

Truthfulness and Truth in Jaina Philosophy

Peter Flügel*

Truthfulness and truth are not clearly distinguished in Jaina scriptures. A maxim of speaking the truth is stated in the so-called “*satya-mahāvratā*”, which Jain ascetics recite twice a day during their obligatory *pratikramaṇa* ritual. In accordance with the preferred Jain method of negative determination, the general principle of truthful speech is treated in terms of its characteristic violations, *aticāra*, that is, as the opposite of speaking non-truth, *a-satya*.¹ Normative principles such as this are constitutive for Jain discourse to the extent that they are used by speech communities, both to generate and to interpret speech. The precise implications of the maxim of truthfulness for language usage are specified in form of a distinction of four types or ‘species’ of speech, *bhāsā-jāya* <*bhāsā-jāta*>, which are at the centre of the Jain theory of discourse, supplemented by context-sensitive rules for proper ways of speaking, and examples. These analytical categories should be known and utilised by mendicants (ideally by all Jains) to prevent both the preparation and performance of violence, *ārambha*.

The rules and clauses for language usage expressed by the *bhāsā-jāta* tetrad consider speech primarily from a normative point of view, rather than from the perspective of the intention of the speaker. In this respect, the analysis of the uses of language in the Jaina scriptures shares many characteristics with the approach of universal pragmatics in contemporary

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philosophy:²

‘A mendicant should know that there are four kinds of speech: The first is truth; the second is untruth; the third is truth mixed with untruth; what is neither truth, nor untruth, nor truth mixed with untruth, that is the fourth kind of speech: neither truth nor untruth’ (Āyāra 2.4.1.4).³

Notably, the same scheme of four modes is applied to speech and to cognition (*maṇa* <*manas*>) or knowledge (*ñāna* <*jñāna*>) (Viy 622b/8.7.1b, 874b/15.1.4). Hence, the four *bhāsā-guttis* <*bhāsā-guptis*>, or controls of speech, and the four *maṇa-guttis* <*mano-guptis*>, or controls of the inner sense, are both characterised by the same terms in Utt 24.19–23. The four modes, thus, represent general attitudes towards truth, both in mind and in speech:

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|----------------------------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1. <i>saccā</i> < <i>satyā</i> > | truth |
| 2. <i>mosā</i> < <i>mṛṣā</i> > | untruth |
| 3. <i>saccā-mosā</i> < <i>satyā-mṛṣā</i> > | truth mixed with untruth |
| 4. <i>asaccā-mosā</i> < <i>asatyā-mṛṣā</i> > | neither truth nor untruth |

The formal structure of the four alternatives (tetra-lemma) is known as *catus-koṭi* in Buddhist literature, but used differently here.⁴ As the frequent use of the four alternatives (*catur-bhaṅga* or *catur-bhaṅgi*) as a classificatory scheme in Thāṇa IV, for instance, indicates,⁵ the *catus-koṭi* is used in Jain scholasticism in a similar way as the *nikṣepa* pattern, described by BRUHN–HÄRTEL (1978: v) as a formal ‘dialectical technique (often employed in a “pseudo-exegetical function”)’.⁶

JACOBI (1884: 150 n. 2) understood the first three modes to refer to assertions and the fourth to injunctions.

According to Paṇṇ 860 (255b), the first two modes are distinct (*pajjattiyā* <*paryāptā*>) ways of speaking, which can be analysed in terms of the true / false distinction,⁷ and the third and fourth are indistinct (*apajjattiyā* <*aparyāptā*>) ways of speaking, whose validity or non-validity is indeterminable. The sub-categories of distinct speech are true speech (*satyā bhāṣā*) and wrong or false speech (*mṛṣā bhāṣā*), and the sub-categories of indistinct speech are true-as-well-as-false speech (*satyā-mṛṣā bhāṣā*) and neither-true-nor-false speech (*asatyā-mṛṣā bhāṣā*). A *muni* should use only the first and the last mode of speech, and avoid the remaining two ‘by all means’ (DVS₂ 7.1) in order to minimise harm:

‘A monk or a nun, considering well, should use true and accurate speech, or speech which is neither truth nor untruth (i.e. injunctions); for such speech is not sinful, blameable, rough, stinging, &c.’ (Āyāra 2.4.1.7).⁸

(a) Speaking truthfully can either be interpreted ethically, as straightforward and accurate talk (on-record), or ontologically, as an assertion of the way things are.⁹ Both perspectives can be found in the Jain and non-Jain commentary literature alike,¹⁰ often mixed together, as the identical characterisation of the four *guptis* of mind and speech illustrates. *Satyā bhāṣā* refers both to the psychological and the normative conditions of truthfulness, that is, sincere, grammatically accurate and contextually acceptable speech, and to propositional truth.¹¹ It is explicitly recognised in the Jain scriptures (though not in these terms) that, as a speech act, propositional language has also an expressive and normative content. The normative, the expressive, and the propositional components of spoken language are altogether necessary to communicate something. Paṇṇ 862 states that ‘the truth or validity of the speech depends on various situations and conditions’ (MĀLVANIYĀ 1971: 325). Ten different dimensions or ‘validity conditions’ of truthful

speech are distinguished¹² (the compound “*saccā* <*satyā*> can be translated as ‘sincere’ or ‘true’ ‘according to the conventions of ____’):¹³

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|-----------------------------------------------------|----------------|
| 1. <i>janavaya-saccā</i> < <i>janapada-satyā</i> > | Country |
| 2. <i>sammata-saccā</i> < <i>sammata-satyā</i> > | Consensus |
| 3. <i>thavaṇā-saccā</i> < <i>sthāpanā-satyā</i> > | Representation |
| 4. <i>nāma-saccā</i> < <i>nāma-satyā</i> > | Name |
| 5. <i>rūva-saccā</i> < <i>rūpa-satyā</i> > | Form |
| 6. <i>paḍucca-saccā</i> < <i>pratitya-satyā</i> > | Confirmation |
| 7. <i>vavahāra-saccā</i> < <i>vyavahāra-satyā</i> > | Custom |
| 8. <i>bhāva-saccā</i> < <i>bhāva-satyā</i> > | Inner Meaning |
| 9. <i>joga-saccā</i> < <i>yoga-satyā</i> > | Practice |
| 10. <i>ovamma-saccā</i> < <i>aupamyā-satyā</i> > | Analogy |

The same list is given and explained in *Mūlācāra* 5.111–116, with exception of *yoga-satyā*, which is replaced by category No. 8 *sambhāvanā-satyā*, translated by OKUDA (1975: 128) as ‘truth of possibilities’ (*Möglichkeitswahrheit*; see *infra* p. 161).¹⁴ There is no apparent systematic connection between the categories in this list. Yet, the list is clearly informed by the four ‘doors of disquisition’ (*aṇugaddāra* <*anuyoga-dvāra*>) of canonical hermeneutics (AṇD 75), especially by the method of contextual interpretation (*aṇugama* <*anugama*>) through progressive specification via fixed standpoints (*naya*) (AṇD 601–606).¹⁵ The occurrence of the terms *nāma*, *sthāpanā* and *bhāva* indicates the deliberate incorporation of a variant of the ‘canonical’ *nikkheva* <*nikṣepa*>, as BHATT (1978: xv, 20) suggested, although the *davva* <*dravya*> standpoint is missing.¹⁶ A *nikṣepa* is a scholastic scheme which delineates fixed perspectives for the analysis of the principal dimensions of the possible contextual meanings of a word (contemporary linguistics is still struggling to establish comparable categories). The original purpose of the list of ten, as a whole, may have been similar. That is, assessing the meaning of an utterance from several commonly relevant perspectives.¹⁷

Most categories are self-explanatory. Truthful utterances based on the linguistic conventions of a country are explained by the commentaries through the example that ‘in Konkan *piccam* is said for *payas* and that by the *gopāla* the lotus is called *aravinda* only’ (SCHUBRING 2000: 157 n. 4, § 74). Because terms such as these are synonyms, they are all equally true.¹⁸ Similarly, what is accepted by many people, i.e. linguistic expressions, is conventionally true (*sammata-satyā*).¹⁹ Pragmatic theories of truth would fall under this perspective. A figurative representation, such as a statue which is not god itself, may itself not be accurate, but that what it symbolises can be recognized as true (*sthāpanā-satyā*).²⁰ The same applies to a name such as Devadatta or ‘given by god’ (*nāma-satyā*) (MĀc 113).²¹ Allusions to external appearance in form of prototypes such as ‘white cranes’ (not all cranes are white) are examples of *rūpa-satyā*.²² According to the commentators Haribhadra (PaṇṇV) and Malayagiri (PaṇṇṬ), the term *pratitya-satyā* designates an utterance which is true only under certain conditions, and thus predicated on empirical confirmation.²³ Examples are relative size (‘this is long’) or the relative state of transformation of objects at a given time (cf. MĀc 114).²⁴ Like other conventional expressions which, under certain conditions, could equally be classified as ‘truth-mixed-with-untruth’, common or idiomatic utterances such as ‘the *kūra* (i.e. the cooked rice) is cooking’ (MĀc 114) are acceptable as customarily true (*vyavahāra-satyā*).²⁵ The Śvetāmbara commentators explain the inner truth (*bhāva-satyā*) expressed by certain utterances with the example of a ‘white crane’ (*śuklā balākā*),²⁶ which MĀc 113 uses to illustrate *rūpa-satyā*, whereas Vaṭṭakera interprets the term as designating the ‘higher truth’, i.e. saying something untrue in order to avoid injury to someone (MĀc 116). This perspective is also applied to other contexts in the Śvetāmbara texts Āyāra 2.4.1.6 and DVS 7.11. An example of truth based on association with practice (*yoga-satyā*) is to describe someone according to his / her activity,

for instance the designation *chattri* (a *kṣatriya* who should protect his realm performs *chattrā-yoga*), or *daṇḍī* (who performs *daṇḍa-yoga* or punishment).²⁷ Instead of *yoga-satyā*, the *Mūlācāra* 115 has *sambhāvanā-satyā*, which means that assuming the possibility of something is a valid condition of truthful language: ‘If he wanted, he could do it. If Indra wanted, he could overturn the Jambudvīpa’ (OKUDA 1975: 128). As an example of speaking the truth, using comparison or analogy (*aupamyā-satyā*),²⁸ MĀc 116 mentions the word *palidovama* < *palyôpama* >, literally ‘like a sack of corn’, which designates a high number.²⁹ *Aṇuogaddārāim* (AGD) 368–382 demonstrates the practical ‘usefulness’ of this simile through the *naya* method of progressive disambiguation.³⁰

(b) Untruthful language or speaking untruthfully (*mṛṣā bhāṣā*) is the proscribed opposite of truth or truthfulness.³¹ In contrast to the ten conditions of truth, featuring the semantics of propositional utterances, the ten conditions out of which untruth ‘arises’ (compound: “*nissiya* <*niḥṣṛita*>), listed in Paṇṇ 863, are primarily psycho-physical conditions.³² According to SCHUBRING (2000: 157, § 69), ‘speech springing from emotion is by itself understood as *mosā*.’³³ Eight of the ten categories overlap with the standard Jain list of the eighteen sources of sin (*pāva-ṭhāṇa* <*pāpa-sthāna*>),³⁴ starting with the four passions (*kaṣāya* <*kaṣāya*>), and attachment and aversion, which in the Paṇṇ are the sole cause of karmic bondage, disregarding *yoga*, or activity (MĀLVANĪYĀ 1971: 384). Most types of untrue speech, conditioned by these factors, can be categorised as expressive utterances. The last two categories, *ākhyāyika-niḥṣṛita*³⁵ and *upaghāta-niḥṣṛita*,³⁶ do not refer merely to an underlying negative psycho-physical state in general, but to the unspecified psycho-physical conditions of two specific types of self-referentially defined commonly untrue speech acts—hearsay and false accusation—with predominately constative and regulative attributes.

