side of the south-eastern garrisons under English control and thus King Edward, returning east after the Falkirk campaign, headed straight for Jedburgh. The siege was over by 18 October 1298. The new English constable was named as Sir

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10 See Chapter Seven, pp.214-5.

11 See Chapter Seventeen, p.391.

12 A.T. Simpson and S. Stevenson, *Historic Jedburgh: the archaeological implications of development*, 2, 9-10; *R.C.A.H.M.S., (Roxburghshire)*, i., 210.

13 See Chapter One, p.31.

Richard Hastangs, brother of the sheriff of Roxburgh<sup>14</sup>. John Pencaitland, the Scottish constable and a Lothian man, was given a grant of 100s. for his service to the English king in delivering Jedburgh to him, and went off to continue that service in the garrison at Berwick<sup>15</sup>.

Sir Richard was not a popular constable. He reportedly ransacked Jedburgh abbey to such an extent that it was uninhabitable in 1300. Certainly he removed the lead from the church roofs, presumably for the engines in Jedburgh castle<sup>16</sup>. At an unknown date, probably before 1300, Hastangs petitioned the king, saying that "he cannot keep his castle of Jedburgh without the forest of the same place". The abbot of Jedburgh and Sir Ivo Aldeburgh, a member of the Roxburgh garrison in 1298<sup>17</sup>, volunteered "to undertake the custody of the castle by a sufficient bachelor, partly at the charges of the king and partly at our own". They also offered to repair the houses in the castle, suggesting that they were not in a very good state<sup>18</sup>.

At some point after 1300<sup>19</sup>, the Jedburgh Forest was still a bone of contention between the above parties. Edward had apparently ruled that the forest was to be maintained by the abbot and Sir Ivo as 'farmers of our lord king', but the latter claimed that "the said constable of Jedburgh has still disturbed the said farmers as before"<sup>20</sup>. The dispute had still not been settled by 1305, when the abbot and convent of Jedburgh again petitioned the king, "seeking remedy for certain crimes committed on them by Sir Richard Hastangs and his accomplices". Sir John Segrave was ordered to investigate<sup>21</sup>. This kind of dispute was perhaps not unusual between royal officials and members of the local community, but if the king's word was ignored by his own men, the Scots were unlikely to have a high opinion of his authority.

Despite having fallen to the Scots in 1297, no measures appear to have been taken to improve Jedburgh's defences. However, the castle does not seem to have experienced any particular trouble in the following years. The garrison took part in expeditions to Selkirk Forest, as well as contributing, on occasions, to the royal army, but otherwise there is no evidence for problems from 'rebel' activity. In 1305, like Roxburgh, Jedburgh was placed under the jurisdiction of the new lieutenant, John of Brittany.

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14 The keepership of Selkirk Forest was by now a separate office.

15 See Chapter Three, p.79.

16 *R.C.A.H.M.S., (Roxburghshire), i, 194.*

17 *C.D.S., ii, no.1007.*

18 *Stevenson, Documents, ii, 264.*

19 Since Sir John de St. John was mentioned in the petition, it must have been sent after the latter's appointment in January 1300.

20 *Stevenson, Documents, ii, 265.*

21 *Memo. de Parl., no.300.*

## SELKIRK CASTLE and FOREST

### Early history:

The modern county of Selkirkshire at one time formed part of a large area of royal demesne based around a royal manor at Selkirk itself. In the twelfth century, it was made a royal "forest", thereby placing it under a separate administration in order to preserve it as a royal hunting-ground. This "forest", described as "the forest of Selkirk", "the forest of Selkirk, Ettrick and Traquair" or just "the Forest", was eventually known as "Ettrick Forest". Though initially outwith the jurisdiction of the sheriff of Selkirk, by the late thirteenth century it was increasingly identified with that sheriffdom.

The first reference to a castle in the area occurs as early as 1120, in the foundation charter of Selkirk Abbey. The royal burgh of Selkirk, situated below the junction of the rivers Ettrick and Yarrow, grew up around the castle at an unidentifiable point before 1366. The latter was a favourite royal residence of the early kings of Scots - William the Lion issued at least twenty-seven charters from the castle<sup>22</sup>.

### Selkirk during the first War of Independence:

In 1296, Selkirk Forest was placed under the jurisdiction of the constable of Jedburgh castle<sup>23</sup>. The inadequacies of the castle's defences - suggesting that it was undoubtedly constructed of earth and timber - meant that it was not garrisoned with English troops until 1301.

Selkirk Forest was an ideal haven for the 'rebels'. Indeed one of the contingents of the Scottish army which suffered the heaviest casualties at Falkirk was a group of archers from the Forest under Sir John Stewart of Jedburgh, brother of the High Steward.

Despite its association with the 'rebels', Edward appointed a keeper of Selkirk Forest, separate from the office of constable of Jedburgh, in 1297. This was Sir Simon Fraser of Oliver, whose family had been keepers of the Forest in the past. Although captured and imprisoned after the battle of Dunbar, Fraser had earned Edward's favour in Flanders and his appointment presumably came soon after his return to Scotland after that campaign<sup>24</sup>.

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22 R.C.A.H.M.S., (*Selkirkshire*), 4, 11; A.T. Simpson and S. Stevenson, *Historic Selkirk: the archaeological implications of development*, 1, 4.

23 See Chapter One, p.30.

24 See Chapter Three, p.79.

Edward's faith was not well-placed, however. In 1299, a letter from Sir John Kingston, the sheriff of Edinburgh, makes it clear that Fraser was, at best, allowing the Scots to harbour in the Forest; at worst, conspiring with the 'rebels' to try to bring about the fall of the garrison at Edinburgh castle<sup>25</sup>.

Despite these indications of his pro-Scottish leanings, Fraser was not removed from office, and, indeed, was captured by the Scots in 1300 - perhaps to provide a cover for his activities. He had been released by 31 July of that year, but Edward was presumably now convinced of Sir Simon's true loyalties since Sir Hugh Audley was appointed keeper of the Forest by June 1301. Sir Simon soon left Edward's service and had joined the Scots by September 1301<sup>26</sup>.

Now that Fraser had been removed from control of Selkirk Forest, the Scots no longer found it so easy to find refuge there. However, Edward went further than merely providing a loyal keeper; he also ordered the construction of a pele at Selkirk, in order to make the castle worth garrisoning. An earthwork located in the grounds of a Georgian mansion house on the outskirts of the town is all that remains of both the early castle and the Edwardian pele.

"The mound is about 238 feet by 185 feet and is about 40 feet high, except at the north end, where a round motte rises 16 feet 6 inches higher. On the north and east a ditch may be seen, although it is much overgrown, and this probably extended to the loch on the south; it averages 40 feet in width by 3 feet in depth. On the west side of the mound there is trace of a ditch but it has been much interfered with".

The tower of both the original castle and the pele was placed on the summit of the mound, which has a diameter of 40 feet<sup>27</sup>.

As with Linlithgow, the king set out his plans for Selkirk on 12 February 1302. Sir Alexander Balliol and Sir Robert Hastings were to oversee the work and William Rue was to be the clerk responsible for paying wages and 'attendant expenses'. Balliol and Hastings were each to provide a clerk to act as keeper of the counter-roll. Master Reginald the engineer, who was usually at Berwick, and Master Stephen of Northampton were appointed as master carpenters. The sheriff of Northumberland was ordered to send carpenters, diggers and masons for the work and sufficient carriage for transporting the 'necessary materials'. Balliol and Hastings were also to provide workmen and carriage<sup>28</sup>.

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25 See Chapter Four, pp.98-9.

26 Chapter Six, p.172.

27 *R.C.A.H.M.S., (Selkirkshire)*, 4, 46; A.T. Simpson and S. Stevenson, *Historic Selkirk: the archaeological implications of development*, 1, 4-5.

28 *C.D.S.*, ii, no.1288.

By September the work was not quite completed:

"The tower of the fortress of Selkirk is finished, except the roof, from default of 'plunk' [?planking]; a postern is made out of the same to the west, faced with stone; a drawbridge and portcullis, with a good brattice above; the stone work of said bridge is half finished. And fourteen perches [75 yards] of 'pele' have been completed from one part of the tower to the other. There are forty-three perches [237 yards] of 'pele' yet to make. The stone work of the main gate of the fortress is raised above ground to the drawbridge".

These figures suggest that the new structure covered about a couple of acres in area, at a total cost of £1372 13s.10d.<sup>29</sup>. The Scots may have attacked the pele while building work was in operation: on 6 June 1301, Sir Robert Hastings, as "keeper of our works at Selkirk", was paid 100 marks for making an expedition 'without delay'<sup>30</sup>.

Even before the new castle had begun construction, a garrison under Sir Alexander Balliol of Cavers, a local landowner, had been formed<sup>31</sup>. On 12 February 1302, the same day as the indenture for the building works was sealed, an agreement was made with Sir Alexander "to guard Selkirk forest" as well<sup>32</sup>.

Although the Forest was now far less of a threat to the south-eastern English garrisons, the Scots themselves were still a problem. In January 1303, despite the fact that an English force was massing at Berwick, prepared to ride against an expected Scottish attack in the south-east, Selkirk fell to the 'rebel' army. Orders for the arrest of Sir Alexander Balliol were issued immediately - although there is no suggestion of double-dealing on the part of *this* keeper of Selkirk Forest. However, he was allowed to continue in office, finally receiving a pardon for his 'crime' in 1305<sup>33</sup>.

In the ordinances of 1305, Selkirk returned to its traditional status as a heritable sheriffdom. Isabella Synton, whose brother had been the last heritable sheriff, petitioned the king successfully for the restoration of the office to her family<sup>34</sup>.

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29 C.D.S., ii, no.1324, pp.339-40; R.C.A.H.M.S., (*Selkirkshire*), 48.

30 E159/75, m.7.

31 E101/9/16, m.1.

32 E101/68/1, m.24.

33 See Chapter Eight, p.223.

34 See Chapter Sixteen, p.368.

## PEEBLES

### Early history:

The royal castle at Peebles, and its adjacent burgh, are first on record in the middle of the twelfth century. As with Selkirk, much of the present county of Peebles formed part of the extensive royal demesne once covered by Ettrick Forest. There was also a royal manor-house at Traquair and the jurisdiction of the earliest sheriff of the district covered the neighbourhood of both royal residences: the sheriffdom was known by both names.

Peebles high street runs straight to the site of the castle - most likely a timber and earth motte - at the junction of the river Tweed and Eddleston Water.

"We can imagine a palisaded enclosure, including the present site of Tweedside Mill and the parish church, bounded on the south by the Tweed, on the north by Eddleston or Peebles water, on the west by both streams, and extending for some distance along the line of the present High Street. Outside of the enclosure on the east were the dwellings of the burgesses and the town's market. Inside, there would probably be several buildings suitable for the accommodation of the king and his garrison, and there was also the chapel which David I bestowed on the abbey of Kelso."<sup>35</sup>

### Peebles during the first War of Independence:

There is no reference to the appointment of a sheriff at Peebles in 1296, perhaps because, like Selkirk, Edward did not consider that the existing castle was suitable. Also like Selkirk, the sheriffdom of Peebles remained outwith English control until 1301. This was again a result of the fact that Selkirk Forest, which extended into Peeblesshire, was used by the 'rebels' as a base until that year. The first mention of Peebles makes it clear that, despite being so close to the English garrisons at Roxburgh and Jedburgh, it was within 'the Scottish zone'. In August 1299, the Scottish leaders held a meeting there which is more famous for the violent argument between the two Guardians, Comyn and Bruce, than for the fact that among the decisions taken at this meeting was the appointment of a sheriff of Roxburgh and a keeper of Selkirk Forest for the Scots.

The next reference to Peebles occurs two years later, when Edward himself stayed there in July and August 1301. This signified the beginning of the push to bring the

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<sup>35</sup> R.C.A.H.M.S., (*Peeblesshire*), i, 6; R. Gourelay and A. Turner, *Historic Peebles: the archaeological implications of development*, 8; *A History of Peeblesshire*, ed. J.W. Buchan, i, 56; ii, 6.

sheriffdoms of Selkirk and Peebles firmly under English control<sup>36</sup>. On 13 August 1301 Sir William Durham was named as sheriff, with a retinue of eight men-at-arms<sup>37</sup>. This number had been reduced to four by 1 September<sup>38</sup>, making it hard to imagine that the sheriff occupied the castle. If he did, he resided in the original buildings since there are no references to construction works at Peebles.

Given that Durham had a maximum of only eight men to enforce his authority, it is no surprise to find that Sir Hugh Audley, keeper of Selkirk Forest, informed the king that the sheriffdom of Peebles was still not well-guarded in September 1301. Although it can be said, for the first time, in 1301, that the English held the south-east, the Scots were still able to harass the area, presumably using a restricted area of the Forest as a base<sup>39</sup>.

The last reference to Sir William Durham as sheriff occurs in November 1302<sup>40</sup>. By 1304, Robert Hastings, presumably a relative of the constables of Roxburgh and Jedburgh, was collecting the issues of the sheriffdom and, in the ordinances of September 1305, he was named as sheriff of Peebles<sup>41</sup>.

## HERMITAGE and LIDDEL

### Early history:

Liddel castle was the caput of the barony of Liddesdale, granted to Ralph Soules by David I. The castle is situated on a bluff which extends northwards "and falls steeply to a level haugh in a loop of Liddel Water". The church of St. Martin next to the castle was granted by Soules to Jedburgh Abbey at some point before 1156, while the adjoining *villa* of Castleton is first mentioned in 1220. Little remains of the castle today, other than its impressive earthworks.

Hermitage castle has been described as the "most perfect of the mediaeval castles on the Scottish border". Situated on the left bank of Hermitage Water "in a remote moorland valley", it was not protected, like so many of the Scottish castles described in these chapters, by the impregnability of its natural surroundings. However, broken and marshy ground formed a sufficient barrier against invaders, together with the sturdiness of the castle's walls.

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36 See Chapter Six, p.169.

37 E101/9/15 (dorso).

38 E101/9/13, m.1.

39 For example in 1303, immediately prior to Ròslyn.

40 E101/364/13, m.46.

41 See Table 10.



The present castle may stand on the original site, with traces of the original stonework perhaps still remaining in parts of the north and south walls. It was probably built by Sir Nicholas Soules, lord of Liddesdale, around the same time as Caerlaverock, causing similar consternation to King Henry II<sup>42</sup>. Hermitage was given the added appellation of 'Soules' to distinguish it from another castle of the same name in Northumberland<sup>43</sup>.

### **Hermitage and Liddel during the first War of Independence:**

At the close of the thirteenth century, the castles of Hermitage-Soules and Liddel - and, indeed, the whole of Liddesdale - were in the active possession of Sir John Wake, due to the forfeiture of the Soules family, who were extremely active on the patriotic side. Sir John was dead by 7 July 1300 and, presumably because of the minority of his heir, the castles of Hermitage and Liddel were given to Sir Simon Lindsay, Edward's captain in Eskdale since 1298. The issues of the surrounding lands were to be used to "provide supplies for himself and his men in our service in the parts of Scotland". Lindsay was also granted supplies from the Berwick store in 1300<sup>44</sup>.

The lands of Liddesdale should have belonged to William Soules, who also owned the barony of Urquhart. Since William was still a minor in 1304, when the Scottish 'rebels' received their lands back, Sir Simon presumably continued in possession of them<sup>45</sup>.

## **BERWICK**

### **Defensive improvements:**

Before 1296:

"Berwick had been one of the most successful Scottish ports, a 'second Alexandria'. It exported the produce of Tweeddale, including wool and grain, the customs dues in 1286 amounting to £2190. There was scarcely an abbey in Scotland that had not property in Berwick. There was a colony of Flemings in their Red Hall and trade links with Norway."<sup>46</sup>

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42 G.W.S. Barrow, 'The army of Alexander III's Scotland', *Scotland in the Reign of Alexander III, 1249-1286*, ed. N. Reid, 132.

43 R.C.A.H.M.S., (Roxburghshire), i, 75-6, 82, 85.

44 See Tables 6.1-2, 7.1.

45 See Chapter Sixteen, p.347.

46 *Northern Petitions, Berwick, Cumbria and Durham*, ed. C.M. Fraser, vol. 144, 7.

Although its commercial supremacy may have been broken, the town took on even greater political importance after the conquest of 1296. Edward's immediate concern - even before the outset of deliberations with English burgesses to restructure the town - was the inadequacy of Berwick's defences. Immediately after its capture in March 1296, ditchers, carpenters, masons and smiths were ordered to be sent there from Northumberland. A ditch - supposedly 80 feet wide and 40 feet deep - was constructed on the north side of the town, crowned, on its completion, by a tall timber palisade. A stone wall was, in fact, intended to replace the wooden structure, but, according to Guisborough, due to the thriftiness of the treasurer, sir Hugh Cressingham, this was never put into effect. The chronicler condemned this as a dangerous false economy<sup>47</sup>.

In the following year, 1297-8, various building works appear in the accounts of sir Walter Amersham, the chancellor. £122 was spent on "making the bridge of Berwick castle"<sup>48</sup>, a stone wall beneath le Snok, a wall between the castle and the river Tweed, Surrey's sally-port [*porta exitus*] and engines within the castle. William Romeyn was named as the clerk of these works. In addition, among the more minor works, a ditch and a gateway were constructed 'towards the Magdalen house' and a brattice beneath the castle<sup>49</sup>.

This brattice was made under the direction of Master Reginald the engineer, who resided at Berwick as part of the garrison, having charge of the engines. He also became a burgess of the town<sup>50</sup>. Master Reginald had been the King's Engineer since 1272-3, accompanying Edward into North Wales a few years later. Together with Master James de St. George, he was in charge of building the castles of Flint and Rhuddlan, and was also perhaps one of the principal architects at Conway. Despite residing at Berwick from 1299, Master Reginald continued to supervise the upkeep of the new Welsh castles<sup>51</sup>.

With regard to Berwick, in 1300-1 he was engaged in work on the king's chamber in the castle and "in the following year he was one of two burgesses assigned to repair the palisade and ditch round the town and to make the new stone wall and the new gate of the town above the castle". The wooden palisade thus appears to have been replaced slowly with a stone wall, as was the original intention.

Though the outline of the castle can be ascertained from the Tudor plans, it is not possible to gauge the strength of the mediaeval fortifications. However, one account

47 *The King's Works*, i, 563; *Guisborough*, 294.

48 The original bridge was perhaps damaged or destroyed during the capture of the town in the previous year.

49 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 160-1.

50 *The King's Works*, i, 564.

51 J. Harvey, *English Mediaeval Architects*, 178-80.

states that it was constructed "so low under the town so that, if the town by any means be against the castle, the said castle can no ways hurt or danger the town, and the town greatly hurt and danger the castle". Despite this disparaging description, Wallace and his men, who managed to capture the town in the winter of 1297/8, failed to capture the castle from the English.

The castle was most vulnerable at its main entrance, which was on the town side. In 1303, Sir John Segrave, the royal lieutenant in Lothian and keeper of the castle, ordered sir Richard Bremesgrave, the keeper of the royal store at Berwick, to undertake the completion of "a stone brattice begun at the outer gate of the castle". These various works "suggest an Edwardian origin for the elaborate defences which are known to have protected the main entrance to the castle in later times".<sup>52</sup>

### Planning Berwick town:

Having set out his plans to improve the town's defences after the conquest of 1296, Edward next turned his attention on how best 'to devise, order and array' Berwick in its new role as the centre of the English administration of Scotland. The English king was already well-qualified to enter into such a town-planning exercise. As well as the many and varied foundations in Wales, Edward had been responsible for the establishment of the English town of Kingston-upon-Hull in the 1290's. The lapsing of the lordship of Holderness (part of the earldom of Albemarle) to the Crown had enabled him to choose a site for a port easily accessible to York. Edward's interest in Scotland after 1290 was no doubt an important factor leading to Hull's establishment as a free borough in 1299.

Berwick's strategic and commercial importance - based on her peninsular site between the Tweed and the sea - had already made the town one of the most prosperous in Scotland. It had been a burgh for almost two centuries, with provosts, burgesses and a common seal by 1212. An annual feu of 500 marks was probably agreed between the burgh and Alexander II in 1235<sup>53</sup>. Edward, however, clearly believed that there was potential for much improvement.

"This involved the displacement of the Scottish population and the assignment of their homes to English settlers, to attract whom a new constitution was clearly necessary"<sup>54</sup>.

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<sup>52</sup> *The King's Works*, i, 564-566.

<sup>51</sup> A.A.M. Duncan, *The Making of the Kingdom*, 465, 494-6.

<sup>54</sup> *The Collected Papers of Thomas Frederick Tout*, iii, 79-80. 84-5.

Accordingly, various representatives from England's major towns were summoned to a general parliament to be held at Bury St. Edmunds from 3 November 1296. In fact, those originally summoned did not form the consultative body which met at that parliament. Fresh writs were sent out in September to other towns: London, for example, was to choose "four wise men of the most knowing and most sufficient to know best how to devise, order and array a new town to the most profit of the king and of the merchants". Twenty-three other cities and boroughs were each to elect two representatives with similar qualifications.

However, little seems to have been achieved at Bury St. Edmunds and a new group of advisors was ordered to meet with the king on 2 January 1297 "at whatsoever place in England he might then happen to be"<sup>55</sup>. It was only at this point that Edward intimated that Berwick-upon-Tweed was the object of his attention. Tout states that "the transparent veil of secrecy" was adopted merely for its own sake. However, the English king might also have been aware that his enthusiasm for transforming this Scottish town might not have been shared by his subjects. Certainly he now dropped the idea of elected representatives and sent writs to his own nominees.

"By this device he at least procured the services of some experts, for he summoned Henry le Waleys, the sometime joint-planner of Winchelsea, now again Mayor of London, and Thomas Alard, warden of Winchelsea for life and its leading citizen".

However, this assembly was equally unproductive, despite Edward's promise that he would not keep the delegates from their homes any longer than necessary. A third set of summonses called for nominees from certain north-eastern towns to meet at Berwick itself in April 1297. This assembly seems to have managed to arrange for a number of Englishmen to be resettled in Berwick, but little was done to change the actual plan of the town<sup>56</sup>. Other issues of greater urgency occupied Edward's mind for the next five years and thus only Berwick's military and defensive needs were attended to during that period.

### **The Berwick garrisons:**

In 1296, command of Berwick was given to Osbert Spaldington, a royal clerk. The castle was presumably occupied not only by Spaldington, but by the officials comprising the Scottish government - Surrey, the lieutenant (during the brief periods

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55 *Parl. Writs*, i, 49-50; 'Medieval Town-planning', *The Collected Works of Thomas Frederick Tout*, iii, 85.

56 'Medieval Town-planning', *The Collected Works of Thomas Frederick Tout*, iii, 85-6.

when he was resident in Scotland), Amersham, the chancellor and Cressingham, the treasurer, together with their staff.

During the Scottish counter-conquest, Berwick town fell to Wallace's army, but the castle held out until Surrey's army arrived to relieve it in March 1298<sup>57</sup>. Although this army disbanded soon after, its leaders were clearly concerned about the state of the defences of Berwick in particular, and the south-east in general, since the earls of Surrey, Norfolk, Gloucester, Hereford and Angus remained in the town with their retinues. Even when these earls were summoned to a parliament at York, immediately prior to the Falkirk campaign, they were ordered to leave sufficient numbers behind to protect the town<sup>58</sup>. Earl Patrick of Dunbar was appointed captain of the Berwick town garrison on 28 May 1298<sup>59</sup>.

After Falkirk, the king returned to the south-east to reorganise the garrisons there. Though few men were ordered to reside in Berwick castle, a small standing army, numbering sixty men-at-arms and 1000 footsoldiers, was established in the town<sup>60</sup>. The constable of the castle seems to have been both Sir John Poitou and Sir Hugh Audley in this year, serving under Sir John Burdon as keeper of the castle and sheriffdom. On 19 November 1298, earl Patrick was promoted from captain of the Berwick town garrison to captain of 'all fortifications and troops in the eastern march'<sup>61</sup>.

In 1299, there was still concern over the town's security. Orders were given that the defences were to be checked for weaknesses and the troops inspected to make sure that they were 'sufficient'. On 25 May of that year, Sir William Latimer replaced earl Patrick as captain of the eastern garrisons, while Sir Robert fitz Roger took up the position of keeper of the march around the same time. Both men were presumably based at Berwick. On 25 December 1299, Sir Robert was described as keeper and governor of Northumberland and the garrisons at Berwick and Wark, thus combining his own office with that held by Latimer. Sir Walter Teye occupied a position of unspecified authority in the town over Sir Philip Vernay, who had command of the Berwick town garrison. Teye himself was appointed keeper of Berwick town on 30 June 1300 and in September 1300 Sir William Latimer replaced Sir Robert fitz Roger as warden of the march and captain of the eastern garrisons. Latimer, as warden of the march, organised an expedition against

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57 See Chapter Two, p.59.

58 See Chapter Three, p.68.

59 C.P.R., 1292-1301, 351.

60 See Chapter Three, p.81.

61 See Chapter Three, p.81.

the Scots in Selkirk Forest in October 1300. Sir John Burdon remained unconfusingly as constable of the castle and sheriff of Berwick<sup>62</sup>.

There seems to be a degree of overlapping in the above offices, together with varying job titles which undoubtedly described the same job. The reality was probably a small group of men doing their best to make the most of the vulnerable position in which the south-eastern garrisons still found themselves, irrespective of what office they actually held. However, the warden of the march was always the most senior official.

In September 1301 a most extraordinary incident occurred at Berwick, proving that Edward and his officials in Scotland did not only have to worry about the state of their defences to prevent the disintegration of the English garrisons. As a result of the late arrival of £200 required for the payment of the wages of the Berwick town garrison, a mutiny broke out among the footsoldiers. Sir Ralph Manton, Edward's cofferer, who was primarily responsible for such wage payments, was at Berwick and, together with Sir Walter Teye, the keeper of the town garrison, he organised the men-at-arms to mount guard, provided that the money arrived within two days. Fortunately, the £200 arrived the next day and order was restored, but the seriousness of this incident was undoubtedly reflected in the king's frantic letters to the exchequer at York, demanding more and more funds to prevent both his army *and* his garrisons from deserting<sup>63</sup>.

