

GOLDSMITHS Research Online
Article

Moore, James W. and Haggard, Patrick

Commentary on 'How Something Can Be Said About
Telling More Than We Can Know: On Choice Blindness
and Introspective Report'.

You may cite this version as: Moore, James W. and Haggard, Patrick. 2006. Commentary on 'How Something Can Be Said About Telling More Than We Can Know: On Choice Blindness and Introspective Report'. *Consciousness and Cognition*, 15, pp. 693-696. [Article] : Goldsmiths Research Online.

Available at: <http://eprints.gold.ac.uk/6971/>

COPYRIGHT

All material supplied via Goldsmiths Library and Goldsmiths Research Online (GRO) is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights. You may use this copy for personal study or research, or for educational purposes, as defined by UK copyright law. Other specific conditions may apply to individual items.

This copy has been supplied on the understanding that it is copyright material. Duplication or sale of all or part of any of the GRO Data Collections is not permitted, and no quotation or excerpt from the work may be published without the prior written consent of the copyright holder/s.

Commentary on 'How Something Can Be Said About the Mind of Thanos
Knowing Our Choices and the Report'.

Can

Author: Jim Moore* & Paul Haggard

Address: Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, Queen's University Belfast, Belfast, Northern Ireland, BT7 1NN, UK

Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, Queen's University Belfast, Belfast, Northern Ireland, BT7 1NN, UK

*Author for correspondence: Email address: jim.moore@qub.ac.uk
1128

jim.moore@qub.ac.uk T: 0207679

Acknowledgements: This work was supported by ESR
and by ESR Grant RES002315716PH.

CM R C student grant

Everyday of four explanations for
making accurate decisions. The
article by Nisbett and Wilson
knows about the process (1977). The
answer about the process is

and choices we
are not aware of
of them and we can
and contribute
y.

Despite the splash created by Nisbett and Wilson's article, and their proposed
paradigm for the hypothesis, a research program in memory. This
is a situation that Johansson and colleagues have sought to address with their 'Choice
Blindness Paradigm' (CBP; see Johansson, Hall, Sikstrom, Tarning, & Lind, current
issue)

In line with Nisbett and Wilson's hypothesis, the CBP suggests that
a contribution by Johansson, Hall, Sikstrom, and Olsson (2005) presented
participants with photographs of faces, one of which they had chosen
being more attractive. The 'chosen' photograph was then presented to the
participant and they had to justify their choice of the chosen photograph.
Unbeknownst to the participants, the photograph that was chosen and presented
Johansson found that they presented the participant photograph they
had chosen. Participants could not justify their choice of the
'choice'.

This study appears to be a neat demonstration of Nisbett and Wilson's hypothesis.
Participants could not justify their choice of the chosen photograph.

in addition to the study itself

have been on the other

of the contribution of the

of the contribution of the

of the contribution of the

of the contribution of the

of the contribution of the

of the contribution of the

our justifications for 'real' choices may be based on the same processes

of the contribution of the

A key issue is how far we should accept the conclusions of Johansson et al's study.

of the contribution of the

of the contribution of the

psychological literature on the feature of voluntary action called 'agency' provides a

of the contribution of the

of the contribution of the

A generally accepted definition

of the contribution of the

of the contribution of the

A generally accepted definition

of the contribution of the

of the contribution of the

of the contribution of the

of the contribution of the

of the contribution of the

of the contribution of the

of the contribution of the

of the contribution of the

of the contribution of the

D and Wegmann and colleagues suggest that

of the contribution of the

of the contribution of the

'...we are not intrinsically informed about our

of the contribution of the

of the contribution of the

of the contribution of the

'. Support for this assertion comes from a

of the contribution of the

of the contribution of the

of the contribution of the

of the contribution of the

heightened sense of agency over her/himself

explicit form

part of them or a conscious sense

of agency can occur in various

conditions for example in

'utilisation behaviour' with a key element

form education to object in vision

in environment without conscious intending

habit. They recognize the objects

though they do not experience any

intentional action (Mace 2005). Although the

action is not consciously

intended, participants were able to

locate the objects

action for example, participants could

and Spina (2002) provide the

following examples of the study

of behaviour

'... while the CU spot dropped the knife

on purpose or not?

the single H participant

The examiners asked why he

was eating the apple. He replied "Well...it was there", "Are you hungry?" "No, well a bit", "Have you not just finished eating?" "Yes", "Is this apple yours?" "No". "And whose apple is it?" "Yours, I think", "So why are you eating it?" "Because it is here" (p. 293).

The experimental design appeared

to provide convincing evidence

supporting the hypothesis of automatic type

of action.

How ever, these experiments

are not the norm. For example, in Wegner and Wheatley's

study on the impact of the experimenter

and given environment on the effect

could be caused by the experimenter

of the sense of agency was

highly influenced by the behavior

of the experimenter

for all such cases as in the case of

of agency indeed

contributing to the resources of

from a more ambiguous

(through the introduction of other possible causes as in Wegner & Wheatley's study),

now he has in particular the case of

of behaviour and Levy

(2006) point to the importance of

in the sense of

agency in the sense of

underlying mechanisms

W hat evidence do we have from the

of agency and the A

study by Fried (1991) suggests that

of agency is generated by

perception of neural processes that

voluntary actions

proper procedure, Fried and colleagues

claim that

supplying information about the

of current events

report having a greater impact on

and they

action and on the other hand

potential for this

suggests that the initial 'urge' is a normal accompaniment of the neural

processes that generate the sense of

agency or a feeling of

perception of neural processes that

of action

herein respect to the explanation. However, Fried et al.'s result suggests that

an experimental agency procedure

of physical action

The sense of agency is a central

of action

neural mechanism responsible for the action. Fried et al.'s study argues against

of agency.