1. <i>koha-nissiya</i> < <i>krodha-niḥṣṛita</i> >	Anger
2. <i>māṇa-nissiya</i> < <i>māna-niḥṣṛita</i> >	Pride
3. <i>māyā-nissiya</i> < <i>māyā-niḥṣṛita</i> >	Deceit
4. <i>lobha-nissiya</i> < <i>lobha-niḥṣṛita</i> >	Greed
5. <i>pejja-nissiya</i> < <i>premana-niḥṣṛita</i> >	Attachment
6. <i>dosa-nissiya</i> < <i>dveṣa-niḥṣṛita</i> >	Aversion
7. <i>hāsa-nissiya</i> < <i>hāsyā-niḥṣṛita</i> >	Ridicule
8. <i>bhaya-nissiya</i> < <i>bhaya-niḥṣṛita</i> >	Fear
9. <i>akkhāya-nissiya</i> < <i>ākhyāyika-niḥṣṛita</i> >	Hearsay
10. <i>uvaghāya-nissiya</i> < <i>upaghāta-niḥṣṛita</i> >	False Accusation

CAILLAT (1991: 11) observed that the Paṇṇ presents the *kaṣāyas* as the cause of untruth, not of injury, as in Āyāra 2.4.1.1 and DVS 7.11. This change of perspective, from *ahiṃsā* to “*satya* as the main criterion, may reflect the shift of emphasis in classical Jain *karman* theory from act to intention. The ten categories seem to have in common that they refer to acts which, intentionally or unintentionally, produce unwholesome perlocutionary effects in the addressee (and the speaker as well). They are either factually false, ethically wrong or both.³⁷

(g) The category ‘partially true speech’³⁸ or ‘truth-mixed-with-untruth’ (*saccā-mosā bhāsā* <*satyā-mṛṣā bhāsā*>) should not be mixed up with the conditionally true standpoints of *syād-vāda*, which apply only to valid statements, not to false knowledge (*apramāṇa*). ‘Truth-mixed-with-untruth’ designates intentionally or unintentionally ambiguous or unclear speech, which is strictly prohibited.³⁹ The meaning of the term is explained by DVS 7.4–10:

4. But this and that topic which confines the Eternal within limits—this half-true speech the wise [monk] should avoid.
5. By a speech which is untrue, though its appearance is that of a true one, a man is touched by sin, how much more a man who speaks plain untruth!’ (DVS₁

7.4).⁴⁰

Satyā-mṛṣā bhāsā is sinful language, based on the whole on non-universalisable ethical principles. For instance, the language of heretical forest-monks, who do not abstain from killing, whose thought, speech and behaviour is not well controlled:

‘They employ speech that is true and untrue at the same time: “do not beat me, beat others; do not abuse me, abuse others; do not capture me, capture others; do not torment me, torment others; do not deprive me of life, deprive others of life”’ (Suy 2.2.21).

The ten types of truth-mixed-with-untruth listed in Paṇṇ 865⁴¹ do not explicitly address expressive or regulative aspects of speech acts, but only propositional content; despite the fact that performatives can also be both true and untrue. According to the commentaries, all types deal with indiscriminate speech, and with semantic and logical fallacies, such as category mistakes regarding the quality or quantity of objects or temporal modalities which can be easily ‘mixed up’ (compound: “*missiyā* <*miśritā*>”), for instance in utterances designating part-whole relationships.

1. <i>uppaṇṇa-missiyā</i> < <i>utpanna-miśritā</i> >	Born
2. <i>vigaya-missiyā</i> < <i>vigata-miśritā</i> >	Destroyed
3. <i>uppaṇṇa-vigaya-missiyā</i> < <i>utpanna-vigata-miśritā</i> >	Born-Destroyed
4. <i>jīva-missiyā</i> < <i>jīva-miśritā</i> >	Life
5. <i>ajīva-missiyā</i> < <i>ajīva-miśritā</i> >	Matter
6. <i>jīvājīva-missiyā</i> < <i>jīvājīva-miśritā</i> >	Life-Matter
7. <i>aṇanta-missiyā</i> < <i>ananta-miśritā</i> >	Infinite
8. <i>paritta-missiyā</i> < <i>parita-miśritā</i> >	Separate
9. <i>addhā-missiyā</i> < <i>adhva-miśritā</i> >	Time
10. <i>addhāddhā-missiyā</i> < <i>ardhādhva-miśritā</i> >	Halftime

The list of ten modalities evidently reflects general issues of

particular concern for Jain doctrine. It can be thematically subdivided in two triplets and two pairs. The first triplet—*utpanna*, *vigata*, *utpanna-vigata*—addresses unclear distinctions concerning life and death. The commentators explain the meaning of *utpanna-miśritā* as speaking in non-specific ways about the born, mixed with references to the yet unborn; for instance birth occurring in this or that village or town, that ten or more or less boys were born ('ten boys were born in this village today') etc.⁴² In the same way, *vigata-miśritā* refers to cases of 'stating mortality in an indefinite way, e.g. saying that ten people have died in this village, etc.' (RATNACANDRA 1988 IV: 400).⁴³ *Utpanna-vigata-miśritā* refers to both true and false, or contradictory assertions (*viśamvāda*) regarding manifestations of both birth and death.⁴⁴ The second triplet—*jīva*, *ajīva*, *jīvājīva*—similarly addresses the problem of pointing in a general way to 'great numbers' of either living or dead beings, or quantities of mixed living and dead beings.⁴⁵ Life (*jīva*) in abstract and concrete form can be confused through vague language, such as the language of sets (*rāśī*), or other numerical expressions. The same applies to matter (*ajīva*), and both life and matter (*jīvājīva*). The consequence of imprecise language may be unintentional violence against individual living beings (in a 'heap of dead beings'). According to *Āvassaya-nijjutti* (ĀvNi 8.56–100), one of the principal heretics of the canonical period, Rohagutta, committed the mistake of mixing up categories by positing a third principle, *no-jīva* or the half-living, which mediates between *jīva* and *ajīva*. Hence, his heresy was called *terāsiyā*.⁴⁶ The pair *ananta* and *parīta* addresses indiscriminate language regarding aspects of finite-infinite, part-whole, or singular term-existence relationships. The commentaries explain *ananta-miśritā* with reference to the case of certain plants, for instance root vegetables such as radish (*mūlaka*), which have only one body, yet are composed of an infinite number of souls (*ananta-jīva*).⁴⁷ The category *parīta-miśritā* focuses, conversely, for

instance on the independence and separateness of each individual element within a composite form of vegetation.⁴⁸ The two ontological levels of the relationship between one and many can easily be mixed up in these cases; which has potential ethical (karmic) consequences. One of the principle concerns of the *Pannavaṇā*, highlighted in Malayagiri's commentary, is the difference between the categories infinite (*ananta*) and uncountable (*asamkhyāta*).⁴⁹ With regard to *adhva*, time, speech is both true and untrue if one says, for some reason, that 'it is night' during the daytime, or 'get up, it is day' when it is night.⁵⁰ The same applies to the part of a measure of time, or *ardhādhva*, such as a *prahara*, a quarter of the bright or dark period of the day.⁵¹ The statements may be true in as much as time in general is concerned, but false with regard to time in particular (i.e. it may be bright, although technically it is still night).⁵² Examples for a potential mix up of the modalities of time, which may have negative moral consequences in cases of promises for instance, are given in Āyāra 2.4.2, and in DVS 7.6–10 as paradigmatic cases for *satyā-mṛṣā* speech. The illocutionary form of these sentences is not essential, since they can be transformed into propositions of the form: 'x promises (commands etc.), that p':⁵³

'6. Such speech therefore, as e.g. "we [shall] go", "we shall say", "we shall have to do that", or: "I shall do that", or "he shall do that", 7. uncertain in the future or with regard to a matter of the present [or] of the past, a wise [monk] should avoid. 8.9. If [a monk] does not know, [or] has some doubt about, a matter which concerns past, present and future, he should not say: "it is thus"; 10. (this he should do only) when there is no room for doubt' (DVS₁ 7.6–10).⁵⁴

Somadeva, in his *Yaśastilaka* of 959 CE (YT, p. 349–350), mentions a similar example of a statement which is on the whole true but to some extent false, that is, when someone

‘after promising to give something at the end of a fortnight, gives it after a month or a year’ (HANDIQUI 1968: 265). He also mentions the statement ‘he cooks food or weaves clothes’ as one which is to some extent true but on the whole false because ‘properly speaking, one cooks rice etc. and weaves yarn’. A different example of mixed speech, mentioned in Vy 18.7.1 (749a), are utterances of someone who is possessed. The fact that this case, referring to an existentially mixed psycho-physical state rather than to semantic ambiguity, cannot be easily fitted into any of the ten categories illustrates that the list is not exhaustive. From other viewpoints, the examples may also fit the categories of the other lists.

All of the ten enumerated modalities seem to refer to utterances in which the universal and the particular, or modalities of time, quantifiers, or other categories,⁵⁵ are mixed up in an indiscriminate and hence ambiguous way.⁵⁶ Though the mistakes discussed in the texts seem to be primarily based on indiscriminate cognition, producing objectionable uncertainty (cf. Āyāra 2.4.1–2), the ten categories are very broad and can cover a great variety of motives, logical and semantic conundrums, such as vagueness or paradoxes, and linguistic forms and discursive strategies, such as off-record uses of metaphor, similes, veiled speech and politeness, which GRICE (1975) and BROWN-LEVINSON (1978) have analysed as popular forms for saying one thing and meaning another.⁵⁷ These phenomena deserve more detailed analysis in future studies. For the purpose of this essay, a few comparative notes on the implications of the findings for the question of the stance of Jain philosophy on the law of non-contradiction must suffice.

For PRIEST–ROUTLEY (1989: 3), ‘admission or insistence, that some statement is both true and false, in a context where not everything is accepted or some things are rejected, is a sure sign of a paraconsistent approach—in fact

a dialethic approach’, i.e. the assumption that ‘the world is inconsistent’. The Greek word *dialetheia* (two-way truth) refers to a true contradiction facing both truth and falsity.⁵⁸ PRIEST–ROUTLEY (1983: 17) were the first to point out parallels between Jaina logic and modern discussive logic, but argue, like most logicians before them, that Jain perspectivism is predicated on the rejection of the law of contradiction.⁵⁹ However, GANERI (2002: 274) demonstrated in his reconstruction of the assumptions underlying the method of seven-fold predication (*sapta-bhaṅgī*), based on an extension of discussive logic via modalised many-valued truth-tables, that Jain logic ‘does not involve any radical departure from classical logic... The underlying logic *within* each standpoint is classical, and it is further assumed that each standpoint or participant is internally consistent.’ The findings of BALCEROWICZ (2003: 64) on the contextual logic of the seven *nayas* concur with this general conclusion. Both authors show that Jain logic is context-sensitive and a quasi-functional system.