On 5 August 1302 Sir John Segrave was appointed keeper of Berwick castle, although Sir John Burdon remained as constable and sheriff. Segrave's duties included organising expeditions against the Scots<sup>64</sup>. Thus, when the 'rebels' were discovered to be heading for the south-east at the beginning of 1303, Segrave organised a small army, divided into three groups, to meet them. However, as his own force rode north, it was ambushed by the Scots at Roslyn. Sir John and many of his retinue were captured, but one of the other squadrons managed to rescue them later.

During the summer of 1303, Sir Aymer de Valence occupied the office of royal lieutenant south of the Forth, and remained at Berwick with other members of the king's council to organise the defence of the south against the Scots. Valence then took an army westwards, reaching Inverkip by the end of August<sup>65</sup>. Segrave, who had accompanied the king through the north-east, returned to Berwick as royal lieutenant south of the Forth, occupying that office until 1 August 1305. In the ordinance of September 1305,

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62 See Chapter Four, pp.95, 108, 116; Chapter Five, p.127.

63 See Chapter Six, pp.177-8, 180-4.

64 See Chapter Seven, p.204.

65 See Chapter Eight, p.232.

custody of Berwick castle was granted to the chamberlain of Scotland, sir John Sandale. Sandale was also to nominate the sheriff of Berwick<sup>66</sup>.

### 1302 - further town-planning:

The truce of Asnières of January 1302 was perhaps indirectly responsible for the finalisation of the town-planning exercise which had been begun at Berwick in 1296, since the king was not so occupied with the direct prosecution of the Scottish war during the truce. The new English burgesses in the town were, in fact, responsible for reviving Edward's interest in Berwick.

On 4 July 1302 the king ordered an inquest to be held "to inquire by what services a burgage and four 'places' are held by Nicholas Carlisle, the king's serjeant in Berwick and whether forty acres lying between said town and its fosses .... might be granted, without damage, to Nicholas to hold of the king". This writ, therefore, came in response to a petition from Nicholas Carlisle, seeking a grant of these lands.

The inquest was held on 30 July before sir Walter Amersham, the chancellor of Scotland, Sir Edmund Hastings, now the warden of Berwick town, and Sir John Burdon, the sheriff, by a jury of sixteen. The jurors asserted that Nicholas Carlisle held the burgage "which was Ralph Phelipe's" and three places belonging to the bishop of Moray, William the scriptor and Henry Stirling. As for the forty acres, it was asserted that they were held:

"in the late King Alexander's time by divers burgesses of Berwick freely without any *reddendum*, as is pertinent of their burgages, and when the said burgh was founded they were given to the burgesses to build; if any wished to do so, and there are streets in said ground arranged for this."

Now, however, these lands were held by "divers burgesses of the king of England for a yearly payment of 2s. an acre."

These 'divers burgesses', who numbered thirty, are named. Three of the main English administrators in Scotland, namely sir Walter Amersham, the chancellor, sir John Weston, the receiver, and Master Robert Heron, the comptroller and keeper of the customs at Berwick, are included. Five of the jury were also English burgesses at Berwick. The remaining twenty-two included Reginald the engineer, who was usually a member of the Berwick garrison but was currently master of the carpenters at work on the pele at Selkirk<sup>67</sup>, and two ship owners, John Spark of Newcastle and John Packer of Sandwich, who had served the king faithfully in bringing supplies up the north-east coast

66 See Chapter Seventeen, p.391.

67 See Chapter Fourteen, p.321.

to Berwick in the previous six years. Edward seems, therefore, to have been successful in making Berwick the home of men who had proved their loyalty in years of service to the Crown.

Though four of the jurors, namely Philip Rydale, John Badby, William Orford<sup>68</sup> and Simon Dirleton, were burgesses of Berwick before 1296 and can therefore be regarded as native, none of the burgesses named as holding land in the forty acres could be described without doubt as Scottish. Though the description 'divers burgesses of the King of England' technically applied to any burghess in Scotland as well as England, it would therefore appear that the thirty burgesses named in the inquisition were those sent north by the king in 1297.

Whether or not they had only recently become burgesses of Berwick, there is no need to doubt the competence of the jurors in assessing how these forty acres were let out. Thus the jurors could state categorically that:

"this ground cannot, without the greatest injury of the king and the confusion and destruction of the aforesaid town be held wholly [*integre*] by Nicholas or any other; for he might build as good or a better town there than the present and the burgesses have no other place within or without their town where they can have a handful of grass or pasture, or any other easement, except these forty acres, whereon all the burgesses, both small and great, have common pasture in open time by use and wont, and they are divided in small divisions as in the time of King Alexander, among the burgesses."<sup>69</sup>

Thus, though the majority of these jurors would appear to be English incomers, they seemed to be speaking for the joint good of all the burgesses, both Scottish and English. In addition, the two references to 'the time of King Alexander' show clearly that the 're-founding' of the burgh by the English burgesses was achieved with reference to the traditional rights and liberties that the town had held for nearly two hundred years.

This was not the only petition addressed to Edward by the burgesses of Berwick in this year. Of far more importance was their quest for a charter of liberties, because "they are new men come into the town and had and have great need of the king's aid and have several times asked him, for his own benefit and the profit of his town of Berwick, as well as of the burgesses inhabitant." Edward had, in fact, again promised them certain

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67 Orford, although described as 'English by birth' [C.D.S., ii, p.148] had been a burghess of Berwick since at least 1292.

68 C.D.S., ii, no.1313.



franchises when he was at Roxburgh in February 1302, as a result of which "many merchants and other sufficient persons<sup>70</sup> have come and stayed there since then"<sup>71</sup>.

As a result of this petition, Edward granted Berwick a charter of privileges on 4 August 1302. These consisted of the right to be a free burgh, with burgesses and a merchant guild and 'Hanse' [guild entry fee], the right to elect a mayor and four bailiffs yearly, as well as a coroner. We have already seen that the sheriff of Berwick had acted as the coroner in 1299<sup>72</sup>, which shows that this charter was not merely the rubber-stamping of current practices, but allowed for the re-introduction of previous procedures. The burgesses were also permitted to have a prison within, and a gallows without, the burgh, as well as a twice-weekly market on Monday and Friday and a fair each year from 3 May to 24 June.

This charter of privileges restored to Berwick the rights and privileges which she had long enjoyed and many of which, presumably, had fallen into abeyance during the extraordinary circumstances since the conquest of 1296. A letter was sent to the keeper of Berwick town, Sir Edmund Hastings, on the same date, informing him of these rights and privileges and ordering him to present the new mayor to the chancellor of Scotland - as Edward's representative - to make his fealty. Hastings was then ordered "not to intermeddle further in the custody of the town, but to permit [the burgesses] to use the liberties and customs contained in the late charter granting that the town shall henceforth be a free borough"<sup>73</sup>.

Having been awarded the status of a free burgh by the king, Berwick was now grouped together with English trading centres. Thus, on 13 August 1302, John Spark and William Brown, two of those named as burgesses holding land in the 40 acres, were appointed as "collectors and receivers in ports of the new custom of 2s. a barrel, which the merchant vintners of the duchy [of Aquitaine] have granted to the king, in addition to the old customs."<sup>74</sup>

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70 Whether from England or Scotland is not made clear.

71 *Northern Petitions, Berwick, Cumbria and Durham*, ed. C.M. Fraser, vol. 144, no.13.

72 See Chapter Four, p.108.

73 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 443-4; *C.P.R.*, 1301-1307, 60-61; *C.D.S.*, ii, no.1314.

74 *C.P.R.*, 1301-1307, 78.

## CHAPTER FIFTEEN

## SUBMISSION

**Introduction:**

In January - February 1304, Sir John Comyn of Badenoch, presumably in the capacity of guardian of Scotland although he is naturally not so named in the English documents, led negotiations for the most wholesale submission made by the Scots to Edward I since the conquest of 1296. The 'rebels' had, in fact, begun negotiations with the English as early as September 1303, when Sir John Menteith and Sir Alexander Menzies met with Sir Aymer de Valence, the English warden south of the Forth, at Linlithgow. However, the weakness of the English position which the two Scottish representatives encountered, caused them to break off the peace talks, "by reason of the scarcity that they saw among the said people"<sup>1</sup>.

The Guardian therefore decided to take up the offensive once more, crossing north over the Forth into the lands of the Countess of Lennox "as far as Drymen" at the beginning of October with a force supposedly numbering "a hundred mounted men and a thousand footsoldiers"<sup>2</sup>.

Nevertheless, by November 1303, Edward and his army had returned from a successful campaign in the north-east, during which sheriffs and other royal officers were installed in that area on his behalf for the first time since 1297. In January 1304 the king ordered chevauchees under Sir John Segrave, Sir Robert Clifford, Sir William Latimer and Sir John Botetourt to be made against the Scots in the south. This culminated in the "discomfiting" of Sir Simon Fraser and Sir William Wallace at Happlew near Peebles some time in the next month<sup>3</sup>.

Edward and his household settled down for the winter at Dunfermline at the beginning of November 1303. His son, the prince of Wales, was sent with his household to Perth on 24 November<sup>4</sup>, in order to conduct an offensive against the remaining rebels.

According to letters to the prince from the earls of Lennox and Menteith early in January 1304, Comyn and his company had now retired to the safety of their lands beyond the Forth. However, the abbot of Coupar [Angus], whose letter arrived at Perth on 9 January, reported that "a great part of the enemy who had gone towards Strathearn have now returned to Angus and that they would willingly break down more of the bridge<sup>5</sup> if they could". This did not worry the prince and his men because, apparently, thirty men could defend it against the Scots. Repair work had been ordered, "but the river

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1 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 482-4; Chapter Eight, p.232-3.

2 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 486.

3 *C.D.S.*, ii, nos.1432, 1437; *C.D.S.*, iv, p.474; see Chapter Eight, pp.234-5.

4 *C.D.S.*, ii, no.1516, p.391.

5 This is presumably the bridge across the Tay at Perth.

is so overflowing that it is impossible to place the supports on which the bridge will be laid. When the water abates there, there will be good news of this, for most of the timber is prepared". Comyn's clerk, sent by the Guardian to ask for a parley in the same month, said that "Comyn .. [did not] cross the Tay after Martinmas [10 November 1303], but that some of his people are well across it"<sup>6</sup>. These somewhat conflicting reports suggest that the Scots had gone north after the expedition to Lennox in October 1303. At some point thereafter, some of those in Sir John Comyn's company<sup>7</sup> had gone on the offensive south over the Tay once more, but the Guardian himself was not involved.

With Edward's continuing presence in Scotland making it clear that the final settlement of the country in the near future was his single-minded intention, it might seem more politic to submit now to gain the best-possible terms. The Balliol, and therefore Comyn, star was waning. The Comyns would now have been concerned to retain their position within Scotland, especially since the earl of Carrick had had a two-year head start in earning King Edward's favour.

#### The preliminary offer from the Scots:

A story related by Sir Thomas Grey in his *Scalacronica*, despite referring to Robert Bruce and being dated 1306, seems, in fact, to be referring this period. Grey relates that King Edward was at Dunfermline and his son had gone "with a great host" to Perth. Bruce then apparently approached Perth, having come from Atholl, to see if could make peace. This was reported to the king, who was outraged that anyone had dared to treat with "our traitors" without his permission<sup>8</sup>.

If this is indeed relating to John Comyn, rather than Robert Bruce, in 1304, then Edward's wrath was quickly assuaged. On 11 January 1304 a letter was sent from Perth to an official or noble of note at Dunfermline<sup>9</sup>. This letter told the addressee to go to the royal castle at Kinclaven, between Coupar Angus and Dunkeld, with Sir Aymer de Valence, who was also at Dunfermline, "to hear what [Sir John Comyn]<sup>10</sup> wishes to say and if he wishes to treat". Comyn's clerk, who had been sent to Perth to arrange this meeting, was to "return on Sunday [19 January<sup>11</sup>] [on which day] Comyn will come to

6 C.D.S., v, no.346.

7 Sir Simon Fraser and Sir William Wallace were certainly now operating in Lothian [see Chapter Eight, p.235], though they may well have been with the Guardian in October.

8 *Scalacronica* 132.

9 It is most unfortunate that it is not possible to ascertain with certainty the identity of either the sender nor the addressee. However, the latter was probably either sir John Benstede or Sir Henry Percy, who, along with the earl of Ulster and Sir Aymer de Valence, were named as negotiators with the Scots on 9 February [see below, p338]. The sender, Rodori, was perhaps a member of the prince of Wales' staff.

10 The parts in brackets are where the manuscript is illegible.

11 The clerk is most likely to have returned on Sunday, 19 January, one week after the writing of this letter, rather than Sunday, 26 January, since enough time was required for

Kinclaven". The earl of Ulster and Sir Hugh Despenser, both of whom were in the prince's company at Perth, were to be sent to Kinclaven with at least 200 men-at-arms, "as a safeguard against harm"<sup>12</sup>.

It was indeed a preliminary offer of submission which "Sir John Comyn and those who are of his party, both beyond the sea as here<sup>13</sup>", wished to make. Firstly, they sought safety of life and limb, freedom from imprisonment and to be confirmed in possession of all their lands and property for themselves and their heirs in England, Scotland and Ireland.

Secondly they asked to be pardoned of all acts committed during the war for all time, including liability for all issues raised previously from royal and other lands.

Thirdly came the much-quoted demand that all the "laws, usages, customs and franchises" should be kept "in all points as they were in the time of king Alexander" and any amendment should be made with the advice of the king and the advice and assent of the *bones gentz* of the land.

The fourth clause contained specific requests from Sir John Comyn and Sir John Moubray. They asked Edward to grant them the lands which King John had given to their fathers and to themselves before the war. However the restoration of lands which King John gave to Sir John Comyn "since he (King John) made him a knight" [quant il le fyst chevalier<sup>14</sup>] was to be at the king's will.

The fifth clause asked that there be no taking of hostages nor of any other sureties but only homage and fealty and the somewhat obscure request that "if the king of France, with the messengers of England or of Scotland agree among themselves in any/no (nul) certain and affirmed way, let it be at their will to keep that way this aforesaid". This refers to the taking of homage and fealty only, which provision might be included in any agreement made with the French. Of more interest is the fact that the text reads "les messagers d'Engleterre *ou* d'Ecosse", rather than "les messagers d'Engleterre *et* d'Ecosse", suggesting that the Scots on the Continent were still trying to negotiate on their own.

the preliminary offer of peace to have been sent to Edward at Dunfermline and the issuing of a general set of conditions for those who wished to submit by 2 February [see below, p.337].

<sup>12</sup> C.D.S., v, no.346.

<sup>13</sup> The Scots "beyond the sea", that is, in France, included the bishop of St. Andrews, the earl of Buchan, James the Steward and Sir Ingram d'Umfraville.

<sup>14</sup> It is not known when Sir John Comyn was knighted, although it cannot have been before 6 October 1294, when he was described as a 'vallet' [C.D.S., ii, no.702]. The lands in question here were, therefore, perhaps granted by King John perhaps as late as 1296 and may have included certain Bruce lands, forfeited because that family remained loyal to Edward.

Finally a document sealed with the seals of the king, his lieges and his baronage was to be given as sufficient surety. Prince Edward agreed to the above conditions, presumably subject to his father's agreement<sup>15</sup>.

#### **The king's reply:**

In response Edward drew up a general set of conditions for those who wished to return to his peace by 2 February. The prince of Wales was to have the honour of receiving these submissions, thereby bringing about the final subjugation of Scotland which his father had tried so hard to have him achieve at the head of an army.

These terms were generous enough. Edward agreed that there should be no loss of life or limb, nor imprisonment or disinheritance. The Scots were, however, to submit completely to Edward's ordinances with regard to ransoms, amends for trespass and, most importantly, the settlement of the land of Scotland. In addition, there were three exceptions to these conditions, namely, Sir Simon Fraser, Sir David Graham and Thomas Bois, "... since they are of another category than the others." The king was also more willing to receive those who did not come in Sir John Comyn's company since Edward was of the opinion that:

"...regarding Sir John Comyn and Sir John Moubray who have been more concerned to harm and travail the king and his people and have done worse than the others, wherefore they should be more humble: it does not seem at all to the king that they should receive the conditions they ask."

This presumably means that Edward was not inclined to allow Comyn and Moubray to retain the lands requested in the fourth clause of their preliminary offer of submission. However, "when, by themselves or their friends, they ask something which can be granted to his honour and that of his kingdom, he would hear them willingly"<sup>16</sup>. If they asked humbly enough, they were not excluded from all chance of favour. Beyond that, Edward would not go.

#### **English negotiators sent to Strathord to discuss a definitive settlement:**

Sir John Comyn and the Scots were now assembled at Strathord, a forest near Dunkeld. On 5 February 1304 a team of negotiators, probably the earl of Ulster, Sir Henry Percy, Sir Aymer de Valence and Master John Benstede, who were certainly involved later, was sent from the prince at Perth to discuss a more definitive peace formula. Presumably they already had the king's reply to guide them as to what would be acceptable to Edward. A memorandum of these negotiations and a full copy of further draft terms were sent from Perth to Dunfermline on the following day. Though the writer

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<sup>15</sup> Palgrave, *Documents*, i, 286-8.

<sup>16</sup> Palgrave, *Documents*, i, 278-9.

is not named, he is likely to have been Sir Aymer de Valence, since it was his knight, Sir Robert fitz Payne, who was sent to the king to report more fully on the proceedings at Strathord.

The general terms laid down in this final draft agreement were the same as those issued by the king in January, with the further stipulations that heirs were to enjoy the same conditions, strongholds [fermetez] in the hands of the king and his people were to remain in present hands until the next parliament and all prisoners were to be released on both sides, with the exception of Sir Herbert Morham and his father.

*Conditions offered by Sir John Comyn, the Guardian*

The rest of the draft concerned the exceptions to these general conditions. Sir John Comyn was the first of these and his terms of surrender are worth quoting in full since they are different not only from the general conditions but from all others negotiated on a personal basis:

"Firstly it has been spoken for Sir John Comyn that whereas it was granted that he be saved in life and limb and he be free from imprisonment and for all trespasses and for all manner of things which he has committed and caused to be committed in time of war and from ransom also and he should retain the lands of his ancient heritage, provided that he be exiled for one year outside Scotland, the same John, for reverence and honour of the king, and to come closer to his good will, puts his lands and all the other things above in the will and grace of the king, saving that his body be not imprisoned and he will keep the exile as the king has devised before this time. And [he] says well that he would not hold land nor anything else without the good wish and will of his liege lord, as Sir Robert fitz Payne will be able to say more fully."<sup>17</sup>

As Guardian of Scotland in 1298-1301 and 1303-4 and constantly prominent since 1297, John Comyn was in a unique position in his relationship with Edward in 1304, given that the latter had always categorically refused to acknowledge any form of government in Scotland other than his own. Comyn therefore required to be absolved of personal blame for Scottish resistance throughout the previous six years. Thus he alone sought assurance that he was free "of all manner of things which he has committed and caused to be committed in time of war." Edward had already stated clearly that the former Guardian was to be brought lower than most for the trouble he had caused the English administration<sup>18</sup>, and hence stipulated here that Comyn should "not hold land nor anything else without the good wish and will of his liege lord." Though the late Guardian

<sup>17</sup> Palgrave, *Documents*, i, 280

<sup>18</sup> Palgrave, *Documents*, i, 278-9.

was eventually confirmed in "the lands of his ancient heritage", Edward was at pains to let Comyn know that this was granted only at the good will of the Lord Paramount of Scotland.

*Conditions offered by James the Steward, Sir John Soules, Sir Simon Fraser, Thomas Bois and the bishop of Glasgow*

The five further exceptions in the final draft sought to be granted, subject to Edward's agreement, the general conditions with varying periods of exile in addition. James the Steward and Sir John Soules were to spend two years in exile outside Scotland and south of the Trent. The Steward's castles were to remain in the king's hands but to be maintained at his own costs.

It should be remembered that both Soules and the Steward were currently in France, and these conditions were therefore offered by the Guardian on their behalf. It is not clear, however, why conditions were not also offered here for the bishops of St. Andrews and Dunkeld, the earl of Buchan and Sir Ingram d'Umfraville, who were also on the Continent, though all except the bishop of St. Andrews were mentioned in the final agreement. It is possible that Edward did not yet realise the part that each had played for the patriotic cause and was willing to let them submit according to the general terms.

Sir Simon Fraser and Thomas Bois were to surrender under the harshest conditions, that is, three years exile not only outwith the British Isles and Gascony, which constituted the seigneurie of King Edward, but outwith the lordship of the King of France also, "if they can find no greater grace in the meantime".

The conditions named for the Bishop of Glasgow, the aging Robert Wishart, were curious, namely either the same as Soules and the Steward (two years exile outside Scotland and south of the Trent) or submission to the king's will. The perfunctory nature of these conditions suggests that Wishart, who had probably been with the Guardian in the previous months, had not approved of the latter's decision to submit and the Scots were not, therefore, sure of the bishop's intentions<sup>19</sup>.

*The finer details*

In addition to informing the king more fully about what had been discussed at Strathord, Sir Robert fitz Payne was also to bring up various points regarding the execution of these submissions. A day was to be decided upon when Comyn and those with him should come to the king, and the prince was to be told how he should bring them to Dunfermline. Decisions had also to be taken with regard to letters of safe-conduct to be issued to Comyn, a submission date for those Scots who were abroad and

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<sup>19</sup> Palgrave, *Documents*, i, 279-82.

also, most interestingly, instructions concerning the surety which the royal messengers were to give "to stand by the things granted"<sup>20</sup>.

The Scots must have been concerned to ensure that the conditions which were agreed between themselves and the English ambassadors were not reneged upon in any way and betrayed a considerable lack of trust in the English king. King Edward was to send a reply back by the following Saturday, 8th February. Without making too much of this apparent distrust, it should be remembered that Edward was regarded by his own nobility as a king who broke his promises<sup>21</sup>.

#### Edward's response:

The king's reply is also printed in Palgrave. Edward agreed to ratify the draft agreement made between the Scots and his ambassadors on 5 February, but made some additions. As stated previously, strongholds [fermetez] were to remain as at present until the next parliament but at the costs of those to whom they belonged<sup>22</sup>. Hostages, as well as prisoners, were to be released on both sides. If nothing had been paid of instalments of ransoms due to date, then the arrears owed were to be paid, but all future instalments were to be remitted.

Edward had by now decided that the Bishop of Glasgow was to be exiled for two or three years outside the land of Scotland, "for the great evils he has caused." A further three Scots who had earned his particular disfavour were now added to the list. Sir David Graham was to be exiled for six months beyond the Tweed "for bearing himself so falsely with regard to the discussions which he held with the members of the king's council." Sir Alexander Lindsay was "to make some penance beyond the conditions of the community for the flight he made from the king who made him a knight". And William Wallace is mentioned for the first time. He was simply "to be received to the king's will and ordinance." It is highly unlikely that the general conditions, guaranteeing life, limb and freedom from imprisonment, applied to this individual.

The rest of the document deals with the points raised by fitz Payne. The prince was ordered to bring with him to Dunfermline the earl of Lancaster, the earl of Ulster, the earl of Warwick, Sir John of Brittany, Sir Hugh Despenser, Sir Robert Clifford, Sir William Leybourne, Sir Alexander Abernethy and Sir Richard Siward. The earls of Strathearn and Menteith were also to be commanded to come with them. Perth was to be left sufficiently defended, which implies that by no means all the Scots, Wallace being the obvious example, were known to be intending to submit at this time.

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<sup>20</sup> Palgrave, *Documents*, i, 283.

<sup>21</sup> *Guisborough*, 329.

<sup>22</sup> That is, if they were English-occupied.



Then came the assurance that any agreement made would be stood by:

"With regard to the security which the messengers should make, the king wishes that they should seal their open letters with their seals, as it seems to them that it would be best, to keep the things as they were discussed and granted; and when Sir John Comyn shall have done homage and fealty to the king and what he owes, the king will have made his letters patent to keep all the things as they were discussed and granted and according to the purport of the writing which these same messengers shall have made thereof, as is said before<sup>23</sup>."

### **The conclusion of negotiations:**

The earl of Ulster, Valence, Percy and Benstede then returned from Perth to Strathord the following day, Sunday 9th February, to finalise the agreement. It was now just a question of refinements. It was finally agreed that the Bishop of Glasgow was to be exiled for two years. Wallace was to submit to "the will and grace of the king, if it seems good to him"<sup>24</sup>, with no reference to the application of the general conditions: Lindsay was to be exiled for six months, like Graham, but below the Trent rather than the Tweed. The rest was accepted with Edward's additions. Comyn and those with him were to come to Dunfermline by Sunday 16 February to pay their homage and fealty<sup>25</sup>.

### *Conditions for Scots overseas*

The final agreement also contained directions for those Scots who were in France, namely Matthew Crambeth, bishop of Dunkeld, the earl of Buchan, the Steward, Sir John Soules and Sir Ingram d'Umfraville. These five were to come to Edward's peace by 12 April 1304, "each according to his condition and state." The bishop of St. Andrews is conspicuous by his absence from this list, though he returned to Scotland at the same time as the earl of Buchan<sup>26</sup>. It is possible that those not mentioned during the negotiations with the Guardian sent messengers to King Edward personally, to agree the conditions of their submission.

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23 Palgrave, *Documents*, i, 283-5. This security is therefore a written guarantee of the conditions now finally agreed with the Scots.

24 This undoubtedly refers to the king, rather than Wallace, as Professor Barrow suggests [Barrow, *Bruce*, 130, n.124]. It is highly unlikely that Wallace's opinion would have been considered and it was quite usual to qualify agreements with such a phrase.

25 E159/79, m.30. The conditions for those coming from overseas are also contained in this reference.

26 Palgrave, *Documents*, i, 288-291, 334.

## Conclusions:

These peace negotiations are of interest since they provide evidence for the activities of certain Scots in the recent past and also for Edward's attitude towards the Scots in general. There would seem to be a pattern in the degree of severity with which the English king dealt with the Scots rebels.

It should be said first of all, however, that the final conditions were in no way vindictive or ungenerous, for the very good reason that the English were in no position at this point to demand harsh penalties - Edward had only recently faced large-scale desertions from his army<sup>27</sup> and could not stay in Scotland forever to keep the peace. The army and more particularly the English garrisons in Scotland had also faced very severe food shortages. As a result of this, Edward, in all his dealings with the Scottish nobility, appears to have believed that winning their support was the best means of controlling the country. It thus made sound political sense to allow all Scots, except Sir William Wallace, to retain their lands and positions in Scotland.

The lengths of exile are also very revealing. Comyn himself was to be exiled for only one year outside Scotland, despite having led the Scots for a total of four years. Wishart, whom Edward accused of "great evils" was eventually exiled for two years below the Trent.