A computational model of the

of action

W oolfe & G hahram an (2006) review support

of agency

f

agency in a broad sense, and

the conscious

agency in a narrow sense, and

the conscious

agency in a broad sense, and

This could be explained

agency in a broad sense, and the patients' conscious intentions to move appeared to be based

agency in a broad sense, and

the conscious

Agency in a broad sense, and

the conscious

Agency in a broad sense, and

Previous studies have shown that

Agency in a broad sense, and

the conscious

Agency in a broad sense, and

This has been found

'intentional binding'. Agency in a broad sense, and

binding

Agency in a broad sense, and

the conscious

Agency in a broad sense, and

the conscious

Agency in a broad sense, and

showed binding effects even

Agency in a broad sense, and

effects were as strong as

Agency in a broad sense, and

the conscious

Agency in a broad sense, and

the conscious

Agency in a broad sense, and

the conscious consequences of

Agency in a broad sense, and

s

The present results suggest

the conscious

Agency in a broad sense, and

the conscious

Agency in a broad sense, and

the conscious

Agency in a broad sense, and

the conscious

Agency in a broad sense, and

) as a result?

We suggest CBP is an inherent kind of exam p the

CBP choice

him added to your portfolio

that profound care

when not to do it

Johansson's subjects could make sense of he

the actions of your system

the actions they

made in the past (how high

achieved)

choices) They would thus accept the agency A that

they could

contribute new reasons for why his work

the specific defender

aims successful in the future

the CBP experiential contribution

is a more method of 'sense-making' than accepting the agency A convincing

of the system would be on the

of the CBP decisions

regarding the exam p the work would be

decisions presumably

established in the contribution.

A note key regarding the effort

of the CBP the

experiential participation of the system

the behavior

participate in the system in the

with the intended

they are willing to do in the experiential

the actions

by the participant's choice

of the participant

and by giving the participant

the intentions

some empirical.

How ever should be between

access to one's reasons for forming

and access to the system of

and intentions

conscious work of CBP appears

the form of the system

has it spec reason for ho
W suggest that about bou tea
with it about sense of gency
of im bju in pain eW general know abou
perform hough w em ay be on fised belec
hem For exam p... of com
just in excuse for why h not

of the process of choosing
son for in or com m on,
each of unusual itions
our w m on s v hen w e
epi about w hy w e perform
m on think of spec/e
denying that perform ed

W hlv ev dom d... in C B Pa
suggest that should be exci dext
hear any instances of fibul in spec
in spec does not ok for spec bur
fit research in and character
def in m akces for excep on gen
voluntary on before w ak hem H ow eve
m on cognie m ak abundance p h r

use to explain em th d body e
em tip that U ndoubtedly
of B ut on fibul by
a m h m A key is for
have of fibul and b
ev know about our w n
ason for on rem the
spec d influences

The h... reasons for m ay be
psychology Freud, 92 3) w ev it suggest possible explain w hy
m ay be on m ak h angency A gency of m
experi em in- in ad W elnd have d phenom ena k pain
reasons for the sam ev ay R the m a
respective of the sam general se-
understand external be d l w r beca
m ak the exam inar because m y boss said

der has on ghio y n
volves d phenom enal
son for on h pedit and
m ak ing process that w use
use it study thing;
dough w e because d

asons
cof
I

knew with the happy system
sense of agency and the processes
of being possible for B P
researcher and the function
experience of thinking about reasons

of the processes of high
reasons for beginning
by a in potentials
interaction between
function.

References

Bayne & Levy (2006) The Feeling of Agency
Phenomenology of Agency
MIT Press

Balke & Singer (2009) The sense of agency
Trends in Cognitive Sciences
6(2) 17-24.

Balke, S. & Singer, J. (2009) The sense of agency
Trends in Cognitive Sciences
6(2) 17-24.

Freud (1923) 'The ego and the id'. In Freud, S. (1961) The
Complete Works of Sigmund Freud
W W Norton.

Fink, A. M. & C. S. (2009) The sense of agency
Spend (1991) Functionalism
in the study of the mind
365-366.

- Johansson, H., Skram, S., & Olsson, A. (2005). A direct
 link between cortical and subcortical brain
 regions. *Journal of Neuroscience*, 25(10),
 3101-3119.
- Haggard, P., & Kilner, J. (2002). A sense of
 agency. *Nature Neuroscience*, 5(4), 382-385.
- Morgan, A. (2005). The sense of agency: A
 review. In R. C. O'Keefe & N. E. Carr
 (Eds.), *Agency and self-awareness*.
 Oxford: University Press.
- Morgan, A., & Haggard, P. (2007). A sense of
 agency. *Journal of Neuroscience*, 27(10),
 2738-2742.
- Nelkin, D., & Welford, R. (1977). The
 sense of agency. *Psychological Review*, 84(2),
 31-57.
- Wegner, D. M. (2002). *The illusion of conscious
 will*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Wegner, D. M., & Wundt, J. (1999). A
 sense of agency. *Journal of Experimental
 Psychology*, 128(4), 804-824.
- Wegner, D. M., & Gromer, A. (2000). A
 sense of agency. *Journal of Experimental
 Psychology*, 129(1), 121-127.