To *syād-vāda* and *anekānta-vāda* the Jain *catuṣ-koṭi* of the modes of speech can be added, as another example of ‘Jain logic’ which clearly operates within the confines of the law of non-contradiction, and does not need to be interpreted as a form of scepticism, nor of syncretism predicated on the notion of a total truth integration of all viewpoints, as MATILAL (1981) argues. Our brief glance at the Jain interpretation of the third mode of the so-called ‘four-valued logic’ of the *catuṣ-koṭi*, applied to language usage, that is, the explicit exclusion of the values ‘false’ and ‘both true and false’, showed that ‘Jain logic’ does not ‘flatly deny’⁶⁰ the law of non-contradiction. The examples in Jain scriptures for modes of speech which are both-true-and-false, and their explicit rejection, demonstrate, on the contrary, that Jain philosophy is unequivocally opposed to violations of the law of non-

contradiction. This conclusion is also borne out by the Jain analysis of the temporal aspects of action (Viy 1.1.1=13a, 9.33.2d = 484a), which explicitly denies the possibility that an action that is being performed is not equal to the completed action, as the heretic Jamāli held ('has the bed been made or is it being made?'). The question of the identity of an action in time has important consequence for the evaluation of karmic consequences, also of speech-acts. Contrary to PRIEST-ROUTLEY's (1989) intuitions, it seems, the main technique of argumentation used by Jain philosophers in all these cases resembles Aristotle's refutation of Heraclitus and other 'paraconsistent' thinkers in ancient Greece:

'Key parts of his analysis involved the use of time to avoid contradiction—instead of saying that a changing thing was both in a given state and also not in that state, it was said that the thing was in that state at time t1, but not in that state at a different time t2—and the theory of potentiality—required to reunify these now temporarily isolated states as parts of the one (and same) change. The appeal to different temporal quantifiers illustrated the *method of (alleged) equivocation* used since ancient times to avoid contradiction and reinforce consistency hypothesis; namely, where both A and – A appear to hold, find a respect or factor or difference r such that it can be said that A holds in respect r1 and – A in respect r2. It can then be said that a contradiction resulted only by equivocation on respect or factor r. Often however the method of alleged equivocation does not work in a convincing way, and it breaks down in an irreparable way with the semantic paradoxes, as the Megarians were the first to realize' (PRIEST-ROUTLEY 1989: 8).

Speech that is both-true-and-untrue is rejected in the Jain scriptures, because it mixes aspects which can be

discriminated, if necessary with the help of the method of perspective variation in time. To what extent ancient Jain philosophers would have agreed with Aristotle on this point is a question which can only be clearly answered in a separate study. It seems to me that the Jain theory of time is fundamental, also for Jain perspectivism.

(d) The most interesting of the four modes of speech (and cognition) is 'speaking neither truth nor untruth' (*asaccā-mosā*). That is, speech to which the true / false distinction is not applicable. Twelve types of the *asatyā-mṛṣā bhāṣā* are distinguished in Paṇṇ 866 = Viy 10.3.3 (499b):⁶¹

1. <i>āmantaṇi</i> < <i>āmantraṇi</i> >	Address
2. <i>āṇavaṇi</i> < <i>ājñāpani</i> >	Order
3. <i>jāyaṇi</i> < <i>yācana</i> >	Request
4. <i>pucchaṇi</i> < <i>ṭṭcchani</i> >	Question
5. <i>paṇṇavaṇi</i> < <i>praññāpani</i> >	Communication
6. <i>paccakkhāṇi</i> < <i>pratyākhyāṇi</i> >	Renunciation
7. <i>icchāṇulomā</i> < <i>icchāṇulomā</i> >	Consent
8. <i>aṇabhiggahiyā</i> < <i>anabhigṛhitā</i> >	Unintelligible
9. <i>abhiggahiyā</i> < <i>abhigṛhitā</i> >	Intelligible
10. <i>saṃsaya-karaṇi</i> < <i>saṃsaya-karaṇi</i> >	Doubt-Creating
11. <i>voyaḍā</i> < <i>vyākṛtā</i> >	Explicit
12. <i>avvoyaḍā</i> < <i>avyākṛtā</i> >	Implicit

Nine of the twelve categories are also listed in Māc 5.118–119. The categories 1–7 are identical in both texts. Of the last five, only *saṃsaya* (No. 10) is mentioned by Vaṭṭakera, and a category labelled *aṇakkhara* <*anaḥsara*>, 'incomprehensible', which can be read as an equivalent of *aṇabhiggahiyā* <*anabhigṛhitā*> (No. 8, maybe also incorporating aspects of No. 12).⁶²

Speaking neither-truth-nor-untruth is interpreted by JACOBI (1884: 150 n. 2, 151)⁶³ and MĀLVANIYĀ (1971: 325 f.) as referring to injunctions. However, considering the

great variety of listed speech acts (only the first three are injunctions), it seems better to use AUSTIN's (1962) term 'performatives', which are by definition neither true nor false, to characterise the first seven terms.⁶⁴ The last five terms cover aspects which GRICE (1975) discussed under the conversational maxims of relation ('relevance') and manner ('avoid obscurity'). In Austin's terminology, addressing, ordering, requesting, and questioning etc. are all illocutionary acts. Questions,⁶⁵ commands, and exclamations are not propositions, since they can not be asserted or denied; that is, they are neither true nor false. Imperatives (directives), such as orders and requests, and regulatives (commissives), such as consenting and renouncing (promising, vowing etc.), through which the speaker commits him / herself to perform certain actions in future, imply normative conditions which ought to be fulfilled, but which are not fulfilled yet. In this sense, the propositional content is also neither true nor false. Truth, and its opposite, falsity, are properties that belong only to propositions. Propositions are statements that either assert or deny that something is the case. Not all sentences are true or false, because not all sentences make such claims. Commands, questions, and expressions of volition neither assert nor deny that something is the case, and are, consequently, neither true nor false.

ARISTOTLE (PH 4) already noted that 'every sentence is not a proposition; only such are propositions as have in them either truth or falsity. Thus a prayer is a sentence, but is neither true nor false.' Problems related to the ontological and truth-functional status of future events and the grammatical future were also discussed in Greek philosophy, which may or may not have influenced Indian philosophy in this point.⁶⁶274 In *De Interpretatione* (PH), ARISTOTLE offers the following solution to a paradox posed by Diodoros Cronus as to the truth-value of the sentence 'Will there be a sea battle

tomorrow?' Any definite answer ('yes' or 'no') to this indecidable question is presently neither true nor false, but in future one becomes true, then the other becomes false:

'One of the two propositions in such instances must be true and the other false, but we cannot say determinately that this or that is false, but must leave the alternative undecided. One may indeed be more likely to be true than the other, but it cannot be either actually true or actually false. It is therefore plain that it is not necessary that of an affirmation and a denial one should be true and the other false. For in the case of that which exists potentially, but not actually, the rule which applies to that which exists actually does not hold good' (PH 9).

For Aristotle, as for the Jains, it is both unethical and factually wrong to assume the future is determined, since actions evidently influence events. Although it is not entirely clear what exactly Aristotle and the Jain author(s) had in mind, in both cases the commitment to free will and to the logic of events overrules the logic of propositions. Generally, empirical facts can neither be proven true nor false by logical necessity: 'Even if I say "It's raining now" when the sun is shining, I have not said something that is necessarily false, just something that happens to be false' (HARNAD 1999: 1).⁶⁷ From a purely logical point of view, Bertrand RUSSELL (1905) showed that all predicates with variables are not propositions to which a truth value can be attached in an unambiguous way. Hence they are neither true nor false. However, they can be transformed into propositions by replacing the variable with a value or a quantifier.⁶⁸ It is, of course, difficult to say to what extent ancient Jain philosophers already shared certain intuitions with modern logicians.

The first seven categories, sometimes combined, cover most speech acts a Jain ascetic would conventionally use in

contexts of monastic life;⁶⁹ for instance taking vows (*paccakkhāṇa*), requesting permission (*āpucchāṇa*), ordering (*ājñā*), confessing (*ālocanā*), begging forgiveness (*kṣamāpaṇā*) etc. *Āmantaṇi* <*āmantraṇi*> speech or language, for instance, is ‘used for attracting somebody’s attention, a vocative word or expression’ (GHATAGE 2003 III.2: 1001), for instance ‘O Devadatta!’⁷⁰ MĀLVANĪYĀ (1971: 325) gives the following examples of an address and an order: ‘when a person wanting John to come near him says “O! John”, or ‘when a person says to another person, “Go ahead”.’ However, not in all contexts are such expressions neither-true-nor-false. Under certain circumstances, the first example may represent or can be read as an ‘indirect’ or ‘implicit performative’ speech act clad in form of an address, and it could be argued that, in certain contexts, the second example does not correspond to the prescription in Āyāra 2.4 for mendicants to avoid pragmatic interventions.

The last five terms of the list are of a different nature. The term *aṇabhiggahiyā*<*anabhigrhīṭā*> refers to ‘unintelligible or incomprehensible speech’ (RATNACANDRA 1988 I: 156), which is either ‘irrelevant’ (DELEU (1970: 169) or / and ‘unacceptable’ (GHATAGE 1996 I: 237), but neither-true-nor-false. Its antonym, *abhiggahammi boddhavvā*, intelligible instruction, refers to ‘clear and intelligible language’ (RATNACANDRA 1988 IV: 351), which is ‘relevant’ and ‘acceptable’, and neither-true-nor-false.⁷¹ Malayagiri’s commentary⁷² explains the difference between irrelevant and relevant speech through the following example: ‘to the question “What shall I do now?” the answer “Do as you like” is *aṇabhiggahiyā*, the answer “Do this, do not that!” is *abhiggahiyā*’ (DELEU 1970: 169).

It is not entirely clear why *saṃsaya-karaṇi bhāsā* <*saṃśaya-karaṇi bhāsā*>, ‘ambiguous language which causes doubt’ (RATNACANDRA 1988 IV: 570), is regarded as

neither-true-nor-false, and therefore permissible. It must be assumed that only the use of strategically ambiguous messages for the purpose of creating *vairāgya*-shocks is seen as legitimate, but not language which creates doubt about Jainism in the minds of believers. He seems to follow Malayagiri (PaṇṇṬ), who argued that from the *niścaya-naya* not only *satya-mṛṣā* but also *asatyā-mṛṣā* statements are false—‘if they are spoken with the intention of deceiving others’ (MĀLVANĪYĀ 1971: 346). However, Viy 18.7.1 (749a) states that, by definition, the speech of a Kevalin, because it is harmless, can only be true or neither-true-nor false.⁷³ The statement associates higher moral truth with this type of speech, which can thus be compared with the ‘twilight-language’ (*sandhā-bhāsā*) of Tantric Buddhism, which is also characterised as neither-true-nor-false.⁷⁴ Jambūvijaya’s edition of the Ṭhāṇa 4.23 (238) contains the following commentary of According to OKUDA (1975: 129), MĀc 119 explains *saṃsaya-vayaṇi* <*saṃśaya-vacana*> as ‘speech which expresses doubt’. But its commentator Vasunandin (11th–12th century) interprets this as ‘speech of children and old people’ as well as the sounds of (five-sensed) ‘roaring buffalos’ etc., which cause doubt as to their meaning, while the Digambara authors Aparājita and Āśādhara and the Śvetāmbara Haribhadra commenting on DVS 7, read *saṃsaya-karaṇi* simply as ‘ambiguous speech’ (*anekārtha-sādhāraṇā*). Haribhadra classifies speech of children as *aṇakkhara* <*anākṣara*>, incomprehensible, which also figures as the ninth and last category listed in MĀc 119, which Vasunandin reserves for expressions of animals of two-four senses, and for sounds created by snipping fingers etc. (OKUDA 1975: 129).⁷⁵

Vyākṛtā bhāsā refers to clear distinct speech with explicit unambiguous meaning (RATNACANDRA 1988 IV: 511).⁷⁶ There is no example given by the commentaries for distinct speech which is neither-true-nor-untrue. *Avyākṛtā-bhāsā*>, refers to indistinct involuted or poetic speech consisting of obscure

or unintelligible words ‘with deep and profound meaning’ (RATNACANDRA 1988 IV: 445; cf. GHATAGE 2001 II: 800).⁷⁷ *Mantras* or *sūtras* may be fitting examples. The fact that the *Mūlācāra* does not mention these two categories reinforces the suspicion that they are redundant, and overlapping with the category of incomprehensible language.