It is interesting also to compare the two Scots who were to be exiled for six months. The harsher sentence, that is, exile below the Trent, was incurred by Lindsay, who had absconded from the king's service, having been made a knight. He had, therefore, broken the code of chivalry and betrayed the king personally. Graham, who had perhaps been part of the peace negotiations of the previous autumn which came to nothing when the weakness of the English position was ascertained, was only to be exiled south of the Tweed "for bearing himself so falsely."

The longest periods of exile were agreed for Sir Simon Fraser and Thomas Bois. The latter is not very well known but his career shares a particular feature with Fraser's in that both were at one time part of the English administration of Scotland: he was named as an esquire in the garrison of Edinburgh castle on 28 February 1300. Bois had changed sides by 25 July 1301 since on that date John Autry, a valet of the earl of Lincoln, was given sasine of all his lands in Scotland "when Thomas went against the king in the Scottish war"<sup>28</sup>.

Two others mentioned in these negotiations were also members of the Edinburgh garrison in February 1300, namely Sir Herbert Morham and his father, Sir Thomas. Sir Herbert returned to the Scottish camp at some point in 1301<sup>29</sup>. However, his father never left Edward's service, appearing in the household accounts over the winter of 1303-4 and

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27 See Chapter Six, p.180-1.

28 C.D.S., ii, no.1132, no.1429.

29 See Chapter Six, p.172.

being given responsibility, along with Alwyn Calender<sup>30</sup>, for the forces of the sheriff of Stirling being sent to Castlecary, between Falkirk and Kilsyth, on March 20 1304<sup>31</sup>. It is unclear why the two Morhams should have been exempted from the clause permitting the release of all prisoners on both sides, since Sir Thomas, at least, does not seem to have been a prisoner.

It should be noted that Sir Herbert Morham and Thomas Bois, both members of the Edinburgh garrison, and Sir Simon Fraser all joined the rebel side at some point between 1300 and 1301. It is quite possible that all three left at the same time. More importantly, it is clear that those Scots, such as Fraser, Lindsay, Morham and Bois, who had all been actively in Edward's service, were treated more harshly than others who had been longer on the rebel side.

### **The Guardian's Council:**

The final draft document drawn up at Strathord on 9 February 1304<sup>32</sup> also gives the names of those who constituted Sir John Comyn's council mentioned in the memorandum to Edward on 6 February<sup>33</sup>, namely Sir Edmund Comyn of Kilbride, Sir John Graham, Sir John Vaux, Sir Godfrey Ros, Sir John Maxwell the elder, Sir Peter Prendregast, Sir Walter Barclay, Sir Hugh Airth, Sir William Airth, Sir James Ros and Sir Walter Ruthven.

Three of these Comyn men became sheriffs under Edward's settlement of Scotland in 1305: Sir William Airth at Forfar; Sir Walter Barclay at Banff; Sir Godfrey Ros at Ayr<sup>34</sup>. Edward was, therefore, prepared to let those who had played a prominent part in the Scottish administration have a place within his own administration.

### **The final phase of the conquest: *the capture of Stirling castle***

In May 1304 Edward began the final phase of the re-establishment of English control over Scotland - the capture of Stirling castle. The siege lasted three months until July 1304, starvation and English siege-weapons winning the day. Various stories are cited to show Edward's apparent cruelty towards the Scots who defended the castle. His use of the "Warwolf", his new siege-engine, on a garrison which had already offered to surrender is generally used as an example of the increasing vindictiveness to be seen in Edward at the end of his reign<sup>35</sup>.

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30 Alwyn Calender was established as heir to Sir John Calendar by the inquest into the latter's lands held at Stirling on 22 February 1304. Alwyn was twenty-eight and thus able to inherit straight away [see Chapter Sixteen, p.353].

31 C.D.S., v, no.353.

32 E159/79, m.30.

33 Palgrave, *Documents*, i, 282

34 C.D.S., ii, no.1691; see **Table 10**.

35 Barrow, *Bruce*, 130; see Chapter Eight, p.238.

*Edward orders the Scots to endeavour to capture Wallace*

There is some justification for thinking that the king's attitude hardened after the surrender of Stirling castle even towards those Scots who had already submitted. In a document issued on 25 July 1304, "the day after the castle [Stirling] was handed over"<sup>36</sup>, Edward ordered the people of Scotland, but especially Sir John Comyn, Sir Alexander Comyn, Sir David Graham and Sir Simon Fraser - all of whom were still under sentence of exile - "to make an effort between now and the twentieth day of Christmas [13 January 1305] to take Sir William Wallace and hand him over to the king so that he can see how each one bears himself whereby he can have better regard towards the one who takes him, with regard to exile or ransom or amend of trespass or anything else in which they are obliged to the king"<sup>37</sup>.

The Steward, Sir John Soules and Sir Ingram d'Umfraville, who, since they had been on the Continent, were supposed to have submitted by 12 April had obviously still not done so and Edward now asserted that they "shall not have conduct nor in any way come within our lord king's power until Sir William Wallace is handed over to him"<sup>38</sup>.

However, with regard to those who had already submitted, Edward was effectively offering postponement of the sentences of exile, which he was still to finalise, until Wallace was captured, whereupon, he was hinting, they might be rescinded. The English king's patience had certainly run out, but only with those who still refused to acknowledge his lordship of Scotland.

**October 1305 - the final peace settlement:**

There were still several details of the peace settlement to be finalised, namely the ransoms, amends of trespasses and the general settlement of Scotland which Edward had always demanded that he be able to decide for himself at a later date.

This did not, in fact, happen until October 1305, the month following the promulgation of the ordinances for the settlement of Scotland and some twenty months after the original peace negotiations.

Ostensibly, because the "despites, trespasses, outrages and disobediences" perpetrated by those who had submitted were so great that they could never make sufficient amends, Edward was concerned to ensure that they did not avoid all punishment. Nevertheless, because the Scots had "borne themselves well and loyally" since his return from Scotland and in anticipation of their future good behaviour, the king was gracious enough to stand by the terms of their submission with regard to the saving of life and limb and quittance of imprisonment and disinheritance. Edward then went on

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<sup>36</sup> Palgrave, *Documents*, i, 274.

<sup>37</sup> These issues were still to be dealt with by the king.

<sup>38</sup> Palgrave, *Documents*, i, 276.

to state that the "lands, property and seigneurie" of King John were his "to give and to alienate from the demesnes pertaining to the *roiaute* of Scotland". Edward was clearly claiming the lands and property and the rights over them that pertained to a king of Scots which had escheated to him by forfeiture and resignation, just as he had done in 1296. Despite the use of the word '*roiaute*' [kingship], Scotland was now consistently described as a 'land', and not a 'kingdom'.

*A scheme of fines based on land value in return for the waiving of the sentences of exile*

In order to satisfy his apparent twin desire to punish and be merciful, Edward devised a scheme whereby the Scots nobility would pay over the annual value of their lands for a varying number of years. This also satisfied his far greater need for money. The money thus paid over by Sir John Comyn and those who had submitted with him, were to be used "for the work of new castles<sup>39</sup> that we are having built in said land of Scotland for the security of the said land and keeping the peace, or to be put to another use, as we see should be done".

The Scottish nobility were not buying back their lands, as is usually stated. It was always made quite clear, throughout the previous peace negotiations and earlier in this document, that the Scots who submitted were not to be disinherited. The position of Englishmen who had been granted the lands of Scots rebels would obviously trouble the king but there was never any question of the Scots not getting their lands back. This was a fine, prompted primarily perhaps by Edward's desire, after nearly ten years of major expenditure, to have Scotland pay for the emptying of his coffers.

In return, the conditions of exile were dropped. Those Scots who had submitted to Edward before Comyn were to pay the value of their rents for two years instead of three, except if they could show that they had been quit of this burden "*par notre graunt et fait especial*". The Scottish clergy, with the exception of the Bishop of Glasgow, were to pay the value of one year's rents. Wishart was to pay three years' rents. Sir Ingram d'Umfraville, who had only recently returned from abroad to submit<sup>40</sup>, was to be punished accordingly for his 'cowardliness' with the payment of the value of five years' rents. Two knights who had returned with him, Sir William Balliol and Sir John Wishart, were each to pay four years' rents.

In order to arrange the payment of these fines, the lieutenant and the chamberlain of Scotland, "when they have come there", were to have an assessment made of the lands of those who were to pay. They would then:

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39 These were the castles to be built at Tullibothwell and Polmaise [see Chapter Twelve, p.239].

40 The order restoring to Sir Ingram his lands in England, was issued on 8 October 1305 [C.C.R., 1302-1307, 291].

"pay per year at the usual terms of these parts, half the value of their lands and their rents according to the said assessments; and thus from year to year, so that they will be paying what pertains to them, according to the said ordinance and pronouncement, and the other half of the value of their lands and rents will remain to them for their sustenance."

It was also made quite clear that these conditions were in no way to apply to those Scots who had been imprisoned or who had not yet submitted<sup>41</sup>.

### Conclusions:

Edward could well afford to be generous in October 1305. The conquest of Scotland had been accomplished. Wallace was now dead and the Scottish nobles had been on their best behaviour for a year and a half. With regard to the original conditions sought by the Guardian, the Scots had, in practice, done rather well. All were free to enjoy their lands and property in Scotland with the payment of a fine: the only sign of retribution for nearly seven years of rebellion.

These Scottish nobles had all been confirmed in their lands and property in 1296. Some had even been given a part to play in governing their country. Nevertheless, they had been prepared to rebel against Edward in pursuit of the right to have Scotland governed in a way that was particular to that country. They had not been defeated militarily in a major engagement. Submission to Edward was an acknowledgement of the fact that even though the English king could not conquer Scotland by force of arms, neither could the Scots free their country completely of the English presence. The lack of an effective administration, able to regulate the country as a whole, affected the people living there far more than it did the English king.

However, the reasons for rebellion and the possibility of success against the English administration remained unchanged. The events of 1306 were perhaps no more surprising than the uprisings of 1297.

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<sup>41</sup> *Rot. Parl.*, i, 211-2.

## CHAPTER SIXTEEN

## THE ENGLISH JUSTINIAN IN SCOTLAND

1303-5

**Introduction:**

From 1303 onwards, evidence for an effective English administration of Scotland increases dramatically as the majority of the Scottish nobility conceded defeat and submitted to Edward. The English king was magnanimous in victory, having learned that the active co-operation of Scotland's natural leaders was essential to the success of his government of the northern kingdom.

The submission of these landowners - some of whom had had access to their estates during the previous seven years of war, and some of whom had not - resulted in a large number of court cases regarding land disputes. Many of these cases concerned those who had benefited from gifts of forfeited lands and property in the service of the English king.

Edward's response was, almost without exception, unequivocal: decisions were to be based on the status quo of 1296<sup>1</sup>. There was to be no question of resentment against a foreign oppressor because of disinheritance and the protection of Scottish property rights, Edward no doubt hoped, would hasten the acceptance of his regime. Instead, those who had served the English cause - including high-ranking members of both the English and Scottish nobility - were to surrender their rewards.

The Westminster parliament of February 1305 was faced with a large number of petitions concerning Scotland, the majority of which were referred to the Scottish lieutenant, Sir John Segrave, and chamberlain, Sir John Sandale. The use of inquests by local men of substance, which can first be noted in January 1303, became usual once more in assessing the claims of the petitioners.

The second parliament of 1305, which took place in September, was held for the express purpose of establishing the administration of Scotland. In comparison with the system set up in 1296, Edward had learned much from seven years of war. Not only did he appoint as officials in the new administration a far greater percentage of Scots, notable among whom were a number who had recently taken an active part in the government of the Guardians, but much attention was paid to the system of government which had existed under the kings of Scots.

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<sup>1</sup> Edward does not seem to have wished to restore the status quo of 1291, when he first explicitly made his claim to overlordship of Scotland, and generally allowed grants made during the reign of King John Balliol to stand.

### The meaning of success:

Edward's progress through the north-east of Scotland during the campaign of 1303 meant the reinstatement of English sheriffs and other officials in areas which had been governed successfully by the Guardians since 1297<sup>2</sup>.

Similar administrative activities were taking place in the south. Between 6 and 14 September 1303 the earl of Carrick and Sir John Botetourt rode round the sheriffdoms of Linlithgow, Lanark and Peebles "and elsewhere south of the Forth to ordain and appoint sheriffs and other officials on the part of the king"<sup>3</sup>. Carrick, currently sheriff of both Ayr and Lanark<sup>4</sup>, was obviously occupying a prominent position in the English administrative hierarchy. Though there does not seem to have been any question of his becoming Edward's representative in the south-west, the earl worked closely with Botetourt and there is no indication of any dissatisfaction with the arrangement.

### *Account of sir James Dalilegh, escheator south of Forth*

Another indication of Edward's increasing confidence in the effectiveness of his conquest is revealed in the task given to sir James Dalilegh, with two esquires and one clerk, to ride "south of the Forth to value and assess the king's lands and to collect and receive farms and escheats of the same ..." Dalilegh was engaged in this activity in the Lowlands from 20 November 1303 to 1 May 1304, thereafter repeating the exercise north of the Forth<sup>5</sup>.

The escheator's account for the issues of his office south of the Forth for regnal years 31 and 32 [20 November 1302 - 19 November 1304] provides some interesting evidence. The sheriffdoms of Lanark, Peebles, Ayr and Dumfries brought in the reasonable total of £668 4s.2.75d. for the first year (1302-3), despite the fact that, in the sheriffdom of Lanark, the barony of Cambusnethan and the farms of the burgh of Glasgow had been laid waste by the Irish, the lands of Nemphlar and Cartland yielded nothing because they were in the hands of the Scots and the barony of Rutherglen received a £10 rebate "on account of the inability of the tenants". According to a summary of the values of the sheriffdoms of Scotland, which may have been among the nineteen rolls containing the extents of the demesne lands given to Dalilegh and Weston in 1304, these four sheriffdoms should have brought in a total of £1037 16s.4d<sup>6</sup>.

The total for the 32nd year (1303-4), which did not include the issues from the sheriffdom of Dumfries, at £206 3s. was less than one third of the previous year's total<sup>7</sup>. The reason behind this surprising decrease is simple. In 1302-3 many of these lands were

<sup>2</sup> See Chapter Thirteen, pp.259-61.

<sup>3</sup> E101/11/19, m.4.

<sup>4</sup> See Chapter Twelve, pp.296, 301.

<sup>5</sup> E101/19/11, m.11 (dorso); see Chapter Thirteen, p.262.

<sup>6</sup> Bateson, 'The Scottish King's Household', 25.

<sup>7</sup> C.D.S., ii, no.1608.



in the king's hands due to the forfeiture of their owners. Thus the escheator could claim all the issues that were owed to the original holder in the king's name. He did not always get them, of course, since the Scots sometimes still held them. In 1303-4 the escheator could only claim those issues which ordinarily pertained to the king in peacetime and thus the total was much less.

*Evidence for increased English administrative involvement 1303-5:*

**The holding of inquests:**

Despite the military successes of the Scots earlier in 1303, there is a considerable increase in the amount of evidence right through that year for the ability of the English administration, in certain areas, to deal with questions regarding land holding. This naturally continued throughout 1304, when most of the Scottish nobility submitted, and the holding of inquests became a regular feature of the English administrative system in Scotland as normal procedure re-established itself.

*Lanark*

Between 20 and 29 January 1303, the first inquest of a peacetime nature to be held by the English administration in Scotland since 1296<sup>8</sup> took place at Lanark. The writ ordering this inquest does not, unfortunately, survive; only the results of the inquiry made by "twelve free liegemen" remain. None of these liegemen appear in the Ragman Roll, although two are again named as jurors on 30 December 1303<sup>9</sup>.

The inquest found that the lands of Sir John Baird, who had died on 13 January 1303, were held of Sir Nicholas Biggar. These lands, in the barony of Strathaven, were currently in the hands of Sir John Segrave, Edward's lieutenant in Scotland<sup>10</sup>. Since it was normal practice in both England and Scotland for the feudal superior (in this case, Sir Nicholas Biggar) to take a tenant's lands into his hands after that tenant's death until an inquest had ascertained the rights of an heir, the fact that Baird's lands were in the hands of Sir John Segrave suggests that Sir Nicholas was a rebel.

Since this inquest was held only a week after the death of Sir John Baird, it was obviously held in response to his death, at the instigation of Baird's son and heir,

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<sup>8</sup> Inquests held by the sheriffs of Fife, Dumfries, Ayr, Wigtown, Berwick and Edinburgh into the lands held in Scotland by Elena la Zouche took place between 25 and 28 August 1296. Inquests had taken place at both Berwick and Roxburgh in 1299, but they were held to investigate the extent of rebel lands before they were granted out and thus were not usual peacetime procedure [Chapter Four, p.108].

<sup>9</sup> C.D.S., ii, no.1420; see below, p.351.

<sup>10</sup> Segrave probably had administrative jurisdiction over both marches in the period between the death of Sir John de St. John in August/September 1302 [C.D.S., v, no.292] and the arrival of his replacement, Sir John Botetourt before 25 February 1303 [C.D.S., ii, no.1345]. Sir Richard Siward acted as captain of the western march in a military capacity during this period [see Chapter Ten, p.209].

Alexander, as was normal, rather than at a later date when Edward's officers were able to deal with the backlog. It is worth noting that the sheriff of Lanark at this time was probably the earl of Carrick<sup>11</sup>, so that one of the earliest examples of a procedure amounting to 'normal' administration for Edward was exercised by a Scottish earl.

### *Fife*

On 19 March 1303 another inquest took place, this time at St. Andrews, in the presence of Sir John Cambo, lieutenant of the sheriff of Fife, Sir Richard Siward. As with the inquest at Lanark, the thirteen jurors, one of whom was a tenant of the bishop of St. Andrews and one a burghess of that city<sup>12</sup>, were investigating the lands held by a recently-deceased tenant (in this case, of the bishop of St. Andrews), named William, and establishing his heir. This was, in fact, his daughter, who was also heir of Adam le Marischal, a burghess of Inverkeithing, "in half of the land of Nidy", which was, again, held of the bishop<sup>13</sup>.

Since Sir Richard Siward, the English warden of Nithsdale since 1299<sup>14</sup>, spent most of his time at his home at Tibbers in the south-west, he was clearly unable to exercise his duties as sheriff of Fife. The patriotic bishop of St. Andrews, William Lamberton, had, in fact, controlled the county since his election on 3 November 1297, since on 5 May 1304, shortly after his submission, Lamberton declared "that having at his consecration and for some time since, drawn the issues without the king's leave, he will answer for these when called upon"<sup>15</sup>.

However, Lamberton had been involved in diplomatic activities in Paris since the autumn of 1302 and did not return to Scotland until 1304<sup>16</sup>. Since the inquest was held in the episcopal centre itself, Edward, in the person of Sir John Cambo, seems to have recovered control of Fife by March 1303.

Sir John, himself, provides something of a problem. His family were important landholders in the area, although the Walter Cambo who had been keeper of the late earl of Fife's lands in 1293-4 was, in fact, a member of the Northumberland family of the same name. Walter's son, another John, was sheriff of Northumberland in 1300, but there is no evidence to suggest, and indeed it is most unlikely, that he was also lieutenant of the sheriff of Fife. Thus the holder of this last office must have been Sir John Cambo of Fife<sup>17</sup>.

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11 See Chapter Twelve, p.291.

12 *C.D.S.*, ii, p.205; *C.D.S.*, ii, no.1646.

13 *C.D.S.*, ii, p.198.

14 *C.D.S.*, ii no.1067.

15 *C.D.S.*, ii no.1531.

16 Barrow, *Bruce*, 124; 129.

17 Stevenson, *Documents*, i, 407-12; *C.D.S.*, ii, 1398.

However, Sir John was supposed to swear allegiance to King Edward, along with eighty-nine other landowners, on 14 March 1304, at the parliament held at St. Andrews. These are clearly former rebels. Cambo did not manage to take his oath, however, because he was challenged by Sir Henry Beaumont, whose sister, Isabella, widow of Sir John de Vescy of Sprouston, owned the barony of Crail in Fife. Cambo was perhaps accused of rebellious activities which had had a detrimental effect on the rights to the barony of Beaumont's sister, whose heir he was<sup>18</sup>.

It would seem, given the above, and the fact that he was hanged in 1306<sup>19</sup> for supporting Robert Bruce that Sir John had not been loyal to King Edward after 1297. However, he must have submitted before March 1303 and been granted effective control of the sheriffdom<sup>20</sup>, which he had probably held under the Guardians.

### *Lanark*

On 30 December 1303, the third inquest of this year took place, for the second time, at Lanark, in the presence of Magnus of Strathearn and Nicholas Bannatyne, vicegerents of the sheriff, the earl of Carrick. Twelve jurors were set to investigate the lands held by Sir William Galbraith.

Sir William owned the land of Dalsarf, near Wishaw, which had been granted to him by Sir John Comyn, grandfather of the Guardian, when he married Comyn's daughter. The heirs were Galbraith's four grand-daughters, the eldest of whom, Johanna, "was at the King's peace at her death at Candlemas [2 February] 1301". She had inherited the *dominium*. Her mother, the daughter of Sir William Douglas, died after Johanna, around 25 December 1302, "in possession of the tenement."

Though Johanna had a son, Bernard Cathe, the jurors stated that "Dalsarf was held of the late Sir John Comyn, and now of Sir Robert the Constable, by the king's gift," Sir Robert had been captured by the Scots early in the war and exchanged for Sir Arthur (Campbell) of Dunoon in 1299. In 1302 he owed the service of one man-at-arms in the garrison of Carstairs castle for this land in the sheriffdom of Lanark, gifted to him by the king from the forfeited lands of Sir John Comyn of Badenoch<sup>21</sup>.

### *Roxburgh*

Inquests were also held when a Scot who had recently submitted had inherited land during the time that he/she had not been at King Edward's peace. Thus the sheriff of

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18 C.D.S., ii, no.1676.

19 C.D.S., ii, no.1811.

20 Since Sir Richard Siward was based in the south-west.

21 C.D.S., ii, no.1420; E101/331/10; C.D.S., ii, no.1062; E101/9/16, m.1 (dorso); E101/9/30, m.21 (dorso). Sir John Comyn of Badenoch died at some time in 1303 and thus the lands, if they had not been forfeited, now belonged to Sir John Comyn, the Guardian.

Roxburgh held an inquest into the inheritance of William Charteris<sup>22</sup> on 2 January 1304. Twelve jurors, seven of whom appear on the Ragman Roll in 1296<sup>23</sup>, were set to investigate Charteris's inheritance through Thomas Charteris, who died "beyond the mountains, an enemy of the king" on 30 October 1302 and through his mother, Agnes de Vescy, who had died, at the king's peace, in November 1301<sup>24</sup>. Since Thomas Charteris had died in the north, despite being a landholder only in Roxburghshire<sup>25</sup>, he cannot have been able to retain possession of his lands in the south-east.

### *Peebles*

On 4 January 1304 an inquest was held at Peebles, presumably before the sheriff, into the lands of the late William Melville (Maleville), who had died in February 1298. Sixteen jurors were employed on this occasion. Melville's son, another William, was due to come of age on 2 February 1304 and thus the inquest was held to ascertain his inheritance. The lands had been taken into the king's hands because of the minority, and Edward had given them to Sir William Durham, his sheriff of Peebles, all in accordance with usual feudal procedure in both England and Scotland.

### *Dumfries*

A similar inquest was held in regnal year 32 [20 November 1303 - 19 November 1304] into not only the conditions on which John Hirdmanstone had been received to the king's peace and who held his lands during his forfeiture but also his conduct since submitting. Although there is no reference to where the inquest was held, or who was presiding, three of the jurors can be identified as landholders in Dumfriesshire<sup>26</sup>.

The jurors stated that Hirdmanstone had conducted himself well, but did not know the conditions of his submission. He held the land of Ardry in Galloway which the king had granted to one Philip Dury<sup>27</sup>. The conditions of Hirdmanstone's submission were therefore important because these would have stated whether or not he was to regain possession of his lands<sup>28</sup>, although it would have been most unusual if he had not been promised this. The outcome of this case is, unfortunately, unknown.

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22 Charteris had been one of those captured with Sir Robert Keith on the banks of the Cree in August 1300 [C.D.S., ii, no.1147].

23 C.D.S., ii, pp.199-200, 209.

24 C.D.S., ii, no.1435. The relationship between Thomas and William Charteris is not clear, though they cannot have been father and son, since Thomas was probably married to Lady Johanne de Vescy, with whom he was jointly enfeoffed in half of the barony of Wilton, and William's mother was Agnes de Vescy.

25 C.D.S., ii, p.199.

26 C.D.S., ii, p.198.

27 C.D.S., ii, no.1619.

28 However, the fact that Philip Dury had been gifted the lands of Ardry and even had a charter does not necessarily mean that he actually had possession of it.

### *Stirling*

On 22 February 1304, Sir Archibald Livingston, here named for the first time as sheriff of Stirling, but more usually Edward's sheriff of Linlithgow, held an inquest into the lands of the late Sir John Callander. It is, unfortunately, not stated where the inquest was actually held, but the only juror mentioned on the Ragman Roll was certainly from Stirlingshire<sup>29</sup> and it is likely that the English now had control of Stirling town even if the castle was still in Scottish hands.

According to the inquest, conducted by fourteen jurors, Sir John held Callander directly of the king and the land of Kilsyth from the earl of Fife. His heir, Alwyn, was twenty-eight and thus able to inherit straight away. Since Sir John had been exchanged in 1299 for a Scottish prisoner held in England<sup>30</sup>, he appears to have been actively loyal to King Edward during the war and there was therefore no question of forfeiture.

The most interesting information ascertained by the inquest was that the land of Callandar had an annual value of £40 'in time of peace' but was now worth only £8 6s.8d. Kilsyth had similarly depreciated in value from £60 to £12<sup>31</sup>. Thus both were worth only one fifth of their peacetime value, giving some indication of the damage caused by the war in the Stirlingshire area at least.

### *Sir Ingram de Guines and Sir John Soules*

An inquest which took place around 9 February 1304<sup>32</sup> shows how complicated the territorial situation could be. Though the inquest appears, at first glance, to have been investigating the lands of the late Guardian, Sir John Soules, it must, in fact, have been concerned with those of Sir Ingram de Guines. Guines, a nephew of Queen Marie de Coucy, mother of King Alexander III, had large estates in Scotland through his wife, Christian Lindsay. He consistently supported the English cause, serving Edward in an unspecified office in the Esk valley in 1299<sup>33</sup>.

According to the results of the inquest, Sir John Soules 'the fugitive', who, in February 1304, was still in France<sup>34</sup>, had leased the castle and barony of Durisdeer, in Nithsdale, the lands of Westerker in Eskdale, and Philipstoun<sup>35</sup> from Sir Ingram. Durisdeer had first been leased to him, before the war, on 3 May 1296 for a period of twelve years but Sir John had then transferred this lease to Sir William Conigesburghe of

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29 C.D.S., ii, p.208.

30 C.D.S., ii, no.1062.

31 C.D.S., ii, no.1457.

32 The only information still surviving about this inquest is a memorandum listing its findings.

33 Stevenson, *Documents*, ii, 331; C.D.S., ii, 263; see Chapter Three, p.82.

34 Soules, unlike the Steward, the bishops of St. Andrews and Dunkeld, the earl of Buchan and Sir Ingram d'Umfraville, never returned to Scotland.

35 This is either Philpstoun, Lothian or, less likely, Philipstown, Grampian.

Lanarkshire<sup>36</sup>. Because of a debt owed by Sir Ingram to William Jargun, a burges of Dumfries, Durisdeer was again leased to Sir John Soules for twelve years, but the document does not state when this second lease was agreed.

Westerker was held by Sir John directly in fee of Sir Ingram, but Philipstoun had been leased to Soules for five years from 21 May 1301 by Sir William Conigesburghe, who held it of Sir Ingram<sup>37</sup>.

The most interesting aspect of this inquest is that it shows that both Sir Ingram de Guines and Sir William Conigesburghe, both of whom remained at Edward's peace between 1296 and 1304, had entered into land transactions with a man who was not only a rebel, but the Guardian of Scotland between 1301 and 1303. There would have been no question of disloyalty to Edward in their minds; they were conducting their business as they always had, under the auspices of whoever was competent to deal with it. The need for an established system capable of dealing with questions of property on a more day-to-day basis - which the English administration had clearly been unable to do throughout the previous seven years - explains why Edward seems to have been at great pains to deal fairly and competently with Scottish territorial questions, by means of his own officers in Scotland, between 1303 and 1305.

### *Jurors*

It would seem, from the above cases, that twelve<sup>38</sup> was the most usual - but by no means standard - number required for the juries of such inquests. The use of "twelve good men and true" was an established part of the English system, but it was not so in Scotland and Edward seems to have conformed to native custom in this respect.

It is also clear from the names of these men - Hugh Galbraith, Adam Kininmund, Patrick of Auchenlek, Adam Gourlay, Gilbert Fraser, Geoffrey of Falkirk - and the fact that a number are to be found in the Ragman Roll, that these were the *probi homines* of the sheriffdom, who were traditionally chosen on the basis of competence to assess the case in hand.

In addition, two jurors were found to have served in the English garrisons of Scottish castles, admittedly in areas where the English had a relatively strong hold. Gilbert Fraser, a juror at Peebles in January 1304 was a member of the Berwick garrison in 1299-1300; Sir Richard le Marshal, who served on the joint Roxburgh-Dumfries jury in August 1304, was a member of the Caerlaverock garrison in 1300<sup>39</sup>. Though two is

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36 C.D.S., ii, p.203.

37 C.D.S., ii, no.1452.

38 The jury of twenty-four inquiring into the privileges of the earl of Carrick in Annandale was taken from two sheriffdoms and was thus twice the normal size.

39 Lib. Quot., 145-6; 141.

not a very significant number, this is certainly an indication that some of the more prominent members of the local communities did serve in English garrisons nearby.

#### Disputed land cases:

On 3 September 1296 King Edward had ordered that all the lands of King John and the other magnates of Scotland who were in prison or had not yet submitted were to be kept in his hands. However, the sub-tenants of these magnates were to have their lands restored to them. During the next month certain magnates, such as Sir Gilbert d'Umfraville, who had submitted to the king, were also given back their lands<sup>40</sup>.

#### *William Gardyn and his lands in Cumberland*

However, the order of 3 September 1296 was not always carried out. We have already noted the case of Thomas Fishburn, whose rent in the sheriffdom of Roxburgh, confirmed to him in 1296, had still not been restored to him by 1302<sup>41</sup>.

William Gardyn experienced similar problems in gaining reiseisin of his lands, "worth not more than 57 marks yearly", in Cumberland. Gardyn's lands had been taken into Edward's hands in 1296 by the sheriff "in accordance with a letter to every English sheriff to seize Scottish lands in their shrievalities, as it was held of the earl of Buchan, although he had never borne arms against the king"<sup>42</sup>.

Gardyn had since petitioned the king in parliament and Sir John de St. John, who was also warden in Cumberland, was ordered to make an inquiry<sup>43</sup>. As with Fishburn, however, although a writ was issued, "nothing was done" and Gardyn petitioned the king for restoration of the same lands in the parliament of February 1305. Sir John Lisle, a baron of the exchequer was ordered to investigate and inform the king, but, unfortunately, there is no further information on the case<sup>44</sup>.

#### *Forfeited lands*

For those who rebelled again in 1297 or thereafter, the forfeiture of their lands, which could then be re-granted to Edward's supporters, was a natural consequence of the war. However, the English king appears to have had a different attitude towards the patronage available to him from the English lands of Scottish rebels than he did towards their lands in Scotland itself.

The use of confiscated lands in England as patronage was not an empty threat. On 28 December 1300, Sir John Bar was granted a licence to "assart and arrent the soil and

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40 C.D.S., ii, no.853.

41 See Chapter Seve, p.212-3.

42 *Northern Petitions, Berwick, Cumbria and Durham*, ed. C.M. Fraser, vol.144, 124.

43 This was therefore before August 1302, when St. John died.

44 *Memo. de Parl.*, no.482, p.310; C.D.S., ii, no.1634.

waste of" the manor of Whitwick in Leicestershire which had been forfeited from the earl of Buchan. Ironically enough, this was compensation for Bar's lands in France which had been confiscated by Philip IV because of his war with the English king. The lands in England belonging to Sir Edmund Comyn of Kilbride were granted to the earl of Norfolk in 1302<sup>45</sup>. Sir Edmund Comyn had certainly been forfeited by May 1298 and the earl of Buchan, who played a dominant role in Scottish government<sup>46</sup>, might well also have been forfeited in the previous year. These lands had probably, therefore, been in the king's hands for two and four years respectively.

These examples suggest that Edward was keen to reap the benefit from forfeited lands himself, presumably to off-set the costs of his campaigns, and that he used these lands as patronage sparingly. There was little difficulty in raising revenues from such English lands, unlike those in Scotland itself, grants of which were made as early as 1298<sup>47</sup>.

### *Sir Nicholas Graham*

Not all grants of forfeited lands in Scotland were unattainable to their new owners, especially in the English-controlled south-east. The following case involved Sir Nicholas Graham, who was described in 1304 as having "been long at the king's peace"<sup>48</sup>. At some point between 1304 and 1305<sup>49</sup>, Graham petitioned the king concerning the vill of Halsington [Hallington, in Northumberland] and other lands which he held of earl Patrick of Dunbar. The latter had seized them, at the beginning of the war, and leased them to Sir William Durham for a term. Though Sir Nicholas had been restored to all his lands<sup>50</sup> on his submission, "he has ever since sued the earl and the sheriff of Roxburgh for Halsington and other lands deforced by the earl, without success. And he prays the king to give orders that the earl's influence may not prevent his getting seisin". The warden and lieutenant were ordered to inquire into the case "and do justice"<sup>51</sup>.

This is interesting evidence for the authority exercised particularly by the earl of March, but also English officers such as the sheriff of Roxburgh in the south-east<sup>52</sup>, since it is clear that Graham had not been able to keep possession of these lands while he

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45 C.P.R., 1292-1301, 560; see below, p.366.

46 C.D.S., ii, nos.982, 992; see Chapter Nine, p.253.

47 See Chapter Three, pp.78-9.

48 C.D.S., ii, no.1359.

49 Since the case was referred to the warden and chamberlain of Scotland, it must have occurred between these years [see Chapter Seventeen, p.390].

50 A writ to the bishop of Durham to restore the heritages of Graham and his wife was issued on 10 May 1304 [C.C.R., 1302-1307, 138].

51 C.D.S., iv, no.1804.

52 Although Halsington was in Northumberland, Graham was clearly also seeking to recover lands in the sheriffdom of Roxburgh.



was a rebel. This case is also the first of many to illustrate that although it was Edward's intention to allow those who submitted to regain seisin of their lands, those who had benefited in the meantime were not quite as willing to allow the status quo of 1296 to return.

Grants of Scottish lands were often made for a different purpose: as an incentive to the grantee to endeavour to recover the lands in question<sup>53</sup>. However, many of these grants were worthless, because their original Scottish owners were able to retain possession. Other grantees found themselves involved in court cases in which the Scottish claimants often seemed to have a better chance of success<sup>54</sup>.

### *The Scottish lands of Sir Walter Beauchamp*

When the original owner was still under sentence of forfeiture, the heir of the grantee was quite entitled to succeed to any lands in Scotland, provided the gift was not made for life only. Thus, on 10 April 1303, shortly after the death of Edward's steward, Sir Walter Beauchamp, on 1 February 1303<sup>55</sup>, writs were sent to Sir John Segrave, the king's lieutenant in Scotland, and Sir John Botetourt, the king's lieutenant in Galloway, ordering them to deliver Beauchamp's lands in Scotland to his son, another Walter, saving the dower due to the widow<sup>56</sup>. Presumably an inquest would have (or should have) been held to ascertain what these lands were, but there is no evidence for one.

Part of Beauchamp's grant was, in fact, 500 marks worth of land forfeited from Sir Edmund Comyn of Kilbride<sup>57</sup>, who submitted, along with the Guardian, at Strathord in February 1304<sup>58</sup>. Some time after<sup>59</sup>, Lady Alice Beauchamp, the steward's widow, petitioned the king for restitution of, or compensation for, her dower from these lands, "with her damages for being disseised for three years and more", that is, since c.1301. The king replied that even if Sir Walter were still alive, he would no longer be seised in these Scottish lands "on account of the agreement between the king and John Comyn"<sup>60</sup> and the petition was refused. There is no mention of liability for compensation<sup>61</sup>.

Alice Beauchamp's claim that she had been disseised for over three years only makes sense if it means that both she and her husband had been unable to enjoy these lands because Sir Edmund Comyn had retained control of them. Lady Alice's petition

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53 Prestwich, 'Colonial Scotland: The English in Scotland under Edward I', *Scotland and England, 1286-1815*, ed. Roger Mason, 8.

54 A fuller discussion of Edward's patronage of forfeited lands is given on below on pages 380-1.

55 *Handbook of British Chronology*, 74.

56 C.C.R., 1302-1307, 25; see below, p.357-8.

57 Beauchamp was also granted the lands of Sir John Cambroun of Ballingarnach, which were in Perthshire [Palgrave, *Documents*, i, 302].

58 C.D.S., ii, no.1741.

59 The petition is undated, but was probably made some time in 1304.

60 This agreement is the terms of submission agreed with the Guardian at Strathord.

61 C.D.S., ii, no.1621.

states that her husband had died seised in his lands, but that could have been a fairly recent state of affairs. When arrangements were being made for the garrisoning of Bothwell castle after its capture in 1301, Sir Walter Beauchamp was ordered to provide the service of two men-at-arms in the garrison, owed for his lands in Scotland. However, it was noted that they had not yet come<sup>62</sup>. If Sir Walter had not been able to gain entry to his lands, then he would not have been willing to provide men as service for them.

In addition, the account made by sir James Dalilegh of escheats south of the Forth for regnal years 31 and 32 (20 November 1302 - 19 November 1304) shows that Sir Edmund Comyn's lands of Nemphlar in the sheriffdom of Lanark<sup>63</sup> provided nothing for the Whitsun term of 1303 because "they were then in the hands of the Scots"<sup>64</sup>. Since Sir Edmund was still a rebel, he presumably held them himself. Though Sir Walter's lands may not have been Nemphlar, but another of Comyn's lands in the same sheriffdom, Edward's steward does not seem to have been able to enjoy the lands granted to him in Scotland for long, if at all.

This petition illustrates clearly that many of the grants made by Edward to his supporters between 1298 and 1304 were worthless since they could not gain access to property still in the hands of their forfeited owners. In addition, once these original owners had submitted, the English grantees found themselves without any claim to compensation for lost revenue. It should be remembered that these grants had been made in the first place as an incentive to the grantees to conquer them - and therefore to help Edward conquer Scotland! Now that Scotland was conquered, the grants were being reneged upon. It was a difficult situation. The king was undoubtedly wise to restore the Scots to their lands - thereby leaving no grounds for resentment and future rebellion. However, there is also no doubt that those who had served the English cause faithfully during the previous seven years received little reward for their service, however good Edward's grants of lands might look on paper.

#### *John Autry and the lands of Thomas Bois*

On 25 July 1301, John Autry, a valet of the earl of Lincoln, was granted the lands in West Lothian of Thomas Bois, a Scot who had served Edward in the garrison of Edinburgh castle, but had recently rebelled. In 1303 Autry petitioned the king to grant him the value elsewhere in Scotland of a part of these lands, namely the manor of Ogilface, in accordance with an agreement made with Edward when the manor had been given by the king to William Baird, a Scotsman<sup>65</sup>.

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62 E101/9/16, m.1, dorso.

63 The lands granted to Sir Walter Beauchamp were probably in Lanarkshire since he owed the service of men-at-arms in Bothwell castle which was also in that county.

64 See above, p.348.

65 C.D.S., ii, no.1429; C.D.S., ii, no.1429.

Some time in 1304, however, Autry was still unable to enjoy his lands in peace. According to his petition:

"... when he was in Gascony with his lord the earl, Archibald Livingston<sup>66</sup> falsely persuaded the king that the manor [of Duddingston] was in [Edward's] hand, and procured a writ to the sheriff of Edinburgh to give him seisin and got it fairly. When John came to the siege of Stirling with the earl from Gascony, Archibald kept him out of the manor".

Though Autry had a charter from the king dated at Bothwell on 9 September 1301 clearly showing his title to the lands, the king required to be informed of all the facts. The English guardian of Scotland was ordered to "hear the parties and do justice to both"<sup>67</sup>.

Thus those who had been granted Scottish lands not only often had problems in gaining possession from their original owners but were at risk from the opportunism of Edward's own officials on the spot. Though such activities were undoubtedly far from unknown in England also, the degree of confusion over the land situation in Scotland, caused by the lack of a uniform administration throughout the country, undoubtedly made opportunism easier. The next case also illustrates the potential which the redistribution of land gave for pursuing fraudulent claims to lands.

#### *John Bristol and the lands of Alan of Dumfries*

John of Bristol, a royal serjeant, had been granted the lands of a rebel, Alan of Dumfries<sup>68</sup>, at an unspecified date between 1297 and 1303. The latter eventually died without having submitted. However, one William Penpont (a Scotsman) then came with a writ of seisin for the lands (presumably from the English chancery), claiming to be Alan's cousin and heir. He then found out, presumably through an inquest, that Alan was a bastard and that thus he could not inherit his lands. William then produced another writ, claiming this time to be the cousin and heir of William Hauwyse, who had held the lands over thirty years previously, long before the war. John of Bristol therefore petitioned the king that:

"as the writ of seisin is for people who were seised before the war, of lands subsequently taken into the king's hand<sup>69</sup> and is not to interfere with the writ of mortancestor concerning the death of people thirty or forty years ago, and the people of these parts dislike any English disinheritor among them by the king's gift, so he prays the king's grace that he may

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66 Edward's Scottish sheriff of Linlithgow.

67 C.D.S., ii, no.1613.

68 This Alan of Dumfries was possibly chancellor of Scotland in June 1292 [C.D.S., ii, no.606].

69 That is, due to the rebellion or death of the tenant.

take the land as the king's escheat by reason of the bastardy of the last feoffee".<sup>70</sup>

This is unequivocal evidence, from an Englishman benefiting from his position within the occupying regime, for resentment among the Scots against those who received another's inheritance by the king's gift.

The royal council was ordered to deliberate on this case but the king did note that the writ of seisin held by William Penpont did not validate his claim since it only referred to those lands held by his ancestors "at the beginning of the war, and occupied by reason of the war". John of Bristol therefore presumably continued in seisin of the lands.

However, Penpont was not prepared to let matters rest there. In the parliament of February 1305 he petitioned the king for his lands and property in Dumfries, claiming that he had recovered seisin by verdict (that is, from an inquest), but that Bristol still remained seised. It was then ordained in parliament that a writ from the English chancellor should be sent to the Scottish chancellor, ordering him to "make remedy according to the customs of those parts"<sup>71</sup>.

Whether or not Penpont succeeded in ousting Bristol is unfortunately not known, but the impression conveyed is that the Englishman was fighting a losing battle. The English chancery appears to have been consistently unable to secure all the details regarding the complicated land transactions of this period which would have enabled an impartial - and final - judgement to have been made. It should also be noted that in these last two cases, two Scots had taken the opportunity to make a claim to 'rebel' lands. This perhaps indicates that the Scots at Edward's peace knew that the king took a favourable attitude to their land claims because of the insecurity of the English position in Scotland. Edward seems to have gone to great lengths to ensure that no Scot could complain of being unfairly dealt with. This does not seem to have been the case with English claims to Scottish lands.

### *The Galloway lands of King John*

Although many Scottish landowners had their property seized by the king in 1296, only King John suffered permanent forfeiture. Balliol's lands naturally formed a good source of patronage.

### *The earl of Buchan*

The first case connected with King John's Galloway lands concerned a grant made during the latter's reign. At some point after his submission in May 1304, John, earl of Buchan, complained to the king that lands which had been granted to him in the north-

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<sup>70</sup> C.D.S., ii, no.1423.

<sup>71</sup> Memo. de Parl., no.403.

east by King John in recompense for his right in the latter's Galloway lands and the lands belonging to Thomas of Galloway<sup>72</sup> had been taken and retained by Edward's officials, despite the fact that the earl had been seised in these lands, presumably at his submission. The king's lieutenant was ordered to hold an inquest and presumably, since Buchan had a charter for these lands, he was allowed to retain them in peace<sup>73</sup>. This case again reflects the confusion caused by the restoration of lands to Scots after their submissions.

*Sir John de St. John v. Sir Alexander Balliol*

An undated petition to the king and council, probably from 1304, from Sir John de St. John, junior, provides evidence that there was confusion even among those who had been granted Scottish lands by the king's gift. St. John was concerned with the lands in Galloway "to which Sir John Balliol succeeded on the death of Dervorguilla, his mother", which had been granted to his father, the late warden of the western Scottish march and to which he was heir on the latter's death in August 1302.

According to a petition from Sir Alexander Balliol, no land in Galloway had been granted to before Balliol himself received Kirkpatrick in 1298. St. John subsequently received his lands 'apres bone fete'<sup>74</sup>. It is not at all clear when exactly that was, but it seems likely that such a large and important grant as the demesne lands of the late King of Scots was not made until St. John had been appointed to the office of warden of the western march in January 1300. He had certainly been granted them before the end of the year, since a grant of 11 September 1300 gave him lands and rents in England of the same value as those he held in Galloway which were still 'at war'<sup>75</sup>. There is no other event between 1298 and 1300 which could be construed as the 'good peace', since there was no truce and no campaign in 1299.

Sir Alexander's petition arose from the fact that Buittle, from which Kirkpatrick was held in chief, formed part of the grant to St. John, whose son was now claiming Sir Alexander's lands as an escheat. The latter was forfeited early in 1303, because he allowed the Scots to capture the new pele at Selkirk, which was in his charge. However, as early as 14 March 1303, the king ordered that Balliol was to be released from arrest and his lands and goods restored, having made an oath "to serve the king and his heirs faithfully in peace and war" and delivered his son, Thomas, as a hostage<sup>76</sup>. Sir Alexander, therefore, claimed that, since "the writer (Balliol) has been in seisin till now,

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72 This was the bastard son of the last Celtic lord of Galloway.

73 C.D.S., ii, no.1541.

74 Bain misread this as 'bone pais' providing great problems with dating the gift to St. John since only 1296 or 1304 could be described as a 'good peace'. Consultation with the original document (C47/22/9 m.43) showed, however, that the word in question was 'fete' not 'pais'.

75 C.D.S., ii, no.1153.

76 C.D.S., ii, no.1349; see Chapter Eight, p.223.

[he] prays the king to order a writ from chancery to Sir John to desist molesting him"<sup>77</sup>. There is, unfortunately, no minute of the king's reaction to this petition.

*Sir John de St. John v. the heir of Sir William Latimer*

A second piece of land belonging to St. John, namely Ardrossan, had been granted - at an unspecified date - to another of Edward's long-standing officials in Scotland, Sir William Latimer, senior. It was to be held of St. John and homage to the latter had duly been performed. Sir William died on 5 December 1304<sup>78</sup> and, according to St. John, junior:

"one Sir Thomas Latimer entered into Ardrossan not as son and heir but as a stranger, and without the petitioner's leave, whose bailiffs disputed his entry. Whereupon Sir Thomas went to court, and persuading the king that the lands were held in chief of him, tendered his homage in deceit of the court and to the petitioner's damage and prays remedy."<sup>79</sup>

This certainly proves that St. John was in active possession of these lands, since he had bailiffs there. As we have seen, his father had not been able to enjoy his Scottish lands in 1300. Although this petition claimed that St. John, senior, died seised in the land of Ardrossan in 1302, this, as we have already seen, does not mean that either he, or Sir William Latimer, senior, actually had possession of it. However, since an English garrison was established at Ayr in 1301<sup>80</sup>, it is possible that Ardrossan, some ten miles further north, was also in English hands.

The unusual feature of this case is that Sir Thomas Latimer was allowed by the court to take possession without an inquest of succession, perhaps indicating that the English administration of Scotland was still not working completely smoothly, even in 1304. Sir Thomas was not exactly 'a stranger', but the second son of Sir William<sup>81</sup>, and thus the latter was using his Scottish lands to endow his younger son.

St. John's claims to hold these lands in chief were upheld, and it was ordered that he should "distrain for the homage and services in arrear, according to the custom of these parts."<sup>82</sup> Distance from the king (and hence access to him) was always a crucial factor in the administration of property rights during the Middle Ages and those in Scotland, both the Scots themselves and English officials serving there, were therefore in a vulnerable position.

St. John may perhaps have been aware of this when he wrote to the king in 1302, immediately after his father's death, asking him to:

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<sup>77</sup> C.D.S., ii, no.1630.

<sup>78</sup> *Guisborough*, 363.

<sup>79</sup> C.D.S., ii, no.1615

<sup>80</sup> See Chapter Six, p.170.

<sup>81</sup> *The Knights of Edward I*, iii, 20.

<sup>82</sup> C.D.S., ii, no.1615.

"grant no writ of seisin to any one of his lands in Scotland, that is, Preston, Glasserton, or any others in the counties of Dumfries or Wigtown, which the king gave by charter to Sir John de St. John, his father, whose heir he is, until the petitioner is called to answer in court according to law<sup>83</sup>; as he is in the king's service and has a charter of warrandice of his said lands."<sup>84</sup>

Fortunately for Sir John de St. John, Sir Alexander Balliol and Sir Thomas Latimer, the original Scottish owner of their lands had been John Balliol, now settled on his family lands in France and never again to return to Scotland. The earl of Buchan once had a claim to part of the Balliol lands in Galloway but he had been given compensation for them in the north-east by King John before the beginning of the war and was concerned only with these new lands once he had returned to Edward's peace<sup>85</sup>. The submission terms granted in February 1304 thus affected Galloway, and the new lords there, much less than those claiming lands in the rest of Scotland.

#### Treatment of rebels who were slow to submit:

Although the submission agreement of February 1304 can be seen as territorially magnanimous, there is increasing evidence of Edward's exasperation with those rebels who were slow to take advantage of his forbearance. There was perhaps, also, a desire to extract as much from such laggards, before their inevitable submissions<sup>86</sup>, on behalf of both himself and those who had been rewarded with their lands now that the English administration was in a position to raise issues from Scotland.

#### *Lands of the earl of Buchan, Sir John Moubray, Andrew Charteris and Sir John Stirling*

Thus, on 14 March 1304, Sir Alexander Abernethy, the royal warden between the Forth and the Mounth, was ordered to levy the arrears of rents for the previous Martinmas term from the lands belonging to the forfeited earl of Buchan, which had been granted to Sir Henry Percy. Abernethy was similarly ordered, a week later, to levy the rents due to the earl of Warwick in his baillery<sup>87</sup>. Guy of Warwick had been granted the forfeited lands of Sir Geoffrey Moubray, Sir John Stirling and Andrew Charteris on 25 September 1298<sup>88</sup>.

In view of the case brought before the earl of Atholl, Edward's warden from the Forth to Orkney, in September 1304 regarding Sir Geoffrey Moubray's lands of Methven,

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83 That is, the holding of an inquest into his inheritance.

84 C.D.S., ii, no.1338.

85 C.D.S., ii, no.1541; see above, p.361.

86 Inevitable from Edward's point of view.

87 C.D.S., ii, no.1472; no.1476.

88 Palgrave, *Documents*, i, 202-204. Sir Geoffrey Moubray was now dead. His son, and heir, was Sir John Moubray.

which concerned the fact that the Scottish Guardian had been able to punish the earl of Strathearn, who remained at Edward's peace, for ravaging these lands<sup>89</sup>, it is extremely unlikely that the earl of Warwick had received much from Moubray's Scottish lands, at least before 1303.

Sir Henry Percy would have experienced even less success with the lands of the earl of Buchan, whose hold over the north-east was undoubtedly little affected by the English occupation of parts of southern Scotland until the campaign of 1303<sup>90</sup>. However, Percy may have received something from these lands for the Martinmas term of 1303, since the earl was abroad in France, returning to Scotland in May 1304 to make his submission. Sir James Dalilegh and Master John Weston received a total of £66 13s.4d. for the Whitsun term of 1304 as the farm of the thanage of Formartin, which belonged to Buchan. In the next term, however, Dalilegh and Weston received £16 for the farms from Buchan himself, now restored to Edward's peace<sup>91</sup>.