The most interesting case is *pannavaṇī-bhāṣā* <*prajñāpanī-bhāṣā*>, explanation, the generic term which Vardhamāna Mahāvira himself employs in the scriptures⁷⁸ to designate his discourse, which also gives the *Pannavaṇā-suttam* its name. Like all descriptions of speech acts, *pannavaṇī* is a somewhat ambiguous term, because it refers both to the illocutionary act, locutionary content, and perlocutionary effect of proclaiming something. This ambiguity is reflected in different translations of the word. SCHUBRING (2000 § 69: 158) and DELEU (1970: 169) translate *pannavaṇī* as ‘communication’ (*Mitteilung*). According to SCHUBRING (2000 § 69: 157 f.), the examples for ‘communication’ given in *Viy* 10.3.3 (499b) = *Paṇṇ* 866, ‘We want to [*wollen*] lie down’ (*āsaissāmo*) etc., refer to ‘expressions of an intention’ (to do something). However, DELEU (1970: 169) and LALWANI (1985: 133) translate *āsaissāmo* <*āsayiṣyāmaḥ*> as ‘we will lie down’ and ‘we shall lie down’ respectively, that is, as the description of a future action or state.⁷⁹ MĀLVANIYĀ (1971: 211), who points to kindred views in the Pāli text *Puggala-paññatti*, prefers the word ‘describing’ as a translation of *pannavaṇī* which he renders as ‘speech that intends to describe a thing’. In this, he follows the 13th century commentary of Ācārya Malayagiri who stated that *pannavaṇī* ‘means the speech that intends to describe the thing (or event) [as it is]’.⁸⁰ It is a form of *asaccāmosā* speech, ‘a speech which has nothing to do with norm (validity or invalidity) but which only describes the thing (or event)’: ‘To be more explicit, the speech which has nothing to do with religious dos and do-nots but which simply describes

the thing is called *Prajñāpanī*.⁸¹ MĀLVANIYĀ (1971: 212) cites the example quoted by the commentator Malayagiri’s *Prajñāpanā-ṭikā*, ‘Those who refrain from killing living beings live long and enjoy good health (in the next birth)’,⁸² and notes: ‘The *gāthā* in point contains no command “do not kill” but simply describes the fact that those who do not kill live long and remain healthy.’ Such speech ‘has nothing to do with religious dos and do-nots’ (MĀLVANIYĀ 1971: 211). Hence, it should be distinguished from implicit performative speech. But, of course, it may be interpreted as such by a listener who infers an ‘ought’ from the ‘is’. MONIER-WILLIAMS’ (1986: 659) *Sanskrit - English Dictionary* translates the causative *prajñāpana* as ‘statement, assertion’. LALWANI (1985 IV: 133) apparently follows the *Illustrated Ardhmāgadhi Dictionary* of RATNACANDRA (1988 III: 443), based on Malayagiri, in using the word ‘advice’ (*upadeśa*).⁸³ What is probably meant by the term *pannavaṇī* is that from the conventional point of view, which underlies the Jain ‘*catuskoṭī*’ of language usage, the testimony of an authoritative person is neither true nor untrue, because its meaning may be incomprehensible for a hearer, similarly to unintelligible utterances of non-enlightened creatures. With imperatives and addresses expressing universal truths or ideals has in common that no referent exists *in re* at a given place and point of time (as for instance in Malayagiri’s example which should not be read as a prediction relating to a specific individual). The multidimensional implications of a general statement or rule such as this cannot be understood entirely in an instant, as WITTGENSTEIN (1953: 53–55, § 138 40) noted in his remarks on the relation between meaning and use of a word (ib., pp. 190 ff., § 138 f.). Moreover, the example given by the commentaries concerning the necessary link between non-violence and health cannot be proved or disproved from a conventional perspective. It must be accepted on the basis of the authority of the speaker. Interestingly enough, the two

truth theory is not invoked by the commentaries in defence of the concept of transcendental speech, being neither-true-nor-false, in spite of its capability to immunise any statement against criticism.⁸⁴

Paṇṇ 832–857 gives another example for speech which is neither-true-nor-false by discussing the question of the ‘congruity of grammatical and natural gender and number’ (SCHUBRING 2000 § 74: 158). It argues that words such as *go*, *cow*, which express (genderless) universals but are employed in masculine singular, are not false or both-true-and-false, say, with regard to female cows, but neither-true-nor-false. The same applies to imperatives (*ājñāpanī*), since ‘we may order a person of any gender and this person may or may not carry out our orders’ (MĀLVANIYĀ 1971: 326).⁸⁵

The last of the four variants of *ohāraṇī-bhāsā* <*avadhāraṇī-bhāṣā*>, or determinate speech, is another example of speech which is neither-true-nor-false. Reflexive expressions such as ‘I believe’ or ‘I think’ are said to be capable of expressing any of the four modes of speech, depending on whether they serve religion (*ārāhiya* <*ārādhita*>), in which case they are true by definition, harm religion (*virāhiya* <*virādhita*>), in which case they are false, both serve and harm religion, in which case they are true-as-well-as-false, or whether they do neither, in which case they are neither-true-nor-false (Paṇṇ 830–831 [246b]).⁸⁶

The examples show that in the Jain philosophy of speech pragmatic efficacy, that is, non-violence, supersedes propositional truth.⁸⁷

‘It goes with the sphere of *ethics* that all four modes of speech, and consequently the mode of wrong speech as well, are admitted, provided they are employed in a pious way of mind (*āuttam=samyak*), while even true speech coming from a sinner’s mouth

will count for nothing (Pannav. 268a)’ (SCHUBRING 2000 § 74: 158).

Conversely, as mentioned before, ‘a mode of speech springing from emotion is by itself understood as *mosā*’ (SCHUBRING (2000 § 74: 157). In other words, the speaker’s state of mind, his / her beliefs, attitudes or intentions (if not his / her *Being*), and the specific pragmatic context is decisive, not the words themselves, or their propositional meaning. Arguments relating to the ‘higher truth’ of morality based on similar considerations. HANDIQUI (1968: 266) notes that the 10th century Digambara *ācārya* Somadeva is more concerned with ethics than with propositional truth:

‘Somadeva appears in certain circumstances to attach greater importance to self-preservation and philanthropic considerations than to speaking the truth. He opines that the truth must not be spoken if it is likely to endanger others and bring inevitable ruin to oneself.’

Another example of this attitude is given by the Śvetāmbara Ācārya Hemacandra who, in his 12th century *Yogaśāstra* (YŚ 2.61) and self-commentary, narrates that the sage Kauśika, who was famous for speaking the truth, ‘went to hell because accurate information given by him led to the capture and killing of a band of robbers’ (cited by HANDIQUI 1968: 266 n. 4):

‘On the other hand (*api*), even though a statement may be true, it should not be spoken if it causes affliction to others [This is] because, even if it is accepted [by all the people] in the world, Kauśika was sent to hell [on account of making such a statement]’ (YŚ 2.61).⁸⁸

The explanations of the four modes of speech in canonical Jain literature and its medieval Sanskrit commentaries

show that they are conceived as meta-rules, on a level of abstraction comparable to the discourse ethics of universal pragmatics, while the sub-categories and examples correspond to the level of empirical semantics and pragmatics. The levels of abstraction of the lists of examples in the commentaries vary, since the Jain lists are relatively unsystematic, although some may have been intended as scholastic devices for cumulative indexation *qua* fixed analytical perspectives. From the point of view of comparative analytical philosophy, some examples could serve as illustrations for one or other of the conversational postulates *à la* Grice ('be relevant' etc.), Searle, or Habermas, while others can be related to the modern logical investigations of vagueness, category mistakes, quantifiers, or modalities of time in particular. In contrast to modern intentionalist semantics, Jain philosophers of language analyse examples of their four fundamental types of speech rarely with reference to the intention of the speaker, but prefer an objective or listener's standpoint. That is, they investigate the structure of the utterance as a whole, from the de-contextualised point of view of the four combinations of the basic true / false distinction, seen from the perspective of discourse ethics. The same perspective is preferred by universal pragmatics.

We can conclude from this brief discussion of the explanations of the four modes of speech in the Śvetāmbara canon and the commentaries that the rules of Jain discourse are less concerned with referential truth than with the pragmatics of speech;⁸⁹ in particular with the expression of the 'higher truth' of religious insight gained through direct self experience, and speaking in accordance with the ethics of non-violence. Yet, it would be a mistake to assume that truth in Jain discourse is always defined as an aspect of objective illocutionary force, depending on the form of the utterance and the intentional state of a speaker alone, without the need to be backed up by argument in processes of critical inquiry. The primacy of

pragmatic ethical and moral considerations, though considered from a monological perspective, makes the Jain theory of speech in many ways akin to universal pragmatics. It is apparent that, albeit unsystematically presented, for almost all universal pragmatic principles and conversational postulates there are functional equivalences amongst the Jain principles and rules of speech, which are by no means 'primitive' and 'ill-assorted', as for instance the philologist SCHUBRING (2000 § 74: 157) believed. Jain principles and rules of discourse are not mere examples of a culture-specific 'particularistic ethics', as LAIDLAW (1995: 14) argues, but form a 'comparatively systematic code which is well-grounded in objective considerations' (CAILLAT 1991: 14).

The analysis of the implications of the Jain maxim of truth and the general rules for proper language usage shows that the 'universal validity claims': propositional truth, normative rightness, and truthfulness are important considerations of Jain discourse ethics. Despite the primacy of non-violence and sincerity of expression, there are numerous examples for rules concerning referential truth, the ideal of univocal or straight (*ṛju*) speech, and the avoidance of deception, especially Āyāra 2.4.1.1, Āyāra 2.4.2.19, and DVS 8.46.⁹⁰ Such rules of avoidance of false representations (including false reference to past, present and future) and non-deceptive speech etc., can be understood as expressions of a pragmatic anti-illusionist (anti-Brāhmaṇic) realism, that is, as anti-deception strategies.

Although, the Jaina texts deliberately avoid defining certain words as 'sacred', for Jainism, too, 'correct speech is of religious value' (CAILLAT 1984: 71) in so far as the foremost requirement for the realisation of Jain norms is restraint (negative politeness) in mind, speech and action. The norms of unequivocal and grammatically correct signification and transmission of information are fundamental for the Jain understanding of proper language use. The religious ideal of

correct, truthful and non-violent manner of speech is summarised in the following passage, already quoted above:

‘A monk or nun, putting aside wrath, pride, deceit, and greed, considering well, speaking with precision, what one has heard, not too quick, with discrimination, should employ language in moderation and restraint’ (Āyār 2.4.2.19).⁹¹

What is manifest in this statement is that the Jain maxims themselves address the necessity of avoiding the violence and the consequential *karmic* results of ‘flouting’ the rules of proper speech by means of off-record strategies. At the same time, negative politeness (especially conventional indirectness) is regarded as mandatory for maintaining the vows of non-violence and truth in language usage. Recommended speech-strategies are usually forms of negative politeness, such as conventional indirectness, impersonalisation or nominalisation.⁹² Impersonalisation by way of transforming directives and commissives into assertives, that is, a second-person performative perspective into a third-person observer’s perspective, is the preferred method; evidently, because in this way ‘illocutionary force switches over into the propositional content and thereby loses, if not its meaning, at least its force’ (HABERMAS 1993: 27).⁹³ For instance, one should not say ‘this should be done’, but ‘this is’. And one should not speak about forbidden subjects, such as business-choices etc., at all. One should not ask householders to do something, or ‘forecast’, or make promises to them (DVS₂ 7.46 f.; 51). Thus, although the Jain analysis of language usage is essentially pragmatist, its rules of proper speech are predicated on the denial of pragmatic intent in favour of propositional statements whose pragmatic implications are, if at all, to be worked out by the listener, in a Gricean fashion:

‘Guessing the teachers thought and the purport of his words, one should express one’s assent, and execute

(what he desires to be done). An excellent pupil needs no express directions, or he is (at least) quickly directed; he always carries out his duties as he is told’ (Utt 1.43 f.)

The running comparison between the theory of communicative action and Jain discourse ethics revealed significant similarities. Both approaches are rule-oriented, not goal oriented. That is, they are concerned with the general interest of many, not with the eudaemonic perspective of a single actor, despite the fact that the methods of universalisation are different. The respective ideals of consensus and non-violence leading to liberation mutually implicate each other. Basic non-violence is presupposed by communicative action, and the general interest of all is presupposed by universal non-violence. Though the criterion of generalisability, equal interest, is not theorized in Jain philosophy, and only touched upon with reference to specific negative rights such as the privileged case of the universal interest in avoiding pain,⁹⁴ the scope of the moral universe is extended from humanity to all living beings, whose essential spiritual equality is a fundamental principle of Jaina philosophy. The vanishing points of both theories, the ideal consensus of an infinite community of interpretation and the ideal omniscient observer, presuppose absolute knowledge and absolute consensus.

Yet, there are also significant differences. The main difference between the transcendental pragmatics of mutual recognition and the monadological Jain ethics of non-violence concerns the nature of the fundamental principles. The former is predicated on positive norms and the latter on norms of prohibition. The implicit method of universalisation of Jain ethics is the double negation, that is, the negation of non-generalisable statements. The resulting priority of physical non-action as a theoretical limiting case (not as a practical maxim) unburdens the doctrine of discussions of specific dilemmas of

norm application, thus safeguarding both generalisability and contextual determinateness, while maintaining a perspective of disengagement with the world and non-specific positive duties. The second main difference between the two types of discourse ethics concerns the moral division of labour presupposed by Jain norms of discourse, which privileges institutionally verified competent speakers or *āpta*. In contrast to universal pragmatics, Jain discourse ethics is not concerned with questions of human justice, only with individual negative freedom.

Footnotes

¹ The earliest formulations of this maxim in the Āgamas use the expression *musā-vāya veramaṇaṃ* (S. *mṛṣā-vāda viramaṇa*), cessation of telling lies. Like SCHUBRING (2000 § 171: 301), BRUHN (2003: 8) notes: ‘The concept of “truth” is not uniform. But there are several references to the *kaṣāya.s* as the root of undesirable speech’.

² This approach, which informs the following analysis, goes back to Peirce, Royce and Mead, and was further developed by APEL (1973) and HABERMAS (1980). The principal analytical question is not: What does it mean to understand an intention? But: What does it mean to understand a speech act? Universal pragmatics focuses not only on speech acts but on the normative presuppositions of ‘linguistically mediated interaction’ and on the social function of speech for the co-ordination of action. Building upon the work of analytical philosophers such as WITTGENSTEIN (1953), AUSTIN (1962), GRICE (1975), SEARLE (1969) and sociolinguists such as GUMPERZ (1964) and HYMES (1972), HABERMAS (1980) distinguishes three universal validity claims presupposed by every communicative action: ‘truth’, ‘rightness’ and ‘truthfulness’.

³ Āyāra 2.4.1.4: *aha bhikkhū jāṇejjā cattāri bhāsā-jāyāim, taṃ jahā—saccam egaṃ paḍhamam bhāsā-jāyam, biyam mosam, taiyam saccā-mosam, jaṃ ṇ’eva saccam ṇ’eva mosam ṇ’eva saccā-mosam—asaccā-mosam ṇāma taṃ cautthaṃ bhāsā-jāyam*. CAILLAT (1991: 8 n.4) located the following parallels to the above *sūtra* in the Śvetāmbara canon: Utt 24.20–23, Ṭhāṇa 4.23 (238), Viy 13.7.1a (621a-b), Pannavaṇā 11 (860–866). See also Viy 16.2.2b (701a), 18.7.1 (749a), 19.8 (770b), Samavāya 13.1, and DVS 7.1–3. OHIRA (1994: 14, 155) is of the opinion that the

four modes were first taught at the time of DVS 7, which she dates between 5th–4th century BcE.

⁴ In contrast to the debate on the use of the *catus-koṭi* in ‘Buddhist logic’, focusing largely on the ‘negative dialectic’ of Nāgārjuna, the cited Jain cases indicate that the *catus-koṭi* was used (at least by Jains) from early on as a scholastic frame for the discussion of logical alternatives, without specific doctrinal implications being connected with the frame itself. MURTI (1955: 129) noted early on: ‘Four alternative views are possible on any subject’. Notably, the four alternatives in Āyāra 2.4.1.4 etc., are disjunctive, not additive, as stereotypical representations of ‘Jaina Logic’ generally assume. Because Jain usage of *catus-koṭis* is ignored, and because of the almost exclusive focus on Nāgārjuna, Buddhist scholars compared the ‘four-cornered negation’ only with the ‘Jain relativism’ in general. They derived the *catus-koṭi* either speculatively from Jain *syād-vāda* (GUNARATNE 1980: 232) or vice versa (BAHM 1957: 128), or (and) contrasted it with ‘the relativistic logic proposed by the Jains, to which Buddhism was opposed’ (JAYATILLEKE 1967: 82). According to RAJU (1954), the mythical Sanjaya framed the four alternatives already in the 7th century BCE, negating all of them, whereas ‘Jaina logicians saw a relative truth in each pole and thus adopted a more positive and determinate attitude toward our cognitions of the world.’ For recent, less logocentric, views on Nāgārjuna, focusing on ‘skillful means’, see for instance JONES (1978), SCHROEDER (2000). A similar four-valued theory of truth was defended by the Megarians (PRIEST–ROUTLEY 1989: 13), which demonstrates that no specific philosophical position is associated with the form itself, only with its uses.

⁵ See DUNDAS (2007: 50 f.) on the analogy between four types of armies and four types of ascetics in Ṭhāṇa 292 (4.280–1). ALSDORF (1966: 186 f., cf. 190 f.) discussed a different type of *catur-bhaṅgas* in Jaina literature, made up of combinations of two positive and two negative possibilities. He pointed out that the use of the ‘fourfold combination’ is ‘very typical of the scholastic who never misses an opportunity to make a “caturbhaṅga”, i.e. the four possible combinations of two positive and two negative possibilities...’ (p. 186).

⁶ Ṭhāṇa 3.239 offers also a trilemma: (1) to state the truth (*tavvayaṇa* <*tadvacana*>), (2) to state the untruth (*tadaṇṇavayaṇa* <*tadanyavacana*>), (3) to state something meaningless or negative (*no-avayaṇa* <*no-avacana*>); Ṭhāṇa 7.129 a heptalemma: (1) speech (*ālāva* <*ālāpa*>), (2)

taciturnity (*aṅālāva* <*an-ālāpa*>), (3) flattery (*ullāva* <*ullāpa*>), (4) insult (*aṅ-ullāva* <*an-ullāpa*>), (5) dialogue (*saṃlāva* <*saṃlāpa*>), (6) prattle (*palāva* <*pralāpa*>), (7) contradiction (*vi-ppalāva* <*vi-pralāpa*>).

⁷ The differentiation between ‘the True (*sacca*) and the Wrong (*mosa*)’ was characterised as ‘primitive’ by SCHUBRING (2000 § 74: 157).

⁸ I do not give the original wording in all cases. In different words, the same teaching is expressed in DVS₁ 7.1–3, which may be the oldest text concerning this subject:

*cauṅhaṃ khalu bhāsāṇaṃ parisamkhāya pannavaṃ /
doṅhaṃ tu viṇayaṃ sikkhe, do na bhāsejja savvaso // 1 //*

*jā ya saccā avattavvā saccāmosā ya jā musā /
jā ya buddhehi ’nāinnā, na taṃ bhāsejja pannavaṃ // 2 //*

*a-sacca-mosaṃ saccaṃ ca aṇavajjam akakkasaṃ /
samuppeham asaṃdiddhaṃ girāṃ bhāsejja pannavaṃ // 3 //*

‘[1] Of the four kinds of speech, the thoughtful [monk] should, after consideration, learn the training in two, [but] should not use the other two ones at any occasion.

[2] That [form of speech] which is true, [but] not to be uttered, that which is halftrue, that which is [quite] untrue and which is not practised by the Jinās, the thoughtful monk should not use.

[3] [But] he should, after deliberation, use a speech not exposed to doubt, [a speech] which is neither true nor untrue and [a speech] which is true, provided that it is not to be blamed [and] rough’ (SCHUBRING 1932: 101).

See Āyāra 2.4.8–11 and cf. DVS 7.11, 7.2 for examples.

⁹ Cf. HABERMAS’ (1980: 419 ff.) / (1984–1987 I: 312 ff.) defence of his clear-cut distinction between claims to truth and claims to truthfulness.

¹⁰ Mookerjee, in TULSi (1985: 107): ‘Truthfulness is the revelation of truth. (Gloss) Truth means the straight-forwardness [rjutā] in deed (physical movement), intention and word, and non-discrepant behaviour. The revelation (disclosure) of that truth is called truthfulness.’ (Note) Here “truth”, as an ethical principle, is defined and explained. Umāsvāti

[*Tattvārtha-bhāṣya* 7.9], however has included revelation of ontological reality also as an aspect of truthfulness.’