**Cases brought after February 1304:**      *Elena Prenderleith v. Sir John Wishart of the Carse*

The question of land restoration was further complicated by the claims of sub-tenants of rebellious Scots. On 31 September 1304 an inquest was held by twelve jurors<sup>92</sup> in the presence of the sheriff of Northumberland into 20 marks of the vill of Moneylaws in that county which Sir John Wishart of the Carse had granted to Elena Prenderleith for seven and a half years from 10 November 1295. Despite the writ of 3 September 1296, ordering the restoration of lands to the sub-tenants of those Scots in prison or who had not yet submitted<sup>93</sup>, Elena had only managed to hold the vill for six months before it was taken into the king's hands through Sir John's rebellion.

The jurors found that Moneylaws was still in the king's hands and Edward ordered that it was to remain there because Wishart had still not returned to his peace. Sir John did not, in fact, do so until his return to Scotland from France, along with Sir Ingram d'Umfraville and five others around October 1305<sup>94</sup>.

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89 See Chapter Nine, p.259-261.

90 See Chapter Nine, pp.230-2.

91 C.D.S., ii, p.438; p.440. The marked decrease between the two terms reflects the fact that the royal officials could take far more from the farms in the first term, because the earl's lands were forfeited, although presumably some of this money should have been handed over to Percy.

92 One of these jurors, Thomas Wetwode, had served in the Berwick garrison from 1298 to 1300 and the Peebles garrison in 1301.

93 C.D.S., ii, no.853. Elena was presumably related to Johanna Prenderleith, Sir John Wishart's wife [C.D.S., ii, no.628].

94 C.D.S., ii, no.1596; no.1696.



Edward had changed his mind, however, by 8 April 1305, on which date the sheriff of Northumberland was ordered to deliver the vill of Moneylaws to Elena "to hold until the end of the term for which it was demised to her by John Wishart". The king reserved his right to retain the vill in his hands, but agreed to let Elena have it because he wished to show her favour<sup>95</sup>.

### *Sir Robert Keith*

The confirmation of lands and other property as a condition of submission, even if this occurred before February 1304 and therefore in a period where there was less likely to be confusion, was no guarantee of actual possession.

Sir Robert Keith, the Scottish sheriff of Roxburgh, was captured by the English in August 1300, along with Sir Thomas Soules, Robert Baird, William Charteris and Laurence Ramsay. Having been moved from Carlisle to York for safer keeping, the order for his transfer to Bristol castle was issued on 4 October 1300. However, the account of Sir John Cambo<sup>96</sup>, sheriff of Northumberland for regnal year 30 [20 November 1301 - 19 November 1302] shows that Keith, along with Sir Thomas Soules, John Somerville and Christian Laird, were taken to Berwick at some point in that year and were presumably then released, having formally submitted to King Edward<sup>97</sup>.

Around 11 November [Martinmas] 1303, while the court was at Dunfermline, Sir Robert brought a petition before the king, concerning the ward and marriage of the two daughters of Andrew Crawford of Ayrshire, which Keith had bought from King John and in which wished to be confirmed again<sup>98</sup>. This ward and marriage was contested by Sir Neil Campbell, to whom it had been given while Sir Robert was still a rebel. The royal auditors, Sir John of Brittany, Sir Hugh Despenser, sir John Benstede and one unidentifiable other, were to deal with Sir Neil, using the bishop of Dunblane as an arbiter, if necessary. However, if they could not agree, the king was bound to Sir Robert.

The auditors prohibited Campbell from marrying the younger daughter until the royal Council had decided who should have the ward. However, Sir Neil went ahead with the marriage and was summoned before the Council for contempt. He declared that there was no contempt since the daughter was not in seisin at the date of the prohibition and

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95 C.C.R., 1302-1307, 257.

96 This Sir John Cambo was a native of Northumberland [*Knights of Edward I*, i, 175].

97 C.D.S., ii, no.1147; see Chapter Five, p.137; C.D.S., ii, no.1159; no.1602. Somerville and Laird had both been in English prisons since the battle of Dunbar in 1296 [C.D.S., ii, pp.177-8]. Their release could not have occurred any earlier than 28 January 1302, since the sheriff of Somerset was ordered to pay Christian Laird, currently in Corfe castle, the arrears of his wages [C.D.S., ii, no.1283]. Unfortunately the date cannot be established any more closely.

98 C.D.S., ii, p.425. This is despite the fact that he had been confirmed in all his lands and possessions at his submission.

the case was ordered to be put before a jury in the presence of the English guardian and chamberlain<sup>99</sup>. The findings of that jury have, unfortunately, not survived.

It is clear from this case that the rights of recently-submitted Scotsmen to less tangible property, such as a wardship and marriage, were protected in the same way as their rights to land. Conversely, those who had been rewarded for their service to the English king during the previous seven years might not even be allowed to retain gifts of feudal casualties forfeited from the Scots.

#### *The earl of Ross v. Sir Thomas Morham*

Similarly the earl of Ross, who was released from captivity in England in September 1303, thereafter becoming Edward's warden beyond the Spey<sup>100</sup>, had difficulty in gaining access to his wife's inheritance in the sheriffdom of Edinburgh, even though he had been given seisin of it on his submission. At some point after his forfeiture in 1296, these lands had been given to Sir Thomas Morham. Sir Thomas was unwilling to relinquish these lands, which had been granted to him as a reward for his service to Edward, and continued to uplift the farms and other issues after the earl had been given sasine. He also pulled down houses and caused other destruction. The sheriff of Edinburgh, Sir John Kingston, was ordered to stop Morham and to make amends to the earl<sup>101</sup>.

#### *Sir Edmund Comyn of Kilbride*

Sir Edmund Comyn of Kilbride also experienced difficulty in gaining repossession of all his lands. His lands in England had been granted to the earl of Norfolk on 13 April 1302. However, having been present with the Guardian at Strathord, Sir Edmund was granted the restoration of his English lands on 19 February 1304] and the order to the sheriffs of York, Northumberland, Essex and Hertford to execute this command was issued a month later<sup>102</sup>.

On 30 July 1304, however, the king was informed that Sir Edmund had not yet received seisin of his manor of Fakenham Aspes in Suffolk, because the earl Marshal still retained possession of it. Edward accordingly ordered "the treasurer and barons immediately to see that Edmund has his rights and that the earl have land or something else in lieu, to the same amount". This was done on 4 October 1304, after the earl had shown exactly how much he had received from Comyn's lands since 1302. The earl duly resigned the lands back to the king, "which in pursuance of an ordinance<sup>103</sup> made by the

99 C.D.S., ii, no.1406.

100 C.D.S., ii, no.1403; no.1669.

101 C.D.S., v, no.365.

102 C.P.R., 1301-1307, 29-30; C.D.S., ii, no.1456; C.C.R., 1302-1307, 129.

103 It is not clear what ordinance this is, but the king and his council may have made such an agreement before the first set of conditions for those wishing to return to his

king and council touching the lands of Scots taken in the king's hands by reason of the war, the king desires to deliver to the said Edmund." Lands in England amounting to the same value as those which he had just lost were then granted to Norfolk<sup>104</sup>.

By comparison with the case involving Lady Alice Beauchamp<sup>105</sup>, it is clear that compensation would be given only in special cases concerning nobles such as the earl Marshal, who were able, by their positions, to influence the king. It would have been quite impossible for Edward to have granted compensation to all those who had benefited from the lands of forfeited Scots, simply because he did not have recourse to enough land or money to do so. Perhaps these 'disinherited' accepted their losses as part of the fortunes of war. Nevertheless, it is perhaps more realistic to suggest that those, like Sir Thomas Morham, who had served Edward loyally in a long and costly war had good grounds for resentment when they found themselves deprived in favour of those against whom they had been struggling for eight years. The king may have been trying to restore the status quo of 1296, but he could not eradicate the memories and experiences of the intervening years.

#### Scottish laws and customs: *the Scottish chamberlain*

Some of the complaints which came before Edward in February 1305 stemmed from an ignorance of laws and customs peculiar to Scotland. For example, Sir John Sulleye, an Englishman, informed the king that:

"the people of Scotland ... say ... that the king's chamberlain does not have anything more than the robes of his office and half a mark which is owed for doing homage to the king, according to what he has had up till now, as was usual during the time of King Alexander..."

This must mean that when a Scot did homage to the king, he did it to the chamberlain, for the king, and paid him a fee of half a mark and a robe. The king accordingly ordered the chamberlain "to inquire into the usual customs of these parts in previous times"<sup>106</sup>. Edward was thus not unwilling to maintain such laws and customs, providing that they were not contrary to the way in which he wished to govern Scotland.

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peace was sent by Edward to his negotiators at Perth in January 1304 [Palgrave, *Documents*, i, 278-9].

104 C.P.R., 1301-1307, 261-2.

105 See above, pp.357-8.

106 *Memo. de Parl.*, no.384.

### *Sir Donald MacCan*

Although no definitive statement was ever made by Edward on the status of Scotland, there was obviously no longer a king of Scots. Since the English king had assumed the rights of the kings of Scots, part of his interest in protecting Scottish custom stemmed from a desire to protect the rights pertaining to the Scottish crown<sup>107</sup>.

Thus Sir Donald MacCan, who had been granted royal land in the sheriffdom of Ayr worth £10 worth annually by King John, "to the diminution of his crown and against the custom of that realm, for which reason the said lands were taken into the king's hands", was henceforth to receive £10 annually from the Scottish exchequer. Unfortunately, Sir Donald found that the Scottish chamberlain would not issue him this £10 at Berwick without a warrant and he petitioned the king for such a document in the February parliament of 1305. On 2 November 1305 a warrant was issued to the chamberlain to pay 100s. of the £10 due to MacCan on 6 June and four days later another was sent to Berwick, ordering the £10 to be paid half-yearly from henceforth<sup>108</sup>.

### *The sheriffdom of Selkirk*

Edward's belief that the English administration had finally succeeded in bringing back 'normality' to Scotland by 1305 is illustrated by an inquest which took place at Peebles on 21 June 1305 before Sir John Segrave, the warden south of the Forth. In response to a petition brought by Isabella Synton and Sir Edward Keith, her husband, in the parliament of February 1305, twelve jurors were ordered to investigate their claim to the heritable sheriffdom of Selkirk, granted to the Syntons by King William the Lion<sup>109</sup>.

The inquest found that Isabella was heir to her brother, Andrew Synton, who had held the sheriffdom of Selkirk until he was captured at Dunbar and imprisoned in Fotheringay, where he died. "Full justice" was thereafter delivered to Isabella as a result of this inquest. The heritable sheriff of Selkirk was answerable to the king for the issues of the sheriffdom and was also freed from the farm of the castle ward of Roxburgh and suit thereto<sup>110</sup>.

The re-establishment of rights to heritable sheriffdoms, which can also be seen in the ordinances for the settlement of Scotland of September 1305<sup>111</sup> is again a symptom of Edward's desire to please his Scottish subjects by respecting - so long as he did not

107 See Prestwich, *Edward I*, 475-6. A further discussion of Edward's attitude towards Scottish laws and customs is given in Chapter Seventeen, p.395.

108 *C.P.R.*, 1301-1307, 337; *Memo. de Parl.*, no.386.

109 *Memo. de Parl.*, no.268. Keith's elder brother, Sir Robert, had been appointed warden of Selkirk forest by the rebel Guardians in August 1299 [*C.D.S.*, ii, no.1978], perhaps in view of this claim [see Chapter Four, pp.101-2].

110 *C.D.S.*, ii, no.1681.

111 *C.D.S.*, ii, no.1691; see **Table 10**.

regard it as detrimental to his own vision of a Scottish administration - their traditional rights and customs.

*The earl of Carrick's privileges in Annandale*

One of the most important examples of the questioning of traditional rights occurred after an inquest held on 31 August 1304. A jury of twenty-four men, seven of whom were knights, from the sheriffdoms of Roxburgh and Dumfries were ordered to inquire into "the privileges claimed by Robert Bruce, (VIII) earl of Carrick, in Annandale", following the death of his father shortly before 4 April 1304<sup>112</sup>. The presiding officers were to be Sir Matthew Redmayne, the English keeper of Dumfries castle and sheriff, and Sir John Lucy, the sheriff of Cumberland. Apart from the use of an English sheriff, this inquest was therefore in keeping with normal procedure but the jury's findings provided the king with a dilemma.

It was found that the earl had the following rights in Annandale:

"... that no sheriff of Dumfries or other servant of the king or his ancestors may enter the bounds of Annandale to make attachments, summonses, or distrains, nor have they done so for time beyond memory; but that the king may choose a coroner from one of the earl's homagers in Annandale and issue writs to him direct, who shall represent and answer to the king and his justice of Lothian at Dumfries; that the earl has these liberties by the title of antiquity, that is, from the time of William, king of Scotland and all his successors uninterruptedly till this day."<sup>113</sup>

This is indeed a fair interpretation of King William's charter to the Bruces of around 1172<sup>114</sup>.

The use of the word 'uninterruptedly' was not strictly accurate since Bruce's father, who remained lord of Annandale until his death, having relinquished the earldom of Carrick to his son and heir, had not even been able to gain access to his castle of Lochmaben, the caput of Annandale, since 1296<sup>115</sup>.

On 26 October 1304 the result of this inquest was sent by Edward to the English chancellor in order that the latter might deliberate its contents, with the rest of the royal council, and advise the king. This suggests that just because Carrick and his ancestors were used to having these privileges under the kings of Scots, Edward would not necessarily allow them to continue if he felt that they were detrimental his own rights.

Unfortunately there is no indication of the final outcome of this case, although the fact that the earl sent another petition to the king in November 1304 on the same subject

<sup>112</sup> C.D.S., ii, no.1493.

<sup>113</sup> C.D.S., ii, no.1589.

<sup>114</sup> R.R.S., ii, no.80, 178-9.

<sup>115</sup> C.D.S., iv., no.376 (2); see Chapter Eleven, p.287.

indicates that he was very keen to gain confirmation of his rights<sup>116</sup>. Although Carrick was clearly not contemplating immediate rebellion, the questioning of his traditional privileges in Annandale may have been on the list of grievances which led him to seek the throne in 1306.

Despite the fine rhetoric on the subject of the rights of the Scottish crown and Scottish customs used to MacCan, Edward's true feelings are illustrated more clearly in this last case: the English king was not prepared to allow established custom to continue if he felt that it was prejudicial to his own position<sup>117</sup>. Edward undoubtedly cared less about Scottish customs than he did about his own royal dignity, which the conquest of Scotland was intended to augment.

### The parliament of February 1305:

The cases examined in the parliament held at Westminster in February 1305 were presented by Scots from varying social backgrounds. The commonest complaint, no matter what the background, was difficulty in gaining possession of lands despite confirmation at submission.

#### *Sir Richard le Marshal*

Sir Richard le Marshal and his father, Sir David, sought confirmation of a grant of land from the latter to the former. This would seem to be a recent grant, made after Sir David had been confirmed in his Scottish lands. Sir Richard was a member of Edward's household and had served the king faithfully in Scotland since 1299, after his capture at Dunbar<sup>118</sup>. The grant was confirmed and a writ was ordered to be sent from the chancellor of England to the chancellor of Scotland to be made into a charter<sup>119</sup>. This time-consuming dependence of the Scottish chancery on its English counterpart, caused by the need to get the king's approval, can be seen in various cases of this kind, exposing the lack of independence of the separate Scottish administration. Many Scots must surely have found this frustrating.

#### *John Kincalteny, Duncan of Mar, William of Dundee, Sir John Moubray, Margaret Soules*

John Kincalteny (Kincaldrum, in Tayside) petitioned the king because he was "unjustly detained outwith possession of seisin of the thanage of Kincalteny.." Duncan of Mar and his wife Margaret were similarly "unjustly detained from seisin of lands ... called Loghlande (Lochlands, in Tayside)". William of Dundee, a clerk, requested to be

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116 C.D.S., ii, no.1604.

117 See above, p.368.

118 See above, p.354.

119 Memo. de Parl., no.304.

reseised in a grant of 40 quarters of wheat in Berwickshire, "which he used to be able to receive before the war". Sir John Moubray sought restitution of his lands of Glendogher (Glendochart), having been evicted by royal ministers. Margaret Soules had been similarly prevented from enjoying her dower lands in Liddesdale by Sir John Wake, lord of Liddel<sup>120</sup>.

### *The chancellor of Scotland*

There was even a petition from Edward's Scottish chancellor, William Bevercotes. He informed the king:

"that other chancellors, his predecessors, who have been given the office of chancellor of the land of Scotland have been given in their office in the king's name all the hospitals which were vacant and in the king's gift in the land of Scotland."

He therefore asked that he should be similarly endowed. The lieutenant was ordered to inquire "as to what was usual in the times of the Kings of Scots"<sup>121</sup>.

Such a petition indicates a desire, on the part of both Edward and his ministers, for continuity from Alexander III in the Scottish administration. Although Scotland was ultimately governed from Westminster, the northern kingdom was allowed to retain its native administration, albeit with a considerable number of English administrators.

Such petitions were all a necessary part of the process of re-establishment and even though the Scots involved must have found it frustrating to have to petition and sometimes litigate in order to gain entry to lands in which they had already been seised, the intention was clearly that they should recover all property held in 1296.

### **Cases outstanding from the pre-1296 period:**

Two petitions to Edward refer to cases which dated from the reign of King John and before. A merchant from Thornham in England sought restitution of £200 from the men of Inverkeithing in Fife for seizing his boat when it was swept into their harbour during a storm, killing its crew and making off with its goods "before the beginning of the Scottish war"<sup>122</sup>.

The other case concerned the marriage of Margaret Collanstone which had been wrongly granted twice by King Alexander. William Cromelyn, to whom the marriage had been given first, now sought restitution of Margaret's dower lands which were in Edward's hands, because King Alexander had died while the case was being

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120 *Memo. de Parl.*, no.314; no.315; no.324; no.394; no.395.

121 *Memo. de Parl.*, no.323.

122 *Memo. de Parl.*, no.378.

adjudicated<sup>123</sup>. These two cases are odd, in that there should have been opportunity for justice to be done even under King John. It is most likely that judgement after previous inquests had gone against these two petitioners and that they were both trying their luck with King Edward. Nonetheless, such opportunism suggests that the English hold over Scotland was regarded as secure enough to be worth taking such action.

#### Petitions from towns:

Not all petitions presented at the parliament of February 1305 came from individual landowners. Several were sent on behalf of the burgesses of Scotland and particular towns. The general concern of the Scottish burgesses, as with the Scottish church, was to receive a guarantee that their liberties and laws would be maintained<sup>124</sup>. Combined action provided the burghs with effective political clout.

One of these petitions sought to remedy the meddling of sheriffs and other royal officials in burgh affairs "since [the burgesses] are heedful and responsible to their chamberlain". This is the first example of a recurring burghal concern. The organisation of the burghs under the chamberlain, who was originally a royal officer, was different from that in England, but again Edward was quite happy for this system to continue. There is no mention, even after 1303, of the Court of the Four Burghs, which usually dealt with burghal affairs under the direction of the Chamberlain. Perhaps the burghs themselves did not want it revived.

It was also requested that the monopoly of the burghs with regard to the holding of markets should be maintained "as was usual before this time" and that only the king, his lieutenant or the chamberlain should be permitted to make any financial demand of the burgesses.

This petition also asked the king to ordain against "various tallages and customs" imposed on the merchandise belonging to the other burghs by the burgesses of Berwick and Roxburgh, "when they are freely enfeoffed and have a franchise and quit of such tallages"<sup>125</sup>. The towns of Berwick and Roxburgh both had a number of English burgesses permanently resident in the town<sup>126</sup> and this petition may have been aimed at them.

However burgesses of Roxburgh "from the nation of England" had their own complaint to make, asserting that they were hindered from carrying out their business by the "burgesses of that town from the nation of Scotland". They asked Edward to confirm:

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123 *Memo. de Parl.*, no.401.

124 *Memo. de Parl.*, no.333.

125 *Memo. de Parl.*, no.383.

126 In the case of Roxburgh, the English burgesses had been there prior to the war; in the case of Berwick, some had probably also resided there before 1296, but the majority were introduced by Edward himself [Chapter Fourteen, p.328].



"charters which they have from the kings of Scots, or to enfeoff them in the same way as burgesses from Berwick have been enfeoffed and so that they can hold the said town from the king in fee for the true value of same and to choose from among them a mayor."

This is a reference to the charter of privileges granted by Edward I to the burgesses of Berwick in 1302<sup>127</sup>. No such charter is known to have been issued for Roxburgh.

It would appear, from a petition from the burgesses of Perth, that towns, as well as individuals, had been able to take advantage of the unsettled state of Scotland to advance their own interests. According to the petition, the burgesses of Dundee had:

"attracted certain profits which belong by right to the town of Perth and now are endeavouring to harm them in other ways, as far as they can."<sup>128</sup>

The problem stemmed from the fact that the burgesses of Perth claimed that all ships entering the Tay had to bring their cargoes to Perth, unless they were ships belonging to Dundee merchants. This right would have been very difficult to enforce during troubled times and it would appear that the Dundee merchants had managed to insist that ships stop there. Perth and Dundee had certainly been outwith any English control between 1296 and 1303. Dundee's opportunism was thus, perhaps, encouraged by the power vacuum created by the fact that neither Edward nor the Guardians governed Scotland as a whole. After 1303, Edward clearly had to beware of those trying to take advantage of the fact that he and his chancery were not yet particularly well-versed in Scottish law and custom.

#### **Petition of the king's husbandmen:**

Many of the above petitions were concerned with the retention of laws, customs and privileges which were particular to Scotland. One petition, however, shows that at least one section of the Scottish community was prepared to take advantage of the changed political situation to demand an improvement in their position. These were 'the king's husbandmen' in Scotland<sup>129</sup>, who sought:

"that it be conceded to them that they can hold the king's lands in Scotland in the way that they do in England so that they are not removed from year to year..."

The lieutenant and chamberlain were ordered to investigate "what would be to the king's profit (in this case)", but unfortunately there is no record of what they decided<sup>130</sup>.

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<sup>127</sup> *Memo. de Parl.*, no.319; Chapter Fourteen, pp.332-3.

<sup>128</sup> *Memo. de Parl.*, no.310.

<sup>129</sup> Husbandmen can be described as peasants: they had their own holdings but worked their lord's land (in this case, the royal demesne).

<sup>130</sup> *Memo. de Parl.*, no.400.

Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of this petition is the fact that these husbandmen had combined as a group to present this petition and were aware of the situation enjoyed by their counterparts on the English royal demesne. It is also clear that English influences were not always unwelcome.

#### **The new attraction of offices in Scotland:**

Further evidence for a contemporary belief that Edward's conquest of Scotland was now finally accomplished can also be found in petitions to the king from those who served him in Scotland. Much of this chapter has been concerned with how such officials, both English and Scottish, were treated.

It was established that grants of lands of forfeited Scots were used to encourage such officials to continue to serve in Scotland by providing them with a vested interest there. Such gifts were also intended to off-set the expenses which they would also undoubtedly incur from their own pocket. As Sir Brian fitz Alan illustrated in 1297, a private income was a necessity for those seeking positions of authority<sup>131</sup>.

However, these land grants were not very effective in establishing such a commitment since the lands were often controlled by rebel Scots (i.e., their original owners) and were certainly given back to these original owners whenever they submitted. Edward had thus faced considerable difficulty in persuading men of sufficient quality to become his sheriffs and garrison commanders and often had to take what he could get. This perhaps explains why Sir Simon Fraser, Edward's keeper of Selkirk Forest (1298-1300), was retained in this office, despite serious doubts about his loyalty, which were later proved to be well-founded, expressed to the king by the sheriff of Edinburgh, Sir John Kingston, as early as 1299 - there was no-one else willing to take on the position at that time!

This no longer appears to be true in 1305. Instead, Edward was faced with requests for offices and lands in Scotland, some from men who had held positions there during the previous decade and others from those who had merely performed their duty on campaign. Scotland had now become a land of opportunity instead of a place of exile for those forced to serve there.

Richard Vigrous, a burgher of Roxburgh and member of the garrison there since 1298, requested a grant of land for his services. Another Scot, Margaret of Hawick, sought confirmation of lands conceded for service to Edward to her father, possibly Ralph of Hawick, who served in the Roxburgh garrison in 1302. Geoffrey Ampelford, a member of the royal household and also part of the Roxburgh garrison in 1303, requested the constabulary of Berwick or Dundee. John Cave, the royal clerk in charge of victuals

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<sup>131</sup> See Chapter One, p.43.

at Glasgow and Kirkintilloch, petitioned the king for the lands of Dalile in Lanarkshire<sup>132</sup>.

Others who had no great previous experience of Scotland now sought positions of responsibility there. John Perraunt requested the constabulary of Berwick castle. John Cunningham asked to be coroner of Lothian, an office which had not been filled in the previous decade. Thomas Cotingham, another member of the royal household, sought "possession of things pertaining to the custody of the gate of Stirling"<sup>133</sup>.

These offices brought in little or no salary. However, the fees and issues which pertained to them could often be valuable. This suggests not only that Scotland was regarded as a land of potential, but that the financial machinery was once more in place to enable Edward's officers to make the most of their positions in a way that was not seen even in 1296.

### Complaints against Edward's officials: *Sir Matthew Redmayne*

However, the fine line between 'making the most' of an office and downright corruption was a fine one. Around April 1304, a series of complaints, mainly of extortion, were made against Sir Matthew Redmayne, Edward's sheriff of Dumfries, by several inhabitants of his sherrifdom. For example, it was claimed that:

"though the king, of his grace, gave to William [Jargun]<sup>134</sup> and other good men of Dumfries seisin of their land, Sir William, by duress, extorted fines from them, some one mark and others more or less, for getting possession."

There is no official record of Sir Matthew's appointment as constable and sheriff of Dumfries, but it was perhaps made in September 1303, when Sir John Botetourt and the earl of Carrick appointed sheriffs and other officials in the sherrifdoms of Linlithgow, Lanark and Peebles<sup>135</sup>.

Jargun was claiming that payments were extorted from the men of Dumfries in order to regain possession of their lands after submitting to King Edward. Redmayne and his officials were also accused of seeking "to grieve and distress the poor people by tallages", though it should be noted that any tax which was not popular, no matter how lawful or customary, was described as a tallage. The sheriff had also acquired the lands of John Heytone and Matthew Terregles in the county by various dubious methods, including 'champerty', or bribery, another pejorative term. The lieutenant, the chamberlain, James Dalilegh and the warden of the Hospital of St. John (some of whose

<sup>132</sup> *Memo. de Parl.*, no.294; no.349; *C.D.S.*, ii, nos. 1686, 1921; *Memo. de Parl.*, no.337.

<sup>133</sup> *Memo. de Parl.*, no.338; no.339; no.372.

<sup>134</sup> William Jargun, a burgess of Dumfries, was mentioned in the findings of the inquest looking into the lands held by Sir John Soules from Sir Ingram de Guines [above, p.354].

<sup>135</sup> E101/11/19, m.4; see above, p.348.

lands were contested) were ordered to hear the case. Again, there is no record of their findings which would have provided us with evidence of Edward's attitude towards such behaviour on the part of his officials<sup>136</sup>.

Since Redmayne was accused of taking carts, corn and beasts, some of which were used for the king's work, and imposing tallages, which were presumably also on Edward's behalf, many of these complaints appear to have resulted from the execution of his duties of sheriff. Others, however, undoubtedly arose from an abuse of his position. The activities of over-zealous officials are naturally unpopular, but they become even more resented when they are done in the name of what is regarded as a foreign regime.

#### *Sir James Dalilegh and Master John Weston*

This was certainly true when James Dalilegh and John Weston were appointed by Edward in 1304 to go round Scotland investigating the extent of royal lands and revenues. A number of complaints at their activities were addressed to the king.

The abbot and convent of Jedburgh, for example, wrote to Edward in that year, defending the rights of their daughter-church of Restenneth, near Forfar, which was seised in certain revenues of the towns of Forfar and Montrose, of the sheriffdom of Forfar, of the royal demesne lands and escheats of "justiciary and sheriffdom, according to their charters from the time and by the gift of King Malcolm, till now, that they have been ejected by Master John Weston and sir James Dalilegh, and since by Sir John Sandale (the chamberlain)". As we might expect, these claims were upheld by the king<sup>137</sup>.

Sir Reginald Cheyne, one of Edward's officials in the north-east, was also ejected by Dalilegh and Weston from "a little land called Drum, in the county of Elgin which was worth only £10 per year", despite "the great injury and loss which he has suffered by reason of his loyalty given on his part to the king who now is"<sup>138</sup>. At least Dalilegh and Weston could not be accused of showing favour.

There are many other examples of Edward's officials preventing revenues, in particular, from being restored to those who had previously held them. The bishop of Aberdeen, for example, had to write to the king in 1305, showing him that:

"... his church and his predecessors have been in full seisin in King Alexander's time, and in his own, and beyond the memory of men of his second teinds, and the king had warranted them against disturbance by letters to the warden of Scotland beyond the mountains and his sheriffs of

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<sup>136</sup> C.D.S., ii, no.1526.

<sup>137</sup> C.D.S., ii, no.1724; *Memo. de Parl.*, no.382, no.385. See *R.R.S.*, i, no.195, 231-2 for the confirmation by King Malcolm of St. Peter's church of Restenneth to Jedburgh abbey.

<sup>138</sup> *Memo. de Parl.*, no.305. This does not, of course, prove that Cheyne was legally entitled to hold this land.

Aberdeen and Banff; but the present Chamberlain will not let him have them without a new order from the king."<sup>139</sup>

The previous orders had been issued not earlier than late 1303.

Part of the problem for the churches of Restenneth and Aberdeen was that Dalilegh and Weston had to rely on local informants, who were naturally hostile to the paying of these teinds, when making their survey. Nevertheless, in the case of the bishop of Aberdeen, a letter of warrant from the king should surely have been enough.

### *Sir Duncan Frendraught*

It was not only officials of English origin who experienced resentment, suggesting that it was Edward's administration as a whole that did not meet with approval. Sir Alexander Comyn, Edward's only official in the north during the period 1297-1303, was certainly aware of considerable resentment against him<sup>140</sup>.

Another Scot appointed as a royal official in the north-east who was unpopular with those under his jurisdiction was Sir Duncan Frendraught, the sheriff of Banff. Frendraught had been one of those present at the earl of Buchan's court in 1300 but there is no indication as to when exactly he submitted<sup>141</sup>.

In February 1305 he was accused by Hamelyn Troup, junior, of attacking his lands of Fyndone, burning his home, capturing his men and making off with the goods of himself and his father. Frendraught was also reputed to have maintained "evil-doers and robbers" within the regality of the abbey of Arbroath, from where they attacked Thomas le Grant, "..and after committing this felony, the same evil-doers stayed with the same sheriff in the same regality .... so that from men staying in said abbey's liberty, justice could not be had". Sir Reginald Cheyne, junior, who was based in Elgin and appointed as joint-justice beyond the Mountains in September 1305, was also named as an associate of Frendraught<sup>142</sup>.

The essential point to be deduced from these examples is that even though Edward behaved justly towards his Scottish subjects, and intended his officers in Scotland to behave in the same way (though they did not always live up to this), there were certain natural conflicts of interest which were even more resented because the Scots regarded Edward's government as an imposition. Many of these conflicts arose from a desire on the part of Edward's officers - as was expected of them by their royal master - to serve him as efficiently as possible, whether or not that meant offending the Scots.

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<sup>139</sup> C.D.S., ii, no.1729.

<sup>140</sup> See Chapter Nine, p.253.

<sup>141</sup> See Chapter Nine, p.253. He was probably appointed as Edward's sheriff of Banff in 1303.

<sup>142</sup> *Memo. de Parl.*, nos.287-8; C.D.S., ii, p.443, no.1691; *Memo. de Parl.*, no.389.

### Cases involving the Scottish church:

As with lay patronage, Edward's ecclesiastical patronage was often limited to little more than a declaration of intention. There were thus many cases of double presentations to a single benefice - one made by the king and another by the Scottish Guardians. Scottish clerics also experienced problems in trying to retain their rights to benefices when they had done nothing to deserve removal. Those in the lower reaches of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, the parish priests and chaplains perhaps felt that they were in the worst position, often caught between two conflicting parties.

#### *The abbot and convent of Paisley*

A case concerning the abbot and convent of Paisley provides evidence of just such a situation. On 4 October 1301 the abbot had received letters from the king requesting them to present sir Robert, chaplain of the earl of Lennox, to the vacant vicarage of Kilpatrick.

Unfortunately, two weeks previously, they had presented another vicar, "as sir Robert was not then at the king's peace, and had been taken and attached by John called Marischal, the baillie of that county, wherefore they dared not provide him"<sup>143</sup>. John Marshal was baillie of the earl of Lincoln, in the latter's lands of Renfrew and Strathgryfe. The abbot and convent were therefore caught in the middle - they could not have presented a rebel to the benefice in the first place, but now they were in the position of having rejected, unwittingly, the royal candidate.

#### *Duncan Karr v. sir Ralph Manton*

The rights of a royal candidate were also questioned in a letter sent between 1300 and 1303 by Duncan Karr, rector of the church of Bothwell, to Ralph Manton, Edward's cofferer, concerning their conflicting claims to this church.

The parson of Bothwell church in 1296 was David Murray, later appointed to the bishopric of Moray by the Guardians, Comyn and Carrick. His 'rebellion' presumably justified the presentation of Manton to the benefice in July 1298. Since Sir William Murray did not die until 1300, Duncan Karr had presumably been presented by the former in 1298. The royal presentation was made illegally, according to Karr, because Sir William "did not suffer forfeiture in his life, nor died dispossessed". Karr therefore requested Manton "to consider these things to allow him to hold the church in peace"<sup>144</sup>.

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<sup>143</sup> C.D.S., ii, no.1238.

<sup>144</sup> C.D.S., ii, p.212; Barrow, Bruce, 116; C.D.S., ii, no.1023; C.D.S., v, no.343.

The question of Sir William Murray's forfeiture has already been discussed with reference to the gift of the castle and barony of Bothwell made to Sir Aymer de Valence in August 1301<sup>145</sup>. In both these cases, Edward seems to have used the general forfeiture applied to Scots before they submitted in 1296 as the justification for using Bothwell as patronage, even though there is much evidence to show that Sir William was restored to his lands and property shortly thereafter. This helps to counterbalance the picture of Edward as consistently generous to the Scots when dealing with questions of land and property: this generosity was calculated to bind the Scots to him and the king had no scruples about high-handed behaviour if it suited his purpose better.

#### *Bernard of Ipswich v. Hamo Felton*

Ecclesiastics with access to the king were also guilty of attempting to gain advancement under false pretences, even if this meant evicting another Englishman. On 9 August 1302 the presentation of Hamo Felton to a church in Nithsdale was revoked since it was established that Bernard of Ipswich, "who was admitted thereto by the diocesan [the bishop of Glasgow] and possessed it peaceably, is still alive and not dead, as was falsely suggested by the said Hamo"<sup>146</sup>. Both these clerics were English.

Two years later, however, in February 1304, Bernard of Ipswich was still "hindered from possession" of his church. Though it is not stated who was causing this hindrance, it is quite likely to have been Hamo Felton. The English chancellor was ordered "to hear Bernard's case and see what can be done"<sup>147</sup>.

#### *Henry the chaplain*

It was not only English clerks who suffered. Henry the chaplain, a native of the county of Jedburgh<sup>148</sup>, was ousted from the church of Newyth by William Wallace, presumably for having done homage to Edward. Wallace then installed some of his own clerks. It was had not been worth Henry's while to take action until the parliament of February 1305, when he petitioned Edward to get his benefice back<sup>149</sup>.

Church lands and revenues, as with lands belonging to laymen, caused much litigation in the royal courts before they were completely restored to those holding them in 1296. It is also clear that, in many cases, the war had taken a great toll on church property and revenues and many churchmen welcomed the protection offered to them by the English king. Thus, when each church or religious house petitioned the king to be

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145 C.D.S., ii, no.1214; see Chapter Six, p.171.

146 C.P.R., 1301-1307, 30 Ed.1, m.13.

147 C.D.S., ii, no.1454.

148 C.D.S., ii, p.199.

149 *Memo. de Parl.*, no.309.

re-seised in their lands and revenues, they also asked Edward to take them into his protection and maintain them<sup>150</sup>. Such an attitude was perhaps true of many other citizens of Scotland.

### 'Colonialism':

In his article, 'Colonial Scotland: The English in Scotland under Edward I', Professor Prestwich has written on the subject of Edward's policy towards the granting of lands to his supporters. In contradicting the view of the chronicler Pierre Langtoft that the English king's lack of generosity in dispensing patronage during the Scottish wars was responsible for his inability to hold the northern kingdom, Prestwich states that:

"Edward was much less ungenerous in the case of Scotland than he had been in Wales, and the danger in his policy was less that English magnates would be discontented at receiving inadequate rewards for service, than the alienation of the Scottish nobles whom the king was anxious to win over to his cause"<sup>151</sup>.

This synopsis is correct - in theory. Edward's grants of Scottish lands to his supporters were indeed numerous - the fact that fifty-one of these grantees were required to provide men-at-arms for the Scottish garrisons illustrates this<sup>152</sup>, and there were others who received lesser landholdings. However, it is quite clear from the cases described above that many of these grantees never gained access to their lands, or, if they did, were in possession for only a short space of time.

The Scottish nobility whose lands formed this potential patronage had little reason to feel alienated. In the first place, it would have been quite extraordinary if Edward had not passed sentences of forfeiture against those whom he regarded as rebellious vassals; secondly, as we have said, in most cases this forfeiture was a mere technicality since those owning lands beyond the south-east generally retained possession of them. Those with the most justification for feeling alienated were Edward's supporters who had spent six years fighting the Scots, only to lose any reward they might have been granted in the meantime when the majority of 'the enemy' submitted in 1304. In addition, as the petition submitted by Sir Edmund Comyn of Kilbride illustrates, Edward was aware of the need to restore to their property in both England and Scotland those who returned to his peace as quickly as possible, to minimise any potential resentment on the part of the Scots at least.

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150 *Memo. de Parl.*, nos.280, 283, 303, 362, 398.

151 M.C. Prestwich, 'Colonial Scotland: The English in Scotland under Edward I', *Scotland and England 1286-1815*, ed. R. Mason, 7-8.

152 See Chapter Seven, p.202.



Thus, although Edward's grants look good on paper, they actually amounted to very little. In addition, the barrage of petitions for lands and offices addressed to the king after the second conquest of 1303-4 makes it quite clear that only then was it regarded as worthwhile to make such requests. Any policy of colonialism, "in a broad sense of conquest, expropriation, exploitation and settlement"<sup>153</sup>, was restricted to the town-planning exercise at Berwick.

### Sir William Wallace:

In the cases described above, it is clear that if there was resentment over Edward's behaviour, it is more likely to have been felt by those who had supported him during the war, rather than those who were now submitting. However, this should not be taken to mean that the English king had now become a Scotophile. Edward undoubtedly restrained his more natural instincts to punish the Scots far more severely - a restraint which is evident during the early stages of the surrender negotiations particularly<sup>154</sup> - in order to win their gratitude and acceptance. Having recognised that the question of land ownership was the key to that acceptance, he made a major effort, as we have seen, to ensure that the Scots had little cause for complaint.

The proof that this was 'statesmanlike' restraint lies with the treatment of Sir William Wallace. According to Langtoft, Wallace and Fraser sought to come to Edward's peace some time in 1303, but did not turn up on the appointed day to make their submissions. At some point after Christmas 1303, Wallace again apparently sought to come to Edward's peace "without surrendering into his hands body or head" and also requested "an honourable allowance of woods and cattle", a request which Edward angrily refused<sup>155</sup>. With regard to the veracity of these offers to surrender, Andrew Fisher states that "the Wallace we read of here ... is neither the Wallace of history nor of tradition"<sup>156</sup>. It would certainly have been uncharacteristic of both Wallace and Fraser to have offered to submit before the general peace was agreed with Sir John Comyn, although it would do Sir William no dishonour to suggest that, thereafter, he may have offered to surrender - on terms - as the chronicler suggests.

In any event, the terms of submission made with Comyn allowed all Scots to come to Edward's peace without fear of execution, imprisonment or loss of lands, with varying categories of penalties for those who had offended the English king most deeply. All, that is, except for Sir William Wallace, who was to "place himself in the will and grace of the king, if it seems good to him"<sup>157</sup>. Although Edward could have claimed that

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153 M.C. Prestwich, 'Colonial Scotland: The English in Scotland under Edward 1', *Scotland and England 1286-1815*, ed. R. Mason, (Edinburgh, 1987), 6.

154 See Chapter Fifteen, p.337.

155 Langtoft, ii, 351, 353.

156 A. Fisher, *William Wallace*, 109.

157 See Chapter Fifteen, n.24.

he would have been merciful if Wallace had complied, the latter had no reason to believe that he would have escaped with his life.

At the parliament held at St. Andrews in March 1304, Wallace, together with the other Scots who had not yet submitted, were declared outlaws<sup>158</sup>. It was probably at this parliament, also, that a grant was made to a person, described as the king's "dear valet", of "all goods and chattels of whatever kind he may gain from Sir William Wallace, the king's enemy". Though the place and date of the document is obscured at the end, enough remains to suggest that it was issued at St. Andrews.

The name of the beneficiary was first written as Edward Bruce, but this surname was deleted and that of Keith substituted<sup>159</sup>. There is no other mention of Edward Keith, Sir Robert Keith's brother, as a royal valet but there are two pieces of evidence which show beyond doubt that Edward Bruce was a member of the household of the prince of Wales, whom he most probably served in Scotland over the winter of 1303-4. In November 1303 payment was made at Dunfermline in a household account for money owed to Edward Bruce<sup>160</sup>, proving that he was a member of a royal household. However, an entry for 6 April 1304 in the controller's roll for the household of the prince of Wales, when the latter was at Cupar, reads:

"For the obsequies here of a companion of Edward de Brus, by the order of the Prince's council, 8 lbs. of wax." 161

There is perhaps nothing sinister about the change of beneficiary of this grant. However, the fact that the younger Bruces do not appear to have been rewarded with property or offices for their early detachment from the 'rebel' cause, unlike other Scots who returned to Edward's peace at a later date<sup>162</sup>, suggests, perhaps, that the English king was now seeking to distance himself from a family whose aspirations to the throne of Scotland might have seemed more hopeful due to the complete failure of the cause of John Balliol. However, it is undoubtedly fortunate for the reputation of the future patriotic hero, King Robert I, that his brother did not profit at the expense of William Wallace!

After the fall of Stirling Castle to Edward in July 1304, Wallace's capture was the next major item on Edward's agenda. On 8 August, instructions were issued to various Scots, including Sir Simon Fraser, ordering them to 'exert themselves' in bringing this about<sup>163</sup>. Edward's desire to make these recent rebels, including some who had fought alongside Wallace only months before, responsible for his capture does seem 'disgraceful'

158 Trivet, *Annales*, ed. T. Hog, 402.

159 C.D.S., ii, no.1424.

160 E101/364/13, m.96.

161 C.D.S., ii, no.1516.

162 Sir Alexander Abernethy, Edward's warden between the Forth and the Mounth after the former's submission c.1303, is a good example.

163 Palgrave, *Documents*, i, 276. It is not at all clear when exactly Fraser submitted and, indeed, it is only his inclusion in these instructions which prove that he had come to Edward's peace before, or during, the siege of Stirling.

to the modern conscience<sup>164</sup>. However, it seems to have been most important to Edward that the Scots were with him at each step of the way towards the final settlement of Scotland.

The last mention of Wallace before his capture was in September 1304, when Thomas Umfraville, the constable at Dundee, and other members of that garrison gave chase to him 'beneath' Ironside (Yrenside; OS NO4041), a hill behind Dundee<sup>165</sup>. On 3 August 1305 he was captured by men of the keeper of Dumbarton, Sir John Menteith, near Glasgow. A mere twenty days later, Wallace was brought to 'trial' and executed at Smithfield. The charges brought against him can also be read as a list of his successes, particularly with regard to the holding of Scottish parliaments and the maintenance of the Franco-Scottish alliance<sup>166</sup>.

Edward's experiences in Scotland "undoubtedly crystallized [his] theories and practices in dealing with treason". Prior to Wallace's trial in 1305, a number of Scots had been charged with treacherous behaviour and, in the case of MacDuff, in 1297, he and his sons were promised punishment as such. However, this threat was never carried out and no Scot was tried for treason before 1305<sup>167</sup>.

At Wallace's trial, the captive, when accused of betraying his king, denied this charge but accepted the other crimes attributed to him. As an outlaw 'according to the customs of England and Scotland', the record of the charges which Edward accused him of was proof of itself and thus Wallace had no right to put himself on jury: "in such circumstances there was no proper trial but merely the passing of sentence and its execution"<sup>168</sup>.

In strictly legal terms, Edward's justification for the charge of treason - that Balliol's return to the English king's homage and fealty in 1296, which conceded that the latter's conquest of Scotland was 'by right', together with the homage and fealties contained in the 'Ragman Roll' rendered all Scots as Edward's vassals - was probably more correct than Wallace's assertion that the lack of a personal oath to the English king exonerated him from that charge. However, the law concerning fealty and treason does not seem to have been sufficiently clear-cut at the time to allow us to state categorically that either was right<sup>169</sup>, though they undoubtedly both believed that they were.

164 Barrow, *Bruce*, 130.

165 *C.D.S.*, iv, no.477. Professor Barrow has suggested that 'Yrenside' is Earnside [Barrow, *Bruce*, 136], but the presence of the constable of Dundee makes Ironside more likely.

166 Barrow, *Bruce*, 136-7.

167 J.G. Bellamy, *The Law of Treason in England in the later Middle Ages*, 31-2; see Chapter Two, p.49.

168 J.G. Bellamy, *The Law of Treason in England in the later Middle Ages*, 35.

169 J.G. Bellamy, *The Law of Treason in England in the later Middle Ages*, 37-8; Barrow, *Bruce*, 137, n.39.

Similarly, the various gruesome methods by which Wallace was to meet his death were not thought up specially for him by the bloodthirsty English king: each punishment corresponded to one of the crimes with which Wallace was charged and "the process was akin in the sentence pronounced to the one which concerned David ap Gruffydd", the Welsh prince executed by Edward in 1283. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that:

"From the political view-point the trial and sentence were ill-judged and personal animosity may have clouded the king's vision"<sup>170</sup>.

The clemency shown to the Scots in general therefore contrasts sharply with the fate of William Wallace and stamps the trial and execution with a degree of vindictiveness which does Edward no credit.

It is unclear exactly why Wallace should have inspired such fury. The English king usually reacted violently only against those whom he regarded as having betrayed him personally in some way. Such sentiments are evident during the trial of David ap Gruffydd<sup>171</sup> and also in the submission terms of February 1304<sup>172</sup>. It seems most likely that, together with the Scottish nobility, Edward felt most uncomfortable with Wallace's ideals of liberty and nationalism, ideals which, if allowed to develop, clearly challenged the established order of society. If the freedom of a country was accepted as more important than the rights of a king, it followed that the freedom of the individual was more important than the rights of a landowner. Wallace certainly "had different values and priorities" from both Edward and Scotland's 'political community', more through his own natural idealism than his 'class' and background.

Wallace's death was probably witnessed by many of the Scots who were in London to attend the parliament of September 1305 in which the ordinances of September 1305 were set out. Their silence at the fate of Wallace does imply condonement, if not complicity. However, we must ask ourselves what they could have done when it was abundantly clear that the judgement was a foregone conclusion, whatever the legal niceties. Having accepted the English king as their overlord once more, the Scottish nobility would have been on dangerous ground to plead clemency by virtue of Wallace's denial of the charge of treason and they could hardly refute the other charges. Nevertheless, the ferocity of Wallace's punishment should not be forgotten when discussing Edward's statesmanlike behaviour over the settlement of Scotland.

### **The cost of the war south of the border:**

It should also not be forgotten that those sheriffdoms immediately south of the Border paid a very high price for Edward's war. This price was two-fold: through the devastation caused by Scottish raids which took place there right through the period 1297

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<sup>170</sup> J.G. Bellamy, *The Law of Treason in England in the later Middle Ages*, 38-9.

<sup>171</sup> See J.G. Bellamy, *The Law of Treason in England in the later Middle Ages*, 26.

<sup>172</sup> See Chapter Fifteen, pp.342-3.

to 1303; and in the cost of the war-effort which those areas so affected by the Scottish war felt obliged to contribute heavily towards.

Edward received a number of petitions relating to the loss of revenue caused by destructive Scottish raids. In 1300, the former sheriff of Northumberland, who was currently serving in the garrison of Berwick town, requested to be allowed to pay off his debts at the exchequer at a rate of £20 per annum "because his property has been destroyed by the Scots and his land is not worth more than £40 per year for everything"<sup>173</sup>. The majority of such petitions were dealt with in the parliament of 1305. The Masters and Brothers of the Hospital outside Carlisle requested wood from the Inglewode Forest "to rebuild the said hospital which was completely burned down and destroyed by the Scots"; the prior and convent of Kirkham wished for some recompense "for damage and loss sustained in their manor houses on the Scottish march by the Scottish war, by which they were burned and destroyed". This was not an uncommon request. The king replied that since had been "advised to have regard for others who sustained damage through the Scottish war, he will think on this"<sup>174</sup>.

The people of Cumberland seem to have suffered particularly from the war. In one petition, they sought recompense:

"... since the men of Scotland crossed over the Esk and stole booty from the men living on the march and fled with it to Liddesdale, which men followed them and when they came across them there were not able to pursue them safely".

A further four petitions were addressed to the king on the subject of their contribution to the war effort, since they had provided victuals for which they had not yet been paid<sup>175</sup>. The Scots were not alone in welcoming the opportunity to remedy grievances as a result of the end of hostilities; the communities of Northumberland, Cumberland and Westmorland perhaps had even more reason to be thankful for the end of the war.

### Conclusions:

This examination of the large number of cases which came before the English king when Scotland was once more under his dominion, provides a good indication of the relationship between Edward and his Scottish subjects throughout the decade from 1296. The most celebrated example of Edward's 'justice' to the Scots, the trial of Sir William Wallace, would appear to be a great exception, and should be judged as such. This does not detract from its significance; indeed, it increases it.

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<sup>173</sup> *Ancient Petitions relating to Northumberland*, ed. C.M. Fraser, vol. 176, no.65.

<sup>174</sup> *Memo. de Parl.*, no.249; no.265.

<sup>175</sup> *Memo. de Parl.*, no.106.; nos.137-40.

It is clear from the evidence provided in this chapter that Edward was concerned to be just to his Scottish subjects, even if this meant being unjust to his own followers. He presumably felt that he could command the loyalty of the latter; his concern was to win the loyalty of the former.

Conversely, however, there is also no doubt that, despite these efforts, his government was resented in Scotland. This was partly due to the activities of over-zealous or corrupt officials - the government of Alexander III was not nearly as centralised as that of his brother-in-law, Edward I, and thus what the English king may have regarded as within his jurisdiction, the Scots may have seen as interference. Resentment was also partly caused by the confusion resulting from the war, combined with a natural lack of knowledge and understanding of Scottish affairs on the part of English officials.

On the other hand, after a decade of war and nearly two decades without an undisputed and efficient government in Scotland, the Scots themselves appeared to be willing to accept an English overlord in return for firm rule, especially as Edward proved himself willing to adhere to Scottish law and customs. The rights of each subject, which essentially meant property rights, could not be maintained when there were two opposing governments in the same country. The Guardians knew that they could not win the war. Edward, acknowledging the undoubted power and authority which the 'rebels' had maintained, allowed them to participate in his administration of Scotland only months after their submissions. The people of Scotland wanted an undisputed leader. Since there was no other choice - at the moment - they accepted Edward.

## CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

NEW BEGINNINGS?: THE SETTLEMENT OF SCOTLAND  
1304-5**Introduction:**

Following the success of Edward's campaign of 1303, which led to the submission of most of the Scottish nobility in the following year, a number of appointments were made in areas where there had previously been an English presence after 1297 and also in areas where there had not.

In the two-year period between the campaign of 1303 and the promulgation of the ordinances for the settlement of Scotland in the parliament of September 1305, there is no doubt that an effective administration of Scotland (excluding the Highland north-west, which was still in a state of internal strife) was set up on Edward's behalf. The ordinances were intended to finalise the details of that administration, whereafter it would be fully competent to govern Scotland.

**The formulation of a new constitution:**

The settlement of Scotland was conducted far more carefully - and over a longer period of time - than it had been in 1296. In the Westminster parliament of February 1305 the bishop of Glasgow, the earl of Carrick and Sir John Moubray were ordered to advise the king as to how the settlement of Scotland should be achieved<sup>1</sup>. This is a most remarkable trio, since Wishart and Moubray were enemies of King Edward until very recently. It is, unfortunately, not known whether the king asked that they should form this committee, or if the Scots themselves proposed them. As a result of their advice, ten Scottish representatives, chosen at a parliament in Scotland in May 1305, were sent to Westminster in September 1305, to help frame the ordinances<sup>2</sup>.