¹¹ Ṭhāṇa 308 (4.349) gives the *nikṣepa* of *satya*: name, object, knowledge, knowledge and action according to truth. Ṭhāṇa 254 (4.102) distinguishes four types (aspects) of truth defined in terms of unequivocality or sincerity (*ujjuyayā* <*rjutā*>) of (1) gesture, (2) speech, (3) mind, (4) seamless combination of the three, with the intention not to deceive.

¹² See also Ṭhāṇa 10.89.

¹³ JACOBI (1895: 160) translated *bhāva-satyā* as ‘sincerity of the mind’, and *yoga-satyā* as ‘sincerity of acting’.

¹⁴ Māc 5.111: *jaṇa-vada sammada thavaṇā nāme rūve paḍucca-sacce ya sambhāvaṇa vavahāre bhāve opamma-sacce ya*.

¹⁵ According to AṅD 605, contextual interpretation (*aṅugama*) of the meaning of a *sutta* should progress in the following sequence: ‘Know that the characteristic features (of exposition) are sixfold, viz. (1) the (correct) utterance of the text (*saṃhitā*), (2) disjunction and parting (of words), (3) paraphrasing, (4) expounding of compound words, (5) anticipation of objections, and (8) establishment (of the correct meaning).’

¹⁶ Cf. Ṭhāṇa 4.349.

¹⁷ BHATT (1978: 14) emphasises that the *nikṣepa* in Paṇṇ 863 ‘has no execution in the canonical context.’ The material is therefore likely to belong to ‘post-canonical works from which it was taken before the canon acquired its present shape.’ He lists similar passages in the canon and the commentary literature (BHATT 1978: 157).

¹⁸ PaṇṇU 81: *jana-pada-satyaṃ nāma nānā-deśi-bhāṣā-rūpam apy avipratipattiyā yad ekārtha-pratyāyana-vyavahāra-samartham iti, yathôdakārthe koṃkaṇādiṣu payaḥ piccam niram udakam ity-ādi, aduṣṭa-vivakṣā-hetuvān nānā-jana-padeṣv iṣṭārtha-pratipatti-janakatvād vyavahāra-pravṛtteḥ satyam etad iti, evaṃ śeṣeṣv api bhāvanā kāryā. PaṇṇT₁ 257a.1: ity-ādi “jaṇa-vaya-saccā” iti taṃ taṃ jana-padam adhikṛtyeṣṭārtha-pratipatti-janakatayā vyavahāra-hetuvāt satyā jana-pada-satyā yathā koṅkāṇādiṣu payaḥ piccam ity-ādi.*

¹⁹ PaṇṇU 81: *sammata-satyaṃ nāma kumuda-kuvalayôtpala-tāmarasānāṃ samāne paṃkaja-sambhave gopālādīnāṃ sammataṃ*

araviṃdam eva paṃkajam iti.

²⁰ PaṇṇU 81: *sthāpanā-satyam nāma akṣara-mudrā-vinyāsādiṣu yathā māśako'yaṃ kārṣāpaṇo'yaṃ śatam idaṃ sahasram idaṃ iti.*

²¹ PaṇṇU 81: *nāma-satyam nāma kulama-varddhayann api kula-varddhana ity ucyate dhanam avarddhamāno 'pi dhana-varddhana ity ucyate, apakṣas tu pakṣa iti.*

²² PaṇṇU 81: *rūpa-satyam nāma tad-guṇasya tathā rūpa-dhāraṇam rūpa-satyam, yathā prapañcayateḥ pravrajita-rūpa-dhāraṇam iti.* PaṇṇT₁ 257a: *yathā dambhato gr̥hita-pravrajitarūpaṃ pravrajito 'yam iti.*

²³ OKUDA (1975: 127) translates *pratitya-satyā* as 'relative truth'.

²⁴ PaṇṇU 81: *pratitya-satyam nāma yathā anāmikāyā dirghatvaṃ hrasvatvaṃ cēti, tathā hi tasyānamta-pariṇāmasya dravyasya tat tat-sahakāri-kāraṇa-sannidhānena tat tad-rūpam abhivyajyata iti satyatā.* PaṇṇT₂ 257a uses the expression *pratitya-āsritya*, recourse to confirmation. PaṇṇV 11.17 gives the synonym *apekṣā*, consideration or regard.

²⁵ PaṇṇU 81: *vyavahāra-satyam nāma dahyate giriḥ galati bhājanam anudarā kanyā alomā eḍiketi, giri-gata-tṛṇādi-dāhe loke vyavahārah pravarttate, tathōdake ca galati sati, tathā saṃbhoga-jīva-prabhavōdarābhāve ca sati, lavana-yogyā-lomābhāve cēti.*

²⁶ PaṇṇU 81: *bhāva-satyam nāma śuklā balākā, saty api paṃca-varṇa-saṃbhāve.*

²⁷ PaṇṇU 81: *yoga-satyam nāma chattra-yogāc chattri daṇḍa-yogād daṇḍity evam ādi.*

²⁸ Cf. UPADHYAYA (1987: 105–7) on Hemacandra's examples of *upacāra*, secondary meaning of a word based on similarity.

²⁹ PaṇṇU 81: *upamayā satyam nāma samudravat taḍāgam.*

³⁰ The problem of the vagueness of the concept of 'heaps' is also addressed in the so-called sorites paradoxes attributed to Eubulides.

³¹ Ṭhāṇa 254 (4.102) distinguishes four types (aspects) of untruth defined in terms of equivocality or insincerity (*aṇujjuyatā <aṇjukatā>*) of (1) gesture, (2) speech, (3) mind, (4) contradictory combination of the three, with the intent to deceive.

³² According to Jain philosophy, cognitive and motivational factors are linked. See also HYMES (1972: 283) notion of communicative competence: 'The specification of ability for use as part of competence allows for the role of non-cognitive factors, such as motivation, as partly determining competence. In speaking of competence, it is especially important not to separate cognitive from affective and volitive factors, so far as the impact of the theory on educational practice is concerned; but also with regard to speech design and explanation.'

³³ Arguably, conditions such as anger and pride can also evoke (painfully) true statements.

³⁴ Viy 1.9.1 (95a).

³⁵ Following Haribhadra (PaṇṇU 82: *ākhyāyikā asaṃbhāvyābhīdhānam*) and Malayagiri (PaṇṇT₁ 258b.9: *ākhyāyikā-niḥsr̥tā yat-kathāsv-asaṃbhāvyābhīdhānam*), *akkhāiya <ākhyāyika>* is usually understood as a narrative (*kathā*) of something non-existing or impossible, based on mere 'legend' or hearsay. See RATNACANDRA (1988 I: 59), and GHATAGE (1996 I: 64). This betrays the spirit of realism of Jain philosophy. Though, *kathā* may also refer to 'talk', 'discussion' or 'disputation'. Potentially negative consequences of knowledge based on mere hearsay are explained in Viy 9.31(430a–438a). Ṭhāṇa 7.80 lists seven types of gossip (*vi-kahā <vi-kathā>*).

³⁶ *Uvaghāya / uvagghāya <upaghāta>* is explained by Malayagiri (PaṇṇT₁ 258b.10) through the example *cauras tvam* ('you are a thief'), understood here as *abhyākhyāna*—false and groundless accusation. The term *upaghāta* generally designates an act of violence, but here more specifically an insult. See also Āyāra 2.4.8 for this and similar examples of 'sinful speech'.

³⁷ Ṭhāṇa 6.100 lists six types of unwholesome speech. Ṭhāṇa 6.101 lists six types of false accusations, related to the context of enumeration (*pathārā <prastāra>*) in confession.

³⁸ See for instance NYAYAVIJAYA (1998: 343–5).

³⁹ On combinations of truth and untruth in behaviour (*vyavahāra*), intent (*pariṇata*), belief (*dr̥ṣṭi*) etc., for instance in succession, theorised in terms of character types, see Ṭhāṇa 241 (4.35–44). See CAILLAT (1965/1975: 80) on types of duplicity to be avoided.

⁴⁰ DSV 7.4–5:

evam ca atthamanam va jam tu nannei sasavam /
sa bhāsam sacca-mosam pi tam pi dhiro vivajjāe // 4 //
vītham pi tahamottim jam giram bhāse naro /
tamhā so piṭṭho pāveṇam, kim puṇa jo musam vae // 5 //

⁴¹ See also Thāna 10.91.

⁴² PaṇṇU 82: saccā-mosā dāsa-vīhā uppaṇṇa-misaga-vīgata-misagādi,
uddissa gāman va nagaram va dāsaṇham dāra-gāṇam jammam
paḡasamītassa tṇesu ahiesu va evam ādi uppanna-missiyā. PaṇṇṬ, 258a:
“uppaṇṇa-missiyā” ity-ādi, utpannā mīṣṛitā anuppannāḥ saha saṅkhyā-
pūraṇārtham yatra sā utpanna-mīṣṛitā, evam anyatrāpi yathā yogam
bhāvanyam, tatpāpanna-mīṣṛitā yathā kasmimścīt grāme nagare va tṇesv
adhikesu va dāraikesu jātesu dāśa dārakā asmim adya jātā ity-ādi.

⁴³ PaṇṇU 82: em eva maraṇa-kahane vīgaya-missiyā. PaṇṇṬ, 258b:
evam eva maraṇa-kahane vīgata-mīṣṛitā.

⁴⁴ PaṇṇU 82: jammaṇassa maraṇassa ya kaya-pariṇāmassa ubhaya-
kahane viṣamvādane uppaṇṇa-vīgata-mīṣṛitā. PaṇṇṬ, 258b: tathā jammato
maraṇasya ca kṛta-pariṇāmasyābhīdhāne viṣamvādena cōppanna-vīgata-
mīṣṛitā.

⁴⁵ PaṇṇU 82: jivanti-mayāga-saṅkhaṇagādi-rāsi-darisaṇe aho
maham jiva-rāsi ti bhāṇamītassa jivantesu saccā maasu mosa ti jiva-
missiā, ettha ceva bahusu matesu aho mahamto jiva-rāsi ti bhāṇamītassa
maesu saccā jivantesu musā itī gīva-missiyā, saccām mayam amayam va
ubhayam ṇiyameṇa avadhāṇāyamtassa viṣamvāde jivājīva-missiyā. PaṇṇṬ,
258b: [4] tathā prabhūṭānām jivatām stokānām ca mṛtānām śāṅkha-
śāṅkhanakādhām ekatra rāśau dṛṣṭe yadā kaścid evam vadati—aho maham
jiva-rāśīr ayaṃ itī tadā sā jiva-mīṣṛitā, satyā-mṣāivam cāśyā jivatu
satyatvāi mṛtesu mṣāivāi, [5] tathā yadā prabhūtesu mṛtesu stokeṣu jivatu
ekatra rāśī-kṛtesu śāṅkhādīsv evam vadati—aho mahānāyam mṛto jiva-
rāśīr itī tadā sā gīva-mīṣṛitā, asyā api satyā-mṣāivam mṛtesu satyatvāt
jivatu mṣāivāt, [6] tathā tasmim eva rāśau etāvanto 'tra jivanta etāvanto
'tra mṛta itī ṇiyamenāvadhārayato viṣamvāde jivājīva-mīṣṛitā.

⁴⁶ See LEUMANN'S (1885) article on the seven early schisms
(mīṇhava).

⁴⁷ PaṇṇU 82: mūlakādi aṇanta-kāyam tasseeva paḡirīkkaya-paṇḡum-
pattehim aṇṇeṇa va vaṇassaikkāeṇa missam dāṭṭhūna eṣa aṇanta-kāyōtī
bhāṇamītassa aṇanta-missiyā. PaṇṇṬ, 259a: tathā mūlakādikam ananta-

kāyam tasyāiva satkaiḥ paripaṇḡu-patṭair anyena va kenacī-
pratyekavanaspatīnā mīṣṛam avalokya sarvo 'py eṣo 'nanta-kāyika itī
vadato 'nanta-mīṣṛitā. Cf. GHATAGE (1996 I: 227). On the ananta-kāyas
see WILLIAMS (1983: 113–6).

⁴⁸ PaṇṇU 82: tam eva samudayam karamette saritāṇam amīṇāṇam
rāsi-kāyam paritam itī bhāṇamītassa parita-missiyā. PaṇṇṬ, 259a: tathā
pratyeka-vanaspati-saṅghātam ananta-kāyīkena saha rāsi-kṛtam avalokya
pratyeka-vanaspatir ayaṃ sarvo 'pīti vadataḥ pratyeka-mīṣṛitā.

⁴⁹ See MALVANĪYĀ (1971: 271, 430). Thāna 10.66 lists ten
meanings of the word *ananta*.

⁵⁰ This characterisation cannot be related to the difference between
experienced or conventional time (*saṃaya*) and imperceptible abstract
time (*addhā*) explained in Vīy 11.11.1 (532b) (DELEU 1970: 178), because
in this case the speech act would be neither-true-nor-false. As the
authoritative work of Jain scholastic hermeneutics, the *Aṇugaddāṭṭim*
shows, Jains are careful to distinguish semantic ambiguity from
philosophical perspectivism (*anekānta-vāda*, *syād-vāda*, *niṣepa*, *mayā*
etc.), which is seen as an analytic instrument for disambiguation: ‘Whereas
in the fallacy of *chhal* (fraud), one word has two meanings, no word in
this argument [of *syād-vādaj*] is of such nature. ... To declare the existence
of an object from one point of view and to declare its non-existence from
another point of view, is not to indulge in a *pum*, and thus to be guilty
of this fallacy’ (KANNOOMAL 1917: 16). Cf. C. R. JAIN (1929: 8, 16–
18), GANERI (2001: 133). It should be noted that similes and analogies
are considered to be media of disambiguation and not conveyors of
mixed truth and untruth. Obviously, they can play both roles. On *chala*,
features of ‘god’, ‘bad debates’ etc., especially in the *Nyāya-sūtra*, see
MATILAL (1999, Chapters 2–3).

⁵¹ RATNACANDRA (1988 I: 270 f., 268), GHATAGE (2001 II: 454,
461).

⁵² PaṇṇU 82: addhā kaḷo so divaso ratti vā, jo tam-missiyam kareṇi,
param turiyāveṇto divasato bhāṇati-utthēhi ratti jāyati, eṣā addhā-missiyā,
tasseeva divasassa rāte va ega-padeso addhāddhā, tam paḡḡama-porīsi-
kāle taheva turiyamto majjhaṇḡi-bhūtam bhāṇatassa addhāddha-missiyā.

PaṇṇṬ, 259a: [9] tathā addhā—kālah, sa eḡha prastāvāt divaso rāṭṭir vā
pariḡḡvate, sa mīṣṛito yayā sādhdhā-mīṣṛitā, yathā kaścī kaṇāna tvarayam
divase varttamāna eva vadati—uttīṣṭha rāṭṭir yāḡēti, rāṭṭrau vā
varttamānāyām uttīṣṭhōḡgataḥ sūrya itī, [10] tathā divasasya rāṭṭrer vā

ekadeśo 'ddhāddhā sā miśritā yayā sā addhāddhā-miśritā, yathā prathamapauruṣyām eva varttamānāyām kaścit kañcana tvarayan evaṃ vadati—cala madhyāhni-bhūtaṃ iti.

⁵³ HABERMAS (1981: 97–117) / (1984–1987 II: 62–76), and others, showed that semantic content of normative sentences can be transformed into propositional sentences while the reverse is not always possible.

⁵⁴ DVS 7.6–10:

*tamhā gacchāmo, vakkhāmo, amugaṃ vā ñe bhavissai /
ahaṃ vā ñaṃ karissāmi, eso vā ñaṃ karissai // 6 //
evamāi u jā bhāsā esa-kālammi sañkiyā /
sappayāiyam aṭṭhe vā taṃ pi dhiro vivajjāe // 7 //
aiyammi ya kālammi paccuppannam aṇāgae /
jamaṭṭhaṃ tu na jāñejjā “evameyaṃ” ti no vae // 8 //
aiyammi ya kālammi paccuppannam aṇāgae /
jattha sañkā bhava taṃ tu “evameyaṃ” ti no vae // 9 //
aiyammi ya kālammi paccuppannam aṇāgae /
nissañkiyaṃ bhava jaṃ tu “evameyaṃ” ti niddise // 10 //*

⁵⁵ See the mixed true-false utterance ‘The god of the sky’ (Āyāra 2.4.1.12–13) and similar examples of mislabelling discussed **in footnote 293**.

⁵⁶ In symbolic logic such problems are discussed under the labels such as ‘no-item thesis’, ‘misleading form thesis’, ‘truth value gap thesis’, and ‘new truth-value thesis’ (HAACK 1974: 47 ff.). According to PRIEST (1987 / 2006) the single rationale underlying the theory of different types of truth value gaps, derived from the correspondence theory of truth, is that ‘for certain sentences, a there is no Fact which makes a true, neither is there a Fact which makes ¬a true’, which are to be distinguished from *dialetheia*, or true contradictions such that both statement A and its negation, ¬A, are true. In his view, the argument fails, because ‘if there is no Fact which makes a true, there is a Fact which makes ¬a true, viz. the Fact that there is no Fact which makes a true’ (ib., p. 54).

⁵⁷ See for instance BALBIR (1987: 9) and DUNDAS (1996: 62).

⁵⁸ PRIEST–ROUTLEY (1983: 14) cite Stoic and other authors from Greek antiquity defending this view.

⁵⁹ ‘In this respect the Jains anticipate contemporary discursive logic, initiated by Jaśkowski, and they may similarly be interpreted in

terms of integration of different worlds, or positions, reflecting partial truth ... Naturally such a theory risks trivialisation unless some (cogent) restrictions are imposed on the parties admitted as having obtained partial truth—restrictions of a type that might well be applied to block amalgamation leading to violations of Non-Contradiction.

Unlike the Jains, the Mādhyamikas apparently affirmed the law of Contradiction. But this does not prevent a certain unity of opposites, e.g. in the negative dialectic of Nāgārjuna, a concept, such as Being, can become indistinguishable from its opposite, Non-Being’ (PRIEST–ROUTLEY 1983: 17).

⁶⁰ STCHERBATSKEY (1958: 415), cited in PRIEST–ROUTLEY (1989: 16).

⁶¹ LALWANI’s (1985 IV: 133 f.) rendition of Vii 10.3.34 reads as follows: ‘[Gautama speaks] *Bhante!* There are twelve forms of language—address, order, prayer, question, advice, refusal, consent, enquiry, conviction, confusion, distinct and indistinct. Now, when one says, I shall take lodge, I shall lie, I shall stand, I shall sit, I shall stretch, do these forms conform to the fifth type viz. advice, and it is correct to say that they are never false?—[Mahāvira answers] Yes Gautama! They conform to the fifth type and they are never false.’

⁶² On articulated (*akkhara-suya*) evidence, composed of written and oral sources see SCHUBRING (2000: § 74).

⁶³ Āyāra 2.4.1.4 n., 2.4.1.7.

⁶⁴ AUSTIN (1962) distinguishes between implicit and explicit, self-verifying, performatives. An ‘explicit performative sentence’, such as taking a vow, ‘indicates that the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action—it is not normally thought of as just saying something’ (ib., pp. 6 f.)—this would be a ‘descriptive fallacy’ (ib., p. 3). ‘None of the utterances cited is either true or false’ (ib.). ‘It is essential to realize that “true” and “false”, like “free” and “unfree”, do not stand for anything simple at all; but only for a general dimension of being a right or proper thing to say as opposed to a wrong thing, in these circumstances, to this audience, for these purposes and with these intentions. ... This doctrine is quite different from much that the pragmatists have said, to the effect that the true is what works, &c. The truth or falsity of a statement depends not merely on the meanings of words but on what act you were performing in what circumstances’ (ib., p. 144). The problem of

determining truth-values of performative utterances has been discussed, for example, by FAUCONNIER (1981: 182).

⁶⁵ Ṭhāṇa 6.111 lists six types of question-contexts, not all of which can be categorised as neither-true-nor-false; e.g. *vuggaha-paṭṭha* <*vyudgraha-praśna*>, questioning an opponent.

⁶⁶ On ambiguities created by the use of the future tense see also FAUCONNIER (1981: 180 f.), and others.

⁶⁷ HAACK (1974: 58 f., 73–90) criticises the ‘modal fallacy’ in Aristotle’s argument on future contingents, but accepts it as valid if interpreted as a truth value gap theory.

⁶⁸ See further STRAWSON (1950) and the ensuing debate, on which see also HORN (1985), (2001: 362 ff.), and others.

⁶⁹ Muni Nathmal (Ācārya Mahāprajña) characterized *asatyā-mṛṣā* language as *vyavahāra-bhāṣā*, or conventional or common speech (Ṭhāṇa 4.23, Hindi commentary).

⁷⁰ PaṇṇU 82 f.: “*āmantaṇi*” *ity-ādi*, *he deva iti āmantaṇi*, *eṣā kilāpravarttaka-nivarttakatvāt satyādi bhāṣā-traya-lakṣaṇa-viyogataś cāsatyāmṛṣēti*, *evaṃ sva-buddhayā anyatrāpi bhāvanā kāryēti*, *kajje parassa pavattaṇaṃ jahā imaṃ karehitti āṇavaṇi*, *katthai vatthu-visesassa dehitti maggaṇaṃ jāyaṇi*, *avinṇāyassa saṃdiddhassa vā atthassa jāṇaṇatthaṃ tad-abhijutta-codaṇaṃ pucchaṇi*, *viṇiyassa uvaeso jahā—pāṇavahāu ṇiyattā havati dihhūyā arogā ya emādi paṇṇavaṇi paṇṇattā viyarāgehiṃ*. PaṇṇṬ₁ 258b: “*āmantaṇi*” *iti tatra āmantraṇi he devadatta ity-ādi*, *eṣā hi prāg-ukta-satyādi-bhāṣā-traya-lakṣaṇa-vikalatvān na satyā nāpi mṛṣā nāpi satyā-mṛṣā kevalaṃ vyavahāra-mātra-pravṛtti-hetur ity asatyā-mṛṣā*.

⁷¹ PaṇṇṬ₁ 259a: *abhigṛhitā prati-niyatārthādvadhāraṇaṃ*, *yathā idam idāniṃ kartavyam idam nēti*.

⁷² PaṇṇṬ₁ 259a: *anabhiḡrahā yatra na prati-niyatārthādvadhāraṇaṃ*, *yathā bahukāryeṣv avasthiteṣu kaścit kañcana pṛcchati—kim idāniṃ karomi?*, *sa prāha—yat pratibhāṣate tat kurv iti*.