**Personnel:**

The ordinances which were promulgated in the Westminster parliament of September 1305 listed not only the offices which were to form the new administration, but also named those who were to hold them. However, the English administration had been running throughout most of Scotland since 1303 and thus it is necessary to describe the establishment of that administration throughout the period 1303 to 1305. The promulgation of the ordinances was the end of that establishment, not the beginning.

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<sup>1</sup> *Memo. de Parl.*, 14.

<sup>2</sup> *A.P.S.*, i, 119-20; *Memo. de Parl.*, 293; Barrow, *Bruce*, 134.

*The lieutenants - Segrave, Botetourt, Abernethy, Atholl and Ross*

In April 1303, before the arrival of Edward and his army, the king's most senior representatives in Scotland had been Sir John Segrave, the royal lieutenant in Lothian<sup>3</sup> and Sir John Botetourt, the lieutenant in Galloway<sup>4</sup>. Botetourt appears to have relinquished this office on 30 April 1304. Segrave, however, continued to serve in the Scottish administration until 1 August 1305 as lieutenant south of the Forth and justiciar of Lothian<sup>5</sup>.

In the north, an 'English' official supposedly wielded authority there, even before Edward's arrival. From 2 February 1303, Sir Alexander Abernethy<sup>6</sup> claimed to have held "the sheriffdoms of Kincardine (the Mearns), Forfar and Perth, with their clerks and constabularies and all others the king's servants there". On 29 September 1303, while Edward and his army were still in the north, Abernethy was given "the custody of all the land from the Forth to the Scottish mountains"<sup>7</sup>.

However, Abernethy was superseded in this office by John, earl of Atholl, who was "lieutenant and justiciar of Scotland from the Forth to Orkney" from 29 March 1304 to 19 November 1305. His deputy was the earl of Strathearn<sup>8</sup>.

Earl William of Ross, released from prison in the Tower of London in September 1303 was made Edward's lieutenant north of the Spey soon thereafter since he accounted for the issues of Ross and the bishoprics of Caithness and Sutherland in 1304. This office seems to clash with the jurisdiction first given to the earl of Atholl, which extended to Orkney, but, by May 1305, the latter was merely described as the lieutenant north of the Forth<sup>9</sup>.

Edward was undoubtedly forced to employ a somewhat 'ad hoc' policy with regard to these lieutenancies. He realised that granting these offices to Scots was the best way to make his government acceptable in the north. Nevertheless, he was unlikely to have been willing to allow Atholl, a prominent member of the patriotic administration, a free hand in governing Scotland north of the Forth and thus the elevation of Ross to equal status was perhaps designed to provide such a check. Edward had already tried this policy with regard to the north. He probably released Alexander MacDougall of Lorne in 1297 to counterbalance the power wielded by Alexander MacDonald in the north-west. Atholl himself may have been given this lieutenancy partly in order to curtail the

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3 Segrave is sometimes described as lieutenant of Scotland, which, at this time, meant Lothian.

4 C.C.R., 1302-1307, 25.

5 C.D.S., ii, no.1659, no.1707.

6 See Chapter Nine, pp.257-8.

7 C.D.S., ii, no.1694.

8 C.D.S., ii, no.1592, no.1682, no.1689.

9 C.D.S., ii, no.1403; C.D.S., ii, pp.438-9; C.C.R., 1302-1307, 336.



activities of Sir Alexander Comyn, Edward's only representative north of the Forth prior to 1303<sup>10</sup>.

Segrave, Atholl and Ross, together with William Bevercotes, who became chancellor late in 1304 and sir John Sandale, appointed chamberlain by March 1305<sup>11</sup>, ruled Scotland in Edward's name in the period leading up to the finalisation of Scotland's new constitution in September 1305. There is a good deal of evidence to show that they were active in the execution of the duties pertaining to their offices. For example, both Sir John Segrave and the earl of Atholl presided over inquests and the earl of Ross had "laboured in his ward, under the king's commands, especially in the 'foreign' [outer] isles, to do justice"<sup>12</sup>.

### *The chancellor and the seal*

On 7 November 1303 a royal clerk, Walter Beauchamp, was granted a prebend in England "which Walter Amersham, lately deceased, held"<sup>13</sup>. As chancellor of Scotland, in name at least, since 1296, Amersham was Edward's longest-serving officer in Scotland. Indeed, his presence at Berwick, is one of the few consistent features of the English administration throughout the period 1296 to 1303, although his role there in the first years after 1297 was primarily that of receiver, rather than chancellor<sup>14</sup>.

The next reference to a chancellor of Scotland does not occur until late 1304 when William Bevercotes was named as such on 8 December of that year<sup>15</sup>. Bevercotes had been appointed keeper of the seal of Scotland on 5 October 1296, but there is no evidence for his activities and there can be no doubt that he did not take up the office. The seal itself is not mentioned at all during the period 1296 to 1304 and yet it was certainly used on the charters granting Edward's supporters land in Scotland. Due to this silence, it is not even clear where it was kept, though it is most likely that Amersham retained it at Berwick. In August 1304, writs to various Scottish sheriffs were once more sent out "sub magno sigilo regis quo utitur in Scocia"<sup>16</sup>. It is undoubtedly no coincidence that the seal should have reappeared in 1304, when Edward's Scottish chancery, like the exchequer, was re-established at Berwick. Amersham's job as chancellor had not required its use, since writs were issued to Edward's officials in Scotland through the English chancery.

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10 See Chapter Nine, p.254.

11 See below, p.390.

12 C.D.S., ii, nos. 1592, 1670, 1675; no.1632.

13 C.P.R., 1301-1307, 164.

14 See Chapter Two, p.58.

15 C.D.S., ii, no.1611.

16 C.D.S., iv, p.484.

### *The chamberlain*

In 1296 the chief officers of state appointed by Edward in Scotland were the royal lieutenant, the chancellor and the treasurer. This last office corresponded to English but not to Scottish practice. In Scotland, the chief financial officer was usually the chamberlain. His duties were:

"to guide and govern the burghs, the demesne lands of the king, and his poor husbandmen in demesne, and [he] will deal with the wards, reliefs, marriages, and all manner of the realm's issues to the profit of the Crown, except with those which are given or assigned by the king in chief."<sup>17</sup>

The first mention of this office as part of the English administration of Scotland occurs in November 1303, when the case brought by Sir Robert Keith before the king at Dunfermline was ordered to be investigated by Sir John Segrave, currently the royal lieutenant in Lothian, and the [unnamed] chamberlain.

It is difficult to establish who was occupying this last office. Sir John Sandale, who was paid as chamberlain on 14 February 1305, was not with the king during the siege of Stirling in 1304, nor was he referred to as chamberlain in that year. Writs were directed to him in that capacity only from March 1305<sup>18</sup>. Sir Malcolm Innerpeffry was acting as his deputy in September 1305<sup>19</sup> and perhaps, therefore, stood in for Sandale from as early as November 1303. Sir Robert Heron, who was now one of the few English officials to have been in office since 1297, was to remain as controller<sup>20</sup>.

### *Sheriffs*

During the two years leading up to the promulgation of the ordinances, Edward had already installed sheriffs throughout Scotland. A comparison between those who occupied the office in 1304 and those who were appointed as sheriffs in the ordinances of September 1305 provides some interesting observations.

Table 9: Sheriffs in 1304<sup>21</sup>

Aberdeen	- Sir Alexander Comyn
Ayr	- earl of Carrick
Auchterarder	- <i>Sir Malcolm Innerpeffry</i>
Banff	- Sir Duncan Frendraught
Clackmannan	- William Bisset
Dumbarton	- <i>Sir John Menteith</i>

17 Bateson, 'The Scottish King's Household', 32.

18 C.D.S., ii, p.442; no.1520; no.1689; no.1654-6, 1658.

19 C.D.S., ii, no.1689.

20 See Chapter Two, p.58; C.D.S., ii, no.1691.

21 Most, if not all, of these sheriffs were appointed in 1303, however. The references for the table below are C.D.S., ii, nos. 1474, 1514, 1586, 1646. Those names in italics held the same office both before and after the ordinances.

Dumfries	- Sir Matthew Redeman
Edinburgh	- Sir Ebulo Mountz
Fife	- Sir Richard Siward
Forfar	- John Pollok/ Henry Preston
Inverness (constable of the castle)	- Alexander Pilche
Lanark	- earl of Carrick
Linlithgow	- Sir Archibald Livingston
Peebles	- <i>Robert Hastangs</i> <sup>22</sup>
Perth	- Sir Robert Harcars
Nairn (constable of the castle)	- Gervase the clerk
Mearns (Kincardine)	- <i>Sir Richard Dundemor</i>
Roxburgh	- Sir Robert Hastangs
Stirling	- Sir Archibald Livingston

Table 10: Sheriffs of the ordinances of 1305<sup>23</sup>

Aberdeen	- Sir Norman Leslie
Ayr	- Sir Godfrey Ros
Banff	- Sir Walter Barclay
Clackmannan & Auchterarder	- <i>Sir Malcolm Innerpeffry</i>
Cromarty	- Sir William Mowat (heritable)
Dumbarton	- <i>Sir John Menteith</i>
Dumfries	- Sir Richard Siward
Edinburgh, Haddington & Linlithgow	- Sir Ivo Aldeburgh
Elgin	- William Wiseman
Fife	- Sir Constantine Lochore
Forfar	- Sir William Airth
Forres & Nairn	- Alexander Wiseman
Kincardine (Mearns)	- <i>Sir Richard Dundemor</i>
Kinross	- the heritable sheriff
Lanark	- Sir Henry Sinclair
Peebles	- <i>Robert Hastangs</i>
Perth	- Sir John Inchmartin
Selkirk	- the heritable sheriff
Stirling	- William Bisset
Wigtown	- Thomas MacCullough

The sheriff of Berwick was to be named by the Chamberlain of Scotland, who had the keeping of Berwick castle. The lieutenant of Scotland was to hold the castles of Roxburgh and Jedburgh and was thus to install a sheriff at Roxburgh<sup>24</sup>.

22 Robert Hastangs, an esquire and presumably relative of Sir Robert and Sir Richard Hastangs, constables of Roxburgh and Jedburgh respectively, is not named as sheriff of Peebles in 1304 but he did account for the issues of the county for both years 31 and 32 [20 November 1302 - 19 November 1304] and is certainly named as sheriff in the ordinance of September 1305.

23 The reference for this table is *C.D.S.*, ii, no.1691.

24 *C.D.S.*, ii, p.457; Palgrave, *Documents*, i, 292.

The number of Scots holding the office of sheriff in both years is striking. In 1304 there were only four English sheriffs out of a total of seventeen and, out of the thirteen Scottish sheriffs, only three - Sir Richard Siward, Sir Alexander Comyn and Sir Archibald Livingston - had remained actively loyal<sup>25</sup> to King Edward after 1296.

In addition, the earl of Carrick, Sir Duncan Fren draught and Sir John Menteith, at least, had spent a number of years during the period 1296-1303 actively on the rebel side. The example of Sir Norman Leslie of Aberdeenshire, who was penalised by the Guardians for remaining loyal to King Edward<sup>26</sup> means that we cannot presume that all local landowners supported the Guardians' administration in areas where the latter held undisputed control<sup>27</sup>. Nevertheless, it seems likely, given that these men were the natural leaders of these counties, that many of the sheriffs installed by Edward in 1303, especially those in the north-east, had held office under the Guardians.

In the ordinances of 1305 only two Englishmen were named as sheriffs, that is Sir Ivo Aldeburgh, who was to hold the reunited sheriffdoms of 'the three Lothians', Edinburgh, Haddington and Linlithgow, and Robert Hastangs, who remained as sheriff of Peebles. Of the eighteen Scots, Sir John Menteith retained the office of sheriff of Dumbarton, which he had been granted in the previous year, no doubt because of his conspicuous service to Edward in capturing Sir William Wallace. Sir Richard Dundemor remained as sheriff of Kincardine or the Mearns and Sir Malcolm Innerpeffry was still sheriff of Auchterarder, but was also given the keeping of the sheriffdom of Clackmannan in 1305. Sir Richard Siward and William Bisset had also held office in 1304 but they were now moved to other sheriffdoms.

According to the ordinances of September 1305, the sheriffs were to be either natives of Scotland or English. They could be appointed or removed by the lieutenant or the chamberlain. These sheriffs were to be "sufficient men and most profitable for the king and people, and the maintenance of peace"<sup>28</sup>. Again, Edward seems to have adhered to this when making his appointments. It is likely that the Scottish delegates had a big say in choosing who should be sheriff. Thus, in the ordinances, Constantine of Lochore, a local man, was named as sheriff of Fife, while Sir Richard Siward, a south-western landowner, was chosen by Edward in 1303. The Scottish delegates would also have known who held the heritable sheriffdoms, while the English administration undoubtedly would not.

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25 That is, they held office under Edward in his Scottish administration.

26 See Chapter Nine, p.261.

27 This refers particularly to the north-east.

28 C.D.S., ii, 1691.

### *Escheators*

In 1296 two escheators - one with authority north and the other south of the Forth - had been appointed. This was in accordance with English, but not Scottish, practice. In the ordinances of 1305, it was stated that sheriffs were to execute the office of escheatry "as usual". This was a return to Scottish custom<sup>29</sup>.

### *Justiciars*

In 1296 Edward appointed William Ormesby, William Mortimer and Roger Skoter as justiciars of Lothian, Galloway and north of the Forth respectively<sup>30</sup>. This was in keeping with usual Scottish (though not English) practice. In the ordinances of 1305 this format was adapted slightly. Instead of three justiciars, as was usual, there were now to be four 'pairs', one Englishman and one Scotsman. The extra pair were to have authority 'beyond the mountains'. Those appointed were:-

Lothian	- Sir John Lisle Sir Adam Gordon
Galloway	- Sir Walter Burghdon Sir Roger Kirkpatrick
Between Forth and Mountains	- Sir William Inge Sir Robert Keith
Beyond Mountains	- Sir John Vaux Sir Reginald Cheyne

It is not clear exactly how this pairing system was supposed to work. The justiciars normally went round on ayre for criminal cases, their business being prepared by the coroners. The Scottish half of the pairs were therefore more likely to know what was happening, and, indeed, to turn up.

Of the new English justiciars, two - Sir John Lisle and Sir William Inge - had had experience as English justices<sup>31</sup>. Sir Walter Burghdon had experience of administrative affairs as Edward's sheriff of Lanark and constable of Carstairs. It is less easy to ascertain the qualifications of the Scottish justiciars, though Sir Adam Gordon had been warden of the west march for the Scots in 1300 and Sir Reginald Cheyne was sheriff of Elgin in 1291 and probably also in 1304<sup>32</sup>. These were thus men of considerable, though varying, administrative experience.

### *Coroners*

According to the ordinance of 1305, the lieutenant, chancellor and chamberlain were to appoint coroners if the present incumbents were found to be unfit, "unless the latter hold by charter, in which case they shall take the king's pleasure first."

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29 C.D.S., ii, no.1691, p.457; Bateson, 'The Scottish King's Household', 42.

30 See Chapter One, p.27.

31 C.D.S., ii, no.678, no. 715.

32 *Foedera*, i, 925; C.D.S., ii, no.546; p.443.

A coroner was a sergeant appointed in each sheriffdom to bring cases and parties before the justiciars. No mention was made of the office in 1296 and the only reference in the period between 1296 and 1303 was the description of Sir Philip Vernay, the keeper of Berwick town, as coroner there in 1299. The normal Scottish practice was supposedly for the justiciars to appoint the coroners, "for whom they are answerable"<sup>33</sup>.

### *The lieutenant*

John of Brittany was named for the first time as lieutenant of Scotland in the ordinances of 1305. According to a memorandum recording this appointment, Brittany was to have with him a company of sixty men-at-arms. His salary, to maintain him in his office, to pay for these men-at-arms and also the garrisons of the castles of Jedburgh and Roxburgh which were in his custody, was to be 2000 marks per annum, to be received from the chamberlain from the issues of the land of Scotland. This fee was increased to 3000 marks on 15 October 1305<sup>34</sup>. Sir Brian fitz Alan, when he was ordered to remain in Scotland as lieutenant there in August 1297, was also to have a total retinue of 60 men-at-arms. The earl of Surrey, Edward's lieutenant from 1296 to 1297, was paid 2000 marks per annum<sup>35</sup>.

Born in 1266, John of Brittany, earl of Richmond, grandson of King Henry III, was brought up in England with his cousins, the sons and daughters of Edward I. Edward himself perhaps regarded Richmond as the kind of son he had not found in Edward of Caernarvon and this is reflected in the positions with which John was entrusted. In 1294, he was sent as the royal lieutenant to Gascony, together with Sir John de St. John, a suitable training ground for the office of lieutenant in Scotland<sup>36</sup>.

Brittany was to take office on 2 February 1306, on which date payment would commence. In the meantime Sir Brian fitz Alan and the bishop of St. Andrews were to be Guardians of Scotland. Brittany could not, in fact, leave Gascony for Scotland until at least 17 April 1306 and the bishop of St. Andrews, sir John Sandale, the chamberlain, Sir Robert Keith and Sir John Kingston were ordered, on 16 February 1306, to act as Guardians of Scotland until his arrival<sup>37</sup>.

Twenty-one Scots - four bishops, four abbots, five earls and eight barons - were to act as the lieutenant's council, along with the Chancellor and the Chamberlain, the Justices and other royal officials. Again, the number of prominent members of the patriotic cause - the bishop of St. Andrews, the bishop of Dunkeld, the earls of Buchan, Carrick and Atholl, Sir John Comyn, Sir John Moubray, Sir Alexander of Argyll, Sir

33 See Chapter Four, p.108; Bateson, 'The Scottish King's Household', 36.

34 Palgrave, *Documents*, i, 292; C.D.S., ii, no.1699.

35 Stevenson, *Documents*, 225; *Rot. Scot.*, i, 34.

36 Prestwich, *Edward I*, 128, 132, 381-2.

37 C.P.R., 1301-1307, 415. This was, in fact, six days after the murder of Comyn at Dumfries.

Robert Keith, Sir John Menteith, Sir Duncan Fren draught, Sir Adam Gordon and Sir John Inchmartin, is striking<sup>38</sup>. However, the omission of the bishop of Glasgow as a counsellor is equally surprising. Wishart had certainly been one of the three Scots appointed to advise the king on the settlement of Scotland in February 1305, but he may have behaved in such a way during the capture, trial and execution of Sir William Wallace in August 1305 as to make Edward suspicious of his loyalty.

The appointment of a single royal lieutenant, with no mention even of a lieutenant in Galloway, as in 1296, presumably brought an end to the lieutenancies of the earl of Atholl and the earl of Ross in the north.

#### **Amendment of Scottish law:**

One of the most important aspects of the ordinances concerned Scottish law. From henceforth, "*l'usage* of Scots and Brets" was banned. More importantly, the lieutenant was ordered to assemble "the good people of Scotland in a convenient place, and there the laws of King David, and amendments and additions by other kings shall be rehearsed". As a result, Brittany, "with the aid which he shall have there of both English and Scots men", was to "amend such of these laws and usages which are plainly against God and reason, as he best may in so brief a term, and as far as he can without advising the king". Those matters that required Edward's attention were to be sent in writing to the king, along with the amendments already agreed. All this was to be done by 12 May 1306<sup>39</sup>.

The implication of the phrase 'against God and reason', that Edward considered parts of Scottish law as archaic at best, ridiculous at worst, might have signalled a warning to the Scots that the English king's amenable public attitude towards the northern kingdom after 1303 was born out of political necessity and hid his true feelings.

#### **Conclusions:**

There is no doubt that, in the settlement of Scotland, which culminated in the ordinances of September 1305, Edward went to great lengths to make his government acceptable to the 'good folk' of Scotland.

One of the most important aspects of this was his desire to associate the Scottish political community with each step of the settlement of their country. Although this manifested itself, in the first instance, in the order to the Scottish nobility to endeavour to capture William Wallace, subsequent examples of this were of a much more positive nature. The most obvious, and important, example, is the way in which they were involved in working out the new constitution for their country.

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38 Palgrave, *Documents*, i, 293.

39 C.D.S., ii, no.1691.

If 'statesmanship' is taken to mean "dictated by far-sighted, sagacious and practical views on politics"<sup>40</sup>, then there is surely much about Edward's behaviour in the years following 1303 which could be attributed to that quality. It was his intention to bring about the permanent subjugation of Scotland to rule, ultimately, from Westminster. To achieve this, Edward had learned several lessons from 1296-7. Not only was he now prepared to give a much more prominent place in government to the natural leaders of Scotland, but he was also careful to abide by Scottish laws and customs - when this did not clash with his own interests.

The resurrection of the office of chamberlain is an obvious example of Edward's concern, which was not evident in 1296, to retain the Scottish administrative identity, in return for the support of the Scottish political community. Nevertheless, Sandale had much the same duties as sir Hugh Cressingham to collect the issues of Scotland to use them to pay for the administration and to be held accountable for these functions.

The area of administration in which the Scots were to be most heavily involved was the sheriffdoms. This was a far-sighted policy, which again contrasts sharply with the situation in 1296, when very few Scots were appointed to this office. Since the sheriffs were responsible for much justice in the localities and also for raising the issues of their bailiwicks, the appointment of local men would have gone a long way to making Edward's regime more acceptable since the majority of the population would not, therefore, come into much contact with English-born officials.

All these Scottish sheriffs were indeed local landowners. However, the two English sheriffs appointed in the ordinances were both given posts in that area - Sir Ivo Aldeburgh in the 'three Lothians' (Edinburgh, Haddington and Linlithgow) and Robert Hastangs at Peebles. The sheriffs of Berwick and Roxburgh were to be appointed by the chamberlain and the lieutenant respectively and the latter also held the castle of Roxburgh. Thus every sheriffdom in the south-east was held by an English official.

The change to the system of justices, which still corresponded largely to the traditional Scottish format, like the order for an assembly to amend Scottish law, probably reflects Edward's interest in justice more than anything else<sup>41</sup>. As we have seen in Chapter Sixteen, he was generally willing to defer to Scottish law and custom in cases brought before him, having understood that to do so would again speed up acceptance of his regime. In the preliminary offer of peace made by the Scots in January 1304, the Guardian asked for the retention of Scotland's legal identity, as it had been in the time of King Alexander. Any amendment was to be made with the advice and assent of the *bones*

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40 *Pocket Oxford Dictionary*, 827.

41 See Prestwich, *Edward I*, 267.



*gentz* of the land<sup>42</sup>. This is clearly what was being carried out in the ordinances of September 1305.

Thus far there is much to be said in praise of Edward's handling of the settlement of Scotland after the re-conquest of 1303-4. This was by no means the whole story, however.

We have already seen how the sheriffdoms were given to the charge of those who were their natural leaders. The big exception was the south-east, which was kept exclusively in English hands.

The main officers of state - the lieutenant, chancellor and chamberlain - were also English and thus real power still lay with men who were not natives of Scotland. All three, though undoubtedly experienced in administration, had not served in Scotland before their appointments to these offices. It should be remembered that the chancellor, particularly, was supposed to "know the Chancery forms and know the laws of the land"<sup>43</sup>. If Edward had been truly committed to retaining Scotland's administrative identity and allowing the Scots to play a part in the government of their country, then the chancellor, at least, would have been Scottish.

It was also, perhaps, short-sighted of the English king to allow men such as the earls of Carrick, Ross and Atholl, the bishops of St. Andrews and Glasgow, Sir John Moubray and Sir Robert Keith - all prominent members of the patriotic movement - to play a leading role in the run-up to the settlement of Scotland and then expect them to give way to three Englishmen. Certainly many of these men were to be a part of the lieutenant's council, but the final decisions were not to be made by Scots.

### Looking to the future:

The ordinances of 1305 should have marked a new beginning for Scotland. Edward, now sixty-six, had achieved his aim of bringing about a 'united kingship'.

Less than five months later it was shown to have been nothing more than a grand illusion. The effect of the murder of Comyn of Badenoch and the rebellion of the earl of Carrick on 10 February 1306 on the aging king must have been devastating, and vindictiveness, which was so patently lacking - with one important exception - in the period 1303-5, characterised his actions thereafter.

As far as the English administration of Scotland is concerned, there is little more to say. It is not possible to judge the ordinances since there was so little time to put them into operation.

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42 Palgrave, *Documents*, i, 286-8; Chapter Fifteen, p.336.

43 Bateson, 'The Scottish King's Household', 31.

However, it could be said that Edward's policy with regard to sheriffs seems to have been successful. Of the seventeen Scottish sheriffs named in the ordinances, only three - Sir Walter Berkeley, Sir Malcolm Innerpeffry and Sir William Mowat - joined the earl of Carrick in 1306<sup>44</sup>.

Unfortunately, it is not possible to say whether or not those appointed in September 1305 - the majority of whom were not already holding this office - had actually managed to take up their positions. For example, Sir Duncan Fren draught, sheriff of Banff in 1304, was still holding the office in 1306<sup>45</sup>. The rebellion of Sir Walter Berkeley, who was supposed to be sheriff of Banff, according to the ordinance, may therefore have been related to his inability to gain possession of the sheriffdom. Fren draught, together with Sir Reginald Cheyne, one of the new justices beyond the mountains, was accused of high-handed behaviour by Hamelin Troup in 1304 or 1305. Troup was also to be found on the rebel side in 1306<sup>46</sup>.

The behaviour of officials such as Cheyne and Fren draught may have been in the mind of Sir John Moubray when he advised the king - admittedly probably at some point after Carrick's rebellion - to "send into Scotland some man of authority to protect his lieges there against the injustice of their rulers"<sup>47</sup>. As Edward was well aware, the acceptability of his regime was, to a large extent, tied up with the effectiveness of his officials in providing justice. If they themselves were the cause of complaints, whether they were Scottish or English, this would lessen confidence in his administration.