⁷³ DELEU (1970: 241).

⁷⁴ Jambūvijaya’s edition of the Ṭhāṇa 4.23 (238) contains the following commentary of Jinabhadra’s *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣā* (VāBh) 376–7: *aṇahigaya jā tisu vi saddo cciya kevalo asacca-musa*.

⁷⁵ PaṇṇṬ₁ 259a: *saṃśaya-karaṇi yā vāk anekārthābhīdhāyitayā parasya saṃśayam utpādayati*, *yathā saindhavamāniyatām ity atra saindhava-śabdo lavaṇa-vastra-puruṣa-vājiṣu*. SCHUBRING (2000 § 74: 157 f.): ‘All animals with two to four senses and beings with five senses express themselves in the neither true nor wrong way, but the latter will employ the first three modes just as well (Pannav. 260a) provided they have learnt to do so or carry along with them a higher ability.’

⁷⁶ PaṇṇṬ₁ 259a: *vyākṛtā yā prakāṭārthā*.

⁷⁷ PaṇṇṬ₁ 259a: *avyākṛtā atigambhira-śabdārthā avyaktākṣara-prayuktā vā avibhāvitārthātvāt*.

⁷⁸ The Pāli equivalents of *pannavāṇā* and *pannatta* are *paññāpana*, *paññatta* (MĀLVANIYĀ 1971: 212). The word *pannatti* <*prajñapti*>, teaching, information, instruction, is frequently used in the canon, for instance at Viy 2.1.90, or Viy 16.6 (709b) where the verbs *pannaveti parūveti* <*prajñāpayati prarūpayati*> are used in to describe Mahāvira’s preaching activity. Hence, his teachings are called *pannavāṇā* <*prajñāpana*>, exposition, or *parūvaṇa* <*prarūpana*>, explanation (AGD 51, MĀLVANIYĀ 1971: 210). The ‘proclamations’ (*Kundmachung*) or preachings of the unattached ones are also called *niggantha pāvayaṇa* / *pāvayaṇa* <*nirgrantha pravacana*> in Viy 2.5.5 (134b), 20.8.5 (792b) and Ṭhāṇa 176a. See SCHUBRING 2000 § 37: 73).

⁷⁹ DELEU (1970: 169) writes: ‘*āsaissāmo* is *āśayiṣyāmaḥ*, not, as Abhay. says, *āśrayiṣyāmaḥ*.’ According to the rules of speech in Āyāra 2.4.1.5 and DVS 7.8–10 one should avoid such a statement if one cannot be entirely sure.

⁸⁰ PaṇṇṬ 249b: *yathāvasthitārthābhīdhānād iyaṃ prajñāpani*, in MĀLVANIYĀ (1971: 211, cf. 346).

⁸¹ Contrary to MĀLVANIYĀ’s (1971: 211) view that *asatyā-mṛṣā* speech ‘has nothing to do with norm’ it is obvious that by referring to situations that ought to be both imperatives, commissives (vows), and declaratives imply normative conditions, even if used by an enlightened being. Only assertives attempt to represent situations as they are. Searle showed that from the hearer’s perspective even literal speech implies a contextual horizon to be intelligible (HABERMAS 1980: 452) / (1984–1987 I: 337). According to Paṇṇ 246b, *asatyā-mṛṣā* speech signifies not only *ohāraṇi* <*avadhāraṇi*> or determinative expressions such as ‘I believe’ or ‘I think’, but all attempts to communicate transcendental truth through

descriptive (*prajñāpani*) speech, which is assumed to be context-free and thus by definition neither-true-nor-false (*satyā-mṛṣā*). The Paṇṇ accounts for the use of certain classificatory terms and words which express universals (e.g. masculine, feminine, neuter) without clearly specifying their contextual range of meaning. Imperatives such as ‘go ahead’ belong to this category too. For instance, we may ‘order a person of any gender and this person may or may not carry out orders. ... This *ājñāpani* (imperative) speech too could not be held as false. It should be regarded as a case of *prajñāpani* speech’ (MĀLVANIYĀ 1971: 326).

⁸² Paṇṇṭ, 249b:

*pāṇivahāu niyattā havamti dihāuyā arogā ya /
emāi paṇṇattā paṇṇavaṇi vīyarāgehiṃ //*

⁸³ Utt 28.16 ff. lists amongst the ten sources of right insight (*samyag-darśana*) communications such as *upadeśa*, instruction, *ājñā*, command, *bija*, seed (suggestion), as well as *abhigama*, comprehension of the sacred scriptures, and *vistāra*, complete course of study (including proofs, *pramāṇa*, and perspectives, *naya*): *nisagguvaesa-rui, āṇā-rui sutta-bīya-rui-meva / abhigama-vitthāra-rui, kiriyā-saṃkheva-dhamma-rui //* .

⁸⁴ Cf. MURTI (1955: 129) on transcendental language which expresses truth which is beyond language; and GANERI (2002: 271) on the non-assertible (inexpressible) in classical Jain seven-valued logic (*sapta-bhaṅgi*), which may be conceptually related to incomprehensible speech.

⁸⁵ This example could be interpreted as an early version of the ‘misleading form thesis’ addressed by RUSSELL (1905) and others. See HAACK (1974: 53–55). By contrast, the example ‘Devadatta, give me the cow’, mentioned by GLASENAPP (1915: 46), is neither-true-nor-untrue as a simple performative.

⁸⁶ Cf. SCHUBRING (2000 § 74: 158), MĀLVANIYĀ (1971: 325 f.).

⁸⁷ Cf. CAILLAT (1965/1975: 80), QVARNSTRÖM (2002: 41 n. 4).

⁸⁸ For discussion of the ethical implications of this dilemma, for instance in terms of appropriateness, see for instance GERT (1973), HARE (1981), WELLMER (1986: 26 ff.), and HABERMAS (1991: 170).

⁸⁹ GANERI (2002: 277) shows that the *sapta-bhaṅgi* is also ‘not strictly truth-functional’, but suggests a solution to this problem.

⁹⁰ Interestingly, some *ślokas* are similar to the last of GRICE’s quality maxims: ‘Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence’, which invokes questions of referential truth and of the relationship between representational and expressive functions of language. The definition of the concepts of truth and falsehood, or of aspects thereof, is a notoriously difficult problem for modern science and philosophy, whose discourse is constituted by this fundamental distinction according to FOUCAULT (1981) and LUHMANN (1990). It is therefore interesting to see how the Jains tackle this issue, which is one of their foremost concerns. There is a note by LALWANI added to DVS 24.12 which identifies three types of falsehood: ‘(i) to deny what is, (ii) to establish what is not, and (iii) to alter the meaning’. They can be illustrated by the following examples:

- (i) Jainism propagates epistemic realism. Hence, it is not surprising that there are explicit statements defending the ideal of objective truth in the scriptures, as opposed to mere appearance, opinion, or consensus. The following passage stresses the necessity for ascetics to use their faculty of judgement to discover the truth of a given phenomenon, and not to be deceived by false appearances: ‘Employing their judgment, they should know something for certain and something for uncertain: (1) Having received food or not having received food, having eaten it or not having eaten it, has come or has not come, comes or does not come, will come or will nor come’ (Āyāra 2.4.1.1–2). This orientation toward the world, predicated on a realistic analysis of the modalities of time, is diametrically opposed to Brāhmaṇism and Vedāntic concepts such as *māyā* etc. This is evident in the following passage, which implicitly criticises the confusion of natural phenomena with illusory imagery of divine agency: ‘A monk should not say: “The god of the sky! the god of the thunderstorm! the god of lightning! the god who begins to rain! the god who ceases to rain! may rain fall or may it not fall! may the crops grow or may they not grow! may the night wane or may it not wane! may the sun rise or may it not rise! may the king conquer or may he not conquer!” They should not use such speech. ... But knowing the nature of things, he should say: “the air; the follower of Guhya; a cloud has gathered or come down; the

cloud has rained” (Āyāra 2.4.1.12–13).

- (ii) False appearance and deception should be avoided by all means: ‘A *muni* speaks of appearance, ignoring the truth, encounters a sin. Then what to speak of one who indulges in whole untruth [Note by LALWANI: When a woman is dressed as a man and if she be called a man, it is a falsehood, though in her dress she appears like a man ...].’ (DVS₂ 7.5, cf. Āyāra 2.4.1.3). Ways of ‘establishing what is not’, such as vague promises and speculation, are also seen indiscriminate or deceptive utterances, because of the confusion of past, present, and future. Language which may create doubt (‘maybe or not’) has to be avoided by all means: ‘When one knows not true implication, in the context of the present, past, and future, says not one, “surely it’s like this”. When one is in doubt about implication, in the context of the present, past and future, says not one, “surely it’s like this”. “Surely it’s so”,—says one when one has not an iota of doubt of implication about the present, the past and future’ (DVS₂ 7.8–10, cf. DVS₂ 7.6–7, Āyāra 2.4.1.5). It is remarkable, that early Jainism already insists on the correct use of temporal modalities, which must be related to the philosophy of transmigration, but also with the critique of the Brāhmaṇic sacred-word theory: ‘speech exists only the moment when being spoken’ (SCHUBRING § 68 2000: 149). The practical value of all the cited examples is the same: reducing illusory appearances to their ‘real’ content.
- (iii) There are no further maxims concerning ‘changing the meaning’ in the texts on the ways of speaking. Effectively, however, Jain narrative literature is based on a method of ‘changing the meaning’ of Indian folklore (HERTEL 1922). The combined systematicity and context-sensitivity of Jain rules and regulations is particularly obvious in the following statement of the Digambara author Vasunandin’s (1100 CE) *Śrāvākācāra* 209, which propagates not only the ‘abstention from untruth spoken out of passion or hate’ but ‘from truth too, if it provokes the destruction of a living being’ (cited in WILLIAMS 1983: 78). This and similar examples illustrate how the hierarchically superior principle of *ahimsā* supersedes the maxim of truthfulness in cases of rule-

contradiction. Cf. MĀLVANIYĀ (1971: 325) on the role of the (situational) conditions of truthfulness in the *Pannavaṇā*.

⁹¹ Conversely: ‘[1.] The monks and nuns may not use the following six forbidden forms of speech: lying, sneering, insult, coarse speaking, worldly speech, or speech renewing atoned matters. 2. There are six cases of idle talk about right conduct: of speaking rashly in relation to others, of damaging living creatures, of untruthfulness, of forbidden appropriation, of a jade, a eunuch, or a slave. Whoever uses those six kinds of idle talk, without being able to prove them fully, ranks as one who has committed the transgression himself’ (KS 6.1).

⁹² Cf. BROWN–LEVINSON (1978: 134 ff.). In Paṇṇṭ folio 259 B cited by MĀLVANIYĀ (1971: 212) the positive karmic consequences of not killing are expressed in this way; avoiding commandments of the form ‘do not kill’ for example by saying: ‘Those who refrain from killing living beings live long and enjoy good health (in the next birth).’

⁹³ See also AUSTIN (1962: 4) on disguising a performative utterance as a descriptive or constative statement.

⁹⁴ Cf. GERT’s (1973) ‘minimal ethic’.

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Dept. of the Studies of Religions
SOAS University of LONDON
Thornhough Street, Russell Square
LONDON WC1H0XG