This is not the only evidence to suggest that the new administration was facing difficulty even before the promulgation of the ordinances. James Dalilegh and John Weston, while engaged in assessing the king's lands in Scotland, required the services of an escort "while the men of the parts beyond the mountains, and in Galloway and Carrick had not yet fully come to the king's peace." Since this escort was required until 25. December 1304, several months after the reduction of Stirling castle, Scotland was by no means completely resigned to English rule before Edward left for the south in August 1304. Escorts were also required in the north-east, which was supposedly pacified during Edward's campaign of the previous year. At Inverness a company of men-at-arms and footsoldiers was required "on account of the imminent peril of enemies". At Elgin twenty footsoldiers stood guard "through fear of some enemies who had not yet come to the king's peace". On 16 January 1305, the exchequer was ordered to postpone the hearing of an account "until Scotland is secure"<sup>48</sup>.

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44 Palgrave, *Documents*, i, 301-319.

45 *C.D.S.*, v, no.292, p.215.

46 *C.D.S.*, ii, nos.1734-5; Palgrave, *Documents*, i, 315.

47 *C.D.S.*, ii, no.1726.

48 *C.D.S.*, ii, p.442-3; *C.D.S.*, v, no.400.

The support which Robert Bruce received when he seized the throne early in 1306 relied, to a large extent, on traditional loyalties which had long focussed on the two great Scottish families of Comyn and Bruce. This is equally true of those who did not support the new king. It is thus not surprising to find the late warden north of the Forth, the earl of Atholl, on Bruce's side, just as it is not surprising that Sir Ingram d'Umfraville, related to the Balliols, now remained loyal to King Edward.

Nevertheless, the evidence for unrest in Scotland before the murder at Dumfries, together with the fact that many of those who joined Carrick did not have any obvious ties with the Bruce family<sup>49</sup>, suggests that this was by no means the whole story. Edward had learned much in the period 1296 to 1303, but he had not grasped the basic point: rule from Westminster, however benign, was not acceptable to a large part of the Scottish political community (and, beyond them, to the nation as a whole), despite an understandable desire for peace after almost eight years of war. In addition, the English king had not proved that he could conquer Scotland permanently through military force. With the question of leadership now settled by the inauguration of a king of Scots, no matter what the circumstances of his accession were, Edward's fury towards the rebels was primarily a recognition that he had lost.

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49 Those such as Hamelin Troup and Alexander Pilche in the north-east are more likely to have come under Comyn influence but they are still to be found supporting the new king [Palgrave, *Documents*, i, 314-5].

## CONCLUSION

### **The where and how much of English control, 1297-1303:**

It is now time to bring together the evidence of the preceding chapters to draw some conclusions as to what authority was wielded by Edward's officials and where.

#### *The sheriffdom of Berwick*

As far as the English administration was concerned, Berwick was the new capital of Scotland. The town-planning exercise, begun in 1297 and resulting in a charter of privileges in 1302, appears to have been successful to the extent that around thirty Englishmen were transplanted to the town to become burgesses.

There were two English garrisons at Berwick - a small standing army in the town and a few men-at-arms in the castle. The sheriff of Berwick, who was Sir John Burdon for most of this period, was also the constable of the castle. Its keeper, who, somewhat unusually, was resident there, often also held the office of warden of the eastern march. Sir Walter Amersham, the Scottish chancellor and royal receiver in Northumberland, and perhaps the keeper of the royal store at Berwick, sir Richard Bremesgrave, probably also had quarters in the castle.

As the centre of the English administration, it could be expected that Edward's officials held effective authority throughout the sheriffdom. Certainly, though the Scots were active in neighbouring sheriffdoms as late as 1303, 1297 was the only year in which they threatened Berwick itself. After the submission of the majority of the Scots in 1304, five Scots from the sheriffdom of Berwick were noted as receiving back their lands. Another two performed homage to Edward at the parliament held at St. Andrews in March 1304<sup>1</sup>. Since the English did undoubtedly control the sheriffdom, it is unlikely that these Scots had managed to hold on to their lands during their rebellion. Certainly an inquest was held in 1299 into the extent of lands held by a 'rebel', prior to their regranteeing.

#### *The sheriffdom of Roxburgh*

There were two English garrisons in the sheriffdom of Roxburgh - one at Roxburgh itself and the other at Jedburgh. The constables throughout this period were two brothers, Sir Robert and Sir Richard Hastings. Roxburgh narrowly avoided falling to Wallace in 1297-8, but was threatened continuously thereafter by the Scots, who

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<sup>1</sup> Palgrave, *Documents*, i, 194-197; 299-301 and for all other references concerned with the submissions made in the St. Andrews parliament of 1304.

appointed their own sheriff in 1299, succeeded in capturing Sir Robert, the English sheriff, in 1301 and put the garrison there "in daily peril of our lives" in 1303. Jedburgh did succumb to Wallace and his army in 1297, though there is no further evidence of trouble with the Scots.

The disagreement between Sir Robert Hastings, the sheriff, and the keeper of Selkirk Forest, Sir Hugh Audley, in 1302, regarding the prosecution of certain robbers, shows that the sheriff of Roxburgh had achieved some previous success in bringing malefactors to justice.

In 1304, a total of three Scots from this sheriffdom received back their lands, and a further five performed homage to Edward at St. Andrews in 1304. Despite Scottish activities in this area throughout this period, it is also unlikely that these 'rebels' had been able to retain their lands. This is corroborated by an inquest held in 1303, which established that one such 'rebel' - Thomas Charteris - holding lands in the sheriffdom of Roxburgh, had died 'beyond the mountains, an enemy of the king'. It had not been safe for him to reside on his lands in the south-west.

### *The sheriffdom of Peebles*

The first reference to a sheriff at Peebles does not occur until August 1301. The proximity of Peebles to Selkirk Forest, which provided a haven for the Scots, particularly up until the defection to the 'rebel' side of Sir Simon Fraser, Edward's keeper of the Forest, also in 1301, suggests that the English had not been able to exert much control over this sheriffdom until that year.

Although Sir William Durham, the new sheriff, and the four to six men-at-arms usually ascribed to him were not initially able to keep the sheriffdom 'well-guarded', it should be noted that in 1304 Durham held the lands of Sir William Melville during the minority of his heir, suggesting that the sheriff could control the land in his bailiery.

However, this could easily have been a recent state of affairs. The evidence suggests, overall, that the sheriff's control was tenuous until 1303. There are certainly no issues recorded as coming to the English exchequer during the period 1296-1303.

### *Sheriffdom of Selkirk*

Despite being a heritable Scottish sheriffdom, Edward does not seem to have retained a sheriff at Selkirk until 1305, when it was restored to Isabella Synton, to whose inheritance it fell. Nevertheless, an English official did reside in the area from 1296, most notably in the person of the Scot, Sir Simon Fraser. Fraser was replaced in the office of keeper of Selkirk Forest in 1301, most probably because of his sympathies towards the 'rebels'. The Scots had, in fact, appointed their own keeper of the forest in 1299. Prominence in the area thereafter was given to another Scot, Sir Alexander Balliol, a

local landowner. Now that Fraser's influence was removed and a new pele built at Selkirk itself, the Scots undoubtedly found it more difficult - though not impossible - to use Selkirk Forest as a base, rendering the English position more secure throughout the south-east. Nevertheless, the Guardian's force, which now included Fraser, was able to capture the newly-built pele at Selkirk for a brief period early in 1303. Thus, as with Peebles, Selkirk cannot be said to have been an integral and secure part of the English-dominated south-east.

### *The sheriffdom of Edinburgh*

The sheriffdom of Edinburgh seems to have been administered the most successfully by Edward's sheriff there, Sir John Kingston. Though the years prior to 1300 saw Scottish activities affecting a town as close to Edinburgh as Penicuik, subsequent years were almost free of trouble, with the notable exception of the battle of Roslyn in 1303. The town of Edinburgh may also have been captured in 1302.

As a result, Kingston was the first sheriff after 1296 to produce the issues of his bailiwick on behalf of King Edward. Though these only amounted to just over £20 in the first year - 1300 - they had increased to nearly £100 in the following year, although this was far short of the customary annual revenue. Even more unusually, the English garrison at Edinburgh were able to use the services of local farriers and the reference to coal mines in the list of issues also suggests that supplies of coal - at least - could be purchased within the sheriffdom.

In 1304 a total of fourteen Scots are recorded as either performing homage to Edward or receiving back their lands. Given the degree of authority wielded by the sheriff after 1300, it is again unlikely that these 'rebels' had been able to retain possession of these lands before 1304. Certainly the earl of Ross's property in Edinburgh had been held successfully by Sir Thomas Morham, a Scot serving Edward in the garrison there, and the manor of Duddingstone, belonging to Thomas Boys, who left the same garrison to join the Scots in 1301, was also occupied successfully by a valet of the earl of Lincoln, to whom it was granted.

### *The sheriffdom of Linlithgow*

Linlithgow, along with Edinburgh and Haddington, formed the traditional Scottish sheriffdom of the three Lothians. Edward maintained this format in 1296, but after 1297 only Edinburgh survived as a sheriffdom under English control (though presumably Haddington formed a part of it).

Linlithgow reappears in English records when Edward and his army spent an uncomfortable winter there in 1301/2. The fortifications already in existence had to be improved before the king's arrival and a pele was begun several months later in February

1302. Unlike a similar construction at Selkirk, begun at the same time, this pele survived a Scottish attack early in 1303.

There were two English officials at Linlithgow - Sir William Felton was constable of the royal castle and Sir Archibald Livingston, a Scot, was the sheriff. Their authority seems to have been effective. Livingston managed to gain entry to the manor of Ogilface, despite the fact that it had already been granted to a valet of the earl of Lincoln. More importantly, the only recorded court to be held under the auspices of the English government before 1303 was held at Linlithgow in 1302. This is certainly evidence for 'normal' administration.

### *The sheriffdom of Lanark*

The sheriffdom of Lanark is a particularly interesting case. The caput of the sheriffdom was the castle of Carstairs and the first sheriff and constable of the castle was Sir Walter Burghdon, another Scot, taking office in 1301. The earl of Carrick then occupied the office of sheriff of Lanark after his submission to Edward early in 1302.

As a sheriffdom on the frontier line of the English zone of occupation, Lanark appears to have experienced a degree of destruction caused by military activity as both English and Scottish forces vied for control. Bothwell, one of the strongest castles in the area, was the subject of much attention: the Scots captured it around April 1301, only to lose it to an English army in September of the same year. In addition, when the English escheator, sir James Dalilegh, compiled an assessment of Crown lands in 1303-4, it was noted that the barony of Cambusnethan and the farms of the burgh of Glasgow had been laid waste by the Irish troops in the English army and the lands of Nenflare and Cartland were still in the hands of the Scots.

A number of grants of forfeited lands in this sheriffdom was made by Edward to his followers. Sir Robert the Constable does seem to have been able to enjoy the lands of Dalserf, forfeited from Sir John Comyn, and Sir Aymer de Valence, to whom the castle and barony of Bothwell was granted immediately prior to the siege there in 1301, certainly retained possession from that year onwards. The earl of Lincoln, who had been given the lands of James the Steward, had been able to install a bailiff in the lands of Strathgryfe by 1300.

On the other hand, Sir William Beauchamp, Edward's steward, had been granted lands of Sir Edmund Comyn of Kilbride in this sheriffdom, but a petition from the former's widow in 1304 makes it clear that Comyn had managed to prevent Beauchamp from gaining possession. This evidence therefore suggests that English control of the area did not exist before 1301 and was by no means complete thereafter.

### *The sheriffdom of Stirling*

Stirling castle was always regarded as a particular prize during the Wars of Independence, controlling, as it did, the approaches to both the north-west and the north-east of Scotland. The castle changed hands several times during the period 1296-1304. Wallace recaptured it from the English at some point after the battle of Stirling bridge in 1297, but Edward managed to retake it in the following year. However, the Scots were so successful in disrupting lines of supply to the new English garrison throughout 1299 that an expedition to relieve the castle was organised by the south-eastern garrisons at the end of that year. Despite being successfully replenished, Stirling fell to the Scots in January 1300, strongly suggesting that treachery was involved. The castle remained in Scottish hands until the siege of 1304.

The Scottish commander of Stirling, Sir William Oliphant, who presumably also acted as sheriff, wielded enough authority to exile a woman of the town who had brought victuals to the English garrison during the siege of 1299 and to forfeit another native of the sheriffdom who supported the English cause. However, military activity in the Stirling area had also caused considerable damage to land and property. An inquest held into the lands of Sir John Callendar, who remained at Edward's peace after 1296, reported that the annual value of these lands had dropped to one-fifth of their peacetime value by 1303.

### *The sheriffdom of Dumfries and the lordship of Annandale*

The castle of Dumfries also changed hands more than once. Bishop Wishart, the earl of Carrick and the Steward probably succeeded in capturing the castle around May 1297, though it was restored to English control shortly after. Nevertheless, since the entire south-west seems to have been relieved of any English presence by Wallace and his army, Dumfries was undoubtedly back in Scottish hands by the end of the year, only to be retaken by Edward during the Falkirk campaign of 1298. The fate of the castle is unclear thereafter - the Scots may have succeeded in evicting this garrison, since there is no mention of an English force there in 1299. In any event, a new English constable and sheriff - Sir John Dolive - was appointed in March 1300, and the castle remained in English hands thereafter.

Though the nearby castle of Lochmaben, belonging to Robert Bruce of Annandale, was garrisoned with troops in Edward's pay, both these garrisons were vulnerable to attack from the Scottish garrison in Caerlaverock. This threat was removed in 1300 when Edward successfully besieged this last castle, granting it to Sir Robert Clifford, although references to the English garrison there cease after that year. Though there is no evidence to suggest that the Scots recaptured Caerlaverock, and despite the



fact that Edward organised two campaigns in successive years to the south-west, it is clear that the English garrisons at Dumfries and Lochmaben were vulnerable to attack.

Nevertheless, £23 13s.4d. was collected from the issues of Annandale as early as 1299 and a case heard in 1304 makes it clear that the lands of a 'rebel', Alan of Dumfries, had been in English hands for several years. On balance, therefore, it would seem that the English were able to exert effective control over parts of the sheriffdom of Dumfries, as was the case at Lanark.

### *Galloway*

Galloway was traditionally a land apart, a peninsula retaining its separate laws and customs. The campaigns of 1300 and 1301 certainly proved that the English could not force their authority on the area and even as late as 1303 the Scots made use of the rugged terrain of Galloway to launch very potent attacks on those parts of the south-west held by Edward's men.

Since King John had held most of his demesne lands in Galloway, these lands naturally formed an important - and permanent - source of patronage for King Edward. At an unknown date, presumably after his appointment as warden of the western march in January 1300, Sir John de St. John was granted the entire Balliol inheritance in Galloway to hold in chief. However, by the end of that year, Edward had to give St. John lands to the value of £1000 in Cumberland, because these Galloway lands were still 'at war'. However, Sir Alexander Balliol claimed, in 1304, that he had remained peacefully in seisin of the lands of Kilpatrick, granted to him in 1298, 'until now'. Again, the evidence suggests that parts - probably the greater part - of Galloway remained outwith English control, but that certain areas, particularly those closer to the more English-dominated sheriffdom of Dumfries, were susceptible to the authority of Edward's officials.

### *The sheriffdom of Ayr*

Ayr, like Lanark and Linlithgow, was completely outwith English control until the campaign of 1301. After the capture of Ayr castle, and neighbouring Turnberry, by the prince of Wales in the summer of that year, earl Patrick of Dunbar became keeper of the sheriffdom. The castle was besieged by the Scots almost immediately upon its capture, but the defection to the English side in 1302 of the earl of Carrick, to whom this siege may perhaps be attributed, secured the area for Edward.

The recapture of Ayr meant that Edward could at last claim that he controlled Scotland from coast to coast - even if large chunks in the middle were far from reconciled to English rule. In practical terms, Ayr became important as another royal store in the south-west.

### *The north-west*

Although Edward did have an official in the north-west in 1296-7, in the person of Alexander MacDonald of Islay, the area largely degenerated into a state of civil war after 1297. An English fleet was sent up the western seaboard in 1301, hoping to effect the submission of the other important chief of the north-west Highlands, Alexander MacDougall of Argyll. Though this attempt does not seem to have been successful, MacDougall is mentioned in 1304, accounting for the royal revenues of Loch Awe and Ardscofnish. In addition, the earl of Ross was appointed warden beyond the Spey after his release from English prison in 1303. However, the independent nature of the clan chiefs of this area, evident even under the kings of Scots, became more pronounced during this interregnum and Edward could do little to enforce his authority other than trust those native lords willing to remain at his peace.

### *The north-east*

Scotland north of the Forth was completely outwith English control. Even the ancient kingdom of Fife, across the water from the strongly English-held sheriffdom of Edinburgh, seems to have been governed by the 'rebels', particularly the Guardian, William Lamberton, bishop of St. Andrews, up until 1303. The latter was certainly able to draw the issues of his see, though presumably not those in Lothian.

The east coast sheriffdoms between Perth and Aberdeen seem to have been most effectively governed by the Guardians. There is every reason to believe, from Wallace's charter granting the constabulary of Dundee to Alexander Scrymgeour, and the ratification of that charter by the succeeding Guardians, in December 1298, which refers to a Scottish sheriff of Forfar, that offices usually found under a king of Scots existed under the Guardians in these areas. The few remaining charters of the period also provide evidence for the existence of a Scottish chancery, headed, by 1301, by a loyalist chancellor, Master Nicholas Balmyle.

In the sheriffdom of Aberdeen, an interesting situation - perhaps more common than the available evidence suggests - had developed. The earl of Buchan, the main landowner in the area, occupied the office of justiciar north of the Forth and was successful in executing this office, together with the Scottish sheriff of Aberdeen, the earl of Atholl. However, there was also an English sheriff of Aberdeen operating in the area, namely Sir Alexander Comyn, brother of the earl of Buchan. In 1304 the latter not only applied for the arrears of his expenses in that office, but claimed that he had earned considerable resentment for his activities from the people of his sheriffdom, suggesting that Comyn had been able to perform at least some of the duties of his office on Edward's behalf. Certainly, reports of his destructive activities in the north of Scotland caused

consternation among the Scots at the Peebles' council of August 1299. It seems likely, however, that an accommodation was reached between Comyn and his brother, in order to safeguard the family interests, although there was no love lost between Sir Alexander and the earl of Atholl. Despite Comyn's claims, therefore, there is no reason to believe that he represented any more than nuisance value to the loyalist government.

Since the north-east became the heartland of the Scottish government, the Comyns, who dominated the area, were no doubt able to exert such an influence over the Guardianship partly because of their relationship to King John and partly because English influence was felt so little in the north-east, unlike the south-west, the centre of Bruce authority. There is no doubt that Sir John Comyn, at least, was able to wield considerable power as Guardian, ruling that the earl of Strathearn - at Edward's peace - should pay compensation to Sir John Moubray for ravaging the latter's father's lands of Methven, and forfeiting a knight of Aberdeen for adhering to the English cause.

The north-east was once more subjected to the might of an English army in 1303 and Edward was able to install his own officers throughout the area. Nevertheless, as illustrated by a letter written immediately prior to the submission of the Guardian, Sir John Comyn, the prince of Wales, residing at Perth with his household, was only saved from a Scottish attack from Angus by the fact that the bridge across the Tay had been destroyed.

#### **Some conclusions about the English administration, 1297-1303:**

So, could the English presence in Scotland during these years be described as an administration? The evidence for the period 1297-1300 suggests that the answer is no. There were English garrisons in residence throughout this period only at Berwick, Roxburgh, Jedburgh, Edinburgh, and Lochmaben. This last garrison was under constant threat of attack from the Scots, either from the neighbouring castle of Caerlaverock, or from the earl of Carrick, whose father's castle it was.

Even in the south-east, where the four major royal castles were all in English hands, the garrisons were by no means secure. The ability of the Scots to operate from Selkirk forest, which reached a peak in 1299 with the holding of a council at Peebles and the appointment of a Scottish sheriff of Roxburgh and keeper of Selkirk Forest, illustrates clearly how ill-advised it would be to claim that Lothian and the eastern border sheriffdoms were firmly controlled by the English. This situation naturally meant that there was little scope for normal administrative activities, the main indications of which are the raising of revenues and the prosecution of justice. Lastly, the failure to prevent the capture of Stirling castle by the Scots in 1299 is perhaps the most striking example of the impotence of the south-eastern garrisons.

The picture changes in 1300, however. In the first place, the south-west was rendered more secure by the capture of Caerlaverock in that year, bringing the sheriffdom of Dumfries more firmly under English control. In the following year a considerable number of castles across Lowland Scotland were either recaptured or built up to enable them to hold an English garrison. Thus, by 1302, the castles of Berwick, Roxburgh, Jedburgh, Selkirk, Edinburgh, Linlithgow, Carstairs, Bothwell, Kirkintilloch, Dumfries, Lochmaben and Ayr were all held for King Edward and there was an English sheriff at Peebles.

This network of English-held castles across southern Scotland placed Edward's officials in a much stronger position. Although control was by no means complete in the south-west, it is clear that the sheriffs or the warden of the march were able to make effective the orders of forfeiture on certain 'rebel' lands and that a few of their new owners gained possession. The administrative processes involved in effecting such a redistribution of land meant that the raising of revenues and the prosecution of justice were also not beyond their capabilities, with the important proviso that this was by no means the case in all areas of the south-west.

However, English control of the south-east was now effective in all sheriffdoms, although the sheriff of Edinburgh appears to have been alone in collecting all forms of revenue. There is also evidence for the prosecution of robbers in the sheriffdom of Roxburgh and the holding of a burgh court at Linlithgow.

Thus, after the turn of the century, the English were able to operate a limited administration in the south of Scotland. Admittedly, it bore little resemblance to the system established in 1296, nor that described in the ordinances of September 1305. Nevertheless, the people of southern Scotland, particularly in the south-east, seem to have come to accept Edward's government, if not out of choice, at least out of necessity.

However, it must be said, finally, that the great volume of petitions concerning Scotland given a hearing in the parliament of February 1305 attest to the limitations of the English administration before that date. Disputes over land and property in almost every part of Scotland, including areas in which there would appear to have been effective English control, were brought before the king. In those few instances where claims had been made and upheld in previous years, it is quite clear that Edward's officers had not been able to execute the judgement, although obviously any who had been restored to land and property according to such a judgement would not now be making a complaint.

It must also be said that behind the capitulation of the majority of the Scots in 1304 lay a desire to re-establish a uniform administration throughout the land to protect the rights of its people. Since the loyalist government could never fully expel the English from the fertile lands of southern Scotland, and it had become clear that the figurehead of

that government, King John, was either unwilling, or unable, to return to his kingdom, the best hope for a settled future lay with Edward.

### Reflections on the Scottish government:

Despite the lack of evidence for the activities of the Scottish government, there is probably more evidence for the ability of the Guardians to execute the judgements of their courts during the period 1297-1303 than there is for King Edward. Although such evidence mostly refers to courts held in the north-east, Sir William Oliphant, the Scottish sheriff of Stirling, was also able to exercise his authority effectively. In addition, since the bishop of St. Andrews was able to enjoy the fruits of his see as far south as Fife, there is also good reason to believe that the 'rebel' government was successful in raising revenues in the north-east at least. Finance, as Edward well knew, was essential to the waging of the war, and although the Guardians were in an equivocal legal position with regard to the calling out of the Scottish army, it is clear that, even after the defection of the earl of Carrick in 1302, the forces at the command of the 'rebel' leaders were potent enough to cause the English much anxiety, so long as a pitched battle was avoided. The capture of Stirling castle from the English, followed closely by that of Bothwell, suggests that although there was certainly a degree of crisis management in their choice of leaders<sup>2</sup>, the Scots were able to rally round the Guardians, whoever they might be, and use their undoubtedly limited resources to great effect.

The patriots, therefore, had cause for a degree of pride in their achievements between 1297 and 1304. They had held on to parts of the south-west, and the north-east in its entirety - a larger geographical area than the English ever held - throughout that period in far more than name only. It is reasonable to suggest, therefore, that the Scottish nobility were not nearly as demoralised in 1304 as they had been after the battle of Dunbar in 1296. In addition, the degree of responsibility which Edward gave the Scottish political community in 1305, again in comparison with 1296, can only have increased their confidence. Having proved that they could exercise power in defiance of the English king, the Scots now only required a legitimate leader to act as a catalyst for revolt. The main obstacle to the success of Robert Bruce was not the English but the Comyn family and their allies, who, after all, dominated that very part of Scotland which had so effectively resisted the influence of Edward I. If there was any lesson to be learned by the English king from his experiences of 1296-1304, it was that Scotland would not remain conquered for long.

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
<sup>2</sup> Although rank was sometimes sufficient qualification to become a Guardian, success was more often the necessary prerequisite.

## APPENDIX A GARRISON GRAPHS


The following graphs, illustrating fluctuating garrison numbers, were constructed from a database containing all evidence for garrison membership throughout the period 1296 to 1305 collected during the course of my research. The results of this database were then transferred onto a spreadsheet, from which the graphs were generated.

It must be stressed, however, that the results produced can only serve as an impression of the numbers involved in the castles shown in the graphs. In so many cases, the evidence can be regarded as indicative only of those who **should** have been present. Those parts of the graphs which fluctuate gently over a comparatively small time-scale [for example, Graph 1] are, in fact, the most accurate, since they were taken from wages accounts. Little faith should be put in straight lines! The dotted lines indicate periods for which there is no evidence whatsoever. Finally, graphs have been produced only for those garrisons for which there is sufficient information.


**Graph 1: *Caerlaverock men-at-arms***




Graph 2.1: Lochmaben men-at-arms




Graph 2.2: Lochmaben footsoldiers



Graph 3.1: Dumfries men-at-arms




Graph 3.2: Dumfries footsoldiers






Graph 4: Ayr men-at-arms




There were no footsoldiers in the garrison at Ayr during this period.


Graph 5.1: Carstairs men-at-arms




Graph 5.2: Carstairs footsoldiers




Graph 6.1: Kirkintilloch men-at-arms





Graph 6.2: Kirkintilloch footsoldiers




Graph 7: *Linlithgow men-at-arms*


Though there were footsoldiers in the garrison at Linlithgow during this period, they remained fairly static and insufficiently interesting for a graph. See page 205 for an example of the numbers of footsoldiers usually present at Linlithgow.

Graph 8.1: *Edinburgh men-at-arms*Graph 8.2: *Edinburgh footsoldiers*


Graph 9.1: Roxburgh men-at-arms




Graph 9.2: Roxburgh footsoldiers




Graph 10.1: *Jedburgh men-at-arms*




Graph 10.2: *Jedburgh footsoldiers*



Graph 11.1: Berwick men-at-arms



Graph 11.2: Berwick footsoldiers





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